United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 1, 2022 

Decided March 9, 2022 

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2553 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DEANDRE JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:20-cr-00803 

Ronald A. Guzmán, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Deandre Johnson pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a gun as a felon, 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 96 

months’ imprisonment. The court emphasized Johnson’s refusal to reform despite his 

previous convictions and sentences, his dangerous behavior during and after his arrest, 

and the need for general deterrence given rising gun violence in Chicago. On appeal, 

Johnson argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and unwarranted by the 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-2553 Page 2 

record. Because the district court sufficiently justified his sentence based on the 

statutory sentencing factors, the judgment is affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND

Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In 

2019, police officers had caught him with a gun while on state-based parole for a felony 

conviction. He had been driving his girlfriend home; she asked him to bring a pistol for 

protection, and he agreed. When police attempted to stop his car for a traffic violation, 

Johnson pulled into an alley and fled on foot with the pistol, dropping the magazine in 

an alley and later depositing the pistol in a recycling bin. Johnson’s conviction for 

possessing a firearm as a felon referenced two past felony convictions—for aggravated 

battery and aggravated assault. 

At sentencing, the court first computed the prison term recommended under the 

Sentencing Guidelines. The parties debated whether Johnson should receive a 2-level 

enhancement for recklessly endangering others during flight. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. 

Calling it “really a close call,” the court accepted Johnson’s contention that it did not 

apply. This led to an offense level of 21, criminal history category of IV, and a 

recommended prison term of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. 

Next, the court addressed arguments about the sentencing factors under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). The government argued that a within-guidelines sentence was 

appropriate because Johnson’s criminal history, including juvenile arrests and parole 

violations not reflected in his history score, showed a need to deter Johnson from future 

crimes and protect the public. Johnson responded that a below-guidelines sentence was 

justified because the guidelines range exaggerated the severity of his criminal history. 

He urged that his aggravated-battery conviction stemmed from a desire to protect his 

brother, his conviction for aggravated assault was based on an accidental car collision, 

and his current offense arose out of a wish to protect himself and his girlfriend, not a 

plan for violence. He added that if he had offended 10 days later, the 2-point

enhancement for committing the offence while on parole would not have applied.

The district court sentenced Johnson to 96 months’ imprisonment, above the 

guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. Discussing the § 3553(a) factors, it first focused on 

specific deterrence. It noted that despite his past incarcerations, including for “two 

convictions . . . for violent behavior,” and despite his active parole status, Johnson chose 

to reoffend, instead of, as the court expected, going “out of his way to avoid any 
No. 21-2553 Page 3 

criminal conduct.” This history revealed a “repetitive pattern of criminal conduct,” and 

a refusal to “change[] an iota.” It concluded that Johnson had “no respect for the law 

whatsoever” and that his prior incarcerations had been “totally inadequate to change 

his behavior.”

The court next considered the nature of Johnson’s offense and his behavior 

during and after his arrest. It found that his conduct was “extremely dangerous.” The 

court explained that, although it declined to apply the reckless-endangerment 

enhancement, Johnson had created a “greater danger to [police] just by having them 

chase” him and that fleeing with a weapon elevated that risk to “an added danger” to 

police and the public. Regarding his post-arrest behavior, the court referenced a phone 

call that Johnson made from jail. During the call, Johnson urged a friend to shoot a dog 

that had bitten her, just as he would. The court said that this advice was “outrageous” 

and showed that Johnson did not “[have] a clue as to the seriousness of the things he 

has done.”

Finally, the court considered the need for general deterrence against illegal gun 

possession in Chicago. It observed that the need to “keep . . . guns out of the hands of 

convicted felons[] could not be greater at this point in time and this particular location,” 

because it contributes to the high rates of gun violence in Chicago. It concluded that this 

concern, combined with Johnson’s “inability to learn from his past experiences, his 

pattern of violent behavior, his [lack of] respect for the law, his parole, [and] his prior 

sentences” justified the above-guidelines sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Johnson argues that the above-guidelines sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse 

of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We will uphold such a 

sentence as long as the district court provided adequate reasons for the variance 

consistent with the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Gill, 824 F.3d 653, 665 (7th Cir. 

2016). We address each of his arguments in turn. 

Johnson contends that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring the 

context of his past crimes. In his view, the court focused “on the names given for his 

previous crimes” (aggravated battery and assault) rather than his actual behavior, 

which he believes was not aggressive. But for three reasons the court adequately 

justified its upward variance and reasonably rejected Johnson’s argument that his past 
No. 21-2553 Page 4 

crimes did not warrant a significant sentence. See United States v. Stephens, 986 F.3d 1004, 

1009–10 (7th Cir. 2021). 

First, although the district court mentioned the violent nature of his past crimes, 

it based the current sentence on the fact that the sentences for Johnson’s past crimes had 

not caused him to change even “an iota.” It emphasized that Johnson's commission of 

his latest offense while still on parole showed that he had “no respect for the law.” This 

behavior confirmed that the previous sentences had been “totally inadequate to change 

his behavior.” See § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A). The court thus reasonably concluded that 

deterring Johnson from future crimes in a way that he had not been deterred before was 

a primary factor in sentencing him above the guidelines range. See § 3553(a)(2)(B). 

Second, the district court permissibly relied on Johnson’s dangerous flight from 

the police to sentence him above the guidelines range. In commenting on that flight, the 

court reasonably emphasized the danger to police and the public he caused, not just by 

running away, but doing so with a weapon. Johnson replies that it was unreasonable for 

the court to use his flight to justify an above-guidelines sentence after rejecting (in “a 

close call”) the reckless-endangerment enhancement for that conduct. But in sentencing 

a defendant, the district court may weigh behavior that technically falls outside of the 

guideline calculation. See United States v. Moultrie, 975 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2020) 

(upholding an above-guidelines sentence for a § 922(g)(1) conviction where the court 

concluded that defendant’s offense level did not reflect the danger of his conduct or 

lack of respect for the legal system). 

Third, in imposing an above-guidelines sentence, the district court reasonably 

relied on Johnson’s behavior after his arrest, because it bore on his personal 

characteristics, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and was not factored into his offense score. See

Moultrie, 975 F.3d at 662. The court permissibly found that Johnson’s advice during the 

post-arrest call that his girlfriend violently kill a dog was “outrageous.” This again 

confirmed for the court that Johnson did not “[have] a clue as to the seriousness of the 

things he has done.” Id. 

Johnson next argues that his 96-month sentence is an “extreme outlier” 

compared to similarly situated defendants. He notes that the 35% increase over the top 

of his guidelines range is statistically unusual: the median sentence for offenders in his 

guidelines range is 57 months, and fewer than 5% receive above-guidelines sentences. 

But this court may not apply “a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage” 

variation from the guidelines range to decide whether a sentence is reasonable. Gall, 552 
No. 21-2553 Page 5 

U.S. at 47. It may consider “the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to 

the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 

variance.” Id. at 51. Due deference is warranted here because the district court analyzed 

several offense-specific factors under § 3553(a) that were not adequately reflected in the 

guidelines range and justified the variance: Johnson’s lack of deterrence and reform, his 

armed flight from arrest, and his post-arrest advice to a friend to offend violently. See

United States v. Matthews, 701 F.3d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir. 2012) (sentencing differences are 

not “a forbidden disparity” if justified by legitimate considerations).

Finally, Johnson objects to the district court’s consideration of the recent rise in 

gun violence in Chicago, arguing that this general problem does not justify varying 

from the guidelines for him specifically. But we have ruled that judges may consider 

“local factors” in evaluating the seriousness of an offense and need for deterrence. See 

United States v. Hatch, 909 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming an above-guidelines 

sentence where the court “situated [the defendant’s] offense against . . . observations 

about widespread gun violence in Chicago”). Johnson responds that Hatch is 

distinguishable because the defendant’s underlying conduct there—trafficking guns 

from Indiana to Chicago—was related to the “local factors” that the district court 

considered. But that relationship is as present here as it was in Hatch because the district 

court discussed rising gun violence in the context of the Johnson’s underlying offense. 

While observing that Johnson was a felon in possession of a gun, the court noted the 

need “to keep [] guns out of the hands of convicted felons, [which] could not be greater 

at this point in time and this particular location.” The district court thus reasonably 

determined that an above-guidelines sentence was necessary to deter a severe problem 

of similar wrongdoing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); Hatch, 909 F.3d at 876. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.