NO. 81-231 

IN THE SUPREBIE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF PHYLLIS R. LUPO, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

VS . 

ANTHONY L. LUPO, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead. 

Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

E. Eugene Atherton, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

WardentChristiansen, Johnson & Berg, Kalispell, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: September 3, 1981 

Decided: March 25, 1982 

Filed : MAR 2 5 1982 

w 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opknion of the 

Court. 

The husband appeals the Flathead County District Court's 

unequal division of the net marital estate (60 percent to 

the wife) and its determination of the value of some real 

estate owned by the parties. We affirm. 

The parties were married on February 15, 1947, when the 

husband was studying to be an accountant. A decree of 

dissolution was granted on February 5, 1975, but the parties 

have been unable to agree on a property distribution since 

that time. The wife, age 56, has worked since the date of 

the marriage, except for a 12-year period during which she 

was raising the parties' children. At the time of trial, 

she was earning approximately $14,000 per year as a registered 

nurse. There was evidence that her physical abilities are 

limited by spinal arthritis and abdominal problems. The 

husband, age 59, receives approximately $14,500 per year as 

Chief Deputy Assessor for Flathead County, and from $1,800 

to $4,000 per year from a private accounting practice. 

The parties own seven undeveloped lots (known as the 

"Ryker lots") in Kalispell. The lots were appraised at a 

minimum total value of $17,000 by a special master, although 

the wife's own appraiser testified that the lots had a total 

value between $20,000 and $40,000, and there was evidence 

that the parties' son had offered to buy the lots for $20,000. 

The trial court valued the lots at $30,000. 

The $30,000 valuation for the lots was included in the 

trial court's decision awarding the wife 60 percent of the 

marital assets. The husband argues that the apportionment 

of marital assets should have been equal because the parties 

contributed equally to the marriage and because the wife had 
also asked for no more than an equal apportionment. The 

evidence, however, was that the wife has health problems 

which severely limit her mobility and professional advancement opportunities, and that she would have no opportunity 

to acquire capital assets other than those already acquired. 

On the other hand, there is no evidence that the husband is 

in anything but good health and no evidence that any problems 

would prevent him from maintaining or expanding his income 

in future years. The trial court found that the wife's 

health limited her employability and that she does not have 

a good opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets 

or for increased income. The trial court properly considered these factors under section 40-4-202, MCA, and was 

not required to divide the assets equally. 

Nor can we say the trial court abused its discretion in 

valuing the Ryker lots at $30,000. A special master submitted 

a report to the court valuing the land between $17,000 and 

$37,000, depending upon a wide range of variables. A qualified 

appraiser valued the lots between $20,000 and $40,000, 

depending upon improvements and planned uses. This appraiser 

based his opinion on the special master's report, on an 

inspection of the property, and on his knowledge of the 

rapidly-developing surrounding commercial areas. The husband 

presented no evidence valuing the Ryker lots. 

The case of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), - Mont . - I 

607 P.2d 102, 37 St.Rep. 247, contrary to the husband's 

assertion, has no application here. In Hamilton, we held 

that a trial court's $30,000 valuation of some Arabian horses was 

in error because we were unable to determine how the trial 

court arrived at this figure. The expert valuations were 

not even close to each other, not all of the horses had been 
appraised, and there was no indication of the number of 

horses involved. But here the trial court's valuation was 

well within the range of each expert's appraisal. Although 

it is true that the trial court did not state why it chose 

the $30,000 figure as the value of the Ryker lots, and we 

prefer that the trial courts give reasons for their valuations, 

we cannot say under the facts here that the trial court 

abused its discretion. 

The judgment valuing and dividing the marital estate is 

af f irmed. 

We Concur: