NO. 4-03-0506

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: the Estate of DOUGLAS HARRISON	)	Appeal from

LANE, Deceased,					)	Circuit Court of

SHIRLEY L. LANE, Executrix,			)	Sangamon County

		Petitioner-Appellee,		)	No. 02P310

		v.						)

QIK N EZ PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,			)	Honorable

		Respondent-Appellant.		)	Dennis L. Schwartz,

								)	Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

		Respondent, Qik N EZ Properties, L.L.C. (Qik N EZ),

appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing its claim

against the estate of Douglas Harrison Lane as untimely.  We

affirm.

		On or about December 30, 1999, the decedent, Douglas

Harrison Lane, and his wife, Shirley Lane, entered into an

indemnification agreement with the Joel A. Schneider 1996 Trust. 

The indemnification agreement was later assigned to Qik N EZ. 

Mr. Lane died on April 20, 2002.  On May 21, his will was admit

ted to probate, and Mrs. Lane was appointed the executrix of the

estate.  Notice of the opening of the estate was properly pub

lished, first appearing on May 25.  The publication gave notice

that the period in which to make claims against the estate would

expire six months from the date of first publication, i.e., November 25, 2002.  On December 16, Qik N EZ filed a claim

against the estate in the circuit court.  The estate filed a

motion to dismiss the claim on December 18.  The motion was denied, and an amended motion to dismiss was latersubsequently filed. 

The trial court granted the amended motion to dismiss the estate

as untimely on March 7, 2003.  Qik N EZ appeals this dismissal.

		Qik N EZ argues that the December 16 filing of its

claim in the circuit court was only a formality and that it had

actually presented its claim against the estate in a series of

letters beginning in May, well within the six-month statutory

window to present claims against the estate.  On May 6, 2002,

counsel for Qik N EZ first wrote Mrs. Lane about the indemnifica

tion agreement.  The letter was addressed to her personally and

made no mention of either her husband or his estate except to

note that he had signed the indemnification agreement along with

her.  On May 9, counsel for Mrs. Lane responded, making no

mention of Mr. Lane except to note that he had signed the agree

ment also.  On May 14, counsel for Mrs. Lane informed Qik N EZ

that Mr. Lane had recently passed away, that a petition to open

probate was being prepared, and, "[s]hould you wish to file a

claim in that proceeding, please advise, and once probate has

been opened, we will provide you with the case number."  Qik N EZ

did not directly respond to this invitation to file a claim in

the probate proceeding.  However, in its June 19 response, Qik N

EZ did state, "[t]he Indemnification Agreement requires Shirley

Lane and the Estate of Harrison Lane to clean up the fill that

has been placed on the property."  Also, in subsequent letters,

Qik N EZ no longer referred to Mr. Lane as being a responsible

party under the agreement but began to reference his estate instead.  These references are the basis for Qik N EZ's conten

tion that a claim was filed with the representative of the

estate.

		In dismissing the claim, the trial court found the

correspondence relied upon by Qik N EZ to create a valid claim to

be insufficient since said correspondence was to Mrs. Lane

individually and not to her as the representative of the estate. 

We affirm.

		First, under the Probate Act of 197537 (Act), a claim

against the estate of a decedent may either be filed with the

court, the representative of the estate, or both.  755 ILCS 5/18-

1(a) (West 2002).  The Act further provides "[e]very claim filed

must be in writing and state sufficient information to notify the

representative of the nature of the claim or other relief

sought."  755 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2002).  The courts have held that

technical legal form is not required to present a valid claim. 

Sheetz v. Morgan, 98 Ill. App. 3d 794, 424 N.E.2d 867, 868 (1981).  However, the claim must still be sufficient to notify

the representative of the nature of the claim.

		In the instant case, the initial letter sent by Qik N

EZ was addressed to Mrs. Lane in her individual capacity. 

Nothing indicates that the correspondence was also directed

toward her husband, his estate, nor toward her as executrix of his

estate.  When informed of Mr. Lane's death, Qik N EZ chose  not

to then file a claim with the court or to further inquire about

the probate case, even though it was openly invited to do so by Mrs. Lane's counsel.  Although not required by law, this would

have clearly shown Qik N EZ's intentions to pursue a claim

against the estate.  Instead, Qik N EZ continued in the manner it

had begun, which was to pursue the matter with Mrs. Lane individ

ually, as if the opening of probate had no effect upon their

dealings.  We cannot say that one sentence in a letter stating

that the indemnification agreement requires action by "Shirley

Lane and the Estate of Harrison Lane" is sufficient information

under the Act to notify the representative of the nature of the

claim when previous correspondence had only referred to Mrs. Lane

in her individual capacity as a codebtor.  Language of this

nature could be construed as doing nothing more than recognizing

that an estate had been opened and Mrs. Lane's codebtor had

changed as a result.  We must look at the sufficiency of the

letter to notify the representative of the estate of a claim at

the time the letter was received; we may not use the benefit of 

hindsight.

		Although the facts differ somewhat from the instant

case, we find the reasoning employed by the court in In re Estate of Beider, 268 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 645 N.E.2d 553 (1994), to be applicable here.  In Beider, the court held that letters ad dressed personally to the deceased rather than to his estate were

insufficient to state a claim against the estate.  In reaching

its decision, the court first examined a Minnesota case, Harter v. Lenmark, 443 N.W.2d 537 (Minn. 1989).  In Harter, the Minne sota court held that demand letters a creditor had sent to a husband in his individual capacity as a codebtor were insuffi

cient to constitute a claim against his wife's estate, of which

he was the executor.  The Harter court noted,

		"'[T]he two letters did not request or 

		demand 

	payment from the estate, but only from       

[the 

	estate's representative] individually. [and 

	wWhile] it can be assumed that *** [the] personal

	representative *** was aware of [the decedent's]

	participation and obligations under at least 

	one of the notes, no claim or demand for pay-

	ment from the estate was asserted.'"  Beider, 

	268 Ill. App. 3d at 1097, 645 N.E.2d at 555, 

	quoting Harter, 443 N.W.2d at 539.

The ruling in Harter is basically that knowledge an administrator has of a potential claim against an estate is not enough,; that

for a claim to have any effect, it must clearly and intentionally

be directed at the estate.

		To supplement the decision in Harter, the Beider court also examined State v. Griffin, 171 Conn. 333, 370 A.2d 1301 (1976).  In Griffin, the Connecticut court found a letter ad dressed to an individual, who had not yet been appointed

administratrix, was sufficient to state a claim against the

estate because the letter made it clear that there was an inten

tion that the letter serve as notice to the future administratrix

of the claim against the estate.  The court said that the intent

was apparent because the letter conveyed the exact amount of the claimed indebtedness, identified the creditor, stated an unequiv

ocal intention to pursue the claim, and an expectation that the

recipient would apply for letters of administration.  Beider, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 1097-98, 645 N.E.2d at 555, citing Griffin, 171 Conn. at 338-39, 370 A.2d at 1304.

		Essentially, by reading these two cases together, the

court in Beider found that unless letters are addressed directly to the estate or to an administrator of the estate in his or hertheir

capacity as such, we cannot find that those letters state a claim

against the estate.  It is the intent to make a claim against an estate that is important, and as a rule, that intent must be

clearly presented to the representative of the estate.  Harter and Griffin outline the spectrum in which letters to a represen tative of an estate sufficiently show the intent necessary to

state a claim.  In Griffin, the letter clearly elucidated its intent to pursue a claim against the estate, even though the

estate had not yet been opened.  In Harter, the letter was not clear about its intent to pursue a claim against the estate, even

though that was a reasonable inference that could have been made

by the recipient.  Although a letter need not include every

detail found in the letter in Griffin, at the very least a letter must state an unequivocal intention to pursue a claim against the

estate, and it must specify the grounds or basis for the claim,

along with identifying the creditor.

		In the instant case, the facts are much more similar to

those in Harter than those in Griffin.  Nothing in the letters to Mrs. Lane suggests that Qik N EZ was writing to her in her

capacity as executrix of Mr. Lane's estate.  There is no evidence

that Qik N EZ even knew that Mrs. Lane was the personal represen

tative of her husband's estate.  On the contrary, the letters are

addressed to her in her individual capacity, much like the

situation in Harter.  Although it may be a reasonable inference to make, we cannot equate a demand against Mrs. Lane as a codeb-

tor with an intention to pursue a claim against the estate over

which she was executrix.  There is no unequivocal intention to

pursue a claim against the estate in Qik N EZ's letters to Mrs.

Lane, and as such the trial court did not err in dismissing Qik N

EZ's claim against the estate.

		Affirmed.

		TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.