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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

FAMILY SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF 

STEUBENVILLE, OHIO, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 Case No. 2:12-cv-135 

v. Judge Watson 

 Magistrate Judge King 

WELLS TOWNSHIP, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the Wells Township Defendants’ 

Motion to Stay Ruling on Summary Judgment, ECF 65 (“Motion to Stay”). 

For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Stay is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On December 25, 2011, defendant Officer Jeffrey “J.J.” Kamerer, 

an employee of the Wells Township Police Department, approached James 

W. Coil, II, and his friend, Barry Starcher, in Brilliant, Ohio. 

Amended Complaint, ECF 34, ¶¶ 14, 16. After denying that anything was 

wrong, Mr. Coil and Mr. Starcher attempted to leave. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. 

In response, defendant Kamerer parked his police vehicle on the side 

of the road, without the emergency lights on, and exited the vehicle. 

Id. at ¶ 18. The encounter escalated, id. at ¶¶ 17-22; eventually, 

defendant Kamerer left Mr. Coil, handcuffed, on the road. Id. at ¶ 

24. Defendant Kamerer turned to Mr. Starcher, who was standing on the 

sidewalk. Id. At that point, a car driven by defendant Ronald 

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Bradcovich approached. Id. at ¶ 25. Defendant Kamerer ran towards 

defendant Bradcovich’s approaching car, which struck both defendant 

Kamerer and Mr. Coil. Id. at ¶ 26. Mr. Coil allegedly suffered a 

severe brain injury and has been hospitalized since that time. Id. at 

¶¶ 27-29.1

 On February 13, 2012, plaintiff filed the initial Complaint, ECF 

1, which was later amended. See First Amended Complaint. Named as 

defendants are Officer Kamerer, Wells Township, which funds and 

manages the Wells Township Police Department, and John Ingram, Chief 

of Police of the Wells Township Police Department (collectively, “the 

Wells Township defendants”), as well as Mr. Bradcovich. The Amended 

Complaint alleges the denial of Mr. Coil’s constitutional rights and 

also asserts a state law claim of assault and battery against the 

Wells Township defendants, a claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against defendant Kamerer and a claim of negligence 

against defendant Bradcovich. The Wells Township defendants assert a 

cross claim against defendant Bradcovich for indemnification and 

contribution, and defendant Bradcovich asserts a cross claim for 

contribution against the Wells Township defendants. 

 On April 30, 2013, the Wells Township defendants moved for 

summary judgment. ECF 37. With the filing of plaintiff’s sur-reply, 

ECF 63, on July 2, 2013, the motion for summary judgment is ripe for 

 

1 The Probate Court of Jefferson County, Ohio, appointed plaintiff, the Family 

Service Association of Steubenville, Ohio, to serve as the guardian of Mr. 

Coil’s person and estate. Amended Complaint, ¶ 7. 

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resolution.2 

 After the motion for summary judgment had been fully briefed, 

plaintiff provided notice of a decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals 

for the Seventh District in State v. Barry Starcher, Case No. 13 JE 1 

(“the Seventh District decision”).3

 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 

Supplemental Authority, ECF 64 (“Notice”). In that criminal case, Mr. 

Starcher is charged with two misdemeanors arising out of the events of 

December 25, 2011: (1) obstructing official business in violation of 

O.R.C. § 2921.31, a second-degree misdemeanor; and (2) failure to 

disclose personal information in violation of O.R.C. § 2921.29(A), a 

fourth-degree misdemeanor. Id. at PAGEID#:2328. Mr. Starcher 

originally pled no contest to these charges. Id. However, that plea 

was later vacated and Mr. Starcher filed a motion to dismiss 

(construed as a motion to suppress), which the trial court denied 

after a hearing. Id. In denying that motion, the trial court 

concluded that Officer Kamerer had reasonable suspicion to make an 

initial investigative stop, id. at PAGEID#:2329, and, further, that 

Officer Kamerer had probable cause later to arrest Mr. Starcher. Id. 

Mr. Starcher appealed that ruling, id. at PAGEID#:2328-PAGEID#:2329, 

and the state appellate court reversed, finding that, “[a]s a matter 

of law, the initial encounter [between Mr. Starcher and Officer 

Kamerer] was a consensual encounter; there is no evidence in the 

record of a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to 

 

2 Upon motion, ECF 59, plaintiff was granted leave to file a sur-reply. Order, 

ECF 62. Although permitted to do so, id., the Wells Township defendants did 

not file a response to plaintiff’s sur-reply. 

3 The underlying state criminal action filed in Jefferson County Court 3 

(Dillonvale County Court) is State v. Starcher, Case No. 11 CRB 347. Id. 

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initiate the stop.” Id. at PAGEID#:2332. The matter was remanded 

with instructions to the trial court to 

first determine which facts it finds credible. Then in 

applying those facts to the law, the [trial] court should 

determine whether during the consensual encounter the 

officer showed an exertion of authority that resulted in an 

illegal seizure, or if the actions of Starcher and Coil 

changed the encounter from consensual to investigatory. 

 

Id. at PAGEID#:2334. 

 In bringing this decision to the Court’s attention, plaintiff 

contended that the decision of the Ohio appellate court is “of 

significant precedential value in this case” because it “arises out of 

the very occurrence and facts at issue in this case[.]” Notice, p. 1. 

In particular, plaintiff points to the appellate court’s finding that 

Officer Kamerer’s initial stop was a consensual encounter. Id. at 1-

2. Because the material facts surrounding the events that followed 

that consensual encounter are in dispute, plaintiff contends that 

summary judgment in this action is unwarranted. Id. at 3. 

 The Wells Township defendants filed the Motion to Stay in 

response to plaintiff’s Notice. The Wells Township defendants ask this 

Court to stay consideration of their motion for summary judgment 

pending final resolution of the state court criminal case against Mr. 

Starcher, State v. Starcher, Case No. 11CRB347. Plaintiff opposes the 

Motion to Stay. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants Wells 

Township, John Ingram, and Jeffrey James Kamerer’s Motion to Stay 

Ruling on Summary Judgment, ECF 66 (“Memo. in Opp.”). No reply 

memorandum has been filed. 

II. STANDARD 

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A district court’s power to stay proceedings is “incidental to 

the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the 

causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

counsel and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 

248, 254 (1936). The party seeking a stay of proceedings has the 

burden of establishing both the “pressing need for delay” and “that 

neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of 

the order.” Ohio Envtl. Council v. United States District Court, 

Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th 

Cir. 1977). See also Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (stating that the movant 

“must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required 

to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for 

which he prays will work damage to someone else”). 

In determining whether or not to grant a stay of proceedings, a 

court may consider the following factors: “[1] the potentiality of 

another case having a dispositive effect on the case to be stayed, [2] 

the judicial economy to be saved by waiting on a dispositive decision, 

[3] the public welfare, and [4] the hardship/prejudice to the party 

opposing the stay, given its duration.” Michael v. Ghee, 325 F. 

Supp.2d 829, 831 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). 

See also Ferrell v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 1:01-cv-447, 2005 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25358, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2005) (“There is no 

precise test in this Circuit for when a stay is appropriate. However, 

district courts often consider the following factors: the need for a 

stay, the balance of potential hardship to the parties and the public, 

and the promotion of judicial economy.”). 

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Finally, “a court must tread carefully in granting a stay of 

proceedings, since a party has a right to a determination of its 

rights and liabilities without undue delay.” Ohio Envtl. Council, 565 

F.2d at 396. See also Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (noting that a stay of 

proceedings occurs “[o]nly in rare circumstances”). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 In requesting a stay, the Wells Township defendants first argue 

that the state trial court’s determination “of the issue of whether 

the actions of Starcher and Coil elevated the consensual encounter to 

the level of an investigatory stop may be dispositive on key factual 

determinations that resolve the constitutional issues before this 

court on summary judgment.” Motion to Stay, p. 4. More specifically, 

the moving defendants contend that, should the state court conclude 

that the initial consensual encounter between defendant Kamerer, 

plaintiff and Mr. Starcher later became an investigatory stop, this 

Court “will have the factual and legal material necessary to grant 

qualified immunity and summary judgment in favor of the Wells Township 

defendants.” Id. at 4-5. 

This Court disagrees. The Wells Township defendants cite to no 

authority for the proposition that plaintiff in this action will be 

bound to the state court’s determination on any matter, whether 

factual or legal, in State v. Starcher, Case No. 11 CRB 347. As 

detailed supra, the state court action involves the alleged criminal 

activity of Mr. Starcher. Any final resolution of that action will be 

based on the evidence and arguments presented in that action. Mr. 

Starcher is not a party to this case and neither plaintiff nor its 

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ward, Mr. Coil, is a party to the state criminal proceedings. This 

Court is therefore not persuaded that an Ohio court’s determination in 

a criminal case involving different parties can be dispositive of any 

issue in the case sub judice. It therefore cannot be said that a stay 

of the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims in this case 

will promote judicial economy. 

The Wells Township defendants also argue that a stay in this case 

serves the public interest “by allowing the Jefferson County Court 3 

to proceed in the state case where the issues have been vetted by the 

Seventh District Court of Appeals and a clear mandate for a very 

specific and narrow determination has been made.” Motion to Stay, p. 

5. It is not immediately clear to this Court what the moving 

defendants intend by this argument. Because, for the reasons stated 

supra, the state court’s resolution of Mr. Starcher’s criminal case 

cannot be determinative of the issues presented in this case, the 

Court concludes that the requested stay will not serve the public 

interest. 

Finally, the Wells Township defendants argue that its requested 

stay will not prejudice plaintiff because it was plaintiff who 

initially brought the decision of the Ohio court of appeals to this 

Court’s attention. Id. However, the Wells Township defendants offer 

no insight into the anticipated length of the state court proceedings 

or of the requested stay. The resulting prejudice to plaintiff, who is 

entitled to a determination of its claims without undue delay, see

Ohio Envtl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396, is apparent. 

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In short, the Court concludes that the Wells Township defendants 

have pointed to no “rare circumstances” that would justify a stay of 

proceedings on their motion for summary judgment. 

WHEREUPON, the Wells Township Defendants’ Motion to Stay Ruling 

on Summary Judgment, ECF 65, is DENIED. 

March 12, 2014 s/Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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