alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 132 

Expressing support for prayer at school board meetings. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 29 (legislative day, April 28), 2005 

Mr. VITTER (for himself, Mr. COBURN, and Mr. DEMINT) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing support for prayer at school board meetings. 

Whereas the freedom to practice religion and to express religious thought is acknowledged to be a fundamental and 

unalienable right belonging to all individuals; 

Whereas the United States was founded on the principle of 

freedom of religion and not freedom from religion; 

Whereas the framers intended that the First Amendment 

would prohibit the Federal Government from enacting 

any law that favors one religious denomination over another, not prohibit any mention of religion or reference 

to God in civic dialog; 

Whereas in 1983, the United States Supreme Court held in 

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, that the practice of 

opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part 
2 

•SRES 132 IS

of the fabric of our society and to invoke divine guidance 

on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not 

a violation of the Establishment Clause, but rather is 

simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 

among the people of this Nation; 

Whereas voluntary prayer in elected bodies should not be limited to prayer in State legislatures and Congress; 

Whereas school boards are deliberative bodies of adults similar to a legislature in that they are elected by the people, 

act in the public interest, and are open to the public for 

voluntary attendance; and 

Whereas voluntary prayer by an elected body should be protected under law and encouraged in society because voluntary prayer has become a part of the fabric of our society, voluntary prayer acknowledges beliefs widely held 

among the people of this Nation, and the Supreme Court 

has held that it is not a violation of the Establishment 

Clause for a public body to invoke divine guidance: Now, 

therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) recognizes that prayer before school board 

3 meetings is a protected act in accordance with the 

4 fundamental principles upon which the Nation was 

5 founded; and 

6 (2) expresses support for the practice of prayer 

7 at the beginning of school board meetings. 

Æ
Opinion issued November 16 , 2021

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 20 - 00405 - CV

——————————— MIGUEL TORRES HERNANDEZ , Appella nt

V. TERESA HERNANDEZ , Appell e e On Appeal from the 246th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2019 - 88163
MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Miguel Torres Hernandez, has neither paid the required fees nor established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 5, 20.1; see also T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §§ 51.207, 51.941(a), 101.041; Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, and B efore the Judicial2

Panel on Multi

- District Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 15

- 9158 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2015). Further, appellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay the fee for preparing the clerk’s record. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 37.3(b). After being notified th at this appeal was subject to dismissal, appellant did not respond. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 5, 42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fees and for want of prosecution. We dismiss any pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justice s Goodman, Rivas

- Molloy, and Farris
.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ANDREW W. KATZENMOYER, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-660 

 Judge Watson 

 Magistrate Judge King 

TR’BL MARKETING, LTD, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

ORDER 

 This case has been reported settled. The court conferred with 

counsel for the parties, by telephone, on March 21, 2013. 

 With the agreement of plaintiff, this action is hereby DISMISSED

with prejudice, except that the case will be reopened and restored to 

the active docket upon motion filed by any party within sixty (60) 

days should terms of settlement not be met. 

 

 s/ Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

March 21, 2013 

Date 

Case: 2:12-cv-00660-MHW-NMK Doc #: 32 Filed: 03/21/13 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: <pageID>
No. 51165.

#### Protests 952586-G, etc., of S. S. Kresge Co. et al. (Baltimore, etc.).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
Case: 2:12-cv-01182-EAS-EPD Doc #: 55 Filed: 11/15/13 Page: 1 of 1  PAGEID #: <pageID>

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2015-05-12T13:26:01-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
(Reap. Dec. 10250)

#### Riker Laboratories, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 35726.

(Decided May 15, 1962)

*James S. Cline*and *Robert John Jensen (Robert John Jensen*of counsel) for the plaintiff.

*William H. Orriclc, Jr.,*Assistant Attorney General *(Sheila N. Ziff,*trial attorney) , for the defendant.

Donlon, Judge:

On call of this case at the term of court in Los Angeles on February 2,1962, counsel stipulated, in open court, that the merchandise covered by the entry in this appeal for reappraisement was entered after February 27, 1958, the effective date of the final list published by the Secretary of the Treasury, T.D. 54521, under section 6(a) of the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 943, T.D. 54165. The case was submitted on a further written stipulation of counsel for the parties, which was filed of record, as follows:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the attorneys for the parties hereto:

> 1. That the above entitled appeal for reappraisement covers merchandise described on the invoice as Adrenalin Bitartrate, USP, which is a coal tar derivative.

> *6532. That the said merchandise was appraised under Section 402(e) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, Public Law 927, 84th Congress, 2nd Session.

> 3. That at the time of exportation, domestic producers of Adrenalin Bitartrate were freely selling and offering to sell said merchandise at 55$ per gram which price included the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature and other expenses incidental to placing this merchandise in condition packed ready for delivery, said sales were for domestic consumption in the principal market of the United States, in the ordinary course of trade and in the usual wholesale quantities.

Paragraph 28(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides that coal-tar products shall be assessed with duty, under section 402(e) of said act, on the basis of American selling price of any similar competitive article manufactured or produced in the United States.

Accepting these two stipulations as an agreed statement of facts, and on the basis of the statutory requirement of paragraph 28(c), I find and hold that American selling price, as defined in section 402 (e) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, supra, is the proper basis for determination of the value of the coal-tar derivative described as Adrenaline Bitartrate, U.S.P., on the invoice covered by the entry in this appeal for reappraisement and that such value is 55 cents per gram.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-11053

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Semaj Kinney,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CR-44-4

______________________________

Before Jolly, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Semaj Kinney pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841. He 

now challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis in support of his guilty plea, 

relying on McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015).

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 3, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-11053 Document: 48-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/03/2024
No. 23-11053

2

We review the unpreserved argument for plain error, “examining the 

entire record for facts supporting the guilty plea and drawing reasonable 

inferences from those facts to determine whether the conduct to which the 

defendant admits satisfies the elements of the offense charged.” United 

States v. Escajeda, 8 F.4th 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2021). Based on that review of 

the record, including the factual basis and other record evidence regarding 

Kinney’s admitted role in a conspiracy involving hundreds of thousands of 

fentanyl pills, we are not persuaded that the district court plainly erred in 

accepting the guilty plea. See id.; United States v. Alvarado-Casas, 715 F.3d 

945, 951-52 (5th Cir. 2013).

AFFIRMED.

Case: 23-11053 Document: 48-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/03/2024
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v JOE F. HOLZHUTER, Private E-2, U. S. Army, Appellant

10 USCMA 374, 27 CMR 448

No. 12,510

Decided April 24, 1959

*First Lieutenant Thomas J. Simmons*argued the cause for Appellant, Accused. With him on the brief were *Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Herrod*and *Captain Arnold I. Melnick.*

*First Lieutenant Wade H. Sides, Jr.,*argued the cause for Appellee, United States. With him on the brief were *Lieutenant Colonel James G. Mc-Conaughy*and *Major Thomas J. Nichols.*

Opinion of the Court

Homer Ferguson, Judge:

In this case, the accused was convicted by general court-martial of bigamy and forgery, in violation of Articles 134 and 123, respectively, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 934 and 923. He was sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for two years. The convening authority approved the sentence, but suspended execution of the punitive discharge until completion of appellate review or the accused’s release from confinement, whichever is later. The board of review held this type of suspension valid under the provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951.

We granted the accused’s petition for review to determine whether “The nonprobationary type suspension given the accused is illegal” and “Whether the current Army policy on sentence suspension impinges on the discretionary sentence powers granted to convening authorities by law.”

In United States v Cecil, 10 USCMA 358, 27 CMR 432, decided this date, we *375held that portion of the Manual relied on by the board to be invalid for it conflicts with Article 72 of the Code, which “establishes but a single type of suspension, that is, one which constitutes the accused a probationer. It contemplates full restoration at the completion of the period of probation fixed in the action, unless it is determined *after a hearing*that the accused has violated his probation.”

However, since the probationary period had not expired at the time the board of review acted, and since there is no indication that the accused’s military superiors are presently planning to order execution of the punitive discharge without the type of hearing demanded by the Code, the accused has not been, and will not be, prejudiced. See United States v May, 10 USCMA 358, 27 CMR 432.

In view of the conclusion we reach with respect to the first issue, there is no necessity for further consideration of the second issue.

The findings of guilty and the sentence, as modified below, are affirmed.

Chief Judge Quinn concurs:

LatimeR, Judge

(dissenting):

I dissent.

In still another case involving the suspension of a punitive discharge, the majority affirms the findings and sentence below, but in effect requires military authorities to prove accused has breached unidentified conditions of a status of probation created by this Court — a status admittedly not within the contemplation of the parties — before he can be separated from the service as a result of his sentence.

For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in United States v May, 10 USCMA 358, 27 CMR 432, decided this day, I must disagree.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-55,762-10

EX PARTE JOSEPH BARNARD HINES, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 809892-B IN THE 180TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of aggravated sexual

assault and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his

conviction. Hines v. State, No. 14-99-01384-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 8, 2001)

(not designated for publication).

On October 8, 2014, we dismissed this application without written order. TEX.CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 11.07, § 4. Applicant has now filed a motion to reconsider. His motion is granted. The
2

October 8 dismissal is withdrawn. If he decides to supplement the habeas record, Applicant shall

file his evidence in the trial court within 30 days of the date of this order. No extensions shall be

granted. 

Filed: April 1, 2015

Do not publish
Exhibit 32.1





Certification of Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As Adopted Pursuant To Section 906 of


The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K of OnTarget360 Group, Inc. (the “Company”) for the annual period ended September 30, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Conn Flanigan, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of our knowledge:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:  January 22, 2014
/s/ Conn FlaniganConn Flanigan, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Executive and Chief Financial and Accounting Officer)




This certification accompanies this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 75 (Thursday, April 19, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 19716]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-7461]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

[Docket No. 2007N-0077]


Withdrawal of Approval of New Animal Drug Applications; Pyrantel; 
Tylosin; Tylosin and Sulfamethazine

AGENCY:  Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION:  Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY:  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is withdrawing 
approval of three new animal drug applications (NADAs) for intermediate 
premixes used to manufacture Type C medicated feeds. In a final rule 
published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register, FDA is 
amending the animal drug regulations to remove portions reflecting 
approval of these NADAs.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  Pamela K. Esposito, Center for 
Veterinary Medicine (HFV-212), Food and Drug Administration, 7519 
Standish Pl., Rockville, MD 20855, 240-276-9067, e-mail: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#493928242c2528672c3a39263a203d26092f2d286721213a672e263f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4333222e262f226d2630332c302a372c032527226d2b2b306d242c35">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Custom Feed Services Corp., 2100 N. 13th 
St., Norfolk, NE 68701, has requested that FDA withdraw approval of 
NADA 121-200 for Tylosin 10 Premix (tylosin), NADA 129-159 for TYLAN 40 
Sulfa-G (tylosin and sulfamethazine), and NADA 137-484 for Swine Guard-
BN (pyrantel). All are intermediate premixes used to manufacture Type C 
medicated feeds. This action is requested because the products are no 
longer manufactured or marketed.
    Therefore, under authority delegated to the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs, redelegated to the Center for Veterinary Medicine, and in 
accordance with 21 CFR 514.115 Withdrawal of approval of applications, 
notice is given that approval of NADA 121-200, NADA 129-159, and NADA 
137-484, and all supplements and amendments thereto, are hereby 
withdrawn, effective April 30, 2007.
    In a final rule published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal 
Register, FDA is amending the animal drug regulations to reflect the 
withdrawal of approval of these NADAs.

    Dated: April 9, 2007.
Bernadette Dunham,
Deputy Director, Center for Veterinary Medicine.
[FR Doc. E7-7461 Filed 4-18-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-S


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Before the Third Division,

July 14, 1938

No. 39002.

#### Protest 877908-G of Mrs. John Bate (Baltimore).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

It appeared that a silver pitcher which was claimed to be an artistic antiquity was produced in 1834. As paragraph 1811, Tariff Act of 1930, limits free entry to artistic antiquities produced prior to 1830, the protest was overruled.
My name is Andrew Sharp, and I live in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

I am fully supportive of the EPA's proposed standard. It should be implemented 

promptly and without being weakened in any way. 

Carbon pollution accelerates climate change, contributes to more frequent and 

more violent extreme weather that costs communities, the federal government, 

and our economy billions every year and threatens public health. 

Currently we limit how much mercury, arsenic, soot and other air pollution power 

plants can dump into our air, but there are no federal limits on carbon pollution. 

The EPA has the regulatory power to limit carbon pollution per a bipartisan vote 

of congress and confirmation by the Supreme Court in a decision written by 

conservative Justice Antonin Scalia. 

The carbon pollution causing climate change is responsible for thousands of 

premature deaths, higher risks of asthma attacks and respiratory disease, and 

hundreds of thousands of missed work and low activity days. A study by the 

Clean Air Task Force estimates that 13,000 American deaths were attributable to 

power plant pollution in 2010. 

Some people may think that they don't feel any of these impacts personally. 

There is a good reason for that. Power plant pollution does not impact Americans 

equally. Dirty air disproportionately affects low-income communities, as well as 

children, seniors and those who work or play outdoors. Still, nearly half of 

Americans live in counties that have unhealthy levels of dirty air, according to the 

American Lung Association. 

Big polluters want to continue to dump unlimited amounts of carbon pollution into 

the air without penalty and without regard for the public health impacts on 

children, seniors and families, instead of adopting reasonable carbon pollution 

safeguards that protect public health and slow climate change. That's wrong and 

the EPA has the chance to correct it. 

Right this wrong by implementing the proposed standard as soon as possible 

without any modifications that water it down. Thank you. 

Andrew Sharp 

Philadelphia, PA 

rex.andrew.sharp@gmail.com
No. 64317.

protests 59/2887, 59/5312, and 59/5943 (Los Angeles).

#### Quon Quon Company *v.*United States,

*514Opinion by

Donlon, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of trays, silent butlers, etc., similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Ignas Strauss & Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(28 Cust. Ct. 280, C.D. 1423), the articles in question were held dutiable as follows: (1) The items marked with the letter “A” at 40 percent under paragraph 339 as household utensils, composed wholly or in chief value of brass, not plated with platinum, gold, or silver; (2) the items marked with the letter “B” at 35 percent under the provision in said paragraph, as modified by the trade agreement with the United Kingdom (T.D. 49753), for household utensils, composed wholly or in chief value of copper, not plated with platinum, gold, or silver; and (3) the items marked with the letter “0” at 25 percent under the provision in said paragraph, as modified, *supra,*for household utensils, composed wholly or in chief value of pewter, not plated with platinum, gold, or silver.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v JAMES C. REYNOLDS, Private E-2, U. S. Army, Appellant

8 USCMA 314, 24 CMR 124

No. 10,417

Decided October 18, 1957

*Major Edward Fenig*and *First Lieutenant William H. Carpenter*were on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel John G. Lee*and *First Lieutenant Jay D. Fischer*were on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

ROBERT E. Quinn, Chief Judge:

The law officer admitted a pretrial statement of the accused over the objection of defense counsel on the ground that the statement was obtained in violation of Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Later he instructed the court members on their right to consider the accused’s pretrial statement. The instruction is substantially similar to that which we held to be erroneous in United States v Jones, 7 USCMA 623, 23 CMR 87. The erroneous instruction was not induced or waived by the accused or his counsel. See United States v Schwed, 8 USCMA 305, 24 CMR 115. Since it may have deprived the accused of a substantial right accorded to him by the Uniform Code, the conviction must be set aside. United States v Yearty, 8 USCMA 191, 23 CMR 415.

The decision of the board of review is reversed. The findings of guilty and the sentence are set aside. A rehearing may be ordered.

Judge Ferguson concurs.

Judge Latimer dissents.