JAMES WEBB 

SPACE TELESCOPE

Project Meeting 

Commitments but 

Current Technical, 

Cost, and Schedule 

Challenges Could 

Affect Continued 

Progress

Report to Congressional Committees

January 2014

GAO-14-72

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-72, a report to 

congressional committees

January 2014

JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE

Project Meeting Commitments but Current Technical,

Cost, and Schedule Challenges Could Affect 

Continued Progress

Why GAO Did This Study

JWST is one of NASA‘s most complex 

and costly science projects. Effective 

execution of the project is critical given 

the potential effect further cost 

increases could have on NASA’s 

science portfolio. The project was 

rebaselined in 2011 with a 78 percent 

life-cycle cost estimate increase —now

$8.8 billion—and a launch delay of 52 

months—now October 2018. GAO has 

made a number of prior 

recommendations, including that the 

project perform an updated cost and 

schedule risk analysis to improve cost 

estimates. GAO was mandated to 

assess the program annually and 

report on its progress. This is the 

second such report. 

This report assesses the (1) extent to 

which the JWST project is meeting its 

cost and schedule commitments and 

maintaining oversight, (2) current major 

technological challenges facing the 

project, (3) extent to which cost risks 

exist that may threaten the project’s 

ability to execute as planned, and (4) 

extent to which the JWST project 

schedule is reliable based on 

scheduling best practices. GAO 

reviewed relevant NASA and 

contractor documents, interviewed 

NASA and contractor officials, and 

compared the project schedule with 

best practices criteria.

What GAO Recommends

Congress should consider directing 

NASA to perform an updated 

integrated cost/schedule risk analysis.

GAO recommends that NASA address

issues related to low cost reserves and

perform schedule risk analyses on the 

three subsystem schedules GAO 

reviewed. NASA concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is generally executing to its 

September 2011 revised cost and schedule baseline; however, several 

challenges remain that could affect continued progress. The National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has requested funding that is in 

line with the rebaseline and the project is maintaining 14 months of schedule 

reserve prior to its launch date. Performance data from the prime contractor

indicate that generally work is being accomplished on schedule and at the cost 

expected; however, monthly performance declined in fiscal year 2013. Project 

officials have maintained and enhanced project oversight by, for example, 

continuing quarterly NASA and contractor management meetings and instituting 

a tool to update cost estimates for internal efforts. Program officials, however, are

not planning to perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk analysis, as 

GAO recommended in 2012, stating that the project performs monthly integrated 

risk analyses they believe are adequate. Updating the more comprehensive 

analysis with a more refined schedule and current risks, however, would provide 

management and stakeholders with better information to gauge progress.

The JWST project has made progress addressing some technical challenges that 

GAO reported in 2012, such as inadequate spacecraft mass margin, but others

have persisted, causing subsystem development delays and cost increases. For 

example, the development and delivery schedule of the cryocooler—which cools 

one instrument—was deemed unattainable by the subcontractor due to technical 

issues and its contract was modified in August 2013 for the second time in less 

than 2 years, leading to a cumulative 120 percent increase in contract costs.

While recent modifications have been made, execution of the cryocooler remains 

a concern given that technical performance and schedule issues persist.

Overall the project is maintaining a significant amount of cost reserves; however, 

low levels of near-term cost reserves could limit its ability to continue to meet 

future cost and schedule commitments. Development challenges have required 

the project to allocate a significant portion of cost reserves in fiscal year 2014. 

Adequate cost reserves for the prime contractor are also a concern in fiscal years 

2014 and 2015 given the rate at which these cost reserves are being used.

Limited reserves could require work to be extended or work to address project 

risks to be deferred—a contributing factor to the project’s prior performance

issues. Potential sequestration and funding challenges on other major NASA 

projects could limit the project's ability to address near-term challenges.

GAO’s analysis of three subsystem schedules determined that the reliability of 

the project’s integrated master schedule—which is dependent on the reliability of 

JWST’s subsystem schedules—is questionable. GAO's analysis found that the 

Optical Telescope Element (OTE) schedule was unreliable because it could not 

adequately identify a critical path—the earliest completion date or minimum 

duration it will take to complete all project activities, which informs officials of the

effects that a slip of one activity may have on other activities. In addition, reliable 

schedule risk analyses of the OTE, the cryocooler, or the Integrated Science 

Instrument Module schedules were not performed. A schedule risk analysis is a 

best practice that gives confidence that estimates are credible based on known 

risks so the schedule can be relied upon to track progress.

View GAO-14-72. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Letter 1

Background 3

JWST Project Is Generally Executing to Its 2011 Cost and 

Schedule Baseline; Recent Performance Has Declined 11

Project Made Progress Addressing Technical Risks; Challenges 

Persist 20

Near-term Funding Constraints May Limit Project’s Ability to Meet 

Future Commitments 26

Selected JWST Schedules Demonstrate Many Best Practices, but 

Identified Weaknesses Erode Confidence in the Project’s 

Integrated Master Schedule 30

Conclusions 36

Matter for Congressional Consideration 37

Recommendations for Executive Action 37

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41

Appendix II Subsystems of the JWST Observatory 45

Appendix III The Four Characteristics and Ten Best Practices of a High-Quality 

and Reliable Schedule 46

Appendix IV Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 47

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49

Tables

Table 1: Status of James Webb Space Telescope Top-level 

Project Milestones 17

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Table 2: Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM), Optical 

Telescope Element (OTE), and Cryocooler Schedule 

Results for Characteristics and Associated Best Practices 

of a High-Quality and Reliable Schedule 32

Figures

Figure 1: James Webb Space Telescope 4

Figure 2: Components of the Mid-Infrared Instrument Cryocooler 5

Figure 3: James Webb Space Telescope 2008 Baseline and 

Revised 2011 Schedules 8

Figure 4: Organizational Chart for the James Webb Space 

Telescope Program 9

Figure 5: Cumulative and Monthly CPI for the James Webb Space 

Telescope Prime Contract from August 2012 to July 2013 13

Figure 6: Project Integration and Test (I&T) Timeline 15

Figure 7: Cumulative and Monthly SPI for the James Webb Space 

Telescope Prime Contract from August 2012 to July 2013 18

Figure 8: James Webb Space Telescope Fiscal Year 2014 and 

2015 Project-held Reserves Remaining as of September 

2013 Based on Allocations in Fiscal Year 2013 27

Figure 9: Subsystems of JWST: Interactive Information 45
Page iii GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Abbreviations

CPI cost performance index

EVM earned value management

FGS Fine Guidance Sensor

I&T integration and test

ICRP Independent Comprehensive Review Panel 

ISIM Integrated Science Instrument Module

JCL Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

JWST James Webb Space Telescope

K Kelvin 

MIRI Mid-Infrared Instrument

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NIRCam Near-Infrared Camera

NIRISS Near-Infrared Imager and Slitless Spectrograph

NIRSpec Near-Infrared Spectrograph

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements

OTE Optical Telescope Element

OTIS Optical Telescope Element and Integrated Science 

 Instrument Module

SPI schedule performance index

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

January 8, 2014

Congressional Committees

At a current expected cost of approximately $8.8 billion, the James Webb 

Space Telescope (JWST) is one of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) most complex and costly science projects. 

Effective execution of the JWST project is critical given the tradeoffs that 

the agency made to ensure that it was well-funded and the potential 

impact that any future cost increases or delays could have on the health 

of NASA’s overall science portfolio. Specifically, based on the cost and 

schedule estimates established in 2011, the cost of the project is almost 

nine times the cost in its original plan established in 1999, and the impact 

of funding JWST for more years than originally anticipated has 

significantly decreased the amount of funds NASA has available to begin 

work on other major projects. NASA will have the opportunity over the 

next few years, during the course of several very complex test events, to 

demonstrate the credibility of the 2011 plan. While additional setbacks are 

to be expected given the technically challenging and complex nature of 

the project, much is at stake, including the progress NASA has made in 

restoring the confidence of Congress and other decision makers in its 

ability to effectively plan for and execute major acquisitions.

The on-time and on-budget delivery of JWST is a high congressional 

priority. In November 2011, the conference report for the Consolidated 

and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, mandated GAO to 

assess the program annually and to report to the Committees on 

Appropriations on key issues relating to program and risk management, 

achievement of cost and schedule goals, and program technical status.1

In our first report, issued in 2012, we assessed the reliability of NASA’s 

revised cost estimate based on best practices, the major risks and 

technological challenges facing the project, and NASA’s oversight of the 

JWST project.2

 1

H.R. Rep. No. 112-284, at 254 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).

This report is our second in response to that mandate. For 

this report, we assessed (1) the extent to which the JWST project is 

meeting its cost and schedule commitments and maintaining oversight, 

2

GAO, James Webb Space Telescope: Actions Needed to Improve Cost Estimate and 

Oversight of Test and Integration, GAO-13-4 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2012).
Page 2 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

(2) the current major technological challenges facing the JWST project, 

(3) the extent to which cost risks exist that may threaten the project’s 

ability to execute as planned, and (4) the extent to which the JWST 

project schedule is reliable based on scheduling best practices.

Our approach included an examination of the overall cost and schedule 

progress that NASA has made since our last report in December 2012 

and the JWST program changes made in 2011. We examined and 

analyzed earned value management data; analyzed the progress made 

and any variances to milestones established during the replan in 2011; 

and interviewed officials from the JWST program, various contractors, 

and the Defense Contract Management Agency to determine the extent 

to which oversight was being conducted. To identify the major 

technological risks and challenges facing the project, we reviewed the 

project’s risk database, monthly status reviews, and other documentation. 

We also interviewed project and contractor officials for the major 

subsystems. To identify the cost risks that may threaten the project’s 

ability to execute as planned, we examined data on JWST’s cost reserve 

posture and reviewed project and contractor documentation on risks to 

maintaining cost targets and plans to mitigate those risks. We took steps 

to confirm the accuracy of the data and performed various checks to 

determine that the data provided was reliable enough for our purposes. 

To determine the extent to which the JWST project schedule can be 

relied on to accurately represent the potential impact of schedule risks 

and technical challenges, we analyzed three subsystem schedules that 

are used as inputs to the integrated master schedule using scheduling 

best practices.3

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to January 

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

We also conducted interviews with project and contractor 

management, schedulers, and analyzed project and contractor 

documentation concerning scheduling policies and practices. See 

appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology.

 3

GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, 

GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).
Page 3 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

JWST is a large deployable, infrared-optimized space telescope intended 

to be the scientific successor to the aging Hubble Space Telescope. 

JWST is designed for a 5-year mission to find the first stars and trace the 

evolution of galaxies from their beginning to their current formation, and is 

intended to operate in an orbit approximately 1.5 million kilometers—or 1 

million miles—from the Earth. With its 6.5-meter primary mirror, JWST will 

be able to operate at 100 times the sensitivity of the Hubble Space 

Telescope. A tennis-court-sized sunshield will protect the mirrors and 

instruments from the sun’s heat to allow the JWST to look at very faint 

infrared sources. The Hubble Telescope operates primarily in the visible 

and ultraviolet regions of the electromagnetic spectrum.4 The observatory 

segment of JWST includes several major subsystems.5 These 

subsystems are being developed through a mixture of NASA, contractor, 

and international partner efforts. See figure 1.

 4

The electromagnetic spectrum consists of the wavelengths of all visible and invisible 

light. The infrared part of the spectrum, also known as radiant heat, has wavelengths that 

go from about 0.75 microns to a few hundred microns. The Hubble is designed to operate 

primarily in the ultraviolet and visible wavelengths of the spectrum from 0.1 to 0.8 microns. 

Humans cannot see in the ultraviolet region.

5

The JWST project is divided into three major segments: the launch segment, the ground 

segment, and the observatory segment. The hardware configuration created when the 

Optical Telescope Element and the Integrated Science Instrument Module are integrated, 

referred to as OTIS, is not considered a subsystem by NASA, but we categorize it as such 

for ease of discussion. 

Background
Page 4 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 1: James Webb Space Telescope

Sources: GAO (analysis); NASA (data and images).

Interactive Graphic Rollover the white dots to see description. See appendix II for the non-interactive, printer-friendly version.

Integrated Science

Instrument Module

Optical 

Telescope

Element

Spacecraft

Sunshield

Optical Telescope &

Integrated Science

Instrument Module
Page 5 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

The Mid-Infrared Instrument (MIRI)—one of JWST’s four instruments in 

the Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM)—requires a dedicated, 

interdependent two-stage cooler system designed to bring the optics to 

the required temperature of 6.7 Kelvin (K), just above absolute zero. This 

system is referred to as a cryocooler. See figure 2 for a depiction of the 

cooling system on JWST.

Figure 2: Components of the Mid-Infrared Instrument Cryocooler

Note: Not drawn to scale.

The cryocooler moves helium gas through 10 meters (approximately 33 

feet) of refrigerant lines from the sun-facing surface of the JWST 

observatory to the colder shaded side where the ISIM is located. 

According to NASA officials, a cooler system of this configuration, with so 

much separation between the beginning and final cooling components, 

has never been developed or flown in space before. Project officials 

stated that the MIRI cryocooler is particularly complex and challenging 

Optimal Environment for 

Instrument to Function
Page 6 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

because of this relatively great distance between cooling components 

located in different temperature regions of the observatory and the need 

to overcome multiple sources of unwanted heat through the regions 

before the system can cool MIRI. Specifically, the cooling components 

span temperatures ranging from approximately 300K (about 80 degrees 

Fahrenheit, or room temperature) where the spacecraft is located on the 

sun-facing surface of the telescope to approximately 40K (about -388 

degrees Fahrenheit) within the ISIM.

Since entering development in 1999, JWST has experienced significant 

schedule delays and increases to project costs. Prior to being approved 

for development, cost estimates of the project originally ranged from $1 

billion to $3.5 billion with expected launch dates ranging from 2007 to 

2011. In March 2005, NASA increased the JWST’s life-cycle cost 

estimate to $4.5 billion and delayed the launch date to 2013. We reported 

in 2006 that the cost growth was due to a delay in launch vehicle 

selection, budget limitations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, requirements 

changes, and an increase in the project’s reserve funding—funding used 

to mitigate issues that arise but which were previously unknown.6

In response to a request from the Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on 

Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies to the NASA 

Administrator for an independent review of JWST—stemming from the 

In April 

2006, an Independent Review Team confirmed that the project’s technical 

content was complete and sound, but expressed concern over the 

project’s reserve funding, reporting that it was too low and phased in too 

late in the development lifecycle. The review team reported that for a 

project as complex as JWST, a 25 to 30 percent total reserve funding was 

appropriate. The team cautioned that low reserve funding compromised 

the project’s ability to resolve issues, address risk areas, and 

accommodate unknown problems. The project was baselined in April 

2009 with a life-cycle cost estimate of $4.964 billion—including additional 

cost reserves—and a launch date in June 2014. Shortly after JWST was 

approved for development and its cost and schedule estimates were 

baselined, project costs continued to increase and the schedule was 

extended. 

 6

GAO, NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach 

Key to Addressing Program Challenges, GAO-06-634 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2006).

History of Cost Growth, 

Low Project Reserves, 

and Schedule Delays
Page 7 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

project’s cost increases and reports that the June 2014 launch date was 

in jeopardy—NASA commissioned the Independent Comprehensive 

Review Panel (ICRP). In October 2010, the ICRP issued its report and 

cited several reasons for the project’s problems including management, 

budgeting, oversight, governance and accountability, and communication 

issues.7

 7

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Independent Comprehensive Review Panel 

(ICRP): Final Report (Oct. 29, 2010).

The panel concluded JWST was executing well from a technical 

standpoint, but that the baseline funding did not reflect the most probable 

cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in 

an unexecutable project. Following this review, the JWST program 

underwent a replan in September 2011 and was reauthorized by 

Congress in November 2011, which placed an $8 billion cap on the 

formulation and development costs for the project. On the basis of the 

replan, NASA announced that the project would be rebaselined with a lifecycle cost at $8.835 billion—a 78 percent increase—and would launch in 

October 2018—a delay of 52 months. The revised life-cycle cost estimate 

included 13 months of funded schedule reserve. In the President’s Fiscal 

Year 2013 budget request, NASA reported a 66 percent joint cost and 

schedule confidence level associated with these estimates. A joint cost 

and schedule confidence level, or JCL, is the process NASA uses to 

assign a percentage to the probable success of meeting cost and 

schedule targets and is part of the project’s estimating process. Figure 3 

shows the original baseline schedule and the revised 2011 baseline for 

JWST.
Page 8 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 3: James Webb Space Telescope 2008 Baseline and Revised 2011 Schedules

As part of the replan in 2011, JWST was restructured and is now a single 

project program reporting directly to the NASA Associate Administrator for 

programmatic oversight and to the Associate Administrator for the 

Science Mission Directorate for technical and analysis support.8

 8

A project typically reports to a program within a mission directorate, such as the Science 

Mission Directorate. A similar reporting structure was also instituted in the past with both 

the Hubble Space Telescope and the Mars Exploration Program when they began 

experiencing significant cost and schedule issues. For JWST, the change was made in 

response to recommendations from the ICRP.

Goddard 

Space Flight Center is the NASA center responsible for the management 

of JWST. See figure 4 for the current JWST organizational chart.
Page 9 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 4: Organizational Chart for the James Webb Space Telescope Program
Page 10 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

In 2012, we reported on numerous technical challenges and risks the 

project was facing.9 For example, a combination of numerous instrument 

delays and leaks in the cryocooler’s bypass valves resulted in the use of 

18 of ISIM’s 26 months of schedule reserve and the potential for more 

schedule reserve to be consumed. Additionally, we identified that the 

current JWST schedule reserve lacked flexibility for the last three 

integration and testing events (OTIS, the spacecraft, and observatory), 

planned for April 2016 through May 2018. While there was a total of 14 

months of schedule reserve for all five integration and test events—when 

problems are more likely to be found—only 7 months were likely to be 

available for these last three efforts. We also reported that the spacecraft 

exceeded the mass limit for its launch vehicle and that project officials 

were concerned about the mass of JWST since the inception of the 

project because of the telescope’s size and limits of the launch vehicle.10

In our December 2012 report, we made numerous recommendations 

focused on providing high-fidelity cost information for monitoring project 

progress and ensuring technical risks and challenges were being 

effectively managed and sustaining oversight. One recommendation was 

that the project should perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk, 

or JCL, analysis. In addition, we recommended that the JWST project 

conduct a separate review to determine the readiness to conduct 

integration and test activities prior to the beginning of the OTIS and 

spacecraft integration and test efforts. NASA concurred with these two 

recommendations.

In addition to these technical challenges, we reported that the lack of 

detail in the summary schedule used for JWST’s JCL analysis during the 

2011 replan prevented us from sufficiently understanding how risks were 

incorporated, calling into question the results of that analysis and, 

therefore, the reliability of the replanned cost estimate.

 9

GAO-13-4

10Mass is a measurement of how much matter is in an object. It is related to an object’s 

weight, which is mathematically equivalent to mass multiplied by acceleration due to 

gravity. The project uses mass for JWST because when it goes into space, its weight 

changes with gravity, but its mass stays the same.

GAO Reviewed JWST 

Project in 2012
Page 11 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

The JWST project is generally executing to its September 2011 revised 

cost and schedule baseline. Through the administration’s annual budget 

submissions, NASA has requested funding for JWST that is in line with 

the rebaseline plan and the project is maintaining 14 months of schedule 

reserve to its October 2018 launch date. Cumulative performance data 

from the prime contractor, which is responsible for more than 40 percent 

of JWST’s remaining $2.76 billion in development costs, indicate that 

work is being accomplished on schedule and at the cost expected. 

Monthly cost and schedule metrics, however, indicate that this 

performance has been declining since early 2013. The JWST project is 

maintaining oversight established as part of the replan, for example, by 

continuing quarterly NASA and contractor management meetings and 

instituting a cost and schedule tracking tool for internal efforts. The 

project, however, is not planning to perform an updated integrated cost 

and schedule risk analysis, which would provide management and 

stakeholders with information to continually gauge progress against the 

baseline estimates.

The JWST project is executing to the cost commitment agreed to during 

the September 2011 rebaseline. Since that time, NASA’s funding 

requests for JWST have been consistent with the budget profile of the 

new cost rebaseline. For fiscal year 2013, the funding the project 

received—almost $628 million—matched the agency’s budget request. In 

addition, the project has been able to absorb cost increases on various 

subsystems through the use of its cost reserves. Project officials remain 

confident that they can meet their commitments, and stay within an $8 

billion development cost cap recommended by congressional conferees, 

if funding is provided as agreed during the replan.

Performance data from contractors show that planned work was generally 

being performed within expected costs, but performance has declined 

over the past year. The project collects earned value management (EVM) 

cost data from several of its major contractors and subcontractors.11

 11Earned value management is a project management tool that integrates the technical 

scope of work with schedule and cost elements and compares the value of work 

accomplished in a given period with the value of the work expected in that period. When 

used properly, earned value management can provide objective assessments of project 

progress, produce early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, 

and provide unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at completion. As a best practice, the 

work breakdown structure should match the schedule, cost estimate, and earned value 

management system at a high level so that it clearly reflects the work to be done.

EVM 

JWST Project Is 

Generally Executing 

to Its 2011 Cost and 

Schedule Baseline; 

Recent Performance 

Has Declined

Rebaselined Cost 

Commitments Are Being 

Met; Recent Work Is 

Costing More Than 

Planned
Page 12 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

data for Northrop Grumman—the project’s prime contractor which is 

responsible for more than 40 percent of the remaining development 

costs—indicates that cumulatively from May 2011 work planned is being 

performed at the cost expected.12 This measure, known as the cumulative 

cost performance index (CPI), provides an indication of how a contractor 

has performed over an extended period of time. The CPI indicates that 

until June 2013 the contractor performed slightly more work for the cost 

incurred than what was expected.13

 12Project officials state that they reached agreement on a revised cost estimate for the 

work being performed by Northrop Grumman as part to the replan; however, the contract 

modification was not signed until December 2013.

Recent monthly performance, 

however, has begun to lower the cumulative index. From December 2012 

until June 2013, monthly CPI data, which gives an indication of current 

performance, show that the contractor has been accomplishing less work 

than planned for the cost incurred. See figure 5.

13Cost performance index (CPI), the ratio of work performed (or earned value) to actual 

costs for work performed. A CPI less than 1 is unfavorable, because work is being 

performed less efficiently than planned; a CPI greater than 1 is favorable, implying that 

work is being performed more efficiently than planned. CPI can be expressed in dollars: 

0.9 means that for every dollar spent, the program has received 90 cents worth of 

completed work. The CPI is calculated both from the monthly EVM data reported and as a 

cumulative metric from the establishment of the baseline. 
Page 13 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 5: Cumulative and Monthly CPI for the James Webb Space Telescope Prime 

Contract from August 2012 to July 2013

Although several subsystems are experiencing positive performance, cost 

overruns on spacecraft-related development activities are contributing to 

this recent trend. For example, Northrop Grumman has reported negative 

performance within the spacecraft systems engineering and the electrical 

power subsystems activities for a 6-month period as of the end of June 

2013. We calculate that this contract, which is approximately two-thirds 

complete, could experience a slight cost overrun based on current data. 

Northrop Grumman is using cost management reserves to offset the 

decline in performance, but the JWST project reports that Northrop 

Grumman is consuming cost reserves at a rate faster than planned.

Contractor EVM cost data for ITT/Exelis—which is providing services 

related to the OTE and OTIS integration and test efforts—also indicate 

that in recent months the contractor has been accomplishing less work 

than planned for the cost incurred. ITT/Exelis has experienced cost 

overruns in each month from March through June 2013, which has 

lowered the cumulative CPI to 0.98. Project officials told us that the 

ITT/Exelis has sufficient cost reserves to offset the recent cost overruns 

and that a cumulative CPI of 0.98 is within the range of acceptable 
Page 14 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

performance. Best practices indicate that a CPI of 1.0 or above is 

favorable.

14

In addition to the work being performed by contractors, the JWST project 

also performs development work internally at NASA’s Goddard Space 

Flight Center. For example, the project internally manages the ISIM 

development effort that is expected to cost over $1 billion, which includes 

the first of five major integration and test efforts. The current estimated 

cost at completion for ISIM as calculated by the project has risen more 

than $109 million—a 9.8 percent increase—since the 2011 rebaseline of 

the project. The cost overrun is primarily because of late instrument 

deliveries and is being accommodated through the use of project 

reserves.

We found small cost overruns across many elements of the 

work being performed by ITT/Exelis, similar to the analysis performed by 

the project. Based on our analysis of EVM data through the end of July 

2013, we estimate that this contract could experience a small cost 

overrun. As of July 2013, ITT/Exelis had completed a little more than onethird of the planned work for this contract and used more than 44 percent 

of available management reserves from October 2012 to July 2013.

The JWST project is executing to the baseline schedule commitment 

agreed to during the September 2011 rebaseline. The JWST project 

continues to report 14 months of schedule reserve to its October 2018 

launch date, pending a review of the need to use schedule reserve based 

on the impacts of the government shutdown in October 2013. See figure 

6.

 14GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).

JWST Is Executing to Its 

Rebaselined Schedule; 

Recent Work Is Taking 

Longer Than Planned
Page 15 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 6: Project Integration and Test (I&T) Timeline

We found in 2012 that the 7 months of schedule reserve held by the OTE 

subsystem will likely be used during its integration and test, prior to 

delivery to OTIS. If the OTE integration and test effort uses schedule 

reserve beyond those 7 months, it will reduce the amount of schedule 

reserve available for the last three integration and test efforts. Northrop 

Grumman officials said that the OTE integration and test effort is very 

sequential and does not offer much flexibility to allow for changes to the 

process flow. The integration and test of OTE must be complete for the 

OTIS integration effort to begin on schedule. In December 2013, the 

project indicated that the 14 months of total schedule reserve held by the 

project was being assessed due to delivery problems with portions of the 

observatory’s sunshield and the impact of the government shutdown.

Because of instrument and hardware delays and non-availability of a test 

chamber, the project now reports 7 months of schedule reserve

associated with the ISIM integration and test effort before it is needed for 

integration with the OTE subsystem to form OTIS. Previously, the project 
Page 16 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

reported that ISIM had almost 8 months of schedule reserve, which did 

not account for the delayed start of the first scheduled cryo-vacuum test—

in which a test chamber is used to simulate the near-absolute zero 

temperatures in space. The current 7 months of schedule reserve for the 

ISIM integrations and test effort does not include the impact of any 

potential delays due to the government shutdown in October 2013, which 

was still being determined in mid-December 2013. The first cryo-vacuum 

test was considered a risk reduction test by the project because it did not 

include two of the project’s four instruments and was to test procedures 

and the ground support equipment to be used in later cryo-vacuum tests 

of ISIM. During the replan, this test was scheduled to begin in February 

2013, but was delayed until August 2013 because of several issues, 

including availability of the test chamber and delays in development and 

delivery of a radiator for the harness that holds electrical wiring. Project 

officials said they will adjust the ISIM schedule to minimize the schedule 

impact by performing some activities concurrently, delaying some 

activities until after the first cryo-vacuum test, and removing some 

activities. They added that a recently approved September 2013 revision 

to the ISIM schedule only reduced schedule reserve by 1 week and no 

additional risk will be incurred based on these changes to the ISIM 

schedule. The two subsequent cryo-vacuum tests, however, have slipped 

up to 2 months in the latest revision to the ISIM schedule, although 

project officials state that the April 2016 completion date for ISIM testing 

and delivery to the OTIS integration and test effort remains unchanged. 

According to the JWST program manager, however, the first cryo-vacuum 

test was in process when the government shutdown happened and, 

although many of the testing goals were accomplished through 

prioritization of test activities, the test was terminated once the ISIM staff 

resumed work and some activities were not accomplished. As a result, he 

said that the project would incur more risk in the second cryo-vacuum test 

that is currently scheduled to start in April 2014.

In addition to maintaining up to 14 months of schedule reserve, the 

project is generally meeting the milestones it reports to Congress and 

other external entities. See table 1. These milestones include technical 

reviews prior to the spacecraft critical design review, hardware tests, and 

the delivery of key pieces of hardware. As shown in the table, the project 

has completed the majority of its milestones as planned and has deferred 

six milestones in the past 2 fiscal years. Among the deferred milestones 

are delays to completion of the first ISIM cryo-vacuum test and delivery of 

flight hardware for the MIRI instrument cryocooler.
Page 17 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Table 1: Status of James Webb Space Telescope Top-level Project Milestones

Total 

milestones

Milestones 

completed

Milestones

deferred to future year

Fiscal year 2011 21 21 0

Fiscal year 2012 37 34 3

Fiscal year 2013 41 38 3

Source: GAO presentation of NASA data.

EVM schedule data for Northrop Grumman indicates that the cumulative 

planned work since the new schedule estimate was agreed upon is being 

performed as expected. This measure, known as the cumulative schedule 

performance index (SPI), shows consistent performance at the aggregate 

level for the past year.15

 15Schedule performance index (SPI), the ratio of work performed (or earned value) to the 

initial planned schedule. An SPI less than 1 indicates that work is not being completed as 

planned and the program may be behind schedule if the incomplete work is on the critical 

path; an SPI greater than 1 means work has been completed ahead of the plan. An SPI 

can be thought of as describing work efficiency: 0.9 means that for every dollar planned, 

the program is accomplishing 90 cents worth of work. The SPI is calculated both from the 

monthly EVM data reported and as a cumulative metric from the establishment of the 

baseline. 

However, monthly SPI metrics indicate a slight 

decline in performance in 9 of the 12 months between August 2012 and 

July 2013. See figure 7.
Page 18 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 7: Cumulative and Monthly SPI for the James Webb Space Telescope Prime 

Contract from August 2012 to July 2013

The data from Northrop Grumman in recent months indicates that work is 

slightly behind schedule for the spacecraft subsystem.

The JWST project has maintained the oversight activities put in place 

following the replan and added additional oversight mechanisms. For 

example, some of the oversight activities implemented as part of the 2011 

replan that are still ongoing include

• The JWST Program Director is holding monthly meetings with the 

NASA Associate Administrator,

• The JWST Program Director is holding quarterly meetings with 

Northrop Grumman senior management and the Goddard Space 

Flight Center Director, and

• The JWST Project Spacecraft Manager has relocated to provide an 

on-site presence at the Northrop Grumman facility.

JWST Project Maintained 

and Enhanced Oversight 

Initiatives, but is Not 

Planning to Perform 

Updated Cost and 

Schedule Risk Analysis to 

Support Monitoring of 

Project Progress
Page 19 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

The project also has implemented some new oversight mechanisms since 

the time of our last review in 2012, according to JWST officials. For 

example, the project is implementing a tool to continually update the cost 

estimate for the internal work on the ISIM development activities. In 

addition, the project is working with the Space Telescope Science 

Institute to design a tool, similar to EVM, to monitor progress on ground 

systems development. The project also has added a financial analyst at 

the Northrop Grumman facility to provide the spacecraft manager and the 

project ongoing and increased financial insight of the work being 

performed by Northrop Grumman and to analyze monthly data prior to the 

monthly project business meetings with the contractor. In response to our 

prior recommendation, the project has modified its schedule to add an 

independent review prior to the beginning of the OTIS and spacecraft 

integration and test efforts.16

Despite these improvements in oversight, JWST project officials said that 

they are not planning to perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk 

analysis—or joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) analysis as 

we recommended in 2012.17 GAO’s cost estimating best practices call for 

a risk analysis and risk simulation exercise—like the JCL analysis—to be 

conducted periodically through the life of a program, as risks can 

materialize or change throughout the life of a project.18

 16

Unless properly 

updated on a regular basis, the cost estimate cannot provide decision 

makers and stakeholders with accurate information to assess the current 

status of the project. As we recommended in 2012, updating the project’s 

JCL would provide high-fidelity cost information for monitoring project 

progress. While NASA concurred with our recommendation, project 

GAO-13-4.

17The JCL is a quantitative probability analysis that requires the project to combine its 

cost, schedule, and risks into a complete quantitative picture to help assess whether the 

project will be successfully completed within cost and on schedule. NASA introduced the 

analysis in 2009, and it is among the agency’s initiatives to reduce acquisition 

management risk. The move to probabilistic estimating marks a major departure from 

NASA’s prior practice of establishing a point estimate and adding a percentage on top of 

that point estimate to provide for contingencies. NASA’s procedural requirements state 

that Mission Directorates should plan and budget programs and projects based on a 70 

percent JCL, or at a different level as approved by the Decision Authority of the Agency 

Program Management Council, and any JCL approved at less than 70 percent must be 

justified and documented. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E, NASA Space 

Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, paragraph 2.4.4 (Aug. 14, 2012).

18GAO-09-3SP.
Page 20 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

officials have subsequently stated that they do not plan to conduct an 

updated JCL. A program official stated that the project performs monthly 

integrated programmatic and cost/schedule risk analyses using various 

tools and that the information that these tools provide is adequate for their 

needs. For example, the JWST project conducts on-going risk 

identification, assigning probability and dollar values to the risks, tracks 

actual costs against planned costs to assess the viability of current 

estimates, uses earned value management, and performs schedule 

analyses.

Moreover, while the JWST program manager acknowledged that NASA 

concurred with our recommendation, he said that the agency interpreted 

that it would be sufficient to do these lower level analyses instead of 

performing an updated JCL. NASA, however, has not addressed the 

shortcomings of the schedule that supports the baseline itself. For 

example, we found that the lack of detail in the summary schedule used 

for JWST’s last JCL in May 2011 prevented us from sufficiently 

understanding how risks were incorporated, therefore calling into question 

the results of that analysis. Since the JCL was a key input to the decision 

process of approving the project’s new cost and schedule baseline 

estimates, we maintain that the JWST project should perform an updated 

JCL analysis using a schedule that should now be much more refined and 

accurate and has sufficient detail to map risks to activities and costs in 

addition to the other analyses they currently perform. Doing so could help 

increase the reliability of the cost estimate and the confidence level of the 

JCL. Furthermore, risk management is a continuous process that 

constantly monitors a project’s health. The JWST project is still executing 

to a plan that was based on the JCL performed in May 2011. The risks 

the project is currently facing are different than those identified during the 

JCL process more than 2 years ago, and will likely continue to evolve as 

JWST is still many years from launch.

The JWST project has made progress in addressing some technical risks; 

however, other technical challenges exist that have caused development 

delays and cost increases at the subsystem level. The project and its 

contractors have nearly addressed a problematic valve issue in the MIRI 

cryocooler that has been a concern for several years, the OTE and ISIM 

development efforts have made progress over the past year, and both the 

project and contractors have remedied the spacecraft mass issue that we 

reported on last year. The project has other technical issues, however, 

that still need to be resolved. For example, there is a separate and 

significant performance issue with the cryocooler and though project 

Project Made 

Progress Addressing 

Technical Risks; 

Challenges Persist
Page 21 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

officials state that they understand the issue, the subcontractor is still 

working to validate the changes made to the cryocooler to address the 

issue. These issues with the cryocooler have led to an increase of about 

120 percent in cryocooler contract costs and the execution of the 

remaining cryocooler effort will be challenging. In addition, the OTE and 

ISIM efforts are still addressing risks that threaten their schedules.

Despite progress in some areas, the cryocooler development effort has 

been and remains a technical challenge for the project. The cryocooler 

subcontractor has addressed much of the valve leak issue that we 

reported on in 2012, and all but the last of the replacement valves, which 

were produced with new seal materials, have successfully completed 

testing. While resolution of this issue will be a positive step for the project, 

other, still unresolved issues with the cryocooler have arisen that have 

required additional cost and schedule resources to address. Specifically, 

a key component of the cryocooler underperformed prior tests of this 

technology by about 30 percent. In addition, both the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory (JPL)—which awarded the cryocooler subcontract—and the 

subcontractor were focused on addressing the valve issue, which limited 

their attention to the cooling underperformance issue. In late 2012, the 

cryocooler subcontractor reported that it would be unable to meet the 

cryocooler schedule. The subcontractor is working toward a revised test 

schedule, agreed upon in April 2013, which delays acceptance testing 

and includes concurrent testing of hardware.19

Various issues may have contributed to the current problems with the 

cryocooler. For example, according to project and JPL officials they had 

not verified the cryocooler cost and schedule estimates provided by the 

subcontractor prior to the project establishing new baseline cost and 

In August 2013, the 

cryocooler subcontract was modified to reflect a 69 percent cost increase. 

Additionally, the number of subcontractor staff assigned to the cryocooler 

subcontract has increased from 40 to approximately 110, which accounts 

for a significant portion of the cost increase. This was the second time in 

less than 2 years that the cryocooler subcontract was modified. 

Cumulatively, the cryocooler subcontract value has increased by about 

120 percent from March 2012.

 19Acceptance testing evaluates whether a specific component meets specifications and is 

suitable for flight.

Despite Progress, 

Cryocooler Performance 

Issues Led to Multiple 

Replans, Increased Costs, 

and Schedule Delays
Page 22 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

schedule estimates in 2011. Doing so may have allowed them to ensure 

adequate resources were accounted for in the new baseline estimates. 

JPL officials stated that the subcontractor proposal was verified prior to 

the completion of the March 2012 cryocooler replan. The subcontractor, 

however, reported that the 2012 replan did not include cost or schedule 

allowance for rework should additional problems arise, which did happen. 

In addition, despite erratic and negative EVM data from the subcontractor 

immediately following the March 2012 cryocooler replan, an in-depth 

review was not initiated until 9 months later by the cryocooler 

subcontractor. JPL officials stated that, during this time, they were 

performing analysis of the EVM data and the technical progress of the 

subcontractor and provided the results of their analysis to the project. 

Finally, the project had not followed key best practices since early in 

development, which left it at an increased risk of cost and schedule 

delays. For example, best practices call for testing of a model or 

prototype of a critical technology in its flight-like form, fit, and function and 

in a simulated realistic or high fidelity lab environment by its preliminary 

design review. While the subcontractor tested a demonstration model of 

the cryocooler in such an environment and the project assessed the 

technology as mature in 2008, a project official acknowledges that the 

demonstration model’s mechanical design was different than what would 

be used in space and, according to that official, those differences led to 

the loss of performance between the demonstration model and the 

current cryocooler. In addition, only 60 percent of the cryocooler’s 

expected design drawings were released as of the mission critical design 

review—well below the best practice standard of 90 percent drawings 

released by critical design review—indicating that the project moved 

forward without a stable cryocooler design as well as an immature 

cryocooler technology, which increases risk.

The execution of the remaining cryocooler schedule will continue to be 

challenging as the performance issue is not resolved, the revised 

schedule is optimistic, the subcontractor has identified significant risks not 

incorporated in the rebaseline, and there are risks associated with the 

revised testing approach. The cryocooler subcontractor has developed a 

separate verification model, which is now being used to validate that the 

cryocooler redesign will address the underperformance. This step is 

important because, according to the cryocooler subcontractor program 

manager, the internal structures of the cryocooler component are intricate 

and once a unit is completed the internal structure cannot be modified. 

Thus, when issues arise, such as use of incorrect parts or unexpected 

underperformance, a new unit must be built rather than simply changing 

parts on the underperforming cryocooler component. Testing of the 
Page 23 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

verification model, which will give an indication of whether the 

performance issue has been rectified and a new flight model can be built, 

was scheduled to be complete in October 2013, but has been delayed. 

The subcontractor project manager reports that issues were found with 

processes used to assemble the verification model that must be resolved 

before testing resumes, which is not expected until at least late December

2013. This delay may reduce the amount of schedule margin available to 

the overall cryocooler effort.

The cryocooler schedule—agreed upon in April 2013—was optimistic, 

according to the cryocooler subcontractor program manager. Shortly after 

the new schedule was put in place, he told us that he had low confidence 

that the subcontractor would be able to meet this schedule based on the 

development issues mentioned above. In addition, the JPL scheduler for 

the cryocooler said that he had only moderate confidence of the 

subcontractor’s ability to meet this schedule. In line with their concerns, 

the cryocooler subcontractor recently depleted all of its schedule reserve 

for deliveries to JPL prior to the start of acceptance testing. The 

cryocooler subcontractor also identified other risks that could impact its 

execution of the subcontract, but that were not included as part of the 

rebaseline plan in the modified subcontract. The project retained financial 

responsibility for addressing those risks, should they arise, at the project 

level by identifying over $8 million in cost reserves in fiscal years 2014 

and 2015. However, some of these risks could require significantly more 

than $8 million to address. For example, the cryocooler subcontractor 

program manager stated that some of these risks, if realized, could take a 

year to mitigate. As of September 2013, delivery dates agreed to in April 

2013 for all of the major flight and spare cryocooler components have 

been delayed, all six weeks of schedule reserve being held at the 

cryocooler subcontractor had been exhausted, and the start of 

acceptance testing at JPL has been delayed. Any further delays will have 

to be accommodated through the use of 12 weeks of schedule reserve 

held by JPL. The cryocooler subcontractor also recently began reporting 

EVM data based on the latest cost and schedule estimates and, in line 

with the delays mentioned above, this data already shows that work is 

costing more and taking longer than planned. JPL’s schedule reserve 

also has to support any issues that arise during acceptance and end-to-
Page 24 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

end testing of the cryocooler hardware prior to delivery to the spacecraft 

integration and test effort.20

In an effort to reduce this risk, the project reordered the integration and 

test schedule. This removed some, but not all, of the cryocooler 

component testing schedule risk, which may limit the project’s ability to 

address issues that arise during component testing. Specifically, two 

major spare components of the cryocooler will still be in acceptance 

testing when spacecraft integration and test begins in April 2016, which is 

also a risk to the spacecraft integration and test schedule. For example, if 

a particular cryocooler component fails during one test and a spare 

component is still undergoing acceptance testing, then the test schedule 

may be delayed waiting for repairs to be made to the component or for 

the spare component to be available.

Northrop Grumman has made progress on the OTE, but the project 

expects the contractor to use its current schedule reserve and the OTE is 

facing risks that may impact the schedule if they are realized. Progress 

has been made over the past year in fabricating the OTE support 

structure, which holds the mirrors and ISIM and connects all the pieces of 

the observatory. Specifically, all of the support structure sections have 

been completed and fully integrated and the structure has entered 

cryovacuum testing. The project is tracking an issue with release 

mechanisms holding the spacecraft and the OTE together while stowed 

within the launch vehicle and used during the deployment of the 

telescope after launch. Currently the mechanisms are causing excessive 

shock vibration when released. According to a NASA official, the project 

and the contractor are evaluating potential solutions which include 

changes to the design of the release mechanism, using damping 

materials to lessen the impact to the spacecraft, and testing to see if the 

shock requirement can be relaxed. The project has delayed the release 

mechanism design review until January 2014—after the spacecraft critical 

design review—while it works to mitigate the issue with contractors. 

Project officials stated the results of this component level design review 

will be evaluated prior to a larger mission review to be held later in 2014.

In December 2013, the project was also assessing the possibility that 

 20The end-to-end test, which includes representative components to simulate portions of 

the MIRI, will evaluate the performance of the entire cryocooler rather than individual 

components.

OTE and ISIM Have Made 

Progress but Face Risks 

That May Impact Schedule
Page 25 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

portions of the observatory’s sunshield may be delivered up to 3 months 

late, which could impact the amount of schedule reserve being held by 

the project. The project indicates that it is considering options by the 

contractor to recover some of that potential schedule delay.

The project has made progress on various portions of the ISIM as well. 

For example, two of the four instruments have been integrated into the 

ISIM for testing and fabrication of replacement near infrared detectors 

used in three of the four instruments—which we reported in 2012 may 

need to be replaced—is ahead of schedule. Prior schedule conflicts with 

another NASA project, however, delayed the start of the ISIM integration 

and test effort and instrument and component delays are further 

threatening the ISIM integration and test schedule which may lead to 

additional cost increases. The project has already replanned the ISIM 

schedule flow due, in part, to delays with the Near-Infrared Camera 

(NIRCam) and Near-Infrared Spectrograph (NIRSpec) instruments. 

Specifically, the NIRSpec instrument and NIRCam’s optics were delivered 

more than a year behind schedule. NIRSpec completed environmental 

testing and was delivered to Goddard in late September 2013. An 

electronics component of the NIRCam instrument, however, failed 

functional testing following a vibration test possibly due to manufacturing 

defects. The contractor has developed an approach to screen similar 

components to verify whether those components have similar anomalies. 

If the components pass the screening process, then environmental testing 

will continue with a spare in place of the component that malfunctioned. If 

all of the components show similar anomalies, they will be restricted from 

vibration tests and used in other testing until replacement components 

are ready. This issue may impact the already delayed start of the second 

and third ISIM cryo-vacuum tests, which would further compress the ISIM 

integration and test schedule or require the project to use some of ISIM’s 

schedule reserve. Because the ISIM schedule has already been 

compressed, the project will have less flexibility should any issues or 

delays arise during this effort. The project is covering the current ISIMrelated cost increase—9.8 percent—primarily with funding reserves. 

Extending the length of time needed to conduct the ISIM integration and 

test effort, should there be further delays, would require maintaining test 

personnel and facilities longer than planned, which may lead to further 

cost increases.
Page 26 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Northrop Grumman has successfully addressed the spacecraft mass 

issue that we reported on in 2012 and project officials state that they are 

comfortable with the observatory mass margin as the project heads into 

multiple major integration and test efforts, despite the mass margin being 

lower than Goddard standards. In December 2012, we reported that the 

spacecraft was more than 200 kilograms over its mass allocation. In 

November 2013, Northrop Grumman officials stated that the spacecraft 

was under its mass allocation at that time. Since December 2011, both 

the contractor and the project made mass reduction a priority and the 

contractor currently has margin available to address future issues that 

may require additional mass to solve. The project’s current overall mass 

margin is approximately 7.7 percent, which does not include 90 kilograms 

of additional mass allocation the project received in 2013 from the launch 

vehicle provider. This is lower than the Goddard standard of 15 percent 

mass margin at this phase of development. According to project officials, 

they applied the Goddard standard at the subsystem level rather than at 

the observatory level due to JWST’s complexity, which allowed them to 

maintain a lower overall observatory mass margin. They added that the 

observatory and its component elements have an acceptable amount of 

mass margin as the project enters its major integration and test efforts 

and, while they will maintain standard mass controls to avoid 

unnecessary growth, they do not expect mass margins to be a significant 

concern going forward. We plan to continue to monitor mass margin in 

future reviews as the project proceeds through integration and test efforts.

Several current near-term funding constraints such as low cost reserves, 

a higher-than-expected rate of spending, and potential sequestration 

impacts are putting at risk NASA’s ability to meet its cost and schedule 

commitments for JWST. In September 2013, project officials reported that 

while they are making good technical progress, the level of cost reserves 

held by the project in fiscal year 2014 had become the top issue facing 

the project and may require them to defer future work. Although not 

currently identified as an issue by the project, a significant portion of fiscal 

year 2015 project-held cost reserves have also already been allocated. 

This does not take into account reserves held by the JWST program at 

NASA headquarters in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 that can be used to 

supplement reserves held by the project. However, fiscal year 2014 

program reserves are minimal compared to future years. As of September 

2013, the project has allocated approximately 60 and 42 percent of its 

reserves in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, respectively. See figure 8.

Northrop Grumman Has 

Addressed Spacecraft 

Mass Issues

Near-term Funding 

Constraints May Limit 

Project’s Ability to 

Meet Future 

Commitments
Page 27 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 8: James Webb Space Telescope Fiscal Year 2014 and 2015 Project-held 

Reserves Remaining as of September 2013 Based on Allocations in Fiscal Year 

2013

The need to allocate a significant portion of cost reserves in fiscal year 

2014 and 2015 has been driven primarily by the technical issues with the 

MIRI cryocooler. Specifically, the subcontract modification resulting from 

the cryocooler replan required the allocation of over $25 million of cost 

reserves in fiscal year 2014 and 2015. After allocation of these cost 

reserves, the project began tracking the risk of low fiscal year 2014 cost 

reserves.

Project officials report that the project’s low reserve posture in fiscal year 

2014 may require them to defer work to future years. Specifically, 

because the project continues to maintain 14 months of funded schedule 

reserve, it may begin using some of that schedule reserve to conduct 

work later or allow work to take longer than planned. There are risks 

associated with this approach, however. For example, prior to the 

project’s replan in 2011, low cost reserves and technical challenges 

forced project management to defer planned work into future years. This 

ultimately led to increased costs for the deferred work and a schedule that 

was unsustainable. Much of the remaining work on JWST involves the 
Page 28 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

five major integration and test efforts—which began in fiscal year 2011—

during which work is often sequential in nature and cost and schedule 

growth typically occurs. Depleting schedule reserve now could impact 

project officials’ ability to address technical risks or challenges not 

currently identified or realized, but that will likely arise during this phase.

Project officials said that they would like to strike a balance between 

using remaining cost reserves and having to utilize schedule margin to 

complete planned work and address currently unknown technical 

challenges, but their goal is to use as little schedule margin as possible in 

fiscal year 2014.

Northrop Grumman has also identified issues with the adequacy of its 

cost management reserves in fiscal year 2014. The project shares this 

concern given that Northrop Grumman’s cost reserves are eroding faster 

than anticipated. As of October 2012, the contractor held more than $244 

million in cost management reserves for the remainder of the contract, but 

has used almost 24 percent of those management reserves since then. 

The approximately $185 million in cost management reserves Northrop 

Grumman has available as of September 2013 represents the total 

amount of reserves available through the remainder of the contract—

almost 6 years—and not how much is available for use specifically for 

fiscal year 2014. The contract modification for the 2011 replan was signed 

in December 2013 and, according to the Northrop Grumman program 

manager, the amount of management reserve available will likely 

increase by more than $45 million once budget distributions are 

completed by the end of January 2014. In June 2013, Northrop Grumman 

had identified up to $80 million in potential risks for fiscal year 2014. 

Project officials said that Northrop Grumman will sometimes fund new 

contract requirements for future fiscal years with current year cost 

reserves. These officials added that they are in the process of 

determining whether the rate Northrop Grumman is spending cost 

reserves is a result of additional requirements or because of performance 

issues. According to JWST project analysts, Northrop Grumman cost 

management reserves also remain a challenge in fiscal year 2015 when 

compared to the potential threats. The JWST project manager said that 

the project could rephase some planned Northrop Grumman cost 

management reserves from future years to fiscal year 2014 instead, but 

that would require the project to use some of its fiscal year 2014 cost 

reserves, which as noted are already constrained. As noted earlier, the 

JWST Program at NASA headquarters maintains another set of cost 

reserves that could be used to help in situations such as this, but the bulk 

of these reserves will not be available until fiscal year 2015.
Page 29 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

The project’s rate of spending in fiscal year 2013 could also be a 

significant issue if it continues into fiscal year 2014 and officials have 

begun tracking the rate of spending as a risk. The project spent

approximately $40 million more than planned in fiscal year 2013. 

According to program officials, the amount of this overage is becoming 

significant not because of a lack of funds in fiscal year 2013, but because 

the fiscal year 2014 budget and project cost reserves are constrained. 

Project officials said that they planned to carry over funding from fiscal 

year 2013 to support approximately 21⁄2 months of work to help fund 

contracts and ensure continued operations during a potential continuing 

resolution or other periods of funding uncertainty. If the project were to 

receive its full funding allocation for fiscal year 2014 at the level planned, 

this 2013 money would supplement the money available to the project in 

2014. But if the current rate of spending is sustained, the project would 

only carry over enough 2013 money to fund the project for about 7 to 8 

weeks into fiscal year 2014. The lower amount of funding carried over will 

also cause the project to have less available to supplement shortfalls in 

future years. For example, the JWST program manager told us that 

Northrop Grumman has requested more funding in fiscal year 2014 than 

the amount planned. Program officials noted that if the project continues 

to spend in fiscal year 2014 at a rate experienced during the latter part of 

fiscal year 2013, it may not be able to carry any funds into fiscal year 

2015 as planned. Project officials, however, indicate that they are 

confident that they will carryover funds into fiscal year 2015. Our review of 

the data found that the project’s increased spend rate in fiscal year 2013 

is due mainly to additional resources necessary for the ISIM due to late 

hardware deliveries, the cryocooler effort, and the Northrop Grumman 

effort to prepare for the spacecraft critical design review in January 2014.

NASA’s ability to remedy these issues will likely be significantly hindered 

by the potential impacts from sequestration and competing demands from 

other major projects. For example, while NASA officials report that the 

agency was able to absorb the sequestration-related reductions in fiscal 

year 2013 with relatively no impact on its major projects, including JWST, 

they indicate that the agency cannot sustain all of its long-term funding 

commitments at sequester levels in fiscal year 2014 and beyond. 

Importantly, the JWST project recently began tracking a risk for the 

budget uncertainty due to sequestration. The risk outlines that there is a 

potential cut to the JWST budget starting in fiscal year 2014, which could 

adversely affect the execution of the project’s current plan and potentially 

jeopardize the October 2018 launch date. The program office indicates 

that NASA headquarters directed JWST to plan for its fiscal year 2014 

budget to be consistent with the replan. This direction by NASA could 
Page 30 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

have an impact on other major NASA projects. In interviews for several 

other major NASA projects, officials informed us that they have less than 

adequate funding in fiscal year 2014 and some have requested that the 

agency rephase funds from later years to fiscal year 2014 to address the 

issue. If additional funds are required and prioritized for JWST, there 

could be a potentially significant impact on these and other projects within 

the agency that are already reporting funding issues in fiscal year 2014.

The reliability of the JWST integrated master schedule is questionable 

because some of the 23 subordinate schedules synthesized to create it 

are lacking in one or more characteristics of a reliable schedule. Schedule 

quality weaknesses in the JWST subsystem schedules transfer to the 

integrated master schedule. We found a similar result this year consistent

with our analysis in 2012 in which weaknesses in the two subsystem 

schedules we analyzed undermined the reliability of the integrated master 

schedule.

According to scheduling best practices, the success of a program 

depends in part on having an integrated and reliable master schedule that 

defines when work will occur, how long it will take, and how each activity 

is related to the others that come both before and after it. If the schedule 

is dynamic, planned activities within the schedule will be affected by 

changes that may occur during a program’s development. For example, if 

the date of one activity changes, the dates of its related activities will also 

change in response. The master schedule will be able to identify the 

consequences of changes and alert managers so they can determine the 

best response. The government project management office, in this case 

the JWST project office at Goddard Space Flight Center, is ultimately 

responsible for the integrated master schedule’s development and 

maintenance.

The quality and reliability of three selected subsystem schedules we 

examined for this review—ISIM, OTE, and cryocooler—were inconsistent 

in following the characteristics of high-quality, reliable schedules. Using 

the 10 best practices for schedules, we individually scored and evaluated 

the schedules for these subsystems. We then grouped the best practices 

into one of four characteristics: comprehensive, well-constructed, 

credible, and controlled. The individual best practice scores within each 

characteristic were then combined to determine the final score for each 

characteristic. See appendix III for more detailed information on each 

characteristic and its corresponding best practices. The ISIM and OTE 

schedules had more strengths than weaknesses, substantially meeting 

Selected JWST 

Schedules 

Demonstrate Many 

Best Practices, but 

Identified 

Weaknesses Erode 

Confidence in the 

Project’s Integrated 

Master Schedule
Page 31 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

three of four characteristics of a reliable schedule. The cryocooler 

schedule demonstrated weaknesses in both of the characteristics we 

examined.21 We selected these three subordinate schedules because 

they represent the significant portion of ongoing work for the project and 

reflect work by the project, the prime contractor, and a subcontractor. 

Table 2 identifies the results of each of the selected JWST subordinate 

schedules and their corresponding best practices sub scores.

 21We chose the well-constructed and credible characteristics because they represent the 

basic logic structure of the schedule, which determines the overall ability of the schedules 

to forecast dates reliably. We did not examine the comprehensive and controlled 

characteristics of schedule best practices as the cryocooler schedule was rebaselined in 

August 2013. 
Page 32 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Table 2: Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM), Optical Telescope Element (OTE), and Cryocooler Schedule Results for 

Characteristics and Associated Best Practices of a High-Quality and Reliable Schedule

Schedule characteristic or best practice ISIM OTE Cryocooler

Comprehensive ◕ ● Not assessed

1. Capturing all activities ◕ ● Not assessed

3. Assigning resources to all activities ◐ ◕ Not assessed

4. Establishing the duration of all activities ● ● Not assessed

Well-constructed ◕ ◐ ◐

2. Sequencing all activities ◕ ◕ ◕

6. Confirming that the critical path is valid ◕ ◐ ◐

7. Ensuring reasonable total float ◕ ◐ ◐

Credible ◐ ◕ ◐

5. Verifying that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically ◐ ◕ ◐

8. Conducting a schedule risk analysis ◔ ◐ ◔

Controlled ◕ ◕ Not assessed

9. Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic ◕ ◕ Not assessed

10. Maintaining a baseline schedule ◕ ◕ Not assessed

Source: GAO analysis of detailed project level schedules and related documentation for the ISIM, OTE, and cryocooler.

Legend:

● = Met: The program office or contractor provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.

◕ = Substantially Met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a large 

portion of the criterion.

◐ = Partially Met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies about half the 

criterion.

◔ = Minimally Met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a small portion 

of the criterion.

○ = Not Met: The program office or contractor provided no evidence that satisfied any of the criterion.

Of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule that we assessed for the 

ISIM schedule, we found that three substantially met the criteria—

comprehensive, well-constructed, and controlled—while the credible 

characteristic was partially met. The strengths of the ISIM schedule were 

that it

• captured all activities in manageable durations with their proper 

sequence,

Integrated Science Instrument 

Module
Page 33 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

• identified the longest continuous sequence of activities in the 

schedule, known as its critical path,22

• estimated reasonable amounts of total float, defined as the time 

activities can slip before delaying key delivery dates.

and

NASA also maintains a baseline schedule that is regularly analyzed and 

updated as progress is made. However, the schedule lacked a schedule 

risk assessment—a best practice that gives decision makers confidence 

that the estimates are credible based on known risks and allows 

management to account for the cost of a schedule slip when developing 

the life-cycle cost estimate. Without a schedule risk assessment decision 

makers may not obtain accurate cost impacts when schedule changes 

occur. Officials noted that while a schedule risk assessment was not 

performed on the ISIM schedule itself, the schedule was included as a 

part of the overall JWST JCL analysis, and subsequent cost and schedule 

estimate, conducted during the project replan in 2011. However, our 

analysis of the 2011 JCL indicated that the estimate’s accuracy, and 

therefore the confidence level assigned to the estimate, was reduced by 

the quality of the summary schedule used for the JCL because it did not 

provide enough detail to determine how risks were applied to critical 

project activities.

Of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule that we assessed for the 

OTE schedule, we found that the comprehensive characteristic was fully 

met, credible and controlled characteristics were substantially met, and 

the well-constructed characteristic was partially met. The strengths of the 

OTE schedule were that it

• captured all activities in manageable durations with their proper 

sequence,

• identified the resources needed for each activity,

• linked activities to the final deliverables the work in the schedule is 

intended to produce, and

• accurately reflected dates presented to management in high-level 

presentations.

 22The critical path defines the program’s earliest completion date or minimum duration it 

will take to complete all activities.

Optical Telescope Element
Page 34 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Northrop Grumman, the creator and manager of the schedule, also 

maintains a baseline schedule that is regularly analyzed and updated as 

progress is recorded by schedule experts. However, while Northrop 

Grumman has identified a critical path, our analysis was not able to 

confirm that this path described activities in the schedule that were truly 

driving the key delivery date for the OTE, which is the delivery of the OTE 

to the OTIS testing and integration at Goddard Space Flight Center on 

April 28, 2016. Identifying a valid critical path is essential for management 

to identify and focus upon activities which will potentially have detrimental 

effects on key project milestones and deliverables if they slip. In addition, 

we found that one-third of the remaining activities and milestones had 

over 200 days of total float. This means that, according to the schedule, 

these activities could be delayed 9 working months without impacting the 

key delivery date. Realistic float values allow managers to see the impact 

of a delayed activity on future work. However, unrealistic estimates of 

float make it difficult to know the amount of time one event can slip 

without impacting the project finish date. In addition, incorrect float 

estimates will result in an invalid critical path. Northrop Grumman officials 

agreed with our assessment but noted the high values of total float are 

due to their planning process which only details out the schedule in 6

month increments. Activities beyond the detailed planning window of the 

schedule have high float and those estimates of float will become more 

reasonable as the schedule is planned in detail. However, best practices 

state that all activities in the schedule, even far-term planning packages, 

should be logically linked in such a way as to portray a complete picture 

of the program’s available float and its critical path. Finally, a schedule 

risk assessment has not been conducted on the OTE schedule since 

2011. Northrop Grumman officials stated that they are not contractually 

required to periodically conduct a schedule risk assessment. However, as 

with the ISIM, without a schedule risk assessment decision makers may 

not have accurate cost impacts when schedule changes occur.

Of the two characteristics of a reliable schedule that were assessed for 

the cryocooler schedule, the well-constructed and credible characteristics 

were both partially met. The strengths of the cryocooler schedule were 

that it had

• a logical sequence of activities with few missing logic links, and

• few issues with incorrect logic that might impair the ability of the 

schedule to forecast dates dynamically.

Cryocooler
Page 35 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Despite these strengths, two of the ultimate goals of a reliable schedule—

determining a valid critical path and realistic total float—were only partially 

achieved. Officials stated that the schedule is used to manage critical 

paths to six major hardware deliveries, or key delivery dates. However, 

we could not determine how the schedule is used to identify and present 

those paths to management. In addition, the use of date constraints in 19 

activities within the schedule helps determine the remaining total float to 

some deliveries, but causes an overabundance of activities to appear as 

critical, which interferes with the identification of the true project-level 

critical path. We also found that while the schedule accurately reflected 

some of the delays the project is currently experiencing, its schedule 

appears to be overly flexible in some cases, such as having activities with 

over 500 days—or over 2 working years—of total float. Incorrect float 

estimates may result in an invalid critical path and an inaccurate 

assessment of project completion dates.

The schedule also lacks a complete and credible schedule risk analysis, 

without which managers cannot determine the likelihood of the project’s 

completion date, how much total schedule risk reserve funding is needed, 

risks most likely to delay the project, or how much reserve funding should 

be included for each individual risk. Northrop Grumman officials, who 

manage the schedule and the project, stated that a schedule risk analysis 

was performed in March 2013, but the results were not used by JPL 

management who oversees the contract. The results of the schedule risk 

analysis may help JPL determine the probability of meeting key dates or 

how much schedule contingency is needed.

Officials provided us examples of the schedule risk analysis output, but 

we were not able to confirm their validity because documentation was not 

available on the data, risk, or methodologies. In addition to the lack of 

documentation, because we found the schedule to be only partially wellconstructed, we cannot be sure that the results of the schedule risk 

analysis are valid. Given the weaknesses noted above, if the schedule 

risk analysis is to be credible, the program must have a quality schedule 

that reflects reliable logic and clearly identifies the critical path before a 

schedule risk analysis is conducted. If the schedule does not follow best 

practices, confidence in the schedule risk analysis results will be lacking. 

Without the schedule risk analysis, the project office cannot rely on the 

schedule to provide a high level of confidence in meeting the project’s 

completion date or identify reserve funding for unplanned problems that 

may occur.
Page 36 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

The JWST project has maintained its cost and schedule commitments 

since its 2011 replan, has continued to make good technical progress, 

and has implemented and enhanced efforts to improve oversight. 

Nevertheless, inherent risks continue to make execution of the JWST 

project challenging and near-term indicators show that the project is 

currently facing challenges that need to be addressed primarily by 

increased reserves and progress tracked using the proper tools. Our 

report, however, indicates that the project may not have the appropriate 

resources and high fidelity information to ensure execution as planned 

and provide realistic information to decision makers and other 

stakeholders. For example, near-term cost reserves are constrained and 

the project is spending at a higher rate than planned. Without adequate 

cost reserves in the near-term and if its increased rate of spending 

continues, the project may need to defer planned work and delay the 

resolution of future and yet unknown threats. These actions could put the 

project on a course to repeat past missteps that led to congressional 

intervention and the institution of a cap on development costs. In addition, 

the effect sequestration would have on available funding for the project in 

fiscal year 2014 and beyond is unknown at this point, but could potentially 

compound this issue. As a result, NASA may need to make difficult 

decisions about funding JWST adequately at the expense of other, 

already cash-strapped projects.

Importantly, JWST project officials may not have the necessary 

information to determine the impacts of any resource issues because the 

project currently lacks a reliable integrated master schedule due to 

weaknesses we found in several subschedules. Without a reliable 

schedule, project officials cannot accurately manage and forecast the 

impacts of changes to the schedule that will likely come about during the 

integration and testing periods. Despite these concerns, the JWST project 

has declined to take adequate steps to address our recommendation to 

perform an updated cost and schedule risk analysis—or JCL—that is 

based on current risks and a reliable schedule. Unless properly updated 

to include a reliable schedule that incorporates known risks, particularly if 

NASA is faced with additional resource constraints through the 

continuation of sequestration, the cost estimate will not provide decision 

makers with accurate information to assess the current status of the 

project.

Conclusions
Page 37 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

To help ensure that NASA officials are making decisions using up to date 

and reliable information about the JWST project, Congress should 

consider requiring the NASA Administrator to direct the JWST project to 

conduct an updated joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis that 

is based on a reliable schedule and current risks.

We recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following two 

actions:

• In order to ensure that the JWST project has sufficient available 

funding to complete its mission and meet its October 2018 launch 

date and reduce project risk, ensure the JWST project has adequate 

cost reserves to meet the development needs in each fiscal year, 

particularly in fiscal year 2014, and report to Congress on steps it is 

taking to do so, and

• In order to help ensure that the JWST program and project 

management has reliable and accurate information that can convey

and forecast the impact of potential issues and manage the impacts of 

changes to the integrated master schedule, perform a schedule risk 

analysis on OTE, ISIM, and cryocooler schedules, as well as any 

other subschedules for which a schedule risk analysis was not 

performed. In accordance with schedule best practices, the JWST 

project should ensure that the risk analyses are performed on reliable 

schedules.

NASA provided written comments on a draft of this report. These 

comments are reprinted in appendix IV. 

In responding to a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our two 

recommendations; however, in some cases it is either not clear what 

actions NASA plans to take or when they will complete the action to 

satisfy the intent of the recommendations. 

NASA officials concurred with our recommendation to ensure the JWST 

project has adequate cost reserves to meet the development needs in 

each fiscal year, particularly in fiscal year 2014, and report to Congress 

on steps it is taking to do so. In their response, the Acting JWST Program 

Director cited NASA and the administration’s request to Congress to 

appropriate the full JWST replan level funding for fiscal year 2014, which 

includes the level of unallocated future expenses, or cost reserves, 

established in the replan. He also commented that NASA conducts 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 38 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

monthly reviews to evaluate risks and associated impacts to funding in 

order to ensure that adequate cost reserves are available in each fiscal 

year. We acknowledge in our report that the JWST project has been fully 

funded at levels commensurate with the 2011 baseline through fiscal year 

2013. However, cost reserves approved for the project during the 2011 

replan were based on the risks known at that time. The events of fiscal

year 2013 have weakened the project’s financial posture and flexibility the 

project has to address any potential technical challenges going forward 

into fiscal year 2014 and beyond. In addition, NASA’s response does not 

indicate how the agency plans to report to Congress the steps it is taking 

to ensure that the JWST project has adequate cost reserves to meet its 

October 2018 launch date. We maintain that NASA should provide more 

detail to Congress on its plans given the already constrained cost reserve 

posture the project has early in fiscal year 2014 and past issues with low 

levels of cost reserves that forced the project to defer work, which led to 

significant cost increases and schedule delays. 

NASA officials concurred with our recommendation to perform a schedule 

risk analysis on OTE, ISIM, and cryocooler schedules, as well as any 

other subschedules where a schedule risk analysis was not performed 

and that, in accordance with schedule best practices, the risk analyses 

are performed on reliable schedules. The Acting Program Director stated 

NASA will conduct probability schedule risk analyses on the OTE, ISIM, 

and cryocooler schedules by the end of calendar 2014 using NASA best 

practices. This is a positive step, given that our previous work has found 

that GAO and NASA best practices for scheduling are largely 

consistent.23

 23GAO, Polar Weather Satellites: NOAA Identified Ways to Mitigate Data Gaps, but 

Contingency Plans and Schedules Require Further Attention, GAO-13-676 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sep. 11, 2013).

The Acting Program Director also stated that NASA will 

conduct the same analyses for other schedules lacking a risk analysis. 

However, no deadline was mentioned for when these analyses will be 

accomplished or for how many schedules will be affected. Having reliable 

schedules sooner will provide management with more timely and 

accurate information on which to make decisions. If the schedule risk 

assessments are not completed until after 2014, the project will have less 

than 4 years until launch to utilize the information these risk analyses can 

provide. Given that we have found reliability issues with the project’s 

schedules for the second year, improving the current schedules to meet 
Page 39 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

best practices is important to provide management with improved tools to 

better understand the schedule risks and manage the project.

We are sending copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and 

interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Cristina T. Chaplain

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 40 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

List of Committees

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski

Chairwoman

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Chairman

The Honorable Chaka Fattah

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Lamar Smith

Chairman

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

Ranking Member

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the James Webb 

Space Telescope (JWST) project is meeting its cost and schedule 

commitments and maintaining oversight established as part of the 

project’s replan, (2) the current major technological challenges facing the 

JWST project, (3) the extent to which cost risks exist that may threaten 

the project’s ability to execute the project as planned, and (4) the extent 

to which the JWST project schedule is reliable based on best practices. In 

assessing earned value management (EVM) data from several 

contractors and subcontractors and the project’s schedule estimate, we 

performed various checks to determine that the data provided was 

reliable enough for our purposes.

To assess the extent to which the JWST project is meeting its cost and 

schedule commitments and maintaining oversight, we reviewed project 

and contractor documentation, analyzed the progress made and any 

variances to milestones established during the project’s replan in 2011, 

and held interviews with project, contractor, and Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials. We reviewed project monthly status 

reviews, documentation on project risks, and budget documentation. We 

examined and analyzed EVM data from several contractors and 

subcontractors. The EVM data reviewed included monthly contractor 

performance reports and analysis performed by the JWST project on this 

information. For our analysis, we entered only high-level monthly 

contractor EVM data into a GAO-developed spreadsheet, which includes 

checks to ensure the EVM data provided was reliable enough for our 

purposes. We also reviewed the project’s analysis of the estimate at 

completion for internal work being performed on the Integrated Science 

Instrument Module. We interviewed program and project officials at NASA 

headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center to obtain additional 

information on the status of the project with regard to progress toward 

baseline commitments. We periodically attended flight program reviews at 

NASA headquarters where the current status of the program was briefed 

to NASA headquarters officials and members of the Standing Review 

Board. We also interviewed JWST project and contractor officials from the 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems to 

determine the extent to which oversight was being conducted. In addition, 

we interviewed officials from the Defense Contract Management Agency 

to obtain information on oversight activities delegated to it by the JWST 

project.

To assess the technological challenges and risks facing the project, we 

reviewed project monthly status reviews, information from the project’s 

risk database, as well as briefings and schedule documentation provided 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

by project and contractor officials. These documents included information 

on the project’s technological challenges and risks, mitigation plans, and 

timelines for addressing these risks and challenges. We also interviewed 

program and project officials for each major observatory system to clarify 

information and to obtain additional information on system and subsystem 

level risks and technological challenges for each subsystem. Further, we 

interviewed officials from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Northrop 

Grumman Aerospace Systems concerning risks and challenges on the 

subsystems, instruments, or components they were developing. We 

reviewed GAO’s prior work on NASA Large Scale Acquisitions; the 

Goddard Space Flight Center Rules for the Design, Development, 

Verification, and Operation of Flight Systems technical standards;1 and 

NASA’s Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements 

and Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements policy 

documents.2

To assess the extent to which cost risks exist that may threaten the 

project’s ability to execute the project as planned, we reviewed project 

and contractor documentation and held interviews with project and 

contractor officials. We reviewed project monthly status reviews and 

NASA headquarters flight program reviews, contractor information on the 

potential cost to address identified risks, and project analysis of budgetrelated risks to include the project’s cost reserve posture and the impact 

of sequestration. We interviewed program and project officials at NASA 

headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center as well as officials from 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Northrop Grumman Aerospace 

Systems to obtain information on risks to maintaining cost targets and 

plans to mitigate those risks.

We compared Goddard standards with data reported by the 

project to assess the extent to which the JWST project followed NASA 

policies.

To assess the extent to which the JWST project schedule is reliable, we 

used GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide to assess characteristics of 

three selected subordinate schedules—the Integrated Science Instrument 

Module (ISIM), Optical Telescope Element (OTE), and cryocooler—that 

 1

GSFC STD 1000, Revision D (June 2, 2008) and GSFC STD 1000, Revision F (Feb. 8, 

2013).

2

NPR 7120.5E (Aug. 14, 2012) and NASA Procedural Requirements 7123.1A, NASA 

Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements with Change 1. (Nov.4, 2009).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

are used as inputs to the integrated master schedule.3 We selected the 

three schedules above as they reflect a significant portion of the work 

being conducted within NASA (ISIM), at the contractor level (OTE), and 

the subcontractor level (cryocooler) during the course of our work. We 

also analyzed schedule metrics as a part of that analysis to highlight 

potential areas of strengths and weaknesses against each of our 4 

characteristics of a reliable schedule. In order to assess each schedule 

against the 4 characteristics and their accompanying 10 best practices,4

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 

D.C. and Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. We also 

visited the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California; Northrop 

Grumman Aerospace Systems in Redondo Beach, California; and the 

Defense Contract Management Agency in Redondo Beach, California.

we traced and verified underlying support and determined whether the 

program office or contractor provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the 

criterion and assigned a score depicting that the practices were not met, 

minimally met, partially met, substantially met, or fully met. By examining 

the schedules against our guidance, we conducted a reliability 

assessment on each of the schedules and incorporated our findings on 

reliability limitations in the analysis of each subordinate schedule. We 

also conducted interviews with project and contractor management and 

schedulers before our analysis was completed and analyzed project and 

contractor documentation concerning scheduling policies and practices. 

After conducting our initial analysis, we shared it with the relevant parties 

to provide an opportunity for them to comment and identify reasons for 

observed shortfalls in schedule management best practices. We took 

their comments and any additional information they provided and 

incorporated it into the assessments to finalize the scores for each 

characteristic and best practice. We were also able to use the results of 

the three subordinate schedules to provide insight into the health of the 

integrated master schedule since the same strengths and weaknesses of 

the subordinate schedules would transfer to the master schedule. We 

determined that the schedules were sufficiently reliable for our reporting 

purposes and our report notes the instances where reliability concerns 

affect the quality of the schedules.

 3

GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, 

GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).

4

For the cryocooler schedule, only 2 characteristics were assessed. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to January 

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Subsystems of the JWST 

Observatory

Page 45 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Figure 9: Subsystems of JWST: Interactive Information

Appendix II: Subsystems of the JWST 

Observatory
Appendix III: The Four Characteristics and Ten 

Best Practices of a High-Quality and Reliable 

Schedule

Page 46 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Schedule characteristic Schedule best practice

Comprehensive, reflecting

• all activities as defined in the project’s WBS

• the labor, materials, and overhead needed to do the work and whether those 

resources will be available when needed

• how long each activity will take, allowing for discrete progress measurement with 

specific start and finish dates

1) Capturing all activities

3) Assigning resources to all activities

4) Establishing the durations of all 

activities

Well constructed, with

• all activities logically sequenced with predecessor and successor logic

• limited amounts of unusual or complicated logic techniques that are justified in the 

schedule documentation

• a critical path that determines which activities drive the project’s earliest completion 

date

• total float that accurately determines the schedule’s flexibility

2) Sequencing all activities

6) Confirming that the critical path is valid

7) Ensuring reasonable total float

Credible, reflecting

• the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated products or outcomes

• varying levels of activities, supporting activities, and subtasks

• key dates that can be used to present status updates to management

• a level of confidence in meeting a project’s completion date based on data about 

risks and opportunities for the project

• necessary schedule contingency and high priority risks based on conducting a robust 

schedule risk analysis

5) Verifying that the schedule is traceable 

horizontally and vertically

8) Conducting a schedule risk analysis

Controlled, being

• updated periodically by schedulers trained in critical path method scheduling

• statused using actual progress and logic to realistically forecast dates for program 

activities

• compared against a documented baseline schedule to determine variances from the 

plan

• accompanied by a corresponding baseline document that explains the overall 

approach to the project, defines assumptions, and describes unique features of the 

schedule

• subject to a configuration management control process

9) Updating the schedule with actual 

progress and logic

10) Maintaining a baseline schedule

Source: GAO.

Appendix III: The Four Characteristics and 

Ten Best Practices of a High-Quality and 

Reliable Schedule
Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 47 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration
Appendix IV: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 48 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 49 GAO-14-72 James Webb Space Telescope

Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant 

Director; Karen Richey, Assistant Director; Patrick Breiding; Richard A. 

Cederholm; Laura Greifner; Keith Hornbacher; David T. Hulett; Jason 

Lee; Sylvia Schatz; Ryan Stott; and Roxanna T. Sun made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121122)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.