The Campaign

 of 1812

The U.S. Army Campaigns

of the War of 1812
Cover: The American Soldier, 1812

by H. Charles McBarron

(U.S. Army Art Collection) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

CMH Pub 74–2
•••

The Campaign of 1812

by

Steven J. Rauch

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Center of Military History

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 2013

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•••

Introduction

The War of 1812 is perhaps the United States’ least known conflict. Other than Andrew Jackson’s 1815 victory at New Orleans and 

Francis Scott Key’s poem “The Star-Spangled Banner” written in 

1814 during the British attack on Baltimore, most Americans know 

little about the country’s second major war. Its causes are still debated 

by historians today. Great Britain’s impressment of American sailors, 

its seizure of American ships on the high seas, and suspected British 

encouragement of Indian opposition to further American settlement 

on the western frontier all contributed to America’s decision to declare 

war against Great Britain in June 1812.

None of these factors, however, adequately explain why President James Madison called for a war the country was ill-prepared to 

wage. Moreover, the war was quite unpopular from the start. Many 

Federalists—chiefly in the New England states—opposed an armed 

conflict with Great Britain, continued to trade with the British, and 

even met in convention to propose secession from the Union. Some 

members of the president’s own Republican Party objected to the 

war’s inevitable costs and questionable objectives, such as the conquest of Canada.

To declare war was one thing, but to prosecute it successfully was 

a different matter. Much of the story of the War of 1812 is about 

the unpreparedness of America’s Army and Navy at the conflict’s 

outset, and the enormous difficulties the new nation faced in raising 

troops, finding competent officers, and supplying its forces. Most 

of America’s military leaders were inexperienced and performed 

poorly, particularly in the first two years of war. Only gradually did 

better leaders rise to the top to command the more disciplined and 

well-trained units that America eventually fielded. But despite costly 

initial setbacks, by the time the fighting stopped American arms had 

won key victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and New Orleans 

under excellent officers such as Winfield Scott, Jacob Brown, and 

Andrew Jackson. Although the United States achieved few of its 

political objectives in the War of 1812, its Regular Army emerged 

more professional, better led, and fit to take its place as the foundation of America’s national defenses.
•••• 6 ••••

I encourage all Army leaders and soldiers to read this pamphlet 

and the others in our series of campaign pamphlets in commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812. We can all profit from 

greater knowledge about the beginnings of our Army: an Army forged 

in victory and defeat during what has often been called the second 

war of American independence.

RICHARD W. STEWART

Chief Historian
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•••

The Campaign of 1812

In June 1812, the United States invoked the war powers of the 

Constitution for the first time and declared war against Great Britain. 

The three-year conflict between the United States and Great Britain, 

known as the War of 1812, had its origins in periodic, yet persistent, 

confrontations between the two nations throughout the first decade 

of the nineteenth century. For many years, Great Britain had been 

embroiled in a desperate struggle against Napoleonic France. In 

its effort to cut France off from maritime trade, Britain had demonstrated little concern for the rights or sovereignty of neutral nations such as the United States. Unfortunately, the British blockade 

seriously damaged American trade and provoked constant friction 

on the seas. Britain’s naval supremacy enabled it to seize American 

ships and take crew members believed to be Royal Navy deserters 

who had taken employment on American vessels. Britain did not 

recognize naturalized citizenship and enforced a doctrine that once 

a British subject, always a British subject. It is estimated that Britain 

impressed ten thousand Americans during its decades-long struggle 

against France. The repeated clashes over Britain’s aggressive maritime policies and its support for Indians hostile to the United States 

on the young nation’s western and southern frontiers all contributed 

to the outbreak of war.

Strategic Setting

Because the small size of the U.S. Navy precluded an effective 

naval response to British actions on the high seas, President James 

Madison decided to seize Canada as a way to obtain redress. Americans had several reasons to expect that a campaign against Canada 

would have a favorable outcome. The most obvious was that British military forces were fully engaged in fighting France and could 

divert minimal resources to North America. A second advantage 

was that U.S. forces would be close to their supply bases, while the 

British would be fighting an ocean away from home, further straining their already taxed logistical capability. The third advantage 

was demographic. The United States had a population around 
•••• 8 ••••

7.7 million, while Canada’s 

numbered nearly 500,000. Furthermore, many Canadians were 

of questionable loyalty, being 

of either French or American 

descent. Based on these considerations, many believed a U.S. 

victory was inevitable. 

The U.S. Army in 1812

Whether the United States 

could fulfill its high expectations 

depended less on lofty aspirations than on the actual strength 

of its military forces, and here 

there were reasons for concern. 

In 1811, the U.S. Army consisted 

of a small corps of engineers; 

seven infantry regiments; and one 

regiment each of rifles, dragoons, 

artillery, and light artillery. The 

light artillery regiment was to 

be a mobile formation, but as a 

cost-saving measure, the government had sold its horses in 1808. 

The rest of the Army also suffered from a chronic manpower 

shortage, having just fifty-five hundred men under arms with another 

forty-five hundred positions vacant. 

As the prospect for war grew imminent, Congress enacted several expansions. By June 1812, the authorized strength of the Army 

had grown to 35,603 men organized into twenty-five regiments of 

infantry, four of artillery (including the now remounted regiment of 

light artillery), two of dragoons, the rifle regiment, six companies of 

rangers, and various engineer and ordnance troops. In actuality, only 

6,744 soldiers were on active service, scattered mostly in small detachments along the extensive frontier at such places as Fort Mackinac, 

on a small island at the straits of Lakes Michigan and Huron; Fort 

Dearborn, near present-day Chicago; and at trading centers such as 

Fort Osage, Missouri Territory, and Fort Hawkins, Georgia. In order 

to fill the ranks, the government offered a signing bonus of $16 for 

a five-year term of service, but few were willing to enlist for such a 

James Madison

by John Vanderlyn 

(White House Historical 

Association) •••••••••••••••
•••• 9 ••••

long time. Desperate to attract recruits, Congress reduced the length 

of service, added more financial incentives, and banned the practice 

of flogging. Despite all of these measures, the government failed to 

bring the desired number of men into the Regular Army. 

One of the reasons that the Regular Army failed to draw recruits 

was that many men preferred the shorter enlistments and the attractive financial incentives offered by their home state militias. The War 

Department estimated that 719,449 militiamen were available for active service. In the spring of 1812, Congress authorized the president 

to ask the states to provide 30,000 federal volunteers for one-year’s 

service drawn from their militias. It also permitted the president to 

call on the states to mobilize as many as 100,000 militiamen for up 

to six months of federal service. The numbers were impressive but 

deceiving, for most of the militia was poorly trained and equipped. 

Militia leadership was equally haphazard, with many state officers 

owing their rank to social status, political patronage, or popularity, 

as some units elected their officers. In short, the militia was a weak 

foundation upon which to base a national mobilization.

Issues of regionalism and politics also affected mobilization. The 

strongest support for the war came from those areas with the fewest 

resources to sustain it, namely, the South and the West. States in the 

Northeast were better situated for the conflict, but their support was 

less than wholehearted. When Republican President Madison issued 

his call for militia, several of the New England states, where the Federalist Party was strong, refused to supply troops on the grounds that 

Madison’s intended purpose did not meet the missions authorized in 

Article 1, Section 8, of the United States Constitution “to execute 

the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.” 

Some state courts ruled that the federal government did not have the 

authority to require militia to cross international borders to fight 

outside the United States, reserving that decision exclusively to the 

commander of a state’s militia. As a result of these legal challenges, 

the federal government would experience difficulty in raising militia 

forces from the Northeast throughout much of the war. 

Getting men into the ranks was only the start of the government’s 

problems. Feeding, equipping, training, and moving the Army likewise posed daunting obstacles, particularly given the rudimentary 

transportation network that existed along the frontier with Canada. 

Nor did the Army have the bureaucratic infrastructure to wrestle 

with the burgeoning issues of mobilizing and sustaining a wartime 

force. In 1812, the entire War Department consisted of Secretary 

of War William Eustis and eight clerks. Eustis had been a surgeon 
•••• 10 ••••

during the Revolutionary War 

and was later elected to the 

House of Representatives. President Thomas Jefferson had appointed him secretary of war in 

1809 because he was a staunch 

member of the Republican Party. 

His military and bureaucratic 

skills were limited.

In March 1812, Congress 

attempted to rectify some of the 

Army’s administrative deficiencies 

by establishing the positions of 

quartermaster general and commissary general of purchases. 

Then in May, the legislature created an Ordnance Department to 

develop weapons and equipment 

and to address the deplorable condition of military stores. As many 

as one in five of the Army’s weapons were inoperable, and much of 

its ammunition had been procured 

in 1795. Shortages of everything from tents and shoes to medicine and 

other items likewise existed. Unfortunately, without central direction, 

the quartermaster general, commissary general, chief of ordnance, 

and various contractors would often compete for the same resources, 

adding further chaos to the Army’s primitive logistical system. 

The Army’s senior officer in 1812, Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, 

had a stellar record of service during the Revolutionary War, serving 

in all major battles in the northern theater, including Bunker Hill, 

Saratoga, Monmouth, and Yorktown. He had aligned himself with 

the Republican Party, and when Jefferson had become president in 

1801, he had appointed Dearborn as secretary of war. Dearborn, who 

had served in that office until Eustis replaced him in March 1809, 

had been thoroughly involved during his tenure with reducing Army 

force structure under Jefferson’s Military Peace Establishment Act 

of 1802. Although considered the nominal commander of the U.S. 

Army, Dearborn lacked the statutory authority and the staff to fully 

oversee Army operations, and, like Eustis, he was overwhelmed by 

the crush of responsibilities incumbent with mobilizing and guiding 

the national war effort. 

William Eustis,

by Walter M. Brackett

(U.S. Army Art Collection)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 11 ••••

As for the officer corps, it 

was as unprepared for what lay 

ahead as the rest of American 

military establishment. If most 

militia and volunteer officers 

were rank amateurs who owed 

their posts to their political and 

social connections, then the officers of the Regular Army were 

not much better. The nation’s 

small Regular Army was a backwater in American society that 

did not necessarily attract the 

finest talent, while the Jefferson 

and Madison administrations 

had often applied a political 

litmus test in selecting officers. 

A glimmer of professionalism 

existed among a few individuals, 

but these were the exceptions 

to the rule. Perhaps the Army’s 

best hope for the future, the U.S. 

Military Academy at West Point, 

New York, was by 1812 barely ten 

years old and had produced just 120 graduates, of whom 99 would 

serve in the war, mostly in junior positions. As for the rest, one of the 

nation’s more gifted military leaders, Lt. Col. Winfield Scott, claimed 

that the older officers had “very generally sunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking,” while the new officers 

were for the most part “course and ignorant men . . . swaggerers . . . 

decayed gentlemen, and others—‘fit for nothing else,’ which always 

turned out utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever.”

British Forces in North America

Opposing the United States was one of the strongest military 

and economic powers in the world. The British army had nearly one 

hundred thousand men in service in 1812 and could draw replacements and reinforcements from a population of eighteen million. 

Most of Britain’s resources were tied up in the war against Napoleon, so for the time being, very little assistance could be spared for 

the defense of Canada. In 1812, there were about fifty-five hundred 

British regulars in Canada, with about twelve hundred of those 

Henry Dearborn,

by Walter M. Brackett

(U.S. Army Art Collection)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 12 ••••

in Upper Canada (present-day 

Ontario). Backing them were 

contingents of Canadian militia 

who, much as their American 

counterparts, were of questionable effectiveness. During the 

war, the provinces of Upper and 

Lower Canada would provide 

about ten thousand militiamen. 

Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost 

served as the Captain General 

and Governor in Chief of British North America, an office that 

combined both civil and military 

functions. Prevost had entered 

the army in 1784 and distinguished himself as a competent 

leader. In 1808 he was promoted 

to lieutenant general, and in 

1811 he became the governor of 

British North America. As war 

loomed, he judiciously managed his limited resources by improving 

the state of the Canadian militia and by raising several provincial units 

for long-term service. More importantly, he protected the vital rivers 

and lakes that formed his lines of communications and support by 

improving fortifications and by constructing armed vessels. Prevost 

initially feared the United States would attack either Montreal or 

Quebec, so he concentrated his slim forces for the defense of those 

points. He wanted to avoid decisive engagements with the Americans 

and hoped the war would be solved through diplomatic means before 

military action could begin. 

Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock assisted Prevost as lieutenant governor and military commander of Upper Canada. He had been a 

soldier since he was sixteen years old and commanded a regiment 

at twenty-eight. When he arrived in Canada in 1802, he found an 

army with low morale, poor discipline, inadequate supplies, and 

strained relations with the citizens. Brock’s dominating personality 

enabled him to resolve many of the problems. The British soldiers 

soon realized they could expect strict but fair treatment from him 

and discipline soon improved. After ten years in Canada, Brock 

had become thoroughly familiar with the people, the geography, 

and his responsibilities. 

Isaac Brock •••••••••••••••
•••• 13 ••••

The British hoped to offset 

their limited manpower through 

an alliance with the Indian nations residing in Upper Canada 

and adjoining U.S. territories. The 

most influential Indian leader was 

Tecumseh, a Shawnee who had 

fought the Americans at the battle 

of Fallen Timbers in 1794. In the 

years leading up to the war, Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa, known as the Prophet, had 

attempted to form a confederacy 

of Indian nations to oppose further American settlement in the 

Northwest. The Prophet preached 

a return to Indian values and the 

renunciation of white civilization. 

The brothers believed that land 

belonged to all Indians in common and could not be ceded by 

individual tribes in treaties with 

America without the consent of 

all the nations. During the War of 1812, many Indians supported the 

British war aim of attaining an independent Indian buffer state in order 

to halt further American incursion into the Northwest Territory. The 

British welcomed Tecumseh’s leadership and determination to fight in 

an alliance against their common enemy. 

U.S. Strategy

The initial U.S. military strategy was relatively simple. The U.S. 

Army would invade and conquer Canada, while the U.S. Navy would 

take to the seas to harass British commercial shipping. An offensive to 

seize Montreal via Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River offered 

the shortest route into the most vital part of the enemy’s territory. The 

capture of Montreal would cut British lines of communications along 

the St. Lawrence River to Upper Canada, thus severing at one stroke 

British control of everything to the west, including Lakes Erie and Ontario. President Madison favored this approach, since it would simplify 

logistical support. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army was scattered along a 

vast frontier from the Great Lakes to New Orleans and to concentrate 

it in one location would take time and expose American settlements to 

Color version

of Benson J. Lossing’s 

portrait of Tecumseh

•••••••••••••••
•••• 14 ••••

British or Indian attacks. The most immediate forces available to seize 

Montreal were the militias of the northeastern states. However, as New 

England and parts of New York were the centers of Federalist opposition to the war, little support for such an offensive could be expected. 

Given the above calculus, General Dearborn proposed that the 

United States invade Canada at three points simultaneously. In the 

Northwest, an army at Detroit in Michigan Territory would invade 

western Upper Canada to disrupt British influence with the Indians 

and deny the British access to the upper Great Lakes. A central offensive would be aimed at Upper Canada in the Niagara River region 

to cut access between Lakes Erie and Ontario and to suppress any 

Indian involvement on that frontier. Finally, a northeastern offensive 

into Lower Canada would be aimed at cutting the St. Lawrence River 

between Lake Ontario and Montreal, with the capture of Montreal 

being the ultimate objective. Dearborn believed this three-pronged 

strategy would so stretch Prevost’s limited resources that he would 

be unable to oppose the advancing columns effectively at all points. 

Dearborn’s strategy of multiple operations along an extensive 

and remote frontier required the ability to synchronize operations 

so as to bring resources to bear simultaneously at all points. If on 

the other hand the operations were to occur sequentially, the British 

might be able to shift their forces to defeat each column individually. 

Furthermore, only by controlling the Great Lakes and its adjacent 

waterways would the United States be able to easily project, sustain, 

and communicate with its military spearheads. Unfortunately, the 

United States did not possess a naval organization on the Great Lakes 

with which to control those vital waterways. As a result, supplying 

forces in remote theaters, such as Detroit or northern New York, 

would present a complex logistics problem for which no one in the 

War Department had any previous experience. In short, General 

Dearborn’s grand plan stood on shaky legs. Furthermore, once he 

had submitted it, Dearborn left the task of coordinating the three 

American armies to Eustis, and concerned himself only with the army 

under his personal command in the Northeast.

Operations

The Northwest Campaign and the Surrender of Detroit, April–

August 1812

Although intended to be a coordinated effort in which U.S. 

forces advanced against Canada on three fronts simultaneously, the 

westernmost American army moved first, alone and unsupported. 
•••• 15 ••••

The Michigan Territory held 

strategic importance because it 

bordered on the Northwest Indian 

nations and the western section of 

Upper Canada. The territory had 

a population of about forty-seven 

hundred white inhabitants, many 

of French descent, living near 

Detroit and the western shore of 

Lake Erie south to the Maumee 

River Rapids, at present-day Toledo, Ohio. In 1812, the territory 

was ill-prepared for war, protected 

by a small militia battalion, one 

company of the 1st U.S. Infantry commanded by Capt. John 

Whistler, and a detachment of 

the Corps of U.S. Artillery with 

twenty-three artillery pieces at 

Fort Detroit. (See Map 1.)

In the spring of 1812, the 

War Department decided to improve the military situation by 

raising a force in Ohio, designated the Northwestern Army, and 

by sending it to Detroit where it 

would be available in the event 

of war. Normally the most expedient way to travel to Detroit was 

via Lake Erie to the Detroit River. However, since the United States 

did not possess the naval forces to protect water transportation, the 

Northwestern Army had to march overland through a wilderness 

into a logistically austere theater of operations. 

President Madison asked Revolutionary War veteran William 

Hull to command the Northwestern Army. Hull had fought in several Revolutionary War battles, including Monmouth and the attack 

on Stony Point. He had ended the war as a lieutenant colonel in the 

Continental Army. In 1805, President Jefferson had appointed Hull 

governor of the Michigan Territory. As war with Britain became imminent, Madison offered Hull a commission as a brigadier general to 

command U.S. forces in the region. Hull at first declined the appointment, but after an alternate commander became ill, he reluctantly 

accepted the command on 3 April 1812.

William Hull,

by Rembrandt Peale

(Colonial Society of 

Massachusetts)

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River Aux Canard 16 Jul

2 Jul

25 Jun

7 Jun

30 Jun

12 Jul

4 Jul

1 Jun

Maumee R

Miami R

Sciato R

River Raisin Detroit R

Sandusky R

Lake

St. Clair

L A K E E R I E

Portage R

Maumee River Rapids

Fort Deance

Fort Wayne

Fort Findlay

Fort Amherstburg

Fort Miami

Urbana

Dayton

Frenchtown

Brownstown

Sandwich

Detroit

Spring Wells

I N D I A N A T E R R I T O R Y

O H I O

M I C H I G A N

T E R R I T O R Y

O L D N O R T H W E S T

OPERATIONAL AREA

April–July 1812

0 25 50

Miles

U.S. Movement

Battle Site

Map 1
•••• 17 ••••

Hull had a firm grasp of the military situation and cautioned 

Eustis and Madison about the challenges of invading Canada. In 

a letter to Eustis on 6 March 1812, Hull stated that the British held 

the strategic and tactical advantage in resources and geographic 

position. His greatest fear was from the Indians, particularly 

those living along the western shore of Lake Erie astride his line 

of communications between Detroit and Ohio. Hull believed the 

situation could be improved only if sufficient effort was made to 

gain control of the Great Lakes through an ambitious shipbuilding program. Unable to influence Eustis or Madison of the risks 

involved in their plans, he agreed to try to accomplish the mission 

without naval support.

Madison’s orders to Hull included several specific tasks. First, 

Hull had to provide security to the Michigan Territory. Next, in 

the event of war, he would invade Upper Canada to remove British 

influence over the Indians. Last, Hull was to take control of Lake 

Erie bordering Canada and cooperate with any other U.S. forces sent 

to operate in that theater. To accomplish these objectives, Secretary 

of War Eustis asked Governor Return Jonathan Meigs of Ohio to 

provide 1,200 volunteers from his state militia. Meigs appointed 

Duncan McArthur, James Findlay, and Lewis Cass, none of whom 

had significant military experience, as colonels of the regiments, each 

comprising about 400 to 500 men. Hull also received the veterans 

of Tippecanoe, 275 men of the 4th U.S. Infantry commanded by 

Lt. Col. James Miller, stationed at Vincennes. In addition, he had 

a light cavalry troop and a detachment of rangers and scouts. 

The militiamen rendezvoused at Dayton, Ohio, during April and 

May and quickly demonstrated how little experience they had with 

military life. Their weapons were in such poor condition that army 

quartermaster James Taylor organized artificers with a traveling 

forge to repair their weapons on the march. Before the army began 

its march, Hull sent out scouts who reported that the Indians and the 

British were aware of his preparations. The absence of operational 

security would plague Hull throughout the campaign. 

The geography of the theater dictated in large measure how the 

Northwestern Army could move and be sustained. The territory was 

vast, with primitive forests, deep swamps, marshes, and rivers. It was 

sparsely populated, with an average of only six persons per square 

mile in a band of territory seventy-five miles along the fringes of the 

frontier. This lack of settlement meant that the army had to depend 

on supplies obtained hundreds of miles away in southern Ohio or 

western Pennsylvania. After supplies were stockpiled at magazines, 
•••• 18 ••••

usually at the last town near the frontier, the problem then became 

transporting them to the army in a timely manner.

The Northwestern Army began its march for Detroit on 1 June, 

seventeen days before Congress declared war. At Urbana, Ohio, the 

4th U.S. Infantry joined the column. The militia’s dislike of military 

discipline became manifest during an incident in which the men of 

one company refused to march any farther until they were paid. Hull 

ordered some regulars to use their bayonets to prod the recalcitrant 

unit along. The stern demeanor of the regulars was sufficient to induce the militiamen to march, whereby Hull told Miller, “By God, 

sir, your regiment is a powerful argument. Without it I could not 

march these volunteers to Detroit.” 

As it moved, the army cut a crude road through the heavily 

forested country. The militia regiments provided the pioneers, who 

worked ahead of the main army cutting a path fifteen to twenty 

feet wide through heavy timber. As with most nineteenth century 

armies, the Northwestern Army carried a great deal of impedimenta, 

requiring one hundred twenty teams of horses. The army’s wagons 

carried fourteen thousand pounds of flour and drovers herded three 

hundred head of cattle for food. Adding to the logistical burden were 

the many servants, wives, children, contractors, and other civilians 

who followed the army. 

To secure and extend his supply line, Hull’s men built blockhouses 

every twenty miles or so to serve as magazines for storing and issuing supplies. This preparation was necessary since the column was 

moving almost two hundred miles beyond cultivated areas and thus 

could not count on obtaining forage along the route. Hull garrisoned 

these posts with sick and invalid soldiers, a process that so reduced 

his force that he wrote to Eustis asking for more militiamen to protect 

his line of communications. 

Poor weather, accidents, and injuries also hindered the march. 

Constant rain created mud that mired wagons and caused horses to 

drop dead from exhaustion. Despite these difficulties, the army still 

managed to advance an average nine and a half miles per day. By the 

time the army reached Fort Findlay on 25 June, the baggage wagons 

could not keep pace. The horses were tired, and forage was so scarce 

that the food allowance for the horses and oxen had to be reduced. To 

add to the challenges, Hull received constant dispatches from Eustis 

urging him to reach Detroit as soon as possible. 

While the Americans were conducting this movement, the British were not idle. The main base for British operations in the region 

was Fort Amherstburg, on the southeast bank of the Detroit River, 
•••• 19 ••••

where it commanded the waterway used to travel to Detroit. Lt. Col. 

Thomas B. St. George commanded the garrison, which numbered 

about three hundred regulars of the 41st Foot and Royal Newfoundland Infantry Fencibles. In addition, he had about eight hundred fifty 

militia and four hundred Indians from various tribes. The militiamen, 

were of uncertain loyalty because many were American expatriates, 

or related to U.S. citizens. Adding to Fort Amherstburg’s strategic 

significance was the fact that it was a major naval construction yard, 

producing such vessels as the gun brig General Hunter, the sloop-ofwar Queen Charlotte, and the schooner Lady Prevost. The fort also 

hosted the headquarters of the British Indian Department, which had 

responsibility for coordinating diplomatic, military, and economic 

relations with regional Indians, as well as providing annual gifts of 

food, clothing, and weapons. U.S. officials saw Fort Amherstburg as 

a major obstacle to American control of the Northwest. 

As the Northwestern Army advanced, Hull’s scouts reported 

large Indian encampments near Brownstown, Michigan Territory, 

and Fort Amherstburg. On 30 June, Hull reached the Maumee River 

Rapids and encamped near the Fallen Timbers battlefield, the scene 

of General Anthony Wayne’s victory over the Indians on 20 August 

1794. The army crossed the Maumee River the next day by fording 

and by boat.

In order to comply with Eustis’ prodding to get to Detroit quickly, 

General Hull arranged for the small unarmed schooner Cuyahoga to 

take medical supplies, the sick, and some officers’ wives to Detroit via 

water. Someone placed Hull’s official papers on the vessel, including 

the army’s muster rolls and his correspondence with the secretary 

of war. On 1 July, Cuyahoga sailed north into the Detroit River and 

past the guns of Fort Amherstburg. St. George had received notice 

on 30 June that war had been declared, so he sent a small gunboat 

to capture Cuyahoga. Hull’s correspondence, which gave complete 

insight into the American operation, proved an intelligence coup. 

On 2 July, as his army neared Frenchtown, Michigan Territory, 

on the River Raisin (present-day Monroe, Michigan), General Hull 

received a dispatch from Secretary of War Eustis notifying him that 

Congress had declared war on 18 June. Unfortunately, Eustis had 

sent the notice through the U.S. postal system instead of using a 

special courier, which resulted in a significant delay in this important 

information reaching Hull. Upon arriving at Spring Wells, three miles 

south of Detroit, Hull heard cannon fire as the guns of Fort Detroit 

attempted to sink the British warship Queen Charlotte in retaliation 

for its capturing Cuyahoga. 
•••• 20 ••••

When the army reached Detroit, Hull attempted to procure food 

and forage. Eustis had directed a civilian contractor, Augustus Porter, 

to provide three hundred sixty-six thousand rations for Hull’s army. 

However, Porter failed to deliver the provisions, citing the inability 

to move them by water. The army also needed medical supplies since 

these stores had been captured aboard Cuyahoga, and none were 

available in Detroit. Resupply could only reach the army by the road 

it had just cut from Ohio. On 9 July, Hull requested Eustis to supply 

the army with two hundred thousand rations of beef and flour, and 

assistance to secure his line of communications; otherwise he feared, 

“this army will perish for want of provisions.” 

In the meantime, new orders arrived from Eustis directing 

Hull to “take possession of Malden [Fort Amherstburg], Upper 

Canada, and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify.” 

Hull replied to Eustis that he would cross the river into Canada but 

Remnants of a military corduroy road is shown near present 

Brownstown Charter Township, Michigan, near the mouth of 

the Huron River on Lake Erie. This type of road was built of 

logs, placed side by side, to form a traversable road over low or 

swampy areas. (Courtesy of author)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 21 ••••

warned, “The British command the water and the savages; I do not 

think the force here equal to the reduction of Amherstburg; you 

therefore must not be too sanguine.” 

Hull was not aware of the British situation on the other side 

of the river, which was in great confusion. The British had been 

trying desperately to improve the defenses of Fort Amherstburg. 

Witnesses described the Canadian militiamen as mutinous with a 

desire to desert as soon as the American army crossed the river. 

St. George’s lack of confidence in the militia led him to evacuate 

Sandwich (present-day Windsor, Canada) and concentrate his forces 

south at Fort Amherstburg. 

Meanwhile, Hull experienced his own problems with the militia. One Ohio company from Colonel McArthur’s militia regiment 

refused to enter Canada claiming that it could not be required to 

fight outside the United States. The militiamen also exercised little 

fire discipline and accidentally wounded a major from Colonel Cass’ 

regiment. Nevertheless, Hull initiated the invasion of Canada early 

on 12 July. Colonel Cass’ Ohio militia and Colonel Miller’s 4th U.S. 

Infantry regiments embarked from Detroit aboard small boats and 

landed north of Sandwich fifteen minutes later. After McArthur’s 

regiment landed, Hull sent it out to forage supplies for the army. The 

expedition returned after four days with considerable quantities of 

flour, whiskey, and salt.

On 13 July, Hull issued a proclamation urging Canadians not to 

resist. He warned against their collaboration with the Indians stating, 

“No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian will be taken 

prisoner. Instant destruction will be his lot.” The proclamation had 

the desired effect. Almost six hundred Canadian militiamen at Fort 

Amherstburg deserted and returned home to their families and crops.

On 16 July, Hull ordered Cass to reconnoiter enemy positions 

near a bridge on the River Aux Canard, a deep stream that connected 

to the Detroit River about four miles north of the British fort. The 

British had stationed a small picket of men near the bridge. The 

picket opened fire as the Americans approached. Cass endeavored 

to flank the position, but the marshy terrain forced his unit to march 

three miles east to a ford where it crossed to the south bank of the 

river. The British detected the flanking movement and withdrew, 

abandoning the bridge to the Americans. During the skirmish, one 

British soldier was killed and another captured.

Cass sent a message to Hull requesting permission to hold the 

position. Hull was concerned about having a small detachment beyond supporting distance from the main army and within range of 
•••• 22 ••••

enemy naval gunfire from Queen Charlotte, so he ordered Cass to 

return. Cass complied only after a council of officers insisted that he 

follow Hull’s orders. Following two days of inconclusive skirmishing, 

Hull’s subordinate commanders began to suspect that the general was 

afraid of confronting the enemy. But Hull’s experience during the 

Revolutionary War had taught him that proper preparations had to 

be made to ensure the favorable outcome of a siege. On 21 July, the 

general wrote to Eustis explaining that an attack on Fort Amherstburg 

without artillery would result in a great sacrifice of men. 

Meanwhile, over three hundred miles to the north, British forces 

seized Fort Mackinac. The fort guarded the straits connecting Lakes 

Michigan and Huron, supported the fur trade, and served as a symbol of American power to the Indians. American Lt. Porter Hanks 

commanded the post with sixty-one men and several 9-pounder 

cannon. British Capt. Charles Roberts on St. Joseph Island had 

decided to capture Fort Mackinac with a mixed force of British 

regulars, Canadian fur traders, and several hundred Indians. On 16 

July, this force of over six hundred men embarked on boats for their 

objective forty miles away. At about 0300 on 17 July, Roberts’ force 

landed and moved two 6-pounder cannon to a hill overlooking Fort 

Mackinac. Hanks did not know that war had been declared and at 

dawn discovered Roberts’ men with their artillery aimed at his position. To avoid a massacre, he surrendered the fort. Roberts paroled 

the Americans and sent them in a boat to Detroit. 

As word about the British victory at Mackinac spread, Indian 

tribes that had been vacillating about their allegiance decided to assist 

the British cause. Meanwhile, logistical problems consumed Hull. On 

31 July, he received intelligence that the Wyandot Indians south of 

Detroit at Brownstown had joined the British and would attempt to 

interdict American supplies sent overland from Ohio. Unaware of 

Hull’s predicament, Governor Meigs had already dispatched Capt. 

Henry Brush with a supply train that included a herd of cattle and 

barrels of flour to resupply the army at Detroit. Brush made it only 

as far as Frenchtown, about fifty miles south of Detroit, before the 

Wyandot blocked further progress. 

Hull dispatched two hundred militia commanded by Maj. 

Thomas Van Horne to meet and escort the convoy to Detroit. Van 

Horne’s expedition began on 4 August and reached the Ecorse River 

about eight miles south of Detroit where it encamped for the night. 

Tecumseh meanwhile had established an ambush with twenty-four 

Indians in the thick woods along the road at Brownstown. Early 

the next day when Van Horne’s force moved into the ambuscade, 
•••• 23 ••••

Tecumseh and his men attacked. The surprised militiamen thought 

they faced a superior force and quickly retreated. The Indians killed 

seventeen soldiers and captured two during the short fight. They 

scalped the dead Americans, skewered them with stakes, and left the 

bodies along the road to deter future attempts. Concerned about the 

interdiction of his line of communications to Ohio, on 7 August Hull 

ordered his army to evacuate Canada. 

Once back at Detroit, General Hull ordered Colonel Miller 

to assemble a 600-man force of the 4th Infantry, some militia, 

and two pieces of artillery to make another attempt to reach the 

convoy waiting at Frenchtown. Meanwhile, the British decided 

to send one hundred fifty men of the 41st Regiment of Foot, fifty 

militia, and about two hundred of Tecumseh’s Indians to stop the 

Americans. The British crossed the Detroit River on 8 August and 

established their blocking position near the village of Monguagon 

(now Trenton, Michigan). In late afternoon on 9 August, the lead 

elements of Miller’s force came under fire from the enemy ambush. 

Miller quickly formed his men into line, fired a massed volley, and 

advanced on the enemy with bayonets. One witness, Maj. James 

Dalliba, recalled, “The incessant firing in the centre ran diverging 

to the flanks; from the crackling of individual pieces it changed to 

alternate volleys; and at length to one continued sound; and while 

everything seemed hushed amidst the wavering roll, the discharge 

of the six-pounder burst upon the ear. The Americans stood!” The 

battle of Monguagon lasted a little over two hours, during which 

time the British lost six killed and twenty-one wounded and the 

Americans eighteen killed and sixty-three wounded. Having lost 

almost 13 percent of his force, Miller believed he could not advance 

any farther, and he requested help from Hull to transport the injured 

back to Detroit. Three days later the exhausted men, the cream of 

Hull’s army, returned to Detroit because they were not able to link 

up with the supply train. 

Isolated and low on supplies, Hull desperately needed the rest of 

the U.S. Army to reduce the pressure on his beleaguered force by attacking other points of the British defensive system, just as envisioned 

in American strategy. It was not to be. Believing that he needed more 

time to prepare for his advance from New York into Canada, General 

Dearborn, without consulting Madison, Eustis, or Hull, agreed to 

a truce proposed by British General Prevost. The truce, which did 

not include the Detroit area, went into effect on 9 August, the same 

day as Monguagon. In one stroke, Dearborn had undercut his own 

strategy of breaking the British by placing simultaneous pressure on 
•••• 24 ••••

several points of their overextended line. Upon learning of the truce, 

President Madison wrote to Dearborn on 9 August: 

It was much to have been desired that simultaneous invasions of 

Canada at several points . . . might have secured the great object of 

bringing all Upper Canada . . . under our command. . . . This systematic operation having been frustrated, it only remains to pursue 

the course that will diminish the disappointment as much as possible.

Dearborn responded on 15 August, writing that he did not realize 

that he was to synchronize his operations with Hull, and that he did 

not even know he was to take the offensive against the eastern portions of Upper Canada along the Niagara and St. Lawrence Rivers. 

As he told the president, “No explicit orders have been received by 

me in relation to Upper Canada, until it was too late, even to make 

an effectual diversion in favour of Genl. Hull.”

Meanwhile, on 13 August, Hull decided to make another attempt 

to reopen his supply line. He ordered Cass and McArthur with four 

hundred of the fittest militiamen to link up with the waiting supply 

convoy by traveling a circuitous Indian trail to the River Raisin. The 

two colonels were not eager to undertake the expedition. Unbeknownst 

to Hull, they had written to Governor Meigs urging him to send two 

thousand men to help them. After Hull repeated his order to the colonels, they finally departed late in the evening. Once they left Detroit, 

they failed to keep Hull informed of their location (Map 2). 

Realizing that the fall of Fort Mackinac and his own predicament 

at Detroit had rendered the frontier vulnerable, General Hull ordered 

Capt. Nathan Heald at Fort Dearborn (present-day Chicago) to evacuate that post and move the garrison along with its dependents east to 

Fort Wayne, Indiana Territory. Before the evacuation could be implemented, hostile Potawatomi warriors gathered around the small post. 

To assuage their threats, Heald offered them clothing and other goods 

in exchange for a promise not to interfere with the evacuation, whose 

security was somewhat improved by the arrival of U.S. Indian agent 

Capt. William Wells and some reinforcements. About midmorning 

on 15 August, the column departed Fort Dearborn and moved along 

the south shore of Lake Michigan. The soldiers and their families had 

traveled less than two miles when four hundred Potawatomi attacked 

them. Heald immediately led a counterattack and a fierce melee ensued. 

Some Indians made their way to the baggage train where they attacked 

the women and children, a few of whom fought back with swords and 

muskets, including Heald’s wife Rebecca. The Indians demanded Heald 
Detroit 15–16 Aug

Brownstown 5 Aug

Monguagon 9 Aug

Fort Mackinac 17 Jul

Fort Dearborn 15 Aug

Fort Wayne 5–12 Sep

Frenchtown

19–22 Jan

Fort Harrison

4–15 Sep

River Raisin

Lake

St. Clair

L a k e E r i e

L a k e H u r o n

L a k e M i c h i g a n

Maumee R

Miami R

Wabash R Portage R

Maumee River Rapids

Fort Deance

Fort St. Mary’s

Fort Miami

Fort Meigs

Fort Findlay

Fort Seneca

Fort

 Amherstburg

Upper Sandusky

Urbana

Dayton

Delaware

Franklinton

Piqua

Sandwich

M I C H I G A N

T E R R I T O R Y

I N D I A N A

T E R R I T O R Y

O H I O

O L D N O R T H W E S T

OPERATIONAL AREA

July 1812–January 1813

0 25 100

Miles

U.S. Supply Line

Battle Site

Map 2
•••• 26 ••••

surrender and he agreed if they promised there would be no further 

slaughter. After granting these terms, the warriors reneged and began 

to kill the wounded Americans. The massacre resulted in the deaths of 

twenty-six regulars, all of the militia, two women, and twelve children, 

for a total of fifty-three Americans. Among the dead was Lt. George 

Ronan, the first West Point graduate to be killed in combat.

On the same day that Potawatomi warriors massacred Heald’s 

column, General Brock demanded that Hull surrender Detroit. Hull 

was shocked to learn that the British commander of Upper Canada 

was at Detroit. He had assumed that Brock was still in the east 

fending off the planned American offensives against the Niagara 

and St. Lawrence Rivers. Brock, however, was far better informed 

about American operations than Hull, and he had used his control 

over the waterways to rapidly transfer three hundred men to Detroit. 

Moreover, unlike Hull, Brock knew that Cass and McArthur were 

not far away and that he needed to resolve the situation at Detroit 

quickly before they could intervene. Consequently, Brock put on a 

demonstration designed to make Hull think that he had more men 

than he actually had and added a threat to his ultimatum, warning 

that if Hull did not surrender, Brock’s Indian allies “will be beyond 

my control the moment the contest commences.” Demoralized yet 

defiant, Hull rejected Brock’s demand that he surrender, stating that it 

was his duty to fight and “accept any consequences which may result.” 

Immediately after receiving Hull’s rejection, Brock ordered his 

artillery to fire on Fort Detroit from the Canadian side of the Detroit 

River, and soon two British warships joined in. An eyewitness account 

of the terrible effect of the British cannonade is provided by an officer’s wife who wrote: “A 24 pound shot entered the next door . . . 

and cut two officers who were standing in the entry directly in two 

their bowels gushing out, the same ball passed through the wall into 

a room where a number of people were and took the legs of one man 

off and the flesh of the thigh of another.” One of the men killed was 

the unfortunate Lieutenant Hanks. This event further undermined the 

morale of the troops and civilians who had sought refuge in the fort. 

Early in the morning of 16 August, under covering fire from the 

guns of Queen Charlotte and Hunter, Brock led his army across the 

Detroit River and surrounded the fort. At this point, Hull determined 

he had three alternatives. He could accept a fight in the open, endure 

a siege, or surrender. As to the first option, Hull estimated that only 

about eight hundred of his twenty-five hundred men were healthy and 

available for battle due to disease, casualties, desertion, detachments, 

and the dispatch of Cass and McArthur’s four hundred soldiers whose 
•••• 27 ••••

status was unknown to him. Brock had about fifteen hundred Indians, 

soldiers, and militiamen, although he made the force appear larger 

to the Americans by lighting additional campfires and parading his 

men back and forth in view of the fort. Given the apparent odds, 

Hull decided it was unwise to do battle outside the fort.

As for the second option, Hull wrote Eustis that Fort Detroit was 

crowded with women, children, and “the old and decrepit people of 

the town and country.” Supplies were short, and Hull believed the fort 

could only be sustained for a few days. Moreover, the British cannonade 

and Brock’s threats had already impressed upon Hull the suffering this 

course of action would impose on soldier and civilian alike. 

Surrender of Hull’s Army at Fort Detroit,

by Henry Louis Stephens

(Library and Archives Canada)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 28 ••••

The third alternative—surrender—seemed the only viable one. 

Hull chose this option out of “a sense of duty and full conviction of 

its expediency.” On 16 August, the Americans marched to the parade 

ground and stacked their arms while the British cut the American flag 

from the staff and hoisted the Union Jack to the accompaniment of 

“God Save the King.” Under the terms of capitulation, Brock pledged 

to protect the inhabitants of Detroit from the Indians and allowed 

the American militiamen to return home on the promise that they 

would not take up arms again. Hull and over five hundred eighty 

regulars became prisoners and were sent to Quebec for internment. 

The surrender of Detroit was catastrophic for the United 

States. In less than three months, the Northwestern Army had 

been eliminated and the United States had lost the strategic Fort 

Detroit. Public opinion and the Madison administration blamed 

General Hull for the failure. After his release from captivity, Hull 

was tried by court-martial in 1814 for treason, cowardice, neglect 

of duty, and unofficer-like conduct.With none other than General 

Dearborn serving as president of the court, Cass, McArthur, and 

other officers, all since promoted, gave the primary testimony against 

Hull. During the trial, Hull sarcastically stated, “If it all arises out 

of their achievements while under my command, I must say, that it 

appears to me my expedition was more prolific of promotion than 

any other unsuccessful military enterprize I ever heard of.” On 26 

March 1814, the court acquitted Hull of treason but convicted 

him on all the other charges. The court recommended that he be 

sentenced to death but that the sentence be commuted in light of 

his service during the Revolutionary War. On 24 April, Madison 

approved the findings and recommendations of the court and remitted the punishment. Hull was dishonorably discharged and his 

name removed from the rolls of the Army.

The Frontier Besieged, August–December 1812

British victories at Forts Mackinac, Dearborn, and Detroit 

encouraged the Indians of the Northwest to attack American settlements throughout the Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa territories. On 3 

September, a war party of about twenty Shawnee, Delaware, and 

Potawatomi descended on the small frontier community of Pigeon 

Roost, Indiana Territory, about one hundred miles south of presentday Indianapolis. Moving from cabin to cabin, they killed two men, 

five women, and sixteen children in an hour and then burned down 

the empty homes. The next day, one hundred fifty militiamen set out 

to find the Indians, but they were not able to do so. 
•••• 29 ••••

The next attack occurred on 4 September at Fort Harrison, 

Indiana Territory, a stockade fort on the Wabash River north of 

modern Terre Haute and named for former territorial governor 

William Henry Harrison. There, a large force of Kickapoo, Miami, 

Potawatomi, Shawnee, and Winnebago warriors laid siege to the post. 

Capt. Zachary Taylor commanded the fort with a company of sixty 

soldiers of the 7th U.S. Infantry. During the eleven-day siege, the 

Indians burned a hole in a portion of the palisade, but Taylor and 

his men improvised repairs and repelled the assault. For this victory 

during a summer fraught with U.S. military defeats, Taylor achieved 

fame and a brevet promotion to the rank of major.

The raids, however, did not stop. On 5 September, bands of 

Sauk, Fox, and Winnebago Indians led by Black Hawk attacked 

at Fort Madison on the upper Mississippi River in what is now the 

state of Iowa. The garrison avoided defeat when the Indians ran low 

on ammunition, which enabled the soldiers to escape using a trench 

dug from one of the blockhouses to boats moored in the river. Simultaneous with the attack on Fort Madison was an assault on Fort 

Wayne, Indiana Territory, perhaps the most important remaining 

post in the Northwest theater. Fort Wayne had four cannon and a 

garrison of seventy soldiers commanded by Capt. James Rhea. On 

5 September, bands of hostile Indians began attacking the settlers 

near the fort. During the next week, Rhea and the garrison repelled 

repeated attacks. 

When word arrived in Kentucky of the siege of Fort Wayne, William Henry Harrison sprang into action. Harrison was the 39-yearold son of Benjamin Harrison III, a signer of the Declaration of 

Independence. William Harrison had joined the Army in 1791 and 

had served on the frontier under Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne from 

whom he had learned the importance of logistical planning, rigorous 

training, and firm discipline. After participating in Wayne’s victory 

over the Ohio Indians in the 1794 battle of Fallen Timbers, Harrison 

had resigned from the Army in 1798 and become the governor of 

Indiana Territory in 1800. As governor, he had negotiated treaties 

with the Indians that acquired millions of acres of land for the United 

States. His actions had brought him into conflict with the Shawnee 

brothers Tenskwatawa (the Prophet) and Tecumseh, who were trying 

to form an Indian confederacy to oppose further white expansion. 

In November 1811, Governor Harrison had defeated Tenskwatawa 

near the Indian settlement of Prophetstown on the Tippecanoe River.

Not knowing that Detroit had already fallen, in late August 1812 

Harrison, who was a major general of Kentucky militia, persuaded 
•••• 30 ••••

the senior officer of federal forces 

in the region, the elderly and 

uninspiring Brig. Gen. James 

Winchester, to permit him to 

take Col. Samuel Wells’ 17th 

U.S. Infantry along with three 

regiments of Kentucky militia to 

relieve Hull at Detroit.As Harrison explained to Secretary Eustis, 

“It appeared to me Sir, that it was 

necessary that someone should 

undertake the general direction 

of affairs here and I have done 

it.” Upon learning of Captain 

Rhea’s predicament, Harrison 

changed course and marched 

for Fort Wayne. He arrived there 

with twenty-six hundred men on 

12 September but found that the 

Indians had already lifted the 

siege on learning of his approach. 

He then ordered retaliatory attacks against the Indians and 

was in the process of destroying 

several settlements when General 

Winchester, whom the president 

had recently named the commander of the reconstituted 

Northwestern Army, arrived at Fort Wayne to assume command. 

The arrangement was short-lived, for on 24 September Harrison 

received a message from the president appointing him as the commander of the Northwestern Army instead of Winchester. Political 

pressure from Kentucky, the state that was the strongest supporter 

of the war, compelled Madison’s decision. The new orders gave Harrison, whom Madison had also made a federal brigadier general, 

command of all the regulars and militia in the theater, almost ten 

thousand men in total. 

Raising a new Northwestern Army severely strained the government’s resources, but Eustis gave Harrison full authority to requisition 

supplies and men. Harrison concluded that regaining Detroit was “considered so important that expense was to be disregarded.” He thus freely 

expended the money, supplies, and resources he thought necessary to 

William Henry Harrison, 

by Rembrandt Peale

(National Portrait Gallery, 

Smithsonian) •••••••••••••••
•••• 31 ••••

accomplish the mission. His objectives were to provide protection for 

the entire northwestern frontier (stretching from Ohio to the Mississippi 

River), recapture Detroit, and move against Upper Canada. 

Harrison planned to concentrate over four thousand troops at the 

Maumee River Rapids and, after gathering a million rations there, to 

advance to Detroit. He would use three converging columns. General 

Winchester would lead the left wing, composed of the 17th U.S. Infantry, a detachment of the 19th U.S. Infantry, and four Kentucky 

regiments, based initially at Fort Defiance, Ohio, on the Maumee 

River. Brig. Gen. Edward Tupper would command twelve hundred 

Ohio militia along with some Kentucky mounted riflemen to form 

the center wing, which would advance along the road Hull’s army had 

cut through the wilderness. Harrison would directly command the 

right wing, which consisted of a brigade each of Virginia, Ohio, and 

Pennsylvania militia; the 2d Light Dragoons; and the rest of the 19th 

U.S. Infantry commanded by Lt. Col. John B. Campbell. In addition, 

Harrison would assemble as much artillery as possible, eventually accumulating twenty-eight pieces at his headquarters located at Upper 

Sandusky, Ohio. 

Almost half of Harrison’s troops were drawn from Kentucky, 

where there was overwhelming support for the war. Representative 

Henry Clay expressed the view of his state’s citizens to Congress, “I 

verily believe, that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to 

place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.” Even though he 

favored using Kentucky militia, Harrison was not oblivious to their 

lack of discipline. He won the respect and confidence of the militia 

by explaining rather than dictating orders, in contrast to Winchester 

whom the Kentuckians intensely disliked. 

The effort to obtain sufficient supplies proved to be an extremely 

challenging task in the sparsely settled region. Harrison organized 

three main supply routes to support his advance to the Maumee 

River Rapids. He directed forts be built along each route to serve as 

magazines for the transfer and storage of provisions and equipment. 

The left supply route supported Winchester’s column and used both 

land and water transportation from Dayton, Ohio, via Piqua, St. 

Mary’s, and Fort Amanda, to Fort Defiance, since renamed Fort 

Winchester, Ohio. The center route used Hull’s old road from Dayton 

via Urbana, Fort McArthur, and Fort Findlay to Fort Meigs. The 

right route went from Franklinton (in present-day Columbus, Ohio) 

via Delaware, Norton, and Upper Sandusky to Fort Seneca, and 

Lower Sandusky to Fort Meigs. Harrison asked Eustis for $1 million 

to cover the expense of moving supplies. (See Map 2.) 
•••• 32 ••••

A major problem was the lack of coordination among the various 

supply agencies. In addition to a commissary agent, Harrison had a 

quartermaster general and two civilian contractors to furnish commodities: one for troops south of the 41st Parallel and one for forces 

north of the 41st Parallel. In addition, the commissary department 

was disorganized and had bad credit with contractors, who required 

all payments to be made in hard currency. Harrison placed the blame 

on the “imbecility and incompetence of the public agents and the 

villainy of the contractors” for the delay in procuring rations. 

To provide subsistence, Eustis directed Ebenezer Denny, a 

Pittsburgh supply contractor, to purchase 1,098,000 rations for Harrison’s army. But Harrison believed rations could be procured more 

economically in southern Ohio and instructed Denny to purchase no 

more than 400,000. Harrison also asked James White, the contractor 

south of the 41st Parallel, to build magazines and collect rations at 

Urbana and Wooster, Ohio. He appointed John H. Piatt as a deputy 

commissary and directed him to transport 300,000 rations to Fort 

Defiance, deposit 200,000 rations of flour and 500,000 of beef at 

Urbana, and purchase and store 500,000 rations at Wooster. When 

Denny could not procure flour in Pennsylvania, he went to Chillicothe, Ohio, which was in Piatt’s territory. Employing the various 

purchasing agents resulted in competition for scarce resources, and 

once Harrison realized the confusion he had caused, he redirected 

Denny to provide for rations as originally ordered by Eustis. 

By the end of 1812 and despite enormous expenditure of effort 

and money, the Northwestern Army was poorly clothed, inadequately 

fed, and short of all supplies. Winchester’s column especially suffered 

since it had been organized in September and the troops had no winter 

clothing. On 10 December, Winchester’s force ran out of flour, and 

exposure to the cold caused men to suffer sickness, fever, and frostbite. Over one hundred men perished from disease and about three 

hundred were constantly sick. Winchester’s camp along the Maumee 

River was described as “Fort Starvation,” and one private wrote on 

Christmas Eve: “Our sufferings at this place have been greater than 

if we had been in a severe battle. . . . The camp has become a loathsome place.” Ammunition supply was so critical that when soldiers 

died, no volleys were fired to render military honors at funerals. The 

effect the winter weather had on operations was evident when General Winchester tried to move his force to the Maumee River Rapids 

on 30 December. The column proceeded slowly, pulling baggage 

on sleds through snow almost two feet deep. Because of the weakened condition of the men, it took eleven days to march forty miles. 
•••• 33 ••••

This was the state of affairs at the end of December 1812, despite the 

great exertions by Harrison and his quartermasters to provide supplies. 

Hardships notwithstanding, Harrison still managed to inflict suffering on the enemy. On 17 December, a column of Kentucky cavalry, 

militia, and regulars from the 19th Infantry led by Colonel Campbell 

moved through deep snow in frigid weather to attack and burn a Miami 

Indian town on the Mississinewa River in Indiana Territory. At dawn 

the next day, Miami warriors attacked the American encampment. 

While the regulars held the camp perimeter, the Kentucky cavalry 

charged and dispersed the attackers. The Americans lost eight killed 

and forty-eight wounded in the battle of Mississinewa, but the expedition successfully checked the Miamis from making further attacks on 

American frontier settlements for the remainder of the winter.

Disaster at the River Raisin, December 1812–January 1813

While Harrison’s columns were struggling forward through December snows, back in Washington, D.C., William Eustis resigned 

as secretary of war. James Monroe, the secretary of state, assumed 

temporary control of the War Department until another Revolutionary War veteran, John Armstrong, took over the position in January 

1813. In correspondence to Harrison, Monroe expressed concern 

about the upcoming expiration of militia enlistments in February and 

March 1813 and suggested that further offensive military operations 

be postponed until spring. Harrison replied that despite the problems of supply, weather, and terrain, he still intended to begin his 

offensive at the end of January. He planned to make a feint toward 

Detroit, cross his army over the frozen Detroit River, and attack Fort 

Amherstburg. 

Meanwhile, Winchester managed to get his thirteen hundred 

men to the Maumee River Rapids on 10 January. Two days later, he 

received news from Frenchtown that the British were harassing the 

residents and threatening to destroy the village. The British force at 

Frenchtown consisted of fifty militiamen, about two hundred Indians, 

and a 3-pounder manned by regular artillerists. Even though Harrison had ordered him not to advance beyond the rapids, Winchester 

decided to take action. On 17 January, Winchester directed Lt. Col. 

William Lewis with over six hundred men to advance to Frenchtown, 

engage the British, and capture any supplies.

Lewis’ troops marched thirty-five miles north of the rapids along 

Hull’s old road and across the ice of Lake Erie to reach Frenchtown 

on the afternoon of 18 January. The British detected the Americans 

as they approached the village and fired on them with artillery. 
•••• 34 ••••

Lewis ordered his men to charge the enemy position, and after three 

hours of fighting, the British retreated north into the woods beyond 

Frenchtown. Lewis’ force not only liberated the small village, but also 

captured thirty barrels of flour, two thousand pounds of beef, and a 

large amount of wheat. The Americans lost twelve killed and fiftyfive wounded in the engagement. The British admitted losing four 

dead, but the Americans claimed fifteen enemies killed or captured, 

most of them Indians.

Lewis reported the victory to Winchester, who led reinforcements to Frenchtown on 20 January, bringing the total U.S. force 

there to 934 men. The force included 230 men of Colonel Wells’ 

17th Infantry. Even though it was a regular regiment, it had been 

in service only since August and was no more experienced than the 

militia. The rest of the force at Frenchtown consisted of 550 men 

from the 5th Kentucky Volunteer Regiment led by Colonel Lewis; 

the 1st Kentucky Rifle Regiment of 100 men led by Lt. Col. John 

Allen; the 1st Kentucky Volunteer Regiment led by Maj. Richard M. 

Gano; a company of rangers led by Capt. Henry James; and a troop 

of light dragoon volunteers led by Capt. William Garrard. Although 

Winchester had advanced to Frenchtown against orders, once there 

Harrison believed that the position had to be held, and he began efforts to reinforce Winchester.

Convinced that the British would not counterattack, Winchester 

deployed his troops in exposed positions with their backs to the River 

Raisin, failed to distribute ammunition, and did not deploy pickets to 

warn of an enemy approach. He positioned his troops just north of 

the river, with the Kentucky militia occupying enclosed gardens facing 

north in a rough semicircle. He positioned the 17th Infantry in an open 

field one hundred yards to the right of the militia, its only protection 

being a rail fence. Winchester established his headquarters in a house 

on the south bank of the river, about three-quarters of a mile away. 

On 21 January, Colonel Wells urged General Winchester to deploy 

scouts and to distribute ammunition to the men. The general ignored 

Wells’ advice and spoke contemptuously of an attack. Wells then sent 

a message to Harrison about the ill-preparedness of the army stating, 

“The officers . . . are truly desirous of seeing you here. . . . Many things 

ought to be done, which only you know how to do properly."

Meanwhile on 19 January, British Col. Henry Procter crossed 

the frozen Detroit River from Canada with 597 regulars and militia 

and about 800 Indians under the leadership of the Wyandot chief 

Roundhead. He also had six artillery pieces that were mounted on 

sleds. Two hours before dawn on 22 January, Procter’s army advanced 
•••• 35 ••••

to within musket range of the unsuspecting American troops. His 

artillery and regulars formed the center, the Indians were on the 

right, and the militia and Indians on his left. A British officer noted 

the lack of American security and thought the enemy could be taken 

sleeping in their beds, but as luck would have it, reveille sounded and 

Winchester’s men awoke and observed the approaching British. A 

Kentucky militiaman, Elias Darnell, recorded in his journal:

Kentucky Militia at the River Raisin,

by H. Charles McBarron

(Company of Military Historians)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 36 ••••

The reveille had not been beating more than two minutes before 

the sentinels fired three guns in quick succession. . . . The British 

immediately discharged their artillery, loaded with ball shot, bombs, 

and grape-shot, which did little injury. The British infantry then 

charged on those in the pickets, but were repulsed with great loss.

Though surprised by the enemy, the Kentuckians on the left flank 

concentrated their fire on the British artillery crews and prominent 

enemy officers. Their marksmanship wreaked havoc among the artillerymen, causing them to abandon some guns. The British regulars 

attempted to charge the militia’s position, but the accurate and deadly 

fire of the riflemen proved too much for them. The Kentuckians held, 

but the 17th Infantry was exposed to murderous artillery and musket 

fire on the open right flank. Twenty minutes after the start of the 

battle, the 17th Infantry began to fall back. Winchester arrived, still 

in his bedclothes, but failed to rally the retreating regulars.

By this time the Indians had moved to the flank and rear of the 

Americans. As the regulars fled across the frozen river, the Indians 

formed a trap to prevent their escape. The warriors caught, killed, 

and scalped hundreds of American soldiers. Only a small group 

led by Capt. Richard Matson managed to escape by removing their 

shoes so their footprints in the snow would deceive the Indians. These 

thirty men were the only regulars to escape capture or death. Chief 

Roundhead also captured Winchester and Lewis, and turned them 

over to Procter.

As the American right collapsed, the Kentuckians on the left, 

now commanded by Maj. George Madison, repelled three more assaults. After an hour of fighting, the Kentuckians had lost just five 

killed and forty wounded, while the British had lost about a third 

of their attacking force. Procter asked Winchester to order the Kentuckians to surrender, promising that he would protect them from 

Indian vengeance. When men with a white flag approached Madison’s 

position, the Kentuckians thought the British wanted a truce. The 

Kentuckians reacted to Winchester’s plea to surrender with disgust 

and indignation. However, with their ammunition almost exhausted, 

their officers felt they could not resist much longer. Madison agreed 

to surrender but only after receiving a promise from Procter that he 

would protect the prisoners and wounded from the Indians. Elias 

Darnell recorded, “We were surprised and mortified. . . . There was 

scarcely a person that could refrain from shedding tears! Some plead 

with the officers not to surrender, saying they would rather die on 

the field!” Commenting on the Americans who had suffered months 
•••• 37 ••••

of famine, sickness, and hardship in the wilderness, a British officer 

remarked: 

The appearance of the American prisoners captured at Frenchtown 

was miserable to the last degree. They had the air of men to whom 

cleanliness was a virtue unknown . . . scarcely an individual was 

in possession of a great coat or cloak. . . . They were covered with 

slouched hats . . . beneath which their long hair fell matted and 

uncombed over their cheeks. . . . [This] gave them an air of wildness 

and savageness.

Concerned that Harrison would appear with reinforcements at 

any moment, Colonel Procter insisted that his army and the prisoners depart for Canada immediately. The battle had cost the British 

24 killed and 158 wounded, which they had to evacuate with limited 

transportation assets. As a result, Procter had no choice but to leave 

about 80 of the most severely wounded Americans in some of the 

local buildings, with a promise to send sleighs or other transport for 

Scene at the River Raisin, engraving by Albert Bobbett

(New York Public Library)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 38 ••••

them as soon as possible. He marched the remaining 495 prisoners 

to Canada. 

The next morning about two hundred Indians entered Frenchtown 

in an agitated state and began to plunder the village. They stripped 

the wounded and killed and scalped those who could not move. The 

Indians set several buildings on fire and many Americans perished in 

the flames. One survivor wrote: 

Between daybreak and sunrise, the Indians were seen approaching the houses sheltering the wounded. . . . Pretty soon they came 

crowding into the room where we were . . . the Indians tomahawked 

Captain Hickman in less than six feet from me . . . and while standing in the snow eighteen inches deep, the Indians brought Captain 

Hickman out on the porch, stripped of clothing except a flannel 

shirt, and tossed him out on the snow . . . after which he breathed 

once or twice and expired.

When Harrison learned about the defeat at Frenchtown, he wrote 

to Secretary Monroe that the advance had been made without his consent and the defeat at Frenchtown was “total and complete.” Months 

of planning and preparation had been dashed by the debacle. With no 

artillery, his men tired, and facing a substantial British force, General 

Harrison decided to retreat to the Portage River, about thirty miles 

from the Maumee River Rapids, where he began fortifying his advance 

position, accumulating supplies, and reorganizing his army. Disturbed 

by what he saw in the Northwest, Secretary Armstrong endeavored to 

correct one of the fundamental errors of American strategy during 

1812. Realizing that gaining naval control over Lake Erie was the 

prerequisite to lasting success in the Northwest, he prohibited Harrison from resuming the offensive until the United States had built a 

fleet on the lake. To ensure compliance, he prevented Harrison from 

calling out any more militia and limited the Northwestern Army to 

no more than seven thousand regulars. He also reduced appropriations for supplies to control what he believed had been Harrison’s 

undue waste of resources. Harrison had no recourse but to comply. 

The defeat of Winchester’s army at Frenchtown further shocked 

Americans, particularly those in Kentucky, whose families mourned the 

loss of their fathers, sons, and brothers. The disaster dealt yet another 

blow to the spirit of a nation that had deluded itself into thinking that 

the war would be quickly won. However, the defeat also raised a new 

determination to avenge the loss, and the rallying cry of “Remember the 

River Raisin” would be heard whenever Kentuckians fought the British. 
•••• 39 ••••

War on the Niagara, June–December 1812 

Unfortunately for the United States, the armies in the other 

theaters shared the unhappy experiences of those in the Northwest. 

On the Niagara frontier, military action would be focused along the 

36-mile border formed by the Niagara River, which linked the waters 

of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. Settlements on the river were rooted 

in close commercial and personal relationships between Canadians 

and Americans, many of whom were related to one another. Prior 

to the war, the towns of Queenston, Upper Canada, and Lewiston, 

New York, were important ports for merchant vessels transiting from 

Lake Ontario. Both towns sat just below the imposing Niagara escarpment, a 180-foot cliff marking the farthest point where ships could 

navigate between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie and where the portage 

road to bypass Niagara Falls began. If the Americans could capture 

Queenston, then they would be able to sever the British communications route into western Upper Canada and isolate their victory on 

the Northwest frontier. More importantly, by seizing Queenston, the 

Americans could then build up forces there to conduct an overland 

attack on Fort George. (See Map 3.) 

The War Department designated the mix of regular, volunteer, 

and militia troops in the region as the Army of the Center. Fortyeight-year-old New York militia Maj. Gen. Stephen Van Rensselaer 

III commanded the army. Selected by Governor Daniel D. Tompkins 

because he was among the richest and most politically powerful men 

in the state, Van Rensselaer had graduated from Harvard University 

and had served in the state assembly. Although he had been a longtime 

member of the New York militia, he had never seen active military 

service. Interestingly, Van Rensselaer was a member of the Federalist Party and had opposed the war with Great Britain. Believing 

Van Rensselaer would run for governor in the upcoming election, 

Tompkins offered him the military command as a way of removing 

his rival. If Van Rensselaer turned down the offer, he would appear 

unpatriotic. If he accepted and failed—a high prospect given his 

lack of military training—he would be disgraced and discredited. 

If by chance Van Rensselaer emerged victorious, the U.S. government would likely want him to continue in service, which would also 

keep him out of the pending election. Tompkins took delight in the 

conundrum in which he had placed Van Rensselaer. 

To assist him with his new military duties, Van Rensselaer selected 

his cousin, Lt. Col. Solomon Van Rensselaer, who had served as a 

Regular Army officer for about ten years. During his service in Wayne’s 
Queenston

Heights

13 Oct

Fort Niagara 13 Oct

21 Nov

Fort George

13 Oct

21 Nov

Frenchman’s Creek 28 Nov

Fort Erie 28 Nov

Four Mile Cr

L a k e O n t a r i o

L a k e E r i e

Niagara R

Niagara R

to Burlington

Heights

G r a n d I s l a n d

Goat

 Island

Niagara Falls

Beechwoods

Vrooman’s Point

Lewiston Heights

Tuscarora Village

Fort Schlosser

Manchester

Lewiston

Queenston

Newark

Youngstown

Chippewa

Black

 Rock

Bualo

N E W Y O R K

U P P E R

C A N A D A

N I AG A R A R I V E R

OPERATIONAL AREA

August–November 1812

0 5

Miles

Battle Site

Map 3
•••• 41 ••••

Legion of the United States, he 

had been severely wounded during the battle of Fallen Timbers 

in 1794. Together, the two Van 

Rensselaers faced daunting challenges. By early October 1812, the 

Army of the Center had grown to 

almost six thousand soldiers, half 

of whom were regulars, but most 

of whom were not yet well trained 

or disciplined. Severe shortages 

of tents and blankets added to 

the soldiers’ discomfort, which 

along with poor sanitation, incapacitated many men with various 

illnesses. 

Brig. Gen. Alexander Smyth 

commanded the regulars in Rensselaer’s army. He refused to 

recognize Van Rensselaer as his 

superior and believed he should 

command the army. When Smyth 

arrived in Buffalo, he ignored 

Van Rensselaer’s request for a 

meeting at Lewiston and in correspondence insisted that any offensive operation originate from his 

location. This fractured relationship extended down the chain of 

command, causing undue difficulty for the junior regular and militia 

officers. The result of these self-inflicted wounds added unnecessary 

challenges to an already arduous American endeavor. 

Taking advantage of British control over the waterways, General 

Brock arrived in the Niagara theater on 24 August, a week after his 

victory at Detroit. Only then did he first hear about the armistice 

agreement negotiated between Dearborn and Prevost, which had gone 

into effect on 9 August. Brock watched with trepidation throughout 

September as the American army increased its presence along the 

Niagara frontier. By early October, the British had only six hundred 

regulars of the 41st and 49th Foot regiments along with six hundred 

Canadian militia scattered along the Niagara River at Fort George, 

Queenston, Chippewa, and Fort Erie. About three hundred Iroquois 

warriors of the Six Nations, led by John Norton and John Brant, 

were ready to assist their British allies. 

Stephen Van Rensselaer III, 

by Gilbert Charles Stuart

(National Gallery of Art)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 42 ••••

During the armistice, some enterprising U.S. Army and Navy 

officers seized two British warships, the brigs Detroit and Caledonia, 

anchored near Fort Erie. In the early morning on 9 October, a joint 

army-navy force rowed from the American shore and boarded the 

vessels, intending to sail them back to the port at Black Rock, New 

York. Alerted by the noise, British shore batteries opened fire. Detroit 

became stuck on Squaw Island, while Caledonia maneuvered to the 

American shore. British troops boarded Detroit but were met with 

effective American fire and forced to retreat. A small American force 

later burned Detroit to prevent the British from recapturing the ship. 

This bold action seemed to motivate the American militia, which 

had threatened to return home if something did not happen soon. 

Believing that “the crisis in this campaign was rapidly advancing and 

that the blow must soon be struck or all the toil and expense of the 

campaign will go for nothing,” Van Rensselaer decided to conduct 

an amphibious landing at Queenston. Before finalizing his plans, 

he wrote to General Smyth at Buffalo suggesting that they meet to 

coordinate their actions. Smyth never replied to this request. Van 

Rensselaer therefore decided to use those troops gathered at or near 

Lewiston to make the invasion. These consisted of two companies 

from the U.S. Regiment of Riflemen commanded by Maj. Charles 

Moseley; the 18th, 19th, and 20th Infantry regiments of New York 

militia; one company of New York Volunteers commanded by Capt. 

Abraham Dox; five companies of the 13th U.S. Infantry led by Lt. 

Col. John Chrystie, and two companies from the 2d U.S. Artillery 

with four 6-pounder cannon commanded by Lt. Col. Winfield Scott. 

The artillery was to be emplaced on Lewiston Heights to provide 

covering fire while the infantry crossed the river on boats. 

In late afternoon on 11 October, the American army assembled at 

the Lewiston dock, opposite Queenston. New York militia Lt. John 

Simms commanded some experienced river men who were to crew 

the boats to be used for the crossing. Simms, however, drifted past 

the embarkation point, anchored his boat at the shore, and was never 

seen again. Some of the other boats arrived at the right place, but 

most of their oars had been in the boat commanded by Simms. While 

the soldiers stood waiting until the oars could be found, a violent 

storm broke. A cold driving rain lasted over twenty-four hours and 

rendered the flintlock muskets useless, thus postponing the invasion 

until the night of 12–13 October 1812. During the delay, Van Rensselaer finally received a message from Smyth informing him that 

Smyth’s soldiers would be receiving new uniforms on the thirteenth, 

and that they needed time to clean up their camp from the effects of 
•••• 43 ••••

the storm, so that they could not participate in the upcoming attack. 

Smyth would remain at Black Rock with two militia regiments and 

over one thousand men from five different regular infantry regiments, 

while Van Rensselaer undertook the invasion of Canada.

Brock had observed the American preparations and believed 

that the impending attack on Queenston was a feint to divert British 

attention from the real target, Fort George. The abortive American attempt to cross the river on 11 October affirmed his opinion, especially 

since it occurred in full view of British positions at Queenston. Brock 

therefore decided to deploy only two companies of regulars—about 

one hundred fifty men of the 49th Regiment of Foot—and about one 

hundred fifty Canadian militiamen at Queenston. They supported 

one 18-pounder cannon located behind a stone embrasure halfway 

up the heights, known as the redan battery, and another battery, with 

two 24-pounder cannon, at Vrooman’s Point. Brock kept his main 

forces near Fort George, where he believed the real American attack 

would take place. 

During the early morning of 13 October, three hundred regulars 

of the 13th U.S. Infantry commanded by Chrystie and three hundred 

men of the 19th New York militia led by Colonel Van Rensselaer 

quietly embarked into thirteen waiting boats. At about 0300, as this 

force neared the Canadian shore, a sentry spotted them and fired, 

alerting the British garrison at Queenston. Soon the soldiers of the 

49th Regiment of Foot stood on the edge of the riverbank rapidly 

firing their muskets down on the Americans. The Canadian militia 

joined the battle along with a 9-pounder artillery piece. However, U.S. 

artillery on Lewiston Heights directed effective counterbattery fire at 

the British guns. Soldiers recalled a terrible night filled with the noise 

of gunfire, the thunder of cannon, and the screams of the wounded.

Colonel Van Rensselaer and his boat were almost the last to land 

on the narrow, rocky shore and were quickly shot to pieces by British 

musket fire. In a few minutes, nine American officers were wounded, 

including Van Rensselaer who was hit by six musket balls in his thigh, 

calves, and heel, soaking his white trousers red with blood. He sought 

to find Chrystie to have him take over command, but Chrystie had 

never made it ashore; his boat had broken an oarlock and had drifted 

past the landing point before returning to Lewiston. 

Capt. John E. Wool of the 13th U.S. Infantry assumed command 

of the attack. Though wounded in both hips, he gathered about one 

hundred fifty men and climbed the heights using a narrow one-manwide fisherman’s path. The British had left the route unguarded as 

they did not think it was a feasible approach up the cliffs. But it was, 
•••• 44 ••••

and Wool and his collection of regulars from the 6th, 13th, and 23d 

U.S. Infantry regiments emerged at a point above the redan battery. 

When about sixty Americans made it to the top of the hill, Wool 

led them in a charge on the surprised British gunners. Wool’s action 

silenced the battery and enabled the Americans to fire on the British 

southern flank, while additional troops continued to cross the river 

from Lewiston. 

At Fort George, General Brock heard the artillery fire from the 

direction of Queenston and mounted his horse to investigate the situation. He left orders for his second in command, Maj. Gen. Roger Hale 

Sheaffe, to keep the soldiers at Fort George on alert for any signs of 

American movement on the other side of the river. Almost an hour 

later, Brock arrived at Queenston just as dawn began to illuminate the 

smoke-engulfed town. Simultaneously, more Americans attempted 

to land, this time north of Queenston at Hamilton Cove, where they 

were met with severe fire much as their comrades had farther south. 

One American boat received a direct hit with canister from a British 

battery that instantly killed or wounded fifteen men.

Brock quickly assessed the situation and determined that the 

British would have to recapture the redan battery before Wool’s contingent could be reinforced. He rallied about fifty regulars and militia, 

dismounted from his horse, drew his sword, and led his men up the 

slope to retake the redan. Wool, still bleeding from his wounds, had 

deployed his men in a defensive circle around the position and was 

closely watching for an enemy assault. As Brock neared the redan, 

he raised his sword and turned to urge his men forward, when an 

American regular leveled his musket and fired a load of buck and ball 

into the tall British general. Brock, hit in the left side of the chest, 

fell and died almost immediately. 

The prospects for an American victory looked assured. By late 

morning, the Americans had landed about thirteen hundred men 

and a 6-pounder gun. Van Rensselaer, Wool, and other wounded 

officers had been evacuated back to Lewiston. Finding chaos and 

confusion, Chrystie, who had finally arrived at about 0700, and Scott 

went forward to bring order to the operation. 

Meanwhile, at about 0400, the American gunners at Fort Niagara 

had opened an artillery cannonade against Fort George as a diversion. 

They fired hot shot, which set fire to several buildings in the British 

fort and nearby town. However, there did not appear to be any activity indicating an assault would be forthcoming, so Sheaffe concluded 

that the capture of Queenston was the main U.S. objective. Receiving 

word that Brock had been killed, Sheaffe ordered all available men 
•••• 45 ••••

to march to Queenston, leaving a small garrison at Fort George to 

continue the artillery duel with Fort Niagara.

About one hundred sixty Indians of the Six Nations led by John 

Norton along with some Canadian militiamen had already rushed to 

Queenston and found the Americans improving their defenses on the 

heights. After scaling the escarpment, about eighty Indians occupied 

the woods at the summit of Queenston Heights and opened a steady 

fire on the Americans. Though the Americans had about six hundred 

men in this sector of the battlefield, they had suffered many wounded, 

were almost out of ammunition, and were in need of food and water 

and, more importantly, fresh men to renew the attack. 

At about 1000, General Van Rensselaer decided to cross the river 

with as many of the over four thousand troops still at Lewiston as he 

could. As at Detroit, however, many of the militiamen refused to leave 

American soil. Reinforcing their doubts over the constitutionality of 

the matter were fears stoked by the war whoops of Norton’s Indians 

and the sight of the boats returning from Canada soaked in blood. 

Van Rensselaer ordered, begged, and pleaded with the militia to help 

Death of General Brock at Queenston Heights,

by John David Kelly (Library and Archives Canada) •••••••••••••••
•••• 46 ••••

their fellow Americans across the river, but most refused. He stated 

in his report of the battle, “I rode in all directions; urged the men by 

every consideration to pass over, but in vain.” 

Back across the river, as no one could locate Colonel Chrystie, 

Scott led the action as the men built hasty defenses on top of the 

heights, skirmished with the Indians, and awaited badly needed 

reinforcements. Though Scott did not have a formal military education, he had served in the militia before being commissioned a 

regular artillery officer in 1808. He was also a voracious reader 

who had studied important military manuals. His great height, six 

foot five inches, helped him stand out, and he would prove to be 

one of the U.S. Army’s most gifted tactical commanders during 

the War of 1812. He had at his disposal 125 regular infantry, 14 

regular artillerymen, and 296 militiamen who faced the situation 

with fortitude and the hope that their comrades at Lewiston would 

soon come to their aid. 

Just after 1300, Sheaffe and his men arrived at Vrooman’s Point, 

where he assessed the situation. Sheaffe, like Brock, decided that he 

needed to recapture the redan on the heights held by the stranded 

Americans. But unlike Brock, instead of attacking uphill at the American front, he decided to march his men west around Queenston out of 

range of the American artillery, then come in behind the Americans 

from the south along the road from Chippewa. Upon reaching the 

heights, Sheaffe ordered his force of eight to nine hundred regulars, 

militia, and Indians, along with four light artillery pieces, into a line 

a few hundred yards from the American position. At about 1500, he 

ordered his men to fix bayonets and advance to the sounds of fifes and 

drums. They halted about one hundred paces from the Americans, 

leveled their muskets, and fired. With smoke obscuring the battlefield, 

the British closed with a fierce bayonet charge punctuated by the war 

whoops of the Indians. The panicked Americans had nowhere to retreat with the steep slope of the escarpment and the Niagara River to 

their rear. Some U.S. soldiers died as they tried to scramble down the 

escarpment, lost their footing, and fell to their deaths. Others drowned 

trying to swim the Niagara back to Lewiston. Most, however, threw 

down their arms and surrendered. Scott carried a white flag, and was 

shot at several times before he was taken to Sheaffe who accepted the 

surrender and ordered a cease-fire at about 1600. 

After the battle ended, the British discovered hundreds of U.S. 

troops who had never joined the battle hiding below the cliffs. The 

British captured a total of 436 U.S. regulars and 489 militia. About 

five hundred Americans had been killed, drowned, or wounded, 
•••• 47 ••••

many from artillery fire at the beginning of the battle. Of almost 

six thousand U.S. troops at Lewiston, only about sixteen hundred 

actually crossed the river during the battle. The British suffered 

twenty killed, eight-five wounded, and twenty-two taken as prisoners. After the battle, Sheaffe arranged for a three-day armistice with 

Van Rensselaer to parole and exchange prisoners. He also offered to 

send his surgeons to the American lines to help with the wounded. 

On 16 October, Brock was honored with a grand funeral ceremony 

and was buried in one of the bastions at Fort George. During the 

funeral, the Americans at Fort Niagara fired their artillery in a salute 

to a respected opponent.

The thirteen-hour battle was closely fought, and though a clear 

tactical victory for the British, Sheaffe missed the opportunity to 

exploit the success and achieve a strategic victory by attacking Fort 

Niagara. In addition, the death of Brock proved an especially significant blow to British morale. Despite the leadership of Solomon 

Van Rensselaer, John Wool, and Winfield Scott, the U.S. Army 

had performed poorly. Thus, the second major campaign ended in 

disaster much as that along the Northwest frontier. Stephen Van 

Rensselaer resigned his command on 20 October, still stunned at 

the outcome, stating, “My extreme mortification at surrendering a 

victory which had been gallantly won and which I had ample force 

to have retained, and my disgust at the cause which changed triumph into defeat.” Command of the Army of the Center passed to 

General Smyth, one of the main objects of Van Rensselaer’s disgust. 

Unlike Hull, Van Rensselaer would not be subject to court-martial, 

but Daniel Tompkins would be reelected as governor of New York 

in the next election. 

Smyth began to organize another offensive along the Niagara 

River. He wrote to Eustis asking for eight thousand men, one hundred 

thirty boats, additional artillery, and more supplies of all types. Six 

weeks later, in mid-November, the revitalized Army of the Center 

had grown to about four thousand men. On 17 November, Smyth 

issued a proclamation to his troops promising to annex Canada and 

stating that the “rewards and honours await the brave. Infamy and 

contempt are reserved for cowards.” However, when he polled his men 

about participating in another invasion, he found that the militia still 

refused to cross into Canada.

On 21 November, an artillery duel broke out between Fort George 

and Fort Niagara. The resulting cannonade lasted over twelve hours 

and could be heard as far away as Buffalo. During this action, a 

woman named Betsy (or Mary Elizabeth) Doyle, whose husband 
•••• 48 ••••

had been captured at Queenston, took an active role servicing the 

artillery pieces at Fort Niagara with hot shot, which was thrown at 

the enemy “as if it had been a special messenger of her vengeance.” 

On 28 November, Smyth landed several detachments on the 

Canadian side of the river. Lt. Col. Charles G. Boerstler led troops 

from the 14th U.S. Infantry to destroy a bridge at Frenchman’s Creek 

to prevent British reinforcements from reaching the area where the 

main army would land. Col. William H. Winder led another attack 

to capture several British batteries opposite Black Rock, which could 

oppose the landing of the main force. Winder’s force captured the 

artillery batteries, but enemy scouts detected Boerstler’s force and 

warned their superiors, and coordinated artillery fire soon struck his 

boats as they crossed the river. As this transpired, Smyth vacillated 

with the main force, at one point ordering twelve hundred men to 

disembark for dinner while he held a council of war with his officers 

to determine what to do next. After issuing a demand to the British 

commander at Fort Erie to surrender, Smyth ordered his army back 

into camp for the night. 

On 30 November, Smyth ordered his soldiers to once again load 

into the boats only to cancel the operation due to a rainstorm. At this 

point, the men were fed up and chaos ensued in the American camp. 

Frightened by the mutinous soldiers, Smyth fled from the encampment. 

A Soldier’s Wife at Fort Niagara (Library of Congress)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 49 ••••

He requested permission from Dearborn to take leave to visit his family, 

from which he never returned, and the Army eventually dropped him 

from the rolls. By December 1812, U.S. Army operations had ceased 

along the Niagara frontier, as the armies went into winter quarters and 

U.S. leaders struggled with the political and military dilemmas created 

by their flawed strategy.

The Northern Theater, July 1812–February 1813

The third, and final, theater of American offensive operations 

during 1812 was perhaps the most strategically important because 

it provided the best opportunity to sever the British supply lines to 

Upper Canada. The operational area formed a triangle with Montreal at its apex in the north. Kingston, Upper Canada, and Sackett’s 

Harbor, New York, both on Lake Ontario, formed the western points 

of the triangle, while Plattsburgh, New York, marked its southern 

point. Due to the wilderness between Plattsburgh and Lake Ontario, 

the Americans confined their activities to two avenues of approach 

into Canada: the corridor formed by eastern Lake Ontario and 

the St. Lawrence River, and the corridor that ran up through Lake 

Champlain and Plattsburgh. Generals Dearborn and Prevost oversaw 

American and British forces, respectively, in this potentially decisive 

theater of war.

The St. Lawrence Front, July 1812–February 1813

The St. Lawrence River and the eastern portion of Lake Ontario provided a natural point of entry into Canada. Much as in 

the Northwest and Niagara theaters, control of the waterways was 

vitally important for moving troops and supplies through the sparsely 

populated frontier. Also as in other theaters, the United States did 

not have a naval force on the lake until well after the war began. 

Sackett’s Harbor would serve as the main American naval base on 

Lake Ontario, while Kingston provided the British a similar harbor. 

On 19 July, New York militia Brig. Gen. Jacob J. Brown, a former 

Quaker, schoolteacher, and now a prosperous landowner, repulsed a 

British raid on Sackett’s Harbor in the first significant action of this 

region in the war. Dubbed the Fighting Quaker, Brown possessed 

enthusiasm and combativeness, which proved useful in the back-andforth raids that soon followed along the Lake Ontario–St. Lawrence 

frontier. Brown enjoyed the luxury of having a company of welltrained regulars from the U.S. Regiment of Riflemen commanded 

by the “dashing dare-devil from North Carolina,” Capt. Benjamin 

Forsyth. Forsyth’s green-coated men were armed with the .54-caliber 
•••• 50 ••••

Model 1803 Harpers Ferry Rifle 

that could hit a target accurately 

up to three hundred yards away. 

They quickly gained a reputation 

as one of the few American units 

that could consistently defeat the 

enemy during the early stages of 

the War of 1812. 

Because of persistent supply and ammunition shortages, 

Brown ordered Forsyth to organize a raid on the British supply 

depot at Gananoque, Upper 

Canada (in present-day Ontario), 

about forty miles from Sackett’s 

Harbor. Forsyth embarked seventy riflemen and thirty-four 

militiamen on boats, whereupon 

they glided among the numerous 

river islands to avoid detection. 

On the morning of 21 September, 

Forsyth’s unit landed unopposed 

and surprised about a hundred 

Canadian militiamen guarding the depot. After forming 

ranks and exchanging volleys, the 

American regulars charged, and 

the militia fled, leaving behind ten 

dead. The Americans seized dozens of muskets and numerous casks 

of ammunition, and took eight prisoners. They burned a large storehouse and departed after the thirty-minute action. Forsyth lost one 

man killed and ten wounded. This daring raid induced the British to 

strengthen their defenses along the St. Lawrence River, particularly 

at Kingston, Prescott, and Gananoque (Map 4).

At the end of September, Brown moved his base of operations 

from Sackett’s Harbor to Ogdensburg, New York, a small village at 

the confluence of the Oswegatchie and St. Lawrence Rivers, directly 

opposite Prescott, Upper Canada, and astride the main British supply 

line to the Great Lakes. Both towns served as transshipment points for 

commerce bypassing the rapids on the St. Lawrence River. Brown’s 

men garrisoned the village and built several artillery batteries aimed 

toward Prescott. For this they won few accolades from the largely 

Jacob J. Brown, engraving 

by Thomas Gimbrede

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
Lacolle

20 Nov

Sackett’s Harbor

19 Jul

Gananoque

21 Sep

Elizabethtown

6 Feb

French Mills

23 Nov Akwesasne

23 Oct

23 Nov

Fort La Presentation

22 Feb

22 Feb

Ogdensburg

4 Oct

St. Lawrence R

Chateauguay R

Ottawa R

Lake Champlain

Lake George

R

i

ch

e

li

e

u

R

Salmon R

L a k e O n t a r i o

Wolfe Island

Long Sault Rapids

Kingston

Prescott

Four Corners

Plattsburgh

Isle aux Noix

St. Johns

Montreal

Ottawa

Odelltown

Champlain

N E W Y O R K

T V E R M O N

U P P E R

C A N A D A

L O W E R

C A N A D A

L O W E R

C A N A D A

S T. L AW R E N C E R I V E R

OPERATIONAL AREA

July 1812–February 1813

Battle Site

0 50 25

Miles

Map 4
•••• 52 ••••

Federalist citizens of Ogdensburg, who had until that time enjoyed 

a thriving trade with their friends and relatives living in Canada. 

Economic and family ties trumped national loyalty. 

On 4 October, the British launched the first of several operations 

against Ogdensburg. Disregarding Prevost’s nonaggression policy, 

Col. Robert Lethbridge organized an amphibious attack. Brown 

waited until the enemy was halfway across the river, then ordered his 

batteries to fire, killing three men and wounding nine. The British 

boats returned to Prescott without reaching the American shore, and 

Prevost recalled Lethbridge to Montreal when he heard of the fiasco.

On 23 October, two hundred New York militia commanded by 

Maj. Guilford D. Young departed Troy, New York, to attack Akwesasne, a community of French-Catholic Mohawk Indians located 

on the St. Lawrence southwest of Montreal at Lake St. Francis and 

straddled the border. A company of the Corps of Canadian Voltigeurs

under the command of Capt. John MacDonnell guarded Akwesasne. 

During the raid, the Americans captured the post, killed seven of the 

British, and took forty-one prisoners. A small party of New York 

militia then remained to guard this post.

The British retaliated in November when British Capt. Andrew 

Gray, who was proceeding up the St. Lawrence River with a convoy 

of bateaux filled with supplies, received orders to recapture Akwesasne 

and attack the American post at French Mills, New York, located on 

the Salmon River about nine miles to the east. Gray gathered a mixed 

force of regulars and militia and led it across the Salmon River before 

dawn on 23 November. He regained control of Akwesasne without opposition from the squad of Americans stationed there. Upon arrival at 

French Mills, he surprised and defeated the New York militia garrison, 

killing three men and capturing forty-two. The British then destroyed 

any arms, ammunition, and bateaux they could not carry away.

The winter passed quietly in the region until the North Carolina 

daredevil, the newly promoted Major Forsyth, broke the calm. During 

the early morning of 6 February 1813, he led two hundred riflemen 

and militia in sleighs across the frozen St. Lawrence River to liberate 

Americans imprisoned at Elizabethtown, Upper Canada (present-day 

Brockville, Canada). The raiders surprised the garrison in their beds 

and freed the prisoners. They captured fifty-two Canadian militiamen 

and seized one hundred twenty stands of arms that the British had 

previously captured at Detroit. They then returned to Ogdensburg 

having suffered one man wounded. The action earned Forsyth a brevet 

promotion to lieutenant colonel, and the magazine the Niles Weekly 

Register proclaimed him to be a “terror to the enemy.” 
•••• 53 ••••

The raid proved to be Forsyth’s undoing. The British commander 

at Prescott, Lt. Col. George MacDonnell, had frequently appealed 

to Prevost for permission to attack Ogdensburg, but to no avail. 

Unwilling to allow the Elizabethtown raid to go unanswered, on 22 

February 1813, Colonel MacDonnell decided to ignore Prevost’s 

orders and assault Ogdensburg. He organized his force of eight 

hundred men into two columns. The right column, commanded 

by Capt. John Jenkins, was to attack the town near the old French 

Fort La Presentation on the west bank of the Oswegatchie River. 

Simultaneously, the left column, which included some artillery and 

was under MacDonnell’s direct command, would attack from the 

east. Both columns would have to move through heavy snow, which 

further added to the difficulty of this maneuver.

The American defenders consisted of Forsyth’s rifle company and 

four understrength companies of New York militia. MacDonnell’s 

column quickly captured several American batteries on the river, 

while Jenkins’ column ran into stiff opposition at Fort La Presentation, where the riflemen inflicted heavy casualties on the British. 

During a pause in the action, MacDonnell demanded that Forsyth 

surrender. Forsyth, however, managed to escape. The British occupied 

Ogdensburg and burned two large barracks, two merchant vessels, 

and two gunboats. The British lost seven men killed and sixty-three 

wounded, including MacDonnell and Jenkins, while the Americans 

suffered three killed, seventeen wounded, and fifty-two captured.

Forsyth withdrew about nine miles from Ogdensburg and sent a 

message to Col. Alexander Macomb at Sackett’s Harbor, asking for 

three hundred reinforcements to mount a counterattack to regain Ogdensburg and to seize Prescott. Macomb would send no reinforcements, 

so Forsyth and his command moved to Sackett’s Harbor. Thereafter the 

citizens of Ogdensburg refused to allow American troops to return to 

the town, fearing their presence would lead to further bloodshed and 

destruction. For the remainder of the war, the British supply convoys 

would pass this stretch of the St. Lawrence River unmolested. 

The Plattsburgh Front, November–December 1812

While the warring parties sparred along the St. Lawrence frontier, 

General Dearborn planned to strike a knockout blow against the heart 

of British administration in Canada, the city of Montreal, via Plattsburgh. To execute the mission, in early September he formed what he 

called the Northern Army. By 8 November, over one thousand troops 

had arrived. Dearborn, however, dithered, and he did not arrive at 

Plattsburgh until 10 November, where he found an army weakened 
•••• 54 ••••

by illness and lax discipline. Finally, in mid-November, he decided 

to undertake the long-awaited offensive to seize Montreal. But the 

delay would prove costly. Not only had cold weather and inclement 

conditions set in that would adversely affect operations, but also the 

other two prongs of his grand strategic design had already run their 

course and ended in failure at Detroit and Queenston. The advance 

against Montreal would go forward alone. 

General Dearborn’s army numbered about six thousand men, 

including seven regiments of regular infantry, some artillery, and 

light dragoons. In addition, he had a variety of militia from various 

northeastern states. The commanding general divided this force into 

two brigades: one commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Bloomfield and 

the other by Brig. Gen. John Chandler. Dearborn wanted Bloomfield 

to lead the offensive, but when he became ill, Dearborn reluctantly 

chose to lead it himself. On 19 November, the Americans reached 

Champlain, New York, just below the Canadian border. Here 

Dearborn faced the same situation that Hull and Van Rensselaer 

had experienced when about half of his militia refused to cross the 

Canadian border. 

Early on 20 November, Col. Zebulon M. Pike crossed into Canada 

with six hundred fifty men of the 15th U.S. Infantry and three hundred 

militiamen, and advanced on Lacolle, a small village two miles west 

of the Richelieu River and five miles north of the New York border. 

A small contingent of the Canadian Voltigeurs, some fur traders, and 

Kahnawake Mohawk Indians commanded by Lt. Col. Charles-Michel 

de Salaberry defended the town. 

Pike formed his men on line and ordered them to attack only with 

bayonets. The British put up a brief defense at a blockhouse but were 

forced to retreat. The Americans proceeded to destroy many of the 

buildings of the village as darkness fell. However, the small victory 

was soon spoiled. Some Americans accidentally fired on a body of 

New York militia who had trailed behind the main force and were mistaken for Canadians. A confused, two-hour firefight ensued that left 

two Americans dead, twelve wounded, and five missing. Meanwhile, 

de Salaberry returned to Lacolle with about one hundred Voltigeurs

and two hundred thirty Kahnawake warriors. This proved too much 

for the Americans who withdrew back to Champlain. 

At this point, Dearborn called a council of war with his subordinate officers who recommended returning to Plattsburgh and winter 

quarters. On 22 November, the Northern Army began marching 

south, and the next day the militiamen were discharged and sent home, 

while the regulars went into winter quarters. Fully expecting to be 
•••• 55 ••••

blamed, or at worst relieved of command, Dearborn was surprised 

that responsibility for the cumulative disasters fell instead upon Secretary Eustis. On 3 December 1812, Eustis resigned as secretary of 

war. Both his tenure and the year 1812 had come to an end.

Analysis

The year 1812 and the early months of 1813 had been bitterly disappointing for the United States Army. The defeat of American arms at 

Detroit, Queenston Heights, the River Raisin, and Ogdensburg—not to 

mention Dearborn’s failed invasion of Canada—illustrated a systemic 

institutional failure of leadership, organization, training, and logistics. 

The United States had simply not prepared for a war it chose to fight. 

At its root, the strategic plan for the invasion of Canada proved 

far beyond the capabilities of the United States Army. The organization and administration of the War Department was wholly inadequate for the task it faced. Eustis demonstrated, and later admitted, 

that he was unable to cope with the burgeoning responsibilities of war. 

His focus on petty details instead of the larger problems of leadership 

and policy greatly hindered the early campaigns. Unreliable and slow 

overland transportation also hampered communications between 

Washington and the field commanders. The secretary of war often 

did not know what decisions or movements his commanders were 

making, while commanders often waited for clarification of orders 

or misinterpreted what they were being asked to do. As a result, the 

Army failed to coordinate operations on the three major theaters. 

Logistics, too, proved a critical weakness. The field armies depended on civilian contractors for all classes of supplies and transportation. Under the contract system, rations were purchased, and 

the contractor had to deliver them in a specific quantity, to a specific 

place, and at a specific time. Most contractors were unreliable in this 

regard. Transportation was not only slow, but also added to the cost 

of supplies. The loss of horses and the expense of forage raised the 

price the Army paid for a barrel of pork to $127, a barrel of flour to 

$100, and a bushel of oats to $160. British control of the waterways 

exacerbated this problem, forcing the Army to move supplies laboriously overland.

Madison’s idea of concentrating the Army for a strike north 

toward Montreal made sense both logistically and strategically, but 

the local inhabitants were less than enthusiastic about waging war 

against their Canadian trading partners. Many New England states 

argued they were not threatened by invasion from that quarter, but 
•••• 56 ••••

by sea, and so tended to focus their resources on coastal defense. 

Conversely, it was politically and logistically impossible to convince 

troops from the West and South, where the war was generally popular, 

to move to New York and to bear the brunt of offensive operations 

while New Englanders remained passive. 

Another culprit in the nation’s failure in 1812 was the militia system. For philosophical, political, and financial reasons, the founders 

of the nation had chosen a manpower policy that relied on a small 

standing army in peace and the more numerous, but less well-trained 

and disciplined, state militias during war. All too frequently in 1812, 

the nation’s militia proved unequal to the task. Moreover, many militiamen felt no obligation to serve outside of their home states and 

absolutely refused to invade another country. Thus public rhetoric 

about easily seizing Canada clashed with the reality of actually carrying out the invasion under very unfavorable circumstances. 

The enemy also played a role, as should be expected, in thwarting U.S. offensive operations. The British enjoyed the advantage of 

interior lines of movement, communications, and supply, facilitated 

by control of the waterways. They were thus able to shift their limited 

forces from one threatened theater to the next to defeat each of the 

unsynchronized American threats in turn. Elated by their unexpected 

success, Anglo-Canadian morale soared, further raising the challenge 

for a demoralized America. 

At the tactical level, the U.S. Army clearly needed more than 

just good generals, although these too had been in short supply in 

1812. It badly needed competent junior officers and soldiers who 

were thoroughly trained and disciplined. Developing such men and 

fixing the Army’s shortcomings in organization, communications, 

and logistics would take time, and solid leadership. Until these could 

be found, prospects for victory—so deceptively bright in the heady 

days following the declaration of war in June 1812—looked dim. 
•••• 57 ••••

•••

The Author

Steven J. Rauch is the command historian for the U.S. Army 

Signal Center of Excellence at Fort Gordon, Georgia. He received 

bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history from Eastern Michigan 

University. He was commissioned in the U.S. Army as an ordnance 

officer and retired from active duty in 2002. During his military 

service, he served as an Army ROTC instructor at the University 

of Michigan and an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College. He has written and presented 

his scholarship about the War of 1812 in various forums, including 

the Michigan Historical Review, the Encyclopedia of the War of 1812, 

the Society for Military History, and the Journal of the War of 1812. 
•••• 58 ••••

•••

Further Readings

Crackel, Theodore J. “The Battle of Queenston Heights.” In America’s 

First Battles. Edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft. 

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.

Everest, Allan S. The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley. Syracuse, 

N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981.

Fredrikson, John C. Green Coats and Glory: The United States Regiment of Riflemen 1808–1821. Youngstown, N.Y.: Old Fort Niagara 

Association, 2000.

________. The United States Army in the War of 1812: Concise Biographies of Commanders and Operational Histories of Regiments, 

with Bibliographies of Published and Primary Sources. Jefferson, 

N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2009. 

Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: 

University of Illinois Press, 1989.

Hitsman, J. Mackay. The Incredible War of 1812. Rev. ed. Toronto: 

Robin Brass Studio, 2000.

Mahon, John K. The War of 1812. Gainesville: University of Florida 

Press, 1972. Reprint New York: Da Capo Press, 1991.

Malcomson, Robert. A Very Brilliant Affair: The Battle of Queenston 

Heights, 1812. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

Quimby, Robert S. The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational 

and Command Study. East Lansing: Michigan State University 

Press, 1997. 

Tucker, Spencer C., ed. The Encyclopedia of the War of 1812. 3 vols. 

Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2012.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the War of 1812, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812 series 

published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

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