Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1706-CR-1292 | November 30, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Ruth Johnson

Valerie K. Boots

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro,

1

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1706-CR-1292

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

Angela Dow Davis, Judge

The Honorable 

Peggy R. Hart, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G16-1609-F6-36976

 

1 We note that, although defendant’s name is spelled Davilla-Castro throughout the record, at trial, the 

defendant spelled his name as Davila-Castro, i.e., Davila was spelled with one “l.” Tr. Vol. II at 42. 
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Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro (“Davilla-Castro”) appeals his conviction of Level 6 

felony criminal recklessness,2claiming that his conviction was not supported by 

sufficient evidence. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. On September 17, 2016, 

Diana Pizarro3(“Pizarro”) and her fiancé, Ulises Grande (“Grande”), were 

caring for Grande’s three children from his previous relationship with Alejandra 

Tellez (“Tellez”). Around 3:00 a.m., the youngest child, still a baby, was 

crying. This prompted Pizzaro and Grande to ask Tellez, who was living with 

Davilla-Castro, if they could bring the baby to her. Tellez agreed.

[4] When Pizarro and Grande arrived at Tellez’s apartment, they saw Tellez 

running into the street. Tellez was crying and said that she was hurt and that 

Davilla-Castro had been strangling her. Pizarro, Grande, and Tellez decided to 

go into the apartment. In the hallway, they found Davilla-Castro, who was

“very mad” and screaming. Tr. Vol. II at 15. Davilla-Castro threatened to fight 

Grande, took off his belt, and approached Grande while wrapping the belt 

 

2

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b).

3

In the record before us, Diana Pizarro is also referred to as Diana Ticarro; however, we will use only 

Pizarro. Tr. Vol. II at 4, 34, 40, 56, 57, 59.
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around his right hand. Id. at 15, 25. Based on Davilla-Castro’s aggression, 

Grande told Pizarro and Tellez to leave. Tellez called the police. 

[5] Soon thereafter, Pizarro, who was concerned for Grande’s safety, went back 

into the apartment and found Davilla-Castro and Grande fighting. As she 

entered, Pizarro saw Davilla-Castro with a knife in his right hand, and Grande 

holding Davilla-Castro by the wrists. Grande told Pizarro to take the knife 

from Davilla-Castro, which she did, and in the process cut Davilla-Castro’s

hand. Pizarro said that she “was very scared” at that moment because DavillaCastro was trying to “stab” Grande. Id. at 17. Pizarro was concerned for 

Grande’s life. Id. To prevent Davilla-Castro from grabbing another knife, 

Pizarro put the knife she had taken from Davilla-Castro, as well as all the other 

household knives, into her vehicle. 

[6] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Mitchell Farnsley (“Officer Farnsley”) 

responded to the call of a domestic disturbance. There, he found four 

individuals in the apartment and separated them for later interview.

Encountering Davilla-Castro, Officer Farnsley noted that he was agitated with 

Grande. Davilla-Castro appeared heavily intoxicated and had a bleeding cut on 

his hand. It was Officer Farnsley’s opinion that Davilla-Castro had sustained 

that injury “during the struggle with the knife being taken away from him.” Id. 

at 37. Talking with Grande, Officer Farnsley noted that Grande was “a little 

relieved,” “exhausted,” “sweaty,” and “a little nervous.” Id. at 31-32. Grande

had “fresh cuts” on his face that were bleeding. Id. at 32. Officer Farnsley 
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testified that he arrested Davilla-Castro for criminal recklessness based on his 

conduct involving the knife. Id. at 38.

[7] In September 2016, the State charged Davilla-Castro with Level 6 felony 

criminal recklessness.

4 At the March 2017 bench trial, Pizarro and Officer 

Farnsley testified for the State, and Davilla-Castro testified in his defense, 

saying that he had not held the knife. Instead, he said that he had only touched 

the blade when he tried to remove the knife from Grande, and that is when he 

cut his hand. Tr. Vol. II at 53, 54. The trial court found Davilla-Castro guilty as 

charged and sentenced him to 365 days with ten days executed in jail and the 

rest suspended to probation. Davilla-Castro now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] Indiana Code section 35-42-2-2 provides, “A person who recklessly, knowingly, 

or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 

another person commits criminal recklessness,” a Class B misdemeanor. 

However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if “it is committed while armed with a 

deadly weapon.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b). Davilla-Castro’s sole claim on 

appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of Level 6 

felony criminal recklessness. 

 

4 The State also charged Davilla-Castro with Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony 

strangulation, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor domestic 

battery; however, those charges were dismissed at the commencement of the bench trial. Tr. Vol. II at 7-8, 

19-20.
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[9] Sufficiency of evidence claims “face a steep standard of review.” Griffith v. 

State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). When reviewing challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the 

credibility of witnesses. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). Instead, 

“we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that 

support the [judgment] and will affirm the conviction if there is probative 

evidence from which a reasonable [fact-finder] could have found the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A conviction may be sustained on 

appeal on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness or victim. Lay v. 

State, 933 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Moreover, a 

conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone so long as the 

circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Gonzalez v. 

State, 908 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

[10] Davilla-Castro’s charging information provided, in relevant part, as follows:

On or about September 17, 2016, [Davilla-Castro] did recklessly, 

with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, perform[] an act, that is: 

walking at and toward the person of Ulises Grande and/or Diana 

[Pizarro] with a knife, that created a substantial risk of bodily 

injury to Ulises Grande and/or Diana [Pizarro].

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 19. Thus, to convict Davilla-Castro of Level 6 felony 

criminal recklessness, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)

he (2) recklessly, (3) with a knife, (4) walked at or toward the person of Grande 

or Pizarro, (5) thereby, creating a substantial risk of bodily injury to either 
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Grande or Pizarro. Davilla-Castro focuses on the fourth element,

5

contending 

that his conviction cannot stand because there was no direct evidence to

support the element that he walked at or toward Grande or Pizarro with a knife, 

and the circumstantial evidence does not support a reasonable inference of 

such. Appellant’s Br. at 8-10 We disagree. 

[11] Here, the State presented evidence that Grande and Pizarro were at DavillaCastro’s apartment to drop off Tellez’s baby and were met outside by Tellez 

crying and saying that Davilla-Castro had hurt her. Tr. Vol. II at 10, 11. 

Pizarro, Grande, and Tellez all entered the apartment and found Davilla-Castro 

very mad and screaming. Id. at 15. Davilla-Castro took off his belt and 

wrapped it around his wrist as he approached Grande and threatened to fight 

him. Id. Due to Davilla-Castro’s aggressive actions, Pizarro and Tellez left the 

apartment. Id. Pizarro, concerned for Grande’s safety, returned to the 

apartment and saw Davilla-Castro and Grande fighting. Id. at 16. DavillaCastro had a knife in his right hand, and Grande was holding onto DavillaCastro’s wrists. Id. at 16, 26. Pizarro said that she “was very scared” at that 

moment because Davilla-Castro was trying to “stab” Grande. Id. at 17. 

Pizarro was concerned for Grande’s life. Id. At Grande’s instruction, Pizarro 

took the knife out of Davilla-Castro’s hand, and in the struggle, Davilla-Castro 

 

5 To the extent Davilla-Castro argues that he did not have a knife, we are unpersuaded. Pizarro testified at 

trial that Davilla-Castro held a knife. While Davilla-Castro testified at trial that he never held a knife, his 

possession of a knife was a question of fact, which the trial court decided in favor of the State. We cannot 

reweigh that evidence. Krueger v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1240, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
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cut his hand. Id. at 17, 18. Responding to the 911 call, Officer Farnsley noted 

that Davilla-Castro was agitated with Grande. Id. at 32. It was Officer 

Farnsley’s opinion that Davilla-Castro sustained the cut on his hand “during 

the struggle with the knife being taken away from him.” Id. at 37. Grande 

appeared exhausted, sweaty, and a little nervous and relieved. Id. at 31-32. 

Officer Farnsley noted that Grande had fresh cuts on his face that were 

bleeding. Id. at 32. From this evidence, the finder of fact court could have 

made a reasonable inference that Davilla-Castro, agitated with Grande, 

approached him with a knife in order to engage him in a fight and to attempt to 

stab him, thereby creating a substantial risk of bodily injury. 

[12] Davilla-Castro contends that the trial court drew an unreasonable inference 

from the above facts. He argues that the evidence showed only that: DavillaCastro and Grande were involved in “a mutual fight”; Pizarro did not see how 

Grande’s injuries occurred; “Grande’s minor injuries to his head were not stab 

wounds, but appear more characteristic of a fist fight”; and the laceration 

Davilla-Castro sustained to the webbing between his thumb and index finger is 

consistent with his attempting to grab the blade of the knife as it was being held 

by someone else. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Davilla-Castro’s alternative version of 

the facts is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility 

of the witnesses, which we cannot do. Krueger v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1240, 1244 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Accordingly, we conclude that the State 

presented sufficient evidence to support Davilla-Castro’s conviction for Level 6 

felony criminal recklessness.
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[13] Affirmed.

[14] Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.