Technical Report 654

Application of a Cognitive Model for Army Training:

Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis

0

00

o Ruth H. Phelps, Judith A. Englert, and Sharon A. Mutter

| Battlefield Information Systems Technical Area

Systems Research Laboratory

" DTIC

OCT3 019

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

October 1984

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

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Technical Report 654

Application of a Cognitive Model for Army Training:

Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Ruth H. Phelps, Judith A. Englert, and Sharon A. Mutter

Submitted by

Franklin L. Moses, Chief

Battlefield Information Systems Technical Area

Approved as technically adequate

and submitted for publication by

Jerrold M. Levine, Director

Systems Research Laboratory

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

October 1984

Army Project Number Intelllgence Aiding

20203730A793

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

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U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

L. NEALE COSBY

EDGAR M. JOHNSON Colonel, IN

Technical Director Commander

Research accomplished under contract Accession For

for the Department of the Army NTIS GRA&T

"DTIC TAB , -

Operating Systems Division of Logicon, Inc. UnannBuncer Q

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!Dist Special

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DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this report has been made by ARI.

Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, ATTN:

PERI-POT, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600.

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needed. Please do not return It to the U.S. Army Research Institute for

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NOTE: The findings In this report are not to be construed as an official

Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized

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ARI Technical Report 654 A' 0 4. TITLE (and Subtle*) S TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

Final Rep~or t

APPLICATION OF A COGNITIVE MODEL FOR ARMY

TRAINING: HANDBOOK FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE July 1982 - June 1983

ANALYSIS 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(e) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(e)

Ruth H. Phelps, Judith A. Englert, and

Sharon A. Mutter MDA 903-82-C-0409

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Operating Systems Division of Logicon, Inc. AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

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- IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Development of the handbook was jointly sponsored by the

" U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) and the U.S. Army

*', Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOH). The U.S. Army Research Institute

-(ARI) monitored technical progress. Special efforts were contributed to the

management of the project by Dr. Alan Goldman of ITAC.

IS. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree side if neceeeary and identify by block nueber)

Analysis

Intelligence

." Coqnitive model

Conceptual models

2&. A NST"R ACT (Cwt fwe oev ' N E n....eyaw e and idertl fy by block Member)

'This report discusses the development of the Handbook for Strategic

Intelligence Analysis that is currently being used as part of a training program for analysts at the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

• .(ITAC). The handbook grew out of a recognized need to provide analysts with

improved support and training to deal with ever increasing amounts of complex

- information. The first step toward addressing this concern was a research

program to evaluate and describe the cognitive processes that underlie analysis, synthesis, and production. - (Continued)

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The research findings were then applied to the development of training

materials for intelligence analysts, including the handbook presented here.'

"" This report provides a brief overview of the background research and history

- of the handbook and includes a copy of the handbook itself for interested ' bi r e a d e r s . , , a '" @ " '

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of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

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FOREWORE

A concern of the Army in recent years has been to provide improved support and training to intelligence analysts who must deal with the increasing

amounts of complex information being generated by modern intelligence collection systems. As a first step toward the development of appropriate analyst

support and/or training, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

* (INSCOM) and the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) initiated a joint research program to evaluate and describe

the human analytic processes underlying intelligence analysis, synthesis,

and production. The result of that 4-year research program was a descriptive

cognitive model of intelligence analysis applicable to both single- and multisource intelligence production activities across all disciplines.

The research findings have since served as a basis for the development

of training materials for entry level tactical and strategic all-source intelligence analysts. One of those products is the Handbook for Strategic

Intelligence Analysis developed by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat

Analysis Center (ITAC) and ARI. It is currently being used at ITAC to help

new analysts become full contributing members of the ITAC team in as short a

* time as possible. In addition to providing background about ITAC

*as a work environment and intelligence producing organization, the handbook

* also emphasizes the cognitive tasks of analysis and the development of skills

that enhance one's ability to think logically and analytically.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Technical Director

V

p%

- .. * . *.10
APPLICATION OF A COGNITIVE MODEL FOR ARMY TRAYNING:

HANDBOOK FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

To document the background research and rationale for the development of

a handbook for conducting strategic intelligence analysis.

Procedure:

An initial research program resulted in a general descriptive model of

the cognitive bases of intelligence analysis (Thompson, Hopf-Weichel, &

Geiselman, 1984). These research findings plus interviews with U.S. Army

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) strategic analysts and managers served as the basis for development of the handbook.

* Findings:

The major conclusions regarding intelligence analysis that emerged from

* the initial research study were:

o Analysis is a creative process.

o Quality of cognitive activity depends on organizational constraints,

personal interactions, background, and training.

o The analyst's own memory is a critical resource.

o Decisionmaking pervades analysis.

o Analysis can be studied scientifically and objectively.

o There are common cognitive processes for all disciplines of analysis.

These findings were applied to the development of a handbook for strategic

intelligence analysis, a copy of which is included in the report. The handbook provides analysts with important information about their job environment,

a systematic approach for conducting analysis, as well as guidelines for

thinking logically and analytically.

Utilization of Findings:

7

The Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis (ITAC Report ATC-PP2660-161-83) is specifically tailored to meet the needs of ITAC. It currently

is being used as part of that organization's training program for new analysts

and as a refresher guide for both new and experienced analysts.

vii
,,,, ,

APPLICATION OF A COGNITIVE MODEL FOR ARMY TRAINING:

HANDBOOK FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The purpose of this technical report is twofold. One purpose is to

present an end product of a multi-year research effort into the cognitive

skills involved in performing intelligence analysis. The product is a Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis developed for the U.S. Army Intel-

. ligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC). The other purpose of this report

is to summarize the course of development of the handbook so that users and

training developers may better understand the Army needs that prompted the

handbook development and the research on which it is based.

With these purposes in mind, the report begins with a discussion of the

background research into the thinking processes of intelligence analysis and

of the resulting descriptive cognitive model of analysis. It then briefly

describes the training products that were developed based on the research

findings, including the Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis. Finally, the handbook itself is provided in an appendix. The handbook is being

used at ITAC as part of their training program for new strategic analysts and

as a general reference guide.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The handbook was based on the study results of a 4-year project conducted

* jointly by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sci-

- ences (ARI) and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). This

- project, Investigation of Methodologies and Techniques for Intelligence Analy-

* .sis (IMTIA), was initially designed to provide recommendations for automated

- system support for all-source analysts (see Katter, Montgomery, & Thompson,

1979b). After studying the actual processing activities performed by the

• "analysts during the course of intelligence production, it was discovered that

* not only is relatively little known about the thinking processes, but also

that there is little training focus on how to subjectively process informa-

*tion. Thus, the focus of the study changed from a study of automated support

"- to a study of the thinking processes underlying intelligence analysis.

The outcome of the IMTIA study was a general model of the mental activities of analysts as they filter, interpret, and analyze information (see

Montgomery, Thompson, & Katter, 1979a and Thompson, Hopf-Weichel, & Geiselman, 1984 for initial and updated versions of the model; see also Montgomery,

"- Thompson, & Katter, 1980 for an imagery production model). The model provides

a basis for specifying which thinking/analytical skills should be trained but

are not part of existing training programs. It also helps to determine where

automated procedures or tools can support the thinking requirements of analysis--the places that are error prone or difficult because of human processing

limitations.

The first step in developing the model was to formulate a general description of the tasks common to the analysis of the different disciplines

of intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, all-source). This information was obtained

1. -
through lengthy interviews with over 200 tactical and strategic intelligence

personnel performing either single-source or multi-source intelligence production activities. Observation of analysts on the job and review of relevant Army and DOD manuals, reports, and instructional materials were additional sources of information regarding how intelligence analysis is performed.

Published scientific research findings on human perception, attention, memory,

learning, decisionmaking, and problem solving were also reviewed. The scientific literature and the information gathered on intelligence analysis were

integrated in the formulation of the general model of thinking activity during analysis.

The resulting model describes the cognitive structures and processes involved in analytic thinking and identifies nine specific tasks conducted explicitly or implicitly by all intelligence analysts. These tasks are:

o Recognizing goals and objectives;

o Establishing baseline;

o Recognizing uncertainties;

o Gathering and interpreting inforwation;

o Formulating hypotheses;

o Testing hypotheses;

o Cataloging analytic procedure and results;

o Evaluating results; and

o Formulating the output.

While the above listing represents one logical ordering of the tasks, it is

clear that the tasks may be performed in different sequences. Moreover, thie

tasks are likely to vary in their frequency of use and in the amount of conscious effort required for their execution.

The IMTIA study also identified two very basic processes that impact on

the execution of all of these tasks. One is that analysts formulate their

own conceptual models or frameworks that are unique personal ways of thinking,

organizing, and interpreting. Analysts use these frameworks to help them

understand the enemy threat, organize information, notice gaps in information, and make decisions. The other basic process is understanding the conceptual framewrk of the user of the intelligence product. By understanding

the user's '-n'-:ptual framework, i.e., knowing how this person thinks, views

a situation, etc., the analyst can tailor the ingelligence product to meet

the user's needs.

Finally, six major conclusions regarding the conduct of intelligence

analysis also emerged from the IMTIA study and are briefly summarized below:

o Analysis is a creative process. Intelligence doesn't exist as a

single piece of information or even in an overwhelming amount of information. Intelligence is created by analysts as a result of actively integrating, interpreting, analyzing, and synthesizing information. What is

created is a unique product of the analysts' mental processing. Intelligence is not simply finding the "right piece of information" but rather

knowing what to do with the information. The analyst's conceptual framework,

understanding of the client's framework, and thinking processes all contribute to that creative process.

2

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o Quality of mental cognitive activity depends on organizational constraints, personal interactions, background, and training. The ability of

*an analyst to create intelligence will be helped or hindered by the restric-

*tions, freedom, professional atmosphere and colleague relationships afforded

* by the mission, and working environment of the intelligence unit. The ana-

*" lyst's own training and background will affect the quality and range of men-

* tal processing exerted by the analyst.

o The analyst's own memory is a critical resource. Analysts must make

.- effective use of their own memory as well as external memory sources. Analysts can learn to improve their own memory capabilities by, for example,

more effectively organizing and structuring new material to be remembered.

*Moreover, how well analysts have organized what they know will determine how

well they will be able to use the massive amount of information available

from external sources such as computerized data bases, references, and card

files.

o Decisionmaking pervades analysis. Every time an analyst records

sorts, or interprets a piece of information, a decision is made that will

influence later processing and ultimately, perhaps, commander decisions.

Analysts are constantly predicting the future from partial and unreliable

information. Decisionmaking is an inescapable and fundamental aspect of

intelligence analysis that is often unrecognized.

o Analysis can be studied scientifically and objectively. The processes, variables, constraints, and strengths of intelligence analysis can

be largely understood and documented by scientists. Objective study will

help the Army provide training, equipment, and automation that will improve

the quality of intelligence products and possibly reduce the time required.

While scientists can never read people's minds or precisely predict how

people think, there is nonetheless a great deal of analytical processing

that is amenable to scientific study.

o There are common cognitive processes for all disciplines of analy-

* sis. The general model developed by the IMTIA project applies to all singlesource as well as all-source disciplines. Many of the thinking processes are

also fundamental to other fields of military analysis such as operations

planning and collection and resource allocation. This commonality of processes allows application of the cognitive approach to not only all MI areas,

but also other military fields.

PRODUCTS DEVELOPED FROM IMTIA FINDINGS

At the end of the 4-year study on the cognitive bases of analysis, the

Army requested that the findings be applied to the development of training

materials suitable for entry level all-source intelligence analysts. It was

believed that explicit training in the thinking processes of analysis would

help new analysts who had not yet benefited from years of experience actually

* ,performing analysis to be successful in their jobs within a relatively short

amount of time. Two projects were therefore initiated, one aimed at tactical

*and one at strategic all-source analysts. The tactical project was conducted

* jointly by ARI, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), and

the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI). This

3
project involved the development of a Field Circular, titled "An Introduction

to Tactical Intelligence Analysis: Cognitive Preparation for the Battlefield,"

for teaching the fundamentals of all-source intelligence analysis. The circular will be published jointly by ARI and USAICS spring 1985. Copies can be

obtained from USAICS (Office Symbol ATSI-TD).

The other project, conducted by ARI, ITAC, and INSCOM, resulted in the

Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis, a copy of which is included in

this report as an appendix. The handbook, tailored specifically for ITAC, was

designed to be used as part of their training program for new analysts and as

a reference guide for all of their analysts. Data from extensive interviews

conducted with ITAC managers and ITAC analysts representing a broad range of

experience levels provided a specific context in which to present the findings

and concepts that grew out of the IMTIA research. Part of the handbook is

devoted to a description of the ITAC job environment and to general discussions of intelligence production and management. Other portions deal explicitly with logical thinking and sound analytical procedures. The next

section presents a brief chapter-by-chapter overview.

HANDBOOK OVERVIEW

The first two chapters of the handbook describe the ITAC organization,

including its misgion, standards, information resources, intelligence products, and users. Substantial attention is given to this information, since

understanding the job environment has been found to be an important prerequisite for establishing the analyst's conceptual framework as well as successful job performance and job satisfaction. Chapter three presents a broad

discussion of intelligence production management with emphasis on the coordinated management of analysts, requirements, and production resources; again

this information is used to build the analyst's conceptual framework. The

next two chapters strongly emphasize the application of the general IMTIA

findings to specific ITAC training requirements. They discuss the nature

'- and goals of strategic intelligence analysis (chapter four) and suggest a

systematic approach and analytical procedures for conducting strategic analy-

* sis (chapter five). The final chapter discusses intelligence analyst train-

"" ing needs and training opportunities.

Comments or questions concerning the handbook development or its contents are welcome and should be directed to the authors of this report.

* 4
REFERENCES

Katter, R. V., Montgomery, C. A., & Thompson, J. R. Human Processes in

Intelligence Analysis: Phase I Overview. ARI Research Report 1237,

December 1979 (b). (AD A086 503)

Montgomery, C. A., Thompson, J. R., & Katter, R. V. Imagery Intelligence

(IMINT) Production Model. ARI Research Report 1210, January 1980.

(AD A086 455)

Montgomery, C. A., Thompson, J. R., & Katter, R. V. Cognitive Processes in

Intelligence Analysis: A Descriptive Model and Review of the Literature. ARI Technical Report 445, December 1979 (a). (AD A086 451)

Thompson, J. R., Hopf-Weichel, R., & Geiselman, R. E. The Cognitive Bases

of Intelligence Analysis. ARI Research Report 1362, January 1984.

(AD A146 132)

5

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APPENDIX
ATC-PP-2660-161-83

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

* (

ti m i

UNITED STATES ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR

INTELLIGENk AND THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER

- * . . .

°. . . . . . . . .- ... -- -. .- * ~ ** * * '' ~ ** * .* *..* *; !-?.
HANDBOOK FOR STRATEGIC

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

30 July 1983

Prepared For:

United States Army Intelligence and

Threat Analysis Center (USAITAC)

Arlington Hall Station

Arlington, Virginia 22212

Contract: MDA 903-82-C-0409

OS: 424

OSD Report No.: R83-039B

LOGICON, INC.

OPERATING SYSTEMS DIVISION

21031 Ventura Boulevard

Woodland Hills, CA 91364

(213) 887-4950

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the author(s)

and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or

decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

.X . ... .... *-:"'* '..

4 4*.
ERRATA LIST FOR

HANDBOOK FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

PAGE LINE ERROR CHANGE TO

v 11 Principal Consmers of... Principal Consumers of...

V 14 ITAC: Its Standard, Values, and Goals ITAC: Its Standard, Values, and Goal

viii 4 Thinking WHITE/RED/BLUE as Applied Thinking WHITE/RED/BLUE as Applied

Source Identification to Source Identification

3-8 9 or international climate. or International climate?

3-8 Bottom Thinking WHITE/RED/BLUE as Applied Thinking WHITE/RED/BLUE as Applied

Source Identification to Source Identification

4-5 Figure 4-1 COURSES OF ACTION BATTLEFIELD TACTICS

6-1 7 ...you must to establish ... ... you must establish...

6-2 9 Table 6-2 Table 6-1

S(

°* .
' FOREWORD

The U. S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) has numerous requirements from a multitude of sources to produce strategic intelligence. ITAC products have

considerable impact upon the plans and decisions that determine the way in which the U.S.

Army will be trained and prepared to fight wars of the future. Given the growing demands

upon ITAC's resources, it is vital that new ITAC analysts become full contributing members

of the ITAC team in the shortest time possible. it is our firm belief that this Handbook is

a major step toward meeting this goal.

This Handbook is based on several years of research into both the processes of intelligence analysis and the procedures to improve the quality of military intelligence products.

These extensive scientific investigations were jointly undertaken by the U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and the U.S. Army Intelligence and

Security Command (INSCOM). ITAC has now joined with these two organizations to apply

the research findings to the specific demands, requirements, and environment at ITAC.

The result is the publication of this Handbook to help in the understanding of analytical

processing and the production of quality intelligence.

The Handbook for Strategic intelligence Analysis (HASTIA) is a valuable reference

manual that will play a central role in the orientation and training of new ITAC analysts.

Its descriptions of ITAC's history, mission, resources, values, goal, and products will provide

new analysts with valuable information and background about ITAC as a work environment

and active intelligence producing organization. Similarly, HASTIA's discussions of the basic

concepts and components of strategic analysis and the management of strategic intelligence

production introduce the reader to important substantive material that is necessary for

becoming an effective strategic analyst.

The most valuable contribution of HASTIA, however, is its emphasis upon the mental

tasks of analysis and the need to develop skills that enhance one's ability to think logically

and analytically. The importance of employing structured approaches to intelligence

analysis is widely recognized as a way to avoid many of the pitfalls that result in faulty

analysis and can lead to costly intelligence failures. These discussions, together with a

description of over 40 distinct analytic methodologies, are valuable to the experienced and

inexperienced analyst alike.

Comments on the content and utility of this Handbook should be addressed to

Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center, Attn: IAX-PP,

Arlington Hall Station, Arli gton, Virginia, 22212.

DR. EDGAR M. JOANSON COL DAVID T. HOTTEL

Technical Director for ARI and Commander, U.S. Army

Chief Psychologist, U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat

Analysis Center

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( PREFACE

The Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis (HASTIA) Is a basic reference

resource for new ITAC analysts. Its purpose is to provide the reader with information, discussions, and techniques that are most relevant to the tasks of strategic

Intelligence analysts.

The Handbook was designed with the new analyst in mind. Its style and content are

Introductory in nature and strive to complement existing training and orientation programs at ITAC. However, significant portions of the Handbook are also relevant to

experienced strategic analysts and intelligence production managers.

Specifically, the objective of the Handbook is to introduce the reader to:

1. ITAC as a strategic intelligence center and unique component of the U.S. Army

and national intelligence communities.

2. The fundamental concepts of strategic intelligence.

3. Analysis as a mental process.

4. The need to develop analytic skills and apply structured approaches.

( 6. The methods and techniques most appropriate for conducting strategic intelligence analysis.

The Information in this publication presents the view of USAITAC and ARI. Comments

on the content and utility of this Handbook are welcome and should be addressed to

Cdr., USAITAC, Attn: IAX-PP, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia 22212.

- II, -

• . " " . " • • 4 b' ., *b * % .%
J 

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraph Page

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1-1

Welcome to ITAC 1.1 1-1

Purpose of This Handbook 1.2 1-2

CHAPTER 2. THIS IS ITAC 2-1

Introduction 2.1 2-1

Background 2.2 2-1

The History of ITAC 2.3 2-1

The ITAC Mission 2.4 2-3

Principal Consmers of ITAC Products 2.5 2-4

Intelligence Resources Used in ITAC Products 2.6 2-3

The Importance of Establishing a Personal Information Network 2.6.1 2-4

ITAC: Its Standard, Values, and Goals 2.7 2-4

The ITAC Standard 2.7.1 2-4

ITAC Values 2.7.2 2-4

The ITAC Goal 2.7.3 2-5

The Evolving ITAC 2.8 2-5

Summary 2.9 2-5

CHAPTER 3. THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 3-1

Introduction 3.1 3-1

Product Quality 3.2 3-1

i How Analysts are Managed 3.3 3-1

Managing Information Resources 3.4 3-2

Experienced Analysts are Resources 3.4.1 3-2

Collection Systems are Resources 3.4.2 3-2

Information Repositories are Resources 3.4.3 3-3

. Managing Requirements 3.5 3-3

Production Resource Multipliers 3.6 3-4

Removing Redundant Requirements Is a Multiplier 3.6.1 3-4

Preparation is a Time Multiplier 3.6.2 3-5

Generalization is a Speed Multiplier 3.6.3 3-5

Phasing Analysis from General to Specific is a Speed Multiplier 3.6.4 3-6

Exploiting All Sources is a Multiplier of Certainty 3.6.5 3-6

Information Source Multipliers 3.6.6 3-7

Capacity Multipliers 3.6.7 3-9

Summary 3.7 3-10

CHAPTER 4. INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 4-1

Introduction and Definition 4.1 4-1

The Goal of ITAC Strategic Analyses 4.1.1 4-1

Strategic and Tactical Intelligence:

A Useful Comparison 4.1.2 4-2

V
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Paragraph Page

The Nature of Strategic Analysis 4.2 4-3

Analysis as the First Step In Problem-Solving 4.2.1 4-3

Analysis can Create Information from Sparse Data 4.2.2 4-4

Analysis as a Mental Process 4.2.3 4-4

Strategic Analysis at ITAC 4.3 4-5

Assessments and Projections 4.3.1 4-5

Levels of Strategic Analysis 4.3.2 4-6

Theater-Strategic Operations 4.3.3 4-7

Conducting Strategic Analysis 4.4 4-8

Know the Enemy -- Think Red 4.4.1 4-8

Know our Programs and Capabilities -- Think Blue 4.4.2 4-10

Know the Environment -- Think White 4.4.3 4-10

Develop a Methodical Approach to Intelligence Analysis 4.4.4 4-11

Summary 4.5 4-11

CHAPTER 5. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 5-1

Introduction 6.1 5-1

A Methodology for Strategic Intelligence Analysis 5.2 5-1

The Steps of Strategic Intelligence Analysis 5.3 5-3

Step 1. Understanding the Intelligence Requirement 5.3.1 5-3

Step 2. Prepare an Initial Intelligence Survey 5.3.2 5-4

Step 3. Select an Analytic Method 5.3.3 5-8

Step 4. Execute the Analytic Method 5.3.4 5-10

Step 6. Prepare a Revised Intelligence Assessment 6.3.5 5-12

Step 6. Produce a Report of the Production Results 5.3.6 5-14

Summary 5.3.7 5-15

CHAPTER 6. TRAINING TO BECOME AN ITAC STRATEGIC ANALYST 6-1

Introduction 6.1 6-1

ITAC and the Well Trained Analyst 6.2 6-1

Commitment 6.2.1 6-1

Capability 6.2.2 6-1

Retraining 6.2.3 6-2

Exploitation of Library Resources 6.3 6-2

Academic Training and the Strategic Analyst 6.4 6-3

BIBLIOGRAPHY BIB-1

* APPENDIX A. ITAC CONFIGURATION AND DIRECTORATE RESPONSIBILITIES A-1

APPENDIX B. ITAC TASK ORGANIZATION B-1

APPENDIX C. ITAC PRODUCTS AND CLIENTS C-1

APPENDIX D. ITAC AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY D-1

V1v.

:':: .')
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Paragraph Page

APPENDIX E. BASIC TOOLS AND CONCEPTS E-1

APPENDIX F. WORKSHEET TO ESTABLISH CONSTRAINTS AND RESOURCES F-1

* APPENDIX G. GUIDE TO ANALYTIC METHOD SELECTION G-1

APPENDIX H. IDENTIFYING THE INFORMATIONAL VALUE OF DATA H-1

APPENDIX 1. COURSES AVAILABLE FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS TRAINING I-1

INDEX. IND-1

- vi

. - * .
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

)

Figure Page

2-1. (U) ITAC All Source Production 2-3

3-1. (U) Thinking WHITE/RED/BLUE as Applied Source Identification 3-8

4-1. (U) The Levels of Strategic Analysis 4-5

4-2. (U) Think Red! 4-8

4-3. (U) Become an "Expert" on the Enemy 4-9

6-1. (U) The Steps of Strategic Intelligence Analysis 5-2

6-2. (U) How to Create a Fault Tree 5-13

TABLES

Table Page

4-1. (U) Definition of Strategic Intelligence 4-1

4-2. (U) Definition of Tactical Intelligence 4-2

5-1. (U) Consumer Profile Checklist 5-3

5-2. (U) Structuring Questions 5-5

6-3. (U) Intelligence Survey Checklist 5-6

6-4. (U) Unusual Places to Find Information 5-6

5-5. (U) External Information Sources at ITAC 5-6

6-6a. (U) Organizing Memory 5-7

6-8b. (U) Organizing Memory 5-8

5-7. (U) SQ3R: Mnemonic Strategy for Organized Material 5-8

6-8. (U) Mnemonic Strategy For Unrelated items 5-9

5-9. (U) Assets of the Technical Library 5-10

5-10. (U) Where to Look for Human Resources 5-10

6-11. (U) Techniques to Stimulate Creativity 5-11

6-12. (U) Ideal Product Checklist 5-14

6-1. (U) Information Data Bases at ITAC 6-2

6-2. (U) Sample of Periodicals at the TIF 6-2

- viii -
LIST OF TERMS

ACSI Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence

AFMIC The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

* AIS Army Intelligence Survey

AMCA Advanced Materiel Concepts Agency

AU American University

AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network

ACC Concepts Analysis Agency

CG Commanding General

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COINS Community On-Line Intelligence System

CONUS Continental United States

CUA Catholic University of America

DA Department of the Army

DARCOM U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

DCSPCR Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DCSRDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition

DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIAOLS Defense Intelligence Agency On-Line System

DIC Defense Intelligence College

DO Director of Operations (ITAC)

DOD Department of Defense

EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information

FCD Forces Capabilities Directorate (ITAC)

FISS Foreign Intelligence Security Service

FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command

FSI Foreign Service Institute

FSTC Foreign Science and Technology Center

FTD Foreign Technology Division

GFOBB Ground Forces Order of Battle Book

GMU George Mason University

GWU George Washington University

HGF Handbook of Ground Forces

HOIS Hostile Intelligence Security Service

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IDHS Intelligence Data Handling System

II Imagery Interpreter

ILC Institute of Land Combat

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

lOSS Intelligence Organization Stationing Study

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IPO Intelligence Production Directorate (ITAC)

KGB Committee for State Security of the USSR

LAMM Land Armaments Manpower Model

LRPE Long-Range Planning Estimate

MACOM Major Army Command

ix -

%e'-
MENS Mission Element Need Statement

MIA Missile Intelligence Agency

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

OACSI Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

OB Order of Battle

OCSA Office, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

OPSEC Operations Security

PPBS Planning Programming and Budgeting System

RDJTF Rapid Development Joint Task Force

SBDP Soviet Battlefield Development Plan

SIGINT Signal Intelligence

SMD Support Management Directorate (SMD)

S&T Science and Technology

STAR System Threat Assessment Report

SOLIS SIGINT On-Line Intelligence System

TATC Threat Analyst Training Course

TIF Technical Information Facility

TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSD Technical Services Directorate

UM University of Maryland

USAINSCOM United States Army Intelligence and Security Command

USAITAC United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

USAITAD United States Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment

USAITAG United States Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Group

USAITFG United States Army Intelligence Threats Forecast Group

o
1. INTRODUCTION In the training and orientation programs

that are available at ITAC and other

organizations of the Intelligence com1.1 Welcome to ITAC munity. These Include the "ITAC Today"

briefing, ITAC's Threat Analyst Training Welcome to the United States Army cus TT) n h ore n

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (USAITAC). Your arrival here could not programs offered at the Defense Intelli- hUSae come . a more ival cinte gence College (DIC), the Central Intelli- ITAC Is evolving in ways that are gence Agency's (CIA) office of Intellipc Isto make it the prm/er t ntel- gence Training, and the State expected tDepartment's Foreign Service Institute

ligence analysis production center in (FSI). Together these programs can

the United States Army. provide you with a foundation of backIf you are a civilian, you have been ground and training from which you can

recruited because of your credentials begin the process of becoming a straand capabilities. If you are enlisted or tegic analyst.

commissioned In the U.S. Army, you have However, your education process does

been assigned here because your ser- not end here. It will be your responsivice record matched the high standards bility to seek out those colleagues, pro- and requirements that were listed In the grams, and additional sources of infor- personnel requisition. Whatever your mation that will enable you to become a

"status, you are here because of our ainttwllebeyotoecma seliftats you, haee ecs r first-rate strategic intelligence analyst.

belief that you, have the necessary You were selected for your particular

qualities, experience, and potential to

help make ITAC an elite, productive, and position at ITAC because of our belief in ( highly l ryour respected ability to meet this challenge. intelligence organiza- whlITC ilpridyowt a

tion. While ITAC will provide you wit'- as

much help as possible, the ultimate

As a newcomer to ITAC, you have prob- responsibility for your success rests

ably formed some expectations about with you.

your new job and work environment. you Jb nw nd or enirnmet. The following principles, if strictly

You should realize, however, that some

of these expectations may prove to be adhered to, will guide you throughout

an inaccurate or Incomplete assessment your career and will enable you to ITAC's complex mission, functions, reach your fullest potential as an effi- cient and productive ITAC strategic and responsibilities within the U.S. Army analyst:

Intelligence system. This may lead to

some confusion and frustration as you e You must develop a belief In the

attempt to "learn the ropes" In your ITAC organization, its mission and

new job. Shortly, however, you will function, and the jobs assigned to

become more familiar and comfortable you and your peers.

with the ITAC environment.

e You must develop a plan to succeed

Because ITAC's work is vital to the suc- by knowing what your goals are and

cess of the Army and the security of by having a schedule of objectives

the United States, your period of to achieve these goals.

adjustment must be as rapid as possi- e You must learn the tools and techble. To speed up this process, you

must actively seek out and participate niques of strategic analysis.

1-1
a You must make a concerted and con- * As a reference source of Information

tinual effort to interact with about ITAC and the Intelligence cornexperts, supervisors, and peers. Do munity environment within which It

not overlook anyone. operates. This should prove particu-

" You must be persistent and never larly helpful during those first months

give u. when everything may be very new

to you.

-I You aciev must the develop goas the an desire ob ecti toes * As an introduction to strategic achieve the goals and objectives analysis, providing you with definiyou have set for yourself. tions, discussions, and descriptions

of basic strategic analysis concepts,

as well as information about courses

1.2 Purpose of This Handbook and programs relating to the substantive areas of strategic affairs The purpose of this handbook is to help within the Intelligence community

you become an effective and produc- nd at universities In the Washingtive member of the ITAC team In the anD a resh

shortest time possible. It Is not ton, D.C., area.

Intended to replace on-the-job training NOTE: During your first few months

or serve as a substitute for ITAC or at ITAC, you will be encouraged to

community training programs. Rather, it attend training programs and orienwill complement these efforts by pro- tation seminars. However, these

viding you with a reference source and programs do not address what strawith some procedures on how to think tegic analysis is or how to approach

and perform as a strategic analyst. strategic analysis requirements.

This handbook contains four distinct * As a manual of strategic analytic

categories of Information that will help methods and techniques, providing

you become more familiar and comfort- many useful tools and procedures for

able with your new job. These are: (1) accomplishing specific strategic

the mission and goals of ITAC, (2) the analysis tasks. Together with your

management of Intelligence production, own personal techniques and capa-

(3) the nature of strategic intelligence bilities and those you will acquire

analysis, and (4) procedures for per- through training and experience, you

forming strategic analysis. This hand- will find these aids very useful for

book, therefore, can function in the fol- guiding you through new or particulowing capacities: larly complicated intelligence

requirements.

1-

"" 1-2

"i* .. * * t a .~l
2. THIS IS ITAC 2.3 The History of ITAC

ITAC was created in 1977 in response

to recommendations to the Army Chief

2.1 Introduction of Staff by the Intelligence Organization

As a newcomer, you undoubtedly have and Stationing Study (lOSS). Six geoquestions relating to ITAC's history, graphically separate, independently

functions, and consumers. This chapter functioning intelligence production

Is designed to provide answers to organizations were merged under centhese kinds of questions. tralized control to form ITAC. The purpose of creating ITAC was to establish

a single, streamlined intelligence

2.2 Background analysis center for the U.S. Army. By

consolidating separate intelligence

ITAC Is the all-source intelligence organizations into a single unit, total

center for the Department of the Army all-source production could be both

(DA). As the Army's only national-level Improved and expanded without signifistrategic intelligence and threat pro- cantly increasing manpower and production center, ITAC is at the apex of a duction costs.

pyramid of intelligence organizations in

the Army. Being at the apex, ITAC is Although the history of ITAC as it exists strivingtoday goes back to 1977 and the lOSS, Its full roots can be traced to 1966 and

elite, the best in the business. the establishment of the U.S. Army

ITAC is under the command of the Coin- Intelligence Threats Forecast Group

manding General (CG) U.S.Army Inteili- (USAITFG). At that time, the Army was

gence and Security Command (USAIN- grappling with ways to introduce more

SCOM), but under the tasking authority rational and systematic methods into its

of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel- long range planning, training, and

Ilgence (ACSI). The relationship to the materiel development efforts. ITFG was

ACSI has had a particularly beneficial established to provide the kinds of proImpact upon ITAC and its product line. A jections and forecasts that would

good example of this influence is the enable the Army to meet this need and

cooperation between ITAC and the ACSI thereby enhance its ability to meet the

on the Soviet Battlefield Development threats of the future. Placed under the

Plan (SBDP). This ongoing project is jurisdiction of the ACSI, ITFG's mission

expected to have a significant impact was "to provide Department of the Army

upon the military establishment. ITAC's (DA) level support to the Army Study

role in this study will continue to be Program." This was accomplished

Important. For this reason, the SBDP through application of operations

will play a particularly influential role in research techniques in the preparation

ITAC's development, of threat data and models for use by

ITAC serves many functions and con- Army Units engaged in actual threat

mands. IT serve auncs acling hoe analysis. In addition, ITFG provided fmands. We serve as a clearing house considerable support to Army wargaming

for the Army for general intelligence andinterdisas a central point for Army access into tiry "e Plnnin Tea."

the national intelligence community (see

Appendix 0). By virtue of its organiza- In 1967, ITFG became the U.S. Army

tional position, ITAC has responsibility Intelligence Threat Analysis Group (USIfor specific intelligence products to TAG) and its mission was expanded to

support the Army Staff. provide threat data in support of Army

2-1

. . . . -.
development programs, supervise Army (AMCA), the rational and systematic

threat analysis operations, and develop foundation that had been sought in

threat modeling methodology throughout 1966 with the formation of ITFG was )

the Army. To meet these responsibill- now firmly established.

ties, ITAG grew from eight to 32 military From 1970 until the establishment of

and civilian personnel. ITAC In 1977, ITAC gradually developed

In 1969, ITFG was reorganized and its and took on additional responsibilities.

name was changed to the U.S. Army Since 1977, ITAC has grown to approxiIntelligence and Threat Analysis mately 500 members and has to its

Detachment (USAITAD). Although its credit many recognized studies on a

central mission and functions remained variety of threats to the U.S. Army. In

the same, ITAD grew to 50 profession- particular, ITAC's revision of previously

als by the end of 1971. Most signifi- held North Korean Army strengths has

cant was the Impact that ITAD had upon been credited with Influencing a

Army planning, training and development presidential turnabout In 1979 on U.S.

processes. Together with the comple- troop withdrawals from the Korean Penmentary and coordinated efforts of the Insula. Special emphasis, naturally, is

Institute of Land Combat (ILC) and the on the Soviet threat in all its manifestaAdvanced Materiel Concepts Agency tions, from specific weapons systems to

combined operations.

2--
(:

OTHER SYSTEMS

],. SETTING

,.M

LOCAL COLLECTION ASSETS IN OTHER INTELLIGENCE

OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

ORGANIZATION AN+LYST'S BACKGROUND OWN (

Figure 2-7. ITAC All Source Production

2.4 The ITAC Mission mission as established in 1982 is as

ITAC is responsible for the production of follows:

high-quality analysis that fully meets "To support Department of the

the needs of the consumers of its Intel- Army planning and decision-making,

Ilgence products. This involves produc- in war and peace, with production

- Ing Intelligence that reduces areas of of intelligence from all sources of

uncertainty. By reducing uncertainty, information, in accordance with

consumers of ITAC products are able to requirements validated by the

develop plans, policies, and capabilities Assistant Chief of Staff for Intellithat will enhance their ability to control gence (ACSI)."

future potential conflict situations. This mission places ITAC at the center

Based upon the consumer requests and the dequcy f it dat baes, TAC of the U.S. Army's most important intelUgence and strategic analysis functions.

may utilize its own internal resources or It also means that ITAC has considertask the intelligence collection commun- able impact upon the Army's role in the

ity to provide information needed to fill overall national intelligence community,

Information gaps. No source of information or collection method is overlooked and hence a role in the national secuin the effort to satisfy consumer needs rity of the United States.

(see Figure 2-1). Officially, the ITAC

2-3

...........................
2.5 Principal Consumers of ITAC 2.6.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF

Products ESTABUSHING A PERSONAL ~INFORMATION NETWORK

ITAC must establish priorities In

addressing the intelligence needs of Other ITAC analysts and your

the Army. Intelligence requirements of counterparts at other agencies are

U.S. Army senior decision-makers and another primary source of valuable

planners (Army Staff) are priority one. Information. Strategic analysis requires

At the major command (MACOM) level, a considerable amount of team work.

Intelligence requirements of Training Information that Is relevant to a

and Doctrine (TRADOC) come first. particular requirement may be widely

However, all requirements that are dispersed. Networks of analysts who

accepted at ITAC, no matter where they share common interests and

originate or what the priority, receive responsibilities can be found throughout

the same careful, professional the intelligence community.

treatment and must meet the same These personal Information networks

high-quality standards. Recipients folwig of serve se pe as mechanisms anfomatio for newrks sharing

ITAC products fall within the following information, resources, and ideas.

categories: Establishing a network of contacts (or

a Senior decision-makers and planners getting into an existing one) will be of

at DA and national level, paramount Importance to your success

9 Operational forces, both tactical and as an ITAC strategic analyst.

special purpose.

* Force, combat, and materiel 2.7 ITAC: Its Standard, Values, and

developers including the training Goal

community. G

* Scientific and technical intelligence

communities. 2.7.1 THE ITAC STANDARD

The essence of an organization is the

standard that it sets for itself. ITAC

2.6 Intelligence Resources Used in has dedicated itself to the standard of

ITAC Products quality in its product and in the means

'- that are employed In producing It.

In producing strategic analyses, ITAC

analysts draw upon every relevant

source of Information at their disposal.

This includes open sources such as 2.7.2 THE ITAC VALUES

periodicals, public Information, and The values upon which ITAC is founded

• unclassified reports, as well as informa- The were valuen chosen after whichTAisfounded considerable delition derived from Imagery, signal, and beration at the ITAC Organizational

human intelligence collection programs. Conference in 1982. They are:

ITAC analysts also use finished Intelligence produced by agencies such as • PURPOSEFULNESS: Each member of

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ITAC shall be Instilled with a sense

the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), of direction toward established

the Foreign Science and Technology objectives.

Center (FSTC), the Foreign Technology • SUCCESS: ITAC shall be the premier

Division (FTD), the Missile Intelligence

Agency (MIA), and the Armed Forces Army Intelligence production agency.

Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC).

2-4

• . . .- . - • • . . ° " . 0' o° • "o". " "• .. . " . . • . - . - ... • - -. . .. "•
• FULFILLMENT: ITAC will help each ITAC will support the Army goal of stra-

( person to realize his/her potential. tegic deployment by analyzing potential

conflicts ranging from low-intensity

• EXCITEMENT: ITAC will create a threats to general nuclear war. The

,stimulating environment to challenge objective of many of ITAC's products is

individuals and encourage innovation. to determine:

e INTEGRATION: Unity In ITAC will be

p The significance of projected promoted so that all activities con changes in enemy forces as they tribute to success. will affect the U.S. Army.

e The conditions within which enemy

2.7.3 THE ITAC GOAL forces will operate.

A The range of possible tactics and

At ITAC, one goal is paramount: strategies that an enemy might

First in Intelligence employ.

* The circumstances that might lead to

Being "First In armed conflict and intervention of Intelligence" means the U.S. Army.

creating an elite organization and a

high-performance production environment. It means exhibiting a rhythm of

operation felt by all ITAC members and 2.9 Summary

evident to outside observers. It means In addition to improving the quality of all

- generating curiosity on the part of the our products, we at ITAC have linked ;.Intelligence community and developing orpoutw tIA aelne Itlieccomntandeeoig the achievement of our goal - "First in

protagonists who play important roles in theeachievementwofhour goalilm"First in

ITAC'sintelligence" - with the fulfillment of our pniTACs ielltionce oranitigon. cmission to support the DA staff. We

panion intelligence organizations. have dedicated ourselves to creating

and maintaining a high-performance

environment that is rewarding for all

2.8 The Evolving ITAC who work here. Meeting these chalYou have come to ITAC at a critical lenges depends upon the dedication of

Yo aecoet"TA tacrtcl the strategic analysts.

period. In 1982, we developed a new

organizational configuration (see Appen- As a member of the ITAC team, a large

dix A) and selected a new mission, new measure of responsibility rests with

values, and a new goal. Together, you. To contribute, you must:

these provide a foundation upon which * Understand ITAC's role in the Army

ITAC of the 1980s and 1 990s is being intelligence production system.

constructed.

e Develop a thorough comprehension

In addition to developing a more effi- of strategic analysis concepts and

cient and responsive organizational practices.

structure, ITAC has undertaken efforts

to enhance its line of intelligence pro- * Identify your own professional

ducts. The product enhancement effort weaknesses and seek out approprihas been spurred and encouraged by ate training to overcome them.

senior Army planners and decisionmakers, who appreciate the value of

early identification and analysis of the

threats facing the Army of the future.

2-5

. o . . . .-..- . .
S(

3. THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC 3.2 Product Quality

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION As an analyst, you will be an important

factor in controlling product quality. In

performing this function, you will be

3.1 Introduction responsible for making important deciThis chapter Introduces you to Issues sions regarding how your time Is used,

Involved in managing the analysis and what information sources you use, and

support activities of an Intelligence pro- whether the information for your

duction organization such as ITAC. You analysis is adequate.

will be affected by the decisions made The intelligence manager directly

by ITAC management during your affects product quality through deciassignment here, and you may eventu- sions made that Impact upon the time

ally take on some of the responsibilities and resources available for production.

of ITAC management. You can have an effect on such deciAn Intelligence producing organization is sions by making the manager aware of

not like a commercial enterprise in that the limitations and uncertainties of

It cannot turn customers away because information sources and the effects of

It is already busy. It does not turn pro- time limitations on your ability to do the

duction off after a product has been required analysis.

delivered because new information may

require that the product be revised.

ITAC, as any other intelligence organi- 3.3 How Analysts are Managed zation, often has more demands for zedAnalysts are the critical resource of

Intelligence than it has resources and Intelligence production. Your value as

time to produce. It is the intelligence an analytic resource is measured in

production manager who shifts priorities terms of your background, current

and schedules the work, tasks the expertise, and time available for workanalyst, and allocates information Ing against production requirements.

resources to provide an information pro- Your level of background and expertise

duct. ITAC's management has the goal In working similar problems is a direct

of: factor in how long It will take you to

maximizing the effectiveness of produce a particular product. The

resources allocated toward meeting the manager is well aware of the relation

needs of intelligence product users. between background and analytic perAs an analyst, you are one of ITAC's ~ formance. Analysis speed is increased

as you are able to draw on information resorce. Dcisons adeby TAC and procedures that have been memormanagers will place you under con- izd Icres epeeneao

straints of time pressure, resource limi- broden rknede of so

tations, and procedural guidelines. In bodn orkoldeo ore

rtton, and proceuale gu vide n that are likely to have relevant informareturn, you must be able to provide ton

Information to managers that will Inform tion.

them of the impact of these constraints The manager keeps track of each

on product quality, analyst's academic background and

experience and also keeps track of the

products that analysts produce.

Knowledge of country (language,

3-1

S"
culture, geography, history, international and automated databases).

studies, etc.) Is a major part of the

background knowledge that Is signifi- cant for gauging the analyst's value as 3.4.1 EXPERIENCED ANALYSTS ARE

a resource. RESOURCES

The intelligence production manager has The most valuable information source of

control over the analyst resources In all is the experienced analyst -- the

several ways: one that knows where to look, knows

a• Selection. Analysts selected for where It was found before, knows what

assinmet toITA ar piced ri- doesn't work, and may know how to ask Sassignment to ITAC are picked pri- teqeto etr o a o

marly on the basis of their academic the question better. You may not

background and experience. ITAC always get the answer, and what you

looks for individuals with qualifica- get may be wrong, but this is the quicktions that are known to be important est way to Information that may already tfons thstataregknt bbe available. When the experienced for the strategic analyst. analyst points out new information

a Assignment. By assigning you to a sources to you, your own background

specific division in ITAC, the man- knowledge will be enhanced. Informaager may attempt to exploit your tion sources you have found on your

previous background in similar ITAC own may eventually be of use to someactivities. Conversely, the manager one else.

may attempt to broaden your back- The Intelligence manager can facilitate by assigning you to an area Thground n toyu aaccess to other analysts by sponsoring new to you. Joint working groups, co-locating of-

• Preparation. The ITAC Division man- fices, and promoting Informal exchanges

ager may attempt to enhance your and a cooperative work environment.

background by giving you opportuni- Access Is sometimes controlled or

ties to attend seminars, attend discouraged to prevent interference In

classes, and participate In work critical work activities. As you become

sessions or otherwise build up an more familiar with the activities of ITAC,

area of expertise. The Intent of you will know when informal Interaction

these activities is to give you expo- with other analysts is appropriate.

sure to new Information sources and Don't be afraid to ask -- and don't feel

to prepare you for meeting future badly if you are rebuffed by someone

ITAC production requirements. who is busy.

3.4.2 COLLECTION SYSTEMS ARE

". 3.4 Managing Information Resources RESOURCES

To the Intelligence production manager, When Information needs cannot be

Information sources are anything that satisfied with available Information, the

can provide useful Information to be analyst must look to the collection

exploited for an Intelligence product. asst of looC an the itllin

• . he ost epedabl Inormaion assets of ITAC and the intelligence Td brcommunity as potential sources. Syssources are 1) experienced analysts, tems that collect strategically signifi2) collection systems, and 3) reposi- cant Information are costly, and gentories of data (libraries, personal files, cant are are byte Inlgen orally are shared by the Intelligence

3-2

.............................................
community. Access to collection sys- information.

tems is controlled through the ITAC Col- Much of the ITAC institutional

lection Requirements Division. The col- Much knowledge of can te be found fTAC in Instital the ITAC

lection manager In this division ensures library In the form of previous products

that overlapping Information require- and studies. Divisions of ITAC and proments can be served efficiently. The ject groups frequently have their own

collection manager can also establish working files and databases. Personal

priorities for various requirements that files and references of individuals are

are competing to use these resources. also an Invaluable asset that is availITAC requirements may in turn have to able through personal contact with

compete with the requirements of other other analysts. The advent of the Army

intelligence organizations. Threat Intelligence Production System

It Is extremely important for you to (ATIPS) will greatly increase the

understand the tasking procedures for access, speed, and availability of ITAC

the various collection systems available databases. In addition, ATIPS will facilithrough ITAC, and to use them. You tate the sharing of information through

must also know the cycle times for communication networks such as the

tasking these systems, including delays Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)

for collection coordination, mission task- and the Intelligence Data Handling SysIng, mission execution, initial interpreta- tern (IDHS) and by accessing databases

tions, and cominunications. The time such as the Land Armaments Manpower

line of the collection cycle must be fac- Model (LAMM), SIGINT On-Line Informatored into your estimates of how long it tion System (SOLIS), NPIC Data System

. will take to produce a specific product. (NDS), and the Defense Intelligence

You have a responsibility to provide Agency On-line System/Community

clearly defined collection requirement Intelligence Network System (DIAOLS/

statements that will cue these systems COINS).

to collect appropriate information in the

most effective and efficient manner

possible. To do collection system task- 3.5 Managing Requirements

Ing well, you must know how these systems work and what their limitations One of the complexities of intelligence

are. Again, the most important sources production management is in dealing

of knowledge on this subject are likely with requirements from many consumers

to be experienced analysts who have at the same time. Having multiple

used these systems in the past. requirements means there is competition for resources, multiple tasking of

analysts, and overlapping information

3.4.3 INFORMATION REPOSITORIES ARE requirements.

RESOURCES The ITAC Requirements Division atAccess to the personal and institutional tempts to sort out the individual needs

repositories of information at ITAC is and priorities of each consumer so that

controlled in many different ways. specific tasking information can be

Access to sensitive information may be given to the analytic team that will procontrolled by compartmentatlon. An duce the product. The intelligence

analyst must establish a need-to-know requirements manager must effectively

to gain access to these sources of "walk" through the analytical procedure

3-3

.............................................. " .'."" ".',"",'.', ".',' •", ".".''.","-•".",. ., ".., "."".,' .
to determine the time and resources In most cases, the intelligence manager

that will be required to respond to the will make these evaluations based on

* requirement. experience with similar requirements

As the person who will do the analysis, and products. The manager frequently

Syou mahbe eronsuholted dr the dnsi- roquires an interactive dialogue with

you may be consulted during the defini- both the consumer and the analysts tion and refinement of the requirement. who will do the analysis. This dialogue

Before the intelligence manager can Is needed to adequately refine the

establish tasking priorities, the following things must be known about the requirement to fit the needs of the conreqigemut bsumer into the available time and ITAC *requirement: rsucs resources.

e How and when the product is to be

used.

• How much time is available for 3.6 Production Resource Multipliers

"analysis. The manager's most difficult problem

e What information resources will be occurs when the resources required to

required. satisfy demand for information exceeds

the resources that are available. A set How the product is to be dissem- of simple heuristics (or rules of thumb)

inated, are used by managers to effectively

The answers to these questions are multiply their resources and improve

used to negotiate a suspense time for productivity.

the product, determine the level of

detail and accuracy for information, and

choose an analyst to perform the 3.6.1 REMOVING REDUNDANT

analysis. These issues must be agreed REQUIREMENTS IS A MULTIPUER

upon between the consumer and the A most Important heuristic applied by

Intelligence manager. Sometimes the the manager is to minimize redundant

requirement must be refined or the ITAC analytical efforts. This situation could

resources supplemented with additional easily occur if the intelligence manager

resources. The Intelligence manager did not identify overlapping information

may need to request special personnel needs in requirements, and tasked

i-fromt other organizations, or special ned Inrqimntadasd frioriy for organizaton, cori s l different analysts to provide the same

priority for the use of collection sys information. By identifying overlapping

tents, requirements, the intelligence manager

Evaluating the required information can "kill two birds with one stone" by

resources is a matter of determining if using one analytic task or one collection

there is an information overlap between mission to satisfy two or more

current or previous intelligence pro- requirements.

ducts, selecting an analyst (or Exploiting the historical intelligence

analysts) capable of using that informatlon, and determ base Is a multiplier as well. Previously ining If the collectioncol te In rm i n ca ap y to a y plan andpriritis ar adquat to collected information can apply to many plans and priorities are adequate to

new products and requirements, esmeet any additional information require- peclally those that depend on an

merits, analysis of trends and problem areas.

ITAC managers are responsible for

3-4
seeing that records are maintained on the battlefield (IPB) is taught as a

" ( collection coverage and products for means of preparing information on

potential use in future requirements. terrain, weather, and enemy capabilities

for use in time-critical decision making. Managers, who decide on job assign- IPB prepares the mind of the analyst for

ments for analysts, will attempt to task

the same analyst with a similar more rapid analytical processing as well

requirement in order to exploit that a r-rcsigmc ftesai analysemt 

analyst's 

meorr 

memory of o prior pi pr productt information base required for analysis.

Information. The strategic equivalent of IPB is the

The most common tool for focusing on systematic development of knowiedge

common Information needs Is the about the strategic war plans of foreign

forces and knowledge about the creation of shared databases. Order of battlefields and environments in which

battle (OB) is one of the most familiar conflicts might occur. The SBDP and

shared database used in both strategic Long Range Planning Estimate (LRPE)

and tactical Intelligence. Other forms of are examples of strategic IPB products

data stores that represent shared (see Appendix C).

information sources are maps, finished

Intelligence products, doctrine studies ITAC puts substantial efforts into

(such as found in the SBDP), and target creating and maintaining the knowledge

files, bases used as sources for other

products. Anticipation of required Although overlapping requirements can Information is a responsibility of the

be grouped together to share common Information sources, THE ANALYST intelligence manager because time and

InfmUtion TREAT E es, HE RE A T resources must be allocated for such MSAREY I F H RUINGMT preparations. The anticipation of rePRODUCT FOR THE USERS. Even if the quirements allows for systematic devel-

•opment of common information

requirements are completeiy over- omn f cmo nomto • . lappingeIntheire ~lapping in their inomtionnee, information needs, i In baselines, poeue.Peaainhsteipc and rehearsal of analytic

formulating the final product you must of multiplying the effectiveness of the

still consider how each product user is ofmltiplying t ftins of the

going goin tousetha infrmaion Ifthe analysts during situations that are time to use that information. If the critical and/or that have limited collectailoring is not done on an individual

end-user basis, the value of saving tion assets.

resources through combined analysis

may be wasted on an inferior product. 3.6.3 GENERALIZATION IS A SPEED

Chapter 5 provides guidelines for MULTIPLIER

tailoring the final intelligence product.

Another technique used by the intelligence production manager to produce

3.6.2 PREPARATION IS A TIME products in less time, is to designate a

MULTIPLIER less-precise level of description for

Once past, time is lost -- except when conveying information in the product.

The time required to do analysis is in

you have spent that time in preparing direct proportion to the level of detail

for future Information needs of and accuracy required in the product.

intelligence consumers. In the tactical If an intelligence requirement can be

". environment, intelligence preparation of satisfied with more general descriptions

3-5

.

.. , .-.'-, .. . .-.;-.., '..,-,...',: .... '...., / ... , , .. ... ,.,, .' ". ,-. .,.,., ., ., , ,, , . .. ,, .,,., , ,. "- t _ .- L L J =,. l = = - "

, ',",,=='== , b '' ;' '" ' - -" , -. -"
or with less accuracy, a corresponding requiring less detail can be satisfied

reduction can be achieved in the time immediately and with a minimum of

needed to produce that product. Espe- resource expenditure.

cially in those cases where the required

level of detail is not known, it is important for the intelligence manager (or the 3.6.5 EXPLOITING ALL SOURCES IS A

analyst) to find out how the information MULTIPUER OF CERTAINTY

1s to be used and how accuracy will Dealing with uncertainty is the inaffect that use. telligence analyst's stock-in-trade.

An example of how generalization can Uncertainty is reduced by information

reduce analysis time can be seen in a that confirms likely hypotheses and

combat modeling application. One com- iqcreased by information that disbat model might require a very detailed confirms them. For the strategic

description of the operation of a partic- analyst in particular, the "ground truth"

ular kind of unit or weapon system in is seldom, If ever, known. The

order to represent time-critical perfor- intelligence organization deals with the

mance features. On the other hand, issue of uncertainty by creating an allanother model might require only source environment to bring as diverse

- stereotyped representations of overall as possible a set of relevant

force structure. The analyst would not information to bear on the Issue.

be required to spend the same amount Most people recognize intuitively that

of time on analyzing force structure as problems are more likely to yield a

would be required by someone looking correct solution when there Is a wider

at the details of a logistics application. range of Information about the problem.

In intelligence production, information is

3actively pursued from any possible 3.8.4 PHAINGR NALYOSCIS source that might fill information gaps, G A S I Ihowever vague or error prone that

SPEED MULTIPLIER

source might be. It Is the diversity of

You can produce general, less-accurate Information sources used by the

Information quicker than accurate de- strategic analyst that is an effective

tailed information. If information basis for producing superior Intelligence

. requirements overlap but differ in detail products.

and accuracy requirements, the general The term "all source environment"

Information should be addressed first generally is used in the intelligence

because that information can be community to mean that the analyst can

produced more quickly. If you try to access information from the most

merge both requirements into a single sensitive national collection systems as

requirement, you may compromise well as from collateral and unclassified

accuracy on one hand or delivery speed sources. ITAC management also aron the other.sore.IA maaentloaranges for access to other intelligence

A classic solution for overlapping producing organizations as well as

requirements is to have analysts make academic and other non-intelligence

multiple passes over the same Infor- organizations. Formal access

mation, extracting greater levels of arrangements of ITAC are supplemented

detail with each successive pass. In by the individual contacts that analysts

this way, the product Information have throughout the intelligence,

3-6

°o)

. .* . . . . . . . . . . . .

,. . . . . . . . . . . . ..- 2~ .
academic, and professional community. This level of source reference makes it

The rule "Think White, Think Red, Think possible for you or other analysts to

Blue" as depicted in Figure 3-1 can get back to the original source data to

help you structure your canvassing of check or modify interpretations. You

potential information sources that might must always be wary of using other

analyst's interpretations of information

,answer your own needs. The unless you know the source, the

Importance of "white", "red", and analyst, and the conditions under which

"blue" thinking is addressed more fully the analysis was performed. If the

In Chapter 4. Interpretation of another analyst is to

be used without going back to the

3.6.6 INFORMATION SOURCE original source information, the following MULTIPLOERS Information must be added:

Information that someone else collects * Source credibility (belief that source

for another purpose may be a valuable Is capable of providing sufficient

Information source for you to exploit Information for this interpretation).

also. The interpretation of that infor- * Source reliability (historical quality

mation may in itself become a source if of source).

Its original source is known and if its

* credibility for your own use has been Source precision(precisionlevelof

evaluated. source for this interpretation). 9 Name of analyst who did the

ITAC products should have audit trails interpretation.

that trace the information sources and

the analysts who performed the e Purpose for which the interpretation

analysis. The intelligence production was made.

manager generally establishes the

procedures and guidelines by which Evaluation of the source is a much more

sources are referenced in shared difficult task than simply providing a

reference to the source. An

databases and in products disseminated Interpretation for one application may

within the intelligence community. Ref- nterpret froe liction may

erences to information sources should not require the same level of credibility

por precision as for another application. pnfrvi tFor : example, the interpretation of

information: Imagery to determine the number of

* Collection mode (SIGINT, HUMINT, weapon systems in a unit does not

IMINT, Open Source). require the same level of precision as

e• Collection mission identifier or to determine the specific model or

Collei mssinient features of a weapon system.

source designation.

Guidelines for evaluating sources are

* Requirement reference for mission generally informal, and rating scales,

tasking. where used, tend to be imprecise.

a Intended use of information as Imagery is rated on a formal basis using

viewed by the source. the NIIRS scale, but this applies only to

how the imagery was used for a

r Mission parameters or standard specific target interpretation and not to

reference.

the overall value of the imagery as a

source for other uses.

3-7
THINK WHITE

" Who Is Interested in this geographic area?

* Who is interested in the topographic features of this area?

e Does that source collect Information which relates to indicators

of change In military, economic, social, political, cultural, Industrial,

technological, weather, terrain, or International climate.

e Does the source tie into a line of communication going into this area?

* Does the source deal with a similar type of environment?

THINK RED

e What are the activities that go into Red war planning?

e What are the indicators of those activities?

" What are the signatures of those indicators?

. What are sensors that are capable of detecting those signatures?

e What collection systems use those sensors?

a What are the past, present, and future collection plans for those

collection systems?

THINK BLUE

* What other intelligence organizations would need this same information?

* What kind of friendly force units would use this information in their own

operations?

* What kind of government organizations have this information?

e What kind of academic organizations have this information?

* What kind of commercial/industrial organizations have this information?

e What kind of foreign organizations would have this information?

Figure 3-7: Thinking WHITE/RED/BLUE as Applied Source Identification

3-8

*%.°4-- *%V.**
In summary, sharing Information sources * Give responsibility by geographic

( can multiply the analyst's access to area (White boundaries).

information. The intelligence manager • Give responsibility by collection

tries to make this information source

source mode (SIGINT, HUMINT, sharing as effective as possible by IMINT).

ensuring that source references are

disseminated. As either an analyst or . Give responsibility by different levmanager you must recognize the els of Red Thinking.

Importance of recording Information ortce osecding nf ion e Give responsibility for end-user

sources used In analysis. -' dialogue and product tailoring (Blue Interpretations of information are to be p erspoctirn).

used by other analysts, it is important

that the full context of the inter- In order to maintain analytical integrity

pretation be clearly stated in the under these rules of dividing responsiproduct. bility, the team leader must ensure that

all analysts in the team share an understanding of the general mission parame3.6.7 CAPACITY MULTIPLIERS ters. The analyst team is, in effect,

Problems occur when the time needed creating a group hypothesis of a threat

by the analyst is greater than the time situation (threat model). Within their

available. When avalabe.Whe this tis happens, apens analysts aalyts own members areas contribute of responsibility, team to the shared

may be formed into analytical teams to temel iute o

decrease the pr6duction time by paralleling analysis tasks. The way in which a Providing background knowledge.

analysts are organized as a team is a

reflection of underlying principles of * Identifying missing information.

information-sharing and exploitation of a Filling-in information gaps from inforthe personal knowledge of analysts as mation sources.

a resource. The capacity gains are in

terms of the added background know- i Testing the threat model with new

ledge of a multi-disciplinary analytical Information.

team, parallel capacity for exploiting * Testing the threat model against

more information sources, and ability to doctrinal concepts.

look at the problem from multiple per- e Evaluating the significance of

spectives. changes in the threat model.

The organizational principles applied by a Selecting Information for product

the ITAC manager or team leader reporting and tailoring it for the proinclude rules for specialization, rules for duct.

partitioning workload, rules for team

communication, and rules for maintaining * Cataloging information sources and

team integrity. The team leader main- maintaining an audit trail of the

tains the integrity of the analytical methods and reasoning used in the

team by defining individual responsi- analysis.

bilities and by providing mechanisms for Although this is a very simplified

team communications. The rules for description of the operation of an ITAC

dividing responsibility include: analytic team, you will witness these

principles in action in the individual

3-9

.......... .

o% .
assignments and responsibilities of analyst, must weigh the demands of

analysts and in the communications current production requirements against )

between analysts and team leaders. the need to prepare for the time-critical

Information needs of wartime operation. Your own position as a member of an

analytical team will be determined by You will soon become aware that a critihow well you can serve as an informa- cal asset of Intelligence production is

tion source and by your specific area of your own personal knowledge. You will

responsibility as designated by the also become aware of how the time

team leader. available can constrain the types of

Information sources you can exploit and

the procedures you can use in analysis.

3.7 Summary The management rules described in this

The ITAC intelligence manager is faced chapter will help you to maximize the

with the problem of scarce time and effectiveness of scarce time, personresources to meet the information nel, and information resources in intellineeds of the ITAC product users. The gence production.

Intelligence manager, and you as an

3-10
: (Strategic intelligence is that knowledge which is required to serve as a basis for

the formulation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.

Oriented on national objectives, it assists in determining feasible national objectives and in furnishing a basis for planning methods of accomplishing them. Fac-

*tors which influence the military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable

courses of action of nations are considered components of strategic intelligence.

(Emphasis added)

*[ (FM 30-5)

, Table 4-1. Definition of Strategic Intelligence

4. INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC This chapter provides you with a frameINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS work for understanding the nature of

the job that you have been selected to

do--strategic analysis. When you fin-

" 4.1 Introduction and Definition Ish, you will be familiar with the nature,

Strategic analysis Is the most complex goals, and levels of strategic analysis.

, -of tofrallntegneaiites. all Intelligence activities. It iolves You will appreciate the way in which an It Involves experienced analyst thinks, and you will

* an ability to integrate complex circumstances and vast amounts of Infor- understand how to begin the process of

mation in a timely manner. The stra- learning strategic analysis.

tegic analyst must be able to fill in gaps

*. of Information, understand historical

trends and Influencing factors, and 4.1.1 THE GOAL OF ITAC STRATEGIC

visualize the future environment. The ANALYSES

strategic analyst must be willing to ITAC's role In Army Intelligence is to

respond to requirements that might respond to requirements and information

seem Impossible to others. You must needs of senior Army planners and become well-versed in the essential decision-makers. Given Increasingly

" concepts of this unique discipline. .. c sdangerous global tendencies and rapid

advances in weapon technologies, the

Army has come to rely upon ITAC's analyses and Intelligence expertise. These

consumers depend on ITAC to reduce

"War is the realm of uncertainty; uncertainties surrounding the nature of

" three quarters of the factors on the future battlefield, and the plans,

which action in war is based are operations, and capabilities of potential

wrapped in a fog of greater or enemies. ITAC products enable Army

lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and planners and senior decision-makers to

discriminating judgment is called design and develop those strategies,

" for; a skilled Intelligence to scent doctrine, training, and material that will

out the truth." respond most effectively to future

threat. The goal of ITAC products Is to

(CLAUSEWITZ) reduce the uncertainties of the consumers of those products.

4-1

i %**. .* ' % .. .

. . . . . . . . .
Tactical Intelligence Is that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical)

features required by a commander In the planning and conduct of tactical operations. It may be obtained from within his own command, or from higher or adjacent

headquarters. Tactical Intelligence Is derived from the evaluation of information

on the enemy (both his capabilities and his vuinerabilities), the weather, and the

terrain. The objective of tactical Intelligence Is to minimize uncertainty concernIng the effects of these factors on the accomplishment of the mission. The commander employs tactical intelligence to determine how to best use available

resources In accomplishing the mission and maintaining the security of his command. In noncombat commands, tactical intelligence provides a basis for security

measures, for decisions as to the best use of the area of operations In accomplishing the mission, and for determining or anticipating future support requiremenits.

(FM 30-6)

Table 4-2: Definition of Tactical Intelligence

4.1.2 STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL Intelligence can be a commander or

INTELLGENCE: A USEFUL another Intelligence analyst. In

COMPARISON responding to what are Usually

Onewa t ahive a etershort-term needs, the tactical

undestadingof tratgicIntelignceIntelligence analyst will rely heavily

unstanin c o f strategi I fntline upon readily available Information.

eivaeto comar tacta Itsllfrone.Tie This might involve accessing (1)

equialen tactcalintelignce.Thespecific -- coliection resources, (2) distinctions between these companion mna n uoae iesses

disciplines are both ililustrative and (anuapersonaltmemoryfiand/ort(4)

Important (see Tables 4-1 and 4-2). If oth ersnalss Were, inorto is)

you are coming f rom a tactical unit or lakigt teetia analysts Whr n otnI

have had any experience in this area, lackinte atia prevlost simila

you must begin to move away from yourlok to peiu smla

previous way of thinking about experiences, or calls upon Intuition.

Intelligence. If you have little or no * Strategic Intelligence contributes , pfamiliarity with tactical Intelligence, It is directly to the formulation of plans

Important that you become at least and policies by providing decisionsomewhat familiar with Its nature and makers with a glimpse of future

functions. Whatever your background, conditions and possible events. It is

the comparison made here Is Intended therefore much broader In both time

to broaden your understanding of and space than Its tactical counterstrategic Intelligence analysis: part. At ITAC, for example, a

*Tactical Intelligence Is concerned srtgcitliec eurmn

with the Immediate or very near- may Involve evaluating what will

term sitatin. actial equre-happen In the distant future, e.g., In

ments are usually specific In nature20yasSuhatkmybevr

and call for a rapid turn-around for complex and difficult given the

respnse Theconume of actcal uncertain nature and course of

resone. heconumr o tctial future events. The strategic

-4-2

6.

6%
analyst needs Information that may a projection seeks to establish or narnot exist for another 10 to 20 row a range of possibility. Likewise,

years. Current Information is useful, projections are less subjective in that

but Is often severely limited In Its they rely to a great extent upon those

applications to the future. Yet, the current and previous trends and tenstrategic analyst must come up with dencies that may affect the range of

an appropriate response to the possibilities.

Intelligence requirement. Forecasting is the most rigorous of the

To overcome the barrier of insuffi- three categories of strategic analysis.

cient information, the strategic In conducting a forecast, the strategic

analyst must be resourceful and analyst looks to every relevant

Imaginative. This requires training influencing factor. This involves

and the development of a mindset designing methods and procedures that

that goes beyond practical weight and balance these factors as

limitations. objectively as possible. Forecasting

techniques, when properly designed and

conducted, are therefore preferred

when the accuracy and reliability of the 4.2 The Nature of Strategic Analysis Intelligence product is most important.

Generally speaking, there are three The distinctions between predictions,

categories of strategic analysis - pred- projections and forecasts are an imporIctions, projections, and forecasts. proonnd for aranio

While the distinctions between them tant component of your understanding mayof strategic analysis. However, to fully m m l a hunderstand strategic analysis, you must

very significant to those who conduct know what analysis is and how it is

Supon strategic the analysis accuracy and and to those reliability who rely of epoe employed In nteAm the Army intelligence nelgnecnconstrategic Intelligence products. It is text. This requires understanding (1)

stothe role of analysis in solving problems,

therefore important that you understand iieach of these thoroughly. (2) that analysis can create information

from sparse data, and (3) that analysis

The primary factors involved in distin- is essentially a mental process requiring

gulshing between predictions, projec- many skills.

tions and forecasts are (1) the kinds of

Information utilized and (2) the degree

of objectivity of the analysis. A prediction can be described as a positive PROBLEM-SOLVING

assertion that a future event or circumstance will or will not occur. There The need for analysis typically arises

is no requirement regarding the kinds or when a decision-maker recognizes that

amount of information needed to make a a particular problem cannot be effecprediction. It can be based upon any- tively addressed without some addithing the predictor desires including tional consideration. Depending on the

simple beliefs. As such, this highly sub- problem and the available information,

Jective form of analysis is often analysis can perform several different

rejected where a significant degree of functions. In some instances, analysis

accuracy and reliability is required. may be applied to integrate or "digest"

Like predictions, projections are similar existing knowledge about the problem. aikempts petionsed prjton are re In other cases, analysis may be utilized

attempts to shed light upon future

events and conditions. However, to locate a "piece of the puzzle" that is

whereas predictions attempt precision, crucial for making an informed judgment.

4-3

...................-.. ,......,............
In either example, analysis is the first either projections or forecasts.

step toward eliminating the uncertain- Despite the uncertain nature of the

ties and risks associated with a prob- future and the lack of concrete

lem. This, In turn, facilitates the Information about It, the analyst who is

development of plans and strategies faced with a projection must predict

that may ultimately solve the problem. what will or may exist or occur at some

distant point in time. Unless the analyst

can fill in information shortfalls, the task

will be Impossible. The ability to use

"The term "analysis" has slightly imagination, intuition, and strategic

different connotations In intelli- vision to fill information gaps separates

gence research and in academic the strategic analyst from the

research. Despite the subtle dis- researcher. This ability requires not

tinctions, analysis, in both con- Only a command of available information,

texts, refers to breaking down a but also an understanding of related

large problem into a number of historical, technological, and doctrinal

smaller problems and performing trends and tendencies. Similarly, the

mental (and sometimes physical) strategic analyst must be aware of

operations on the data in order to Internal and external factors that may

arrive at a conclusion or generali- influence changes in these trends or

zation." otherwise affect possible courses of

enemy behavior.

(DIC)

Analysis is a craft that is

performed in the mind of the

4.2.2 ANALYSIS CAN CREATE analyst.

INFORMATION FROM SPARSE

DATA

There Is more to intelligence analysis

than merely seeking out information 4.2.3 ANALYSIS ASA MENTAL PROCESS

about the enemy. The successful

analyst is one who develops the ability Every occupation has specific and

to extract meaning from seemingly unique procedures and processes for

Insignificant Information. This Is partic- performing job-related tasks. A fighter

ularly Important since information that is pilot must fully understand the instruessential to understanding the nature ments of the craft and the tactics for

of enemy actions, Intentions, and different combat conditions. An autocapabilities is often inaccessible mobile mechanic must have extensive

(secret) or not yet developed (future). knowledge about the internal combusThis makes it necessary for the Army to tion engine and the way its components

train and maintain an elite corps of Interact to move the vehicle.

Individuals who can satisfy intelligence Like the pilot or mechanic, you must

requirements despite Information requrems ddevelop a mastery of the procedures

and processes of your occupation--

To be successful, the strategic analyst strategic analysis. But first you must

must develop the ability to create understand an important truth: Analysis

Information from sparse data. This is

particularly Important when working on

4-4

........ ...... -,.,.. . . . .. . .
CAPABILITEs

/ Figure 4-1: The Levels of Strategic Analysis

* is foremost a "mental" process. To 4.3 Strategic Analysis at ITAC

* effectively use your imagination, intul- The following subsections describe

tion, and strategic vision, you must train three major components of ITAC stra-

*' yourself to think analytically. tegic analysis: (1) assessments and

' The processes that occur In the head projections, (2) levels of strategic

.. of the analyst are numerous and cor- analysis, and (3) theater-strategic

i"plex. ITAC has some understanding of operations.

| the mental (cognitive) processes of

~analysis, which helps us understand

why some intelligence products are 4.3.1 ASSESSMENTS AND THREAT

good while others are not. This enables PROJECTIONS

-us to pass on to new analysts some of TCalye fllit th brd

." the effective strategies, techniques, categories of assessments, projections,

and tools of analysis that experienced and forecasts. An assessment is a

analysts use. These are addressed in study or report that contains new or

Chapter 5. updated information on a current or

.4-5

............. h... .- ....................- *.*. .
"When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized

peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is

always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.... if we

keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the

prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting

It.

...Policy. then, will permeate all military operations, and, In so far as their violent

nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them."

(Emphasis added)

(CLAUSEWITZ)

near-term topic. It Is essentially a sub- requirements to which ITAC responds

category of forecasting in that it (see Figure 4-1). These coincide with

Involves evaluating the impact of new the hierarchy of detail that constitute

Information upon an already existing an enemy war plan.

Intelligence topic. The purpose of an assessment is to keep the intelligence In order to frustrate the enemy on a

asussmeinformed about the status of battlefield, it is necessary to destroy

consumer ituao te sysem, the strategies and operations that cona particular situation or enemy system, aiueteeeyswrpas h organization, location, or intention. atitute the enemy's war plans. The

next best thing to capturing the

A significant proportion of ITAC ana- enemy's war plans is to replicate them

lyses involves projections and fore- through analysis. As an ITAC analyst,

casts of threat. The value of threat you will be contributing to this effort. It

projections is that they tend to reduce Is Important that you be able to respond

uncertainties associated with planning, to requirements at each of the following

training, and equipping the army of the levels of strategic analysis:

future. ITAC threat projections may * Political-military goals.

look as far as 20 years or more into the

future. They are intended to provide * Strategies and operations.

Information for countering threats the

Army may face In the future. • Battlefield tactics.

ITAC is the only Intelligence organi- e Capabilities.

zation in the U.S. Army that is per- The following subsections discuss these

manently tasked with producing long- levels.

range strategic projections and forecasts. It is also charged with shortterm assessment studies. By perform- 4.3.2.1 Level 1: Political-Military

ing both functions, ITAC plays pivotal Gos

roles in the near-term and future security concerns of the United States. As noted by Clausewltz over 1 50 years

ago, the use of armed forces is never

an end in itself. Rather, the purpose of

initiating a military action of any magni- 4.3.2 LEVELS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS tude is to achieve specific political

For both forecasts and projections, ends. The enemy's war plan is

there are four levels of analysis designed to achieve such aims. Since

4-6 )

-.-,- •,o-.,.. .' .- ... .-- .................... ••... .. .... -. -. - .. . .'... .- .....- .. .. : ... .... ..-... -.. ,. .. ..... ..- .- . . . -...-.. -. .'-.' .'..... . . .. • ..-.- 
an end in itself. Rather, the purpose of 4.3.2.4 Level 4: Capabilities

Initiating a military action of any magni- The way in which enemy units are

"" tude is to achieve specific political orgai t hih he wns

ends. The enemy's war plan is organized, together with the weapons

designed to achieve such alms. Since and equipment that they employ on the

daabattlefield, comprise enemy "capabilipolicy aims permeate all military opera- ties." Analysis of enemy capabilities is

tions, strategic analysis must focus ties Anlyif enem capateis the most specific form of strategic Sintensively upon enemy policies, analysis. Its goal is to predict the

enemy's battlefield effectiveness.

Analysts working at this level must

4.3.2.2 Level 2: General Staff keep in mind the relationships between

Operations Plan the four levels of strategic analysis.

This perspective results in more

The second level of strategic analysis thoughtful analysis and a superior proIs derived from the first. To achieve duct

the political goals of military action,

strategies must be prepared in advance

with these goals in mind. These

operations plans are usually prepared 4.3.3 THEATER-STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

at the General Staff level of command The four levels constitute the elements of enemy armed forces. of enemy war plans. You must visualize

By replicating these strategies through how they operate and interact on the

analysis, Army planners and decision- battlefield. Historically, the trend has

makers are able to defeat these been toward increasingly massive and

strategies and keep the enemy from complex engagements and operations.

achieving his political goals. The largest combat grouping during the

16th century was a regiment. These

groupings grew to the size of brigades

by the 1 7th century and to division

"If you know the enemy and know level by the 18th century. During the

yourself, you need not fear the Napoleonic period of the early 19th

results of a hundred battles. If you century, armies emerged as the largest

know yourself, but not the enemy, aggregates of command.

for every victory you will suffer a In the 20th century, armed conflict has

defeat. If you know neither expanded to warfare on multiple fronts.

yourself nor the enemy, you are a It is probable that the next major world

fool and will meet defeat in every war will be conducted on an even larger

battle." scale--the "theater-strategic opera-

(SU tion." As noted by Soviet Chief of Staff

(SUN TZU) Ogarkov, frontal operations during World

War II often halted for days and weeks

at a time. However, in a war characterIzed as "theater-strategic," frontal

4.3.2.3 Level 3: Battlefield Tactics operations would be closely coordinated

To be successful, strategies designed and even more massive and continuous

to achieve political objectives must be -- the second following almost immedireduced to tactics on the battlefield. ately upon the first, and so forth.

Analyses that address enemy tactics

can provide a view of what the Army

may face.

4-7

...... . . . . . .

.-. -......-..-.. :. .,. ...,'.-. ..: ..-.. -,.,. ,... ..,,..- , ,....,,.,. .-,,. .. ..., ,,.- , , . .. ..... ....-.... ,-.,.-.,.. ... ...,,,.- .,.,. .. .....,.,
I)

~WARFARE

REDED

goalsRUCUR inC min.EccrdngtothOSNS

PREP4R47-t,,m..REDC

ti od D

that th SRissrvntoahee ras

s iuh a- cpbTin te! fuue.TisI

-ot

For theater-strategic operations to be a Know the enemy.

successful, each of the four levels ofp it

the enemy war plan would have to beil

designed and integrated with these * Know the envronment.

I goals in mind. According to the SBDP, *Dvlpamtoia prah

.4Soviet military writings, organization and

weapons- development efforts indicate The following subsections discuss these

that the USSR is striving to achieve areas.

fsuch a capability in the future. This Is

the kind of overall threat that the Army

.may face and which you as an ITAC 4.4.1 KNOW THE ENEMY - THINK RED

' analyst must understand and visualize.

~A goal of Intelligence is to predict

enemy objectives and how they will

pursue these objectives. Knowing the . enemy allows for accurate prediction of

•The conduct of strategic intelligence enemy behavior and the development of

• .- analysis can be categorized into four plans and strategies to defeat the

11functional areas: enemy (see Figure 4-2). Knowledge of

~the enemy takes two forms: (1) a

~~thorough substantive expertise of the t

4-8

* ........................................ . o .
*ALLIES

FORCES

* LANGUAGE

*ECONOMY

b(

Figure 4-3: Become an "Expert" on the Enemy

enemy's capabilities and behavior, and does. To accurately analyze what the

(2) an understanding of how the enemy enemy will do, you must become an

thinks. These two components form the expert on the sources of the enemy's

essence of knowing your enemy as con- potential behavior (see Figure 4-3).

templated by Sun Tzu. They are also Through continuous research, education,

the goals that you must achieve to and training, you must become as famibecome an effective ITAC analyst. liar as possible with all the forces and

influences that affect, or could affect,

the enemy's behavior. These include

4.4.1.1 Become an Expert on the Enemy factors relating to the enemy's:

9 Military history and doctrine.

,* For the ITAC analyst, knowing the

enemy goes beyond having expertise in * Battlefield tactics.

a specific area of enemy behavior or

capability. Knowing the enemy requires

an understanding of his objectives, a Military-industrial programs.

" strategies, and intentions. This

Involves a thorough understanding of

what "makes the enemy tick": why he In addition to having a primary area of

Is who he is and why he behaves as he expertise (such as armor, air defenses,

4-9

S. ..
chemical warfare, etc.), the analyst red framework.

who becomes knowledgeable In the

above areas will have an advantage

over the analyst who does not. The 4.4.2 KNOW OUR PROGRAMS AND

analyst who understands what influ- CAPABILITIES - THINK BLUE

ences enemy decisions and practices

will usually produce a superior product Much of the enemy's behavior may

and will avoid the pitfalls and miscalcu- appear inexplicable unless you also

lations that lead to intelligence failures, think blue (develop expertise about our

misdirected policies, economic waste, or own plans, programs, and forces). To

loss of life. predict the nature and level of threat

the Army may face in the future, you 'must take into consideration the Army

forces, weapons, and systems that will

The Analyst who truly knows the be targeted by the enemy. Much of

enemy is the Analyst who can think what an enemy does in the way of planlike the enemy. ning, training, and force modernization is

In response to our own efforts in these

areas. Understanding this actionreaction component of enemy behavior

4.4.1.2 Understand Enemy Behavior Is crucial for effective strategic

analysis.

Training yourself to become an expert

on the enemy Is your first step toward

becoming a high-quality strategic

analyst. However, there is more to 4.4.3 KNOW THE ENVIRONMENT -

knowing the enemy than simply having THINK WHITE

at your disposal facts about enemy In addition to knowing the enemy (think

doctrine, capabilities, organizations, red) and our own forces and programs

etc. The facts must be molded to that may be threatened on the battleachieve an understanding of enemy field (think blue), you must also conbehavior. To be able to predict how the sider the environment where conflict

enemy will act, you must develop the may occur (think white).

ability to think like the enemy. Wars are waged within environments of

To become an effective red thinker you varying extremes and complexities that

must be able to put aside your own affect the way in which forces, sysways of thinking and the influences of tems, and tactics are employed. For

your society, culture, and organization, example, a major component of the

By practicing "putting on a red hat," so combat environment Is topology. Threat

to speak, you will become able to took to Army units in a tropical setting may

at a situation from the enemy's per- differ substantially from that encounspective. This will help you to replicate tered In desert or mountainous terrains.

how the enemy views the world:

strengths and weaknesses, opportuni- Other environmental elements that may

ties and constraints, foes and allies. Influence the nature and intensity of

This will result in more accurate predic- combat-related threat include weather,

tions and Intelligence products that are populatIon densities, and transportation

more responsive to the needs of Army facilities. Combat itself creates new

planners and decision-makers. Thinking environmental factors that threaten ared requires using many different vital systems and operations. These

organizational perspectives within the may include both intended and

4-10

Sk

.m .' ' ' - - . - - • . . . . . .. ° - . . . =. . b -. . = . .... - . ..°° . °.°. . - = . ' ' ' -" -" ° % "•

• o • 

". ' '•''" . " •"% • - " ' ° ' ° "' ' o° "" . ," .. . '' ' ' . " " - ' . "°" •". ",° o . " ° °.°o. •.

• .,. . =,..,,--eel I=, . ,, . e,==,.-.,a= . =lk=h . . ==.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dii.., . . ,, . • . . . - . . . . . ... .. . .. ." -,-,.-- . ... . . • . , ... .. ". 
unintended consequences of electronic Methodology provides both form and

and chemical warfare, or nuclear direction to the application of skills, and

effects such as blast, radiation, elec- a forum for creative thinking. By servtromagnetic pulse, and fratricide. Ing as a structure within which to work,

methodology acts as a catalyst that

allows projects to reach their true

potentials.

To be effective in responding to Quantitative methods will often be valuintelligence requirements you must able in your work as a strategic

first establish a methodology or analyst. But as demonstrated in such

Plan of Attack. products as the SBDP and the LRPE,

methodology is not confined to the

quantitative arena. Before performing

analysis, you must accomplish the following tasks:

" Understand the requirement * Understand the requirement.

" Think through your basic assump- a Analyze your assumptions. tions and write them down. • Develop an information-gathering

strategy.

The success of the LRPE and the SBDP

4.4.4 DEVELOP A METHODICAL can be attributed in part to the careful

APPROACH TO INTELUGENCE execution of these tasks prior to dealANALYSIS Ing with the substance of the studies.

These tasks are discussed and

To be an effective strategic analyst, developed in more detail in Chapter 5.

( you must handle an intelligence requirement in an efficient and systematic

way. Organizing your production is as

important as the analysis itself. To be

most effective, you must develop a 4.5 Summary

methodology for responding to different Analysis serves many different funckinds of intelligence requirements. tions. A need for analysis may arise

To many newcomers to the world of from a recognition that a problem canstrategic analysis, the term methodol- not be solved without additional inforogy evokes visions of complicated mation or consideration. Analysis may

mathematical formulas, reams of com- be applied to produce information where

puter printouts and a language that is no relevant data exist; this is particucomprehensible only to methodologists. larly true when the analyst must make a

This, of course, is a distortion of what projection or forecast. Analysis is used

methodology really is. Methodology is in tactical and strategic operations, and

first and foremost the creation of a the differences between the two are

thorough and workable structure within Informative.

which to employ analytic skills. It is Analysis is essentially a mental process,

essentially a "plan of attack" that you and relevant thinking skills can be

develop prior to any substantive enhanced through training.

research, analysis, or production

activity. The goal of strategic analysis is to

reduce the uncertainties of ITAC consumers, to enable them to develop plans

4-11
.".

and policies to meet future threats. actions and that, In turn, influence

The four levels of strategic analysis enemy behavior. You must take into

match the categories of detail that con- consideration environmental factors

stitute an enemy war plan. The that may impact upon operations and

"theater-strategic" operation Is the systems under combat conditions.

logical next step in global warfare. By becoming familiar with this concept, you Finally, to become efficient at performwill be able to visualize the operational ing a systematic strategic analysis, approach you must or plan developof environment and thereby produce a asseai praho lno better product, attack. Characteristics of such a plan Include taking steps to (1) understand

You must know the enemy and to try to the requirement, (2) analyze your

think like the enemy. In addition, you assumptions, and (3) establish a stramust learn about the "blue" systems tegy to make available all necessary

that may be threatened by enemy Information.

4-12

* 

Z.
6. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH FOR The second step is to prepare an initial

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS Intelligence survey. This results in the

selection and organization of background knowledge that will allow you to

6.1 Introduction recognize existing pertinent information

and to Identify areas where more infor- This chapter provides you with a gen- mation Is needed.

eral approach to use for most of the

Intelligence requirements you are likely In the third step, you first determine

to encounter. It is Important for you to whether the existing information is sufunderstand that the steps outlined In ficient to satisfy the consumer's intellithis approach are intended only to pro- gence requirements. (If so, no further

vide a model for developing an analyti- resources need be allocated to the job

cal approach of your own. The experi- and you can proceed to the final step

ence you eventually gain from answer- of the methodology.) If more information

Ing many intelligence requirements will is needed, then you must select an anaallow you to modify and by-pass certain lytic method. This involves choosing an

steps. Nevertheless, by understanding established method (or designing a new

the rationale for using a systematic one) to produce an intelligence product

approach and by incorporating the that best answers the consumer's

steps of the following approach to requirement within the constraints of

analysis into your own analytic efforts, your time and the available resources.

you will have established a solid foun- Following the selection of an analytic

dation for producing high-quality stra- method, the fourth step Is to execute

tegic intelligence, the method by gathering information

pertinent to the consumer's requirements and then evaluating the reliability

5.2 A Methodology for Strategic of this information.

Intelligence Analysis In the fifth step, information determined

The analytic approach developed in this to be reliable is subsequently used to

chapter is presented as a flowchart of prepare a revised intelligence survey

procedural steps (see Figure 5-1). This survey incorporates new informaProgress through these steps Is tion Into the existing framework of the

achieved by completing certain pro- initial survey. Then, you must again

cedures in each that are designed to determine whether the revised intellilay the groundwork for the next step. gence survey satisfies the consumer's

The following brief overview will provide Intelligence requirements. (If not, more Thefolowngbrif verie wil rovde Information must be gathered and

you with a feeling for the six component steps of the strategic analysis evaluated, and the survey must be

p st a nrevised again. This cycle is repeated

". process: prcs:until you determine that the consumer's

The first step in conducting strategic Intelligence requirements are satisfied.)

analysis is to understand the intelli- When the revised intelligence survey

gence requirement. By completing this Wh e the cnsed ei e es ,

step you obtain a thorough under- satisfies the consumer's requirements,

the consumer's intelligence you proceed to the sixth step and pronstand of tsduce a report that answers the needs and expectations for the finishedand

product. This is important because the reduces the uncertainty that created consumer's requirements provide direction for the entire analytic effort.

5-1

t ... :..:.. - - / ..,. '. .,,.,-..-. .... ,-..-;.-'.:,. -.-.. . .. .. .... : .,:. .. ,,., ,. ... .. , , ,..,,.,, ,,..,,., ,.,, ... , ,.. ,.-.,-.,..-
STEP 1 UNDERSTAND THE

INTELLIGENCE

REQUIREMENT

STEP 2 PREPARE AN INITIAL

INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

STEP3DSE ECT ANLYI STE 

STEP Y PROUCE A REPORT

INLEGEE SURVFY410 THEE C L IEN T 'S PRODUCTION RESULTS

F rS QUIREMENTS A

-+No2

METHD T

"- • Assess consetraints

,, a Select a method

STEP 4 EXECUTE THE METH.OD

l STEP 5 PREPARE A REVISED

INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

~Figure 5-I.: Steps of Strategic Intelligence Analysis

5-2
The following sections describe each * Production Requirements file.

strategic analysis step in greater detail

a Requirements Office. and point out some thinking skills you

may use, some problems you might e Other ITAC analysts.

, encounter, cmplte some achstep procedures an soe to help tch- you When you are satisfied that you undercomplete each step, and some tech- stn th coumrs nelgne

niques to Improve your thinking skills stand the consumeos Intelligence

" ~~and helpyou avoid problems. eurmnyu sol eemn n e u d lwhether the requirement is "do-able."

That is, how successful can the

6.3 The Steps of Strategic analysis be, given the consumer's level

Intelligence Analysis of expectation? If the requirement is

unrealistic, it is extremely important to

communicate this fact to the consumer

5.3.1 STEP 1: UNDERSTANDING THE or your supervisor, who may then be

INTELLGENCE REQUIREMENT able to recast it in a manageable form.

Products are created to meet specific

consumer requirements. Indeed, these

requirements are the focus of the entire

analytic prcess. - Who is the consumer?

An initial lack of understanding of the - What does the consumer

consumer's requirements may uitimateiy already know about the

lead to an imprecise and vague intelli- topic of analysis?

gence product ,or one that is too

detailed to be of use to the consumer. - What are the consumer's

Since this will certainly lead to consu- areas of uncertainty?

mer dissatisfaction and wasted time,

you should have an undistorted picture -What information does

of the consumer's requirements before the consumer require and

beginning your work. To do this, you how will this information

must know the consumer, understand contribute to the reduction

the consumer's specific intelligence of his uncertainty?

requirement and time frame, and know

how the Information in the final report -What is the ultimate purpose

will be used. Completion of Step 1 will for the collection and

help you to obtain and organize this analysis of information,

knowledge. i.e., how will the consumer

use this information?

5.3.1.1 Procedures/Tools for Step 7 - What historical breadth

To maximize your knowledge of each does the consumer expect?

consumer and the consumer's individual

Intelligence requirements, you should - How long is the information

attempt to document answers to all of In the product expected

the questions in the Consumer Profile to be relevant?

Checklist (see Table 5-1) in your product folder. Table 5-1: Consumer Profile

Information to help you understand con- Checklist

sumer requirements may be obtained

from the:

5-3
5.3.7.2 Potential 9 Use your understanding of the

Difficulties/Suggestions for consumer's present state of

Step I knowledge and fundamental assump- tions to guide your survey of the

Understanding the consumer's intelli- int gce e urm ents.

gence requirements depends upon the

efficiency of the consumer/analyst * Identify and evaluate the validity of

communication process. The consumer's your own assumptions. Note how

(as well as the analyst's) expectations, these assumptions may affect your

assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, and analysis.

existing knowledge can influence this * Be willing to indicate your own

process. 

may 

For example, the consumer uncertainty and lack of understand- leave a critical piece of information

out of the communication of product Ing.

requirements simply by assuming that * Establish a dialogue with the consuyou already have this information. Simi- mer whenever possible.

larly, you may incorrectly assume that

you understand a consumer's current other analysts.

requirements because you know a great

deal about that consumer's past * Learn to generate structured quesrequirements. tions that request specific, focused

answers (see Table 5-2). This will

Assumptions will often be relied upon to ati sfy T al requiement

fill certain information gaps when there satisfy Informational requirements

are no other available means. Fre- without wasting the consumer's, other analysts', or your own time.

quently, assumptions form a basis for

how analysis is performed and for how

conclusions are drawn. This can save

time, but unchecked assumptions can 5 TEPU2ENEPARE 

easily lead to errors. It is important to INTELLGENCE SURVEY

be aware of the assumptions used to fill Preparing an Initial intelligence survey

information gaps. (See Appendix E, Is the process of collecting, evaluating,

Section 2.1 on "Identifying Assump- and organizing background knowledge

tlons.") about the topic area of the intelligence

The problem of prior assumptions is requirement.

magnified when intelligence needs are In one sense, this process involves the

communicated through many levels, accumulation of extensive general

Consider the distortion that can occur knowledge (for example, existing intelliwhen information is communicated gence, the geographic features, the

through several bureaucratic levels, political climate, and the cultural history

each of which can revise and append of the country or countries implicated in

the message according to its own set the topic). The collection and organizaof pre-existing assumptions. Given the tion of this type of knowledge may take

frequency with which intelligence needs days, months, or years, depending upon

are communicated in this fashion, you your initial level of expertise in an area.

may seldom encounter a situation in In a second, more practical sense,

which initially you completely under- preparing an Initial Intelligence survey

stand the intelligence requirement. prer ing an iegne suvy Some general rules that will facilitateonly

your communication with the consumer

are:

5-4

............ ......-,:.,.....: ....
latter information. Therefore, you

* The purpose of asking structured should make every effort to increase

questions is to reduce the amount your awareness and understanding of

of thinking required to answer a existing background information on the

question, and to limit the answer to Intelligence topic.

a specific piece of information. Using select pieces of background

Here are some examples of struc- Information, you can tailor an initial

tured and unstructured questions: intelligence survey to the current intelSTRUCTURED ligence requirements. This will define

what is known about this area of intelli-

- Where Is the enemy deployed? gence. To avoid "re-inventing the

wheel," you must be familiar with exist-

- How is the enemy organized? Ing intelligence information and be able

to assess its reliability, accuracy, and

- What are the enemy's possible applicability to the current problem.

courses of action? Upon comparing the analytical objectives of the current problem to the - What objectives could this existing intelligence data, you may find

deployment of enemy forces d ent othat it contains all of the information

have? you need to satisfy a consumer's intelligence requirement. If it does not con- - How long would it take for tain this information, you will neverthethis force to fully mobilize? less gain a much clearer idea of what to

look for to fill in the gaps. In defining

UNSTRUCTURED what is known about a topic, the initial

( Intelligence survey also helps define

-What do you think the enemy what is not known. This survey is,

is up to? therefore, instrumental in helping you

focus and direct the search for informa-

- What do you think of enemy tion to fill in areas of uncertainty in the

weapon systems? intelligence topic.

- How do you feel about enemy

intentions? 5.3.2.7 Procedures/Tools for Step 2

The following procedure will help you

Table 5-2: Structuring Questions develop an organized and complete survey of the intelligence situation:

that subset of information from the gen- * Have a basic understanding of the

that subse at f the den- topics in the Intelligence Survey

eral knowledge base that directly Checklist (see Table 5-3).

applies to the consumer's intelligence

requirements. That is, the existing e When information covered by the

general body of information Is filtered to checklist points is inadequate,

produce an initial survey that is highly obtain additional information. Check

pertinent to the current requirements. out more than one source; look for

information in unlikely as well as While the initial Intelligence survey can likely places (see rable 5-4); be

be distinguished from general aggressive in obtaining pertinent

knowledge of the topic, it is neverthe- information.

less dependent upon the scope of this

6-5

h," . .o" -... , • -,•. ~ ~. . • ,. •.". . ... . . . . . . . . . . .
a Refer to Table G-1 in Appendix G for

Know as much as you can about: additional procedures to aid In the

preparation of an initial Intelligence )

- the product history related survey.

to the threat

- the collection history against

the threat - Travel agencies

- the consumer's history in dealing - Foreign radio stations

with this threat

- Communities of foreigners

- the history of the country in in the U.S., e.g.,

which the threat exists Chinatown, Little Italy

- the current foreign policy of the - Chamber of commerce publications

country in which the threat exists

- Statistical and census reports

- the current military policy for the

country in which the threat exists - Geological surveys

Table 5-3: Intelligence Survey Country tourism bureaus

Checklist

Table 5-4. Unusual Places to

Find Information

9 Seek out and incorporate information

from previous Intelligence products,

but do not rely on this information

alone. A current survey Is critical. e Other intelligence agencies

The following sources, if available,

may contain recent intelligence pro- e Other government agencies

ducts that are related to your

consumer's requirements: * Public and university libraries

- Technical library. * Open source materials

- Product history file.

- Computerized data bases. - Professional journals

- Open source literature. - Translations of foreign

- Closed source literature, publications

e Determine the relevance of all col- -Newspapers

lected Information to the current

requirements. - Military publications

* Document the Information in the

intelligence survey in your product Table 6-5: External Information

folder. Note the source and the Sources at ITAC

status (age, reliability, classification,

etc.) of this information.

5-6

- ...........................- . .;.... . . . .. ........... ........ ,.•."
5.3.2.2 Potential Individuals who developed that docDifficulties/Suggestions for trine. When you need to recall this

Step 2 Information, you will be more likely to

The thinking skills that are used to for- recognize its applicability and

remember it in its entirety because

mulate an initial intelligence survey are

similar to those used in the day-to-day It Is meaningfully organized.

learning of new Information. They . Information in memory is harder to

Include recognizing the pertinence of remember when it is used infrenew Information, organizing or integrat- quently. This could cause you to

Ing new information with old information, develop an incomplete initial survey

knowing how to store and retrieve by failing to remember pertinent

Information (whether it be in memory, a information.

computer data base, or even a product Develop a sensitivity to situations in

folder), and using this information to which you know your memory will be

make Inferences about unknown fac- taxed.

tors.

General background knowledge about Don't always rely on your memory,

an Intelligence topic constitutes a very especially when external Information

sources are easily accessible (see large body of information, and it is nei- Table 5-6). Compile a list of exterther possible nor desirable for you to nal Information sources and refer

remember all of this information. It is necesar, hoeve, fo yo toback to this list frequently. Use necessary, however, for you toth s so r e to up l m n t e these sources to supplement the

remember the more Important aspects Information in your memory and to

of this Information and where to go to verify its accuracy.

collect additional information. Some

obstacles you may encounter in doing

this and some suggestions for getting

around them are given below:

Take about a minute and memorize

• Information that is remembered as a these letters:

disconnected, unorganized set of I B M N S F C I A N R C 0 P E C

material is both difficult to memorize Now try to recall as many of the

and virtually impossible to recall letters as you can.

when It is needed (see Tables 5-6a After you have recalled the letters,

and 5-6b). turn to the next page.

This can cause you to devote more

effort than necessary to "re- Table 5-6a: Organizing Memory

collecting" information you have collected previously. It can also cause

you to leave critical information out * Memory for information becomes disof the Initial survey. torted over time; i.e., it becomes

Organizing information into meaning- harder to distinguish fact from ficful "chunks" can greatly increase tion.

the amount of information you can The older the memory, the more ~Th oldld the memour thery moreamle

hold in your memory. For example, likely it is to be unreliable. A related

,', you could organize Information about problem is that irrelevant information

the history of military policy of the is often well remembered because it

Soviet Union by tracing the evolution is unusual or unexpected. These

of military doctrine through the two memory limitations can lead to

associated writings of key

5-7
biased initial surveys.

Document important information, not- S - Survey Q -Question R -Read

ing whether the information is fact or R = Recite R = Review

Inference, and review this Information frequently. e Skim the material to obtain

an overview.

e Memory is exceedingly poor for

unrelated bits of information. For e Skim the material a second time

example, Information can be left out and generate questions.

of the survey simply because you

may have forgotten the name or e Read the material in depth.

designation of some available

sources of information. If this hap- e Re-read and describe the

pens, you obviously did not obtain central contents to yourself.

and incorporate the source's information into your Initial survey. e Review those areas In which

Use mnemonic strategies for memor- questions remain unanswered

Izing Important information (e.g., or where understanding is

names of external information Incomplete.

sources, classification codes). I _II

Develop strategies to organize Infor- Table 5-7: SQ3R: Mnemonic Strategy

mation and to aid in remembering for Organized Material

facts.

Descriptions of memory strategies

that have proven effective in the 5.3.3 STEP 3: SELECT AN ANALYTIC

past can be found In several popular METHOD i*.)

books on memory (e.g., Lorayne & Once you have formed a current intelliLucas, 1974). Table 5-7 lists the gence survey, you may be able to

steps for remembering meaningfully answer the consumer's requirement

associated material. Table 5-8 pro- with the information already available in

vides a description of steps In this survey. (if so, the next step is to

creating your own mnemonic stra- produce a report for the consumer.) In

tegies. most cases, however, you will identify

Information and analytical gaps in the

_Initial survey that must be filled in to

satisfy consumer requirements. With

You probably had a difficult time these gaps identified, you can select

recalling all the letters. However, an existing analytic method or create a

If you apply an organizing principle tailored method to guide the application

designed to "chunk" the letters of resources and the analysis of inforinto meaningful units - IBM, NSF, mation these resources provide.

CIA, NRC, OPEC - you will have less

difficulty in recalling the letters. An analytic method is a clear, precise plan for conducting analysis for the

U - .1 current intelligence requirement. You

Table b-6b: Organizing Memory are not limited to using only one method

for a given requirement. Each individual

requirement will determine the particular analytic method, and you should consider several methods before selecting

-- 6-8
one that Is eventually used. Examples Some examples of these are the

of established analytic methods are suspense time for completing the

" simulation, formal hypothesis testing, analysis and the priority for use of

and "cut and paste". These and other available resources.

established methods are described In eAbhend mConstraints limit the availability of time

Appendix G. and resources to meet the consumer's

needs. It is necessary that you select

_ _._a method that increases the efficiency

of conducting analysis within the con-

* Establish cues to help you straints. By ignoring constraints, you remember. For example, the remeer. Fo G exY ape, tes run the risk of wasting time waiting for

lttes intial ROYts of te uresources to become available, and you

toina c lettr omay fail to meet the allotted suspense

prism colors, time for the product. Using the Step 3

procedures and tools, outlined below, Whenever possible, associate will help you determine constraints and

the material to be remembered establish an analytic method for any to the cues by forming a mental intelligence requirement.

image of the association.

When visual imagery is not

possible, create a meaningful

phrase or sentence using the 5.3.3.1 Procedures/Tools for Step 3

cue and the material to be Use the "Worksheet to Establish Conremembered. straints and Resources" (see Appendix

* Rehearse the association F) to increase the probability that you consider and account for all relevant

between the cue and the constraints associated with the

to-be-remembered material until requirement. Then choose a method

thinking of one leads you to with these constraints in mind.

think of the other.

For any intelligence requirement, evaluate at least two possible methods. This

Table 5-8: Mnemonic Strategy will counteract the tendency to use a

For Unrelated Items. single method for all situations. To

evaluate methods, use the "Guide to

Analytic Method Selection" (see Appen- As you gain more experience, you will dix G).

develop your own analytic methods and

techniques. Some may be novel; others Be systematic in planning your use of

will incorporate some of the features of resources:

those listed in Appendix E. The use of * know where and what the available

a well-thought-out method leads to a resources in your community are.

product of higher quality than does a

haphazard, unsystematic approach. It know the assets of the technical

Is Important that you be familiar with library (see Table 5-9).

several kinds of analytic methods and e exploit the available human

the types of situations in which to use resources in your community (see

them. Table 5-10).

Before you can select a method to con- Document the method you choose and

duct analysis, you must be aware of the steps for its implementation and

constraints on analytic resources. completion.

5-9

,: ~~~..'..: •..•.................. . .. . .,...... . . . .. ....
ness of the methods available to you,

- Newspapers and remembering and using available

resources. These skills, in turn, require

- Maps that you be creative and flexible in

your thinking. By not taking into

- Reference books account all relevant constraints, or by

(history, foreign policy, failing to explore a variety of methods

military policy) and available resources, you may

prematurely adopt one method regard-

- Journals less of Its applicability to the current

situation. This may be less than optimal

- Automated data bases for all but a few situations.

Also, the failure to explore a variety of

Table 5-9: Assets of the Information sources may result in the

Technical Library embarrassing absence of a critical

piece of Information in the final product.

The use of the "Worksheet to Establish

_- Constraints and Resources" (see

Appendix F) and the "Guide to Analytic

- Travel agencies Method Selection" (see Appendix G)

- Country tourism bureaus will facilitate your selection of an

C ybappropriate method. Some specific

- Well-traveled friends self-help procedures that will stimulate

your ability to think creatively are and - acquaintances described in Table 5-11.

- Your own association

with other analysts

5.3.4 STEP 4: EXECUTE THE ANALYTIC

- Intelligence directories METHOD

- pnThe first sub-step in executing the .- DoD phone book analytic method is to gather the necessary information identified in the initial

asProfsion c intelligence survey. The second sub-

.associations step is to analyze or evaluate the infor- i;-'.- Unrimation Universities that you have collected.

The analytic method that you have

- Other intelligence agencies established will, to some extent, guide

_ __ _your efforts in gathering information.

You should refer to this plan frequently Table 5-10: Where to Look to avoid overlooking a possible informafor Human Resources tion source. Some flexibility should be

built into this plan to allow you to evaluate Informational sources and to

5.3.3.2 Potential explore promising leads that are not

Difficulties/Suggestions for specifically detailed in the plan.

Step 3

Establishing an analytic method requires

that you be adept at analyzing your

constraints, evaluating the appropriate5-10

m" dk~hf'tml'U 'm ,.-..............hi ,,m( . .. . .. . ... .
( BRAINSTORMING

Generate as many ideas as you can for solving a problem. Do not worry about

how silly or impractical your ideas are during this generation phase.

* ATTRIBUTE LISTING

Isolate and select the major characteristics of a problem topic. Identify as many

of their attributes as possible without critical evaluation. For each attribute, consider its relevance to the problem topic.

o FORCED OBJECT TECHNIQUE

Select a fixed idea or object then randomly select another idea or object and

attempt to relate the two. Free associate other ideas from this forced relationship.

e AD HOC ANALYST GROUPS

Establish an informal group of colleagues that share similar Interests or problems.

Meet regularly to share ideas, experiences, and new techniques for problem solving.

* CAR POOLING

Find a car pool that has a cross section of analysts and/or production managers.

e CONCEPT PAPERS

Write your ideas down in a concept paper and circulate it to those whose opinion

and expertise you value. Request comments and suggestions.

Table 5-11: Techniques to

Stimulate Creativity

As you gather information, it should be source (see Appendix H).

evaluated for its reliability, relevance Use a checklist for rating information on

to the intelligence topic, and ability to the dimensions of pertinence, accuracy,

reduce the areas of uncertainty in the

Initial survey. Only information deter- reliability, and ambiguity.

mined to be reliable, relevant, and truly Learn how to use automated decision

Informative should be used to revise aids.

the initial intelligence survey. This Document all Information, its source, and

Insures that the final intelligence pro- its reliability in your product folder.

duct contains a more accurate, useful

answer to the consumer's requirements. Refer to Taole G-1 in Appendix G for

additional procedures to aid you in executing the analytic method.

5.3.4.1 Procedures/Tools for Step 4

Explore as many information sources as

possible within the existing time constraInts. Determine the degree of informational value for each information

6-11

7" .....-.. ,..."......................-.............................. .......... ,
5.3.4.2 Potential Difficulties/ Sugges- * Refer to Appendix H to keep track of

tions for Step 4 information that supports or refutes

In gathering information, people tend to your hypotheses.

pay more attention to data that confirm * Create fault trees to account for

their initial ideas or assumptions, missing information (See Figure 5-2).

Indeed, analysts can fail to collect

information that could disconfirm their • To improve your memory:

Ideas. This can be a serious mistake, - Take notes as information is colsince disconfirming evidence logically lected.

carries as much weight as confirming - Devise a strategy to organize evDeisidstence.ooranz

evidence. incoming information.

Other problems that may arise when - Periodically review the initial

collecting information are the failure to

seek multiple, independent pieces of intelligence survey.

Information, inordinate attention to • Frequently consult the steps of the

unreliable, irrelevant, or ambiguous analytic method and lists of availInformation, and too little attention to able information sources to facilitate

pertinent information. These latter two Information collection and reduce

problems directly influence the salience forgetting of sources.

of collected information and indirectly Have an understanding of several

influence subsequent memory for the kinds of decision rules and stra- innsfformiioarlesanosr.

information, tegles. (See Appendix E, Sections

More specifically, information that 2.4 and 2.5.)

receives a great deal of attention

becomes more salient. Very salient

Information will be easily remembered,

while less salient information will be 5.3.5 STEP 5: PREPARE A REVISED

easily forgotten. This can, of course, INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

lead to a biased final product. The revised intelligence survey takes

Because you will analyze very complex, the place of the initial survey and is the

ambiguous information, you will probably precursor to the final product that will

encounter some difficulty in remember- answer the consumer's requirements. It

Ing, organizing, and evaluating your should, therefore, be as well organized

information. To deal with this "informa- and as unbiased as the initial survey. It

tion overload", you will automatically should reflect the validity of the inforuse simplifying heuristics, rules of mation used in its revision, and should

thumb, or thinking shortcuts. Be aware address all of the Information requested

of your own thinking shortcuts and by the consumer.

when they can lead to problems. If the revised intelligence survey is

Reducing informational load is useful in inconsistent with the consumer's

some situations; however, in others, it requirement, you may have been lax In

may cause errors (e.g., important infor- the performance of a previous step. If,

mation could receive too little weight or

the judgments may be seriously however, the revised survey simply "biased). contains too little information to satisfy the consumer's requirements, you

The following suggestions may help you should again identify missing informacomplete Step 4: tion, establish an analytic method, execute this new method, and develop

another revised intelligence survey.

5-12

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
HOW TO DEVELOP A FAULT TREE

A fault tree Is an cutllne indicating all preliminary events that may have

contributed to an outcome event. To construct a fault tree:

1. Enter the outcome event at the top of the tree.

2. List all preliminary events and actions that could have caused the outcome.

Enter them as branches extending down from the top.

3. List several causal factors under each preliminary event.

4. Use information concerning the probability of occurrence for each of

these causal factors to help you evaluate the importance of each

preliminary event in causing the outcome event.

FAULT TREE

- DETECT A CHANGE IN THE CONFIGURATION

AND/OR ACTIVITY OF KEY RED UNIT

CHANGE OF COMMAND CHANGE IN COMPONENT

OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

- AT GENERAL STAFF - PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY SCIENCE

AT SERVICE LEVEL -PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY ART

- AT MILITARY DISTRICT - PRINCIPLE OF FORCE POSTURE

-AT UNIT LEVEL - PRINCIPLE OF TRAINING

INTRODUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL

THAT IMPACTS UPON REQUIREMENT

- FIRE POWER

- REACTION TO CHANGE IN BLUE

- MOBILITY CAPABILITIES OR POSTURE

- NEW CRITICAL MILITARY OBJECTIVE

- COMMAND, CONTROL ESTABLISHED

AND COMMUNICATIONS - RESPONSE TO SPECIAL TACTICS/

TERRAIN PROBLEM

- READINESS

MOBILIZATION

INTENSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL

CRISIS

- PREPARATION FOR WAR

- CIVIL DISTURBANCE

- NATURAL DISASTER

- PREPARATION OF COUP ATTEMPT

- FALSE ALARM

- START OF EXERCISE

Figure 5-2: How to Create a Fault Tree.

6-13

- .e .t iir" . .. i
This process continues within the pro- pieces of information (see Appendix G

duction constraints until the consumer's references).

requirements are met or until you have Use numerical indications of uncertainty

exhausted all the available information. In the revised survey (see Appendix E,

Section 2.4).

Document the intelligence survey in

THE IDEAL PRODUCT: your product folder.

a References the requirement

statement. 5.3.5.2 Potential Difficultiesl Suggestions for Step 5

e Defines the baseline against See Step 2, "Establish an Initial Intelliwhich new information is gence Survey."

applied.

e Defines the geographic, 5.3.6 STEP 6: PRODUCE A REPORT OF

geopolitical, and ethnographic THE PRODUCTION RESULTS

area within which the threat

exists. The production report is likely to be the

only exposure that the consumer will

* Establishes the time frame have to your skill and ability as an

within which any predictions analyst. This report should contain as

remain valid, accurate an answer to the consumer's

request for intelligence as possible.

* Provides the level of detail, Being right in estimating an outcome is

accuracy, format, and supporting irrelevant if the consumer cannot use ) Information required by the the information provided in the product.

consumer. It is not enough that the report simply

contain the requested Intelligence. In

a Identifies areas of uncertainty both verbal and written reports, this

and an evaluation of the re- information must be presented in such a

sources that went into the way that it easily translates into the

analysis. consumer's own understanding of the

topic. The consumer should not have to

e Places most Important infor- search for essential or critical informamation first. tion amidst a profusion of irrelevant

detail, but should be able to follow the

Table 5-12: Ideal Product Checklist logic and reasoning behind your conclusions and correctly understand the

magnitude of uncertainty in the

5.3.5.1 Procedures/Tools for Step 5 analysis. The consumer should not be

distracted by incorrect grammar and

Compare your revised survey with the spelling.

Ideal Product Checklist (see Table 5-

12) and against the consumer's Lack of attention to any of the above

requirements, previously documented In can seriously detract from the quality

:. your product folder. and usefulness of the intelligence product.

Use statistical methods to facilitate

integration of multiple, independent

6-14

I~~~~~~~~~....."-o",*,°°. -................ ....... ....................... ....--. 
5.3.6.1 Procedures/Tools for Step 6 5.3.7 SUMMARY

Include In your report hard facts and an This general approach for conducting

Interpretation of what these facts strategic intelligence analysis has a

Imply. Indicate what Is known as well great deal of flexibility. Entire steps or

as what Is not known. Individual procedures within a step can

be eliminated in certain situations. As Whenever possible, document any prior you gain experience In analysis, you will

assumptions you may hold that have you cai elmin ss and

Influenced your analysis. (See Appendix know when you can eliminate steps and

E, Section 2.1.) A good rule of thumb is procedures without detracting from the to address these assumptions when- final product. Until you reach this point,

to thse adres ssuptios wen- you will increase your chances of

ever the product exceeds two or three crea sesfu fia ct by pages.creating a successful final product by pages. following the systematic approach outIndicate the reliability of the information lined in this chapter.

In the report using numerical estimates.

Be selective; do not include unnecessary detail. Elicit feedback from the

consumer to determine whether your

report is adequate.

5.3.6.2 Potential

Diff iculties/Suggestions for

Step 6

Poor writing and verbal skills can seriously damage your ability to communicate the results of a brilliant analysis.

You should learn how to present your

Ideas clearly and in a straightforward

manner. Make certain that you:

e Use your technical journal to help

you remember pertinent information.

e Present your ideas using a wellorganized, conversational style. Use

lists sparingly.

e Follow all organizational and formatting procedures where required.

e Use the ITAC Writer's Guide to

determine correct grammatical rules

for written reports.

e Use a dictionary to check pronunciation, word meaning, and spelling.

e Proofread.

5-15

.....................................
6. TRAINING TO BECOME AN ITAC quality, fully responsive intelligence

STRATEGIC ANALYST producing organization, ITAC will

achieve its goal of "first In Intelligence". Commitment, capability, and

6.1 Introduction continued training are keys to becoming

As a newcomer to ITAC you must to a top notch strategic analyst.

establish a plan that will guide you in

your efforts to become a first-rate

strategic analyst. Such a plan should 6.2.1 COMMITMENT

Include a set of personal and profes- Whether ITAC is able to reach its goals

sional objectives and the means by depends to a great extent upon the

which to achieve them. The purpose of commitment and capability of you and

this chapter is to underscore the impor- your fellow ITAC analysts. Commitment

tance of training as a major component your o yTAc an Cote

of this plan. The following discussion to your job, your career and to the

addresses the role of training and edu- goals of ITAC is something that can only

come from within. While personal comcation for both new and experienced mitment can never be measured, it is Sstrategic analysts. You must remember something that stands out and is recogthat "expertise" is something that is sometin at indu and is ogachieved achivedthrogh through hard ard work orkand and tion nized such in an as individual ITAC. Commitment and an organiza- to proInteraction with your peers. Expertise tins itAc. omtent toprIs also something Is aso that ometingthatmus must be be continu- ontnu- ducing Intelligence of the highest qual- typsieiswtdsinuhsth

ally refined and biaintained. In addition iy possible waistinuihe the

to the discussions below, Appendix I highnperformaceo

contains a list of many local area

( courses relevant to strategic analysis.

We recommend that you set some time

aside to review this material. 6.2.2 CAPABILI7Y

Commitment and dedication also

extends to the need to continually

6.2 ITAC and the Well Trained improve your own analytic capabilities

Analyst and areas of expertise. While you have

" h been selected to join ITAC on the basis

T s r gof your present talents and capabilities,

e To effectively respond to the needs your selection was also based upon a

of its intelligence consumers. belief in your potential to become a

Da To be "first in intelligence". superior strategic analyst. It is imporT e t n etant that you realize that your training

As discussed in Chapter 4, responsive- and education have just begun. To

ness to consumer requirements means become, and then continue to be, an

reducing the uncertainties that may analyst who excels in the production of

surround a particular system, issue or strategic intelligence, you must (1) parproblem. By removing uncertainty, Army ticipate in the ITAC training and orientaplanners and senior decision makers are tion programs, and (2) seek out those

able to develop and implement the kinds colleagues, courses, and sources of

of plans and policies that will most information that will enhance your ability

effectively counter future threats to to perform analytically.

the Army. The second goal is closely

related to the first. By becoming a high

" 6-1
8.2.3 RETRAINING

Finished Intelligence, other analysts, Adelphi Papers

open sources, and automated data Africa Confidential

bases are Important resources for the Air Force Magazine

strategic analyst. However, your most American Political Science Review

Important resource for analysis will be Army

your own mind. To avoid becoming stale Army Times

and less effective you must make a Aviation Week and Space Technology

concerted effort to continually train and Astronautics and Aeronautics

re-educate yourself. By reinforcing Businessweek

existing knowledge and constantly Chemical and Engineering News

adding to it, your areas of expertise will Computer Decisions

expand. This will be reflected in the Defense Electronics

quality of your work, and it will also Field Artillery Journal

Increase your value to ITAC and the Foreign Affairs

national intelligence community as a Infantry

whole. Janes

Journal of Guidance and Control

Journal of Operational Research

Latin American Studies

ASDIA Military Engineer

COINS Military Review

DIOLOGUE Military Technology

DIAOLS NATO Review

IRISA Orbis

ORBIT Political Methodology

NEXIS Scientific American

SIGNAL

- _Soviet Analyst

Table 6-2: Information Data Bases Soviet Military Review

at ITAC. Strategic Review

Technology Review

Terrorism

6.3 Exploitation of Library Resources USSR Facts and Figures Annual

In addition to participating In ITAC and

community training programs, you should Table 6-2: Sample of

also set aside a particular time during Periodicals at the TIF

the week to review materials in the

ITAC library. The library is a most valuable resource for the strategic analyst. ITAC's Technical Information Center

In addition to allowing you to keep (TIF) holds approximately 35,000

abreast of new ideas and innovations in volumes of community intelligence, and

your area of expertise frequent use of technical, geopolitical, and general

the library resources will enhance your reference material at all levels of clasprofessional development and comple- sification. Substantial information Is

ment any plan you may have for available on microfiche readers and

advancement. data base retrieval systems (see Table

6-1). Other information resources that

are available through the TIF include

journals, Intelligence reports, new

6-2

",-'".-""" ,'-" -'2-,"- ";"i'"'---2-...-",':. "-'..'""..'" " - ",-. -. .,"
books, magazines, and newspapers. A New analysts are typically not familiar

list of many of the most useful periodi- with the ways in which nations train,

cals available at TIF is presented in organize, and employ their armed forces

Table 6-2. For those sources of infor- capabilities. Analysts must learn to

mation that are not readily accessible "think red"; they must become experts

at ITAC, the TIF has an interlibrary loan on the enemy.

arrangement with other community One way to acquire the background and

libraries. education needed to become an expert

As a new ITAC analyst, it is recom- on the enemy Is by taking courses in

mended that you become familiar with the local academic institutions. The

the materials offered at the TIF and Washington, D.C. area has a number of

establish a regular reading list to begin universities that have extensive

your professional development, programs in International relations, area

studies, and national security affairs.

In addition, the Defense Intelligence

College (DIC) offers a masters degree 8.4 Academic Training and the In strategic intelligence. Whether or Strategic Analyst not you work toward a degree, you are

ITAC analysts deal primarily with strongly encouraged to look into the DIC

problems of a technical nature that programs. Other U.S. Government

require an understanding of military affiliated institutions that offer training

environments, military organization, and relevant to strategic analysis are the

the principles of warfare. You were State Department's Foreign Service

chosen to become an ITAC analyst Institute (FSI) and the CIA Office of

because of your previous experience in Training. Like the DIC, these too are

these areas, or because of other highly recommended.

criteria that convinced us that you will

be able to acquire this knowledge in a

short time.

6-3

.. 

o

. . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . ..
BIBLIOGRAPHY Baxter, William P.

NWhat Ivan Knows About Us."

Army, 1980.

Introduction

The literature on strategic analysis Is Betts, Richard D.

"Analysis, War, and Decision: Why rich and extensive. It is important that Intelligence Failures Are Inevityou become familiar with these writings

that address strategic Issues of most World Politics. Vol. 31, No. 1,

relevance to your job. This bibliography Wor 1l78.

October 1978.

will Introduce you to a cross-section of

writings on strategic affairs. Many of

these works were used In the prepara- Buynoski, Mathew S.

ton of this handbook. Others are listedgaers: teaos of hishndbook. thar Iste oParts I & II. The General - Part 1:

because of their particular insight or Vol 8, No. 4. Part 2: Vol. 8, No. 5.

treatment of topics.

Chan, Steve

'The Intelligence of Stupidity:

Understanding Failures in Strategic

Warning."

Akff R. L. American Political Science Review,

The Art of Problem Solving. John Vol. 73, 1979.

Wiley & Sons, New York, 1978. Clarkson, Albert

Adams, James L. Toward Effective Strategic

Conceptual Blocku sting. W. H. Analysis: New Applications of

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clsco, 1974.

A a , nClauser, Jerome K., & Weir, Sandra M.

Behavior and Quantitative *spec- "Intelligence Research MethodolBeaior nd Quanitatism e r Per- ogy: An Introduction to Techniques tii on Terrorism. New York, Per- and Procedures for Conducting

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Alexander, Yonah, ed. Preparel for the Defense Intelligence School, Washington, D.C., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Per- 1975.

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1977. Clausewitz, Carl Von

On War. (Edited and translated by Allison, Graham T. Michael Howard and Peter Paret),

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;" the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, ton, N.J., 1976.

Brown, Boston, 1971.

Axelrod, Robert (ed.) Colby, William E.

Strcturo Structure eof of e Decision: ision."Intelligence The Cogni- ho in the 1980's." Information Society. Vol. 1,

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The Craft of Intelligence. New

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York, Harper and Row, 1963. Some Insights on Data, Concepts,

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Gardner, Martin Operations Research. Holden-Day,

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New York, 1978. Janis, Irving L.

Victims of Groupthink: A PsychoGodson, Roy (ed.). logical Study of Foreign Policy

Intelligence Requirements for the Decisions and Fiascoes.

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National Strategy Information

Center, New Brunswick, 1980. Jervis, Robert

Perception and Misperception in

Goure, Leon International Affairs. Princeton

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Center for Advanced International 1976.

Studies, Miami, 1976.

Katter, R. V., Montgomery, C.A., and

Graham, Daniel 0. Thompson, J.R.

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Heuer, Richards J. Systems, INSCOM, Research

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1978. Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value TraHeuer, Richards J., Jr. deof fs. John Wiley and Sons, New

"A Problem Solving Perspective on York, 1976.

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Government Foreign Affairs Koberg, Don and Bagnall, J.

Analysis", Paper presented to The Universal Traveler. William

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Washington, D.C., February 22-25, Kinter, W. R., and Scott, H.F.

1978. The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet

Military Affairs. University of

Heuer, Richard J. Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1968.

"Improving Intelligence Analysis:

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Kupperman, Robert H. and Trent, Darrell Prados, John

M. Terrorism: Threat, Reality. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. InteiliResponse. Stanford, California, gence Analysis and Russian Miii-

" Hoover Institution, 1979. tary Strength. The Dial Press, New

York, 1982.

Legvold, Robert

"The Nature of Soviet Power.u Raiffa, H.

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Luttwak, Edward N.

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Roberts, Fred S.

Empire: from the first century A.D. Discrete Mathematical Models.

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Rubinstein, M. F.

Machiavelli, Niccolo Patterns of Problem Solving.

The Prince, (Translated by Peter Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood

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Rubinstein, M. F. and Pfeiffer, K.

Martlno, Joseph P. Concepts in Problem Solving.

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The Analytic Hierarchy Process.

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"The Analytic Hierarchy Process

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Orgarkov, Nikolay V. "High-Level Decisions: A Lesson

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Pipes, Richard Scott, Harriet, and William

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Colorado, 1981. 1977.

Skolovski, Marshal V.D. Whiting, Kenneth R. .3

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Sterling, Clair.

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Stover, John G., and Gordon, T. J.

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1978, pp. 301-328.

Strauch, Ralph E.

"A Critical Assessment of Quantitative Methodology as a Policy

Analysis Tool." R- 1423-PR/ARPA,

The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1979.

Summers, Harry G.

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of

the Vietnam War. Presidio Press,

Novato, CA, 1982.

U.S. Congress Senate Judiciary Committee. Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support. Hearings, 97th

Congress, 1st Session, 1981.

Vangundy, Arthur B.

Techniques of Structured Problem

Solving. Van Nostrand Reinhold

Company, New York, 1981.

Whiting, Kenneth R.

The Development of the Soviet

Armed Forces 1917-7977. Air

University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama,

BIB-4

U

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APPENDIX A

ITAC Configuration

and Directorate Responsibilities

.o . . .
APPENDIX A.

ITAC CONFIGURATION AND DIRECTORATE

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Purpose

You can expect to experience a brief the tasking authority of OACSI which

period of adjustment while you get used validates all requirements sent to ITAC.

to your new job, colleagues and work The current ITAC configuration was

environment. One of the first questions established In 1982 and was designed

that may come to mind will concern the to maximize the responsiveness to the

way In which ITAC is organized and the needs of consumers of ITAC products.

responsibilities of the major organiza- This organizational framework is

tional components. The purpose of this represented In Figure A-1. You will

appendix s to provide you with an notice that ITAC is made up of five main

overview of ITAC that will help answer directorates, each of which report

these kinds of questions, directly to the commander. Using this

figure, you should be able to locate the

division that you have been assigned to

2. Introduction and thereby establish an idea of its

official relationship to other ITAC divi- ITAC's mission is to support Department sosandretae.Thfucis at Amy laningand ecllonmakn sions and directorates. The functions •of Army planning and decision-making adsrcueo h omne fIA

with all-source intelligence products. and structure of the Commander of ITAC

"Although ITAC Is a major subordinate together with each of the five Directorctoughndof ITAC sIsmajor M subrte t ates will be addressed in the discussion ( command of INSCOM, ITAC Is subject to thtflos

thatfollows.

A-1
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3. The Functions and Structure of

ITAC's Primary Organizational

Components

COMMANDER

3.1 Commander

3. 1.1 FUNCTIONS Commander also develops proposed

The Commander tasking and integrates the activities of is responsible for other agencies in support of ITAC mismanaging assigned assets for the suc- olhn reieens

cessful accomplishment of the ITAC

mission. The commander serves as the

highest authority on all matters involving general intelligence production and 3.1.2 STRUCTURE

threat analysis. In addition, the Com- The office of the Commander Is organmander directs the preparation of all Ized according to the operational style

ITAC's plans, programs, policies, pro- and preferences of the Commander of

cedures, and intelligence products. The ITAC.

A-3

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DIRECTORATE

OF

FOREIGN FORCES

CAPABILITIES

::GROUND AIR FORCE

COMBAT COMBAT OPERATIONS

DIIIN DIVISION DIVISION

3.2 Foreign Forces Capabilities

Directorate

3.2.1 FUNCTIONS

The Foreign Forces Capabilities Direc- States) interface for Army intelligence

torate (FCD) Is primarily responsible for production between echelons below

conducting research, analysis, and pro- corps, DOD, and national agencies.

ductlon on Soviet/WP forces, tactics,

operations, organization, and materiel.

FCD tailors products and briefings In

response to ACSI requirements to sup- 3.2.2 STRUCTURE

port the Army force, concepts, doctrine, The Forces Capabilities Directorate is

combat, and materiel developers (HODA, organized into three functionally

TRADOC, DARCOM) who are required by Integrated divisions. As projects are

regulation to account for the threat as assigned, the divisions form teams of

they build the U.S. Army of the future. combat or mission area functions and

In peacetime the FCD concentrates on families of systems (i.e. Armor, Artillery,

mid- and long-range projections of Logistics teams, etc.). The teams are

Soviet/WP forces; generally at a level grouped under Ground Combat, ir Coinof theater and below. In wartime, the bat, and Force Operations Divisions and

directorate shifts its emphasis to short- coordinate directly with their counterand mid-term projections in order to parts at the DA staff and major comanticipate battlefield tactical and mands Including their schools, centers,

materiel developments that can and subcommands systems. Analysts

adversely affect U.S. and allied forces. with modeling and wargaming skills are -" assigned to the FCD to support During peace or war, the FCD also asiC

serves as a CONUS (Continental United nalysis.

A-4

.. . . . .• . .- . . . . .
DIRECTORATE

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

AREAS IMAGERY OPERATIONS CI/TERR

ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS

DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION

3.3 Intelligence Production identification, counterintelligence and

Directorate support to OPSEC, and national and

departmental Interface.

In wartime the Directorate determines,

detects, and reports critical indicators

In response to ACSI requirements and In of enemy deep rear area activity, and

. support of U.S. Army planners and senior provides short-term reports and

decision-makers, the Intelligence Pro- assessments In response to wartime

duction Directorate (IP) provides: intelligence requirements from echelon

e Regional military estimates, above corps and sustaining base. In R n t iaddition, It receives data from all

scenarios, and assessments.

sources In theaters of war for purposes

e Analyses of conduct, exercises, and of supporting the Department of Army

training, with worldwide Intelligence assess-

. • Vulnerability/susceptibility assess- ments and appraisals.

ments.

e * SIGINT exploitation. 3.3.2 STRUCTURE

-e IThe IPD Is structured along both geographic and intelligence discipline lines

e Counterintelligence analyses. and In time of war, or threat of war, is

capable of rapid augmentation by in- The IPO also tasks and organizes for house hosanU..Am and U.S. Army Rerv Reserve Ci- Com,-

specific projects as required, by ponents In accordance with analytic

assembling all-source expertise from perts requirents. aTheyic

IIamong Its divisions. expertise requirements. The IPD

a t sIncludes an Area Division consisting of

In peacetime the IPD produces studies regional branches, and Imagery Intelli-

. and briefings to prepare the CONUS gence, Exercise Analysis and Counter-

" sustaining base and echelons above intelligence/ Terrorism Analysis. In

corps for war. This Involves a multitude peace and war, IPD Is capable of applyof activities to satisfy such mission ing all source analysis to regional

area requirements as situation develop- area(s) of high national interest.

ment, targeting, and critical Indicator

A-5

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DIRECTORATE

OF

OPERATIONS

!"REQUIREMENTS COLLECTION PROGRAM

D IVISION DIVISION OPERATIONS

DIVISION

8.4 Operations Directorate

3.4.1 FUNCTIONS then either returned to the requester or

The Director of Operations (DO) serves tasked to the appropriate directorate.

as the operations officer for ITAC. The

DO is responsible for processing

requirements, providing collection 3.4.2 STRUCTURE

~management, and maintaining required maeent and aitning orui red The DO is organized into small divisions

schedules and statistics for ITAC projects and products. All requirements that accomplish the functions of

are received by the directorate, requirements analysis and processing,

analyzed to determine their validity and collection support, and scheduling.

A-6

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-i ,,.Jl--.L 6 ,.,-'-.. ..m,.ak ~ u .,I-. ~ dll~l dli ..,,]lll ,.~a ,.hil.i .ir d ":" " . . Y ] ' " : , ,. - . . . . " ]
DIRECTORATE QUALITY

OF CONTROL

TECHNICAL SERVICES OFFICE

111

TECHNICAL PRODUCTION AUTOMATION &

INFORMATION SUPPORT ANALYTIC

DIVISION DIVISION SERVICES

DIVISION

GRAPHICS EDIT PRINTING

BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH

3.5 Technical Services Directorate

3.5.1 FUNCTIONS the analytical divisions, which in turn

The Technical Services Directorate are required to establish and accom-

(TSD) provides a variety of support pllsh their own high standards of quality

functions for the Command, particularly control for each product and project

the analytical directorates. This prior to forwarding It to TSO.

Includes all manner of library/ reference

center assistance, one-stop graphics, 3.5.2 STRUCTURE

printing, quality control, and automated

support. The TSD Is responsible for the The TSD consists of a Technical Infortechnical modernization of the organiza- mation Division, a Production Support

tlon. A primary task of the TSD Is to Division and a Management Information

minimize the administrative burdens on and Automation Division.

A- 7

* . - . * -*... *-*..**. .

. 'Ft . *1' .' I
DIRECTORATE

OF SUPPORT MANAGEMENT)

PLANS RESOURCE SUPPORT READINESS

AND POLICY MANAGEMENT SERVICES AND TRAINING

DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION

3.6 Support Management Directorate 4. Conclusion

The organization of ITAC is noteworthy

for Its horizontal structure and flexible

3.6.7 FUNCTION character. This allows ITAC to respond

to multiple and varying mission area

The Support Management Directorate requirements in peace and war.

(SMD) Is responsible for all the planning,

programming, budgeting, training, man- The management Is lean, and priority for

power management and personnel spaces Is given to analysts and their

activities, logistics and security for support staff for production.

ITAC. The Plans and Policies Division The operations of ITAC depend greatly

prepares all short-, mid-, and long-term upon the team approach by organizing

plans with Input from all Directorates. tasks to accomplish projects. There is

The Resource Management Division is special emphasis on brienting ITAC

responsible for GDIP preparation, and teams on specific Army organizations

management of the command operating and projects, thereby Insuring that

budget Budgets and TDS's are based Intelligence and threat factors are adeon long-range plans and policies. quately taken into account as the Army

builds and prepares for tomorrow.

3.6.2 STRUCTURE

The SMD is organized Into divisions

required to accomplish Its missions of

plans and policy, program and budget,

supply, manpower management, personnel, training, and readiness.

-. 0

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APPENDIX B

ITAC Task Organization
APPENDIX B.

ITAC TASK ORGANIZATION

1. Introduction 2. Concept of Operations

Prior to the most recent reconfiguration, Since the establishment of the present

Individual ITAC production divisions spe- ITAC configuration, intelligence produccialized in specific functional areas and tion has shifted toward a total integraserved a narrow range of clients. As tion of ITAC production, and away from

semi-autonomous intelligence produc- many of the traditional ways of producers, there was little coordination either Ing analyses.

within or between directorates. Con- Figure B-1 represents the way in which

sistent with guidance provided by the fully Integrated, all-source ITAC producACSI and CG INSCOM in 1982, ITAC pro- tn is accomplished. A major feature of

duction currently seeks to employ the this concept is that each analyst can

expertise within all of ITAC, to produce tin supprt fo al ca

truly all-source intelligence reports and analytical and support experts

studies. As a result, ITAC divisions now tgu aC. se scpertn

Interact as a team In the production of throughout ITAC. Precise scoping and

strategic intelliqence, tasking of requirements by the Director

of Operations (DO) and close coordination of Directors, Division Chiefs, and

Branch Chiefs is a central feature of

this concept.

B-1

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/ DI

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imIL 00 i r = CAPj

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AUT ANAL I

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AUTO & ANIAL MlV

Soid Lnes 0 Action tasking and main flow of project.

Broken Lines 8 Coordnation among and withiin Directrate.

otod Uifte 9 project analyst'si coordination with other "experts."

Figure B-7: Example of All-Source Product Flow

B-2

,'-' -~~~~~~~~~~......... . --..--........ ...-..- '.'.'."... ... . ... , . . .
APPENDIX C

ITAC Products and Clients
APPENDIX C. 2.1 Capstone Studies

ITAC PRODUCTS AND CLIENTS Knowing how to equip, train, and deploy

armed forces requires an understanding

of the nature and location of potential

conflicts and the goals, strategies and

1.0 Introduction capabilities of potential enemies. Such

an understanding is particularly crucial

ITAC Is charged with executing intelli- for senior decision makers who are

gence production functions to Include responsible for developing and implestrategic overviews, general intelli- menting the Army Long-Range Planning

gence threat analysis, and tactical System. ITAC supports these decision

technical intelligence. This effort makers through the production of Capdirectly supports the following four stone Studies that provide a view into

categories of consumers: potential geographic regions of conflict,

and into the types of conditions and

e Senior decision-makers and planners -at DA and national level. threat that the Army may face, should It

a a i lbe deployed into these regions under

* Operational forces - both tactical conflict conditions. ITAC's Capstone

and special purpose. Studies are divided into two major

e Force, combat, and materiel develop- categories: Environmental Studies and

era - to include the training commun- Strategic Overviews.

Ity.

e Scientific (and technical Intelligence 2.1.1 Environmenta Studies

communities.

The kinds of ITAC products that support The most significant environmental

each of study is the Long-Range Planning Esti- these consumer categories are eachmate (IRPE). This widely respected

represented in Figures C-1 and C-2. mtC product Tis aalyes of

ITAC product contains analyses of

political-military factors and trends out

to the year 2000 for Europe, the Middle

East and Persian Gulf, Asia and the 2.0 Support to Senior Decision Pacific, Latin America, and Africa. By

Makers addressing who, when, where, and

Support to senior Army decision-makers under what conditions the Army may be

Is an exciting and rapidly expanding called upon to fight, senior decisionarea within ITAC's overall intelligence makers are better able to determine

analysis and production responsibilities. long-range implications and strategic

ITAC has stipulated that requirements requirements. In addition, ITAC'S

environmental studies enable them to originating from elements of the Army evelondpraritie equie fe

Staff such as the ACSI and the Deputy caes and chrteristics.

Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) capabilities and characteristics.

receive highest priority. We anticipate

that a growing proportion of the work at

ITAC will be in response to requirements 2.1.2 Strategic Overviews

of these and other Army Staff

requirements. At present, ITAC support Like ITAC's environmental studies in

at this level consists of two types of general, and the LRPE In particular,

products: (a) Capstone Studies, and (b) strategic overviews provide a perspecArchitecture Studies. tive of potential conflict situations that

C-1

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..... . .... .. "..."
FOREIGN FORCE CAPABILITIES

DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT

PRODUCTION HIERARCHY

Figure C-i 1:TfAC Support to Strategic Intelligence Consumers

C-2
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IIs much broader than the generic and Volume 3: Geographic Organization of

system threats provided in support of Military Operational Responsibilities.

operational forces, combat and materiel This volume presents the command and

developers, and the S+T Intelligence control apparatus of Soviet military producers. The strategic overview cnrlaprtso pucrass. Th tateg onvrvewl forces. Organized geographically, It is

must encompass both the environmental cnee nMso n aitsott

trends and potential enemy force capa- the areas of influence and interest of

bilitles. It must predict enemy behavior, major commands. The idea is to present

environmental conditions, and the dura- the Soviet counterpart to the U.S.

tion of a potential future war. teSve onepr oteUS

organization of Unified and Specified

The most significant of ITAC's Strategic Commands. Forecasts are made as to

Overviews Is the Soviet Battlefield the possibility of changes in geographic

Development Plan (SBDP). The SBDP is organizations or emphasis out to the

an eight volume product that describes Year 2000.

the major components of the Soviet war Volume 4: Soviet Weapons and Sysmachine for the Year 2000. The SBDP

serves as an officially approved base

document for analyzing Soviet reaction Volume 4 describes Soviet weapons and

to new developments In the U.S. Army's systems In relation to such factors as

means and methods of warfare. Yet the size of production facilities, inventories,

SBDP Is much more. It estimates the production rates/capacity, and how all

organization and capabilities of Soviet these contribute to the Soviet's ability

armed forces and examines the social, to fight on today's battlefield. Major

political, economic, and ideological foun- emphasis is on weapons developments.

dations of the USSR's military might. Estimates are made as to characterisThese fundamental components provide tics of future weapons, the numbers

senior decision makers with a better expected, and their impact on the batunderstanding of both the source of mil- tiefield.

Itary capabilities and the potentials that Volume 5: Ground Force Organizations

exist for the future expansion of these and Operations.

capabilities. The SBDP Is divided into

the following eight volumes: This volume explains the piesent organIzation of the Soviet Army, from front

forces to battalion-size units, with speWar. clal focus on the interrelationships

This volume presents the Marxist- among organizations, tactics, and equipLeninist foundations of Soviet military ment. The primary emphasis is on

thought, strategies, and organization, expected changes to future organizations In such areas as doctrine, straVolume 2: Preparation of the Rear for tegy, equipment, and tactics. This General War.

volume forecasts how Soviet units, from

"Rear" In Russian means the entire battalions to fronts, will be organized,

home front - economy, manpower, how they will be equipped, and how

morale, etc. Volume 2, therefore, they will fight on the battlefield of the

addresses how the home front Is organ- Year 2000.

Ized to support the potential outbreak Volume 8: Ground Force OB by Region.

of war. The emphasis here is on how

these efforts enhance the Soviet capa- This volume presents the order of batbility to win on the battlefield in the tie of the Soviet Army by region, disYear 2000. cussing factors of historical differences

such as type of organizations, economy,

C-4
political alliances, etc. 3.0 Support to Operational Forces

Volume 7: Exercises and War Plans. ITAC provides support to Forces ComThis volume reviews recent Soviet mill- mand (FORSCOM), DA, the Department

tary exercises by geographic areas and of Defense (DOD), and other major Army

points out what these exercises imply and tactical commands with three basic

about present Soviet war plans. Fore- products: (a) the Army Intelligence Surcasts of vey (AIS), (b) Special Studies, and (c) future exercises and war CutrItllec rdcs

plans are made based on changes

expected In Soviet military organizations, equipment strategy, tactics and

objectives. Home front exercises are 3.1 AIS

also discussed in areas such as indus- The AIS responds to FORSCOM and

try, transportation, civil defense, other major Army and tactical command

KGB/MVD, emphasizing how these exer- requirements to support the planning for

cises contribute to the effectiveness rqents toysuppo tanin for of Soviet forces on the battlefields of potential deployment of tactical forces

to Soviet foresron toverseas. The AIS supports the Rapid today and tomorrow. Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF),

Volume 8: Soviet Military Missions and focuses on Africa, Latin America,

versus Capabilities. and the Persian Gulf. The AIS consists

This is probably the most valuable of six volumes on each country:

volume of the entire SBDP. It compares Volume 1: Country Resume.

the missions of' Soviet ground forces This volume provides an overview of

with the forces' capabilities to achieve

them. A discussion of both Soviet current and historical data on many

strengths and weaknesses In relation to third world countries and identifies

areas of concern to the U.S. military In mission accomplishment is presented. the event of U.S. Involvement. It conThe main emphasis is on forecasts of

Soviet abilities to close any existing

gaps and prepare for new gaps that physical geography and climate, tranat sportation, telecommunications and

may appear between now and the Year electric power, key strategic areas,

2000. secondary urban areas, history and culLike the LRPE, the SBDP is highly ture, population, government, economy,

respected in the military intelligence and the Armed Forces.

community In general and by senior Army Volume 2: Military Geography.

decision makers in particular. Like the

LRPE, the SBDP has served to consider- Volume 2 addresses specific characably enhance ITAC's reputation and teristics and factors of military geograprestige. phy and provides a detailed examination of climate and weather (including

effects on tactical operations and a

climatic data chart), natural terrain,

tactical considerations (key terrain,

Architectural studies address threats air/airmobile operations, observation

concerning a broad spectrum of capa- and fire, cover and concealment, obstabilitles, Including multi-system projects, cle, water supply, special operations),

networks, and their associated con- transportation, resources, and key

cepts and doctrine. Examples are industries.

threats to the Army Command and Control Master Plan.

C-5

.... " .'.............. ... ......... . ....
Volume 3, Part 1: Handbook of Ground potential and actual health and environForces (HGF). mental threats to U.S. forces, and a

The HGF provides relatively permanent thorough assessment of available mediTinihed IGntpridee reatve prant cal intelligence, Is of critical Importance

tfinished intelligence on the background, to U.S. military planners/commanders in Sstructure, and doctrine of the country s the event of U.S. involvement in that

ground forces and the identification of count

the historical characteristics, modern country.

techniques and procedures, constraints Volume 6: Psychological Operations.

and vulnerabilities, abilities, trends, and (Volume 6 Is produced by the 4th

developments that have combined to

produce the present ground forces Psychological Operations Group.) This

organization and status. The HGF volume provides psychological profile

odranizatio anmatus.fheoy HF information on country military forces, addresses the impact of history and supplying the U.S. military

culture on the ground forces and an pl /n de with mrehanassesmet o Rula Ary icluing planner/commander with a comprehen- assessment of Regular Army including sive assessment of psychological facdiscussion and analysis of mission, corn- tore aestic of thotargetcposition, disposition, personnel strength, try, to support U.s. military operations

tactics, training, logistics, capabilities, and to ts Un lital operations

key personalities, ur~forms and insignia, and tactics in psychological operations.

weapons and equipment, paramilitary

forces, ground forces of other services,

and foreign forces stationed in the 3.2 Special Studies

country. In response to DA and DOD validated

Volume 3, Part 2: Ground Forces Order requirements, ITAC produces all-source,

of Battle Book (GFOBB). single topic, in-depth studies and

The GFOBB Is designed to supplement reports on foreign ground force capabil- )

and update the desgnd povidlmoet Ities. Special Studies are normally and update the HGF and provides more short-term, and completed in-house.

perishable data on trends and develop- Special Studies fall into the following

ments of the country's ground forces. geographic areas of Interest: CommunIt will analyze the Implementation of let countries, Middle East and Persian

doctrine and focus on specific capabili- Gulf, Western Hemisphere (Central

ties, weaknesses, and significant America), Africa, Asia, and Western

developments. Europe.

Volume 4: Counter-Intelligence.

This volume addresses the characteristics and environment of counter- 3.3 Counter-Intelligence Production

Intelligence in the country and provides The final category of ITAC product that

the capabilities of the counter- The serves fn to categort susport the Operational th at

Intelligence organization. It covers Forces is Counter-Intelligence ProducInternal security, foreign Intelligence tion. This series focuses upon the

collection, and military ground forces International threats to worldwide U.S.

Intelligence. Army Interests. Under this category of

Volume 6: Medical Intelligence. products, ITC is responsible for

(Volume 5 Is produced by AFMIC.) This assessing the Internal security of coun-

' volume provides an analysis of the tries bedpod. where the U.S. TA Army aloissa my have to

be deployed. ITAC also Issues a

environment and health factors that

would Impact on U.S. military operations buted throughout the intelligence and

In that area. The Identification of b

C-8

" - .. . .. ...- . . . .. . •...... ___
foreign policy community up to and * Intelligence (recon, all-source; IntetliIncluding the White House. gence, surveillance, and target acquisition)

The generic product is designed to be a

4.0 Support to Force, Combat, and basic source document from which pertinent threat data can be drawn by Materiel Developers Intelligence consumers and producers to

Support to this category of customer support force, combat, and materiel

constitutes the bulk of ITAC's work. development projects at all levels.

These organizations include the U.S.

Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA),

TRADOC, and DARCOM. ITAC supplies

these customers with (a) Generic 4.2 Threat Projection Studies

Threat Analyses, (b) Threat Projection Threat Projection Studies are underStudies, (c) System Threats, (d) Hostile taken to build databases in support of

Intelligence Threat, (e) Non-U.S. NATO Army requirements, particularly in supForce Projections, and (f) Analyses of port of the U. S. Army force, combat and

Soviet Exercises and Training. materiel developers, and to fill recognized gaps in established databases.

These studies provide threat analyses

4for general army use, such as army

4.1 Army Threat Studies planning, doctrine, strategy, operations,

ITAC's Army Threat products integrate and associated material. The projecgeneral intelligbnce and scientific and tions fall into short (0-2 years), and

technical (S+T) intelligence Into an long-term (10-20 years) analyses. A

assessment (including mid- and long- Threat Projection Study is also underrange projections) of current foreign taken as a result of a future capabilicapabilities, divided into the following ties study effort: Whereas a FCS study

functional areas: seeks to uncover all known information

specific to a system or area, a Threat

a Ground Air Defense Projection Study gives the consumer an

* Artillery (tube and surface-to-surface intense, in-depth analysis of a specific

missile) subject or problem area not resolved by

the generic study, or fills generic datae Armor (tank, vehicle and anti-tank) base gaps. Projection studies fall into

' EW the same general categories as the

e C3 generic threat described above.

• NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical)

e Logistics 4.3 System Threats

e Engineer (mine and anti-mine) ITAC produces three separate threat

e Exotic Weapons (directed energy, the documents materiel to support systems major acquisition programs pro-of

parapsychology, and munitions) ce ofthe Arm cess of the Army:

" Missiles (strategic and ballistic missile The Mission Element Need Statement

defense) (MENS).

• Air (tactical and light aviation) e System Threat Assessment Report

e Infantry (straight infantry and movers, (STAR).

airborne, airmobile, small arms)

C-7

... -.... ...-.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...• '.'..-......,..........,.,...... ....... ... ,..,..-....,...,.. ...' .' '. -,% '.*,...... ..... ,..-
9 The Integrated Program Summary. 4.6 Analysis of Soviet Exercises and

The STAR Is supported by STAR appen- Training

dices In which combat and materiel ITAC examines the application of Soviet

developers participate with ITAC to tactics, doctrine, operations, and equipprepare the appendices. Descriptions ment as reflected in foreign exercise

of the System Threat documents are activity. Lessons learned from the

found in Chapter 3 of AR 381-11, 16 analysis will be Included In studies on

August 1981. this subject.

4.4 Hostile Intelligence

Service/Foreign Intelligence 5.0 Support to Scientific and TechniSecurity Service (HOIS/FISS) cal Intelligence Producers

Threat In response to Army S+T requirements,

ITAC monitors, analyzes, and evaluates ITAC produces imagery exploitation

the HOIS collection efforts targeted reports on foreign ground forces, equipagainst the U.S. Army. This Includes the ment, and weapons systems. ITAC

Threat against the U.S. Army posed by analysts use Imagery to study military

units and activities such as exercises, hostile signal, imagery and traditional training, and tactics. ITAC analysts also

human Intelligence collection efforts.

The production supports the Army's prepare Imagery keys to assist cinOperations Security (OPSEC) program. mnt imagnte t is

The products present those HOIS col- equipment recognition.

lection capabilities and activities that

Army planners, program managers, and

commanders must consider when formulating programs to deny Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) to

hostile collectors.

The FISS Threat is produced in Volume 4

of the Army Intelligence Survey

described above, In Periodic Summaries,

and in daily specific hostile Intelligence

threat reports.

4.5 Non-U.S. NATO Production

ITAC produces near-, mid-, and longterm projections of NATO capabilities In

support of Army force developers and

the Planning Programming and Budgeting

System (PPBS). The studies pay particular attention to Non-U.S. NATO logistics capabilities and command, control,

and communications.

C-B

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APPENDIX D

ITAC and the National Intelligence Community

1"
APPENDIX 0. 2.1 Responsibilities of Intelligence

( ITAC AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Community Members

COMMUNITY

2.1.1 The National Security Council

1. Introduction The National Security Council (NSC) was

established by the National Security Act

As a newcomer to ITAC (or even to the of 1947 to advise the President with

Intelligence business in general) you respect to the integration of domestic,

may have questions about the functions foreign, and military policies relating to

and responsibilities of individual corn- the national security. The NSC acts as

munity members and their relationships the highest Executive Branch entity

to ITAC. To attempt to describe all or and provides review of, guidance for,

even a substantial number of the and direction to the conduct of all

thousands of Individual offices and divi- national foreign intelligence and

slons in the intelligence community counter-intelligence activities.

would, of course be Impossible. The

purpose of this appendix, however, is to

provide you with some background on

some of the community's major actors 2. telirec

and a general feel for their areas of

responsibility. An abbreviated explana- The Director of Central Intelligence is

tion of the general intelligence produc- directly responsible to the NSC and:

tion functions of the community is found In Figure D-1. The community Itself is 9 Acts as the primary adviser to the

President and the NSC on national

represented in Figure D-2. A descrip- foreign intelligence and provides the

tion of the functions and responsibilities President and other officials in the

of key components of the intelligence Executive Branch with national

community is provided below, foreign Intelligence;

* Is head of the CIA and of such staff

elements as may be required for

2. Members of the Intelligence discharge of the Director's

Community Intelligence Community • '" responsibilities;

Members of the United States intelligence community include: a Develops such objectives and

guidance for the Intelligence

* National Security Council Community as will enhance

* Director of Central Intelligence capabilities for responding to

expected future needs for national

* Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) foreign intelligence;

* National Security Agency (NSA) * Has authority for the development

- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and prioritization of national

*• The Army Intelligence System intelligence program and budget.

D-1
2.?.3 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the armed services. Its responsibiliThe CIA falls under the direction of the ties include:

NSC, is responsible for: e Production and coordination of mili-

• Collecting foreign Intelligence, tary for the and Secretary military-related of Defense, Intelligence the

(including information not otherwise Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense

obtainable), and developing, con- comnts an as opriae

ducting, or providing support for components, and as appropriate,

technical and other programs that non-Defense agencies;

collect national foreign intelligence. • Providing military intelligence for

* Producing and disseminating foreign national foreign intelligence prointelligence relating to the national ducts;

security, Including foreign political, e Coordination of all Department of

economic, scientific, technical, mill- Defense Intelligence collection

tary, geographic and sociological requirements for departmental

Intelligence to meet the needs of needs;

the President, the NSC and other elements of the United States 9 Management of the Defense Attache ef esystem; and

Government;

* Conducting and coordinating a Providing foreign Intelligence and

counter-intelligence activities o- counter-intelligence staff support as

side sieteitede Stait s odirected by the Joint Chiefs of the United States. Saf Staff.

• Conducting special activities

approved by the President and carrying out such activities consistent 2.1.6 The Army Intelligence System

with applicable law;

Army Intelligence collection and exploitation capabilities may be tasked by

2.1.4 National Security Agency (NSA) the NTIC, the Department of Defense,

Defense Intelligence Agency, the U&W

The NSA is responsible for the estab- command structure and other military

lishment and operation of an effective departments.

unified organization for signals intelli- Within the Department of the Army, (see

gence activities. This involves the con- Figure D-3). the guiding force of Army

trol, collection, process and dissemina- Intelligence is the Assistant chief of

tion of Signals Information for national Staff Intelligence (ACSI). The ACSI

Intelligence and counter-intelligence directs the Intelligence efforts of the

purposes. U.S. Army intelligence community. This

community Includes members with an

active Intelligence mission, such as the

2.1.5 Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Security Command

(DIA) (INSCOM), U.S. Army Europe, and the

Forces Command (FORSCOM). Additional

The DIA serves as the primary intelll- members of the community include the gence arm for the Department of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine CoinDefense. As an ITAC analyst you may mand (TRADOC), of which the U.S. Army

expect to have frequent contact with

your counterparts at DIA. This key Intelligence Center and School Is a part.

Intelligence organization is made up of The functions and responsibilities of

civilians and elements from each branch these and other actors In the Army

0-2

*---------------------------------- --------....- *., .°,
Intelligence system will be looked at In • Army Research Institute

' more detail In the Threat Analyst TrainIng Course. It is Important, however,

that you familiarize yourself with these 9 Army Recruiting Command

organizations In preparation for the

level of detail that will be provided

later.

Major Commands (MACOMs)

2.2 Army Studies and Analysis 9 US Army Europe

Community Organizations • US Army Intelligence and Security

Command

In addition to the major actors discussed briefly above, the following * US Army Communications Command

organizations are also Involved in the

production and dissemination of intellCgence information:

-I US Army Training and Doctrine

HQDA Command (TRADOC)

e DCS, Combat Development--Analysis

e Office Deputy Under Secretary of

the Army (Operations Research)

o- Study Managiement Office, OCSA S TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity

e Combined Arms Combat Development * Technical Advisor Office, ODCSOPS Activity

e System Review and Analysis Office, e L Center

ODCSRDA -Je Admin Center

e Advisor for Research, Development

and Acquisition, ODCSRDA

e Research and Studies Office; Human Schools/Centers

Analysis Team, ODCSPER.LI Study * Armor

Management Office, ODCSLOG

. Red Team, OACSI • Artillery r,-e Air Defense

, Program Analysis and Evaluation,

OCSA * Infantry

• Aviation

SSA/FOA * Engineer

e Strategic Studies Institute • Transportation

* Concepts Analysis Agency * Quartermaster

e Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency * Missile and Munitions

* Army Research, Development and * Intelligence

Acquisition Information System

Agency a Signal

* Logistics Evaluation Agency a Military Police

D-3
a Ordnance and Chemical e Logistics Studies Office

a Logistics Control Activity

US Army Materiel Development and e Security Assistance Center - Readiness Commend Re s C Procurement Research Office

" Battlefield Systems Integration

Directorate

* Systems Analysis Readiness

Command

* Armament Materiel Readiness

Command

. Communications and Electronics

Materiel Readiness Command

• Missile Materiel Readiness Command

* Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness

Command

a Troop Support and Aviation materiel

Readiness Command

* Armament Research and

Development Command

* Aviation Research and Development

Command

* Communications Research and

Development Command

a Electronics Research and

Development Command and Harry

Diamond Laboratories

• Mobility Equipment Research and

Development Command

* Missile Research and Development

Command

9 Natick Research and Development

Command

* Tank-Automotive Research and

Development Command

* US Army Materiel Systems Analysis

Activity

a US Army Management Englneering

Training Agency

* Depot System Command

e Inventory Research Office

D-4

PR .................... p. ~ . L... ... t...s.....:....s...p .. t. ,..,...-..............-..........-........,-...h. . .;:.,-...),,.,.;-.,.,.,.,..;
COMPONENT OF STRATEGIC PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE

BIOGRAPHIC DIA (MILITARY)

CIA (OTHERS)

ECONOMIC STATE DEPARTMENT (FREE WORLD)

CIA (COMMUNIST COUNTRIES)

SOCIOLOGICAL STATE

TRANSPORTATION/TELLECOMMUNICA- DIA

TIONS

MILITARY GEOGRAPHIC DIA IND INDIVIDUAL SERVICE

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

ARMED FORCES DIA AND INDIVIDUAL SERVICE

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

POLITICAL STATE

SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL DIA (AND VARIOUS S&T ORGANIZATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT

SERVICES)

CIA

Figure D-1. Intelligence Organizations

and their Pr/mary Production Responsibility

D

;.. D-5

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APPENDIX E

Basic Tools and Concepts
APPENDIX E some of these implicit assumptions may

BASIC TOOLS AND CONCEPTS not be applicable to a given problem or

situation. If you do not recognize that

you are making them, such assumptions

1. Purpose can needlessly constrain your solutions

or distort your Interpretations. In this

This appendix consists of some basic section, we will discuss ways of making

tools and concepts for strategic hidden assumptions more readily visible.

analysis. These are described in some

detail because they represent underlyIng requirements for many of the 2.1.1 WHEN TO USE TECHNIQUES FOR

methods and techniques used in doing IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS

strategic analysis. Implicit assumptions serve a useful

purpose-- they make it unnecessary for

you to have to uthink through" all of the

fundamental premises that you have

2. Basic Tools and Concepts for Stra- learned through experience every time

tegic Analysis you encounter a new problem or situation. Consider the number of factors in

The basic tools and concepts for using the world (both the physical world and

analytical techniques are as follows: the cultural) that you do not explicitly

e Identifying assumptions, consider every time you interpret information from your environment. If you

• Biases. had to constantly make judgments

9 General problem-solving approaches. about them, you would be in the position

of Aesop's centipede who, attempting

e Probability assessment and general to figure out how he managed to walk

concepts of decision theory. with all those legs, could no longer

* Decision-making strategies. move.

• Pattern recognition and matching. Nevertheless, there are times when

hidden or unchallenged assumptions can

e Communication skills. Impede the problem-solving process by

forcing you to work with propositions

that stem from Invalid premises. This is

all too common a failing in human logic.

2.1 Identifying Assumptions To avoid being taken by surprise in a

Whenever you try to evaluate the foreign environment in which deceptive

meaning of Information, you must make a practices must be anticipated, technumber of assumptions about that Infor- niques for Identifying assumptions that

maionubr oeofhs assumptions air- allow them to be explicitly reconsidered

mation. Some of these assumptions are

are extremely useful. These techmade explicitly-- you know you are arexemlusf.Thetcmadeiegplieitly-- you undeano tr niques are particularly applicable in the making them, and you understand their aayiitgain n euto analysis, Integration, and deduction

Impact on the interpretations of the

Information that you are going to make. steps of Information interpretation.

There are also Implicit assumptions--

ones which you take for granted 2.1.2 HOW TO USE TECHNIQUES FOR

because you have become so accustomed to them that they have become

part of the "background" against which There are several rules of thumb for

you do your thinking. Unfortunately, identifying the hidden assumptions that

E-1

................................................. ,............... '.........,_, " ,• . T* .. . '
you may be making. Some are "quick culture may, however, be invalid

and dirty" methods, while others are when applied to others. The 

)

more structured and time-consuming. assumption that the enemy will act

Which ones you use will depend on your analogously to friendly forces may

* situation, thinking style, and resources be correct, or It may be a critical

available. flaw in the analysis; always chal- - Change Representation: You can lenge the validity of such an

often represent a problem or situa- assumption.

tion in different ways. Among these e Peer Review: Take advantage of

are the written and spoken word, the fact that other analysts in your

pictures, maps, and mathematical work environment are not immersed

expressions. Changing the way In in the details of your task. They can

which the problem or situation is provide excellent feedback as to

modeled can bring implicit assump- the validity of the assumptions that

tions to the surface where they can go into your analysis. Take the risk

be examined and, perhaps, rejected. of sharing your concepts, intuitions,

Using multiple representations for and uncertainties with your colthe same problem can greatly leagues. Their critical review of

strengthen the analysis, since the your interpretations can provide

assumptions highlighted by each invaluable Insight into both the promodel are likely to complement each duct of the analysis and the process

other. Make a point of examining by which you arrived at It.

situations to see if alternate

n Sensitivity Analysis: Test the sen- Interpretations or models are pothi sitivity of your hypotheses to subtle

ble, and whether some of the changes In assumptions or small weaknesses In the interpretations or changes in the data. If a hypothesis data can be turned into strengths. Is excessively sensitive to such

0 Question Premises: Every changes, it may not be sufficiently

hypothesis about a problem or situa- "robust", and should be thought

tion is associated with a set of through again. Keep in mind that the

requirements and conditions that are majority of the data which must be

held to be true. You should question used in intelligence analysis are

these, for they may not accurately uncertain and represent only a parreflect the problem. This is espe- tial picture of the situation.

cially true when the problem or Hypotheses that are not robust to

situation is similar to problems or small variations in the data tend to

situations you have previously be risky under conditions of high

encountered; you may then Inap- data uncertainty. Recognizing this

propriately attribute the premises of can help you justify your confidence

the past problems to the new one. In your hypotheses; remember that

Ask yourself If your assumptions your clients need to know both what

about the problem situation unreal- your Interpretations are, and how

Istically limit your view of possible certain you are about their validity.

options. Another aspect of sensitivity

. e Mirror Imaging: We often assume analysis Is determining what data

that other people will behave as we would be fatal to your hypothesis,

would under similar conditions. The and seeking that Information out. If

concepts, preferences, and per- you find disconfirming information,

spectIves that we have developed you must re-think the hypothesis. If

over a lifetime spent In our own not, you can place greater

E-2
confidence in Its validity. Do not fall Intuition should be Ignored-- seninto the common trap of selectively sitivity is a valuable asset in

pursuing only the information that intelligence analysis that can be

will confirm your hypothesis. Proving exploited. Do not, however, allow

you are "right" is far less Important your personal emotions (anger,

than accomplishing your mission of anxiety, affection) toward your

reducing the client's uncertainty, enemy, the local population, or

e Identify Unnecessary Constraints: even your own forces Interfere

You may be placing constraints with your Interpretations by res- and trcting the possibilities that you

limitations on your view of a situation are willing to consider.

that are unnecessary. Some of the

ones to watch for are: - Perceptual: You may find your

- Functional: You may be limiting view of a situation distorted by

yurptiona s o how to cimin- the way in which you are looking your options as to how to con- at it. Try to look at situations in

duct the analysis. There may be different ways, from different

sources of information, ways to points of view. Use multiple senrepresent Information, or ways to modalities when possible.

process the Information that you Be aware that "the eyes can

are not accustomed to consider- play tricks," especially on a bating. There is room for creativity tiefleld where deception may be

in how you exploit your collection practiced.

and production resources. Don't

feel obligated to do something a Environmental: You may be

certain way because that Is accepting limitations that appear

always how you have done it in to be Imposed by the setting

the past. (either the work setting or the

Associative: You may be making situation under analysis) that are

faulty a associations between beween the nssociations not frepotn valid. Explore h all possibilities niomn

current situation and some situation and sources of Information about in the past that limit your the environment. Do not overlook

options. You may also make

faulty links between information potential support systems.

and situations that are, in fact, Communicative: You may react to

unrelated. Experience is one of constraints Imposed by communiyour most valuable assets, but cations procedures and

keep in mind that relationships processes that are artifacts of

between the objects of intelli- the situation, and not part of the

gence analysis can change. situation Itself. That is, you

Cultural: You may be allowing should not permit the ways in

yor culturalbYouemayobeiallowinwhich you receive and transmit your cultural biases to limit your Information to become confused

perception of the options open to Itthiation hich ise

you r t othrs.KeepIn indwith the situation which is the you or to others. Keep in mind object of your communication.

that cultural, organizational, and Communications about situations

personal values In other countries alwaysicotins inforation

diffr wn.always fom yur contain less Information

differ from your own. than the situation itself.

- Emotional: You may be permitting

feelings to Interfere with logic,

closing of f possibilities. This is

not to say that feelings and

E-3

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2.2 Cognitive Biases While cultural, personal, and organizaThe term bias Thetem ia refers rfes to o a subjective sbjctve of tional the biases world, tend cognitive to distort biases one's are viewnot }

point of view. Typically, the term Is necesarl de tie a es thinkused to Indicate preconceived (and ncearldtimtltoneshnuseally t nae preoncive, (d Ing. In the absence of information, a

generally false) notions, attitudes, or preconceived Idea about something can

judgments about something or someone. at least give the analyst a starting

Biases are the result of being associ- point for thinking about a situation.

ated with specific environments, or ted wiethe esulOfSpecific vir ,r However, It Is critical for the analyst to

they are the result of specific charac- raieta h oreo h daI

terstics associated with the human internal, and that the uncertainty level

Information processing system. Biases associated with it is quite high.

can be categorized as follows:

In general, cognitive biases tend to distort what you remember, how you

" Organizational. remember, and how you evaluate infor-

" Cognitive. mation. To help you counteract these

tendencies, several of the more common

Cultural biases are constraints on ones cognitive biases are discussed below.

thinking, acquired during maturation from

widely held beliefs, practices, or cognitive styles that characterize one's 2.2.1 SELECTIVI7Y BIAS

specific social environment. Personal

biases are constraints that arise from Wen you rcll normato from

specific past experiences of the Indivi- memny yu will normember eedual. Organizational biases are con- thing equally well. Information is selecstraints on cognitive flexibility Imposed tively recalled as a function of how

by local Information, goals, mores, and vivid, concrete, and personal it is. Vivid

Information has a greater Impact on traditions, that have evolved within the thinking than pallid, abstract information

speclfic organization In which the ndlvl- that may objectively have greater

dual serves. In many Instances, cul- value as evidence. Information that is

tural, personal, and organizational personally perceived is also likely to be

biases are In fact Identical to the ber re bed I formton

underlying assumptions that were dis- reeiv ed ha Ina icused pevius n te ecton.received secondhand. Initial Impresslons and items that are first in a series

Cognitive biases differ from the above also tend to be more vivid, and hence,

In that they are to a large extent better remembered.

Inherent characteristics of the way Intelligence analysts generally work

humans think, both in the way they with secondhand information. On occarecall information from memory and In sionsenhan at direct -

the way they process (perceive and cavs inorman suc a dr

understand) Information from their cie nomtosc sdrn

udeirsnd nfforeign travel or through direct communIcation with a national from a particular

All humans are Influenced by biases. country, these events and Information

The Important Issue, for analysts, Is to will become especially noteworthy.

recognize the types of biases that Such vivid experiences are often a

exist and be aware of the potential source of new Insights, but they can

Influences that these biases may have also be a cause of self-deception, and

on Intelligence analysis, hence, they can bias your interpretation

of a given situation. In the instance of

foreign travel, the visitor typically will )

E-4

- ... .. . . . . . , / . . .... .... ...... ... .... .... . .= . .... . -...... .. .-.. ..... .. . -... ,.., . . . , .
become familiar with only a small sample to be missing. Missing data are a norof people representing a narrow seg- mal characteristic of intelligence probment of the total society. Incomplete lems. Research has shown the diffiand distorted perceptions are a common culty that even experts have in recogresult of the selectivity bias. nizing and Incorporating missing data

Into judgments of abstract problems.

2. BThe notion "out of sight, out of mind" . A.Ishould not be a description of the

The ability to recall Instances of an impact of gaps in information. The

event is influenced by how recently an analyst needs to be able to explicitly

event occurred, by personal Involve- identify those relevant variables on

ment, by how important it seemed at which information is lacking, consider

the time, and by vivid details. All of alternative hypotheses concerning the

these factors are unrelated to the true true status of those variables, then

probability of an event. These factors modify their judgment (and especially

do, however, influence our judgment by their level of certainty) accordingly. It

making recall of such events more is also relevant to consider whether a

* easily "available" from our memory. lack of Information on such variables is

When making judgments about the likell- normal, or whether the absence of

hood or frequency of certain events, information is itself an indicator of

the availability rule of thumb is used, unusual activity or Inactivity.

- according to which the probability of

some event Is judged by the ease with 2.2.4 CONFIRMATION BIAS

which we can imagine relevant

Instances of that event or the number The confirmation bias is the result of

of such events that we can easily the tendency to perceive events in

remember. The availability rule often such a way as to confirm what one

works quite well, but It can be mislead- already believes. It can occur in one of

Ing when the recalled vividness of an two ways. The first occurs because we

event is unrelated to Its probability, tend to only perceive events that fit

Using the availability rule is a time within Thseodwyitatediorte our existing conceptual models.

saver, but the intelligence analyst must meanngof wat ws that it ts

be aware of such shortcuts and recog- our preconceived ideas.

nize the strengths and weaknesses of

their use. The confirmation bias Is very pervasive;

It Is a result of our need to understand

our environment in terms of what we

2.2.3 ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE BIAS already know. This need leads us to

A principal characteristic of Intelligence perceive what we expect to perceive.

analysis Is that key Information is gen- This Is Important to remember during the

. erally lacking. Analytical problems are process of generating hypotheses

selected on the basis of their impor- about a situation or some future event.

tance and the perceived needs of the The confirmation bias will cause you to

users, without much regard for availabil- perceive or Interpret information in a

Ity of information. Analysts must do the way that will confirm hypotheses that

best they can with limited Information, you already have. At the same time, it

but they must also anticipate the gaps will prevent you from realizing that the

and somehow take Into account the new data do not support your existing

fact that relevant Information Is known hypotheses.

E-5
2.2.5 OVER-CONFIDENCE BIAS because it Is redundant, in which case

A large component of any analyst's job many related reports may be no more

is to summarize complex ensembles of than a single one of them.

Information Into dichotomous judgments. Or it may be consistent only because

For instance, you might have to decide the information came from a very small

whether a particular set of maneuvers sample or a biased sample.

are exercises or the early stages of an When working with a small but

attack. Or, on the basis of personal consistent body of evidence, analysts

impressions and reports, you might have need to consider how representative

to decide whether a particular informant that evidence Is of the total body of

Is or Is not competent. potentially available information. If the

An important aspect of such judgment ,analyst is stuck with only a small amount of evidence and cannot

tasks is the degree of confidence that determine how representative the

accompanies them. That confidence evidence Is, confidence In judgments

may determine whether or not more based on this evidence should be low

Information will be gathered, or whether regardless of the consistency of the

an action will be taken. Information.

In general, humans tend to be overly

confident in their ability to make those

types of judgments. Even with minimal 2.2.7 THE REUABILI7Y BIAS

information about a topic, humans will tendto enerte grat nmbe of Humans have a tendency to deal with tend to generate a great number Of

hypotheses concerning a Information at face value, regardless of judgment task the reliability of that information. There

without testing these hypotheses prop- arelmay on hy information may

erly. Over-confidence in one's judg- are many reasons why Information may

et O ha. e en n one ude, be less than perfectly reliable: small

manta has been found to be the rule, sample size that is not representative

rather than the exception. Such over- of thzetat o tepin ation

confidence may lead to premature ces- ofstertoalith of the

sation of Information gathering and to misperception or bias on the part of the

Ineffective decision making. The most source; distortion in the reporting chain; ieffective decison makrc . the most misunderstanding or misperception on

effective way to overcome this type of the part of the analyst. Further, some

of the Information used in analysis is

retrieved from the analyst's memory,

and the degree of reliability originally attributed to the Information may have

CONSISTENCY BIAS been long forgotten.

Internal consistency In a pattern of Analysts generally must consider many

evidence is a major determinant of Items of information with different

confidence in judgments based on that degrees of reliability that are related in

evidence. In one sense, consistency Is complex ways. It Is unlikely that the

an appropriate guideline for evaluating comlys . it is nlat the evidence. We formulate alternative analyst can make neat mathematical or

even Intuitive calculations that take all explanations or estimates and select reliability factors Into account. There

the one that encompasses the greatest seems little the analyst can do about amount evienc oftl wnilyst aa logicalut amount of evidence within a logically this problem short of breaking the probconsistent scenario. lem down In a way that permits assignUnder some circumstances, however, Ing probabilities to Individual Items, and

consistency can be deceptive, then using a mathematical formula to

Information may be consistent only integrate the separate probability

E-S

" ;" '-".."-" '-.i."-"- "- .'.'L '- .'.,,,' '*'-. -' -" " .--- i '-,., --..-......... , :-_ , - , " ... .''. .. "._'' . •,. . ,, . '., .. " .......... ".: " " ".. ".". .

"." .... , . ,"."
judgments. predecessor. The predecessor's analytic estimates become a starting point.

This starting point Is then adjusted,

2.2.8 THE DISCREDITED EVIDENCE SIAS based on the results of additional inforImpressions tend to persist even after mation or analysis. Typically, however,

the evidence that created those the starting point serves as an anchor

or drag that reduces the amount of

Impressions has been fully discredited. a that the fin st

When evidence is received, there Is a adjustment made, so that the final estitendncyto ostlatea st o cas I mate remains closer to the starting

tendency to postulate a set of causalbe.

connections that explains the evidence.

Even though the evidence may subse- Anchoring is a particularly difficult bias

quently be discredited, the causal links to avoid. Analysts may attempt to

remain plausible even in the absence of ignore their previous work or others'

the now discredited evidence, earlier Judgments and re-think the problem through. Time and information con- Consider the example of an analyst straints may preclude using this solureceiving Information from a clandestine tion. An alternative solution might be

source. The analyst may have formed a the use of formal statistical procedures. number of favlierrpore imsis sonte Bayesian statistical analysis, for exambasis of earlier reports from this source. pe a eue orvs ro ug

When the analyst finds out that the pie, can be used to revise prior judg- Whentheanalst indsoutthatthe ments on the basis of new information in

source is under hostile control and that

the received Information Is probably a way that is designed to avoid the

unreliable, the analyst will tend to anchoring bias.

rationalize earlier impressions by argu- (Ing that the Information Is true despite

the source being under control, or by 2.3 Problem-Solving Skills

doubting the validity of the report The analytical hypotheses that you forclaiming the source to be under control. mulate are often representations of

In the latter case, the phenomenon of problems that either you have solved or

"Impression perseverance" may Itself are trying to solve. Knowing what to

affect evaluation of the evidence that hypothesize means that you have come

supposedly discredits the Impression. up with an Idea about the real world on

Humans have a tendency to retain Initial the basis of scarce and uncertain inforImpressions concerning the validity of mation. This represents a solution to a

Information and disbelieve new evi- problem in that you have decided the

dence that contradicts the Initial probable meaning or Inter-relations of

impressions, the Information at your disposal; you will

then want to test that meaning as a

hypothesis. How to do that with the

2.2.9 ANCHORING resources at your disposal may

Anchoring Is one strategy that people represent yet another problem.

seem to use intuitively and uncons- As you are well aware, you ordinarily

ciously to simplify the task of mentally spend a significant amount of your time

processing complex information. Some solving an enormous variety of problems

natural starting point Is used as a first of varying complexity. Since different

approximation to the desired judgment. problems call for different problem solvThis Issue is particularly relevant when Ing methods, you have had to develop

moving Into a new work setting and tak- some techniques for understanding the

nature of a specific problem and for Ing over responsibilities from a ffinding the best way to approach it on

E-7

S...................... ....................-..
the basis of all the methods that you some of them on the problems you

have tried on other problems in the encounter in your personal planning.

past. As an analyst, you will find the You can also find more detailed treatdemands on your problem-solving skills ments of the techniques raised here in

even greater. In some cases, you will the references listed at the end of this

be expected to apply appropriate stra- appendix.

tegles to problems under stressful conditions; in other cases, you will also

encounter problem classes that do not 2.3.2 THE PROBLEM-SOLVING SKILLS:

exactly match the kinds of problems WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW TO USE

you have faced in the past. You will THEM

need a systematic way to approach the It might surprise you to learn how much

process of working through alternate *he way you loo at a problem affects

solutions until you come up with the he speed (and success) with which

*right" one for a given problem-- you solve It. Most of the techniques

something that we all do Instinctively, dsuse her are oncere thhow

but not always successfully or effl- discussed here are concerned with how

ciently. The purpose of this section is you formulate a problem, and how you tprent sohe urposeof this sctin Isv organize the steps in the solution. to present some tools that will Improve While the techniques will be discussed

your skills for structuring approaches to separately, they are not themselves

problem situations. "steps" In a process; the techniques

are meant to work together. As noted

2.3.1I WHEN TO USE PROBLEM-SOLVING above, they should become part of your

Sattitude" toward working through prob- METHODOLOGIES

The tools in this section are systematic

guidelines and rules of thumb that apply

to many situations Involving planning, 2.3.2.? A General Model of Problems.

evaluation, assessment, explanation, All problem situations have some eleand prediction. When applied formally,

they can be time consuming but many of lingstematic toustructue

these skills can be applied Informally, learning systematic ways to structure

and should be used automatically by all approaches to different kinds of probgood analysts. That is, problem-solving it is useful to start off with a -es, gen- -. skills are ways of looking at problems structure eral model of problems themselves--the that they all share.

and problem-solving that you should,

with practice, find yourself using o All problems begin with an Initial

without having to stop and think about state. This Is the condition of things

It. The skills should become a basic when the problem Is recognized or

part of your approach to complex situs- assigned to you.

tions and novel problems. This can only e All problems have a goal state. This

" happen by employing the techniques i Is the the co condition n of o things hi when the

that will be discussed, and by observing problem is solved; it is the desired

how experienced analysts structure

their own problem-solving efforts. All state that you are trying to achieve.

that can be done In this brief discussion o Progress Is made from the initial

Is to give you an Introduction to the state to the goal state by way of

techniques; to be able to really benefit the solution path. The solution path from them will require some effort on is simply the sequence of steps you

your part. Since the techniques are so follow to achieve a solution. There

general, you can begin by trying out may be miore than one solution path;

E-8

.. ". - .

............. . . .. : .. ....
you should be sensitive to which - What is unknown?

may be the best for your problem,

especially when resources (e.g., - What are the data?

time) are scarce. - How do the parts of the problem ," relate to each other? How do

* The elements of the problem are te to each othe Hownd

embedded in a context. The context the data relate to the unknown?

may Include parallel problems, - Do you have enough Information

resources available, country areas, to find a solution; that is, do you

and your own overall, guiding goals have enough data and a clear

or those of your client, enough picture of the relationWhen a new type of problem arises, ships, or do you need to gather

Identifying the four elements permits more Information?

you to take the first step toward def in- e Analyze the Problem: Find a way to

Ing the problem. As will be seen, this Is represent the problem, that is, to

the first step in a systematic approach show the relationship between its

to finding a solution. A problem that Is parts (especially the data and the

Initially intimidating because of its com- unknown). It might be best to draw

plexity can become much more manage- a picture, or perhaps to use a suitable when its elements, especially the able notation (like a mathematical

Initial and goal states, are well under- relationship, or a table). Ask yourstood; however, the model is not meant self if you have seen the problem

to stand alone.. It Is simply a structur- before, or, If not, if you know a

Ing tool that is used in combination with related problem. To do this, it often

the other aspects of the general helps to look at what is unknown,

problem-solving model, to which we now thinking about past problems with a

turn. similar unknown.

e Devise a Solution Path: Consider the

alternative ways of solving the -.2.3.2.2 " A Soving.problem. General Model of Problem- plem.aif If you y hv have tind time, and moe more

Solving, than one solution path exists, conThere are several problem-solving sider as many of them as possible,

models that represent ways to organize unless experience dictates a particyour problem-solving strategy. A gen- ular one. Brainstorming (see Table

oral model Is presented here that com- G-2) may help you to hypothesize

bines some of the best elements of the multiple solution paths. A valid soludifferent models. This is obviously not tion path may be known from experithe only approach to solving problems, ence, emerge gradually as a result

but is very useful, especially when you of step-by-step analysis, or arise

come up against the unknown or unfami- suddenly, as a "leap of insight." If,

liar. In analyzing the problem, you found a

related problem or a problem with a

The steps in the general problem- similar unknown, you can use your

solving model are: past experience to devise one or

. Understand the Problem: Use the more solution paths. If a solution

general problem-solving model path still can't be found, try restatdescribed above. Be particularly Ing the problem; by doing so, you

careful to define the initial and goal might find similarities to problems

states. It sometimes helps to ask with which you are familiar. Some-

* yourself the following questions: times, if time is available, it is useful

to "Incubate" a difficult problem.

E-9

..

, '" .' ." .".. .'"'. -. .'.'.'. .' .'. . '.'Z; . . .".. " . '"- ".-'-- ...-.. "-;, .,*'. d". '- . -.'.-.. ''.'-" .''-'-; . . .,. .'.-"."-'. . . .-. . .-. ... .-. .- ,.. "'
That is, having analyzed the problem, solution path. This may occur

turn your attention to something else repeatedly, as you gradually )

and let your unconscious mind work approach a solution. To say that

on a creative solution. If a solution, problem-solving Is Iterative, howor an intuition that brings you closer ever, Is not to condone repeated

to devising one, arises, analyze it as backtracking through mis-directed

carefully as you would a solution effort.

that was arrived at by more explicit e Handling III-Defined Problems: Not

means. all problems lend themselves to easy

e Choose a Solution Path: Select a definition at the beginning of the

solution path from those that you problem-solving process. If you try

have considered and apply It. Follow to approach a particularly vague

your steps; If a step suddenly problem by attacking It directly, you

seems unreasonable, back up and may end up with little progress.

reconsider the solution path. Instead, you may have to generate

solution paths for the Ill-defined

a Evaluate the Solution: Look back and problem, and then analyze the

see If the goal state has actually weaknesses In the Inadequate solubeen achieved. It sometimes hap- tions. Identifying those weaknesses

pens that problem solvers can becmso 

become ist praed byote ca- may permit you to refine the original so distracted by the complexities of implementing the solution problem process, definition. By repeating this YOU May simultaneously

path that they will not notice that

converge on both a clear problem the presumed solution does not statement and an appropriate solumatch the goal as originally stated. tion. Alternately, Ill-defined probTime permitting, results should lems can frequently be broken down

always be checked. In addition, you Into better defined sub-problems.

can evaluate and document your This is the "divide and conquer"

solution path for future reference. Thi I ipotat or usifin yur approach: redefine Individual

This Important t for Justifying your aspects of the problem, identify

results (to your client or other solution paths for each, and

analysts who may use your data) Integrate the results. Sometimes

and for dealing with similar problems the goal state can be subdivided

in the future. Into sub-goals, and solution paths

found for each sub-goal, making the

2.3.2.3 Some Rules of Thumb for DiffI- handling of Ill-defined problems more

cult Problems.

e Divergent vs. Convergent Thinking: Three simple points can be quite useful Effective probleM-solving requires

in dealing with particularly stubborn both Intuitive, free-flowing thought

problems: (divergent thinking) and rigorous

e Problem-Solving as an Iterative Pro- analysis (convergent thinking). This

cess: It Is Important to keep In mind is particularly apparent In hypothesis

that problem-solvIng can be highly formulation. Careful analysis of a

iterative In nature. That is, limited number of inadequate

problem-solving does not always hypotheses cannot result in a quality

proceed In a "straight line" from ini- Intelligence product. On the other

tial to goal state. Sometimes, new hand, an exhaustive, but unorganinformation or Insight will cause you Ized, collection of creative

to go back to an earlier step in the hypotheses is useless until ordered

E-10
and analyzed. You must practice evaluate your analysis and determine

* tapping both types of thinking at the the risk associated with a specific

proper time. course of action.

Probability assessment, therefore, is a

critical activity that requires a systematic approach to the problem of

Probability assessment involves uncertainty. It figures strongly in

estimating how likely a situation or hypothesis testing, evaluating the

hypothesis is. Decision making and baseline situation, and cataloging your

planning often call for assessing the analytic processes. It requires an

probability of future hazardous events understanding of how to think in a cli-

(e.g., a swift build-up of enemy forces) mate of uncertainty, and an awareness

or the frequency of past hazardous of the common fallacies that skew proevents (e.g., the failure rate for a par- babilistic estimates.

ticular part or command system).

Probabilities can be assessed on the 2.4.2 HOW TO PERFORM PROBABILITY

basis of measurement, experience, or ASSESSMENT

Intuitions and subjective Impressions.

In this section, systematic guidelines In order to give you a foundation for

are presented for assigning probabili- working with uncertainty, we will

ties and for recognizing some of the present several topics concerning funcommon biases that can distort your damental ways of thinking about probaestimates. bilities. While there are mathematical

aspects to many of these topics, and

structured aids that can help you make

2.4.7 WHEN TO USE PROBABILITY decisions, these are beyond the scope

ASSESSMENT of this document. You will find, how-

,' 'One e oever, of the most significant concepts in slderably that Improved your judgements by becoming can be familiar condoing strategic analysis is the uncer- wite ba Issesn

tainty that characterizes It. Uncertainty

enters into practically every aspect of 24.2.1 Defining Uncertainty.

strategic analysis and Into practically

every decision based on analytic Certainty Is complete belief in a single

results. Uncertainty in decision-making answer to a question. Uncertainty is

Implies risk. An incorrect estimate can the inability of the analyst to provide a

lead to a decision that is highly costly definitive answer with complete confiin terms of lives and materiel, and that dence. There are actually two types of

leads to failure of the mission, uncertainty: general uncertainty, meanA n yrIng that, In principle, no answer to the

your clients' uncertainties about the question can be provided with complete

current and future situations anduncertainty, e ameaning that, although you are uncer- thereby help them make decisions. You tan about a question, the question

must be able to evaluate your could, in principle, be answered with

hypotheses and you must be able to complete confidence.

document the reasons for your conclusions. This means that you need to be In order to state the certainty, or

- able to show how you arrived at esti- degree of belief, with which a conclumates of the probabilities of events and sion can be reached, it is important to

situations, so that your clients can analyze all of the possible conclusions,

E-11

........ . ....................... ............... ...... ,,,p,
or answers to the question. When all of e Numbers are Identically understood

the answers are equally likely, you by different people. )

naturally experience the greatest e Numbers permit comparisons.

uncertainty, for there Is no rational way

to choose among them. Uncertainty Is e Numbers can accurately represent

reduced by defining one or more of the small differences.

conclusions as more likely than others. e Numbers separate estimation from

Under these conditions, you can predict evaluation.

with greater confidence what the outcome of a situation will be, even though

your prediction will still not be perfect 2.4.2.3 Estimaton.

(that Is, guaranteed). Reducing uncertainty reduces the risk Involved in mak- While assigning degrees of belief to

Ing a decision, but does not eliminate it. alternatives Is not a trivial task, there

must be a rational basis for doing so,

otherwise the analyst is "just guess2.4.2.2 Dealing Quantitatively with Ing." Guessing can be valid If there is

Uncertainty. no other choice; but even for guessing

there are guidelines to help avoid some We often talk of uncertainty in vague of the pitfalls that render guesses

terms. One may speak of an event as

being "likely", "possible", "probable",

"almost certain", or use terms like Estimation is the systematic assignment

"maybe", "Iffy", "chancy", "risky", and of a value (an estimate) when you don't

so on. Such expressions can cause have an exact, or "real" number. Obviproblems in analysis, since: ously, assigning degrees of belief to

s They are used Inconsistently by the conclusions or hypotheses usually

The ae iue d cont entlyby the requires estimation. In order to be

same Individual and among different "systematic", a set procedure must be

established and followed consistently in

e Their Interpretation varies with dif- making an estimate. In order to help ferent contexts. you develop estimating procedures for

* They are not sensitive to small, but various situations, the following points

are useful:

Important, differences In belief.

* Consider, first of all, how precise the

e They often confuse the degree of estimate must be. A range of values

belief with evaluation (that Is, how (as opposed to a single value) may

"good" or "bad" some alternative be acceptable (or even preferable)

In some situations.

To overcome these weaknesses, It is

e Define the relevant Information preferable to speak quantitatively about needed to make the estimate, and

uncertainty -- to express your degree pursue this Information actively and

of belief In a proposition with numbers. persientyis iffern anels

In order to do so, begin by considering persistently; use different channels

all of the possibilities. Imagine that you and approaches for gathering Inforhave a "store" of belief that amounts to mation.

100 units. Divide these units up among • Begin with a starting point (a prelimall of the possibilities. The result Inary estimate) and modify It as

expresses the percent certainty of the information becomes available (see

various possibilities. This approach has Bayesian Analysis).

several advantages:

E-12
e As an alternative to selecting a Probabilities can either be calculated,

single-valued starting point, you may or assigned through your own subjecfind it more appropriate to select tive reasoning. While everyone would

extreme values and narrow these agree on the results of probability calboundaries as Information is col- culations (because the methods are, in

lected. general, well established and standardized), people can disagree over subjec- * In some circumstances, decomposi- tive assignments of probabilities. We

tion may be a useful technique: will consider these two areas

start with an estimate for a whole separately.

that is relatively well understood,

and use Information to compute an Probabilities can be calculated in two

estimate for a component of the ways: whole. whole. aIf all possible outcomes of a group

e Alternately, you may make estimates have an equal probability of

about a whole by recomposing esti- occurrence, the probability of a parmates for Its parts. ticular outcome is equal to the perWhatever the estimating procedure, centage that the outcome occurs in e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Whtverouetmaigprceue ~ ~ h 

checA the results afterwards. See if the group.

they "make sense" given your a If an event is repeated over many

understanding of the situation and trials, the probability of a particular

experience with similar situations in outcome is equal to the proportion of

the past. times with which it occurred over

the many trials.

The instances In which actual calcula- tions of probabilities are possible are

When you express your certainty about limited In typical strategic situations.

a hypothesis or answer to a question as This is because frequency data or

a percent of your "store" of belief, you population descriptions for events are

are stating the probability that the often not known. You must rely on subhypothesis or answer is correct. Pro- jective assignment of probabilities.

bability can be thought of as the per- This Is often attempted either by corncent of the time that a particular outcome will occur over an Infinite number paring a situation with a prototype of

of Independent trials. Consider, for which you have certain knowledge, or

instance, flipping a coin. We would by estimating frequencies based on

your past experience. Unfortunately,

expect "heads" to come up about fifty both ofstheseecannleadUtooerror.eCon

percent of the time, and "tails" to come

up fifty percent of the time. Since pro- aider, for example, predicting an enemy

babilities are usually expressed In course of action based on what the

decimal fractions (with 1.00 indicating enemy has done In the past. While this

total certainty that an outcome will seems (and may be) reasonable, it must

occur and 0.00 Indicating the mpossi- be recalled that surprise is an important

bility of the outcome), we could state battlefield variable. General Patton

that the probability of heads Is 0.50, predicted the German attack on Basand the probability of tails is 0.50. togne, which seriously threatened the

at 101st Airborne Division and the entire That is, your certainty about getting Erpa apin ntebsso h

heads on a particular flip of the coin Is European campaign, on the basis of the

fact that the weather did not favor an

.60, or 0.50. enemy attack and that the enemy had

not attempted such a winter operation

E-13

; -.. .. ... .: .. . .. .:...- - :. ................................................................-......... ',............,.,.-,,...
since Frederick the Great; therefore, larger ones.

the Germans were likely, out of

L'PI desperation, the ermas wee lkely outof e A tendency to exaggerate the fre- to attempt just such an •Atednyoexgraehef- doperation, quency of some individual events

o i and to underestimate the frequency

Your subjective assignments of proba- of others.

bilities can be made more reliable by These biases are related to the selecfollowing these steps: tivity and availability biases discussed

e Start with a limited number of the earlier. Since analysts frequently deal

relevant characteristics of the with low frequency events and must

event in question, preferably .make forecasts based on their esticharacteristics for which you have mates of such events, it is important for

valid frequency (or population distri- you to become familiar with these

bution) data. You can start with a biases.

single characteristic.

9 Make an initial estimate of the pro- 2.4.2.5 Hypothesis Testing

babilitles based on the

characteristic(s). In scientific terms, testing a hypothesis

refers to establishing the probability teCostider eaherg adton Iharaithat the results you have obtained are

explained by the propositions of your

necessary. Carefully weigh the reli- hypothesis, and not by chance. For

abilty (how accurate is the measure- example, assume that you have three

ment of the characteristic; would It Indicators suggesting that the enemy Is

vary much if repeated measurements about to attack. These Indicators are

were taken?) and validity (is the based on sensor readings that may be

measurement measuring what relevant; you think are you're you subject ubetto o fluctuations fluctuains due to to system system

measuring?) of the data. Do not errors, bird migrations, power supply meauerendng?) of t , data no fluctuations, weather, and so on. Stat- Include redundant data, that Is, data ing that the Indicators support your

that do not add any new Information hypothesis means that you consider the

to the problem. probability of obtaining those sensor

* Modify the probability estimates on readings as a result of a combination of

the basis of the new data. random variations to be "small." Just how large a probability of obtaining

* After repeating this process until the hos eare b ance ou areaiing

dataareexhaste, chck he eti- those effects by chance you are willing data are exhausted, checA the esti -totlrt n tl osdryu

mates against common sense, Intui- to tolerate and still consider your

mtios agapinstc nen s, u hypothesis supported by the facts

tion, and experience, depends on the circumstances; there Is

A common problem in probability assess- no hard and fast rule for making the

ment concerns how people judge decision. If your hypothesis involves

events that have low frequencies and high risk, you are more likely to at least

probabilities. Research has shown that consider it, even if the supporting evihumans have subjective frequency dence can be explained by chance or

scales that are highly consistent inter- by rival alternative hypotheses. If the

nally, but that are systematically hypothesis Involves low risk, you may

biased. Two kinds of biases were Iden- determine that more rigorous evidence

tified: Is required before accepting it.

* A tendency to overestimate small In accepting or rejecting a hypothesis,

frequencies and underestimate there are two types of error that you )

E-14
can commit. The first is called Type I made to make a comparison between

error, and refers to the possibility of available pieces of information. Use

accepting your hypothesis when it is, in this strategy only when you are

fact, false. Type ii error refers to interested in a general improvement

rejebting your hypothesis when it Is, in over an existing situation.

fact, true. The two kinds of error

represent a trade-off in hypothesis eliminate Information by evaluating it

testing; decreasing one tends to against a set of criteria that have

increase the other (in a complex way been organized from highest to

that is beyond the scope of this sec- lowest priority. Information that

tion). You must therefore consider the does not meet the highest priority

relative risks for each particular situa- criterion is eliminated. The remaining

tion. Information is then evaluated against

By using a structured approach to the next highest priority criterion,

uncertainty and probability, you can do and so on until only that Information

a better job of communicating your that meets all criteria remains. Criresults to your clients by supplying teria must be carefully prioritized for

them with quantitative, reliable esti- this strategy to be successful.

mates of situations. You will also be

better able to document the reasoning

behind your conclusions, enabling your 2.5.1 SOME FACTORS THAT LEAD TO

clients (and other analysts) to evaluate FAULTY DECISIONS

and understand your analysis. e Bolstering. Once Information has

been selected, it often becomes

2more "attractive" than it was during Its Initial evaluation. This happens

Decision-making is an integral part of through a process called "bolsterlife. As an analyst, you will make many Ing." Bolstering occurs when only the

decisions. For example, you must positive aspects of selected Infor-

- decide where and how to obtain data, mation and only the negative

whether or not to use these data, and aspects of non-selected information

what their meaning are. Various deci- are emphasized. Thus, bolstering

slon strategies may simplify this indicates a lack of objectivity. This

decision-making process. must be avoided to prevent biasing

a Optimizing requires that you evalu- future Information evaluation and

ate each piece of available Informa- selection.

tion against mulitple criteria to Groupthink. Analysts sometimes

determine its expected cost or work collectively on an intelligence

benefit, then select the best of this assignment. Several problems can

Information. This strategy Increases arise in group decision-making situayour chance of selecting information tions.

that benefits you the most, but it Is members of the group tend to

time-consuming and should only be develop an Illusion of Invulnerabilused when there is no time pressure dty a mayuencouraerxceand the Information load is relatively Ity that may encourage exces

light. slve optimism and risk-taking.

members collectively rationalize

* SatIsficing requires that you select In order to discount warnings.

any Information that satisfies a

minimal set of criteria. No attempt is

E-15

...................................

. . "•" •" . . n " " •"... 

"

.. . . . . . . . . . . .. . ,. . .. "% . °" . " . •° . "" .. " " k' " , % . "." - . .p % . °." . % "p %
- members tend to sterotype rivals clients' uncertainty and increases their

and enemies as too evil to war- ability to make decisions.

rant negotiation. You also need to fully understand the

- members who express opposing goals and requirements imparted by

views are put under pressure by your clients, and be able to solicit the

other group members and may be information you may need to satisfy

ostracized if they persist. those requirements from other individu-

- members tend to practice self- als in your work setting. As an intellicensorship to reduce deviation gence analyst, you must be able to

from the group standard. effectively communicate with intelligence and combat personnel in your

own and other intelligence communities.

Basic skills in human communication are 2.6 Pattern Recognition and Matching a nipnii ato orpeaa an indispensible part of your preparaPattern recognition and matching tion as an analyst.

Involves two major processes:

" A process whereby Information in the 2.7.1 HOW TO USE COMMUNICATIONS

environment Is compared to the conceptual model one has of It in

memory. The Importance to the There are numerous references on how

analyst lies in the way relevant to communicate effectively with other

Information Is recognized from people. You will find some of these at

Irrelevant Information. This process the end of this appendix. In these few

Is required for many techniques, pages, It is possible only to suggest

such as the recognition of indicators. some of the dimensions of the communia The recognition of repetitions and cation process In analysis. )

patterns of events or behaviors that

already exist In the environment. 2.7.1.1 Active Communication.

This Is an important process when

using techniques such as Historical Communication is an active two-way

Analogy. process. That Is, both the formatting

and transmitting of Information, and the There are no definite guidelines that

can be used to aid these processes, an of e infran, eqire th- The major point to keep In mind Is that meaning of the Information, require initiative on the parts of both parties to

these processes are Improved In direct the conversation.

proportion to the background knowledge

you have concerning the problem situa- Communicating always Involves shared

tion. conceptual models. When you are telling someone about a situation, you

assume a great deal about what that

2.7 Communication Skills person already knows about the situaCommunications skills comprise your tion. You also make many assumptions

abilities to present verbal and written about the person's "common sense

Information to your clients, and to solicit knowledge" about the world, and about

information from your clients, other how the person responds to certain Infalystion rome indiuclies, ot combinations of words, figures of analysts, or other Individuals, speech, tone of voice, body language,

Your basic goal as an analyst is to pro- and so on. Sending a message so that

duce a product that decreases your It is understood requires that you make

E-16

%
an effort to understand the conceptual • Start by asking easy questions--

models of the receiver, and make your people enjoy giving answers they

message conform to a pattern that know are right.

"fits" those models; it Is not simply a

matter of talking or writing what you

think. Listening to a message means 2.7.1.3 Structured Questions.

that you actively fit the message into One useful way to classify questions is

your own conceptual models; it is not by their degree of structure. The

simply a matter of keeping your ears structure of a question has a great deal

open. of Influence on the kind of answer

You must also be sensitive to a given. A highly structured question

mismatch between your idea of what asks for a specific fact. It also

another person's conceptual models requires preparation on the questioner's

may be and what they actually are. part. A low-structured question, on the

Many misunderstandings occur when other hand, requires little thought to

this Is not done effectively. Subtle formulate it. It is designed merely to

nuances of voice and style, as well as stimulate the other person to talk in a

the contents of a message, can alert particular area, without the questioner

you to possible misunderstandings. necessarily having much of an Idea

Some of the techniques that will be dis- about where the talk might lead. If time

cussed in this section can help you to is limited, it is best to use well

achieve such sensitivity, thought-out, structured questions.

2.7.1.2 Eliciting Information. 2.7.1.4 Unstructured Questions.

When you try to elicit Information from If you need a lot of Information from

someone, you are asking that person to another person, the key is the lowdo something for you-- to give up time structured questlr'. It Initiates the

and energy. In addition, the person may other person's thknking processes, and

not be Inclined to share the information activates the conceptual models necesthat you are after. You must therefore sary to address the topic. The more

motivate that person to supply you with unstructured the question, the more

the Information you need. You can Information you are likely to get.

facilitate the process by keeping In There are four ways to ask unstrucmind the following: tured questions:

e Express appreciation for the Infor- mation. • Ask questions that cannot be

answered "yes" or "no".

* Listen with Interest both to the a Preface key words with "what

answers to your questions and to Prefac ke wor wh h

comments that may not be directly

relevant to the questions. e Repeat back the key words.

• Make comments to show your under- e Summarize and repeat back the

standing and Interest. answer as you understand it.

e Provide relevant Information of your

own to stimulate the conversation,

but watch out for the other person's

reactions; don't bore them, or you

will lose their attention.

E-17
2.7.1.5 Formulating Communications giving a complete picture of the

for Transmission. situation, each time. This saves time

and reduces the potential for corn- )

In formulating the product of your municaton errors.

analysis for transmission, you need to

know who the users of your product will a Elicit feedback from the users. if

be and what their needs are. If you uncertainty was reduced, then the

have more than one user for your Intelli- Information was relevant.

gence products, you may need to formulate the output in more than one way.

You may have to use the same informa- 2.7.1.6 Feedback

tion, but select or emphasize certain Whether your questions are structured

aspects of it to fit each user's needs. or unstructured, feedback is essential

Good communication involves knowing In communications of any kind. You must

the other person's point of view, know- elicit feedback from your clients, to

Ing what they need to know, and Insure that you comprehend all of their

selecting only relevant Information to requirements, but at the same time, you

transmit to that person. Relevant Infor- must provide them with feedback as

matlon is Information that makes a well. Feedback insures that the parties

difference in the way the recipients to conversation understand each other

think, and that will help them make within the same context, and that they

decisions concerning courses of define the concepts or issues disactions. Specifically, relevant Informa- cussed in the same way. In other

tion will reduce the recipients' uncer- words, feedback permits the verificatalnty with respect to their Initial tion of the shared conceptual models

requirements and solutions to problems. involved In the communication. TechThe following guidelines are helpful In niques for Insuring proper feedback

determining what is important to the Include:

users of your Intelligence products: • Repeat key words and ask for confirmation that the key words are the * Understand the users' goals, context, and time frame. same for the other pers.

* Know what the users know so that • Summarize back and ask for confirmation.

the communication involves updatIng" their knowledge, rather than e Ask for additional key information.

E-18

.- . . . *~. -.... ... . * ... .
APPENDIX F

WORKSHEET TO ESTABLISH CONSTRAINTS AND RESOURCES

Answer all questions in as much detail as possible.

Preliminary Considerations

Client(s):

Client requirement:

Assumptions undeirlying requirement:

End use of product (planning, decision-making, etc.):

Tasks needed to achieve product:

Possible techniques to use:

Are there any conflicts concerning the requirements, time and

". resource availability, underlying assumptions?

- if so, how can they be resolved?

F-1
Time Constraints

What is the total suspense time for the product?

How much of this time must be allocated to:.

- Information delivery from collection resources?

- survey and organization of collected information?

- analysis and integration of new Information?

- drafting final report?

What Is the total amount of time that I can devote to this project?

Resource Constraints

What resources are essential to this project?

When are these resources available; how easy/difficult are they to

acquire?

Within these essential resources, which have the highest priority?

What are the procedures to allocate resources to my project?

What types of data will be used to create the product?

Which information exists in documented form and which information

must be collected?

What information can be obtained from other analysts?

Who are they? How can I contact them?

F-2
Level of Effort Constraints

Who else (if anyone) Is working on this project?

Are there existing projects with areas of interest that coincide with

the project I am working on?

What Is the level of accuracy and the breadth of knowledge desired

by the client for the final product?

Personal Knowledge Requirements

What areas (geographic, political, cultural, etc.) do the product involve?

Do I have enough knowledge about these areas?

Do the requirements specify a particular technique or method?

- Am I familiar with the method?

- Have I ever usedut before? Was it successful?

- What problems did I have with it?

If I do not have enough knowledge about the area of interest, or

method, what resources are there to supplement my knowledge

(other analysts, courses, literature, etc.)?

F-3

w- r r q Jr f i- N m l ,go " . .• .. • .. . . -. *......*-.*.*---* ... o: . * ,, >. ... 2 . . •. •
F 9

APPENDIX 6

Guide to Analytic Method Selection
APPENDIX G In Table G-1, techniques are

GUIDE TO ANALYTIC METHOD SELECTION presented according to broadly Gdefined tasks that a strategic

1. Purpose analyst generally performs. In practicality, however, these tasks are

This appendix is an introduction and a not that well defined. That is, the

preliminary guide to selecting tools and distinction between tasks, as well

techniques for doing strategic analysis. as between methodologies, is often

It will suggest questions that are somewhat tenuous. It is up to you to

relevant in selecting a particular tech- understand the tasks and the

nique, and provide a guide for using the methodologies well enough so that,

table of tasks (Table G-1) and the in time, you become very good at

table of techniques (Table G-2). It is matching one with the other. The

not possible to provide details of the guidelines presented here should

concepts, tools, and methodologies you only be viewed as initial suggeswill be using; however, a brief tions.

description/definition and a reference *For a given task, there are usually

" for each technique mentioned In the different techniques that may be

te aappropriate, just as a given techThe first section consists of a summary nique can frequently be used for

of guidelines, concepts and questions more than one type of task. In Table

to keep in mind before selecting a G-2 we have attempted to present

technique for a particular task. the major constraints and requirements for using a specific technique.

Table G- makes 1 up the second sec- However, techniques are frequently

ton. Table G- is organized broad adaptable. If a technique appears

general classes of tasks performed by relevant for a particular task, a

strategic analysts. Relevant tech- reference should be consulted,

niques '-- are proposed for these classes regardless of the constraints and

of tasks, as well as those "Basic Tools

and Concepts" (see Appendix E) that requirements mentioned in Table Gare particularly appropriate for the

given class of tasks. The third section e Some of the techniques listed in this

contains Table G-2, an alphabetical list appendix can be applied either

of all techniques mentioned in Table G- informally, or in a quantitative and/or

1, followed by the definition of each. structured manner (for example,

Attributes and relevant aspects of each decision analysis). Structured

technique are also identified in Table and/or quantitative techniques are

G-2. generally more costly and timeconsuming to use; they may also be

2. General guidelines and cautions more accurate than unstructured

techniques. However, if you have a - All techniques proposed in this

appendix should be viewed primarily choice between structured and

as suggestions. As you become pro- anotrcriten to am .. another criterion to apply: namely,

flcient in using various approaches the quality of the data you are

and techniques, you may want to using. If you use a quantitative

make up your own tables and check- technique with unreliable and/or

lists, following the structure of Invalid data, the results of the

Tables G-1 and G-2. analysis may look more impressive

" than if you use an Informal method,

G-1

........................................-... "..-...-......--, ....- ..---..- ,,.. ....... -7-
but they will also be more mislead- 3. Categories of Strategic Analysis

Ing. The results of a quantitative Tasks

application are only as good as the Tasks can be Identified on several

Input data. dimensions that tend to be orthogonal

9 Humans have a bias towards bellev- to each other. However, for present

ing that numbers are, by definition, purposes, the tasks selected are those

better and/or more accurate than that correspond to the six procedural

qualitative statements. In general, steps described in Chapter 5.

the more structured, formal, and/or It must be remembered that categorizaquantitative the technique used, the

more likely are the results going to no no means ass clear-cut. adcof.te We are are onlyby

look impressive and hence, accepted presenting one of several possible

"on faith" by the user. Therefore, preucntres o r o f e te p se o nthe more careful you have to be in structures for organizing these conyour use of data, procedure, and cepts. They are primarily suggestions

to help you devise your own, since only you can determine what type of organiYou must understand the assump- zation Is most suitable to your needs.

tlons underlying the collection and The same is true for the references

the manipulation of the data, and you provided. They are only designed to

must know and review the cognitive give you a start In your search for use- biases that pervade human Informa- ful references. Several of the refertion processing. In Appendix E, we

ences provided (e.g., the "Handbook of

Forecasting Techniques") are merely a

and on the identification of assump- good source for additional references.

tions because these are basic to go orefradtoa eeecs

tins becaseratese areaasic t They do not provide enough details so

doing good strategic analysis. that a particular technique can be

* All analyses should always be tem- applied.

pered by good judgment. Good Judg- in selecting a method or technique,

ment is difficult to define. However, there are no hard and fast rules to folIt may be thought of as combining low. The general approach is to use

good mental faculties, good area lo.TegnrlapacIstue

any method or technique that helps get

knowledge, an understanding of cog- the job done In the most efficient and

nitlve and other biases, an under- accurate manner. Your goal must be to

standing of underlying assumptions, Improve analysis, and to view sysplus a tempered use of Intuition. tematlc methods as one means of trying

Intuition Is another fuzzy concept, to overcome problems that seem

but one that is very important In

Intelligence intllienc anlyss. or ntutio to inherent in the process of conducting analysis. For Intuition to Intelligence analysis.

contribute positively to analysis, It

must be guided by a thorough 4. Techniques: Characteristics and

knowledge and understanding of the Definitions

topic to be analyzed.

The above represent some general Table G-2 Is an alphabetized list of the

comments that are important for you to techniques mentioned In Table G-1. For

keep in mind before selecting a particu- each technique, the following attributep

lar technique for a particular task. You

must also remember to determine avail- 9 data requirements (i.e., In general,

able resources and establish existing what types of data are necessary to

constraints as outlined in Appendix F. perform these techniques?).

G-2

- """ l " 4" , "*

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° "

-

'

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a usable time frame (many of the e output characteristics (this refers to

techniques listed are used in fore- the form of the output, after the

casting; the usable time frame technique has been applied). "" refers to the typical forecasting

v.period p-ero that 

th 

the te tecu technique is is Table G-2 Is then followed by a brief

appropriate for). definition/description of each technique

listed.

e type of procedure used (this refers

to the primary means of processing Figure G-1 is a graphic representation

information, underlying each tech- of how to use Tables G-1 and G-2 to

nique). select an appropriate technique for

strategic analysis.

G-3
00 Y

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ITATOSK ND APPRPRICEULTIESM

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ALL THEMOF 

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TIM PEMT

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7 7-

STEPS AND TASKS BASIC TOOLS AND CONCEPTS SUGGESTED METHOOS

AND TECHNIQUES*

p . Understand the Intelligence Communication Skins Techniques

Requirement. Identifying Assumptions Goal Analysis

Recognizing Biases Mission Flow Diagrams

0 Know Client needs. Client Profile Checklist

Expert Opinion

* Trulate requirements into specific

objectives and tasks.

$Up L Prepare an Initial Problem Representation Methods

Intelligence Survey. (see General Problem Solving). Cut and Paste

Identifying Assumptions LRPE

* Idwetify what is known. Pattern Recognition and Matching Scientific Method (Steps 18&2)

Probability Assessment Change Signals Monitoring (Step 1

- Id• uftily what is unknown. Memory Skills War Gaming - Modeling

9 Idestity areas of uncertainty. Techniques

Intelligence Survey Checldt

SIdwttify memory/data shortfalls. Expert Opinion Exponential Smoothing

0 Ra11gnize threat. Historical Analogy

Leading Indicators

e Dvwmeop a threat model. Precursor Events

Scenarios

0 ONflnelformulate the problem. Time Lines

Sep . Select an Analytic Method. General Problem Solving Methods

Identifying Assumptions Scientific Method (Stea 2)

" Amass constraints Pattern Recognition and

Matching (recognizing Techniques

0 1Puudate hypotheses similarities in Worksheet to Establish

different requirements) Constraints and Resources

- Fobmate plans Decision-Making Strategies Appendix H) e.,ud Table G-2

Brainstorming

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Decision Matrices

Decision Theory

Goal Analysis

Mission Flow Diagrams Multi-attribute Utility (MAU)

Relevance Trees

Synectics

.-- __System Analysis

TaW IGI: Concepts, Methods, and Techniques for Supporting the Steps of Analysis

G-5

. . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . .

"- ::: " -,., " -": , "-:."-":" "":"--:". ,,, ..... .": _ ,,,,;,, -"-"? ,_ ,,] '" ..:]-] -:.]. ;,:]::;-i;.;: :::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::: .=======================.
SUGGESTED METHODS STEPS AND TASKS BASIC TOOLS AND CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES*

Stop 4. Execute the Method. Pattern Recognition Methods

and Matching Change Signals Monitoring (Step

I Collect date Identifying Assumptions Cut and Paste

Recognizing Biases LRPE

* Evaluate data Probability Assessment Scientific Method (Steps 3&4)

and Decision Theory War Gaming-Simulaton

e Interpret data

Techniques

a Develop estimates Anomalous Event Matrix

Bayesian Analysis

9 Evaluate hypotheses Breakthroughs

Canonical Trend Variation

e Identify possibilities Critical Event Filters

Delphi

Decision Matrices

Decision Theory

Intuitive Analysis

KSIM

MAU

Panis

Relevance Trees

Worksheet for Identifying

Informational Value of Data

(Appendix H)

Step 5. Prepare a Revised Probability Assessment Methods

Intelligence Survey. Identifying Assumptions Change Signals

Recognizing Biases Monitoring (Step 4)

• Predict future threat Cut and Paste

LRPE

a impact Assessment Scientific Method (Steps 4&5)

e Evaluation Techniques

Bayesian Analysis

Croes-impact Analysis

PAMNACS and DENS

Dynamic Models

KSIM

Probabilistic Forecasting

Scenarios

Time Lines

Trend Extrapolation

Step S. Produce a Report Communication Skills Techniques

of the Production Results. Identifying Assumptions ITAC Writer's Guide

Probability Assessment Ideal Product Checklist

Expert Opinion

S A method is a broad general approach that has components

which can be applied to many of the steps In conducting strategic Intelligence analysis. A technique is a more specific tool

for doing a particular task. Several different techniques may

be useful within a general method.

TABLE G-1 (Continued):

Concepts, Methods, and Techniques for Supporting the Steps of Analysis

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4.1 Definitions/Descriptions of Tech- Bayesian calculations are periodically

niques updated as events evolve over time.

The events that are used for this

updating are the tactical Indications,

Anomalous Event Matrix (ANEM) namely, specific evidence from current

events that indicate the direction in

The anomalous event matrix Is an which events are moving.

* approach to aiding in the difficult tasks The analysts's overall Intuitive evaluaof recognizing novel threat situations tion of probabilities usually lags behind

and of dealing with new data. The events, and the Bayesian procedure

technique involves special examination compensates for this, in that is gives

of input data that does not relate satis- gre ate,"r w h t eie facoriy esablshe t moels A im- greater weight to current evidence

factorily to established models. A simg than intuitive analysis does. It compenpie matrix is developed for assessing sates for the bias that makes us err In

Incoming data against new hypotheses. the direction of being too strongly influThe Intended resut is to develop new enced by the most recent reporting or

perspectives for looking at incoming the the latest short-run ort-runtrendr(eng., trend (e.g.,

data. These new perspectives can recency and availability biases).

then be used to modify or expand the

existing models or create new ones. Reference: Heuer, 1978; Clauser &

Reference: Clarkson, 1981. Weir, 1975.

Bayesian Analysis Brainstorming

SasIn this technique for evoking creative

Bayesian analysis is a statistical pro- thinking, a group accepts a very precedure for revising a probability judg- ting pro p acces a very pe

ment on the basis of new Information. It de problem and comes up with as

Is based on Bayes' Theorem, which many ideas as possible concerning its

takes as a starting point your estimate solution. Every Idea, no matter how

remote, is accepted. Success of the of the lkelhood of an event (or multiple method seems to depend on the freeevents). Wen ane p of cnfora- dom and imagination used In Inventing

otlon becomes available, you can update Ideas. Only at a later stage are the

your estimate of the event's likelihood, Ideas tested for practicality. Synectics

even though the new Information Is of

uncertain validity. The process can be st oring.

repeated as more Information is storming.

obtained. Bayesian analysis Is particu- Special Data Requirements: No data are

larly Important to strategic analysts required except ideas. Requirements

because It can be used to estimate the for data come after the brainstorming,

probability of a unique event, when to check the practicality of proposed

there Is an n of 1. solutions.

The normal, straightforward way to Reference: VanGundy, 1981.

evaluate evidence is to ask, "Given this

evidence, what is the probability of the

various hypotheses?" Bayesian Infer- Breakthroughs

ence poses the question in a seemingly

backwards manner: "Given the truth of Breakthroughs refer to a systematic

this hypothesis, what is the probability seeking out of precursor events in

of seeing this evidence?" order to identify potential signals in

G-9

- ,* *.- a**, • ... .,.... '. ,. ... .. ..... . ... . ... ,..,. ,.', .,' /.'.'.
hypothesizing a pattern or break- trends. It is based on a systematic,

through. A breakthrough appears to four-step procedure that involves 1)

transcend prior limitations. It is used to monitoring the environment for precurwatch for technological breakthroughs sor signals, 2) identifying alternative

and to obtain warning of any other consequences If the signaled changes

shifts In the environment that might are valid and persist, 3) selecting items

affect the analyst's area of interest, to monitor continuously, and 4) organizHowever, the analyst must understand ing the results for presentation to the

the nature of precursor events within client.

the relevant area of interest and must Special Limitation: The use of this

screen the Incoming data based on technique requires a model or theory

showing the relationship of precursor

Breakthroughs is a technique used In signals to the changes of interest. The

conjunction with other forecasting signals may be obscure or difficult to

methods to perform analysis; It Is not a interpret.

data gathering technique. Related technique: Precursor Event.

Special limitations: There is no sure Reference: Bright, 1972.

way to assign a threshold to a potential

signal; that is, it is difficult to separate

signals from noise. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Related techniques: Precursor Event,

Change Signals Monitoring. A technique to measure the costs of an

Reference: Martino, 1972. alternative course of action to achieve

some objective against the benefits

resulting from taking that course.

Canonical Trend Variation Special Data Requirement: Estimates of

costs and benefits are needed for all

Canonical Trend Variation refers to a Important factors Identified in each proset of surprise-free projections used to cedure. When factors cannot be measdevelop an arbitrary, contrasting set of ured in monetary terms, subjective esti-

"standard worlds", or different potential mates are required. Subjective estifutures for a given topic. By altering mates must be based on good, Intuitive

basic assumptions for one or more pro- Insights and in-depth understanding of

jection, one develops correspondingly the subject matter.

different "standard worlds". Alteration

of assumptions with corresponding outputs are called canonical trend varlations. The results are not predictions or Critical Event Filters (CEF)

forecasts; rather, they are useful tools

for Intelligent conjecture. This Is a technique used in conjuction

Related Technique: Surprise-Free Pro- with PAMNACS and DENs (see separate

jectons. entries). CEFs may be thought of as

Reference: Kahn-WeIner, 1967. cntalners for holding data that are jud(d to signify that the activity

modelled at given nodes In the PAMNACs

Change Signals Monitoring and in the DENs is occurring. In a

computer-based memory, the CEFs

A technique used to organize informa- could be considered a portion of the

tion when the focus Is on key events or memory in which such Input data would

G-10

-.• .. .....- ,..1 ,," . ,,- .. ...... '.:...:.'.. .. "..:.....'.....',, .'. -.'
U

be stored. by providing a statistical group

response. It is adaptable to almost any Related Techniques: PAMNACs, DENs. subject matter, but the topics to be

Reference: Clarkson, 1981. forecast must be explicitly defined.

Related Techniques: Brainstorming, Panels.

Cross-Impact Analysis

Reference: Linstone & Turoff, 1975.

Cross-Impact Analysis Is a structured

technique to compare individual forecasts, on a pair-wise basis, to deter- Decision Matrices

mine whether there are any Interactions

between them. This technique also pro- Decision matrices refers to a basic

vides a systematic method for examin- method in applied decision theory. This

Ing the Interactions among several fac- technique provides a systematic,

tors. The procedure is judgmental, but comprehensive consideration of many

the use of experts and probabilities interrelationships among those factors

provides for extensive feedback and that are of Interest. A two-dimensional

review, decision table is used when two basic

kinds of factors (e.g., resources vs Reference: Martino, 1972. requirements) are crucial, or a cube,

when three factors are Involved. Quali-

"" Cut and Paste tative and quantitative procedures are

Cused to specify each inter-relationship

among all the factors considered. HorThis Is a "quick and dirty" technique for Izontal matrices (interactions among making minor changes in existing factors at one level of generality) are

reports, situation assessments, etc. It relatively well developed but vertical

can be quite useful under time con- matrices are more primitive because it

straints, or when the necessary Is more difficult to estimate/quantify/

changes are minor, specify relationships between different

Reference: Clauser & Weir, 1975. levels of detail.

Reference: Beyth-Marom & Lichtenstein,

Decision/Event Networks (DEN). 1982.

DEN Is an analytic technique that is

used in conjunction and as an extension

of PAMNACS. See "PAMNACS". Decision Theory Is an approach that

refers to a large, varied, rapidly

Delphi expanding body of basic and applied

theory relating to processes for making

This technique employs a panel of a variety of types of decisions under

experts to render judgments as to tim- many types and degrees of uncertainty.

Decision theory is used as an aid in

ing, probability, and often implications of making rational choices in highly comspecified trends and events. The technique differs from the usual panel dis- plex and uncertain situations, especussonaly whenever the costs, risks, and

panel members, through iteration of potential benefits of the problem situation are large and/or critical. It can be

results with controlled feedback, and applied to forecast requirements,

Q-1 1

.. ...- • . : . . . , .
specifications, designs, and execution permits the decision maker to select an

tasks. optimal course of action In light of the

Reference: Beyth-Marom & Lichtenstein, number of options available to each

1982; Janis & Mann, 1977; Ralffa, player and the rules of the game. An

optimal course of action Is one which

1968; Steiner, 1969.maximizes the player's probability of

success and minimizes the probability of

Dynamic Models loss or failure.

Reference: Clauser & Weir, 1975.

Dynamic models are used to study the

interrelationships among internal activities, as dynamic changes from the Goal Analysis

environment are experienced. Successive relationships of key factors are Goal analysis is a systematic five-step

determined and described by procedure for identifying the performathematical equations. mances and tasks required that will

achieve a goal. This technique is parSpecial Data Requirements Large ticularly useful when goals or objecamounts of Input data and computer tives are not clearly stated.

programs.

Special Limitations: Extremely complex. Reference: Mager, 1972.

Some variables may be very difficult to

quantify. Historical Analogy

Reference: Steiner, 1969.

This approach seeks to draw parallels -

between past events and what may

Exponential Smoothing occur in the future. It can provide useful Insights, but must be tempered with

Using historical data, the average of a good judgment. Events rarely repeat

quantifiable variable becomes the fore- themselves exactly, and causal relacast value. Historical data showing tionships presumed for one era or conregular patterns for the selected vari- dition may not apply In other cirable over at least three equal time cumstances, no matter how apparently

periods must be available. More recent Identical. Therefore, this approach is

data are given more weight than earlier generally not appropriate for detailed

data. forecasts, but rather for suggesting

Slikely directions of broad trends. Hisca Special efrcs.torical Limitation: Only one quantity trclaaoissol analogies should be ebsdo based on

recurrent analogous patterns.

Related Technique: Historical Analogies. Reference: Jervis, 1968.

Reference: Brown, 1963.

Intuitive Analysis

Game Theory

Decisions vital to the accomplishment of

Game theory Is a theory of decision military objectives are determined in

making in a conflict or competitive large part by the Intuitive judgments

situation. Participants attempt to Influ- and educated guesses of decision makence the action so as to optimize the ers or experts acting In their behalf.

results for themselves. Game theory The critical role of intuitive judgments in )

G-12

.................-.... O. lni.mltdlbTm~ldZl;kn'll~ll/ . S'" S" .. ... . ... . .. .. . . "
IL

strategic analysis makes it important to Reference: Box & Jenkins, 1970.

be aware of the various cognitive

biases described earlier. Intuitive

analysis includes estimating the initial LRPE

probabilities that serve as the starting

point for Bayesian analysis. These LRPE is a methodology developed at

estimates are normally based on stra- ITAC to provide Force Planners with

tegic assumptions. Strategic assump- information about future Army battlefield

tIons are fundamental assumptions con- environments. It indicates where,

cerning Intentions and capabilities, when, and why the Army will fight, as

These assumptions tend to resist well as trends and problem areas that

change, as they are based on a large the Army must provide solutions for.

body of interrelated evidence and have The LRPE methodology is heavily based

usually been held for a long time. Iden- on historical knowledge and known

tifying assumptions Is therefore an problem areas. Using a standard set of

Important part of doing intuitive indicators, it follows the development of

analysis. relevant problems and Issues. LRPE

.Reference- Heuer, 1978; Kahneman & provides for periodic updates of indicaTversky, 1977. tors and allows systematic reevaluation

of probable conflict situations.

Reference: ITAC.

KSIM

KSIM Is a simulation technique that Mission Flow Diagrams

allows a group of "experts" from different disciplines to evaluate the Mission Flow Diagrams are a means for

interactions among variables and to analyzing, organizing, and structuring a

test alternatives. it allows planners to problem to insure completeness. It is a

understand system structure, relate normative or goal-setting method of

quantitative and qualitative factors, and forecasting, used to identify

communicate the oucome of proposed bottlenecks that prevent the realizaton

planning Interventions, of otherwise promising paths. These

Related Technique: Cross-Impact bottlenecks fravneetefrs can then serve as targets for advancement efforts.

Analysis.

Reference: Kane, 1972. Reference: Martino, 1972.

Leading Indicator Multi-Attribute Utility (MAU)

A leading Indicator Is any measure of Multi-attribute utility (MAU) models are

a class of highly structured mathemati- the economy that moves in the same cal procedures for selecting a course of

manner as the economy but does so action from a set of alternatives.

several months ahead of the economy. These procedures clarify the underlying

Since It Is based on past trends, it may structure of the decision- making probfall to predict basic changes. lem, yielding Information on the relative

Special Data: Requires time series data importance of the different factors that

on a standard base over a period of go into the decision. Unlike relevance

many years. trees, the factor of risk is incorporated

into MAU's. Uncertainty and variations

G-13

l 'i~'Li -,, - ' . ...-.. 'L ? - Li.'-............ .... ?-...... . . .. . . . -
In the ability to control threat, for opinion. In addition, specialists are

example, create a situation in which often unwilling to publically abandon

risk is a factor. MAU's provide a previously expressed opinions.

mathematical framework in which alter- natives naties e ealuaed an ithresect Related Techniques:. Delphi, Brainstorm- can be evaluated with respect Ig

to risk and uncertainty. ing. Reference: Jantsch, 1967; Martino,

Related Technique: Relevance Trees. 1972.

1972.

Reference: Beyth-Marom & Lichtenstein,

1982.

Precursor Events

PAMNACS A precursor event Is any observable

event or development in technology,

PAMNACS stands for "Projected Alter- economy, politics, or society, that

native Major National Courses of clearly will cause another, subsequent

Action". It is a structured form for future event.

expressing what are believed to be the

most definitive national policies and Menaton TehnIe:cane ia

courses of action of a given foreign Monitoring, Leading Indicator.

country, with respect to key strategic Reference: Handbook of Forecasting

aspects. PAMNACS must be flexible Techniques, 1975.

and easily changeable to accommodate

new analytic perspective as they arise.

DENs are extensions of the PAMNACS. Probabilistic Forecasting

,." For each of the possible major national corec of tio Dis deo e This technique refers to various statist-

,"and 

courses 

serves 

of action, a DEN Is developed Ical methods that Include stochastic as a means of further p o e s s a k v c an , G u sa

h modeling contryof the nterst possible ightexhbit activity that hen the processes, distributions, Markov Bayesian chains, statistics, Gaussian Monte

country of Interest might exhibit when Carlo simulations, and Parametric Sensiimplementing that particular course of tivity analysis. Probabilistic forecasting

action.

can only be applied If the possible outRelated Techniques: DENs, CEFs. comes can be hypothesized.

Reference: Clarkson, 1981. Reference: Jantsch, 1969.

Panels Relevance Trees

In this technique, experts are brought Relevance Trees is a simple form of

together In open discussions to reach a multi-attribute utility model. It permits

consensus judgment concerning the the structured consideration of the

future of a specified trend or prospect. relevance or Importance of various facDelphi Is a special case of the use of tors, attributes, and criteria as they

panels for forecasting. Panel forecast- contribute to an objective. Relevance

Ing Is suitable (but not necessarily trees are best applied to decisions

best) whenever expert opinion Is the under certainty conditions; that is,

major Input. when the consequences of all available

Special Limitation: There Is a danger of actions are known in advance. It can

generating a "bandwagon" majority be used In conditons of uncertainty, if

measurable criteria associated with

G-14

.... ... ... ................-.. ....... ,, .. , .- ,,-."..... ,.. .,,. ........
uncertain events can be reasonably Reference: Jantsch, 1967.

well-defined. Such decisions as the

analyst must make in tasking collection

resources, or in situation and event

analysis, can be served by this tool. In Scientific Method

addition, however, the steps in creating

the tree are of value even if the The Scientific Method is a prescription

analysis is not used for decision making. for understanding one's environment so

The definition of objectives and charac- as to have more control over it. Control

teristics, and the assigning of weights, Includes the ability to predict unexcan help analysts refine their baseline pected outcomes. The Scientific

model of the situation, aiding them in Method involves the following steps: 1)

taking advantage of the other tools at the researcher makes observations

their disposal. either directly or vicariously by studyRelated Technique: Multi-Attribute Util- Ing reports of earlier observations and

ity Models. measurements; 2) the researcher formulates a model or hypotheses to

References. Marples, 1974. account for the observed phenomena;

3) the researcher subjects the model

or hypotheses to a test (the experiScenarios ment), checking underlying assumptions,

measurements, and logic at each step;

Scenarios are literary, numerical, and/or 4) the researcher compares the

graphic narratives that describe and/or results of the tests against the

explore the Implications of future predicted results and draws conclusions

sequences of events and states of concerning the validity of the initial

( affairs. Scenarios are more appropriate hypotheses or model; 5) after the inifor Interpreting forecasts or stimulating tial hypotheses or model have been

the imagination than for firm, rigorous upheld, the model can be used to derive

forecasts. They are most useful when new hypotheses or predictions that can

the writers Integrate isolated and be subjected to further tests.

diverse specific projections and/or Reference: Clauser and Weir, 1975.

predictions, so that the user acquires a

"feel" for the overall future state

addressed by each isolated projection. Simple Regression

Scenarios are particulary good for

developing "worst case hypotheses". A linear algebraic relationship is defined

Special Data: A large fund of data, between two variables. The statistical

Information, and Ideas pertinent to the method of least squares is used to

topic are required. Personnel skilled in determine the equation of the relationscenario-development should work in ship. It may be used whenever there is

concert with subject matter experts. sufficient and accurate historical data

to define the linearity of a relationship.

Special Limitation: In scenarios, much

may be implicit, ambiguous, and not Special Limitation: The method can only

necessarily supported by specific and be used for two variables. Multiple

valid forecasts. Writers need to have a regressions can deal with multiple variclear sense of who the user is, what ables, but it only forecasts one.

the topic is, and the intended uses of Reference: Problem Solving Techniques

the scenario. for Intelligence Analysts, 1981.

G-16

- - - - - - - - - I
Social Trend Analysis mathematical techniques of Operations

Research. An approach to complex

Social Trend Analysis refers to any of a problems of choice under uncertainty

variety of procedures for Identifying, that systematically examines the costs,

specifying, and Interpreting continuities, effectiveness, and risks of various

discontinuities, and change rates for alternatives. It has many uses in miliany number of specific phenomena. tary applications. This approach provides a systematic way to take large Specal imittio: Wek ~tasks and divide them into manageable

existent theories about processes of taska. Sydtem ana el

social change are a -serious limitation to subtsks. Systems Analysis helps

decision-makers sharpen their judgthe use of this technique. merts and deal effectively with imporRelated Techniques: Leading Indicators, tant, broad, and ill-structured problems.

Trend Extrapolation. It is less an actual technique than a

Reference: Handbook of Forecasting way of thinking.

Techniques, 1975. Specia/ Data. The data requirements

depend on the specific problems investigated.

Synectlcs References: Quads, 1973; Steiner,

Synectics is a non-analytical approach 1969; Jantsch, 1969.

to inducing creative thinking that may

be applied to Inventing products, social Time-Lines

issues, alternative futures, etc. ThinkIng In analogies plays a major role In the Time-Lines are structured aids that

9-step process defined as Synectics. permit the representation of complex

The technique forces imaginative, non- events or tasks with respect to time

routine thinking about problems and and Interdependencies. Structured

often comes up with lnspired" solutions. The system is an aid to forecast- dependency diagrams facilitate a inbut does not by Itself produce fore- standardized graphic representation of

Ing, events so that analysts can recognize relationships, critical paths, critical

Specia/ Data: Data on the problem and events, etc. There exist several difprior, unsuccessful approaches to its ferent, specific methods that are all

solution are used. considered Time-Line techniques.

Related Technique: Brainstorming. Reference: Zeldman, 1978.

Reference: Handbook of Forecasting

Techniques, 1976. Trend Extrapolation

Trend Extrapolation refers to one of the more common methods of forecasting

future conditions or trends. it Involves

Broadly, systems analysis refers to anthe future the trends or

orderly, analytic study of a system that conditions that have existed in the past

is designed to help decision makers and exist In the present.

Identify a preferred course of action

from among possible alternatives to Related Techniques: Historical Analogy,

achieve an objective. It Is primarily an Simple Regression.

"art" that requires specialized

Z.-1-
Reference: Clauser & Weir, 1975.

War Gaming

War games are experiments with alternative tactics and strategies In a conflict situation. Game theory can provide

a theoretical basis for war gaming, but

is not synonymous with it. War gaming

can be represented as games, models,

or simulations. A game is a contest

* played according to rules and decided

by skill, strength, or chance. A model is

a representation of a process or an

object, while a simulation is a dynamic

imitation of a process.

Reference: Clauser & Weir, 1975.

G-17

....... °* ***~- -..--. .
References Jervis, R. Hypotheses on Misperception.

World Politics, 20, 1968.

Beyth-Marom, R. & Lichtenstein, S. An Kahn, H. & Weiner, A. The Year 2000.

Elementary Approach to Thinking under MacMillan, New York, 1967.

Uncertainty. ARI, May, 1982. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. Intuitive

Predictions Biases and Corrective Pro- Box, G. & Jenkins, G. Time Series cedures. DARPA Technical Report PTRAnalysis: Forecasting and Control. 1042-77-6. Decision Research;

Holden-Day, Calif., 1970. Eugene, Oregon, 1977

Bright, J. A Brief Introduction to Tech- Kane, J. A Primer for a New Crossnological Forecasting. Pemaquid Press, Impact Language--KSIM. Technological

Forecasting and Social Change. Vol. 4,

Brown, R.G. Smoothing, Forecasting, No. 2, 1972.

and Prediction of Discrete Time Series. Llnstone, H. & Turoff, M. (Eds.) The DelPrentice-Hall, N.J., 1963. phi Method. Techniques and ApplicaClarkson, A. Toward Effective Strategic tlons. Addison-Wesley, Mass., 1975.

Analysis. Westview Press, Boulder, Lorayne, H. & Lucas, J. The Memory

Colorado, 1981. Book. Ballantine Books, 1975.

Clauser, J.K. & Weir, S.M. Intelligence

Research Methodology. Defense Intelli- Mager, R.F. Goal Analysis Fearon Publ.,

gence School. Washington, D.C., 1975. Calif., 1972.

Griffith, D. A Review of Literature on Marples, D.L. Argument and Technique

Memory Enhancement: The Potential and in the Solution of Problems in MechanRelevance of mnemotechnics for M/ii- ics and Electricity. Cambridge Univertary Training. AD A086 407. Dec., sity, 1974.

1979. Martino, J.P. Technological Forecasting

Handbook of Forecasting Techniques. for Decisionmaking. American Elsevier,

Defense Technical Information Center. New York, 1972.

Technical Report, 1975. Nlrenberg, J.S. Getting through to PeoHeuer, R.J. A Problem Solving Perspec- pie. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1973.

tive on the Role of Methodology In Problem Solving Techniques for IntelliGovernment Foreign Affairs Analysis. gence Analysts. Problem Solving HandPaper, Washington, D.C. 1978. book Project. ORD/ACS, 1981.

Jackson, K.F. The Art of Solving Prob- Polya, G. How to Solve it. Doubleday,

lems. Morrison & Gibb, Ltd., London, New York, 1957.

1975.

Quade, E.S. Analysis for Military Deci- Jansons. Rand McNally, Chicago, II., 1964.

A Psychological Analysis of Conflict,

Choice, and Commitment. Free Press, Raiffa, H. Decision Analysis AddisonNew York, 1977. Wesley, Mass., 1968.

Jantach, E. Technological Forecasting Rubinstein, M. & Pfeiffer, K. Concepts

In Perspective. Organization for in Problem-Solving. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,

Economic Cooperation and Development, New Jersey, 1980.

Paris, France, 1967. Steiner, G.A. Top Management Planning.

MacMillan, New York, 1969.

G-18

...........
VanGundy, A.B. Techniques of Structured

Problem Solving. Van Nostrand Reinhold

Co., New York, 1981.

Wickelgren, W.A. How to Solve Problems: Elements of a Theory of Problems

and Problem Solving. Freeman, San

Francisco, 1974.

Zeldman, M. Keeping Technical Projects

on Target. AMA Management Briefing,

American Management Association,

1978.

G-19
APPENDIX H

Worksheet for Identifying

Informational Value of Data

I
APPENDIX H.

IDENTIFYING THE INFORMATIONAL

VALUE OF DATA

Data have Informational value to the 3. For the first piece of Information,

extent that they help you to differen- place a checkmark under the "suptiate between hypotheses you are ports", "refutes", or "neither supevaluating and to the extent that they ports nor refutes" column for each

support or refute a given hypothesis. A of the hypotheses.

piece of information has maximum value

4. Look at the pattern of checkmarks for discriminating between twofothtie an dtrmeit

hypohese whn Itsuportsonefor that Item and determine its

hypotheses when it supports one Informational value. Use "++", "4+",

hypothesis and refutes the other. and "0" to rate the information, as

When the Information supports both suggested In the sample

hypotheses, It is not useful for evaluat- worksheet, or develop your own

Ing the likelihood of one hypothesis numerical rating system.

relative to the other. Of course the

Information may be valuable for other 6. Repeat steps 3 and 4 for all other

reasons, but in this case it is not helpful pieces of Information.

In differentiating between the two

hypotheses you are currently evaluat- Once you have filled in the worksheet,

ing. you can use the "informational value"

column to Identify those pieces of inforThe sample worksheet included in this mation that are most useful for difappendix (Table H-i) is one technique ferentiating between your hypotheses.

for evaluating and keeping track of the For purposes of determining which

Informational value of data. You can hypothesis if more likely to be correct,

develop and use your own worksheet the most weight should be given to the

by following these simple steps: information with the highest informal. In the left-hand column list the tional value. If there is insufficient evipieces of information or data that dence to select one hypothesis over

you have to evaluate, another, you will need to gather more

information. The type of information you

2. Along the top of the worksheet list gather should be carefully chosen for

the two or more hypotheses that its potential to discriminate between

you are evaluating, hypotheses.

H-1
0=0

z0 z

0a

00

* 0

C. 0 0

c go

0 0

to 6. - 4 40. 0

00

0 t

o

00

1m-
7- 7-.-.

APPENDIX I

Courses Available for Strategic

Analysis Training pt

.. . . . . . . . . ........
APPENDIX I

COURSES AVAILABLE FOR STRATEGIC

ANALYSIS TRAINING

1. introduction 2. Education and Training: Local

This appendix describes a wide variety institutions

of courses and training programs that

are available in the metropolitan Wash- a. The American University (AU)

Ington, D.C. area. Likewise, the institu- Massachusetts and Nebraska Avetions and courses listed can help you nues NW

Increase your ability to "think red". Washington, D. C. 20016

While academically oriented, these pro- Registration: (202) 686-2200

grams will help you round out your b. The Catholic University (CUA)

expertise and assist you in the 620 Michigan Avenue NE

development of a broader understand- 60Mhign Avnu NE

Ing of the political and military environ- Washington, D. C. 20064

ment within which military force is c. Defense Intelligence College

employed. Anacostla Naval Station Annex

This list is not 1 inclusive. It is partic- Washington, D. C. 20374

ularly lacking In the more technicallyoriented areas. The courses Included d. Foreign Service Institute (FSI)

are likewise not necessarily required 1400 Key Boulevard

for your own personalized training Arlington, Virginia 22209

schedule, but are simply an aggregation Information: (202) 235-8727

of what is locally available. What Is e. George Mason University (GMU) important is that you review these and 4400 University Drive

begin to think about your own deficien- 4400 VirityaDrive

cles In training and experience and set Fairfax, Virginia 22030

up a program to address them. Registration: (703) 323-2141

In compiling this information, course f. George Washington University

names and descriptions were taken (GWU)

2121 "I" Street NW directly out of the course catalogs of

the Institutions that were considered. Washington, D.C. 20052

There is therefore no guarantee that Registration: (202) 676-6286

the Information is 100 percent accu- g. Georgetown University (GTU)

rate. Times, dates, prerequisites, 37th and "0" Streets NW

registration Information, etc., have not Washington, D. C. 20057

been Included since they are subject to Registration: (202) 625-4373

frequent change. If you are interested h. University of Maryland (UM)

in taking a particular course it is up to College Park Campus

you to seek out this kind of information. College Park Mara 24

The information provided here should Registration (301) 454-5559

give you a good start.

p--

I-
3. Courses for the Strategic Analyst * Foreign Policies of the Great Powers

(AU) 33.381

The course listings below are grouped a Functional Problems in international

Into the following topical categories: Relations - Comparative Systems

* International Relations (UM) GVPT 401

* National/Internatonal Security a Perspective on World Affairs (GTU) IA 106

• U.S. Foreign Policy a Seminar In International Relations

• Ideology and Political Thought Theory (UM) GVPT 706

* Quantitative Methods of Analysis

a Cognitive Training 3.2 National/international Security

a Government and Public Administration These core courses deal with domestic

* Area Studies or International Issues that have an

-- Eastern Europe and the USSR Impact upon the security of the U.S. and

the world. Topics will frequently Include

- Asia and the PRC trade, economic stability, resources,

- The Third World terrorism, warfare, technology, arms

control, and nuclear proliferation.

- The Middle East and North Africa These courses may also include discussions of national or International security organizations and mechanisms.

Africa American 450 Defense Policy (GTU) IA

3.1 International Relations a American Defense and Security PolIcy (AU) 33.384

Typically these courses focus upon

modern thought in International Rela- H Arms and Men": Aspects of War in

tions theory, contemporary International History (AU) 29.20

political and economic Issues, compara- a Conflict and Security In International

tlve politics and foreign policy Affairs (GTU) IA 123

decision-making. • Developmental Conflicts and Political

* Advanced International Relations Change (AU) 53.631

(GMU) 340 a Economic Issues and National Secu-

• Comparative Study of Foreign Policy rity (CUA) Pol 567

(UM) GVPT 450

a Energy and National Security (GTU)

a Comparative Politics: change IA 121

Leadership, Participation (AU)

53.230 a Interdependence, Scarcity and

Power (AU) 53.331

• Contemporary Theories and Con- Coteptoray ITeor iendl R on- • International Conflict and Conflict

cepts of International Relations Resolution (AU) 33.588 (CUA) Pol 631

• Foreign Policy and Analysis (GMU) a The International Politics of the

Govt 44 Atlantic Alliance (CUA) Pol 575

1-2
• International Security Affairs (CUA) American foreign policy. Emphasis may

Pol 534 be on the central Issues, history, and

e Issues in International Security roots of American foreign policy and

Salso Include the study of the domestic (GMU) Govt 444 mechanisms and Influences on the con-

* Law Morality and War (UM) GVPT duct of foreign affairs. Several courses

403 focus upon comparative approach to the

e Military Force and Foreign Policy analysis of U.S. Foreign policy.

(GWU) PS 149 a American Foreign Policy (GMU) Govt

344

e National Security and Arms Control

(FSI) P107 • The Analysis of United States

* The National Foreign Intelligence Foreign Policy (AU) 33.382

Community (DIC) SM605 • Elements In Foreign Policy Making

e National Security Decision-Making (GTU) IA 134

(GTU) IA 350 * Intelligence and Foreign Policy (FSI)

P104

e National Security Policy (AU) 33.684

e Revolution and Violence (AU) 53.431 e Seminar In Policy Analysis (AU)

33.489

e Science, Technology and World United States Foreign Policy (AU)

Order (GWU) PS 252 33.682

e Seminar on the Cold War (GTU) IA 444 * United States Foreign Policy (CUA)

444 •Poi 535

e Seminar: Contemporary Military Stra- a United States in World Affairs (AU)

tegy (CUA) Pol 736 33.583

e Seminar in History of Modern Wars

(UM) HIST 859

e Seminar: International Politics of the 3.4 Ideology and Political Thought

Atlantic Alliance (CUA) Pol 704 These courses trace the development

9 Seminar in National Security Policy and practice of contemporary theories

(UM) GVPT 878 of political thought and practice. They

* Strategic Intelligence and World Include such topics as marxism, fasPower (GTU) iA 377 cism, totalitarianism, corporatism and

pluralism.

e Twentieth Century Wars and Change * Authoritarian Regimes: Generals,

(AU) 29328 Presidents and Kings (AU) 53.430

e U.S. Nation Security Policy (GWU) PS

248 * Communism in Non-Communist Europe

(GWU) PS 263

* War and the Military in American Life -(GMU) 413, 414 • Current Problems in Political Theory (UM) GVPT 848

* History and Politics of the Interna3.3 Foreign Policy tional Communist Movement (CUA)

F g lPol 637

These courses provide an introduction (UM) GVPT

to the formation and implementation of 845

1-3
o Modern Communist Ideologies (GWU) e Political Science Research (AU)

PS 108 63.610 I)

* Non-Western Political Thought (UM) e Quantitative Analysis (DIC) SS350 GVPT 448 4 Quantitative Methods for Political

a Readings in Socialism and Commun- Science (UM) GVPT 622

ism (GWU) PS 207 o Quantitative Political Analysis (UM)

* Readings In Marxism-Leninism (GWU) GVPT 422

PS 208 * Scope and Method of Political Sci-

* Seminar in Non-Western Political once (UM) GVPT 700

Theory (UM) GVPT 847 * Scope and Methods of Political Sci-

* Theories of Democracy (UM) GVPT ence (GWU) PS 101

846 * Social Science Methodology (CUA)

* Theories of International Politics PSY 705, 708

(GWU) PS 240 e Statistical Methods I, II (CUA) ASY

705, 706

SQuantitative Methods of Analysis Statistics for Analysts and Managers

(DIC) SS850

The fastest growing analysis discipline

is in the area of quantitative methodolo- a Rsh Desgn Metods

gies. These courses tend to emphasize and Research Design (CUA) Pol 525

the application of such techniques for

bivariate and multivariate analysis such low

as correlation, regression, discrimlnant 3.6 Strategic Intelligence Operations

analysis, factor analysis, and analysis D

of variance. Many of these courses

also stress concepts and approaches to

research, the philosophy and benefits o Communicative Skills for Intelligence

of scientific Inquiry, research design, Operations (DIC) S0201

hypothesis catins. testing, and computer appil- I

Intelligence Analyst Course (IAC) (DIC) S0300

o Advanced Quantitative Methods for Intelligence Collection Management

Political Science (UM) GVPT 722 Course CoreC (ICMC) cio) (DIC) S S0305ngmt

a Applied Foreign Policy Analysis (UM) GVPT 850 9 Scientific and Technical Intelligence

Analyst Introductory (DIC) S0350

o Aspects of Probability Theory for the o indications and Warning Course

Intelligence Analyst (l&W) (DIC) S0380

o Conduct of Political Inquiry and R Introduction to Intelligence Produc- tion and Analysis (DIC) S0402

9 Empirical Political Analysis (GWU) PS 102 a Intelligence Operations Overview

(DIC) So600

9 Introduction to Political Research (AU) Survey of Intelligence Collection

(DIC) S0603

9 Methods of Multivariate Statistics

(CUA) PSY 760

1-4

- %"-, o",o . . . . o, -- . .. o-.. . . . . .

" '" . .... .. .-. "-.. i..- -:. . . " ---.....--..... , .-... .. . . . .. .. . .:. . .. .. , .. .-, ... , .. .** . ... ,. .- , , .,.,, -,-. .. .. ,. . .-- . . .
e Advanced Methods of Intelligence * Contemporary East Europe (AU)

Collection (DIC) S0604 33.259

* Introduction to National Intelligence a Contemporary Russia (AU) 33.258

Productlon(DIC) S0606 . Early Russian History 988-1700 (AU)

* Advanced Estimative Intelligence 29230

(DIC) 80621 * Eastern Europe Since 1815 (AU)

* Scientific and Technical Intelligence 29.314

1 (DIC) S0852 * Foreign Policy of the USSR (UM)

* Scientific and Technical Intelligence GVPT 451

1(DIC) S0653 a The Government and Politics of

e Introduction to Indications and Warn- Eastern Europe (CUA) Pol 586

Ing Intelligence and Terrorism (DIC) 80680 • The Government and Administration

of the Soviet Union (UM) GVPT 481

* The Government and Politics of the

3.7 Government and Public Soviet Union (CUA) Pol 585

Administration * The History of Russia to 1801 (UM)

• Bureaucratic Power and Decision HIST 424

Modeling (AU) 53.360 * The History of Russia from 1801 -

e Leadership fcr Human Resource 1917 (UM) HIS 425

Development (AU) 54.640 * Imperial Russia 1700 - 1917 (AU)

e The Machiavellianism and Modern 29.231

Organization (AU) 53.460 @ International Relations of the Soviet

• Readings In Organizational Theory Union (AU) 33.859

(CUA) Pol 522 & Introduction to Soviet Armed Forces

(DIC) SA462

* Modern Balkan History (UM) HIST

3.8 Area Studies 442

As an ITAC analyst you will undoubtedly * Modern Russia and the Soviet Union

be tasked to examine aspects of a (GMU) HIST 329

foreign military system, doctrine, armed

forces organization, tactics, capabili- Russian Political Thought (UM) GVPT

ties, etc. As noted in Chapter 4, the

analyst who has a broad knowledge 9 The Russian Revolution and the Oriabout an enemy will have an advantage gins of the Soviet State (GMU) HIST

over the analyst who does not. The fol- 746

lowing course listings are broken down * Russian Studies (AU) A)23529345

according to geographic area.

* Seminar In Russian History (UM) HIST

849

3.8.1 Eastern Europe and the USSR 9 Seminar in East European History

a Contemporary Governmental Institu- (UM) HIST 850

tions - Soviet Union (UM) GVPT 881 * Soviet Foreign Policy (GWU) PS 168

I-5

. I& P

r .. -S! II 1 .. _ • _ ' . ,. , , , . o ,
. . ..  ,o. . .. . .. . . ...

" Soviet Military Policy and Strategy e Modern Asia (AU) 29.250

(GWU) PS 269 * Modern China (AU) 33.561

e Soviet Political System (AU) 33.558 e Modern China (BMU) HiST 354

* The Soviet Union in World Affairs

(AU) 33.359 * People's Republic of China (FSI)

R1 03

* Soviet Union, 1917 to Present (AU) * Recent Asian Politics

29.232

9 Soviet-West European Relations e South Asia (FSI) R108

(GTU) IA 136 a Survey of China (DIC) SA401

3.8.2 Asia and the PRC 3.8.3 The Third World

e Asian Power Rivalries (AU) 33.366 * Seminar In the Politics of Developing

e Comparative Governmental Institu- Nations (UM) GVPT 887

tions: Asia (UM) APTV 883 * Third World Politics (AU) 53.231

* Contemporary East Asia (AU) 33.261

* Contemporary South Asia (AU) 3.8.4 The Middle East and North

33.263 Africa

* East Asia (FSI) R104

a Comparative Governmental

" Foreign Policy of the PRC (GWU) PS Institutions-Middle East (UM) GVPT

272 885

a Governments of Japan and Korea e Contemporary Middle East (AU)

(GWU) PS 276 33.264

a Government and Politics of Asia e The Contemporary Middle East (UM)

(GMU) Govt 333 HIST 492

* Government and Politics of Asia (UM) e Contemporary Middle Eastern Politics

GVPT 483 (UM) GVPT 455

e Government and Politics of South e The Cultural History of the Islamic

Asia (UM) GVPT 487 World (GMU) HIST 783

e History of Chinese Communism (UM) e Government and Politics of the MidHIST 486 die East and North Africa (GMU) Govt

332

e History of Modern China (UM) HIST

481 * Government and Politics of North

Africa (GWU) PS 28

9 International Politics of Asia (CUA)

Pal 671 * Government and Politics of the Mid-

" International Politics of the Far East die East (UM) GVPT 485

(GWU) PS 275 e International Relations of the Middle

e International Relations of East Asia East 1,11 (AU) 331.571

II (AU) 33.567 e International Relations of the Middle

* International Relations of Southeast East (GWU) PS 178

Asia (AU) 33.569 3

i-

""I-
• The Middle East In the 20th Century • Latin America Since Independence

(GMU) Pol 465 (AU) 29.242

* The Modern Arab World (AU) 33.564 * Survey of Latin America (DIC) SA401

" Near East and North Africa (FSI) * United States Policy in the Western

R107 Hemisphere (CUA) POL 574

" Politics and Foreign Policy in the

Middle East (GTU) IA 132

" Survey of the Middle East (DIC)

SA421 e Africa, Sub-Sahara (FSI) R101

e African International Relations (GTU)

357

3.8.5 Latin America 3 Comparative Governmental Instltua Contemporary Latin America (AU) tions - Africa (UM) 33.276 3 Contemporary Africa (AU) 33.265

* Diplomacy and War in Latin America

(GMU) HIST 470 e Contemporary African Politics (UM)

GVPT 454

a Diplomatic History of Latin America (UM) HIST 470 a Economic History of West Africa

(UM) HIST 497

* Government and Politics of Latin Government and Politics of Africa

America (GMU) Govt 331 (UM) GVPT 484

e Government and Politics of Latin

America e A History of West Africa (UM) HIST

496

• Government and Politics of Latin

America (UM) GVPT 482 * Topics in African Politics (GWU) PS

281

History of the Argentine Republic

(UM) HIST 472 a International Relations of Africa I, II

e History of Argentina, Brazil and Chile (AU) 33.573

(GMU) HIST 363 * U.S. African Relations (GTU) IA 11 7

e History of Brazil (UM) HIST 471

9 History of Mexico and Central America I, II (UM) HIST 474

e History of the Spanish Caribbean

(UM) HIST 473

* Inter-American Relations (UM) GVP

452

e International Relations of Latin AmerIca I, II (AU) 33.577

e International Relations of Latin America (GWU) PS 284

e Latin America (FSI) R106

1-7

.°..o ". -... ""°"%% % . " ". ". ". °" " °" ". ". ". .**" " .% ." ." o " 'm' .""P ". . " % "" "" "" ". ". "." " " " ° qD "q " . " 1" . - "- • ° 
Index
INDEX

TOPIC PAGE

Analysis

Create Information from Sparse Data 4-4

First Step In Problem Solving 4-3

Mental Process 4-4

Army Intelligence System 0-2

Army Studies and Analysis Community Organizations 0-3

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) D-2

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) D-2

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) D-1

Forecasts 4-5

ITAC

Configuration A-2

Consumers 2-4

Commander A-3

Foreign Forces Capabilities Directorate A-4

Goal 2-5

History of 2-1

Intelligence Production Directorate A-5

Mission 2-3

Products

Army Intelligence Survey (AIS) C-3

Army Threat Studies C-7

Capstone Studies C-1

Counter Intelligence Production C-6

Environmental Studies C I

Hostile Intelligence Service/Foreign Intelligence

Security Service (HOIS/FISS) Threat C-8

Long Range Planning Estimate (LRPE) C-1

Quality 3-1

Non-US-NATO Production C-8

Resources used in 2-4

Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP) C-4

Special Studies C-6

Strategic Overviews C-2

System Threats C-7

Standard 2-4

Support Management Directorate A-8

Technical Services Directorate A-7

Task Organization B-1

Values 2-4

Welcome To 1-1

IND-1
INDEX CONT'D

TOPIC PAGE )

Methodology

Anomalous Event Matrix (ANEM) G-9

Assumptions, Identifying E-1

Bayesian Analysis G-9

Brainstorming G-9

Breakthrough G-9

Canonical Trend Variation G-10

Change Signals Monitoring G-10

Cognitive Biases E-4

Communication Skills E- 16

Cost Benefit Analysis G-10

Critical Event Filters (CEF) G-10

Cross Impact Analysis G-1 1

Cut and Paste G-1 1

Decision Event Networks (DEN) G-11

Decision-making Strategies E-15

Decision Theory G-1 1

Delphi G-1 1

Dynamic Model G-12

Exponential Smoothing G-12

Fault Tree 5-13

For Strategic Analysis 5-1

Step 1. Understanding the Intelligence Requirement 5-3

Step 2. Prepare an Initial Intelligence Survey 5-4

Step 3. Select an Analytic Methods 5-8

Step 4. Execute the Analytic Method 5-10

Step 5. Prepare a Revised Intelligence Assessment 5-12

Step 6. Produce a Report of the Production Results 5-14

Game Theory G-12

Goal Analysis G-12

Historical Analogy G-12

Intuitive Analysis G-12

KSIM G-1 3

Leading Indicator G-13

LRPE G-13

Mission Flow Diagrams G-13

Multi-Attribute Utility (MAU) G-1 3

PAMNACS G-14

Panels G-14

Precursor Events G-14

Probabilistic Forecasting 6-14

Problem-Solving Skills E-7

Probability Assessment E-11

Regression G-15

IND-2

........................................ .. *_ .. ~ % ~ . *** . * .. -,-.. . . % % *
INDEX CONT'D

* TOPIC PAGE

Relevance Trees G-1 4

Scenarios G- 15

Scientific Method G-15

Social Trend Analysis G-16

Synectics G-1 6

Systems Analysis G-16

Time Lines G-16

Trend Extrapolation G-1 6

War Gaming G-17

Management of Strategic Intelligence Production 3-1

Information Resources 3-2

Requirements 3-3

Periodicals 6-3

Projections 4-5

National Security Agency (NSA) D-2

Resources

Analysts 3-2

Collection Systems 3-2

Data Bases 6-2

Information Repositories 3-3

Library, Exploitation of 6-2

Personal Information Networks 2-4

Production Multipliers 3-4

Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Conducting 4-8

Definition 4-1

Goal of (ITAC) 4-1

Introduction to 4-1

Know the Enemy -- Think Red 4-8

Know the Environment - Think White 4-10

Know our Programs and Capabilities -- Think Blue 4-10

Levels of 4-6

Nature of 4-3

Tactical Intelligence Analysis 4-2

Universities I-1

I- 102485

*D IND-3

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