United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

September 1996 ARMY ACQUISITION

Javelin Is Not Ready

for Multiyear

Procurement

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-199

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272415 

September 26, 1996

Congressional Committees

The Army is purchasing a new $4-billion man portable, antiarmor weapon

system—known as the Javelin—to replace its aging Dragon system.

Javelin is a joint Army and Marine Corps program expected to increase the

infantry’s lethality against advanced armor threats. In 1997, the Army plans

to award a multiyear (3 year) production contract and begin full-rate

production.

We reviewed the Javelin program under our basic legislative authority to

determine whether (1) the system meets criteria established for multiyear

production contracts, (2) the Army has adequately tested Javelin to

determine its suitability for full-rate production, and (3) the Army is using

sound economic judgment in purchasing command launch units during

limited production. This report, which contains a matter for congressional

consideration, is addressed to your committees because they have

jurisdiction in this area. We are suggesting that the Congress may wish to

take the corrective actions that the agency has indicated an unwillingness

to take.

Results in Brief The Army plans to award a multiyear contract for Javelin full-rate

production in 1997, even though the system does not meet the criteria

established for multiyear production contracts and the Army has not yet

adequately tested Javelin’s suitability for full-rate production. The Army

has not demonstrated that Javelin’s design is sufficiently stable for a

multiyear contract, and tests have not shown that the weapon to be

produced during full-rate production is suitable for combat. The Army

expects the multiyear contract and design changes to decrease system

costs. However, if the Army has to modify the multiyear contract because

the system requires further redesign to meet operational needs, program

costs could increase. Therefore, we believe the Army should (1) not award

a multiyear contract for Javelin production at this time and

(2) operationally test the redesigned Javelin, as required by regulation,

before proceeding to full-rate production.

In addition, the Army decision to award a third low-rate initial production

contract for command launch units was questionable because (1) the

Army plans to replace these launch units with redesigned units about

3 years after the originals are fielded and (2) the Army is not purchasing

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
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Javelin to address an urgent threat, but rather to improve warfighting

capability. Accordingly, we believe the contract should be modified to

produce as few command launch units as possible.

Background The Javelin is a man portable, fire-and-forget, antitank weapon system

composed of two major components—a command launch unit and a

round, which is a missile sealed in a disposable launcher container. 

(See fig. 1.) For operation of the system, the round is mated with the

launch unit, but the launch unit may also be used in a stand-alone mode

for battlefield surveillance and target detection. The Army expects Javelin

to defeat armored targets out to distances of 2,000 meters, during the day

or night and in adverse weather.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

Figure 1: Javelin System

Command


Launch


Unit

Missile


Round

The Army completed development of the Javelin system in December

1993. However, operational testing showed that the system’s design did

not meet operational suitability requirements. As a result, the Army made

numerous design changes to the launch unit and round before the

contractor initiated low-rate production in June 1994.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

The Javelin system has experienced significant cost increases since it was

first approved. In the early 1990s, the Army made budget decisions that

stretched Javelin’s procurement phase from 6 to 14 years. In addition, the

end of the cold war caused the Army and Marine Corps to reduce Javelin’s

procurement quantities. Combined, these actions increased the average

cost of the launch unit to about 4.5 times its originally estimated cost and

more than doubled the average cost of the round.

To mitigate these cost increases, the Army is attempting to shorten the

system’s procurement phase. Initially, the Army planned to shorten

procurement from 14 to 11 years by using production, logistics, and

multiyear savings to purchase Javelin systems earlier than planned. On

February 13, 1996, the Army announced that Program Budget Decision 104

added $993 million of additional procurement funds for fiscal years 1999

through 2001 to reduce Javelin’s procurement phase to 9 years. As the

program is currently planned, these funds allow the Army to complete

fielding by fiscal year 2004.

The Army also hopes to reduce Javelin’s cost by awarding two multiyear

contracts—one in 1997 and another in 2000. Multiyear procurement is a

method of acquiring up to 5 years’ requirements of a system with a single

contract. The procurements help the government reduce costs and provide

incentives to contractors to improve productivity by investing in capital

facilities, equipment, and advanced technology. However, multiyear

contracts decrease annual budget flexibility. The Congress and the

Department of Defense (DOD) commit themselves to fund multiyear

contracts through completion or pay any contract cancellation charges,

which may be substantial.

According to the President’s 1997 Budget, the Army and the Marine Corps

plan to purchase 31,269 Javelin rounds and 3,264 command launch units.

The Army’s share of the purchase is 26,600 rounds and 2,800 command

launch units. The Marines Corps plans to acquire 4,669 rounds and

464 launch units.

Javelin’s Design May

Not Be Stable

The Army has not demonstrated that Javelin’s design is sufficiently stable

for a multiyear production contract. By awarding a multiyear production

contract before the design has stabilized and the system has been

thoroughly tested, the Army risks cost overruns and/or schedule delays

that could more than offset the savings produced by the contract.

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B-272415 

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2306b, a military service is authorized to award

multiyear contracts for the purchase of weapon systems if certain criteria

are met. These criteria include the requirement that the design of the

system remain substantially unchanged during the period covered by the

multiyear contract. If the government awards a multiyear contract for a

weapon system with an unstable design, the government could lose its

budget flexibility without corresponding cost savings because contract

changes or termination costs may substantially increase the cost of the

weapon system.

Between the end of development in 1993 and the beginning of low-rate

production in 1994, the Army made 39 design changes to correct reliability

problems. Since 1994, the Army has made a number of changes to the

system’s design to reduce production and logistics costs and expects to

continue making changes through the beginning of full-rate production in

1997. Most of these changes are being incrementally incorporated into

hardware produced under three low-rate production contracts. The

contractor is continuing production while changes are developed and

qualified. As changes are approved, the contractor incorporates them into

units in the production process.

The Army estimates it will spend approximately $49.4 million from fiscal

year 1994 through fiscal year 1997 while Javelin is in low-rate production

to redesign various Javelin components. These changes are expected to

reduce production and logistics costs by $329 million. However, because

redesigned components are added to the production line as they are

developed and qualified, the contractor will produce at least one and

sometimes two variations of the Javelin system during each of the three

low-rate production runs. According to current schedules, the last planned

changes will not be incorporated into the production line until after

full-rate production begins in 1997 under the planned multiyear contract.

Javelin tests conducted to date have identified the need for additional

design changes. During the first 8 months of Javelin round assembly, the

round contractor stopped final assembly twice so engineers could

redesign components that failed during testing. In January 1996, warheads

in missiles undergoing production verification tests failed to function

properly. Engineers said the failures occurred after they made minor

changes to the fuzing device’s electronics. However, the warhead failures

stopped production for 4 weeks until a remedy could be identified and

implemented. In April, the contractor stopped round assembly for 2 weeks

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

when electrical problems in the restraint pin mechanisms1 of two missiles

occurred during a limited user test. The problems prevented one missile

from leaving the launch tube after the gunner pulled the trigger and caused

another to dive into the ground shortly after launch. During this test, a

third missile failed when a short occurred in a transistor. This missile also

failed to leave the launch tube. Army officials said the restraint pin

assembly has been modified to remedy the problems that occurred during

the limited user test. The contractor is retrofitting already produced

missiles with the new assembly.

Other unscheduled design changes could also be necessary as the Army

continues to test the Javelin system.

Operational Testing of

Javelin Is Inadequate

Even though it is making over 50 separate changes to Javelin’s original

design, the Army does not plan to conduct any operational tests of missiles

with all of the design changes until after full-rate production begins under

a multiyear contract. In the opinion of Army officials, technical tests and a

limited user test provide adequate information on Javelin’s operational

capability. However, technical tests are conducted under controlled

conditions and the limited user test does not test hardware that

incorporates all design changes.

The military services are statutorily required to operationally test each

major weapon system under realistic combat conditions to determine if

the system is operationally effective and suitable for combat prior to

entering full-rate production. The military services are also required by

DOD regulation to retest equipment if the design changes materially after

initial operational testing. Therefore, we believe the Army must ensure

that the redesigned Javelin works as intended prior to any commitment to

full-rate production. In our view, the best way to accomplish that would be

to conduct additional operational tests using fully redesigned systems.

Javelin Is Being

Extensively Redesigned

The Javelin system that will enter full-rate production will be significantly

different from the Javelin that the Army operationally tested in 1993. To

correct reliability failures recognized during full-scale development, and to

reduce the cost of producing and supporting Javelin, engineers are

changing many major components of the system. Between the end of the

early operational testing and the beginning of low-rate production, the

Army made changes to the round’s guidance unit, fuzing mechanism,

1

The restraint pin mechanism holds the missile in place within the launch tube until the missile is fired.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

propulsion unit, control system, battery coolant unit, and launch tube

assembly, as well as the launch unit’s detection device, optics, display

screen, and software. The Army will make additional round and launch

unit changes during low-rate production. According to project office

estimates, about 35 percent of the command launch unit’s components and

23 percent of the round will be redesigned during low-rate production.

While Javelin’s Chief Engineer agreed that the command launch unit the

Army plans to produce during full-rate production will be significantly

different from the original configuration, he said that the round changes

will not be significant. However, tests of warheads and rounds from the

first low-rate production line have already identified potentially serious

problems. Before low-rate production began, engineers made changes to

electronic components in the warhead fuzing device. When missiles

incorporating the changes were fired, the warheads failed to function

properly. Army officials considered this problem so serious that they

stopped round assembly until engineers identified and implemented a

solution. Another post-development change—buying a liner for the main

charge warhead from a second source—also caused problems. The liner

should collapse and form a jet capable of perforating armor. However, the

new vendor’s liner formed a jet that was not compatible with other Javelin

components. Project office engineers believe the jet would have degraded

Javelin’s lethality. The engineers modified Javelin components to correct

the problem.

Army Officials Think

Planned Testing Is

Adequate

Army officials told us that technical tests will provide sufficient proof that

Javelin is suitable for combat. However, these tests—which determine if

redesigned hardware (1) performs its intended function, (2) is compatible

with other components of the system, and (3) can withstand various

environmental stresses—are conducted under controlled conditions. Some

technical tests are planned by the contractor and conducted at its facility.

Even if tests are controlled by the government, test officials try to control

as many variables as possible. For example, an Army operational test

official said that during technical tests, trained technicians handle the

equipment and follow precise guidelines. According to one DOD systems

analyst, hardware may be sufficiently reliable to pass required technical

tests, but still lack the endurance needed for battlefield conditions.

The Army and the Marine Corps are jointly conducting one limited user

test of Javelin prior to full-rate production. However, this test will not

provide data that the Army can use to assess the suitability of the full-rate

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

production configuration of Javelin. Soldiers participating in the test are

using command launch units and rounds coming off the first low-rate

production line that do not include all planned cost reduction changes.

The Army does not plan to operationally test the system with all changes

until 1998, over a year after the Army makes its decision to begin Javelin

full-rate production.

Early Tests Indicate Javelin

Rounds May Not Meet

Reliability Goal

DOD requires that before Javelin proceeds into full-rate production, flight

tests must prove the round is 82 percent reliable. According to the Army,

tests conducted through June 19, 1996, demonstrated the round should

perform as designed 81.5 percent of the time. However, some of the tests

used to predict reliability could have potentially inflated the reliability

score.

By the end of May 1996, the Army had completed 22 planned test flights

under controlled test conditions. The Army did not score five of the tests

for reliability because the tests did not meet the Army’s criteria for a valid

reliability test or the purpose of the flights was to assess round safety. Of

the 17 scored tests, 2 were failures. In one test, the missile overflew its

target; in another, the missile did not leave the launch tube because its

launch motor did not fire.

The Army planned to fire six more rounds as part of a limited user test.

However, after three failures, Javelin’s Project Manager halted the tests to

determine the cause of the failures and, if required, make design

modifications. When flight tests were halted, 75 percent of all rounds

tested had functioned as intended upon launch.

Before resuming the limited user test, the Army modified a missile

component and completed 12 unplanned controlled test flights to verify

performance of the design change. Of the 12 flights, 10 were successful.

With the design deficiency corrected, the Army resumed the limited user

test and successfully fired six rounds. According to the Army, considering

the results of all 38 scored tests, 81.5 percent of the rounds tested met

established reliability criteria.

However, the last 18 tests may not be useful for predicting reliability

because the Army used a method of selecting the missiles for these tests

that potentially could have affected the test outcome and inflated the

reliability score. Army officials carefully screened the production records

of the missiles selected for the 12 controlled test flights and the 6 final

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

limited user tests. Only missiles that the Army was highly confident would

perform as designed were retained for testing. Test officials said about

one-third of the missiles were eliminated from the sample.

The Army does not agree that the 18 tests are not useful for assessing

reliability. Project officials said the purpose of screening the missiles

before testing them was to ensure that the latest configuration was being

tested, that subsystem performance specifications were met, and to review

the manufacturing and assembly process. They acknowledged, however,

that these actions increased the likelihood that the tests would be

successful.

The officials said that they do not believe the screening process prejudiced

test results. They said that since the completion of the limited user test,

they have either tested or performed a second review of the production

records for all eliminated rounds. As a result, the officials said they believe

some missiles were needlessly eliminated from the sample. However, if a

test or second production review indicated an eliminated missile was

defective, all missiles at the contractor’s facility were screened for similar

deficiencies. In addition, Javelin’s Project Manager said that rounds tested

during lot acceptance test scheduled for October will be randomly chosen

and should further prove the round’s reliability.

Army Can Purchase

Fewer Low-Rate

Production Launch

Units

The Army plans to replace all 277 launch units manufactured under the

3 low-rate production contracts about 3 years after they are produced. The

Army is redesigning the command launch unit to reduce production and

logistics costs, and plans to replace all the original production units

because it cannot afford to maintain two configurations of the launch unit.

To minimize replacement costs, the Army could reduce quantities to be

produced under its third low-rate production contract to a minimum level

of production.

During low-rate production, the Army is redesigning the launch units’

electronics and housing and adding built-in-test equipment that it

estimates will reduce each unit’s procurement cost an average of $14,590

and total logistics cost by $45.1 million. The contractor will not begin

producing launch units with all the changes incorporated until 1997.

Javelin’s Chief of Logistics said the Army cannot afford to maintain both

the low-rate production and redesigned launch unit configurations. He

said that if soldiers were given different launch units, the Army would

have to maintain inventory and train personnel to repair both

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

configurations. In addition, the Army would have to develop and produce

test equipment for the low-rate production configuration because it will

not have built-in-test equipment to diagnose system failures.

Before the Army awarded the third low-rate production contract in

February 1996, we expressed concern about the Army’s plan to produce

launch units at a relatively high rate and then replace them only 3 years

after the units are fielded. The Deputy Director of DOD’s Land Warfare

Office, which is responsible for Javelin oversight, asked the Javelin Project

Manager to delay contract award until his office and the project office

could determine if actions could be taken to minimize replacement costs.

Despite the request, the Project Manager awarded the contract. He later

explained that reducing Javelin production would delay fielding to infantry

battalions that urgently need an improved antiarmor system. However,

officials in the Office of the Secretary of the Army for Research,

Development, and Acquisition said Javelin is not needed to address an

urgent threat as it was before the decline of the Warsaw Pact nations, but

rather will be used to improve overall warfighting capability.

The Army can still modify the third low-rate production contract to

purchase as few as 36 launch units because the contractor has not begun

assembly of the units and the level of production required to keep the

manufacturing facility running is 3 units per month, or 36 units per year.2

The contract, when originally awarded on February 29, 1996, called for

production of 125 units at a cost of about $29 million. According to project

office cost officials, reducing the purchase to 36 launch units would

decrease the contract cost by $18.5 million. But, the officials said that

purchasing fewer launch units will increase the per unit cost of the

remaining units because the contractor has already purchased materials

and incurred costs in anticipation of production. However, they agreed

that some of the materials could be used during future production

contracts. In addition, the Army is already decreasing the number of

command launch units being purchased under the contract. The Army has

already decided to cancel production of 17 of these units and may cancel

production of another 12 if 1 infantry battalion returns the 12 launch units

that battalion borrowed to participate in the Army’s Advanced Warfighting

Experiment.

2

Army officials said that even if production is reduced, the minimum level of production that will allow

the command launch unit contractor to proceed to full-rate production in fiscal year 1997, as currently

planned, is 72 launch units.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

Recommendations According to Army estimates, the changes in the Javelin weapon system

should result in a more effective, less expensive weapon. However, the

Army risks these gains by accelerating production and committing to a

multiyear contract before it has demonstrated that the system’s design is

stable and operational tests prove the redesigned system is suitable for

combat. The Army has already increased system cost by purchasing

launch units in relatively large quantities before all design changes were

incorporated. But replacement cost can be reduced somewhat by

modifying the third low-rate production contract to purchase fewer launch

units.

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army

to (1) award annual (vice multiyear) Javelin contracts for the minimum

quantity needed to sustain production until the Army demonstrates that

the system’s design is stable, (2) operationally test the redesigned Javelin

before proceeding to full-rate production, and (3) modify the third low-rate

production contract to reduce command launch unit production from 125

to the contractor’s minimum production level of 3 units per month or 

36 total units.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DOD (see

app.I). DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of

Defense direct the Army to award annual Javelin contracts for the

minimum quantity needed until the Army demonstrates that the design of

Javelin is stable. While DOD agreed that Javelin has undergone a large

number of design changes, in their opinion the stability of the design has

been verified through successful production verification testing and

limited user testing. However, production verification testing for the

Javelin configuration that the Army will produce during full-rate

production is not complete and full-rate production representative items

have not been subjected to any type of operational test. Until the tests are

successfully completed and the stability of Javelin’s design is

demonstrated in production, the Army cannot be certain Javelin’s design is

stable.

DOD agreed that the redesigned Javelin should be operationally tested

before proceeding to full-rate production. Before a decision is made in

May 1997 to begin Javelin full-rate production, the Army will complete an

operational test program with production representative hardware.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

DOD did not agree that the third low-rate production contract should be

modified to reduce the command launch unit production from 125 units to

36 units. DOD commented that the (1) currently deployed Dragon antiarmor

system cannot effectively engage or destroy modern armor; (2) savings of

reducing the purchase to 36 units will be only $10 million—not the

$18.5-million reduction in contract cost—if parts salvaged from low-rate

production units can be used as repair parts; and (3) cost of replacing

units produced during low-rate production is more than offset by the

benefits of having Javelin in the contingency forces. Although we agree

that Javelin should improve the Army and the Marine Corps’ warfighting

capability, Army officials told us that there is no longer an urgent need for

Javelin as there was before the decline of the Warsaw Pact nations.

Without an urgent need, the Army should purchase only the quantity of

command launch units required to keep the manufacturing facility

running.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

We continue to believe that the Army should not pursue a multiyear

production contract for Javelin at this time and should reduce the number

of launch units procured under the third low-rate production contract.

Therefore, we suggest that the Congress consider requiring that the Army

(1) award annual (instead of multiyear) Javelin contracts for the minimum

quantity needed to sustain production until the Army demonstrates that

the system’s design is stable and (2) reduce the command launch unit

production to the contractor’s minimum production level of three units

per month.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed the Army’s justification for a multiyear contract and

discussed multiyear criteria with officials in the Army’s Javelin Project

Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and the U.S. Marine Corps Ground

Weapons System, Quantico, Virginia. We also obtained information on

quantity requirements and Javelin’s design stability from the Army Office

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D.C.,

and the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen, Maryland.

To determine the adequacy of planned system testing, we obtained and

reviewed test plans and reports from the Javelin Project Office. We

discussed Javelin testing with project office officials and officials from the

Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia; the

Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.;

and the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen, Maryland.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

To assess the Army’s decision to purchase launch units, we evaluated

production and fielding plans and held discussions with officials in the

Javelin Project Office; the Army Missile Command Acquisition Center,

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; the Office of the Secretary of the Army

(Research, Development, and Acquisition), Washington, D.C.; and the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,

Washington, D.C.

We conducted our review from December 1995 to June 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Army, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the

Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be

made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact

me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were Lee

Edwards, Barbara Haynes, and John Randall.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisition Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
B-272415 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

Now on pp. 13-14.

See comment 4.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated August 16, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. DOD provided comments on the technical accuracy of the report. We

have reviewed DOD’s suggestions and made changes as appropriate.

2. Based on new information provided by DOD as a result of its review of

our report, we no longer question the stability of the Javelin quantities the

Army and the Marine Corps will purchase during the multiyear contract.

At the time of our audit, the Marine Corps had not formalized their plans

to reduce their purchase of Javelin rounds and it appeared likely that

quantities could be reduced during the period of the multiyear contract.

With DOD’s assurance that the Marine Corps’ reductions will be known

before the multiyear contract is awarded and that the Army anticipates no

changes in their requirements, we have removed information regarding

this issue from the report.

3. Javelin’s design has been in transition since it was operationally tested

in 1993. Each production of Javelin through the first year of full-rate

production will produce a different configuration of the system. The Army

has not completed technical and operational tests of Javelin with all

design changes incorporated. In addition, early tests have shown that

some changes require additional redesign. By delaying the multiyear

contract until the Army has successfully tested Javelin’s design and the

design’s stability is demonstrated by production, the government can

reduce the risk that additional redesign will reduce or eliminate multiyear

cost savings.

4. We agree that the Javelin should be a significant improvement over the

aging Dragon system. However, because there is no urgent threat, we

believe that the Army should reduce their third low-rate production

contract to purchase only the minimum quantity necessary to keep the

manufacturing facility running. This will minimize the costs of replacing

these launch units with redesigned units.

(707140) Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-199 Army Acquisition
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