1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 4 8088

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.
RONALD ALLEN DOERR, JR.,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: September 7, 2021
Melanie Gagnepain , Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. James S. Cawthon , District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for felony driving under the influence
, affirmed

.
Eric D. Fredericksen , State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, A ttorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ HUSKEY, Chief Judge Ronald Allen Doerr, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon h is conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence , I daho C ode § 18

- 8004 (1)(a)

. Doerr argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officer unlawfully
seized him w hen the officer approached his vehicle while carrying a flashlight and ask ed Doerr to roll down his window. Because the officer’s actions did not constitute a seizure, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Accordingly, the dis trict court’s order denying the motion to suppress is affirm ed

. I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND An officer was engage d in a traffic stop when Doerr stopped his car behind the officer’s patrol car

. The officer radioed a request for an additional officer. As the responding officer2 approached the traffic stop , he witnessed Doerr pull away from behind the patrol car
, drive into a nearby parking lot
, and park his car

. The responding officer park ed his patrol car on the street outside the parking lot , turned on the patrol car’s rear lights
, but not the overhead lights , and walked
over to Doerr. The officer approached Doerr’s car , shone his flashlight into the car, and asked
Doerr to roll down his window ; Doerr complied. After Doerr rolled down the w indow , the officer
noticed the smell of alcohol coming from inside the car , and Doerr admitted to consuming alcohol earlier that evening

. Doerr appeared intoxicated and based on the officer’s observations and
Doerr’s admission , the officer asked Doerr to step out of the car

. The officer performed field sobriety tests on Doerr, which Doerr failed. Doerr consented to a breath test, which indicated
Doerr’s blood alcohol concentration was .169 and .170

. The State charged Doerr with felony dri ving under the influence

. Doerr filed a motion to suppress arguing that the officer seized Doerr without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion finding that the initial interaction between the officer and Doerr was consensual

. The di strict court also found that the subsequent detention and investigation for driving under the
influence was based on the officer’s articulable
, reasonable suspicion that Doerr was under the
influence of alcohol while driving

. Doerr entered a conditional g uilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Doerr timely appeal s

. II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitut ional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual in ferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez

- Molina
, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).3 III.
ANALYSIS Doerr argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Mindful of the relevant precedent on the issue, Doerr c ontends the district court erred when it found that the initial
encounter with the responding officer was consensual. In response, t he State contends the district court properly d enied the motion because the initial encounter was not a seizure

. We agree with
the district court that the initial interaction was consensual and did not constitute a seizure

. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee s the right of every citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, not all encounters between the police and citizens involve the seizure of a person. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968);
State v. Jordan , 122 Idaho 771, 772, 8 39 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1992). Only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude
that a seizure has occurred. State v. Fry , 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 1991 ). A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public place, by asking if the individual is willing to answer some questions or by putting forth questions if the individual is willing to listen. Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Unless and until there is a detention, there is no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and no constitutional rights have been infringed. Royer , 460 U.S. at 498. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine identification. Fry , 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944. So long as police do not convey a message t hat compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. Id. Doerr acknowledges that State v. Ray , 153 Idaho 564, 286 P.3d 1114 (2012) and State v.
Randle , 152 Idaho 860, 866, 276 P.3d 73 2, 738 (Ct. App. 2012) are instructive. In Randle , an officer parked behind Randle’s car, left the patrol car’s headlights on, approached Randle’s car , and knocked on the driver’s side window

. Randle
, 15 3 Idaho at 866, 276 P.3d at 738. This Court
held that because the officer’s conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty to ignore the officer’s presence and go about his or her business , there
was not a seizure. Id

. Similarly, in Ray , the Idaho Supreme Court held that a trooper’s actions in4 walking toward a vehicle did not constitute a seizure even though the action indicated the trooper’s desire to speak with the driver of the vehicle. Ray , 153 Idaho at 568, 286 P.3d at 1118.
Our de cision in State v. Pieper , 163 Idaho 732, 418 P.3d 1241 (Ct. App. 2018 ) i s also
instructive. In Pieper , two officers parked their patrol car an d approached Pieper’s car which was parked in a parking lot. Pieper , 163 a t 733 , 418 P.3d at 1242

. Officers sh ined flashlights in to the
interior of the car and asked the occupants if they could speak with them; Pieper a nswered yes

. Id

. Shortly therea fter, officers saw a jar containing marijuana in the car and ordered Pieper out of the

car. Id. Officers searched the car and found a gun, controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia.
Id . Pieper moved to suppress the evidence arguing the initial interaction with officers was not
consensual and was a warrantless seizure without reasonable suspici on

. Id . This Court held that
the officers ’ re quest to speak with Pieper was lawful because officer s may generally ask an individual questions and ask to examine identification. Id. at 735 , 418 P.3d at 1244 . Further, we
noted that an officer ’ s use of a flashlight to illuminate the interior of a car does not constitute a
seizure because the use of a flashlight does not make the interaction more intrusive and can significantly increase officer safety. Id

. Here, t he district court found that during the i nitial interaction between the officer and
Doerr: There was no threatening presence of several officers; there was only the single officer. There was no physical touching of the person of the citizen. There is no indication that the use of the language or tone of the voice asking the defendant to roll down the window indicated mandatory compliance with some type of order from law enforcement versus simply a consensual inquiry. No overhead lights were used. And the officer certainly did not block the de fendant’s vehicle. Defendant’s vehicle was in a parking lot, so he was free to leave. Although Doerr does not challenge these findings , he nonetheless argues the officer seized
him when the office r approach ed Doerr’s car , shin ed a flashlight inside the car , and ask ed Doerr
to roll down his window . Doerr does not cite to any precedent in support of his argument. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko , 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that the
initial encounter between Doerr and the officer was consensual. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Ray , and this Court’s holdings in Randle and Pieper , the officer’s actions in5 this c ase did not constitute a seizure. Accordingly, Doerr has failed to show the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION The district court did not err in denying Doerr’s motion to suppress as the initial interaction
with the o fficer was consensual and did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment

. Therefore, we affirm Doerr’s judgment of conviction

. Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO CONCUR

.