20030 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 77 / Monday, April 23, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under the provisions 

of § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

As noted earlier, the McDonnell 

Douglas Model DC–10 airplanes 

modified by Canard Aerospace will 

incorporate the Astronautics Electronic 

Flight Information System (EFIS) that 

will perform critical functions. This 

system may be vulnerable to highintensity radiated fields external to the 

airplane. Current airworthiness 

standards of part 25 do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for protecting this equipment from 

adverse effects of HIRF. So this system 

is considered to be a novel or unusual 

design feature. 

Discussion 

As previously stated, there is no 

specific regulation that addresses 

protection for electrical and electronic 

systems from HIRF. Increased power 

levels from radio frequency transmitters 

and the growing use of sensitive 

avionics/electronics and electrical 

systems to command and control 

airplanes have made it necessary to 

provide adequate protection. 

To ensure that a level of safety is 

achieved equivalent to that intended by 

the regulations incorporated by 

reference, special conditions are needed 

for the McDonnell Douglas Model DC–

10 airplanes modified by Canard 

Aerospace Corporation. These special 

conditions require that new avionics/ 

electronics and electrical systems that 

perform critical functions be designed 

and installed to preclude component 

damage and interruption of function 

because of HIRF. 

High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) 

High-power radio frequency 

transmitters for radio, radar, television, 

and satellite communications can 

adversely affect operation of airplane 

electric and electronic systems. 

Therefore, the immunity of critical 

avionics/electronics and electrical 

systems to HIRF must be established. 

Based on surveys and an analysis of 

existing HIRF emitters, an adequate 

level of protection exists when airplane 

system immunity is demonstrated when 

exposed to the HIRF environments in 

either paragraph 1 OR 2 below: 

1. A minimum environment of 100 

volts rms (root-mean-square) per meter 

electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 

GHz. 

a. System elements and their 

associated wiring harnesses must be 

exposed to the environment without 

benefit of airframe shielding. 

b. Demonstration of this level of 

protection is established through system 

tests and analysis. 

2. An environment external to the 

airframe of the field strengths shown in 

the table below for the frequency ranges 

indicated. Immunity to both peak and 

average field strength components from 

the table must be demonstrated. 

Frequency 

Field strength 

(volts per meter) 

Peak Average 

10 kHz–100 kHz ........... 50 50 

100 kHz–500 kHz ......... 50 50 

500 kHz–2 MHz ............ 50 50 

2 MHz–30 MHz ............. 100 100 

30 MHz–70 MHz ........... 50 50 

70 MHz–100 MHz ......... 50 50 

100 MHz–200 MHz ....... 100 100 

200 MHz–400 MHz ....... 100 100 

400 MHz–700 MHz ....... 700 50 

700 MHz–1 GHz ........... 700 100 

1 GHz–2 GHz ............... 2000 200 

2 GHz–4 GHz ............... 3000 200 

4 GHz–6 GHz ............... 3000 200 

6 GHz–8 GHz ............... 1000 200 

8 GHz–12 GHz ............. 3000 300 

12 GHz–18 GHz ........... 2000 200 

18 GHz–40 GHz ........... 600 200 

The field strengths are expressed in terms 

of peak of the root-mean-square (rms) over 

the complete modulation period. 

The environment levels identified 

above are the result of an FAA review 

of existing studies on the subject of 

HIRF and of the work of the 

Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization 

Working Group of the Aviation 

Rulemaking Advisory Committee. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to McDonnell Douglas Model 

DC–10 airplanes modified by Canard 

Aerospace Corporation. Should Canard 

Aerospace apply at a later date for a 

supplemental type certificate to modify 

any other model included on Type 

Certificate No. A22WE to incorporate 

the same or similar novel or unusual 

design feature, these special conditions 

would apply to that model as well 

under provisions of § 21.101. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on 

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–10 

airplanes modified by Canard Aerospace 

Corporation. It is not a rule of general 

applicability and affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

■ The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

■ Therefore, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the supplemental type 

certification basis for the McDonnell 

Douglas Models DC–10–10, 10–15, 10–

30, 10–30F, 10–40, and 10–40F 

airplanes modified by Canard Aerospace 

Corporation. 

1. Protection from Unwanted Effects 

of High-Intensity Radiated Fields 

(HIRF). Each electrical and electronic 

system that performs critical functions 

must be designed and installed to 

ensure that the operation and 

operational capability of these systems 

to perform critical functions are not 

adversely affected when the airplane is 

exposed to high-intensity radiated 

fields. 

2. For the purpose of these special 

conditions, the following definition 

applies: 

Critical Functions: Functions whose 

failure would contribute to or cause a 

failure condition that would prevent 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

airplane. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 16, 

2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–7699 Filed 4–20–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27866; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–055–AD; Amendment 

39–15027; AD 2007–08–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Short 

Brothers Model SD3–60 SHERPA, 

SD3–SHERPA, SD3–30, and SD3–60 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC74 with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 77 / Monday, April 23, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 20031 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

An analysis of the cable operated control 

system installed on the SD3 aircraft types 

that use MS 21260 type end fittings has 

identified a number of potentially unsafe 

conditions due to a combination of failures 

* * *. 

The failure of certain control cables 

could result in the loss of certain critical 

systems. For example, the loss of the 

low pressure (LP) fuel control cable in 

combination with a single failure of a 

fuel condition control cable on the same 

engine can cause the loss of the 

capability to shut down the engine in 

the event of an engine fire. This AD 

requires actions that are intended to 

address the unsafe condition described 

in the MCAI. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective May 

8, 2007. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of May 8, 2007. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by May 23, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

AD, the regulatory evaluation, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–

5227) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1175; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Streamlined Issuance of AD 

The FAA is implementing a new 

process for streamlining the issuance of 

ADs related to MCAI. This streamlined 

process will allow us to adopt MCAI 

safety requirements in a more efficient 

manner and will reduce safety risks to 

the public. This process continues to 

follow all FAA AD issuance processes to 

meet legal, economic, Administrative 

Procedure Act, and Federal Register 

requirements. We also continue to meet 

our technical decision-making 

responsibilities to identify and correct 

unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated 

products. 

This AD references the MCAI and 

related service information that we 

considered in forming the engineering 

basis to correct the unsafe condition. 

The AD contains text copied from the 

MCAI and for this reason might not 

follow our plain language principles. 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the technical agent for 

the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Emergency Airworthiness Directive 

2007–0039-E, dated February 16, 2007 

(referred to after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to 

correct an unsafe condition for the 

specified products. The MCAI states: 

Following the identification of a failed 

propeller RPM (revolutions per minute) cable 

end fitting and an LP (low pressure) fuel 

lever cable end fitting on an SD3 aircraft, 

several subsequent occurrences of control 

cable end fittings (type MS21260) with signs 

of pitting corrosion or cracking have been 

reported to Bombardier Shorts. All reported 

instances being identified during ground 

maintenance inspections on the SD3 fleet. 

Bombardier Shorts have performed 

examinations on the failed cable end fittings 

and established the root cause of failure as 

stress corrosion cracking of the SAE–AISI 

303 stainless steel material they are 

manufactured from, initiated by pitting 

corrosion on the surface. The root cause of 

the stress corrosion is sustained tensile stress 

in a corrosive (warm, humid and salty) 

atmosphere. 

An analysis of the cable operated control 

systems installed on the SD3 aircraft types 

that use MS 21260 type end fittings has 

identified a number of potentially unsafe 

conditions due to a combination of failures 

that may result from this common mode 

cause. 

The failure of certain control cables 

could result in the loss of certain critical 

systems. For example, the loss of the LP 

fuel control cable in combination with 

a single failure of a fuel condition 

control cable on the same engine can 

cause the loss of the capability to shut 

down the engine in the event of an 

engine fire. You may obtain further 

information by examining the MCAI in 

the AD docket. 

Relevant Service Information 

Shorts has issued the following 

service bulletins. The actions described 

in this service information are intended 

to correct the unsafe condition 

identified in the MCAI. 

• Shorts Alert Service Bulletin SD3 

Sherpa–76–A02, Revision 1, dated 

January 24, 2007. 

• Shorts Alert Service Bulletin 

SD330–76–A09, Revision 1, dated 

January 24, 2007. 

• Shorts Alert Service Bulletin SD360 

Sherpa–76–A03, Revision 1, dated 

January 24, 2007. 

• Shorts Alert Service Bulletin 

SD360–76–A12, Revision 1, dated 

January 24, 2007. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are issuing this 

AD because we evaluated all pertinent 

information and determined the unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

Differences Between the AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. 

Any such differences are highlighted in 

a NOTE within the AD. 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC74 with RULES
20032 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 77 / Monday, April 23, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

An unsafe condition exists that 

requires the immediate adoption of this 

AD. The FAA has found that the risk to 

the flying public justifies waiving notice 

and comment prior to adoption of this 

rule because of the number of control 

cable assemblies that were deemed not 

to be airworthy when evaluated against 

specific inspection criteria. Therefore, 

we determined that notice and 

opportunity for public comment before 

issuing this AD are impracticable and 

that good cause exists for making this 

amendment effective in fewer than 30 

days. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not precede it by notice and 

opportunity for public comment. We 

invite you to send any written relevant 

data, views, or arguments about this AD. 

Send your comments to an address 

listed under the ADDRESSES section. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2007–27866; 

Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–055–

AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. 

We specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this AD. We will consider all comments 

received by the closing date and may 

amend this AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2007–08–09 Short Brothers PLC: 

Amendment 39–15027. Docket No. 

FAA–2007–27866; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–055–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective May 8, 2007. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all Shorts Model 

SD3–60 SHERPA, SD3–SHERPA, SD3–30, 

and SD3–60 airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

Subject 

(d) Engine controls. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continued airworthiness 

information (MCAI) states: 

Following the identification of a failed 

propeller RPM (revolutions per minute) cable 

end fitting and an LP (low pressure) fuel 

lever cable end fitting on an SD3 aircraft, 

several subsequent occurrences of control 

cable end fittings (type MS21260) with signs 

of pitting corrosion or cracking have been 

reported to Bombardier Shorts. All reported 

instances being identified during ground 

maintenance inspections on the SD3 fleet. 

Bombardier Shorts have performed 

examinations on the failed cable end fittings 

and established the root cause of failure as 

stress corrosion cracking of the SAE–AISI 

303 stainless steel material they are 

manufactured from, initiated by pitting 

corrosion on the surface. The root cause of 

the stress corrosion is sustained tensile stress 

in a corrosive (warm, humid and salty) 

atmosphere. 

An analysis of the cable operated control 

systems installed on the SD3 aircraft types 

that use MS 21260 type end fittings has 

identified a number of potentially unsafe 

conditions due to a combination of failures 

that may result from this common mode 

cause. 

The failure of certain control cables could 

result in the loss of certain critical systems. 

For example, the loss of the low pressure (LP) 

fuel control cable in combination with a 

single failure of a fuel condition control cable 

on the same engine can cause the loss of the 

capability to shut down the engine in the 

event of an engine fire. 

Actions and Compliance 

(f) Unless already done, do the following 

actions. 

(1) Within 30 days after the effective date 

of this AD, inspect the affected cable 

assembly end fittings in accordance with the 

applicable service bulletin specified in Table 

1 of this AD. 

(2) If no pitting/corrosion or cracking is 

found, within 12 months after the inspection 

required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, and 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 

months, repeat the inspection of the cable 

assembly end fittings in accordance with the 

applicable service bulletin specified in Table 

1 of this AD. Replacing the cable assembly 

with a new cable assembly in accordance 

with the applicable service bulletin 

terminates the repetitive inspection intervals 

of this paragraph for the replaced cable 

assembly. 

(3) When pitting/corrosion or cracking is 

found during any inspection required by this 

AD, before further flight, replace the affected 

cable assembly with a new cable assembly in 

accordance with the applicable service 

bulletin specified in Table 1 of this AD. 

(4) After any replacement done in 

accordance with paragraph (f)(2) or (f)(3) of 

this AD, repeat the inspection required by 

paragraph (f)(1) of this AD for the replaced 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 77 / Monday, April 23, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 20033 

cable assembly at intervals not to exceed 180 

months. 

(5) Do the actions in paragraphs (f)(1), 

(f)(2), (f)(3), and (f)(4) of this AD in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of the applicable Shorts Alert 

Service Bulletin listed in Table 1 of this AD. 

TABLE 1.—SERVICE BULLETINS FOR APPLICABLE ACTIONS

Shorts Alert Service Bulletin Revision level Date 

SD3 Sherpa–76–A02 .................................................................................................................................. 1 January 24, 2007. 

SD330–76–A09 ........................................................................................................................................... 1 January 24, 2007. 

SD360 Sherpa–76–A03 .............................................................................................................................. 1 January 24, 2007. 

SD360–76–A12 ........................................................................................................................................... 1 January 24, 2007. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/ 

or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(g) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Todd Thompson, 

Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, 

ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 

227–1175; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using 

any AMOC approved in accordance with 

§ 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC 

applies, notify the appropriate principal 

inspector in the FAA Flight Standards 

Certificate Holding District Office. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

has approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) Emergency 

Airworthiness Directive 2007–0039–E, dated 

February 16, 2007, and the Shorts service 

information listed in Table 2 of this AD. 

TABLE 2.—RELATED INFORMATION

Shorts Alert Service Bulletin Revision level Date 

SD3 Sherpa–76–A02 .................................................................................................................................. 1 January 24, 2007. 

SD330–76–A09 ........................................................................................................................................... 1 January 24, 2007. 

SD360 Sherpa–76–A03 .............................................................................................................................. 1 January 24, 2007. 

SD360–76–A12 ........................................................................................................................................... 1 January 24, 2007. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use the service information 

specified in Table 3 of this AD to do the 

actions required by this AD, unless the AD 

specifies otherwise. 

TABLE 3.—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Shorts Alert Service Bulletin Page No. Revision level Date 

SD3 Sherpa–76–A02 .................................................................................................... 1, 6 ................... 1 ....................... January 24, 2007. 

2–5, 7–16 ......... Original ............. January 10, 2007. 

SD330–76–A09 ............................................................................................................. 1, 6 ................... 1 ....................... January 24, 2007. 

2–5, 7–19 ......... Original ............. January 10, 2007. 

SD360 Sherpa–76–A03 ................................................................................................ 1, 6 ................... 1 ....................... January 24, 2007. 

2–5, 7–16 ......... Original ............. January 10, 2007. 

SD360–76–A12 ............................................................................................................. 1, 6 ................... 1 ....................... January 24, 2007. 

2–5, 7–16 ......... Original ............. January 10, 2007. 


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20034 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 77 / Monday, April 23, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Short Brothers, 

Airworthiness & Engineering Quality, P.O. 

Box 241, Airport Road, Belfast BT3 9DZ, 

Northern Ireland. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 6, 

2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–7118 Filed 4–20–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Office of the Secretary 

14 CFR Parts 204 and 399 

[Docket No. OST–2003–15759] 

RIN 2105–AD25 

Review of Data Filed by Certificated or 

Commuter Air Carriers To Support 

Continuing Fitness Determinations 

Involving Citizenship Issues 

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Department is adopting 

its proposed editorial changes to its 

rules on Data to Support Fitness 

Determinations, 14 CFR part 204, and 

has determined to maintain its existing 

procedures for conducting reviews of 

the continuing fitness of air carriers. 

These actions complete this rulemaking. 

The Department had earlier withdrawn 

a proposal made in this rulemaking to 

modify the Department’s standards for 

determining whether carriers remain 

under the actual control of U.S. citizens. 

EFFECTIVE DATE: The rule is effective 

May 23, 2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William M. Bertram, Chief, Air Carrier 

Fitness Division (X–56), Office of 

Aviation Analysis, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., 

Washington, DC 20590; (202) 366–9721. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Introduction 

By statute, only citizens of the United 

States may obtain and hold certificate 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 41102 or 

41103 authorizing them to provide air 

transportation within the United States 

or operate as a U.S. air carrier on 

international routes. The statutory 

citizenship requirements require that at 

least 75 percent of the voting interest of 

a U.S. air carrier be owned and 

controlled by U.S. citizens, that the 

president and two-thirds of the board of 

directors and managing officers be U.S. 

citizens, and that U.S. carriers be subject 

to the actual control of U.S. citizens. 49 

U.S.C. 40102(a)(15). In this proceeding, 

we invited public comment on three 

matters related to our consideration of 

citizenship issues: (i) We proposed 

technical changes to our rules governing 

citizenship and fitness determinations, 

14 CFR part 204; (ii) we considered 

whether we should modify our 

procedures for reviewing whether a 

carrier is complying with the continuing 

citizenship requirement; and (iii) we 

proposed to modify the standards used 

for determining whether a carrier is 

actually controlled by U.S. citizens. We 

have withdrawn the proposal to modify 

our standards on actual control. 71 FR 

71106 (December 8, 2006). In this final 

rule, we are resolving the other two 

matters. We are adopting the proposed 

technical changes to part 204, and we 

explain why we have decided to 

continue following our procedural 

practices in continuing fitness cases. 

Background 

We examine carrier citizenship 

primarily in two situations. First, when 

a firm applies for authority to operate as 

a U.S. carrier, we conduct an initial 

fitness review, which necessarily 

includes a review of the carrier’s 

citizenship. We conduct initial fitness 

reviews through docketed proceedings, 

where a public record of the pleadings 

is maintained; we publish all 

Department decisions in the case; and 

we give interested persons an 

opportunity to comment on the 

application. Second, we conduct a 

continuing fitness review if an existing 

carrier undergoes a substantial change 

in ownership, operations, or 

management. We usually conduct 

continuing fitness investigations 

without a public proceeding and 

therefore do not create a docket 

containing record material, publish a 

final decision, or provide an 

opportunity for public comment. In 

some continuing fitness cases, we may 

decide to use more formal public 

procedures. See 71 FR 26426–26427. 

Rulemaking Notices 

We issued a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed to 

update our interpretation of actual 

control and to continue using our 

informal procedures in most continuing 

fitness reviews. 70 FR 67389 (November 

7, 2005). We also proposed changes to 

part 204 to correct minor typographical 

errors, update statutory references, and 

clarify some language. 70 FR 67395. We 

thereafter issued a Supplemental Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) to 

address the comments made on the 

NPRM, and to propose additional 

refinements to our proposed 

modification of our actual control 

standard. 71 FR 26425 (May 5, 2006). 

We again proposed to continue using 

our informal procedures in most 

continuing fitness reviews. 

In the NPRM and SNPRM, we stated 

that we had tentatively determined to 

continue using the same informal 

procedures for continuing fitness 

reviews that we have always used. 71 

FR 26436; 70 FR 67392. We believed 

that significant potential harm could 

result if we made all substantial foreign 

investment cases subject to public 

notice and comment, and that using 

public proceedings in all significant 

cases appeared to be unnecessary for the 

protection of interested persons. We 

stated that we would have the option of 

beginning a public proceeding in any 

case if we found that doing so would be 

useful. 71 FR 26436. 

Comments 

The comments on the NPRM and 

SNPRM focused on our proposed 

change to our standard for defining 

when U.S. citizens had actual control of 

a U.S. carrier. None of the commenters 

opposed our proposed changes to part 

204. While several commenters 

discussed the procedural issues in their 

responses to our NPRM, only 

Continental commented in any detail on 

our SNPRM’s proposed decision to 

continue using informal procedures in 

most continuing fitness reviews. 

Continental asserted that the informal 

procedures enable us to resolve 

citizenship matters after negotiating 

only with the carrier and its foreign 

investors, not with other persons 

affected by the transaction. Continental 

Comments at 9. 

Decision on Procedures 

We have determined to continue 

following our existing procedures for 

continuing fitness reviews for the 

reasons stated in our earlier notices. We 

can, of course, always choose to use 

public procedures in any continuing 

fitness review, and interested persons 

have the right to ask us to do so. See 71 

FR 26436. 


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