[Cite as Beckham v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2011-Ohio-2833.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

DALE BECKHAM 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2009-09442 

Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr. 

Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo 

MAGISTRATE DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging that he was assaulted by an 

employee of defendant. The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated and the 

case proceeded to trial on the issue of liability. 

{¶ 2} At all times relevant, plaintiff was in inmate in the custody and control of 

defendant at the London Correctional Institution (LoCI) pursuant to R.C. 5120.16. 

Plaintiff testified that he was eating in the LoCI dining room on either July 4 or 5, 2009, 

at approximately 4:20 p.m. when inmate Martin asked him for a packet of mayonnaise. 

Plaintiff stated that when he tossed the mayonnaise to Martin, Corrections Captain 

Wimberly “chewed him out” and told him he had two minutes to finish eating his 

sandwich. According to plaintiff, he soon thereafter stood up from the table and bused 

his food tray, but continued to eat his sandwich. Plaintiff testified that Wimberly gave 

him several orders to throw the sandwich in the trash, but that he quickly stuffed the 

remainder of the sandwich in his mouth. According to plaintiff, Wimberly became angry 

and struck him in the face with his shoulder several times. Plaintiff testified that he 
Case No. 2009-09442 - 2 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

spent 52 days in the “hole” as a result of the incident. Plaintiff asserts that Wimberly’s 

actions amount to an assault. 

{¶ 3} However, plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the LoCI dining room 

rules, which include: prohibitions on throwing food, taking food out of the dining room, 

and loitering; and a limitation on the amount of time inmates have to eat their food. 

Plaintiff also admitted that he disobeyed Wimberly’s orders to finish his sandwich, bus 

his tray, and leave the dining room. 

{¶ 4} Maurice Wimberly is a Corrections Captain posted as the first shift 

commander at LoCI. Wimberly testified that he had only a vague recollection of the 

incident with plaintiff. According to Wimberly, after plaintiff threw the mayonnaise 

packet, he gave plaintiff a direct order to bus his tray and leave the dining room. 

However, when plaintiff refused, Wimberly had a corrections officer escort plaintiff out of 

the dining room to the administration area where Wimberly dealt with him “face to face” 

after the meal was finished. Wimberly stated that he did not write a report concerning 

the incident because it was minor and he did not believe a formal reprimand was 

necessary. Wimberly testified that he did not use force against plaintiff at any time 

during the incident. 

{¶ 5} Harold Sewell was an inmate in the LoCI dining hall on the day of the 

incident. Sewell testified that he saw plaintiff throw the mayonnaise packet, that 

Wimberly warned plaintiff, and that when plaintiff bused his tray, Wimberly came up 

beside him and bumped him with his shoulder before having him escorted out of the 

dining area. 

{¶ 6} DeCarlo Blackwell was the institutional inspector for LoCI at the time of 

the incident. Blackwell testified that he began an investigation of the incident after 

plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Wimberly used force against him. No report was 

filed by Wimberly regarding the incident. According to Blackwell, plaintiff was placed in 

segregation during the investigation for his own safety, per defendant’s policy. 
Case No. 2009-09442 - 3 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

Blackwell stated that he interviewed both plaintiff and Wimberly, and reviewed security 

video footage during his investigation. Blackwell testified that plaintiff stated to him that 

he was not harmed during the encounter with Wimberly and that it was a matter of 

“principle.” Blackwell further testified that the security videos for July 4 and 5, 2009, do 

not show the alleged incident. The Ohio Administrative Code sets forth the 

circumstances under which force may be lawfully utilized by prison officials and 

employees in controlling inmates. Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01(C) provides, in relevant 

part: 

{¶ 7} “(2) Less-than-deadly force. There are six general 

circumstances in which a staff member may use force against an inmate or third person. 

A staff member may use less-than-deadly force against an inmate in the following 

circumstances: 

{¶ 8} “(a) Self-defense from physical attack or threat of 

physical harm; 

{¶ 9} “(b) Defense of another from physical attack or 

threat of physical attack; 

{¶ 10} “(c) When necessary to control or subdue an 

inmate who refuses to obey prison rules, regulations or orders; 

{¶ 11} “(d) When necessary to stop an inmate from 

destroying property or engaging in a riot or other disturbance; 

{¶ 12} “(e) Prevention of an escape or apprehension of an 

escapee; or 

{¶ 13} “(f) Controlling or subduing an inmate in order to 

stop or prevent self-inflicted harm.” 

{¶ 14} The court has recognized that “corrections officers have a privilege to use 

force upon inmates under certain conditions. * * * However, such force must be used in 

the performance of official duties and cannot exceed the amount of force which is 

reasonably necessary under the circumstances. * * * Obviously, ‘the use of force is a 
Case No. 2009-09442 - 4 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

reality of prison life’ and the precise degree of force required to respond to a given 

situation requires an exercise of discretion by the corrections officer.” Mason v. Ohio 

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1990), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 96, 101-102. (Internal citations 

omitted.) 

{¶ 15} Based upon the foregoing testimony, the court finds that any “force” 

Wimberly used against plaintiff was both minimal and justified in light of plaintiff’s refusal 

to comply with Wimberly’s orders. 

{¶ 16} Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff claims he was improperly held in 

segregation during the investigation, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he 

language in R.C. 2743.02 that ‘the state’ shall ‘have its liability determined * * * in 

accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *’ 

means that the state cannot be sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the 

exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy 

decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or 

discretion.” Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70; Von Hoene v. State (1985), 

20 Ohio App.3d 363, 364. Prison administrators are provided “wide-ranging deference 

in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed 

to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. 

Wolfish (1979), 441 U.S. 520, 547. 

{¶ 17} The court finds that the policy to hold plaintiff in the “hole” during the 

pendency of the investigation into the alleged incident was characterized by a high 

degree of official judgment or discretion and was based upon a need to maintain 

institutional security. Defendant is therefore entitled to discretionary immunity from 

claims arising out of that decision. 

{¶ 18} Judgment is recommended in favor of defendant. 

 A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14 days of 

the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that 
Case No. 2009-09442 - 5 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, 

any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections 

are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual 

finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or 

conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically 

objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of the 

decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

 _____________________________________ 

 MATTHEW C. RAMBO 

 Magistrate 

cc: 

 

Kristin S. Boggs 

Assistant Attorney General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Dale Beckham, #435-197 

Allen Correctional Institution 

2338 North West Street 

P.O. Box 4501 

Lima, Ohio 45801 

MR/cmd/Filed May 27, 2011/To S.C. reporter June 7, 2011