Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed June 26, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-2019

Lower Tribunal No. F19-14549

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The State of Florida,

Appellant,

vs.

Stephen F. Myers,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton 

Hirsch, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant.

Rothman & Associates, P.A., and David B. Rothman and Jeanne T. 

Melendez; The Bedell Firm, and Brian T. Coughlin (Jacksonville), for 

appellee.

Before SCALES, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ. 

BOKOR, J.
2

The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s grant of Stephen Myers’ 

motion to suppress incriminating statements relating to a second-degree 

murder charge based on a claimed Miranda1 violation. The trial court found 

that the statements, which occurred during a police interrogation, were 

improperly elicited by continued questioning after Myers requested a lawyer. 

Because the record does not support the trial court’s finding that Myers’ 

request for a lawyer was clear and unequivocal, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts are undisputed. Myers was arrested on suspicion 

of murder and taken into police custody. After being taken to an interview 

room and instructed to read his Miranda rights from a form and confirm that 

he understood them, Myers (who, at that point, was visibly upset and crying) 

mumbled, “I think I should have a lawyer.” The officer responded by 

explaining that “you’re going to want to explain some things” and that “you 

can start speaking. If at any point you think we’re being mean to you or 

anything like that, then you can just tell us you don’t want to talk to us 

anymore, okay?” Myers then asked, “[i]f I want a lawyer later on, can I get 

one?” and the officer answered in the affirmative. Myers then agreed to waive

his Miranda rights and signed the written waiver. The officers proceeded to 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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question Myers for over 45 minutes, during which he made various 

incriminating statements and did not attempt to invoke his Miranda rights or 

cease questioning.

Myers later moved to suppress all statements or confessions made to 

police during the interview, arguing that his “I think I should have a lawyer” 

statement invoked his right to counsel and that questioning should have 

ceased at that point. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, finding 

that accounting for his general tone and demeanor, Myers expressed himself 

“clearly enough” to invoke his right to counsel under the circumstances, so

any answers he gave after that point were inadmissible. This appeal 

followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

“Suppression issues are extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the 

gamut from (1) pure questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law and fact, 

to (3) pure questions of law.” State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 

2001). When reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, we typically defer

to the trial court’s findings of fact where they are supported by competent 

substantial evidence. Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002) (“As 

has often been stated, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes 

to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the 
4

reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and 

deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the 

trial court's ruling.”). However, “this deference to the trial court's findings of 

fact does not fully apply when the findings are based on evidence other than 

live testimony.” Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 279 (Fla. 2004) (reviewing 

voluntariness of waiver of Miranda rights); see also Black v. State, 59 So. 3d 

340, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[W]e review the trial court's findings that are 

based on hearing each detective's live testimony under the ordinary 

‘competent and substantial evidence’ standard. However, to the extent that 

the trial court's findings are based on viewing the interrogation DVD, which 

this court of course has also viewed, we utilize a much less deferential 

standard.”); State v. Thornton, 286 So. 3d 924, 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) 

(same). Thus, to the extent the trial court was required to make factual 

findings on disputed issues, we apply this less deferential standard with 

respect to the issue of whether the trial court correctly found that Myers 

invoked his Miranda rights during the interrogation.

More importantly though, here, the main issue before the trial court 

wasn’t a factual determination, credibility determination, weighing of the 

evidence, or the like. Instead, the trial court was asked to determine whether 

a statement made during a recorded interrogation constituted an 
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unequivocal request invoking the right to counsel. Therefore, the trial court 

was asked to perform a legal function, not a fact-finding function, and apply 

the law to the facts as presented on the video interrogation. For “application 

of law to those facts” we entertain a de novo review. State v. Pitts, 936 So. 

2d 1111, 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 

608 (Fla. 2001)); see also Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Castro, 351 So. 3d 

127, 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“Questions of law and the application of legal 

principles to settled facts are ‘subject to de novo review.’”) (quoting in part 

Johnson v. Omega Ins. Co., 200 So. 3d 1207, 1213 (Fla. 2016)).

And the application of the law to the facts present require denial of the 

motion to suppress. Typically, “if, at any point during custodial interrogation, 

a suspect asks a clear question concerning his or her rights, the officer must 

stop the interview and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and 

straightforward answer.” Almeida v. State, 737 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 1999). 

However, police are not required to terminate an interrogation or clarify the 

suspect’s wishes if the suspect makes only an “ambiguous” or “equivocal” 

invocation of Miranda rights. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 

(1994) (declining to “require law enforcement officers to cease questioning 

immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an 

attorney”); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997) (same). Here, 
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particularly in context with his subsequent questions about getting a lawyer 

“later on,” Myers’ “I think I should have a lawyer” statement constituted, at 

best, an equivocal statement. See Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 574 (Fla. 

2007) (finding that suspect’s pre-interrogation statement of “I think I might 

want to talk to an attorney” was equivocal); Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F. 3d 61, 

63, 65 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that “do you think I need a lawyer?” statement 

was equivocal). Thus, the officers were not required to terminate the 

interrogation, and Myers’ motion to suppress should’ve been denied.

Reversed and remanded.
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The State of Florida v. Stephen F. Myers

3D22-2019

SCALES, J., concurring. 

I concur with reversing the trial court’s suppression order but write 

separately to clarify the special standard of review that we employed in 

reviewing the challenged order in this case. 

Police are not required to stop a custodial interrogation unless the 

suspect has made an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel. 

State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 717-18 (Fla. 1979). The standard for 

determining whether a defendant’s invocation of Miranda is equivocal is an 

objective one: whether a reasonable police officer under the circumstances 

would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Wilson v. 

State, 274 So. 3d 549, 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citing Davis v. United 

States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). If a suspect makes a statement 

referencing an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal such that a 

reasonable police officer would understand only that the suspect might be 

invoking the right to counsel, questioning need not cease. Davis, 512 U.S. at 

459. Hence, the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s custodial 

statement are relevant to the inquiry, but only insomuch as they bear upon a 

reasonable police officer’s understanding of a defendant’s statements. 
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The trial court, after viewing a video of Myers’s interrogation, 

determined that Myers’s alleged invocation of Miranda – “I think I should 

have a lawyer” – was unequivocal. As is evident by its written suppression 

order, the trial court, in making its suppression determination, took into 

consideration several circumstances surrounding the interrogation: 

I have seen the video of the interrogation of Mr. Myers. I agree 

with the interrogating detective that it shows a subject who is 

emotionally overwrought. But Mr. Myers was able to express 

himself clearly enough. Considering not only his choice of words, 

but also his demeanor, his manner of expression, the context of 

his statement, and other like-kind factors, I conclude that Mr. 

Myers did all that was required of him to invoke his right to 

counsel. 

(Emphasis added). 

To be clear, we are not second-guessing nor disturbing the trial court’s 

observations regarding Mr. Myers’s demeanor, manner of expression, etc. 

But the trial court’s order does nothing to explain how these circumstances

– i.e., the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression, context of his 

statement, and other like-kind factors – in any way would have affected a 

reasonable police officer’s understanding of Myers’s statement, “I think I 

should have a lawyer.” 

The trial court made no factual findings regarding why or how such 

circumstances would cause a reasonable police officer to have understood 

Myers’s statements as an unequivocal invocation of Myers’s right to counsel. 
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In fact, it appears as though the trial court focused its inquiry not upon 

whether the interrogating officer understood Myers’s statement to be an 

unequivocal invocation of right to counsel, but rather, on Myers’s intentions

in making the statement. Indeed, the trial court’s order summarizes Myers’s

argument as follows: 

The defense takes the position that Mr. Myer’s [sic] wording 

constitutes just such an unequivocal assertion to his right to 

counsel. In the defense view, Mr. Myers had done his 

contemplating and was stating the conclusion that was the fruit 

of that contemplation. What he meant to convey was that, having 

mulled over the options available to him, he had decided that he 

wanted a lawyer. 

(Emphasis added). 

Because the challenged order contained no specific findings regarding 

how the circumstances surrounding Myers’s statement would have been 

understood by a reasonable police officer, this Court undertook what 

amounted to a de novo review of the same video reviewed by the trial court. 

Upon such review, we found no competent, substantial evidence in the video 

footage that would support a finding that a reasonable police officer would 

have, under the circumstances, understood Myers’s statement – “I think I 

should have a lawyer” – to be anything but equivocal and ambiguous. 

Even if the trial court had made a specific factual finding that the 

circumstances surrounding Myers’s statement would have led a reasonable 
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police officer to believe Myers unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, our 

traditional deference to the trial court’s factual findings probably would not 

have applied in this case.2 When, as here, the findings are based mainly on 

review of a videotape, the trial court has no superior vantage point from that 

of the appellate court. See Almeida v. State, 737 So. 2d 520, 524 n.9 (Fla. 

1999) (“The trial court had no special vantage point in reviewing this tape. 

Based on our review of the transcript and tape, we conclude that the record 

evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding.”); State v. 

Carter, 172 So. 3d 538, 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citing Almeida and 

reversing a trial court suppression order that concluded that a defendant’s 

statement – “I think I should wait to talk to my public defender” – constituted 

an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel). 

In sum, while the trial court’s suppression order contained conclusory 

observations regarding Myers’s demeanor, manner of expression, etc., to 

the extent that those observations constitute findings of fact, the trial court 

did not relate those findings to the relevant inquiry. The relevent inquiry is

whether a reasonable police officer would understand Myers’s statement –

“I think I should have a lawyer” – as an unequivocal invocation of right to 

2 Ordinarily, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact so long as those 

findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Wilson v. State, 

274 So. 3d 549, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
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counsel. And even if the trial court had related those findings to the relevant 

inquiry, it is likely that we would not have afforded the traditional deference 

we generally afford to such findings because the trial court had no superior 

vantage point from that of this Court.