Defense Science Board 

Task Force 

on 

Directed Energy Weapons 

December 2007 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the 

Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report 

do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The DSB Task Force on Directed Energy Weapons completed its information gathering in 

June 2007. This report is UNCLASSIFIED and is releasable to the public.


MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Directed Energy 

Weapon Systems and Technology Applications

Directed energy offers promise as a transformational “game changer” in military 

operations, able to augment and improve operational capabilities in many areas.

Yet despite this potential, years of investment have not resulted in any operational 

systems with high energy laser capability. The lack of progress is a result of many 

factors from unexpected technological challenges to a lack of understanding of the 

costs and benefits of such systems. Ultimately, as a result of these circumstances,

interest in such systems has declined over the years.

This task force was asked to review all directed energy programs in the Department

and other organizations as well as supporting technology advancements and their 

applications. This report contains the results of that review and provides a window

into the progress toward weaponization of these systems.

While the task force heard descriptions of dozens of technically feasible and 

operationally relevant directed energy programs and activities, the report focuses 

on a smaller number of the most promising applications. Applications with 

potential to provide superior capabilities include long-range strategic missions 

such as space control and force protection, and tactical missions such as groundbased defense against rockets, artillery, and mortars and defense against man 

portable air defense systems. For some applications, directed energy has the 

potential to compete favorably with kinetic solutions; for others, no adequate 

kinetic approach currently exists.

The task force believes that the range of potential applications is sufficient to 

warrant significantly increased attention to the scope and direction of efforts to

assess, develop, and field appropriate laser, microwave, and millimeter wave

weapons. But until the operational demand generates priorities, there is little reason

to expect rapid progress in fielding such systems. Further, the currently fragmented

science and technology projects and programs must be directed to research and

development programs leading to fielded systems. The task force believes that the 

Department can take the following steps to better position itself for successful

development and deployment of operational directed energy systems.
• Directed energy employment needs to be clearly described in concepts of 

operation as the basis for decisions relating to technical, employment,

policy planning and priorities.

• For each capability gap where directed energy is a proposed solution, the 

directed energy solution should be assessed against available kinetic or 

other approaches to filling the gap.

• Research and development funding should be focused on those directed 

energy solutions where rigorous analyses identify directed energy as the 

most promising solution to a priority need and concentrated for progress 

rather than spread over a large number of projects.

• S&T funding for laser weapons should be heavily focused on high power 

solid state and fiber lasers and significantly improved beam control for 

appropriate applications and on concentrated development of free electron 

lasers for ship defense.

• The Department needs an authoritative single source data base for directed 

energy effects similar to the munitions effects manual for kinetic weapons.

• The development of laser and high power microwave technologies and

systems available to potential adversaries poses a new set of challenges to

U.S. military force capabilities which must be better understood and tracked.

• The Department needs a concerted education effort to replace the “death 

ray” myth of directed weapons with a comprehensive understanding of the 

potential benefits and limitations of their application.

We appreciate the contributions of all those involved in this effort: the members of 

the study; the government advisors; our executive secretaries Col Jim D. Wallace 

II, USAF Reserve and Dr. Thomas Spencer; Maj Charles E. Lominac II, military 

assistant; and staff analyst, Mr. Anthony L. Johnson.

General Larry D. Welch Dr. Robert J. Hermann

Co-Chair Co-Chair
TABLE OF CONTENTS I v

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ....................................................................................................vii 

Chapter 1. Threat ..........................................................................................................1 

Findings and Recommendations..............................................................................3 

Chapter 2. High-Energy Laser Technology and Programs.....................................5 

Laser Approaches.......................................................................................................5 

HEL Science and Technology and R&D Funding, Fiscal Year 2007.................8 

Low- and Medium-Power Applications................................................................11 

High-Power Applications........................................................................................14 

Findings and Recommendations............................................................................30 

Chapter 3. High-Powered Microwave Technology and Programs......................33 

Effects........................................................................................................................34 

Low-Technology Solutions.....................................................................................35 

Transportability.........................................................................................................35 

Specific Research to Support Effective Use of HPM Technology...................35 

HPM Science and Technology and Research and Development Funding......36 

HPM Applications....................................................................................................38 

Findings and Recommendations............................................................................43 

Chapter 4. Industrial Base..........................................................................................45 

Industrial Firms.........................................................................................................45 

Funding......................................................................................................................46

Market Potential........................................................................................................47 

Personnel ...................................................................................................................48 

Findings and Recommendations............................................................................49 

Chapter 5. Summary of Findings and Recommendations ....................................50 

Appendix A. Terms of Reference.............................................................................59 

Appendix B. Task Force Membership.....................................................................63 

Appendix C. Presentations to the Task Force........................................................64 

Appendix D. Organization ........................................................................................67 

Appendix E. Glossary.................................................................................................78
vi I TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I vii

Executive Summary 

The Potential 

Directed energy continues to offer promise as a transformational 

“game changer” as the Department of Defense (DOD) encounters new 

asymmetric and disruptive threats, while facing increasingly sophisticated 

traditional challenges. Yet years of investment have not resulted in any 

currently operational high-energy laser capability. In addition, the single 

high-energy laser program of record, the Airborne Laser (ABL) for boost 

phase missile defense, continues to experience delays and potential 

budget reductions. 

There is a strong belief in the directed energy community, and in 

segments of the warfighter and force-provider communities, that highpower microwave (HPM) offers capabilities in anti-sensor applications 

and as non-lethal weapons. Still, HPM advancement has been limited by 

uncertainty about its effects and effectiveness. 

Years of major investment in chemical lasers has produced 

megawatt-class systems that could have a wide range of applications. 

However, size, weight, and logistics issues limit them to integration on 

large platforms, such as the 747 used for the ABL program, or fixed 

ground applications such as the Ground-Based Laser for Space Control. 

As a consequence, interest in these systems and expectations of 

progress has significantly decreased. 

The current focus is on solid state lasers with the promise of 

providing for smaller, lighter systems with deep magazines. However, 

the current goal for solid state laser development would provide a 

power level more than an order of magnitude lower than current 

chemical lasers. While beam quality and other factors can compensate 

for some of the difference in power level, there is currently little 

investment in those aspects. Further, these cannot make up the delta in 

power of chemical vs. solid state lasers. The near-term projection for 

solid state lasers is a power level closer to two orders of magnitude 

below that of chemical lasers. A major increase in investment is 
viii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

required—perhaps of the same order as the previous investment in 

chemical lasers—to realize the potential of solid state lasers. 

Even considering the reduced power levels, electrically based solid 

state and fiber high-energy laser (HEL) technologies, with improving 

efficiency and power levels, could, with time and investment, enable 

transportable “tactical” applications on aircraft, ground vehicles, and 

ships. Free electron lasers, with the promise of high power, high beam 

quality, and wavelength agility could offer unique advantages for shipbased applications. 

At medium power levels, solid state laser systems with improved 

efficiency and reasonable beam quality could provide manned and 

unmanned aircraft applications at power levels of tens to hundreds of 

kilowatts for self-defense and, eventually, precision ground attack. 

Advances in electrically based solid state and fiber lasers have 

produced low-power applications with higher power applications 

achievable within a few years, given adequate direction and investment. 

These include less than lethal applications at power levels ranging from 

less than a watt to 10s of watts of average power. Technology 

prospects, applications, and issues for laser power are discussed in 

Chapter 2 of this report. 

High-power microwave and millimeter wave system developments 

have provided prototype capabilities currently in use in combat 

operations. Further, there are promising applications that address 

identified current gaps in capability. Specific discussion of microwave 

technologies, applications, and issues is found in Chapter 3 of this report. 

The Record and Obstacles 

In spite of the promise, delivery of high-power laser capabilities 

remains a potential for the future. In June 2001, the Defense Science 

Board provided a comprehensive assessment of the state of laser 

technologies in its report High Energy Laser Weapon Systems Applications,

which addressed, among other tasks, “what remains to be done to 

‘weaponize’ these systems.” At that time, there was high interest and 

optimism for future progress, based on a number of ongoing programs 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I ix

that were expected to produce fielded capabilities within five to twenty 

years, including: 

 The Airborne Laser’s critical operational demonstration has 

slipped almost year for year since that report was published. 

 The Space-Based Laser for missile defense has been effectively 

abandoned. 

 The Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program to provide 

battlefield capabilities for ground forces was terminated. 

 Maritime Self-Defense, the Free Electron Laser, is still in the 

technology development phase. 

 The Airborne Tactical Laser (ATL), undergoing an extended 

user evaluation at the end of a successful advanced concept 

technology development (ACTD), is not a program of record. 

 The Ground-Based Laser for Space Control is not currently 

being pursued. 

 The Tactical High Energy Laser Fighter is no longer a projected 

program, but could be an evolution of the ATL ACTD. 

 Future Combat Systems applications are no longer part of the 

Future Combat System program. 

 Laser blinding of guidance systems of air-to-air missiles has 

been demonstrated but not fielded. 

With this disappointing lack of progress, there has been a marked 

decline in interest on the part of operational customers, force providers, 

and industry. There are multiple reasons for the lack of current progress 

and perceived promise of directed energy, including unexpected 

challenges in developing the technology and lack of priority. The most 

fundamental issue affecting priority for developing and fielding laser and 

microwave/millimeter wave systems useful to combatant command 

missions is the need for cost-benefit analyses supporting priority choices. 

Such analyses require a coherent and consistent means of evaluating and 

reporting laser and microwave/millimeter wave system effects that, to 

date, have not been a rigorous element of the programs and projects. 
x I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The need for such analyses is exacerbated by two underlying issues. 

The first is that directed energy, in general, suffers from a history of 

overly optimistic expectations. For example, in the early 1970s, an Air 

Force decision to cancel a short range air-to-air missile program was 

strongly influenced by the projection that, with increased focus and 

funding, the need could be filled in the near term with laser weapons 

suitable for fighter aircraft. Almost 30 years later, there is little prospect 

of achieving such a capability. More recent examples, mentioned above, 

are the multiple years of delay on the well-funded ABL program and 

the demise of the otherwise successful THEL program for 

programmatic issues, including logistic complexity on the battlefield. 

A second issue is that, for many proposed applications, there are 

competing and well-understood conventional approaches to producing 

the desired effect. Given the history of high-energy laser programs, these 

conventional approaches are more credible to warfighters and force 

providers. 

The lack of adequate cost-benefit analyses and focused mission 

analyses inhibits the effective use of currently programmed resources 

for directed energy development with over half the total DOD 

investment going into a single system—the Airborne Laser—with 

emphasis on a currently unproven mission capability of boost phase 

intercept of ballistic missiles. 

Some Promising Applications 

The task force heard impressive descriptions of dozens of directed 

energy programs and activities, many of which seemed technically 

feasible and operationally relevant. Still, given the generally low level of 

operational user needs assessment relevant to directed energy 

applications, it was not useful to fill this report with descriptions of the 

many activities currently underway. Instead, the focus is on a smaller 

number of promising applications that stood out, each supported by 

any number of activities, but few being pursued on a defined path to 

operationally useful fielded capability. 

The task force did conclude that there are a number of promising 

applications of directed energy. For some of the applications, directed 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xi

energy has the potential to compete favorably with kinetic solutions. 

For others, the task force found no adequate kinetic approach. While 

the process of choosing priorities for funding and emphasis should 

include rigorous cost-benefit analyses, the following have the potential 

to provide superior, and in some cases unique, capabilities: 

 Long-range strategic missions for HEL application 

- Space control 

- Force protection 

 Tactical missions for HEL application 

- Ship defense against maneuvering cruise missiles and 

tactical ballistic missiles 

- Ground-based defense against rockets, artillery, and mortars 

- Ground-based capability to destroy adversarial unmanned 

aerial vehicles 

- Airborne defense of aircraft against man-portable air 

defense systems (MANPADS) 

 Tactical missions for HPM 

- Ground-based vehicle stopping system 

- Airborne defeat of MANPADS 

- Vehicle mounted defeat of implanted improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs) 

- Airborne defeat of electronic systems 

 Tactical missions for high-power millimeter wave 

- Ground-based active denial system 

While the above list is neither exhaustive nor adequately assessed, it 

should be enough to warrant significantly increased attention to the 

scope and direction of efforts to assess, develop, and field appropriate 

laser, microwave, and millimeter wave weapons. There is little reason to 

expect rapid progress in fielding high-power laser or high-power 
xii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

microwave weapons until operational demand generates priorities, and 

until the currently fragmented science and technology (S&T) projects 

and programs are focused on moving to research and development 

programs leading to fielded systems. 

Organization 

There is an extensive array of organizations within the Department 

with roles and responsibilities for aspects of directed energy work. 

Appendix D provides a description of a number of those organizations 

and their roles. The task force did not find compelling reasons to 

reorganize. The report includes recommendations intended to focus the 

current organizations more effectively on activities consistent with 

currently assigned roles and responsibilities. 

Legal and Policy Aspects 

The task force heard concerns over the legal and policy aspects of 

employing directed energy weapons. The concern is seen by some as 

inhibiting or deterring development of such weapons with reluctance to 

invest in capabilities that might not be useable in the battlespace due to 

legal or policy constraints. Much of this concern is the product of 

inadequate communications rather than any unusual legal or policy 

constraints. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and service component 

Judge Advocate General Offices have determined that directed energy 

weapons are, in and of themselves, legal according to all U.S. laws, the 

Laws of Armed Conflict, and are consistent with all current U.S. treaty 

and international obligations. Noting that directed energy weapons are 

legal does not imply that their use in a particular situation is legal. There 

are situations where the use of a directed energy weapon could be 

contrary to U.S. or international law. This consideration is the case with 

virtually any weapon. 

One such constraint is the use of a laser weapon to intentionally 

blind combatants. The States Parties to the 1980 Convention on 

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xiii

Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 

have Indiscriminate Effects had a fourth protocol adopted in 1995, 

where the intent is to prohibit laser weapons that are specifically used to 

blind combatants systematically and intentionally.1 While the United 

States is not a signatory to this particular protocol, the DOD has issued 

a policy that prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause 

permanent blindness of unenhanced vision. 

 That same policy stated that “...laser systems are absolutely vital to 

our modern military. Among other things, they are currently used for 

detection, targeting, range-finding, communications, and target destruction. 

They provide a critical technological edge to U.S. forces and allow our 

forces to fight, win, and survive on an increasingly lethal battlefield. In 

addition, lasers provide significant humanitarian benefits. They allow 

weapon systems to be increasingly discriminate, thereby reducing collateral 

damage to civilian lives and property. The [DOD] recognizes that 

accidental or incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield as the 

result of the use of legitimate laser systems. Therefore, we continue to 

strive, through training and doctrine, to minimize these injuries.” 

A similarly supportive policy has been stated for other directed 

energy weapons. At the same time, when such weapons are new to the 

battlespace, there will be a policy determination on their initial 

introduction to include an understanding by appropriate policy makers 

of the intended uses. Such determination needs to be informed by a 

thorough and credible understanding of the risk and benefits of 

employing such weapons. Beyond the process of approving first use, 

the expectation is that the Laws of Armed Conflict, rules of 

engagement, and combat commander direction will govern employment 

of directed energy weapons as is the case for kinetic weapons. 

 

1. W. Hays Park, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Department of the Army, Office 

of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum of Law, DAJA-IO (27-1a), 20 December 1996. 
xiv I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Bottom Line Findings and Recommendations 

 Directed energy employment needs to be clearly described in 

concepts of operation as the basis for decisions relating to 

technical, employment, policy planning, and priorities. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD [AT&L]) should require that the military 

departments provide a concept of operation for each proposed laser and 

HPM weapons system. 

 For each capability gap where directed energy is a proposed 

solution, the directed energy solution should be assessed against 

available kinetic or other approaches to filling the gap. 

- USD (AT&L), the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

and the military departments should establish programs analyzing the 

cost and benefit of promising applications of laser and HPM weapons 

to fill identified capability needs. 

 Research and development funding should be focused on those 

directed energy solutions where rigorous analyses identify 

directed energy as the most promising solution to a priority 

need and concentrated for progress rather than spread over a 

large number of projects. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the military departments to provide road 

maps (strategic plans) to move demonstrated technologies to fielded 

capabilities in accordance with priorities established by combatant 

commands and force providers. 

 S&T funding for laser weapons should be heavily focused on 

high power solid state and fiber lasers and significantly improved 

beam control for appropriate applications and on concentrated 

development of free electron lasers for ship defense. 

- The Director, Defense Research and Engineering, should give high 

priority to S&T activities addressing high power solid state laser 

development and accompanying beam quality and beam control 

development. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xv

 The Department needs an authoritative single source database 

for directed energy effects similar to the munitions effects 

manual for kinetic weapons. Development of meaningful 

concepts of operations and analyses of military utility require 

the foundation of credible weapons effects data and 

assessments. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should assign responsibility to a 

military department to develop a laser and high power microwave 

effects manual. 

 The development of laser and high power microwave 

technologies and systems available to potential adversaries 

poses a new set of challenges to U.S. military force capabilities. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD [I]) should: 

 Produce a needs statement for the national intelligence community 

that details the information support that is required to perform 

quality threat assessment and identify development opportunities 

and needs. 

 Designate a member of the USD (I) staff to be a focal point for 

advocating improvement in all dimensions of directed energy 

intelligence. 

- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, should undertake a specific 

program to discover and assess emerging laser and high-power 

microwave capabilities available to the full range of potential 

adversaries. The program needs to be supported by people with 

expertise in directed energy technologies and applications.

 The Department needs a concerted education effort to replace 

the “death ray” myth of directed weapons with a 

comprehensive understanding of the potential benefits and 

limitations of low-, medium-, and high-power laser applications, 

high-power microwave, and millimeter wave applications. 

- The military departments should accelerate efforts to credibly assess 

effects on human targets, and widely publicize the facts. 

THREAT I 1

Chapter 1. Threat 

 The continuing transformation of U.S. defense forces has produced 

new and highly effective military capabilities. At the same time, this 

transformation can expose new vulnerabilities that can be exploited with 

directed energy weapons that are within the technological capabilities of a 

variety of potential adversaries. 

This unclassified chapter does not attempt to describe specific 

threats or ascribe threat capabilities to specific potential adversaries. 

Instead the focus is on inherent vulnerabilities relevant to directed 

energy applications. U.S. and allied military operations are increasingly 

dependent on surveillance and reconnaissance assets to make decisions 

that are essential to effective operations. 

Advanced kinetic weapon systems have been and still are in 

development in a number of nations and the proliferation of those 

systems to a wide range of nations and non-state organizations has 

increased significantly over the past 15 years. A number of these entities 

have openly published critiques of U.S. military operations from the 

Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan. The observations point to the lesson 

that the U.S. military has large tactical battlefield advantages that anyone 

that wishes to oppose us must solve if they are to have any chance for 

success. Directed energy weapons technology is accessible to a wide 

range of potential adversaries and represents a means for potential 

adversaries to seek military advantage. 

The international offensive weapons trend facing the United States 

and its allies will include a combination of greater speed, improved 

signature reduction, integrated employment of decoys, and sophisticated 

deception. The new weapons are intended in sum to compress the time 

available for effective reaction. Defensive systems that address the 

compressed reaction time problem can negate deception and decoy 

employment. These systems, which are capable of dealing with swarming 

tactics, present the most effective counter to emerging threats. The 

calculus of the relative advantages of kinetic and directed energy 
2 I CHAPTER 1 

defensive systems will need to be continuously reevaluated as these new 

developments emerge. 

U.S. dependence on force-enabling capabilities in command and 

control, information management, advanced sensors, and support 

systems are recognized around the world. It would be prudent to assume 

that future enemies intend to take on these enabling factors. In many 

cases current and projected systems have inherent vulnerabilities and 

inadequate defensive features. They are particularly susceptible to the 

types of directed energy systems that are believed to be feasible for a 

wide range of potential adversaries. It will be essential to have substantial 

operational experience in directed energy weapons capabilities to 

adequately assess threat impacts on U.S. and coalition operations. 

As examples, laser systems that could disable space-based and 

airborne sensors—either permanently or temporarily—are available to 

potential adversaries to include non-state actors. Increased design 

attention to protection against these capabilities is needed. 

Similarly, high-power microwave technologies that can be exploited 

to damage or disable electronic components of essential communications 

networks are available to a range of potential adversaries, including nonstate actors. Investment in approaches that provide increased robustness 

in essential networks is needed to preclude denial of these capabilities. 

Defensive directed energy systems should be attractive to a number 

of potential adversaries whose strategies are oriented toward negating 

the effectiveness of U.S. and allied offensive power. Systems that can be 

relocated, though not necessary mobile, are suitable for employment in 

defending relatively small geographic regions from airborne threats. It 

should be expected in the coming decade that the United States will 

have to deal with a number of directed energy systems developed along 

these conceptual lines. Current technology favors the use of directed 

energy weapons in a defensive strategy, where a ready re-supply of 

consumables and adequate power facilitate operations. 

Intelligence on the global trend in all forms of weapons systems 

development needs to be considered an integral part of the U.S. directed 

energy program. The end of the cold war and the attention paid since the 
THREAT I 3

mid-1990s to immediate problems of international unrest and the global 

war on terrorism have diverted attention from scientific and technical 

intelligence. The national and tactical intelligence gathering and analytic 

communities should substantially increase the emphasis on knowing with 

higher certainty the threats faced by the United States and the technology 

achievements that could alter the strategic balance. Current work is by 

too few people, with inadequate budgets, insufficient technical collection 

capabilities, and fragmented connection to the directions and 

achievements of U.S.-directed energy programs. 

Findings and Recommendations 

 The development of laser and high-power microwave 

technologies and systems available to potential adversaries 

poses a new set of challenges to U.S. military force capabilities. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD [I]) should: 

 Produce a needs statement for the national intelligence community 

that details the information support that is required to perform 

quality threat assessment and identify development opportunities 

and needs. 

 Designate a member of the USD (I) staff to be a focal point for 

advocating improvement in all dimensions of directed energy 

intelligence. 

- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, should undertake a specific 

program to discover and assess emerging laser and high-power 

microwave capabilities available to the full range of potential 

adversaries. The program needs to be supported by people with 

expertise in directed energy technologies and applications. 

 Space-based and airborne sensor development programs and 

communications satellites should include protection against 

laser systems that can dazzle or destroy sensor capabilities. 

- The Secretary of the Air Force; the Commander, Air Force Space 

Command; and the Director, National Reconnaissance Office should 

require a full analysis of the survivability of essential space-based 
4 I CHAPTER 1 

capabilities assuming adversary capabilities to attack satellites with 

directed energy weapons. 

 Electronic components of essential communications networks 

are susceptible to damage and disruption from high-power 

microwave systems. 

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration (ASD (NII)) and the Director, DISA, should require a 

full analysis of the survivability of essential communications networks 

assuming adversary capabilities to attack electronic components with 

directed energy weapons. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD (AT&L)) should direct that: 

 New systems include protection against high power microwave 

disruption. 

 The ASD (NII) should direct an assessment of the feasibility of 

protecting existing command and control networks against directed 

energy attacks. 

 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 5

Chapter 2. High-Energy Laser 

Technology and Programs 

This chapter assesses the status of high-energy laser (HEL) 

programs; developments; and technology, subsystem, and prototype 

demonstrations that have occurred since the baseline established in the 

June 2001 Defense Science Board (DSB) study. In addition, this chapter 

also examines what remains to be accomplished to identify and follow 

logical and coherent paths for system development. 

The long-cited advantages of HEL include speed of light response, 

precision effects, limiting collateral damage, deep magazines, and low 

cost per kill. The potential HEL missions of boost phase missile 

defense and ship self-defense can be supplemented with near-term 

applications that can now be achieved with lower power. 

Electrically based solid-state and fiber lasers with improved efficiency 

and power levels have enabled transportable “tactical” applications on 

aircraft, ground vehicles, and ships. Free electron lasers, with the promise 

of high power, high-beam quality, good efficiency, and frequency agility 

offer the promise of defense against high-maneuverability, low-flying 

supersonic missiles. This chapter summarizes a range of potential laser 

mission areas and capabilities. 

Laser Approaches 

There are four fundamental approaches to high- and medium-power 

laser energy: chemical lasers, solid-state lasers, fiber lasers, and freeelectron lasers. 

Chemical Lasers 

Chemical lasers can achieve continuous wave output with power 

reaching to multi-megawatt levels. Examples of chemical lasers include 

the chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), the hydrogen fluoride (HF) 

laser, and the deuterium fluoride (DF) laser. There is also a DF-CO2 

(deuterium fluoride-carbon dioxide) laser. 
6 I CHAPTER 2 

The COIL laser is fed with gaseous chlorine, molecular iodine, and 

an aqueous mixture of hydrogen peroxide and potassium hydroxide. 

The laser operates at relatively low gas pressures, but the gas flow has 

to be nearing the speed of sound at the reaction time. The low pressure 

and fast flow facilitate the removal of heat from the lasing medium in 

comparison with high-power solid-state lasers. The reaction products 

are potassium salt, water, and oxygen. Traces of chlorine and iodine are 

removed from the exhaust gases by a halogen scrubber. 

The COIL laser was developed by the U.S. Air Force in 1977. The 

Airborne Laser (ABL) and the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) systems 

both use chemical oxygen iodine lasers. In 2005 the ABL COIL 

achieved a major milestone, i.e., the complete 6-module laser system 

was run reliably at power levels and durations necessary for achieving 

lethal effects. The ATL COIL concept, which involves a sealed exhaust 

system, was demonstrated in ground tests 

Solid State Lasers 

Diode-pumped solid-state (DPSS) lasers operate by pumping a solid 

gain medium (for example, a ruby or a neodymium-doped YAG crystal) 

with a laser diode. 

The most common DPSS laser in use is the 532 nm wavelength 

green laser pointer. A powerful (>200 milliwatt) 808 nm wavelength 

infrared laser diode pumps a neodymium doped yttrium orthvanadate 

(Nd:YVO4) crystal that produces 1064 nm wavelength light. This is 

then frequency-doubled using a nonlinear optical process producing 

532 nm light. DPSS lasers have advantages in compactness and 

efficiency over other types. 

High-power lasers use many laser diodes, arranged in strips. This 

diode grid can be imaged onto the crystal by means of a lens. Higher 

brightness (leading to better beam profile and longer diode lifetime) is 

achieved by optically removing the dark areas between the diodes, 

which are needed for cooling and delivering the current. 

The beams from multiple diodes can also be combined by coupling 

each diode into an optical fiber, which is placed precisely over the diode 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 7

(but behind the micro-lens). At the other end of the fiber bundle, the 

fibers are fused together to form a uniform, gap-less, round profile on 

the crystal. This also permits the use of a remote power supply. 

A current major objective of the Joint High Power Solid State Laser 

(JHPSSL) program is to produce a 100 kW solid-state laser. 

Slab lasers are one class of high-power solid-state bulk lasers, where 

the gain medium (laser crystal) has the form of a slab. 

Fiber Lasers 

Combining the outputs of many fiber lasers (100 to 10,000) is a 

possible way to achieve a highly efficient HEL. Fiber-laser technology 

continues to advance. At 1 m, 200 W amplifiers are available 

commercially, and > 500 W has been demonstrated in the lab. At 1.55 

m, which may be required in applications where eye safety is a 

concern, 80 W amplifiers are available commercially, and 180 W has 

been demonstrated in the lab. Various beam-combining experiments 

have been done. 

Free-Electron Lasers 

Free-electron lasers (FELs) are unique lasers in that they do not use 

bound molecular or atomic states for the lasing medium. FELs use a 

relativistic electron beam (e-beam) as the lasing medium. Generating 

the e-beam energy requires the creation of an e-beam (typically in a 

vacuum) and an e-beam accelerator. This accelerated e-beam is then 

injected into a periodic, transverse magnetic field (undulator). By 

synchronizing the e-beam/electromagnetic field wavelengths, an 

amplified electromagnetic output wave is created. Adjusting either the 

e-beam energy or the transverse magnetic field allows for the 

wavelength to be tuned. FELs thus have the widest frequency/ 

wavelength range of any laser type. 

Free-electron lasers are expected to produce power levels in the 

multi-megawatt class. The Navy is pursuing FELs for integration on a 

future all-electric ship to provide ship defense. In 2006 Jefferson 
8 I CHAPTER 2 

Laboratory achieved a new record average power from free-electron 

laser: 14.3 kW at 1.6 m (a good wavelength for maritime propagation). 

HEL Science and Technology and R&D 

Funding, Fiscal Year 2007 

DOD funding for high-energy research and development (R&D) in 

fiscal year 2007 totals $961 million, as shown in Table 1. About 70 

percent of this investment is for major projects, principally the ABL 

program ($629 million). The core S&T investment is about $218 

million. This core investment is diffuse, spread across six DOD 

organizations: the military departments, the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Missile Defense Agency, and 

the High Energy Laser–Joint Technology Office (HEL-JTO). Funding 

for these six organizations ranges from a low of $6 million for the Navy 

to a high of $71 million for the Air Force. The diffuse nature of the 

funding is somewhat mitigated in the solid-state laser area, in which the 

Army, Air Force, and the HEL-JTO have combined to fund the 

JHPSSL. Some highlights of S&T advances and accomplishments over 

the past few years include: 

 Solid-State Lasers. A major focus of the HEL technology 

community has been to increase the average power of solidstate lasers. The HEL-JTO, the Army, and the Air Force have 

been funding the JHPSSL program, with the goal of producing 

a 100 kW solid-state laser. DARPA has been funding the HighEnergy Liquid-Laser Area Defense System with a similar goal. 

Under the JHPSSL program, a 1.06 m Nd:YAG laser has been 

developed and demonstrated with the following characteristics: 

19 kW average power, beam quality of 1.7, and a run time of > 

5 minutes. 

A significant materials development affecting solid-state lasers 

has been the introduction of Nd:YAG ceramics. Replacing 

crystalline material with ceramics has the potential to 

considerably improve the manufacturability of solid-state lasers. 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 9

Table 1. Funding for DOD High-Energy Laser Programs in FY2007

DoD 

Organization 

Program 

Element PE Title Project # 

Project 

Title $K 

Army 62120A Sensors & 

Electronic 

Survivability 

A140 HPM 

Technology/

SSL 

1,652 

Army 62307A Advanced 

Weapons 

Technology 

42 HEL 

Technology 

18,618 

Army 63004A L96 HEL 

Technology 

9,056 

Navy 62114N Power 

Projection 

None Directed 

Energy 

6,422 

Navy 63114N Power 

Projection 

None* Lasers 2,600 

Navy 63925N NAVSEA None* FEL 3,500 

Navy None* 19,500 

Air Force 62605F Directed 

Energy 

Technology 

4866 Lasers & 

Imaging 

Technology 

23,324 

Air Force 62605F Directed 

Energy 

Technology 

4866* Lasers & 

Imaging 

Technology 

1,800 

Air Force 62605F Directed 

Energy 

Technology 

55SP 9,471 

Air Force 63605F Advanced 

Weapons 

Technology 

11SP 9,368 

Air Force 63605F Advanced 

Weapons 

Technology 

3151 High Power 

Solid-State 

Laser 

17,350 

Air Force 63605F Advanced 

Weapons 

Technology 

3151* High Power 

Solid-State 

Laser 

9,300 

Air Force 63605F Advanced 

Weapons 

Technology 

3647* HEL 

Technology 

3,915 

DARPA 62702E Tactical 

Technology 

TT-06 Advanced 

Tactical 

Technology 

42,695 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

Table 1 (cont). Funding for DOD High-Energy Laser Programs in FY2007

DoD 

Organization 

Program 

Element PE Title Project # 

Project 

Title $M 

MDA 63175C Laser 

Technology 

15,000 

AF-JTO 61108F 5097 HEL 

Research 

Initiatives 

12,356 

AF-JTO 62890F 5096 HEL 

Research 

48,936 

AF-JTO 62890F 5096* HEL 

Research 

3,200 

AF-JTO 63924F 5095 HEL 

Advanced 

Technology 

3,699 

JNLWD 62651M JNLW Applied 

Research 

NL Fiber 

Laser 

$0.33 

JNLWD 62651M JNLW Applied 

Research 

Laser 

Obscurant 

Interaction 

with 

Windshields 

$0.18 

 S&T Total 261,762 

*Of the S&T total $43.8M is Congressionally directed. 

 

MDA 603883C BA4 810 ABL Block 

2006 

595,427 

MDA 603883C BA4 602 Programwide 

Support 

33,531 

SOCOM 116402BB BA3 S200 ATL ACTD 45,000 

JNLWD 63851M ATL 0.00 

JNLWD 63851M PEP 0.30 

 Major 

Project Total 

673,958 

 

Army 605605A DoD 

HELSTF 

E97 HELSTF 16,438 

OSD 63941D T&E S&T T&E5 DE 8,828 

 T&E Total 25,266 

 Grand Total 960,990 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 11

 Beam Control. The most significant activity in advanced beam 

control was in the relay mirror area. In 2006 the contractor and 

the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) used a subscale relay 

mirror system in a significant ground-based demonstration. 

The relay mirror was hung on a crane, and a low-power laser was 

relayed from a ground station two miles away and onto a target. 

The ABL beam-control system is currently being flight tested. 

Completion of these tests will be a major milestone for the ABL, 

but in terms of advanced technology, this system was largely 

designed over a decade ago. 

Applications 

Table 2 provides a summary of some identified capability gaps where 

laser applications might prove to be a viable solution. The figure also 

includes some performance parameters appropriate to the application. 

The listing is not exhaustive but is intended to provide a sense of the 

breadth of possibilities. 

Low- and Medium-Power Applications 

Advances in electrically based solid-state and fiber lasers have made 

useful low-power applications achievable within a few years. These 

include less-than-lethal applications at power levels ranging from less 

than a watt to 10s of watts of average power. Low-power lasers can 

provide the capability to “dazzle” snipers and the operators of small 

surface ship threats (jet skis, small boats), and to counter visible and 

infrared sensors and night vision systems. Active sensing could have 

application to remote detection of weapons of mass destruction, IEDs, 

floating mines, and imaging, in support of high-altitude airborne 

precision strikes. 

Systems with improved efficiency and reasonable beam quality for 

solid-state and fiber lasers offer the promise of manned and unmanned 

aircraft applications at power levels of hundreds of kilowatts for selfdefense and precision ground attack at distances to 10 kilometers with 

moderate beam control system apertures (5-30 cm). 
12 I CHAPTER 2 

Table 2. Representative Laser Mission Areas and Capabilities 

Mission Gap Range Required 

Technologies/Device 

Power

Status 

Maturity/Availability

Cost

Aircraft SelfProtection<10 km Diode Pumped SS Osc 

with Freq. Conversion

TRL 9, 400 Built 1.5-3M per 

aircraft

Groundbased 

CounterSniper

100m-2 km Warn/Dazzle:1-100W 

Strike 5kw SSL with 

20-30m aperture

Warn/Dazzle handheld 

TRL9 

Long range TRL4

<$100M to 

develop 

$1M/copy

Low-Altitude 

Airborne 

CounterSniper

3-5 km Warn/Dazzle: 100W 

Strike: 10-15kw SSL 

with 20-30 cm aperture

Fieldable prototype in 2 

yrs

$100M to 

develop 

$10-$20M/ copy

Ship Surface 

Threat 

Defense

1-2km Warn/Dazzle: 10s-100s 

W 

Strike: 10s of KW SSL 

with 20-30 cm aperture

Warn/Dazzle: prototype 

in 1 yr 

Strike: prototype in 2 yrs

$10M to develop 

$Ms/copy

Robust 

Aircraft SelfProtection

5-20km 50-100W

High-Latitude 

Airborne 

Strike

Imaging: 

20+km 

Strike: 10km

Imaging: 100W with 

30cm aperture 

Strike: 50-100kw SSL 

w/ 30 cm aperture

Imaging: TRL 5/6, 2 yrs 

to field 

Strike: TRL 3/4

Groundbased/Air & 

Missile 

Defense, 

Counter-RAM

5-10km 100s of KW CL w/ 1m 

aperture 

100s of KW SSL w/ 30-

50 cm aperture

CL TRL 6 , field in 18 

mos. 

SSL TRL4 demo in 4-5 

yrs

CL $200M 

prototype, 

%$50M/copy 

SSL: $200M to 

demo, $500M to 

prototype

Ballistic 

Missile Boost 

Phase

100s of km MW-class chemical 

laser

Shootdown demo in 

2009

Battle Group 

Defense

5-20KM 1-3 MW Free Electron 

Laser

TRL 2, prototype in 2020
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 13

Dazzler/Optical Augmentation Systems 

Examples of dazzler/optical augmentation systems (1-100w visible 

lasers) include the P208 rifle-mounted dazzler for sniper detection at 

<2km, detections and unambiguous warning sensor for ship protection 

at <2km, and CSAR-X/ACCM large area dazzler for para-rescue 

helicopters. 

Laser-based optical incapacitation devices have been deployed to Iraq 

in response to urgent fielding requirements for a non-lethal means to 

warn or temporarily incapacitate individuals. Marines employing these 

devices have reported that “they consistently defuse potential escalation 

of force incidents.” Laser devices currently employed by the Marine 

Corps are green laser (532 nm) systems emitting a strong beam that can 

temporarily reduce visual acuity at a distance of 300m or more. It has a 

nominal ocular hazard minimum distance that the operator must avoid to 

preclude risk of eye injury. The lasers have been successfully used in 

convoy operations, mounted and dismounted patrols, vehicle check 

points, and entry control points. Army units have also purchased laser 

optical incapacitation devices of various types, principally for use in 

escalation of force situations and to warn or deter drivers of cars 

approaching checkpoints, U.S. convoys, or fixed-site installations. 

Issues. The use of lasers to temporarily incapacitate personnel is new 

for DOD, especially lasers that if inadvertently used inside of their 

minimum safe range may cause irreversible eye damage. Laser optical 

incapacitation devices are being procured only on a case-by-case basis to 

support urgent operational requirements. For example, the Marine Corps 

received approval to use the green laser in theater from the Navy Laser 

Safety Review Board for a limited period of time (March 2008). There is 

no existing program of record for sustaining or improving the capability. 

Aircraft Self-Protection 

Low-power solid-state devices can provide countermeasures against 

infrared-based threats <10 km. Examples include the Guardian DIRCM, 

with both ultra-violet and two-color infrared missile warning sensors, and 

a Viper solid-state, laser-based jammer. 
14 I CHAPTER 2 

Aircraft self-protection is an urgently needed capability. Mediumpower solid-state lasers or beam-combined fiber lasers, along with 

appropriate beam-control systems (e.g., an electrically steerable beam 

director conformable to the aircraft surface), could potentially address 

this need. 

Ground Attack 

Similar laser systems enable precision ground attack to minimize 

collateral damage in urban conflicts and in close proximity to friendly 

troops. Future gunships could provide extended precision lethality and 

sensing. High-altitude airborne precision strikes, enabled by solid-state or 

fiber systems with hundreds of kilowatts, aperture sizes of 10s of 

centimeters, and the use of adaptive optics for atmospheric 

compensation, offer enhanced air platform survivability. 

UAV Defeat

Ground-based electrical laser systems used with mobile weapons 

platforms could provide the ability to defeat the rapidly growing threat 

of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) as sensor platforms and weapons 

carriers. Medium-power lasers are effective in this near-term application 

because of the relative vulnerability of UAV platforms and the rapid 

expansion of UAVs on the battlefield. 

Defense Against Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars (RAM) 

Extended air defense is another critical application to protect against 

RAM and missiles. The promise of medium-energy lasers to quickly 

engage and defeat such systems has been demonstrated in preliminary 

field tests. 

High-Power Applications 

Chemical lasers in a variety of forms (COIL, HF, and DF lasers) 

have provided test beds for critically needed lethality and beam control 

experiments, and have served as the first generation of high power 

systems for aircraft integration. The ABL, based on a megawatt-class, 

COIL-integrated laser weapon demonstration system on a 747-400 

platform, is to provide a first generation ballistic missile defense 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 15

capability, while demonstrating that chemical lasers offer airborne 

systems for a variety of applications. 

Advances in electrical laser power, quality, and efficiency have made 

solid-state and fiber lasers the preferred next-generation systems of 

choice. 

Airborne Laser 

The Airborne Laser was conceived in the early 1980s and has evolved 

from a laboratory initiative (Airborne Laser Lab) to demonstrate the 

feasibility of operating an aircraft-based CO2 laser with both pointing 

and tracking and weapon system capabilities. 

The current focus of the ABL program is to demonstrate missile 

shoot-down capability with a prototype laser weapon system. Efforts in 

the past years have been focused on integrating a multi-megawatt COIL 

with a 1.3 micron wavelength into a modified Boeing 747, along with an 

adjunct laser pointing and tracking system to provide acquisition, 

detection, and target tracking. Figure 1 shows the components of the 

weapon system as integrated on the 747. 

During operation, the aircraft will cruise at altitudes approaching 

40,000 feet and use onboard infrared sensors to provide autonomous 

detection of missile boost phase plumes. The Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (BMDS) also provides detection and target handover data to 

ABL and integrates the weapon system into the global BMDS (a tiered 

system consisting of ground-, sea-, and space-based elements) through 

communication links in development. Similarly, the ABL is to provide 

detection and pointing and tracking information to BMDS. Depending 

upon the construct of the BMDS detection, discrimination, and 

designation system, the ABL could potentially provide data for 

discrimination. 
16 I CHAPTER 2 

Figure 1. Airborne Laser Weapon System Elements 

Issues. Turning a laser system into an effective weapon proved to 

be more difficult than projected at the time of the 2001 DSB review, as 

the ABL was scheduled to demonstrate a lethal intercept in 2003. 

However, the ABL did not have a separate technology base to build 

upon. As the program progressed, each of the subsystems that 

comprise ABL required extensive development, along with establishing 

functional interfaces with other subsystems and integrating into the 

airborne platform environment. Examples of ABL technology 

development include increasing the specific power (watts/lb) of the 

COIL, enhancing beam control to increase the fluence (watts/cm2) on 

the target, and improving atmospheric compensation techniques. 

Since the time of the previous DSB review, the program has been 

transitioned into the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and several key 

objectives have been met, as shown in Figure 2, in the progression to 

an integrated weapon system. Passive flight tests of the beam control 

system, as well as long duration tests (72 lasers with a total duration of 

82 seconds) of the COIL in the ground test environment. In addition, 

both the beacon illuminator laser and the track illuminator laser have 

been ground-tested. MDA established specific “knowledge points” to 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 17

highlight the developments essential on the acquisition path to 

integrating and demonstrating a prototype weapon system. 

 

Figure 2. ABL Program Progression 

Schedule and Funding The ABL program is to complete laser 

installation in the 747, conduct a ground test of the ABL weapon 

system, demonstrate the airworthiness of the ABL, and demonstrate a 

lethal intercept by late 2009. 

Funding for the current program (T-1) has been based upon a 

single aircraft being used for the ABL development, apart from aircraft 

used for tracking and targeting purposes. Upon completion of the 2009 

lethal demonstration, a decision could be made to move to more 

advanced laser technology, such as electrically powered solid-state lasers 

when they become available, though the technology for the needed 

power levels is not on the near horizon. 
18 I CHAPTER 2 

Tactical High Energy Laser 

Program Description. At the time of the 2001 DSB review, the 

Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) represented the low-risk, low-cost 

approach to field a high-energy laser system with operational capability 

of value in defending against air and missile attacks on forces, urban 

areas, or critical infrastructure. The DF laser demonstrated, in tests, 

effectiveness in destroying Katyusha rockets and airborne targets, 

including simultaneous engagements of both airborne and rocketlaunched targets. THEL was the first laser weapon system developed by 

the United States. 

Interest from an allied government hastened the development of a 

“mobile” (actually relocatable) THEL (MTHEL)by focusing on 

implementing a more compact and transportable operational version of 

the 3.8 micron wavelength DF laser. Evolving requirements from the 

customer, concerns about the logistics tail in fielding, and operating a 

relocatable system in a battlefield environment that employs toxic and 

corrosive chemicals caused the program to be terminated. 

Mobile Directed Energy Weapons System 

Program Description. The termination of the THEL/MTHEL 

programs served as a significant turning point in the Army’s laser 

development. Employing toxic and corrosive systems in a battlefield 

environment that could operate with certainty in all weather conditions 

was a price that warfighters, even with a need for enhanced defensive 

system effectiveness, were unwilling to pay. This caused a reevaluation 

of the program’s path as compared to what had been projected at the 

time of the 2001 DSB assessment. 

Building upon the knowledge gained from THEL/MTHEL (to 

include acquisition and track, aim point selection, beam control, kill 

assessment, as well as concepts of operations, logistics, and 

supportability), the Army embarked on a broader-based S&T program. 

The Space and Missile Development Center, Army Research 

Laboratory, Army Air Defense Artillery School, and the DOD High 

Energy Laser Joint Technology Office share the responsibility for 

identifying needs and developing the elements and components 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 19

essential for future ground-based high-energy laser systems. Goals for 

the projects include exploring land-based directed energy weapon 

solutions for mine clearing, responsive precision fire support (both lineof-sight and near line-of-sight), counter rockets, artillery and mortars, 

air defense (i.e., an element of the Extended Area Air Defense System), 

and, eventually, space control. 

The program strategy adopted post-THEL/MTHEL is to 

demonstrate high-power solid-state laser technologies, adopt the 

laboratory solid-state lasers for ground-based systems, conduct military 

utility assessments, and then weaponize the elements and subsystems 

for the Army’s needs following propagation and lethality testing. Based 

upon prototype system-level demonstrations, decisions to proceed with 

weapon system development programs can then be made relying upon 

a technical foundation necessary for schedule, budget, and 

implementation planning. Thus, what exists today is a collection of 

S&T projects intended to lead to a program of record. 

Issues. First order challenges facing tactical ground-based laser 

system development are shown in Figure 3. The Army has chosen to 

address the system development risks by breaking the weapon system 

down into its essential elements and concentrate on each element as 

follows: 

 The JHPSSL program, led by the Army’s Space and Missile 

Development Center, is to develop a 100+Kw optical output 

power device. Beam quality relative to the diffractive limit is 

projected to be “excellent;” that is, less than 2xDL, with a goal 

of <1.5xDL. (1xDL is perfect beam control.) 

 In parallel, the HEL technology demonstrator is projected to 

develop beam control system(s) that will be ready for pointing 

and tracking, as well as subsystem level range tests after JHPSSL 

delivers a laboratory solid state laser device. 

 The option exists, depending upon system level assessments of 

target lethality, modeling, and simulation of notional system level 

concepts, and the success of the JHPSSL and the beam control 

system technology developments, to integrate the elements into a 

mobile demonstrator (a possible component of Future Combat 

System) for proof of concept tests beginning in fiscal year 2012. 
20 I CHAPTER 2 

Figure 3. Solid State Laser Weapon System Critical Issues 

There are important issues to address in this “program of projects” 

spread across several organizations. Issues include determining how 

much laser energy is essential to provide the desired effects for each 

system application, developing tailored system designs based upon 

available technology for credible force implementation, ensuring the 

various laboratory elements of a weapon system are sufficiently rugged, 

and demonstrating the operability of developed weapon systems. 

Eventually, the solid-state laser design concept selected may operate 

at ~400 kW for several minutes, but today’s current laboratory 

demonstration of 15-40 kW for a few seconds indicates that technology 

advancements in the collection of Army projects are critical for 

eventual weapon systems applications. For ground-based systems, all 

weather operation would appear to represent a continuing limitation. 

Schedule and Funding. Funding appears to at the level of 

approximately $50 million a year each from the Army and the Joint 

Technology Office for projects that would support ground-based HEL 

initiatives. Future system progress is strongly driven by progress in this 

area. Both lethality initiatives and modeling and simulation 

development for systems, elements, and components (that also relies 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 21

upon lethality for end-to-end performance assessment) appear 

disconnected and underfunded. 

Advanced Tactical Laser 

Program Description. Since the 2001 DSB review, the ATL 

advanced concept development program has evolved to a program 

objective to build and conduct a military utility demonstration of a 

modular, high-energy, closed-cycle laser weapon system on a C-130 

aircraft. Day/night operational capability and adjustable laser dwell 

times are to be demonstrated over Air Force Special Operations 

Command-specified mission scenarios. Targeting objectives (such as 

disable aircraft on ground, create roadblock, clear building, close air 

support, and limited conflict strike) must be accomplished covertly 

(without thermal signatures) from varying altitudes, but typically close 

range, as opposed to the high-altitude, long-range, significantly higherpowered ABL weapon system. 

U.S. Special Operations Command serves as the executing agent 

through U.S. Army Space and Missile Development Center and the Air 

Force Research Laboratory. Air Force Special Operations Command is 

the operational manager. 

The configuration of the ACTD is shown in Figure 4. In some 

regards the ACTD is analogous to the Airborne Laser Lab (the 

predecessor of ABL) in that the objective is to focus on the laser and 

subsystem technology developments, rather than spending resources to 

shrink-fit the lab-developed packages into an airframe; e.g., plans in 

2001 to use the V-22 or Ch-47 as the ACTD platform have been 

abandoned in favor of the larger volume, heavier payload capability C130. The laser, optical control subsystems, and the weapon system 

management station are developed independently before integration on 

the modified C-130H. 
22 I CHAPTER 2 

Figure 4. High Power A/C Configuration 

Issues. The ACTD is relying upon success in parallel technology 

development projects, many of which represent significant challenges. 

While an ATL could offer military utility with the COIL system that has 

been under development, the direct exhaust system will not work well 

at the lower altitudes typical of Special Forces operations. 

The alternative closed-cycle system (CC-COIL) also has some 

inherent weaknesses. For example, magazine capability is limited by the 

sealed-exhaust system size. Further, chemical lasers, despite the 

recirculation and regeneration developments, retain logistics liabilities. 

In addition, the ability to obtain significant increases in power with the 

system architecture has been elusive for future long-range operations. 

The rudimentary beam control system currently implemented does not 

support the precision and range potential of the system. 

Schedule and Funding. Development accomplished to date on 

the ACTD and progress achieved has positioned the CC-COIL to be 

ready for a decision to proceed in utility evaluations projected in 2009 

and 2010, as described in Figure 5. 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 23

ATL funding for fiscal year 2007 was $45 million. This is the final 

year of the ACTD. The Air Force has picked up the extended user 

evaluation beginning in the second quarter of fiscal year 2008 for 

further exploration of the ATL mission set and preservation of the test 

program. 

Figure 5. ATL Parallel Technology Development Program

Maritime Self-Defense 

As noted earlier, the Navy has a need for an effective high-energy 

laser system for defending high-value ships against supersonic missiles. 

Existing stressing threats are represented by a new anti-ship missile with 

a rocket-propelled warhead that has the ability for high-g defensive 

maneuvers as it approaches its target. Particular characteristics make the 

warhead a particularly difficult system to counter with kinetic energy 

weapons. 

The free-electron laser, with its favorable scaling to high power, beam 

quality, ability to be tuned for enhanced maritime propagation, and 

efficiency make it an attractive candidate for ship defense against such 
24 I CHAPTER 2 

threats. Used in combination with kinetic energy systems, the “deep 

magazine” of the FEL enhances the utility of both systems. The ability of 

large-aperture beam directors for high-precision locating and tracking 

also supplements the capability of Aegis-radar-based acquisition and 

tracking systems, offering more time for the combined directed energykinetic energy defensive system to engage this stressing threat. 

Program Description. The breadth of the options being explored 

for maritime applications is illustrated in Figure 6. FEL can be scaled to 

higher powers through continued evolutionary upgrade of the beam 

source. In addition, the FEL can operate at selected or tunable 

wavelengths depending upon the laser configuration, and it offers good 

beam quality. Although eventually the FEL could provide an effective 

and affordable point defense capability against current surface and air 

threats, as well as potential anti-ship cruise missiles, near-term efforts 

are focused on countering asymmetric threats and swarms of small 

boats, and providing surveillance and inspection to prevent direct entry 

from the sea to U.S. ports by nuclear terrorists on dedicated ships. 

Figure 6. Directed Energy Weapons for Force Protection and Self Defense 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 25

The approach advocated by Naval Sea Systems Command is to build 

upon the efforts conducted in the Army, the HEL-JTO, and the Office 

of Force Transformation so that an initial (Block 1) capability can be 

demonstrated with a 50-100kw fiber laser with inherent modest beam 

quality against RAM, UAVs, floating mines, and asymmetric threats (such 

as jet skis and cigarette boats) within a kilometer of the platform. In 

addition, the system could damage electro-optical sensors as well as 

negate the effectiveness of close-range, man-portable artillery devices. 

A higher power laser in Block 2 with improved beam quality could 

provide increased standoff ranges. Injection of the FEL in Block 3 

would offer initial laser theater ballistic missile defense capability for the 

surface Navy that could be integrated into current concepts of 

operation. Future upgrades (Block 4) achieved with >1Mw FEL and 

relay mirrors could offer the potential for littoral offensive support as 

well as fleet defense against more robust airborne attack platforms. 

Issues. This program is a collection of multi-agency projects that 

depend upon appropriate funding and technology development in each 

to achieve the vision. Maritime defense using lasers has been studied 

since the late 1960s and assessed in various laboratory-level 

investigations, but results to date have not brought the system to 

fruition. The rationale for FEL development appears solid, but it is 

apparently not the top priority of a very broad set of technology 

projects spread across several agencies. 

Other technology development efforts; such as laser beam control 

technology, as shown in Figure 7, and ultra-short pulsed lasers, 

described in Figure 8, are, or could be, common to Army, Air Force, or 

MDA pursuits and, thus, have an inherently broader base of support 

for wringing out issues. But the top technology risk for the Navy is the 

transition of a FEL from a low-power laboratory development to a 

high-power weapon system that can be used at sea. 
26 I CHAPTER 2 

Figure 7. Laser Beam Control Technology 

Figure 8. Ultra Short Pulse Laser 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 27

Funding and Schedule. The Navy programs are funded at about 

$10–15 million per year in the current future years defense plan. The 

Office of Naval Research vision of FEL availability for implementation 

in 2025 is shown in Figure 9. 

Figure 9. ONR Directed Energy Vision 

System Enabling Developments 

The Office of Force Transformation has sponsored a suite of 

enabling technologies that could speed the utility of directed energy 

weapons in the battlefield. Figure 10 shows the possible evolution of 

these concepts. Initially, in two to three years, a 25kW HEL could be 

used with aerostat-based laser relay systems to increase the range of 

line-of-sight weapon systems dramatically in urban areas. The low 

power stationary laser could use the legs offered by the relay system to 

detect and track targets (placement of IED or threats to forward 

operating bases) and engage (disarm or destroy) the targets. Successful 

development of the 100kW laser will permit an expansion of 

capabilities within five years using the aerostat relay system to counter 

RAM and, potentially, cruise missiles that could threaten ports or ships. 
28 I CHAPTER 2 

Eventual mobile operation of a ~200kW ground-based HEL, coupled 

with development of an UAV-based laser relay system, could offer, in 

the longer term, the potential of both force protection and force 

projection with precision strike of selected targets. 

Figure 10. Tactical Laser Relay Systems Will Evolve to Address a Range of 

Mission Needs 

Recent S&T accomplishments, although technically impressive, 

have often demonstrated performance well short of that required for 

DOD applications, and have done so in configurations that have not 

addressed manufacturability, packaging, maintainability, and other 

similar concerns that are critical for making HELs operationally 

acceptable. For example, although the JHPSSL and FEL results 

mentioned above represent significant advances for the particular 

classes of lasers involved, the power levels of 19 kW and 14 kW, 

respectively, are approximately two orders of magnitude lower than the 

megawatt-class outputs already obtainable with chemical lasers. In 

addition, the JHPSSL lasers and the Jefferson Laboratory FEL are 

basically laboratory experimental devices; they have not been built to 

demonstrate the packaging and “ilities” necessary for operational 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 29

systems. Similarly, in the beam-control area, the relay-mirror system was 

used in an impressive end-to-end functional demonstration; but the 

overall pointing accuracy was coarser than required for strategic 

applications, and the relay-mirror system was constructed from parts 

and sub-systems that are not traceable to an operational system. 

Laser system developments (parallel projects) and payload systems 

for Predator class UAVs remain pacing items for any eventual HEL 

relay system evolution. 

Laser Systems Effects 

The HEL-JTO has formed a working group to address the 

methodology issues with continuous wave or pulsed lasers effects. The 

difficulty is establishing the coherent program that has the funding and 

organizational capabilities to exploit targets (or design meaningful 

emulators) and test them in a way that vulnerability assessments of 

subsystems or components can be provided to all HEL developers. 

Modeling and simulation of the system (shown, for example, in 

Figure 11) begins with laser-target interaction (lethality or damage) as 

identified above and then working backwards to determine what beam 

control, adaptive optics, and laser device power are necessary to enforce 

ranges of interest. Without that consistent methodology and database 

applied uniformly, it is not possible to assess the relative merits of 

competing notional concepts for directed energy weapon operation 

with kinetic weapons, or as a replacement for them in certain instances. 
30 I CHAPTER 2 

Figure 11. High Energy Laser System Construct 

Findings and Recommendations 

 There needs to be a rigorous analytical effort to identify those 

capability gaps for which laser weapons are likely to be the most 

effective solution. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should direct that the military 

departments provide rigorous analyses to determine where capability gaps 

are best addressed by directed energy weapons and provide roadmaps of 

the path to developing such capabilities. 

 Enhanced modeling and simulation capabilities for laser systems 

are needed to reduce development times and costs, and to 

ensure that operational and logistics considerations are 

understood and addressed. 

- USD (AT&L) should direct development of non-proprietary modeling 

and simulation capabilities to be made available to government and 

contractors. 
HEL TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 31

- There needs to be an authoritative single source database for directed 

energy effects similar to the munitions effects manual for kinetic weapons. 

 Research and development needs to be concentrated on those 

applications where rigorous assessment shows that a laser 

weapon is the preferred solution vice a kinetic weapon. 

- USD (AT&L), the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

and the military departments should establish programs analyzing the 

cost and benefit of promising applications of laser energy to fill 

identified weapons needs. 

 S&T funding for laser application is fragmented across a wide 

range of explorations and activities without established 

priorities. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E), to develop directed energy S&T priorities 

for FY09 and beyond so that projects and programs that support the 

identified R&D can be properly supported. 

 S&T funding for laser weapons should be heavily focused on 

solid-state and fiber lasers with at least 100 kilowatts of power 

and with significantly improved beam quality and control. 

- DDR&E should give high priority to S&T activities addressing high 

power solid state laser development, fiber beam combining, and 

accompanying beam quality and beam control development. 

 S&T funding for low- and medium-power laser applications 

should be concentrated on a defined set of applications meeting 

high priority needs to include defeating UAV platform mission 

capabilities, defeat of MANPADS, and defeat of rockets, 

artillery, and mortars. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the military departments to provide road 

maps (strategic plans) to move demonstrated technologies to fielded 

capabilities in accordance with priorities established by combatant 

commands and force providers. 

 High-powered chemical lasers, as a more mature technology, 

should be the preferred first generation solution for high-energy 

fixed or very large platform applications. 
32 I CHAPTER 2 

- USD(AT&L), with support from the Air Force, should identify and 

support future needs other than ABL and Tactical Airborne Laser 

and should realign funding for high power chemical lasers to a 

considered balance between technical development and efforts to field 

operational systems. 

 The fragmented programs associated with developing a freeelectron capability for ship defense should be coalesced into a 

coherent program directed at providing a fielded system. 

– The Secretary of the Navy should direct transition to an “Innovative 

Naval Prototype” program to integrate technology programs into a 

program that has the potential to develop a fleet defense system.

 Recent S&T accomplishments, although technically impressive, 

have often demonstrated performance well short of that 

required for DOD applications, and have done so in 

configurations that have not addressed manufacturability, 

packaging, maintainability, and other similar concerns that are 

critical for making HELs operationally acceptable.

- DDR&E should require that S&T work include focus on 

operational and logistics aspects. The cost/benefit analyses for each 

projected application should include consideration of operability and 

sustainment in the battlespace. 

 Enhanced modeling and simulation capabilities for laser systems 

are needed to reduce development times and costs, and to 

ensure that operational and logistics considerations are 

understood and addressed. 

- USD (AT&L) should direct development of non-proprietary modeling 

and simulation capabilities to be made available to government and 

contractors. 

 There needs to be an authoritative single source database for 

directed energy effects similar to the munitions effects manual 

for kinetic weapons. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should assign responsibility to a 

military department to develop a laser (and HPM) effects manual. 
HPM TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 33

Chapter 3. High-Powered Microwave 

Technology and Programs 

There are arguments for treating microwave and millimeter wave 

systems separately and there are differences in physical properties and 

current application emphasis. However, for simplicity, this report refers 

to the full spectrum of these technologies as high-power microwave 

(HPM). HPM weapons vary widely in effectiveness and development as 

their design characteristics are varied over a number of parameters. For 

that reason, these weapons are often categorized first by band ratio. 

Following Nitsch and Sabath, a set of categories are: 

 Narrowband/continuous wave (band ratio about 1 percent) 

 Narrowband/pulsed (band ratio about 1 percent) 

 Wideband (band ratio < 100 percent) 

 Ultra wideband (band ratio >100 percent) 

Much of the research budget over the last 15 years has been 

expended on developing narrowband/pulsed sources with a goal of 

1GW, 1 kHz PRF, 1kJ per pulse characteristics (MCTL Draft Report, 

Barker and Shamiloglu). Currently, at the Air Force Research 

Laboratory, there is an emphasis in development of a gigawatt (GW) 

class demonstrator for optimization and development of lighter 

components. Use of such a demonstrator and the development of 

design tools allow the United States to capitalize on the earlier 

investment. These sources suffer from limitations of air breakdown in 

development of weapon systems. 

These limitations include a minimum antenna aperture area. 

Notable recent successful applications have been primarily in the area 

of narrowband/continuous wave sources. Active denial is one of those 

systems that use the depth of nerve endings in the skin to choose a 

center frequency. Certain counter-IED systems also use bandwidths 

from 1–20 percent to couple energy efficiently in the IED. These types 

of sources also have potential in application against electronics. 
34 I CHAPTER 3 

According to a summary of 94 test series evaluated by Nitsch and 

Sabath, the damage and upset thresholds for narrowband/continuous 

wave sources are substantially lower than those from the other 

categories of sources noted above. 

Wideband sources that also include electromagnetic pulse-like sources 

are only recently being developed, although the technology has been 

around for many years. Combining a fast switch with a resonant structure 

or oscillator allows the development of small, light, and effective sources 

that vary considerably in the level of technology required to build a 

successful source. These types of sources are best developed for 

transportable sources that can be delivered close to the target. 

Ultra-wideband sources have also recently been developed around 

the impulse-radiating antenna originally developed through AFRL 

research not focused on HPM. This antenna was combined with a fast 

switch to produce the JOLT system that has been widely described in 

the open literature. It has a record-setting figure of merit (E*r) of 5.5 

MV. Its effectiveness as a weapon has not been demonstrated. JOLT 

and systems like it get much of their high peak fields at a distance by 

the time-domain equivalent of high directivity. That method has the 

disadvantage of not covering a large target area for each pulse. 

Effects 

Determining the appropriate lethal parameter mix requires a serious 

investment—similar to that applied thus far to source development. 

A much larger investment in system testing; sources capable of 

transmitting a wide variety of pulse, waveforms, laboratory and 

computer simulations; and extensive data analysis of the available test 

data is required. System testing must be sufficient to obtain statistically 

significant conclusions, not just single-event demonstrations. Results 

from the university community performed under a series of multiuniversity research initiatives for microwave effects have not been 

widely accepted by the services. Although there is increasing emphasis 

in effects research (testing and the necessary predictive tools that link 

the weapons effectiveness predictions to tactical simulations) the task is 

difficult and more resources are needed in that area. 
HPM TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 35

Low-Technology Solutions 

HPM weapons have been built and demonstrated to be effective

against commercial electronics, such as systems that control the 

infrastructure. Components needed to produce such weapons are 

widely available. Low-cost hardening technology that will appeal to the 

commercial sector is still needed since many defense systems depend on

commercial products. 

Transportability 

Many of the sources described above have been developed to operate 

in a laboratory environment. That means they are heavy and require large 

amounts of prime power. To be useful in tactical applications, lighter, 

more efficient systems are needed and are under development. Handcarried, briefcase-sized, truck-mounted, and airborne systems have all 

been considered and demonstrated. Full system development should be 

considered for some of these approaches. 

Specific Research to Support Effective Use of 

HPM Technology 

Development of more effective counter-IED and countermine applications. Investment in this area to date has produced 

limited results for only a few systems. HPM techniques have been 

shown to work in specific field applications. That success should act as 

a baseline to develop more effective, more general, and more easily 

transportable systems. 

Development of an effective airborne platform-mounted 

system that can stop enemy electronic systems sufficiently long to 

conduct other attacks and/or surveillance. The decay with distance of 

HPM field strengths demands that this system must get within about 10 

meters of the target limiting effectiveness in many relevant situations. 

UAVs could be used but have limited surface area bounding the 

antenna aperture. The consequent antenna directivity allows reasonable 

ground coverage areas at frequencies of 1GHz or less. Digital buses and 

the like operate at 10s of MHz, unlike the individual processors that 
36 I CHAPTER 3 

have on-chip oscillators of several GHz and rising. Electronic systems 

tend to be more susceptible near their operating frequencies. These 

simple constraints can be used to scope a system that can be effective. 

Obviously, it must be tested and optimized within the weight, balance, 

and prime power constraints of a mobile platform. 

Simple systems. Many foreign countries have invested in small, 

technologically simple HPM sources. Diehl of Germany sells several of 

these sources commercially. These types of sources range from 

briefcase-sized to truck-mounted. Surplus radar tubes are used and have 

been shown effective against a variety of electronic systems that are 

critical to our military and civilian infrastructure. 

Effects data. Numerous organizations have attempted to create 

HPM effects databases that can be used as a “universal HPM effects 

predictor.” All of those efforts have failed to produce a true predictive 

capability for reasons varying from seemingly slight differences in 

experimental conditions to the inability to share data between 

organizations. A better approach is to establish canonical test 

simulation facilities like the MOATS facility at Dahlgren. This facility 

represents a complex PC-based headquarters with communications, 

industrial digital control systems, alarms, and the like in representative 

buildings. Other canonical systems represent IADS, satellite- and 

ground-based communications and data processing facilities, and other 

general use facilities. Sources spanning a large parameter space are 

required. The British Orion system is an example of such a system. 

Others could include electromagnetic pulse simulators with fast rising 

waveforms and simultaneous current injection. 

HPM Science and Technology and Research and 

Development Funding 

Table 3 shows the DOD funding for high-power microwave 

research and development in fiscal year 2007. The funding is spread 

across the military departments and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 

Directorate (JNLWL). The JNLWL directorate pursues a wide range of 

kinetic weapons, as well as directed energy weapons. At present, within 
HPM TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 37

the JWLWL program, one HPM program is in ACTD status. The rest 

are in the S&T category. 

Table 3: Funding for DOD High-Power Microwave Programs in FY 2007 

DOD 

Organization

Program 

Element PE Title Project Number

Project 

Title

Dollars 

(in Millions)

Army 62120A

Sensors & 

Electronic 

Survivability

A140 HPM 

Technology $972.00

Army 62624A HPM-NL H18 $3,030.00

Army 62624A HPM-NL H19 $2,789.00

Army 63004A 232 $0.00

Navy 62xxxN NRL $330.00

Navy 62114N Power Projection $6,000.00

Navy 62114N Power Projection HPM 

Technology $1,000.00

Air Force 62605F DE Technology 4867 RF Modeling $15,424.00

Air Force 62605F

Advanced 

Weapons 

Technology

3152

Advanced 

Weapons & 

Survivability

$12,890.00

JNLWD 62651M

JNLW Applied 

Research

RF Vessel 

Stopping $0.65

JNLWD

63651M

JNLW 

Technology 

Development

RF Vehicle 

Stopping $0.50

JNLWD

63651M

JNLW 

Technology 

Development Compact ADT $0.84

JNLWD 62651M

JNLW Applied 

Research Laser ADT $0.15

JNLWD

62651M

JNLW Applied 

Research

RF Vessel 

Stopper 

Wideband 

Evaluation $0.42

JNLWD

62651M

JNLW Applied 

Research

RF Vehicle 

Stopper 

Wideband 

Evaluation $0.18

JNLWD 63851M

JNLW 

Demonstration / 

Validation

ADS ACTD $4,500.00

Total $46,937.74
38 I CHAPTER 3 

HPM Applications 

Active Denial System 

Program Description. The Active Denial System (ADS) ACTD is 

a non-lethal, counter-personnel, line-of-sight directed energy weapon, 

using a controllable millimeter-wave beam to produce an irresistible 

heating sensation on the adversary’s skin causing an immediate 

deterrence effect. Operational applications include area denial, force 

protection, maneuver support, and escalation of force management, 

with reliable effects well beyond small arms range. The ADS is the first 

directed-energy non-lethal weapon to be ready for fielding by DOD. It 

is a pathfinder in proving this kind of weapon’s potential military 

effectiveness while meeting the critical standards of human effects, 

safety, legal, treaty, policy and public affairs reviews. 

The ADS ACTD has successfully undergone legal, treaty and U.S. 

Central Command rules of engagement reviews. The Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council has formally approved the ACTD concept of 

operations. DOD has provided policy memorandums supporting 

acquisition of ADS. 

Two versions of ADS have been developed. System 1 is a vehiclebased system, deployed on a hybrid electric High Mobility Multi-Wheeled 

Vehicle (HMMWV). System 2 is a containerized version more suited to a 

fixed operating location, such as covering an access control point or a 

portion of a perimeter fence. Several requests to field System 1 to the 

Central Command area of responsibility have been received including: 

 Southern European Task Force request for deployment to 

Operation Enduring Freedom (2004): System was not ready for 

deployment at the time of the request. 

 Army Rapid Equipping Force initiative in response to urgent 

need statement to field System 1 with 18th MP Brigade for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment (2005–2006): System 

available for deployment; however, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy deemed the intended mission 
HPM TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 39

(detainee operations) not politically tenable, hence it has not 

been fielded for operational use. 

The ADS has accomplished multiple “firsts.” It is the first weapon 

that has successfully completed formally-evaluated directed energy 

counter-personnel Joint Military Utility Assessments, across three 

separate bases and environments, using twenty different scenarios with 

multiple iterations. There have been 3,500 full body shots recorded in 

four field exercises with no significant injuries. The ADS has conducted 

the first urban environment testing with seven separate vignettes at 

Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, and Fort Benning, Georgia. 

The ADS program has completed an evaluation of nine separate 

countermeasure techniques and the first use of maritime, over the water 

shots, against five types of U.S. Coast Guard boats. ADS System 1 has 

over 1,100 hours of operation. 

Issues. The ADS ACTD is principally focused on proving the 

utility of a scalable electronic waveform, with joint applicability, which 

can be integrated into an aircraft, ship, or ground vehicle using various 

ranges, power, and effects criteria. This electronic waveform works well 

on test subjects; however, the deterrent non-lethal effects, 

instantaneous heating of the skin, are new and different, providing a 

novel battlefield effect that will require significant education and 

awareness for military members and the general public to understand. 

The ADS has the challenge to demonstrate and train with 

volunteers at their home station. Lacking precedents for this type of 

weapon, it typically takes one to three months to satisfy a base or 

station and local unit’s questions prior to receiving approval for live fire 

evaluations. This process is time consuming but achievable. 

Schedule and Funding. ADS System 1, hand-built on a hybridelectric HMMWV, cost approximately $10.5 million dollars. There are 

limited efforts underway to reduce cost, size, and weight to more 

acceptable levels. Until ADS is actually used, the military services are 

reluctant to seriously consider investing in this type of directed energy 

weapon. Deploying ADS for first-time use will be precedent setting. 
40 I CHAPTER 3 

As is the case with most new weapons, first time use of ADS will 

require approval by the Secretary of Defense. 

The ADS ACTD schedule was unable to accelerate its testing fast 

enough to provide data to the services in time to consider in their fiscal 

year 2008 POM. However, ADS is now ready for deployment and 

could be included in the POM for 2010 as a deployable directed energy 

weapon system. However, as stated earlier, ADS has not been approved 

for operational use in ongoing contingency operations. 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and 

the Office of Naval Research have sponsored development of 

breadboard technology that permits the assessment of the effects of 

directed radio frequency (RF) on RF and non-RF components (such as 

timers and infrared sensors) of IED triggers. The goal has been to 

achieve mine or IED neutralization through controlled dud or 

detonation at safe ranges. Initial assessment of the technology provided 

the means to offer a portal protection system that could prevent entry 

of bombs into secure areas by neutralizing hot wire initiators and 

electro-explosive devices. 

A low-rate production of a weaponized HPM breadboard system 

has provided a vehicle mounted version that can self protect a vehicle 

or a convoy. The IED neutralizer, based on commercial off-the-shelf 

components, has been assessed in theater operations. A variant is being 

developed for possible robotic operations. 

Funding for this promising technology application is currently 

about $2–2.5 million per year, and the objective is to transition within 

five years to Army program implementation. 

Counter-Vehicle 

RF-directed energy is projected to have utility in countering vehicles 

through engaging and disrupting the occupants similar to ADS 

applications or by stopping the engines (electronic controls). The 

JNLWD, along with the Department of Justice, is sponsoring joint 
HPM TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 41

research at the Army Research Lab, the Naval Research Lab, and the 

Air Force Research Lab, to collect data on the most effective 

combination of power and frequency modulation to enforce the 

development of a vehicle engine stopper for ranges of interest, and to 

develop a demonstrator system. 

Counter-Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars 

Increases in power density (W/cm2) that are required to disable 

vehicles, coupled with accurate directional pointing and tracking of the 

RF array, could provide a capability to counter rockets, artillery, and 

mortars. This capability could be achieved by disrupting the electronics 

of inbound guided rockets and/or artillery or mortar that rely on fusing 

for weapons effectiveness. An early capability to counter terrorist 

missiles that might be used against large airborne targets has been 

demonstrated. Waveforms selected are tailored to specific enemy 

missile designs and are viewed to be effective against common electromagnetic shielding techniques. 

C-C4ISR 

HPM could be used to disrupt electro-optical sensors and onboard 

electronics of elements of surveillance and reconnaissance systems. In 

addition, disruption of computer-based assets, perhaps without 

knowledge of the cause, is possible with dedicated HPM applications. 

High-Power Microwave Systems Effects 

The process to assess the effects of high-powered microwave on a 

target has to include the full process from power source to target 

response. Figure 12 illustrates the chain from source to response and 

includes some of the drivers of the output of each step in the chain of 

events. Assessing each of these activities and the coupling with the target 

environment will be essential in determining the military utility of the 

respective system concept. However, the information is target-specific 

(threat-sensitive) and, as a consequence, stove piped and/or may not be 

generally available for the potential DOD user set. Because the Active 

Denial System was an early ACTD with humans as the non-lethal target, 
42 I CHAPTER 3 

there has been a dedicated effort to assess the non-lethal suitability and 

effectiveness of operation and promulgate the results of the analyses. 

Figure 12. Source-to-Target Response 

The ADS employs millimeter wave technology to repel individuals 

without causing injury. This capability enables users to stop, deter, and 

turn back adversaries without the use of lethal force. The system also 

disrupts an assailant’s ability to effectively use a weapon. The ADS 

provides the ability to control outbreaks of violence, minimize collateral 

damage, and ultimately saves lives. 

The ADS emits a 95 GHz non-ionizing electromagnetic beam of 

energy that penetrates approximately 1/64 of an inch into human skin 

tissue, where nerve receptors are concentrated. Within seconds, the 

beam will heat the exposed skin tissue to a level where intolerable pain 

is experienced and natural defense mechanisms take over. This intense 

heating sensation stops only if the individual moves out of the beam’s 

path or if the beam is turned off. The sensation caused by the system 

has been described by test subjects as feeling like touching a hot frying 

pan or the intense radiant heat from a fire. 
HPM TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS I 43

Findings and Recommendations 

 A rigorous analytical effort is required to identify those 

capability gaps for which HPM weapons are likely to be the 

most effective solution. 

- USD (AT&L), the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

and the military departments should establish programs analyzing the 

cost and benefit of promising applications of high-power microwave 

systems to fill identified weapons needs. 

 High-power microwave is the preferred solution for many nonlethal applications to include active denial, vehicle denial, and 

electronic defeat systems. 

- The designated executive agent (Marine Corps) for non-lethal weapons 

should provide a vision and strategic plan for exploiting HPM 

technologies for non-lethal applications. 

 Research and development should be concentrated on those 

applications where rigorous assessment shows that an HPM 

weapon is the preferred solution vice a kinetic or laser weapon. 

- USD (AT&L) and the Director, Program Analysis and 

Evaluation, should establish a program analyzing the cost and benefit 

of promising applications of HPM to fill identified weapons needs. A 

coherent weapons effects program, available to all services and agencies, 

is an essential underpinning of cost/benefit analyses. 

 S&T funding for HPM applications should be concentrated on 

a defined set of applications meeting high priority needs. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the military departments to provide road 

maps to move demonstrated technologies to fielded capabilities in 

accordance with priorities established by combatant commands and 

force providers. 

 The structure of programs directed at fielding capabilities is 

currently not consistent with the resources or the number and 

scope of HPM activities in the Department. 
44 I CHAPTER 3 

- USD (AT&L) should task DDR&E to prioritize efforts so that a 

coherent set of programs can be aligned to move to fielded capabilities. 

 There is inadequate communication on legal and policy support 

for HPM non-lethal weapons development, deployment, and 

employment. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should publish unclassified 

clarification of the legal and policy implications for non-lethal HPM 

applications. 
INDUSTRIAL BASE I 45

Chapter 4. Industrial Base 

In their seminal book Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, 

John White and Ashton Carter credited the U.S. success in 

counterbalancing the numerical superiority of Soviet forces by the 

capabilities of America’s high technology military systems. The key to this 

success was attributed to the nation’s aggressive pursuit of military R&D, 

coupled with a high technology industrial base, while concurrently 

denying that technology to opponents. 

Today, however, the nation faces the threats of both superior 

numbers in some parts of the world and the ubiquitous nature of high 

technology information available to virtually any state via the global cyber 

world. This environment requires U.S. defense forces to operate in both 

the legacy mode of the last century and the advanced technology era of 

the 21st century. To continue to lead in R&D and to maintain U.S. 

superiority, a necessary condition is a strong and flexible industrial base. 

In the assessment that follows, the industrial base is divided into four 

components, recognizing that these components are not mutually 

exclusive: industry firms, funding, market potential, and personnel. 

Industrial Firms 

During the Cold War, a large number of prime contractors 

concentrated on defense systems. In the decade of the 1990s, with the 

demise of the Soviet block, major mergers and buy-outs resulted in a 

dramatic reduction in the number of defense-oriented contractors. For 

example, a recent study found that defense prime contractors that 

numbered 36 in 1993 had shrunk to only 8 by the turn of the century. 

The positive aspect of this phenomenon is less defense funds are needed 

to maintain viable contractors vying for defense contracts. However, on 

the negative side is a reduction in serious competition for defense 

contracts and a large number of 2nd and 3rd tier companies out of work or 

turning to non-defense projects. In addition, the technical depth in many 

critical areas at the remaining large defense contractors has been lost so 

that in specific areas, there is an obvious loss of viability. 
46 I CHAPTER 4 

Prime contractors depend on sub-tier vendors to provide the 

building blocks essential to major systems—items that range from 

fasteners and special cabling to black boxes and small, but critical, 

electrical parts. Furthermore, if a vendor can supply a small number of 

parts needed for an R&D project, there might be no capability to ramp 

up to full production should the prototype be turned into a full scale 

production order. For example, two different prime contractors 

described to the task force the need to go to foreign sources for critical, 

high-quality parts needed in the development of high-energy lasers. 

For lasers, the technical-base situation is mixed. There are a wide 

variety of companies, including both large aerospace companies and 

smaller companies, with expertise in solid-state lasers. There are two 

large aerospace companies with proven capabilities to build high-energy 

COIL lasers. The nation used to have a significant capability to build 

HF/DF chemical lasers, but no significant-sized HF/DF laser has been 

built since the THEL laser was completed in 1999; thus, it is unclear 

what current capability exists. Most of the technical expertise in FELs 

resides in national laboratories and universities; there is little 

demonstrated capability in industry to design and build a high-energy 

FEL. There is a growing community of organizations with expertise in 

fiber lasers, although several of the leading organizations are foreign. 

Funding 

In the aftermath of Vietnam, the defense budget gave high priority 

to funding R&D of advanced technology for integration into existing 

systems. Laser range-finders and target designators, millimeter wave 

employment in communication systems, and basic research on highpowered lasers and microwave weapons were some of the results 

achieved. In the early 1990s, Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the 

fruits of these efforts in the relatively rapid success of U.S. forces who 

were aided by high technology systems that guided U.S. missiles, 

provided superb accuracy for tank guns, allowed ground forces to 

navigate the desert with unique accuracy, and confounded an enemy 

who was credited with being strong and capable. 

Now the nation finds itself in conflict with non-state enemies who 

use non-combatants as shields, wear no uniforms, are willing to sacrifice 
INDUSTRIAL BASE I 47

themselves to achieve great lethality, and obey none of the international 

conventions for warfare. U.S. forces are searching for ways to distinguish 

the enemy from non-combatant civilians and for defending themselves 

from suicide attackers that care nothing about collateral damage. 

Directed energy appears to have the potential to provide U.S. forces with 

some of the advanced capability to answer the needs. 

At present there are few formal programs for directed energy, with 

the majority of funding in research, rather than supported systems. As a 

result, the industrial base for directed energy is small and at risk. One 

solution to this weakness is to clearly define directed energy applications 

that have a high potential for payoff on the battlefield as a complement 

to kinetic energy weapons or as a stand-alone operational system. 

Currently there is little user demand, which raises a question of the 

market potential for directed energy systems. 

Market Potential 

Research and development is considered the necessary lifeblood for 

new systems. However, R&D is not the function that brings margin to 

the operating profit of the contractors. Production is essential to profit 

and, thus, to shareholder support. Subcontractors and vendors, as well 

as the prime contractors, depend on the sales that come with full-scale 

production. When R&D is continued for long periods without a 

promise of future production quantities, the small vendors cannot 

continue to operate and plan for future business. In defense systems, 

the key to future business is the existence of funded programs. 

Military commanders understand the lethality and employment of 

kinetic energy weapons. Computer war games and battlefield 

maneuvers based on well-used weapons effects data are superb training 

aids. Recent actual battles have served to confirm what the training aids 

projected. Weapons based on new technology, such as high-powered 

microwave or high-powered lasers, do not have weapons effects 

manuals as yet. The weapons effects of directed energy systems may not 

be as visible as an explosion of a kinetic round, even though the actual 

damage done destroys the target’s ability to operate. 
48 I CHAPTER 4 

Some directed energy systems are designed to be non-lethal. As a 

consequence of this new phenomenon, commanders have been 

reluctant to opt for directed energy weapons. Moreover, they question 

whether the well-known kinetic weapon is to be replaced with a littleknown directed energy system, or will the addition of a directed energy 

weapon compete for space in the already crowded crew compartments? 

To be successful in establishing viable programs for directed energy 

operating systems, there needs to be a strong effort to demonstrate to 

the user community the significant advantages of these systems. Only 

then will there be support for programs, which is evidence of market 

potential, and in turn influences the viability of the industrial base. 

Personnel 

A qualified workforce is central to industrial capability. More often 

than not, new industry is sought after by communities in order to provide 

work for its inhabitants and to increase the tax base. Many such 

communities have excellent pools of trained people. However, in the case 

of new technologies (such as directed energy) that require scientific 

research and innovative engineers, the need for exceptionally qualified 

and experienced people is critical to successful development of products. 

In briefings to the task force, prime contractors made the point that 

high tech groups of subject matter scientists and experienced engineers 

with a clear vision of what is needed by the customer generally provide 

better products on schedule and within budget. However, if R&D is not 

followed in a reasonable time by programs and orders for products, then 

the experienced teams are broken up and their synergy lost. The industrial 

base of people is at risk when untimely delays between prototype and 

production occur. The history of directed energy technology becoming 

integrated into military operating systems exemplifies this point. 

The ADS, the THEL, and STINGRAY are a few examples of 

directed energy systems that achieved success as demonstrators, but have 

not yet resulted in funded programs. One prime contractor stated: that at 

the prime level the directed energy industrial base is heavily dependent 

upon ABL and pointed out that if ABL doesn’t succeed for production, 

there is high risk of the loss of design and system engineering talent. 

A further concern of this contractor is the fact that in some key areas, 
INDUSTRIAL BASE I 49

there is only one 2nd and 3rd tier supplier, who is unable to invest to stay 

in the queue for uncertain orders. If designing and employing directed 

energy as weapons and in supporting systems indeed offers good leverage 

for the U.S .military forces, it is important to understand the important 

role played by high technology teams for both research and development 

and industrial base surge. 

Findings and Recommendations 

 The lack of directed energy production programs or the serious 

prospect of significant production programs has jeopardized the 

supporting industrial base. There is essentially one U.S. vendor 

capable of supplying deformable mirrors. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should direct the military departments 

to provide overall vision and strategic plans for developing relevant 

directed energy capabilities that can provide visibility into the likely future 

business case for sustaining directed energy industry capabilities. 

 Several primes are using foreign sources for some high technology 

items to support the continued development of a solid state laser. 

- The USD (AT&L) should assess the long-term reliability and 

acceptability of foreign sources for essential components of directed 

energy systems. 

 The nation’s capability to fabricate and coat large high-power 

optics is sufficiently atrophied that obtaining a replacement for 

the ABL output window would be problematic. 

- The Secretary of the Air Force should direct an urgent review of supply 

sources for large high-power optics of the class needed for an ABL class 

system. 

 The nation’s technical capabilities in HEL components and subsystems are thin and have, in some cases, atrophied. The 

situation in large high-power optics and beam control is 

particularly fragile depending on a single vendor at best. 

USD (AT&L) should direct a survey of laser component capability and 

produce a plan for sustaining access to the required capability.
50 I CHAPTER 5 

Chapter 5. Summary of Findings and 

Recommendations 

Bottom Lines 

 Directed energy employment needs to be clearly described in 

concepts of operation as the basis for decisions relating to 

technical, employment, policy planning and priorities. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD [AT&L]) should require that the military 

departments provide a concept of operation for each proposed laser and 

HPM weapons system. 

 For each capability gap where directed energy is a proposed 

solution, the directed energy solution should be assessed against 

available kinetic or other approaches to filling the gap. 

- USD (AT&L), the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

and the military departments should establish programs analyzing the 

cost and benefit of promising applications of laser and HPM weapons 

to fill identified capability needs. 

 Research and development funding should be focused on those 

directed energy solutions where rigorous analyses identify 

directed energy as the most promising solution to a priority 

need and concentrated for progress rather than spread over a 

large number of projects. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the military departments to provide road 

maps (strategic plans) to move demonstrated technologies to fielded 

capabilities in accordance with priorities established by combatant 

commands and force providers. 

 S&T funding for laser weapons should be heavily focused on 

high power solid state lasers and significantly improved beam 

control for appropriate applications and on concentrated 

development of free electron lasers for ship defense. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 51

- The Director, Defense Research and Engineering should give high 

priority to S&T activities addressing high power solid state laser 

development and accompanying beam quality and beam control 

development. 

 The Department needs an authoritative single source data base 

for directed energy effects similar to the munitions effects 

manual for kinetic weapons. Development of meaningful 

concepts of operations and analyses of military utility require the 

foundation of credible weapons effects data and assessments. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should assign responsibility to a 

military department to develop a laser and high power microwave effects 

manual. 

 The development of laser and high power microwave 

technologies and systems available to potential adversaries 

poses a new set of challenges to U.S. military force capabilities. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD [I]) should: 

 Produce a needs statement for the National Intelligence 

Community that details the information support that is required 

to perform quality threat assessment and identify development 

opportunities and needs. 

 Designate a member of the USD (I) staff to be a focal point for 

advocating improvement in all dimensions of directed energy 

intelligence. 

- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency should undertake a specific 

program to discover and assess emerging laser and high power 

microwave capabilities available to the full range of potential 

adversaries. The program needs to be supported by people with 

expertise in directed energy technologies and applications.

 The Department needs a concerted education effort to replace 

the “death ray” myth of directed weapons with a comprehensive 

understanding of the potential benefits and limitations of low-, 

medium-, and high-power laser applications, high power 

microwave, and millimeter wave applications. 
52 I CHAPTER 5 

- The military departments should accelerate efforts to credibly assess 

effects on human targets, and widely publicize the facts. 

Threat 

 The development of laser and high power microwave 

technologies and systems available to potential adversaries poses 

a new set of challenges to U.S. military force capabilities. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD [I]) should: 

 Produce a needs statement for the National Intelligence 

Community that details the information support that is required 

to perform quality threat assessment and identify development 

opportunities and needs. 

 Designate a member of the USD (I) staff to be a focal point for 

advocating improvement in all dimensions of directed energy 

intelligence. 

- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency should undertake a specific 

program to discover and assess emerging laser and high power 

microwave capabilities available to the full range of potential 

adversaries. The program needs to be supported by people with 

expertise in directed energy technologies and applications. 

 Space-based and airborne sensor development programs and 

communications satellites should include protection against 

laser systems that can dazzle or destroy sensor capabilities. 

- The Secretary of the Air Force; the Commander, Air Force Space 

Command; and the Director, National Reconnaissance Office should 

require a full analysis of the survivability of essential space-based 

capabilities assuming adversary capabilities to attack satellites with 

directed energy weapons. 

 Electronic components of essential communications networks 

are susceptible to damage and disruption from high power 

microwave systems. 

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration (ASD (NII)) and the Director, DISA should require a 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 53

full analysis of the survivability of essential communications networks 

assuming adversary capabilities to attack electronic components with 

directed energy weapons. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD (AT&L)) should direct that: 

 New systems include protection against high power microwave 

disruption. 

 The ASD (NII) should direct an assessment of the feasibility of 

protecting existing command and control networks against directed 

energy attacks. 

High Power Lasers 

 There needs to be a rigorous analytical effort to identify those 

capability gaps for which laser weapons are likely to be the most 

effective solution. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should direct that the military 

departments provide rigorous analyses to determine where capability gaps 

are best addressed by directed energy weapons and provide roadmaps of 

the path to developing such capabilities. 

 Enhanced modeling-and-simulation capabilities for laser 

systems are needed to reduce development times and costs and 

to ensure that operational and logistics considerations are 

understood and addressed. 

- USD (AT&L) should direct development of non-proprietary modeling 

and simulation capabilities to be made available to government and 

contractors. 

- There needs to be an authoritative single source data base 

for directed energy effects similar to the munitions effects 

manual for kinetic weapons. 

 Research and development needs to be concentrated on those 

applications where rigorous assessment shows that a laser 

weapon is the preferred solution vice a kinetic weapon. 
54 I CHAPTER 5 

- USD (AT&L), the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

and the military departments should establish programs analyzing the 

cost and benefit of promising applications of laser energy to fill 

identified weapons needs. 

 S&T funding for laser application is fragmented across a wide 

range of explorations and activities without established priorities. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E) to develop directed energy S&T priorities for 

FY09 and beyond so that projects and programs that support the 

identified R&D can be properly supported. 

 S&T funding for laser weapons should be heavily focused on 

solid-state and fiber lasers with at least 100 kilowatts of power 

and with significantly improved beam quality and control. 

- DDR&E should give high priority to S&T activities addressing high 

power solid state laser development, fiber beam combining, and 

accompanying beam quality and beam control development. 

 S&T funding for low and medium power laser applications 

should be concentrated on a defined set of applications meeting 

high priority needs to include defeating UAV platform mission 

capabilities, defeat of MANPADS and defeat of rockets, 

artillery and mortars. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the military departments to provide road 

maps (strategic plans) to move demonstrated technologies to fielded 

capabilities in accordance with priorities established by combatant 

commands and force providers. 

 High powered chemical lasers, as a more mature technology, 

should be the preferred first generation solution for high energy 

fixed or very large platform applications. 

- USD(AT&L), with support from the Air Force, should identify and 

support future needs other than ABL and Tactical Airborne Laser 

and should realign funding for high power chemical lasers to a 

considered balance between technical development and efforts to field 

operational systems. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 55

 The fragmented programs associated with developing a freeelectron capability for ship defense should be coalesced into a 

coherent program directed at providing a fielded system. 

– The Secretary of the Navy should direct transition to an “Innovative 

Naval Prototype” program to integrate technology programs into a 

program that has the potential to develop a fleet defense system. 

 Recent S&T accomplishments, although technically impressive, 

have often demonstrated performance well short of that 

required for DOD applications and have done so in 

configurations that have not addressed manufacturability, 

packaging, maintainability, and other similar concerns that are 

critical for making HELs operationally acceptable.

- DDR&E should require that S&T work include focus on 

operational and logistics aspects. The cost/benefit analyses for each 

projected application should include consideration of operability and 

sustainment in the battlespace. 

 Enhanced modeling-and-simulation capabilities for laser 

systems are needed to reduce development times and costs and 

to ensure that operational and logistics considerations are 

understood and addressed. 

- USD (AT&L) should direct development of non-proprietary modeling 

and simulation capabilities to be made available to government and 

contractors. 

 There needs to be an authoritative single source data base for 

directed energy effects similar to the munitions effects manual 

for kinetic weapons. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should assign responsibility to a 

military department to develop a laser (and HPM) effects manual. 

 A concerted education effort is needed to replace the “death ray” 

myth of directed weapons with a comprehensive understanding 

of the potential benefits and limitations of low, medium, and 

high power laser and high power microwave applications. 

- The military departments should accelerate efforts to credibly assess 

effects on human targets, and widely publicize the facts. 
56 I CHAPTER 5 

High Power Microwave 

 A rigorous analytical effort is required to identify those 

capability gaps for which HPM weapons are likely to be the 

most effective solution. 

- USD (AT&L), the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

and the military departments should establish programs analyzing the 

cost and benefit of promising applications of high power microwave 

systems to fill identified weapons needs. 

 High power microwave is the preferred solution for many nonlethal applications to include active denial, vehicle denial, and 

electronic defeat systems. 

- The designated Executive Agent (Marine Corps) for non-lethal 

weapons should provide a vision and strategic plan for exploiting 

HPM technologies for non-lethal applications. 

 Research and development should be concentrated on those 

applications where rigorous assessment shows that an HPM 

weapon is the preferred solution vice a kinetic or laser weapon. 

- USD (AT&L) and the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation 

should establish a program analyzing the cost and benefit of promising 

applications of HPM to fill identified weapons needs. A coherent 

weapons effects program, available to all services and agencies, is an 

essential underpinning of cost/benefit analyses. 

 S&T funding for HPM applications should be concentrated on 

a defined set of applications meeting high priority needs. 

- USD (AT&L) should task the military departments to provide road 

maps to move demonstrated technologies to fielded capabilities in 

accordance with priorities established by combatant commands and 

force providers. 

 The structure of programs directed at fielding capabilities is 

currently not consistent with the resources or the number and 

scope of HPM activities in the Department. 

- USD (AT&L) should task DDR&E to prioritize efforts so that a 

coherent set of programs can be aligned to move to fielded capabilities. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 57

 There is inadequate communication on legal and policy support 

for HPM non-lethal weapons development, deployment, and 

employment. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should publish unclassified 

clarification of the legal and policy implications for non-lethal HPM 

applications. 

Industrial Base 

 The lack of directed energy production programs or the serious 

prospect of significant production programs has jeopardized the 

supporting industrial base. There is essentially one U.S. vendor 

capable of supplying deformable mirrors. 

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense should direct the military departments 

to provide overall vision and strategic plans for developing relevant 

directed energy capabilities that can provide visibility into the likely future 

business case for sustaining directed energy industry capabilities. 

 Several primes are using foreign sources for some high technology 

items to support the continued development of a solid state laser. 

- The USD (AT&L) should assess the long term reliability and 

acceptability of foreign sources for essential components of directed 

energy systems. 

 The nation's capability to fabricate and coat large high-power 

optics is sufficiently atrophied that obtaining a replacement for 

the ABL output window would be problematic. 

- The Secretary of the Air Force should direct an urgent review of supply 

sources for large high-power optics of the class needed for an ABL class 

system. 

 The nation's technical capabilities in HEL components and subsystems are thin and have, in some cases, atrophied. The situation 

in large high-power optics and beam control is particularly fragile 

depending on a single vendor at best. 

- USD (AT&L) should direct a survey of laser component capability 

and produce a plan for sustaining access to the required capability. 
58 I CHAPTER 5 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 59 

Appendix A. Terms of Reference 



TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP I 6 3

Appendix B. Task Force Membership 

CO-CHAIRS 

Name Affiliation

Gen Larry D. Welch Institute for Defense Analysis, Inc. 

Dr. Robert Hermann Private Consultant 

MEMBERS 

Mr. Richard Haver Northrop Grumman Corporation 

Gen Robert Marsh, USAF(Ret) Private Consultant 

GEN Glenn Otis, USA (Ret) Private Consultant 

Dr. Bruce Pierce Photon Research Associates, Inc. 

Dr. Charles A. Primmerman MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

Dr. Robert Strickler Private Consultant 

Dr. Richard Wagner Los Alamos National Laboratories 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Col John Costa, USAF 

Mr. Richard Gullickson, SES Office of Naval Research, DTRA 

Col Craig Hughes, USAF Office of the Secretary of Defense, S&T 

Dr. Spiro Lekoudis Office of the Secretary of Defense, S&T 

Ms. Susan Levine Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate 

Dr. David C. Stoudt Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES 

Dr. Thomas Spencer Office of the Secretary of Defense, AT&L 

Lt Col Jimmy Wallace, USAF Reserve HQ USAF / Air Force Combat Support Office 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE 

Maj Charles Lominac Office of the Secretary of Defense, AT&L 

STAFF 

Mr. Anthony L. Johnson Strategic Analysis Inc. 

Ms. Carla King Strategic Analysis Inc. 
64 I APPENDIX C 

Appendix C. Presentations to the Task 

Force 

Name Topic

NOVEMBER 2 – 3, 2006 

Lt Col Jimmy Wallace, USAF Reserve 2001 HEL DSB Study Review 

Dr. David Stoudt Navy and Marine Corps Directed Energy 

Programs 

Mr. Elliott Lehman DIA Threat Briefing 

Dr. Thomas Spencer DOD DE Roadmap 

Dr. Thomas Spencer DE S&T Overview 

DECEMBER 4 – 5, 2006 

Col Craig A. Hughes & Mr. Lloyd Feldman Force Transformation's Directed Energy Systems 

Overview 

Dr. Joseph Mangano High Power Fiber Lasers driving Adaptive 

Photonic Phase-Locked Elements (APPLE) 

Dr. Donald Woodbury High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System 

(HELLADS) 

Mr. Michael Cochrane Directed Energy Way Ahead 

Dr. Gary Wood, Mr. John Tatum, Mr. John 

Hopkins, & Mr. Steve Bayne 

Army Research Laboratory Directed Energy 

Programs 

Ms. Mary J. Miller Army Science & Technology: Directed Energy 

Efforts 

Col John Daniels & Dr. Lamberson Airborne Laser Program Status 

Dr. Jason Marshall Overview of the Advanced Tactical Laser ACTD 

and Advanced COIL Technology Development 

JANUARY 9 – 10, 2007 

Mr. Mark W. Neic JTO overview, FY07 efforts and funding profile & 

HEL/JTO Strategic/Operational Levels brief 

Ms. Susan LeVine Non-Lethal Directed Energy Weapons 

Mr. Richard Gullickson Applications of Directed Energy for WMD 

Detection 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 65 

Mr. Mike Booen Raytheon DE Perspective 

Mr. Jay Kistler OSD Joint Forces Office DE Overview 

Mr. Gary Fitzmire Presentation to the DSB Directed Energy Task 

Force 

Jim Alley Overview of Lethality Analysis Approach for NonKinetic Damage Mechanisms 

Mr. Mark Stephen L-3 Communications Directed Energy Programs 

and Challenges 

Mr. Charles Gilman & Dr. Robert Peterkin SAIC Perspectives on DE Technology and 

Transition to Weapons Systems 

Patrick Garret Adversary Space Doctrine 

FEBRUARY 13, 200 

CAPT David H. Kiel, USN Surface Navy HEL vision and Initial Laser 

Weapon System 

Mr. Dan Wildt Northrop Grumman Space Technology Directed 

Energy Programs 

Mr. Castro Giovanni Directed Energy Technology and Weaponization: 

ATK Activity and Perspective 

MARCH 15 – 16, 2007 

Mr. Doug Graham Presentation to the DSB Task Force on Directed 

Energy 

Col JD Clem. USAF Directed Energy Aspirations for the Next 

Generation Gunship & AFSOC/SOCOM 

Mr. Francis Corbett High Energy Laser – Directed Energy Weapon 

Development 

Dr. Kenneth Watman Findings from the A8 Policy Summit 

Col Dave Wooden, USAF ACC Directed Energy Way Ahead 

Col Edwards, USAF AF DETF update 

Mr. Amit Kapadia & Mr. Lori Decker DE Science & Technology and DE Test & 

Evaluation Capability 

Mr. Brian Duffek AFSPACE 
66 I APPENDIX C 

APRIL 27, 2007 

Mr. Hennessey & Lt Col Ki Kang, USAF SAF/AAZ Brief 

Mr. Jorge Beraun AFRL/DETP Brief 

Dr. Lew DeSandre FEL Navy S&T Program for High Energy Lasers 

and Beam Control 

Dr. Frank E. Peterkin & Dr. Brian J. Hankla DETO HEL Lethality on Naval Targets 

MAY 23, 2007 

Mr. Robert Turman An Overview of DE at Sandia 

Dr. Robert Yamamoto Lawrence Livermore DE Programs 
ORGANIZATION I 6 7 

Appendix D. Organization 

The DOD currently oversees approximately $1.1 billion in directed 

energy investment. These resources are concentrated on developing 

technology to ultimately be introduced into systems to fill DOD 

capability gaps. The organizational structure for directed energy 

weapons and technology development is spread across the military 

services and defense agencies. At the top level, the organizations 

encompass the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines research and 

development and acquisition structures; DOD agencies, such as the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Missile Defense 

Agency; and joint components, such as the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 

Directorate, the High Energy Laser Technology Council, and the High 

Energy Laser Joint Technology Office. 

In addition, the intelligence community is involved in performing 

directed energy threat assessments. The Defense Intelligence Agency, 

the individual service intelligence agencies, such as the National 

Ground Intelligence Center and the National Air and Space Intelligence 

Center, compile and disseminate assessments of directed energy 

capabilities around the world. 

This chapter provides an overview of organizations involved with 

directed energy technology and applications, though it is not intended to 

be exhaustive. Joint and defense agency organizations discussed include: 

 Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

- Provides oversight and direction of the DOD directed 

energy S&T efforts. 

 Advanced System and Concept Office 

- provides policies, plans, procedures, and guidance for ACTDs 

 High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office 

- develops and manages a joint program to develop laser 

technology for potential weapons applications 
68 I APPENDIX D 

- managed by the Air Force 

 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate 

- provides day-to-day management for the DOD Non-Lethal 

Weapons Executive Agent, the Marine Corps 

 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

- manages and directs selected R&D projects 

 Missile Defense Agency 

- oversees and directs the ABL program 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

The Director, Defense Research and Engineering is responsible the 

direction and content of the DOD science and technology program. 

DDR&E establishes the vision, strategy, and priorities and oversees 

program management, execution, and output. DDR&E is responsible for 

budget activities (BA) 1–4 (BA 4 funds Technical Readiness Levels 5 and 

6) leading up to Milestone B in the acquisition process (the point where 

technology transitions from a technology development effort into the 

system development and demonstration phase). Budget activities 1–4 are 

also widely referred to as research (6.1), exploratory development (6.2), 

and advanced development (6.3.). DDR&E oversees laboratories, 

research, development, engineering centers, and warfare centers operated 

by the military departments or other Department of Defense 

components, federally funded research and development centers, and 

university affiliated research centers. DDR&E also oversees DARPA. 

For fiscal year 2007, the directed energy S&T investment in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), across budget activities 1–4 

is approximately $1.1 billion. Figure D-1 shows the directed energy 

investment as a function of service and component. As shown in Figure 

28, the majority of the investment in BA 4 is in the Missile Defense 

Agency Airborne Laser Program, an investment of approximately $630 

million. At present, the only other OSD activity investing BA 4 funds is 

the JNLWD, investing a small amount in the Active Denial System 

ACTD and in engine stopping technology. 
ORGANIZATION I 6 9 

Figure D-2 shows the OSD directed energy BA 1–3 investment. 

Although not explicitly shown in Figure 29, the fiscal year 2007 BA 1–3 

directed energy investment is predominantly in laser technology with 

some $375 million compared to 45 million for HPM. The Air Force 

currently has the largest investment—approximately 25 percent of the 

total OSD directed energy investment. There is also a large portion of 

congressionally-directed investment (19 percent), as well as an 

investment in lasers by the High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office, 

discussed in further detail later in this section. For fiscal year 2007, the 

OSD portion includes $45 million from Special Operations Command 

for the Advanced Tactical Laser ACTD. 

Figure D-1. OSD Directed Energy Budget Activity 1-4 Investment, Fiscal 

Year 2007 (millions of dollars) 
70 I APPENDIX D 

Figure D-2. OSD Directed Energy Budget Activity 1-3 Investment, Fiscal 

Year 2007 (millions of dollars) 

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

The Advanced Systems and Concepts (AS&C) office, which reports 

to DDR&E, is also involved in directed energy systems. AS&C is 

responsible for policies, plans and procedures, and guidelines for 

advanced concept technology demonstrations, now known as joint 

capabilities technology demonstrations (JCTDs). AS&C oversees 

evaluation of ACTD candidates and coordinates approval for those 

ACTDs selected for execution. In addition, AS&C oversees execution 

of ACTD programs to assess the military utility of proposed 

capabilities, and oversees planning and preparations for the transition 

of ACTDs into the formal acquisition process. Currently, there are two 

active directed energy ACTDs, the Active Denial System and the 

Advanced Tactical Laser. Both demonstrations are scheduled to 
ORGANIZATION I 7 1 

complete at the end of fiscal year 2007. There is one directed energy 

program proposed for a fiscal year 2008 JCTD, Counter-Electronics 

High Power Microwave Advanced Munitions Project. 

High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office 

The High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office reports to the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology, 

(DUSD [S&T]) located in the DDR&E office. This organization is 

relatively new, founded in 2000. The Fiscal Year 2000 Defense 

Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a 

unified plan for the Department of Defense to develop laser technology 

for potential weapons applications. This plan includes identification of 

potential weapons, identification of critical technologies and 

manufacturing capabilities required to achieve such weapons 

applications, a development path for those critical technologies and 

manufacturing capabilities, identification of the funding required in 

future fiscal years to carry out the laser master plan, identification of 

unfunded requirements in the laser master plan, and an appropriate 

management and oversight structure to carry out the laser master plan. 

One of the recommendations of the resulting plan was the 

formation of the HEL-JTO to develop and manage a joint program for 

revitalizing HEL S&T and to serve as a clearinghouse for new S&T 

initiatives proposed by DOD components. The Fiscal Year 2001 

Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to 

implement the management and organizational structure specified in 

that plan. 

The HEL-JTO manages a portfolio of HEL technology 

development that flows into service and agency high energy laser 

weapons systems development and acquisition programs. In fiscal year 

2004, USD (AT&L) directed transfer of the HEL-JTO program to the 

Air Force. The HEL-JTO budget lines moved to the Air Force, with 

unchanged service and agency participation in the HEL-JTO program. 

Oversight responsibility for the HEL-JTO program remains with the 

HEL Technology Council chaired by DUSD (S&T). 
72 I APPENDIX D 

The deliverables from contracts awarded on behalf of the joint 

technology office are based on military department and service agency 

needs and are intended for transition to traditional acquisition 

programs. Some of these deliverables are to benefit the Missile Defense 

Agency Airborne Laser program, Army High Energy Laser Technology 

Demonstrator program, Navy Free Electron Laser program, and the 

Advanced Tactical Laser ACTD managed by U.S. Special Operations 

Command. In addition to work accomplished in the areas of lasers and 

beam control; the HEL-JTO has established tri-service Lethality and 

Modeling & Simulation Technical Area Working Groups. The specific 

project work is accomplished at DOD laboratories, industry, and 

academic institutions under the oversight of government subject matter 

experts. There are approximately 80 funded programs totaling about 

$65 million in fiscal year 2007. 

One of the major initiatives supported by the HEL-JTO is 

developing a 100 kilowatt solid state laser, under the Joint High-Power 

Solid-State Laser project. This project, managed by the HEL-JTO and 

the military departments, offers the potential for the nation’s first 

weapon’s class tactical laser small enough to fit aboard combat aircraft, 

ground vehicles, and ships. Solid-state tactical lasers could be used for 

both offensive and defensive missions and offer the potential of being 

capable of generating enough laser energy to be an effective tactical 

weapon. Other initiatives include maritime propagation windows, the 

demonstration of a 25 kilowatt Free Electron Laser, at the appropriate 

wavelengths, and the demonstration of highly precise tracking 

algorithms at the Air Force North Oscura Peak site, and the High 

Energy Laser Test Facility at White Sands Missile Range. 

Investments in HEL technologies are expected to transform 

warfighting, enabling revolutionary advances in engagement precision, 

lethality, speed of attack, and range, while minimizing collateral damage 

and complementing precision munitions capability. The HEL-JTO is 

proceeding in its mission to champion, communicate, and develop high 

energy laser technologies for use by DOD. 
ORGANIZATION I 7 3 

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate 

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate serves as the day to day 

management office for the Commandant of the Marine Corps in his 

role as the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Agent. The JNLWD 

conducts a wide range of activities that span across the Defense 

Department and beyond in its role as the central focal point for nonlethal weapons. These activities include sponsoring research into 

promising technologies that have potential application for non-lethal 

weapons. The JNLWD has provided emphasis on directed energy 

technology research for the next-generation of non-lethal weapons. The 

JNLWD has served as the primary resource sponsor and executing 

agent of the Active Denial System Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration and has invested in non-lethal directed energy 

technology research for both counter-personnel and counter-material 

applications. Current priorities include funding for directed energy 

vehicle and vessel stopping solutions. 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as a component 

of DDR&E, is the DOD-level central research and development 

organization. DARPA manages and directs selected basic and applied 

research and development projects, which are not only extremely high 

risk with respect to research and technology but also have a high payoff 

where success may provide dramatic advances for traditional military 

roles and missions. In this role, DARPA maintains the technological 

superiority of the U.S. military and prevents technological surprise from 

harming U.S. national security by sponsoring revolutionary, high-payoff 

research that bridges the gap between fundamental discoveries and their 

military use. For fiscal year 2007, DARPA is investing approximately 

$43 million in laser system research. 

Missile Defense Agency 

The Missile Defense Agency is tasked to develop and field an 

integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System capable of providing a 

layered defense for the homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies 
74 I APPENDIX D 

against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. Using 

complementary interceptors, land-, sea-, air- and space-based sensors, 

and battle management command and control systems, the planned 

missile defense system will be able to engage all classes and ranges of 

ballistic missile threats. Missile defense systems being developed and 

tested by MDA are primarily based on hit-to-kill technology. It has 

been described as hitting a bullet with a bullet—a capability that has 

been successfully demonstrated in test after test. The Airborne Laser is 

MDA's primary boost-phase missile defense element, and is being 

developed to destroy ballistic missiles of all classes in their boost phase 

of flight using its megawatt-class high-energy laser. 

Directed Energy Program Review Activity 

The review process for directed energy programs has been 

extensive. The process includes: 

 Reliance21 Directed Energy Technical Focus Team 

 Defense Science Board Task Force on Directed Energy Systems 

and Technology Applications (plan to report June 2007) 

 DUSD(S&T) High Power Microwave Steering Committee 

 High Energy Laser Technology Council (oversees the High 

Energy Laser Joint Technology Office) 

 DUSD(S&T) Technology Area Review & Assessment–

Weapons, Team 3, Directed Energy 

 Strategic Planning Guidance and directed energy net assessment 

 The Joint IED Defeat Organization 

Reliance 21 Directed Energy Technical Focus Team 

Reliance 21, which is the replacement for the former Technology 

Area Review and Assessment S&T reviews, provides a framework to 

promote collaboration and cooperation between components to 

enhance the DOD S&T program. The new process utilizes technology 

focus teams to help integrate and coordinate strategic planning and 

investment strategies for the DOD S&T program. 
ORGANIZATION I 7 5 

Under the general guidance of the Defense S&T Advisory Group 

(DSTAG), technology focus teams closely examine select technology 

areas. For fiscal year 2007, one of six teams is the Directed Energy 

Technology Focus Team, which assists the DDR&E and the DSTAG 

by providing an assessment of the overall DOD S&T efforts in directed 

energy weapons technology. The team is chartered to: 

 provide a succinct description of major work in this area by 

including DOD efforts, and, if relevant, other federal agency or 

related commercial work in the area and relating the technology 

work to capabilities identified by the Joint Staff or the services 

 identify areas of effective cooperation and synergy, and, if 

applicable, activities that may be duplicative when the need is 

not clearly evident 

 identify the responsibilities of each service or agency within this 

technology area and a lead service or agency designation as 

required 

 recommend (if possible) future S&T efforts. 

The technology focus team presents recommendations and findings 

to DDR&E and the DSTAG, as well as an associated roadmap 

documenting currently funded efforts and planned efforts from services 

and agencies. 

DOD Test Community 

The DOD test community has realized the need to prepare for the 

possibility of directed energy weapons testing in the future. The Strategic 

Planning Office in the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), USD 

(AT&L), is responsible for this task. The center is involved in two 

specific S&T programs. One lies within the Test and Evaluation Science 

and Technology Program and the other within the Central Test and 

Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP). Both programs have efforts 

supporting directed energy test and evaluation capabilities. The CTEIP 

program funds the Directed Energy Test and Evaluation Capability 

(DETEC) tri-service studies that have resulted in the prioritization and 

funding for directed energy test and evaluation capability S&T and 

technology development. The Phase 1 DETEC study was conducted in 
76 I APPENDIX D 

fiscal year 2003 and resulted in the development of five HEL test 

capabilities and seven HPM test capabilities. Phase 2 of the DETEC triservice study is underway at this time and, at the end of fiscal year 2007, 

will report on prioritized needs for future test and evaluation S&T and 

CTEIP efforts. 

National Intelligence Community 

The National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology should 

have a designated full-time intelligence officer responsible for producing 

information on foreign-directed energy programs. The person should be 

part of the mission manager effort to improve scientific and technical 

collection and serve as an advocate for improving the quality of 

collection against foreign-directed energy systems. 

Directed Energy Security Classification 

Each service has a component high-power microwave and highenergy laser OPR, responsible for determining classification levels for 

directed energy programs. For unresolved matters, issues are elevated to 

USD (AT&L) in the DDR&E organization and the Joint RF 

Coordination and Technical Interchange Group (in the case of HPM 

discrepancies) for final determination. 

In general, basic research associated with HPM and HEL 

technology is considered unclassified, concept exploration may be at 

the collateral level, and weaponization efforts may be considered a 

special access program, once reviewed against the DOD special access 

program thresholds. 

Effects testing results that describe and demonstrate lethality, 

vulnerability, and susceptibility to any system are classified at a collateral 

level. Possible countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are 

classified at the collateral level. Performance parameters (such as range 

and power), are classified at the collateral level when an individual 

parameter, or a combination of parameters, reveals lethality, 

vulnerability, susceptibility, capability, or possible weapon parameters. 

Weaponization component details may also be collateral secret. These 
ORGANIZATION I 7 7 

examples are not all inclusive; refer to the HPM and HEL security 

classification guidelines for further details. 

In the past, the OSD DDR&E HPM Steering Group and other 

panels, such as the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and the OSD 

Technology Area Review & Assessment teams, have been concerned 

with the inconsistencies of separate component classification decisions 

and the general approach of over-classification of technology. This is 

currently being addressed by OSD and service components. 
78 I APPENDIX E 

Appendix E. Glossary 

ABL Airborne Laser 

ACTD advanced concept technology development 

ADS Active Denial System 

AF Air Force 

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 

AS&C Advanced Systems and Concepts 

ASD (NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration 

ATL Advanced Tactical Laser 

BA budget activity 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

CC-COIL closed-cycle COIL 

CTEIP Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program 

COIL chemical oxygen iodine laser 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DF deuterium fluoride 

DF-CO deuterium fluoride-carbon dioxide 

DETEC Directed Energy Test and Evaluation Capability 

DOD Department of Defense 

DPSS diode-pumped solid-state 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSTAG Defense S&T Advisory Group 

DUSD (S&T) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology, 

e-beam electron beam 

FEL free-electron laser 

GW gigawatt 
GLOSSARY I 79 

HEL high- energy laser 

HEL-JTO High Energy Laser-Joint Technology Office 

HF hydrogen fluoride 

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 

HPM high-power microwave 

IEDs improvised explosive devices 

IFX Integrated Flight Experiment 

JCTDs joint capabilities technology demonstrations 

JHPSSL Joint High Power Solid State Laser 

JNLWL Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate 

JTO Joint Technical Office 

MANPADS man-portable air defense systems 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MTHEL Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PC personal computer 

POM program objective memorandum 

RAM rockets, artillery, and mortars 

R&D research and development 

RF radio frequency

S&T science and technology 

SBL Space Based Laser 

THEL Tactical High Energy Laser 

TRMC Test Resource Management Center 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicles 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics 

USD (I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence