NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

FREDERICK DION FORD, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0652

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-450766-001

The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Consuelo M. Ohanesian

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 8-31-2017
STATE v. FORD

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 Frederick Dion Ford (“Ford”) appeals his conviction and 

sentence for second-degree murder. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Ford shot another man twice, once in the face and once in the

back of the head, killing him. He was indicted on one count of seconddegree murder and one count of misconduct involving weapons. 1 After a 

jury trial, Ford was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 22 

years’ imprisonment. He timely appealed, raising one issue regarding the 

jury selection process. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes sections 12–120.21(A)(1), 13–4031, and –4033(A)(1) (2017).

DISCUSSION

¶3 Ford argues that the State’s use of a peremptory strike of a 

prospective juror violated his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 

rights.

¶4 During voir dire, prospective jurors, including jurors 9, 66, and 

11, stated that serving on the jury would cause them financial hardship. 

Juror 9 stated that he worked from 4 a.m. until 6 p.m. and could not afford 

to miss work to sit as a juror. Juror 66, an office manager, stated he had no 

replacement at work, and was one of only a few employees who spoke 

English. Juror 66 was also concerned he would face retaliation for serving 

on a jury, and his employer made no provisions for employee jury service. 

Juror 11, who is black, stated she works full-time to pay for school. The 

court dismissed jurors 9 and 66 for cause without objection. However, the 

court did not dismiss juror 11 for cause; the State exercised a peremptory 

strike to dismiss her.

 

1 The misconduct involving weapons charge was severed from the 

second-degree murder charge and is not part of this appeal or decision.
STATE v. FORD

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Ford objected to the State’s peremptory strike of juror 11 on 

the ground that she was the only black member of the venire panel. The 

superior court then asked the State for a race-neutral reason for the 

challenge. The State explained that it struck juror 11 because she expressed 

similar concerns to jurors 9 and 66; that is, she was worried about the 

financial hardship of serving on a jury. Ford was given an opportunity to 

respond to the State’s reasoning, and did so. He argued juror 11 stated she 

would face financial difficulties because the trial would last at least six days 

and she would miss work. But that she said this was only the case if she 

was not reimbursed by the court for her service. Nevertheless, the superior 

court accepted the race-neutral basis presented by the State and overruled 

Ford’s objection. A jury was then empaneled.

¶6 Use of peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on their 

race violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See 

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). The trial court follows a three-step

analysis to determine whether a peremptory strike violates Batson. State v. 

Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, 271, ¶ 35 (2017) (Petition for Certiorari Filed 

(NO. 17-90), July 18, 2017). First, a defendant must make a prima facie

showing that the strike was racially discriminatory. Id. Second, if the 

showing is made, the prosecutor must provide a race-neutral reason for the 

strike. Id. Finally, if the prosecutor provides a facially race-neutral 

rationale, the burden shifts to the defense to prove the peremptory strike 

rested on purposeful discrimination. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 401, ¶¶

54-55 (2006). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it was clearly 

erroneous. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 271, ¶ 35.

¶7 Here, after Ford objected to the peremptory strike of juror 11, 

the superior court asked the State to present a race-neutral reason for the 

challenge, and by doing so implicitly found a prima facie case for racial 

discrimination. This request triggered the second step of the Batson process. 

See Newell, 212 Ariz. at 401, ¶ 54 (2006) (“The first step of the Batson analysis

is complete when the trial court requests an explanation for the peremptory

strike.”). The State explained that, like jurors 9 and 66, juror 11 was facing 

potential financial hardship, and was struck for that reason. After giving 

Ford an opportunity to respond, the court overruled his objection, finding 

that the State established a valid basis for striking juror 11.

¶8 The State met its burden of presenting a race-neutral reason 

for striking a minority juror. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence, 

only Ford’s inference, that the State based its peremptory strike on 

purposeful racial discrimination. See Newell, 212 Ariz. at 402, ¶ 58 (mere 

inference by defense that peremptory strike was result of purposeful racial 
STATE v. FORD

Decision of the Court

4

discrimination insufficient to satisfy burden of persuasion). Ford argues 

that because jurors 9 and 66 had far more serious financial concerns than 

juror 11, the State’s peremptory strike was based on a pretextual concern. 

Whether the prosecutor’s exercise of the strike was pretextual was a 

question of fact and credibility to be resolved by the trial court. See id. at 

401, ¶ 54 (“This third step is fact intensive and will turn on issues of 

credibility which the trial court is in a better position to assess than is this 

Court.”). The superior court determined there was a non-discriminatory 

reason for the State’s peremptory strike of juror 11. Because the “trial court 

is in a better position to assess” credibility than this court, its “finding at 

this step is due much deference.” Id. There is no support in the record for 

Ford’s assertion that the State’s peremptory strike regarding juror 11 was 

pretextual. The court did not err by denying Ford’s Batson challenge to 

juror 11.

CONCLUSION

¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ford’s conviction and 

sentence.