IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

STEVEN S. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIRECTOR MOHR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2: 13-cv-006

Judge Peter C. Economus

Magistrate Judge Terrence P. Kemp

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a prisoner civil rights case. This matter is before the Court for consideration of 

Plaintiff Mr. Brown’s Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 117.) Mr. Brown asks this Court to 

reconsider its Order (ECF No. 113) adopting United States Magistrate Judge Terrence P. Kemp’s 

Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) issued on February 23, 2015 (ECF No. 109). For the 

reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Mr. Brown’s Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 

117.) 

I. Background

Mr. Brown, a prison inmate, brings this pro se civil rights action against numerous 

Defendants. This case came before the Court by way of a transfer from the United States District 

Court for Southern District of Ohio, Western Division. In the Western Division, Magistrate 

Judge J. Gregory Wehrman issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) dismissing some of 

Mr. Brown’s original claims, and transferring other claims to the United States District Court for 

Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. (ECF No. 12.)

Following the transfer, Mr. Brown filed a Second Amended Complaint in this Court. 

(ECF No. 51.) In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Brown alleges the following: an Eighth 

Amendment violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the 

deliberate indifference standard for denial of medical treatment; retaliation for having taken legal 

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action and this includes being placed in a cell with Nazi’s and skinheads because he is Jewish; 

denial of adequate kosher food; and many other claims. 

On February 23, 2015 Magistrate Judge Kemp issued an R & R, addressing a number of 

pending motions. (ECF No. 109.) Magistrate Judge Kemp recommended that Mr. Brown’s motion 

for an order to protect his legal papers (ECF No. 64 as supplemented by ECF No. 72 and 73) be 

denied as moot. Further, Magistrate Judge Kemp recommended that Mr. Brown’s motions for an 

entry of default (ECF No. 78), to dismiss (ECF No. 79), for sanctions (ECF No. 90), and to 

supplement (ECF No. 95 and 102) be denied, and that Mr. Brown’s motion to stay a decision on the 

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 94) be denied as moot. Finally, Magistrate Judge Kemp recommended 

that the Court decline to consider the issues raised in Mr. Brown’s motion for an order directing 

defendants to debit his prison account for copies (ECF No. 82) and that this motion be removed from 

this Court’s pending motions list.

On March 11, 2015, this Court issued an Order adopting the Magistrates R & R because no 

party had objected to the R & R and the time period for filing objections had past. (ECF No. 113.) On 

March12, 2015 Mr. Brown filed a motion for extension of time to file objections to the R & R. (ECF 

No. 114.) The Court granted the motion to the extent Mr. Brown was given an opportunity to file a 

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Order adopting the R & R. (ECF No. 113.) On March 19, 

2015, Mr. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 117.)

II. Discussion

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly address motions for 

reconsideration of interlocutory orders, the authority for a district court to hear such motions is 

found in both the common law and in Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 Fed. Appx’ 949, 959 (6th Cir.2004). 

Traditionally, courts will find justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is 

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(1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or, (3) a need to correct 

a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Id. at 959 (citing Reich v. Hall Holding Co., 990 F.

Supp. 955, 965 (N. D. Ohio 1998)). In this case, Mr. Brown does not seek reconsideration on 

either of the first two grounds. Mr. Brown relies only on the third prong, contending that this 

Court made a clear error in denying preliminary injunction.

“Manifest injustice” has been defined as “[a]n error in the trial court that is direct, 

obvious, and observable.” Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342, 348 (6th 

Cir.2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 974 (7th ed.1999)). In other 

words, “a showing of manifest injustice requires that there exist a fundamental flaw in the court's 

decision that without correction would lead to a result that is both inequitable and not in line with 

applicable policy.” McDaniel v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04–2667 B, 2007 WL 2084277, 

at *2 (W.D. Tenn. July 17, 2007) (quoting In re Bunting Bearings Corp., 321 B.R. 420, 423 

(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004)).

The Court has reviewed Mr. Brown’s Motion (ECF No. 117), and finds no basis for 

reconsidering its Order (ECF No. 113). In his motion, Mr. Brown argues that the Court should 

allow him the opportunity to make objections to the R & R. (ECF No. 117.) Mr. Brown’s 

argument is not well taken. The Court finds no obvious and observable error in its decision to 

adopt Magistrate Jude Kemp’s R & R after the time to file objections had past. See United States 

v. Jarnigan, No. 3:08-CR-7, 2008 WL 5248172, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2008) (“The Court 

notes that even if Defendant Jarnigan’s motion for reconsideration were granted and the Court 

performed a de novo review the portions of the R & R to which he has objected as would be 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the ultimate outcome would be no different.”).

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Mr. Brown also raises the same arguments he has previously made. Again, Mr. Brown 

argues that Defendants provided inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution. Mr. Brown’s Eighth Amendment Claim for inadequate medical 

care is insufficient. To establish an Eighth Amendment violation premised on inadequate 

medical care, Mr. Brown must demonstrate that the Defendants acted with “deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment 

violation, a prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that 

a substantial risk of serious harms exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837-38. “Furthermore, a difference of opinion between a prisoner and a doctor over 

diagnosis or treatment also fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to 

a serious medical need.” Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Westlake v. 

Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)).

Mr. Brown does not meet this burden. Mr. Brown simply contends that he received no 

medical treatment. (ECF No. 117.) Mr. Brown, however, discusses a number of recent medical 

operations that he has received. Clearly, Mr. Brown has received at least some medical 

treatment. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Brown’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 117)

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby DENIES Mr. Brown’s Motion for 

Reconsideration. (ECF No. 117.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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