T h e p anel una n i mou s l y c on cl u des t h i s c as e i s s u i t abl e f or de ci s i on *
w itho u t o ra l ar g u m e n t. See Fed

. R

. A p p
. P

. 34 (a)( 2 ).

T he H o no rable J a m es P

. Jo nes, U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he ** W est ern D i st ri ct of V i rgi ni a, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

J EF F R EY M EI ER , Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v. C AR OL YN W. C O LV IN , C o m m i s s i o n e r

o f S o c i a l S e c ur i ty, Defendant-

Appellee

. No. 11-35736

D.C. No. 4:09-cv-00031- SEH

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Montana Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Pre siding
Submit ted August 10, 2012 * Filed July 23, 2013
Be fore : Wi lliam A. Fletche r and Ray mond C. Fisher, Circuit J udg es, and James P. J ones, District Judge. **

Opinion by

J udg e F isherM EI ER V
. C O LV IN

2

T hi s s ummary co ns t i t ut es no p ar t of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s *** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y ***

Equ al Acce ss to Justice Ac t / Att orneys’ F ees
T h e p an el re v er s edth e d i s tri ctco urt ’s o r d er d en yi n g a p l ai ntiff’s motion for attorne y s’ fe es and c osts under the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Ac t, a nd it r emande d for an awa rd of fe e s and c os ts. The pa nel held that the posit ion of the United States wa s not substantially

justified in this case conce rningthe pla int if f’ s a pp lic atio n f

or so c ia l se c ur ity di sa

bil ity be ne fi ts. Th e pa ne l st a te d th at th e “ po sit ion of the Unit e d St a te s” includes both the g overnme nt’s litigation position and the underlying a g ency

action g iving r ise to the civil action. The pa ne l he ld t hat in the so c ia l sec ur ity

c on te xt, th e c ourt

tr e a ts the dec ision of the administrative law judg e as the underly ing ag ency action.

CO UN SEL
JohnE. Se idlit z , Jr. , Se idl itz L aw O ff ic e , G re a t F a lls , Mo nta na , f or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt.
Mi chael C. C o t ter , Un it ed S tat es A tt orn ey , Ge orge F. Da rr a g h, Jr., As sistant Unit e d St ate s A tto rn e y , G re a t F a lls , Montana; Dorr ely

n K. Dietric h, Special Assistant Uni t ed States Attorney , Social Security Administration, Office of the Gene ral Counsel, De nver, Colora do; J ohn J ay L ee, Re g ionalM EI ER V
. C O LV IN 3

Chief C ounsel, Reg ion VI I I , Social Security Administration, Offic e of the Gene ral Counsel, Denver, Colorado, f or Def endant- Appellee

.

OP IN ION
FI SHER, Ci rcuit Judge:
J eff rey Meier a ppeal s the district court’s or der de nying his moti on for attorney ’s fee s and costs under the Equal Acc ess to J ustice Ac t. W e h o l d that the position of the United States was not sub s t antially justified. We therefor e re ve rs e and

re mand fo r a n a wa rd of fe e s and c os ts.
BACK GR OUND
Meier a pplied for social secur ity

disability benef its. The administrative law judg e (A L J ) denie d benef its and the district court af

firmed. We re verse d and re man ded for an awa rd of be nefits in an unpub lished memorandum dis po sit ion , h old ingtha

t th e AL J (1) fa iled to o ff e r s pe c if ic and leg itimate rea sons, supported by substantial evidence , for reje ctingtreating phy sician Dr. Me l M arg aris’ opinion that Meier w as inca

pable of working , and (2) failed to of fer clea r and convinc ing r easons, supporte d by su b s t anti al evidenc e, for discountingMeier’ s subjective pain testimony

. See M eier v. Astrue , 404 F. App’ x 150 (9th Cir. 2010).
Meier move d for a

n awa rd of $14,856.55 in attorne y ’s fee s and $805 in costs under the Equal Access to J ustice Ac t (EAJA), 28 U. S

. C . § 2412(d). The district court denie d the motion, offeringonly

this brief explanation f

or the denial of fe e s:M EI ER V
. C O LV IN

4 No less than 6 separate ruling s were issued de nying be ne fi ts be fo re the Ni nth Ci rc uit Court of Appea ls ordere d b en efits be paid. The position o f t h e g overnme nt in opposing th e p e t i t i o nf

o r b e n e f i t s w a s s u

b s t an t i a l ly justified.
On a pp e a l, M e ie r a

rgue s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s discretion by

denying E AJ A fe es. We ag ree
. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
We reviewthe district court’s de nial of attorne y ’s fe es under EA J A for an abuse of discre tion. See Sam pson v. Chater , 1 0 3 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1996). A district court abuses its discre tion when i t fails to apply the cor rec t leg al ru le or its a pp lic atio n o f t

he c orr ect le g a l r

ule is i llo g ic a l, implausible or without support in inferenc es that may be drawn from the f

acts in the re cord. S

ee Un i t ed

States v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (en ba nc).
DI SCU SSIO N
I. EAJA provides that “a c o u rt s hall awa rd to a pre vailing party other than the United S tates fees and othe r expenses . . . incurre d by

that party

in any civil action . . . unless the cour t fi nd s th a t th e po sit ion

of the Un ite d State s wa s su bs tanti a lly justified or that specia l circumstanc es make an award unjust.”M EI ER V
. C O LV IN 5

In f ull , § 2 4 1 2 (d )(1 )(A ) p ro vid es: 1

E x c e p t as o the rw ise sp e c ifi c a lly p ro v id e d b y sta tute , a co urt s hal l a w a rd t o a prevail i ng pa rt y other t han t he U n ited S ta te s fee s a n d o the r e x p e n se s, in a d d iti o n to any cos t s awar ded pur s uan t t o s ubs ect i on ( a) , i ncu r r ed by t hat par t y i n a ny ci vi l acti o n (ot her t han ca s es s ou n di n g i n t or t ) , i n c l u di n g pr oc e e di n g s f or j u di ci al revi ew o f

a gency act i o n, bro ught by or agai nst t he U ni t ed St at es i n a ny cour t ha vi ng j ur i s di ct i o n of t hat act i o n, unl ess t he co urt f i nd s t hat t he p o si t i o n of t he U ni t ed St at es was s ubs t ant i al l y j us t i f i ed or t hat s peci al
c irc u m sta n c e s m a k e a n a w a rd un ju st.
2 8 U

. S.C

. § 2 4 1 2 (d)(1)(A ). 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1)( A). I t is the g ov e rnme nt’ s b ur de n to 1 show that its posit ion was substantially justified. See Gu tie rre z v. B ar nh ar t , 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). Sub sta nti a l ju sti fi c atio n me ans “ jus ti fi ed in su

bs tanc e or

in th e m a i n–

th a ti s , j u s t i f

i e d t o a d e g r e e th a tc o u l d

s a t i s f y a rea sonable pe rson.” Piercev. Unde rwood , 487 U.S. 552, 565 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ( i n t e r

n a l qu o t at i o n m ar

k s o m i t t e d )

. P u t d i f

f e r e n t l y, the g ov e rnme nt’ s posi tio n must have a “ re a so na ble ba sis bo th in law and f

act.” Id.
The “ position of the United States” i n cl u des both the g overnme nt’s litigation position and the underl y ing a g ency action g iving r i s e t o the civil action. See, e .g. , Hardisty v. Astrue , 5 92 F .3 d 1 07 2, 10 77 (9 th C ir . 2 01 0) ; Al-H arbi v . I NS , 28 4 F .3 d 10 80 , 10 84 (9 th Cir

. 20 02 ) ( or de r) ; Kali v. Bowen , 85 4 F .2 d 3 29 , 3 32 (9 th C ir

. 19 88 ). As E AJA p ro vid e s, “‘position of the United States’ means, in ad dition to t he position t aken by

the United States in the civil ac t i on, the ac tio n o r fa ilu reto a c t by theage nc

yup on whi c h th e c iv ilM EI ER V
. C O LV IN

6
action is based .” 28 U. S.C. § 241 2( d) (2 )( D) (e mph a sis added)

. In the social secur ity context, we have c onsistently treated the AL J ’s dec ision as the “ac tion or failure to act by the ag ency upon which the c iv i l ac t i o n is based,” but we have never explained why t h is is the case. See, e .g. , Ha rd ist y , 59 2 F .3 d at 10 77 ; Gutierrez , 2 74 F .3 d at 125 9. In th is opinion, we explain the rational e for our long standing prac tice.
Treating the A L J ’s dec ision as the und erly ing a g ency action may , at first glanc e, see m unwarr anted. In deter mining wh e the r f e e s sh ould be awa

rd e d, we wo uld

mos t natur a lly be g in b y fo c us ing on the be havio r of the g ov e rnme nt whe n it acte d as a lit iga tor and when it acted a s a party whose a ction or inac tion is challeng ed in the suit. I t is less obvious t hat we should evaluate (and disappr ove by th e award of

fee s) the behavior of the g overnme nt when it a cted as an adjudicator

. Th a t vi e w d oe s n ot bear sc rutiny , h ow e ve r. F ir st, disreg ardingthe g overnme nt’s conduct a s ad judicator runs counter to the EAJA’s plain l an guag e. In the ty pical socia l secur ity case , the civil complaint alleg es p roce dural a nd substantive err ors by

the AL J . The AL J ’s dec ision, therefor e, i s d i rec tly

and litera lly

“the a ction or fa ilure to ac t by the a g e nc y up on

wh ic h th e c ivi l a c tio n is ba se d. ” 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (2 )( D)

. EA JA’ s pla in l angua g e thu s d ir e c ts c ourt s to focus on the AL J ’s dec ision.
Se c on d, in t

he ty pic a l c a se the AL J’s d e c isi on re pr e se nts no t on ly the g ov e rnme nt’ s p os iti on a s a dju dic a tor

but a lso its p osition as a party . When an AL J denies a n application for social sec urity

benef its, th e cl aimant has the option ofM EI ER V
. C O LV IN 7

appea ling that de cision to the Appea ls Council. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. I f the Appea ls Council denies re view, the AL J ’s de cision become s the final dec ision of the Commi ssioner of Social Sec urity

. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; S h a f er v. Astrue , 5 1 8 F

. 3 d

1 0 6 7 , 1 0 6 8

- 6 9 ( 9 th

Ci r
. 2 008) (“ Th e Soc ial Se c ur ity

Ad min istratio n’ s App e a ls C ounc il denied Shaf

er’ s reque st fo r re view of the AL J ’s dec ision, leavingthe AL J ’s decision to stand as t he final decision of the Commis sio ne r. ” ); cf. Taylor v. Hec kler , 835 F.2d 1037, 1043 n. 14 (3 d Ci r. 19 87 ) ( “ In th is c ase, th e Se c re tary a do pte d in total, and def

ended in the district c ourt, the AL J ’s eva luation of Ta y l o r’s disabili ty

claim. The A L J ’s deter mination that Taylor was not disabled thus bec ame the g overnme n t ’s under ly in g p o s it io n , o n e o f

th e tw o p o s it io n s o f

th e U n ite d State s th a t mu st b e su

bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d if thi s a pp e a l is to fall within EAJ A’s exception.”). That is prec isely what occur red in this case : the Appea ls Council denied Meier’ s reque st f or revie w, making “the Administrative L aw Judge ’s decision . . . the fina l decision of the Com missioner of Social Se c ur ity in [Me ie r’ s] c a se .” No tic e of Ap pe a ls C ou nc il Action. Thus, eve n if it were inappropriate to consider the g overnme nt’s position as adjudicat or, we would still revie w the AL J ’s dec ision because it constit u tes not only an adjudication b u t also the Commissi oner’ s final dec ision de nyingbe ne fi ts. Finally , even if

the AL J ’s d ec i s ion repre sented only an adjudication and n o t also the position of the Commis sioner, it would still be proper to c onsider it. EAJA re fer s to the g overnme nt’s “position” and to the “ac tion or failure to act by the ag ency ,” makingno d i s tinction between a n ag ency ’s adjudicative a

nd adver sarial a cts. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)( A), (d)( 2)(D)

. The statute thus c overs both ty pes of g overnme nt conduct, a s we pre viously made cl ear

in the analog ousM EI ER V
. C O LV IN

8 immigrat i o n context in Thangaraja v. Gonzales , 428 F.3d 870, 873–74 (9th Cir. 2005).
In Tha ng araja , the g overnme nt argued that dec ision s by the Board of Immigration Appeals (B I A) a nd immigration judge (I J ) wer e irrele vant to the EAJA ana ly sis a nd t h at t he only position t hat mattere d was the Depa rtment of Homela

nd Securit y ’s (DH S) defe nse of the B I A’s and I J ’s dec isions befor e this court. See id. at 87 3. We re je c te d th a t argume nt, holding that “the ‘position of the United States’ as de fined by EAJA enc o mp a s s es both the DHS’s litigation posit ion and the underlying a g ency

decision re nd ere d by

the B I A or a

n I J .” Id. at 874. We said:
Pursuant to EAJ A, the B I A and I J decisions we r eview ar e as muc h the “position of the United States” a s is the DHS’s litiga t i on position. The I J ’s dec ision i n this case, summarily

aff irmed wit hout opinion by the BIA, i s “t h e action . . . by the ag ency

upon which the c ivil action is based,” whi ch the statute requir es us to consider in de termining wh e ther th e “ po sit ion

of the Un ite d St a te s” was substantially

justified.
M o r e o v e r , th e D H S’ s an a lo g y to ju d ic ial proce eding s is misplace d. Both the Executive Of fi c e fo r Immi g ratio n Revi e w ( EO I R) , to which the B I A and t h e I mmigration Court belong , and the DH S a

re part of the executive br anc h o f t

he Unite d St ate s g ov e rnme nt, despite their mutual indepe ndence

.M EI ER V
. C O LV IN 9

Id. at 873–74 (a lteration in orig inal ) (citations omitted). Thus , e ve n if the AL J’s de c isi on we re pure ly a dju dic a tiv e , it would nonetheless qua lify as the position of the United States f o r p ur p o s e s o f E A J A ’ s s u

b s t an t i a l j u s t i f

i c a t i o ni n qu i r

y. Fo r eac h of these r easons, we proper ly look to decisions of the AL J to determine wh ether the g overnme nt’s position in the underlying a g ency

action wa s substantially

justified.
II. Ap ply ingthe su

bs tanti a l ju sti fi c atio n te st h ere, we fi rs t consider the underlying a g ency action, which, for the r easons we have just explained, is the decision of the AL J

. We then consider the g overnme nt’s litigation position.

A. Underlying Agency Conduct
I n o u r memora

ndum disposit ion, we held that the A L J ’s decision wa s not supported by substantial ev i dence

. See Meie r , 404 F. App’x at 151–52. Specifica lly , the AL J failed to offer specif i c and legitimate re asons, supported by substantial evidence , for reje cting Dr. Mar g aris’ opinion that Meier w as inca

pable of workin g
. See Leste r v. Chater , 81 F.3d 821, 830 ( 9th Ci r. 1 9 9 5 ). W e fur ther he ld that the AL J failed to off

er clear and convinc ing r easons, supporte d by substantial evi dence , for discountingMeier’ s subjective pain t estimony

. See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc . Sec. A dmin. , 53 3 F .3 d 1 15 5, 1160 (9t h Cir. 20 08 ). We a c c or din g ly re m an d e d f

o r an aw ar d o f b e n e f

i t s
. In r e a c h i n g the se conclusions, we a

pplied the def

ere ntial substan tial evidence standard of

revie w. Under

this standard, “‘ [s] ubst an tial e vid e nc e ’ m e ans
. . . s uc h r e le va nt evid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble per s o nmi g h t a c c e p t a s a d e qu ate to s u p p o rt a c o n c lu s ion.”M EI ER V
. C O LV IN

10 Lingenfelter v. Astrue , 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Given the sig nificant similarity betwee n this standard and the substantial justification standard – “justified t o a degree that could satisfy

a re asonable person,” Pierce , 487 U.S. at 565 – this court and other circ uits have held that a “holding that the ag ency ’s de ci sion . . . was unsupported by substantial evidenc e is . . . a s t rongindication that the ‘position of the United States’ . . . wa s n o t substantially justified.” T ha ng ar aja , 428 F .3 d at 87 4; see also id. (“ [I ]t wi ll b e on ly a ‘de cidedly

unusual ca se in which ther e is substantial justification under the EA J A eve n t h o u gh the ag ency ’s decis i o n was re verse d as lac king in r easona ble, substantial an d p ro b at i v e e v i d en ce i nth e r ec o rd

. ’” (q u o t i n g Al-Harbi , 28 4 F .3 d at 10 85 )) ; Hadde n v. Bowen , 851 F.2d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that “a la ck of substantial e vidence indicates, but does not conc lu s i v ely establish, that the g overnme nt’s position concerning a claim was not substantially

justified”). For

this reason, a

nd for the r easons state d in our m e mor and

um d isp os iti on

on the me ri ts, we ho ld that th e g ov e rnme nt’ s und e rl yinga c tio n wa s not s ub sta nti a lly justified in this case
.

B. Litigation P osition
Be cause the g overnme nt’s u n d erlying position was not subs t an t i ally

justified, we nee d not addre ss whether the g overnme n t ’s l itigation position was justified. See Shafe r , 518 F.3 d at 1071 (“The g overnme nt’s position m ust be substantially

justified at each s t ag e of the proce eding s.” (q u o t i n g Corbin v. Apfel , 149 F.3d 1051, 10 5 2 (9 t h Cir. 19 98 )) (i nte rn a l qu ota

tio n m arks omi tte d) ); Li v. Keisler , 505 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2007) (order) (“ [T] he g overnme nt mus t sh owthat a ll o f t hese po sit ion s w e re su

bs tanti a lly j u s t i f i e d i no r d e r t o av o i d anaw ar d

o f E A JAf e e s
. ” ) ; c f.M EI ER V
. C O LV IN 11

Commiss i o n er

, INS v. Je an , 496 U.S. 154, 159 n.7 (1990) (“[T]he amendment will make c lear that the C o ng ressional int e nt i s to pr ov ide fo r atto rn e y fe e s w he n a

n unju sti fi a

ble a g e nc y a c tio n f or c e s li tig atio n, and th e ag e nc y the n tr ie s to avoi d s uch liability

by rea sonable be havior duringthe litigation[.] ” (f

irst alteration in original) ( quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-992, pp. 9, 13 (1984) )). Eve n if we we re to re ach the issue, we would c onclude tha t the g overnme nt’s litigation position – defendingthe AL J ’s er rors on a ppeal – lac ked the requisite justificati o n
. See Sam pson , 1 03 F .3 d at 92 2 ( “ I t is difficult to imagine any circ umstance in whic h the g overnme nt’s decision to defe nd its actions i n court would be substantially

justified, but the underlying adm inistrative d ec i s i o n wo u l d n o t

. ” ( qu o t i n g Flor es v . S ha lal a , 49 F.3d 562, 570 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995) ) (interna l quotation mar ks omitt ed). Although the g overnme nt proffe rs a l en gthy defe nse of the AL J ’s dec ision, itlarg ely reiter at es ar g uments that we reje cted in the pr evious appea l. Given the serious flaws in the AL J ’s ana ly sis, we ar e not per suaded that the g overnme nt rea sonably

chose to defe nd the AL J ’s decision in this action.
The district cour

t concluded that t he g overnme nt’s position was substantially jus t i fi ed bec ause the g overnme nt preva iled at t he adminis trative and district court leve ls before losing in t h i s co urt. Althoug h it was proper for the district court to consider

the g overnme nt ’s s u cce ss in the district c ou rt a s p art o f

th e E A JA an a ly sis, se e Le wis v . B ar nh ar t , 281 F.3d 1081, 1084 ( 9th Cir. 20 0 2 ), the cour t erre d by consideringthe g overnme nt’s s ucce ss at the administrati ve level. Th e AL J ’s dec ision was not supported by substantial e vid e nc e . T hat th e AL J ag re e d w iththe g ov e rnme nt, there fore , does not support the conc lus i o n that the g overnme nt’s position was substantially justified.M EI ER V
. C O LV IN

12
CO NC LU SION
The orde r of the district c ourt denying Meier’ s motion for a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and

c os ts und er E AJA i s r e ve rs e d. Th e c a se is r e mand e d f

or an a wa rd of fe e s and c os ts.
REVERSED AND REMAND ED.