IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

Gregory Gimbrone, :

 Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:12-cv-251

 v. : JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

Dr. Krisher, et al., :

 Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court to consider a motion for

judgment on the pleadings filed by defendants the Ohio Department

of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Dr. Krisher, Ms.

Higginbotham, and Mr. Free (collectively “defendants”). (Doc.

#65). For the reasons set forth below, it will be recommended

that the motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted. 

I. Background

Plaintiff, Gregory Gimbrone, is a prisoner who resides at

the Chillicothe Correctional Institution. (Doc. #19 at 2). On

June 11, 2012, Mr. Gimbrone filed an amended complaint against

defendants, alleging that they improperly denied him the use of a

cane beginning in 2010. Id. at 3. More specifically, Mr.

Gimbrone alleged that he suffers from foot problems as a result

of the partial amputation of his right foot when he was fourteen

(although the foot was subsequently reattached), and that he used

a cane on a fairly consistent basis from 1999, when he was first

incarcerated, until it was improperly taken from him in 2010. 

Id. Based upon these allegations, Mr. Gimbrone brings claims

against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with

Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and state law.

Id. at 2, 5-6. Mr. Gimbrone seeks restoration of the cane, as

well as substantial monetary damages for the time he has spent

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without it. Id. at 7-8.

In the motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants

assert that Mr. Gimbrone’s amended complaint should be dismissed

for a number of reasons. First, defendants claim that this

action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment because defendants are

state employees and a state department. Second, defendants argue

that Mr. Gimbrone fails to state a claim because ODRC is not a

“person” within the meaning of §1983. Third, defendants argue

that Mr. Gimbrone fails to plead sufficient factual allegations

to state a plausible constitutional violation against each

defendant. Fourth, defendants allege that they are immune from

liability for any state law claims because Mr. Gimbrone did not

first seek an immunity determination in the Ohio Court of Claims. 

Fifth, defendants contend that Mr. Gimbrone failed to state a

claim under the ADA because he does not allege that he has a

disability as defined by the statute and the ADA does not provide

for individual liability against defendants.

II. Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks the

sufficiency of the pleadings and is evaluated under the same

standard as a motion to dismiss. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,

598 F.2d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 1979). In ruling upon such a

motion, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded material

allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party, and the

motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless

clearly entitled to judgment. Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir.

1973). 

The new pleading standards articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007) apply with equal force to motions for judgment on the

pleadings. See Schwab v. Smalls, No. 10-221-cv, 2011 WL 3156530,

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at *1 (2d Cir. July 27, 2011). Those cases make clear that in

order to survive such a motion, a complaint must contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, the Court must disregard

statements of legal conclusions and look only to the well-pleaded

facts of the complaint in order to determine its legal

sufficiency. Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally in

favor of the pro se party. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972). It is with these standards in mind that the motion

for judgment on the pleadings must be decided.

III. Analysis

In examining the pending motion for judgment on the

pleadings, the Court first will address Mr. Gimbrone’s §1983

claims against the individual defendants in their official

capacities and ODRC. Next, the Court will turn to the §1983

claims against defendants in their individual capacities. The

Court then will examine Mr. Gimbrone’s ADA claim. Finally, the

Court will discuss Mr. Gimbrone’s state law claims. 

A. §1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants

in Their Official Capacities and ODRC

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

bars suits against either a state or agencies of a state by

citizens of that state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 651

(1974). Under certain circumstances, a suit against an

individual state official may nonetheless be deemed to be a suit

against the state and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

The primary test for determining whether the state is the real

party in interest in a suit is whether the source of any funds

from which a damage award would be paid would be the state

treasury. Id. at 663. Additionally, if an individual is alleged

to have only vicarious liability as a result of his official

position, any damage award made (if one were permissible) would

necessarily be against the office rather than the officeholder

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and therefore be an award against the state. See Hall v. Medical

College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1984). When a suit

is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court lacks jurisdiction

over it and it must be dismissed without prejudice. Cf. Gwinn

Comm. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1984).

In his amended complaint, Mr. Gimbrone states that he filed

the lawsuit against the individual defendants in their individual

and “professional” capacities and against ODRC. (Doc. #19 at 5-

6). The claims against the individual defendants in their

official capacities are deemed to be brought against the state. 

Accordingly, Mr. Gimbrone’s claims for relief against these

defendants must be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. Mr.

Gimbrone’s §1983 claim against the ODRC likewise fails because

the ODRC is a state agency which is also immune from liability

under the Eleventh Amendment. See Carmichael v. Cleveland, 881

F. Supp. 2d 833, 844 (N.D. Ohio 2012); see also Stoutamire v.

Department of Rehab. and Corr., No. 2:10-cv-645, 2011 WL 1233469,

at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011)(finding that “the ODRC is a state

agency of Ohio”). Further, the ODRC is not a “person” who can be

held liable under §1983. See id.; see also Stoutamire, 2011 WL

1233469, at *2 (finding that the ODRC “is immune from suit in

federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and is not a

person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983"). Consequently,

the Court will recommend granting defendants’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings as to Mr. Gimbrone’s claims against the

individual defendants in their official capacities and ODRC. The

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not, however, bar Mr. Gimbrone’s

claims against the individual defendants in their individual

capacities. The Court now turns to those claims.

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B. §1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants

in Their Individual Capacities

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to judgment on

the pleadings as to Mr. Gimbrone’s §1983 claims against them in

their individual capacities. As to Ms. Higginbotham and Mr.

Free, defendants argue that Mr. Gimbrone’s allegations are

insufficient to state a claim and should be dismissed. (Doc. #65

at 6). As to Dr. Krisher, defendants argue that Mr. Gimbrone’s

allegations “amount to a disagreement over treatment and do not

establish liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 10. The

Court will examine defendants’ arguments in turn.

1. §1983 Claim Against Ms. Higginbotham

in her Individual Capacity

In the motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants

state that “the totality of Plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendant Higginbotham is that she met with Plaintiff after

reviewing his medical records with Defendant Dr. Krisher, and

relayed to Plaintiff that Dr. Krisher would not change his course

of treatment.” Id. at 9. Defendants argue that these

allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that Ms.

Higginbotham, through her own individual actions, violated the

Constitution. Id. This Court agrees. 

Contrary to defendants’ contentions, it is unclear from the

amended complaint whether Mr. Gimbrone is alleging that, upon a

review of the records, Ms. Higginbotham and/or Dr. Krisher would

do nothing to address Mr. Gimbrone’s foot condition. The

relevant sentence states that “[t]he Plaintiff met with Ms.

Higginbotham several days later when she stated that her and Dr.

Krisher would still do nothing concerning Plaintiff’s pain and

worsening condition of his foot.” (Doc. #19 at 4.) Plaintiff

made a handwritten insertion to the sentence just after the words

“Dr. Krisher” which said “reviewed the records.” Id.

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Defendants argue that, by adding the insertion, Mr. Gimbrone

intended for the sentence to state that “[t]he Plaintiff met with

Ms. Higginbotham several days later when she stated that her and

Dr. Krisher reviewed the records [Dr. Krisher] would still do

nothing concerning Plaintiff’s pain and worsening condition of

his foot.” (Doc. #65 at 8) (alteration in original). Giving

appropriate consideration to Mr. Gimbrone’s pro se status and

under the relevant law, the Court construes Mr. Gimbrone’s

sentence broadly to allege that neither Ms. Higgonbotham nor Dr.

Krisher would do anything to address Mr. Gimbrone’s foot

condition.

Even considering that broad construction, however, Mr.

Gimbrone fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a

claim. With respect to his §1983 claim, Mr. Gimbrone must

“identify a right secured by the United States Constitution and

the deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of

state law.” Russo v. Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir.

1992). Mere “conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct

without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim.” 

Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.

1996)). Although Mr. Gimbrone believes that Ms. Higginbotham

should have allowed him to retain his cane as treatment for his

medical condition, “the Constitution does not guarantee to a

prisoner the treatment of his choice.” Blakely v. Moore, No.

5:12-cv-1214, 2013 WL 980412, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 12,

2013)(finding plaintiff failed to establish genuine issue of

material fact as to whether doctor was deliberately indifferent

to his serious medical need when doctor issued plaintiff a walker

as a substitute for a walking cane). That is, “a prisoner’s mere

difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or

a course of medical treatment fails to rise to the level of a

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constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Nelson v. Shuffman, 603

F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010)). Further, non-medical prison

officials, such as Ms. Higginbotham, who Mr. Gimbrone alleges is

the health care administrator at the Chillicothe Correctional

Institution, are not:

considered deliberately indifferent simply because they

failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of

a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison

doctor. If a prisoner is under the care of medical

experts, a nonmedical prison official will generally be

justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable

hands.

Camp v. Overton, No. 10-281, 2011 WL 5188038, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

Oct. 11, 2011). Under the pleading standards in Twombly and

Iqbal, Mr. Gimbrone has not plead sufficient facts to set forth a

claim against Ms. Higginbotham. Consequently, the Court will

recommend granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings as it applies to Mr. Gimbrone’s §1983 claim against Ms.

Higginbotham in her individual capacity.

2. §1983 Claim Against Mr. Free

in his Individual Capacity

The Court now turns to Mr. Gimbrone’s §1983 claim against

Mr. Free in his individual capacity. In the amended complaint,

Mr. Gimbrone alleges that he filed a grievance with Mr. Free, the

Institutional Inspector/Americans with Disabilities Act

Coordinator, and Mr. Free denied that grievance. (Doc. #19 at 4-

5). The denial of a grievance is insufficient to give rise to

§1983 liability. See Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 Fed. Appx. 784,

787 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[p]rison officials are not

liable under §1983 for denying or failing to act on grievances”);

see also Alder v. Correctional Med. Servs., 73 Fed. Appx. 839,

841 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that “[t]he mere denial of a

prisoner’s grievance states no claim of constitutional

dimension”); Martin v. Harvey, 14 Fed. Appx. 307, 309 (6th Cir.

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2001) (stating that “[t]he denial of the grievance is not the

same as the denial of a request to receive medical care”). 

Further, to the extent that Mr. Gimbrone may have sued Mr. Free

because of his position of authority, respondeat superior does

not give rise to §1983 liability. See Monell v. Department of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978). Based upon the foregoing,

the Court will recommended granting defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings as it applies to Mr. Gimbrone’s §1983

claim against Mr. Free in his individual capacity.

3. §1983 Claim Against Dr. Krisher

in his Individual Capacity

The Court now examines Mr. Gimbrone’s claim against Dr.

Krisher. Because an Eighth Amendment medical claim must be

premised on deliberate indifference, mere negligence by a prison

doctor with respect to medical diagnosis or treatment is not

actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976). “[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Id.; see also

Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1994).

Although Mr. Gimbrone claims that Dr. Krisher did not

examine him or provide him with medical treatment, the exhibits

which Mr. Gimbrone incorporates into to the amended complaint

demonstrate otherwise. In particular, Mr. Gimbrone incorporated

exhibit D into the amended complaint, which was attached to his

original complaint filed on March 21, 2012. (Doc. #2, Ex. 1 at

7). Exhibit D consists of a disposition of grievance dated

December 28, 2011, which states that Mr. Gimbrone was “examined

by CMO Dr. Krisher on 9-21-11 and he observed that [Mr. Gimbrone]

walked without difficulty, but with a slight limp.” Id. Mr.

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Gimbrone also incorporated exhibit G into the amended complaint,

which was attached to his original complaint. (Doc. #2, Ex. 1 at

10). Exhibit G is a decision of the chief inspector on a

grievance appeal, which provides:

I note that you were seen by Dr. Krisher on 9-22-11

related to your complaint of problems with ambulation

related to your foot being amputated as a child, which

was reattached. Dr. Krisher noted that you stated you

complained of psoriasis in addition to the problems with

the reattached foot and that it hurts to walk on the foot

when it flares up. Dr. Krisher noted that you walk with

a slight limp. He noted scars to your right foot with no

skin lesions, tenderness, edema or warmth. His plan is

noted as ‘get records of cane need. Patient walks with

slight limp but without difficulty. Ibuprofen/Tylenol

when has outbreak. Concern for fungal infection

discussed.’

Id. Consequently, the record reflects that Dr. Krisher examined

Mr. Gimbrone and recommended over-the-counter medication, and not

a cane, to treat Mr. Gimbrone’s discomfort. Id. 

“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and

the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts

are reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to

constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” 

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). 

Moreover, a difference of opinion between an inmate and prison

physician as to the necessity and type of treatment required does

not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical

needs. See Owens v. Hutchinson, 79 Fed. Appx. 159, 161 (6th Cir.

2003). Rather, in order to give rise to a constitutional claim,

the treatment rendered must be so woefully inadequate as to

constitute no treatment at all. See Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860

n.5. 

Here, the record reflects that Dr. Krisher provided Mr.

Gimbrone with medical attention and that the care rendered was

not so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all. 

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Mr. Gimbrone’s disagreement with Dr. Krisher’s decision does not

give rise to a constitutional claim. Consequently, the Court

will recommend granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings as to Mr. Gimbrone’s §1983 claim against Dr. Krisher in

his individual capacity.

C. ADA Claim

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied benefits of the services, programs,

or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §12132. As used

in Title II of the ADA, “public entity” is defined as: “(A) any

State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special

purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States

or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger

Corporation, and any other commuter authority (as defined in

section 24102(4) of Title 49).” 42 U.S.C. §12131. 

Although the ADA applies to both federal and state prisons,

see Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 482 (6th Cir. 2010),

individual prison officials cannot be held individually liable

under the ADA. See Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 850

(E.D. Mich. 2008) (“‘Public entity’ under the Act does not

include an individual prison official, and thus plaintiff fails

to state a claim against the individual defendants under the

ADA”). As noted above, Mr. Gimbrone has sued defendants in their

individual and official capacities. Because Mr. Gimbrone may not

bring an ADA claim against defendants in their individual

capacities, it will be recommended that the motion for judgment

on the pleadings be granted as to those claims.

Although the ODRC and a public official acting in his or her

official capacity may be a proper defendant under an ADA Title II

claim, see Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396-97 (6th

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Cir. 2002), in order to state a claim, Mr. Gimbrone bears the

burden of demonstrating that he is a qualified individual with a

disability within the meaning of the statute and that he is being

denied the benefits of a service, program, or activity by reason

of his disability. See Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 533

(6th Cir. 2008). An individual is disabled under the ADA if he

or she (1) has a physical impairment that substantially limits

one or more of the major life activities, (2) has a record of

such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 

See Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099,

1105 (6th Cir. 2008). 

Defendants claim that they are entitled to judgment on the

pleadings because Mr. Gimbrone “never alleges that the condition

of his foot, which seems to be what he contends would qualify him

under the ADA, limits one or more of his major life activities.” 

(Doc. #65 at 15). More specifically, defendants state that

“[t]he only allegation Plaintiff makes relating to a disability

designation is that he was placed on Social Security disability

in 1993 or 1994 due to unspecified, chronic recurring

psychological and physical problems, but this allegation is not

sufficient to state a claim for relief under the ADA.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Defendants are correct that “a disability determination by

the Social Security Administration, even if substantiated, would

not be controlling.” Thornton v. Federal Express Corp., 530 F.3d

451, 455 (6th Cir. 2008). Further, “[m]erely having an

impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA.” 

Gerton v. Verizon South Inc., 145 Fed. Appx. 159, 164-65 (6th

Cir. 2005). Rather, in order to state a claim under the ADA, Mr.

Gimbrone must allege that his physical impairment substantially

limits one or more of his major life functions, such as caring

for himself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,

speaking, breathing, and learning. See id. 

The Court is willing to give Mr. Gimbrone the benefit of the

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doubt and find that he has pleaded facts supporting his claimed

disability, which affects his ability to walk. However, even

assuming that Mr. Gimbrone’s amended complaint is construed to

allege that he was disabled under the ADA, he fails to allege

that he was denied the benefit of a service, program, or activity

“solely” by reason of the disability. See Sandison v. Michigan

High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1036 (6th Cir.

1995). Stated another way, Mr. Gimbrone fails to plead facts

from which it is plausible to conclude that his cane was

confiscated and not replaced due to his disability. Mr. Gimbrone

also fails to allege that the denial of a cane has precluded his

participation in prison programs or other activities. Instead,

Mr. Gimbrone’s claim focuses on the denial of access to

equipment, namely a cane, that he claims entitlement to by reason

of a disability. These allegations alone do not give rise to an

ADA claim. Medical treatment decisions, or alleged medical

malpractice, cannot form the basis of a claim under the ADA. See

Baldridge-El v. Gundy, No. 99-2387, 2000 WL 1721014, at *2 (6th

Cir. Nov. 8, 2000)(stating that the plaintiff’s ADA claim fails

because the ADA does not “provide a cause of action for medical

malpractice”); see also Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883

(8th Cir. 2005) (“A lawsuit under [the ADA] cannot be based on

medical treatment decisions”); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246,

249 (7th Cir. 1996)(recognizing that “the ADA does not create a

remedy for medical malpractice”). Consequently, this Court will

also recommend that defendants’ motion be granted on the ADA

claim. 

D. State Law Claims

Last, the Court turns to any claims arising under state law. 

Mr. Gimbrone’s amended complaint contains a statement of

jurisdiction which asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over

pendent state law claims. (Doc. #19 at 2). Despite including

state law claims in the statement of jurisdiction, no such claims

appear elsewhere in the complaint. 

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Defendants argue, inter alia, that any state law claims that

Mr. Gimbrone would propose to assert are not actionable here. 

This Court agrees. The Eleventh Amendment precludes the

assertion of state law claims against the state and state actors

in federal courts. See Jones v. Swank, No. 2:11-cv-797, 2012 WL

4107981, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2012) (stating that “[t]he

ODRC is an arm of the State of Ohio and is immune from suit in

federal court under the Eleventh Amendment”); Powell v. Morris,

184 F.R.D. 591, 597 (S.D. Ohio 1998)(finding that “[t]he Eleventh

Amendment precludes the assertion of pendent [now supplemental]

state law claims against state actors in federal courts”). 

Further, under O.R.C. §9.86 no such claims may be maintained

against state officials in their individual capacities unless and

until it has been determined that those officials acted

manifestly outside the scope of their employment. That

determination cannot be made by a federal court; rather, it is

reserved for the Ohio Court of Claims under O.R.C. §2743.02(F). 

See Griffin v. Kyle, No. 2:10-cv-664, 2011 WL 2885007, at *3

(S.D. Ohio July 15, 2011). As this Court explained in Nuovo v.

The Ohio State University, 726 F. Supp.2d 829, 848 (S.D. Ohio

2010)(Frost, J.),

as another judicial officer has recognized, “[t]he Sixth

Circuit has read §§9.86 and 2743.02(F) together to hold

that a state employee is immune from state law claims

until the Court of Claims has held that §9.86 immunity is

unavailable.” Prior v. Mukasey, No. 3:08CV994, 2008 WL

5076821, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2008). This means

that, “[u]ntil the Ohio Court of Claims determines that

[defendants] are not immune, there is no cause of action

cognizable under Ohio law over which the district court

can assert jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Haynes v.

Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Accordingly, this Court will recommend that the motion for

judgment on the pleadings be granted as to any claims arising

under state law.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that the

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motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted. (Doc. #65). 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Report, file

and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,

together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge

of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,

may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object

to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the

right to have the district judge review the Report and

Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the

right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the

Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

 /s/ Terence P. Kemp 

United States Magistrate Judge

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