IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 3-1205 / 13-0124

Filed March 26, 2014

AMISH CONNECTION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 

COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M. 

Lekar, Judge. 

Insured appeals an adverse grant of summary judgment holding loss was 

not covered by insurance policy. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Samuel C. Anderson and Joseph G. Martin of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., 

Waterloo, for appellant. 

Mark W. Thomas of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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McDONALD, J.

What is the meaning of “rain”? That is the question presented in this 

insurance coverage dispute. Amish Connection, Inc., (hereinafter “Amish 

Connection”) appeals from an adverse grant of summary judgment in which the 

district court held, as a matter of law, Amish Connection’s loss was not covered 

under a business insurance policy issued by State Farm Fire & Casualty 

Company (hereinafter “State Farm”) due to a limitation on “loss . . . to the interior 

of any building or structure, or the property inside any building or structure, 

caused by rain.” We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for 

further proceedings.

I.

Amish Connection leased space in the Crossroads Shopping Mall in 

Waterloo to operate the Amish Connection Store. At all times relevant to this 

suit, Amish Connection was using the leased space only for storage. Above the 

ceiling and along the interior back wall of Amish Connection’s leased space was 

a four-inch cast iron drain pipe connected to the building’s roof drain line. The 

roof drain system in the mall was designed to collect water on the roof and 

transport the water through interior pipes in the mall and down to the storm 

sewer. On the evening of June 14 and the morning of June 15, 2010, it rained 

heavily in Waterloo. At some point during this storm, the drain pipe over Amish 

Connection’s unit burst, flooding portions of Amish Connection’s storage space 

and causing damage to the unit and the property within.
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Amish Connection purchased a business policy from State Farm. The 

policy insured “for accidental direct physical loss to property . . . unless the loss 

is: 1. limited in the PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS section; or 2. 

Excluded in the LOSSES NOT INSURED section” of the policy. On or about 

June 16, 2010, Amish Connection submitted a claim to State Farm for the water 

damage to its storage space and inventory. By letter dated the same day, State 

Farm denied Amish Connection’s claim for coverage, citing a limitation in the

PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS section of the policy for loss “caused 

by rain.” 

On December 27, 2010, Amish Connection initiated this proceeding. In its 

amended petition, Amish Connection asserted a claim against State Farm for 

breach of contract arising out of State Farm’s denial of Amish Connection’s 

claim. State Farm filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the rain 

limitation precluded recovery for Amish Connection’s loss. The district court 

agreed and granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. 

II.

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.981(3). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing 

that the facts are undisputed and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. See Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 
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2004). Summary judgment is correctly granted where the only issue to be 

decided is what legal consequences follow from otherwise undisputed facts. See 

Emmet Cnty. State Bank v. Reutter, 439 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Iowa 1989). We 

review the district court’s grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at 

law. See Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 826 N.W.2d 494, 500 (Iowa 2013 

III.

The standards for interpreting and construing insurance policies are well 

established, and they need not be repeated at any great length here. See

Boelman, 826 N.W.2d at 501-02. We begin our analysis by looking at the plain 

language of the policy. The policy provides that State Farm will pay for 

“accidental direct physical loss to property covered” unless the loss is otherwise 

limited or excluded. State Farm contends Amish Connection’s loss is not within 

the initial grant of coverage pursuant to the following limitation on loss “caused by 

rain”:

PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS

We will not pay for loss:

. . . .

6. to the interior of any building or structure, or the property 

inside any building or structure, caused by rain, snow, sleet, ice, 

sand or dust, whether driven by wind or not, unless:

a. the building or structure first sustains damage by an insured 

loss to its roof or walls through which the rain, snow, sleet, ice, 

sand or dust enters; or

b. the loss is caused by thawing of snow, sleet or ice on the 

building or structure;
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“Rain” is not a defined term in the policy. “Words that are not defined in 

the policy are given their ordinary meaning, one that a reasonable person would 

understand them to mean.” Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Sand Livestock Sys., Inc., 

728 N.W.2d 216, 220-21 (Iowa 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The ordinary meaning of “rain” is well understood. Gene Kelly sang in 

it. Noah sailed through it. It is water falling from the sky. The common 

understanding of “rain” is reinforced by reference materials. See MerriamWebster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rain (last visited January 7, 

2014) (defining “rain” as “water falling in drops condensed from vapor in the 

atmosphere”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (Unabridged) 1876 (1993) 

(same). We think it fair to say that a reasonable person standing in the interior of 

a shopping mall underneath a burst drain pipe would not conclude that he or she 

was standing in the “rain.” Under the plain language of the policy, Amish 

Connection’s loss is not limited by the provision on which State Farm relies.

The district court reached the opposite conclusion. In State Farm’s 

memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment and at oral argument 

on the motion, State Farm argued the water emitted from the burst pipe was 

“rainwater.” Because the water from the pipe was “rainwater,” State Farm 

contended the limitation applied. The district court agreed with the proposed 

interpretation. In ruling on State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, the 

district court stated, “The Court does not find that the language in the policy is 

ambiguous. Rainwater only has one plain meaning.” The district court then 

analogized the interior drain system in the mall to an external gutter. Because 
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the water collected in an external gutter “would unquestionably be considered 

rainwater,” the court determined “as a matter of law the water running through 

the pipe which caused the loss on the leased premises was rainwater.” 

Accordingly, the district court held, the loss was not within the initial grant of 

coverage. We conclude the district court erred.

First, “[t]he plain meaning of the insurance contract generally prevails.” 

Boelman, 826 N.W.2d at 501. Here, the policy limits coverage for loss “caused 

by rain.” The policy does not use the term “rainwater.” The distinction is 

important. As previously stated, “rain” is water falling in condensed drops from 

the atmosphere. “Rainwater” is a separate and distinct term meaning “water 

fallen as rain that has not had an opportunity to collect soluble matter from the 

soil.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (Unabridged) 1876 (1993). The 

definitions of “rain” and “rainwater,” although similar, encompass two different 

points in time. As water is falling, it is considered “rain.” After it has fallen—and, 

as here, been collected on a rooftop and channeled into pipes for transport to a 

storm sewer—it is considered “rainwater.” As one court noted: 

“Rain” is ordinarily and commonly thought of as water falling from 

the sky. After it stops falling, one does not say that it is “raining” 

although there may still be wet sidewalks and streets, puddles of 

water resulting from the rain, or water running through gutters and 

elsewhere as a result of the rain. It is not common or usual to say in 

such instances that it is still raining . . . . If, by definition, “rain” 

remains “rain” after it stops falling, then the water in streams and 

lakes, coming from household faucets, etc. is “rain” since it 

originated, partly at least, from water that fell from the sky.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 767 (Wyo. 1988) (holding 

that “rain” became “surface water” upon striking the earth, and therefore, water 
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that entered the building through a broken window was excluded under a

“surface water” exclusion); see also Unobskey v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 86 A.2d 160, 

164 (Me. 1952) (noting that in an insurance policy excluding damage “caused by 

rain,” the exclusion would not apply to “damage caused by running surface water 

from rainstorm”). While the water emitting from the burst pipe may fall within the 

definition of “rainwater,” it does not fall within the definition of “rain”. Because 

loss caused by “rainwater” is not excluded or otherwise limited under the policy, 

the district court erred in interpolating the term “rainwater” into the policy and 

concluding the interpolated term was unambiguous. 

Second, even if “rain” could have a secondary meaning encompassing 

“rainwater,” ambiguities in limitation provisions must be construed in favor of the 

insured. See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer, 574 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa 1998)

(“Because of the adhesive nature of insurance policies, their provisions are 

construed in the light most favorable to the insured.”). Thus, exclusions from and 

limitations of coverage are construed strictly against the insurer. See id. “[W]hen 

an insurer has affirmatively expressed coverage through broad promises, it 

assumes a duty to define any limitations or exclusionary clauses in clear and 

explicit terms.” Bituminous Cas. Corp., 728 N.W.2d at 220 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “Where the meaning of terms in 

an insurance policy is susceptible to two interpretations, the one favoring the 

insured is adopted.” N. Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holty, 402 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Iowa 

1987). Thus, to the extent that “rain” could be interpreted to mean “rainwater,” 
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the ambiguity should have been construed in favor of Amish Connection and 

against State Farm.

IV.

The district court erred by finding that the rain limitation was applicable to 

this case. The court has considered the parties’ remaining arguments and 

concludes that the arguments are best addressed in the district court in the first 

instance. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.