DHS INTELLIGENCE 

ANALYSIS

Additional Actions 

Needed to Address 

Analytic Priorities and 

Workforce Challenges

Congressional Requesters

June 2014

GAO-14-397

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-397, a report to 

congressional requesters

June 2014

DHS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Additional Actions Needed to Address Analytic 

Priorities and Workforce Challenges

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS plays a vital role in securing the 

nation, and its intelligence analysis 

capabilities are a key part of this effort. 

Within DHS, I&A has a lead role for 

intelligence analysis, but other 

operational components also perform 

their own analysis activities. GAO was 

asked to review the management of 

departmental analysis efforts. 

This report addresses the extent to 

which (1) DHS intelligence analysis 

activities are integrated to support 

departmental intelligence priorities, (2) 

I&A customers find analytic products 

and services useful, and (3) I&A has 

addressed challenges in maintaining a 

skilled analytic workforce.

GAO examined mechanisms DHS 

used to coordinate analysis across 

components, I&A reports and feedback 

surveys, and human capital plans. 

GAO also interviewed officials from 

I&A, the five DHS components with 

intelligence analysis as a core function, 

the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence who represent the 

Intelligence Community, 7 of 78 fusion 

centers (focal points within states that 

analyze and share information), and 

the private sector. The fusion center 

and sector interviews, chosen based 

on geographic location and other 

factors, are not generalizable, but 

provided insight on progress.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that DHS (1) establish strategic 

intelligence priorities and use them to 

inform analytic activities and (2) 

establish mechanisms to evaluate 

workforce initiatives and use results to 

determine any needed changes. DHS 

concurred with our recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established mechanisms—

including an intelligence framework and an analytic planning process—to better 

integrate analysis activities throughout the department, but the mechanisms are 

not functioning as intended. For example, the framework does not establish 

strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual 

planning decisions, such as what analytic activities to pursue and the level of 

investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to officials from 

DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), it can be challenging for DHS 

components to focus on developing both strategic priorities and more tactical 

priorities that support their specific operations. Absent strategic priorities, DHS 

used component subject matter experts and other information to develop key 

questions of common interest they would address through analysis. As a result, 

DHS does not have reasonable assurance that component analytic activities and 

resource investments are aligned to support departmental priorities. The 

mechanisms to integrate analysis, however, gave components insight into one 

another’s work and helped them avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication.

I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic products and 

services are useful. GAO’s interviews with representatives of I&A’s five customer 

groups indicate that two groups—DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners—found products to be useful, while three groups—DHS 

components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—generally did 

not. Representatives of four of the five groups said that they found other types of 

services, such as briefings, to be useful. Results from surveys that are attached 

to I&A products indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the 

products’ usefulness, but the results are not generalizable because they reflect 

only the views of customers who chose to respond. To address this issue, I&A is 

conducting more comprehensive surveys and interviews with customers to 

evaluate the products and services that best meet their needs. I&A expects to 

complete this effort by the end of June 2014.

I&A has taken steps to address challenges it faced in maintaining a skilled 

workforce, but has not assessed whether its efforts are resolving the challenges. 

For example: 

• I&A faced challenges in recruiting and hiring analysts, in part because of its 

hiring authority, which put it at a disadvantage compared with other agencies 

that were able to process hiring actions more quickly. I&A’s hiring authority 

was changed in 2013, a fact that could help ease these challenges. 

• I&A experienced low morale and high rates of attrition, particularly among its 

lower-level analysts. To help address these issues, I&A restructured its grade 

levels in 2012 to provide additional career advancement opportunities. 

However, I&A has not established mechanisms to evaluate its efforts and use the 

results to make any needed changes because I&A leadership has focused on 

other priorities. Such mechanisms will help I&A evaluate if efforts are achieving 

their intended results of improving recruiting and hiring, bolstering morale, and 

reducing attrition. In addition, using the evaluation results to determine any 

needed changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions.

View GAO-14-397. For more information, 

contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or 

larencee@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Letter 1 

Background 7

Mechanisms to Integrate DHS Analysis Activities to Support 

Departmental Intelligence Priorities Are Not Functioning as 

Intended but Help Reduce Overlap and Duplication 11

Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Usefulness of I&A 

Products and Services; I&A Is Taking Steps to Better 

Understand Customers’ Analytic Support Needs 17

I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges It Faces in 

Maintaining a Skilled Workforce, but Assessing Results Could 

Help Strengthen Future Human Capital Efforts 26

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Members of the Intelligence Community 37

Appendix II Description of Key Finished Intelligence Products from the Six 

DHS Intelligence Entities in Our Review 38

Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40

Appendix IV Analysis of Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication in DHS 

Components’ Intelligence Analysis 46

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 50

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Tables

Table 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise Planned Contributions to 

DHS Mission Goals, as Outlined in the Fiscal Year 2012 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis 46

Table 2: Missions and Customers of DHS Intelligence Analysis 

Entities 47

Figures

Figure 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise 8

Figure 2: Results of Selected Intelligence Community Climate 

Survey Items for Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

Fiscal Year 2012 28

Abbreviations

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CINT Chief Intelligence Officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FAST Field Analytic Support Taskforce 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

FTE full-time equivalent 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

PCIS Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security 

POA Program of Analysis 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

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Page 1 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 4, 2014

Congressional Requesters

The bombings at the Boston Marathon in April 2013 underscore the 

importance of ensuring that intelligence is analyzed and shared with 

stakeholders across all levels of government in an effective and timely 

manner. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has a lead role in analyzing and sharing 

law enforcement, intelligence, and other information in support of the 

department’s missions and responsibilities. Other DHS components also 

have their own intelligence analysis capabilities and are part of the DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise (the enterprise).1 In an effort to promote the 

understanding of threats, members of the enterprise are to deliver 

intelligence analysis and information to DHS leadership; state, local, 

tribal, and territorial partners; DHS components; the Intelligence 

Community; and private sector partners.2

Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in response to the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DHS has a primary mission that 

includes preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and reducing 

the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.3 In furtherance of the 

department’s mission, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is 

responsible for ensuring that the department’s information analysis 

activities are carried out.4

 

1

The enterprise consists of all entities of DHS that are engaged in directing, collecting, 

reporting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence and information in support 

of the department’s missions.

For example, to identify and assess the nature 

and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland and to understand such 

threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities, the Under Secretary 

for I&A is to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from 

2

The Intelligence Community consists of 17 U.S. intelligence agencies whose mission is to 

collect and convey essential information that the President and members of the 

policymaking, law enforcement, and military communities require to execute their 

appointed duties. See app. I for a list of Intelligence Community member agencies.

3

See 6 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)-(b). 

4

See 6 U.S.C. § 121(c) (providing specifically that the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

through the Under Secretary for Intelligence Analysis, is responsible for carrying out the 

department’s information analysis activities).
 

Page 2 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

federal, state, and local government agencies, and private sector entities, 

in support of DHS’s missions.5 To assist in the deterrence, prevention, 

preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States, 

the Under Secretary is to, as appropriate, disseminate DHS-analyzed 

information within the department; to other federal, state, and local 

agencies, and to private sector entities, with responsibilities relating to 

homeland security.6 In general, the Under Secretary’s responsibilities 

encompass intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide 

intelligence integration; and supporting state, local, and tribal 

governments, as well as the private sector.7

In 2005, we designated the sharing of terrorism-related information as 

high risk because of the significant challenges the federal government 

faces in sharing this information in a timely, accurate, and useful 

manner.8 We have since monitored federal efforts to implement the 

Information Sharing Environment—an approach that is intended to serve 

as an overarching solution to strengthening the sharing of intelligence, 

terrorism, law enforcement, and other information among federal, state, 

local, tribal, international, and private sector partners.9

 

5

See 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(1) (providing further that the analysis and integration of such 

information is to support the functions of the National Counterterrorism Center, which 

serves as the primary organization in the U.S. government for integrating and analyzing all 

intelligence pertaining to terrorism—except purely domestic terrorism—possessed or 

acquired by the U.S. government).

DHS’s analysis 

and sharing of terrorism-related information is a key part of this effort. You 

asked that we assess DHS’s progress in managing the enterprise’s 

intelligence analysis efforts, as well as the usefulness of I&A products, 

and how I&A ensures that it has a staff capable of performing I&A’s 

analysis mission. This report addresses the following questions:

6

See 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(8). 

7

See generally 6 U.S.C. §§ 121-124m.

8

Terrorism-related information sharing remained a high-risk area for our February 2013 

update. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.14, 

2013) for the most recent update. Every 2 years, at the start of a new Congress, we call 

attention to agencies and program areas that, according to our audits and evaluations, are 

at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of 

transformation.

9

See 6 U.S.C. § 485.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

• To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise 

integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence priorities, and 

to what extent are enterprise analysis activities unnecessarily 

overlapping or duplicative?

• To what extent do I&A’s customers report that they find I&A products 

and other analytic services to be useful?10

• What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic 

workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges?

For all objectives, we focused on the six DHS entities in the enterprise for 

which intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their unique 

missions and operations: I&A, the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).11 Subject to departmental 

direction, and consistent with any direction and guidance from the 

President and, as applicable, by the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI),12 the head of each DHS intelligence component is 

responsible for, among other things, ensuring the effective and efficient 

collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence 

information, and supporting and implementing the intelligence mission of 

the department.13

To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS and I&A documents 

intended to set strategic departmental intelligence priorities—such as the 

fiscal years 2011 through 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of 

See appendix II for a description of the intelligence 

products generated by each entity.

 

10I&A’s five customer groups are (1) DHS leadership; (2) DHS operational components; 

(3) Intelligence Community members; (4) state, local, tribal, and territorial partners; and (5) 

private critical infrastructure sectors.

11As discussed later, there are other DHS entities in the enterprise. However, intelligence 

analysis is not a core function of these entities; therefore we excluded them from our 

review.

12The Office of the Director of National Intelligence was established by the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to manage the efforts of the Intelligence 

Community. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 3023-25. Its mission is to lead intelligence integration and 

forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most insightful intelligence possible. 

Among its goals are to integrate intelligence analysis and collection to inform decisions, 

drive responsible and secure information sharing, and set strategic direction and priorities 

for national intelligence resources and capabilities.

13See 6 U.S.C. § 124d.
 

Page 4 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Analysis (POA) and the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 Homeland Security 

Intelligence Priorities Framework (the Framework)—to determine how 

strategic intelligence priorities are established and how the enterprise is 

to follow them.14 We also analyzed component documents—such as 

TSA’s Mission and Functional Statement and ICE’s intelligence fact sheet 

on securing borders, safe travel, and legal trade—to help determine to 

what extent components address departmental priorities. We met with 

officials responsible for managing the enterprise to determine 

expectations for components in following the priorities, and with officials 

from I&A and the intelligence offices of CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, 

TSA, and USCIS to obtain views on the extent to which the POA and 

Framework guide their analytic production. We compared DHS’s actions 

with requirements of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, 

that call for the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 

Secretary for I&A, to, among other things, establish departmental 

intelligence priorities.15

To address the second objective, we met with staff from I&A’s Production 

Management Division, which is responsible for distributing finished 

intelligence products and measuring their usefulness, to determine how 

I&A uses surveys to obtain feedback on products and identify other efforts 

to improve customer satisfaction. We also analyzed the results of 

customer satisfaction surveys that were included with all fiscal year 2012 

I&A finished analytic products to determine what users of I&A products 

To assess potential overlap or duplication in 

finished intelligence products, we analyzed all 21 products written by I&A, 

CBP, and ICE in response to questions in the 2012 POA related to the 

DHS mission area of U.S. border security. We selected the 2012 POA 

because it was the most recent available when we began this analysis. 

We selected this mission area because it contained the most questions 

assigned to multiple components, and chose I&A, CBP, and ICE products 

to review because these components all have responsibility for different 

aspects of intelligence related to border security. By reviewing only one 

mission area, we cannot determine if there was duplication in other areas.

 

14The POA is the document used to plan and manage the more specific intelligence 

analysis activities of the enterprise. Specifically, the POA is to identify a series of key 

intelligence questions that the enterprise will seek to address in the upcoming year. The 

Framework is intended to present the department’s overall strategic intelligence priorities 

and to inform annual intelligence planning decisions related to collection, analysis, and 

resource management.

15See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(19). 
 

Page 5 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

think of the quality and usefulness of the products. We compared I&A’s 

efforts to ensure its products’ quality and usefulness with criteria in the 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government related to 

meeting stakeholder needs.16 Also, to determine how customers view the 

usefulness of I&A products and other analytic support, we met with 

officials from four of I&A’s five customer groups. While we did not meet 

with representatives from DHS leadership, we did meet with 

representatives of the I&A unit that briefs leadership. Specifically, we met 

with (1) officials from DHS component intelligence programs (USCIS, the 

U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA); (2) staff from ODNI; (3) state and 

local officials from 7 of the 78 nationwide fusion centers;17 and (4) 

members of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) and 

the National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), 

two organizations composed of private sector critical infrastructure 

sectors that coordinate with the federal government on security 

measures.18

For the third objective, we reviewed documents from the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM), DHS, I&A, and ODNI to obtain 

information on intelligence analyst hiring needs and practices, such as the 

November 2012 I&A memorandum on hiring standards and the January 

2010 I&A recruitment strategy. To determine the challenges I&A 

experienced maintaining a skilled workforce, we reviewed I&A data such 

The information we obtained from fusion centers and the 

private sector may not be generalized across all fusion centers and 

throughout the private sector, but provided us with an overview of users’ 

perspectives on the usefulness of I&A’s products and other analytic 

support.

 

16GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov.1, 1999).

17State and major urban area fusion centers serve as primary focal points within the state 

and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related 

information among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security partners.

We selected these centers to provide access to a range of state-level users of I&A analytic 

products with an emphasis on border issues because of our examination of potential 

overlap or duplication related to DHS components’ intelligence analysis reporting on 

border issues.

18We met with representatives from 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sector committees of 

PCIS and 6 of the 16 information-sharing and analysis center members of the National 

Council of ISACs during scheduled meetings of these organizations. We also met with 

private sector officials from the PCIS Commercial Facilities Sector Committee and the 

Transportation Sector Committee in separate meetings.
 

Page 6 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

as analyst attrition rates from 2009 through 2013,19 and documents such 

as I&A’s November 2012 memo to the Director of National Intelligence 

requesting conversion of competitive service positions to excepted 

service positions.20 To assess I&A’s training and development practices, 

we analyzed training expectations, offerings, and strategies by DHS and

I&A. We also analyzed documents from DHS and I&A to determine I&A’s 

performance management practices, including the January 2010 I&A 

Human Capital Standard Operating Procedures and the December 2008 

DHS Human Resources Performance Management Program Guidance. 

We compared I&A’s workforce hiring and development actions against

criteria in DHS’s Workforce Planning Guide.

21

 

19Attrition is the percentage of personnel losses for all reasons during the fiscal year, and 

is measured by comparing personnel losses during the year with the total number of 

personnel on board at the beginning of the year. Our work focused on attrition among I&A 

analysts classified as GS-0132. According to the Office of Personnel Management’s 

Position Classification Standard for Intelligence Series, GS-0132s advise on, administer, 

supervise, or perform work in the collection, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and 

dissemination of information on political, economic, social, cultural, physical, geographic, 

scientific, or military condition, trends, and forces in foreign and domestic areas that 

directly or indirectly affect the national security.

We also met with officials 

from I&A’s human capital office, training branch, mission support office, 

and the acting Chief of Staff to discuss attrition, recruitment, hiring, 

training, and evaluation practices and procedures. For a complete 

discussion of the objectives, scope, and methodology of this report see 

appendix III.

20The Director of National Intelligence may, with concurrence of the head of the 

department concerned and in consultation with the Director of OPM, convert competitive 

service positions within an element of the Intelligence Community in such department to 

excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary 

to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. See 50 U.S.C. § 3024. See also 5 

U.S.C. §§ 2102(a) (defining “competitive service”), 2103(a) (defining “excepted service”), 

and 5 C.F.R. pt. 213, subpt. C (specifying the types of positions eligible for excepted 

appointments) Pursuant to its regulations, OPM may except a position from the 

competitive service if it determines, for example, that appointments into such positions are 

not practicable. See 5 C.F.R. § 6.1(a).

21Department of Homeland Security, DHS Workforce Planning Guide (Washington, D.C.: 

November, 2012). The DHS Workforce Planning Guide outlines the process for workforce 

planning at DHS. It provides steps, tools, and resources to plan for current and future 

organizational and workforce needs. According to the guide, workforce planners must 

monitor and assess the progress of their strategies, evaluate the outcomes, and use the 

results from the evaluation to revise the strategies, if needed.
 

Page 7 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Consistent with provisions of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, 

the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of the department—who also holds 

the position of DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and is 

the head of I&A—is to exercise leadership and authority over the 

enterprise and intelligence policy throughout the department.22 For 

example, the CINT is to provide strategic oversight to and support the 

missions and goals of members of the enterprise.23 The enterprise is 

composed of all DHS component intelligence programs.24

 

22See generally 6 U.S.C. § 121.

Specifically, it 

consists of I&A, the intelligence elements of six DHS operational 

components (CBP, USCIS, ICE, TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. 

Secret Service), and three DHS headquarters elements supported by I&A 

(the National Protection and Plans Directorate, the Office of Operations 

23See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(18), (20). 

24Pursuant to DHS Directive 264-01: Intelligence Integration and Management (June 12, 

2013), component intelligence programs consist of any organizations within a DHS 

intelligence component, a significant purpose of which is the collection, gathering, 

processing, analysis, production, or dissemination of any intelligence, and would include 

any organization within a component that employs intelligence professionals (0132 job 

series) to perform national or departmental intelligence functions. The Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, as amended, defines “intelligence component of the Department [of 

Homeland Security],” in general, as “any element or entity of the Department that collects, 

gathers, processes, analyzes, produces, or disseminates intelligence information within 

the scope of the information sharing environment, including homeland security 

information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction information, or 

national intelligence.” See 6 U.S.C. § 101(9).

Background

DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise
 

Page 8 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Coordination and Planning, and the Office of the Chief Security Officer).25

Figure 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise

However, as shown in figure 1, not all members of the enterprise perform 

intelligence analysis activities.

I&A emerged from what the Homeland Security Act originally established 

as the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. 

Specifically, the Homeland Security Act established within DHS the 

directorate—led by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—to carry out DHS’s 

 

25Each component maintains an intelligence capability consistent with its existing 

authorities. For example, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which established 

TSA, specifically requires that the head of TSA “receive, assess, and distribute 

intelligence information related to transportation security.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(f). The U.S. 

Coast Guard may also conduct intelligence activities when operating, for example, as an 

armed force under the command and control of the Commandant of the Coast Guard or, 

with respect to U.S. Coast Guard as an element of the Intelligence Community, under the 

authority of ODNI. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(9)(B). In addition, although U.S. Secret Service is 

specifically excluded from the definition of “intelligence component of the department,” 

DHS and the U.S. Secret Service officials indicated they do participate in the enterprise 

and, by statute, the U.S. Secret Service must provide certain information to and cooperate 

with the Under Secretary for I&A. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A); Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 502(b), 

121 Stat. 266, 311 (2007), 6 U.S.C. § 124a Note. 

DHS Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis
 

Page 9 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

responsibilities in regard to, among other things, information analysis.26 In 

2007, amendments to the Homeland Security Act included in the 

Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007

reorganized the department by dividing the directorate into an Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis—headed by the Under Secretary for Information 

and Analysis—and an Office of Infrastructure Protection, headed by the 

Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.27 As a result of the 

reorganization, responsibilities previously assigned to the Under 

Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection relating to 

intelligence analysis became attributed to the Secretary (as carried out 

through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) and remained 

largely unchanged.28 I&A is an element of the Intelligence Community.29

According to its February 2011 strategic plan, I&A’s mission is to equip 

the homeland security enterprise with the intelligence and information it 

needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.30

I&A prepares written, finished analytical products that it makes available 

to its customers. In addition to written analytical reports, I&A provides 

intelligence analysis to its customers through oral briefings (both 

classified and unclassified) and other analytic services, such as access to 

I&A analysts for review of the customers’ intelligence products, and 

To carry out its 

mission, I&A is to ensure that information related to homeland security 

threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to homeland security 

partners to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

 

26See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(a)-(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2145 (2002) (establishing also 

the positions of Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis and Assistant Secretary for 

Infrastructure Protection to assist the Under Secretary). 

27See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 531(a), 121 Stat. at 332-35.

28See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 501(a)(2)(A), (b), 531(a), and 1002(a), 121 Stat. at 

309, 332-35, 374.

29See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(K). The U.S. Coast Guard is also recognized as a separate 

member of the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H). See also Exec. 

Order No. 12,333, reprinted as amended at 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325, 45,340-41 (Aug. 4, 

2008) (identifying both I&A and the U.S. Coast Guard as Intelligence Community 

elements).

30Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan, 

Fiscal Year 2011 - Fiscal Year 2018, February 2011.
 

Page 10 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

advice and instruction on tradecraft standards.31 For example, I&A

provides services to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as 

the private sector, through deployed personnel at fusion centers. 

Additionally, I&A’s deployed personnel are to assist fusion centers in 

obtaining needed information and analysis to aid in supporting their own 

customer bases. I&A is also to act as a conduit between the DHS 

component intelligence programs and the Intelligence Community. For 

example, I&A provides relevant information from the Intelligence 

Community to the components.

In 2010, we were mandated to identify programs, agencies, offices, and 

initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and 

government-wide and report annually to Congress.32 In March 2011, 

February 2012, April 2013, and April 2014 we issued our first four annual 

reports to Congress in response to this requirement.33

• Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more 

than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad 

area of national need.

The annual reports 

describe, in part, areas in which we found evidence of fragmentation, 

overlap, or duplication among federal programs. Using the framework we 

established in these reports, we used the following definitions for the 

purpose of assessing the analysis activities of the enterprise:

• Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in 

similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar 

beneficiaries.

 

31In general, tradecraft denotes the skills, means, and techniques intelligence analysts 

use to develop intelligence analysis.

32See Pub. L. No 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 8, 29-30 (2010), 31 U.S.C. § 712 Note. 

33GAO, 2011 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in 

Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011); 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce 

Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed 

to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, 

GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2013); and 2014 Annual Report: Additional 

Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other 

Financial Benefits, GAO-14-343SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2014). 

Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication
 

Page 11 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

• Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are 

engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the 

same beneficiaries.

DHS has established mechanisms—including a governance board, 

intelligence framework, and analysis planning process—intended to better 

integrate analysis activities across the enterprise and help ensure that 

activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities. However, 

the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence 

priorities or drive the analytic planning process across the enterprise, as 

intended. On the other hand, intelligence officials from I&A and all five 

components in our review reported that efforts to implement these 

mechanisms, particularly the analytic planning process, have allowed 

them to coordinate component activities and avoid unnecessary overlap 

or duplication of efforts. Likewise, we did not find unnecessary overlap or 

duplication in our review of border security products from I&A and two 

components.

According to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, an integrated 

and collaborative Intelligence Enterprise is crucial to the department 

accomplishing its homeland security mission.34 Further, according to the 

plan, removing existing barriers to integration, while concurrently 

respecting and supporting DHS components’ unique missions—such as 

CBP’s mission to protect the borders—is necessary in order to fully 

integrate the DHS components that perform intelligence analysis. In 2005, 

DHS established a governance board—the Homeland Security 

Intelligence Council (the council)—to serve as the decision-making and 

implementation oversight body that supports the CINT in leading and 

managing the activities of the enterprise, and furthering a unified, 

coordinated, and integrated intelligence program for the department.35

 

34In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming DHS as a high-risk area, as 

DHS faced challenges integrating its 22 legacy agencies into one cohesive department. 

See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 

2003).We have continued to assess the department’s ability to build a single cohesive and 

effective department that is greater than the sum of its parts—a goal that requires effective 

collaboration and integration of DHS’s various components and management functions. 

35In accordance with its 2009 charter, the council is composed of members from the 

following DHS components: I&A, U.S. Coast Guard, USCIS, U.S. Secret Service, CBP, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, TSA, and ICE. We did not evaluate the extent 

to which the council was meeting its goals as part of this review. 

Mechanisms to 

Integrate DHS 

Analysis Activities to 

Support Departmental 

Intelligence Priorities 

Are Not Functioning 

as Intended but Help 

Reduce Overlap and 

Duplication

DHS’s Intelligence 

Framework and 

Component Analysis 

Planning Process Are Not 

Functioning as Intended
 

Page 12 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

The council’s Analysis Working Group—composed of subject matter 

experts from I&A’s analytic divisions and the intelligence elements of the 

components—is to coordinate analysis and production across the 

enterprise.

Additionally, DHS has established two key mechanisms to help ensure 

that component intelligence analysis activities and resource investments 

align to support strategic departmental intelligence priorities—the 

Framework and the POA. According to the Framework, this is an annual 

document that is intended to present the department’s overall strategic 

intelligence priorities and to inform annual intelligence planning decisions 

related to collection, analysis, and resource management. In addition to 

the Framework, the POA is to be an annual document that DHS uses to 

plan and manage the more specific intelligence analysis activities of its 

enterprise. Specifically, according to DHS guidance, the POA is to identify 

a series of key intelligence questions that the enterprise will seek to 

address in the upcoming year. According to the 2011 I&A Strategic Plan 

and DHS guidance, the strategic priorities in the Framework should be 

used to drive analytic planning and production in the POA. However, 

neither mechanism is working as intended. Specifically, we identified two 

gaps in the implementation of these mechanisms that limit DHS’s 

assurance that component analytic activities support strategic 

departmental intelligence priorities:

• The Framework does not establish strategic departmental 

priorities: The Framework does not establish strategic departmental 

intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence 

planning decisions—such as what analytic activities to pursue and 

what level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. The 

Framework—developed by I&A’s Information Sharing and Intelligence 

Enterprise Management Division—was established in fiscal year 

2011. However, the senior I&A official who assumed management of 

the Framework process in May 2013 stated that the Framework does 

not accomplish its intended purpose of informing annual intelligence 

planning decisions. According to this official, DHS took a bottom-up 

approach to developing the Framework in fiscal years 2011 through 

2013. Specifically, DHS created a matrix that links the broad 

departmental missions outlined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review—such as preventing terrorist attacks and effectively 

controlling U.S. borders—to different intelligence categories that are 
 

Page 13 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

relevant to these missions.36

According to officials responsible for the Framework, the goal of the 

fiscal years 2011 through 2013 Frameworks was to understand the 

diverse nature of intelligence priorities across the enterprise, not to 

establish overall departmental intelligence priorities. Accordingly, the 

officials acknowledged that the Framework does not fulfill its stated 

purpose of informing annual intelligence planning decisions. To begin 

addressing this problem, the officials stated that I&A plans to make 

some changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework. However, the 

planned changes relate primarily to the methodology used to tally the 

current intelligence activities of the components. Specifically, the 

officials said that rather than giving all components equal weighting, 

the fiscal year 2014 Framework will give greater weight to the 

priorities of components that have a large intelligence portfolio. 

However, the official stated that the fiscal year 2014 Framework will 

look similar to the fiscal year 2013 Framework.

DHS allocated each component 100 

points and asked the components to distribute these points across the 

QHSR missions and intelligence categories in accordance with the 

types of intelligence activities the component conducted. I&A then 

added up the total points assigned by the components for each 

intelligence category. These totals became a proxy for the intelligence 

priorities of the enterprise as a whole. Accordingly, the Framework 

presented the existing intelligence activities of the members of the 

enterprise, rather than outlining strategic departmental intelligence 

priorities.

37

 

36Pursuant to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 

DHS released its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) in February 2010. 

See 6 U.S.C. § 347. The purpose of the QHSR is to outline the strategic framework to 

guide the activities of participants in homeland security toward a common end. The QHSR 

identified 14 goals, organized in five mission areas: (1) Preventing Terrorism and 

Enhancing Security, (2) Securing and Managing Our Borders, (3) Enforcing and 

Administering Our Immigration Laws, (4) Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and (5) 

Ensuring Resilience to Disasters. Specific examples of intelligence categories are 

classified.

Therefore, the 

planned changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework will not result in 

the establishment of strategic departmental intelligence priorities that 

can be used to inform annual intelligence planning and resource 

decisions, as called for in DHS guidance.

37As of March 2014, the fiscal year 2014 Framework had not been finalized. 
 

Page 14 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

• The Framework does not drive analytic planning and production:

The Framework was not used to drive analytic planning and 

production in the POA. The POA, established in fiscal year 2011, is 

overseen by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Analysis 

Working Group. As with the Framework, DHS took a bottom-up 

approach to developing the POA for fiscal years 2012 and 2013.38

DHS modified the process for the fiscal year 2014 POA in order to 

focus analytic planning efforts on a smaller, more strategic set of 

priority questions of common interest to the enterprise as a whole. As 

a result, the number of key intelligence questions decreased to 15. 

Also, rather than having each component individually generate key 

intelligence questions for inclusion in the POA, subject matter experts 

from participating DHS components brainstormed to collectively

develop the 2014 key intelligence questions, determine which DHS 

components would contribute analysis to each question, and identify 

what specific intelligence products each would generate to address 

the questions. According to the I&A official responsible for the POA, 

the brainstorming was informed by the subject matter experts’ daily 

engagement with DHS leadership, knowledge of operational and 

policy priorities and missions, the current threat environment, 

customer-specific requirements, and Intelligence Community and law 

enforcement engagement and collaboration. However, given the 

Framework limitations described above, and because of the new 

focus of the fiscal year 2014 POA, the official stated that the 2014 

process was not informed or influenced by the Framework.

Specifically, each component independently developed a set of key 

intelligence questions that it would address in the upcoming year. 

Officials from each of the five components we contacted said that they 

developed these questions in order to be responsive to their unique 

missions and customer needs. DHS then aggregated these individual 

component responses to generate the POA. For the 2013 POA, this 

resulted in a catalogue of more than 80 questions to be addressed.

Because of the gaps we identified in the Framework and POA processes, 

DHS cannot provide reasonable assurance that component intelligence 

analysis activities and resource investments throughout the enterprise are 

aligned to support both strategic departmental intelligence priorities as 

 

38The fiscal year 2011 POA was an internal I&A document. Component participation in the 

POA began in fiscal year 2012. 
 

Page 15 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

well as component-specific priorities driven by their unique operational 

missions. According to I&A officials, it can be challenging for components 

to focus on both overall strategic departmental intelligence priorities and 

their more tactical intelligence priorities that support their specific 

operations and component customers. As articulated in the DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, the CINT recognizes the 

importance of respecting and supporting these unique component 

intelligence missions. However, to achieve its strategic goal of 

establishing an integrated intelligence enterprise, it will be important for 

DHS to clearly define its departmental intelligence priorities and ensure 

that annual enterprise intelligence planning activities are aligned to 

support these priorities. Establishing strategic departmental intelligence 

priorities in the Framework, and using these priorities to inform the 

planned analytic activities of the enterprise, as articulated in the POA, 

would better assure DHS of this alignment.

DHS’s efforts to implement mechanisms—particularly the POA—have 

helped to minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication across 

component intelligence analysis activities. The intelligence analysis 

activities within DHS are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS 

components conduct intelligence analysis in support of the same broad 

intelligence topics. For example, I&A, CBP, ICE, TSA, and the U.S. Coast 

Guard all contributed intelligence analysis to the DHS goal of Securing 

and Managing Our Borders in fiscal year 2012, as articulated in that 

year’s POA. However, intelligence officials at I&A and all five operational 

components with whom we met stated that the mechanisms DHS 

instituted to integrate analysis throughout the enterprise—particularly the 

POA—helped to avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication. Specifically, 

senior intelligence officials in all five components said the POA helped 

them gain a better understanding of the work of other components or 

prevent duplication in the intelligence analysis activities of the 

components. For example, U.S. Coast Guard intelligence officials stated 

that through the POA process, they gained an understanding of what 

other DHS components were doing in the intelligence realm to meet their 

mission requirements and learned that they may have some areas of 

commonality with CBP. This understanding allowed U.S. Coast Guard 

analysts to reach out to CBP analysts to determine which component 

would lead analysis work on different topics, thereby preventing 

duplication. Specifically, the U.S. Coast Guard agreed to lead maritime 

border analysis work and CBP agreed to lead land border analysis work. 

Intelligence officials from another component stated that because of the 

POA, departmental components have developed a relationship such that 

Enterprise Officials 

Reported That the 

Component Analytic 

Planning Process Has 

Helped Reduce 

Duplication, and We Did 

Not Find Evidence of 

Unnecessary Duplication
 

Page 16 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

two components conducting similar analysis will work together to 

determine which component is better suited to do the analysis.

Officials from four of the five DHS components we met with also reported 

that the revised POA process used in fiscal year 2014 was an 

improvement over the process used in prior years for various reasons. 

The reasons most often mentioned were improved coordination and 

reduced redundancy, and the ability of the components to display their 

contributions and inject the components’ internal needs into the broader 

priorities included in the POA. Additionally, DHS is considering additional 

ways to enhance coordination across its enterprise, according to I&A 

officials. For example, officials said that DHS is exploring ways to have 

the Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Analysis Working Group—

the group currently responsible for developing the POA—play a more 

active role in sharing information on planned analytic production 

throughout the enterprise and in monitoring joint production across the 

components.

In addition, we did not find evidence of any duplication among the 

intelligence analysis products that we reviewed as part of our case study 

in the area of border security. We did identify one instance of overlap 

where two DHS components provided similar information to similar 

customers in different products, but the information was packaged 

differently such that the products were not duplicative.39

 

39Additional details of our border security case study and results are contained in app. IV. 

This result is 

consistent with our determination based on our case study review, which 

senior intelligence officials at I&A and the components confirmed, that 

I&A products tend to be more strategic and written to a broader customer 

base than are component intelligence products, which tend to be more 

tactical and written to component operators. We also found that I&A 

products tend to be based on multiple sources of information, including 

DHS component data and information from the Intelligence Community, 

whereas component products tend to be sourced primarily from internal 

component data. In this way, I&A products aggregate information from 

across the department and the Intelligence Community to present a 

national picture, whereas component products use component 

information to discuss the implications on component operations. For 

example, a component intelligence product may provide analysis of a 

specific law enforcement incident, such as a drug seizure in a specific 
 

Page 17 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

jurisdiction, whereas an I&A product may provide a strategic look at drug 

activity across the country using data from CBP, ICE, and international 

law enforcement sources.40

Results from customer feedback surveys that are attached to I&A 

intelligence products indicate general satisfaction with these products, but 

the results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing readership-wide 

conclusions. Our discussions with representatives of I&A’s five customer 

groups indicate that customers in two groups—DHS leadership and state 

and local officials at fusion centers—found I&A’s products to be useful, 

while customers in the other three groups—DHS components, the 

Intelligence Community, and private critical infrastructure sectors—

generally did not. Customers in four of the five groups reported that they 

found other types of I&A analytic support to be useful, such as briefings 

from I&A analysts. I&A is taking steps to identify the analytic products and 

services that best meet its customers’ needs.

 

40There may be exceptions to the general trend we identified through our review of border 

security products. For example, according to a senior intelligence official from the U.S. 

Coast Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard generates strategic-level assessments of threats to 

the maritime domain and, as a standing member of the Intelligence Community, relies on 

Intelligence Community information sources. Similarly, a senior intelligence official from 

ICE stated that ICE also strives to write strategic intelligence products and may use nonICE sources of information.

Customers Reported 

Mixed Views on the 

Usefulness of I&A 

Products and 

Services; I&A Is 

Taking Steps to Better 

Understand 

Customers’ Analytic 

Support Needs
 

Page 18 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

I&A assesses the accuracy and usefulness of its intelligence analysis 

products through voluntary customer feedback surveys that are attached 

to products. Survey results indicate general satisfaction, but the results 

have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing statistically significant 

conclusions about all the readers of its products. Specifically, during fiscal 

year 2013, 73 percent of I&A customers that responded to the feedback 

surveys were very satisfied with the products’ usefulness, and 68 percent 

were very satisfied with the products’ timeliness.41 During this period, I&A 

issued a total of 830 intelligence products, of which 467 included a 

customer feedback survey.42 I&A received survey responses for 104 (22 

percent) of the 467 products, with a total of 4,162 responses.43

While generally positive, I&A survey results have limitations due in part to 

a bias in those who respond to the surveys. This bias exists because the 

results reflect the views of I&A customers who chose to respond to the 

feedback form and do not reflect the views of those who did not respond, 

a fact that prevents I&A from drawing statistically significant conclusions 

about the usefulness of its products since the results are not 

representative of all customers. Also, certain products concerning 

particularly notable topics can also account for a disproportionate number 

of survey responses received, which can bias the overall results since the 

responses do not reflect the full range of issued products. For example, in 

September 2012, I&A data show that three intelligence products 

accounted for 513 (88 percent) of the 586 total survey responses 

According 

to ODNI officials, I&A’s level of effort directed at obtaining feedback from 

its customers, along with the number of responses received, were above 

the norm for the Intelligence Community.

 

41I&A surveys ask customers to rate satisfaction on a five-point scale—very satisfied, 

somewhat satisfied, neither satisfied or dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very 

dissatisfied.

42I&A officials noted that many of the products that did not include an attached survey 

were quick-turnaround, information-only in nature and produced by I&A’s Current 

Intelligence Division. The officials noted that customer surveys are more appropriate for 

longer-term products that are often analytical in nature and produced by I&A’s other 

analytic divisions.

43Ten of the 104 products had more than 100 responses—of which 4 concerned a recent 

high-profile terrorist incident—and 42 received fewer than 10 responses.

Customer Feedback 

Surveys Indicate General 

Satisfaction with the 

Usefulness of I&A 

Products, but Results 

Cannot Be Used to Draw 

Readership-wide 

Conclusions
 

Page 19 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

received during the month. The remaining 73 responses (12 percent) I&A 

received during the month covered a total of 18 products.44

Further, because I&A’s products are distributed through broad 

information-sharing networks and generally not sent directly to individual 

recipients, I&A cannot determine the full extent of its customer base.45

Despite these limitations, I&A officials view the survey results as a useful 

tool for generally understanding how their products are being received by 

the customer base. The surveys also allow customers to submit product 

and service improvement recommendations that help to inform I&A in 

making adjustments to products to better serve customers’ needs. 

Officials from I&A’s Production Management Division said they provide 

the survey results to the I&A analytic division responsible for the product 

in order for the division to consider and make improvements in future 

products. In addition, I&A formed the Analytic Production Improvement 

Council in fiscal year 2012 to implement product quality improvement 

initiatives. For example, one product improvement effort the council 

implemented was to change product titles to better inform prospective 

customers of the topic of interest in those products.

I&A officials agree that this distribution method limits its ability to form 

readership-wide conclusions based on the survey results; however, I&A 

officials stated that I&A uses these networks to further its goal for a wide 

distribution of its products. Additionally, because of the broad distribution 

through information sharing networks, I&A cannot track the number of 

individuals who ultimately open and read its products in order to obtain 

more complete feedback. All of these factors limit I&A’s ability to draw any 

readership-wide conclusions about its products.

 

44Additional information on I&A’s efforts to survey customers is discussed later in this 

report.

45I&A has established portals on web-based distribution networks to facilitate customers’ 

access to its intelligence products, such as the Homeland Security Information Network for 

unclassified products and the Homeland Secure Data Network for classified reporting.
 

Page 20 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

According to I&A’s strategic plan, because of resource constraints and 

other factors, I&A gives priority in its intelligence analysis efforts to the 

needs of DHS leadership and state and local customers. I&A officials 

added that the priority order of customer groups is (1) departmental 

leadership; (2) state, local, tribal, and territorial partners; (3) DHS 

operational components; (4) Intelligence Community members; and (5) 

private critical infrastructure sectors. Our work indicates that I&A’s 

finished intelligence products are useful and relevant to DHS leadership 

and state, local, tribal, and territorial customers, but generally not to 

customers in the other three groups. Officials from four of the five 

customer groups (state, local, tribal, territorial partners; DHS components; 

the intelligence community; and the private sector) said they found other 

types of I&A analytic support to be useful, including briefings on emerging 

threats, tradecraft review of the customers’ own products, assistance with 

developing intelligence analysis, training, and the general exchange of 

information.46

I&A’s first priority is to provide finished intelligence products and other 

analytic services to DHS leadership—which consists of the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, Deputy Secretary, and DHS component heads—to 

support decision making. According to I&A officials who brief the 

Secretary, I&A’s products and services are useful and relevant to meeting

leadership needs. For example, I&A’s daily intelligence report and related 

threat briefing to the Secretary include actions DHS components plan to 

take in response to threats, which helps the Secretary ensure that the 

department is taking actions to mitigate these threats.

I&A has given priority to providing intelligence reports and other support 

to state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, consistent with provisions of 

the Homeland Security Act, as amended, and subsequently enacted 

laws.47

 

46Since I&A is internal to DHS and I&A analysts are already tasked with directly 

supporting DHS leadership, we did not discuss with leadership representatives their desire 

for direct access to I&A analysts (as we did with I&A’s other four customer groups).

Officials from five of the seven fusion centers we contacted said 

that I&A products were useful for providing an overall, strategic-level 

perspective and situational awareness regarding emerging threats. The 

47See e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 121 (articulating the department’s intelligence and analysis 

responsibilities), 124h (articulating the department’s responsibilities with respect to fusion 

centers), and 485 (directing establishment of an information-sharing environment of which 

DHS is a participant).

Selected Officials from 

Two of I&A’s Five 

Customer Groups Said 

Products Were Useful, and 

Officials from Four of the 

Five Groups Said Other 

Types of Analytic Services 

Were Useful

DHS Leadership

State, Local, Tribal, and 

Territorial Partners
 

Page 21 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

officials also said they incorporate threat analysis from I&A products into 

their own reporting to state and local customers. They specifically cited 

I&A’s Joint Intelligence Bulletins and Roll Call Releases as products that 

were useful.48

I&A has deployed analysts to fusion centers on a limited basis. 

Specifically, I&A initially deployed one analyst to the Los Angeles and 

San Diego fusion centers. According to I&A officials responsible for 

FAST, the purpose of these embedded analysts is to work with fusion 

centers to do detailed analytic work in accordance with the tradecraft 

standards that I&A follows.

Officials at the two fusion centers that generally did not find 

I&A analytic products to be useful said the products rarely addressed 

concerns that were unique to their geographic area, such as domestic 

terrorist groups that operate in their regions. In addition, officials from all 

seven fusion centers said that they valued access to I&A personnel, 

including analysts, for assistance with fusion center needs related to 

intelligence analysis. This assistance included training on proper methods 

for developing analytic products, reviewing fusion center products, and 

providing other analytic services, such as oral briefings on emerging 

threats that may be relevant to the center.

49

Intelligence officials from all five DHS components we contacted generally 

stated that they did not consider themselves customers of I&A with regard 

to finished intelligence products. The officials recognized the overall highlevel perspectives and situational awareness that I&A products can 

provide, but noted that their operational elements generally have a more 

I&A Production Management Division 

officials noted that these analysts provide an avenue for improving the 

tradecraft skills of fusion center analysts, which could help reduce delays 

in the issuance of I&A’s joint products with centers. I&A has recently 

taken steps to deploy additional analysts to fusion centers. According to 

the I&A Deputy Research Director, I&A deployed an additional four 

analysts to fusion centers and plans to deploy a fifth analyst in June.

 

48The Joint Intelligence Bulletin is produced with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 

response to significant or emerging threats or developments. The Roll Call Release is a 

single-topic intelligence product for first responders on terrorist tactics, techniques, and 

procedures that may be encountered during daily routines.

49I&A is to follow the same tradecraft standards as the rest of the Intelligence Community. 

These standards are detailed in Intelligence Community Directive Number 203—Analytic 

Standards (June 21, 2007), which is the basis on which ODNI evaluates DHS intelligence 

analysis products (along with those from other members of the Intelligence Community).

DHS Components
 

Page 22 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

critical need for tactical information and analysis to support operations 

and investigations—such as details on specific individuals or groups—

which their own intelligence groups typically provide. Officials from all five 

components noted the value of I&A’s other analytic support, such as 

providing access to the Intelligence Community and training. Managers of 

the intelligence elements of two components (the U.S. Coast Guard and 

USCIS) cited a desire to have I&A analysts placed in the components’ 

intelligence offices to allow for better exchanges of information, analysis, 

and subject matter expertise. For example, according to U.S. Coast 

Guard officials, colocating I&A analysts within components would allow 

I&A to better serve the Secretary by facilitating the identification of 

relevant information and analysis. In January 2014, I&A officials said that 

they were in the process of developing and considering several plans to 

deploy analysts to jointly work on high-priority issues of mutual interest to 

I&A and components.

ODNI officials said that they generally do not perceive the members of the 

Intelligence Community to be customers of I&A’s finished intelligence 

products because the products are not targeted to the Intelligence 

Community elements, and these agencies rely on other sources for 

analysis. The officials noted that Intelligence Community elements also 

tend to have an international focus, while I&A focuses on the homeland. 

ODNI officials said that they appreciated that I&A serves state and local 

customers since they are not traditional Intelligence Community 

customers. The officials also noted that I&A frequently writes its products 

at an unclassified level, which hinders their usefulness to the Intelligence 

Community. According to ODNI officials, the daily interaction between 

their personnel and I&A analysts embedded at ODNI’s National 

Counterterrorism Center provides expertise and perspective on DHS data 

sets—such as data on individuals crossing the borders—that are valuable 

to the Intelligence Community.50

 

50The National Counterterrorism Center is organizationally part of ODNI and serves as the 

principal adviser to ODNI on intelligence operations and analysis related to 

counterterrorism. See 50 U.S.C. § 3056(a), (f)(1). Further, it describes its missions as, 

among other things, serving as the primary organization in the U.S. government for 

integrating and analyzing all intelligence related to terrorism possessed or acquired by the 

U.S. government (except purely domestic terrorism), serving as the central and shared 

knowledge bank on terrorism information, and providing all-source intelligence support to 

government-wide counterterrorism activities.

The officials noted that they value being 

able to integrate information from these data sets into their own analyses. 

Intelligence Community
 

Page 23 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Representatives from all nine private critical infrastructure sectors and 

subsectors we contacted said that I&A generally does not generate 

products that are either useful or relevant to them, except for I&A’s 

analytic efforts related to cyber security, for which all of the officials 

generally had positive views. The officials said that I&A’s finished 

intelligence products are usually more strategic than they require, and 

I&A does not fully understand the intelligence needs of their industries.51

According to I&A officials, I&A has historically given the private sector 

lower priority with respect to intelligence analysis than its other customer 

groups because of resource considerations. However, the officials stated 

that I&A is continuing efforts going forward to perform outreach to the 

private sector to better determine private sector’s analytic needs and how 

to satisfy them. For example, I&A is participating in the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s (FBI) Infragard program for sharing information and 

analysis with the private sector.

The officials added that they are interested in developing a relationship 

with I&A. For example, officials from all nine sectors noted that having 

I&A analysts detailed to the private sector on a limited and temporary 

basis would better position I&A to understand their industries and related 

threats and provide intelligence analysis, including written reports, oral 

briefings, and other direct assistance. In January 2014, I&A officials said 

they are not considering long-term deployments (90 days or longer) in 

part because of staffing constraints, but are considering shorter-term 

deployments to interested private sector companies.

52

 

51Critical infrastructure refers to the systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 

vital that the incapacity or destruction of such may have a debilitating impact on security, 

national economic security, national public health or safety, environment, or any 

combination of those matters. See 42 U.S.C. § 5195c. The critical infrastructure sectors 

are the Defense Industrial Base; Energy; Food and Agriculture; Healthcare and Public 

Health; Financial Services; Water and Wastewater Systems; Chemical; Commercial 

Facilities; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Emergency Services; Nuclear Reactors, 

Materials, and Waste; Information Technology; Communications; Transportation Systems; 

and Government Facilities. GAO, Transportation Security Information Sharing: 

Stakeholders Generally Satisfied but TSA Could Improve Analysis, Awareness, and 

Accountability, 

Further, I&A’s Strategic Plan calls for 

GAO-12-44 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2011).

52InfraGard is an FBI-sponsored initiative that brings together representatives from the 

private and public sectors to help protect our nation’s critical infrastructure from attacks by 

terrorists and criminals. Members have access to an FBI secure communications network 

featuring an encrypted website, web mail, Listservs, and message boards. The FBI uses 

the InfraGard website to disseminate threat alerts and advisories. InfraGard also sends 

out intelligence products from the FBI and other agencies.

Private Critical Infrastructure 

Sectors
 

Page 24 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

enabling the National Network of Fusion Centers to serve as a conduit for 

disseminating products to private sector partners.53

I&A has not identified the types and mix of analytic products and services 

that best meet the needs of its various customers, but has recently taken 

steps that could support doing so. Specifically, the surveys I&A attaches 

to individual products help obtain customer feedback on various aspects 

of the products, but are not intended to obtain customer views on the full 

range of analytic products or services that I&A provides. However, in 

fiscal year 2012, I&A’s Production Management Division initiated a Core 

Customer Study to ascertain, among other things, its core customers’ 

organizations, the functions they perform, and their intelligence-related 

mission needs. The study is using a combination of interviews and 

surveys with members of I&A’s five customer groups. I&A characterized 

the Core Customer Study as a long-term effort to define, identify, and 

profile its core customers as a step to better identify their overall 

intelligence needs. Production Management Division officials said they 

expect to complete the study by the end of June 2014.

In addition, in January 2014, I&A initiated the Customer Satisfaction 

Assessment to obtain views on I&A products and services that were 

provided to customers during 2013 and forecast how I&A can better meet 

customer needs in the future. To support this assessment, and in 

response to our September 2012 report, I&A initiated a survey in March 

2014 to gain a better understanding of its customers’ satisfaction with and 

use of I&A intelligence products and services.54

 

53The National Network of Fusion Centers describes the association of individual fusion 

centers that serve the national homeland security mission, including counterterrorism. The 

federal government identifies fusion centers within the National Network as the primary 

conduit for sharing federal terrorism-related information with state, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners.

Among other things, the 

survey covers the types of I&A products the customers read in 2013, 

including finished intelligence and current intelligence (e.g., alerts and 

54See GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Has Demonstrated Leadership and Progress, but 

Additional Actions Could Help Sustain and Strengthen Efforts, GAO-12-809 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012). In an e-mail accompanying the customer satisfaction survey, I&A 

officials stated they were conducting the survey in response to a recommendation in this 

GAO report to survey an identified population of I&A customers in order to (1) gauge their 

satisfaction with I&A products and services and (2) identify opportunities for future 

improvement.

I&A Is Taking Steps to 

Identify the Analytic 

Products and Services 

that Best Meet the Needs 

of Its Customers
 

Page 25 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

warnings); the extent to which the products were useful in informing 

actions and decisions, such as in making resource investments; and 

satisfaction with I&A services, such as threat briefings and tradecraft 

assistance. According to I&A officials, they sent the survey to customers 

who were likely recipients of I&A intelligence products and services in 

2013. Specifically, I&A sent the survey to customers who maintained an 

active account to a portal where I&A products are posted (e.g., the 

Homeland Security Information Network), were members of a homeland 

security information-sharing network that regularly distributes I&A 

products (e.g., terrorism liaison officer network), or were individually 

referred by their local fusion center or the I&A private sector outreach 

program. According to I&A officials, the results of this survey will be 

analyzed and provided directly to I&A intelligence analysts, managers, 

and senior leadership to help them better understand how their customers 

use I&A intelligence and determine how to tailor and improve products 

and services in the future.

I&A officials said that as part of the Customer Satisfaction Assessment

they also plan to conduct detailed interviews with a smaller group of 

customers in order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of ways to 

increase the usefulness of I&A’s analytic products and services that will 

guide its improvement efforts. According to I&A officials, the assessment

will also help I&A understand its customers’ desired mix of products and 

analytic services. I&A plans to complete the first draft of a report on the 

results of the assessment by the end of April 2014.

Once completed, the Core Customer Study and Customer Satisfaction 

Assessment could provide I&A with information to help it more clearly 

define how it plans to support each customer group, the types of analytic 

products and services it will provide, and related levels of investment. The 

results could also assist I&A in determining how best to use its available 

analytic resources, including deciding whether additional deployments of 

I&A intelligence analysts to DHS components, fusion centers, and private 

sector entities would allow for better exchanges of information and 

analysis in support of national counterterrorism efforts.
 

Page 26 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

I&A has faced human capital challenges in recruiting and hiring the skilled 

workforce it needs and providing training and professional development 

opportunities that keep morale high and attrition low.55 Specifically, 

according to I&A’s recruitment strategy, I&A’s hiring authority under 

competitive service put it at a disadvantage compared with other 

organizations that were able to process hiring actions more quickly and 

offer career advantages associated with excepted service status. 56

 

55Attrition is the percentage of personnel losses for all reasons during the fiscal year, and 

is measured by comparing personnel losses during the year with the total number of 

personnel on board at the beginning of the year. Our work focused on attrition among I&A 

analysts classified as GS-0132. According to OPM’s Position Classification Standard for 

Intelligence Series, GS-0132 analysts advise on, administer, supervise, or perform work in 

the collection, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information on 

political, economic, social, cultural, physical, geographic, scientific, or military condition, 

trends, and forces in foreign and domestic areas that directly or indirectly affect the 

national security.

For 

example, according to officials, under competitive service status, it could 

take anywhere from several months to a year between the initial hiring 

56The Director of National Intelligence may, with concurrence of the head of the 

department concerned and in consultation with the Director of OPM, convert competitive 

service positions within an element of the Intelligence Community in such department to 

excepted service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary 

to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. See 50 U.S.C. § 3024. See also 5 

U.S.C. §§ 2102(a) (defining “competitive service”), 2103(a) (defining “excepted service”), 

and 5 C.F.R. pt. 213, subpt. C (specifying the types of positions eligible for excepted 

appointments) Pursuant to its regulations, OPM may except a position from the 

competitive service if it determines, for example, that appointments into such positions are 

not practicable. See 5 C.F.R. § 6.1(a).

I&A Has Taken Steps 

to Address 

Challenges It Faces 

in Maintaining a 

Skilled Workforce, but 

Assessing Results 

Could Help 

Strengthen Future 

Human Capital Efforts

I&A Has Taken Steps to 

Address Challenges 

Related to Recruiting, 

Hiring, and Professional 

Development
 

Page 27 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

offer and completion of the hiring process, a time lag that they said led 

many applicants to seek employment elsewhere. The officials added that 

when they engaged in Intelligence Community career fairs, many 

individuals were looking for offers on the spot that other Intelligence 

Community elements could provide but that I&A could not, a fact that

affected their ability to compete for top talent. In addition, according 

officials, the perception of I&A as a less than prestigious intelligence 

agency than the others in the Intelligence Community also affects its 

ability to recruit top talent.

To some extent, such hiring challenges contributed to I&A’s historical

reliance on contractors to fill the gaps in Intelligence Community 

experience. For example, a 2009 Homeland Security Institute study 

concluded that burdensome recruitment and hiring processes resulted in 

I&A’s heavy reliance on contract labor to staff key positions.57 I&A officials 

stated that the use of contractors was the primary method outside of 

federal hiring to acquire the needed tradecraft skills. They added that 

budgetary limitations on the number of authorized full-time equivalent 

(FTE) positions, the desire for operational flexibility to deal with 

uncertainty, and the need for “surge capability” also made contractors a 

viable alternative. As of November 2013, I&A’s Office of Analysis had the 

smallest percentage of contractors compared with the rest of I&A, but the 

office still relied on contractors to support analytical instruction, such as 

reviews of the Program of Analysis.58

I&A has also faced challenges in providing professional development 

opportunities for its workforce, and experienced low morale scores and 

high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. 

Regarding professional development, I&A historically did not 

institutionalize a commitment to investing in its workforce, according to 

I&A officials. For example, they said that some managers sent their 

employees to training, assigned mentors, and provided rotational 

opportunities, while others did not. Furthermore, I&A’s training program 

did not always focus on mission-specific requirements that its workforce 

 

57Homeland Security Institute, Independent Evaluation of Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis Programs (Arlington, Virginia: Apr. 25, 2009).

58See GAO, Additional Actions Needed to Improve Reporting on and Planning for the Use 

of Contract Personnel, GAO-14-204 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2014) for more on the 

use of contract personnel in the Intelligence Community.
 

Page 28 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

needed, according to officials. The 2009 Homeland Security Institute 

report also concluded that I&A lacked a robust training program.59

According to officials, these challenges contributed to I&A’s low morale 

and high rates of attrition. For example, I&A employee responses to the 

2012 Intelligence Community Climate Survey show that 36 percent of 

employees responded positively when asked if they would recommend 

I&A as a good place to work, as shown in figure 2.60

Figure 2: Results of Selected Intelligence Community Climate Survey Items for 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Fiscal Year 2012

Note: Survey responses are from all Office of Intelligence and Analysis staff and not just limited to 

intelligence analysts. Results could be different if limited to intelligence analysts.

 

59Homeland Security Institute, Independent Evaluation of Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis Programs. 

60The climate survey measures employee perceptions about an organization’s ability to 

recruit and retain top talent. It gauges if employees understand how their work relates to 

their agency’s goals and mission priorities and if they get a sense of accomplishment from 

their work. It also assesses employee satisfaction with coworkers, supervisors, working 

conditions, involvement in workplace decisions, training and development opportunities, 

promotions, pay, and rewards. 
 

Page 29 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Also, in September 2012, we reported that I&A had one of the lowest 

morale scores within DHS in OPM’s Federal Viewpoints Survey—a tool 

that measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent 

conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their 

agencies.61

According to I&A officials, attrition among I&A intelligence analysts has 

led to a loss in valuable technical expertise and organizational 

knowledge. I&A data show that attrition has been the highest for lowerlevel analysts, with attrition for GS-9 positions fluctuating from a high of 

80 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 21 percent in fiscal year 2013. According 

to exit interviews, I&A officials attributed the attrition to a number of 

factors, including low morale and limited promotion opportunities for 

lower-level analysts. The officials added that exit interviews indicate that 

analysts leave for positions with other Intelligence Community agencies, 

which are often perceived as higher-profile agencies.

To help address these challenges, I&A has taken the following steps:

• To help address recruitment and hiring challenges, in November 

2012, DHS requested excepted service status on behalf of I&A from 

ODNI and OPM to align itself with the rest of the Intelligence 

Community and better compete for top talent. In June 2013, I&A 

received excepted service status. According to I&A officials, this will 

allow them to process hiring actions quicker and offer career 

advantages associated with excepted service positions, which will in 

turn help them recruit and hire the right applicants. In addition, I&A 

human capital officials stated that they started working with DHS 

human capital officials in 2013 to improve intelligence analyst position 

descriptions by, for example, targeting specific skill requirements, to 

help ensure that I&A recruits the right people.

• To address low morale and attrition among its intelligence analysts 

and enhance professional development opportunities, I&A 

restructured its organizational grade structure to provide more career 

advancement and promotion opportunities. In 2012, I&A awarded a 

contract to the MITRE Corporation to review its workforce structure. 

 

61GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better Determine 

Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans, GAO-12-940 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28 2012). Responses to the Office of Personnel Management 

survey are from all I&A employees and not specific to analysts within I&A’s Office of 

Analysis. 
 

Page 30 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

MITRE concluded that I&A had more staff at the higher grade levels 

and that this was out of line with the rest of the Intelligence 

Community. As a result, in November 2012, I&A released a 

memorandum that noted the grade structure changes. Specifically, 

I&A increased the number of GS-7 through GS-12 analyst positions 

and decreased the number of GS-13 through GS-15 positions.62

I&A has also enhanced its professional development by improving its 

training program, institutionalizing the use of Individual Development 

Plans, and encouraging rotational details. In fiscal year 2013, I&A’s Office 

of Analysis established minimum training requirements for its analysts, 

among other training requirements. For example, analysts are required to 

complete four analytical tradecraft courses a year that are offered by 

I&A’s Office of the Research Director.

According to the directors of the four Office of Analysis analytic 

divisions, this change is intended to help I&A grow its workforce 

through junior analysts and increase promotion opportunities that 

were previously not available.

63

 

62To communicate its new workforce composition, I&A released a memorandum in 

November 2012 stating that I&A will cap hiring at 25 percent for GS-12/13 to ensure it 

maintains a proper distribution of personnel within the GS 7 through GS-13 range. For 

fiscal year 2013, the Office of Analysis was capped at five new hires at the GS-12/13 

level. The memorandum does not specify whether those five are intelligence analysts or 

other staff positions.

I&A officials noted that these 

courses are helping I&A build a better, more knowledgeable Intelligence 

Community workforce, which translates into better finished intelligence 

products. This is supported by ODNI’s annual assessment of Intelligence 

Community finished intelligence products, which shows that I&A’s 

tradecraft scores have improved substantially over the past few years and 

that I&A’s scores are now above average within the Intelligence 

Community. In fiscal year 2014, I&A also issued guidance intended to 

standardize the use of Individual Development Plans. According to the 

guidance, the development plans are intended to help I&A staff plan their 

careers and motivate them to meet the demands placed on them by 

constant organizational and technological changes. Further, I&A is 

encouraging its analysts to take rotational assignments to other 

Intelligence Community elements and DHS operational components, 

according to officials. As of January 2014, seven I&A intelligence analysts 

63In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, I&A provided over 20 courses related to analytic 

tradecraft for its analytic workforce. According to I&A officials, these courses were 

developed in accordance with ODNI standards.
 

Page 31 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

were detailed to other Intelligence Community elements or DHS 

components. According to I&A officials, this program helps I&A analysts 

better understand the operations and needs of other Intelligence 

Community elements and DHS components and helps them develop their 

analytic tradecraft.64

In May 2013, I&A began to strategically assess whether its workforce has 

the right skills—such as written communications, program knowledge, 

and decision making—through a competency gap assessment.65

According to officials, this gap assessment will also to serve as an 

opportunity for I&A to determine whether its current practice of recruiting 

and hiring individuals that have strong analytical skills as opposed to 

subject matter expertise, and then training them to specialize in areas that 

support DHS’s unique operational missions, is appropriate.66

 

64The current Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for the Office of Analysis is on detail from 

the Defense Intelligence Agency.

According to 

officials, the gap assessment will include a survey of the knowledge, 

skills, and capabilities of intelligence analysts across the enterprise. The 

survey will cover critical skills and competencies that I&A developed in 

conjunction with other DHS components. According to I&A officials, the 

results of the assessment are to be released in fiscal year 2014. I&A 

officials said that they intend to use the results of the assessment to help 

fill skill gaps within the current workforce through training and analyst 

performance management activities. I&A officials acknowledged the 

importance and the need to use the results of the competency gap 

assessment given the absence of other mechanisms or documents that 

can help guide its overall workforce planning efforts.

65The competency gap assessment is sponsored by OPM and DHS and includes all 

intelligence analysts within DHS’s enterprise. 

66According to the directors of the four analytical divisions within I&A’s Office of Analysis—

Current Intelligence, Border Security, Homeland Counterterrorism, and Cyber— I&A looks 

for people that have the ability to analyze and piece together seemingly unrelated 

information from multiple sources and have strong written and oral communication skills. 

I&A does recruit for and hire individuals for their specific expertise in certain areas. For 

example, according to I&A officials, some positions that require technical expertise are 

difficult to train in-house, a fact that makes it more feasible to directly hire for this 

expertise.

Assessing Results and 

Impacts of Recently 

Completed and Ongoing 

Initiatives Could Help I&A 

Strengthen Future Human 

Capital Efforts
 

Page 32 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

While the competency gap assessment is an important step in strategic 

workforce planning, I&A has not assessed the effects of its recently 

completed workforce efforts. In the past 3 years, I&A has implemented 

changes that are intended to strengthen its workforce, however; I&A 

currently has no established mechanisms in place to monitor and 

evaluate the effect of these efforts and use the results to make any 

needed changes. Specifically, we identified three areas where I&A could 

strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of its human capital efforts. 

First, I&A officials stated that they use ODNI and DHS-OPM surveys and 

survey forms from analysts regarding training to review changes in 

morale; however, I&A does not have a systematic way of monitoring 

these activities and using the results to make changes. Second, the 

results I&A receives from the ODNI and DHS-OPM morale surveys reflect 

all of I&A, which makes it difficult for I&A to determine whether its 

workforce activities are having any results on the intelligence analysts 

within the Office of Analysis. Third, I&A does not have any mechanisms in 

place to monitor and assess the effects of its excepted service status and 

grade restructuring.

According to I&A officials, these mechanisms are not in place because 

I&A leadership was focused on other priorities. However, these officials 

agreed that such mechanisms could help ensure that its efforts are 

helping to address the challenges of its analytic intelligence workforce.

According to DHS workforce planning guidance, workforce planners must 

monitor and assess the progress of their strategies, evaluate the 

outcomes, and use the results from the evaluation to revise the 

strategies, if needed.67 Consistent with this guidance, establishing 

mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce efforts, such as changes 

to I&A’s hiring authority and grade levels restructuring, could help the 

Office of Analysis determine if the efforts are achieving their intended 

results. In addition, using the results from these evaluations to determine 

any need for changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound 

workforce decisions.

The organizations within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise play critical roles 

in uncovering and analyzing threats to the United States. DHS has made 

efforts, such as developing the Framework and POA, to integrate the 

 

67DHS Workforce Planning Guide. 

Conclusions
 

Page 33 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

analysis activities of its enterprise in support of common departmental 

intelligence priorities. These efforts, however, are not functioning as 

intended and as a result, DHS has not yet reached its goal of having an 

intelligence enterprise that responds to an integrated set of strategic 

departmental priorities that in turn drive analytical plans and resource 

decisions. Because of challenges I&A experienced in recruiting and hiring 

a skilled workforce, it has also taken actions intended to make it easier to 

attract, develop, and maintain skilled analysts, and many of these actions 

have been recently completed. By not monitoring and evaluating the 

effect of these actions, I&A cannot be confident that it is making progress 

in improving its ability to build and maintain the workforce it needs to 

effectively and efficiently analyze possible threats to the homeland. 

Furthermore, I&A lacks the information essential to know whether 

additional changes are needed to its workforce improvement activities 

and the strategies that underlie those activities.

To help ensure that the intelligence analysis activities and resources 

throughout the enterprise align to an integrated set of strategic 

departmental intelligence priorities, we recommend that the Under 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Security take the 

following two actions:

• establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Homeland 

Security Intelligence Priorities Framework that can be used to guide 

annual enterprise planning efforts, including intelligence analysis and 

resource management and

• ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are 

established, the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic 

activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as articulated in the 

Program of Analysis.

To help ensure that I&A maintains critical skills and competencies, when 

planning for and implementing current and future workforce actions, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish 

mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results 

to determine any needed changes.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In its 

written comments, reprinted in appendix V and summarized below, DHS 

concurred with the three recommendations and described actions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 34 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

underway and planned to address them. In addition, DHS provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

With regard to the first recommendation, that I&A establish strategic 

departmental intelligence priorities in the Framework that can be used to 

guide annual enterprise planning efforts, DHS concurred and stated that, 

based in part on GAO’s work, I&A has revised its approach to developing 

strategic departmental intelligence priorities. Further, DHS stated that the 

2014 Framework was approved on April 9, 2014, and I&A will coordinate 

future refinements to the methodology with the Homeland Security 

Intelligence Enterprise prior to the beginning of the 2015 priorities 

process. We will determine if I&A’s revised approach and the resulting 

2014 Framework address the intent of our recommendation as part of our 

recommendation follow-up process.

With regard to the second recommendation, that I&A ensure that once 

strategic departmental intelligence priorities are established the 

Framework is used to inform the planned analytic activities of the DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise, DHS concurred, and stated that the priorities 

established in the 2014 Framework will inform the development of the 

2015 POA. Additionally, DHS stated in its letter that the 2015 POA will be 

informed by updated Intelligence Community-wide guidance from the 

Director of National Intelligence pertaining to both the development of the 

POA and key intelligence questions, and lessons learned from last year’s 

development process. If fully implemented, these planned actions should 

address the intent of the recommendation.

With regard to the third recommendation, that I&A establish mechanisms 

to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine 

any needed changes, DHS concurred and stated that I&A is developing 

specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate workforce 

initiatives and plans to develop a complete set of measures by the end of 

fiscal year 2014. If fully implemented, these planned actions should 

address the intent of the recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and interested 

congressional committees as appropriate. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
 

Page 35 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributions to this report are listed in 

appendix VI.

Eileen R. Larence

Director

Homeland Security and Justice
 

Page 36 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis 

List of Requesters 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D. 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Michael McCaul 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Members of the Intelligence 

Community 

Page 37 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

The Intelligence Community consists of 17 U.S. intelligence agencies 

whose mission is to collect and convey essential information that the 

President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and 

military communities require to execute their appointed duties. See 50 

U.S.C. § 3003(4).The agencies include the following: 

Central Intelligence Agency

Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis (I&A)

Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Department of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Defense Intelligence Agency

Drug Enforcement Administration

Federal Bureau of Investigation

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

National Reconnaissance Office

National Security Agency

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

U.S. Air Force, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

U.S. Army, Army Military Intelligence

U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Intelligence

U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

U.S. Navy, Naval Intelligence

Appendix I: Members of the Intelligence 

Community
Appendix II: Description of Key Finished 

Intelligence Products from the Six DHS 

Intelligence Entities in Our Review

Page 38 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

DHS Intelligence Entity

Finished Intelligence 

Product Product Description

Department of 

Homeland Security 

(DHS) Office of 

Intelligence and 

Analysis

Homeland Intelligence Today DHS’s daily product that provides the Secretary, DHS operational 

component leadership, and other federal partners with timely homelandrelevant analysis and reporting. 

Intelligence Assessment Provides strategic analysis on a variety of topics that impact homeland 

security; can range from covering a single issue to an in-depth multithemed analysis.

Joint Intelligence Bulletin Produced jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and focused on 

emergent or recent terrorism-related threats or events that are pertinent to 

the Homeland.

Roll Call Release Produced for frontline law enforcement officers to highlight emergent 

terrorist or criminal techniques or tactics they may encounter in the field.

Fire Line A sister product to Roll Call Release that is geared toward fire, rescue, and 

emergency management personnel to aid in planning, response, and 

mitigation.

Reference Aid Provides an informational overview on an issue, development, key figure, 

or lasting trend.

U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) 

CBP Threat Assessment Provides a comprehensive analysis of threats and hazards that impact 

CBP operations.

CBP Intelligence Report Provides analysis, trends, and patterns that directly relate to CBP efforts. 

Special Research Report Provides research, primarily associated with travel and imports, to other 

law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community. 

Homeland Security 

Intelligence Report

Provides DHS and other members of the Intelligence Community with CBP 

analysis of terrorism and other criminal activities that affect border security.

U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement

(ICE) 

Homeland Security 

Assessment (HSA) 

Provides a comprehensive analysis of a complex intelligence topic or target 

related to specific events or trends. HSA’s typically include a threat 

analysis; a discussion or potential threat actors and tactics, techniques, 

and procedures; and an outlook or review of potential mitigation strategies, 

counter-measures, or vulnerabilities. 

Homeland Security 

Intelligence Report

Provides in-depth analysis of a single intelligence development, discovery, 

finding, or issue. 

Intelligence Note Covers new intelligence and summarize developments on an issue or topic 

area of interest to ICE customers. 

Transportation Security 

Administration

Transportation Intelligence 

Note

Provides information and analysis on a single threat or situation involving

transportation security.

Modal Threat Assessment Provides analyses of threats to transportation’s critical modal sectors, such 

as aviation and mass transit. 

Poster Posters focus on a single topic of concern, such as concealment 

techniques. 

Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures Assessment

Analyzes how violent extremists, typically overseas, attack transportation 

modes in order to discern impacts on the homeland transportation 

environment.

Appendix II: Description of Key Finished 

Intelligence Products from the Six DHS 

Intelligence Entities in Our Review
Appendix II: Description of Key Finished 

Intelligence Products from the Six DHS 

Intelligence Entities in Our Review 

Page 39 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis 

DHS Intelligence Entity 

Finished Intelligence 

Product Product Description 

United States 

Citizenship and 

Immigration Services 

Immigration Systems History 

Report 

Provides information on individual subjects such as their immigration 

history, current immigration status/expiration, previous and pending 

immigration benefits, and a list of immigration systems checked. 

Special Research Report Contains the information in an individual’s Immigration Systems History, as 

well as additional information on the evolution of the subject’s immigration 

history. 

Intelligence Assessment Provides in-depth analysis and judgments of an event or development 

previously addressed in a previous product. 

United States Coast 

Guard 

Intelligence Bulletin Provides immediate maritime intelligence and law enforcement situational 

awareness. 

Intelligence Assessment An Analytic product providing judgments and prognosis regarding a specific 

intelligence issue. 

Intelligence Estimate Provides an overview and summary judgments on an intelligence issue 

based on all-source intelligence information. 

Source: GAO analysis of component-provided information. | GAO-14-397 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 40 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

This report addresses the following questions: 

• To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise 

integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence priorities, and 

to what extent are enterprise analysis activities unnecessarily 

overlapping or duplicative?

• To what extent do I&A’s customers report that they find I&A products 

and other analytic services to be useful?

• What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic 

workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges?

To address the first objective, we analyzed documents produced by DHS 

and I&A related to setting intelligence priorities to determine how priorities 

are established and how the priorities are to be followed by the 

enterprise. Specifically, we reviewed the Department of Homeland 

Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, the 2006 and 2008 

versions of DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan; Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 2011–Fiscal Year 

2018; Delegation to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis/Chief Intelligence Officer, August 10, 2012; DHS Management 

Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and Management, January 30, 

2006; Department of Homeland Security Directive 264-01, Intelligence 

Integration and Management, June 12, 2013; DHS Instruction Number: 

264-01-001 DHS Intelligence Enterprise June 28, 2013; the 2005 and 

2009 versions of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council Charter; I&A 

memos including the fiscal year 2013 and the fiscal year 2014 DHS 

Enterprise Programmatic Guidance; DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

Programs of Analysis (POA) for fiscal years 2011 through 2014; and the 

Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework for fiscal years 2012 

and 2013 to determine the roles and responsibilities of DHS in managing 

its enterprise and the analytic efforts of the enterprise, and how DHS was 

carrying out these responsibilities.

Additionally, we analyzed documents from DHS components for which 

intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their unique missions 

and operations—the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS)—to help determine the roles and 

responsibilities of component agency intelligence programs and how they 

respond to the coordination and prioritization efforts of I&A. These 

included U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance 

Report, Fiscal Years 2011–2013, Appendix A: Measure Descriptions and 

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Data Collection Methodologies; National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 

Intelligence Information Sharing, Final Report and Recommendations, 

January 10, 2012; Transportation Security Administration Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis Mission and Functional Statement; ICE 

Strategic Plan, FY 2010-2014; U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, Office of Intelligence, 

Analysis Division, Fact Sheet; Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic 

Plan; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Intelligence and 

Information Products Fact Sheet; and U.S. Coast Guard Publication 2-0,

Intelligence, May 2010; among others.

We compared these efforts against requirements listed in the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, as amended, that call on the DHS Chief Intelligence 

Officer (CINT) to establish the intelligence analysis priorities for the 

intelligence components of the department, consistent with any directions 

from the President and, as applicable, the Director of National 

Intelligence. According to DHS guidance, the appropriate vehicle for 

establishing enterprise-wide intelligence priorities is the Homeland 

Security Intelligence Priorities Framework.

We met with the I&A Research Director and members of his staff, and the 

Director of the Information Sharing and Enterprise Management Division 

and his staff who are responsible for developing and implementing the 

management coordination mechanisms for the enterprise. We also met 

with representatives from the intelligence programs of USCIS, the U.S. 

Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA to discuss the coordination 

mechanisms established by DHS.

Additionally, to address in the first objective whether overlap or 

duplication exists in the analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise, we analyzed all 21 products written by I&A, CBP, and ICE

where these three organizations shared responsibility to answer 

questions in the 2012 POA in support of DHS’s border security mission. 

We selected the 2012 POA because it was the most recent available 

when we began this analysis. We selected this mission area for our 

analysis because this departmental mission contained contributions from 

the largest number of DHS intelligence components, and chose I&A, 

CBP, and ICE products to review because these three entities had the 

greatest number of key intelligence questions assigned to them within the 

border security mission area. By reviewing only one mission area, we 

cannot determine if there was duplication in other areas, but our findings 

support statements from intelligence officials in both I&A and the 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

operational components that the content of their products differs because 

of their unique missions and primary customer sets and, therefore the 

products are not duplicative, even when they cover the same broad 

topical area.

Within the DHS mission area of securing the border, we requested an 

inventory of finished intelligence products for fiscal year 2012 from I&A, 

CBP, and ICE—the three entities with the greatest number of key 

intelligence questions assigned to them in this topic area. Products 

written in 2012 were chosen because this was the most recent complete 

available to us at the time of this analysis. According to an analysis of 

these product inventories, we identified six key intelligence questions in 

which I&A and either ICE or CBP both generated finished intelligence 

products. In support of these six key intelligence questions, I&A, ICE, and 

CBP generated a total of 21 finished intelligence products—15 authored 

by I&A, 4 by ICE, and 2 by CBP. We analyzed these 21 products to 

determine the extent to which duplication existed by comparing the topics, 

sources, and customers of these products.

To address the second objective, we met with I&A staff from the 

Production Management Division to determine how I&A develops, 

administers, and analyzes feedback surveys included with all I&A finished 

intelligence products, as well as to discuss the efforts I&A had in place 

through February 2014 to improve customer satisfaction. We then 

analyzed the results of the feedback surveys that were included with all 

fiscal year 2012 I&A finished analytic products to determine what readers 

of these products thought about the quality and usefulness of them. We 

also met with representatives from four of the five I&A customer groups: 

DHS components; the Intelligence Community; state, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments; and the private sector. While we did not meet with 

representatives from DHS leadership, we did meet with representatives of 

the I&A unit that briefs leadership. Specifically, we met with 

representatives from the intelligence programs of the DHS components 

for which intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their 

missions and operations—USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and 

TSA—to discuss the extent to which these organizations find I&A analysis 

relevant and useful. We met with staff from the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence—the office that administers the overall efforts of the 

Intelligence Community—to discuss their review of the quality of I&A 

analytic products, as well as the usefulness of these products to the 

Intelligence Community. We met with DHS and state and local 

government agency staff members working at 7 of 78 state and major

urban area fusion centers—centers that serve as primary focal points 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

within the state and local environments for the receipt, analysis, 

gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, 

local, tribal, and territorial homeland security partners. The fusion centers 

we met with were (1) the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, 

(2) El Paso (Texas) Fusion Center (no DHS staff were located in the El 

Paso Fusion Center at the time of our discussion), (3) Montana All Threat 

Intelligence Center, (4) New York State Intelligence Center, (5) San Diego 

(California) Law Enforcement Coordination Center, (6) Texas Fusion 

Center in Austin, and (7) the Washington State Fusion Center. These 

fusion centers comprised 4 of the 6 centers we considered southwest 

border fusion centers and 3 of the 11 northern border fusion centers. We 

selected each center to provide access to a range of state-level users of 

I&A analytic products with an emphasis on border issues because of our 

examination of potential overlap or duplication related to DHS 

components’ intelligence analysis reporting on border issues. While 

information we obtained at these locations cannot be generalized across 

all fusion centers because we selected these locations based on the 

diversity of participation in the POA and geographic locations along the 

southwest and northern border, the units we visited provided us with an 

overview of users’ perspectives on the usefulness and relevance of I&A 

analytic products. We also met with representatives of the Partnership for 

Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS), the National Council of Information 

Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC),

1

 

1

ISACs are entities established by critical infrastructure key resource owners and 

operators to provide comprehensive sector analysis, which is shared within the sector, 

with other sectors, and with government.

and individual representatives 

from the Transportation and Commercial Facilities critical infrastructure 

sectors to determine how the private sector views the analytic services 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

provided by I&A.2 We compared I&A’s efforts against criteria in the 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that note the 

importance for management to communicate to, and obtain information 

from, both internal and external stakeholders that may have a significant 

impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals and utilize 

resources effectively and efficiently.3

For objective two, we also reviewed the standards by which I&A’s 

products are judged. To do so we reviewed I&A Policy Directive 900.2-

Producing Finished Intelligence (July 15, 2011), I&A Policy Directive

900.4-I&A Joint Production with State and Major Urban Area Fusion 

Centers (August 31, 2011), I&A Policy Instruction IA-901 DHS Intelligence 

and Analysis Review and Clearance of Analytic Products Disseminated 

Outside the Federal Government, I&A memos including Fiscal Year 2013 

and Fiscal Year 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Programmatic 

Guidance; and ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic 

Standards (June 21, 2007). To obtain a general view of the quality of 

these products, we reviewed the 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 DHS 

Report to Congress on Voluntary Feedback from State, Local, Tribal, and 

Private Sector Consumers; I&A’s fiscal year 2011 Customer Feedback 

Report and the September 2012 Production Performance Report that 

includes monthly production and feedback information.

 

2

We met with representatives from 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sector committees of 

PCIS and 6 of the 16 information sharing and analysis center members of the National 

Council of ISACs in group meetings. All of the representatives at the PCIS meeting met 

with us at the conclusion of their meeting. Additionally, of the 9 representatives who 

attended the National Council of ISACs meeting, 6 individuals volunteered to meet with us 

at the conclusion of the meeting. The individuals at the PCIS meeting represented the (1) 

Communications Sector Committee, (2) Defense Industrial Base Sector Committee, (3) 

Energy Sector Committee, (4) Financial Services Sector Committee, and (5) 

Transportation Sector Committee. The individuals who spoke with us at the conclusion of 

the National Council of ISACs meeting represented the (1) Financial Services ISAC, (2) 

Information Technology ISAC, (3) Highway and Motor Carrier ISAC, (4) Public Health 

ISAC, (5) Real Estate ISAC, and (6) Water ISAC. In addition, DHS officials from the 

National Protection and Programs Directorate referred us to two additional private sector 

officials from the PCIS Commercial Facilities Sector Committee and the Transportation 

Sector Committee whom we met with in separate meetings. Information we obtained at 

these meetings cannot be generalized across all private critical infrastructure sectors 

because we did not meet with associations representing all such sectors. These meetings, 

however, provided us with an overview of users’ perspectives on the usefulness and 

relevance of I&A analytic products.

3

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov., 1999).
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

For the third objective, we reviewed the U.S. Office of Personnel 

Management Position Classification Standard Flysheet for Intelligence 

Series GS-0132 June 1960, the classification standard in effect as of 

December 2013, and the I&A Human Capital Standard Operating 

Procedures to obtain basic information about personnel standards and 

operations at I&A. To determine the challenges I&A experienced 

maintaining a skilled workforce, we reviewed correspondence between 

I&A and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence related to 

obtaining excepted service hiring (November 2012-June 2013) and I&Areported data on personnel attrition. To obtain information on intelligence 

analyst hiring needs and practices, we reviewed the I&A memo on career 

ladder decision and hiring standards (November 2012), the DHS 

Competency Assessment Pilot frequently asked questions and 

presentation, and the I&A Recruitment Strategy (January 2010). To 

determine I&A training and development practices and needs we 

reviewed the Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Training Academy Catalog, 

DHS Intelligence Learning Roadmap for Analysts (September 2012), and 

the Analysis 101/BITAC Study Report comparing two alternative 

introductory courses for intelligence analysts prepared for I&A by Booz 

Allen and SAIC (November 2008). We also reviewed the DHS Human 

Resources, Performance Management Program (December 2008), and 

I&A performance competencies to determine I&A’s performance 

management practices. We then compared I&A’s work force planning 

activities with those enumerated in DHS’s Workforce Planning Guide

(November 2012), the DHS document that outlines the process for 

workforce planning at DHS. We also met with representatives from I&A’s 

human capital office, training branch, mission support office, and the 

acting Chief of Staff to discuss human capital recruitment, hiring, training, 

and evaluation practices and procedures.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication in DHS Components’ 

Intelligence Analysis 

Page 46 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis 

Appendix IV provides additional information about our analysis of 

fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in DHS components’ intelligence 

analysis activities. The intelligence analysis activities within DHS are 

inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence 

analysis in support of the same broad intelligence topics. However, on the 

basis of our case study in the area of border security, we did not find 

evidence of unnecessary overlap or duplication among the activities. DHS 

intelligence entities said that implementing the mechanisms to date has 

helped them to minimize such overlap and duplication. 

The intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise are inherently 

fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence analysis in 

support of shared departmental goals. As articulated in the fiscal year 

2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis, three to five DHS 

intelligence components planned to provide intelligence analysis products 

in support of each departmental goal in fiscal year 2012. For example, as 

shown in table 1, five components planned to support the departmental 

goal of Securing and Managing Our Borders through their fiscal year 

2012 intelligence analysis activities. 

Table 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise Planned Contributions to DHS Mission Goals, as Outlined in the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis 

 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Contributionsa

DHS goalb

Office of 

Intelligence 

and Analysis 

U.S. Customs 

and Border 

Protection 

U.S. 

Immigration 

and Customs 

Enforcement 

Transportation 

Security 

Administration 

U.S. Coast 

Guard 

U.S. 

Citizenship 

and 

Immigration 

Service 

Preventing Terrorism and 

Enhancing Security 

 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 

Securing and Managing 

Our Borders 

 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 

Enforcing and 

Administering Our 

Immigration Laws 

 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

Safeguarding and 

Securing Cyberspace 

 ✔ ✔ ✔ 

Ensuring Resilience to 

Disasters 

 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

Source: GAO analysis of fiscal year 2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis. | GAO-14-397 

a

DHS components may conduct additional intelligence analysis activities beyond those reflected in 

the Program of Analysis. Accordingly, the chart may under represent the true intelligence analysis 

contributions of DHS components to the various DHS mission goals. 

Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication in DHS 

Components’ Intelligence Analysis 

Analysis Activities are 

Inherently 

Fragmented 
Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication in DHS Components’ 

Intelligence Analysis 

Page 47 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis 

b

DHS goals as outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. 

Although this creates fragmentation, each entity is providing distinct 

perspectives because of its unique missions and primary customer sets. 

As shown in table 2, I&A focuses on threats to the homeland in general, 

whereas the operational components—such as CBP, ICE, and TSA—

each focus more narrowly on supporting their unique operational missions 

through intelligence analysis. Further, DHS intelligence officials report 

that the primary customers of I&A are DHS leadership and state and local 

partners, whereas the primary customers of the operational components 

are generally internal component customers. 

Table 2: Missions and Customers of DHS Intelligence Analysis Entities 

DHS intelligence 

analysis entity Mission 

Primary customers of 

intelligence analysis 

Secondary customers of 

intelligence analysis 

I&A Office of Analysisa Provide timely, accurate, and relevant 

all-source intelligence analysis of 

threats to the homeland and 

homeland security operations. 

 DHS departmental 

leadership 

 State, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners 

 DHS components

 Intelligence Community 

 Private sector 

 Federal departments and 

agencies 

CBP Office of 

Intelligence and 

Investigative Liaison, 

Analysis Division 

Analyze, produce and disseminate 

tactical and strategic intelligence 

products in support of CBP’s missions

 CBP frontline officers

 CBP national, regional, and 

local offices. 

 External law enforcement, 

including state and local 

partners 

 Intelligence Community 

ICE Homeland Security 

Investigations, Office of 

Intelligence, Analysis 

Division 

Conduct complex strategic-level 

analysis using all-source information 

to positively affect ICE’s worldwide 

investigations and operations 

 ICE

 DHS leadership 

 Other DHS elements

 Intelligence Community 

 Domestic and international 

law enforcement partners 

TSA Office of Intelligence 

and Analysisb Receive, assess, and distribute 

actionable intelligence and vetting 

information related to transportation 

security to arm security professionals 

with timely and relevant information 

needed to prevent/mitigate threats to 

transportation 

 TSA leadership

 TSA field personnel 

 Industry stakeholders 

 DHS leadership

 DHS components 

 Intelligence Community 

 Federal partners 

 Congress 

 State, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners 

United States Coast 

Guardc To provide objective, thorough, 

accurate, timely, usable, relevant 

intelligence about the maritime 

domain; potential threats; and 

adversaries’ capabilities, limitations, 

and intentions 

 U.S. Coast Guard 

leadership 

 U.S. Coast Guard field 

personnel 

 Intelligence Community

 Canadian government 

 State and local fusion 

centers 

USCIS Fraud Detection 

and National Security 

Directorate Intelligence 

Division 

Manage the analysis, production, and 

dissemination of USCIS immigrationrelated intelligence and information 

products 

 USCIS Immigration officers 

 USCIS managers and 

executives 

 Intelligence Community

 Other DHS components 

 Law enforcement agencies 

Source: GAO analysis of component-provided information. | GAO-14-397 
Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication in DHS Components’ 

Intelligence Analysis

Page 48 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

a

Several divisions within I&A’s Office of Analysis conduct intelligence analysis activities, including the 

Border Security Division, the Homeland Counterterrorism Division, and the Cyber Division.

b

Several divisions within TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis conduct intelligence analysis 

activities, including the Intelligence Analysis Division, the Vetting Operations Division, and the Current 

Operations Division.

c

Several entities within the U.S. Coast Guard conduct intelligence analysis activities, including the 

Intelligence Coordination Center, Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, Coast Guard 

Counterintelligence Service, and Area Intelligence Staff.

Despite distinct missions and primary customer sets, some overlap does 

exist in the secondary customers that the six DHS intelligence entities 

serve. For example, as shown in table 2, all six entities reported serving 

the Intelligence Community, and three entities reported serving state and 

local partners as part of their secondary customer sets. In some cases, it 

may be appropriate for multiple entities to be involved in the same 

programmatic or policy area because of the nature or magnitude of the 

federal efforts. For example, having multiple DHS entities contributing 

intelligence analysis to shared departmental goals and serving 

overlapping customers can be beneficial, as it provides a mechanism to 

share and validate information and to facilitate complementary analysis. 

However, fragmentation and overlap may create inefficiencies if 

customers are burdened with too much information or if entities are 

inefficiently using resources to develop duplicate products.

We did not find evidence to suggest that DHS customers were being 

burdened with too much information or that DHS resources were being 

used to develop products that unnecessarily overlapped or were 

duplicative. Specifically, senior intelligence officials from all seven fusion 

centers we contacted said that they had not experienced any instances of 

unnecessary overlap or duplication in the border security–related 

intelligence products they received from various DHS components. 

Further, we did not find any duplicative products among those we 

reviewed in the area of border security that were generated by different 

components. We did identify one instance of overlap where two DHS 

components provided similar information to similar customers in different 

products, but the information was packaged differently such that the 

products were not duplicative. Specifically, we identified one instance 

where I&A and ICE each wrote an intelligence product on a similar 

topic—human smuggling—and for similar customers—DHS leadership 

and the Intelligence Community. Both products discussed the relationship 

between permissive visa policies and the potential for exploitation by 

human-smuggling networks. Further, both products specifically identified 

one particular country as susceptible to exploitation from human 

smugglers due at least in part because of its permissive visa policies.

Our Analysis Showed 

No Unnecessary 

Overlap or 

Duplication among 

Select Products, and 

Customers We 

Interviewed Agreed
Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, 

Overlap, and Duplication in DHS Components’ 

Intelligence Analysis

Page 49 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

However, we determined that the overlapping information was presented 

in a different context in each product. Specifically, the I&A product 

provided a summary graphic depicting the visa permissiveness level of 

each country within a particular region of the world. This provided its 

customers with a snapshot of countries with permissive visa policies and 

a warning that these countries may be more susceptible to exploitation 

from human smugglers than others. This graphic was presented as part 

of I&A’s Border Security Monitor—a quarterly compilation of relevant 

border security intelligence analysis from throughout the enterprise. 

Alternatively, the ICE product was a broader assessment of the factors 

that make certain locations vulnerable to exploitation from human 

smuggling networks. Accordingly, the ICE product provided an analysis of 

the reasons that the specifically identified country may be vulnerable to 

human smuggling, identifying its visa permissiveness policy as just one 

contributing factor.

While our results cannot be generalized beyond the border security 

mission area, our findings support statements from intelligence officials in 

both I&A and the operational components that the content of their 

products differs because of their unique missions and primary customer 

sets and, therefore, are not duplicative, even when the products cover the 

same broad topical area.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 50 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 51 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 52 GAO-14-397 DHS Intelligence Analysis

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant Director), 

Jonathan Bachman, Katherine Davis, Michele Fejfar, Michael Harmond, 

Eric Hauswirth, Katherine Lee, Thomas Lombardi, Bintou Njie, and 

Anthony Pordes made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441101)
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