UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4793

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DARRYL T. LUSTER, a/k/a Darryl Tyrone Luster, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior 

District Judge. (3:08-cr-00085-RLW-1) 

Submitted: March 26, 2009 Decided: May 4, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Valencia Roberts-Brower, Assistant Federal Public 

Defenders, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, 

Acting United States Attorney, John D. Adams, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Darryl T. Luster pled guilty to possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006), but reserved his right to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found 

in a search of a rental car Luster was driving. Luster argues 

on appeal that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

rental car because his wife was the authorized user and gave him 

permission to drive it. Luster also contends that the district 

court erred in finding the police officer properly conducted the 

search pursuant to the impoundment and inventory exception to 

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm. 

We review legal conclusions underlying the denial of a 

motion to suppress de novo, and review factual findings for 

clear error. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 429 (4th 

Cir. 2006). The evidence is construed in the light most 

favorable to the government, as the prevailing party below. 

United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). 

 A search can violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment 

rights only when the individual has “a legitimate expectation of 

privacy” in the place searched. United States v. Wellons, 32 

F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 

U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). An expectation of privacy is legitimate 

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if the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the 

area searched, and that subjective expectation of privacy is 

objectively reasonable based on “concepts of real or personal 

property law” or “understandings that are recognized and 

permitted by society.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 

 An unauthorized driver of a rented car has “no 

legitimate privacy interest in the car” and, therefore, a search 

of the car “cannot have violated his Fourth Amendment rights.” 

Wellons, 32 F.3d at 119. This conclusion is not altered where 

the authorized lessee allows the unauthorized driver to drive 

the rental vehicle, as an unauthorized driver still does not 

have permission of the rental company, the owner of the vehicle. 

Id. at 119 n.2. This principle is of particular applicability 

here as Luster did not possess a valid driver’s license, and 

thus could not have reasonably believed that the rental 

agreement would have authorized him to operate the vehicle, 

regardless of his wife’s consent. Therefore, the district court 

correctly concluded that as an unauthorized driver, Luster did 

not have a legitimate privacy interest in the car and thus the 

search of the car did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 

 Alternatively, Luster urges this court to reconsider 

Wellons. A review of the applicable case law reveals no 

persuasive reason to overturn or alter the Wellons holding in 

this instance. See United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 

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(4th Cir. 1999) (stating that a panel of this court is “bound by 

prior precedent from other panels in this circuit absent 

contrary law from an en banc or Supreme Court decision”). 

Because Luster had no legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the rental vehicle, we do not reach Luster’s second 

argument regarding the propriety of the inventory search. 

Accordingly, we affirm Luster’s conviction and sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED