In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 99-3382 and 99-3391

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MISAEL MONTENEGRO and JUAN PEREZ,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 CR 399--Milton I. Shadur, Judge.

Argued September 20, 2000--Decided October 25, 2000

 Before COFFEY, EASTERBROOK and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On July 7, 1998, a grand

jury in the Northern District of Illinois

returned a three-count indictment against Misael

Montenegro, Juan Perez, and Jose Perez (Juan’s

brother)/1 charging the three men with two

counts of violating the Hostage Taking Act, 18

U.S.C. sec. 1203,/2 and one count of conspiracy

to commit those crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

sec. 371. After a jury found both defendants

guilty of all three counts set forth in the

indictment, the trial judge sentenced Montenegro

to five years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy

count and 160 months’ imprisonment on the Hostage

Taking Act counts, all sentences to run

concurrent with each other. The judge sentenced

Juan Perez to five years’ imprisonment on the

conspiracy count and 200 months’ imprisonment on

the Hostage Taking counts, all sentences to run

concurrently with each other. Each defendant also

received three years’ supervised release on the

conspiracy count and five years’ supervised

release on the Hostage Taking counts, all to run

concurrently with each other. Finally, both

defendants received a $150 special assessment,

and Montenegro was fined $4,000. On appeal, both

defendants challenge their convictions, and Juan

Perez argues that he was entitled to a reduction

in his offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. sec.

3B1.2, for his "minor" role in the kidnapings. We

affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

 Between 1989 and 1993, Montenegro fronted Jose

Moreno one and a half kilos of cocaine with a

value of $30,000. In 1994, Montenegro fronted

Margarito Soto two kilos of cocaine with a value

of $50,000. When Moreno and Soto failed to pay

their debts in a timely fashion, Montenegro

enlisted the assistance of Juan and Jose Perez to

assist him in strong-arming the debtors into

turning over the drug money owed to him.

 The three men began their ill-advised, enforcerlike scheme on May, 11, 1995, when they drove to

Moreno’s residence and abducted Moreno from an

alley behind his house where he was working on

his car. According to Moreno’s testimony at trial

as well as statements made to investigators, when

the three men arrived at Moreno’s house, Jose

Perez jumped out of the van, grabbed Moreno by

his collar, and forced him into the van. Once

Moreno was in the van, a fourth, unidentified

occupant covered Moreno’s eyes with a rag. After

riding in the van for approximately twenty

minutes, the van entered a garage where Moreno

was blindfolded and beaten by his abductors. The

beating left Moreno with cuts, bruises, and

scrapes to his face and chest as well as a broken

nose. Moreno was then led to another room and

handcuffed to a cinder block wall. At this point,

an object Moreno believed to be the barrel of a

gun was jabbed into his chest and he was told by

Jose Perez (Moreno recognized his voice) that he

had to raise the money he owed Montenegro. Moreno

responded by providing phone numbers to Jose

Perez who, in turn, dialed the numbers on a

cellular phone and allowed Moreno to attempt to

raise the ransom money./3

 That same night at approximately 9:30 p.m.,

Montenegro, Juan Perez, and Jose Perez drove to

Soto’s residence. When Soto answered the door,

Montenegro asked him to step outside. After Soto

exited the house, Montenegro placed his foot in

front of the screen door to prevent Soto from

reentering the house while Jose Perez approached

Soto and threatened to kill him if he moved. When

Soto claimed that he did not have the money to

satisfy his outstanding debt, Montenegro and Jose

Perez dragged him into the van, duct-taped his

legs together, and taped his arms behind his

back. According to Soto, he was then blindfolded

and driven approximately twenty minutes to a big

garage or warehouse. Soto was pulled out of the

van and beaten with a hard object. Jose Perez

then placed an object Soto believed to be a gun

barrel on his forehead and asked "Do you want me

to throw you into the river or just kill you

now?" Soto was then dragged into another room

where the duct tape was removed and he was
handcuffed to a ring on the wall. When the

kidnappers left the room, Soto was able to remove

his blindfold and saw that he and Moreno were in

the same room with at least five other Hispanic

men, all handcuffed to the wall./4 For three

days Soto and Moreno attempted to raise money by

contacting friends and family.

 On May 13, 1995, at the direction of the FBI,

Moreno’s girlfriend informed the kidnappers that

Moreno’s ransom had been raised and a drop-off

was arranged at a local Taco Bell restaurant with

Moreno’s uncle, Isauro Delgado, acting as the

delivery man. The day the ransom money was to be

delivered, Moreno was placed in a van with Juan

and Jose Perez. The three men drove to the

designated Taco Bell, but when Jose Perez noticed

a significant amount of traffic in the area, he

directed Moreno to contact his girlfriend and

change the location of the ransom delivery.

Moreno contacted Ayala, but was told that his

uncle was already on his way to Taco Bell. After

agreeing to continue with the original plan, Juan

Perez parked the van at the Taco Bell and the

three men waited inside the van until Moreno saw

his cousin’s car./5 Juan Perez then went into

the restaurant, and after Jose Perez told Moreno,

"[w]e’re watching, so don’t try anything stupid,"

Moreno got out of the van and walked to his

cousin’s car. FBI agents then surrounded the van

where Jose Perez was waiting and arrested him and

Juan Perez. After the police searched Juan and

Jose Perez and the van they arrived in, they

discovered handcuff keys on both of them as well

as a replica of a handgun in the van./6

 The next day, one of the kidnappers removed

Soto’s handcuffs and drove Soto to an alley where

he was told to keep his blindfold on for five

minutes after the kidnapper left or else Soto

would be shot. After waiting several minutes,

Soto removed his blindfold and contacted his wife

who informed the FBI of his release.

II. ISSUES

 Both defendants now appeal their convictions,

arguing that the trial judge committed plain

error when he failed to question prospective

jurors about any potential bias against aliens.

The defendants also argue that the Hostage Taking

Act is unconstitutional because it violates the

Fifth Amendment in that it, according to the

defendants, impermissibly discriminates against

aliens. Finally, Perez raises a separate

challenge and argues that the sentencing judge

committed plain error when he failed to sentence

Perez as a "minor" participant under U.S.S.G.

sec. 3B1.2.
III. DISCUSSION

A. Voir Dire

 On appeal, both defendants argue that the trial

judge should have inquired during voir dire as to

the potential prejudice jurors might have as to

a person’s foreign citizenship despite the fact

that trial counsel never requested that the judge

raise this potential bias issue with the venire.

Because the defendants failed to raise this claim

during trial, we review it for plain error.

United States v. Reynolds, 64 F.3d 292, 296 n.3

(7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. South,

28 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 1994)). As we stated

in United States v. Baker, No. 99-3840, 2000 WL

1347846 at *6 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2000),

[u]nder this standard, there must be: 1) an

error; 2) that is clear or obvious; and 3) that

affects substantial rights. United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123

L. Ed.2d 508 (1993); Cusimano, 148 F.3d at 828.

"In an effort to clarify when an error affects

substantial rights, the [Supreme] Court said ’in

most cases it means that the error must have been

prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of

the District Court proceedings.’" Remsza, 77 F.3d

at 1044 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). In this

circuit it is clear that "the constructive

amendment ’must constitute a mistake so serious

that but for it the defendant probably would have

been acquitted in order for us to reverse.’"

Hughes, 213 F.3d at 329 (quoting Cusimano, 148

F.3d at 828); see also Remsza, 77 F.3d at 1044.

Even then, "we have the power to correct the

error but are not required to do so." Cusimano,

148 F.3d at 828 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 735).

"We will not reverse unless we find the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.;

see also, Remsza, 77 F.3d at 1044.

 On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial

judge’s failure to inquire into the jurors’

potential bias toward non-citizens of this

country violated their constitutional right to be

tried by an impartial jury because some of the

jurors may have had biases against resident

aliens./7 However, "[t]he conduct of voir dire

is left to the trial court’s sound discretion,"

and "litigants do not have a right to have a

particular question asked." Gardner v. Barnett,

199 F.3d 915, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

(citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527

(1973)). Despite this broad discretion, there are

circumstances where trial courts are

constitutionally required, if the criminal

defendant so requests, to voir dire potential

jurors concerning racial or ethnic bias. Indeed,

"some cases may present circumstances in which an
impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed

by due process is posed by a trial court’s

refusal to question prospective jurors

specifically about racial prejudice during voir

dire." Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595

(1976). Thus, when "special circumstances"

reflect that racial issues are "inextricably

bound up with the conduct of the trial," an

accused’s constitutional right to a trial by an

impartial jury prohibits a trial court from

refusing a request for voir dire directed to

racial prejudice. Id. at 597.

 The defendants essentially argue that if the

trial judge is required to ask about race or

ethnicity, then the judge should be required to

inquire about citizenship. However, Ristaino only

requires trial courts to engage in a voir dire

concerning race or ethnicity if requested to do

so by the defendant’s trial counsel, and then

only when race is, or might be, a central aspect

of the case. Neither of the defendants-appellants

has advised us of, nor have we found, any cases

holding that a trial judge must question jurors

sua sponte concerning racial or ethnic prejudice;

presumably because there may be sound trial

strategies for not wanting to focus the jurors’

attention on the race or other aspect of the

defendant. Furthermore, this court has recently

held en banc that

[t]he conduct of voir dire is left to the trial

court’s sound discretion. Morgan v. Illinois, 504

U.S. 719, 729, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed.2d 492

(1992). The litigants do not have a right to have

a particular question asked. Ham v. South

Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527, 93 S. Ct. 848, 35 L.

Ed.2d 46 (1973). Although the Constitution does

require inquiries into certain biases (such as

race), Ham, 409 U.S. at 527, 93 S. Ct. 848, bias

against street gangs is not among them. Thus,

Gardner had no entitlement to the questions he

proposed.

Gardner, 199 F.3d at 920-21./8

 Initially, defense counsel did not request that

the judge direct any question to the jurors to

determine if there existed any potential bias

toward non-citizens of this country. Furthermore,

judges, as the experienced trial judge did in

this case, are well-advised not to raise such

issues without a request from defense counsel

lest the judge introduce questions (information)

that defendants would rather not have the jurors’

attention focused upon. We are convinced that the

district judge did not commit error and that the

voir dire was more than adequate.

B. Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act
 On appeal, the defendants also argue that the

Hostage Taking Act violates the Fifth Amendment

because "it discriminates against aliens by

criminalizing actions by them (and their

associates) which would not be illegal if

everyone involved were American citizens."

Specifically, the defendants claim that the

Hostage Taking Act is unconstitutional because

the Act "discriminates against aliens by using

alienage as a proxy for terrorism."

 "We apply the deferential rational basis test

to federal statutes that classify based on

alienage and will uphold the statute if it is

rationally related to a legitimate government

interest." United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183

F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Mathews v.

Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-87 (1976); United States v.

Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1998); United

States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1475 (9th

Cir. 1995)). Furthermore, the defendants do not

attempt to distinguish the three cases from our

sister circuits which hold that the Hostage

Taking Act is constitutional. Santos-Riviera, 183

F.3d at 373-74; Lue, 134 F.3d at 81-87; LopezFlores, 63 F.3d at 1471-75.

 In Lue, 134 F.3d at 87, the second circuit

explained:

The classification drawn by the Hostage Taking

Act covers all aliens involved in hostage-taking

incidents. The asserted purpose of the statute,

along with the antecedent Convention, is to

address a matter of grave concern to the

international community: hostage taking as a

manifestation of international terrorism. See

Hostage Taking Convention, preamble, T.I.A.S. No.

11,081. We recognize that in the Hostage Taking

Act Congress employs the classification of

alienage to proscribe conduct which may not

always bear a direct relationship to the Act’s

principal object of stemming acts of terrorism,

and that at some point a classification of this

sort may have a "relationship to [the] asserted

goal [which] is so attenuated as to render the

distinction arbitrary or irrational." City of

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 105 S. Ct. at 3258;

see also United States v. Song, No. 95 Cr. 129,

1995 WL 736872, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1995).

However, in this instance, Congress rationally

concluded that a hostage taking within our

jurisdiction involving a noncitizen is

sufficiently likely to involve matters

implicating foreign policy or immigration

concerns as to warrant a federal criminal

proscription. The connection between the act and

its purpose is not so attenuated as to fail to

meet the rational-basis standard. See
Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d at 1475; Song, 1995 WL

736872 at * 5; United States v. Pacheco, 902 F.

Supp. 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Like the Fifth Circuit, we adopt the reasoning

and holding of Lue. Consequently, the defendants’

attempt to put a new spin on an old argument has

fallen upon deaf ears, and we uphold the

convictions of both defendants as constitutional.

C. Minor Role

 On appeal, Juan Perez also argues that the

sentencing judge erred when he failed to reduce

his sentence under U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.2 because,

according to Juan Perez, he played only a minor

role in the scheme to kidnap Moreno and Soto.

Initially, we note that Juan Perez failed to

raise this claim at sentencing. Thus, we review

his claim under the plain error standard. United

States v. Soto, 48 F.3d 1415, 1421 (7th Cir.

1995). A plain error is one that is "particularly

egregious," United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

163 (1982), and "seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings." United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (internal citation and

quotation omitted). Furthermore, we have stated

that the application of section 3B1.2 is heavily

"dependent upon the particular facts of each

case." United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747

(7th Cir. 1991). "The controlling standard for an

offense level reduction under [sec. 3B1.2] is

whether the defendant was substantially less

culpable than the conspiracy’s other

participants." United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d

1201, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993).

 In United States v. Kerr, 13 F.3d 203, 206 (7th

Cir. 1993), we explained this standard and

stated:

Whether one is a minor or minimal participant or

a plain vanilla criminal is answered by the facts

of the case and there is no formulaic solution.

If everyone has an equal role, no one’s offense

level can be diminished, but the fact that one

plays a much lesser role than another does not

mean that one is a minor participant. The boss’s

trusted secretary through the years is crucial to

the enterprise, even where the boss decides

everything and gives all the orders. If the

enterprise is criminal the secretary is a lesser

participant but not a minor one.

When the facts of this case are considered, it is

obvious that Juan Perez is not entitled to a

reduction for being a minor participant.

 Juan Perez admitted that, on May 11, 1997, he,
his brother, and Montenegro went to Moreno’s home

with the intent to use strong-arm tactics to

collect the drug money owed to Montenegro and, if

Moreno failed to come up with the money, to

kidnap him and hold him for ransom. His claim

that he was asleep while Moreno was dragged into

the van and blindfolded is not only highly

dubious (it is unlikely that one could or would

sleep through a kidnaping), but also does nothing

to mitigate his additional involvement in the

kidnapings. According to Soto’s testimony, during

his abduction Jose Perez informed him that Juan

Perez was in the van and wanted to talk to him.

However, because Soto was blindfolded before he

got into the van, he could not positively

identify Juan Perez as one of his abductors.

Despite Juan Perez’s attempts on appeal to

minimize his role in the kidnapings, a review of

the record reveals additional steps Juan took to

complete the kidnap-for-drug money scheme.

 Not only did Juan Perez participate in the

abduction of Moreno and Soto, but after the

ransom drop had been arranged, Juan and Jose

Perez drove Moreno to the Taco Bell for the

exchange. Once they arrived, Juan turned to

Moreno and said, "No hard feeling. It’s business.

This is the way we collect money." (Emphasis

added). Finally, when Juan Perez was arrested in

the Taco Bell, police recovered two sets of

handcuff keys from him.

 Given this information in the record, we are of

the opinion that Juan Perez was not entitled to

a reduction under section 3B1.2.

 The defendants’ convictions and sentences are

AFFIRMED.

/1 Jose Perez is a fugitive and has yet to be tried

for his involvement with these crimes.

/2 The Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1203,

provides:

 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of

this section, whoever, whether inside or outside

the United States, seizes or detains and

threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to

detain another person in order to compel a third

person or a governmental organization to do or

abstain from doing any act as an explicit or

implicit condition for the release of the person

detained, or attempts or conspires to do so,

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of

years or for life and, if the death of any person

results, shall be punished by death or life

imprisonment.

 (b)(1) It is not an offense under this section
if the conduct required for the offense occurred

outside the United States unless--

(A) the offender or the person seized or

detained is a national of the United States;

(B) the offender is found in the United States;

or

(C) the governmental organization sought to be

compelled is the Government of the United States.

 (2) It is not an offense under this section

if the conduct required for the offense occurred

inside the United States, each alleged offender

and each person seized or detained are nationals

of the United States, and each alleged offender

is found in the United States, unless the

governmental organization sought to be compelled

is the Government of the United States.

 (c) As used in this section, the term "national

of the United States" has the meaning given such

term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).

/3 One of the individuals Moreno contacted was his

girlfriend, Brenda Ayala. When Ayala received the

ransom demand, she immediately contacted the

police, who in turn brought in the FBI.

/4 According to Moreno’s statements to

investigators, there were as many as ten other

kidnaping victims, all of whom owed money to a

drug supplier from an organization located in El

Rodeo, Durango, Mexico.

/5 At this time, Juan Perez turned to Moreno and

said, "[n]o hard feelings. It’s business. This is

the way we collect money."

/6 Jose Perez agreed to a search of the apartment

that he and his brother, Juan, shared. The search

resulted in the recovery of a .38 caliber

handgun.

/7 The trial judge did inquire as to the jurors’

potential bias based on: 1) Spanish speaking

individuals (Montenegro needed a translator); 2)

national origin; and 3) race--specifically

Hispanic. Furthermore, the judge asked: "Are

there any questions that I should have asked that

bear on the ability of any of you to be a fair

juror?"

/8 At oral argument, defense counsel, upon being

questioned from the bench, was unable to give any

meaningful reason as to why courts should treat

alienage differently than race or gang

affiliation.