NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

BEVERLY SAMMONS, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

DAVID C. KEAGGY, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0475 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2012-002771

The Honorable Kathleen H. Mead, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Gillespie, Shields, Durrant & Goldfarb, Phoenix

By DeeAn Gillespie Strub and Mark A. Shields

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Michael E. Hurley Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Michael E. Hurley

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
SAMMONS v. KEAGGY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 Beverly Sammons (“Wife”) appeals from the family court’s 

decree of dissolution ordering David C. Keaggy (“Husband”) to sell the 

family business and awarding Wife one-half of the sale proceeds. Wife also 

challenges the court’s denial of her request for attorneys’ fees. For the 

following reasons, we vacate the portion of the decree permitting Husband 

or the parties’ adult son (“Son”) to purchase the business at a discounted 

price and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

However, we affirm the denial of Wife’s fee request.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In June 2012, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of her fortyyear marriage to Husband. The parties disputed, among other things, the 

value of the business they owned equally, David Keaggy & Associates, LLC 

(the “Business”), which Husband operates and where Son has worked for 

more than seven years. Wife also requested Husband pay her attorneys’ 

fees based on the disparity in the parties’ financial resources and Husband’s 

unreasonable positions leading up to trial.

¶3 At trial, Wife presented the testimony of Mark Hughes, a 

certified public accountant who specializes in business valuations, who 

opined the Business had a fair value of $240,000. Hughes explained that 

this reflects the Business’s value assuming Husband continues to operate it. 

Hughes further testified that, if Husband—“the primary integral part of the 

[B]usiness”—sells the Business to a third party and continues to assist the 

buyer in operating it for a “transition” period of six to twelve months, the 

Business would have a value of $190,000. 

¶4 Husband testified that Hughes’ valuation is too high, but 

offered no contrary valuation opinion. Husband further stated that he is

unwilling to sell the Business if he must work for another six to twelve 

months because he wants to retire. Husband explained that he hopes Son

would run the Business, but Son testified he is not willing or able to 
SAMMONS v. KEAGGY

Decision of the Court

3

purchase it because he “can’t afford it.”1 Alternatively, Husband testified 

that he is willing to “dissolve” the Business or let Wife have it, but he does

not want to buy out Wife’s share because “I’m done.” 

¶5 In the decree, the family court noted the Business was the 

most valuable community asset and determined there were insufficient 

community assets existed to award Wife an offset of the Business’s value. 

The court therefore ordered the parties to immediately begin the process of 

selling the Business with the profits to be divided equally. The court further 

ordered that, if Husband or Son decides to buy the Business, either may do 

so for a “discounted rate” of $150,000. The court reasoned this price is 

appropriate as it “will avoid the costs of sale and the issues involving 

transition to a new owner.” The court certified the decree to be final and 

appealable in accordance with Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure

78(B). Wife unsuccessfully moved for a new trial. 

¶6 The court also granted Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees,

finding Husband’s financial position to be superior to Wife’s and finding 

both parties increased the other’s litigation costs. The court, however, did 

not award an amount of fees; instead, it ordered Husband to pay a portion 

of Wife’s attorneys’ fees subject to Wife submitting a supporting affidavit,

in proper form, and other documentation. Wife complied, and Husband 

objected on the basis Wife used more than $53,000 in community funds to 

pay her attorneys along with $9,000 in sole and separate funds. The court 

agreed with Husband and denied Wife’s fee request in an unsigned minute 

entry. Wife appealed from the decree. After hearing oral argument, this 

Court remanded the matter to allow the family court to enter a signed order 

corresponding to the denial of Wife’s fee request. The family court issued 

a signed order containing Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 78(B)

language, and Wife filed an amended notice of appeal. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-

2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2015).

2

 

1 At his deposition, Son testified he is willing to pay Wife a total of 

$50,000 in monthly installments for her half of the Business, and that 

Husband would “gift” him the other half. Son admitted this $100,000 

valuation “was a wild guess” and not based on any valuation method.

2 We cite the current version of applicable statutes because no 

revisions material to this decision have since occurred. 
SAMMONS v. KEAGGY

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DISCUSSION

¶7 Wife argues the family court erred in ordering the Business 

sold and, particularly, in permitting Husband or Son to purchase it for 

$150,000. Instead, Wife contends the court should have awarded the 

Business to Husband and imposed a lien on it pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-318(E) 

(Supp. 2015)3 to secure payment from Husband to Wife in the amount of 

$120,000 to reflect her share in the Business based on its value of $240,000. 

Wife also argues the court erred in denying her request for attorneys’ fees. 

I. Wife’s Share in the Business

¶8 “The valuation of assets is a factual determination that must 

be based on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 

Ariz. 49, 51, 918 P.2d 1067, 1069 (App. 1996). This Court reviews a valuation 

determination for an abuse of discretion, see State v. Mitchell, 234 Ariz. 410, 

413, ¶ 11, 323 P.3d 69, 72 (App. 2014) (“[W]e defer to the trial court’s factual 

determinations . . . .”), including whether the record provides substantial 

evidence supporting the determination, see Flying Diamond Airpark, L.L.C. v. 

Meienberg, 215 Ariz. 44, 50, ¶ 27, 156 P.3d 1149, 1155 (App. 2007) (citation 

omitted). At oral argument, both parties agreed that the valuation is taken 

from the time of the decree.

¶9 The court’s order permitting Husband or Son to purchase the 

Business for $150,000 is not supported by the evidence. The only evidence 

of the Business’s value is the expert opinion indicating a value of $240,000 

if Husband continues to operate the Business and $190,000 in the event he 

sells it to a third party and assists the new owner in running the Business 

for six to twelve months. By permitting Husband to purchase the Business 

for $150,000, the court effectively authorized a $75,000 equalization 

payment to Wife should Husband continue to operate the Business, an 

amount well below what Wife is entitled to according to the expert’s 

opinion. Additionally, the court did not impose a deadline by which a sale 

is to be effectuated or otherwise set out a timeframe for certain steps the 

parties must take to do so. According to the record, it appears Husband 

continues to operate the Business, but no payments have been made to 

Wife. At oral argument, Husband conceded that he does not want to keep 

 

3 In relevant part, the statute states: “The court may impress a lien on 

. . . the marital property awarded to either party in order to secure the 

payment of . . . [a]ny interest or equity the other party has in or to the 

property.” A.R.S. § 25-318(E)(1).
SAMMONS v. KEAGGY

Decision of the Court

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the business, and Son does not want to buy it. Further, there is no evidence 

of record regarding the anticipated “costs of sale.” 

¶10 With no evidence supporting a purchase price of $150,000, the 

court abused its discretion in permitting Husband (or Son) to “purchase” 

the Business for that amount. See Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 296, 297, 727 

P.2d 349, 350 (App. 1986) (determining valuation of professional 

corporation, as community asset, was not supported by evidence where 

there was no evidence from which court, using stated method of 

calculation, could have arrived at stated valuation). Accordingly, we vacate 

that portion of the decree allowing the Business to be sold to Husband or 

Son for $150,000. On remand, because Husband conceded that he does not 

want to keep the Business, and Son has expressed that he does not want to 

buy it, the court shall issue additional orders to ensure compliance with its 

directive to sell the Business, and secure payment to Wife of her community 

share of the Business’s value, which, according to the record, is currently 

$190,000.

II. Denial of Wife’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees

¶11 By statute, the family court has discretion to award a party 

reasonable attorneys’ fees in a marriage dissolution case after considering 

the parties’ respective financial resources and the reasonableness of the 

positions each has taken during the proceedings. A.R.S. § 25-324(A) (Supp. 

2015). Here, as noted, the court ordered Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s 

fees based on its findings that Husband has substantially more financial 

resources than Wife and because both parties unnecessarily increased the 

other’s cost of litigation. The court also found both parties had used 

community funds to pay their attorneys’ fees. However, when 

subsequently presented with the actual amount of community funds Wife 

had already expended for her attorneys’ fees (more than $53,000), the court 

denied Wife’s fee request for an “additional” award of fees. 

¶12 Section 25-324(A) does not authorize a court to deny a fee 

request based solely on the use of community funds to pay fees. Indeed, 

the statute only restricts a fee award to a reasonable amount. A.R.S. § 25-

324(A). We construe the court’s determination that Wife is not entitled to 

an “additional” award of fees as an implied finding that Husband’s 

community share of the $53,000 ($26,500) used by Wife to pay her attorneys 

was a reasonable amount. See Lee Dev. Co. v. Papp, 166 Ariz. 471, 476, 803 

P.2d 464, 469 (App. 1990) (stating this court will imply any additional 

finding necessary to sustain a judgment if it is reasonably supported by the 

evidence).
SAMMONS v. KEAGGY

Decision of the Court

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¶13 Wife does not specifically argue that the court erred in 

implicitly finding Husband’s approximately $26,500 payment of Wife’s 

attorneys’ fees was a reasonable sum. Instead, she argues that the parties’ 

“extreme disparity” in financial resources required the court “to award at 

least some fees to Wife.” But the court did award “some fees” to Wife, 

namely, Husband’s community share of the $53,000 that she had already 

utilized. Further, “a disparity alone does not mandate an award of fees. 

‘[T]he reasonableness of the positions each party has taken’ is an additional 

consideration under the current statute.” Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 

494, ¶ 9, 333 P.3d 818, 821 (App. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting A.R.S. 

§ 25-324(A)). Wife concedes that the court found she “needlessly increased 

Husband’s [attorneys’] fees due to a dispute . . . over the location of 

[Husband’s] Veteran’s Administration funds.” Wife does not contest this 

finding. Accordingly, the denial of Wife’s request for an additional fee 

award is supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion. 

CONCLUSION

¶14 We vacate the portion of the decree that allows Husband or 

Son to purchase the Business for $150,000 and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision. We affirm the order denying 

Wife’s request for additional attorneys’ fees. 

¶15 Wife requests her attorneys’ fees and taxable costs incurred 

on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. Husband requests his fees and 

taxable costs on appeal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 21 and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 (2003), -342 (2003), and -349 (Supp. 2015). 

In the exercise of our discretion, we deny Husband’s request. We grant 

Wife’s request for taxable costs and, in exercising our discretion, grant 

Wife’s request for reasonable fees on appeal, contingent upon her timely 

compliance with ARCAP 21.