Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John E. Kolas

Kolas Law Firm, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jeffrey A. Boggess

Jeffrey A. Boggess, P.C.

Greencastle, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

S&C Financial Group, LLC,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Darren Gaston,

Appellee-Defendant

May 8, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PL-1787

Appeal from the 

Putnam Superior Court

The Honorable 

Charles D. Bridges, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

67D01-1803-PL-11

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] S&C Financial Group, LLC, entered into an oral agreement with Darren 

Gaston to sell him a house. When S&C filed an eviction action against Gaston
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 2 of 10

in Putnam County small-claims court, the parties entered into a settlement 

agreement, and S&C dismissed the case. S&C later sued Gaston for possession 

of the real estate in Putnam Superior Court. The trial court found that Gaston, 

not S&C, was the rightful owner and ordered S&C to give Gaston a deed to the 

property and pay $1,275 of his attorney’s fees. S&C now appeals. We affirm as 

to all issues except the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Gaston.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] S&C is an Indianapolis company that acquires tax-sale properties, fixes them, 

and then rents or sells them. Tr. p. 6. Scott Wynkoop is the owner of S&C. 

Gaston worked as a subcontractor for S&C. S&C purchased a “rehab” house 

on Apple Street in Greencastle at a tax sale in October 2014. Id. at 6, 31. 

Thereafter, S&C and Gaston entered into an oral agreement whereby S&C 

would sell the Apple Street property to Gaston for $13,000. In October 2015, 

Gaston paid S&C $2,000 toward the purchase price and moved in and began 

making extensive repairs to the house, including adding electrical and 

plumbing. Gaston made additional payments toward the purchase price in the 

form of S&C deducting varying amounts from his paychecks. See Ex. E 

(deductions in August and September 2016).

[3] On June 19, 2017, Wynkoop texted Gaston that his last payment was April 17 

for $250, which “leaves a balance of $2305.” Ex. B. Wynkoop added that 

“[w]hen it’s paid off, I will hand you a deed that you can go on record at 

county. It was never supposed to take this long to pay it off. I hadn’t even 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 3 of 10

charged any interest.” Id. On June 26, Gaston paid S&C $305, leaving a

balance of $2,000. Tr. p. 43. 

[4] In July, Gaston developed an infection in his brain, was hospitalized, and 

underwent brain surgery. He could not work for a year and thus S&C was no

longer able to deduct money from his paychecks. 

[5] About a month after Gaston’s brain surgery, S&C filed a Notice of Claim for 

Eviction against Gaston in Putnam County small-claims court. See 67D01-

1708-SC-388. S&C alleged as follows: “No lease in place. Verbal agreement. 

Tenant is no longer making payments.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13. An 

eviction hearing was set for September 21. When Wynkoop and Gaston 

appeared at court for the hearing, they reached an oral agreement off the record

to settle the case, under which Gaston would pay S&C $3,855 and S&C would 

give Gaston a deed to the Apple Street property. The court reporter was present 

during the parties’ negotiations and told them that if they reached an 

agreement, a dismissal would have to be filed. Wynkoop then signed an orderof-dismissal form indicating that the “parties have reached an agreement.” The 

judge signed the order that same day. See Order of Dismissal, 67D01-1708-SC388 (Sept. 21, 2017). 

[6] As soon as he left the courthouse in Putnam County, Gaston went to the bank 

to get a $3,855 cashier’s check. He then drove to S&C’s office in Indianapolis,

gave the check to an employee, and got a “paid in full” receipt. Ex. A. 

Wynkoop arrived at S&C’s office right after Gaston left and was told by the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 4 of 10

employee that Gaston had made the payment but that he was still planning on 

pursuing a mechanic’s lien that he had recorded on an unrelated property. 

Wynkoop immediately texted Gaston as follows: “Come back and pick up your 

check. I am not going to accept the payment until everything is settled . . . . 

I’m not going to have you threaten a lawsuit against me.” Ex. B. Gaston 

texted back “Ur paid,” to which Wynkoop responded: “I am not going to 

deposit the check and I am not going to prepare the deed until that is resolved. 

I’m not going to be threatened.” Id. S&C then returned the cashier’s check to 

Gaston via certified mail. 

[7] In January 2018, S&C filed a new Notice of Claim for Eviction against Gaston

in Putnam County small-claims court. See 67D01-1801-SC-1. S&C alleged as 

follows: “No lease in place. Verbal agreement. Occupant has made no 

payments since June 2017.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 14. Gaston filed a 

motion to dismiss alleging that he was not leasing the Apple Street property but 

rather purchasing it on contract and that the “matter should be filed on the civil 

plenary docket.” Id. at 16. The next day, the small-claims court dismissed the 

case. S&C filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. 

[8] In March, S&C filed a Complaint for Possession of Real Estate and for 

Damages against Gaston in Putnam Superior Court. See 67D01-1803-PL-11. 

In the complaint, S&C acknowledged that Wynkoop and Gaston had reached 

an agreement at the courthouse whereby Gaston would pay S&C $3,855 and 

S&C would give him a deed to the Apple Street property. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 32. However, S&C claimed that the agreement also required Gaston 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 5 of 10

to release the mechanic’s lien on the unrelated property, which he did not do

and therefore breached the agreement. Accordingly, S&C asked for immediate 

possession of the real estate and damages. At S&C’s request, the court set a 

hearing for possession only.

[9] Wynkoop, the court reporter, and Gaston testified at the hearing. First,

Wynkoop testified that the oral agreement he made with Gaston for the sale of 

the Apple Street property “was that if he paid me $13,000 in 12 months, then I 

would convey the property to him.” Tr. p. 18. Wynkoop also testified that the 

agreement he made with Gaston at the courthouse to settle the case was that if 

Gaston paid $3,855 to S&C and released the mechanic’s lien on the unrelated 

property, then S&C would give him a deed to the Apple Street property. Id. at 

15. When Wynkoop was asked on cross examination if he and Gaston had 

discussed the mechanic’s lien during their negotiations at the courthouse, 

Wynkoop responded, “I can’t say for sure if it was.” Id. 

[10] Next, the court reporter testified that the parties reached an agreement that 

Gaston had to pay $3,855 to S&C and that S&C dismissed the case that same 

day. She also testified that the parties did not discuss the mechanic’s lien 

during their negotiations. Id. at 26-27. 

[11] Finally, Gaston testified that the oral agreement he made with Wynkoop for the 

sale of the Apple Street property was that he had to pay S&C $13,000 and that 

there was no hard-and-fast deadline for when the $13,000 had to be paid. 

Gaston also testified that the settlement agreement he reached with Wynkoop 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 6 of 10

at the courthouse was that he had to pay $3,855 in order to get a deed to the 

Apple Street property. Gaston said the mechanic’s lien was not part of their

agreement because that was “a separate issue.” Id. at 35. 

[12] Thereafter, the trial court issued an order finding that the parties entered into a 

settlement agreement in September 2017, that Gaston fulfilled his duties 

pursuant to the settlement agreement when he presented the cashier’s check for 

$3,855, and that S&C breached the settlement agreement when it refused to 

accept the payment. The court therefore ordered Gaston to “pay the $3,855 

agreed upon by the parties” and “retain possession of the property” and ordered 

S&C to “execute a quit claim deed to the property within ten (10) days of 

receiving Gaston’s payment.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 55. The court also 

ordered S&C to pay $1,275 of Gaston’s attorney’s fees.

[13] S&C now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] S&C appeals the trial court’s order on several grounds. In ruling in favor of 

Gaston, the trial court made several findings. Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 

52(A), the reviewing court will not set aside the findings or judgment unless 

clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 

the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 

N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 7 of 10

[15] First, S&C contends that the trial court “erred in issuing an order on all matters, 

as the scheduled hearing was limited to the issue of possession only, with any 

subsequent hearing to be scheduled at the request of a party.” Appellant’s Br. 

p. 13. Specifically, S&C argues that the court should have held a “bifurcated 

proceeding.” Id. at 23. That is, if the court found that S&C was not entitled to 

immediate possession after the first hearing, then “the proper course of conduct 

would have been for the Court to conduct a hearing on remaining issues, 

including the possibility of S&C obtaining possession, at a later date.” Id. at 24. 

However, any potential “remaining issues” were necessarily resolved when the 

trial court determined that Gaston was entitled to possession and ownership of 

the Apple Street property. As indicated below, the court enforced the parties’ 

settlement agreement, which provided for Gaston to receive a deed to the Apple 

Street property upon the payment of $3,855 to S&C. The trial court did not err 

in disposing of the entire case after the first hearing. 

[16] Second, S&C contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the parties 

entered into an enforceable settlement agreement in September 2017 because 

“[t]he facts . . . do not support a meeting of the minds.” Id. at 20. A settlement 

is an agreement to terminate or forestall all or part of a lawsuit. Harding v. State, 

603 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied; see also Vance v. Lozano, 

981 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A ‘compromise’ or ‘settlement’ is a 

contract between two or more people to amicably settle or adjust their 

differences on such terms as they can agree.” (citing 15B Am. Jur.

2d Compromise & Settlement § 1 (2011)). Indiana strongly favors settlement 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 8 of 10

agreements. Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003), reh’g denied. 

Settlement agreements are governed by the same principles of contract law as 

other agreements and require an offer, acceptance, consideration, and meeting 

of the minds. Jonas v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 52 N.E.3d 861, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016), trans. denied. Generally, a settlement agreement is not required to be in 

writing.1 Id. The breach of a settlement agreement by one of the parties is 

actionable, and a trial court has the power to order specific performance. 

Harding, 603 N.E.2d at 179.

[17] Here, it is undisputed that the parties reached an oral agreement at the 

courthouse to settle the case and that S&C dismissed the case that same day. 

That is, the parties agreed that Gaston would pay S&C $3,855 and S&C would 

give Gaston a deed to the Apple Street property. However, the parties dispute 

whether the agreement contained an additional term. Wynkoop testified that 

the agreement also required Gaston to release the mechanic’s lien on the 

unrelated property. Tr. p. 15; see also Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 32 (S&C’s 

complaint conceding that “an agreement had been made to resolve issues for 

the payment of $3,855.00” but “only with the understanding [Gaston] would 

also release a Mechanic’s Lien”). Gaston and the court reporter, however,

testified that the mechanic’s lien was not part of the parties’ agreement. The 

 

1

S&C notes that when a contract is required by law to be in writing, it can only be modified by a written 

instrument. See Huber v. Hamilton, 33 N.E.3d 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied. Here, however, the 

parties did not modify their original oral agreement regarding the sale of the Apple Street property. Rather, 

they entered into an agreement to settle the pending small-claims case. S&C does not cite any authority for 

the proposition that settlement agreements regarding the sale of real estate must be in writing. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 9 of 10

trial court heard both versions and believed Gaston’s and the court reporter’s 

testimony that the mechanic’s lien was not part of the agreement. See 15B Am. 

Jur. 2d Compromise & Settlement § 7 (Feb. 2019 update) (“A party’s mental 

reservations and unexpressed intentions will not supersede outward expressions 

of assent or override objective and unequivocal manifestations of assent to 

terms of the settlement agreement.”). This evidence supports a conclusion that 

there was a meeting of the minds. 

[18] Third, S&C contends that the parties’ oral agreement for the sale of the Apple 

Street property is not enforceable because it was not in writing, as required by 

the Statute of Frauds. However, S&C can no longer challenge this agreement 

because it entered into a subsequent agreement with Gaston to settle the parties’ 

dispute regarding the sale of the Apple Street property. A settlement agreement 

supersedes and extinguishes all preexisting claims the parties intended to settle

and is effective except as to those claims specifically reserved. 15B Am. Jur. 2d 

Compromise & Settlement, § 24 (Feb. 2019 update). Accordingly, if S&C believed 

that the parties’ oral agreement for the sale of the Apple Street property was not 

enforceable because it was not in writing, then it shouldn’t have entered into the 

settlement agreement with Gaston. Having done so, it cannot now go back and 

challenge the parties’ original agreement for the sale of the Apple Street 

property. 

[19] Finally, S&C contends that the trial court erred in ordering it to pay $1,275 in 

attorney’s fees because Gaston “made no claim for attorney fees whatsoever,” 

either in his pleadings or at the hearing. Appellant’s Br. p. 26. Indiana follows 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1787 | May 8, 2019 Page 10 of 10

the American Rule, which requires each party to a lawsuit to pay its own 

attorney’s fees absent an agreement between the parties, statutory authority, or 

an equitable exception. Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 964 N.E.2d 

806, 815-16 (Ind. 2012). Gaston argues that we should affirm the trial court’s 

award of attorney’s fees because “S&C litigated in bad faith.” Appellee’s Br. p. 

17 (citing Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1). However, Gaston did not make such a “bad

faith” argument below, nor did he request an award of attorney’s fees, nor did 

he present any evidence as to the amount of attorney’s fees he had incurred. 

We therefore reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Gaston. 

[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.