UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-30783

(Summary Calendar)

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CHARLES E. LEWIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BRUCE N. LYNN; ET AL.,

Defendants

BUDDY BRYON; L. LEMOINE

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge

January 11, 2001

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Charles Lewis, an inmate at Louisiana State Penitentiary, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against

various prison officials, alleging that he had been required to perform certain field work despite his1 Lewis’ complaint refers to Bryan Budde as “Buddy Bryon”.

-2- asthma ailment. He appeals the district court’s denial of his motions for default judgment and for the

appointment of legal counsel. We affirm.

On three different occasions in 1991, Lewis had been ordered to perform hoe work on a dusty

road, to assist digging a ditch, and to h elp other inmates spread dirt. He complained to prison

o fficials that he could not perform such work because of his asthma. Lewis had earlier received a

limit ed duty status because of this ailment. Upon receiving Lewis’ complaints, the prison officials

contacted the medical staff at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, which informed them that the assigned

work did not violate Lewis’ medical duty status. The prison officials told Lewis to resume his work

and to seek further medical attention if warranted.

Lewis filed a § 1983 lawsuit against various prison officials, alleging that they had violated

his Eighth Amendment right by forcing him to perform these task s. All of the prison

o fficials )) except Bryan Budde a nd Leonard Lemoine, both of whom no longer worked at the

Louisiana State Penitentiary )) answered Lewis’ complaint and filed a summary judgment motion. 1

The court granted the summary judgment motion in favor of the defendants. Lewis then sought a

default judgment against Budde and Lemoine. Adopting the magistrate judge’s finding, the district

court refused to enter a default judgment because it held that Lewis’ allegations, even if found true,

were insufficient to establish § 1983 liabilit y. Additionally, the district court s ua sponte determined

that the summary judgment granted to the appearing defendants accrued to the benefit of Lemoine

and Budde. The co urt also denied Lewis’ request for an appointment of counsel. Lewis appeals

these decisions.

We review a denial of a default judgment for abuse of discretion. See Mason v. Lister

, 562-3-

F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he entry of default judgment is committed to the discretion of the

district judge.”) The district court did not err in refusing to enter a default judgment in favor of

Lewis. The Fifth Circuit has held that a “party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of

right, even where the defendant is technically in default.” Ganther v. Ingle , 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th

Cir. 1996). In fact, “[d]efault judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and

resorted to by

co urt s only in extreme situations.” S un Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead and

Savings Ass’n. , 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989).

The district court refused to ent er a default judgment because it held that Lewis’ factual

allegations, even if found true, could not impose liabilit y against Lemoine and Budde. Cf. Black v.

Lane

, 22 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The entry of a default order does not...preclude a party

from challenging the sufficiency of the complaint.”) An inmate pursuing a constitutional claim needs

to show that prison o ffic ials demo nstrated “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”

Farmer v. Brennan

, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) (holding that a prisoner’s Eight

Amendment right was not violated unless prison o fficials knowingly ignored the risks to health). In

this case, Lewis has not pleaded that prison o fficials knowingly exposed him to health or safety risks.

In fact, Lewis conceded in his complaint that prison o fficials told him to continue working only after

consulting with the prison hospital staff, which informed them that Lewis was capable of such tasks.

W e cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a default

judgment.

Furthermore, we hold that the district co u rt did not err in allowing Lemoine and Budde to

benefit from the appearing defendants’ favorable summary judgment motion. Several courts have

held that where “a defending party establishes that plai nt iff has no cause of action...this defense-4-

generally inures also to the benefit of a defaulting defendant.” U nited States v. Peerless Ins. Co.

, 374

F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted); see also Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elec.

Importers, Inc.

, 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984); Davis v. National Mortgage Corp.

, 349 F.3d

175, 178 (2nd Cir. 1965); Bastien v. R. Row land & Co.

, 631 F.Supp. 1554, 1561 (E.D. Mo. 1986).

We agree with these other courts and accordingly adopt their holding. The policy rationale for this

rule is that it would be “incongruous” and “unfair” to allow so me defendants to prevail, while not

providing the same benefit to similarly situated defendants. See Gulf Coast , 740 F.2d at 1512.

Finally, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’ request

for counsel in his § 1983 suit. S ee Ulmer v. Chancellor

, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A civil

rights complainant has no right to the auto matic appointment of counsel...unless the case presents

exceptional circumstances.”) The district co urt ado pted the magistrate judge’s finding that no

exceptional circumstances existed because the claims were not factually or legally complex, and Lewis

had earlier adequately represented himself without the aid of counsel. We see no reason to disturb

that finding because Lewis has not stated any exceptional circumstances warranting a counsel here.

Cf. Yohey v. Collins

, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Although we liberally construe the briefs

of pro se appellants, we also require that argument s must be brief to be preserved”) (citations

omitted).

AFFIRMED.