IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

KATRINA HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:12-cv-02

v. Judge George C. Smith 

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Katrina Hamilton, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)

for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)

denying her applications for social security disability insurance benefits, supplemental security

income, and child disability benefits. This matter is before the Court for consideration of the

February 22, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (ECF No.

17), Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 18), and the

Commissioner’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 19). For the reasons that follow,

Plaintiff’s Objections are OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. 

Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

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I.

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision ‘is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive . . . .”). Put another way, a decision supported by substantial evidence is not subject

to reversal, even if the reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen,

800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence exists when ‘a reasonable mind could

accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion [and] . . . presupposes that there is a

zone of choice within which the decision-makers can go either way, without interference by the

courts.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal; citation

omitted). Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, “‘a decision of the Commissioner

will not be upheld where the [Commissioner or agency] fails to follow its own regulations and

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial

right.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).

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II. 

Plaintiff, in her Statement of Errors, challenged the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”)

evaluation and weighing of the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gates.1

 After

summarizing the hearing testimony, medical records, administrative decision, standards

governing the review of an ALJ’s decision, and the standards governing an ALJ’s consideration

of a treating physician’s opinion, the Magistrate Judge rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ

had failed to provide adequate reasons for his dismissal of Dr. Gates’ June 2009 and August

2009 assessments. She reasoned as follows: 

The Undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s consideration and weighing of

Dr. Gates’ assessments. The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Gates is a treating

physician. (R. at 24, 26.) He further acknowledged Dr. Gates’ “long-time

relationship with [Plaintiff]” and summarized his treatment of her. (R. at 23-27.) 

For example, the ALJ noted that Dr. Gates’ treatment records revealed that Plaintiff’s

symptoms varied depending on the circumstances of her life such as her relationship

status with her boyfriend and mother and the results of her applications to colleges. 

(R. at 24-26.) He also noted that Plaintiff sometimes stopped taking her medications

because she felt better without them and that she relied on marijuana to selfmedicate. (R. at 24-25.) He further acknowledged Dr. Gates’ frequent reports that

Plaintiff’s medication was effective in relieving her depression. (Id.) The ALJ

specifically considered Dr. Gates’ June 2009 and August 2009 opinions, but

accorded them “little weight.” (R. at 26.) He likewise considered Dr. Gates’ finding

of disability, but rejected it, explaining that “his assessment that [Plaintiff] is

disabled is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.” (Id.) 

The ALJ then offered reasons for his assessment of Dr. Gates’ opinions. 

Specifically, the ALJ pointed out “the lack of objective evidence to support

[Plaintiff’s] allegations” and then asserted that “[a]s a whole, Dr. Gates’ assessments

appear to be based on [Plaintiff’s] subjective reports and complaints, which are found

to be only partially credible.” (R. at 26.) The ALJ further reasoned that Dr. Gates’

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Plaintiff also challenged the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s pain. Plaintiff, however, did

not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s consideration of this contention of error. Further, the Court

finds the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and conclusion that the ALJ did not err in his assessment of

Plaintiff’s credibility concerning her complaints of pain to be correct. Thus, it is unnecessary to

incorporate a thorough discussion on this issue. 

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opinions are inconsistent with the record and his own treatment notes. (Id.) By way

of example, the ALJ s stated that the social limitations that Dr. Gates’ opined are

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s “school records and self-reports, [which] indicate[] that

she performed well in social interaction situations.” (Id.) The ALJ also found the

revisions in Dr. Gates’ August 2009 opinion to conflict with his treatment notes: “In

August 2009, Dr. Gates revised his statement, reducing the claimant’s abilities in all

categories, despite the improvement he noted in the treatment records and reports

during this period.” (Id.) The ALJ assigned Dr. Halas’ assessment “greater weight,”

explaining that his opinion “is more consistent with the totality of evidence and is

based on his expertise and experience. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that the foregoing reasons “are not sufficiently specific.” 

(Pl.’s Statement of Errors 17, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff explains that the ALJ’s failure

to reference specific page/exhibit numbers “does not allow for an adequate review

of the ALJ’s reasoning.” (Id.) She adds that “it is unclear what evidence the ALJ

relied upon in finding [her] condition had improved.” (Id.) The Undersigned

disagrees. 

The Undersigned concludes that ALJ’s proffered reasons satisfy Wilson’s

procedural requirements and are supported by substantial evidence. See 378 F.3d at

544. The ALJ’s findings that Dr. Gates’ opinions were inconsistent with the record

evidence and in conflict with his own treatment notes likewise constitute legally

sufficient reasons to discount his opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)

(identifying “consistency” with the record as a whole and “supportability” as

relevant considerations). The ALJ’s failure to include page/exhibit numbers did not

render his proffered reasons inadequate. Further, he clearly states that Dr. Gates’

own treatment records and reports reflect that Plaintiff improved between his June

2009 and August 2009 assessments even though Dr. Gates, in his revised August

2009 assessment, opined that her condition had significantly worsened. In June

2009, Dr. Gates found either good or fair abilities in eighteen out of twenty-one

work-related mental functions. (R. at 602-03.) The form defines “fair” as

“moderately limited but not precluded . . . [m]ay need special consideration.” 

Consistent with the ALJ’s assertion, in Dr. Gates’ revised August 2009 opinion, he

found that Plaintiff had fair ability in six out of twenty-one work-related mental

functions and poor abilities in the remaining fifteen. (R. at 708-09.) Dr. Gates failed

to provide an explanation for either his June or August 2009 opinions. His treatment

notes, which primarily consist of narrative recitations or Plaintiff’s reported

symptoms, likewise fail to offer any support for hisrevised assessment. See Beverly

v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-41, 2012 WL 395081, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2012) (finding

that the ALJ reasonably discounted psychiatrist’s opinion where his “treatment notes

generally relate[d] to changes in [the claimant’s] personal and family life . . . and fail

to include evidence or clinical findings). For example, in July 2009, Plaintiff

reported primarily somatic complaints and that she was “stressed out financially,”

but “receiving some benefit” from her medications. (R. at 667.) Nurse Phelps

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described Plaintiff as “future and goal oriented.” (R. at 666, 663.) On August 11,

2009, the day Dr. Gates rendered his opinion, Plaintiff reported having conflicts with

her boyfriend and expressed her desire to return to college as soon as possible. Dr.

Gates’ notes reflect that Plaintiff’s other complaints were somatic in nature. (R. at

661.) Dr. Gates’ treatment notes also fail to support his internally inconsistent

opinion that Plaintiff is better able to “understand, remember, and carry out complex

job instructions” than to “understand, remember, and carry out simple job

instructions.” (R. at 603 (emphasis added).) Finally, the ALJ correctly did not

accord Dr. Gates’ disability finding “any special significance” given that such a

finding is reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e); Bass, 499 F.3d

at 511. 

In sum, the Undersigned rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to

provide any substantive basis for dismissing Dr. Gates’ opinions. Notably, the ALJ

recognized that Plaintiff had work-related mental limitations, including moderate

limitations in her ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace and in her

social functioning. Plaintiff identified her worst problems as fibromyalgia,

depression, and anxiety. (R. at 81.) Consistently, the ALJ accommodated these

limitations within his RFC determination, restricting Plaintiff to only occasional

contact with others and only simple, routine, repetitive one-or-two-step tasks. (R.

at 22.) These accommodations are consistent with the record evidence relating to

Plaintiff’s medical treatment and activities of daily living and are supported by the

medical opinions of Drs. Halas, Haskins, and Castro. Further, these accommodations

address the “biggest problems” Plaintiff attributes to her anxiety and depression. 

(See R. at 90-91 (testifying that her “biggest problem” attributable to her anxiety is

“not wanting to be around people” and that her “depression makes it really hard to

concentrate, especially in class.”).) 

(Feb. 22, 2013 Report & Rec. 26–30.) The Magistrate Judge further noted that Dr. Gates’

treatment notes subsequent to his August 2009 opinion did not support his apparent contention

that Plaintiff’s condition was worsening: 

Further, Dr. Gates’ treatment records dated after he rendered his revised August 2009

opinion likewise do not support his conclusion that Plaintiff’s condition was

worsening. (See e.g., R. at 681-83 (Plaintiff cancelled therapy appointments and

reported that she had returned to college and that “things are good right now”); R.

at 657 (Dr. Gates noted that Plaintiff expressed her desire to have her own place and

attend college and agreed that this “would be most beneficial”); R. at 659 (Nurse

Kozlowski described Plaintiff’s affect as “pleasant, willing, appropriate” and noted

that Plaintiff “enjoys making schedules and maintaining a filled routine of things to

keep busy”); R. at 679 (Dr. Gates noted “her medicines are working reasonably

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well”); R. at 674 (Dr. Gates noted that Plaintiff “seems to be handling extraordinary

stressors in a reasonable fashion”); R. at 670 (Gates reported that “[o]verall,

[Plaintiff] seems to be functioning at a higher level with optimism towards the future

and should be able to start back to school in the next few weeks”).)

(Id. at 29 n.4.) The Magistrate Judge also noted in a footnote that in her Statement of Errors,

Plaintiff had mischaracterized one of Dr. Gates’ findings in his June 2009 assessment: 

Plaintiff incorrectly posits that Dr. Gates, in his June 2009 assessment, found that she

“lacked the ability to sustain concentration necessary for basic work demands.” 

(Pl.’s Statement of Errors 12, ECF No. 14.) Rather, Dr. Gates opined that Plaintiff

had “good” ability to “[m]aintain attention and concentration for extended periods

of 2 hour segments.” (R. at 602.) 

(Id. at 28 n. 3.) 

In her Objections, Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s analysis concerning the

ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Gates’ assessments. Plaintiff first posits that the Magistrate Judge’s

analysis is flawed because she failed to consider phone calls Plaintiff made to Nurse Phelps in

July 2009. Plaintiff submits that these phone calls demonstrate that her condition had worsened

and speculates that Dr. Gates would have been aware of these phone calls because he worked at

the same facility as Nurse Phelps. Plaintiff also posits that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis is

flawed because she failed to acknowledge that Dr. Gates found Plaintiff to have a poor ability to

complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions from psychologically-based

symptoms and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods. Plaintiff concludes that if the Magistrate Judge had properly considered the evidence of

record, she would have reversed and remanded this case to the Commissioner. 

 The Court has conducted a de novo review and agrees with the reasoning and analysis of

the Magistrate Judge. As a preliminary matter, the Court adopts and incorporates by reference

the Magistrate Judge’s summarization of the hearing testimony, medical records, and

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administrative decision as well as her recitation of the standards governing the review of an

ALJ’s decision and consideration of a treating physician’s opinion. 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s first objection to be without merit for several reasons. First,

the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation reflects that she did consider Plaintiff’s

treatment in July 2009, including her interactions with Nurse Phelps during this time. (See Feb.

22, 2013 Report & Rec. 28–29 (citing R. at 663–67).) Second, beyond her speculation, Plaintiff

offers no evidence demonstrating that Dr. Gates relied upon two phone conversations Plaintiff

had with Nurse Phelps to support his revisions. Regardless, Nurse Phelps’ progress notes from

these conversations, alone, would not support his revised assessment. (See R. at 663, 666, and

669 (describing Plaintiff as feeling overwhelmed and anxious attributable to financial stress and

conflict with her boyfriend, but presenting as “future and goal oriented” and noting that Plaintiff

failed to follow up with an individual counselor and had declined Nurse Phelps’ offers to aid her

in obtaining community resources that could assist her financial and housing situation). Third,

Dr. Gates treated Plaintiff between his assessments. His notes do not reflect that he had

determined that her mental condition had deteriorated. Rather, as the Magistrate Judge noted,

Dr. Gates’ July 2009 treatment notes primarily consist of narrative recitations of Plaintiff’s

reported symptoms, including her somatic complaints and her assertions that she was “stressed

out financially,” but “receiving some benefit” from her medications. (See R. at 667.) Finally,

Plaintiff has failed to challenge the numerous other reasons that the ALJ offered for discounting

Dr. Gates’ assessments and which the Magistrate Judge concluded constituted good reasons

supported by substantial evidence. 

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The Court finds Plaintiff’s second objection to be equally without merit. Again, contrary

to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Magistrate Judge did consider Dr. Gates’ June 2009 assessment in its

entirety, including Dr. Gates’ opinion that Plaintiff had “poor” abilities to understand, remember,

and carry out simple instructions; to complete a normal workday or work week due to

psychologically based symptoms; and to deal with work stresses. (See Feb. 22, 2013 Report &

Rec. 17–18 (citing R. at 602–03).) Further, nothing in the Magistrate Judge’s footnote is

incorrect—Dr. Gates did, in fact, opine that Plaintiff had “good” ability to “[m]aintain attention

and concentration for extended periods of 2 hour segments.” (R. at 602.) Finally, this objection,

like Plaintiff’s first objection, fails to address the numerous other reasons that the ALJ offered

for discounting Dr. Gates’ assessments and which the Magistrate Judge concluded constituted

good reasons supported by substantial evidence. 

III. 

In sum, having conducted a de novo review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Objections to be

without merit and the reasoning and analysis of the Magistrate Judge to be correct. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 18) are OVERRULED; the Report and Recommendation (ECF

No. 17) is ADOPTED; and the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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