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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

TIMOTHY H. COOPER, 

 Case No. 2:12-cv-0825 

 Plaintiffs, JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King 

v. 

 

THE COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK, et al., 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the following filings: 

1. The separate motions for summary judgment of Defendants Sean Martin (ECF No. 

56), The Commercial Savings Bank (ECF No. 57), and Charles Bartholomew (ECF 

No. 59); 

2. Plaintiff Timothy H. Cooper’s consolidated memorandum contra Defendants’ 

motions (ECF No. 61); 

3. The reply memorandum of Defendant Bartholomew (ECF No. 62) and the joint reply 

memorandum of Defendants Martin and The Commercial Savings Bank (ECF No. 

63) in support of summary judgment; and 

4. Plaintiff’s motion for class certification (ECF No. 49) and Defendants’ responses 

thereto (ECF Nos. 52, 53). 

For the reasons set forth in detail below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for 

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s federal claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and therefore DISMISSES them without prejudice 

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to refiling in state court. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification. 

I. 

 This case arises out of a cognovit judgment entered against Plaintiff in July 2011 in the 

Wyandot County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights in connection with their roles as creditor (The Commercial Savings Bank), 

creditor’s attorney (Defendant Martin), and confessing attorney (Defendant Bartholomew). 

Plaintiff also alleges a number of state-law tort claims in connection with the same conduct. 

 In July 2011, Defendant Bartholomew received a request to act as the confessing attorney 

to confess judgment on a cognovit note, for which Defendant Commercial Savings Bank was the 

obligee. Plaintiff was the debtor on the cognovit note. Bartholomew reviewed the 

documentation of the note to confirm that the note contained the warning required by statute and 

to confirm the amount of delinquency on the loan.1

 Defendant Martin, the creditor’s attorney, 

brought the original paperwork to Bartholomew, who signed the confession of judgment 

pursuant to the terms of the cognovit note. In an affidavit, Bartholomew testified that he 

believed Wyandot County was the proper venue for the action to obtain the cognovit judgment 

against Plaintiff. (Bartholomew Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 59-1.) 

 Shortly after the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas entered the cognovit judgment 

against him, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules 

of Civil Procedure. The common pleas court granted Plaintiff’s motion, vacated the cognovit 

 

1 Under Ohio law, a warrant of attorney to confess judgment on a cognovit note must contain the 

following language: “Warning -- By signing this paper you give up your right to notice and court trial. If 

you do not pay on time a court judgment may be taken against you without your prior knowledge and the 

powers of a court can be used to collect from you regardless of any claims you may have against the 

creditor whether for returned goods, faulty goods, failure on his part to comply with the agreement, or any 

other cause.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.13(D). 

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judgment, and dismissed the case. Plaintiff obtained relief based on the fact that the Wyandot 

County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on the cognovit note under 

Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.13. Pursuant to that statute, an attorney confessing judgment on a 

cognovit note must do so in the county where the maker resides or the county where the warrant 

of attorney was signed. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.13(A). Plaintiff did not execute the note in 

Wyandot County; nor did Plaintiff reside in Wyandot County. 

 Plaintiff claims to have incurred $2,616.34 in legal fees and other costs resulting from the 

wrongful filing of the cognovit proceeding in Wyandot County. (Cooper Aff. ¶ 22, ECF No. 28.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that the scenario that played out against him — Defendants obtaining a 

cognovit judgment in the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas when that court lacked 

jurisdiction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.13 — was not a unique occurrence. Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants did that not only to him, but have done so generally between the years of 1986 

and 2011. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff alleges that there has been an arrangement 

for several years in which The Commercial Savings Bank and Martin would file complaints for 

cognovit judgments against Bank customers and that Bartholomew (or other attorneys) would be 

engaged to sign and file answers confessing judgment in Wyandot County even though venue 

was not proper there. (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

 Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in September 2012. In his amended 

complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants deprived 

him of property without due process of law. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81-93.) The amended complaint 

also contains state law claims for abuse of process, negligence, civil conspiracy, and malicious 

prosecution. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for class certification (ECF No. 49) and seeks to 

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proceed in this action on behalf of himself and others against whom Defendants have allegedly 

obtained invalid cognovit judgments. 

II. 

Summary judgment is proper where no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a 

motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). 

III. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint relies upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to invoke the Court’s federal 

question jurisdiction. Section 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . . 

Thus, in order to assert valid § 1983 claims, Plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a right 

secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that a person acting 

under color of state law caused the deprivation. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 

2003); see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim under § 1983 fails as a matter of law because he 

cannot establish the requisite “state action” on their part. Indeed, none of the Defendants is 

alleged to be a government official or other agent of the state. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that 

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private parties like Defendants can be deemed state actors because “[p]rivate use of state laws 

such as garnishment, attachment, replevin, and by extension, cognovit proceedings, can 

constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Pl.’s Memo Contra, ECF No. 61, at PageID# 

619.) 

A. Ohio’s Statutory Procedure for Cognovit Judgments 

At the root of Plaintiff’s claims in this case is the allegation that Defendants wrongfully 

obtained a confession of judgment pursuant to a cognovit note. A cognovit is “ ‘the ancient legal 

device by which the debtor consents in advance to the holder’s obtaining a judgment without 

notice or hearing, and possibly even with the appearance, on the debtor’s behalf, of an attorney 

designated by the holder.’” Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Five Star Fin. Corp., 195 Ohio App. 

3d 42, 2011-Ohio-2476, 958 N.E. 2d 964, at ¶ 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (quoting D.H. Overmyer 

Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 176 (1972)). “The purpose of a cognovit note is to allow the 

holder of the note to obtain judgment quickly and without a trial.” Klosterman v. Turnkey-Ohio, 

L.L.C., 182 Ohio App.3d 515, 913 N.E. 2d 993, 2009-Ohio-2508, at ¶ 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 

Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2323.12 and 2323.13 govern an Ohio trial court’s jurisdiction over 

cognovit notes. Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.12 authorizes judgments by confession and § 2323.13 

“provides for warrants of attorney, which may authorize an attorney to confess judgment against 

a defendant without prejudgment notice.” Merchants Bank & Trust at ¶ 7. The statutory 

requirements must be met in order for a court to have subject-matter jurisdiction and for a valid 

judgment to be granted upon a cognovit note. Id. See also Huntington Nat’l Bank v. 199 S. Fifth 

St. Co., LLC, No. 10AP-1082, 2011-Ohio-3707, at ¶ 20 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (noting the 

“general rule that we construe the statutory requirements strictly against the party seeking the 

cognovit judgment due to the extraordinary nature of the proceedings”). 

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In this case, Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to follow the statutory requirements 

and therefore obtained a void cognovit judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 

Defendants wrongfully obtained judgment in a county where Plaintiff neither resided nor signed 

the warrant of attorney. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2323.13(A). Plaintiff has made a federal case out 

of it, asserting that Defendants deprived him of his rights to due process of law under the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 87, 92.) As none of 

Defendants is a government official, the obvious question becomes whether they somehow 

engaged in state action in obtaining the cognovit judgment of which Plaintiff complains. 

B. State Action 

It is true that under certain circumstances, a private party who invokes a state procedure 

may become a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 

U.S. 922 (1982). In Lugar, the Supreme Court developed a two-part inquiry, both parts of which 

must be satisfied, before a private party’s act is deemed state action: 

First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege 

created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person 

for whom the State is responsible. . . . Second, the party charged with the 

deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may 

be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has 

obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise 

chargeable to the State. Without a limit such as this, private parties could face 

constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing 

their interactions with the community surrounding them. 

Id. at 937. 

 There is no dispute as to the first element of the two-part inquiry: the power to confess 

judgment and for the state court to enter cognovit judgments comes from Ohio Rev. Code §§ 

2313.12 and 2313.13. The question here is whether Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing with 

regard to the second part of the inquiry. For Defendants to be considered state actors, their 

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conduct must somehow be “chargeable to the state.” The mere action by a private party pursuant 

to state statute is not enough to make the private party a “state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938-

39. There must be “something more” in order for a private party’s conduct to be state action. Id.

 The Sixth Circuit utilizes three tests to evaluate whether a private party’s action is 

chargeable to the state and therefore considered state action. These tests are (1) the public 

function test, (2) the state compulsion test, and (3) the symbiotic relationship, or “nexus,” test. 

Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 289 (6th Cir. 2007). The only test possibly applicable here is 

the nexus test.2 “Under the nexus test, the action of a private party constitutes state action when 

there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated 

entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.” Lansing v. 

City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation omitted). 

There is no clear standard for assessing what is a “sufficiently close nexus.” Id. “Rather, the 

Supreme Court reminds us that ‘readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned’ for finding 

state action in civil rights cases; such a finding ‘can be determined only in the framework of the 

peculiar facts or circumstances present.’” Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 

365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961); see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. Under the circumstances present 

here, the Court finds guidance from other cases finding that, as a matter of law, private party 

action related to a confession of judgment is not state action for purposes of § 1983. 

 

2 The public function test “requires that the private entity party exercise powers which are traditionally 

exclusively reserved to the state, such as holding elections or eminent domain.” Lansing v. City of 

Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation omitted); see generally 

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). The state compulsion test “requires that a 

state exercise such coercive power or provide such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 

in law the choice of the private actor is deemed to be that of the state.” Lansing, 202 F.3d at 829 (citation 

and internal quotation omitted). Neither of these tests is applicable to the situation alleged by Plaintiff 

here (i.e., private parties obtaining a cognovit judgment, alleged non-compliance with state law). 

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 The Court is not writing on a completely clean slate on this issue. In Meros v. Kilbane, 

107 F.3d 12 (table), 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2092 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 1997), the Sixth Circuit 

addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff stated a cognizable § 1983 claim against private parties 

in a case where the plaintiff alleged deprivation of his civil rights in connection with two 

cognovit judgments against him. After unsuccessfully moving in the state court to declare the 

cognovit judgments void on grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

filed a § 1983 lawsuit in federal court, naming as defendants the state court judges who presided 

over the cognovit actions and the attorneys who represented the creditor in the actions. 1997 

U.S. App. LEXIS 2092, at *4. The district court dismissed the action as to the private attorney 

defendants, finding that the alleged actions did not amount to state action. Id. at *6. 

 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. Noting that the private attorneys’ 

sole action involved their representation of the debtor in the cognovit actions, the Court found 

that representation of a client, without more, did not amount to state action. Id. Nor did the 

court find a cognizable “conspiracy” under § 1983. “A private party is liable as a state actor for 

purposes of § 1983 if the private party ‘is a willful participate in a joint activity with the State or 

its agents.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). Because 

the plaintiff made only vague and conclusory allegations of conspiracy, he could not establish 

state action. Id. 

The Third Circuit has also addressed the issue of state action in the context of a judgment 

obtained on a cognovit note. In Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d 

Cir. 1994), the plaintiffs sued, among others, attorneys who invoked a “confession of judgment” 

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clause in a commercial lease. Among the issues on appeal in Jordan was the identical state 

action issue involved in this case. Id. at 1254.3

 Applying the state action analysis from the Supreme Court’s holding in Lugar, the Third 

Circuit concluded in Jordan that the private parties (namely, the attorneys and the creditor) were 

not state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability in connection with the confession of judgment. 

Id. at 1266. The state court procedure allowing for confession of judgment was merely the 

mechanism for allowing private conduct. While state procedures permitting private parties to 

file complaints and confess judgment involve acquiescence by the state, such private conduct is 

not attributable to the state and cannot be considered state action. Id. See also Jordan v. Fox, 

Rothschild, O’Brien, and Frankel, 792 F. Supp. 393, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“A state procedure 

permitting private parties to file a complaint and confess judgment essentially involves 

acquiescence by the state, not compulsion. In such circumstances, private conduct is not 

attributable to the state.”). The Third Circuit therefore found that entry of a confessed judgment 

“is not a state action involving the force of law to an extent sufficient to hold that private persons 

become state actors” for purposes of § 1983 liability. 

 This Court sees no reason to decide this case any differently than Meros or Jordan. The 

theory of liability posited by Plaintiff in this case is virtually the same as the theories that the 

Meros and Jordan plaintiffs pursued in their cases. In those cases, the plaintiffs attempted to 

impose civil rights liability upon private parties for their roles in obtaining allegedly wrongful 

cognovit judgments. In both cases, the court found that there was no state action and therefore 

no liability under § 1983. 

 

3 The Third Circuit recited these issues as: “(1) whether a private person becomes a state actor when he 

causes a court’s filing officer to enter a judgment by confession [and] (2) whether entry of judgment by 

confession and execution on it makes the private persons who cause both state actors.” Jordan, 20 F.3d at 

1254. 

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As noted above, under the “nexus” test of determining whether private action can be 

fairly attributable to the state, there must be a “sufficiently close nexus between the state and the 

challenged action” such that the private party’s action “may be fairly treated as that of the state 

itself.” Lansing, 202 F.3d at 830. Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment does not explain 

how there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between Defendants’ actions and the state in the 

cognovit judgment context. Nor does Plaintiff submit any evidence to demonstrate what that 

“nexus” may be. As his basis for state action, Plaintiff simply relies upon the fact that 

Defendants utilized Ohio’s statutory procedure to wrongfully obtain a cognovit judgment in a 

court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render it. Without more, Plaintiff has not shown 

the requisite state action needed for a cognizable claim under § 1983. 

 In his opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff does not cite, much less try to 

distinguish, the holdings in either Meros or Jordan. Instead, Plaintiff cites to Todd v. Weltman, 

Weinberg, and Reis Co., LPA, 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that private 

parties, including attorneys, who use state laws “such as garnishment, attachment, replevin, and 

by extension, cognovit proceedings” can be state actors for purposes of § 1983 and are not 

immune from liability for torts such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process. (Pl.’s Memo 

Contra, ECF No. 61 at PageID# 619.) But Todd is of no help to Plaintiff here. 

 In Todd, the issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether a defendant who commenced 

garnishment proceedings under Ohio law was entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 

certain provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 

1691 et seq. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA by submitting a false 

affidavit in connection with the defendant’s commencement of the garnishment proceeding. 

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Todd, 434 F.3d at 435. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the defendant 

was not entitled to absolute witness immunity for statements made in the affidavit. Id. at 437-46. 

Todd is not on point, for it says nothing about the ability of a plaintiff to hold a private 

party liable under § 1983 for actions taken in a cognovit proceeding. It is true that the Sixth 

Circuit, in its exhaustive analysis of the immunity issue in Todd, recognized the general rule that 

private use of state laws related to garnishment, prejudgment attachment, and replevin cases 

could constitute state action under § 1983. Id. at 439 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 

(1992)); see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 932-35. But despite Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion to the 

contrary, this rule does not apply “by extension” to cognovit proceedings. Unlike the 

circumstances under which garnishment, prejudgment attachment, or replevin by private parties 

are deemed “state action,” the mere action of obtaining a cognovit judgment does not enlist the 

compulsive powers of the state. As the Third Circuit explained in Jordan: 

When the sheriff, on the direct request of [attorney defendants], 

themselves acting, in turn, on instruction from the [creditor defendants], served 

the writ garnishing [the plaintiff’s] checking account at Fidelity, they caused the 

state forcibly to deprive [the plaintiff] of its property without the pre-deprivation 

notice and hearing due process requires. We think their role in this process also 

satisfies Lugar’s and section 1983’s requirement that a private party accused of 

violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights must so act that he can be fairly 

considered to act under color of law. The deprivation about which [the plaintiff] 

now complains was accomplished through use of the state’s attachment and 

garnishment procedures and restrained the garnishee from acting under penalty of 

law. 

Unlike the procedure for entry of a judgment by confession, writs of 

execution and attachment involve actions by state officials that plainly involve or 

threaten the use of legal force. The district court so decided. We agree and hold 

that a judgment creditor who uses Pennsylvania’s procedure for executing on a 

confessed judgment acts under color of law and becomes a state actor under 

Lugar. 

. . . 

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[A] private individual who enlists the compulsive powers of the state to 

seize property by executing on a judgment without pre-deprivation notice or 

hearing acts under color of law and so may be held liable under section 1983 if his 

acts cause a state official to use the state’s power of legal compulsion to deprive 

another of property. 

Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1267. 

 Plaintiff in this case has not forwarded any argument to undercut this analysis, relying 

instead on the conclusory assertion that Defendants may be deemed state actors because private 

parties have been held to be state actors in garnishment, attachment, and replevin proceedings. 

But cognovit proceedings are different. To treat Defendants as state actors for their roles in 

obtaining a cognovit judgment would be nothing more than finding state action based on the 

mere fact that Defendants acted pursuant to a statutory process. But this is not enough to 

constitute state action for purposes of § 1983 liability. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938-39. 

 For these reasons, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants were state actors for 

purposes of § 1983 liability. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s federal claims. 

IV. 

Having found summary judgment appropriate on each of the federal claims alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court must decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s state-law claims for abuse of process, negligence, civil conspiracy, and malicious 

prosecution. Though Defendants move for summary judgment on the merits of these claims, 

Defendants Martin and Commercial Savings Bank also argue that the Court should decline 

jurisdiction over the state law claims if the Court (as it does today) grants summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. For his part, Defendant Bartholomew asks the Court to retain 

jurisdiction over the state-law claims and decide them on summary judgment. 

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state-law claims where, as here, the district court has disposed of all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction. In making the decision whether to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction, a district court should consider and weigh several factors, including the values of 

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 

951-52 (2010) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)); see also

Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). When a district court 

dismisses all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the balance of considerations is likely

to weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Gamel at 952. 

In assessing the factors of judicial economy, fairness, and comity, a district court is 

guided by several specific considerations. Among these are (1) whether the district court should 

avoid needless state law decisions as a matter of comity, (2) whether the district court, in its 

disposition of federal-law claim, resolved a related state-law issue, (3) whether similar predicate 

factual findings are necessary to resolve both the state and the federal claims, (4) whether the 

district court has expended significant time and resources, (5) whether dismissal or remand will 

result in duplicative litigation, (6) whether the matter has been on the district court’s docket for a 

significant time, (7) whether the parties have completed discovery, (8) whether plaintiff has 

abandoned all federal claims at a late stage of the proceedings, and (9) whether a summary 

judgment motion has been extensively briefed and is ripe for review. Ragland v. City of 

Chillicothe, No. 2:10-cv-879, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55571, at *26-27 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 

2012); Fox v. Brown Memorial Home, 761 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723-24 (S.D. Ohio 2011). 

Admittedly, several of the factors cited above (namely, numbers 5, 6, and 9) cut in favor 

of this Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. But this Court finds factors 1 and 2 to be 

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the most significant and to weigh heavily against retaining jurisdiction. Defendants contend, 

among other defenses to the Amended Complaint, that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata due to a prior proceeding in the Delaware (Ohio) County Court of 

Common Pleas. As a matter of comity, the Court finds it prudent for an Ohio state court to 

decide the res judicata effect of a prior Ohio state court judgment. If this matter proceeds in state 

court and the court finds no res judicata effect, then the state court is a proper forum for 

adjudicating the state law claims. 

V. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment (ECF Nos. 56, 57, and 59) as to the federal claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT 

PREJDUDICE TO REFILING IN STATE COURT Plaintiff’s state-law claims. 

In light of the Court’s grant of summary judgment on the federal claims and the dismissal 

of the remaining state law claims, the Court also DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for 

class certification (ECF No. 49). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

 GREGORY L. FROST 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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