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U.S. Army War College Press

CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 2014

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Stephen J. Blank

November 2013

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ISBN 1-58487-593-3
v

CONTENTS

Foreword .....................................................................vii

1. Introduction ............................................................1

 Stephen J. Blank

2. How the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan

 Will Affect Russia and Eurasia .......................... 13

 Ariel Cohen

3. Collusive Status-Seeking: The Sino-Russian

 Relationship ......................................................... 33

 Geir Flikke

4. China’s Military Goals, Policy, Doctrine,

 and Capabilities in Central Asia ........................81

 Richard Weitz

About the Contributors ............................................123

vii

FOREWORD

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and the United States proceed to withdraw their forces 

from Afghanistan, the inherent and preexisting geopolitical, security, and strategic challenges in Central 

Asia become ever more apparent. The rivalry among 

the great powers (the United States, China, Russia, India, and others to a lesser degree) is becoming increasingly more visible as a key factor that will shape this 

region after the allied withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

The papers collected here, presented at the Strategic 

Studies Institute’s (SSI) annual conference on Russia in 

2012, go far to explain what the agenda for that rivalry 

is and how it is likely to influence regional trends after 

2013. Therefore, these papers provide a vital set of insights into an increasingly critical area of international 

politics and security, especially as it is clear that the 

United States is reducing, but not totally withdrawing, its military establishment in Afghanistan and is 

seeking to consolidate long-term relationships with 

Central Asian states.

Although the nature of our national security engagement with Central Asia will clearly change, the 

fact of it, and perhaps even its intensity, may well endure for some time after our troops depart. Since Central Asian states, as well as some of the great powers, 

clearly believe that the dangers, threats, and risks to 

their security will increase as the United States withdraws, policymakers and analysts alike must think 

critically about the region and its complex security 

relations. Aware of Central Asia’s continuing and perhaps increasing security challenges, SSI is pleased to 
offer this monograph to help inform policy decisions 

and strategy formulation.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

The papers collected here were presented at the 

Fourth annual Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) conference on Russia in May 2012. They focus largely, though 

not exclusively, on the interactions of the great powers in, about, and around Central Asia. That said, it 

is imperative that anyone trying to make sense of the 

complex situation in Central Asia remember that the 

contemporary or new great game is not played upon a 

chessboard of inert Central Asian subjects, as was the 

case in Kipling’s time. Today the Central Asian states 

are all active subjects, as well as objects of international action, and are perfectly capable of attempting, 

even successfully, to shape the interactions of great 

powers and foreign institutions upon their politics.1

As a result, today’s version of the new great game 

is a multidimensional and multiplayer game that is 

played simultaneously on many “chessboards.”

Furthermore, that game is about to change dramatically and substantively. The United States and 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have 

already begun preparations to withdraw from Afghanistan. Beyond that, U.S. funding for Central Asia 

as a whole, probably in anticipation of long-term constrained budgets, has also begun to fall.2

 Since U.S. 

strategy in Central Asia has been officially presented 

as essentially an adjunct to the war in Afghanistan, 

these emerging trends oblige the United States to 

formulate a new, less militarily-oriented strategy for 

the entire region—one that sees the region simultane-
2

ously in both its integrity and diversity. For many reasons, doing so will present a difficult challenge to U.S. 

military-political leaders. These difficulties include 

the actions of external players like Russia and China, 

among others, and are not confined solely to U.S. 

interaction with Central Asia. Indeed, as the papers 

included here show, the complexities of foreign interaction with Central Asia are both intensifying and accelerating, obligating the United States to realign its 

regional strategy and policy. 

That strategy has been primarily focused on the 

military requirements of defeating the Taliban as a 

prelude to winning the war in Afghanistan. That outcome would, in turn, serve as the basis for stabilizing 

Afghanistan internally and then providing for the stabilization of the adjacent states of Central Asia, whose 

regional cooperation with Afghanistan is vital to its 

security and theirs after 2014.3

 These states possess 

limited resources with which to help bring Afghanistan to a more secure condition after 2014, though 

they are making contributions to that end. However, 

the impending drawdown of NATO’s International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. forces, plus 

widespread skepticism as to the staying power of the 

Karzai regime after that drawdown, repeatedly leads 

their governments to warn that Afghanistan’s and 

their future is, to some degree, at considerable risk.4

While some of these statements are fearmongering to 

increase pressure upon foreign donors to assist them, 

their fears are real enough, and they are certainly not 

groundless.

At present, it is clear that the U.S. military is planning to leave some forces behind, though the precise 

number and status of those forces is as yet undecided, 

and it is difficult to imagine the United States simply 
3

turning over five large air bases to Afghanistan. The 

Pentagon and the government are also busy setting 

up training and advisory facilities with Central Asian 

governments. As the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 2013 Posture Statement states: 

Coupled with our NDN [Northern Distribution Network] efforts, USCENTCOM will continue to provide 

military assistance focused on building partner capacity and capabilities to combat terrorists and counter 

illegal trafficking in all its forms. In addition, we will 

work closely with several of our willing partners who 

are committed to developing deployable peacekeeping units. Programs and authorities such as Section 

1206 [Global Train and Equip Fund] and the new 

Global Security Contingency Fund, together with the 

National Guard’s State Partnership Program [SPP] 

represent cost-effective means for the United States 

to respond to emerging opportunities for building 

partner capacity.5

There is also a widespread assumption that if Kyrgyzstan terminates the U.S. lease upon the Manas Air 

Base in 2014, the United States has a so-called “Plan B” 

up its sleeve, namely the establishment of a military 

base or rapid response center in Uzbekistan that would 

permit a U.S. presence, though of undisclosed size, 

in Central Asia and give Uzbekistan added leverage 

against Russian pressure to subordinate Uzbekistan 

to Russian preferences.6 Indeed, many Central Asian 

governments have approached the United States for 

bases for precisely this purpose, as well as for defense 

against the Taliban since 2001, but to no avail.7 Moreover, there is an equally widespread expectation of a 

future civil war outside of the U.S. military command 

and a gathering number of critiques of a U.S. strategy 

that critics feel has been misconceived for a long time.8
4

Thus, since 2001, U.S. military strategists have treated 

this region solely as a geographic and occasionally 

political obstacle to operations—something to be transited or crossed en route to or from Afghanistan. In accordance with the current strategy, when OEF [Operation ENDURING FREEDOM] ends, U.S. operational 

requirements in the region will also end, and Central 

Asia will cease to be of concern. Current U.S. military 

strategy in Central Asia is best summarized as ‘do 

whatever is necessary to keep our bases and supply 

routes open until the last U.S. soldier leaves Afghanistan in 2014.’ As important as it is to support the war 

fighters in OEF, the problem with this approach is that 

it fails to acknowledge the strategic significance of 

the Central Asian region in its own right. A strategic 

analysis of the region demonstrates that Afghanistan 

and Central Asia are inextricably linked, strategically 

as well as operationally. Strategic success in Central 

Asia is critical to strategic (not just operational) success in Afghanistan, and vice versa.9

Yet at the same time, these states’ requests for a U.S. 

presence, military or otherwise, trigger widespread 

fears among major powers like Russia and China that 

the United States is seeking to establish some sort of 

military protectorate or sphere of influence in the region or to balance or even oust them. Since local states, 

like all other Third World governments, are exceedingly sensitive to anything that even remotely looks 

like “neo-colonialism,” reports of these facilities in 

their media frequently trigger exactly the same accusations against U.S. policies, not only in Moscow or in 

Beijing, but also among some Central Asian regimes.10

Alternatively, a sizable U.S. presence could attract 

Taliban attention and make a state like Uzbekistan 

a target of both military and political action against 
5

the current regime and that accompanying U.S. 

presence.11 In that case, indigenous Uzbek anti-regime 

elements or Uzbek and other Central Asian terrorists 

affiliated with the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda could then 

use Afghanistan as a springboard for such attacks. 

Simultaneously, Russia and China are not only pouring resources of their own into Central Asia, but they 

are also trying to set up binding arrangements that 

would, in fact, subordinate those governments to their 

regional and genuinely neo-colonial aspirations in this 

part of the world. Geir Flikke’s and Richard Weitz’s 

papers clearly show this pattern of increased capability to project influence into Central Asia, a heightened 

sensitivity and rivalry between them concerning each 

other’s activities here, and simultaneously their joint 

and united opposition to any sign of an enhanced U.S. 

presence, especially a military one.

Moreover, as budget constraints take hold and will 

do so for years to come, it will be increasingly difficult 

for the U.S. Government and any of the U.S. forces, 

but especially the Army, to maintain a credible and 

enduring strategic presence in Central Asia since military bases clearly provide a major entrée for the United States into Central Asia.12 The absence of a coherent 

U.S. strategy or resources or truly sustainable presence in Central Asia greatly impedes the possibility 

of deploying the kinds of forces that the Army wants 

to build, i.e., an Army that is “globally engaged and 

capable of rapidly employing scalable force packages 

from the smallest to the largest depending on the demands of the situation.”13 Under such circumstances, 

at least as far as potential future crises in Central Asia 

are concerned, it will also become progressively more 

difficult, if not beyond American capabilities, to adhere to the injunctions of key U.S. strategy documents 
6

insofar as they pertain to this region. Thus the Army’s 

Capstone Concept of 2012 states that: 

The Army must maintain a credible, robust capacity to 

win decisively and the depth and resilience to support 

combatant commanders across the range of military 

operations in the homeland and abroad.14

Similarly, the 2010 National Security Strategy states: 

We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities 

to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated 

security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to 

address the full range of military operations.15

Under conditions of withering financial stringency 

that have only just begun, and given the foreseeable 

strategic realities in Central Asia, including Afghanistan, in 2014, and the wisdom embodied in Frederick 

the Great’s timeless admonition that he who seeks to 

defend against everything ends by defending nothing, 

it is hard to see exactly how the United States thinks 

it can project and sustain military force into Central 

Asia for any length of time after 2014 if necessary 

and to what kind of coherent strategic purpose it can 

do so.

Under these circumstances, and assuming that 

we still think Central Asia is of sufficient strategic 

importance to pursue strategic interests there by direct force, the endlessly reiterated Army argument 

that the Army must be ready for operations that span 

the entire range of military operations is a recipe for 

deploying a force capable only of tactical proficiency 

at the expense of strategic insight and capability.16 In 

fact, all we may be capable of sustaining in Central 
7

Asia is a robust security assistance program. While 

that concept is moving to the fore under combined fiscal and strategic realities, it also implies that should 

there be another major crisis there, we might have to 

walk away because we lack the capability to project 

and sustain credible forces in that theater or for lack 

of a definable vital interest.17 Arguably, statements or 

policies implying that not only will the United States 

remain in Central Asia but that it can also prepare 

for and sustain forces capable of spanning the whole 

range of military operations there are, in the current 

fiscal and political climate, the antithesis of strategic 

thinking and literally inconceivable. This is another 

way of saying that, absent the investment and/or 

sponsorship of other parties’ investments in Central 

Asia and Afghanistan after 2014, commensurate with 

the region’s real challenges that are largely economic 

and political in character, neither the U.S. military nor 

the government has a viable strategy for the area.18

Neither private U.S. organizations nor the U.S. Government are investing nearly enough to reckon with 

those economic political challenges, and talk of the 

Silk Road remains just that—talk, since the funding 

for it is not being allocated.19

While U.S. Army programs probably should concentrate after 2014 on enhancing security cooperation 

in all its multifarious forms, as described in the literature on the subject, with Central Asian militaries that 

are willing to do so, the real issue is whether the administration and Congress will make a formal policy 

decision, as embodied not in rhetoric but in actual allocations and policies, that a robust and multidimensional private and public U.S. presence in Central Asia 

is in America’s vital interest. Central Asian governments value the U.S. presence highly and want it to 
8

continue. They certainly want more investment or use 

of Washington’s power to convene and leverage other 

institutions, be they private, public, or multilateral, 

to invest in key sectors like infrastructure, transportation, water, and communications. Those are among 

the real deeply rooted challenges to security in Central Asia and are sectors where U.S. and other foreign 

investments could make a real difference. 

But for that kind of outcome to ensue, Washington 

must make it clear to both domestic and foreign interlocutors that it considers Central Asia a critical zone 

and vigorously intends to sustain its presence there. 

And that is not happening.20 The failure to do so will 

only stimulate local governments to continue to be anti-liberal and repressive, if not incapable of contending 

with their massive governance challenges. This failure 

will also leave a vacuum behind that Moscow and Beijing will try to fill. Others like India, Pakistan, Iran, 

and even possibly Turkey will also try to do so, but 

they will be handicapped relative to the governments 

of Russia and China because of their own relative 

weakness and/or absence of a viable U.S. presence. 

Therefore, the issue confronting the U.S. Government 

as a whole, and its armed forces in particular, is not 

the relevance of Landpower. As far as Central Asia 

is concerned, we neither have the resources nor the 

manpower to engage in a sustained long-term ground 

campaign there. Thus, we do not have sufficiently 

credible Landpower as far as Central Asian strategic 

outcomes are concerned. Rather, the issue is determining the extent to which Washington regards Central 

Asia as a critical or vital strategic region and the extent 

of its willingness to commit resources to implement its 

strategic vision or persuade others to do so in tandem 

with it. This should not be fundamentally a question 
9

of defense policy, though the space of enhanced security cooperation will be a key military component 

of that policy in peacetime, if not during local wars, 

unless Central Asia falls apart. Rather, the challenge is 

to see Central Asia as vital in its own right, not as an 

adjunct to Afghanistan or some other strategic design.

Since the administration has not yet accepted that 

Central Asia may be vital to U.S. interests and is already diminishing the resources necessary to sustain 

any such vision, its resources with which to execute 

such a strategically oriented program of action will 

necessarily be limited. Moreover, it is also clear that 

the real challenges here are not military, and it is highly unlikely that we will send combat forces into this 

area again, barring a major threat to the United States 

and its acknowledged vital interests. It therefore becomes critical for agencies who must conduct policies here to leverage those scarce resources that are or 

will be available by enhancing their understanding of 

regional socioeconomic-political dynamics and recognizing that the fundamental challenges to regional 

security originate in those dynamics and not in military responses that are maladapted for responding to 

those problems. Hopefully, the essays collected here 

will contribute to that understanding. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great 

Power Contest in Central Asia, New York: Oxford University Press, 

2012, is the most cogent recent statement of that fact.

2. Stephen Blank, Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan After the US Withdrawal, Afghanistan Regional Forum, No. 2, Washington, DC: Central Asia Program, 2012.

3. Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in 

Retreat, New York: Doubleday, 2013.
10

4. Blank, Central Asian Perspectives.

5. Statement of General James N. Mattis (USMC), Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee on the posture of U.S. Central 

Command, March 5, 2013, p. 22, available from www.senate.gov.

6. Jacob Zenn, “What Options for U.S. Influence in Central 

Asia After Manas?” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, March 6, 2013.

7. Joshua Kucera, “Tajikistan Wanted U.S. Air Base At Kulyab; Rumsfeld Gave Them Bridge Instead,” Eurasia Insight, March 

15, 2013; Ahmed Rashid, “Security vs. Reconciliation: The Afghan Conundrum,” New York Review of Books Blog, February 13, 

2012, available from www.nybooks.com/blogs/; Erica Marat, “After 

Winning Elections Atambayev Focuses on the US Transit Center,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 3, 2011; Bishkek, Kyrgyz 

Television 1, in Kyrgyz, May 2, 2012, Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service-Soviet (FBIS-SOV), May 2, 2012.

8. Dexter Filkins, “After America,” The New Yorker, July 9 

and 16, 2002, pp. 54-67; Lewis G. Irwin, Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning From America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan 

Nation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2012.

9. Ted Donnelly, Fergana as FATA? Central Asia after 2014—

Outcomes and Strategic Options, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011, p. 6.

10. See, for example, Parviz Mullojonov, “USA’s Strategy: A 

New Silk Road—Road to Nowhere,” Dushanbe, Avesta, in Russian, February 21, 2013, Open Source Center, FBIS SOV, February 

21, 2013.

11. Zenn.

12. Ibid.

13. General Raymond T. Odierno (USA), “The Force of Tomorrow,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013, available from www.

foreignpolicy.com.
11

14. The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 2012, p. 24.

15. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, 2010, p. 14, available from www.whitehouse.gov.

16. General Raymond T. Odierno, “The U.S. Army in a Time of 

Transition,” Foreign Affairs May-June, 2012, available from www.foreignaffairs.

com/articles/137423/raymond-t-odierno/the-us-army-in-a-time-of-transition; U.S. 

Army, 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance, available from www.army.mil/

standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-04-27; Pamphlet 525-3-1, The 

United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028, Washington, DC: 

TRADOC, 2010; Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and 

Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, Washington, DC: TRADOC, 2009; 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Army, 2012. 

17. John A. Nagl, “In an Era of Small Wars, U.S. Army Must 

Embrace Training Mission,” World Politics Review, February 5, 

2013; Daniel Wasserbly, “Panetta Seeks Investments in Regional 

Engagement, Partner Capacity,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 20, 2012, available from www.ihs.com/products/janes/defencebusiness/news/defence-weekly.aspx.

18. Blank, Central Asia Perspectives; S. Frederick Starr et al., Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy: A Handbook of Projects, 

Washington, DC, and Stockholm, Sweden: Central Asia Caucasus 

Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University 

and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2012; Stephen Blank, “How Durable and Sustainable is Indo-American 

Cooperation in South and Central Asia?” paper presented to the 

SSI-Dickinson College Conference Cross-Sector Collaboration to 

Promote Sustainable Development, Carlisle, PA, March 13, 2013.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

13

CHAPTER 2

HOW THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL

FROM AFGHANISTAN

WILL AFFECT RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Ariel Cohen

Anton A. Altman, the Heritage Foundation intern, contributed greatly to production of this chapter.

As the United States is planning for its withdrawal 

from Afghanistan, regional actors are re-evaluating 

the strategic environment and have begun planning 

for the future. For Russia today, Afghanistan is both 

a painful memory and a threat to its desired regional 

dominance in Central Asia. Memories of the Soviet 

Union’s 10-year war in Afghanistan have yet to fade 

and still weigh heavily on the Russian conscience. The 

U.S. opinion makers actively avoid drawing the parallels between the Soviet military engagement more 

than 2 decades ago and the current struggle to stabilize Afghanistan. The Soviets left with the ill-fated Najibullah regime in place, and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) plans to have an arrangement 

in Kabul that will look like a defeat. Russia’s complex 

web of relationships with Afghan parties (especially 

the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, who controlled the Northern Alliance), with Afghanistan’s neighboring states, 

and with the West will therefore play a significant role 

in the outcome of NATO involvement in Afghanistan.
14

THE VIEW FROM THE NORTH

In July 2011, Russia witnessed the first U.S. troops 

beginning their withdrawal from Afghanistan and the 

West’s determination to cede security responsibilities 

over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 

The withdrawal, planned to be completed by 2014, has 

put the issue of an independent Afghanistan back on 

the radar of Central Asian states and regional powers. 

Afghanistan’s neighbors will gain a greater autonomy 

in their relationship with Kabul, and Russia occupies 

an important position in this development. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), Russia stood ready to assist the United States in fighting 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Moscow feared the total 

control of Afghanistan by Islamist extremists and understood the potential consequences of allowing the 

situation to draw on, including the threat of escalating 

violence in Central Asia. However, Russia was wary 

of engaging its own military. Moscow’s assistance 

amounted to material support and some intelligence 

sharing with the United States on Afghanistan. Russia 

chose to consolidate its interests in Central Asia and 

to allow the United States and NATO to deal with the 

military threat.

Russia’s ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan began 

when the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 at the height 

of its power. The ensuing conflict took the lives of 

14,300 soldiers, with over 50,000 wounded. Soviet 

withdrawal came a decade later in 1988-89 as the Soviet Union was crumbling. After the withdrawal, Russia put Afghanistan, and to some extent the Muslim 

world as a whole, out of its collective conscience for 

a number of years. This became known as “Afghan 

Syndrome.” It is largely responsible for the intentional 
15

exclusion of Central Asian states from the post-Soviet 

commonwealth in 1991.1

What the Russians began to understand from their 

involvement in Afghanistan was the power of militant Islam and the denominated tribal complexities 

of the region. As the United States withdraws, Russia 

fears unrest, chaos, and extremism spreading from Afghanistan north. In the scenario of the Taliban gaining 

control in Kabul, they expect a spread of radical Islam 

into Russia’s Central Asian neighbors and into territories and groups within Russia itself, such as the North 

Caucasus. As a result, Moscow fears a diminished influence in its “sphere of privileged interests.” A second problem that is bound to escalate in the event of 

a U.S. failure in Afghanistan is that of drug trafficking. Afghanistan is a large regional producer of opiates that are smuggled not only through, but also into, 

Russia for consumption by its domestic population. In 

an Afghanistan without a Western military presence 

and with an unfriendly government, this problem 

would be exponentially more difficult to control, despite the often quoted statistic that under the Taliban, 

fewer opiates were exported than today. 

In addition to its complicated relationship with 

NATO, Russia, along with China, is a founding 

member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO). The SCO concerns itself with Central Asian 

security. Its goal is to confront the threats of terrorism, separatism, and extremism in Eurasia. Though its 

actions have been limited, the SCO works on improving military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and 

counterterrorism.

While it will seek to protect its own interests first 

and foremost, Russia has a significant role to play in 

the outcome of Afghanistan’s future. Western involve-
16

ment will be a crucial factor in determining whether or 

not a stable government exists in Afghanistan down 

the line. Yet, Russian involvement is boosting the Kabul government, and economic development may also 

play a positive role. Foreign forces have the unenviable task of striking a balance between hunting down 

belligerents and not wading too far into Afghanistan’s 

domestic conflict. The endgame for Western involvement must involve an Afghan-run Afghanistan that 

poses no threat to itself, to its neighbors, and to the 

West—no easy task. 

A Split Personality. 

The Kremlin has mixed feelings about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Russia is somewhat consoled by 

the fact that the operation has a United Nations (UN) 

mandate that Moscow helped draft. Beyond a tepid 

public support of the international effort to stabilize 

the situation in Afghanistan, opinions in the political 

establishment differ. The Russian leadership is wary 

of the U.S. extended military stay in its own backyard 

but understands the consequences of a security void in 

the region. Privately, some in Russia’s political leadership would like to see a U.S. failure in Afghanistan 

reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s. This comes purely 

from a place of anti-Americanism and a false sense of 

competition.2

A pragmatic approach to the situation, however, 

comes down to the fact that a U.S. failure in Afghanistan would lead to a rise of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan, and possibly the region, that Russia would 

not be able to contain. Yet, despite this understanding, 

the “Afghan Syndrome” holds strong, and Russia has 

no intention of getting involved militarily in the con-
17

flict. Those in Moscow who see the United States as 

their primary geopolitical adversary would like to see 

an indefinite U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan with no clear winner. In this scenario, the United 

States would not allow a Taliban victory but would be 

tied up in the conflict indefinitely. They favor a spectator policy of very limited assistance to NATO allies in 

their struggle. This would leave the door open to cutting a deal with the Taliban in the event that becomes 

necessary after a post-NATO withdrawal. Close ties 

with the Karzai regime would leave Russia in a weak 

position, should the current government lose control.

On the other hand, there are those who favor a 

much closer cooperation with the United States and 

NATO. Some support for this strategy comes from a 

“Reset” mindset. If Russia gives the United States support in its time of need, then Moscow will be able to 

lobby more successfully for issues important to Russia’s geopolitical interests. Others support this course 

of action because of the practical implications. A positive NATO outcome in Afghanistan will benefit the 

whole region, including Russia’s geopolitical interests. A NATO victory would remove the most serious 

national security threat Russia faces today. This mix 

of opinions has led to modest Russian support for the 

U.S. efforts in fighting the Taliban and for the Karzai 

government. 

Moscow’s Fears.

Russia views Afghanistan from the perspective 

of a threat to its regional interests. A militant Islamic 

power in Afghanistan could lead to a domino effect 

in the region. That threat could reach as far as Russia’s own borders. A Taliban-controlled Kabul regime 
18

would encourage Central Asian Islamism and may 

again offer training camps to Chechen rebels. Moscow 

fears that the regimes of several countries in the region are not stable enough to handle the stress of such 

a development and is not confident in its own ability 

to contain the Taliban’s regional influence. 

The other, more immediate, problem Russia faces 

is that of the drugs out of Afghanistan. Recently, this 

has become a problem of not only trafficking through 

Russian territory, but also a national epidemic of heroin addiction. According to the UN Office on Drug and 

Crime (UNODC), Russia has become the world’s single largest national market for heroin, consuming approximately 20 percent of all heroin trafficked out of 

Afghanistan annually.3

 Despite a serious focus on the 

issue in Moscow, the problem has only gotten worse. 

There are at least 1.5 million heroin users in Russia, 

and an estimated 80 people die per day from its use. 

Since U.S. and Canadian involvement in Afghanistan 

began in 2001, production levels have reached record 

levels. According to the Russian government’s antidrug czar, Viktor Ivanov, production in Afghanistan 

has increased 44 times since the arrival of Western 

forces in Afghanistan.4

The Russian government maintains that the most 

effective way to solve the problem is to cut it off at 

the source. In October 2010, Russian and U.S. Special 

Services collaborated in destroying four Afghan drug 

laboratories. This was the first collaboration of its kind 

between the two countries in Afghanistan. In 2010, 

they also agreed to step up intelligence cooperation 

on the issue after a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

report revealed that there were two million heroin addicts living in the United States .

5
19

Drugs are smuggled from Afghanistan through 

Central Asian networks in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia has 

had visa free travel with these former Soviet republics since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which may 

be facilitating traffickers. The special services of the 

SCO members have suggested that the member states 

of the SCO (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) fight the drug trafficking problem on their own territories, while NATO 

destroyed the poppy fields prevalent in Afghanistan. 

NATO has consistently declined to head up the targeting of poppy operations, as this would cause a wave 

of anti-NATO sentiment.

Russia’s drug problem is only liable to get worse 

in the event of a premature U.S. withdrawal from 

Afghanistan or if the Taliban come back to power. 

Without any opposition to drug trafficking within the 

country, its output is only liable to increase. According to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

the Taliban earns $150 million from drug production 

annually, and total drug profits amount to over $4 billion.6

 This is not a small revenue stream by any means. 

Russia has very limited economic interests in 

Afghanistan. The trade turnover between the two 

countries in 2008 was just under $200 million.7 In 

a 2010 meeting of NATO and Russian chiefs, Russia offered to restore 142 industrial facilities built by 

Soviet specialists in Afghanistan.8 This amounted to 

a hollow gesture, as they requested funding from 

the international community to complete this work 

rather than offering assistance for Afghanistan’s 

economic development. 
20

RUSSIA IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE

In Russia’s Strategies in Afghanistan and Their Consequences for NATO, Marlene Laruelle introduces the 

following factors as influencing Russia’s perspective 

on Afghanistan:

In terms of foreign policy, the growing relevance of 

a long-term strategic rapprochement with western 

interests against the backdrop of the reconfiguration 

of powers in the 21st century; in terms of the ‘near 

abroad,’ midway between foreign and domestic policy, Moscow’s management of its relationship with 

Central Asia.9

In 2001, following the events of 9/11, to the surprise 

of the Russian military, Vladimir Putin supported the 

U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan and even acquiesced 

to the Pentagon opening air bases at Karshi-Khanabad 

in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan. Today, the 

international coalition relies increasingly on Russia for 

transit. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a 

transport route passing through Russia and its neighbors established in the summer of 2009, carried 40 

percent of nonlethal equipment to the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; this 

amount increased to 75 percent for 2011.10 Russia also 

opened up its airspace to the ISAF, as did Kazakhstan 

at the end of 2010. 

Despite its record of assistance to U.S. forces in 

their operations, Russia remains wary of the U.S. military presence in the neighborhood and has been vocal about its concerns. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has spoken out publicly, objecting to U.S. 

plans to maintain a presence in Afghanistan following 

the pullout of international forces in 2014.11 Another 
21

area where Russia’s opposition to U.S. presence in the 

area is apparent is the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan, a 

key logistics hub. Russia and China regularly lean on 

Kyrgyz authorities to demand the base’s closure. Russia has no real interest in its immediate shutdown, but 

they use this pressure to send the Pentagon a signal 

about their distaste for long-term influence of a U.S. 

military presence in its near abroad. 

Russia is far more concerned with the U.S. military 

presence than the creeping soft power of China in its 

near abroad. Moscow seems to tolerate the vast economic expansion of China’s presence in Central Asia 

far more than the open-ended U.S. military deployment. Russia has partnered with Beijing to bring the 

SCO to the international limelight as a forum for discourse, with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, 

and Iran as observers. Beijing supports dialogue with 

“moderate” Taliban groups, while others, such as India, take the hard line of rejecting all negotiation.

Afghanistan is a delicate issue in Russia’s relationships with India and Pakistan. India’s understanding 

is that Pakistan’s military created the Taliban, which 

is the root of the problem in Afghanistan. Delhi’s view 

is further formed by the use of Islamist terrorism and 

extremism by Pakistan’s military to attack Indian civilians and undermine India’s influence in the region. 

India would prefer that Western troops stay in Afghanistan, while increasing diplomatic and military 

ties and other efforts to bolster its relationship with 

Kabul.12

Moscow’s relationship with Delhi is, on the surface, a friendly one, but it lacks much real substance 

beyond Russian military sales to India. India was one 

of the few countries that refused to condemn the Soviet 

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Russia does not op-
22

pose Delhi’s increasing political presence in Afghanistan, though the two countries do not collaborate on 

issues pertaining to the country’s future. Moscow is 

performing a balancing act in its relationships with 

Beijing and Delhi, trying not to step on either one’s 

toes, but recognizes that in the future, China is likely 

to become the next superpower. Russia also values the 

energy relationship with China—something India has 

not provided so far.

 The largest thorn in Russia’s side in the region is 

Pakistan, which provides shelter to terrorist Islamist 

groups and apparently sheltered Osama bin Laden. 

Pakistan has the most to gain under the renewed Taliban control. The Pakistani military views Afghanistan as a “strategic rear” against India and therefore 

is likely to support the Taliban’s return to Kabul. The 

question for Russia is, will there be sufficient control 

by Islamabad to prevent the Taliban from undermining the Central Asian allies of Moscow? Pakistanis 

share an ethnic link with Afghanistan because of their 

large Pashtun populations—an Eastern Iranian ethnic 

group.13 Any stable government in Afghanistan will 

have to involve its Pashtun population, and Pakistan 

holds much sway in determining Pashtun support 

in Kabul. 

From Russia’s viewpoint, Pakistan is the nation 

that served as waypoint for U.S. policy during the 

Cold War against the Soviet Union and served as 

the main base of operations for U.S. support of resistance against Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 

10-year war. Yet, Russia’s foreign policy towards the 

Islamic nuclear state is one of keeping a distance. Russia also maintains friendly relations with Iran. In the 

mid-1990s, Moscow and Tehran cooperated to put an 

end to the civil war in Tajikistan, the only post-Soviet 
23

conflict in the region that has been resolved.14 The 

economic ties between the two countries continue to 

grow, especially in the energy sector. Russia sees Iran 

as a partner in curbing drugs. Iran favors a powersharing structure among Afghanistan’s ethnic groups 

in the aftermath of Western involvement so that its 

Dari-speaking allies do not lose power to Pashtuns.

Russia’s “Near Abroad” Worries.

Russia views Afghanistan’s future within the context of a larger Central Asian security-oriented framework. Its greatest fears in the region are Islamization 

as it relates to Central Asia, and the Caucasus and 

Russia’s Muslim populated areas, and drug trafficking. President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a customsfree area, the Eurasian Union, aims to consolidate 

political, military, and economic power in the former 

Soviet Union back in the Kremlin. 

One of Russia’s main tools for influence currently 

is the military partnerships it develops with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, and Tajikistan. The Ayni and Kant 

military bases, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are a large part of this. The Kant Air Base 

in Kyrgyzstan has little military value and serves to 

“flatter the vanity of Russian generals,” according 

to Kyrgyzstan’s President Almazbek Atambayev.15

The airbase serves as a hollow motion by Moscow to 

strengthen military ties between the two countries. 

The CSTO is a security cooperation pact signed in 

2002 by the Presidents of Russia and the former Soviet 

republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It seeks to prevent conflict between the nations involved and stem bloodshed from 
24

within. Its first test came in 2010 with the ousting of 

Kyrgyzstan’s President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Russia 

used restraint and did nothing, which was followed 

by harsh criticism from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who no doubt feared the same outcome in his future.16

The regimes in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are 

by no means Moscow’s allies, but their authoritarian 

nature and distrust of the West serve Moscow’s interests. Bishkek has leaned slightly more towards the 

West than Tashkent and Ashgabat but still remains a 

firmly pro-Russian government. On the other hand, 

Tajikistan criticizes Moscow, and Kazakhstan aims 

to keep its political independence while maneuvering between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. What 

Moscow fears most is an end to the “axis of convenience” it currently maintains. 17

Russia’s greatest fear is a destabilization of the 

region in an “Arab Spring” fashion that leads to an 

uncertain political future in each nation. Currently, all 

Central Asian nations have security strategies that involve Moscow’s participation, which suits the Kremlin just fine. In the event of calamity, Russia might 

also depend on China for support, which has never 

hidden its approval of Russian military domination in 

the area, while it continues to grow its considerable 

economic leverage in the region. 

Russia’s other serious problem of drug trafficking comes from Afghanistan, mostly from its Central 

Asian neighbors of Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The narco-terror problems plaguing these nations are aggravated by their corrupt law enforcement 

and secret services and the lack of ability to work with 

Western security forces to stem the drug flow. Russia will not be able to solve its heroin addiction with-
25

out a serious commitment from these nations, from 

Afghanistan, and from NATO countries. 

Russia also has its economic power as a tool for 

influence in the region. The launch of the Eurasian 

Economic Space and the Eurasian Union between Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan, in Putin’s mind, will 

be the beginning of a consolidation of power in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests.” As he once again 

assumes the presidency, Putin will no doubt use his 

power to push this foreign policy agenda and attempt 

to horde Central Asian natives into his reunification 

project. Yet, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, there 

are few takers to go “back to the USSR.” National 

elites prefer ministerial portfolios and ambassadorial 

tuxedos to aisles of Moscow-nominated bureaucrats. 

The Russian elites, too, are hardly ready to return to 

the imperial mode, sharing their perks with their Central Asian “comrades.”

China and the European Union (EU) have overtaken Russia as Central Asia’s largest trading partners, 

surpassing Russia’s economic influence in the region. 

Russia, however, maintains a reserve of soft power 

through the control of TV, other media, education, 

and the Russian language, which still remains a lingua 

franca. Moscow also holds in its grip the hydrocarbon 

economy in the region. Moscow will use both of these 

tools to expand the Eurasian Union in order to solidify 

its hold on the region, push out the growing U.S. influence, and attempt to stabilize its shaky regimes before 

the Taliban completes its takeover. Yet, time is working against Moscow, as the new generation of Central 

Asian leaders no longer see their relationship with 

Russia as the only game in town. 
26

A Central Asian Perspective.

Each country in Central Asia has its own view of 

Afghanistan and its own goals post-U.S. withdrawal. 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are largely failed states. 

Their governments are extremely volatile, and Moscow weighs in heavily on their actions. 

The Manas Air Base, located in Kyrgyzstan, 

has been a point of contention in the region since it 

opened its doors in late 2001. Manas has served as a 

base of support for ongoing U.S. military operations 

in Afghanistan and is the only base of its kind that 

U.S. forces have in Central Asia. In 2009, Kyrgyz officials threatened to shut down the base due to pressure 

from Moscow. The message was clear: a permanent 

U.S. military presence in the region is not welcome. 

The issue was resolved when the Pentagon agreed to 

pay higher rents for the base’s use, which now amount 

to $60 million annually.18

More recently, a top Kyrgyz defense official made 

clear the U.S. military should have “no military mission” at Manas after 2014. The U.S. lease expires in 

July 2014, after which Kyrgyzstan’s government will 

seek to close it down for military use.19 Some Kyrgyzstani officials do seem to understand the dangers 

that a complete U.S. military withdrawal will have for 

their government. In April 2012, Kyrgyzstan asked 

the United States to leave its drones after the NATO 

withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.20 Washington 

appears ready to consider this request in the event of 

future cooperation from Kyrgyzstan following U.S. 

withdrawal.

In the expectation of U.S. withdrawal, Tajikistan 

is strengthening its ties with Pakistan. In March 2012, 

Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari imparted that he 
27

thought it was important for Pakistan to develop closer defense, security, and intelligence ties. He floated 

a proposal that the two countries’ interior ministers 

should meet more often for that purpose, and the 

proposal was readily accepted by Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon at a meeting between the two 

leaders.21

In his address to parliament in April 2012, Rahmon 

spoke of the dangers of leaving Afghanistan in a situation where the progress made is not irreversible. He 

emphasized the regional instability that a premature 

NATO withdrawal is likely to bring to the region and 

the increased responsibility that Tajikistan will have 

in the region as a result. Tajikistan has a 1,300-kilometer-long border with Afghanistan that Rahmon called 

a “buffer zone” in the path of illegal drug traffickers 

from Afghanistan.22 Rahmon’s biggest worry is that 

Taliban rule in Afghanistan will increase in instability 

due to a further Islamization and an increased drug 

trade in the region, leading to his own illegitimate 

government’s downfall.

Uzbekistan’s authoritarian President Islam Karimov is in his mid-70s and not getting any younger. 

Large changes in Uzbekistan’s government are likely 

to occur in the future. Karimov’s regime is frequently 

cited as one of the most repressive in the world. It 

is one of only nine countries that received the lowest score possible in Freedom House’s Freedom in the 

World 2012 report.23 Karimov’s regime is yet another 

Central Asian government that has much to fear from 

increased instability in the region, as it is impossible 

to gauge its support by the military and security 

services. 

Uzbekistan recently gained strategic importance 

to the United States as a key hub of the NDN during 
28

U.S. withdrawal. The relationship is mutually beneficial, and the Uzbek government is earning considerable sums from NATO passage through its territory. 

Karimov attempted to use this position to gain a oneto-one meeting with President Barack Obama at the 

May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, Illinois, but was 

refused by the administration.24 After the U.S. withdrawal, Uzbekistan will have to take far more responsibility for its own security.

Turkmenistan is more insulated from the problems in Afghanistan than other Central Asian countries but has concerns of its own. In December 2010, a 

deal was struck to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan 

through Afghanistan to deliver gas to Pakistan and 

India (known as the TAPI project for the first letter 

of each of the four countries).25 The United States has 

encouraged the project as an alternative to a proposed 

Iranian pipeline to India and Pakistan. Progress has 

been extraordinarily slow on the project. Turkmenistan stated that it intended to sign a natural gas sales 

agreement with the TAPI project member states in 

May 2012, moving it one step closer to a real commitment to the project.26 An unstable Afghanistan would 

be devastating to this project. Security concerns could 

make the pipeline completely unfeasible, and it is uncertain what a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would do to 

the project.

Kazakhstan’s concerns with U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan are aligned with that of its 

neighbors. Its leadership also fears the spread of Islamic extremism from a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan 

and a further increase in the narcotics trade emanating 

from there. The oil rich country is the most economically successful out of the former Soviet Central Asian 

states and the most stable state in the region. It is now 
29

a part of Putin’s Eurasian Union, though its leadership has emphasized sovereignty in making political 

decisions. To Kazakhstan, the problems coming from 

Afghanistan will be a strategic, long-term danger, albeit not an existenital threat. 

CONCLUSION

Much is at stake during and after U.S. and NATO 

forces withdraw from Afghanistan. Beyond the understandable concerns about Afghanistan turning into 

a base for international terrorism and hosting al-Qaeda training camps, one needs to ask questions about 

regional stability. The strategically important heart of 

Eurasia is a region that has millennia-old ties to Afghanistan and was negatively affected by the Soviet 

invasion of the last century, the mujahedeen/Taliban 

conflict, and the Taliban rule. It benefited from American presence in Afghanistan and may suffer if a civil 

war erupts or the Taliban rule is restored post-U.S./

NATO evacuation. 

Russia is casting an uneasy eye toward Kabul and 

Central Asia. It is likely that the Russian leadership 

will blame the United States for any future negative 

developments in Afghanistan, as well as the increase 

in extremism, radicalism, and instability in Central 

Eurasia. Barring unexpected, if not miraculous, developments, the Taliban is likely to increase its footprint 

in Afghanistan, with chances of conflict by mid-decade 

between this largely Pashtun Islamist movement and 

ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara higher than ever. 

Only by building a coherent multilateral and multilayered policy can the corrosive influence of the Taliban in Central Asia be stopped. If the United States is 

not going to build political-military ties with Central 

Asia countries and maintain consultations with China 
30

and Russia, at best case, it will become irrelevant to 

the future of Eurasia, and in the worst, it will witness 

Central Asia transitioning to the radical Islamist orbit. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko, “Afghanistan: A 

View from Moscow,” Carnegieendowment.org, Washington, DC: 

Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, April 2010, available from www.carnegieendowment.org/files/trenin_afghan_final.pdf.

2. Ibid. 

3. Japhet Weeks, “Russia’s Afghan Addiction,” GlobalPost,

July 25, 2011, available from www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/

regions/europe/russia/110725/russia-afghanistan-heroin-addiction.

4. Trenin and Malashenko.

5. Lada Korotun, “Russia, US to Jointly Grapple with Afghan 

Drug Trafficking,” Voice of Russia, April 19, 2012, available from 

english.ruvr.ru/2012_04_19/72295434/.

6. “Russia Concerned over US Plans to Keep Afghan Bases,” 

NY Daily News, April 20, 2012, available from india.nydailynews.

com/business/db4a1fcbaa972fb2d19f339542f996c2/russia-concernedover-us-plans-to-keep-afghan-bases.

7. Trenin and Malashenko.

8. “Russia Willing To Restore Soviet Legacy in Afghanistan,” 

Pravda, February 1, 2010, available from english.pravda.ru/russia/

politics/01-02-2010/111963-russia_afghanistan-0/.

9. Marlene Larualle, “Russia’s Strategies in Afghanistan and 

Their Consequences for NATO,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense 

College, November 2011, p. 3, available from www.ndc.nato.int/

research/series.php?icode=1.

10. Ibid.
31

11. “Russia Concerned over US Plans to Keep Afghan Bases,” 

New York Daily News, April 20, 2012, available from india.nydailynews.com/business/db4a1fcbaa972fb2d19f339542f996c2/russia-concerned-over-us-plans-to-keep-afghan-bases.

12. Trenin and Malashenko.

13. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border,” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, 2009, 

available from www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905.

14. Trenin and Malashenko.

15. “Russia Pledges to Repay Debt for Kyrgyz Base,” 

RIA Novosti, February 27, 2012, available from en.rian.ru/

world/20120227/171562251.html.

16. Andrei Makhovsky, “Belarus Leader Raps Russia, 

May Snub Security Summit,” Thomson Reuters, April 25, 2010, 

available from www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/25/us-belarusrussia-idUSTRE63O0PT20100425.

17. Larualle.

18. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Kyrgyzstan Wants Military Role 

to End at U.S. Base,” The New York Times, March 13, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/world/asia/panetta-meetswith-military-officials-in-kyrgyzstan.html.

19. Ibid.

20. “Kyrgyzstan Asks US to Leave Drones after NATO Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Trend, April 4, 2012, available from 

en.trend.az/regions/casia/kyrgyzstan/2010259.html.

21. “Zardari Wants Closer Ties With Tajikistan,” Daily Times,

March 25, 2012, www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C0

3%5C25%5Cstory_25-3-2012_pg7_1.

22. “Tajik President Concerned About Security After Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, April 
20, 2012, available from www.rferl.org/content/tajik_president_concerned_over_afghan_security/24554695.html.

23. “Freedom in the World 2012,” Freedom House, 2012, 

available from www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedomworld-2012.

24. Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan: Will Karimov Get Blown Off 

in Windy City?” EurasiaNet.org, May 2, 2012, available from www.

eurasianet.org/node/65347.

25. “Turkmen Natural Gas Pipeline Tapi to Cross Afghanistan,” BBC News, December 11, 2010, available from www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11977744.

26. Associated Press, “Turkmenistan Plans Natural Gas Sale 

Deal with Afghanistan, India, Pakistan Later This Month,” Washington Post, May 4, 2012.

32
33

CHAPTER 3

COLLUSIVE STATUS-SEEKING:

THE SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

Geir Flikke

INTRODUCTION

Since 1996, China and Russia have increasingly 

come to view each other as strategic partners in a 

multipolar world.1

 The most visible manifestation of 

the improved bilateral relationship was the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO), which convened 

for the first time in 2001. The organization was initially dedicated to fighting terrorism and separatism 

and flagged the state sovereignty of its members as 

an absolute norm in regional and global politics. By 

2005, the SCO emerged with a more distinct message, 

claiming to be a complex organization capable of challenging U.S. global primacy.2

 At this juncture, China 

and Russia issued a joint communiqué, declaring each 

other as permanent and long-term strategic partners in 

global affairs. To seal this, they also developed a distinct message against U.S. dominance in international 

affairs.3

 That same year, China and Russia conducted 

a large-scale military exercise simulating a collective 

response to a separatist scenario and conducted under 

a “UN [United Nations] mandate.”4 The SCO also established a contact group for Afghanistan, seeking a 

security role for the SCO in anticipation of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) drawdown from 

the region.5

While the Sino-Russian relationship has been a 

capstone of the SCO since 2002, the Chinese-Russian 
34

relationship has gone from a declared strategic partnership to becoming increasingly problematic since 

2006. In 2008, Russia targeted China as a major export 

destination for oil through the East Siberia-Pacific Oil 

(ESPO) pipeline. This “deal of the century” signaled 

that Russia was the weaker part: Russia needed Chinese capital to renationalize formerly privatized oil 

companies and replace the costly and insecure export 

of crude oil to China along the railroad network.6

 To 

be sure, the ESPO is part and parcel of the strategic 

energy partnership flagged by Vladimir Putin in 2003, 

which should bring Russia’s exports to Asia from 3 

percent to 30 percent by 2020.7 Still, Russia has been 

in disputes over oil prices since 2009, and the planned 

Altai gas pipeline to China has been delayed since 

2006, with no pricing mechanism yet decided.8

 Hence, 

the strategic “energy partnership” flagged by both 

in 2008 seemed increasingly problematic in 2009-11. 

Moreover, while China still remains a significant buyer of Russian arms, the period from 2006 to 2010 saw 

a steep decline in the export of Russian arms to China, 

as well as increasing animosities in Russia that China 

may reproduce arms technology and resell this on 

markets where Russia will be a competitor.9

 Finally, in 

economic terms, Russia remains the underdog. China 

has the highest gross domestic product (GDP) in the 

world; in 2010, it was five times the size of Russia’s 

raw material-based GDP.10 Hence, Russia is apprehensive about reach of Chinese sovereign welfare funds, 

especially in Central Asia.

Surely, if China and Russia were to bind together 

as strategic partners, this would be a substantial challenge to U.S. primacy. As Stephen Blank suggested 

in 2010, the United States has, since the mid-1990s, 

pursued a strategy of denying Russia the status of a 
35

regional hegemonic power to ensure that no single 

power—or constellation of powers—should dictate 

energy and economic development in Eurasia.11 At 

present, the Sino-Russian relationship may appear 

to be a distinct challenge to that policy, among other 

things through their collusion on global governance, 

the premise of nonintervention, and their visions of 

a rising multipolar order where powerful sovereign 

autarchies can set the political agenda. Moreover, as 

observed by Jacob Kipp in his recent essay on Chinese-Russian collusion in the Security Council vote 

on Syria:

the emergence of a close alliance between the Russian 

Federation and the Peoples’ Republic of China would 

mean a fundamental shift in the strategic balance of 

power, not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union 

or the American opening to China.12

Clearly, both China and Russia are anticipating a 

tidal change in international affairs. As I wrote with 

a colleague in 2011, Russia and China are preparing 

a script through which politics reshape geopolitics; 

i.e., that “politics” is put before “geo” and that both 

China and Russia “speak” the changes they want to 

see emerge and act upon them.13

This chapter offers a fresh discussion of factors of 

convergence and divergence in Sino-Russian relations. 

It argues that they are both status-seekers regionally 

and globally, and the hypothesis is that while Chinese 

and Russian interests are converging in their common 

pursuit of status in global affairs, their regional interests have so far been diverging in terms of regional 

economic pursuits and energy. It will start by discussing elements of convergence in the context of the SCO 

and then move on to discuss factors of divergence in 
36

bilateral and regional affairs. Finally, the chapter will 

conclude on a discussion of Russia’s Far Eastern dilemmas, offer a discussion of the Kremlin’s moves up 

towards Putin’s inauguration, and suggest how this 

may influence the Chinese-Russian relationship.

SHORT ON THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The SCO—and with it, Chinese-Russian relations—have been analyzed as a revelation of new 

multilateral trends, as well as in a realist perspective. 

For the former, the SCO appears as a power-sharing 

mechanism; for the latter, Chinese-Russian cooperation within it constitutes a great power constellation 

that reins in small states and bars out competing great 

powers. 

The neo-liberal perspective would be more prone 

to view SCO “multilateralism” as a new form of shared 

sovereignty among states and not solely as a balancing act against unipolarity.14 Hence, a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report from 

2007 referred to the organization as a multifunctional 

organization harboring the “deeper goals” to “include 

managing potential Sino-Russian tensions or competition,” and with the aim of adopting “overt activities 

[that] are directed first at transnational threats and, 

additionally, at economic and infrastructure cooperation.” Moreover, they also hold that an analysis of the 

SCO would provide material: 

for the debate on how far the multilateral interstate 

mode of cooperation meets or cannot meet the needs 

of modern-day multidimensional security.15
37

A Clingendal report, also from 2007, concluded in 

a similar fashion, arguing that the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 

SCO could, as multilateral organizations, find a common denominator, primarily because: 

both organizations are active players in international 

security and are thus likely to have a similar interest in 

advancing the international rule of law and stability.16

The competing perspective of “offensive realism” 

offers different conclusions and perhaps more viable 

ones.17 In this analysis, the organization’s balancing capacity against U.S. power would be the central point: 

Chinese and Russian collusion offers substantial challenges to the world order. Their joint endeavors challenge the unipolar moment of universal liberalism (if 

there ever was one such moment) and see Russia and 

China as potential rivals in regional affairs. 

Some disagreements are visible as to labeling the 

constellation as a “balancing act” against unipolarity. 

First, some hold that there are no prospects for Chinese-Russian counterbalancing since it is too costly. 

In this perspective, the SCO is held to be the potentially “strongest case for the argument of balanceof-threat constraints.”18 At this point, realist theories 

find no strong arguments for assuming that ChineseRussian relations are solid enough, and subsequently, 

their balancing act is considered one of “soft power.” 

Second, others predict that Eurasia is and will be a 

playing field where “every side in this multilateral 

‘game’ constantly reacts to the moves of all the other 

players.”19 In this Hobbesian world, states would be 

prone not to pool resources, and they would see all 

multilateral arenas as “stage managing” and plat-
38

forms for cultivating primarily bilateral contacts to 

improve their economic and security gains. Collective 

and cooperative security would be hostage to relative 

material gains, and “the players utilize all available 

instruments of power in pursuit of multidimensional 

ends” and not the “multidimensional security” outlined by liberalists.20 Under such circumstances, some 

conclude, they might form balancing coalitions acting out of self-interest, however, and these coalitions 

may have an effect on the distribution of power in 

international affairs.21 This also implies that the mutual animosities between the major players—and their 

strategic cultures—will prevent them from forging 

enduring coalitions against an outside power. 

In this chapter, I apply a third perspective that 

draws on the emerging literature on status in international affairs. This literature suggests that states that 

seek to advance in the international hierarchy employ 

various strategies to reinvent and reframe their foreign 

and security policy interests with the ultimate aim of 

reducing the attraction of the West. Brand marks like 

“multipolarity,” a “changing world order,” “shifting 

power dimensions,” and “new security alternatives” 

used by status-seekers would, in this perspective, not 

be expressions of wishful thinking or realities but ways 

through which to lift state authority and status in the 

international system. The underlying assumption is 

that in regional theaters where they have no reason to 

doubt their own status, they may employ a strategy of 

“choosing their own pond”—i.e., to forge hierarchies 

that boost their position and contribute to enhancing 

their status in the hierarchy or to make their claims to 

status more manifest. 

Here, a preliminary conclusion would be that 

status-seekers Russia and China have chosen a pond 
39

of considerable strategic energy resources—Eurasia—

to push each other upward in the ranking system of 

states and to create an alternative to the unipolar order. In this context, the order pursued by the two is a 

realist one—i.e., one that is no less prone to let states 

engage in realist politics and harness power ambitions 

than what they supposedly are opposing at the global 

level. Factors determining their joint status-seeking 

would then be the scope of common economic and 

political interests, cost-benefit calculations, the degree 

of their sovereignty pooling, and mutual recognition/

apprehension. 

The SCO: A Status Club. 

On November 7, 2011, the day of the October Revolution, Vladimir Putin announced that an expanding 

SCO would serve to enhance the organization’s status 

and that the SCO should “become a basic structure of 

the global economic and political architecture.”22 This 

statement effectively mirrors the status-seeking dynamics in the SCO, as well as Russia’s emerging priorities. China and Russia use the SCO to define and 

consolidate hierarchies where they can a) recast themselves as significant actors globally, and b) control internal political developments and enhance their soft 

power and influence.23 This particular realist version 

of a “win-win” game would then consist in securing 

access to Central Asian resources while keeping out 

external influences. From this platform, they engage 

in social competition with the West by framing the 

SCO as a rival security alternative to that of a U.S.-led 

security system or finding ways to make the arrangement acceptable in institutional arrangements.
40

There are two primary reasons for considering 

the SCO as status club. First, the organization claims 

to have a multidimensional role, and the actors use 

the organizations to flag all kinds of “globalized” aspirations, ranging from attracting new members, redefining the institutional underpinnings of the world 

economy, shifting the power of international financing 

mechanisms to fit the allegedly new economic powerbalance in the world, and pushing for a new world 

order. Russia has been especially prone to adopt a language of alleged global governance innovation, arguing with President Dmitri Medvedev’s lofty assertion 

at the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg that the “SCO 

should become a universal arena for solving various 

questions.”24

Second, the SCO defines a hierarchy of its own, 

with the Central Asian states henceforth being accommodated politically and socially in a manner that 

suits their own interpretation of status. As observed 

by Stephen Aris, the “special nature” of Central Asian 

regimes is that “the survival of the state is inseparable from the survival of their regime, as without 

this focal point they believe the state will implode.”25

Hence, by accommodating Central Asian state leaders in a way that dovetails with their idea of status, 

China and Russia frame the club’s members as out of 

reach for democracies with a global reach, and they 

convert that message to an organizational rationale 

by framing the organization as being an alternative 

to a unipolar world order. Moreover, China and Russia support each other’s autarchies systematically, as 

when the Chinese daily Global Times, in the wake of 

the 2011 Russian Duma elections, published a leader 

who suggested that: 
41

Russians have cast their ballots, and they voted for 

Russian interests, not Western interests. Democratic 

reform won’t bring us respect from the West.26

With status-seekers Russia and China as constituent members, the SCO is not only a “multipurpose” 

organization, but is also used for multiple purposes, 

global status-seeking and regional security included. 

Both China and Russia have increasingly underlined 

the role of the SCO in providing regional security. Indeed, with NATO set to depart from Afghanistan in 

2014, the pressure would be on the SCO to develop a 

coherent approach to regional security other than the 

somewhat circumstantial Contact Group on Afghanistan that the SCO has had since 2005.27

SCO peace mission exercises may seem designed 

for these ambitions. The largest of these was held in 

2005, involving 9,800 personnel, and in 2007, when all 

SCO states took part in a joint exercise. The 2010 exercise involved the use of Chinese air strike and refueling capacity on ground targets in Kazakhstan, and in 

2012, both China and Russia voiced ambitions to further SCO military cooperation within the framework 

of an action plan from 2013 to 2015.28 Moreover, the scenario of the Peace Mission 2012 exercise stipulates the 

use of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 

fighter planes at the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and 

troops from all SCO members, with the sole exception 

of Uzbekistan. The scenarios are mostly defensive. The 

Peace Mission 2012 rehearsed blocking terrorist incursions in mountainous regions in the north of Tajikistan, which simulates a possible post-2014 scenario. In 

sum, this may indicate that “Russia and China wish to 

project an image of the SCO’s growing role following 

the NATO exit from Afghanistan.”29
42

If the SCO should serve as a regional security organization, however, it should move from what Stephen 

Aris calls sovereignty enhancement to sovereignty 

pooling.30 This seems out of reach for proper analysis; 

at the general level, there is a substantial discrepancy 

between what the SCO is (bureaucracy) and what it 

claims to be (security). The SCO has a complex bureaucratic organization with multilevel meetings; the 

charter suggests a comprehensive structure involving 

a council of the heads of states, a council of the heads 

of governments (prime ministers), a council of the 

ministers of foreign affairs, conferences of ministers 

and directors of other bodies, a council of national coordinators, a regional antiterrorist structure (RATS), 

and a secretariat. In 2004, the total budget for the 

SCO secretariat, consisting of 30 permanent staff was 

U.S.$2.6 million, and U.S.$3.1 million for the regional 

RATS center.31 Moreover, Russia signed the agreement to participate in common anti-terror exercises 

under SCO auspices in 2008 and ratified this agreement in 2009.32 In June 2008, President Medvedev also 

presented a law project for the Duma making it possible to share state secrets with other SCO members.33

This does not mean that the states are pooling resources. Russia’s resource pooling within the RATS 

seems overshadowed by a more dynamic effort to secure inter-Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 

cooperation in combating extremism and terrorism.34

The CSTO members have agreed and coordinated a 

list of terrorist organizations and seem more prone to 

pool efforts in times of economic crisis than what is the 

case with the SCO.35 Russia seems to hedge by using 

military capacities in many different settings. To be 

sure, the interstate agreement ratified by Russia allows 

for regular anti-terrorism exercises on the territory of 
43

the members, the last in 2011 in China, with observers 

Pakistan, India, and Mongolia present.36 Russia also 

officially seeks to take part in these on a regular basis, 

thereby hedging between India and China.37 In 2010, 

Russia took part in the Mirnaya Missia 2010 exercise 

in the SCO framework, in addition to the CSTO exercise, Concerted Action 2010, and bilateral exercises 

with Mongolia and India.38 In sum, Russia does not 

find exercises within the SCO to be incompatible with 

numerous bilateral ones, including its on-and-off arrangements with India. In 2010, Russia renewed exercises with India under the Indra-2010, involving 280 

mountain soldiers instructing Indian soldiers in antiterrorism operations.39 Indeed, former Russian minister of defense Sergei Ivanov harbored the idea of joint 

Chinese-Russian-Indian exercises, holding the first exercise with India in 2005 to be the stepping stone for a 

“triangular relationship,” which Moscow has pursued 

since the late 1990s.40

The apparent flexibility of exercises seems to be 

undermined by the absence of a sense of deep and 

committing cooperation among the SCO members. 

Overall, there have been three exercises: the Joint 

Action-2003 in China and Kazakhstan, and the Mirnaya Missia 2007 in Russia, in addition to the 2010 

Peace Mission exercise.41 More so, much like what 

is assumed in the status-seeking literature, the SCO 

template is brought into relevance in all available contexts. The latest was the attempted transfer of RATS 

operations to other regions, such as in Ukraine, where 

these would allegedly be useful to combat unrest between soccer supporters in Donbass.42 Also, the socalled SCO cooperation against drug smuggling looks 

awkward, given the fact that the Russian armed forces 

had no relevant experience in dealing with narcotics 
44

and smuggling until 2010 and no relevant representation in Russian state committees dealing with these 

issues.43 Indeed, Russian press media have noted that 

the SCO exercise Mirnaya Missia 2010 was more modest than earlier exercises, with fewer notables and 

fewer committed forces.44

In sum, security cooperation within the SCO seems 

hampered by great power reservations against intrusive mechanisms and against the diffusion of power 

through sovereignty pooling.45 Uzbekistan has been 

blocking most SCO exercises (with the exception of 

the 2007 exercise), and other SCO members, like Tajikistan, have been hedging by using former bases as 

points of attraction for states in the region and for the 

United States. Furthermore, Russia uses its regional 

influence and the CSTO as platforms to limit the hedging behavior of the Central Asian states, and Moscow 

is deliberately vague on any plans for the SCO in the 

aftermath of 2014. Responding to a question in 2011 

on whether the SCO had military personnel taking 

part in operations preventing drug trafficking in Afghanistan, Lavrov simply responded that “as mentioned, the most important factors are development 

of economic cooperation, and humanitarian and cultural cooperation within sports and education,” and 

that “the SCO as an organization would not have such 

operations as a task.”46

Earlier examples of SCO crisis management reinforce the impression that the SCO rubber stamps state 

unilateralism rather than defending norms of nonintervention. This is well-illustrated in the SCO response 

to the Russo–Georgian war in 2008. In the immediate 

aftermath of the Russo–Georgian war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the SCO was noticeably silent and 

did not take any stance on the issue of recognizing 
45

these two quasi-states. The SCO declaration adopted 

in August 2008 underlined simply the principle of 

territorial sovereignty as a norm in international relations, thereby refraining from any specific application 

of this principle in the Georgian case. Interestingly, 

this was the exact norm that Russia itself violated, and 

although Russian diplomats interpreted Chinese reluctance as apprehensions that precedents should not 

be created for Tibetan and Uighur independence, they 

were clearly disappointed.47

The SCO did support the six principles for conflict 

regulation promoted by Moscow on August 12, 2008, 

and Russia employed these as a point of departure for 

talks with the EU on a so-called “new” European security system, thus illustrating a typical status-seeking 

move. According to the communiqué, “the SCO greets 

the adoption of the six principles for conflict resolution 

in South Ossetia, and supports Russia’s active role to 

promote peace and cooperation in this region.”48 This 

was important for Moscow since it gave Russia an opportunity to claim the status quo on the recognition of 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while the SCO remained 

effectively neutral when Russia evicted the OSCE 

monitoring mission in December 2008 and when Russia vetoed the prolongation of the UN observer mission in the UN Security Council in 2009. 

In sum, giving carte blanche to Russia’s post-OSCE 

preemptive and revisionist security posture, the 

SCO did not harbor any normative views that could 

dampen Russian unilateralism. The declaration was 

a straightforward recognition of Russia’s sphere of 

interests and its right to intervene on behalf of an 

unrecognized republic on the territory of a neighboring state. Moreover, in Moscow’s rhetorical moves 

toward the West, the SCO’s statement was brought to 
46

support the Russian framing of events in the republic. The SCO left Russia to draw the conclusions from 

the conflict. 

Also, the lame reaction of the SCO to the collapse 

of government in Kyrgyzstan is illustrative. At the 

2010 summit, the SCO limited itself to statements 

about supporting state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Kyrgyzstan but refrained from taking 

any stand as to the sources of the conflict.49 Russia’s 

manipulations in Kyrgyz politics were not criticized 

by any SCO member, nor did Moscow’s attempt to 

rally support around a CSTO intervention cause much 

alarm, at least not from China. 

What that did cause was alarm among other Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan—as was also 

the case in the Russo-Georgian war. Underneath the 

complacent reactions of the SCO in the aftermath of 

the Russo-Georgian conflict, one could sense increasing apprehension among Central Asian states, making them de facto more prone to seek the protection of 

the more benign hegemonic power—China. Although 

Chinese responses were nothing like the Sino response 

to the Brezhnev doctrine in 1968 and the border skirmishes in 1969, China was concerned with Russian 

manifestations of interest in the Caucasus and seemed 

more focused on applying economic incentives after 

the conflict. 

Herein also lays a calculated shift in Beijing away 

from increased dependency on Russian energy sources to that of making use of the SCO to further bilateral 

diplomacy with the Central Asian states. Simultaneously, China also stressed the need for global financial stabilization, using the SCO forum as one of several platforms to voice this. The most visible aspect of 

this was the numerous assertions that the SCO was 
47

a “new global economic forum,” and the less visible 

was Chinese investments in the Central Asian states’ 

energy sectors. 

The SCO: a Global “Economic Forum”?

Much like in security and economic affairs, both 

Russia and China have claimed that the SCO is of 

increasing global significance. Russia has repeatedly 

insisted that the SCO should be a voice in the global 

economy; at the 2009 Yekaterinburg summit, Medvedev pushed for new financial mechanisms for the 

SCO, including a common funding mechanism for 

aid and development and a separate investment and 

development bank. Moreover, at that meeting, Russia 

also suggested that some “transnational” monetary 

unit should be introduced within the SCO, suggesting 

it duplicate the experience of the EU in launching the 

Euro—to have an SCO equivalent of the “ECU.”50

The SCO did not make any significant progress on 

these issues in 2009. The idea of a separate budget line 

or investment bank for SCO projects was reiterated by 

Putin in 2010,51 but as of 2011, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov could only say that there 

was “an agreement that the work on setting up a common financial mechanism should be intensified.”52 In 

April 2012, however, Chinese and Russian counterparts announced the creation of a joint investment 

fund totaling U.S.$4 billion, with U.S.$1 billion from 

Russia, China, and unspecified Chinese contributors.53

This came after a gradual rapprochement between 

China and Russia starting in October 2011, when Putin launched new targets for the bilateral economic 

relationship, seeking an increase in bilateral trade to 

U.S.$100 billion in 2015 and U.S.$200 billion in 2020.54
48

Russian authorities claimed optimistically that in 2012, 

bilateral trade with China would reach U.S.$90 billion, 

an increase from U.S.$33 billion in 2006.

Hence, what seemed like a remote idea in 2009 has 

gained salience in 2012. Rather than pooling resources 

in 2009, China lobbied the Central Asian states in a 

back-to-back meeting to offer a U.S.$10 billion loan 

to Kazakhstan, which resulted in new energy deals 

between the gas giant and China.55 Why the Chinese 

have opted for an SCO investment fund now invites 

speculations. The return of Putin as president might 

be a factor, as he is considered the major instigator of 

the China strategy from 2006 and onward. Notably, in 

September 2011, President Medvedev moved the SCO 

to the forefront of presidential affairs by appointing 

a special presidential representative to the organization, and 4 days afterwards, he effectively resigned 

the position as presidential candidate to Putin.56

If the SCO succeeds in fronting economic growth, 

this may increase the attractiveness of membership. 

Certainly, the geographical scope of the SCO is already impressive, but the region it claims to have a 

voice in is volatile and conflict prone. Traditional state 

reflexes should presumably also be at work when the 

constituents discuss new members. Symptomatically, 

the SCO does not define what is meant by “region” 

in its charter and has been dragging its feet in letting 

in new members. Iran, Pakistan, India, and Mongolia have been observers since 2005, but there has been 

no progress in allowing them membership. In 2006, 

the SCO leaders entrusted the national coordinators 

to work out rules for membership,57 and in 2008, the 

SCO had assigned “partnership dialogues” to Iran and 

Pakistan. However, in 2009, amid the impact of the 

economic recession, there were substantial Russian 
49

reservations against transforming the SCO into an inclusive status club.58 In June 2009, new disagreements 

opened when China and Russia both opposed a Tajik 

proposal to admit Iran as a member, while Russia also 

spoke against membership for Pakistan, partially not 

to jeopardize relations to India.59

The issue was to be decided at the Tashkent summit in 2010. China and Russia stood together on a formula stating that states under UN sanctions could not 

become members of SCO, thus making a pledge to the 

supremacy of the UN in international affairs.60 This 

may have put some limitations on the SCO’s extensive 

regional ambitions; the SCO made its commitment to 

the UN more manifest, while curtailing its geographic 

aspirations. The SCO thus also exposed itself to possible pressure from the UN. Evidently, the SCO could 

not claim a regional UN mandate with member states 

that have been held under sanctions from the UN. 

Moreover, such a clause would be even more complicated in the case that a country was pulled in for 

the UN Security Council after having attained membership in the SCO. Indeed, in 2011, the UN General 

Assembly debated sanctions against observer state Sri 

Lanka for its crimes against the civilian population 

in the military action against the Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. 

These limitations notwithstanding, as of 2001, the 

SCO had developed a broad network of associate 

states and a clearer framework for membership. The 

membership rules are vague on irredentist claims, but 

the conflict clause so far rules out the membership of 

India and Pakistan, although both China and Russia 

(under Putin’s influence) have moved jointly towards 

making their SCO membership more acceptable.61

Certainly, membership for Pakistan and India could 
50

be likely if the SCO does not claim a role as a security organization but focuses on economic issues. Economic issues seem to accommodate all SCO members, 

and indeed, Russia’s focal point in the St. Petersburg 

SCO summit in November 2011 was dedicated to economic affairs and, among others, the establishment of 

a multilateral development bank and a developmental 

investment program during 2012-16.62 Moreover, in 

the back-to-back meeting with China, Putin stressed 

bilateral trade and prophesized rising bilateral trade 

between the two dominant powers.63

On the other hand, Russia pursued a proactive line 

in expanding membership, proposing Afghanistan as 

a candidate member and speaking out for Pakistani 

membership.64 China remained reluctant to this and 

stressed that the SCO should remain focused on economic issues. China, reportedly, “has been careful not 

to pursue military adventures or initiatives [in Central 

Asia], but to build its economic strength.”65 This ad 

hoc policy on Russia’s part more than indicates Russia’s regional ambitions under Putin and the potential 

for increased animosities between China and Russia. 

In sum, enlarging the SCO is definitely viewed 

as a way to enhance the status of the organization. 

Since 2011, Russia has voiced this strongly and has 

repeated that U.S. membership is not possible, while 

also lashing out at “the arrogance of certain states.”66

Still, while the SCO works to boost Russia and China 

as global status-seekers and regional hegemonic powers, there are also elements of stark competition in 

their relationship, as well as animosity and suspicion. 

The launch of a new Far Eastern investment fund by 

Putin in April 2012 may be an indication of both Russia’s Asian ambitions and Moscow’s sense of losing 

a foothold in the Far East. In this context, Moscow 
51

would be better off not to see the SCO develop into 

a security organization, but for different reasons than 

China. Indeed, rebuilding economic unions (like the 

Customs Union) and collective security organizations 

(like CSTO) seems to be a priority of greater importance than the SCO. 

Chinese-Russian rivalries play out in two arenas: 

arms exports and energy, especially in the period from 

2006 to 2010. 

BEYOND STATUS: THE BILATERAL 

RELATIONSHIP

The simplest model to read Sino-Russian collusion would be that of realism: states maximize profit 

through maneuvering in a region with no single authority and resort to traditional balance and counterbalance against any dominant hegemonic power (or 

aspiration to power) in the region. According to Dr. 

Stephen Blank, there are three major aspects of Indian 

interests in Central Asia: energy, security, and the regional balance of power.67 This could easily be applied 

to both China and Russia. China and Russia are no 

different in their mutual apprehensions and their regional priorities. Their so-called strategic relationship 

seems rather a derivative of how their separate interests play out in Central Asia than a cementing force 

in their relationship. Moreover, the SCO format certainly glosses over the fact that both China and Russia 

are intrusive powers in Central Asia, and hence, the 

declared dedication to the principle of “state sovereignty” in international affairs has low credibility.68

China has been important as a major recipient of 

arms exports from Russia and has thus benefitted 

from the bilateral relationship. As China is an energyhungry power, Russia could be a perfect match for a 
52

strategic alliance. Concerning the first, Russia still lists, 

with the United States, as the largest arms exporter in 

the world; with Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), 

and France added, these five held 76 percent of all 

arms exports in 2005-09.69 Contrary to the export of 

energy, however, Russia is heavily Asia-oriented in its 

arms export. The Asia and Oceania region accounted 

for 69 percent of all Russian arms exports in 2005-09,70

and Russia has been the most important provider of 

arms to China, especially within submarine technology.71 In the period from 1992 to 2006, Russia delivered 

arms for a total value of U.S.$26 billion to China,72 and 

in the period from 2005-09, China topped the list of 

arms importers (9 percent of the total), with India at 

7 percent. 

Since 2006, Russia’s export of arms to China has 

declined sharply. No new contracts have been signed 

since then, and in 2009, there was no single large-scale 

defense contract between China and Russia.73 The 

head of the Rosoboronexport claimed that 2010 was 

a successful year for Russia’s arms trade and understated that Russia’s arms trade with China had ”lost 

some of its dynamics.” In 2009, numerous problems 

mounted in the Sino-Russian arms trade relationship.74

China insisted that the cooperation should move over 

to high technology, a move Russia resists for obvious 

reasons: Russia is concerned that China copies Russian technology for resale to third countries.75 Starting in 2010, Russia blocked the sales of engines for the 

aircraft fighter FS-1 to China, as China has used it to 

equip the FS-1 and compete with the MiG-29.76 Moreover, India has risen as the primary strategic partner 

for Russia in this field. Russia has had a dominant position on the Indian arms market, accounting for 77 

percent of all arms procurements in India in the period 
53

from 2005-09.77 According to Russian press data, India 

took one-third of all arms exports in 2010, estimated to 

be U.S.$16 billion.78 This includes aircraft (Su-30MKI 

and MiG-29K), T-90 tanks, artillery (Smersh), and 

maritime missiles.79

A Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute (SIPRI) report lists six factors that impact

Chinese-Russian relations in arms’ export: (1) the low 

level of Russian technology, (2) competition from 

other suppliers, (3) the quality of Russian arms exports, (4) Russian arms transfer relations with India, 

(5) concerns about the Chinese copying equipment, 

and (6) the Chinese competition with Russia on the 

arms market.80 Moscow has claimed that China made 

a domestic version of the Su-27SK aircraft and resold 

this on the world market. For these reasons, the Kremlin has had a keen interest in reducing arms sales to 

Beijing to avoid meeting Chinese competition elsewhere. This is a recurring problem. In March 2012, 

Russian media suggested that China and Russia had 

inched toward signing a new U.S.$4 billion contract 

on the Su-35 fighter jet.81 Russia wanted a guarantee 

against copying to seal the deal, but China seems to 

have been reluctant to grant this. On April 17, 2012, 

RIA Novosti announced that the deal was put off again 

since the Chinese did not accept the Russian condition of a legally binding contract on copyrights.82 Russian industrialists feared that China might choose the 

same procedure as with the Su-27—to accept the deal 

and then buy only a few aircraft to copy these with 

Chinese technology.83

It remains to be seen whether Russia can gloss 

over these problems. Surely, the Kremlin has focused 

extensively on target aims for bilateral trade. Starting with Medevedev’s announcement in June 2011, to 
54

Putin’s claims in October 2011, Russia launched new 

targets for the bilateral economic relationship, seeking 

an increase to U.S.$100 billion in 2015 and U.S.$200 

billion in 2020.84 Russian authorities claim optimistically that in 2012, bilateral trade with China would 

reach U.S.$90 billion, over U.S.$33 billion in 2006. Still, 

70 percent of this trade is raw materials, and even if 

China and Russia formally have matching interests in 

the sphere of energy export and import, the pattern of 

interaction between the two globally and regionally 

indicates that they are rivals. 

In global energy security affairs, Moscow harbors 

no illusions as to China’s emerging role as an energy-hungry power. Russian press sources are already 

reading Chinese foreign policies as mirroring China’s 

energy needs, as when Premier Wen Jiabao visited 

Saudi Arabia in January 2012 to reassure oil deliveries 

in case of a larger crisis in deliveries from Iran, and 

Saudi-Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon sector 

is seen as a distinct challenge to Russian-initiated formal declarations of Saudi-Russian joint ventures with 

no substance.85 More so, even in regional and bilateral 

affairs, the so-called strategic energy partnership between the two also has clear limitations; China held 

fifth place among crude oil importers from Russia in 

2010, the hype around the deal on the ESPO pipeline 

notwithstanding.86 As for gas, this relationship is almost absent, and the two have been in skirmishes over 

gas prices for at least 6 years.

This energy-related pattern of animosity and uncertainty is especially visible in Central Asia. China 

has skillfully converted its participation in the SCO to 

concrete energy deals with Central Asian states, the 

leading states being Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 

recently Uzbekistan. The China National Petroleum 

Corporation (CNPC) controls about 19 percent of the 
55

Kazakh oil production through investments made in 

the Kazakh AktobeMunaiGaz and in MangistauMunaiGaz.87 Moreover, CNPC and KazMunaiGaz formed a 

joint venture (50-50 in shares) to develop the Urikhtau 

field in Kazakhstan, estimated to contain 40 billion 

cubic meters (bcm) gas reserves and 8 million tons of 

liquid hydrocarbons.88 Oil travels long distances from 

the Kazakh fields to China and is subsequently expensive, and China has also plowed into the gas sector. In 

2011, Chinese and Kazakh authorities signed a deal 

to construct a 1,305-kilometer-long Kazakhs section of 

the “C” pipeline that will have an initial capacity for 15 

bcm annual gas export to China by 2014. The CNPC, 

which sponsors construction, has suggested that the 

pipeline’s capacity will rise to 25 bcm by 2015.89

The strategic energy relationship between China 

and Kazakhstan is paralleled by a warming of bilateral trade relations. Evidently, Kazakhstan’s high 

ranking as an easy-to-do-business-with country attracts the Chinese, which is not the case with Russia. 

At the bilateral level, Kazakh President Nursultan 

Nazarbayev has boasted that Chinese-Kazakh trade 

has risen to U.S.$20 billion in 2010. China is Kazakhstan’s third most important export market and second 

most important market for imported goods. Chinese 

loans to the development of iron and ferrous ores are 

also substantial; the China Development Bank Corporation loaned U.S.$1.7 billion to the Kazakhstan 

Eurasian Natural Resource Corporation to be used for 

such purposes.90 In 2011, the Financial Times thus concluded that “Beijing’s reach now expands beyond the 

energy sector.”91 Agreements on sales of 55,000 tons of 

uranium to Chinese nuclear power plants (estimated 

to be U.S.$8 billion) were paralleled by substantial 

loans to the renewal of energy infrastructure (U.S.$5 
56

billion), prompting Financial Times to suggest that “the 

financial crisis provided China with an opportunity to 

strengthen its grip on Kazakh oil and expand into the 

broader economy.”

The Chinese export of Special Economic Zones 

(SEZ) so lavishly practiced in Africa has also made an 

imprint in Central Asia. As of 2011, there are four SEZ 

in Kyrgyzstan, nine in Kazakhstan, 10 in Turkmenistan, four in Tajikistan, and one in Uzbekistan, many 

of which are initiated by the countries themselves to 

attract international investments.92 China has boosted 

Chinese-Kazakh relations by setting up an SEZ as a 

special entry point for Chinese goods arriving to Kazakhstan, as well as into the Kazakh-Belarus-Russia 

Custom’s Union.93 At current, Kazakhstan has nine 

such zones, and the one mentioned is in the Chinese 

border zone, Yili.94

Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev 

signed a law in 2011 for the further development of 

these zones.95 According to this law, the SEZ are exempt from the regulations of the Customs Union, 

and hence, China should not fear that there are any 

restrictions imposed on SEZ economic activity from 

Russia.96 Indeed, at the bilateral level, Russia has expressed apprehension that goods may be smuggled 

into the Russian/Customs Union market, while Kazakhstan will use the SEZ to invite Chinese investments and raw material imports, and assemble goods 

in the SEZ to be sold in the Customs Union—goods 

that would be labeled “made in Kazakhstan.”97 This 

is lucrative for China, and clearly the SEZ also meet 

strategic requirements for China to modernize and 

renew critical transport infrastructure. Eastern-based 

companies invested U.S.$3.7 billion in the region in 

2011, and railroads and highways are allegedly being 

upgraded.98
57

As for relations to Uzbekistan, there has also been 

substantial activity after the 2008-09 financial crises. 

President Karimov visited China in April 2011 and 

struck deals on a Chinese U.S.$5 billion investment in 

the energy and banking sector, as well as an agreement 

to swap currencies for U.S.$106 million. Karimov also 

pledged to finish construction of the Turkmen-UzbekKazakhstan gas pipeline by 2014, thereby preparing 

the grounds for a potential increase of gas exports to 

China.99 Indeed, in June 2012, Karimov announced that 

the companies Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC had entered 

into a framework agreement stipulating an increase of 

exports to 10 bcm annually. He also signaled dissatisfaction with Russia’s monopoly on transport solutions.100 Uzbekistan is considered to have considerable 

reserves, 7.2 trillion cubic meters (tcm) according to 

one estimate, and also a potential for the extraction of 

shale gas.101 This certainly increases the room for Uzbek maneuvering. Uzbekistan can, just as Russia can, 

draw dividends from the SCO policies of shielding 

authoritarian states from external influence. 

Finally, a major source of the Chinese-Russian gas 

pricing dispute is Turkmenistan. Since 2006, Turkmenistan has practiced a specific brand of energy balancing—i.e., not a traditional power-balancer game 

but a game designed to pit bidders up against one 

another and thus secure relative economic gains and 

higher standing in the hierarchy of regional and international relations. Estimates of Turkmen gas reserves 

have reached just less than 20 tcm, making Turkmenistan capable of meeting demands from multiple bidders and holding the third largest world deposits of 

natural gas, behind only Iran and Qatar.102 China and 

Turkmenistan have been declared strategic energy 

partners since 2009, and late in 2011, Turkmenistan 
58

and China agreed on a tripling of gas exports to China, 

from 17 bcm in 2011 to 60 bcm within a 4-year period. 

Optimistically, the Turkmen President announced that 

Turkmenistan would export 40 bcm to China by 2012. 

Still, China has already surpassed Russia as a major 

destination for gas, and Russia lags behind Iran as 

well. Russia received 42 bcm in 2008 but was down to 

about 10-11 bcm annually as of 2011.103 Moreover, this 

also paved the way for a deeper Chinese investment 

in Turkmen gas infrastructure. In 2009, China extended a U.S.$4 billion loan to Turkmenistan to assist in its 

infrastructure gas projects.104 In 2011, China invested 

an additional U.S.$4.1 billion in infrastructure to the 

Yuzhny Iolotan’ gas field and would be well positioned 

to make further investments in the planned Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China pipeline.105

Indeed, as of 2012, the CNPC is the only international 

company holding an onshore Petroleum Concession 

Agreement with Turkmen companies.106

Unable to find common language with China 

over the Altai gas pipeline and gas prices, Gazprom 

has made harsh public statements against the estimation of gas at the Yuzhny Iolotan’ field, saying that 

such claims are exaggerated. This has provoked the 

Turkmens and has probably made the choice in favor 

of China even more grounded. Clearly, and as suggested earlier, a tighter energy cooperation between 

Turkmenistan and China makes Russia’s ambitions to 

strike a strategic gas alliance with China seem further 

afield. Russia cannot offer the prices that China gets 

from Turkmenistan, and, if Turkmenistan diverts gas 

away from Russia, Moscow would be forced to find 

alternative sources of gas to keep up its export to Europe. Moreover, the situation is not alleviated by the 

price games played by the states. While China can ar-
59

gue that it tries to avert sale of gas from Turkmenistan 

to European markets in fear of Turkmenistan demanding a similar price from China, the Chinese also know 

that this is the game that Russia is playing, but with a 

lower cap price on gas. Indeed, Russia has repeatedly 

been appealing to the notion of “European gas prices” 

in disputes with China, an argument that the Chinese 

do not buy.107 China continues to argue that gas prices 

should be linked to the prices of coal—i.e., substantially lower than the prices at the European market.108

The strategic partnership is also becoming fractured with regard to oil exports. Since 2011, both Rosneft and Transneft have been hinting that the CNPC 

might be sued for nonpayment of debts reaching 

U.S.$250 million over a disagreement about whether 

China should pay transit fees for oil passing through 

the last part of the ESPO (the stretch from Skovorodino to Kuzmino). Whether or not this will materialize 

remains to be seen. Like Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft would have limited capacity to have any substantial leverage on CNPC, and the CNPC could further 

punish Russian interests in Central Asia. 

True, Russia has alternative ways of exercising 

leverage on the Central Asian states, and it does so 

most successfully in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, neither of which has substantial hydrocarbon resources. 

Here both the Customs Union with Kazakhstan and 

Belarus, as well as the CSTO, are central. Shortly after 

launching his reselection, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 

both “joined” the Customs Union under substantial 

pressure. Other alternatives were scarce; Gazprom 

supplies 90 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s fuel, and remittances from the Kyrgyz and Tajik labor force in Russia 

amount to half of these countries’ GDP.109 Any political 

crisis between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with Russia 
60

would also have an impact on labor migrants in Russia.110 For Russia, Customs Union membership serves 

clear political purposes; Russia can place border control units along the outer perimeter of the Union, thus 

regaining access to border controls that have been 

lost.111 In Moscow’s relationship to Tajikistan, this has 

been a continuous issue, with Moscow insisting on the 

return of Russian border guards to the Tajik-Afghan 

border. Tajikistan has resisted this by expressing preferences for a U.S.-led border solution pledged by the 

United States in October 2011.112 Russia has resisted 

this fiercely, and Putin has launched this partially as 

a task for the Customs Union (with Belarus and Kazakhstan).113 Moreover, throughout 2011, Medvedev 

also insisted that the Russian basing rights (with the 

201st Division) should be prolonged for 49 years. Tajikistan responded by demanding a higher rental fee 

for the base. 

Russia has leverage over both, however. Kyrgyzstan consumes about one million tons of fuel annually 

from Russian refineries, and Russia has imposed harsh 

taxation on oil products to the country from 2010. The 

Kyrgyz might have thought that joining the Customs 

Union, however involuntarily, might dampen Russian 

assertiveness, but this does not seem to be the case. In 

March 2012, President Atambayev failed to secure a 

U.S.$106 million stabilization loan and to get Russian 

concessions on discount on oil products, and Kyrgyz 

debt to Russia is mounting.114 The presence of Russia’s 

some 6,000 troops in Tajikistan also continues to keep 

Tajikistan in Russia’s orbit and within reach for claims 

that this is a base within the CSTO designed to promote “collective security” in the region.115

Russia’s hegemonic claims within the recast Eurasian institutional framework might sharpen under 
61

Putin. Evidently, this may also be paralleled by a 

more posturing Asia strategy to provide for Russian 

economic interests in the far east. 

RUSSIA’S FAR EAST: INCREASING 

APPREHENSIONS

The returning fear of Russia is not only that China 

should challenge Russia’s traditional hegemony in 

Central Asia—which it does—but also Russia’s Far 

East territory. The Eastern part of Russia is populated 

by 6.7 million people, and the electoral result of the 

2011 Duma elections were dismal for the whole of the 

Siberian Federal District.116 In the 12 federal subjects 

in this district, the average support for United Russia was down 18.5 percent, with a low -3.92 in Tuva, 

and a high 25.23 in Novosibirsk Oblast.117 In the Far 

Eastern District,118 United Russia did not fare any better. The average decline of the nine federal subjects 

here was -18.3 percent. Subsequently, the press made 

Trenin’s “losing Siberia” vision of 2003 a short-lived 

mantra in the major headlines before it was released 

by preparatory articles for the presidential election, all 

on the contributions of the Medvedev-Putin tandem 

to democracy.119

Starting from 2010-11, the Russian government directed attention to established SEZ in the Siberian region. Putin visited the Tomsk SEZ in 2011,120 boasting 

that the SEZ, established in 2005, was now a center for 

50 resident companies doing high technologies. As for 

China, it has established three SEZ in Russia—two in 

Siberia and one in St. Petersburg. The one in St. Petersburg is in real estate, while the Ussuriysk is dedicated 

to industrial enterprises and investments, and the 

Tomsk SEZ to forestry. Russian-Chinese SEZ cooperation on forestry dates back to November 2000.121
62

Clearly, states use economic power to gain influence and to secure access to export and import markets, and China is no exception. China uses these SEZ 

to enhance its soft power (influence by example and 

attraction), secure access to resources, and project 

strategic economic power. But among the 19 SEZ adopted, few seem to be centered on resource extraction 

except the Tomsk SEZ.122 As mentioned previously, 

China seems to implement a similar strategy towards 

Central Asian states as towards Russia—to utilize SEZ 

as point of entry for Chinese production while using 

strategic investment tools and soft power to strike lucrative bilateral bargains in the energy sector. This implies direct soft power competition with Russia over 

Central Asia, a perspective that the Kremlin is waking 

up to. 

Russian authorities seem to vacillate between seeing China as an example and a competitor. In this context, the Chinese model seems attractive for the Kremlin, etc. In Tomsk, Putin seemed inclined to enter into 

a competition over modernization, stating that: 

we have made some accomplishments over the past 

few years. By this, I mean special economic zones, the 

program for establishing technology parks and business think tanks. . . .123

His minister for development, Elvira Naibuillina, 

was more explicit in singling out China as an example:

In China, such zones are already producing more than 

half the GDP. This is a very significant share. China set 

up its first five special economic zones in 1980, that is, 

30 years ago, and now they are playing a major role in 

its economic development.124
63

As of 2011, Russian authorities boasted having 24 

SEZ and 13 science cities modeled on the tax exceptions of the Chinese. Spending on science cities was 

estimated to be a meager 600 million Russian rubles 

(RUR), while Putin stated that the federal budget allocation to SEZ for 2011 would be 17.5 billion RUR, in 

addition to an alleged 28.3 billion RUR infrastructure 

investment already made. Yet, these zones have severe labor shortages, and Russian authorities lament 

that there are still mobility barriers inside the CIS 

hampering a staffing of labor force from this fig-leaf 

commonwealth. 

More challenging are demographic and economic 

developments further east. For Moscow, the viability 

of the Far East is of primary importance for the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and for Russia’s foothold in the Asia-Pacific region.125 The Russian 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in November 2011 

that the major economic development will take place 

in Asia and that the “Asian vector has been moved 

to the forefront of Russian diplomacy.”126 Symptomatically, in April 2012, weeks before the inauguration, 

the Kremlin launched a huge Sovereign Wealth Fundsponsored investment and development project for 

the Far Eastern regions in Russia. The development 

company was to be granted mining rights (gold, minerals) and licenses, as well as vital stakes in the energy 

and natural resource sectors (estimated to U.S.$17 

billion). Comparing it to Ivan the Terrible’s division 

of lands into the zemshchina and the oprichina,

127 news 

commentators stressed that the development corporation de facto supersedes state-owned hydrocarbon 

companies, such as Gazprom and Rosneft, and also 

regional authorities.128 Evidently, this is a new twist in 

Putin’s centralized regional policy and a structure that 
64

side-steps government structures and leaves modernization to be a key priority of a closed network of 

government officials. 

CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the Chinese-Russian relationship along the axis of status-seeking and regional 

rivalries. The primary argument has been that although the SCO effectively may enhance both Russia’s and China’s status in international affairs, and 

although they may use their status positioning in 

the UN Security Council to soft-balance against U.S. 

dominance, their interests do not fully converge at the 

regional level. In terms of convergence, both China and 

Russia could benefit from a more cooperative relationship in energy export and import, with Russia having flagged an ambition to increase exports eastward, 

and China expectedly jumping from a demand of 85 

bcm natural gas in 2008 to a 395 bcm gas demand in 

2035.129 China also seeks to lessen its dependence on 

Middle Eastern oil. Being an energy-hungry maritime 

great power in Asia, China finds the SCO convenient 

as an arrangement that plows new energy inroads for 

it in Central Asia while securing its strategic inland 

backyard. It has been argued that for Russia, the SCO 

has primarily been (and is) a reentry ticket into Central Asia, where it lost control and prestige in the latter part of the Yeltsin period. The SCO could provide 

Russia with the status as a pragmatic regional power, 

able to find new ways in which to address regional issues. The SCO also provided Russia with a diplomatic 

framework for its regional initiatives in collective CIS 

security (the CSTO), and finally, a framework for developing economic cooperation and flagging Eastern 
65

Russia as an “energy hub.” Finally, the SCO also adds 

to their soft-balancing capacity. Through this arrangement, both China and Russia have created a notion of 

an alternative to U.S. influence, while at the same time 

enveloping the Central Asian states in a regional constellation that cuts them off from setting up a regional 

constellation consisting of only Central Asian states.

In terms of divergence, other factors are at play. As 

states dedicated to sovereignty, neither Russia nor 

China is prone to pin security on multilateral arrangements. In this sense, the prospects for a Chinese-Russian counterbalance against U.S. power are clear, and 

it is limited to various attempts of “soft balancing.”130

How this will spell out regionally depends on China’s 

and Russia’s interests and the capacity of the SCO to 

move from sovereignty enhancement to sovereignty 

pooling. Indeed, while soft-balancing may have been 

a proper strategy when the SCO was initiated, it may 

look different in 2012 and beyond. Two factors may be 

brought to illustrate this. First, after the impact of the 

2008 economic crisis, Russia may have few other options than to return to this partnership with a harder 

economic and security agenda. The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) experiment has brought little to 

Russia’s foreign policy, and the task of modernizing 

the Russian north and east is looming while the south 

is becoming an unruly area where Russia cannot seek 

status effectively—the winter Olympics in 2014 notwithstanding. 

Second, the main architect behind Russia’s energy 

power strategy, Putin, may bring the Sino-Russian 

relationship back into center court simply because 

Russia is creating a set of strained relations with the 

West that were brought to the surface in the 2012 presidential “campaign.” Given the fact that the SCO is an 
66

alliance that excludes U.S. membership (and also observer status), China and Russia could find that their 

mutual rapprochement could be the only viable strategic choice after 2014, given NATO withdrawal from 

Afghanistan.131

In sum, even if China and Russia might find it 

strategically convenient to enhance the significance of 

their mutual relationship once more, it’s not certain 

that they will return with a cordial embrace, nor does 

it mean that the SCO will act coherently from 2014 and 

beyond, predictions that it would notwithstanding.132

With NATO set to leave, both China and Russia may 

find themselves confronted with regional challenges 

that could make their promises of building an alternative to U.S. prominence look empty. On the other 

hand, it could also prepare both for moving beyond 

what Bobo Lo called the “axis of convenience.” True, 

Lo suggests that world geopolitics: 

is not based on fixed and long-lasting strategic partnerships, let alone alliances, but on much more supple 

arrangements that are frequently opportunistic, noncommittal, and volatile.133

But whenever there is a security void, there are 

also powers that may make claims. There will be such 

a void when NATO leaves Afghanistan. 
67

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Agreements of confidence-building measures and mutual 

military reductions along the border were signed already in 1996, 

and the 1998 and 1999 summits developed rudimentary frames 

for economic cooperation and fight against terrorism and separatism. See Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, “Chinese-Russian 

Convergence and Central-Asia,” Journal of Geopolitics, Vol. 16, 

2010, pp. 865-901. 

2. The 2005 summit declaration flagged the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a multilateral effort to fight terrorism and separatism regionally, and China and Russia demanded the United States set a time limit for its presence in 

Central Asia. The Russian press has regularly referred to this 

exercise as having taken place under a “Taiwan scenario,” thus 

underlining the distinct challenge to U.S. interests. See “Indiyskiy front rossiyskikh gornykh egerey,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 15, 2010, available from www.ng.ru/world/2010-10-15/1_

india.html. 

3. “Russia - Closer Relations With China,” East Asian Strategic Review, Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 

2006, p. 182. 

4. Ibid., p. 184. China provided 8,000 of the total 10,000 troops 

involved in the exercise. See John Berryman, ”Russia and China in 

Eurasia,” Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 126-145, especially p. 134.

5. The first Contact Group meeting on Afghanistan was held in 

Peking in November 2005, and at that juncture, the SCO pledged 

economic and humanitarian support for Afghanistan. See “Otvet 

ofitsial’nogo predstavitelya MID . . .,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

official site of the Russian Federation, November 8, 2005, available from www.mid.ru/bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/8481C3A8C850437BC3

2570B3006B0E9F?OpenDocument. 

6. The Russian company Rosneft took a loan from China to 

buy the rest of the YUKOS company in 2004 and committed itself 

to a targeted export of oil to China by railroad. East Siberia-Pacific 

Oil (ESPO) supplanted this export. 
68

7. Alexandros Petersen and Katinka Barysch, Russia, China, 

and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia, London, UK: Centre 

for European Reform, 2010, p. 6. This aim may seem unreachable 

unless Moscow succeeds in bringing smaller oil and gas companies in Siberia in on selling hydrocarbons to the proposed pipelines. For these purposes, the Kremlin introduced a new tax code 

in October 2011. On the other hand, the return of Putin may alter 

this. In the fall of 2011, Putin claimed that all pricing businesses 

with China on oil were cleared, and he reiterated the Asian strategy framed by him from 2006 onward.

8. Sergei Blagov, ”Russia Claims Settlement of Energy pricing 

Disputes With China,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 26, 2011. 

9. Linda Jakobson et al., ”China’s Energy and Security relations with Russia,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 29, Stockholm, Sweden: 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011.

10. Berryman, pp. 126-45, especially p. 128. 

11. Stephen Blank, ”International Rivalries in Eurasia,” in 

Freire and Kanet, eds., Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, pp. 29-54, especially p. 31. 

12. Jacob Kipp, “Possible Sub-Texts to the Sino-Russian 

Veto of the Security Council Resolution on Syria,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 29, 2012. An alternative view is given by 

Allen C. Lynch: 

while often frustrated by the West’s resistance to his notion of 

partnership [to partner with the US and the EU and preserve 

predominance in Eurasia], Putin never entertained illusions 

that alliances elsewhere, for instance with China, could compensate for the centrality of Russia’s dense and complex set of 

relationships with Western Europe, North America and Japan.

Allen C. Lynch, Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft, Washington, 

DC: Potomac Books, 2011, p. 95.

13. Wilhelmsen and Flikke, pp. 865-901, especially p. 866. 
69

14. Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 

‘Tackling the Three Evils.’ A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?” Europe-Asia 

Studies, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2009. 

15. Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pal Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail 

Troitsky, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SIPRI Policy 

Brief No. 17, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute, 2007, preface, pp. 1-3.

16. Marcel de Haas, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

and the OSCE: Two of a Kind?” Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 18, No. 246, 

2007, p. 246.

17. The term ’offensive realism’ is used by John Mearsheimer. 

See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New 

York: Norton, 2001.

18. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out 

of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press: 

2008, pp. 72-73. 

19. Blank, ”International Rivalries in Eurasia,” pp. 29-54, especially p. 30.

20. Ibid., p. 37. 

21. As John Berryman suggests, ”pragmatic realpolitik imperatives have largely shaped the construction of this new security 

relationship.” See Berryman, pp. 126-145, especially p. 129. 

22. Sergei Blagov, ”Shanghai Cooperation Organization Considers Expansion,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 29, 2011. 

23. See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” Inernational Security, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, 2010, pp. 72-73.

24. “BRIK za ShOSom,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, June 18, 2009, 

available from www.rg.ru/2009/06/18/shos.html. 
70

25. Stephen Aris tends to dismiss these readings of the SCO 

as overlooking its genuine multilateral nature. I find the genuine 

multilateralism of the SCO less convincing. Aris op.cit.

26. ”Russian Democracy Receives Little Applause,” Global 

Times, December 5, 2011, available from www.globaltimes.cn/

NEWS/tabid/99/ID/687107/Russian-democracy-receives-littleapplause.aspx. 

27. The SCO indicates what it is doing for Afghanistan. Russia’s holding of a conference on Afghanistan in 2009 created no 

clarity as to the future role of the SCO in regional security, however. Russia held a consultation meeting between ministers of foreign affairs in Moscow on January 25, 2010, trying to hammer out 

a regional approach, but there is limited information about what 

came out of it. See www.mid.ru/bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/C4F607C5866

0238AC32576B70043DA4C?OpenDocument.

28. Roger McDermott, ”Beijing-Moscow Axis Drives Preparations for Peace Mission 2012,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 1, 2012. 

29. Ibid.

30. Aris.

31. Bailes et al., p. 5. 

32. “Materialy k zasedaniyu prezidiuma pravitel’stva . . .,” 

The Russian Governmental Web portal June 1, 2009.

33. “Shpionskie igry Dushanbe i Bishkeka,”Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, September 11, 2009, available from nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2009-09-11/11_kirgizia.html. 

34. “Krizis obostryayet terroristicheskie ugrozy,” Nezavisimoe 

voennoe obozrenie, July 3, 2009, available from nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2009-07-03/1_terror.html.

35. “Banditov vzyali na karadash,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 20, 2009, available from nvo.ng.ru/wars/2009-03-20/1_

bandits.html.
71

36. “Indiyskie voyska priobretayet novy oblik,” Nezavisimoe 

voennoe obozrenie, September 9, 2011, available from nvo.ng.ru/

forces/2011-09-09/1_india.html. 

37. Russian experts have held, however, that exercises and 

joint operations are two different things, and seem to be apprehensive about this. Ibid. 

38. “Armeyskaya reforma pomogaet boyevoy podgotovke,” 

Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, December 10, 2010, available from 

nvo.ng.ru/realty/2010-12-10/1_reform.html. The article also mentioned a renewal of exercises with U.S. forces as an option. 

39. “Indiyskiy front rossiyskih gornykh egerey,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 15, 2010, available from www.ng.ru/

world/2010-10-15/1_india.html.

40. Ibid., Russian pundits still see no obstacles for such exercises, and argue that it would be a win-win situation for Russia to 

have India in the SCO and regular tripartite exercises between the 

three most powerful states in the SCO. Evidently, Russia would 

rather see this become a reality than having India plowing too 

deep into the Central Asian states (like China), a region that “New 

Delhi gives top priority,” and about which it is not too public. 

See Amit Das Gupta, “India and Central Asia,” in Freire and Kanet, eds., Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia, pp. 146-163, 

especially p. 146. 

41. “Strany ShOS snova vyidut na voennye ucheniya,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, April 30, 2009, available from nvo.ng.ru/

news/2009-04-30/100_shos.html. 

42. “Antiterror so sportivnym uklonom,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, June 24, 2011, available from nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2011-06-24/1_antiterror.html. It certainly remains to be seen 

whether the recent bomb blasts in the city of Dneporpetrovsk 

(April 2012) may serve as a pretext for making either the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or SCO anti-terror exercises appear as “needed.” 

43. “Vooruzhennye antigeroinovye sily,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 27, 2010, available from www.ng.ru/nvo/2010-09-

27/1_antiheroin.html. 
72

44. “V armii: Slovami oborony ne vystroit’,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, September 27, 2010, available from www.ng.ru/week/2010-

09-27/8_army.html. Russia sent 1,000 troops to the 2010 exercise. See “Tysyacha voennykh RF primet uchastie v ucheniyakh 

ShOS,” Nezavisimnaya Gazeta, April 6, 2010, available from www.

ng.ru/nvo/news/2010/04/06/1270555613.html. 

45. This point is made explicitly by Jeffrey Mankoff, who sees 

the continuous tug of war between Russia and China on the utility of the SCO as a clear indicator of its limited significance in 

regional security. Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 

2009, pp. 196-197. 

46. “Stenogramma interv’yu. . . .,” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ portal, May 14, 2011, available from www.mid.ru/

bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/D7BDF81A60CC75AFC32578900051D87A?O

penDocument. 

47. “Smezhniki podveli,” Kommersant, August 29, 2008. 

48. Ibid. 

49. “Shanghaiskaya shesterka voshla v polozhenie,” Kommersant, June 11, 2010, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/1385715. 

50. “ShoSovaya terapiya,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 17, 2009, 

available from www.rg.ru/2009/06/17/ekonom-bezop.html.

51. See “Materialy k zasedaniyu prezidiuma pravitel’stva . . .”

52. “’Stenogramma interv’yu. . . .,” available from www.mid.

ru/bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/D7BDF81A60CC75AFC32578900051D87A

?OpenDocument. 

53. “Russia-China Investment Fund Seen Up and Running by 

July,” Ros Business Consulting online, April 28, 2012, available 

from www.rbcnews.com/free/20120428172441.shtml. 

54. Sergei Blagov, ”Russia Seeks Increased Trade with China,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 21, 2012; and Blagov, ”Russia Claims 

Settlement of Energy Pricing Disputes With China.”
73

55. “The Ural Summits: BRIC and the SCO,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, June 22, 2009.

56. “Naznachen novy spredstaviltel’ prezidentsa RF po 

ShOS,” Kommersant, September 19, 2011, available from www.kommersant.ru/news/1776880. 

57. Bailes et al., p. 19.

58. India, Pakistan, and Iran were accorded observer status in 

2005. See “Vesennee obostrenie mirovoy diplomatii,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 2, 2009. 

59. “The Ural Summits: BRIC and the SCO”; and “BRIK za 

ShOSom,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 18, 2009, available from www.

rg.ru/2009/06/18/shos.html.

60. “Iran vodyat za ShOS,” Kommersant, June 10, 2010, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/1383916. 

61. Blagov, ”Shanghai Cooperation Organization Considers 

Expansion.”

62. “SCO PMs Agree Project Activity Development Plan until 

2016,” December 5, 2012.

63. Eurasia Daily Monitor on economic growth. 

64. Rafaello Pantucci, ”The Limits of Regional Cooperation 

in Asia,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2011, available from afpak.

foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/16/the_limits_of_regional_cooperation_in_south_asia. 

65. Roman Muzalevski, ”India Seeks to Project Power In and 

Out of Central Asia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 17, 2011. 

66. Vladimir Fedoruk, ”Russia, China don’t see US in SCO,” 

The Voice of Russia, November 1, 2011, available from english.ruvr.

ru/2011/11/01/59706557.html; and Rafaello Pantucci.

67. Stephen Blank, “How Durable and Sustainable is IndoAmerican Cooperation in South and Central Asia?” paper presented to the SSI-Dickinson College Conference Cross-Sector 
74

Collaboration to Promote Sustainable Development, Carlisle, PA, 

March 13, 2013.

68. A tempering argument could be the fact noticed by Bailes 

et al., that Russia could have been better off by building regional 

arrangements with the Central Asian states than to bring China 

in on a multilevel cooperative arrangement. Still, this is not an 

argument against a realist reading. Russia does not seem to have 

much choice, as it is a former hegemonic power in Central Asia. 

China is increasingly an actor that encroaches on Russia’s sphere 

of interests, with new and explorative capital loans and investments in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region 

and through its pro-active bilateral energy policies in Central 

Asia. Bailes et al., p. 13.

69. SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, London, UK: Oxford University Press, p. 285. 

70. Ibid., p. 290. 

71. Hong Yi-Lien, “PLA Military Modernization and SinoRussian Military Cooperation,” Mark J. Miller and Bahram M. 

Rajaee, eds., National Security Under the Obama Administration, 

Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 107. 

72. Ibid., p. 108. 

73. Stephen Blank, “Recent Trends in Russo-Chinese Military Relations,” China Brief, January 22, 2009, available from 

www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_

news%5D=34389&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=459&no_cache=1. 

74. SIPRI 2011, p. 291. 

75. Kommersant, March 14, 2011. 

76. The contract stipulated the sale of 100 engines to China, 

was signed in 2005, and was worth U.S.$238 million. There was 

also a framework agreement on delivering 500 engines, and China could potentially buy 1,000, with a contract reaching U.S.$3.75 

billion. The Chinese price for the copy was U.S.$10 million against 

25 million for the Russian MiG. Apparently, the Russian agency 
75

allowed re-export of the engine to Egypt in 2007, and also to Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Algeria. Chinese and Russian 

arms trade competed for markets in Turkey (anti-aircraft systems) 

and Thailand. “Rossiyskie aviastroiteli glushat motory kitaiskikh 

konkurentov,” Kommersant, July 2010, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/1407757. 

77. SIPRI Yearbook 2010, p. 291. 

78. Kommersant, March 14, 2011. 

79. Ibid.

80. Jakobson et al., ”China’s Energy and Security relations 

with Russia,” p. 17. 

81. ”Russia close to Sign Su-35 Fighter Deal With China,” 

RIA-Novosti, March 6, 2012. 

82. “Russia-China Su-35 fighter talks frozen,” RIA-novosti, April 17, 2012, available from www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/2873118/posts. 

83. ”Russian Industry Wary of Su-35 Sale to China,” Janes Intelligence, March 21, 2012. 

84. Blagov, “Russia Seeks Increased Trade with China; Eurasia 

Daily Monitor, March 21, 2012; and Blagov, “Russia Claims Settlement of Energy Pricing Disputes With China.”

85. Petersen and Barysch, p. 13.

86. Ibid. 

87. Ibid., p. 40. Another estimate suggests 25 percent. See “Kazakhstan Embraces Chinese Investments,” Financial Times, February 22, 2011. 

88. Robert M. Cutler, “Kazakhstan Deepens China Link,” Asia 

Times, March 4, 2011. 

89. “China, Kazakhstan Sign Accord to Expand Gas Pipeline 

Network,” Bloomberg, September 8, 2011.
76

90. Ibid.

91. “Kazakhstan Embraces Chinese Investments.” 

92. Dena Sholk, “Local SEZs Face Substantial Challenges,” 

Uzbekistan Newswire, March 1, 2012, available from www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/uzbekistan/viewstory.aspx?id=11496. 

93. In Africa, China uses these zones as points of entry for 

Chinese goods and as zones to further investments. China has 

argued that, in African countries, these zones should be exempt 

from taxes and labor regulation legislation in exchange for an improved investment climate. See Martyn J. Davies, “Special Economic Zones: China’s Developmental Model Comes to Africa,” 

Robert I. Rotberg, ed., China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008, pp. 137-153. 

94. This zone covers an area of 200 square kilometres and an 

area in China that is mostly populated by ethnic Kazakhs. Border,” September 1, 2010, available from www.china-briefing.com/

news/2010/09/01/new-special-economic-zone-in-yili-near-kazakhstani-border.html.

95. “Nine Special Economic Zones Function in Kazakhstan,” 

The European Political Newspaper, February 5, 2012, available 

from www.neurope.eu/article/nine-special-economic-zones-functionkazakhstan. 

96. See Grata Law Firm, “Kazakhstan Has Adopted a New 

Law on Special Economic Zones,” February 9, 2012, available 

from www.hg.org/article.asp?id=25051. 

97. Richard Orange, ”Kazakhstan: that Customs Union Outpost is Smugglers’ Paradise,” Eurasianet.org, February 7, 2011, available from www.eurasianet.org/node/62843. 

98. Sholk.

99. Nezavisimaya stated that 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of 

Uzbek gas of a total production of 60 bcm annually is bought by 

Gazprom and that 5 bcm is exported to China. See www.ng.ru/
77

cis/2011-04-22/5_karimov.html. Other estimates by that same 

source suggested that in 2011, Uzbekistan exported 10 bcm and 

had made a pledge to increase exports to 25 bcm. See www.ng.ru/

cis/2011-05-17/6_uz.html. 

100. See www.kommersant.ru/doc/1385399?isSearch=True. 

101. See www.ng.ru/cis/2011-05-17/6_uz.html. 

102. Vlad Socor, “Timely Development Essential For Bringing Turkmen Gas to Europe,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 

1, 2012; and Vlad Socor, “New Turkmen Gas Reserve Estimates 

Confirm Vast Export Potential,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 20, 

2011. The South Yolotan has more gas than the Russian Arctic reserves in Stockman and Western Siberia combined (about 11 trillion cubic meters [tcm]).

103. Ibid.

104. Petersen and Barysch, p. 52. 

105. “Turkmenskii gaz otvorachivayut ot Evropy,” Kommersant, November 24 2011, available from www.kommersant.ru/

doc/1822628?isSearch=True. 

106. Socor, “New Turkmen Gas Reserve Estimates Confirm 

Vast Export Potential.” 

107. See www.kommersant.ru/doc/1853708?isSearch=True. 

108. Petersen and Barysch, p. 18. 

109. Erica Marat, “Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Forced into 

Customs Union,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 25, 2011. According to estimates, Tajikistan has about 2 million migrants on 

Moscow, returning U.S.$2.1 billion to Tajikistan (2010). Erica Marat, “Russia Punishes Tajikistan by Assymmetric Means,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor, November 17, 2011.

110. One case here is the arrest of a Russian pilot in Tajikistan 

in November 2011. Russia detained several laborers from Tajikistan in response to this. See Marat, “Russia Punishes Tajikistan by 

Assymmetric Means.” 
78

111. Erica Marat, “ Putin Attempts to reinvent the Customs 

Union As a Eurasian Bloc,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 6, 2011. 

112. Vladimir Socor, “Tajikistan Prefers American Over Russian Assistance for Border Management,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

October 25, 2011. 

113. “Materialy k zasedaniyu prezidiuma pravitel’stva . . .” 

114. Sergei Blagov, “Russia Struggles to Sustain Ties with 

Kyrgyzstan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 9, 2012. 

115. Vladimir Socor, “Warsaw Pact, CIS Peace-keeping, CSTO 

Operations: Moscow Develops ’Collective’ Intervention Concept,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 16, 2011. 

116. Created in May 2000, the Siberian Federal District consists of 12 federal subjects: the Altay, Buryat, Khakassia, and Tuva 

republics, the Altay, Krasnoyarskii, and Zabaykalski krays, and 

the Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tomsk oblasts. 

117. Based on Kommersant, December 12, 2011. 

118. Created in May 2000, the Far Eastern Federal District 

consists of the northernmost part of the Asian continent and covers the terrority of the Russian Far East.

119. See, for instance, www.kommersant.ru/doc/1866753 and

www.kommersant.ru/doc/1866781. 

120. “Putin to Chair Meeting in Tomsk on Special Economic Zones,” March 14, 2011, available from english.ruvr.

ru/2011/03/14/47351117.html. 

121. Deborah Bräutigam and Tang Xiaoyang, “Economic 

Statecraft in China’s New Overseas Specialized Economic Zones,” 

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Discussion 

Paper 01168, Washington, DC: IFPRI, March 2012. 

122. Bräutigam and Xiaoyang argue that there is little evidence that China’s 19 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) are used for 
79

energy security purposes. However, for Russia’s case, there is a 

correlation between a number of SEZ (three) and significant Chinese investments in the natural resources sector.

123. Speech at the Tomsk SEZ innovation meeting, 2011. 

124. Ibid. 

125. Berryman, pp. 126-145, especially p. 132.

126. “ATR prevrotilsya v lokomotiv razvitiya vsego mira,” 

Kommersant, November 29, 2011, available from www.kommersant.

ru/doc/1826725?isSearch=True. 

127. These terms are the dual administration set up after Ivan 

the Terrible’s fake abdication and withdrawal to the Aleksandrovskaia sloboda in 1564. Courted by the Boyars, Ivan the Terrible demanded the creation of a separate realm—the oprichina—under which he would have unlimited jurisdiction. This realm was 

parallelled by the old adminstrative structure of lands (zemshchinas). See Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 122-123. 

128. Anna Arutuniyan, “A Far East ’oprichina’,” Moscow 

News, April 23, 2012. 

129. Petersen and Barysch, p. 6.

130. The term “soft-balancing” is discussed by Brooks and 

Wohlforth (2008, p. 72), who hold that “Although officials in Beijing and Moscow may see a welcome bonus in complications for 

U.S. security policy that emerge from their partnership, analysts 

should not confuse side effects with important causes.” According to these analysts, soft-balancing is thus limited to rhetorical 

ad hoc constraints aimed at undercutting U.S. prestige and forging temporary alliances of convenience to promote visions of an 

alternative world order.

131. Although Putin snubbed the coming head of the Chinese Communist Party in January 2012, saying that he could not 

meet in March due to the “uncertainties of elections” in Russia, 

Russian-Chinese relations may still be elevated beyond the cur-
80

rent standoffs on gas prices and up to a level of strategic political 

importance. 

132. Bailes et al., p. 3. They have gone far in labeling the SCO 

a multipurpose regional security organization and one that is effective but not considered as legitimate. 

133. Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New 

Geopolitics, Baltimore, MD: Boookings Institution Press, 2008, p. 6. 
81

CHAPTER 4

CHINA’S MILITARY GOALS, 

POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND CAPABILITIES 

IN CENTRAL ASIA 

Richard Weitz

China’s growing military power has attracted considerable attention, but most of this relates to the ability 

of the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to project power against Taiwan or into the South China Sea. 

Those analysts who focus on China’s Landpower are 

preoccupied with scenarios involving a clash between 

India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Such 

a focus arguably has been warranted, given that PRC 

policymakers have largely accepted Russian military 

hegemony in Central Asia and the large North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military presence in 

Afghanistan and neighboring regions. But the PRC’s 

growing economic and other interests in Central Asia, 

combined with Chinese fears that neither the United 

States nor Russia can guarantee a secure environment 

there, especially given the ongoing NATO drawdown 

in Afghanistan and the increased instability in the 

Arab World, means that one can no longer exclude the 

possibility that Beijing will direct the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) to employ its growing capabilities 

for military intervention in Central Asia. 

The PLA is now focused on developing its military into highly adaptable and fully mechanized 

units that can be integrated seamlessly with specialized units such as logistics, armor, and support. The 

PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has begun to shift from a defensive force with very little offensive potential to a 
82

force capable of achieving both political and strategic 

objectives outside of China’s borders. A premium is 

placed on the coordination and integration between 

air assets, ground units, and strategic missile forces. 

The PLA has improved its training in all aspects of 

the armed forces, and these improvements can be 

seen in the PLA’s success in multilateral exercises 

with its Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 

partners. Military forces in the westernmost Xinjiang 

Military District are both qualitatively and quantitatively greater than any in the countries of greater 

Central Asia (not including Russia and U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan). 

With this obvious military and economic advantage, China would be able to dominate Greater Central Asia with force. However, Beijing has chosen the 

route of multilateral defense and economic engagement. This course of action is not a surprise, given 

that China thus far has been committed to a “peaceful 

rise.” In today’s geopolitical climate, there are very 

few circumstances in which China would engage in 

armed conflict with any country along its western border. These would include state sponsored terrorism, a 

failed state contingency, or a threat to China’s energy 

security. In the first two cases, the response would 

likely be multilateral, with PLA forces being assisted 

by their SCO counterparts. It would be likely that any 

multilateral military operation would be led by China 

and Russia. 

PRC officials fear that any instability in Central 

Asia could spill over into Xinjiang or that Uighur insurgents could use Central Asia as a base of operations to mount cross-border attacks into China. With 

a growing Islamic revival in Central Asia, a region 

with weak institutions plagued by chronic instability, 
83

and a looming deadline for the U.S. withdrawal from 

Afghanistan, Beijing’s anxiety is increasing. China’s 

foreign policy in Central Asia, therefore, could be 

considered an extension of its own fears about its internal security. As a result, the possibility exists that 

China may deem a military intervention in Central 

Asia necessary for its own defense. China also has 

growing geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia that could prove sufficient grounds for intervention someday. China’s diplomacy in Central Asia 

is primarily economic, as it seeks to promote stability 

through economic development and gain access to 

critical resources such as gas and oil. A threat to these 

fundamental interests would certainly cause alarm in 

Beijing. China also regards any attempt by the West 

to establish a presence in Central Asia with suspicion, 

assuming that U.S. military units in the region are part 

of a Western strategy to “contain” Beijing.1

CHINA’S GOALS IN CENTRAL ASIA

China has had ties for centuries with Central Asia, 

but Russian and Soviet control of the region during 

the 19th and 20th centuries largely severed most of 

these contacts. It has only been since the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) demise in 1990 

that China has reemerged as a major force in Central 

Asia. PRC officials have used their growing presence 

to pursue a variety of strategic, diplomatic, economic, 

and other goals in the region, whose core members are 

the newly independent countries of Central Asia—

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan. Not wishing to remain vassals of 

Moscow, the newly independent countries of Central Asia have sought to develop ties with China and 
84

other countries besides Russia. They consider the PRC 

less an alternative great power patron to Russia than 

a supplementary relationship that could help them 

moderate Moscow’s predominance in the region and 

promote their economic development. The Chinese 

leaders have exploited this opportunity, but cautiously, not wishing to antagonize their Russian colleagues 

with the impression that Beijing is seeking to displace 

Moscow’s predominance in a region of such great 

importance to Russia’s economic and military wellbeing. The substantial overlap in Chinese and Russian 

interests in the region has encouraged PRC leaders 

to adopt a low-key approach toward the region. Although China and Russia often compete for Central 

Asian energy supplies and commercial opportunities, 

the two governments share a desire to limit instability and Western influence in the region. They especially fear ethnic separatism in their border territories 

supported by Islamic fundamentalist movements in 

Central Asia.

The PRC’s primary security goal is to counter separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism in Central 

Asia since PRC policymakers fear that these “three 

evil forces” could adversely affect Beijing’s control 

over several Chinese regions seeking greater autonomy. Many of the latter worries concern ethnic separatism in China’s volatile Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 

Region, a mineral-rich area constituting one-sixth of 

the PRC. Deadly riots between the local ethnic minority, the Uighurs, and the growing ethnic Han population have occurred periodically during the past few 

decades, most recently in 2009 and 2011. Massive 

immigration by Han Chinese into Xinjiang in recent 

decades has decreased the percentage of Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang to below 50 percent of the approxi-
85

mately 20 million people living there. Many of its local 

Muslims, like Tibetan Buddhists, oppose the growing 

influx of Han Chinese into their traditional homeland, 

which enjoyed de facto independence before Beijing 

incorporated its territory into China in 1949.2

 The Uighurs have ethnic and religious links to neighboring 

Turkic populations in Central Asia.3

Beijing has pressed Central Asian governments 

just as vigorously to crack down on perceived antiPRC terrorists, but in these cases, they have typically 

encountered less resistance than in Washington. PRC 

officials have employed explicit and implicit threats 

combined with targeted economic and military assistance to induce the Central Asian governments to curb 

Uighur activism in their countries, deport Uighur political refugees fleeing persecution back to China, and 

not protest Chinese repression in Xinjiang. The PRC 

government has relied on diplomatic initiatives and 

direct security assistance to bolster Central Asian governments against domestic threats and suppress separatist activities by Uighur activists. Furthermore, the 

PRC has sponsored Chinese students and institutions 

to support their studying Islam and Central Asian 

countries partly so that they can understand and 

counter potential Islamist terrorist threats.4

 The PRC 

has also supplied Central Asian governments with 

defense equipment, military training, and intelligence 

data to assist them in combating terrorist groups. China’s multilateral diplomacy has focused on the SCO, 

which, under Beijing’s guidance, is formally devoted 

to fighting the “three evil forces” of “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” The organization has established a Regional Anti-Terrorism Center in which the 

member governments share information about possible terrorist threats. The SCO also organizes periodic 
86

exercises involving paramilitary and law enforcement 

agencies to rehearse counterterrorism operations.

Through these various multilateral, bilateral, and 

unilateral initiatives, the Chinese government has 

proved largely successful in suppressing potential 

separatist activities by Uighur activists in Eurasia. 

Central Asians often sympathize with the Uighurs’ 

separatist aspirations, especially since Uighur activists may have been inspired by the Central Asians’ 

own successful drives for independence, and they 

share the same Muslim faith. Nevertheless, the Central Asian governments, while allowing Uighurs to 

practice limited degrees of political activity, do not 

permit Uighurs to engage in unauthorized activities in 

China and have deported Uighurs accused of terrorism by Beijing.5

 The governments of Kazakhstan and 

Kyrgyzstan have deported Uighurs following Chinese 

requests.6

China’s growing energy needs represent another 

force driving its increased interest and involvement 

in Central Asia. The PRC’s booming economy, combined with its declining domestic energy production, 

has resulted in China’s importing an increasingly 

large percentage of its oil and natural gas. Most of 

these energy imports come from the Persian Gulf and 

Africa, but PRC policymakers are eager to diversify 

the geographic range of their foreign energy suppliers. They recognize that oil deliveries from the Middle 

East are vulnerable to disruption from terrorism, local 

military conflicts, and other regional instability that 

could abruptly curtail energy exports from the Persian Gulf region. Under its Energy Eastward Transportation Program, the Chinese government has been 

promoting the construction of oil and gas pipelines 

that would directly transport Central Asian energy 
87

resources eastward into China.7 Unlike PRC’s energy 

imports from Africa and the Persian Gulf, which travel 

by sea, energy imports from Central Asia and the Caspian region can travel through land-based pipelines to 

China, obviating Beijing’s need to rely on vulnerable 

sea lanes that are susceptible to disruption by pirates 

or foreign navies. 

Besides securing access to the region’s energy resources, Chinese officials also desire to enhance commerce between the PRC’s relatively impoverished 

northwestern regions and their Central Asian neighbors. Increased commerce with Central Asia could 

help promote the economic development of Xinjiang, 

Tibet, and other PRC regions that have lagged behind China’s vibrant eastern cities, helping to realize 

Beijing’s West Development Strategy.8

 Although the 

PRC’s trade with Central Asia constitutes only a small 

percentage of China’s overall commerce, it represents 

a greater and more important share for western China 

due to its geographic location. This consideration applies particularly to Xinjiang.9

 The PRC government 

is developing new rail, pipeline, and other infrastructure links that would tighten connections between 

Xinjiang—which is abundant in coal, natural gas, and 

other valuable minerals—and both Central Asia and 

the rest of China.10 More than half of Xinjiang’s foreign 

trade already derives from commerce with Central 

Asian countries.11

Developing Security Ties.

China has signed a series of bilateral agreements 

with its Central Asian neighbors in such areas as border security and military cooperation. Beijing typically has provided small amounts of military aid to each 
88

Central Asian country. Its quick delivery of communications equipment, tents, and other defense items 

to Kyrgyzstan during the 1999-2000 incursions by the 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an international 

terrorist organization, into that country highlighted 

to Central Asian regimes China’s value as a regional 

defense partner.12 In October 2002, China began participating in several bilateral military exercises with 

Central Asian governments.13 PRC border guards 

have assumed most of the responsibilities for policing the joint China-Tajikistan frontier.14 Sino-Russian 

military cooperation is also extensive and has expanded from arms sales since the 1990s to extensive joint 

military exercises. 

The PRC government has complemented these bilateral initiatives by working within the multilateral 

SCO. By means of the SCO—which, under Beijing’s 

guidance, is formally devoted to fighting the “three 

evil forces” of “terrorism, separatism, and extremism”—the Chinese government has proved largely 

successful in suppressing potential separatist activities by East Turkestan activists and other Uighur opposition to Beijing in Central Asia. The SCO has established a Regional Anti-Terrorism Center in which the 

member governments (which include China, Russia, 

and all the governments of Central Asia except Turkmenistan) share information about possible terrorist 

threats. The SCO also organizes periodic exercises involving paramilitary and law enforcement agencies to 

rehearse counterterrorism operations.

The previously isolated PRC defense establishment has undertaken a comprehensive outreach effort 

in Central Asia, both directly through bilateral programs and multilaterally, especially within the SCO 

framework. Regular meetings now occur between the 
89

defense ministers, armed forces chiefs, general staffs, 

and border commanders of the PLA and other SCO 

militaries. Some of these sessions occur within the 

context of wider meetings among government representatives—such as on the sidelines of bilateral and 

multilateral summits—whereas others involve only 

defense leaders. Contacts are even more common 

among mid-level military officers, especially those of 

border security and other military units in Chinese 

locations near SCO territories. Military experts from 

the PRC and other SCO countries also exchange ideas 

related to their functional expertise, such as communications, engineering, and mapping.15 Academic exchanges also constantly occur, with Chinese students 

studying in the military academies of other SCO countries and vice-versa with, for example, Central Asian 

students studying in PRC military academies. Still, 

the best known SCO military activities involving China are the major multilateral military exercises that 

the organization has been holding every year or two 

since 2005. 

The location of the U.S. airbase at Kyrgyzstan’s 

Manas International Airport only 200 miles from the 

PRC-Kyrgyzstan border, combined with Washington’s long-standing military cooperation with Japan 

and Taiwan and growing security ties with India, invariably has stimulated Chinese fears of U.S. encirclement and containment. PRC officials endorsed the 

2005 SCO leadership declaration calling on coalition 

forces to establish a timetable for reducing their military presence in Central Asia. 

On the other hand, PRC leaders thus far have avoided directly challenging the U.S. (or Russian) military 

presence in Central Asia. Like Russian policymakers, 

Chinese leaders are ambivalent about the U.S. military 

footprint in Central Asia. They see advantages in hav-
90

ing the United States heavily involved in suppressing 

potentially anti-Chinese terrorism in Central Asia. 

PRC leaders are also uncertain how well China could 

manage the consequences of a complete and rapid 

U.S. military disengagement from the region. The precipitous U.S. security withdrawal from Afghanistan in 

the early 1990s, following the withdrawal of the Soviet 

occupation forces, created a major security vacuum in 

the region that disrupted economic and political stability in neighboring countries for at least a decade. 

Although the PRC’s ability to project power into Central Asia is growing, its capacity still lags far behind 

that of the United States or even Russia.

Developments might lead to the PRC’s assuming a 

more prominent military role in Central Asia. Beijing 

has given indications that it hopes to increase its military sales to Central Asia. With an increase in defense 

spending by several Central Asian countries, China 

may be able to assume a larger role in supplying military equipment to the region. Kyrgyzstan increased its 

military spending from $44.8 million in 1999 to $79.3 

million in 2008. Kazakhstan mimicked this spending 

increase more dramatically, spending $855 million in 

2008, up from $206 million in 1999.16 This trend may 

well continue because, as these countries increase 

their military stockpiles, it encourages their neighbors 

to do the same. 

At some point, China might seek a military base 

in Central Asia. When popular upheavals led to the 

collapse of the Kyrgyz government during that country’s 2005 Tulip Revolution, Chinese officials contemplated sending combat forces into Kyrgyzstan, perhaps establishing the PRC’s first foreign military base. 

In late May 2005, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu 

Jianchao said China would “seriously consider” de-
91

ploying troops to southern Kyrgyzstan to help counter 

“terrorism, separatism, and extremism” there.17 Local 

and Russian opposition prevented any PRC military 

operation in Kyrgyzstan.18 In late July 2005, Kyrgyzstan’s acting deputy prime minister said: 

The deployment of a Chinese military base on the Kyrgyz territory has been discussed at a very high level, 

but Bishkek will not turn the national territory into a 

military and political range. We have enough means 

and forces to protect the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan.19

Sino-Russian defense cooperation is also extensive 

and has expanded from arms sales since the 1990s to 

extensive joint exercises. Nevertheless, the PRC has 

not yet established a permanent military presence in 

Central Asia. Although the Chinese government was 

clearly alarmed by the April 2010 chaos in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, which led to the collapse of the regime 

established in 2005 and its replacement by a coalition 

government, there were no further suggestions about 

China sending troops to that country. On April 8, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu simply told reporters that: 

We are deeply concerned over the developments of the 

situation in Kyrgyzstan and hope to see early restoration of order and stability in the country and that relevant issues can be settled through the legal means.20

GROWING CAPABILITIES AND 

EVOLVING DOCTRINE

For decades, the Chinese have observed the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that occurred during 

the swift defeat of Iraqi forces in Operation DESERT 

STORM and the NATO intervention in Kosovo.21 Chi-
92

nese military leaders observed that small, well-trained 

forces equipped with the latest information age technology could decimate much larger forces with great 

precision and lethality. This was observed while the 

PRC experienced an unprecedented level of economic 

growth. This growth has given China the means to 

revamp the oversized and technologically backward 

armed forces. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

understood that in order to maintain its national security in the post-information age RMA world, it would 

need to change the strategy of the PLAAF, the PLAN, 

and the PLA. Its oversized military was cut by one 

million personnel to free up funds for more advanced 

technology, and it changed from a static and reactive 

strategy that was inherently defensive to a mobile and 

proactive defensive strategy that favors offensive capabilities.22 This transformation has led to a more capable and well-equipped force that uses the doctrine 

of active defense. 

China’s military has been in the process of transforming itself from a static, region-based defense force 

into a rapid reaction force, with the reforms certainly 

geared toward Taiwan, but also possibly in anticipation of an intervention in Central Asia.23 In an effort 

to move away from a regional infantry-based army, 

the PLA has adopted modular battle group structures 

like those employed by the U.S. military, with an eye 

toward supporting high-altitude operations in complex terrains, such as those found in Central Asia.24

Many PLA brigade and battalion-sized units are now 

capable of independent operations, offering greater 

flexibility for Chinese commanders, and China has 

been loosening its previously rigid military structure 

to allow for rapid reallocation of forces from one end 

of the country to another, a capability they displayed 
93

during the Stride 2009 exercises.25 Indeed, one of the 

primary goals of China’s Stride 2009 exercise was to 

demonstrate that Chinese units could move far from 

their home region and operate in any environment.26

The PLA has been focusing on developing what it 

calls Rapid Reaction Forces and Resolving Emerging Mobile Combat Forces, units that are trained and 

equipped to move quickly over air, sea, and land to 

contingencies along the PRC’s borders. Chinese special operations forces (SOF) have also been improving 

in terms of training and capability, and China has established a new airborne division designed for rapid 

deployment. Such rapid reaction units will eventually 

comprise 10 to 15 percent of the PLA.27 The PLAAF 

has also been ordered to develop a rapid, mobile force, 

moving from a close air support mission to a more independent combat role.28

Historically, the Chinese military has had difficulty 

sustaining forces along its periphery; examples of this 

include the Sino-Vietnamese war and the response to 

the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which revealed problems 

with air support. In addition, the PLA is faced with 

deficiencies in its rapid air transport and high-altitude 

helicopter support capabilities, both assets that would 

be crucial for rapid-reaction and counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations in Xinjiang and Central Asia. The 

PLAAF has a severe shortage of long-range heavy air 

transports and aerial refuelers, precluding the possibility of rapidly moving significant forces to Central 

Asia by air.29 This problem has been compounded by 

China’s recent cancellation of an order for 38 Il-76 air 

transports and Il-78 refueling aircraft after the factory 

in Uzbekistan was unable to complete delivery.30 The 

workhorse of the Chinese transport helicopter fleet, a 

modified version of the Russian Mi-17, also has a fairly 
94

limited capacity in a mountainous environment such 

as Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, being able to carry only 

6-8 fully equipped soldiers to an altitude of just 3,000 

meters. While the Chinese have developed the AC313 

medium-lift helicopter, which is capable of operating 

at altitudes of 6,000 meters and at temperatures of -40 

to +50 degrees Celsius, it is currently tasked for civilian use.31 Whether it is adapted for the military may be 

telling of the types of operations that the PLA anticipates conducting in the future. 

Problems with air transportation mean that any 

large-scale movement of units to Central Asia will 

have to be done over land, likely by rail. Stride 2009, 

for instance, relied heavily on railroads for long-distance transport.32 More importantly, in anticipation 

of the SCO exercise Peace Mission 2010, the Chinese 

upgraded their rail capacity in the western part of 

the country and used these networks to transport the 

military units participating in the exercise, which was 

held in Kazakhstan. The PLA is closely involved in the 

planning of rail networks, and over 1,000 railway stations have been outfitted with military transportation 

facilities. Central Asian analysts have already noted 

that such rail infrastructure could support a Chinese 

intervention. The PLA has been actively using rail networks to upgrade the long-range logistical capabilities 

of its forces—for example, the Qinghai-Tibet railway 

has been used to enhance the PLAAF’s mobilization 

capabilities in western China. Beijing is in the process 

of upgrading its rail and air facilities in Tibet and is 

also involved in the construction of a rail line through 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, which will 

be part of the United Nations (UN)-sponsored TransAsia railway network.33 Several railways are also being built in Central Asia to transport natural resources 
95

to China.34 Chinese officials have also underlined the 

important experience gained by the PLA in longrange rail transport during Peace Mission 2010, including changing trains and switching rail gauges at 

the border, as well as transporting heavy equipment.35

Given these developments, it can be concluded with a 

fair amount of certainty that any Chinese intervention 

in Central Asia involving regular army units would 

rely heavily on railways for logistical support, with 

Chinese infrastructure already having the capacity for 

such operations.

The 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the 2008 Tibet and 2009 Xinjiang riots also shed some light on 

China’s capability to react to crises on the country’s 

periphery. During the Sichuan crisis, the PLA had 

primary responsibility for allocating government resources and assigning missions.36 The PLA, however, 

had difficulty during search and rescue operations, as 

it did not have enough helicopters, nor did it have the 

experience to sustain a high operations tempo with its 

existing fleet. Noticeable improvement was observed 

during the Sichuan flooding of 2010, however, when 

PLA helicopters from various units operated efficiently under a unified command and maintained a very 

fast operations tempo.37 The incident suggests that the 

PLA is making good use of past lessons and quickly 

adapting. During the Tibet and Xinjiang riots, China’s 

inexperience with COIN was evident, as units had 

significant difficulties with intelligence and coordination between military and political authorities, as well 

as between military and paramilitary forces.38 The 

People’s Armed Police (PAP), employing its counterinsurgency capabilities, was the primary agency used 

to suppress the riots, although the PLA would take 

COIN responsibilities if an international intervention 

was necessary.39
96

The PLA’s growing ability to project military 

power has been most evident in its military exercises 

in the region. For Beijing, these exercises with Russia 

and some Central Asian countries, typically within 

the SCO framework, serve a number of purposes besides enhancing the collective military capacity of the 

member states. These benefits include improving the 

proficiency of the PLA, demonstrating new combat 

skills, learning about other militaries and their capabilities, reassuring the Central Asian members that 

Beijing respected their security needs, cultivating bilateral contacts with other SCO members, and signaling to outside powers that the SCO region was a zone 

of special security concern for Beijing.

The first SCO Peace Mission exercise occurred in 

August 18-25, 2005. Although SCO members sent observers, this event was primarily a Russian-Chinese 

show. The two armed forces conducted a three-phased 

operation that began in Vladivostok in the Russian Far 

East and then moved to China’s Shandong Peninsula, 

where the participants conducted land and amphibious maneuvers.40 While the Chinese supplied most of 

the troops (8,000 versus 2,000), the Russians provided 

the most sophisticated equipment, including Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers, as well as 

some 140 warships.41 The maneuvers practiced during 

Peace Mission 2005 included neutralizing anti-aircraft 

defenses, enforcing a maritime blockade, and conducting an amphibious assault and other joint maritime operations. Although their stated purpose was to 

fight terrorists and restore peace among hypothetical 

local combatants, the large scale of the air, sea, and 

ground operations made it appear to Russian and foreign observers like a rehearsal for a joint amphibious 

invasion of Taiwan, with tactics designed to deter or 
97

defeat American military intervention on the island’s 

behalf.42 The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also 

interpreted the exercise as partly an attempt by China 

to strengthen its power projection capabilities with 

respect to Taiwan.43 The Russian government at least 

did not seek to impart such an impression. Moscow 

reportedly rejected an earlier Chinese proposal to 

conduct the war games in Zhejiang, a Chinese coastal 

province near Taiwan.44 Another possible scenario 

could have been a joint Russian-Chinese military 

occupation of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (DPRK) should the regime in Pyongyang collapse. In such an eventuality, other countries might 

contemplate moving military forces into North Korea 

to avert a humanitarian disaster (which could include 

a massive flight of refugees into neighboring Chinese 

and Russian territories, as well as South Korea) and 

secure the DPRK’s nuclear explosive devices and 

other weapons before they could fall into the hands 

of terrorists, criminals, or other rogue regimes. Beijing 

and Moscow might want to occupy the territory first 

rather than allow American forces to move so close to 

their borders.

The more recent SCO exercise most closely resembles Peace Mission 2007, which occurred from August 9-17, 2007. The 2007 drill transpired more clearly 

within the SCO framework. Unlike in 2005, the armed 

forces of all six full SCO members participated on this 

occasion, with almost 6,500 troops and 80 aircraft engaged in the two phases, including 2,000 troops from 

Russia and 1,600 from China.45 Peace Mission 2007 

began on August 9 in Urumqi, the capital of China’s 

Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Area, and ended on 

August 17, with a live-fire exercise at the Russian military training range near Chelyabinsk, in Russia’s Vol-
98

ga-Urals Military District. Unlike Peace Mission 2005, 

but like Peace Mission 2010, this 2007 exercise, which 

did not involve military ships, was better oriented toward suppressing a major Islamist insurgency (such 

as occurred in Chechnya) or popular rebellion (such 

as occurred at Tiananmen Square in 1989 or Andijan 

in 2005), presumably in one of the landlocked Central 

Asian countries.

Peace Mission 2009 took place from July 22-27, 

2009. Unlike in 2007, only Russian and Chinese troops 

participated on this occasion, but, as in 2005, the other 

SCO members received invitations to send military 

observers to Peace Mission 2009.46 The drills began 

with a single day of political-military consultations 

among senior Russian and Chinese defense personnel 

in Khabarovsk, the largest city in the Russian Far East 

and the headquarters of the Far East Military Command.47 The two delegations reportedly discussed “the 

overall anti-terror situation” and “the terrorism trends 

in member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” as well as Afghanistan.48 The operational 

phases of the exercise took place in northeast China, 

at the Taonan training base in China’s Shenyang Military Area Command.49 They then spent 3 days jointly 

planning and organizing for a combined anti-terrorist 

campaign. The most important exercise segment was 

a live-fire drill at the base, which occupied 90 minutes 

on the last day.50 About 1,300 military personnel from 

each country participated in some phase of the exercise. The Russian air force contributed about 20 military aircraft to the maneuvers in China, including Su25 and Su-27 combat jets, Il-76 transport planes, Su-24 

bombers, and Mi-8 helicopters.51 The Chinese military 

sent about an equal number of combat aircraft, one of 

which crashed a few days before the exercise began. 
99

The Chinese armed forces contributed artillery, air defense, army aviation, and special forces contingents, 

as well as logistical support to both sides.52 Peace Mission 2009 differed from the previous two exercises in 

the series in certain respects. The operational phase of 

the drills occurred only on Chinese territory, with the 

single day of discussions at Khabarovsk looking like 

a simple attempt to involve Russian territory in some 

direct capacity. The number of troops participating 

was much less than in previous years, even if some 

more sophisticated weaponry was involved in that 

year’s exercise.

In Peace Mission 2010, an SCO exercise that occurred September 9-25 in southern Kazakhstan, the 

PLA sent a major contingent consisting of a ground 

force of approximately 1,000 soldiers, an air force combat group, and a logistics group under the command 

of Ma Xiaotian, PLA deputy chief of the PLA General 

Staff.53 The exercise consisted of three phases. The first 

stage involved consultations among senior political 

officials and military officers in Almaty. The defense 

ministers, general staff chiefs, and others involved 

discussed how to employ SCO troops to resolve emergencies, as well as the global and regional security environment, defense cooperation within the SCO, and 

other shared interests among the member states. The 

Chiefs of the General Staffs then issued instructions to 

start the drills.54 The next two phases involved combat 

exercises among the forces that had deployed to the 

Matybulak Air Base near Gvardeisky in Kazakhstan. 

Stage two, which began on September 13, focused 

on joint maneuvers and drills in which the SCO contingents practiced making preparatory fire, mobilizing reserves, besieging residential areas, conducting 

breakouts, and using suppressing fire at night. During 
100

the main hour-long drill on September 15, the forces 

employed more than 1,000 armed vehicles, artillery 

pieces, rocket launchers, and other ground equipment as well as more than 50 military aircraft.55 Phase 

3, which started on September 24, saw some live-fire 

drills, and then ended with a display of combat equipment from the member states, which included some of 

the equipment that the PLA had displayed on 60th anniversary National Day military parades in Beijing.56

The exercise included some 5,000 troops, 300 major 

combat pieces such as tanks, other sophisticated defense equipment for engineering and communications, 

and over 50 combat planes and helicopters.57 Russia, 

China, and Kazakhstan each sent at least 1,000 troops 

to the war games, whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 

contributed smaller numbers, though even these represented at least one self-standing operational-tactical 

group.58 Russia sent the largest amount of military 

equipment—some 130 tanks, self-propelled artillery 

systems, and infantry fighting vehicles, as well as over 

100 trucks and about a dozen aircraft from its nearby 

base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, including Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers, Su-25 Frogfoot close-support aircraft, and 

Mi-8 transport helicopters.59 The PLA sent some of 

its most sophisticated indigenous weapons systems, 

including T-99 tanks, H-6 strategic bombers, and J-10 

fighters, as well as aerial tanker and early warning 

aircraft.60 The H-6 and the J-10 warplanes participated 

on their first foreign exercise.61 With 5,000 troops and 

considerable advanced military equipment, Peace 

Mission 2010 was the largest SCO military exercise 

outside of Russian and Chinese territory. With a duration of 15 days, Peace Mission 2010 was 1 week longer than the previous multinational SCO war games 

in 2007.
101

Peace Mission 2010 could enhance the ability of 

the Russian, Chinese, and perhaps other SCO militaries to work together as a collective security force. Like 

the previous exercises in the Peace Mission series, the 

most recent drill could enhance the ability of the Russian, Chinese, and perhaps other SCO armed forces 

to deter—and if necessary suppress—another popular 

rebellion (which the SCO governments characterize as 

a large-scale terrorist movement), such as the ones that 

occurred in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989 

and in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005. The 2010 

exercise occurred against the backdrop of continuing 

ethnic-religious minority unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet, 

newly resurgent terrorist activity in Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan, and the deteriorating security situation in 

Afghanistan and the Russian-controlled territories of 

the North Caucasus. Hundreds of people had died the 

previous year in vicious street fighting between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang and other parts of 

China. The authorities, who used the military to suppress the disorders after the police and other internal 

security forces lost control of the situation, blamed the 

ethnic rioting on foreign-backed terrorists seeking to 

create a separate state of East Turkmenistan. 

PRC representatives especially emphasized the 

counterterrorist dimensions of the most recent exercise. Although the member governments most often 

described Peace Mission 2010 as an anti-terrorist exercise, their representatives and media acknowledged 

that the capabilities on display could be used to deal 

with other forms of internal armed conflict as well as 

a mass terrorist attack.62 In principle, SCO members 

might come to one another’s defense in case of an external invasion, but the organization’s charter does 

not formally authorize collective defense operations, 
102

so all the observations regarding the SCOs having 

more than half of the world’s landmass and a quarter 

of the world’s population are inapposite in that, lacking even a collective command structure like NATO 

and divided by various competing interests, the SCO 

members will never fight as an integrated unit. There 

is also no evident aggressor state eager to attack one of 

the Central Asian members, while China and Russia—

both possessing nuclear weapons as well as powerful 

conventional forces—are sufficiently powerful to defend themselves without foreign support. In practice, 

China would prove reluctant to make such a defensive commitment since Beijing has shunned formal 

military alliances, while the other five governments 

belong to the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO), whose explicit function is to 

provide for the mutual defense of its members from 

external attack.

An important goal is to improve the operational 

and tactical proficiency of the participating militaries 

and increase their level of interoperability. Chinese 

defense representatives have traditionally cited the 

advantage of using exercises with foreign countries 

as opportunities to learn new tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. In this case, they can also use the SCO 

exercises to practice coordinating large and varied 

forces with Russia, one of the world’s leading military 

powers. One Chinese writer observed that: 

For China, the drills offer opportunities to showcase 

the PLA as a defender of peace on an international 

stage. They help enhance the PLA’s military transparency, promote its coordination ability with foreign 

military forces and improve its competence by learning from the military forces of other countries.63
103

The PLA forces involved in these drills have demonstrated increased proficiency over time, though it 

is unclear whether this improvement results from the 

exercises themselves or the strengthening capabilities 

of both sides’ conventional forces in recent years due 

to other initiatives. The PLA has proved especially apt 

at using these exercises to enhance its capabilities. For 

example, the 2007 live-fire drills in Chelyabinsk allowed the Chinese armed forces to practice deploying 

and supporting a large military force at a considerable 

distance from mainland China.64 The same was perhaps even more true in Peace Mission 2010, when the 

PLA demonstrated improved logistics, command and 

control, and more sophisticated weapons and tactics. 

Before the exercise began, the PLA forces undertook 

extensive pre-deployment theoretical, basic, and combined combat training, optimized for joint counterterrorist training.65

In early September, hundreds of PLA soldiers 

traveled by train at the starting from a PLA training 

military base at Zhurihe, located in North China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, to Matybulak Air 

Base in Kazakhstan. The total distance covered during 

the week-long trip was 5,000 kilometers (km), after 

which the PLA soldiers immediately began preparing for their drills.66 One Chinese writer boasted that 

this represented “a big test for PLA’s comprehensive 

transportation capability.”67 According to Li Zhujun, 

deputy chief of the exterior liaison of the Chinese 

command of the military exercises, the PLA moved a 

total of six contingents of almost 1,000 troops, 1,000 

tons of materials, and additional quantities of military 

equipment. PLA logisticians also had the opportunity to load and unload carriages as they passed from 

the 2.98-meter gauge used in China to the 2.87-meter 
104

gauge employed in Kazakhstan. “By improving the 

quality of service and logistics in various links,” Li 

declared, “we have created conditions for the soldiers 

and officers to devote themselves to the exercises in 

high spirits and full of vitality.”68

Peace Mission 2010 also involved more demanding live-fire drills than previous SCO exercises. In 

those cases, the simulated combat operations often 

appeared as media shows, timed to coincide with the 

annual SCO heads-of-state summits. In 2010, the live 

drills occurred over several days, and about 50 percent took place at night.69 The Chinese Army’s helicopters rehearsed their first nighttime shooting exercise.70 Perhaps the most interesting skill demonstrated 

by the PLA was how the Air Force conducted its first 

simulated long-range air strike. Four H-6 bombers and 

two J-10 fighter jets took off from air bases in Urumqi, 

China. They then divided into two groups that, following mid-air refueling, each rehearsed bombing 

ground targets in Kazakhstan, 2,000 km away from 

their departure base. According to PRC military officials, these planes could have conducted their bombing runs even without refueling.71 Having the capacity to conduct long-range air strikes and coordinate 

air-ground battle maneuvers could prove useful for 

attacking insurgents in Central Asia, as well as combating Indian ground forces further north. A Chinese 

analyst claimed that the H-6 bombers hit their target 

every time and that the helicopters were able to fly 

only 40 meters above the ground in a valley.72 A Western analyst termed the strikes a “milestone” in the 

PLA’s ability to intervene rapidly in Central Asia.73

In order to accomplish these expensive and complex training exercises, the logistical challenges of 

moving a large force into the host country must be 
105

overcome. This is essentially akin to the logistical capabilities needed to project force in the case of conflict. In the case of China’s most recent military exercise with the SCO, the PLA used a mix of air and rail 

transport to rapidly move an expeditionary force of 

over 1,000 men and their vehicles from eastern China 

to Kazakhstan, a journey covering 5,000 km.74 In this 

same exercise, the PLAAF tested its newly developed 

integrated air strike capabilities. Four H-6 bombers 

with two J-10 fighter escorts, supported by tankers 

and an airborne command aircraft, took off from a 

base in Xinjiang and struck their targets in Kazakhstan.75 Successful demonstrations of air power projection are a result of the increased training of PLAAF 

pilots, who have increased annual training from less 

than 100 hours to over 200 hours.76 The PLAAF now 

trains in all weather conditions as well to give its pilots skills required to field a professional air force with 

the means to have a strategic impact. The PLAAF has 

changed from a purely defensive force to one with the 

ability to commit to a broader—although still limited 

in comparison to the U.S. Air Force—range of missions outside of PRC territory.

Force projection is inherently linked to the logistical capabilities of a country’s military. An army must 

be able to have constant access to food, munitions, and 

fuel to maintain combat effectiveness in foreign territory. In the case of China, transportation systems are 

well developed in the coastal regions of the east, promoting economic growth and allowing for the easy 

flow of supplies in case of conflict with Taiwan or other maritime neighbors. The western frontier is a different matter altogether; much of the Xinjiang Military 

District is desert and mountains. To improve logistical capabilities in this western district and throughout 
106

all of mainland China, the National Trunk Highway 

System (NTHS) is being expanded through the 

Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions, giving PLA 

group armies the logistical ability to resupply and 

redeploy as needed. An advanced highway system 

would give the 47th and 21st Group Armies, the latter 

of which contains the Lanzhou Military Region’s special operations group, expanded capabilities to move 

men and vehicles to the borders of Central Asian 

countries. Using the current transportation system, 

their headquarters in Shaanxi is 3,731 km from the 

western frontier. 

As the NTHS expands over the next decade, the 

PLA will find that its logistical base has improved 

dramatically. Because of the need to move military 

forces to flashpoints along the western frontier, the 

PLA has created rapid reaction forces and Resolving 

Emerging Mobile Combat Forces. These forces are capable of being deployed in the event of high intensity 

but short duration conflicts, conventional large-scale 

theater wars, and everything in between.77 The true 

strength of these new mechanized forces is their small 

logistic footprint and organizational flexibility, which 

allows them to fight as independent battle groups in 

the undeveloped rural areas of Xinjiang and Tibet, 

while also enabling the integration of logistical and armored units.78 The unique structure of these forward 

deployed mechanized units sets them apart from their 

counterparts in the PLA. 

The logistics of China’s air projection capabilities 

are increasingly effective due to the close proximity of 

PLAAF bases and civilian airports capable of handling 

military air traffic to the western borders. There is a 

major PLAAF airbase only a 90 km drive from the city 

of Kumul, Xinjiang. The Urumqi Airport and Urumqi 
107

South Air Base both have viable launching points for 

any planes in the PLAAF fleet. Furthermore, they are 

located within 1,700 km of the capital cities of all countries bordering the Lanzhou Military Region. This location puts the J-11 with a combat range of 2,000 km79

and Su-30MKK with a combat range of 3,000 km80

well within effective ranges to support any ground 

operations in the Greater Central Asian (GCA) region. 

While this range is greatly increased with the use of 

tanker aircraft such as the H-6U,81 joint operation capabilities between ground and air forces, while they 

do exist, are still limited by limitations in the PLA’s 

command and control capabilities.82 The PLAAF effectively demonstrated the use of its aerial tanker and 

command and control planes, as well as the H-6 longrange strategic bomber, in the controlled environment 

of the Peace Mission 2010 SCO exercise; this bomber 

has a combat range of 8,060 km.83

Furthermore, the PLAAF strategy for aerial combat 

stresses the targeting of enemy air assets while on the 

ground, which suggests that the PLA lacks an advantage against more advanced air forces such as those of 

the United States or Russia.84 While this lack of confidence to commit to air-to-air combat is unwarranted 

against China’s neighboring Central Asian countries, 

the PLAAF’s preparation for anti-ground operations 

would make the targeting of airbases a top priority for 

a first strike in any air campaign. The PLAAF also has 

a regional air lift capability; its most well equipped 

heavy air transport currently in the fleet is the Il-76, 

which can drop 190 paratroopers or three armored vehicles over a distance of 6,100 km.85

The future is also promising for PLA air projection 

capabilities. The Y-9 unveiled in 2005 is the Chinese 

equivalent to the American C-130J; it boasts a ferry 
108

range of 7,800 km and increased lift capacity with 

the ability to transport armored vehicles, helicopters, 

cargo containers, or up to 130 paratroopers.86 The likelihood of airborne infantry and SOF being utilized to 

attack deep enemy targets in the event of an air campaign is very likely due to their inclusion within the 

ranks of the PLAAF.87

Due to China’s landlocked western borders, its 

short range ballistic missiles and medium range ballistic missiles arsenals can be utilized as a means of 

power projection in tactical support of ground forces 

or strategic strikes. The maximum range of China’s 

farthest reaching conventional ballistic missile is 1,770 

km, giving the PLA strategic missile force’s (2nd Artillery) extensive reach in Greater Central Asia. In 

accordance with the PLAAF’s evolving doctrine, the 

strategic missile forces should be used to supplement 

the PLAAF, which may lack the capability of safely 

destroying targets that are well defended or have 

large surface areas.88 The 2nd Artillery’s conventional 

missiles, as well as PLA regular army tactical missile 

units, would be employed in both offensive missions 

and defensive counter attack operations against enemy air bases and support facilities, with the goal of 

maintaining or regaining the initiative respectively.89

The PLA’s military doctrine has also evolved. 

This new approach is a stark contrast to the Maoist 

“Peoples’ War” doctrine, which emphasized leading 

the enemy into the heartland of China, where it would 

be destroyed by the masses using both conventional 

and unconventional tactics. The new doctrine calls for 

fully integrated forces capable of combined arms force 

projection beyond China’s borders to defend the PRC 

and its interests. Furthermore, RMA-based doctrine is 

much more flexible; the PLA often uses its multina-
109

tional training exercises as a way of getting current 

doctrine critiqued by foreign commanders while utilizing the experience of their foreign counterparts to 

gain new approaches to warfare in the 21st century.90

PRC analysts have been closely observing COIN 

operations around the world, especially the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and the Russian operations in the 

North Caucasus. It seems that many in the PLA favor the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency over the 

Russian one, preferring the Americans’ high-tech reconnaissance and information analysis over the more 

blunt approach taken by Moscow.91 China’s key observations of U.S. operations have been that air power 

is an important power projection tool, and unmanned 

aerial systems (UAS) are a dynamic part of air power, 

as well as the lesson that information analysis and joint 

operations are central to modern warfare.92 China attaches great significance to the gathering, processing, 

and sharing of intelligence and is moving towards a 

network-centric approach to COIN.93 Chinese special 

forces have used UAS since the 1990s, and the PLA 

closely follows developments in the field. The PRC 

has also developed its own drone with offensive capabilities, the CH-3.94 The PAP has primary responsibility for counterterrorism and COIN operations, 

suggesting that the Chinese see these activities as primarily domestic in nature, but it still holds that the 

PLA would play a dominant role in any external operations.95 In sum, China’s conception of COIN has been 

heavily influenced by what it has seen in Afghanistan, 

and one should expect to see China attempt to mimic 

successful U.S. strategies should it ever find itself in a 

similar counterinsurgency situation.
110

LACK OF INTENT

Despite China’s obvious capability to send a military force into Central Asia, there are a number of reasons to suspect that it will not do so. The PRC remains 

politically constrained in its actions. Central Asian 

governments are suspicious of growing Chinese power, as are the citizens of these countries. Nor do Central 

Asian militaries trust their eastern counterparts. Russia, as well, has an interest in keeping the PLA at bay in 

what Moscow views as its “near abroad.” China is not 

diplomatically inclined to intervene in Central Asia. 

Beijing’s strategy, as noted previously, is to increase 

Central Asia’s stability through economic growth, and 

part of the reason for this hands-off, low-interference 

approach is China’s concern about being perceived 

as belligerent. The PRC’s leaders understand that the 

nations of Central Asia have well-founded suspicions 

about Beijing’s growing power and strive to diffuse 

such concerns through their cautious diplomacy.96

China wants to challenge the pervasive negative perceptions that Central Asians have towards it, with 

the goal of making Chinese power more palatable for 

them.97 Beijing does not care what regime is in power 

in a particular country, as long as that regime will 

work with it. Unless an extremist government takes 

power in one of the Central Asian states, these countries will likely not stop cooperating with Beijing on 

matters of mutual interest. 

Central Asian militaries remain much closer to 

Russia in terms of training and doctrine. 98 The PLA 

is also not a “natural” military partner for the Central Asian armed forces, which have common ancestry 

with the Russian military, and they retain many of the 

same doctrines, equipment, and command structures. 
111

In addition, Russia is responsible for training Central 

Asia’s officer corps and has significant ties to Central 

Asian militaries outside of the SCO, something which 

China lacks. The status of Russian as the lingua franca

of Central Asia also has significant practical implications in the realm of military cooperation.99 As a result, Russia has a military advantage in the region that 

will be difficult for China to displace. Central Asians 

generally prefer to fall within Russia’s military shield, 

rather than China’s.100 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the 

two states most likely to experience crises requiring 

foreign intervention, especially depend on Russia; recall that Kyrgyzstan requested Russian intervention 

during the 2010 ethnic violence, and Tajikistan still 

hosts Russian troops on its soil. The PRC has supported Uzbekistan‘s efforts to prevent such changes 

from occurring.101 For example, China and Uzbekistan 

played a role in blocking Russia from intervening in 

Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic violence during the summer of 

2010, despite Kyrgyzstan’s request for an intervention 

and Russia’s seeming willingness to do so.102

For its part, the PRC remains focused on economic 

diplomacy and does not seem interested in sending 

troops to Central Asia; it would rather build up an international image of Beijing as a beneficent neighbor, 

focused merely on providing security and stability. In 

Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere, Beijing has preferred to free ride on the security contributions of other countries. Chinese analysts recognize 

that, on balance, they have benefited from the U.S 

military efforts in Central Asia and Afghanistan since, 

unlike many other countries, the PRC has not had 

to make a major contribution to support it. Whereas 

American pressure has induced many of Afghanistan’s neighbors to grant the Pentagon military bases 
112

and transit rights and has led many other countries to 

provide combat forces for the unpopular Afghan campaign, China has been able to benefit from these military exertions without having to contribute to them. 

PRC officials have resisted U.S. and NATO pressure 

to contribute combat forces to the UN’s International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF), send police trainers to Kabul, or allow the Pentagon to send military 

supplies to Afghanistan through Chinese territory. 

The main weakness with China’s regional strategy is 

its dependence on the foreign forces to hold Central 

Asian terrorism at bay and preserve a benign investment climate for Chinese investment and trade. If 

Russia and NATO forces fail at these tasks, then the 

PRC government might well have to intervene to protect its large geopolitical and growing economic stake 

in Central Asia.

There are very few circumstances in the current 

geopolitical climate in which China would engage in 

armed conflict with any nation along its western border. Although the PLA garrison in Xinjiang Military 

Region is both qualitatively and quantitatively superior to its neighboring states due to the flexibility and 

high mobility of its new mechanized divisions,103 it is 

unlikely that the PRC would risk its current standing 

in the region by taking up interventionist policies in 

all but the most dire circumstances. In most cases, China would feel its interests better served if Russia or the 

United States dealt with insurgent or ethnic conflict in 

the GCA region.104 In the past, border disputes have 

led to military tensions such as the Sino-Indian wars 

in the 1970s and disputes with Kyrgyzstan; however, 

the CCP would not likely risk seeming like a belligerent power and only commit forces in the event of a 

major threat to Chinese strategic interests. Three cir-
113

cumstances that would threaten these strategic interests and result in the use of Chinese military power include (1) evidence of Central Asian state sponsorship 

of the “three evils” directed against China; (2) a major 

risk to China’s energy or resource security; or (3) the 

failure of a neighboring state, which would bring a variety of adverse effects, ranging from arms trafficking 

into China to humanitarian crises. In this latter case, 

the PLA might engage the situation multilaterally 

with the assistance of SCO partner countries because 

these challenges would not be limited to China alone. 

A threat to China’s energy security could trigger unilateral action due to China’s dependence on energy to 

sustain its economic growth.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Stephen Blank, “The Central Asian Dimension of Chinese 

Military Strategy,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 

China Brief Vol. 4, No. 10, 2004, available from www.jamestown.

org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3652.

2. Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist 

Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, pp. 19-24.

3. Andrew McGregor, “Chinese Counter-Terrorist Strike in 

Xinjiang,” CACI Analyst, March 7 2007. 

4. Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel, and Richard Weitz, The 

Ripple Effect: China’s Responses to the Iraq War, Washington, DC: 

Center for a New American Security, October 2008, p. 22. 

5. Kathleen Moore, “Central Asia: China’s Mounting Influence, Part 4—Facing Militant Threats,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty, November 18, 2004.

6. Ibid. 
114

7. Pan Guang, “China and Central Asia: Charting a New 

Course for Regional Cooperation,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 3, 

Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, February 7, 

2007, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32468.

8. Ibid.

9. Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” 

Central Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 2005, p. 432.

10. “China Plans Rail Link to Central Asia for Oil,” January 1, 

2008, available from business.uzreport.com/mir.cgi?lan=e&id=42174.

11. Zhao Huaheng, “China, Russia, and the United States: 

Prospects for Cooperation in Central Asia,” CEF Quarterly, The 

Journal of the China-Eurasia Forum, February 2005, p. 20. available from www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/CEF_Quarterly_

Winter_2005.doc.pdf. 

12. Marat Yermukanov, “Global and Regional Aspects of Sino-Kyrgyz Cooperation,” CEF Quarterly: The Journal of the ChinaEurasia Forum, October 2004, pp. 13-16.

13. Chinese-Kyrgyz military cooperation is reviewed in Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security 

Interests in Central Asia Reassessed, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2004, p. 28.

14. Matthew Oresman, “Engaging China in Central Asia,” 

CEF Monthly, April/May 2004.

15. “Joint Military Drill to Boost Peace and Stability,” People’s Daily Online, July 21, 2009, available from english.people.com.

cn/90001/90780/91345/6705902.htm.

16. Joshua Kucera, “Central Asia & Caucasus: Governments 

Spending Heavily on Arms,” Eurasianet.org, March 23, 2010, 

available from www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/

eav032410.shtml. 
115

17. Cited in “Beijing Mulls Central Asian Military Deployment,” China Reform Monitor, June 20, 2005.

18. For more on the Russian reaction to the possibility of 

China’s establishing a military base in Central Asia, see Dmitri 

Trenin, “Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A 

Difficult Match,” CEF Quarterly: The Journal of the China-Eurasia 

Forum, July 2005, p. 26.

19. “Kyrgyzstan Won’t Have Chinese Military Base on it 

Territory,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, July 29, 2005. Evidence 

of possible Chinese interest in establishing such bases, and Russia’s presumed opposition to such a development, is discussed in 

Stephen Blank, “China Joins the Great Central Asian Base Race,” 

EurasiaNet, November 15, 2005, available from www.eurasianet.

org/departments/insight/articles/eav111605.shtml.

20. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press 

Conference on April 8, 2010,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t678446.htm.

21. Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs 

with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, 

No. 4, 2010, pp. 483-504.

22. China’s New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and 

Military Power in the Next Half-Century, Cicero, IN: Hudson 

Institute, 2005.

23. Blank, “The Central Asian Dimension of Chinese 

Military Strategy.” 

24. Martin Andrew, “The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s Liberation Army,” 

Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese 

Lessons from Other People’s Wars, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2011, p. 238, 

available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1090. 

25. Blank, “The Central Asian Dimension of Chinese 

Military Strategy.” 
116

26. B. Raman, “Stride 2009 - China’s Largest Ever LongRange Military Exercise,” South Asia Analysis Group, 

August 13, 2009, available from www.southasiaanalysis.

org/%5Cpapers34%5Cpaper3354.html. 

27. Blank, “The Central Asian Dimension of Chinese 

Military Strategy.” 

28. Andrew, “The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s Liberation Army.” 

29. Ibid.

30. “Upgraded Il-76 Plane to Make Maiden Flight in Summer,” RIA Novosti, March 2, 2012, available from en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120302/171691313.html. 

31. “AC313 is Z8F-100,” China Defense Blog, March 18, 2010, 

available from china-defense.blogspot.com/2010/03/ac330-is-z-8f100.html. 

32. Roger McDermott, “PLA Displays Network-Centric Capabilities in Peace Mission 2010,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 180, 2010, available from www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_

news]=37001&cHash=ff5fd5240d.

33. Christina Lin, “The PLA’s ‘Orient Express’: Militarization of the Iron Silk Road,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, China Brief Vol. 11, No. 5, March 25, 2011, available 

from www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_

news]=37698&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=61811bad52f8e3abdee

dcd41e16bc5c1.

34. Joshua Kucera, “China, What’s Next? Central Asia,” 

The Diplomat, available from the-diplomat.com/whats-next-china/

central-asia/. 

35. Roger McDermott, “China Showcases Expeditionary 

Military Power in Peace Mission 2010,” Washington, DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 174, 

September 28, 2010, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_

cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36955. 
117

36. Robert O. Modarelli III, “PLA Missions in Frontier Security and Counterterrorism,” Andrew Scobell, David Lai and 

Roy Kamphausen, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than 

Taiwan, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, April 2009, p. 142, available from www.strategicstudies

institute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=910.

37. “PLA Helicopter S&R Operations.” China Defense Blog, 

August 17, 2010, available from china-defense.blogspot.com/2010/08/

pla-helicopter-s-operations.html. 

38. Yu Bin, “Learning from the Neighbors: The Peoples’ Liberation Army Examines the Small Wars and Counterinsurgencies 

Waged by Russia,” Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2011, p. 286, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1090.

39. Ibid.

40. “Sino-Russian Military Drills Demonstrate Commitment 

to World Peace,” People’s Daily Online, August 19, 2005, available 

from www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/1695/1/114/.

41. Vladimir Mukhin, “Po uyguro-chechenskomu stsenariyu” 

(“On the Uighur-Chechen Scenario”), Nezavisimyay Gazeta, July 

21, 2009, available from www.ng.ru/politics/2009-07-21/2_uchenia.

html.

42. Ibid.; and “Russia and China: Joint Military Exercises: 

Comment and Analysis from Taipei, London, Singapore and Tokyo,” WorldPress.org, August 26, 2005, available from www.worldpress.org/Asia/2138.cfm.

43. “U.S. is Watching Russia-China Drill,” New York Times, 

August 19, 2005, available from www.nytimes.com/2005/08/18/

world/asia/18iht-exercise.html?_r=1.

44. Sergei Blagov, “Russian-Chinese War Game Meant to 

Boost Bilateral Partnership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 18, 
118

2005, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews[tt_news]=30804.

45. Jason Kelly, “Anti-Terrorism with Chinese Characteristics: Peace Mission 2007 in Context,” China Brief, October 31, 

2007, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4514.

46. Zhang Quanyi, “Aims of Sino-Russian Military Exercises,” UPI, July 23, 2009, available from www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/07/23/aims_of_sino-russian_military_exercises/8829/.

47. “Mission for Peace Targets Terrorists,” CCTV, July 23, 

2009, available from english.cctv.com/20090723/106704.shtml.

48. Peng Kuang and Li Xiaokun, “Sino-Russian Drill to Begin 

Despite Crash,” China Daily, July 22, 2009.

49. Taonan tactics training base is one of the PLA’s major 

bases for military exercises. It belongs to the PLA’s Shenyang 

Military Command, which borders Russia’s Far Eastern region to 

the north.

50. Liu Anqi, ed., “Day 2 of China-Russia Anti-Terror Drill,” 

CCTV, July 24, 2009, available from www.cctv.com/program/newshour/20090724/104689.shtml.

51. “Russian Troops Go Aboard Train to Take Part in Chinese 

Exercises,” Itar-Tass, July 8, 2009.

52. Zhang Ning, “Chinese Army Battle Group Ready for Russia-China Joint Military Exercise,” CCTV, July 20, 2009, available 

from www.cctv.com/program/newshour/20090720/104771.shtml.

53. “First Contingent of Chinese Soldiers Arrive in Kazakhstan for SCO Drills,” Xinhua, September 7, 2010, available from 

news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/07/c_13483072.htm.

54. “SCO Anti-Terrorist Drills to Show SCO Potential in Security Area,” Itar-Tass, September 10, 2010, available from www.

itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=15480561&PageNum=0.
119

55. “SCO Troops Stage Second Joint Training,” Xinhua, September 16, 2010.

56. Liang Jun, “Three Highlights of ‘Peace Mission 2010’ 

Worth Expecting,” People’s Daily Online, September 13, 2010, 

available from english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7138773.

html.

57. “Kazakh Official Calls for United Efforts,” China Daily, September 11, 2010, available from english.cri.

cn/6966/2010/09/11/2481s594022.htm.

58. “SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in Kazakhstan,” RIA Novosti, September 9, 2010, available from en.rian.ru/

mlitary_news/20100909/160523960.html; and “SCO Anti-Terrorist 

Drills to Show SCO Potential in Security Area.” 

59. “SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in 

Kazakhstan.” 

60. “Chinese Troops Pay Attention to Coordination with 

Friendly Forces,” Xinhua, September 19, 2010, available from english.cri.cn/6909/2010/09/19/1461s595271.htm.

61. Ding Ying, “Practicing for Peace,” Beijing Review, September 21, 2010, available from www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-

09/21/content_299532.htm.

62. “SCO to Begin Large-Scale Anti-Terror Drills in 

Kazakhstan.”

63. Ding Ying.

64. Roger N. McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, October 2007, 

available from www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Jamestown-McDermottRisingDragon.pdf.

65. “Chinese Troops Pay Attention to Coordination with 

Friendly Forces.” 
120

66. “First Contingent of Chinese Soldiers Arrive in Kazakhstan for SCO Drills.”

67. Ding Ying.

68. “Chinese Army Hones Transportation Skills at SCO War 

Games,” Xinhua, September 22, 2010, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/22/c_13525299.htm.

69. See www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/.

70. Liang Jun, “Three highlights of ‘Peace Mission 2010’ worth 

expecting.”

71. McDermott, “PLA Displays Network-Centric Capabilities 

in Peace Mission 2010.”

72. Ding Ying.

73. Gabe Collins, “China’s Military Gets Expeditionary,” The 

Diplomat, April 15, 2011, available from the-diplomat.com/2011/04/15/

china%E2%80%99s-military-gets-expeditionary/?all=true.

74. Wilson Chun Hei Chau, “Explaining China’s Participation in Bilateral and Multilateral Military Exercises,” Security

Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 51-69.

75. McDermott, “China Showcases Expeditionary Military 

Power in Peace Mission 2010.”

76. Roger Cliff, Rand Corporation, and Project Air Force, 

“Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese Air 

Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. 50, available from public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/

PublicView.do?ptiID=669770.

77. Blank, “The Central Asian Dimension of Chinese 

Military Strategy.”

78. Martin Andrew, “Guarding the West: China’s New Mechanized Infantry Division,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 10, 2007.
121

79. “Jian-11 Multirole Fighter Aircraft,” Sino Defence, available 

from www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/j11.asp.

80. “Su-30MKK Multirole Fighter Aircraft,” Sino Defence, 

available from www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/su30.asp.

81. “Hong-6U Tanker,” Sino Defence, available from www.sinodefence.com/airforce/airlift/h6tanker.asp.

82. Cliff, “Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth,” p. 50.

83. “Hong-6 Bomber” Sino Defence, available from www.

sinodefence.com/airforce/airlift/.

84. Cliff, “Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth.”

85. “IL-76MD Transport Aircraft,” Sino Defence, available 

from www.sinodefence.com/airforce/airlift/il76.asp.

86. “Yun-9 Multipurpose,” Sino Defence, available from www.

sinodefence.com/airforce/airlift/y9.asp.

87. Cliff, “Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth.”

88. Ibid., p. 74.

89. Ibid., p. 134.

90. Chau, pp. 51-69.

91. Yu Bin, p. 278.

92. Andrew, “The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency 

Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s Liberation Army,” 

pp. 240-241.

93. Yu Bin, pp. 309-310.

94. Andrew, “The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency 

Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s Liberation Army,” 

pp. 244-246.
122

95. Modarelli, “PLA Missions in Frontier Security and Counterterrorism,” pp. 148-152.

96. Adiljan Umarov and Dmitriy Pashkun, “Tensions in 

Sino-Central Asian Relations and their Implications for Regional Security,” Central Asia Series, Vol. 6, No. 2, Conflict Studies 

Research Center, 2006, p. 15, available from www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/

Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=92580.

97. Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 77-78.

98. Sebastien Peyrouse, “Military Cooperation between China 

and Central Asia: Breakthroughs, Limits, and Prospects,” China 

Brief, Vol. 10, No. 5, 2010, available from www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36123&tx_ttnews[back

Pid]=25&cHash=42beea809e. 

99. Ibid. 

100. Umarov and Pashkun, “Tensions in Sino-Central Asian 

Relations and their Implications for Regional Security,” p. 10.

101. Richard Weitz, “Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s 

Character,” CACI Analyst, May 25, 2011, available from cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5565.

102. Stephen Blank, “A Sino-Uzbek Axis in Central Asia?” 

CACI Analyst, September 1, 2010, available from www.cacianalyst.

org/?q=node/5395.

103. Martin Andrew, “Guarding the West: China’s New 

Mechanized Infantry Division,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 10, 2007.

104. Olga Oliker, Thomas S. Szayna, and RAND Corporation, 

“Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus:

Implications for the U.S. Army,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2002, p. 216.
123

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK served as the Strategic Studies 

Institute's expert on the Soviet block and the postSoviet world from 1989 to 2013. Prior to that he was 

Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; and taught at the University 

of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial 

Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of 

Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles and 

conference papers on Russia, the Commonwealth of 

Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy 

and security in Eurasia. His two most recent books 

are Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command 

London, UK: Global Markets Briefing, 2006; and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for 

Indo-American Strategic Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. 

Dr. Blank holds a B.A. in history from the University 

of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history 

from the University of Chicago.

ARIEL COHEN is Senior Research Fellow in Russian 

and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy 

at the Katherine and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for 

International Policy at The Heritage Foundation. He 

directs high-level conferences on Eurasian security, 

terrorism and energy, the rule of law, crime and corruption, and a variety of other issues. He also directs 
124

Heritage’s energy simulation exercises and war games 

involving Russia (2007-11). Dr. Cohen conducts White 

House briefings and regularly lectures for the U.S. 

Government, including the Foreign Service Institute 

of the U.S. Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and the Training and Doctrine and Special Forces Commands of the U.S. armed services, Central Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency. 

He frequently testifies before committees of the U.S. 

Congress, including the Senate and House Foreign 

Relations Committees, the House Armed Services 

Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the 

Helsinki Commission. Dr. Cohen is also a Member 

of the Council of Foreign Relations and International 

Institute for Strategic Studies (London). Dr. Cohen 

authored Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis (Praeger Publishers/Greenwood, 1996 and 1998), 

edited and co-authored Eurasia in Balance, (Ashgate, 

United Kingdom, 2005), and authored Kazakhstan: The 

Road to Independence: Energy Policy and the Birth of a Nation (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns 

Hopkins Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 2008).

GEIR FLIKKE is Professor II at the High North Center 

for Business and Governance in Bodø, Norway. He is 

a member of the Advisory Board of the Czech journal, 

Defence and Strategy. Previous appointments were as 

Associate Professor at the Institute for Literature, Areas Studies, and European Languages, University of 

Oslo; Adjunct Professor at the Norwegian Institute of 

International Affairs (NUPI); teaching part-time at the 

University of Oslo; Senior Researcher, Research Fellow, and Assistant Director (Acting Director at NUPI); 

and as Political Advisor, Parliamentary group, The 

Conservative Party. Professor Flikke has completed 
125

the project RuBeKa2 (a comparison of the employment 

of workers’ rights in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) 

and works on questions related to Russia’s modernization process in the north. He has participated in a 

workshop on European security. Professor Flikke is 

the author of an article entitled ”Eastward Bound: Options and Limitations in the Union’s Eastern Policies”; 

and has written a chapter in the book, Arctic Security 

in an Age of Climate Change (University of Cambridge, 

James Kraska). Professor Flikke holds a D.Arts. from 

the University of Oslo (Thesis: The Failure of a Movement: The Rise and Decline of Democratic Russia 

1989-1992) and is a candidate in philosophy from the 

University of Oslo.

RICHARD WEITZ is Senior Fellow and Director of the 

Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security 

developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East 

Asia, as well as U.S. foreign, defense, and homeland 

security policies. Dr. Weitz also is a nonresident Senior Advisor at the Project on National Security Reform where he oversees case study research; he is also 

a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New 

American Security where he contributes to various 

defense projects. Dr. Weitz has published or edited 

several books and monographs, including The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow (2010); Global Security Watch-Russia (2009); a volume of National Security Case Studies (2008); China-Russia Security Relations

(2008); Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of 

Eurasia (2008); Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington 

Responds to Crisis (2008); The Reserve Policies of Nations: 

A Comparative Analysis (2007); and Revitalising USRussian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures (2005).
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editor

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil