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AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY FORWARD

IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (PART II)

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 29, 2013

Serial No. 113–82

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., Christopher DeMuth chair and director, Critical 

Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ... 7

General Jack Keane, USA, retired, chairman of the board, Institute for the 

Study of War ......................................................................................................... 15

Ms. Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 27

Stephen Biddle, Ph.D., adjunct senior fellow for defense policy, Council on 

Foreign Relations ................................................................................................. 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 9

General Jack Keane: Prepared statement ............................................................. 17

Ms. Lisa Curtis: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 29

Stephen Biddle, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 41

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 82

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 83

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 85

The Honorable Tulsi Gabbard, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Hawaii: Questions for the record submitted to General Jack Keane .......... 87

(1)

AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY 

FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND 

PAKISTAN (PART II) 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The joint subcommittee hearing will come to 

order. After recognizing myself, Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ted Deutch, and Ranking Member Faleomavaega, for 5 minutes each for opening statements, we will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days 

in which to insert statements and questions for the record, subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. In May, I led a 

bipartisan congressional delegation to Afghanistan and was honored to spend some time with our brave heroes in the armed forces 

who continue to sacrifice their own safety to protect our freedoms. 

As the administration’s deadline to finalize the Bilateral Security 

Agreement, also known as the 

BSA, with the Afghan Government approaches, it is becoming 

clear that there are still obstacles to overcome. It is vitally important that the BSA adequately addresses the safety and well being 

of our brave men and women who will remain in Afghanistan after 

2014. 

However, if a BSA is finalized that addresses all of our concerns, 

we must ensure that an adequate number of U.S. forces will stay 

in Afghanistan to help fight extremist elements and train and advise the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Listening to the counsel and advice of our generals on the ground 

regarding troop numbers is crucial to maintaining the gains we 

have made over the last decade. We cannot let politics get in the 

way of our national security and stability in this volatile region. 

We may not be leaving in place enough of a support team to fight 

the extremist elements who will quickly move to take power away 

from the Afghan people. 

2

I remain highly skeptical of the Afghan security forces’ ability, 

political will, and commitment to fight jihadists on their own. Last 

week an Afghan Special Forces Commander defected to an insurgent group allied with the Taliban, taking with him most of his 

unit’s guns, ammo, high tech equipment, packed in a Humvee. 

We cannot risk allowing the Taliban to retake control of Afghanistan, reversing the significant progress made by our heroes in uniform. This will also lead to al-Qaeda regrouping and stepping up 

terrorist activities using the safe havens in Pakistan as a staging 

ground, posing a real danger to our national security interests and 

those of our allies in the region. 

A major test of the stability of a post-2014 Afghanistan will be 

the upcoming elections in April 2014. In Afghanistan, I urged 

President Karzai to commit to the electoral process and ensure that 

a free, fair, and transparent election will result in a peaceful transition of power through a democratic process. The 2009 election 

was marred in controversy, as corruption and fraud were widespread and rampant. Another fraud-plagued election this spring 

could severely jeopardize Afghan security, and put our own forces 

at risk. With a new government, I hope we will be able to tackle 

the endemic corruption that has plagued the Afghan Government 

and hampered substantial progress. 

One reason for the massive corruption problems in Afghanistan 

stems from narcotics. Our codel pressed the Afghan Government to 

do more to counter narcotics operations and eradication efforts. 

During the last poppy season, it is disappointing that the Afghan 

Government wasn’t willing to provide security for the eradication 

teams. Combating the nexus between terrorism financing and narcotics trafficking is vital to stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan so that terrorist organizations cannot finance their illicit 

operations. 

And let us look at Pakistan’s role on the security situation in Afghanistan. For Afghanistan to achieve security and stability, Pakistan is going to have to play a stronger and more positive role. Extremist groups like the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network have used areas in the Pakistan border as insurgent sanctuaries to conduct militant operations inside Afghanistan without 

much resistance from the Pakistani intelligence and military 

forces, if not outright collaboration. 

Because Pakistan is vital in establishing stability in the region, 

we must work with the government. But we mustn’t continue to 

give billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan and hope, and pray, and 

wish that the Prime Minister will work with us. We must ensure 

that Pakistan is meeting certain benchmarks in its fight against 

these insurgent sanctuaries within its borders, or else Pakistan 

should not receive further U.S. funding. 

And with that, I will conclude my remarks and turn to the ranking member, Mr. Deutch, and then Mr. Chabot and Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Thank you, Ted. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thanks to our 

witnesses for testifying today on the future of Afghanistan as the 

U.S. continues its responsible drawdown of troops. 

3

Like many of my colleagues, I recognize that ending 12 years of 

war in Afghanistan raises many difficult challenges that have no 

easy solutions. But I am deeply committed to bringing our troops 

home as quickly and as responsibly as possible. Our country is 

tired of war. More than 21⁄2 million American men and women 

have served our country in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Tragically, in 

Afghanistan alone, there have been more than 2,200 American casualties. We will never forget these tragic deaths, as well as the 

crippling injuries that so many of our bravest have suffered. 

This war must end for financial reasons as well. Given that the 

United States Government now spends about $2.1 million per year 

per soldier deployed in Afghanistan, an unending presence in Afghanistan is not in our best interest. However, we must act to protect our national security. Allowing Afghanistan to devolve back 

into a safe haven for al-Qaeda threatens U.S. national security. 

Furthermore, we have a moral obligation to ensure that progress 

that has been made with regard to human rights, health, and personal freedoms in Afghanistan continues, even without a sizable 

American military presence. For example, a recent report found 

that a USAID health program has saved the lives of 100,000 Afghan children per year. When considering the staggering statistics, 

it is essential we remember the impact that even one life can have 

on the world. 

Although I wish it was under different circumstances, everyone 

in the world is now familiar with Malala Yousafzai and her courageous stance against the Taliban to advance the universal rights of 

equality in education. She is an inspiration and a reminder that we 

need to give every child, including those from Afghanistan, the education necessary for a brighter future. 

So how do we responsibly ensure that Afghan security and our 

national security without committing to an unending American 

presence? How do we ensure our moral commitment to the Afghan 

people without risking more American lives? There are those who 

believe that the only way to achieve a stable Afghanistan is 

through an unending American military presence on the ground. 

However, as former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, General 

Eikenberry has pointed out, no amount of troops can make our political and military strategies succeed if we do not have the full 

support of Afghani leadership. 

Others have advocated for the immediate withdrawal of every 

last American troop and all resources. However, this, too, is not a 

realistic option. Leaving an on-going war totally on an Afghan Government that cannot afford its own security service threatens our 

national security as it could very well lead to the re-emergence of 

terrorist safe havens inside Afghanistan and severely jeopardize 

the humanitarian gains that have been accomplished. 

Some have advocated for a negotiated political solution with the 

Taliban. And while this should be explored, it cannot come at the 

expense of human rights and equality. At this juncture, it remains 

unclear whether the Taliban is even serious about negotiations or 

wants to be an on-going force for division in Afghanistan’s future. 

Therefore, in a world where we have only bad choices, I believe 

that the best option is for Congress to continue to support the Afghan National Security Forces and the administration’s drawdown 

4

strategy while remaining cautiously hopeful that reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and the Taliban are able to 

resume. 

In June, the Security Forces officially took the lead role in securing the country and is now exclusively patrolling Afghan villages. 

While it is not able to operate independently, it is improving. It has 

shown it is capable and is undoubtedly the future of Afghanistan’s 

security. 

At the same time, we need to finalize the Bilateral Security 

Agreement with the Government of Afghanistan that provides U.S. 

personnel with necessary protections so that American and NATO 

forces are able to continue to train, to assist, and to advise Afghan 

Security Forces. 

Ultimately, for any of this to succeed, the Afghan Government 

must become more accountable for its future. If Afghanistan is 

going to progress as a sustainable democracy, a good point of measure will be the country’s April 2014 elections. These elections cannot be marred with the widespread fraud of 2009 and the next Afghan President must protect the human rights conventions in the 

constitution and provide Afghans with a leader that they ultimately will believe in. 

A stable Afghanistan will require continued patience and some 

level of resources from Congress. Achieving strategic objections in 

Afghanistan is never going to be quick or easy, but we owe it to 

the Americans and Afghans who have sacrificed so much to try to 

get this right. 

I appreciate the witnesses being here today and I look forward 

to our discussion. I yield back. 

Ms. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. And I also want 

to thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for calling this important joint 

hearing this morning or excuse me, this afternoon, with the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. I am pleased to join her efforts 

to discuss the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 

that region and how the United States’ 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan might impact the broader region. 

Earlier this year, the picture of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan remained largely unclear, but it was clear that expediting the withdrawal plan was strategically risky to the stability 

and security interest of South Asia more broadly. The departure of 

34,000 U.S. troops by February 2014 still raises the prospect that 

the security situation may take a wrong turn, especially due to Afghanistan’s weak and corrupt governance. This is an issue that 

should be of particular concern considering that Afghanistan prepares for national elections in April 2014 which is not that far 

away. Even 6 months out, there is consensus that the election process will be filled with political pressures from Karzai, vote rigging, 

and practices not representative of a democratic system. 

There are few signs Karzai’s government learned the lessons 

from Afghanistan’s past elections. He took control of the independent election commission and appointed new commissioners 

who will no doubt show preference toward his alliances and acolytes. There is little disagreement that the structure of Afghanistan’s Government is itself a major problem, but how we help move 

5

it toward a more democratic, fair, and incorrupt system at this 

point is a difficult matter. 

In the coming months, Afghanistan’s mounting internal political 

uncertainties cannot be brushed off. The political power struggle 

that will no doubt consume the Presidential campaign season in Afghanistan may also threaten to unravel negotiations to finalize the 

Bilateral Security Agreement with the U.S. And to no one’s surprise, the likelihood that the U.S. and Afghanistan will finalize the 

BSA before the end of the year faces some major obstacles. 

It is important that the final agreement adequately safeguards 

our troops which, as of earlier this month, is the primary issue still 

on the table. Failure to reach an agreement would threaten U.S. 

gains in Afghanistan and impair our commitments to the broader 

region. But let us not forget that the outcome of the BSA is not the 

only issue influencing U.S. withdrawal plans. Long-term stability 

in Afghanistan, political reconciliation, and a successful U.S. military drawdown is contingent upon Pakistani cooperation. Since the 

election of Prime Minister Sharif earlier this year, U.S.-Pakistan 

relations are showing some signs of improving as illustrated by 

Sharif’s visit to Washington just last week and the Obama administration’s decision to release more than $1.6 billion in military and 

economic aid to Pakistan. 

Suspicions between the U.S. and Pakistan still linger despite 

marginal recent advances. Newly elected Sharif is linked to sectarian extremist groups in Punjab and his past support of the Afghan Taliban may well influence his policies in the upcoming 

months to the detriment of Pakistan’s neighbors and U.S. security 

informed policy interests. Islamabad’s desire in maintaining an indispensable position in Afghan peace talks while obstructing its 

neighbor India is paramount. I find it increasingly difficult to justify the administration’s decision to release the $1.6 billion in military and economic aid and having spoken to my colleagues on the 

Hill, many of them share those same concerns. My concern regarding this level of assistance is amplified by Pakistan’s widespread 

persecution of religious minorities, particularly the Christian communities. 

Pakistan is ranked among the most religiously intolerant countries in the world and this level of intolerance, unfortunately, 

seems to be increasing. A Pakistani adhering to anything but Suni 

Islam finds himself the target of discrimination, overt persecution, 

and potential terrorist attacks. For example, in September 22nd, a 

suicide bombing of the All Saints Church in Peshwar, left over 130 

Christians killed and over 150 injured. And earlier this month, extremists beat two Christians in Islamabad after they refused to 

convert from Christianity to Islam. 

While this is a problem we see happening throughout the region, 

the level of oppression existing in Pakistan is particularly aggressive. It is my hope that Prime Minister Sharif addresses this problem and reforms Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, laws that terrorists 

use as an excuse to attack Christian churches, burn their settlements, and commit murder in Christian communities. 

I urge Prime Minister Sharif to include the protection of religious 

minorities as part of his new security strategy and I urge the 

Obama administration to make Pakistan’s progress on this parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:09 Dec 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102913\85313 HFA PsN: SHIRL
6

ticular issue, among others, a qualification for receiving U.S. assistance. 

I again want to thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen for calling this 

hearing and we look forward to hearing testimony from our distinguished panel of witnesses and it is truly a distinguished panel this 

afternoon. I will turn it back over to Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Steve. Thank you. 

And now we are pleased to welcome our distinguished panelists. 

First, we welcome Dr. Frederick Kagan, who holds the Christopher 

DeMuth chair and is the Director of the Critical Threats Project at 

the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Kagan has served in Afghanistan as part of General Stanley McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment Team and also conducted research there for Generals 

David Petraeus and John Allen. For his work in Afghanistan, he 

received the distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor 

given to a civilian who does not work for the Department of Defense and he gets the Great Witness Award from our subcommittee 

for always being available. Thank you. 

Next we welcome General Jack Keane, who is chairman of the 

Institute for the Study of War. In 2005, General Keane retired 

from the U.S. Army as Vice Chief of Staff after 37 years in public 

service and during this time he provided strategy and oversight for 

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is a career paratrooper and 

like my hubby, he is a decorated combat veteran of Vietnam, who 

has served in operational command roles throughout the world including in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The General is also 

a member of the Secretary of Defense’s Policy Board and an advisor 

to two foundations that assist veterans. Thank you, sir. 

Third, we welcome Ms. Lisa Curtis, who is a senior research fellow for South Asia at The Heritage Foundation. Prior to this, she 

served as a staff member at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, handling the South Asia Portfolio for then Chairman Richard Lugar and from 2001 to ’03, she served as an advisor on IndiaPakistan relations to the Assistant Secretary of State. Ms. Curtis 

also served as a South Asia policy analyst at the CIA and before 

this was stationed in U.S. Embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi 

as a foreign service officer. We welcome you, Ms. Curtis. Thank 

you. 

And finally, we welcome Dr. Stephen Biddle. Thank you, sir, who 

is an adjunct senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of political science and international 

affairs at George Washington University. Prior to joining George 

Washington, Dr. Biddle taught at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and served at the Defense Policy Board and 

also advised Generals Petraeus and McChrystal in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. 

Indeed a distinguished set of panelists and we will begin with 

you, Dr. Kagan. 

7

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, PH.D., CHRISTOPHER 

DEMUTH CHAIR AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS 

PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC 

POLICY RESEARCH 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member, it is an 

honor to be in front of this committee, talking about this important 

topic and I thank you very much for convening hearings at this 

time when so much else is going on to focus on an issue that I 

think hasn’t received as much attention as it should, given what 

the stakes are in so many ways. 

Reasonable people can disagree about the desirability of committing to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan, keeping American troops there, giving large amounts of financial aid to Pakistan 

and many other specific policy decisions in South Asia. We can 

argue about the relative importance of U.S. interests in that area 

compared with the cost of taking this with that action and also 

compared with the cost of inaction or withdrawal. And we can certainly argue and I and many in this room have been part of arguments, about what strategies might work or might not work. 

But all of these discussions and arguments should be based on 

a common set of facts that are not really arguable. American national security requires defeating al-Qaeda and all other affiliated 

groups that seek to kill Americans, working with local partners to 

prevent those groups from maintaining or reestablishing safe havens from which to do so and retaining the ability to take direct 

action against those groups, if and when required. It is also a fact 

that the war in Afghanistan is not yet either won or lost and it can 

still go either way. A more inconvenient fact is that the Afghan National Security Forces will not be ready to secure their government 

or their territory without significant U.S. and international support, including military forces and denablers after 2014. 

A still more unpleasant fact is that Pakistan continues to harbor, 

shelter, and support some of the most virulent insurgents and terrorist groups closely associated with al-Qaeda including serving as 

haven for some that have already tried to attack the U.S. homeland. 

Yet, it is also a fact that Pakistan is a country of some 190 million people with perhaps 100 nuclear weapons and the deepest hatred for the U.S. of any nation on earth. Pakistan is also, moreover, 

perennially on the verge of complete economic collapse that would 

lead to political collapse and consequently very likely a massive increase in the number of terrorist groups operating there. In the 

very worst case, one or more of those terrorist groups might get 

control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon and use it or at least try to 

use it against India, the U.S., or another of our allies. 

The most distressing fact of all is that there is no single clear 

policy or strategy that could reliably handle all of these other facts. 

And that offering simplistic solutions or focusing on one of these 

problems to the exclusion of the others will simply lead rapidly to 

failure. 

International Afghan forces have made tremendous gains against 

the Taliban in the past 4 years, largely sweeping them out of 

Kandahar of which they have nearly gained control in 2009, driving them to the fringes of Helmand, securing the Konar River ValVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:09 Dec 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102913\85313 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

ley to Asadabad and most strategically vital, Nangahar Province, 

and preventing the enemy from sustaining significant bases in 

other parts of the country. 

Isolated spectacular attacks in Herat and Kabul and elsewhere 

have not disrupted Afghan politics nor significantly affected the 

daily lives of most Afghans. Tragic instances of Afghan forces or 

Taliban masquerading as Afghan forces attacking NATO and U.S. 

troops have not destroyed the cooperation or cohesion of the coalition. Many seasons of tough fighting have not seen the erosion of 

the ANSF, but rather have seen it improve in strength size, skill, 

and determination. 

But President Obama ordered reductions in U.S. forces prematurely, preventing them from completing critical clearing operations in southeastern Afghanistan where the Haqqani network operates from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Haqqani forces and their allies retain important safe havens in Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, 

Paktia, Paktika, and Khost Provinces and neither the U.S. nor the 

ANSF have the resources needed to clear them out at this point. 

On the contrary, we can expect to see an increase in Haqqani 

network activity over the coming months and years, including both 

spectacular attacks in Kabul and a regular drumbeat of attacks 

against U.S. and ANSF positions in the Haqqani areas. The ANSF 

will not be able to defend itself against this threat on its own after 

2014. It lacks the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that the U.S. and NATO provide which give it a decisive advantage over its enemies. It does not have enough artillery or skill 

in using it to overmarch the enemy, nor will it have enough of its 

own combat air power to do so. A full U.S. withdrawal would very 

likely be followed by the collapse of ANSF forces facing the 

Haqqanis that would be very bad for the U.S. 

The obvious rejoinder to these comments is that, of course, I am 

talking about bases in Pakistan and that the problem really is in 

Pakistan and not in Afghanistan at this point. And the bottom line 

take away that I would offer to the subcommittees is that you 

should not imagine that we can solve this problem on one side of 

the Durand Line only. Losing in Afghanistan, yielding the gains 

that we have made so far, failing to complete efforts to defeat the 

enemy, to deprive them of safe havens in Afghanistan will make 

it impossible to succeed on the other side of the Durand Line just 

as succeeding in Pakistan is not in and of itself sufficient to 

achieve success in Afghanistan. 

And so despite all of the displeasure, all of the obvious distastefulness of providing support on such a large scale to a regime in 

Islamabad that is so clearly harboring our enemies and so clearly 

failing even to provide adequately for its people, nevertheless, there 

are important strategic reasons to continue to do so having to do 

with the complexity, unfortunately, of any sound strategy that 

might conceivably work to achieve American security in this region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]

9


85313a-1.eps

Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific on "After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part II)" 

An Unarguable Fact: American Security is Tied to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Frederick W. Kagan 

Christopher DeMuth Chair and Director, Critical Threats Proj ect 

American Enterprise Institute 

October 29, 2013 

'ine views expressed in this lestimon.-v are those oJthe author alone and do nol necessar;~v represenllhose oj/he 

. '/merican F.nterprise Institute 
10


85313a-2.eps

Frederick W. Kagan 

October 29,2013 

Reasonable people can disagree about the desirability of committing to a long-term relationship 

with Afghanistan, keeping American troops there, giving large amounts of financial aid to 

Pakistan, and many other specific policy decisions in South Asia. We can argue about the 

relative importance of US. interests in that area compared with the costs of taking this or that 

action-and also compared with the costs of inaction or withdrawal. We can certainl y argue 

about what strategies might work or probably won't work. 

But all of these discussions should be based on a common set of facts that are not really 

arguable. American national security requires defeating al Qaeda and all other affiliated groups 

that seek to kill Americans, working with local partners to prevent those groups from 

maintaining or re-establishing safe-havens from which to do so, and retaining the ability to take 

direct action against those groups if and when required. It is also a factthat the war in 

Afghanistan is not yet either won or lost and it can still go either way. A more inconvenient fact 

is that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will not be ready to secure their government 

or their territory without significant US. and international support, including military forces and 

enablers, after 2014. 

A still more unpleasant fact is that Pakistan continues to harbor, shelter, and support some of the 

most virulent insurgent and terrorist groups, closely associated with al Qaeda, including serving 

as haven for some that have already tried to attack the U.S. homeland. Yet it is also a fact that 

Pakistan is a country of some 190 million people with perhaps 100 nuclear weapons and the 

deepest hatred for the US. of any nation on earth. Pakistan is also, moreover, perennially on the 

verge of complete economic collapse that would lead to political collapse and consequently, very 

likely, a massive increase in the number of terrorist groups operating there. In the very worst 

case, one or more of those terrorist groups might get control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon and 

use it-or at least try to use it-against India, the U.S., or another of our allies. The most 

distressing fact of all is that there is no single, clear policy or strategy that could reliably handle 

all of these other facts, and that offering simplistic solutions or focusing on one of these 

problems to the exclusion of the others will simply lead rapidly to failure. 

Afghanistan in the Balance 

International and Afghan forces have made tremendous gains against the Taliban in the past four 

years, largely sweeping them out of Kandahar, ofwhich they had nearly gained control in 2009, 

driving them to the fringes of Helmand, securing the Konar River Valley to Asadabad and most 

of strategically-vital Nangarhar Province, and preventing the enemy from sustaining significant 

bases in other parts of the country. Isolated spectacular attacks in Herat and Kabul have not 

disrupted Afghan politics nor significantly affected the daily lives of most Afghans. Tragic 

instances of Afghan forces (or Taliban masquerading as Afghan forces) attacking NATO and 

US. troops have not destroyed the cooperation or cohesion of the coalition. Many seasons of 

tough fighting have not seen the erosion of the ANSF but, rather, have seen it improve in 

strength, size, skill, and determination 
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Frederick W. Kagan 

October 29,2013 

But President Obama ordered reductions in U.S. forces prematurely, preventing them from 

completing critical clearing operations in southeastern Afghanistan, where the Haqqani Network 

operates from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Haqqani forces and their allies retain important safehavens in Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost Provinces, and neither the US. nor 

the ANSF have the resources needed to clear them out. On the contrary, we can expect to see an 

increase in Haqqani Network activity over the coming months and years, including both 

spectacular attacks in Kabul and a regular drumbeat of attacks against U.S. and AN SF positions 

in Haqqani areas. 

The ANSF will not be able to defend itself against that threat on its own after 2014. It lacks the 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that the US. and NATO provide, 

which give it decisive advantages over its enemies. It does not have enough artillery (or skill in 

using it) to overmatch the enemy, nor will it have enough of its own combat airpower to do so. 

A full US. withdrawal would very likely be followed by the collapse of AN SF forces facing the 

Haqqanis, and that would be very bad for the US. 

The Haqqani Network is much older than the Taliban, dating back to the 1970s. Its ties with 

Osama bin Laden began in the mid-1980s, and the first al Qaeda camps (and most important 

training camps) were established and maintained in Haqqani territory in the 1990s. Neither 

lalaluddin Haqqani, the group's founder, nor his son and successor, Sirajuddin, have shown the 

slightest inclination to break with al Qaeda, even after bin Laden's death. The Haqqanis are 

prominent in the Miramshah Shura (in North Waziristan, Pakistan), where they coordinate with 

al Qaeda representatives and the leaders of other al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (lMU). A Haqqani victory in 

southeastern Afghanistan would give those groups and others room to expand in Afghanistan, 

where they could re-establish bases from which to plan and conduct future attacks against the 

U.S. and its allies. Preventing such a development remains a vital national security interest for 

the US., and it has not yet been secured-nor will it have been secured by the end of2014. 

Al Qaeda and Affiliates in Pakistan 

The obvious rejoinder to the discussion above is that the Haqqanis are currently based in 

Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, along with al Qaeda leaders, the TTP, IMU, and many others. 

It is reasonable to ask why the US. should continue to spend blood and treasure trying to solve a 

problem in Afghanistan that emanates from Pakistan. The answer is that there is no solution to 

the problem that does not operate on both sides of the Durand Line 

Even today, groups such as the Haqqanis, al Qaeda, and the IMU do not operate with full 

freedom or impunity in Pakistan. Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (lSI) supports 

some of them and turns a blind eye to the activities of others, but it also requires them to keep 

their profile in Pakistan down, to avoid attacking Pakistani targets, and not to develop plans for 

attacking the U.S. easily traceable to Pakistani territory. In addition, Pakistani forces have 

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Frederick W. Kagan 

October 29,2013 

conducted significant operations against groups that directly threaten Pakistan but are still linked 

into this melange, especially the TTP and the IMU. Those operations have disrupted and 

distracted the Afghan-focused groups that the lSI actually supports, albeit briefly. Those 

limitations may not seem like much, but we know that these groups chafe under even this degree 

of Pakistani control. Yet they generally adhere to Pakistani requirements for the simple reason 

that they know that the Pakistani Anny could, ifit chose, round them up at any moment. That 

fact does constrain both the actions and the ambitions of these groups, as we can see from the 

periodic efforts their leaders make to rein in the handful of groups, such as the TTP, that persist 

in violating Islamabad's strictures. 

Were the Haqqanis and their allies able to relocate some or all of their most important bases to an 

ungoverned Afghanistan, those constraints would fall away. They would be free to attack their 

erstwhile Pakistani hosts (which some of them surely would do) and to plan attacks on the US. 

and its allies without having to worry that the heavy ann of the lSI might come down on them at 

any moment. The re-establishment ofHaqqani safe-havens in Afghanistan would be worse than 

the expansion of the safe-havens across the border in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA)--it would be the liberation of one of the most lethal Islamist terrorist groups in 

the world to expand its aims, methods, and targets 

It is equally true, of course, that the status quo is unacceptable. Pakistan must be made to see 

that it cannot continue to protect and support such lethal extremist groups-certainly not while 

pocketing large amounts of money from the US. in exchange for "counter-terrorism" 

cooperation that seems almost laughable after the Abbottabad raid. Surely US. aid money could 

be spent better elsewhere-or even at home, as some would have it. Alas, supporting Pakistan 

financially remains an important pillar of American strategy, distasteful as it is. 

Pakistan: Always on the Brink 

Pakistan's economy epitomizes dysfunction Government revenues are far too low due to 

corruption, absurd tax rates, and pervasive tax-cheating. The government heavily subsidizes 

electricity, theoretically making it available to a broad swath of Pakistan's poor. But the 

electrical infrastructure is inadequate, antiquated, and suffers from extensive theft. As a result, 

rolling blackouts and extended periods without power are common, so that the enormous sums 

the government spends subsidizing electricity leads only to more popular anger over its lack. 

Pakistan has subsisted on large loans from the International Monetary Fund (TMF) in addition to 

the much smaller US. assistance, but the IMF lost patience with Pakistan toward the end of 

President Asif Ali Zardari' s tenure and has insisted on a series of painful economic and fiscal 

corrections that the current government is struggling to undertake. The economy is further 

distorted by the ubiquitous intluence of the military establishment both directly through an 

exorbitant military budget and military industries and indirectly through the assets of current and 

retired military officers The survival of the Pakistani economy at any time seems improbable 
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Frederick W. Kagan 

October 29,2013 

It seemed especially improbable under Zardari, whose reputation for corruption was well-earned. 

But Zardari also refused to undertake badly-needed economic reforms for fear of angering 

institutions already anathema to him and alienating voting constituencies going into the recent 

election. He therefore achieved nothing at all-he lost the election and left the Pakistani 

economy in free-fall 

The peaceful succession ofNawaz Sharif to the premiership after the completion of a full term in 

office by a civilian government was a landmark in Pakistan's history. Such a thing has never 

happened before. More interestingly, Sharif appears to have understood that his political 

survival, along with the survival of his country, depends on righting the economy somehow. He 

has therefore focused his etTorts intently on meeting IMF goals (or corning close), managing the 

enerb'Y crisis, expanding the economy, and even reaching out to India (although spoilers on both 

sides of the border are making that prospect daunting). Sharif is an unlikely hero from the 

American perspective. Ousted from his previous premiership by Pervez Musharraf, Sharif has 

long been seen as virulently anti-American. So far he has not shown such tendencies, perhaps 

because he realizes the depth of his domestic problems. 

It is difficult to believe that Sharif will actually turn the Pakistani economy around. It seems 

clear, however, that he is trying to do so. It is almost as much in our interest that he succeed as it 

is in his. A viable Pakistani economy could supply the Pakistani state-as distinct from the 

Army-with revenues it needs actually to govern and provide services to its people. After the 

first successful transition from one civilian government to another after a full term, Pakistani 

representative government can only be solidified by the emergence of a functional and solvent 

state. Such a development would weaken the influence of the military significantly. It would 

also weaken the attractiveness of groups such as Jamat-ud-Dawa (the front group for Lashkar-eTayyiba), which flourish by providing services when the state does not. 

Now is not the time, therefore, to undercut whatever long-shot prospects Sharif might have by 

cutting ofTU.S. aid, even if Pakistan shows no greater willingness to cut support to America's 

enemies than it has hitherto. It is also vital to keep in mind that Sharif really does not control 

that policy. The Army does. And the best long-term strategy for pulling Pakistan away from 

support to extremist groups is to work to strengthen the elected civilian government. That cannot 

be done by cutting otT aid-even aid to the Anny, which will demand its cut from the state 

regardless of what the U.S. gives it. Whatever leverage the U.S. has with Pakistan, finally, will 

vanish with the end of American assistance. 

Conclusion 

There can be no rapid conclusion to the problems of South Asia, nor is there any end in sight to 

the threats to American security and its interests emanating from that region. The White House 

is quite wrong to keep repeating that al Qaeda is "decimated," "on its last legs," or nearly 

defeated. Even the "core group" still in Pakistan remains functional, but that core group is far 

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Frederick W. Kagan 

October 29,2013 

from being the only threat to Americans. AI Qaeda franchises are expanding in Yemen, Iraq, 

Syria, and North Africa, which should cause us great concern. But the sheer number and 

complexity of extremist Islamist terrorist groups based along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 

remains by far the greatest single concentration of threats. A strategic partnership with 

Afghanistan, underwritten with aid and with troops, along with continued engagement with 

Pakistan, is the only hope for securing American interests and the safety of Americans in this 

region. 
15

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan. 

General? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 

WAR 

General KEANE. Madam Chairman and Ranking Minority and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting 

me. I haven’t been back to foreign affairs until September 2007, 

just prior to Dave Petraeus doing it. Some of you may have been 

there. You had a joint committee meeting in a room much larger 

than this and I think there was somewhere in the neighborhood of 

70 of you there. And myself and Bill Perry went through 5 hours 

of questioning. I really appreciate the seriousness of what you are 

about here. I know this is the second hearing that you have had, 

the first one dealing with the Bilateral Security Agreement. 

This is my third hearing on Afghanistan. Your colleagues in the 

House Armed Services Committee have been about this task as 

well. So I truly appreciate what the House is trying to do in educating and informing itself so it can influence some policy direction. 

Let me correct the record. I am a Vietnam veteran, but I was not 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti. My troops were and I had left the 

Defense Policy Board after 9 years. I thought providing advice to 

three Secretaries was sufficient and probably about wearing my 

welcome out in terms of advice, so I walked away. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are always welcome here. 

General KEANE. I walked away from the fourth opportunity. 

Obviously, the decisions we are going to make in the next 6 to 

12 months are going to have profound impact on Afghanistan and 

the region as a whole. And certainly a stable and secure Afghanistan, free of radical Islamist sanctuaries, free of radical Islamists 

is in the U.S. national interest to be sure and something we are 

trying to achieve. 

What is key to achieving that is, in fact, U.S. commitment and 

resolve and U.S. leadership. It is not about cutting our losses. It 

is about not squandering the gains and the results that we have 

achieved. The United States and Afghanistan have got a written 

strategic agreement right now which is a long-term strategic relationship between both nations for mutual benefit. I am reminded, 

we had a similar agreement in Iraq. It was called the Strategic 

Framework Agreement. In my judgment, it was not honored. We 

pulled away from Iraq. Iran gained influence and al-Qaeda reasserted itself as we can see today. 

At issue at the time was a place we are in now. We are arguing 

over the status of forces agreement. It is a misrepresentation of 

what took place to say that the reason there are no forces in Iraq 

is because we could not get an agreement over immunity. Maliki 

only offered that as a face-saving device because the forces we put 

on the table, personal envoy to the President of the United States 

was 10,000, virtually 60 percent less than what the military commander had recommended. Maliki, a nefarious character to be 

sure, knew that wasn’t a serious proposal and tried to find a way 

out of it. We cannot make that mistake again here. 

16

We need military presence post-2014. We also need a determined, aggressive, diplomatic and political engagement for years to 

come. And we have to help a fledgling democracy mature. We have 

huge experience in this area and we can help them. They certainly 

have huge problems as we all know and has been born out of the 

last 12 years. We have got to assist Afghanistan to move from a 

donor economy to a self-sustaining economy focused around mining, 

agriculture, and a transportation hub and some of that is clearly 

now on the horizon. We know how to do this. We have done this 

in Germany, Italy, Japan, post-World War II, South Korea, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, just to name a few and the list is long. We 

have had some problems as well with other countries. 

The central issue facing Afghanistan post 2014 is managing the 

security risk. Three key decisions to mitigate that risk: Funding 

the ANSF right now through 2015 at 352,000. We have got to keep 

that funding through 2020. If we draw down the ANSF on the 

heels of the NATO–U.S. drawdown it absolutely makes no sense 

operationally and tactically and we might as well underscore failure if we permit that to happen. And we are actually arguing over 

what? Two or three billion dollars a year for 5 years? Given what 

we spent in this government, that is what we are arguing over between 352,000 versus 200,000 and something? That makes no 

sense to me whatsoever and it borders on irresponsibility if we go 

down that road. 

The second thing is the residual force and you spent a lot of time 

on it. I won’t. The force is essential. It is the glue that will bind 

the United States, Afghanistan, and international community relationship during the critical transition years; largely noncombat except for counterterrorism missions. If it is too small and cannot 

perform the required mission, the risk will go up exponentially. 

Must be counterterrorism. Must be training assistance. And must 

be enablers. 

The third thing is sanctuaries. My dear friend, Fred Kagan, mentioned it. This is a huge problem for us. The south is relatively stable. The east, some parts of it are, as you go toward the Pak border, it is not. The Haqqani network dominates. We were never able 

to put in place the surge forces in the east that we were able to 

do in the south. Why? We prematurely withdrew those forces over 

the objections of General Petraeus. So we never had the force application. As a result of that, they still dominate there. 

My recommendation to mitigate that risk is to permit targeting 

of the Haqqani network in those sanctuaries in Pakistan. And then 

you bring down Haqqani’s operational network and certainly raise 

the morale of the ANSF forces to the point where they think they 

have a chance. 

Some relationship to Pakistan because you included it in this 

and just let me very quickly say this is a regime that is dominated 

by its military who puts its military self above the state. We have 

got a weak civilian government, fundamentally corrupt. The economy is in the tank. We have got a raging insurgency. We have got 

an escalating nuclear power. They support terror operations in 

India with terrorist organizations. They support the Haqqani network and the Taliban in conducting operations against the United 

States and NATO and Afghanistan. They have got blood all over 

17

their hands with the casualties, Ranking Minority Member, that 

you mentioned. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]


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Congressional Hearing 

Testimony 

29 October 2013 

1415 hrs 

Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen, ranking minority Ted Deutch, and 

distinguished members of the joint subcommittee, thank you for allowing me 

to testifY today on such a critical subject as the "way forward in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan". Am honored to be with such a distinguished panel who I have 

known for many years. 

Afghanistan is rapidly moving toward its most critical milestone since 

2001, when the Taliban were deposed, as 2014 approaches and Afghanistan 

participates in a political, economic and security transition. It is US and 

Afghanistan written policy that both countries will maintain a long term 

strategic relationship which is mutually beneficial. I am reminded we had a 

similar agreement with Iraq, titled the Strategic Framework Agreement, 

which we have not honored, indeed, we have pulled away from Iraq allowing 

Iran to gain influence and encouraging the Al Qaeda to reassert itself. 

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The United States cannot make this mistake again in Afghanistan, not only is 

U.S. military presence required but a determined, aggressive, diplomatic and 

political engagement is needed for years to come. It took multiple 

generations after the Korean War for South Korea to transition from a 3rd 

world nation run by military dictators to the world's 12'h largest economy and 

a flourishing democracy. U.S. and international community presence in 

Afghanistan is vital to its future success and for overall stability in the region. 

In 2014, there will be national elections in Afghanistan. While there are no 

guarantees, a relatively fair and open election that reflects the peoples' 

choices and results in an improved national government will be a significant 

step forward in the political development of Afghanistan. As such, it will 

positively impact the confidence of the Afghan people and the international 

community at large in the Afghan political process. On the contrary, if the 

election is perceived to be fundamentally corrupt and unfair it will be a major 

setback which will adversely impact US and IC support. 

As part of the post 2014 presence the US and the IC should assist the 

Afghans to move from a "donor" economy with outside sources representing 
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the bulk of the resources to a self-sustaining economy focusing on mining, 

agriculture and transportation. Despite all of Afghanistan's current economic 

woes it does have the real opportunity to dramatically increase the quality of 

life of the Afghan people. 

The central issue facing Afghanistan post 2014 is how to manage the security 

risk. How do we avoid squandering the gains we have made in Afghanistan 

security. Only if the security situation is stable, and the Taliban know they 

cannot win, can there ever be a realistic hope for a political settlement. 

Three key decisions can mitigate the security risk and provide a hedge: 

1. FUNDING AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 

(ANSF) POST 2014 

Currently the transition from USINA TO leading combat operations to 

supporting the lead of the ANSF in combat operations, frankly, is going 

better than most expected. The growth and development of the ANSF into an 

acceptable force which has the respect of the Afghan people is quite an 

achievement. While it is still too early to tell how they will do entirely on 

their own, the preliminary indications are positive. Currently, the ANSF is at 

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a force level of 352 thousand which is funded through 2015. Options are 

under consideration to drawdowl1 the ANSF post 2015. To drawdoWl1 the 

ANSF on the heels of the US/NA TO drawdoWl1 makes no sense and drives 

up the risk. We can mitigate the risk by planning to fund the ANSF at the 

current 352 thousand to 2020. At some point the Afghans will be in a 

position to contribute to the funding level. 

2. POST 2014 RESIDUAL FORCE 

The size of the residual force should be driven by the missions that are 

required for the force. Those missions are counter-terrorism (CT), training 

and assistance and enablers to the ANSF. 

--CT focus is on the Taliban leaders to disrupt their ability to plan, 

support and lead combat operations. While leaders can be replaced, 

successful CT operations are very disruptive to the Taliban and definitely 

adversely impact their operations. Successful CT operations not only require 

a direct action force but also drone crews, analysts, helicopter maintenance 

and night crews, medical trauma units and security forces. 

--Training and assistance are essentially advisors to assist the army and 

police with their continued growth and development. These advisors will be 

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mainly to operational headquarters and to the ministers of defense and 

interior. 

--The enablers for the ANSF is often misunderstood as to its 

importance. Just about every NATO country in Afghanistan requires 

enablers from the US in varying degrees, such as helicopters, intelligence, 

medical, logistics and road and mine clearance. When the ANA was 

organized, recruited and trained the decision was to build an infantry force, or 

a "boots on the ground" force. The enablers would be provided by the US 

and are similar to what the US provides NATO forces. Eventually, the ANA 

will have its own enablers but not till years beyond 2014. Tfthe ANA is to be 

offensive minded they must have confidence in their support, otherwise they 

will be paralyzed and reduced to defending their bases. 

Based on the required missions the residual force size should be 

approximately 20,000 U.S. 

3. PAKISTAN SANCTUARIES 

--us diplomatic policy has failed to reverse Pakistan's support of the 

Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. The most serious impact is in the 

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EAST where the security situation is not as stable as the SOUTH. Indeed the 

Haggani network (HN) in Afghanistan dominates the most eastern provinces. 

US surge forces were withdrawn before they were able to be applied in the 

EAST and as such the ANSF faces a critical security risk, which can be 

reduced by authorizing the targeting of the HN, in its sanctuary in Pakistan. 

This would be an extension of the mission the OGA is conducting against the 

Al Qaeda (AQ) in the FAT A. Once systematic targeting commences, the 

sanctuary will cease to exist as we currently know it; a place where strategy, 

training, operational oversight, intelligence and logistics is executed, 

routinely, in safe haven. These functions will suffer significantly which will 

positively impact operations in the EAST and a huge morale boost for the 

ANSF. 

lI.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN 

Post 9/11 U.S. policy with Pakistan has produced mixed results. Pakistan has 

a history of profound strategic miscalculation. On the positive side, we have 

successfully impacted the PAK military to transition and train conventional 

forces for counter insurgency operations and while they have not defeated the 

Taliban insurgency they have made progress. U.S. and Pakistan have shared 

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intelligence on AQ and the PAK's have been instrumental in killing and 

capturing key AQ leaders. However, as mentioned, the PAK's have not 

withdrawn their support for the HN and the TB as they hedge against a 

potential US failure in Afghanistan. The way forward is to recognize there 

are common goals in regional stability, Pakistan internal security and 

Afghanistan stability and, yet, be cleared eyed about a Pakistan military that 

puts itself before the state, a weak and corrupt civilian government and an 

escalating nuclear power. The aid that the USG just resumed should be 

shifting some of the U.S. effort to assisting in the development of a stronger, 

less corrupt, civilian government capable of controlling its military. 

Additionally, the US must assist PAK leaders to address their real strategic 

issues and a national security strategy to sustain it without confrontation with 

its neighbors or the use of non-state actors as instruments of national policy. 

CONCLUSION 

Let me conclude by saying that war is fundamentally a test of wills and the 

ultimate objective of war is to break your opponents will. Some claim it is 

our will that is being broken, we are war weary, and, it is best to just leave 

because the Taliban will take over eventually, regardless of what we do. No 

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one knows what will be the long term future stability of Afghanistan but there 

are things we do know after almost 12 years of involvement: 

--the AQ has largely been driven out of Afghanistan 

--Afghanistan routinely, now elects its own local and national leaders 

(not close to a mature democracy, but a beginning) 

--education from primary through university is flourishing with woman 

at all levels 

--despite an insurgency, quality oflife has improved 

--the potential for economic self-sustainment is on the horizon 

--the ANSF in recent polling shows dramatic improvement in Afghan 

confidence 

--security has dramatically improved, most of the country is relatively 

stable, the Taliban are largely defeated in the SOUTH and the ANSF is 

holding its own. In the EAST there is risk, and I addressed how to mitigate 

it. My point is, much has been accomplished and we should not squander 

these gains and risk the return of the TB and the AQ. USIIC presence post 

2014 is essential. The required resources are dramatically less than what we 

provided in the past or are providing now. Is that future investment worth it 

to protect the positive results of our previous investment, my judgment is, 

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yes. Ryan Crocker our most esteemed Middle East Ambassador, in over a 

generation, who served in Pakistan, in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 

"surge" periods has said, "how we leave a country and what we leave behind 

is far more important than how we started." What is key is the US policy 

commitment to the stability and security of Afghanistan must be clearly 

stated, time and again, and moreover reflected in the political, economic and 

military assistance that is critical to reduce the risk of failure. We cannot 

afford any equivocation or mixed signals about the strength and resolve of 

the US commitment to Afghanistan's future. 

Thank you and T welcome your questions. 

10 
27

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, General. Thank you so much for 

your testimony. 

General KEANE. Sorry I ran longer than you wanted. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Curtis. Thank you very much, you are next. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Ms. CURTIS. Madam Chairwoman, Chairman Chabot, and Ranking Member Deutch, thank you very much for inviting me here 

today to share my views on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan. 

The election of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif does provide an opportunity for the U.S. to forge a more effective partnership with Pakistan albeit on a limited set of issues including social 

and economic development. Washington and Islamabad are seeking 

to revive these ties following a series of shocks to the relationship, 

particularly in 2011 including the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s 

compound in Abbottabad and an accidental NATO strike on the 

border with Afghanistan and Pakistan that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers later that year. 

Now Pakistan’s reopening of the ground lines of communication 

in the summer of 2012 and the U.S. reinstatement of coalition support funding for Pakistan in December of that year did mark the 

beginning of a rapprochement between our two countries and this 

culminated in last week’s visit of Nawaz Sharif to Washington during which the administration resumed $1.6 billion in economic and 

military assistance. Now the mutual good will that was generated 

by the Obama-Sharif meeting was welcome, but it should not mask 

the fact that each side remains deeply distrustful of the other. 

Pakistan is home to a variety of terrorist groups that keep the 

region unstable and contribute to the spread of global terrorism. 

The Pakistani military’s policies toward the Afghan Taliban and 

terrorist groups like the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e 

Tayyiba have remained largely unchanged over the last 12 years, 

despite U.S. pressure and $27 billion in aid. 

Pakistan’s military maintains a short-term tactical approach of 

fighting some terrorist groups deemed to be a threat to the state, 

while supporting others that are aligned with Pakistan’s goal of 

curbing Indian regional influence. The recent release of Taliban 

leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar from a Pakistani jail is a potentially positive step for Afghan reconciliation efforts. Afghan 

leaders have praised the release of this pro-talks leader but say 

Baradar remains under the supervision of Pakistan’s intelligence 

agencies. But it is unclear to what degree other Taliban leaders believe the group should engage in talks while U.S. and NATO forces 

are departing. There is skepticism among experts, including myself, 

about the Taliban’s sincerity in the negotiating process. The insurgents have stepped up their attacks and they appear confident that 

time is on their side. 

While Pakistan has been helpful in facilitating travel of Afghan 

Taliban leaders to meetings in third countries, there are no signs 

that Pakistan has pressured the Taliban leadership or Haqqani 

network to compromise for peace. For reconciliation talks to succeed, the Taliban and Haqqani network would have to come under 

28

more pressure in Pakistan. Pakistan’s inconsistent policies toward 

terrorism certainly pose a threat to U.S. national security interests. 

But cutting off relationships with Pakistan altogether would be a 

risky option. The U.S. instead should pursue policies that build up 

the economy and support Pakistani civil society while conditioning 

military assistance on Pakistan’s cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism goals. 

There is recognition among some Pakistan civilian leaders that 

a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan would likely have a destabilizing 

effect on Pakistan and unless Islamabad uses its resources now to 

convince the Taliban to compromise in Afghanistan, Pakistan will 

suffer from an emboldened Taliban leadership that will project its 

power back across the border into Pakistan. But despite the frustration with Pakistan’s approach, the U.S. should persist in using 

the tools that it has to try to shape Pakistani decision making in 

a more helpful direction. 

Number one, the U.S. should strictly condition military aid to 

Pakistan. In the last year, the Obama administration has exercised 

its waiver authority on two occasions to provide military aid to 

Pakistan. If the administration continues to rely on its waiver authority, it will undermine its ability to influence Pakistani terrorism policies. 

Number two, as my colleagues have also testified, we should 

maintain a robust, residual force presence in Afghanistan post2014 and commit to funding the ANSF for several more years. 

Third, we should foster U.S.-Pakistan civil society dialogue. 

There are many Pakistani citizens working to reverse extremist 

trends in the society. There is a need for the U.S. to bolster these 

forces through civil society engagement and here I would point to 

an initiative that I believe the U.S. should get behind which is the 

U.S.-Pakistan Leadership Forum which is a forum that brings together American and Pakistani civil society and private sector leaders to cooperate in areas like media, the arts, education, business, 

and agriculture. 

Lastly, it is important for the U.S. to encourage Indo-Pakistani 

dialogue. The two countries made significant progress in their 

peace talks from the period of 2004 to 2007 and the U.S. should 

encourage both countries to get back to those terms of talks. The 

U.S. should not seek to restrict India’s diplomatic and economic involvement in Afghanistan to appease Pakistan. India has an important role to play in encouraging democratic institution building and 

economic development in Afghanistan and it shares our objective of 

preventing terrorists from reestablishing bases in the country. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]

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214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE· Wushington DC 20002 • (202) 546-4400· heritage,org 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part II) 

Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

and 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States House of Representatives 

October 29, 2013 

lisa Curtis 

Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center 

The Heritage Foundation 
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My name is Lisa Curtis. I am Senior Research Fellow on South Asia in the Asian Studies Center 

at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be 

construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

The election of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League/Nawaz 

(PM LiN) party offers the U.S. an opportunity to forge a more effective partnership with Pakistan 

on a limited range of issues, including social and economic development and regional 

integration. Given that the Pakistani military continues to seek to undermine Indian regional 

influence through terrorist proxies operating in both Afghanistan and India, however, Sharifs 

election alone is unlikely to have significant impact on the core U.S. goals of stabilizing 

Afghanistan and rooting out terrorism from the region. 

Despite the challenges, there are sound reasons for the U.S. to pursue engagement with Pakistan, 

including maintaining access for tracking global terrorists sheltering on its territory, encouraging 

Pakistan's leadership to pursue a moderate, democratic path, and maintaining a degree of 

leverage with the military leadership to ensure that Pakistan's nuclear weapons remain safe and 

secure and out of the hands of extremists. 

Pakistan is home to a plethora of terrorist groups that keep the region unstable, and contribute to 

the spread of global terrorism. Its policies toward the Afghan Taliban and terrorist groups like 

the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) have remained largely unchanged over 

the last II years, despite U.S. pressure on Islamabad to crack down on the terror groups. 

Provision of nearly U.S. $27 billion in military and economic assistance to Pakistan over the last 

decade has had little impact on Pakistan's strategic calculus with regard to Afghanistan and 

India. Pakistan's military and intelligence leaders maintain a short-term tactical approach of 

fighting some terrorist groups deemed to be a threat to the state, while supporting others that are 

aligned with Pakistan's goal of curbing Indian regional influence. 

Moving relations forward with a country that is both hurting and helping in the fight against 

global terrorism has proven challenging. But cutting off relations with Pakistan altogether is a 

risky option. The U.S. instead should pursue policies that build up the economy and support 

Pakistani civil society, while conditioning military assistance on Pakistani cooperation with U.S 

counterterrorism goals. 

The Obama Administration exercised its national security waiver authority to skirt 

counterterrorism conditions on military aid to Pakistan earlier this year. This was likely prudent 

in the middle of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan, given Pakistani influence with Afghan 

Taliban leaders and U.S reliance on the Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) 

But a policy of continually overlooking Pakistani inaction against extremist groups on its 

territory would have long-term negative consequences for U.S. interests in the region and 

increase the chances for additional terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. U.S. policymakers 

should make clear to Pakistani leaders that the future of U. S.-Pakistan ties will hinge on how 

helpful Pakistan is in supporting the U.S. objective of stabilizing Afghanistan and reining in 

terrorist groups on Pakistani territory. 

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Reviving Ties amidst Continuing Mistrust 

Washington and Islamabad are making a serious effort to revive ties following a series of shocks 

to the relationship in 2011 and 2012. Relations started to spiral downward when CIA contractor 

Raymond Davis was arrested in Pakistan for shooting two Pakistanis in early 2011, then further 

plummeted following the U.S. unilateral raid on Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, 

Pakistan on May 2, 2011. An attack on the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan by the Pakistan-based 

Haqqani network in September, 2011, and an accidental NATO strike on the AfghanistanPakistan border that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers two months later put relations in cold storage for 

nearly a year. 

Pakistan's full re-opening of the GLOCs and the US. reinstatement of coalition support funding 

(CSF) in December 2012 marked the beginning of a rapprochement in relations that culminated 

in last week's visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington, during which the Obama 

Administration announced full resumption of military and economic aid to the tune of$1.5 

billion. The Obama Administration had been working with Congress over the last several months 

to resume hundreds of millions in assistance programs aimed at strengthening Pakistan's 

counterterrorism capabilities. In the joint statement issued by Prime Minister Sharif and 

President Obama on October 23, the two sides committed to holding a ministerial-level strategic 

dialogue next spring The priorities for the dialogue include law enforcement and 

counterterrorism; economics and finance; energy; security, strategic stability, and nonproliferation; and defense consultations. 

The mutual goodwill generated by the Obama-Sharif meeting was welcome, but it should not 

mask the fact that each side remains deeply distrustful of the other. A recent report in 1I1c 

Washington Post details the challenges the US faces in managing relations with Pakistan. 

According to the report, based on classified CIA documents and Pakistani government memos, 

Pakistan has secretly cooperated with the US drone program. 1 This revelation followed closely 

on the heels of Sharif s calls on the Obama Administration to halt drone strikes and an Amnesty 

International report that denounced drones for causing civilian casualties. 

The Washington Post article further detailed how US. officials have had to confront Pakistan's 

leadership with evidence that Pakistan retains links to groups involved in attacking US forces 

Tn one instance, former US. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Pakistani officials the US. 

had found cell phone numbers of Pakistani intelligence officials on bodies of dead militants. In 

another case, former Deputy Director of the CTA Mike Morell showed Pakistani officials video 

of militants clearing explosive materials from plants the US. had asked Pakistan to raid. US 

officials said the videos proved that Pakistani authorities had tipped off the militants before the 

raid was launched. The article is a reminder that despite all the talk about putting relations on a 

more even keel, the two sides remain deeply divided over the counterterrorism issue. 

1 Greg Mil1er and Bob \Vood\yard, "Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on Drones," 

1he Washington Fast. October 2~. 2013, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/worJd/national-secllrity/top-pakistanileaders-secretly -bac ked-da-drone-ca mpa ign-secret -documents-s how/20 13/ I 0/231 ISe6bOd8-3 beb-I I e3 -b6a9-

daG2c2G4f40e _story _l.html. 

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Pakistani Calcnlus on Afghanistan 

Pakistani leaders appear to believe that US. forces will depart the region before Afghanistan is 

stabilized and thus calculate that continuing support for the Taliban and Haqqani network 

constitutes their best chance to counter Indian regional int1uence. Unfortunately, President 

Obama's aggressive withdrawal strategy and questions about whether the US. will retain a 

residual force presence in the country post-20 14 only reinforces their view. 

Pakistani officials publicly voice support for a stable Afghanistan, but the truth is they want to 

ensure that their own proxies remain int1uential in the country to prevent India from making 

further inroads into Kabul. Pakistan's concerns about increasing Indian int1uence and presence in 

Afghanistan over-ride its desire for a stable Afghan neighbor. This leaves US. policy in a 

conundrum in which American officials acknowledge the need to work with Pakistan on 

encouraging a peace process in Afghanistan, but also recognize that Pakistan has ditTerent 

regional goals than the US., making it an unreliable partner. 

Taliban Reconciliation Talks 

US. efforts to encourage talks between the Afghan government and Taliban have faltered in 

recent months. The proposed opening of a Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar this past 

summer turned into a fiasco when the Taliban raised its t1ag on the office and posted a sign 

referring to the group as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai 

was furious about the move and demanded the office be closed down. 

There is skepticism among many regional experts about the Taliban's sincerity in the negotiating 

process. The insurgents have stepped up their attacks and shown signs of confidence that time is 

on their side. A 2012 National Intelligence Estimate (NJE) on Afghanistan raises concerns that 

the Taliban could manipulate negotiations with the US. to gain international legitimacy, and 

simply stall for time as America draws down its forces 2 Other unidentified Western intelligence 

officials have also expressed reservations about talks with the Taliban, and their assessment is 

that the Taliban is playing a waiting game and has no real interest in reconciling with the Karzai 

government.' 

US. officials say Pakistan has been helpful in facilitating the travel of Afghan Taliban leaders to 

meetings in third countries with US. and Afghan otlicials. But there are no signs that Pakistan 

has used its leverage to pressure either the Taliban leadership or its Haqqani network allies to 

compromise for peace. Details of the relationship between the Pakistan military and the Haqqani 

network are laid out in a recent book, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqafli Nexus, J973-2012, 

by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler4 The book highlights that Pakistan is actively assisting the 

Haqqani network the same way it has over the last 20 years, through training, tactical field 

2 Sara Sarcher. "Peace Talks \yilh Taliban a Good Step. But Unlikely to Pay Off." -,-Val;onal Journal. Janual)' 23. 

lOll, at http://mobile.nationaljoumal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-peace-talks-with-taliban-a-good-step-butunlikcly-Io-pay-orr-20 120 123 . 

.3 Con Coughlin, "Talking to the Taliban: Are Afghanistan's Insnrgents Rea]])' Seriolls About Peace Talks \"\'ith 

Washinb'lon and Kabu]']'" Ihe lI"a/l StreetJournal, January 17, l012. 

4 Vahid Bro\vn and Don Rassler. Fountainhead afJihad: The Haqqani ,\le.ws, /973-l012 (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2013). page 171. 

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advice, financing, and material support. The assistance, the authors note, helps to sustain the 

Haqqani group and enhance its effectiveness on the battlefield. For reconciliation talks to 

succeed, the Taliban and Haqqani network would have to come under more pressure in Pakistan. 

As U.S. national security expert Anthony Cordesman pointed out, the U.S. inability to convince 

Pakistan to give up support for the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other terrorist groups has 

been a "critical failure" of U.S. strategy in the region5 

The case of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the pro-talks Taliban leader whom Pakistan held in 

detention for over three years, also shows that Pakistan's role in the reconciliation process has 

been more opaque than U. S. otlicials seem willing to acknowledge. Pakistani authorities 

captured Mullah Baradar in February 2010. Baradar was reportedly involved with peace 

negotiations with the Karzai administration at the time, so his arrest seemed clearly aimed at 

disrupting the talks. Islamabad refused the Afghan government's request for Baradar' s 

extradition. 

After continuous requests over the last three years from the Afghan government for Baradar's 

release, Pakistan finally let him go last month. Afghan leaders have praised the Pakistani action 

but say that Baradar remains under the supervision of Pakistan's intelligence agencies. Afghan 

Taliban leaders have so far refused to meet him inside Pakistan. Pakistan has released several 

other Taliban prisoners over the last year, but it is still unclear whether this will have an impact 

on the talks. 

Pakistani intelligence otlicials understand better than anyone how to break apart and disrupt the 

Taliban-Haqqani-al-Qaeda nexus. Pakistan's Directorate ofInter-Services Intelligence (lSI) has 

had close relationships with members of these groups for three decades and has a well-developed 

understanding of the dynamics among the organizations and the strengths and weaknesses of 

each group's leaders. But if Pakistan is unwilling to use its leverage to help bring genuine peace 

to Afghanistan, there are other policies-aside from pursuing reconciliation with the Talibanthat the U.S. can pursue. Political reconciliation involving the Taliban is desirable only to the 

extent that it contributes to the goal of ensuring that Afghanistan never serves as a safe haven for 

global terrorists again. 

Peace Efforts with the Pakistani Taliban 

Pakistan's fostering of various militant groups has backfired badly as some extremists have 

turned their guns on the Pakistani state. This is the case with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, 

the Pakistani Taliban), which has killed several thousand Pakistani civilians and security forces 

in terrorist attacks since its creation in 2007. Despite ongoing attacks, an All Parties Conference 

(APC) in Pakistan decided in early September to endorse the idea of peace talks with the TTP. 

The Nawaz Sharif government has reached out to the group, even though nearly 140 people were 

killed in terrorist attacks in the Pakistani city of Peshawar in just the last month. Pakistani leaders 

say the attacks are being carried out by militant elements opposed to negotiations, implying the 

TTP may be splintering as an organization 

, Anthony H. Cordesrnan, 'The Afghanistan-Pakistm War at the End of 20 II: Strdteb~C failureo Talk Without 

Hope? Tactical Success? Spend Not Build (and then Stop Spending)?" Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. November IS, 20ll, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php··Recordld~3M05. 

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TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud, during a recent interview with the BBC, said his group was 

ready for serious negotiations with Islamabad6 It is unclear what the two sides would discuss, 

however, since Mehsud made clear that one of the TTP's main goals is to wage jihad against the 

"infidel" system of governance in Pakistan. He said the TTP would demand the country be run 

exclusively according to Shariah law even after the U.S. and NATO withdraw combat forces 

from Afghanistan. Mehsud also called for an end to the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan's tribal 

border areas and claimed his group would consider a ceasefire, if drone attacks were halted. 

The APC resolution notwithstanding, some Pakistani commentators have expressed skepticism 

about efforts to engage the TTP and see the government's offer as a sign of weakness in the face 

of escalating attacks. In the six weeks before the elections in early May 2013, the TTP took 

responsibility for attacks that killed scores of election workers and candidates mainly from the 

secular-leaning parties. The PMLIN's support for negotiations with the TTP during this 

campaign of violence and failure to denounce the attacks seemed to play in to the TTP's strategy 

of using violence to intimidate civilians and impose its agenda. 

Pakistani leaders have a poor track record of past efforts to forge peace deals with militant 

groups. The most disastrous attempt at peacemaking with militants came in 2008 and 2009, when 

Taliban fighters took control of the Swat Valley and then sought to make inroads in other parts 

of Pakistan. The military finally regained control of the Swat Valley through force in mid-2009, 

but its initial appeasement of the militants had allowed them to entrench themselves in society 

and emboldened them to try to gain more territory. 

Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 

Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have seen both highs and lows in the last few years. The political 

leaders have held several meetings but President Karzai often directly blames Pakistan for 

attacks in Afghanistan. Relations took a downturn earlier this year following a meeting in the 

United Kingdom in which Pakistan apparently demanded that Afghanistan scale back its 

relations with India and agree to allow Pakistani training of Afghan security forces 7 President 

Karzai visited Islamabad in late August, and many see the recent release of Mullah Baradar and 

other lower level pragmatic Taliban leaders as a result of those meetings and an effort to improve 

Afghan-Pal<istani relations. 

There have been some flare-ups along their shared I,SOO-mile border in the last six months. In 

May, an Afghan border policeman was killed and two Pakistani soldiers were injured during a 

firefight along the border. In mid-September, Pakistan accused Afghan border forces of killing 

five innocent Pakistanis along the border in Baluchistan province. 

But their shared border has also led to limited economic cooperation and increasingly robust 

people-to-people linkages. About 3 million Afghan retugees continue to reside in Pakistan and 

30,000 Afghan students study in Pakistani schools, while around 50,000 Afghans move back and 

6 "Full Text: BBe interview with Tolibon's Mehsud," RRC'. October 9, 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.llk/news/worldasia-2~~66 79 L 

Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance. Security. and U.S. Policy. CR/...,' Reportfrlr Congress, 

September 19, 2013. 

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forth across the Afghan-Pakistani border every day. The two countries signed a "transit trade" 

agreement three years ago to allow for easier export of Afghan agricultural products through 

Pakistan. Afghan trucks are not pennitted to move cargo back from India, however. AfghanPakistani trade currently totals around $2 billion. The two countries also are discussing the 

possibility of joint economic projects like building a common hydroelectric station8 

Indo-Pakistani Ties 

India is committed to building economic and political links with Afghanistan both to prevent the 

re-establishment of terrorist sanctuaries in the country and to gain trade and energy access to 

Central Asia. India has pledged nearly $2 billion in aid to Afghanistan, making it one of the top 

donors to the country, and is moving forward with major economic investments. President 

Karzai and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh completed a Strategic Partnership 

Agreement in 2011 that allowed, among other things, Indian training of Afghan security forces. 

Pakistani military and intelligence officials remain highly suspicious of ties between Kabul and 

New Delhi and believe that India uses its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan to recruit 

insurgents to fight in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. From the U.S. perspective, however, India 

is contributing positively to Afghanistan's economic and democratic development and it is, thus, 

in the U.S. interest that India remain engaged in Afghanistan. The only way to reduce Pakistani 

paranoia about Indo-Afghan ties is to promote dialogue and improved relations between India 

and Paki stan. 

Indo-Pakistani tensions are rising after a series of firing incidents in August that killed several 

Indian and Pakistani troops along the Line of Control (LoC) that di vi des Kashmir. LoC tensions 

flared again last week when India accused Pakistani troops of firing b'llns and mortars on at least 

50 Indian border posts in Kashmir. Indian otl'icials said it was the most serious ceasefire 

violation between the countries in a decade. Meanwhile, Pakistan said that Indian troops targeted 

27 Pakistani posts near Sialkot in the same timeframe. 

During his previous stint as prime minister from 1997 to 1999, Sharif encouraged back-channel 

negotiations with India on Kashmir that made significant progress until the Pakistan military 

occupied Indian positions in northern Kashmir. That slammed the brakes on talks and 

precipitated a brief border war in the spring of 1999 in the Kargil region along the LoC that left 

more than 1,000 Indian and Pakistani soldiers dead. Sharif is likely to tread carefully on the issue 

of Kashmir because of this experience. 

U.S. Policy Recommendations: 

Pakistani military leaders have so far resisted cracking down on Taliban and Haqqani network 

sanctuaries largely because of their failure to envision a new strategy that both protects 

Pakistan's regional interests and uproots support for terrorist activities and ideology. Islamabad's 

practice of relying on violent Islamist proxies in Mghanistan (and India) has backfired badly on 

Pakistan and there is increasing recognition among Pakistanis that a Taliban-dominated 

8 Roundtable discussion \vith visiting Pakistani National Security and Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz, \Villard 

Hotel, Washillh1011, DC October 23.2013. 

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Afghanistan would likely have a destabilizing effect on Pakistan. U.S. officials must build on 

this sentiment by convincing Pakistani leaders that unless they use their resources now to force 

the Taliban to compromise in Mghanistan, Pakistan will suffer from an emboldened Taliban 

leadership that will project its power back into Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan will face increasing 

isolation and lose credibility with the international community for continuing policies that 

encourage terrorism and endanger the safety of civilized nations. 

Moving forward the US should: 

Condition military aid. Despite nearly $27 billion in civil and military aid to Pakistan over the 

last decade, the U.S. has been unable to sway Pakistani leaders to adopt consistent and 

comprehensive policies that crack down on terrorism in all its forms. Islamabad has not changed 

its fundamental strategy of supporting extremist groups like the Taliban, Haqqani network, and 

LeT. The US. must strictly condition further military aid to Pakistan on it cracking down on 

terrorism in all its forms. Language in the House of Representatives version of the FY 2014 

National Defense Authorization Act bill that conditions reimbursement of Coalition Support 

Funds for Pakistan on it taking action against the Haqqani network is helpful. 

In September 2012, the Administration waived FY 2012 certifications on U.S. military aid to 

Pakistan and in February 2013, it issued a waiver to allow the transfer of major defense 

equipment. 9 If the Administration continues to rely on its waiver authority, it will undermine its 

ability to influence Pakistani terrorism policies. 

Establish a congressional commission to investigate Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. The 

public contradictions within the Obama Administration regarding the extent to which Pakistan 

supports U.S. enemies in the region is leading to speculation that the Administration is reluctant 

to rock the boat with Pal,istan in the middle of a drawdown of forces from Mghanistan. This in 

tum is weakening the U.S. position in the region and emboldening Pakistan's military leadership. 

A bipartisan panel would help to bring clarity to U.S. policy toward Pal,istan. 

Maintain a robust residual force presence in Afghanistan post-2014 and ensure that people 

in the region know that the U.S. will remain engaged there diplomatically, financially, and 

militarily even after 2014. The major reason that Pakistan continues to support the Haqqani 

network (and other Taliban proxies) is the belief that the US. will fully withdraw from 

Afghanistan before the situation is stable and that the Haqqanis provide the best chance to secure 

Pakistan's interests in the country. Announcing the US. intention to leave a robust number of 

forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014 would signal the Pakistanis that the US. is committed to 

finishing the job in Afghanistan. 

Remain open but clear-eyed on the issue of Afghan reconciliation. The goal of Afghan peace 

talks should be to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda and encourage them to become part of the 

political process, not to allow them to dominate power at the expense of other ethnic groups and 

progress made for the people of Afghanistan over the past 12 years. The U.S. must be realistic 

about the threat that Taliban extremists and their al-Qaeda allies pose and not pin false hopes on 

9 Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt "Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance;' CR,,)' Reportjor ('ongress, July I, 

2013. 

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a political reconciliation process merely to justify a troop withdrawal. Political reconciliation is 

desirable -- but only ifit contributes to the goal of ensuring that Afghanistan never again serves 

as a safe haven for global terrorists. 

Encourage Indo-Pakistani dialogue. The US should fully support dialogue between 

Islamabad and New Delhi but should also avoid any kind of mediation role. Pakistan and India 

made strong progress in peace talks trom 2004 to 2007, and Washington should encourage the 

two countries to return to the terms of those talks. The US. should not seek to restrict India's 

diplomatic and economic involvement in Afghanistan to appease Pakistan. India has an 

important role to play in encouraging democratic institution-building and economic development 

and shares the US. strategic objective of preventing global terrorists trom re-establishing a safe 

haven in Afghanistan. 

Foster U.S.-Pakistan civil society dialogue. Although the Pakistan military and intelligence 

establishment has pursued dual policies toward terrorists that have strengthened support for 

extremism, there are plenty of Pakistani citizens who are working hard and indeed risking their 

Ii ves to reverse extremist trends and ensure the rights and freedoms of all Pakistanis. U S.-

Pakistan government-to-government interactions alone will not help Pakistan achieve the goal of 

becoming a moderate, successful, and stable country. There is a need for more and deeper civil 

society engagement between Americans and Pakistanis. The US. should support initiatives like 

the US.-Pakistan Leadership Forum, organized by three US.-based non-governmental 

organizations (Convergence, the Consensus Building Institute, and the Institute for Resource and 

Security Studies). The Leadership Forum brings together American and Pakistani civil society 

and private sector leaders in cooperative endeavors in the tlelds of media, the arts, education, 

business, and agriculture development. The Pakistanis involved in the forum are voices for 

democracy and good governance and can mobilize support for a more stable and cooperative 

US.-Pakistan relationship. 

Conclusion: 

The global terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan remains a core U.S. national security concern 

as a multitude of different extremist groups with varying degrees of ties to al-Qaeda operate in 

and from Pakistan. While the U.S. has made progress against al-Qaeda's core leadership base in 

Pakistan, it must use whatever pressure is necessary in its engagement with Pakistan to ensure 

that all terrorist groups in the country are denied sanctuary. Failing to make additional progress 

in rooting out terrorism from Pakistan could set the stage for future attacks on the US. 

homeland. Perhaps the strongest argument for continuing to pursue some level of engagement 

with Pakistan, despite its lack of cooperation against some terrorist groups, is to help it avoid 

facing the nightmare scenario of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. 

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Curtis. 

Dr. Biddle. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BIDDLE, PH.D., ADJUNCT SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR DEFENSE POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. BIDDLE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks to the 

committee for the opportunity to speak with you on these important national issues. 

The Afghanistan debate often focuses on the immediate and that 

is understandable. Certainly, there are lots of important short-term 

challenges to overcome from the need to negotiate a Bilateral Security Agreement to the need to hold acceptable Afghan elections in 

the spring, to the need for a successful transition to Afghan security responsibility by the end of 2014. But as important as these 

issues are, they tend to overlook a question of larger, ultimate importance which is not how we get to a successful transition, but 

how we get from a successful transition to an actual end to the war 

that can realize the interests for which we now wage that war. We 

need to avoid losing focus on what David Petraeus famously asked 

in his question, ‘‘Tell me how this ends?’’

And if current trends continue, when U.S. counterinsurgent combat troops withdraw, they are likely to leave behind a stalemated 

war in 2014. The Taliban is unlikely to be able to defeat the Afghan National Security Forces or the ANSF as they are sometimes 

called, or take major urban centers such as Kabul or Kandahar, 

but I think the ANSF is also unlikely to be able to drive the 

Taliban from their remaining strongholds, especially in the countries east, and the Taliban are unlikely to surrender or stop fighting, simply because they can’t break rivals’ hold on major urban 

areas or because foreign combat troops have left. 

In fact, the Taliban are likely to remain militarily viable for the 

foreseeable future. If so, the result would then be deadlock in 

which neither side can prevail, not the Taliban, but also not the 

ANSF. The ANSF can probably sustain the stalemate indefinitely, 

but only as long as the U.S. Congress pays the annual bills needed 

to keep the ANSF in the field and fighting. The war will then become a contest in stamina between the U.S. Congress and the 

Taliban. For the ANSF to win this contest outright would require 

either that the Congress be more patient than the Taliban or that 

the Taliban prove less resilient in the next decade than they have 

been in the last. 

But if the ANSF isn’t going to win the war outright, that leaves 

only two plausible long-term outcomes to the conflict. One is a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, at some point, whether near 

or distant. The other is defeat for the Afghan Government. Of 

course, this body will determine to an important degree via its decisions on funding Afghan National Security Forces whether the 

ANSF can, in fact, outlast the Taliban. 

What I would like to do with the balance of my time this afternoon is to sketch briefly one of the two plausible alternatives to 

that end game, a negotiated settlement, be it near term or be it 

more distant, what that might look like and what it would require 

of us. 

40

My written testimony goes into these questions in some detail. 

For now, I will just make two points. The first is the plausible 

terms of an eventual settlement, if it is possible at all and it may 

not be, would presumably involve the Taliban agreeing to break 

with al-Qaeda, forego violence, disarm and accept something like 

the current Afghan constitution. In exchange, they would get legal 

status as a political actor within Afghanistan, some set of offices 

or parliamentary seats or ministries, and the withdrawal of any remaining foreign forces. This would obviously be no panacea. The 

Taliban are an abhorrent group with the blood of thousands of innocent Afghans and American soldiers on their hands and they represent an ideology contrary to deeply held American values. Settlement with them represents at best a least bad option. But a deal 

along these lines would nevertheless be preferenced to outright defeat and properly structured could preserve the two core interests 

at the heart of the U.S. war effort, that Afghanistan not become 

a base by which militants could strike the United States or our allies in the west and that Afghanistan not become a base for destabilizing its neighbors, including Pakistan. 

The second point I want to make is that if a negotiated settlement is going to be ultimately the way this war ends, and if we 

are serious about ensuring that its terms secure the interests for 

which we are now waging the war, then there are things we need 

to do starting now to lay the ground work. This includes, of course, 

funding the ANSF long enough to enable the talks to reach fruition 

which will be a long process of years at best, but it also includes 

real governance reform of a kind that we have not been willing to 

pursue seriously heretofore. 

Any plausible deal that ends this war will legalize the Taliban 

as a political actor and provide them some sort of a foothold in Afghan politics. The only way to keep the terms of any such deal sustainable and to limit the subsequent influence of the Taliban is via 

domestic political competition within Afghanistan from a viable 

non-Taliban alternative. The existing political establishment in 

Kabul is unable to provide this and is unlikely to change simply 

because we asked them to. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. BIDDLE. Real change of a kind that could make an eventual 

settlement sustainable will require credible conditionality and the 

longer we wait to do this the harder it will get. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Biddle follows:]

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COUNCILon.. 

FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

Octo!>er 29. 201 J 

War Termination in Afghanistan 

Prepared statcIllcnt by 

Dr. Stephen Biddle 

Profe"or (if Polilical Science and Inlemarional Affairs, 

George WashinglOfl Unh'ersil)' 

Adjuncl Senior Fellow/or Defeme Policy, 

('olilleil all Foreign Relatiolls 

Before the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs; Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa & Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Uniled SLaLes HOlm> (ljRepresenLu/,il'es 

I "/ Session) 11 Jlh Congress 

Hearing on "After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan" 

The Afghanist~m debate often focuses on the short ternl.Is violence up or down relative to last year? Is 

the Taliban stronger or v..:eaker? Are Afghan government forces ready yet to take over from international 

troops? This is understandahle. Certainly there are many important short teTIll chal1enges to overcomefrom the need to negotiate a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) this fall to the need to hold an acceptable 

Afghan election in the spring or the need f(Jr a succcssflil transition to A.fghan security responsibility by the 

endoflOl4. 

Yet the more inlportant issue is the long run. How do we get frOll1 transition in 2014 to an end to the 

war that would secure the aims for \vhich we now fight? Short TIm policy is just a means to this end. Of 

course failure in the short run would 11100t the question. But success in the short run is not sufficient, and 

near term polil.;es should he judged in light of their effects on the post-20 14 prognosis, which is ,""hen our 
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rea1 interests wi11 either he \von or 10st. The President often ta1ks ahout 20 14as though the vl/ar \vi11 he over 

then; as he said in January, "[By] the end 0[2014 .... this long war will COlne to a responsible end."l But the 

vl/ar wi11 not end in 20 14. The u.s. role may end, in VI:hole orin part, hut the war vI/ill continue - and its 

u1timate outcome is \Try much in douht. 

If current trends continue, U.S. cOinbat troops are likely to leave behind a staleInated war in 2014. The 

Taliban is unlikely to be able to defeat the Afghan National Security l'orces (ANSI) or to take l11.ajor urban 

centers sllCh as Kabul or Kandahar. Hut the ANSF is also unlikely to be able to drive the Taliban from their 

remaining strongho1ds in Afghanistan's east, south, and southwest, and the Ta1ihan are Im1ikely to surrender 

or stop fighting sunply because they cannot break rivals' hold on Inajor cities or because an ostensible 

foreign occupation is Inostly gone. In fact the T aliban are likely to reInaUI militarily viable for the foreseeable 

future. If so, the result will be a deadlock which the ANSJI can probably sustain, but only as long as the U.S. 

C:ongress pays the multibillion-dollar annual bills needed to keep them fighting. The war is thus likely to 

hecome a contest in stamina between the Congress and the Taliban. Only if the Congress is more patient 

than the Ta1ihan (or if the Ta1ihan prove much 1ess resi1ient in the next decade than they have been in the 1ast 

one) can the ANSF WUI this contest outright. 

If the ANSli is not able to defeat the Talibaal on the battlefield, this leaves onlv two plausible long term 

outcOlnes to the \var. One would be a negotiated cOlnpromise settleInent \vith the Taliban at SOine point, 

sooner or later. The other is defeat for the Afghan government via eventual deflmding of the ANSIi war 

effort. 

Tf defeat is to be avoided, then the purpose of the war is now to shape the terms of a future sett1ement 

to Inake theIn Inore favorable, and to Inake the settleinent nlOre sustainable once reached. A.nd this unplies 

that ncar ternl Ul\TStIllents of lives and dollars Inake sense only if they facilitate an acceptable, sustaulable, 

deal. There are at least three critical requireillents for this which have not yet been lllet, and which current 

approaches may not meet unless we alter today's policies. 

First, we will need to get serious about governance refonn UI Afghanistan. Any unaginable deal will 

legalize the Taliban as a political party and provide thein a set-aside of offices or ministries UI the 

government. Tfthe non-Ta1ihan a1ternatives in Afghanistan contirllle to esca1ate their predation and po1itica1 

exclusion then a legalized Taliban will eventually expand its influence through the political process, and u.s. 

aiIllS will ultunately be lost. The only \-vay to sustaul the tenns of a cOillpromise senieillent is to ensure 

dOlllestic political conlpetitionin Afghanistan than can contain a legalized Taliban's influence after the deal 

1 U1IiLed Press InLemaLionaL ··Obama: Arghan ,\ar 10 end in 201--1-." Ja1l1l.<11) 1 L 2011. a\ailable al 

hHll:)\v\\ \~ .ligi.coln/lOI1.. Nev, s/U SilO IJ/O 1/11lObmn..1-A[ghan-Wqf-to-cnd-ill-l() Ij-fl !Pl-337U l~57R9 J 200i 
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is signed. And this wi11 require that we accept risk to pursue governance reform in a way that vve have been 

unwilling to do heretofore. 

Sccond, thc u.s. Congrcss will hayc to fully hmd thc ANSF t()r many years to comc. Ncgotiations 

with the Taliban "\-yill bc difficult and even if thcy succeed thc process will bc long. In thc llleantimc thc 

ANSI" will have to stave off defeat while talks grind forward. The ANSI' can probably maintain a military 

stalelllate indefInitely, but only if they receive large-scale fm,mcial support frum the \Vest - an ANSI; large 

enough to hold its ground will be 111uch more expensive than any Afghan government can afford. If 

Congressional appropriations shrink and the ANSF collapses, the Taliban wi11 be able to seil.e what they 

want without concessions and u.s. airlls will be forfeitcd. 

linally, the u.s. Congress will have to accept cOlnprOlnise with the Taliban. This will not be pleasant. 

The Taliban are brutal, loathsome actors with much innocent blood on their hands, and they represent an 

ideology contrary to deeply held American values. It would be easy to oppose concessions to such a group. 

Rut if we opposc conccssions thcn we havc to face the alternatiyes realistically. Unless we arc willing to fund 

a nlllchlargcr, longer, u.s. ,var effort than anything currently proposed, then we have no Illeans to end thc 

war lllilitarily. A no-conccssions policy thus lllcans cither fi.ulding the ANSP at llmlti-billion dollar annual 

expenditures indefInitely or accepting defeat. Unless the Congress is willing to accept the former or tolerate 

the latter, the only altcrnative is cOlllpromise. 

If we are unwilling to do these things, a continuation of current polilies ""ill eventually yield outright 

defeat on the battlefield. This ~:ould not be a "responsible end" to the war -it would be doser to what the 

Nixon Administration was willing to accept in the tinal stages ofthe Vietnam conflict, a "decent interval" 

between the United States' withdrawal and the evcntual defeat of its local ally .. A.nd this decent interval 

would be purchased at the cost of III ore Arllericanliycs and possibly another $100 billion or lllore of the 

taxpayers' nloney, depending on the tune it takes for the end to arrive. A strong case can be made for taking 

the steps needed to make settlell1ent possible. Hut if we are not willing to do this, a better choice than slower, 

costlier defeat would he to get all the way out now and avoid wasting more lives and resources in the 

lneantinle. For the United States, losing per se is not thc worst-case scenario; losirlg expensively is. Yet that 

is exactly what a IIlYOpic fl1CUS on short-terrIl transition without the political work needed to settle the war 

will prohahly produce. 

To lnake this case, I first review A.lncrican intercsts in the war to establish the mininl1un conditions 

that would constitute an acceptable outcOlue.I then consider the nrilitary prognosis on the battlefIeld and 

argue that the war is likely to remain stalemated as long as the ANSFis funded. Next I assess the prospects 

for a negotiated settlement that could secure our interests, and T condl,de hy evaluating the steps we would 

need to take to lnake sllch a setticillent viablc. 
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U.S. Interests in Afghanistan 

TIle United States has many aspirations for Afghanistan. \Vc would like its economy to he prosperous, 

its children to be educated, its gOYCrIllllCllt to be dClllocratic, the rights of its wmllen and minorities to be 

respected, audits people to enjoy a decent chance for a better life. \\le seck these things for any COlUltry in 

the international s),stelll, so surely we \vOlud want thel1l for Afghanistan, too. Normally, hov,:ever, we would 

purslle this broader agenda via peaceful economic, diplomatic, and political means. \Vhen it comes to ki11ing 

in the name of the state via \varfare, hy contrast, there is a much narrower range ofpotentia11y vital national 

interests that might justifY such cxtrcIllC lllcasurcs. 

hI fact, they are essentially twofold: that Afghanistan not beconle a base for terrorism against the 

\Vest, and that chaos in Afghanistan not destabili/.e its neighbors, especial1y Pakistan. 

TIle first interest is the most discllssed - and the "\veaker argument for waging \-var The United States 

invaded Afghanistan in the fiTSt place to destroy the al Qaeda safe haven there, and Afghanistan's role in the 

9-11 attacks dearly justilied this. But al Qacda central is no longer based in Afghanistan. nor has it been 

since early 2002; it is now headquartered across the border in Pakistan. The Taliban movelnent in 

Afghanistan is clearly linked with al Qaeda and sYIIlpathetic to it, but there is little evidence of significant al 

Qaeda infrastructure within Afghanistan today that could threaten the U.S. honleland in any direct way. If 

today's Afghan government col1apsed, ifit were replaced with a neo-Taliban regime, or if the Ta1iban were 

able to secure real political control over some major contiguous fraction of Afghan territory then perhaps al 

Qaeda could re-establish a real haven there. 

But this risk is shared with a wide range of other weak states in IIlany parts of the world, frOIIl Yenlen 

to Somalia to Syria to Djibouti to Eritrea to Sudan to the Philippines or even parts of Latin America or 

central, west, or North Africa, among other possibilities -including Pakistan. Many of these offer al Qaeda 

prospects superior in important ways to Afghanistan's. Syria, for example, is richer and far hetter connected 

to the outside world than is prinlltive, land-locked Afghanistan with its minimal conllIllUllcations and 

transportation systelIls. Pakistan, of course, is a nuclear power. Afgharllstan does enjoy a historical 

connection with al Qaeda, and it is important to deny them sanctuary on the Afghan side of the Durand 

Line. But its intrinsic importance is no greater than IIlany other potential hayens - and probably sIlmller 

than IIlany. \Ye clearly CaIliIot afford to wage protracted warfare on an Afghan scale simply to deny al Qaeda 

potential safe havens anywhere terrorists might go s01netiIne iiI the future; we would run out of money and 

troops long before al Qaeda ran out of prospective sanctuaries. 
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The more important U.S. interest in Afghanistan is indirect: to prevent Afghan chaos from 

destabilizing its Pakistani neighbor. 'Vith a population of 193 million (six tirues Afghanistan's), a GDP of 

over $230 hi11ion (over ten times Afghanistan's) and an actual, existing, functional nuc1ear arsenal, a failed 

Pakistan would be a much more dangerous sanctuary for al Qaeda. And the risk of government co11apse 

there nmy be in the same ballpark as AJghanistan, at least in the luedimu to long tenu. Pakistan is already at 

war with internallslamist insurgents allied to al Qaeda, and by nIOst lueasnres that ·war is not going well. 

Should the Pakistani insurgency succeed in collapsing the state or toppling the governl11.ent, the risk of 

nuc1ear weapons falling into al Qaeda's hands would be grave indeed. In fact, brlven the difficulties terrorists 

bce in acqlliring usahle nuc1ear vl/eapons, Pakistani state co11apse is the likeliest scenario t()r a nuc1ear-armed 

a1 Qacda. 

Pakistani state collapse, liloreover, is a danger over which the United States has limited influence. The 

United States is now so unpopular in Pakistan that \\'e have very lilllited options there. C:ertainly we have no 

meaningful prospect of deploying major ground forces to assist the Pakistani government in 

cOlmterinSllTgency. U.S. air strikes can harass insurgents and tern1Tists \vithin Pakistan, but the inevitable 

collateral daruage arouses harsh public opposition that coulditsclf threaten the weak gOyerIllUent's stability. 

U.S. aid is easily - and routinely - diverted to purposes renlOte frOlU countering Islamist insurgents, such as 

the nlaintenance of nrilitary counterweights to India, graft and patronage, or even support for lslamist 

groups seen by Pakistani authorities as potential allies against their Indian neighbor. 

The net result is a major threat over which Americans have very limited influence. \Vith such a limited 

ahility to make a bad situationnlllch hetter, it is especially illlportant to avoid making it any worse than it 

needs to be. 

And failure in Afghanistan could lnake the prognosis in Pakistan luuch worse. All states ,"vorry about 

instability on their borders. ll'or a state as internally threatened as Pakistan, this danger is greater thannl0st. 

The Taliban are a transnational Pashtun movenlent that is active on either side of the Durand Line and 

sympathetic to other Pakistani Tslarnist insurgents. Ry many accounts, their links to anti-Pakistani militants 

arc gro\ving as these groups expand and seek allies to extend their reach and power. If Afghanistan 

descended into chaos, a cOlubination of refugee flmvs, safe haven in an anarchic Afghanistan beyond 

Pakistani state control, and the caHing in ofTOUs by anti-Pakistani militants who had assisted the Afghan 

Taliban in part to secure the latter's support against Islaluabad could eventually be enough to tip an ah'Cadyunstable Pakistan into collapse. Much has been nlade of the tlrreat Pakistani base calups pose to Afghan 

govenUllent stability, but this danger works both ways: instability in Afghanistan poses a serious threat to 

the civil government in Pakistan, and the latter is a greater threat to U.s. interests than the former. 
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These seCllrity interests are real hut they are not unlimited. Afghanistan's potential effect on its 

neighbor is genuine, but indirect. Nor docs failure in Afghanistan predetermine failure in Pakistan: if 

Pakistan puts its own house in order and marshals the full resources of the state behind its own 

c01.mterinSllTgency effort then it could sun"iYe in spite of chaos on its border. A series of uncertain events 

would have to break in unfavorable \vays f(]r an Afghan failure to yield a nudear-anlled terror threat fi'oIll 

south Asian militants. The consequences for our own security if this chain of events did unfold would be 

radically grave, but the likelihood of this should not be overestlll1ated. Am.eriGUl,s have investedll1ajor 

resources to cOll1bat unlikely but grave threats in the past (the Cold \\/ar nuclear arms race had much the 

same qllality), hut that does not mean \ve should always do so, or that it necessarily makes sense to do so 

here. Reasonable people can thus differ on ,vhether our intcrests in Afghanistan warrant American 

wanllaking to secure, or 'whether they llierit the scale of effort we are nm\' expending. 

But to the extent that our interests in Afghanistan are worth waging war to secure, these interests turn 

centrally on denying the use of Afghan territory by Pakistani militants, and secondarily on denying the use 

of that territory to al Qaeda or other tcrrorists 'who might use it to strike the \Vest. Success or failure in the 

war is properly judged against these criteria. 

The Military Prognosis in Afghanistan 

The war we are waging to secure these interests has made llnportant but lllC01nplete progress since 

2009. Prior to that time, the Taliban had been expanding their influence in much of the country's east and 

south, they were solidifying de facto control of much of the central Helmand River Yalley, and they ~:ere 

posing a growing threat to Kandahar and even Kabu1. The troop surge announced by the President in fan 

2009, however, coupled ,vith other \\1 estern reinforcenlents and a nrajor expansion of the ANSF, reversed 

tIlls nlOillentmll andre-established gOyeflUllent control innlUch of Afghanistan'S south and southwest. 

Yet the results fen short of stabili/.ing the country as a whole. Important areas in Afghanistan's east 

and some parts of the SOllth remain under Taliban contro1. And while the surge weakened the Taliban it did 

not destroy theill or their ability to inflict casualties. \Vhcn the original 2009 caillpaign plan was 'written it 

was hoped that the surge 'would dear the Taliban frOlll Afghaillstan's critical terrain and so weaken the 

insurgency that the war would be dose to a finish by the time Afghans took over. 111is has not happened. 

Tight deadlines for u.s. ,vithdra\val cOlllbined with Taliban rcsilience have left insurgents in control of 

cnough critical terrain to rCIllain a threat wcll after 2014. 

To date there are few sibflls of any looming collapse in the Taliban's will to defend these strongholds or 

expand their influence beyond them. Their fimding base and sanctuaries in Pakistan will remain viable for 

the foresecable future. And they have shown theillsehTs still capable of inflicting serious casualties through 
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the 2013 fighting season. Some now hope that v",hen u.s. comhat forces withdr;nv in 2014 this \\'i11 

lUldcnuinc the Taliban's status as opponcnts offoreign occupation, and that this will weakcn their ability to 

recruit and motivate fighters. Yet the \vithorawal of Soviet occupation forces in I 9R9 hao no such effect on 

the Mujahcddin, who continucd to fight through more than a decade of suhsequent hitter warfare over the 

spoils; there is aruplc historical preccdent for Afgharllllilitants to fight on long after foreign f(]rces' 

withdrawal. Nor will the 2014 transition actually reluove all foreign "occupiers" - if a follow-on force of 

\Vestenl advisors or cOlmterterrorist special forces remains, this \vill offer all the justification the T aliball 

needs to continue a \var they dailll is motivated by resistance to foreign occupation. After a1l, the \\'estern 

footprint in the country when the inSllrgency hegan was hardly omnipresent; if2S,000 "\Yestern troops in 

2004 werc sufficient to lllotivate the Taliban to lllount an insurgency then would a residual of pcrhaps as 

nUlCh as half that lllany in 2015 really do othenvise? Overall, the Taliban have shown rClllarkablc patiencc 

and resilience from 2002 -2014, and there is little reason to suppose that they will cease fighting or lose 

effectiveness any time in the foreseeable future. The ANSII' will tlms inherit a more demanding job than 

original1y planneo in 2009. 

The Afghan governillent forces that will take over this job arc a nrixed lot. TIleir best units will 

probably be capable ofluodest offensive action to clear Talibarl strongholds; others' corruption and 

ineptitude will leave theln part of the probieln rather than the solution for the foreseeable future. Opinions 

on the nct potential of tIlls arualgarll vary; on balance, a reasonable optimist would asscss the ANsr as likely 

to hold nlost or all of the terrain the surge cleared but milikely to expand the govef1unent's control nluch 

beyond that. ANSI,' casualties \\'ere heavy this fighting season, but there is little evidence that this broke any 

units' wiH to fight or unoermineo their ahility to holo grouno over any large area of the country. Depending 

on the size of the post-20 14 ANSF structure, they may have to contract their zone of control somewhat to 

ensure adcquate security in the areas they hold. They will continuc to need assistance frOlll "\Vestern enablers 

for luany years (especially in the fornl ofluedical evacuation, air support, logistical support, military 

intelligence, and planning). And they will probably not be able to wrest control of established Taliban 

strongholds any time soon, if ever. Hut their performance this year gives little reason to assume that they will 

col1apse - it is reasonahle to expect them to holo their grouno as long as they are supporteo hy the necessary 

enablers, and especially, as long as SOllleone pays the bills to keep the ANSF operating. 

l1Hlse hi11s wi11 he suhstantial, and it is the u.s. Congress who wi11 have to pay most of them. The 

Coalition has always understood that an ANSF big enough to hold what the surge gained would be yastll' 

1110rc expensive tharl the .Afgharl governillent could afford. Last year's ANSP operating budget of$6.5 

billion was more than twice the Afghan govermllent's entire federal revenue. Most of the 1110ney to keep the 

ANSi-' fighting will thus have to come from abroad, and the lion's share from the u.s. 
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In principle this funding should look like a hargain. Current estimates for the annual cost of a posttransition ANSF often fall in the $4-6 billion range; even $10 billion a year would be tiny relative to the 

nearly $120 hillion the u.s. spent to wage \var with mostly American troops in 20 II. The huther one gets 

from 20 I I, however, the less salient that contrast hecomes. And other natural comparisons arc much less 

congenial A.llllUal u.s. military aid to Israel, for exarnple, was $3.1 billion in FY 2013; U.S. requi.Telnents for 

the ANSII'will surely exceed tIlis for along tunc, and will probably exceed cOlubined U.S.luilitary aid to 

both Israel and Ugypt together for the foreseeable future. 

If the ANSF's appropriations are Cllt hack, their military viahility would erode quickly. The 

Administration appears likely to seek the sluallest ANSF appropriation they can, Clltting expenditures back 

as far as possible to lnake the bill easier to pay. This lllearlS, ho\vever, that evenluodest reductions below the 

requested levels would force the ANSI i to shrink below the troop strength needed to hold the line - and a 

shrinking pool of patronage nl0ney could quickly split the institution along factional lines. I·:ither result risks 

a retunl to the atomit;ed civil \varfare of the I 990s, yet this chaos would provide exactly the kind of terrorist 

havens that the Coalition has t()ught since 200 I to prevent. A stalemated war is strategical1y tolerable for 

Arllericans (if tragic for Afghans), but chaos represents defeat, and staleluate can only be luaintained as long 

as the u.s. Congress funds it. 

The Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement 

IfC:ongressional funding is sustained forever, then the Afghan stalemate can probably be maintained 

forever. Rut if not, then the only way to end the war will be through a negotiated settlement in which both 

sides must compromise. 

Yet therc is widespread skcpticislll on the prognosis for such talks. Many doubt the Taliban arc 

serious. After all, they assassinated 15urhanuddin Rabbani, the head ofKarzai's lligh Peace COlUlcil and the 

Kabul official charged \vith moving talks forward. If they can simply wait the u.s. out and win outright, why 

should they make concessions in a serious negotiation? Others see the Ta1iban seeking only legitimation and 

a soapbox for political grandstanding. Many worry that the sheer cOlllplexity of talks involving lllultiple 

Taliban factions, their Pakistani patrons, the goveIlllllent of Afghanistan, the gOyeIllluent of the U.S., othcr 

al1ies, and intermediaries SllCh as Qatar, few of whom trust the others, wiH prove too diftlCll1t. Many U.S. 

conserYatives doubt the Administration's IllotiYes in the talks, fearing giycaways to cover an Administration 

nlsh to the exits and worrying that negotiation signals weakness. Alllerican progressiyes fear thc loss of 

hard-won gains for Afghan women and nllllorities in concessions to the T aliban. Many Afghans, especially 

women's groups and non-Pashtun northerners, share such concerns; SOll1e have even threatened civil war to 

prevent this. 
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Is there any rea1 pn)spect, then, f()1" a dea1 ()ffering anything more than a fig 1eaf t() c(mcea1 p()1icy 

failluT? Perhaps. The Taliban have, after all, publicly expressed ,villingness to negotiate, and this posture 

inClll"S cost to them. The Ta1ihan is not a monolithic actor, hut a potentially fractious a11iance of factions. 

\Vhen Mul1ah Chnar's representatives accept ta1ks, other factions worry ahout deals being made hehind their 

backs. Taliban field conllllanders wonder \vhether the battlefield prognosis is as fayorable as their leadership 

claiIIls (if outright victory is ncar, why negotiate?), and face the challenge of Illotivating fighters to risk their 

lives when shadowy negotiations nnght render such sacrifice unnecessary. All of tIns reduces T aliban 

effectiveness, and none is necessary: al1 they needed to avoid such complications is to have declared their 

refusal to par1ey. Tn the meantime the Coa1ition wou1d incur al1 the costs and potentia1 divisions of 

proposing talks. The Taliban could simply have pocketed these gifts and carried on, yet they have instead 

declared their willingness to negotiate, accepting costs they could haye averted. This iIIlplies sonlC actual 

interest in a senlel11ent of some kind. 

Tn fact therelllay be good reasons for the Taliban to explore a possible deal. Omar and his allies have 

heen 1iving in exi1e for over a decade, their chi1dren arc growing 11p as Pakistanis, and their moyements arc 

surely ,vatched and constrained by their Pakistani patrons. Afghans are farIlously nationalist, and AfghanPakistani rivalry is old and deep; exile in Pakistan surely grates on the Afghan Taliban. Perhaps marc 

important, they live lU1der the constant threat of assassination by U.S. drones or conll11ando raids - just ask 

OsarIla bin Laden or six of the last seyen al Qaeda operations directors, all killed or captured iII such attacks. 

And the war imposes costs on the T aliban, too. Stalenuted warfare is an equal opportunity waste of lives 

and resources. They are probably able to continue indefinitely, and they will certainly not surrender Silllply 

to stanch the bleeding, but this does not mean they enjoy it or would prefer it to any possible settlement 

terms. Sta1emate is costly enough that the Ta1iban might consider an offer if the process is not tantamount 

to capitulation. 

\Vhat would such a deal conlprise? hI principle a bargaining space exists wherein all parties' vital 

interests could be preserved even ifno one's ideal aims are achieved. The Tali11an would have to renounce 

violence, break \-vith al Qaeda, disarm, and accept something like today's Afghan constitution. Tn exchange 

they would be legalized as a political party, they would receiYe smIle set-aside of oilkes or parliaIIlentary 

scats, and any reIllaining foreign forces iII Afgharustarl would withdraw - negotiations \vould hun on the 

sca1e and nature ofthe set-aside, and the nature of any modest changes to Afghan government po1icies. The 

Afghan goVerIUIlent \volud have to accept a Taliban role in a coalition goVerIUIlent, and the spriIlgboard for 

Taliban political activisrIl tlus would provide. In exchange, the goVerIUllent would preserve the basic 

blueprint of today's state, and would stITely COllllIland the votes needed to lead a governing coalition, at least 

in the near term. Pakistan would have to brlve up its blue sky ambitions for an Afghan puppet state under 

Talihan domination, hut would gain a stahle horder and enough influence via its Talihan pro\.ies to veto any 

Afghan-Indian axis that could t!neaten Pakistan. 
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The United States \-vould have to accept the Taliban as a legal political actor \-vith an extra-deluocratic 

bJ1Jarantee of positions and influence, and the U.s. \-v(mld probably forfeit any significant base structure for 

cOlHlterterrorism from Afghan soi1. Of course this \vould sacritlce aims the U.s. has sought since 200 I. It 

would put at risk the hard-\vonrights of A.fghan ,"ymllen andm.inorities by granting the Taliban a yoice in 

Afghan politics. And it would luean legalizing and offering a share of power to an organization with the 

blood of thousands of Am.ericans on its hands. This would be far from. an ideal oute<.llne. 

Yet ifproperly negotiated, it nmld at least preserve the two vital U.s. national interests at stake in 

Afghanistan: that Afghan soil not becmlle a base for nlllitants to attack the \Vest, and that it not becOllle a 

base for destabilizing Afghanistan's neighbors. The non-Talibanillajority in a coalition goVerIllnent would 

preclude 200 I-style base camps in a post -settlement Afghanistan as long as the T aliban are denied control of 

internal security ministries or district or provincial governments in critical border areas. By contrast, an 

ANSF co]]apse and subsequent chaos ~:ould preclude nothing. And whatever fate Afghan women and 

minorities suffered Ilnder a stahle coalition would he far less had than what they wOllld face under anarchy. 

A compromise deal with the Taliban would be a bitter pill to swallow, but it would sacriflce far less than 

would defeat in a deflUlded war. 

What is to be Done? 

Absent military re-escalation to compel Taliban capitulation, we face two intellectually defensible 

ways forward. 

One is to get serious about negotiations that aren't just Taliban surrender talks. Meeting with the 

Taliban is only part of this, and Inay be the easiest part. Seriousness on this score also delnands painful 

political work now on at least two other fronts. 

The first such front is in Afghanistan. There wi11 be chal1enges getting anti-Taliban northerners to 

accept concessions, but the biggest problelll is predatory, exclusionary nllsgovernance in Kabul. Any 

settlement will legalize the Taliban and grant them a political tl)othold. An acceptable deal will proyide only 

a minority foothold initially, hut the Talihan would then he free to expand it electorally if they can. Over the 

longer tenn, the containillent of the Taliban's influence will thus depend on internal political cOlllpetition 

iroIll a yiable non-Taliban alternative. Karzai's goVerIllllent, howeyer, is deeply cornlpt, exclusionary, and 

getting worse.Hhis successor continues this trend it will hand the Taliban their best opportturity for real 

power. The Taliban are not popular in Afghanistan; the reason any deal will require extra-democratic setasides for them is becallse they know ho\v unpopular they are and wi11 surely reject a mere invitation to 

cOlllpete in elections \vithout guarantees. The one political ace-in-the-hole they enjoy is arepl1tation for 

i{) 
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honesty: they are seen as hnltal hut incorruptihle. This advantage is not yet enough for them to command 

popular support ovcr any lllcaningful part of the country, but iftoday's misgovernance continues to ,vorsen, 

eventllal1y even a hnltal hut honest movement \vi11 make headway. If a legalized Talihan eventual1y controls 

critical border districts, and its Pakistani militant aBies then can in wartime JOUs to establish base camps 

undcr Taliban protection, the result could be nearly as dangerous as govcflllllent military dcfeat. Thc only 

rcal insurance against this is govcrnance refoflll. 

To date, however, the \\'est has been unwilling to compel reform, preferring benign "capacity 

huilding" to coercive diplomacy with Kahll1. Benign assistance might he en(mgh if the prohlem was just a 

lack of capacity, but it isn't: Afghanistan is lnisgovcrned bccausc its power brokers prefer this; bcnign 

capacity building via \Yestern aid just creates better trained kleptocrats given this. Real unprovclncnt thus 

requires, inter alia, real conditionality wherein \\/estern assistance is provided only if refonns are 

implemented and withheld otherwise. \Vithout this, self-interested officials have no incentive to reform. Yet 

heretofore the \Vest has been systematicany unwi11ing to threaten to withhold assistance - the Coalition 

campaign plan turns on transition, and any \vithholding of assistance is seen chiefly as a thrcat to rapid 

creation of an Afghan civil and nOOtary arullinistration that could take ovcr and let Coalition troops go 

horne. If we Call1lOt credibly threaten to withhold sornething Kabul values, however, then governancc will 

never improve. Of course, the \Vest's potential leverage was greater when aid budgets were bigger and 

military resources lnore plentHiu; the less the \Y cst can promise, the less leveragc a threat to withhold it 

conveys.Uut without conditionality even vast assistance does little for governance refof1n, and liberal 

unconditional aid often 111akes matters worse by fueling corruption; serious conditionality could 111ake even 

a smal1er budget into a stronger tool for reform. To use it properly, however, means accepting the risk that 

we may have to reduce deliherately Afghan instittltions' capacity if they continue to refuse reform. TIlis is 

neithcr casy nor pleasant, but it is neccssary if we arc gOUlg to bc rcalistic about settlclncnt. 2 

The other front on which serious political work is needed is Capitoillill. A.ny deal will require real 

concessions from the \Vest, and will take years to negotiate. This 111eanS the Congress must sustain tv..'o 

potential1y unpoplllar policies if Afghan talks are to succeed. 

First, the Congrcss nUlst continue funding nuuti-billion-dollar annual appropriations for the ANSF 

until the negotiations reach fruition, which is likely to he years. And these appropriations will need to 

contume Ul the face of the inevitable criscs in U.S.-Afghanrclations that we have secn with such frcquency 

ovcr the last decade. There will surely be another AfghaIl corruption scandal that will hit the newspapers, or 

another wave of Afghan protests over an accidental Koran burning, or another A1nerican advisor killed by 

an Afghan recipient of U.S. aid, ()r an()ther occasi()l1 when an Afghan president plays to local p()litics by 

2 For a more detlliled discussion of strategies for governance reform in Afghanistan under current conditions. see Stephen Biddle, 

"Salvaging Govem<lnce Refonn in Afghanistan." Conncil on Foreign Relations Polic~ Inno\(}\ion Memorandum No. 16. April 2012. 

a\ ailable at: hUp'/'\'(\\ \" .crr ofo!d[ohamst:Jn!sal\ Jomg-go\ en:mnct~ .. reronn-arlfl¥#-ljsta!t!p2 7778 
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insulting American sensihilities. If the Congressional response to such nises is to reduce the ANSF's 

appropriations, the result could soon be an inability to stave off defeat long enough to settle the war on 

acceptahle terms. 

Second, the Congress lIUlst accept cOlllprOlllise with the Taliban. TIns ·will not be easy. There arc few 

other negotiating partners as abhorrent as these. The difficulties here can be seen innncrocoslll in the 

Athl1inistration's recent experience of trying to negotiate a mutual prisoner release with the T aliban as an 

early confidence building measure. Last year the Administration offered to release five Ta1i11an detainees 

from Guantanamo in exchange for the Talihan releasing Sergeant Rowe Rergdahl, their only American 

prisoner. This offer to releasc Gl1antanalIlo dctainees produccd sharp criticislll fronl U.S.la"\vlnakers; StlUlg, 

the Administration then withdrew the otter, the Taliban charged bad faith (both on the detainee issue and 

on the addition of new conditions fr0111 Karzai), and the negotiations collapsed. Serious talks will provide 

serial opportunities for such controversies extending for years; success will require a Congressional 

~:i11ingness to keep the temperature of such disagreements low enough to a]]ow the Administration to 

negotiate. 

If the U.S. is unwilling to accept the costs a scrious scttleillent effort requires, then the other defensible 

policy at this point is to cut AJ.11erican losses and get out now. A stay -the-course policy that cannot end the 

war and eventually results in its ddllnding is a rccipe for a Illore expensive ycrsion of failurc. Losing per se is 

not the worst case -losing expensively is. And continued myopic focus on short ten11 transition without the 

decisions needed to settle the war is likely to produce exactly this. 

Some might see the Ohama administration's Cl1rrent policy as a hedged version of such disengagement 

already. The u.s. nrilitary presence in Afghanistan will soon shrink to perhaps fe-wcr than 12,000 adyisers 

and trainers, and U.S. aid might decline to around $4 billion a year fc)r the ANSI' and $2-$3 billion in 

economic assistance, with the advisory presence costing perhaps another $12 billion a year. This 

cOll1mitment is far smaller than the 100,000 U.S. troops and over $1 00 billion of20 I I, and it offers some 

chance of muddling thnmgh to an acceptahle outcome \vhile disneetly concealing the United States' 

probable cyentual failure behind a veil of continuing Inodest effort. Only in \Vaslnngton, however, could up 

to $20 billion a year be considered cheap. If this yielded a stable Afghanistan, it would indeed be a bargain, 

hut i( as is like1y ·without a settlement, it produces only a defeat drawn out over several years, it will mean 

needlessly wasting tens of billions of dollars. In a fiscal environlllcnt in wInch $8 billion a year for the Hcad 

Start preschool prograrll or $36 billion a year for Pcll Grant scholarships is controvcrsial, it is hard to justifY 

spending perhaps another $100 billion in Afghanistan over, say, another half decade of stalemated warfare 

merely to disguise failure or defer its political consequences. It is harder still to ask Americans to die for such 

a Glllse. E\'en an ad\'isory mission in\'ol\'esnsk, and right now, thollsands of U.s. soldiers are continuing to 

12 
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patrol the conn try. If failure is corning, many Afghans vviJ] inevitably die, but a faster \\'ithdravval could at 

lcast saye SOlIlC American livcs that would be sacrificed along the slmver routc. 

I prefer the fIrst way: a real eHi.)rt to lay the political gronnd-..vork to cnd thc war yia a compromise 

scttlclIlent. But without the groundv,lOrk, success is lUuikcly. And if Amcricans persist in lUlcxamincd and 

unrcalistically rosy asslUnptions about the post-transition prognosis whilc stalling on rcfonIl in Kabul and 

failing to build a consensus for sustained funding at home, then the likeliest result will be a nl0re expensive 

version of failure. (~etting out now \v(mld be a better policy than that. 
54

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thanks so much to Dr. Biddle. 

Thank you to all of our panelists. I will begin the questions. 

There is no short-term solution, no policy decision that Congress 

or the administration can make to win the war and see stability 

and democracy flourish in Afghanistan in the foreseeable future 

and certainly not before 2015. But there are decisions that we can 

make or not make that would jeopardize our efforts in Afghanistan 

and risk eliminating the gains we have made during the past 12 

years. 

The first obstacle is ensuring that the Bilateral Security Agreement is finalized and that it includes immunity for U.S. personnel 

from persecution under Afghan law. The administration has indicated that without this it would pull out of Afghanistan completely, 

leaving the zero option on the table. Putting aside the immunity 

issue, what are the key features the BSA will need to include in 

order for us to ensure that we are able to maintain the gains made 

while protecting U.S. troops and personnel? That is number one. 

Another major obstacle is the size of the residual force in post2014 Afghanistan. 

General, you testified that based on the scope, size, and difficulty 

of the post-2014 mission, the residual U.S. force should be about 

20,000. 

And Dr. Kagan, you didn’t put a number on it, but you testified 

that the Afghan National Security Forces would not be ready to secure their territory without significant U.S. and international support which includes military forces. 

Ms. Curtis, you stated that the U.S. must maintain a robust residual force. 

We have heard that the administration could set its numbers at 

less than 10,000 and it was reported that NATO is planning on a 

smaller residual force than we first thought. What are the dangers 

of leaving behind a smaller force that has been recommended? Insurgents generate over $100 million a year in illegal drug trade 

and that is with troop levels at a much higher number than is currently been floated. How will the reduced numbers impact other operations that are critical to our mission in Afghanistan like counternarcotics? 

And finally, at times our President has laid out the narrative 

that al-Qaeda has been decimated and nearly defeated. With so 

much of a threat still remaining in Afghanistan, Pakistan region, 

should we underestimate al-Qaeda’s strength and is that believed 

to be setting the U.S. for failure in a post-2014 Afghanistan? 

Dr. Kagan, we will start with you, quickly. 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes, I think al-Qaeda is not decimated and actually 

if you look at maps as our team has provided of al-Qaeda area of 

operations around the world, it controls more territory, has more 

fighters and poses a greater threat to the United States today than 

it ever has. Giving it back its sanctuary in Afghanistan would be 

a crowning glory for al-Qaeda and would be extremely dangerous 

for the U.S. 

Please hear me very carefully because I don’t want to have numbers taken out of context. My personal assessment of the forces required after 2014 to do the missions that are being described is upwards of 30,000. That has not been on the table for a long time. 

55

I agree with General Keane that with 20,000 at very high risk and 

with a great deal of difficulty, it is feasible. When you get down 

below 10,000, a lot of missions fall off. We will not be doing counternarcotics. We will not be doing counterinsurgency and our ability to train, advise, and assist will be extremely limited. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Kagan. 

General? Punch your button for the mic. 

General KEANE. I agree with Dr. Kagan about al-Qaeda. It is on 

the rise and there is a lot of misunderstanding about them. They 

are not morphing into something else. Their plan was always to decentralize, establish a caliphate in a region by gaining operational 

and territorial control in the various countries that they want to 

control and that is absolutely happening before our eyes. So let us 

be clear about it. 

In terms of size of residual force, it is about the missions which 

must be performed that drives the size of the force. And those are 

counterterrorism, training assistance, and also the enablers that 

the force requires. 

The optimal size, I totally agree with Fred is 30,000, a minimum 

of that is 20,000. We can establish arbitrary numbers here and 

then what you have eventually if you get down into the numbers 

people are talking about, 10,000 and below, you have a residual 

force in name only that is not capable of performing assigned missions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I am sorry for the other two, 

I know Ms. Curtis and Dr. Biddle were ready, but I am out of time 

and we have got a lot of folks. So we will get you later. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. General, let me just continue with that. 

You say we can establish arbitrary numbers. Help me understand, 

this is the issue that we all struggle with. I am not a general, so 

when you talk about the need, both of you talk about the need for 

30,000 is optimal, maybe 20,000, the administration has been talking making 10,000, maybe 6,000, all sorts of numbers have been 

thrown around. How do you determine—how is it that the administration can come up with a number that they think works with lots 

of generals giving their input into that decision for you to consider 

it so far off? 

General KEANE. I can’t speak for that analysis. Frankly, just 

when you look at the mission and you start to lay it down what 

it is, let us just take one as an example, counterterrorism. If you 

try to perform that mission from one location, you cannot operationally accomplish the mission. So in other words to go all the 

way to the east to take down Afghan, excuse me, Taliban leaders, 

to go all the way to the south to do the same as we are currently 

doing, you have to be at multiple bases. That drives up numbers. 

It is not just about special operators who kick doors down. The fact 

of the matter is they have to have drones, the crews to support 

them. They have to have helicopters which is an assault force. 

They need maintenance to support those helicopters. They need intelligence analysts. And they also need people to secure them and 

some logistical support as well. 

So when you lay those numbers down, you get way beyond 

10,000. Just in dealing with this one alone, I think the minimum 

56

force requirement on the mission I am just talking to you about is 

about 7,000. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And that mission is what exactly? How do you define the mission? 

General KEANE. Excuse me? 

Mr. DEUTCH. How do you define the mission that we need 30,000 

troops ongoing in Afghanistan? 

General KEANE. How do I define the mission for the residual 

force? 

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes. 

General KEANE. Is to assist in the stability and security of Afghanistan, recognizing that we are in a transition phase from 

where we have been in the lead and the Afghan security forces are 

now on their own. They do not have the kind of terrorism capability that we have. They have a facsimile of it. 

The other thing, they need enablers. Just think of this. All the 

NATO forces that are in Afghanistan to this day by and large all 

receive some kind of enablers from the United States to be able to 

function effectively. How could we possibly walk away and not provide the Afghan National Security Forces with some enablers to enable them to function when they are an infantry-based force? 

Mr. DEUTCH. General, I don’t think anyone is saying that there 

should be no assistance, no enablers. I would make one point 

though. When you said earlier, almost in an off-handed way that 

the discussion about troop numbers, whether it is—we are discussing cost and you said $2 billion, $3 billion a year over the 

course of however many years until 2020 that it is almost irresponsible for us to be discussing that. 

I would just make the point that here in Washington these days, 

we have debates in every one of our committees about where we 

spend money and how we spend money and what our priorities are. 

And I don’t think it is irresponsible for us to struggle through, with 

all due respect, I don’t think it is irresponsible for us to try to 

struggle through whether $2 billion or $3 billion a year more in Afghanistan is something that we should be spending when tomorrow, the conferees are going to meet on the Farm Bill to talk about 

whether to cut SNAP funding by $40 billion. And on Friday, there 

is going to be a $5 billion cut in SNAP funding when the Recovery 

Act expires. 

So I don’t—my problem here is we are trying to get to the right 

point here where we can, as I laid out in my opening statement, 

where we can get to an Afghanistan that can take care of itself, 

that doesn’t become a breeding ground for terrorists again. But we 

can’t have that debate in the absence of a broader debate about 

what our priorities are as a nation. 

So when we listen to the administration make suggestions, to 

readily dismiss a force for being too small because it doesn’t do all 

that we think it should, I think is to lose track. And I don’t blame 

you for this. You are looking at a very specific point. But for us 

here, as we debate these broader issues, at some point we have to 

start to balance whether spending that extra $3 billion a year in 

Afghanistan is more important than spending the extra $3 billion 

a year on critical needs here in this country. That is just part of 

57

the debate that too often is missing and I think it needs to be 

brought back in and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Thank you. 

Mr. Chabot is recognized for his time. 

Ms. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Keane, let me 

get back to you for just a second. If you get down to say 10,000 or 

fewer U.S. troops, I have heard this and if you can tell me how accurate this is, you get to a point where basically those personnel 

are for the most part protecting itself kind of, its own force protection and things like that and that you can’t really perform any 

functions outside that are going to be particularly helpful to U.S. 

interests in Afghanistan. Is that correct? 

General KEANE. Well, certainly, I do agree with that. Numbers 

have a certain quality all of their own. And when you rationalize 

what those numbers should be it has to be on the tasks and the 

missions that are required to be accomplished by a residual force. 

If you permit the sizing of the force to be essentially numbers driven and not mission and task driven, then you are just pulling the 

guts out of what you are trying to accomplish. 

And I think if you will put arbitrary numbers on the table without looking at the tasks—the military can definitely provide task 

purpose and numbers assigned to that task and purpose. And if 

you are going to bring down the numbers, you have to understand 

what we are losing as a result of those reduction in numbers. And 

we should be honest with ourselves about that. I think it is a serious degradation and mission capability when you drive those numbers down like that. We should know what is the loss of that and 

not just tell those 10,000 make do and do the best you can. 

Ms. CHABOT. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Kagan, let me turn to you, if I can. I remember the last time 

I was in Iraq it was maybe 6 months before the agreement with 

Iraq fell apart. And I remember being in various military briefings 

and talking with Iraqis and government leaders over there. Everybody at that point assumed that there would be a residual, pretty 

significant residual U.S. force there on the ground and I and many 

other people were ultimately shocked when it was just announced 

pretty much: We can’t reach an agreement, everybody is coming 

out. 

Now when that happened, there were obviously consequences as 

a result of that. Could you touch on some of the consequences we 

have seen in Iraq? And what should that teach us about what we 

are actually talking about here with respect to Afghanistan which 

isn’t too late? 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Congressman. The consequences in Iraq 

have been absolutely devastating. We have seen the reconstitution 

of al-Qaeda in Iraq in most of the safe havens from which it had 

been operating before the surge and subsequent operations cleared 

it out. It is now conducting car bomb operations at the same level 

as it had been in mid-2007. We have seen Shia sectarian militias 

remobilized and now some of them are being brought into the Iraqi 

security forces. We are seeing increased sectarian killing and of 

course, all of this is in the context of the Syrian war as well. 

If we pull out of Afghanistan, the consequences may or may not 

ensue as rapidly as they did in Iraq, but I believe that they will 

58

ensue very much along those lines because like the Iraqi security 

forces, the Afghan National Security Forces were not created, have 

not been established in such a way that they can continue to operate independently without any support. 

Ms. CHABOT. Thank you. With about a little over a minute that 

I have got left, let me turn to Ms. Curtis and Dr. Biddle. 

We really haven’t touched too much on India which is right in 

the region there and a key player. Could you discuss briefly India’s 

role in all of this relative to the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan 

to some degree? What role have they played? What role would you 

expect them to play? And I have got about a minute so Ms. Curtis, 

maybe I will give you 30 seconds and Dr. Biddle, about 30. 

It is only the second most populist country on earth and let us 

talk about that for 30 seconds. 

Ms. CURTIS. Can I quickly just add that when we are talking 

about troop numbers in Afghanistan, obviously that decision will 

have an impact on Pakistan, a nuclear arms state. So we are not 

just talking about the Afghanistan state, but we are talking about 

the entire region and the impact on the entire region. 

As far as India goes, India has played a helpful role in Afghanistan. They have provided assistance. They have built roads, power 

stations. They have helped support the nascent democratic process 

there. So India’s goals in Afghanistan match those of the U.S. and 

not wanting the Taliban to retake the country. The problem is that 

Pakistan is paranoid about any role that India has in Afghanistan, 

even if the Indian role is helping with the economy, Pakistan sees 

any increase in influence that India has in Afghanistan as detrimental to Pakistan’s interests. 

But as I said, I don’t think we can play into Pakistan’s hands 

and ask India to pull back from Afghanistan just to appease Pakistan. I think the only way to reduce the Pakistani paranoia is to 

encourage better Indo-Pakistani relations. 

Ms. CHABOT. Thank you. Madam Chair, I would ask unanimous 

consent for 30 seconds for Dr. Biddle to complete the thought. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. BIDDLE. I agree with most of what my colleague said. I am 

very skeptical about the prospects for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement any time soon. And I think in the absence of that, the way 

I would prefer we look at India’s role in Afghanistan is as a part 

of a strategy for bringing about a settlement to the war that will 

necessarily require Pakistani agreement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I am so sorry, Mr. Chabot, but 

we have so many——

Ms. CHABOT. He has got 6 seconds. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay, go ahead. 

Mr. BIDDLE. Don’t let marginal Indian help in Afghanistan overturn relations with Pakistan. 

Ms. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Higgins is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, on the issue 

of Afghanistan, we have been there 12 years. We have lost 2,092 

American troops. We have spent $1 trillion. There is an agricultural economy, but it is not one the government controls or at least 

from what we know it is the poppy fields. It is the heroin trade. 

59

And Gretchen Peters in her book, Seeds of Terror, puts the estimate of $1⁄2 billion which goes to fund Taliban activities in Afghanistan. Very little has been done about that issue. And the Taliban 

doesn’t even own the poppy fields. They preside over it. They 

charge protection, but it funds their activities. The United States has spent $89 billion, rebuilding the roads and 

bridges of Afghanistan and then the Taliban sets and provides explosive devices on the very roads and bridges that we built to kill 

our people. The best way to defeat an IED is not to be there. About 

63 percent of American casualties are attributed to IEDs. 

There has been a lot of talk about Pakistan being a partner in 

defeating terrorist activity over the past 12 years. Well, guess 

what? Pakistan is not helping to defeat terrorism. In fact, they are 

facilitating it. 

Abbottabad is about 70 miles north of the capital city of 

Islamabad. Abbottabad is described as a pleasant weather city with 

lots of educational institutions and military establishments. Also 

the place, prior to the knowledge of bin Laden living there, of hundreds of thousands of tourists every day. We are up in the mountains of Afghanistan looking for bin Laden and he is in one of the 

most prosperous cities of Pakistan. The Pakistani Government, the 

military, or the intelligence services didn’t know he was there? He 

has been there for 6 years. How about people just walking by and 

saying I wonder who lives there? He doesn’t pay property taxes. He 

added to the compound going against zoning regulations in that 

city. 

Back to Afghanistan, we, the United States have to bribe the 

brother of the President to help his brother, the President, build a 

functioning state. And after 12 years and $1 trillion and over 2,000 

soldiers lost, Afghanistan is nothing more than a major criminal 

enterprise. Afghanistan is as violent today as it has ever been. So 

this talk about staying in or leaving or kind of staying in or kind 

of leaving, it seems as though we are getting played. There is always two conversations going on in that part of the world, the one 

that the Americans are participating and the ones where they are 

being plotted against. And that is just the reality. 

So I think, you know, we need to develop a new strategic policy 

to try to constrain in some way the bad activity that is taking place 

in both of those countries. And believe me, I am not naive about 

this stuff. I understand. Our Afghan problem is really our Pakistan 

problem. Pakistan is a big country, about 190 million people, a lot 

of Islamist extremists and they have nuclear weapons, last count 

131 of them. A major goal of al-Qaeda is to gain access to an area 

with nuclear weapons. But the amount of time that we have been 

there, the lives that have been lost because of our excursion there, 

our distraction away from the real problem which was Afghanistan 

in the early 2000s to spend time in Iraq chasing weapons of mass 

destruction that weren’t there, this just isn’t working. 

So whether we have 30,000 troops at the end of next year or 

50,000, the fact of the matter is things aren’t changing. We are told 

that we are not nation building Afghanistan. You know what? I 

was in Kandahar city. I was in Kandahar, the spiritual home of the 

Taliban because that is where all the poppy fields are. And the literacy rate for women, 1 percent. One percent. What are we told 

60

constantly that we are doing there? We are building up an Afghan 

army and security force. Oh, really? With a population that is 

largely illiterate? How do you change that? You build schools and 

power lines and roads to get people to those schools. That by definition is nation building. We have been played in that part of the 

world. We continue to be played in that part of the world and the 

American people are sick and tired of it. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it is important 

to remind everybody at the outset of my discussion that there was 

this really tragic event on September 11, 2001 in which thousands 

of Americans were killed by folks that found safe haven in Afghanistan and we were able to root them out of Afghanistan. I also take 

issue with the idea that there has been no improvement and that 

the place is just as violent as it has ever been. I think that flies 

into the face of every statistic I have seen, including the statistic 

that a huge percent of the Afghan population is under the age of 

30, actually under the age of 20, that there actually is this revolution among the youth of this idea that we can discuss our differences without resorting to the gun. We can do it by having 

verbal discussions. I think you have seen revolutionary changes in 

a positive way in the population of Afghanistan. I would also like to remind that the $3 billion we are talking 

about and sure, at any moment we talk about spending taxpayer 

dollars it is something we should take seriously. But that is 1⁄100

of what we spend in interest on our debt every year which has exploded in the last 5 years. 

I also want to thank you, General, for exposing the farce of this 

idea that golly, we really wanted to stay in Iraq, but we just had 

no choice because they didn’t want us. When you offer a plan of 

just a handful of troops, compared to what was needed, you really 

incur upon the Iraqi Government and this was the decision they 

made a much higher political cost than your number of troops had 

the ability to actually counter on the other end. And that is my 

concern with what we are looking at in Afghanistan. There is a 

cost. We have to know it. We have to understand it. There is a cost 

to having American troops when it comes to a domestic government 

having American troops on their soil. They know that they become 

a target of terrorist activities. They become the focus of that. But 

if you end up with 7,000, 8,000, 9,000 troops, half of whose job is 

to clean latrines and cook food and secure the gates so that the 

other half may be able to actually exit the gate at some point, you 

almost incur upon the native population a much higher political 

cost than you do any benefit of U.S. troops being there. 

So I think the number of 20,000, 30,000 is not a number that has 

been pulled out of the air. It is a number that says if we are going 

to have an effective counterterrorism strategy or if we know a network exists or we know bad actors exist, we can send something 

over that kills that person or captures that person to take them out 

of the mix of being a threat to the domestic government of Afghanistan, then that is what we need. I would hate for history in 20 

years to judge that America lost the war in Afghanistan over the 

difference of 10,000 troops and that is what I fear right now. 

61

In Afghanistan, the Taliban have a saying that says, ‘‘America 

has the watches, but we have the time.’’ And that, to me, is so evident of the fact that this administration made the decision to 

‘‘surge’’ into Afghanistan, but in the same breath tried to reassure 

the American people that we are going to be out very quickly. Basically, at the moment the last surge troop is going in, the last one 

is going to exit, so don’t worry, everybody. The Taliban just simply 

said okay, so now we have a timetable on how long we have to outlast the Americans. 

In Iraq, the reason the surge I believe was so successful was not 

just the addition of thousands of American troops, it was the fact 

that in a time when I even heard a leader from the other body in 

this wonderful body we have here, from the other side of the Capitol, stood up and said and I was actually getting ready to fly a 

mission into Afghanistan, and I saw the news and I saw this leader 

say that the war in Iraq is lost. And I could only have imagined 

the cheers that went through the opposition at that point. But in 

the midst of all that bad press, the President of the United States, 

President Bush said not only are we not retreating, not only is the 

war not lost, we are doubling down and we are going to win. And 

we saw the opposition forces in Iraq say we can’t defeat the United 

States on the battlefield. We have no choice but to join them. That 

is what could and should happen in Afghanistan. The longer we debate a post-2014 plan, the longer the administration goes without 

saying what the answer is in Afghanistan, the more damage I fear 

we are doing in the long term. 

Now let me just say one, I guess I have 30 seconds, so Mr. 

Kagan, I will ask you to answer this. Let us say we leave Afghanistan as we did Iraq. What is that going to do to the morale of the 

Taliban and to al-Qaeda and to the enemies of the United States 

around the globe? 

Mr. KAGAN. It will be an enormous boon to the morale of the 

Taliban and it will be an incredible boon for al-Qaeda which will 

explain they wrongly claim credit for defeating the Soviet Union. 

They are poised to claim credit for defeating the second super 

power and for reclaiming the land on which their movement was 

founded. It would be a devastating blow for us from the standpoint 

of al-Qaeda morale. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. Schneider is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you to the 

panel for joining us here today. 

I want to turn to Dr. Biddle and Ms. Curtis to the idea of as we 

look at our strategies, as we look going forward, whatever we want 

to accomplish, we cannot accomplish without partners. And partners in Afghanistan, ANSF, partners in Pakistan. 

Dr. Biddle, I will turn to you first in Afghanistan. What is it we 

need to do immediately, short term, medium term to make sure 

that we have the partnership to get to the choices you laid out earlier? 

Mr. BIDDLE. On the military side of the partnership, I think we 

need to provide funding for the ANSF and the kind of enablers people have talked about. On the governance side of the partnership, 

I think the theme, we can talk about the particular mechanics if 

62

you like, but the theme has to be conditionality. The governance 

problem in Afghanistan which also affects the Afghan National Security Forces, it is not just a problem of civil government, it exists 

because malign actors in Afghanistan profit from it, prefer it, and 

want it to continue. If that is going to change, the only way it is 

going to change is if the United States uses leverage to change the 

interest calculus of actors who are profiting from the kind of 

misgovernance that we see in the country now. 

The scale of leverage at our disposal is much smaller now than 

it was some years ago, but in principle, anything we do in the 

country is a potential source of leverage. If, in fact, we are prepared to use conditionality and shape what we do as a tool for 

changing not the structure of Afghan governance, certainly not 

eliminating corruption in Afghanistan, but to bring about a relatively small number of carefully triaged governance objectives 

that we think are critical to making the difference between there 

being a viable non-Taliban alternative and not after 2014. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Are there things we should be doing in the immediate term before the next election or are there things we should 

be looking to see after the election to do immediately following? 

Mr. BIDDLE. I think before the election, it is time to do the homework. After the election, it is time to execute. We don’t know what 

after the election government in Afghanistan is going to be yet, but 

there is a great deal of preparation we need to do before we act in 

any event. There is intelligence work that we need to do. There is 

policy coordination work that we need to do. We actually enjoy the 

advantage of having an interregnum in which it doesn’t make 

sense to act initially and we ought to use that time to our advantage. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. Ms. Curtis, with respect to Pakistan 

and as you touched on, what do we need to do to develop a workable partnership with Pakistan vis-a`-vis Afghanistan? 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think what we need to do is we need to have 

a dual strategy where we are supporting the civilian leadership, 

the Pakistan civil society through our aid, through our diplomatic 

engagement. But we are also conditioning our military assistance 

to the Pakistan military on its efforts to help us in Afghanistan to 

crack down on the Haqqani network, the Taliban leadership. 

We need to be willing to pull the plug on the military aid that 

we provide Pakistan because it is the Pakistani military and intelligence services that are making those decisions on how they are 

supporting the Haqqani network and the other militant groups. 

There is a lot of debate about whether this is an issue of capability 

or political will. It is my belief after following this region for 20 

years that it is more an issue of political will. And that while capabilities are an issue, particularly when you are looking at the TTP 

and trying to get them under control, that when you are looking 

at groups like the Haqqani network, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the 

senior Taliban leadership, it is more a question of will. And the 

Pakistanis could be doing more to crack down on these groups 

using their leverage to get these groups to compromise for a political solution in Afghanistan. I believe that is possible, but we need 

to be willing to put more pressure on Pakistan. 

63

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think one of the challenges we face though and 

it was highlighted in today’s New York Times in a story of the 

question of Pakistan working in collaboration with Afghani Taliban 

and then we see Afghanistan potentially working with the Pakistani Taliban. How do we deal with two partners on both sides who 

are oftentimes playing against each other and oftentimes playing 

against us? 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think that is true. I think it is very disconcerting to see that the Afghan Government may have been supporting parts of the TTP, a group that has been conducting suicide 

bombings in Pakistan, killed thousands of Pakistanis. This is extremely problematic and again, unfortunately, Pakistan has relied 

on violent groups to achieve its foreign policy objectives and it just 

has backfired on Pakistan and I would see that story that we saw 

today as part of that backfiring effort and that we need to be able 

to convince Pakistan that that is not in its interests either to support these groups. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. 

Schneider. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

General, how much does it cost to have 1,000 troops in Afghanistan? You are advocating 30,000 residual troops. How much would 

it cost? 

General KEANE. I don’t know what that——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thirty billion dollars. Does that sound out of 

line? 

General KEANE. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, that is the estimate of what was given 

to us about a few years ago on the number of cost per troop in Afghanistan, $30 billion. This isn’t a couple billion. This is we were 

borrowing that money at a time we are cutting back services to our 

own people. And we are borrowing money from China in order to 

maintain a force in Afghanistan. 

Could the fact that we haven’t won yet indicate that there is 

something wrong more fundamentally in other than just we don’t 

have enough troops there? Do you believe the constitution—let me 

be more clear. Do you believe the constitution of Afghanistan which 

we forced upon the Afghan people after the Taliban were kicked 

out by the Northern Alliance, I might add, not by U.S. troops, is 

that constitution consistent with Afghan tradition? Do you know 

anything about the constitution there? It is the most centralized 

constitution of any country in the world that we have foisted upon 

these people which is the most decentralized country in the whole 

world with a tribal culture. They don’t even elect their provincial 

leaders, do they? Do you think we would have corruption in the 

United States if we had a government in which the President of 

the United States appointed all the governors and then the governors appointed all the chiefs of police and all the people responsible for education? Do you think we would have a corruption problem here? 

We have forced on these people a system totally inconsistent 

with their tradition and then we are arguing about how many 

64

troops we are going to keep there because the situation is so unstable. 

General, you were in Vietnam. You know, do you think we just 

needed to keep a couple extra troops there and the situation would 

have cleared itself up? There are some fundamental decisions that 

were wrong in Vietnam. And let me say that after 9/11, let us remember this, how many people who flew the planes into those 

buildings were Afghans? None. They were Saudis. And that operation was probably planned in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere and we 

all know it. Yeah, they were giving aid and comfort to Osama bin 

Laden and we should never forgive them for that and I am very 

happy that we support the Northern Alliance to help them free 

their country from the Taliban which was allied with al-Qaeda. But 

those days are over. 

General, it would not have helped our country to stay in Vietnam 

any longer. We were divided then and going through that experience eventually helped us get ourselves together to put a better 

perspective on things. 

We need a better perspective of the role of the United States in 

the world and it is no longer acceptable to the people of the United 

States to be the policemen of the world and they have 2,000 guys 

lost here, 5,000 guys lost here, and then they leave the area because the world hates us now because we are playing the policeman role. This is—what I am getting today is frankly wrong-think. 

And I am sorry, but I disagree with what almost everybody has testified today. 

Let me put it this way. Thirty billion dollars for 30,000 extra 

troops in Afghanistan. The whole gross national product of that 

country is $15 billion. And I can assure you the experience that I 

have had in Afghanistan, which is extensive, that for $3 billion we 

can buy off every tribal leader and every political leader in that 

country and we can have them wave good-bye to us and for an 

extra billion dollars, there can be smiles on their faces and they 

can wave American flags. And that is more important right now, 

just get our troops out of there, let them run their affair. And this 

idea that everywhere that there is a radical Muslim who pops his 

head up that we are going to send troops over to that country, we 

should be yes, helping the Northern Alliance, helping those people 

who are struggling against the radicals in their own country as 

they are in Egypt right now with Morsi. Morsi was kicked out by 

al-Sisi and we should be helping the al-Sisis of the world over there 

and let them do the work. But the last thing we need to do is send 

our troops everywhere in the world any more. The American people 

are tired of it. They are sick and tired of being the policemen of 

the world. It is too expensive and we end up having thousands of 

American lives lost for who knows what. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Bera is recognized. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I had the privilege 

of visiting Afghanistan with our chairwoman over Memorial Day. 

And let me just say we met some of the most professional troops, 

men and women that answered the call of duty and have performed 

extremely admirably. But talking to them, talking to our leaders on 

the ground, talking to our intelligence folks on the ground, talking 

65

to our diplomatic community, and then having the opportunity to 

meet with President Karzai, I don’t think 30,000 troops solves it. 

I don’t think 10,000. I think this is a very difficult part of the world 

and I think my colleague from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, just 

touched on how difficult this part of the world is. 

I also think we haven’t touched on what I think the most critical 

factor in Afghanistan’s stability is. As we start to draw down and 

I think the American people have spoken pretty loud and clear that 

they are ready to start drawing down, whether it is $30 billion or 

$3 billion, the presence of our troops there over this last decade has 

essentially been the driving force of Afghanistan’s economy. 

As we draw down and maybe this is for Ms. Curtis or Dr. Biddle, 

I think my biggest fear of Afghanistan falling apart is their economy falls apart when we are not there and we are no longer pumping those billions of dollars into their economy. I would be interested in your thoughts. 

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you. There are a couple of issues here. There 

is one, the issue of the troop numbers and I would just point out 

we still have 30,000 troops in Korea, 60 years after the war ended. 

So if we can afford to have a number of troops there, I don’t see 

what the issue is with keeping a substantial residual force in Afghanistan, about 20,000 troops in the place where the 9/11 attacks 

originated. 

In terms of moving forward and supporting the Afghans, you 

know, it has also been pointed out that we need to continue funding the Afghan security forces and if we allow the Afghan security 

forces to kind of flail about on their own without any U.S. support, 

then I think we are going to see the Taliban gradually begin to retake parts of the country, allow al-Qaeda to reestablish its safe 

haven there and we do have to think about what we have invested 

there. It is not impossible. We don’t need to go from 100 to zero. 

I think there is something to be said for a responsible drawdown 

where we do have gains that have been made. I think those were 

pointed out by a few people and it is not as if the people of Afghanistan are not better off today than they were under Taliban rule. 

Mr. BERA. Certainly, I don’t disagree that our troops have not 

made gains and certainly inside Kabul, when we were there, you 

see stability and you see a somewhat normal way of life. Obviously, 

in the rural parts of the country, it is probably much less stable. 

Since I have only got about a minute and a half left, I was also 

recently in India and the issue of post-2014 Afghanistan certainly 

is very present on Indian minds. They have invested about $3 billion. I think they stand ready to continue to invest in infrastructure, and both their industry and their government, want to see a 

stable Afghanistan, obviously. They want to see stability in South 

Asia. 

Maybe Dr. Biddle, India’s concern is they won’t invest those dollars if it is an unstable security situation. So I may be contradicting myself, but I understand that we have to have some presence and we have to try to have a stable ANSF. But what would 

you like to see India’s role being in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BIDDLE. I would like to see India’s role in Afghanistan be as 

part of a larger strategy for dealing with Pakistan. I could imagine 

India being cooperative in a way that would help us build leverage 

66

with Pakistan. If it is uncoordinated, however, mostly what it 

stands to do is play into Pakistani paranoia in a way that isn’t constructive and doesn’t move our agenda forward. 

If I could, I would like to spend just a brief moment speaking to 

the question you raised initially on the economic consequences in 

Afghanistan of the western drawdown. Because when I was last 

there in March, we spent some time with the World Bank team 

and with the Economic Branch and the Embassy talking about exactly that question. And to my surprise, their assessment was they 

believed that the economic consequences, while negative, would be 

modest. In fact, their projection is a reduction in the growth rate 

of the Afghan economy, but they don’t actually project a recession. 

There are a variety of reasons for that that I doubt I will be able 

to detail in 4 seconds, but suffice to say that my sense is that the 

best economic analysis of the country at the moment holds that 

they will not see an economic catastrophe as a result of this. I yield 

back. 

Mr. WEBER [presiding]. All right, the gentleman from Florida is 

recognized. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, and ma’am, I 

appreciate you all being here. 

I am going to ask my last question first and that is I want you 

to think about this when I come back to you. I want you to spend 

about 30 seconds. What is the role of the U.S. Government in the 

world? 

And then starting with that, General Keane and Dr. Kagan, you 

both said that al-Qaeda is more dispersed around the world, 

throughout the Middle East, and greater in number, and this is 

after $2 trillion in Afghanistan and Iraq, several thousand lost 

lives, tens of thousands of injured soldiers, and this is after an 11- 

to 12-year effort of going over there fighting the war terror. 

How much has our intervention over the last 60-plus years in the 

Middle East, how much has that led to the radical Islamist terrorists that mean to do us harm like in Beirut, the Cole in Yemen, 

9/11, and Benghazi that we see today? If one or two of you want 

to answer that real quickly, then we will move on to the next question. 

General? 

General KEANE. Well, I don’t see a direct correlation of U.S. involvement in the Middle East and radical Islam. Radical Islam is 

an ideology that has a historical, theological, and philosophical 

foundation for it. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

General KEANE. And you know how ambitious that ideology is. 

One of the near term strategic objectives to be able to achieve their 

ambitious political goals which is what they are is to drive the 

United States out of the region so they can dominate it. The United 

States is in the region because of genuine national interest and we 

have been there rather significantly since post-World War II. 

I don’t think you can draw a correlation that that is the spark 

that drives radical Islam. They certainly use it politically to their 

advantage. 

Mr. YOHO. I would love for you to come by our office at some 

point where we could have a more in-depth discussion. 

67

Dr. Kagan? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, sir, I agree with General Keane on that point. 

I think that this is a movement that has evolved from a number 

of different sources, some of which were related to the American 

presence, some of which weren’t. Most of them pre-dated this significant American presence in the region quite a lot and I think we 

have the problem that al-Qaeda does not identify the United States 

as an enemy because we are in the region. They identify the United 

States as an enemy because of what we stand for and who we support. 

Mr. YOHO. You know, I have heard that, but I personally don’t 

believe that. I believe it is because we try to put western ideologies 

in their government that they don’t want to accept: Freedom of religion, freedom of expression, women’s rights, and all these things 

that we believe on the western side. And we go over there with foreign aid and we say we will give you this foreign aid if you do these 

things. I think we are going to disagree on that. 

Let me go to Ms. Curtis and Dr. Biddle. If we develop energy security in the U.S., would it change our foreign policy in the Middle 

East, if we had energy independence here in this country? 

Mr. BIDDLE. At the margin, but probably not radically because 

our major trading partners will continue to be dependent on the 

Middle East for energy. To the extent that we care about whether 

Europe, for example, as an economy that can trade with us and 

maintain our economic growth, we therefore need to worry not just 

about where we get our energy, but also where our trading partners get it. 

I think at the margin it can mean that we can become less militarily engaged, but I don’t think it can get to the point where we 

can become independent of events in the Middle East. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, let me ask what would be a way to negotiate 

a change in foreign policy from military conflicts and to capitalize 

on the investment we have had with human life, the trillions we 

have spent and build one around trade whether it is agriculture, 

construction. Is it feasible with a corrupt government in both those 

countries? And you know, you both said you know, that both of 

those governments are corrupt. And I don’t understand how we can 

throw billions and billions of dollars over and over again to a corrupt government and expect it is going to turn out good. I see it 

in Egypt and I see it in all these countries in the Middle East that 

we have done over and over again. 

And Ms. Curtis, if you could answer that real quickly. And I 

want to get your response to that first question I asked you. 

Ms. CURTIS. I think you have made a very good point about in 

the interest of building trade linkages and how that might be a 

more stable relationship than just providing foreign aid and this is 

something that the new Pakistan Government is extremely interested in and hopefully we can expand the dialogue and try to improve our trade relationship. Even though I believe the aid is still 

important, perhaps focusing more on trade rather than just focusing on the aid would be a prudent way to approach the relationship 

with Pakistan. 

And also, promoting regional integration and regional trade is 

extremely important. That means Afghanistan-Pakistan trade, 

68

Indo-Pak trade, anything we can do to encourage more regional 

economic linkages. That is going to help stabilize that region and 

that will be in our interest as well. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. 

If you guys would submit that question I asked you, the role of the 

United States Government in the world, I look forward to your answers. Thank you. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our 

panel. 

General Keane, you had a lot to do with helping President Bush 

understand the failed policy in Iraq, militarily, and to repivot with 

the counterinsurgency strategy propounded by General Petraeus. Is 

that correct? 

General KEANE. Yes. Others participated, not the least of which 

is the man sitting next to me. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. I remember your name as well, Mr. 

Kagan. That is right. 

We have been in Afghanistan now for 12 years. By one simple 

measurement, that is the longest war we have ever been involved 

in, is that not correct? 

General KEANE. Yes, it is. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The President who ran against Mr. Gore, Vice 

President Gore, inter alia, saying he didn’t believe in nation building, has spent a lot of money nation building in Afghanistan. And 

included in that nation building was the reconstitution or the constitution of a security force of 350,000 members at a cost estimated 

of about $40 billion. What is your assessment, General, of the ability of that security force after those 12 years to deter insurgent 

threats and to create some semblance of peace and stability domestically in Afghanistan? 

General KEANE. Yes. Just let me briefly say that 12 years is driven by choices that we made. We set up a government initially of 

our choosing. And we did not provide initially to grow and develop 

a security force early on. We changed our priorities from Afghanistan to Iraq very early. The decision was made actually in December 2001 and priorities began to shift. Afghanistan from 2002 to 

late 2008 was on a diet. And we never really got after it again in 

a way that was consequential until after President Obama made 

his decision to escalate. 

Just to put the facts on the table, a lot of our own policy decisions drove this long war. I believe the Afghan National Security 

Forces, after all the stumbling that we have done in fashioning a 

coherent strategy for the growth and development and the resources to support it, we have finally arrived at a point where we 

have an acceptable force. It has proven its mettle in the south. It 

is now leading operations there and according itself. Their casualties have certainly gone up from what they used to be when we 

were in the lead, but those preliminary signs are favorable that 

that investment has been worth it. 

As Dr. Kagan and I have both said, we have a problem in the 

east that I don’t think they can handle by themselves. And we have 

to assist them as we transition and pull all of our combat forces 

69

out which we will do. That is already a decision. We have to assist 

with that transition. 

I also believe the training and assistance force is important intellectually to stay engaged with them. We need officers there to help 

shape their operations. Those numbers are low by comparison to 

what our commitment is now. Those numbers will be in the thousands, but relatively low. What we get out of that is exponentially 

greater than the numbers that are there to help shape it. There is 

a lot we can do to assist them. 

The most important thing is they have the courage to fight, no 

doubt about that and we have given them the skill to fight and 

they have now shown that they can handle that. It is uncertain 

what it would be like when we are totally gone and that is a question mark. We think the signs are favorable, except for what we 

are dealing with in the east. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Mr. Biddle, Dr. Biddle, there were reports in today’s New York Times complicating what General Keane 

I think would like to see accomplished and I don’t disagree, that 

the Afghan Government has been secretly negotiating with elements of the Pakistan Taliban. We captured Mr. Mehsud, one of 

the key leaders in that effort and it raises real questions about 

trust and about the intention of the Afghani Government and given 

what General Keane just said, it might be construed as also undermining the work of their own security forces. Would you comment? 

Mr. BIDDLE. Clearly, it has been a major source of friction between ourselves and the Afghans and may have had something to 

do with the difficulties and the talks over the Bilateral Security 

Agreement over recent months. That said, I think it is only natural 

that the Afghans are trying to develop leverage against what they 

view as a Pakistani Government that has been unhelpful in talks 

to settle the war. 

The appropriate use of leverage in dealing with Pakistanis would 

ideally be something that we would coordinate across the various 

interested parties on our side of the conflict. This was evidently remarkably uncoordinated, but leverage is necessary in any negotiation and it is certainly going to be necessary in this one and we 

are not particularly leverage rich. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. I wish I had more time. This is a fascinating panel. Thank you all for being here. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WEBER. The gentlelady from Florida is recognized. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Weber. It is a pleasure to be 

here with you. I have enjoyed the discussion and thank you all very 

much. I am sure it is very frustrating for you to hear our frustration because really, I think Congress should stand in front of a mirror and yell at itself, but with that said, you are the ones that get 

to sit here. 

My son who I am very proud of, a United States Marine, who 

served in Afghanistan and returned in USAID and I also did visit 

Afghanistan with Mr. Wilson, who led a very wonderful codel. 

One thing that I found and I would echo Mr. Bera’s comments 

that we met with many, many military personnel and I thought 

they were articulate. They were committed. I have nothing but 

very high marks. The other observation I had was that they also 

70

had what I would see as a narrow view of their own world because 

obviously, you are in the military in Afghanistan, that is probably 

what you are thinking about. You are not thinking about educating 

a kid in West Palm Beach, Florida. 

Anyway, I have often wondered—I studied psychology in college 

and I learned about this principle called cognitive dissonance which 

is basically, it is like there was an Aesop’s fable, the fox, when he 

can’t reach the grapes he decides well, he really didn’t want grapes 

in the first place. I often wonder, are we in a situation where we 

have cognitive dissonance which is really defined as a distressing 

mental state that people feel when they find themselves doing 

things that don’t fit what they know. And sometimes otherwise 

they take puzzling and irrational and destructive behavior. 

The point being is this, are we supporting continuing efforts in 

Afghanistan because we want to try to feel good about what we did 

even though we know, I think many of us have doubts about that. 

Or is it about national security? And so the question I have and 

I am not sure whether you can answer it, but I want you to take 

a shot at it if you want to because some of you would seem to me 

are coming from the point of view of continued military action or 

involvement in Afghanistan. 

What do you fear is worse to happen to us in this country than 

us not properly educating our children, not modernizing our infrastructure, not finding cures for diseases, not feeding poor children 

and elderly? Because those are the choices we have to make in 

Congress, where to put our money. 

General KEANE. I will be happy to take a shot at that, Congresswoman. It is obviously a very important question and it needs to 

be answered for anybody who is going to advocate putting U.S. resources against military operations. 

I am not making a sunk cost argument in Afghanistan. My eyes 

are fixed as clearly as they can be on the people who wake up 

every morning and ask themselves what they can do to kill Americans that day. And my answer to your question, ma’am, is having 

more Americans killed on American soil, that I think is worse than 

the various other things that you identified because it is the first 

responsibility of government to protect its citizens from death and 

injury by foreign attack. That is what I am preoccupied with and 

that is what I believe the stakes are, otherwise I wouldn’t be advocating for military force. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I will let somebody else answer that, too. There 

are many who believe that it is our economic superiority that it 

will lead to our security. 

I see, Ms. Curtis, you want to answer that? 

Ms. CURTIS. I lived in Pakistan in the mid-’90s. I saw the rise 

of the Taliban. I saw what the extremist groups in Pakistan, what 

that meant. And then, of course, 9/11. We just cannot afford to go 

back to 1989. That is when we turned our backs on the region after 

the Soviets left. And I believe that over time the result was the 

9/11 attacks and I simply believe we cannot afford to go back to 

that situation where we just simply throw up our hands, say this 

is too difficult, and we can’t make any progress. 

Again, I will reiterate. It is not an either/or option here. Certainly, all of the things that you listed are extremely important, 

71

but I think what I fear is losing our sense of freedom and safety 

here in the U.S. which we certainly lost in spades on September 

11, 2001. And so I think what is driving me to counsel you to continue to support the efforts in Afghanistan is that fear that us completely pulling up stakes and leaving will embolden the Taliban, 

will embolden al-Qaeda, will provide them a safe haven again, we 

will be back to where we were on September 10, 2001. 

General KEANE. You know, the tension that you are describing 

is something your predecessors and national leaders have felt for 

the past 60 years, going all the way back to the decisions should 

we do something about the problem in Europe in World War II, 

etcetera. And those are understandable tensions between what are 

our concerns at home with education and poverty and crime and 

other major issues that this country has dealt with for 60 years, 

and then also our responsibility to protect those very people that 

we are so concerned about, our American citizens. 

The fact is the United States is involved in the world. From a 

national security perspective, we have global interests in the world. 

We want open and free markets. We want a stable world out there. 

Radical Islam is a major, major ideology and political movement 

that is threatening the security of the United States. And the issue 

that we are talking about here is directly related to that and everybody knows that. 

We are at the cusp of a long involvement with it and we are frustrated because it has taken us so long and the fact of the matter 

is some of the key decisions we make now will drive how this does 

turn out. And I think war is fundamentally a test of wills and the 

ultimate objective of it is to break your opponent’s will. It is our 

resolve and it is about our commitment and it is about our leadership. And I believe that is what is needed now. Your leadership, 

as well to understand the issues that we are trying to speak to 

here, and also our national leadership to commit to see this 

through. 

Ms. FRANKEL. It is up to the chair. Does anybody else want to 

try? 

Mr. BIDDLE. Briefly, then. I think probably relative to the other 

members of the panel, I am more skeptical about the merits of 

counterterrorist uses of violence around the world, but I make an 

exception in Afghanistan and South Asia. And among the reasons 

why I make an exception there is the unique status of Pakistan as 

a radically unstable nuclear weapons power in which there is a 

resident of militant groups that have expressed threats toward the 

United States and our allies in the West. 

If Pakistan does collapse, if the state loses the counterinsurgency 

war that it is fighting within its own borders in Pakistan, that nuclear arsenal could breach containment and that is one of the very 

few ways in which I can imagine a terrorist threat to the American 

homeland reaching the scale of weapons of mass destruction in severity. And that strikes me as a very unusual problem relative to 

what the United States faces around the world and merits an unusual degree of attention and sacrifice in order to address. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Just an observation I 

want to share with the panel. Listening to this conversation has to 

be fascinating, especially to those of you who come from conservVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:09 Dec 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102913\85313 HFA PsN: SHIRL
72

ative think tanks. What you heard at this dais today is from the 

right of center and the left of center, real skepticism about the continued role of the United States in conflicts such as this even when 

from your point of view and mine, U.S. self interests are clearly indicated, given the history of Afghanistan. This is part of the consequence, I say to you, as conservatives of the obsession with the 

debt. It has led to a false choice. We can either afford to fund a 

food stamp program or we can fund our foreign policy interests. We 

cannot do both. And I would submit that a great power must never 

be forced into such a false choice, otherwise it will not remain a 

great power. But that is where we are. That is what you just 

heard. 

And you heard it echoed in the debate about Syria. 

We could argue the merits of whether a reaction was justified, 

but much of the debate wasn’t about that. It was about how we are 

sick of it. We are tired of it and we don’t want to be dragged into 

any more conflict irrespective of the merits. And to me, I don’t 

know about you, but that is a very dangerous place for the United 

States to be. Debate is healthy, but looking at where we have been 

led because of the obsession, frankly, with the debt. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to share my thoughts. 

Mr. WEBER. Now it is my turn. Dr. Kagan, you said in your comments, I am paraphrasing, Pakistan hates us like no other nation. 

Ms. Curtis, you said you spent some time—was it in Pakistan, 

and you watched the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. 

General Keane, you said in your comments just a short while ago 

that we are on the cusp of having to deal with radical Islam and 

decision we make are going to be pretty major was what you insinuated. 

Now I want you all to square that for me and I will start with 

Dr. Kagan first. You are saying the Taliban has been around a long 

time. Now let me say this. I liked what our colleague from New 

York, Mr. Higgins, said earlier when he said that we educate and 

we train and we build roads and we build infrastructure and yet 

we have a radical Taliban group who blows up those very roads 

that we build in the country. They stand for anti-education. Is that 

true enough? So even though I like the idea that we would educate 

so that those people would have a political will, that they would develop the political will of their own, they would get educated, they 

would understand they can have freedom if they are ready and 

willing to work and sacrifice and pay one terrific price for it. 

We cannot go in there and absolutely inject with a needle, if you 

will, that political will or that willingness for them to sacrifice and 

pay all kinds of prices, some of them the ultimate price, to take 

their country back. 

So Dr. Kagan, with that in mind, explain to me why it is that 

Pakistan hates us like no other nation? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, Congressman, I don’t know why Pakistan 

hates us like no other nation. We poll very poorly in Pakistan. Part 

of that, I think has been because the number of Pakistani leaders 

have seen it as in their interest while receiving a lot of money from 

the United States to run against the United States. That is a reality of the world and I don’t think there is an obvious conclusion 

73

that follows from that, frankly, about what it is exactly that we 

should do. 

Mr. WEBER. General Keane, how do you explain? I mean, you 

said we are on the cusp of dealing with radical Islam, yet this has 

been going on for a long time, witness Ms. Curtis’ comments that 

she watched the rise of the Taliban in the ’90s. 

General KEANE. The question about the cusp was the decisions 

we are about to make and how they dramatically will affect the future stability of Afghanistan and obviously it is in relationship to 

Pakistan because if Afghanistan is destabilized as a result of the 

policy decisions that we make where we contribute to it, it obviously will have an adverse impact on Pakistan. That is what my 

comments were. It was not to the general issue of radical Islam. 

I have strong feelings about that as well. 

Mr. WEBER. I see. I appreciate that. To any of y’all’s recollection 

has there been any country that is so devolved in this kind of violence and terrorism and we are going to come back to your comments, Dr. Biddle, but you were skeptical about using 

counterterrorist violence around the world is what you just said a 

few minutes ago, and we will come back to that. But is there any 

of you who can remember a country that has so devolved into the 

world where an outside nation, i.e., the United States came in and 

we were able to prop them up and get their people to understand 

what was at stake and they were able to help them pull themselves 

up from the bootstraps and they are now a successful, thriving, democracy today? Anybody remember a country like that? 

Mr. KAGAN. I think you can make an argument for Colombia 

along those lines. Large swaths of the country were controlled by 

vicious drug gangs and there was incredible violence in the capital. 

The government was unable to function. We worked closely with a 

very small footprint with Colombians who were interested in taking that back and Colombia is now very much headed in the right 

direction and much more democratic, much more peaceful and the 

drug trade is much more under control. So yes, I think there are 

premises. Was it as bad as Afghanistan? No, not necessarily. 

Mr. WEBER. Forgive me for interrupting, but what kind of outlay 

of manpower, casualties, suffering on our behalf and money did the 

United States——

Mr. KAGAN. It was obviously much more limited than what we 

have put into Afghanistan, but the circumstances were also very 

different and the requirements were very different. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you say there was a difference in the people, 

the willingness of the people to actually get involved and take their 

country back? 

Mr. KAGAN. Sir, I would not. I have got to tell you that for the 

many months that I have spent in Afghanistan and the many Afghans that I have known, and the many people standing up in 

suras fighting against the Taliban after their successors were killed 

and the successors before them were killed, that the Afghans are 

very determined to take the fight and are willing to take casualties 

and have been willing to take casualties at a much higher rate 

than the United States. 

Mr. WEBER. Time will tell, won’t it? 

74

And Dr. Biddle, we are going to go to you now. Your comment 

about you were skeptical about the use of antiterrorist, 

counterterrorist violence around the world, what did you mean by 

that? 

Mr. BIDDLE. Two things. One is I think with respect to any tool 

when it is perceived as free, it tends to be overused. I think many 

of the military instruments we have been using for counterterrorist 

activity have been perceived by some in the United States Government as being largely free of cost, but especially largely free of risk 

to the United States and I think that necessarily tends to create 

over use. But I would distinguish between terrorist threats to the 

United States and I would not treat them all the same. 

I believe that a terrorist threat of the use of weapons on the 

scale of 9/11 or on the scale of nuclear or biological is a serious existential threat to the American way of life and warrants the waging of war to prevent. 

Mr. WEBER. I.e., the falling of nuclear weapons and Pakistan becoming——

Mr. KAGAN. And I believe that is the primary means by which 

that threat could be realized. 

Mr. WEBER. Does that also translate over to Iran in your estimation? 

Mr. KAGAN. My view of Iran tends to be that they have powerful 

disincentives to transfer weapons of that kind to terrorist groups. 

I would prefer that they not get nuclear weapons. I see no particular benefit to the United States or the region in that happening, but I tend to believe that if they get it, the odds that they 

will transfer the materials are relatively modest. 

What worries me about Pakistan is that the state could collapse 

and if that happens, then you don’t have to assume that a state 

that could be retaliated against will transfer weapons to a terrorist. 

The weapons simply become loose and that strikes me as a 

very——

Mr. WEBER. Are you also concerned about that in Syria? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, Syria doesn’t have——

Mr. WEBER. Well, I get it on nuclear, but we are talking about 

weapons of mass destruction, WMDs. 

Mr. KAGAN. And you will note that I mentioned biological and 

nuclear and I did not mention chemical. I believe the scale of the 

threat associated with chemical weapons is significantly lower than 

the other two and warrants different treatment. 

Mr. WEBER. Your comment intrigued me. I thank you. And we 

have our distinguished colleague, Mr. Sherman, and I yield 5 minutes to him. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. We are obsessed, of course, as we 

should be with our own national security. The Pakistani military 

is either obsessed with its national security or it at least needs to 

appear to be so if it is going to retain its position in that society. 

And one existential threat would be if Afghanistan were to be in 

some alliance with India because India is the traditional existential 

threat to Pakistan. We installed Karzai. It is not like he had this 

huge national following in Afghanistan. And we seem to have done 

so without Pakistan either voicing approval or disapproval in any 

75

loud way. And then today, the Taliban exists pretty much because 

the ISI wants it to exist. 

What can we do to assuage the Pakistani military that Afghanistan will not be a second front in a confrontation with India? Why 

has Karzai allowed the Indian Embassy in Kabul to be so robust? 

And why is he the only Muslim ruler that seems to not take the 

Pakistani side on the Kashmir issue? 

I will look to see if I have got any volunteers? Yes, the witness 

whose name has collapsed in front of you, Mr. Kagan. 

Mr. KAGAN. Hopefully, it is just my name that has collapsed. 

Look, the Pakistanis are hated in Afghanistan by all sides to a 

remarkable degree and the reason for that is that for the past 30 

years Pakistani policy in Afghanistan has been to supply guys with 

guns, foster chaos, create death, and do absolutely nothing positive 

for that country. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can interrupt, you are going back 30 years. 

Pakistan played a critical role in overthrowing the communists, the 

Russian-supported regime? 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes, that is right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The Taliban had enough popular support to obtain 

power in Afghanistan, although they were supported by the Pakistanis. 

Mr. KAGAN. The Taliban was created by the Pakistanis and 

would not have been able to defeat its enemies militarily or take 

control of the country, such control as it had without Pakistani 

support. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But they also wouldn’t have been able to take control without Afghan support. 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes, of course, that is true. What I can tell you is 

the conversations, again, it is remarkable. As you go down to 

Kandahar, you talk to the tribal chiefs there who are fighting 

against the Taliban. You ask them who these guys are and they 

say they are Pakistanis. You ask them who their enemy is, they 

are Pakistanis. And that is not just because they don’t want to 

admit that there is Afghan Taliban. 

My point is that the Pakistanis have been treating problems in 

Afghanistan like a nail, and the hammer that they have is supplied 

guns to bad dudes. They need to figure out that that is not going 

to work and that they need a new policy. And what we can best 

do for them, I think, is to help them figure that out. 

Mr. SHERMAN. General. 

General KEANE. I believe if you look at Pakistan, there are very 

few countries in the world that have a history as profound as theirs 

is in making poor strategic choices and miscalculations. It is quite 

extraordinary. And this one with the Taliban is another example 

of it. 

I mean I have felt for some time in dealing with them that we 

should have taken the gloves off a long time ago, maintain a relationship with them, but certainly deal much more directly with 

them and I agree with my panel colleague about their aid. I think 

it should have been much more conditioned based and this last aid 

should have that——

76

Mr. SHERMAN. General, if I can interrupt because my time is 

close to expiring. Why did we install a regime in Kabul unacceptable to the Pakistani military? 

General KEANE. I think why was Karzai installed was the issue. 

We had a relationship with Karzai and the Central Intelligence 

Agency had a relationship with them. These are all the things that 

were done very quickly to put somebody in charge. Was it a good 

decision? Probably not. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Curtis? 

Ms. CURTIS. I think at the time, Karzai was a good leader for the 

country. He is a Pashtiun. He was a consensus builder. Certainly 

things have fallen off in the last few years and we see more corruption. But you know, it really gets at what, is Afghanistan a sovereign country? That is like asking why we would allow a certain 

Pakistani leader——

Mr. SHERMAN. We didn’t allow Karzai to be swept into Kabul by 

a wave of popular support. You are saying Afghanistan is a sovereign country and therefore had a chance to select its anti-Pakistani leader, it didn’t select Karzai. We selected Karzai. 

Ms. CURTIS. I would refer to Karzai as an anti-Pakistan leader. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But the Pakistani behavior seems to indicate that 

they regard him as an anti-Pakistani leader. 

Ms. CURTIS. But I think he has tried to build better relations and 

he has been able to, to a certain degree with Pakistan civilian leadership. If you look at the equation with——

Mr. SHERMAN. How large is the Indian Embassy in Kabul? 

Ms. CURTIS. How much aid is India supplying to Afghanistan? 

He is a rational leader. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I get to ask the questions. I couldn’t do your job. 

That is why they gave me mine. Let me go on to another question. 

I thank the chairman for a little additional time. And that is Pakistan is a very diverse nation at its upper levels there has been an 

effort to homogenize Pakistan and back when there was an East 

and West Pakistan and even an attempt to impose the Urdu language on East Pakistan. 

Now you have a government there that seems to indicate a preference for the Urdu language. Should we be reaching out to Pakistanis in the various languages they speak or should we accede to 

the wishes of the most Urdu homogenous in Islamabad? 

General? 

General KEANE. Well, I cannot comment about the language 

issue, but certainly I do believe we should be working closely with 

Pakistan. What I wasn’t able to say before is that I agree with my 

colleague here that the aid in general, it has been a mistake to continually provide aid to the military regime that is dominating the 

country. And we should have a condition base so that the country 

moves toward responsible civilian government where they can control the military. That is down the road. It is generational to be 

sure. But the path we are currently on is not the right one. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, thank you. I thank the chairman for his indulgence. 

Mr. WEBER. Ms. Frankel? 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Weber. I do have one followup to 

something to—Dr. Biddle, I am sorry, my glasses are not on. Okay, 

77

because I am very interested in the point you made about what a 

failed Pakistan would look like and the potential of nuclear weapons getting a very bad—worse actor’s hand. And I would just like 

to ask if the rest of the panel agrees with that and whether you 

think that is a serious possibility or consequence. 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes, absolutely. I mean if you are looking at a failed 

Pakistani state, then once you have a state collapse scenario, you 

cannot be confident about how the military forces will break down. 

You certainly have a very large concentration of well armed and 

well trained insurgent fighters who are eager to get their hands on 

those weapons and I do think that it is a significant risk that we 

should be concerned with. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Where do you put that in the—one to ten, you are 

advocating continued military involvement. Where do you put that 

risk compared to some of the others that you talked about today? 

Mr. KAGAN. It is a very low probability, extraordinarily high risk 

scenario. Obviously, a lot of things have to go wrong to get there. 

What I am concerned about is that we, from this perspective, and 

I think there are a lot of other reasons why I would put ahead of 

this as higher probability, things that we need to be concerned 

about. 

What I am concerned about is creating conditions in Afghanistan 

or allowing conditions to be created in Afghanistan that will conduce to this kind of state collapse and make what is now, I think, 

a very low probability scenario a much higher probability. And if 

I could beg your indulgence for one more comment, you know, I 

have come across as very anti-Pakistani in this. 

I want to make the point that Nawaz Sharif has come to office 

trying to focus like a laser beam on getting the Pakistani economy 

turned around. Now I am a little skeptical about his ability to do 

that. But it is a laudable goal. And he is doing it with much more 

energy and creativity than his predecessor did and it is very much 

in our interest for him to succeed in that. 

And I think as we talk about how we are going to approach the 

problem of Pakistan at this minute as opposed to in general terms, 

I don’t think this is actually a terribly good idea to be pulling aid 

or talking about taking aid out. I think it is worthwhile giving 

Sharif a chance to try to turn the Pakistani economy around. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Ms. Curtis, did you want to answer that? 

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, I just wanted to say I would characterize the 

risk of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists as a high risk, low probability scenario. I think the Pakistani 

military is a competent force and the senior leaders understand the 

importance of keeping the nuclear weapons safe and the U.S. has 

assisted in this effort which is important for maintaining our engagement with Pakistan. I have made that point. 

But I think the links to the extremist elements in Pakistan are 

worrisome and that if you do have a scenario where Afghanistan 

falls back on the Taliban sway, there will be blowback into Pakistan. And as Dr. Kagan pointed out, this, what I would call high 

risk, low probability scenario then becomes a high risk, high probability scenario. 

General KEANE. Let me just follow up. You have the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense spend a lot of efVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:09 Dec 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102913\85313 HFA PsN: SHIRL
78

fort on this issue of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. And we have had 

the opportunity to check on the security of those weapons and were 

somewhat comforted that the military establishment has that as a 

top priority to protect those weapon systems. 

There are some issues surrounding that though because Pakistan 

has made a decision to go to tactical nuclear weapons as opposed 

to the strategic nuclear weapons they have now which means that 

you can fire a nuclear weapon out of an artillery or rocket capability that we used to have by the tens of thousands and have destroyed them since the conventions with the Soviet Union. That escalation gives people pause for concern because of the numbers of 

those and the multiple locations they will be at. If they would ever 

be of any use you have to decentralize those weapons to many more 

locations. So that is an issue. 

The second issue is our Department of Defense has very high on 

its list of scenarios for this issue in dealing with an implosion of 

a government and what do we do about those nuclear weapons. 

And it has been practiced and practiced and practiced in dealing 

with the reality of that issue. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So I am not trying to put words in anyone’s 

mouth. So is your top fear 9/11-type scenarios? Is that like number 

one most probable risk? 

Mr. KAGAN. I don’t think it would look like 9/11 again. My concern is that you have a global organization that is trying to bring 

the war to our shores and that enabling them and giving them a 

victory of this variety and giving them a staging area of this variety will make it more likely that they will bring the war to our 

shores. That is my higher probability, perhaps lower risk, but still 

intolerable. 

Ms. FRANKEL. In some of type of terrorist attack, maybe not——

Mr. KAGAN. I am more concerned about the possibility of a terrorist campaign because among other things, we have watched 

these terrorist organizations evolve away from the one off spectacular attack to the multiple attacks, smaller and so forth that in 

some respects could do even more damage to the American psyche. 

Ms. FRANKEL. You are in agreement with that? 

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I also am concerned about emboldening the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the region and 

outside of the region if the terrorists can then propagandize and 

show that they were able to defeat not only the U.S., but the 40-

odd NATO countries as well. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And one last, would this be—is the concern some 

type of a physical conflict or incident or cyber security breach or 

both? 

Mr. KAGAN. When you are talking about al-Qaeda, the principal 

threat is physical attack. They haven’t to my knowledge developed 

a very sophisticated cyber attack wing although they are getting 

more sophisticated at that. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Weber, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. WEBER. General Keane, you said something that got my attention that they now have tactical nuclear weapons. I think in all 

my reading, if I remember correctly, Pakistan has 100 nuclear 

weapons. Does that sound right? 

79

General KEANE. I think that is a generally-accepted number in 

public sources. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So you are saying I think what the gentlelady 

from Florida was driving at if there is another attack along those 

lines, it will be far worse than 9/11, especially if they were able to 

use one of those weapons, whether they were to use them against 

our ally Israel and draw us over there. So with that in mind, what 

would the four of you, each of you offer? How do you fix that for 

Pakistan? What is your recommendation? Okay, so they have got 

these nuclear weapons. They hate us like no other nation on earth 

was part of your testimony. What do we do about that? What is the 

best case scenario? 

General Keane, you look the most anxious. 

General KEANE. To me, it is not a military answer. It has to do 

more with Pakistan’s internal situation, you know, a stronger government, less corrupt, that is responsive to the needs of its people 

that is capable of controlling a military is something that is desperately needed as opposed to the reverse, a military that dominates the country and dominates the civilian government and puts 

itself and its needs first. Those are the kind of things that I think 

are needed and I think in a sense we know how to do that. And 

a much more——

Mr. WEBER. We do know how to do that, but as was already previously stated, it might have been Mr. Connolly who said they don’t 

like it when we come over there to try to help them do that. So 

how do you get around that? How do you placate that hatred for 

Americans when we come over there to try to help them do that? 

And Dr. Biddle, you looked awful anxious to mash your button. 

General KEANE. Let the doctor mash his button. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. My wife tells me you don’t mash a button, 

you press a button. I said look, in Texas, we mash buttons. Go 

ahead. 

Mr. KAGAN. Preempting a military officer is a dangerous thing, 

but I will offer some brief commentary which is that there are very 

few bilateral policy options we enjoy toward Pakistan that I think 

have very much traction for us at all. There is a serious problem 

there that poses serious risks to us. There is very little that we can 

do, I think, positively to make the situation better. Given that, I 

think in many ways the appropriate policy stance for the United 

States is to invoke the Hippocratic Oath, and at least——

Mr. WEBER. Do no harm. 

Mr. KAGAN. Don’t make a bad situation that it is very hard for 

us to improve any worse than it needs to be. And the reason why 

I care about Afghanistan is because it seems to me that failure of 

the project there is actually a serious opportunity for us to make 

things considerably worse in Pakistan than they might be otherwise. And in an environment where it is very hard for us to improve things, avoiding making them worse than they need to be 

strikes me as an unusual policy priority. And I think the key issue 

in policy priority toward Pakistan is the collapse of the state is the 

primary threat to the United States. I don’t worry nearly as much 

about Pakistani nuclear weapons leaking out or somehow being 

stolen by terrorists, as long as the Pakistani Government is intact 

80

and as long as their control of their nuclear arsenal is no worse 

than it is today. 

It is if they lose their war that I think we have got a problem 

that poses literally unique national security issues for the United 

States. And our primary leverage over that, I suspect at the end 

of the day, limited as it is, is our influence over what happens in 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. WEBER. You are not real encouraging. 

Mr. KAGAN. Sorry. 

Ms. CURTIS. If I may make a quick clarification? So Pakistan’s 

development of tactical nuclear weapons is mainly to counter what 

it perceives as the Indian threat. So to the extent that we can encourage Indo-Pakistani talks, strategic stability talks to try to reduce their nuclear arsenals or at least put in mechanisms that provide more stability in the region, I think that is where we can help 

on that issue. 

When it comes to, you talk about Pakistani hatred toward the 

U.S., I think it is important to remember that we have seen that 

the Pakistani intelligence services often feed negative stories to the 

Pakistani media about the U.S. They try to fuel this anti-U.S. sentiment. 

Mr. WEBER. You mean like we are spying on the Germans? 

Ms. CURTIS. I think what I was going to say it was important for 

us to engage directly with civil society, the civilian leadership to 

ensure that we are not just focusing all of our attention on engaging with the military leadership. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, they have called votes. It looks like we have 

picked you all’s brains as long as we can. So I thank the witnesses 

and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the joint subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(81)

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman 

October 22, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be 

held jointly by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Affica and the Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific, in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

iY~\ v~~_JQrei ::rna !I'a; r~l'!2..tlli~J;Q:[) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SlJBJILCT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, October 29,2013 

2:15 p.m 

After the Withdrawal The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part II) 

Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D 

Christopher DeMuth Chair and Director 

Critical Threats Project 

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired 

Chairman of the Board 

Institute for the Study of War 

Ms. Lisa Curtis 

Senior Research Fellow 

Asian Studies Center 

The Heritage Foundation 

Stephen Biddle, Ph.D 

Adjunct Senior Fellow for Defense Policy 

Council on Foreign Relations 

By Direction of the Chairman 
83


85313m-1.eps

COMMITTEE O~ FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE 0"< ____ ,'_li_dd_le_b_,'a_'_' "_il_d_N_Q_rtl_' ~,;fi,-r_ie_a/,_If_si'_'_{{f_'d_tl_te_P:_a_e,,,-'fi_' ___ HEARING 

DaL.,~ ~J:;'!!,:?:~Dat., __ -"1-"OI.:..:2",9-,-,/2:..:0,-,1",3 ___ Room~ __ -,,2,,,-1,-,72,,---__ _ 

Starting Time 2:2Z p,m., _ Ending Time 4:40 p,m, 

Recesses __ <-to __ )( __ to _~_,J ("",)0 __ ) <-to -1 <-to __ ) <-to __ } 

Presiding Member!s) 

Chairman I1ea1UI Ros-Lelttillen. Chairman Stelle C/wbot (R-OH), Rep. Rtl11dy Weber (R-TXJ 

Check all of lit" fallowing thllt apply: 

Open Session [lJ 

Exe~utive (closed) Session D Televised [lJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Rlectrunk"lly Recorded (taped) [lJ 

Stenugraphic Record [{] 

Ajler the Withdrawal: The Way Fonvard in Afghanistan alUl Paki"lan (Pari II) 

SUBCOYIMITTEE ME1VIBERS PRESE:>IT: 

(See attendance sheel) 

NON-SUBCOM;\f1TTRR MEl\1RFRS PRESENT: (l\!fark lvith an * ff they are not members oJ.ful! committee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'? Yes EJ No D (~r"no>·, please !IS! below and include title, agency, departrnen(. 01' organizatwn.j 

STATEMENTS FOR THE llliCOlill: (List an}, statements <"I"nilledj;',. the ,worrn 

SFR - Rep. (;erald Connolly (D- VA) 

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TIME SCHbIJULED TO llliCONVENE ____ " 

or 

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84

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85313m-2.eps

Joint Subcommittee Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title After the Withdrawal' The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part TT) 

Date: 10/29/2013 

NOllcommittee Members 

Member Present Member Present 

Ros-Lehtinen, T1eana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) X 

Chabot, Steve (OH) X Connolly, Gerald (V A) X 

Wilson, Joe (SC) X Higgins, Brian (N Y) X 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) X Cicilline, David (RJ) X 

Cotton, Tom (AR) X 

Grayson, Alan (FL) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) X 

Weber, Randy (TX) X 

Schneider, Bradley (IL) X 

Desanti s, Ron (FL) Kennedy, Joseph (MA) X 

Radel, Trey (FL) Meng, Grace (NY) X 

Collins, Doug (GA) Frankel, Lois (FL) X 

Meadows, Mark (NC) X Bera, Ami (CA) X 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X Gabbard, Tulsi (HT) X 

Messer, Luke (IN) Sherman, Brad (CA) X 

Perry, Scott (PA) X 

Rohrabacher, Dana (CA) X 
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Statement for the Record 

Suhmitted hy the Honorahle Gerald H. Connolly 

The United States and Afghanistan are in the process of negotiating an agreement that would 

allow US troops to stay in Afghanistan beyond 2014. The US. force's key mission would be to 

train Afghan forces to defend against the Taliban. Secretary of State John Kerry and Afghanistan 

President Hamid Karzai recently settled on key elements of an agreement to keep US. forces in 

Afghanistan beyond 2014. A central issue which remains unresolved and has echoes of the Iraq 

withdrawal is immunity for US. soldiers trom Afghan prosecution. For the United States, this 

issue is a deal breaker. Both sides agree that the so-called zero option, where US. troops would 

completely withdraw, is undesirable. Most assessments place the figure of a residual US. force 

in 2014 at 8,000-12,000 servicemembers 

The outcome of next spring's provincial and presidential elections in Afghanistan will provide a 

method to gauge progress since the 2009 elections, which were p1a6'lled with irregularities and 

low voter turnout. An initial vote count showed that President Karzai received an adequate 

number of votes to remain President, but the people of Afghanistan and the international 

community voiced skepticism at the authenticity of the results. Almost 3,000 complaints were 

tlled with the UN.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission (ECC), and the ECC 

determined that 750 of those had a "material effect" on the election 

News reports do little to allay concerns about Afghanistan's readiness for the 2014 elections. As 

reported by Reuters earlier this month, an illicit trade in voter cards has alarmed several 

candidates. A campaign manager can buy a voter card for less than $5 and conspire with a poll 

worker to skew the results of the election. Complicating the entire process is that President 

Karzai has a very real stake in who wins, considering his older brother is running to succeed him. 

The outcome will also signal whether or not a new Afghan government would negotiate with the 

Taliban. Frankly, it is unclear how one can negotiate with a terrorist group that is hell-bent on 

destroying any progress made in Afghanistan, especially recent strides made in women's 

education and empowerment 

Another point of contention is the readiness of Afghanistan' s 350,000 security forces. The 

United States has invested $40 billion in Afghanistan's forces since the beginning of the war, but 

their ability to fight the Taliban and maintain internal security is questionable. Moreover, reports 

of rogue elements within the Afghan forces turning on their American trainers and killing them 

continue to be a source of distress and erode public confidence in the mission 

Pakistan could have a role in potentially stabilizing Afghanistan in the future, but it must first 

show willingness to police on insurgent safe havens within its borders. US trust has been further 

strained due to Pakistan's support for the Haqqani network, which is designated as a Foreign 

Terrorist Organization by the US. Government. In addition, drone strikes, which have long been 

a source of contention, came to the forefront of the discussion once again after Prime Minister 

Sharifs recent visit. He repeatedly raised the issue, and two human rights organizations 

published reports alleging that US. drone strikes have killed innocent civilians. The revelations 

that elements inside of Pakistan, including the lSI, tacitly approved of US. drone strikes while 

denouncing them will further complicate the relationship. 
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The stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to pose challenges for U.S. interests 

in the region. There are several complex issues with long-standing baggage that require a holistic 

approach that finds common ground for all entities involved. 1 look forward to hearing 

suggestions from our witnesses for moving forward in the region as the withdrawal from 

Afghanistan approaches. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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[NOTE: Responses were not received prior to printing.]

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