UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4704

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRAQUAN MALIK HENDERSON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00134-HEH-1)

Submitted: October 20, 2023 Decided: November 28, 2023

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate 

Attorney, John S. Martin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States 

Attorney, Kenneth R. Simon, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Traquan Malik Henderson appeals his conviction entered pursuant to his guilty plea 

to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his 

motion to suppress the firearm seized from him during an investigative stop. We affirm.

In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. United 

States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008). The facts are reviewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th 

Cir. 2007).

An officer may conduct an investigatory detention or seizure only where the officer 

has “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be 

afoot.’” United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Reasonable suspicion requires more than an 

“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”; however, reasonable suspicion may 

be based on inferences made on the basis of police experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

27 (1968). When reviewing the constitutionality of an investigatory stop, we consider 

whether the totality of the circumstances gave the officer a “particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting a legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 805 (4th 

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Here, Officer Moses Railey detained Henderson and recovered the gun, an attached 

extended magazine,1 and a separate standard magazine when he saw Henderson walking 

down the street towards him. We find that Railey had reasonable suspicion that Henderson 

was carrying a concealed weapon and/or a weapon with an extended magazine in violation 

of Virginia law. See United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2008) (reasonable 

suspicion that weapon was concealed in pocket in Virginia tantamount to reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity); Mayo, 361 F.3d at 807-08 (same). This reasonable 

suspicion arose from the following circumstances that either the district court credited 

based on Railey’s testimony, were undisputed at the hearing, or are commonsense 

conclusions:

2 (1) an extended magazine was clearly visible in Henderson’s waistband; (2) a 

1 We use the term “extended magazine” to mean a magazine longer than a usual 

magazine. However, we recognize that, under Virginia law, the length of the magazine is 

not determinative. Instead, the relevant factor is how many rounds of ammunition the 

magazine holds. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-287.4 (prohibiting, subject to exception, 

possession of certain loaded firearms equipped with a magazine that will hold more than 

20 rounds of ammunition) Nonetheless, because a longer magazine can hold more of the 

same type of ammunition than a shorter magazine, the length of the magazine is a factor to 

be considered regarding reasonable suspicion. 

2 Even though we review the district court’s legal determination of reasonable 

suspicion de novo, “due weight” must be given to the “inferences drawn from th[e] facts 

by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 699 (1996). The district court’s “commonsense” conclusions based on “the distinctive 

features and events of the community” and Railey’s experience and expertise “provide a 

context” for the inferences drawn and “deserve deference.” Id. at 695, 699-700 (noting 

that the district court’s assessment can be properly based on “background facts” that are 

not themselves the “subject of explicit findings”). 

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small portion of the butt of a pistol appeared to be attached to the magazine;3 (3) Henderson 

attempted to hide the magazine by pushing it into his pants and keeping his hand on it; 

(4) the “cant” of the magazine and the way it responded to Henderson’s attempt to push it 

into his pants were indicative of the magazine being attached to a firearm; (5) the officer’s 

experience with the particular gun in question, Virginia firearm offenses, and the specific 

high-crime area gave him insight into how those violating Virginia firearm laws generally 

behaved; (6) those legally carrying do not generally attempt to hide a firearm; (7) standard 

magazines are less likely to extend past the butt of firearm; (8) magazines are generally not 

carried in the waistband, unless they are attached to a firearm; and (9) Henderson was in 

an area known specifically for gun violence. 

Henderson first argues that Railey’s “essentially instantaneous decision” resulted in 

a “knee-jerk response” that did not permit “the critical thinking necessary to separate 

innocent pedestrians from suspicious ones.” (Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 16) at 26-27). 

However, Henderson cites to no bright line rule regarding the amount of time required to 

develop reasonable suspicion. Moreover, we have found that reasonable suspicion existed 

in a case where police seized a person suspected of trespassing “five to ten seconds” after 

seeing him. United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 2013).

3 The district court noted that Railey did not mention seeing any part of the firearm 

in his related state court testimony and ruled that its decision would be the same even if 

Railey had not seen the firearm. While Henderson contends that the district court did not 

make a factual finding that Railey saw part of the firearm, the court’s order makes it clear 

that the court made a factual finding that Railey saw what appeared to be a small portion 

of a firearm. (See J.A. 191 (“the relevant facts are as follows”)). 

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Henderson next argues that we should consider Railey’s changing story regarding 

whether he saw a firearm in Henderson’s waistband. Specifically, in state court, Railey 

stated that he saw a magazine without mentioning whether he saw a part of the firearm or 

not. He also averred that he did not see the outline of a firearm. Conversely, in federal 

court, Railey testified that he saw a “small corner” of the butt of the firearm. (J.A. 126-27). 

Even assuming that these statements are in direct conflict, we find that court’s decision to 

credit Railey’s testimony at the federal hearing was not clearly erroneous, and we, 

therefore, defer to the district court’s credibility determination. See United States v. Pulley, 

987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that this court may not reverse the district 

court’s finding of fact simply because it would have found differently); see also United 

States v. Holly, 983 F.3d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that credibility determinations 

are “virtually unreviewable on appeal” and cannot be overturned absent finding that 

testimony is “so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it”).

Henderson also relies on this court’s recent decision in United States v. Peters, 60 

F.4th 855 (4th Cir. 2023). Peters was walking down a sidewalk with another man, when 

officers approached them, accused them of trespass, and requested that they lift their shirts 

to show that they were unarmed. Peters was seized when he refused to do so. Id. at 859. 

The officer testified that he stopped Peters to investigate trespass based solely on Peters’ 

earlier arrest for trespass. Id. at 864. We determined that a prior trespass arrest alone could 

not satisfy reasonable suspicion, and the fact that a confidential informant provided an 

unverified tip that Peters sold drugs in a building near which he was stopped did not 

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significantly elevate the officer’s suspicion. Id. at 866. We ruled that the officer’s 

suspicion that Peters was armed was improperly based on Peters’ “skinny jeans” (known 

to be worn in order to “wedge” a firearm in the waistband), Peters’ refusal to lift his shirt 

when requested to do so, and Peters’ presence in a public housing community. Id. at 868. 

We find that the cases are distinguishable on material bases. Most importantly, here, 

Railey saw an extended magazine clearly visible in Henderson’s waistband. In addition, 

the officer saw a small portion of the butt of a firearm, and the angle of the magazine 

indicated that it was attached to a firearm. Further, after seeing the officers, Henderson

attempted to hide the magazine from the officers’ view. Finally, the officer testified that, 

based on his experience, those legally carrying firearms do not carry unattached magazines 

in their waistbands and do not attempt to hide their firearms. These additional factors, 

which when considered together are significant, were not present in Peters, where the 

officer did not see any physical indicia that Peters was concealing a firearm. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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