IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Marlene Lambright, :

Plaintiff, :

v. : Case No. 2:12-cv-594

Kidney Serviecs of Ohio, et al.,: JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

Defendants. :

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion for an

extension of the discovery deadline filed by plaintiff Marlene

Lambright. Defendants Kidney Services of Ohio and Ohio Thrift

Show & Sells have filed a response. Ms. Lambright filed a motion

to strike the response which the Court will construe as a reply

in support of her motion. For the following reasons, the motion

for an extension of time will be granted in part.

I. The Motion for an Extension

In her motion, Ms. Lambright requests an extension of time

beyond the June 7 discovery deadline but does not specify of what

length. In support of her request, she explains that the

deadline cannot be met for the following reasons. “Plaintiff

completed Defendants’ requested Deposition on May 30th, 2013. 

Plaintiff has not yet reviewed as the report is not completed. 

Plaintiff’s recent medical issues has compromised her mobility

April and May 2013.”

In their response, defendants interpret Ms. Lambright’s

motion as a request to extend the discovery deadline indefinitely

without good cause for the sole purpose of allowing her time to

review her deposition transcript. Defendants also note, however,

that, after filing her motion and after the discovery deadline

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passed, Ms. Lambright served written discovery, including

interrogatories and requests for production. In light of this

series of events, defendants argue that Ms. Lambright’s motion

should be denied because the review of a deposition transcript is

not a sufficient reason for an open-ended extension of the

discovery deadline or for permitting written discovery to go

forward after that deadline. Further, defendants point out that

Ms. Lambright did not request an extension of time to conduct

written discovery in her motion for an extension. They also

challenge her reason for the requested extension, contending that

Ms. Lambright’s alleged mobility issues would not have impeded

her ability to serve discovery just as they did not compromise

her ability to attend court-ordered mediation or her own

deposition. 

At the same time, defendants recognize Ms. Lambright’s pro

se status. However, they assert that such status does not excuse

her failure to comply with a straightforward discovery deadline. 

Additionally, they contend that an extension of the discovery

deadline in light of Ms. Lambright’s failure to adhere to the

Court’s rules will result in prejudice to both them and the

Court. Finally, however, they state that they would agree to a

30-day extension - until July 10, 2013 - for Ms. Lambright to

review and verify her deposition transcript as long as the

dispositive motion deadline is extended from June 24, 2012 to

July 15, 2013. 

In reply, Ms. Lambright asserts that she is not requesting

an indefinite extension of the discovery deadline and that the

basis for her requested extension are her “medical problems

before and after July 16, 2012.” She seems to suggest that an

extension is warranted, in part, because “[t]he Defendants

Discovery was not available for Plaintiff to review on June 7th,

2013.” She also appears to be arguing, by citation to other

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cases, that other pro se plaintiffs have been granted multiple

extensions and that defendants are not in a position to define

her as careless or lacking in diligence. 

II. Legal Standard

Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b) requires the Court, in each civil action

which is not exempt from that rule, to “enter a scheduling order

that limits the time” to, inter alia, file motions, identify

expert witnesses, and complete discovery. The rule further

provides that “[a] schedule shall not be modified except upon a

showing of good cause ....”

Although the Court has broad discretion to modify its own

pretrial orders, it must be remembered that “[a]dherence to

reasonable deadlines is ... critical to maintaining integrity in

court proceedings,” Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F.Supp.

1191, 1199 (N.D. Iowa 1994), and that pretrial scheduling orders

are “the essential mechanism for cases becoming trial-ready in an

efficient, just, and certain manner.” Id. at 1198. In

evaluating whether the party seeking modification of a pretrial

scheduling order has demonstrated good cause, the Court is

mindful that “[t]he party seeking an extension must show that

despite due diligence it could not have reasonably met the

scheduled deadlines.” Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, 904 F.Supp.

1218, 1221 (D. Kan. 1995). The focus is primarily upon the

diligence of the movant; the absence of prejudice to the opposing

party is not equivalent to a showing of good cause. Tschantz v.

McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Of course,

“[c]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and

offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Dilmer Oil Co. v.

Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986 F.Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C. 1997). 

Further, although the primary focus of the inquiry is upon the

moving party’s diligence, the presence or absence of prejudice to

the other party or parties is a factor to be considered. Inge v.

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Rock Financial Corp., 281 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2002). The Court of

Appeals has made it clear that this standard applies to any

deadline set in a Rule 16 order, such as a date by which motions

to amend the pleadings must be made (see Inge, supra), a

discovery cutoff date (see Commerce Benefits Group v. McKesson

Corp., 326 Fed. Appx. 2369 (6th Cir. May 20, 2009)), or a date

for filing summary judgment motions (see Andretti v. Borla

Performance Industries, 426 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2005)). It is

with these standards in mind that Ms. Lambright’s motion will be

decided. 

III. Analysis 

At the outset, the Court notes that, because the defendants

do not have any objection to a brief extension of time to allow

Ms. Lambright to review her deposition transcript as she

requested in her motion, the real issue here is whether she

should be granted an extension of time to undertake written

discovery. On this issue, defendants argue that Ms. Lambright

did not serve any written discovery on them until after the

discovery cut-off and her demonstrated lack of diligence

precludes any extension. Ms. Lambright does not dispute that she

did not undertake written discovery prior to the deadline. Nor

does she argue that, despite her diligence in pursuing discovery,

she was unable to complete the necessary discovery before the

deadline. At best, her argument in support of an extension is

that the defendants did not undertake her deposition in time to

permit her review of it prior to the deadline and that she has

several health issues. Neither of these issues provides a basis

for a finding of diligence necessary to support an extension of

the discovery cut-off under the circumstances presented here. 

First, the timing of the defendants’ taking of her

deposition simply is not an issue addressed to Ms. Lambright’s

diligence in undertaking discovery. Further, given the history

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of this case, Ms. Lambright’s health issues do not provide a

basis for a finding of diligence on her behalf. Although Ms.

Lambright argues that she has had medical problems before and

after July 16, 2012, and underwent “major back surgery” on August

28, 2012, she has been actively involved in prosecuting this case

since those dates. For example, she participated in the Rule

26(f) conference on October 8, 2012, and the preliminary pretrial

conference on October 30, 2012. She also responded to

defendants’ discovery requests in December, 2012, participated in

a settlement week conference on Apri 12, 2013, and attended her

deposition on May 30, 2013. Aside from her bare statement that

she has medical issues, she has provided no information in the

record to allow the Court to conclude that she attempted to

pursue discovery within the established time frame and was

hampered in her efforts as a result of those issues. 

In light of the above, the Court cannot conclude that Ms.

Lambright has established good cause for an extension of the

discovery deadline for purposes of propounding written discovery

on the defendants. Ms. Lambright’s pro se status does not

warrant a different conclusion. The Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals has made clear that “while pro se litigants may be

entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal

issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is no

cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural

requirements that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a

lawyer.” Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991). Pro

se litigants are not to be accorded any special consideration

when they fail to adhere to readily-comprehended court deadlines.

Id. at 110.

However, because the defendants have agreed to an extension

of time until July 10, 2013, for the limited purpose of allowing

her to review her deposition transcript, the Court will grant an

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extension to that extent for that specific purpose only. 

Accordingly,, the dispositive motion deadline will be extended

until July 15, 2013.

IV. Conclusion

The motion for an extension of time (#30) is granted in part

until July 10, 2013, for the limited purpose of allowing

plaintiff to review her deposition transcript. The dispostive

motion deadline is extended until July 15, 2013. The motion to

strike (#37) is construed as a reply and shall be removed from

the Court’s pending motions list. 

Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is

filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for

reconsideration by a District Judge. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A),

Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt.

I., F., 5. The motion must specifically designate the order or

part in question and the basis for any objection. Responses to

objections are due fourteen days after objections are filed and

replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter. 

The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set

aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the

filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge

or District Judge. S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.3.

/s/ Terence P. Kemp 

United States Magistrate Judge

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