HOMELAND 

DEFENSE

Action Needed to 

Improve Cost 

Reporting for DOD's 

Aerospace Control 

Alert Mission

Report to Congressional Committees

September 2013

GAO-13-785

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-785, a report to 

congressional committees

September 2013

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Action Needed to Improve Cost Reporting for DOD's 

Aerospace Control Alert Mission

Why GAO Did This Study

To protect U.S. airspace, DOD 

performs the Aerospace Control Alert 

mission, which includes military forces 

arrayed in a rapid response posture to 

conduct both air sovereignty and air 

defense operations against airborne 

threats over the United States and 

Canada. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

required that the Secretary of Defense 

submit a report to Congress that 

provides a cost-benefit analysis and 

risk-based assessment of the 

Aerospace Control Alert mission as it

relates to expected future changes to 

the budget and force structure of the 

mission. The act also requires that

GAO review DOD’s report and submit 

any findings to the congressional 

defense committees. In response to 

this mandate, GAO examined (1) 

DOD’s April 2013 reporting of a riskbased assessment and cost-benefit 

analysis of the Aerospace Control Alert 

mission as they relate to expected 

future changes to the budget and force 

structure of that mission and (2) the 

extent to which DOD has reported the 

total cost of the Aerospace Control 

Alert mission. GAO reviewed DOD’s 

April 2013 report to Congress and

Aerospace Control Alert budget 

justification displays, and interviewed 

knowledgeable DOD officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD, as it

expands its cost reporting in response

to current reporting requirements, 

ensure that all personnel costs related 

to the Aerospace Control Alert mission, 

including those of the Army and Army 

National Guard, are included in DOD’s 

budget displays. DOD concurred with 

GAO’s recommendation.

What GAO Found

In its April 2013 report to Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD) did not 

provide any new analyses, but provided the results of previous analyses related 

to the Aerospace Control Alert mission because, according to DOD officials, 

DOD was not expecting any future changes to the budget or force structure of 

the mission, including consideration of any basing location alternatives. DOD’s 

April 2013 report summarized the results of three risk assessments that were 

conducted to support DOD’s 2012 decision on which two alert basing locations 

could be removed from 24-hour alert status with the least amount of risk. The 

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and 

the Continental U.S. NORAD Region performed these assessments and all 

concluded that, given the 2012 DOD decision that two alert basing locations 

would be removed from 24-hour alert status, the removal of the locations at 

Duluth, Minnesota, and Langley, Virginia, would provide the least increase in risk. 

DOD’s April 2013 report also summarized a cost savings estimate developed 

after the decision to remove these basing locations from 24-hour alert status. 

Along with the submission of DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2010-14, the 

Air Force reported cost information for components of the Aerospace Control 

Alert mission in budget displays required by the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, but DOD did not report the 

comprehensive cost of the Aerospace Control Alert mission. Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that financial information is 

needed for periodic external reporting and, on a day-to-day basis, to make 

operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. The Air Force 

provided budget displays containing information related to Air Force and Air 

National Guard military personnel costs, flying hours, and certain other costs 

along with DOD’s budget justification materials for fiscal years 2010-14. 

However, DOD did not report other military service costs associated with the 

Aerospace Control Alert mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013 now requires, in addition to the Air Force cost information 

required by the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009, that DOD provide a consolidated budget justification display that fully 

identifies the Aerospace Control Alert budget for each of the military services and 

encompasses all programs and activities of the Aerospace Control Alert mission 

for each of the following: procurement; operations and maintenance; research, 

development, testing, and evaluation; and military construction. According to 

DOD officials, such a display is being developed for inclusion with the fiscal year 

2015 budget submission. These consolidated budget displays should help 

provide a more complete picture of Aerospace Control Alert mission costs. 

However, other military personnel costs, including those associated with the 

Army and the Army National Guard personnel providing ground-based air 

defense capabilities, support the mission as well. Inclusion of this information, in 

addition to the information required in the budget justification displays, could

provide decision makers with more comprehensive cost information to make fully 

informed resource allocation decisions to support the Aerospace Control Alert 

mission.

View GAO-13-785. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

Letter 1

DOD Does Not Anticipate Future Budget or Force Structure 

Changes and 2013 Report to Congress Provides Results of 

Previous Analyses We Reported on in February 2013 4

DOD Has Not Reported Comprehensive Cost Information for the 

Aerospace Control Alert Mission 6

Conclusions 8

Recommendation for Executive Action 8

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 9

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 11

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 13

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

Contents

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Page 1 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 9, 2013

Congressional Committees

As a part of the federal government’s efforts to protect U.S. airspace, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) performs Operation Noble Eagle, which 

consists of several missions. One such mission is the Aerospace Control 

Alert mission, which includes military forces arrayed in a rapid response 

posture to conduct both air sovereignty and air defense operations 

against airborne threats over the United States and Canada.1 These 

forces include fighter aircraft and personnel available 24 hours a day, 

every day, to deter, respond to, and if necessary defeat airborne threats 

at 16 Aerospace Control Alert basing locations across the contiguous 

United States as well as in Alaska and Hawaii. These alert basing 

locations make up a portion of the Aerospace Control Alert mission and 

include pilots, command and control personnel, fighter aircraft, refueling 

tankers, airborne early warning aircraft, and aircraft maintenance 

personnel. The Army and the U.S. Coast Guard also support the 

Aerospace Control Alert mission; the Army provides ground-based air 

defense systems and personnel while the U.S. Coast Guard provides 

alert helicopters. The Aerospace Control Alert mission represents the last 

line of the air defense of the United States. In 2012, in response to the 

Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiatives,2

 1 DOD formerly referred to the Aerospace Control Alert mission as air sovereignty alert. 

DOD defines “air sovereignty” as a nation’s inherent right to exercise absolute control and 

authority over the airspace above its territory. DOD defines “air defense” as defensive 

measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the atmosphere, or 

to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. See Department of Defense, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 

Publication 1-02 (Nov. 8, 2010 as amended through June 15, 2013).

DOD decided that its 

Aerospace Control Alert basing locations in Duluth, Minnesota, and in 

Langley, Virginia, could be taken off 24-hour alert status, with minimal 

impact on overall mission capabilities.

2 In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense publicly announced that DOD was to undertake a 

department-wide initiative to assess how the department is staffed, organized, and 

operated with the goals of reducing costs and modernizing its weapons portfolio, among 

others. The Secretary’s initiative targeted both short- and long-term improvements and set 

specific goals and targets for achieving cost savings and efficiencies, which are expected 

to be achieved from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016. 
Page 2 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

We previously reported on improvements and challenges regarding the 

planning and management of the Aerospace Control Alert mission, 

including challenges faced by the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD) and DOD in their ability to balance risks, costs, and 

benefits associated with that mission. Specifically, in January 2009, we 

reported on shortcomings in DOD’s approach to the mission, including 

NORAD’s difficulty in determining the appropriate numbers and types of 

units, personnel, and aircraft for the mission.3 In January 2012, we 

reported again on the Aerospace Control Alert mission and noted that 

NORAD had not included a prioritized list of metropolitan areas and 

critical infrastructure in its risk assessments and that it did not incorporate 

into these assessments assumptions associated with all three elements 

of risk: threat, vulnerability, and consequence.4 Finally, in February 2013, 

we reported on the analyses DOD used to support its decision to take the 

alert basing locations in Duluth, Minnesota, and in Langley, Virginia, off 

24-hour alert status.5

Effective January 2013, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2013 required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to 

Congress, not later than April 1, 2013, that provided a cost-benefit 

analysis and risk-based assessment of the Aerospace Control Alert 

mission as it relates to expected future changes to the budget and force 

structure of such mission.

Our report summarized the three risk assessments 

conducted by DOD to inform the decision of which of the basing locations, 

once removed from 24-hour alert status, would have the least impact on 

operational effectiveness. Our report also summarized the estimated cost 

savings that DOD expected as a result of these changes.

6

 3 In January 2009, we made five recommendations to DOD to improve the management 

of the Aerospace Control Alert mission, including conducting routine risk assessments as 

part of a risk-based management approach. DOD fully or partially agreed with these five 

recommendations. See GAO, Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve 

Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace, 

On April 18, 2013, DOD submitted its report to 

GAO-09-184

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2009).

4 GAO, Homeland Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air 

Sovereignty Alert Operations, GAO-12-311 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012).

5 GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD’s Aerospace Control Alert Basing Decision Was 

Informed by Various Analyses, GAO-13-230R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2013).

6 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 352(b)(1) (2013). 
Page 3 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

Congress.7 The act also requires that GAO conduct a review of the DOD 

report and submit a report on the findings of that review to the 

congressional defense committees.8

To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant documents and 

interviewed knowledgeable officials from DOD’s Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation, Joint Staff, NORAD/U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific 

Command, Departments of the Army and Air Force, National Guard 

Bureau and Air National Guard, Continental U.S. NORAD Region (a 

component of NORAD that directs aerospace control for the continental 

United States, with the exception of Alaska), and U.S. Army North. To 

examine DOD’s reporting of a risk-based assessment and cost-benefit 

analysis in the April 2013 DOD Report on the Aerospace Control Alert 

Mission Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk-Based Assessment, we examined 

the risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis information contained in the 

2013 DOD report and supporting documentation and testimonial evidence 

provided by DOD during the course of our review. To examine the extent 

to which DOD reported the total cost of the Aerospace Control Alert 

mission, we analyzed the costs included in Air Force budget displays for 

the Aerospace Control Alert mission for fiscal year 2010 through fiscal 

year 2014

In response to this mandate, we 

examined (1) DOD’s reporting of a risk-based assessment and costbenefit analysis of the Aerospace Control Alert mission as they relate to 

expected future changes to the budget and force structure of the mission 

and (2) the extent to which DOD has reported the total cost of the 

Aerospace Control Alert mission.

9

 7 DOD chose to limit the scope of its report to the alert fighter component of the 

Aerospace Control Alert mission and discussed those alert locations located in the 

contiguous continental United States; alert basing locations in Alaska and Hawaii were not 

included.

and compared this information with mission-related costs 

8 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 352(b)(2) (2013).

9 The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires 

that the Secretary of Defense submit a budget display to the President, for consideration 

by the President for inclusion with the yearly budget materials submitted to Congress that 

covers all programs and activities of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission of the Air Force (to 

include Air National Guard costs), including military personnel costs, flying hours, and any 

other associated mission costs. See Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 354 (2008).
Page 4 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

identified during the course of our review by DOD officials associated with 

the mission, as well as with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government.

10

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 until September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In its April 2013 report to Congress, in response to the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requirement that DOD provide a 

cost-benefit analysis and a risk-based assessment of the Aerospace 

Control Alert mission as it relates to expected future changes to the 

budget and force structure of such mission,11

In our prior reports on the Aerospace Control Alert mission, we stated that 

GAO’s risk-based management framework noted that risk assessments 

should contain three key elements: an analysis of threat, an estimation of 

vulnerability, and an identification of consequences.

DOD did not conduct or 

report on any new analyses because, according to DOD officials, DOD 

was not weighing competing Aerospace Control Alert basing location 

alternatives in response to any future budget or force structure changes. 

DOD reported on its previous analyses that consisted of (1) three risk 

assessments DOD conducted to support the 2012 decision that 

determined which two alert basing locations could be reduced with the 

least amount of risk and (2) cost savings estimates DOD developed after 

making the 2012 decision to take two alert basing locations (one in 

Duluth, Minnesota, and the other in Langley, Virginia) off 24-hour alert 

status.

12

 10 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

Following a 

decision by DOD that two alert basing locations should be taken off 24-

hour alert status, three risk assessments were conducted to support the 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

11 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 352 (2013).

12 GAO-09-184 and GAO-12-311.

DOD Does Not 

Anticipate Future 

Budget or Force 

Structure Changes 

and 2013 Report to 

Congress Provides 

Results of Previous 

Analyses We Reported 

on in February 2013
Page 5 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

2012 decision of which two locations, once removed from 24-hour alert 

status, would have the least amount of increase in risk to the overall 

Aerospace Control Alert mission. DOD’s April 2013 report provided a 

summary of the final results of these three risk assessments. These risk 

assessments were performed by NORAD, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the 

Continental U.S. NORAD Region, which included consideration of threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence. All three of these assessments came to 

similar conclusions regarding which of the two alert locations would cause 

the least increase in risk if taken off of 24-hour alert status.

NORAD’s risk assessment analysis was based on quantitative modeling 

of fighter basing and, in our February 2013 report, we noted that NORAD 

had improved its risk analysis by changing some of the assumptions used 

to address vulnerability and consequence.13

According to DOD officials, DOD does not expect to make future changes 

to the budget and force structure of the mission beyond the decision 

already made to remove two sites from 24-hour alert status. In addition, 

the April 2013 DOD report notes that any further reductions in 24-hour 

alert sites would affect cross-border operations with Canada as well as 

mission accomplishment.

We also discussed the 

separate analysis conducted by the Office of Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation, which similarly relied on modeling to aid its 

evaluation of risk. Finally, in our February 2013 report, we described the 

analysis resulting from a panel of subject matter experts convened by 

Continental U.S. NORAD Region, which reached conclusions consistent 

with NORAD and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

modeling. NORAD officials stressed to us that there was an increase in 

risk that resulted from removing two basing locations from 24-hour alert 

status, but the risk assessments informed decision making as to which 

two bases removal would have the least increase in risk. According to 

DOD officials, no additional risk analysis was conducted following these 

three studies.

Regarding the cost savings estimate, DOD’s April 2013 report states that 

removing the 24-hour alert status from the Duluth and Langley alert 

basing locations would result in an estimated savings of over $73 million 

 13 GAO-13-230R.
Page 6 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

over the fiscal year 2013-17 time period. The report states that these 

estimated cost savings are primarily from shifting personnel from full-time 

to part-time status at the two sites no longer on 24-hour alert status. We 

reported on these same cost savings estimates in February 2013 and 

noted that the cost savings were estimated by the Air Force after the 

decision was made to eliminate alert basing locations at Duluth, 

Minnesota, and Langley, Virginia, from 24-hour alert status.14

DOD has reported Air Force cost information for the Aerospace Control 

Alert mission in its budget displays but has not yet reported the 

comprehensive cost of the mission. Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government notes that financial information is needed for 

periodic external reporting and, on a day-to-day basis, to make operating 

decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources.15

Congress has passed specific reporting requirements for the mission. The 

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 

requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a budget display to the 

President, for consideration by the President for inclusion with the yearly 

budget materials submitted to Congress, that covers all programs and 

activities of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission of the Air Force (to include 

Air National Guard costs), including military personnel costs, flying hours, 

and any other associated mission costs.

Pertinent cost 

information should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and 

time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently. Accurate 

and timely reporting of operational and financial data can assist program 

managers in determining whether they are meeting their agencies’ plans 

and meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of 

resources. Without comprehensive cost information, decision-makers 

may not know what resources are allocated and used in support of the 

Aerospace Control Alert mission.

16

 14

The Air Force provided budget 

displays containing information related to military personnel costs, flying 

hours, and certain other costs along with DOD’s budget justification 

materials for fiscal years 2010-14. In January 2012, we concluded that 

GAO-13-230R.

15 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

16 Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 354 (2008).

DOD Has Not 

Reported 

Comprehensive 

Cost Information 

for the Aerospace 

Control Alert Mission
Page 7 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

weak internal controls limited DOD’s ability to accurately identify Air 

Sovereignty Alert mission17 expenditures.18 In addition, according to Air 

National Guard officials, not all National Guard Bureau costs are included 

in total Aerospace Control Alert mission costs. For example, the Air Force 

calculates the costs for each basing location based on formulas that do 

not consider the base’s location and the unit’s home station. However, 

according to Air National Guard officials, the actual costs of each basing 

location can vary depending on a number of factors, such as whether the 

personnel at the location are Air National Guard or active duty Air Force 

personnel or whether the assigned unit is home-based or a detachment 

unit—temporarily relocated from their usual duty station. The Air Force 

budget justification displays submitted for fiscal years 2010-14 include 

personnel costs for Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve 

personnel, but do not include costs, such as military personnel costs, that 

other military services have in conjunction with the Aerospace Control 

Alert mission.19

In addition to the 2009 requirement, the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires that DOD provide a consolidated budget 

justification display that fully identifies the Aerospace Control Alert budget 

for each of the military services and encompasses all programs and 

activities of the Aerospace Control Alert mission for each of the following: 

(1) procurement; (2) operations and maintenance; (3) research, 

development, testing, and evaluation; and (4) military construction.20

 17 Now known as the Aerospace Control Alert mission.

However, the act does not require any additional military personnel cost 

reporting. DOD has not yet developed a consolidated budget display in 

response to this new requirement. However, according to DOD officials, 

such a display is being developed for inclusion with the department’s 

18 Specifically, in January 2012 we found that DOD’s reported expenditures (1) overstated 

mission flying-hours, (2) included expenditures not associated with the mission, and (3) 

omitted some mission-related expenditures. We recommended improvements that the

Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the National Guard Bureau could make to 

improve the accuracy of reported expenditures for this mission. DOD partially concurred 

with this recommendation and the Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the 

Secretary of the Air Force to clarify and standardize tracking of these expenditures. (See 

GAO-12-311.)

19 The military services include the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps 

within DOD and the U.S. Coast Guard within the Department of Homeland Security.

20 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 352(a) (2013).
Page 8 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

fiscal year 2015 budget submission to include the four budget categories 

specifically identified by the act. As a result, DOD’s consolidated budget 

display for the fiscal year 2015 budget submission may not include 

military personnel costs associated with the other services, particularly 

the Army.

The consolidated budget displays required by the Duncan Hunter 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 should help provide 

Congress and senior DOD decision makers with a more complete picture 

of Aerospace Control Alert mission costs. However, in addition to Air 

Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve personnel costs, 

personnel costs from the other DOD components also support the 

mission—including the Army and the Army National Guard personnel 

providing ground-based air defense capabilities in support of the mission. 

Unless this additional information is included in DOD’s revised budget 

display, DOD decision makers will not have comprehensive cost 

information to make fully informed resource allocation decisions to 

support the Aerospace Control Alert mission.

The Aerospace Control Alert mission is critical to defending U.S. 

airspace. Once completed, the budget justification displays required by 

the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2009 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

should aid in the identification of many program and activity costs for 

each of the military services associated with the Aerospace Control Alert 

mission. A comprehensive identification and reporting of all costs 

associated with the mission, including all military personnel costs, could 

aid DOD in exercising effective management of this mission and its 

associated resources. Comprehensive reporting of all costs of the mission 

would also provide the Congress with a fuller accounting of these costs to 

aid in its oversight of the mission.

As DOD expands its cost reporting in the consolidated budget justification 

displays as required by section 354 of the Duncan Hunter National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and section 352 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) and responsible DOD organizations, as appropriate, to 

ensure that all Aerospace Control Alert program and activity costs for 

each of the military services are captured, including military personnel 

costs of the Army and Army National Guard.

Conclusions

Recommendation for 

Executive Action
Page 9 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation to ensure that all Aerospace Control Alert program and 

activity costs for each of the military services are captured, including 

those of the Army and Army National Guard. DOD stated that the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will include these costs in its 

Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission. DOD’s written comments are 

reprinted in their entirety in appendix I.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and 

Homeland Security; the Commanders of NORAD, U.S. Northern 

Command, and U.S. Pacific Command; the Secretaries of the Army and 

of the Air Force; the Commandant of the Coast Guard; the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau; and the Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our 

website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix II.

Brian J. Lepore 

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 10 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 11 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

Appendix I: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 12 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 13 GAO-13-785 Homeland Defense

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; Adam Anguiano; Brent Helt; Mae 

Jones; Jeff Tessin; and Michael Willems.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351823)
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