UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

___________________________________ 

 ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Criminal No. 21-0598 (PLF) 

TERENCE SUTTON ) 

 and ) 

ANDREW ZABAVSKY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 The Court has before it Karen Hylton’s Emergency Motion of Crime Victim to 

Prevent Unreasonable Delay (“Emergency Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 546]; Defendant Andrew 

Zabavsky’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Emergency Motion (“Zabavsky Opp.”) 

[Dkt. No. 548]; Karen Hylton’s Reply to Opposition of Defendant Zabavsky (“Hylton Reply”) 

[Dkt. No. 550]; Defendant Terence Sutton’s Opposition to the Emergency Motion (“Sutton 

Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 551]; Karen Hylton’s Reply to Opposition of Defendant Sutton (“Hylton 

Second Reply”) [Dkt. No. 552]; and the Government’s Response to the Emergency Motion 

(“Govt. Resp.”) [Dkt. No. 553]. 

Ms. Hylton argues that the sentencing of the defendants in this case has been 

unreasonably delayed subject to correction under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7) (affording a crime victim the right to “proceedings free from 

unreasonable delay”). Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zabavsky oppose the motion, arguing that Ms. Hylton 

is not a “crime victim” under the statute. See Zabavsky Opp. at 1-2; Sutton Opp. at 8. The 

government asserts that Ms. Hylton is entitled to relief under the statute, and that sentencing in 
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this case is “long overdue.” Govt. Resp. at 1. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in 

part and deny in part Ms. Hylton’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2022, after a nine-week trial, a jury convicted defendant Terence 

Sutton of the second degree murder of Karon Hylton-Brown, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and 

obstruction of justice, and defendant Andrew Zabavsky of conspiracy to obstruct justice and 

obstruction of justice. See Verdict Form [Dkt. No. 426]. Since their convictions, defendants 

have filed multiple post-trial motions seeking relief from the verdict and have reasonably 

requested the Court to delay sentencing until the motions were fully resolved. See

December 1, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. No. 524] (detailing the procedural 

history regarding the scheduling of a sentencing hearing). On December 6, 2023, the Court 

issued an opinion resolving the defendants’ Rule 29 motions for judgment of acquittal. See

December 6, 2023 Opinion and Order [Dkt. No. 526] (denying defendants’ Rule 29 motions and 

setting forth the facts found by the jury). On January 25, 2024, the Court issued an opinion 

resolving defendants’ Rule 33 and Rule 34 motions. See January 25, 2024 Opinion and Order 

[Dkt. No. 530] (denying defendants’ Rule 33 and 34 motions). It also issued an order scheduling 

a sentencing hearing for June 26, 2024, and set deadlines for the United States Probation Office 

(“Probation Office”) to file its presentence investigation report and the parties to file their 

sentencing memoranda. See January 25, 2024 Order [Dkt. No. 531]. 

On May 1, 2024, the Probation Office filed draft presentence investigation reports 

as to both Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zabavsky. See Draft Presentence Report as to Terence Sutton 

(“Sutton PSR”) [Dkt. No. 533]; Draft Presentence Report as to Andrew Zabavsky (“Zabavsky 

PSR”) [Dkt. No. 534]. On May 9, 2024, Mr. Zabavsky filed a motion to extend the deadline for 
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the filing of his objections to the presentence investigation report by five days. Zabavsky’s 

Motion to Modify the Sentencing Scheduling Order [Dkt. No. 535]. The same day, Mr. Sutton 

filed a consent motion requesting the same extension of time. Consent Motion to Modify the 

Sentencing Schedule Order [Dkt. No. 536]. The Court granted both motions. Minute Orders of

May 9, 2024. On May 10, 2024, the government filed its objections to each presentence

investigation report. Government’s Objections to Sutton PSR [Dkt. No. 538]; Government’s 

Objections to Zabavsky PSR [Dkt. No. 539]. On May 15, 2024, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zabavsky 

each filed their objections. Zabavsky’s Objections to Draft Presentence Report (“Zabavsky PSR 

Objections”) [Dkt. No. 542]; Sutton’s Objections to Draft Presentence Report (“Sutton PSR 

Objections”) [Dkt. No. 543]. After reviewing the very substantial objections raised by both the 

defendants and the government, the Court vacated the sentencing hearing date, set new deadlines 

for the filing of a revised draft and final presentence investigation report and of objections from 

the parties. The Court then scheduled a new sentencing hearing for September 11, 2024. 

May 24, 2024 Order [Dkt. No. 545]. 

II. DISCUSSION

The CVRA enumerates various rights afforded to victims of crime, including the 

right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court and the right to 

proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4), (a)(7). Ms. Hylton asserts 

that the Court’s decision to postpone the sentencing hearing until September 11, 2024 creates an 

unreasonable delay.
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A. Ms. Hylton is a victim within the meaning of the CVRA 

A person may be a “crime victim” for the purposes of the CVRA if they are 

“directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a federal offense or an offense 

in the District of Columbia.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A).1 To determine whether an individual is 

a victim under the CVRA, the Court must engage in a two-step analysis: (1) identify the behavior 

constituting the commission of the offense, and (2) identify the direct and proximate effects of 

that behavior on parties other than the United States. See United States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 F. 

Supp. 3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015). This requires a finding that the commission of the offense 

was both the but-for and the proximate cause of the harm, the latter of which requires that the 

harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the criminal conduct. Id. at 383; see also In

re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011). For a person who was not the primary victim of the 

crime, “a party may qualify as a victim, even though it may not have been the target of the crime, 

as long as it suffers harm as a result of the crime’s commission.” In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 

1289 (11th Cir. 2008). 

In this case, the Court disagrees with the defendants and agrees with Ms. Hylton 

that she is a victim of both Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zabavsky’s offenses. Mr. Sutton was convicted 

of the murder of Ms. Hylton’s son, Karon Hylton-Brown, and, as the mother of the decedent, Ms. 

Hylton has surely suffered as a result of Mr. Sutton’s conduct. The jury found that were it not 

for Mr. Sutton’s actions, Ms. Hylton’s son would be alive today. “Congress crafted the CVRA 

to recognize the harm and anguish suffered by victims of crime.” In re de Henriquez, 2015 

WL 10692637, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 2015). When those victims are deceased, the harm is 

1

 If the victim of a crime is deceased, an individual may also be entitled to the 

protections of the CVRA if they are a legal guardian or family member of the decedent. 18 

U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(B). 
5 

primarily done to the families and communities that they leave behind. It is eminently 

foreseeable that the mother of a deceased child will experience significant pain and grief.

Mr. Zabavsky’s actions also harmed Ms. Hylton. Mr. Zabavsky’s obstruction of 

justice delayed the investigation and prosecution of the events leading to Mr. Hylton-Brown’s 

death. His conduct in not ensuring the preservation of evidence at the crash scene, not promptly 

notifying senior Metropolitan Police Department officials, and affirmatively misleading the 

watch commander – all to conceal details of the crash – deprived Ms. Hylton of seeing swifter 

justice for her son’s murder. Furthermore, as Ms. Hylton emphasizes, it was foreseeable that 

obstructing justice would “hinder accountability for the crime, which is precisely what the family 

members of the decedent seek for some measure of comfort and justice.” Hylton Reply at 2. 

This is more than sufficient to establish her eligibility under the statute. 

B. The delays in sentencing are not unreasonable 

While Ms. Hylton therefore is a victim entitled to petition for relief under the 

CVRA, the Court finds that the delays in sentencing have not been unreasonable. To assess the 

reasonableness of the timeline for proceedings, the Court must balance the victim’s interest in 

avoiding unreasonable delay against a defendant’s right to file post-trial motions and the 

government’s right to defend against them – particularly in a case like this, where the jury trial 

took nine long weeks and the Court issued 28 written opinions before and during trial because of 

significant issues raised by the parties. While a court should not permit delay for the “mere 

convenience” of the parties, see United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 334 

(E.D.N.Y 2005) (citing legislative history), it must be remembered that the CVRA only gives 

victims “a voice but not a veto.” Id. at 331. The government and the defendants have rights as 

well. United States v. Tobin, 2005 WL 1868682 at *2 (D.N.H. 2005). 
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As noted, the Court reasonably agreed to delay sentencing during the pendency of 

the defendants’ post-conviction motions for relief, but it issued a scheduling order for sentencing 

on the very same day that it ruled on the final outstanding motions, the defendants’ motions 

under Rule 33 and 34. See January 25, 2024 Order. And because of the contentious nature of 

the case – engendering strong emotions both within Ms. Hylton’s community and within the 

police community – the Court scheduled a date to hear arguments on sentencing and Sentencing 

Guidelines issues on a day separate from the date on which it will actually impose the sentences. 

The Court will want a day or two to carefully deliberate before making its determination as to 

what are fair and just sentences under the circumstances. 

The Court anticipated that the parties would be prepared to present arguments at a 

sentencing hearing on June 26, 2024. The Probation Office filed its draft presentence 

investigation reports on May 1, 2024, but both the government and defendants raised significant 

objections. Normally, the next step would be for the Probation Office to consider the parties’ 

objections and file its final presentence investigation reports, making changes and adjustments as 

appropriate and explaining why it had rejected other objections. But instead, the Court asked the 

Probation Office to prepare a revised draft presentence investigation report. In view of the 

substantial work already done by the Probation Office, why, Ms. Hylton asks, did the Court 

order “a complete reset,” Hylton Reply at 5, and order a revised draft report, rather than proceed 

in the normal course. She deserves an answer to that question. 

Frankly, it is the fault of counsel for the parties—both government counsel and 

defense counsel. The Probation Office did not attend the nine-week jury trial, so was able to 

provide only a cursory and incomplete statement of the offense conduct in the draft presentence 

investigation report. See Sutton PSR ¶¶ 9-24; Zabavsky PSR ¶¶ 7-22. Mr. Sutton devotes more 
7 

than half of his eighteen pages of objections to explaining why the Probation Office got the facts 

wrong. Sutton PSR Objections at 2-11; see also Zabavsky PSR Objections at 1-5. For its part, 

nearly all of the government’s objections explain why the Probation Office got the law wrong – 

the statutory maximum in the case of the D.C. Code offense and the Sentencing Guidelines 

computations with respect to the federal offenses. See Government’s Objections to Sutton PSR 

at 2-4; Government’s Objections to Zabavsky PSR at 2-3. All of this could have been avoided if 

counsel for the parties had been proactive during their conversations with the Probation Office as 

it prepared its draft reports. 

The inaccuracies in the draft presentence investigation reports could easily have 

been prevented had the parties provided the Probation Office with (1) a copy of the Court’s 98-

page Rule 29 opinion, which set out in great detail the testimony of the witnesses and other 

evidence at trial; (2) the most relevant portions of the final jury instructions, particularly the 

instructions relating to the elements of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), especially

elements (4) and (5), see Jury Instructions [Dkt. No. 435] at 30; and (3) any relevant opinions 

this Court issued before and during the trial. Because of the parties’ lack of initiative on these 

matters, the Probation Office now requires time to correct the draft presentence investigation 

reports, both the fact section and its Guidelines calculations. 

Finally, while this case is extremely important to the parties, to Ms. Hylton, and to 

the community, it is not the only case to which the Probation Office must devote its attention. 

There have been approximately 1,400 January 6 cases filed in this Court to which many 

Probation Office resources have been and continue to be directed. The Probation Office is 

overtaxed and overworked, with probably ten times its normal workload. Furthermore, it must 

prioritize its work for detained defendants over those of defendants who have been released on 
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bond. The delay in sentencing in this case by a measure of months is not unreasonable under the

circumstances. 

III. CONCLUSION

The Court recognizes Ms. Hylton’s right as a victim to bring a claim under the 

CVRA, but it does not agree with her assertion that the delay in sentencing in this case is 

unreasonable. Nevertheless, in order to accommodate her interests and her right to proceedings 

free from unreasonable delay, the Court will revise the schedule for sentencing procedures set 

forth in its Order of May 24, 2024. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Ms. Hylton’s motion [Dkt. No. 546] is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART; it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Probation Office shall submit a 

revised draft presentence investigation report on or before June 28, 2024; it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the revised 

draft presentence report on or before July 11, 2024; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Probation Office shall submit the 

final presentence investigation report on or before July 22, 2024; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the government, Mr. Sutton, and Mr. 

Zabavsky shall each submit memoranda in support of sentencing on or before August 2, 2024; it 

is

FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the government shall submit a response 

to Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zabavsky’s sentencing memoranda on or before August 12, 2024; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zabavsky shall 

submit responses to the government’s sentencing memoranda on or before August 22, 2024; it is