a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Performance and Accountability Series

January 2003 Major Management 

Challenges and 

Program Risks

National Aeronautics 

and Space 

Administration

GAO-03-114
A Glance at the Agency Covered in This Report

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s mission encompasses

● human exploration and development of space,

● the advancement and communication of scientific knowledge, and

● research and development of aeronautics and space technologies.

Its activities span a broad range of complex and technical endeavors—from

investigating the composition, evaluation, and resources of Mars; to working with

its international partners to complete and operate the International Space Station;

to providing satellite and aircraft observations of Earth for scientific and weather

forecasting purposes; to developing new technologies designed to improve

air safety.

This Series

This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999 and updated in

2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management

Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003 Performance and Accountability Series

contains separate reports covering each cabinet department, most major

independent agencies, and the U.S. Postal Service. The series also includes a

governmentwide perspective on transforming the way the government does

business in order to meet 21st century challenges and address long-term fiscal

needs. The companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An Update identifies areas at high risk

due to either their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and

mismanagement or major challenges associated with their economy, efficiency, or

effectiveness. A list of all of the reports in this series is included at the end of

this report.

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Dollars in billions

Budgetary Resources a, b

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Fiscal year

Staff Resourcesb

FTEs in thousands

0

10

20

5

15

15 15 15

16

17

0

10

20

5

15

19 18 18 19 19

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Budgetary and Staff Resources

Fiscal year

a Budgetary resources include new budget authority (BA) and unobligated balances of previous BA.

b Budget and staff resources are actuals for FY 1998-2001. FY 2002 are estimates from the FY 2003 budget, which

are the latest publicly available figures on a consistent basis as of January 2003. Actuals for FY 2002 will be

contained in the President’s FY 2004 budget to be released in February 2003.

Source: Budget of the United States Government.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to 

face challenges that threaten its ability to effectively run its largest 

programs. NASA is taking steps to address these challenges. But because 

they are rooted in NASA’s culture and long-standing ways of doing business, 

NASA will need to make a major transformation. 

• Strengthening strategic human capital management. NASA is 

facing shortages in its workforce, which could likely worsen as the 

workforce continues to age and the pipeline of talent shrinks. This 

dilemma is more pronounced among areas crucial to NASA’s ability 

to perform its mission, such as engineering, science, and information 

technology. NASA is addressing this challenge through strategic 

planning, a new workforce planning and analysis system, and requesting 

additional personnel flexibilities, among other initiatives. 

• Controlling International Space Station costs. Development costs 

for this premier project have soared to the point where NASA has had 

to cutback the program substantially, including reducing construction, 

the number of crew members, and scientific research. This has raised 

concern among NASA’s international partners, who have a large stake 

in the scientific research to be performed on the station. NASA is 

instituting management and cost-estimating reforms. But it must still 

reach agreement with its partners on its planned cutbacks. 

• Reducing space launch costs. NASA recognizes the need to reduce 

the costs of space launches and replace its aging space shuttle. The 

administration recently submitted an amendment to NASA’s fiscal year 

2003 budget request, which (1) extends the life of the space shuttle 

and enhances its reliability, (2) funds the development of a new vehicle 

for ferrying crew to and from the space station, and (3) alters the 

time frame for a shuttle replacement. Accomplishing these and other 

goals related to space launches will be difficult and risky in light of the 

technology advances NASA would like to pursue and the high degree 

of communication and coordination required among industry and 

government partners. 

• Improving contract management. NASA spends most of its funds 

on acquisitions. Yet, for many years, it has been unable to oversee 

contracts effectively, principally because it lacked accurate and reliable 

information on contract spending and it placed little emphasis on end 

results, product performance, and cost control. NASA has addressed 

many acquisition-related weaknesses and is beginning to tackle one of its

most formidable barriers to sound contract management—the lack of a 

modern, integrated financial management system. Considerable work 

remains to be done since NASA is only in the early stages of designing 

and implementing this new system, and NASA reported that it is already 

facing challenges in terms of cost, interoperability, and security. 

PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY SERIES 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-114.

To view the full report, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at 

(202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-114, a report to 

Congress included as part of GAO’s 

Performance and Accountability Series 

January 2003 

In its 2001 performance and 

accountability report on NASA, 

GAO identified important 

management, oversight, and 

workforce issues facing the agency. 

The information GAO presents in 

this report is intended to help 

sustain congressional attention and 

an agency focus on continuing to 

make progress in addressing these 

challenges—and others that have 

arisen since 2001—and ultimately 

overcoming them. This report is 

part of a special series of reports 

on governmentwide and agencyspecific issues. 

To make its improvement 

initiatives fully successful, GAO 

believes that NASA will need to 

• move to a results-oriented 

culture and provide the 

sustained attention needed 

to make sure human capital 

reforms stay on track; 

• overcome barriers facing 

implementation of its financial 

management system and 

transform its financial 

management organization so 

that it better supports NASA’s 

core mission; and 

• successfully follow through 

on planned oversight 

improvements so that costs 

and scheduling risks can 

be mitigated. 
Page i GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Contents

Transmittal Letter 1

Major Performance 

and Accountability 

Challenges

2

GAO Contacts 23

Related GAO Products 24

Performance and 

Accountability and 

High-Risk Series

28

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.
Page 1 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Comptroller General A of the United States

January 2003 TransmtLaileter

The President of the Senate and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks facing the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as it seeks to advance human exploration and 

development of space, advance and communicate scientific knowledge, and research and develop 

aeronautics and space technologies. The report discusses the actions that NASA has taken and that 

are under way to address the challenges GAO identified in its Performance and Accountability Series 

2 years ago, and major events that have occurred that significantly influence the environment in 

which the agency carries out its mission. Also, GAO summarizes the challenges that remain, new ones 

that have emerged, and further actions that GAO believes are needed.

This analysis should help the new Congress and the administration carry out their responsibilities and 

improve government for the benefit of the American people. For additional information about this 

report, please contact Allen Li, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, at (202) 512-4841 or 

at lia@gao.gov.

David M. Walker

Comptroller General

of the United States
Page 2 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

NASA is at a critical juncture. Since its inception, NASA has advanced 

space exploration and scientific knowledge and accomplished unparalled 

feats of engineering. But NASA now faces challenges, particularly in terms 

of maintaining a skilled workforce, controlling costs, and providing 

effective oversight for important projects. Recognizing the need for change, 

NASA’s Administrator has recently articulated a new vision for NASA—one 

that is science-driven, not destination-driven. To put NASA on a better 

footing to fulfill this vision, the agency is taking on a major transformation 

aimed at eliminating stovepipes, becoming more integrated and 

results-oriented, and reducing risks while working more economically, 

efficiently, and effectively.

We have identified four performance and accountability challenges facing 

NASA. These include

• strengthening strategic human capital management,

• controlling International Space Station costs,

• reducing space launch costs, and

• improving contract management.

Collectively, these challenges seriously affect NASA’s ability to effectively 

run its largest programs. With an aging workforce, for example, NASA is 

facing the loss of science and engineering expertise across its mission 

areas. Moreover, cost overruns have prevented NASA from achieving 

its original goals with the International Space Station and taken away 

resources from other programs. Weak contract management and financial 

controls pose additional risks across the agency. Therefore, we have placed 

this area on our high-risk list.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 3 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Since our last Performance and Accountability Series report,1 issued 

in January 2001, NASA has been taking actions to address each of its 

challenges. For example, NASA has hired new staff, who helped address 

imbalances in some critical skill areas in the shuttle program, and it has 

also developed a strategic human capital plan to enhance its entire 

workforce. In an effort to control space station costs, NASA made 

substantial cutbacks in the space station program and is instituting 

management and cost-estimating reforms. NASA also took significant 

steps to improve contract management, including reducing its use of 

unnegotiated contract changes and beginning to implement a new 

integrated financial management system. However, we are continuing to 

categorize contract management as high risk since key actions remain to 

provide the oversight needed for the more than $12 billion NASA spends 

annually on its contracts.

Moreover, in our last report, we had identified NASA’s faster-better-cheaper 

approach to space exploration as a major management challenge. However, 

since NASA decided to end this approach as a preference for managing its 

programs and projects, we removed this designation. We added reducing 

space launch costs as a challenge, given the wide range of complex and 

difficult tasks that need to be addressed for NASA’s plans for future space 

travel to succeed.

While NASA is taking positive steps toward addressing management 

problems, its ultimate challenge will be in tackling the root problems 

impeding its major programs. This will require instituting a results-oriented 

culture that fosters knowledge sharing and empowers its workforce to 

accomplish programmatic goals; making sure that the agency adheres to 

rigorous and effective management controls to prevent cost overruns and 

scheduling problems; transforming the financial management organization 

so that it better supports NASA’s core mission; and sustaining commitment 

to change.

1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 2001).
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 4 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Strengthening Strategic 

Human Capital 

Management

Like many agencies, NASA is facing substantial challenges in attracting 

and retaining a highly skilled workforce. Left unchecked, for example, 

reductions in the space shuttle workforce could have jeopardized NASA’s 

ability to safely support the shuttle’s planned flight rate. NASA is taking 

comprehensive steps to address this problem across all mission areas, 

but implementing a strategic approach to marshaling, managing, and 

maintaining human capital represents a significant challenge.

Leading public organizations here in the United States and abroad have 

found that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece 

of any serious change management initiative and efforts to transform the 

cultures of government agencies. People are an agency’s most important 

organizational asset. They define its culture, drive its performance, and 

embody its knowledge base. Because serious human capital shortfalls are 

eroding the ability of many agencies to effectively perform their missions, 

we designated strategic human capital management as a governmentwide 

high-risk area in January 2001 and continue to designate it as high risk 

today. Plainly, the problem is not federal employees. Rather, the problem 

is the lack of a consistent strategic approach to marshaling, managing, 

Performance and 

Accountability Challenges

Strengthen strategic human capital management

Control International Space Station costs

Reduce space launch costs

Correct weaknesses in contract management
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 5 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize our government 

performance and ensure its accountability.

We reported in January 2001 that NASA’s shuttle workforce had declined 

significantly in recent years to the point of reducing NASA’s ability to safely 

support the shuttle program. Many key areas were not sufficiently staffed 

by qualified workers, and the remaining workforce showed signs of 

overwork and fatigue. To the agency’s credit, NASA has recognized the 

need to revitalize the shuttle’s workforce, discontinued its downsizing 

plans for the shuttle program in December 1999, and initiated efforts to 

hire new staff. In September 2001, we testified that NASA was hiring 

approximately 200 full-time equivalent staff and that it had focused more 

attention on human capital in its annual performance plan by outlining an 

overall strategy to attract and retain a skilled workforce. But even with 

these gains, there were still considerable challenges. For example, NASA’s 

new staff would require considerable training, and the agency still needed 

to deal with critical losses due to retirements in coming years.

Data obtained from NASA since September 2001 show that these 

challenges have not been mitigated, and work climate indicators continue 

to reflect high levels of job stress. In addition, while new hires helped 

address staffing needs in some critical skill areas in the shuttle program, 

staffing shortages in many key areas still remain a problem. These areas 

include subsystems engineering, flight software engineering, electrical 

engineering, environmental control, and shuttle resources management. 

NASA’s hiring posture for fiscal year 2003 will target areas where skill 

imbalances still exist in the shuttle program.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 6 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Figure 1: Shuttle Undergoing Inspection at the Kennedy Space Center

Source: NASA.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 7 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

As we testified in July 2002, NASA believes that similar workforce 

problems affect the entire agency and that, as a result, its ability to 

perform future missions and manage its programs may be at risk. The 

average age of its workforce is over 45, and the agency is finding it 

particularly difficult to hire people with engineering, science, and 

information technology skills—fields critical to NASA missions. At this 

time, within the science and engineering workforce, the over-60 population 

outnumbers the under-30 population nearly 3 to 1. Currently, 15 percent of 

NASA’s science and engineering employees are eligible to retire; within 

5 years, about 25 percent will be retirement eligible. At the same time, 

the pipeline of people with science and engineering skills is shrinking, 

and competition for workers with those skills is intense. According to 

NASA’s Inspector General, the agency also faces the loss of significant 

procurement expertise through the year 2007.2

 Coupled with these 

concerns, NASA has limited capability for personnel tracking and planning, 

particularly on an agencywide or programwide basis. Further, NASA 

acknowledges that it needs to complete and submit to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) a transformation workforce restructuring 

plan, which it notes that, in conjunction with its strategic human capital 

plan, will be critical to ensuring that no skill gaps or deficiencies exist in 

mission critical occupations.3

NASA is taking steps to address its workforce predicament. For example, 

it is developing an agencywide integrated workforce planning and analysis 

system as part of its new financial management system. The new system 

is expected to track the distribution of NASA’s workforce across programs, 

capture critical competencies and skills, determine management and 

leadership depth, and facilitate gap analyses. NASA already completed a 

pilot of an interim competency management system at one of its centers. 

The interim system will facilitate a gap analysis of human capital in terms 

of skills and competencies. NASA plans to implement the interim system 

agencywide in 2003, and integrate it with the new comprehensive 

workforce planning and analysis system in 2005. The new system should 

2

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Audit Report: Procurement Workforce 

Planning, IG-01-041 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2001).

3

As stated in President’s Management Agenda Action Plans For The National Aeronautics 

And Space Administration, (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2002). This document is an 

agreement between NASA and OMB on NASA’s plans for addressing the governmentwide 

initiatives in The President’s Management Agenda. 
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 8 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

foster better management of the existing workforce and enable better 

strategic decisions about future workforce needs.

NASA also developed a strategic human capital plan, which identifies 

human capital goals, problems, improvement initiatives, and intended 

outcomes and incorporates strategies and metrics to support the goals.4

The plan has been reviewed and approved by OMB and the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM). According to NASA, the plan is based on 

OMB’s scorecard of human capital standards and OPM’s scorecard of 

supporting human capital dimensions, as well as our own model, which we 

published in March 2002.5

 Our model is designed to help agency officials 

effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human capital 

considerations into their daily decision making and the program results 

they seek to achieve. In doing so, the model highlights the importance of a 

sustained commitment by agency leaders to maximize the value of their 

agency’s human capital and to manage related risks. Consistent with 

OPM’s and OMB’s views, our model of strategic human capital management 

embodies an approach that is fact-based, focused on achieving strategic 

results, and incorporates merit principles and other national goals.

Additionally, NASA has renewed attention to hiring applicants just out of 

college and intends to pursue this even more aggressively in coming years. 

It is undertaking a number of initiatives and activities aimed at acquiring 

and retaining critically needed skills, such as using the new Federal 

Career Intern Program to hire recent science and engineering graduates, 

supplementing the workforce with nonpermanent civil servants where it 

makes sense, and implementing a program to repay student loans to attract 

and retain employees in critical positions.

NASA has also incorporated a strategic objective and two performance 

goals and supporting indicators to address human capital in its fiscal year 

2003 performance plan. The plan includes a goal to align management of 

the agency’s human resources to best achieve its strategic goals and 

objectives along with a second goal to attract and retain a workforce that 

represents America’s diversity at all levels and to maximize individual 

performance through training and development experiences. Recognizing 

4

NASA has also developed a companion strategic human capital implementation plan that 

contains detailed action plans for the improvement initiatives.

5

U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, 

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 9 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

its human capital management challenge, NASA has included strategies in 

the plan that will focus on restructuring and revitalizing its workforce.

Further, the 107th Congress considered a series of legislative proposals 

developed by NASA to provide it with further flexibilities and authorities 

for attracting and retaining a skilled workforce. These included 

streamlining hiring procedures; making noncompetitive conversions of 

term employees to permanent positions; offering larger recruitment, 

relocation, and retention bonuses; expanding use of early retirement; and 

providing authority for permanent and enhanced buyouts. In testifying 

before Congress on the legislative proposals in July 2002, the NASA 

Administrator indicated that the provisions, taken together as an integrated 

package, form a strong nucleus in support of NASA’s strategic human 

capital plan and The President’s Management Agenda and will enable 

NASA to avert a serious human capital crisis.

During those same hearings, we testified that several of the NASA issues 

mirror aspects of other legislative proposals such as the Federal Human 

Capital Act of 2001 (S. 1603, 107th Cong., 2001),6

 and noted that while we 

had not performed a detailed analysis of the support behind NASA’s 

legislative proposals, several points as outlined as follows were worthy 

of consideration:

• First, the addition of flexibilities and authorities alone will not solve 

workforce problems. Agencies need to undertake a wide array of 

initiatives to attract, retain, and motivate a top quality workforce. These 

include such actions as revitalizing recruiting and college relations 

efforts; conducting employee feedback surveys to set priorities and 

assess progress; conducting employee preference surveys so employees 

can be given the opportunity to work in areas that interest and energize 

them consistent with overall institutional needs; inventorying the 

skills and knowledge of existing employees; initiating professional 

development programs for newly hired staff to help them transition and 

progress; implementing modern, effective, and credible performance 

appraisal and management systems; redesigning training programs to 

directly link them to core competencies; and implementing employeefriendly benefits, such as day care centers, business casual dress, 

flextime, and public transportation subsidies.

6

We testified on this proposed legislation in March 2002.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 10 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

• Second, agencies need to make the most of current flexibilities and 

authorities already available. These flexibilities are identified by OPM in 

its guide, Human Resource Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal 

Government. They include such things as the ability to use commercial 

recruiting firms to recruit for vacancies; customize merit promotion 

plans and performance systems; increase basic pay to attract and retain 

staff with unusually high or unique qualifications; and grant substantial 

cash incentive awards. Agencies should develop a sound business case 

for using these flexibilities by focusing on how a given flexibility will 

address human capital challenges and ultimately improve agency 

results. In tandem with exercising these flexibilities, agencies must 

learn to effectively balance their pay and incentive programs to 

encourage both individual and team contributions to achieve results. 

In our December 2002 report, we identified 6 key practices for the 

effective use of human capital flexibilities. These practices are 

(1) planning strategically and making targeted investments, (2) ensuring 

stakeholder input in developing policies and procedures, (3) educating 

managers and employees on the availability and use of flexibilities, 

(4) streamlining administrative processes, (5) building transparency 

and accountability into the system, and (6) changing the 

organizational culture.7

• Third, agencies need effective succession planning. NASA’s workforce 

profile, particularly for science and engineering workers, points to the 

need for this. Faced with the same problems at GAO, we reinstated our 

Executive Candidate Development Program, under which candidates 

are selected through a rigorous competitive process and are prepared 

for assignments at the SES level. While the potential loss of expertise 

through retirements will be substantial, this turnover also affords 

NASA’s Administrator the opportunity to change culture, skill mix, 

deployment locations, and other agency attributes. NASA will, however, 

need to leverage technology and enhance its training efforts to help 

make this transition and facilitate needed knowledge sharing initiatives.

• Fourth, agencies must ensure that strategic human capital plans are 

results-oriented and data-driven. This includes developing appropriate 

information on the number and location of employees and their key 

competencies and skills as well as data on the profile of the workforce, 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist 

Agencies in Managing Their Workforces, GAO-03-2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 11 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

and performance goals and measures for human capital approaches. 

Further, this data must be used effectively to develop strategies that 

continually ensure they have the right mix of employees to meet 

future needs. A key to success in this area also will be NASA’s ability 

to implement its new financial management system, since it will 

encompass the new workforce planning and analysis system.

We will continue to monitor NASA’s progress in resolving its human capital 

problems, including how well its human capital initiatives and reforms and 

any new and existing flexibilities and authorities are helping to strategically 

manage and reshape its workforce.

Controlling 

International Space 

Station Costs

The International Space Station is characterized as one of the most 

challenging engineering feats ever attempted. It also represents an 

important effort to foster international cooperation in scientific research 

and space exploration. But development costs for the International Space 

Station have soared to the point where NASA has had to make substantial 

cutbacks in the program. Specifically, the cost to complete assembly 

has mushroomed by about $5 billion to the current estimate of about 

$30 billion, and while assembly of the station was originally expected to 

be completed in 2002, NASA now expects it to be done in 2006. This has 

negatively impacted NASA’s credibility with Congress and raised concern 

among international partners and the scientific community about the 

viability of the space station. NASA is taking action to keep costs in check, 

but its success in this area still faces considerable challenges.

NASA has had difficulty predicting and controlling costs and scheduling 

for the space station since its inception in 1984. In September 1997, we 

reported that the cost and schedule performance of the space station’s 

prime contract, which showed signs of deterioration in 1996, had 

continued to worsen steadily and that the program’s financial reserves 

for contingencies had deteriorated, principally because of program 

uncertainties and cost overruns. In our January 2001 Performance and 

Accountability Series report, we reported that the prime contract for the 

space station was initially expected to cost over $5.2 billion, and the 

assembly of the station was expected to be completed in June 2002. But by 

October 2000, the prime contractor’s cost had grown to about $9 billion, of 

which $986 million was for cost overruns, and the station was not expected 

to be complete until April 2006. NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 12 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

reported the same cost overrun in a February 2000 audit report, and based 

on recommendations in that report, NASA agreed to take several actions, 

including discussing the prime contractor’s cost performance at regularly 

scheduled meetings and preparing monthly reports to senior management 

on the overrun status.

Figure 2: The International Space Station

Our July 2002 report on the International Space Station shows that 

the reasons for continued cost growth include an inadequate definition 

of requirements, changes in program content, and schedule delays and 

inadequate program oversight. NASA has controls in place that should 

have alerted management to the growing cost problem and the need for 

mitigation, but these were largely ignored because of NASA’s focus 

on fiscal year budget management rather than on total program 

cost management.

The estimated cost growth is having a profound effect on the utility of 

the space station—with substantial cutbacks in construction, the number 

Source: NASA.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 13 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

of crew members, and scientific research. As a part of the space station 

restructuring, further work and funding for the habitation module and 

crew return vehicle have been deferred, thus requiring the on-orbit crew to 

be reduced from seven to three members. This will limit the crew-member 

hours that can be devoted to research. Additionally, NASA has cut back 

from 27 to 20 the number of facilities available for research. This will 

eliminate some experiments, such as those relating to biotechnology. 

NASA’s international partners and the scientific community are not 

satisfied with these and other reductions in capabilities and have raised 

concerns about the viability of the space station science program.

NASA is instituting a number of management and cost-estimating reforms. 

But there are significant challenges to their successful implementation. 

First, NASA is now preparing a life cycle cost estimate for the program 

based on a three-person crew. However, between now and submission of 

the fiscal year 2004 budget, NASA and OMB must agree on the estimate. 

Furthermore, NASA’s financial management system used to collect 

required space station cost data has proven inadequate. Second, NASA 

must decide how research can be maximized with only a three-person 

crew. Third, NASA has not yet reached an agreement with its international 

partners on an acceptable on-orbit configuration and sharing of research 

facilities and costs. Thus, the capacity and capabilities of the space station, 

the scope of research that can be accomplished, and the partners’ share of 

operating costs are unknown at this time. In addition to the reforms, NASA 

has requested additional funding for the space station program in its 

revised fiscal year 2003 budget request.

Reducing Space 

Launch Costs

Until last November, NASA was pursuing a $4.8 billion, 5-year program—

known as the Space Launch Initiative (SLI)—to build a new generation of 

space vehicles to replace its aging space shuttle. This was part of NASA’s 

broader plan for the future of space travel—known as NASA’s Integrated 

Space Transportation Plan—which involved operating the space shuttle 

through 2020 and developing successive generations of transportation 

vehicles that would begin to be deployed around 2011. The primary goals 

for SLI were to reduce the risk of crew loss as well as substantially 

lower the cost of space transportation so that more funds could be made 

available for scientific research, technology development, and exploration 

activities. Currently, NASA spends nearly one third of its budget on 

space transportation.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 14 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Figure 3: NASA Illustration of Its Second Generation Transportation Vehicle

We reported in September 2002 that SLI was a considerably complex and 

challenging endeavor for NASA—from both a technical and business 

standpoint. For example, it would require NASA to develop and advance 

new technologies for the new vehicle, including (1) new airframe 

technologies that will include robust, low-cost, low-maintenance structure, 

tanks, and thermal protection systems, using advanced ceramic and 

metallic composite materials, and (2) new propulsion technologies, 

including main propulsion systems, orbital maneuvering systems, main 

engines, and propellant management. The program would also require 

NASA to carefully coordinate and communicate among industry and 

government partners since agreements need to be reached on what the 

basic capabilities of the new vehicle will be, what designs or architectures 

should be pursued, how development costs will be shared, and what 

individual partner responsibilities will be. Lastly, the SLI project would 

require careful oversight, especially in view of past difficulties NASA has 

had in developing the technologies for reusable launch vehicles to replace 

the space shuttle. These efforts did not achieve their goals primarily 

Source: NASA.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 15 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

because NASA did not develop realistic cost estimates, timely acquisition 

and risk management plans, or adequate and realistic performance goals.

Most important, however, we reported that NASA was incurring a high level 

of risk in pursuing its plans to select potential designs for the new vehicle 

without first making other decisions that would have a large impact on the 

SLI program. These included decisions on what DOD’s role would be in the 

program; what the final configuration of the International Space Station 

would be; and what overall direction NASA’s Space Transportation Plan 

would take. At the time, there were indications that NASA and DOD 

differed on priorities and requirements for the program. Also, NASA had 

yet to come to agreement with its international partners on space station 

issues that could dramatically impact SLI requirements, such as how many 

crew members would operate the station. Moreover, NASA was still in the 

process of reassessing its overall space transportation plans.

NASA agreed with our findings and took steps needed to refocus its 

space launch efforts. On October 21, 2002, NASA postponed its Systems 

Requirements Review (SRR) for SLI so that it could focus on defining 

DOD’s role, determine the future requirements of the International Space 

Station, and firm up the agency’s future space transportation needs.

In November 2002, the administration submitted to the Congress an 

amendment to NASA’s fiscal year 2003 budget request to implement a 

new Integrated Space Transportation Plan. The new plan makes 

investments to extend the space shuttle’s operational life for continued 

safe operations and refocuses the SLI program on developing an 

orbital space plane—which provides a crew transfer capability to and 

from the space station—and next generation launch technology.

We will continue to monitor NASA’s progress in reducing launch costs 

and position ourselves to advise the Congress accordingly. As it proceeds 

forward with its revised plans, it will still be important for NASA to 

implement management controls that can effectively predict what the 

total costs of the program will be and minimize risks. These include 

cost estimates, controls designed to provide early warnings of cost and 

schedule overruns, and risk mitigation plans. With such controls in place, 

NASA would be positioned to provide its managers and the Congress with 

the information needed to ensure that the program is on track and able to 

meet expectations.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 16 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Correcting Weaknesses 

in Contract 

Management

Much of NASA’s success depends on the work of its contractors—on which 

it spends the greatest part of its funds—$12.7 billion or 90 percent. But 

for many years, NASA has not been able to effectively oversee contracts, 

principally because it lacked accurate and reliable information on 

contract spending and it has placed little emphasis on end results, 

product performance, and cost control. NASA has addressed many 

acquisition-related weaknesses, but key tasks remain, including 

completing the design and implementation of a new integrated financial 

management system.

Since 1990, we have identified NASA’s contract management function as 

an area at high risk due to its ineffective systems and processes for 

overseeing contractor activities. Our reports and testimonies since then 

have demonstrated just how debilitating these weaknesses in contract 

management and oversight can be to important space programs. Our 

July 2002 report on the International Space Station, for example, found that 

NASA did not effectively control costs or technical and scheduling risks, 

provide adequate oversight review, or effectively coordinate efforts with its 

partners. In other examples, we found that NASA lacked effective systems 

and processes for overseeing contractor activities and did not emphasize 

controlling costs.

In addition, NASA’s ability to collect, maintain, and report the full cost of 

its projects and programs is weakened by diverse and often incompatible 

center-level accounting systems and uneven and nonstandard costreporting capabilities. The agency’s financial management environment 

is comprised of decentralized, nonintegrated systems with policies, 

procedures, and practices that are unique to its field centers. For the 

most part, data formats are not standardized, automated systems are not 

interfaced, and on-line financial information is not readily available to 

program managers. Thus, it is difficult to ensure that contracts are being 

efficiently and effectively implemented and that budgets are executed 

as planned.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 17 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

NASA’s lack of a fully integrated financial management system also hurts 

NASA’s ability to provide data required for external reporting purposes. 

For example, in March 2002, we testified that NASA was unable to provide 

us with detailed support for amounts that it reported to Congress as 

obligated against space station and related shuttle program cost limits 

as required by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Authorization Act of 2000.8 Furthermore, NASA’s independent auditor, 

Pricewaterhouse Coopers, disclaimed an opinion on the agency’s fiscal 

year 2001 financial statements and identified significant internal control 

weaknesses related to accounting for space station material and equipment 

and to computer security. This action is in contrast with the unqualified 

or “clean” audit opinions of its previous auditor for fiscal years 1996 

through 2000. Also in contrast with NASA’s previous auditor’s opinion, 

Pricewaterhouse Coopers concluded that NASA’s financial management 

systems do not substantially comply with the requirements of the Federal 

Financial Management Improvement Act of 19969

 (FFMIA). FFMIA builds 

on previous financial management reform legislation by emphasizing the 

need for agencies to have systems that can generate timely, accurate, and 

useful information with which to make informed decisions and to ensure 

accountability on an ongoing basis.

In recent years, NASA made progress in addressing its contract 

management challenges. In July 1998, for example, we reported that 

NASA was developing systems to provide oversight and information 

needed to improve contract management and that it had made progress 

evaluating its field centers’ procurement activities on the basis of 

international quality standards and its own procurement surveys. In 

January 1999, we reported that NASA was implementing its new system 

for measuring procurement-related activities and had made progress in 

evaluating procurement functions in its field centers.

NASA has also made progress reducing its use of undefinitized contract 

actions10—that is, unnegotiated (i.e., uncosted) contract changes. Both 

NASA’s Office of the Inspector General and we have reported our concerns 

8

Section 202 of P.L. 106-391.

9

Section 801 of P.L. 104-208.

10An undefinitized contract action means a unilateral or bilateral contract modification or 

delivery/task order in which the final price or estimated cost and fee have not been 

negotiated and mutually agreed to by NASA and the contractor. 48 CFR 1843.7001.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 18 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

about NASA’s frequent use of undefinitized contract changes. In 2000, 

we reported concerns about NASA’s use of such actions, since this practice 

could result in contract cost overruns and cost growth in the International 

Space Station program. NASA’s Office of the Inspector General is currently 

conducting a review of NASA’s management of undefinitized contract 

actions. Data provided by NASA show significant reductions in the use 

of these actions. NASA officials attribute recent declines to increased 

management controls and emphasis by NASA centers on limiting 

undefinitized contract actions.

Moreover, NASA recognizes the urgency of successfully implementing 

a fully integrated financial management system. NASA is working on 

implementing such a system and expects a new system to be fully 

operational in fiscal year 2008. NASA has estimated the life cycle costs 

of this system to be $861 million.11 This is NASA’s third attempt toward 

implementing a fully integrated financial management system. NASA 

abandoned the first two efforts after 12 years and after spending 

$180 million. According to NASA, the agency’s current approach focuses 

on learning from other organizations’ successes in implementing similar 

projects, as opposed to revisiting its own failures. NASA has also 

abandoned its prior approach of attempting to acquire and implement the 

entire system all at once. Instead, the project is being broken down into 

manageable pieces. That is, it is being split into modules that NASA 

states it will implement individually, based on the availability of proven 

commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software products. NASA initially 

segmented implementation of the integrated financial management project 

into 14 modules, but has since reorganized the program into 8 modules. 

One of the first modules NASA plans to implement is the core financial 

module, which is expected to be fully operational in June 2003. According 

to NASA officials, the core financial module will provide NASA’s program 

managers with timely, consistent, and reliable information for management 

decisions as well as the ability to tie all agency costs to major activities, 

including civil service personnel costs.

While NASA has made some progress, much work remains to strengthen 

contract oversight. First, NASA has encountered some difficulty in 

implementing its new financial management system. As we testified in 

11Life cycle costs include implementation efforts through fiscal year 2008 and major 

upgrades, plus operation and support costs for each module for the first 2 years after the 

module goes live.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 19 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

July 2002, a recent NASA review found that the total cost estimate for 

deployment of the core financial module at all NASA centers had grown 

considerably beyond the cost initially contemplated. The review also 

acknowledged that interoperability and security vulnerabilities exist within 

the current information infrastructure, although specific details were not 

provided. Furthermore, NASA reported that the agency’s technical project 

resources are stretched to the point where the impact of any individual 

schedule mishap could have a systemwide effect. To address these 

continuing problems, the Administrator appointed an executive to provide 

leadership and accountability in the direction and operation of the new 

system. He also recently decided that the near-term focus of the program 

should be to ensure a successful and rapid deployment of the core financial 

module—the backbone of the system—and that the schedule of the 

remaining modules should undergo further risks assessments before 

moving forward. The keys to success as NASA moves forward in acquiring 

and implementing its new financial management system are to employ 

proven best practices, including (1) aligning its selection of commercial 

components of the system with a NASA-wide blueprint, commonly called 

an enterprise architecture; (2) analyzing and understanding the 

dependencies among these commercial components before acquiring and 

implementing them; (3) following an event-driven system acquisition 

strategy; (4) employing effective acquisition management processes, such 

as those governing requirements management, risk management, and test 

management; (5) ensuring that data existing in legacy systems are 

corrected before being loaded into the new system, so that data errors will 

not be perpetuated in the new system; and (6) proactively positioning 

NASA for the business process changes embedded in the new system by, 

for example, providing adequate formal and on-the-job training.

Second, NASA still needs to ensure that it has the right data to oversee 

its programs and contractors—specifically data to allow comparisons of 

actual costs to estimates, provide an early warning of cost overruns or 

other related difficulties, and monitor contract performance and make 

program requirement trade-off decisions. As we reported in August 2001 

and again in March 2002, despite its past and current efforts, NASA does 

not track the actual costs of completed space station components, even 

though it often estimates costs at the component level for planning and 

budgeting purposes. Several factors contribute to this situation, including 

ineffective policies and procedures for updating cost estimates at each 

major design phase. NASA is also not yet able to uniformly ensure that 

contractors provide cost data at a level that will give managers the 

information they need to assess the validity of previous cost estimates, 
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 20 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

fully monitor the work being performed, and appropriately identify 

cost drivers. NASA has begun taking actions to improve the type and 

detail of cost data available for some large programs, but these efforts are 

not yet complete.

Because more work is needed to demonstrate substantial progress in 

resolving the root causes of NASA’s contract management weaknesses, we 

are retaining contract management as a major management challenge and a 

high-risk area. We are continuing to monitor NASA’s progress in addressing 

contract management weaknesses. In response to a May 24, 2002, 

bicameral, bipartisan request from the Senate Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation Committee and the House Science Committee, we 

are currently assessing the extent to which NASA’s management of the 

financial management system acquisition is in accordance with 

effective system acquisition practices and is designed to support NASA’s 

decision-making needs and external reporting requirements.

Addressing the 

Challenges Requires 

Broader Steps

NASA’s management challenges reflect a deeper need for broad cultural 

change within the agency. Particularly important is the need to shift its 

overall orientation from processes to results; stovepipes to matrixes; 

hierarchical to flatter and more horizontal structures; management control 

to employee empowerment; and reactive behavior to proactive approaches. 

Making such a shift will require redefining and communicating priorities 

and values, and a performance management system that will reinforce 

agency priorities. It will also require a fundamental reassessment of the 

organizational layers, levels, units, and locations and possibly realignment 

to support the agency’s strategic plan and desired transformation.

NASA is hardly alone in this respect. Federal agencies generally need to 

reexamine their policies, programs, and operations in light of a number 

of trends, including the changing nature of the economy; rapidly evolving 

science and technology; dramatic shifts in the age and composition of the 

population; diverse, diffuse, and asymmetrical security threats; and long 

range fiscal challenges. Leading public and private organizations here in 

the United States and abroad have found that to successfully transform 

themselves, they must often change their culture. Leading organizations 

also understand that their people, processes, technologies, and 

environments are the key enablers that drive cultural change.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 21 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

NASA’s Administrator recognizes the scope of the transformation 

needed at NASA. In fact, in early 2002, he stressed that NASA must 

avoid getting distracted with challenges that call for simply incremental 

or marginal improvements and dedicate itself to overcoming its limits by 

finding entirely new ways to achieve its objectives. Moreover, to become 

a science-driven organization,12 the Administrator called for a new 

commitment to fiscal responsibility and wise use of assets. The 

Administrator also underscored the need to eliminate stovepipes within 

the agency to build an integrated strategy that links human space flight 

and robotic space flight in a stepping stone approach to exploration and 

discovery. To make its transformation, NASA is primarily using the 

five major initiatives from The President’s Management Agenda

(strategic management of human capital, competitive sourcing, improved 

financial performance, expanded electronic government, and budget and 

performance integration) as a guide to enact management reforms 

within the agency.

The success of NASA’s transformation will hinge on its ability to solve 

financial and contract management problems since these problems 

threaten the success of virtually every major program. While NASA’s efforts 

to design and implement a new financial management system and other 

actions taken certainly move NASA forward in this area, other issues 

remain. Specifically, NASA is not yet able to uniformly ensure that 

contractors provide cost data at a level that will identify cost drivers, give 

managers the information they need to make trade-off decisions, and link 

back to cost estimates. Also, NASA has not yet shifted management 

attention away from yearly budgets to total costs or the need to adhere to 

controls that focus on reducing cost, scheduling, and performance risks. 

Overall, our reviews as well as NASA’s show that finance is not viewed as 

intrinsic to NASA’s program management decision process, nor does it 

focus on what “could” and “should” take place from an analytical costplanning standpoint.

12Specifically, the Administrator would like the science of exploration and discovery to 

determine where NASA should go next and also to use technology to enable advances and to 

facilitate greater achievements.
Major Performance and Accountability 

Challenges

Page 22 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

To address these issues, NASA must transform its financial management 

operations so that it better supports NASA’s core mission. Specifically, as 

discussed in our study of leading private sector and state organizations,13

NASA must go beyond obtaining an unqualified audit opinion toward 

(1) routinely generating reliable cost and performance information and 

analysis, (2) undertaking other value-added activities that support strategic 

decision-making and mission performance, and (3) strengthening NASA’s 

financial team to better support the agency’s mission and goals. NASA must 

also view the implementation of its new financial management system as 

an opportunity to fundamentally change the way it does business. As we 

found in the same study, to reap the full benefit of a modern, integrated 

financial management system, these organizations reengineered their core 

business processes. In fact, productivity gains typically result from more 

efficient processes, not from simply automating old ones.

Lastly, to successfully implement its human capital plan, financial 

management, and other reforms, NASA will need sustained commitment 

from senior leaders. Changing an organization like NASA with its 

deep-seated culture and tradition is a massive undertaking that will take 

considerable effort and time to implement. Given the high stakes involved, 

it is critical that NASA’s leadership provide the necessary direction, 

oversight, and sustained attention to ensure that reforms stay on track. 

In this regard, NASA’s Administrator comes to the position with a strong 

management background and expertise in financial management. He has 

already made a personal commitment to change the workforce and the 

way NASA does business. Moreover, NASA has appointed a chief operating 

officer in order to provide sustained management attention to strategic 

planning, organizational alignment, human capital strategy, performance 

management, and other elements necessary for transformation success. 

The challenge ahead for NASA will be to achieve the same level of 

commitment from managers at NASA centers so that NASA can effectively 

use existing and new authorities to manage its people strategically and 

quickly implement the tools needed to strengthen management 

and oversight.

13U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Creating Value Through World-Class 

Financial Management, GAO/AIMD-00-134 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2000). Our executive 

guide was based on practices used by nine leading organizations—Boeing, Chase Manhattan 

Bank, General Electric, Pfizer, Hewlett-Packard, Owens Corning, and the states of 

Massachusetts, Texas, and Virginia.
Page 23 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

GAO Contacts

Subjects covered in this report Contact persons

Strengthening strategic human capital 

management

Controlling International Space Station 

costs

Reducing space launch costs

Correcting weaknesses in contract 

management

Allen Li, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

(202) 512-4841

lia@gao.gov

Gregory D. Kutz, Director

Financial Management and Assurance

(202) 512-9505

kutzg@gao.gov
Page 24 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Related GAO Products

Performance and 

Accountability Series

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-01-241. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration. GAO-01-258. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.

Human Capital Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies 

in Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.: 

December 6, 2002.

NASA Management Challenges: Human Capital and Other Critical Areas 

Need to be Addressed. GAO-02-945T. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2002.

Managing For Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management 

to Drive Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2002.

Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human 

Capital Reform. GAO-02-528T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2002.

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.

Space Shuttle Safety: Update on NASA’s Progress in Revitalizing 

the Shuttle Workforce and Making Safety Upgrades. GAO-01-1122T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2001.

Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders. 

GAO/OCG-00-14G. Washington, D.C.: September 2000.

Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require 

Continued Attention. GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186. Washington, D.C.: 

August 15, 2000.

Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management 

Attention. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2000.
Related GAO Products

Page 25 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders. 

GAO/GGD-99-179. Washington, D.C.: September 1999.

International Space Station Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, but Significant 

Challenges Remain. GAO-02-735. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.

NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-504R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.

NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management 

Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.

NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits. 

GAO-01-100R. Washington D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Space Station: Inadequate Planning and Design Led to Propulsion 

Module Project Failure. GAO-01-633. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.

Space Station: Prime Contract Changes. GAO/NSIAD-00-103R. 

Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2000.

Space Station: Russian-Built Zarya and Service Module Compliance 

With Safety Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-00-96R. Washington, D.C.: 

April 28, 2000.

Space Station: Russian Compliance with Safety Requirements. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-128. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2000.

Space Station: Russian Commitment and Cost Control Problems. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-175. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 1999.

Space Station: Cost to Operate After Assembly Is Uncertain. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-177. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 1999.

Space Station: Status of Russian Involvement and Cost Control Efforts. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-117. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1999.

Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212. Washington, D.C: June 24, 1998.
Related GAO Products

Page 26 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

International Space Station: U.S. Life-Cycle Funding Requirements. 

GAO/NSIAD-98-147. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 1998.

Space Station: Cost Control Problems. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54. 

Washington, D.C.: November 5, 1997.

Space Station: Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance Under 

the Prime Contract. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262. Washington, D.C.: 

September 18, 1997.

Space Station: Cost Control Problems Are Worsening. GAO/NSIAD-97-213. 

Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1997.

NASA: Major Management Challenges. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1997.

Space Station: Cost Control Problems Continue to Worsen. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-177. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 1997.

Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-210. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1996.

Space Station: Cost Control Difficulties Continue. GAO/NSIAD-96-135. 

Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1996.

Launch Costs Space Transportation: Challenges Facing NASA’s Space Launch 

Initiative. GAO-02-1020. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2002.

Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in 

Managing Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program. GAO-01-826T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.

Space Transportation: Progress of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle 

Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-243. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 1999.

Space Transportation: Status of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle 

Program. GAO/NSIAD-99-176. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1999.
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Page 27 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Contract Management Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, but Significant 

Challenges Remain. GAO-02-735. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.

NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-504R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.

NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management 

Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.

NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits. 

GAO-01-1000R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Space Station: Inadequate Planning and Design Led to Propulsion 

Module Project Failure. GAO-01-633. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001.

Space Station: Prime Contract Changes. GAO/NSIAD-00-103R. 

Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2000.

Executive Guide: Creating Value Through World-class Financial 

Management. GAO/AIMD-00-134. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2000.

NASA Procurement: Status of Efforts to Improve Oversight. 

GAO/NSIAD-98-198R. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1998.

NASA: Major Management Challenges. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1997.

High-Risk Program: Information on Selected High-Risk Areas. 

GAO/HR-97-30. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 1997.

NASA Procurement: Contract Management Oversight. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-114R. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1997.

NASA: Procurement Assessments. GAO/NSIAD-97-80R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 4, 1997.

NASA: Contract Management. GAO/NSIAD-96-95R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 16, 1996.
Page 28 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Performance and Accountability and 

High-Risk Series

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-03-95. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Agriculture. GAO-03-96.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Commerce. GAO-03-97.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Defense. GAO-03-98.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Education. GAO-03-99.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Energy. GAO-03-100.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health 

and Human Services. GAO-03-101.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Homeland Security. GAO-03-102.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Housing and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Interior. GAO-03-104.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Justice. GAO-03-105.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor.

GAO-03-106.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State. 

GAO-03-107.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Transportation. GAO-03-108.
Performance and Accountability and 

High-Risk Series

Page 29 GAO-03-114 NASA Challenges

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Treasury. GAO-03-109.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Veterans Affairs. GAO-03-110.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for 

International Development. GAO-03-111.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental 

Protection Agency. GAO-03-112.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. GAO-03-113.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration. GAO-03-114.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel 

Management. GAO-03-115.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business 

Administration. GAO-03-116.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security 

Administration. GAO-03-117.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service. 

GAO-03-118.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.

High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.

High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the 

Federal Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructures.

GAO-03-121.

High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.
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