### F OR P UBLICATION



## UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J O H N 

### P A U L 

### M I C H A 

### , M.D., an individual Plaintiff

,

v

.

S U N 

### L I F E 

### A S S U R

A N C E O F 

### C A

N A D A 

### , I N C 

### ., a Delaware corporation,

D efendant/CrossD efendant/Appellee

,

G R O U P 

### D I S A B I L I T Y 

### B E

N E F I T S 

### P L

A N
F O R 

### G Y N E C O L O G I C 

### O N C O L O G Y 

### A S S O C I A T E S 

### P A R

T N E R S 

### , L L C, a California limited liability company ,

D efendant/CrossClaimant/Appellant. No. 16-55053

D.C. No. 3 :09-cv-02753- J M-B G S

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California J effrey T. Miller, Senior District J u dg e, Presiding

Submitted Aug ust 22, 2016 *



### F iled October 31, 2017

* T h e p rev io u s p an el f

ro m No

. 1 2

- 5 5 8 1 6
, Mich a v. Gro u p Disa b ility Ben efits Pla n , retain ed j u risd ictio n o f th i s ap p eal.

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### B efore: Michael R. Murphy

, * * 

### Kim M. W ardlaw, and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Murphy ; Concurrence by

J udg e B erz on

SUMMARY * * *



### ERISA / Attorney’s F ees

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of appellate attorney ’s fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) ( 1 ) and remanded for c alculation of a reasona b l e award of fees and costs in an ERI SA case.

The panel held that in a naly zing a party ’s r equ es t for appellate attorney ’s fees under the Hummell test, a court must consider the entire course of the litig ation, r ather than focusing ex clusively on the prior appeal. W eig hing the five Hummell factors in lig h t of all of a defendant’s conduct, from its wrong f ul denial of the plaintiff’s claim for ERI SA benefits
to its filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, the panel h eld that the moving par t y was entitled to attorney ’ s fees for the prior a ppeal, in which the panel had affirmed a n awa r d o f litig ation attorney ’ s fees. The panel declined to consider the i s s u e, n ot raised before the district court, whether fees-o n

-

** T h e Ho n o rab le Mich ael R

. Mu rp h y , S en io r Circu it J u d g e f

or th e U.S. Co u rt o f

A p peals, T en th

Circu i t, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

*** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.

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### fees should be automatically awarded, without application o f the Hummell

test.

Concurring

, J udg e B erz o n wrote that, were the panel reaching the issue, she w ould hold that attorney ’s fees should be awarded automatically o n appeal to a party that successfully defends the fees it was aw a r d e d at the district court, in ERI SA cases as in others.

COUNSEL

M arc S. Schechter and Corey F

. Schechter, B utterfield Schechter L L P, San Dieg o, California, f o r Defendant/CrossClaimant/Appellant.

Michael B

. B ernacchi and Keiko J

. Kojima, B u rke W illiams & S o r e n s e n L L P
, L o s A n g e l e s , C a l i f o r n i a , f o r Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Appellee.

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### OP INION

MURPHY, Circuit J u dg e:

I. INTRODUCTION

This court g enerally employ s the five-part test set o ut in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co.
, 634 F .2d 446 (9th Cir. 1980),
to determine the app r o p r iateness of awarding or deny ing a 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(g )(1) ERI SA-based request for appellate attorney ’s fees. 1 

### S

e e Credit Managers Ass’n of S. Cal. v

. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co.
, 25 F .3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 1994); O

perating E

n g’rs Pension Trus t

s v. B & E Backhoe, Inc.
, 911 F

. 2d 1347, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1 9 90). The question presented here is w hether in analy z ing a party ’s request for appellate a ttorney ’s fees within the Hummell rubric, a court must cons ider the entire course of the litig ation. The decision in Sokol v. B ernstein
, 812 F .2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1 987), compels an affirmative answer to that question. According ly

, ex ercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court REVERSES the district court’s denial of appellate attorney ’s fees and REMANDS the matter to the district cou r t for calculation o f a reasonable award o f fees and costs.

II. BACK G ROUND

I n Micha v. Group Disability B enefits Plan

, we affirmed

a § 1132(g )(1) award of lit ig ation attorney ’ s fees in favor o f

1 W e sp ecif

ically em p h asize th e q u alif

i er “ g e n e r a l ly .” A s set o u t i n f r a , th ere m ay w ell ex ist ex cep tio n s to th e rig id ap p licab ility o f t h e Hu mmell test. F o r reaso n s t h at w ill so o n b eco m e ap p aren t, h o w ev er, th is is n o t th e ap p ro p riate case to ex p lo re th e ex isten ce o f an y su ch ex cep t io n s.

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### G roup Disability B enefits Plan (“Group Disability ”) fo r Gy necolog ic Oncolog y Associates Partners, L L C (“GOA”). 597 F

. A pp’x 905, 906–08 (9th Cir. 2014). Micha concluded (1) G roup Disability achieved “ some success on the merits” 2 

### and (2) the district court did not abuse its d i s c r etion in concluding the f

i v e Hummell factors weig h ed in Group Disability ’s favor. Id. at 9 07 (quotat i o n s omitted). Micha specifically

recog niz ed that

[ w] hen, in the course o f the underlying litig ation, t

h e district court informed [ Sun L ife Assurance Company (“Sun L ife”)] it h ad

ser i o us concerns reg arding Sun L ife’s hand l i ng of [ Dr. J ohn] Micha’s claim for disability benefits, Sun L ife settled the suit. W h en it did so, Sun L ife fully vindi c a t e d Group Disability ’s interests in the lawsuit.

Id. 3

2 S ee Ha rd t v. Relia n ce S ta nd a rd Life In s. Co

. , 5 6 0 U.S. 2 42
, 2 4 4

– 4 5 (2 0 1 0) (h o ld in g a p arty n eed n o t “ p rev ail[]” t o o b tain a f ee aw ard u n der § 11 3 2 (g )(1 ); in s tead

, a co u rt h as d i scretio n t o g ran t su ch an aw ard as lo n g

a s th e p arty “ h as ach iev ed so m e deg ree o f su ccess o n th e m er i t s” (q u o tatio n s o m itted )).

3 T h e d istrict co u rt in th e u n d erly in g b en ef i ts d isp u t e b etw een Mich a

an d Gro u p D isab ility

, o n o n e sid e, an d Su n L if e, o n th e o th e r sid e,

co n clu d ed th ere w as “a m p l e ev id en ce” Su

n L if e en g ag ed in m isco n d u ct in d en y i n g Mich a’ s d isab ility claim :

P lain tif f ’ s cen tral co m

p lain t ap p ears to b e th at Su n L i f e

en g ag ed in a p attern o f

co n d u ct d esig n ed

to p erm it th e

co m pan y to av o i d learn i n g certain d etails ab o u t P lain tif f ’ s co n d i tio n th at w o u l d req u ire it t o fi n d h im

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### Micha emphasiz ed that the fee award in Group Disability ’s favor was a “remnant of discarded precedent” and noted that because of a sig n ificant, intervening chang e in this court’s case law, our u npublished disposition was “likely of no practical sig nif

i c ance to any one other than the parties

on appeal.” I

d. at 906 n.1. 4 

### Sun L ife f iled a Petiti o n fo r a

d isab l ed u n d er th e po licy

. In deed

, a rev iew o f th e

reco rd f in d s am p le ev id en ce to su

p p o rt th is co n ten tio n

.

E O R a t 2 5 4

. In resp o n se to t h e d istrict co u rt’ s co n clu sio n as t o

m isco n d u ct on th e p ar t o f S u n L if e, Su n L if e settled w ith Mich a an d
g ran ted h im d i sab ility ben ef its. T h ereaf

ter, i n g ran tin g Gro u

p Disab ility ’ s

r eq u est f o r litig atio n atto rn ey ’ s f

ees, th e d istrict co u rt sp ecif ically fo u n d Su n L if e acted in b ad f

aith in d en y in g Mich a disab ility ben ef i ts. EOR at 3 3 1 (“ W h ile th is case d id n o t reach t rial, th e co u

rt m ad e sev eral f

in d in g s in its Ord er Reg ard in g Mo tio n s to D eterm in e Sco p e o f R e v i e w

. . . in d icatin g Su

n L if e’ s b ad f aith in assessin g Mich a’ s claim s.”). B ased on its f in d in g S u n L if

e acted i n bad f

aith

, th e district co u rt c o n clu d ed “ th e f irst an d f if th Hu mmell f

acto rs w eig h in f

av o r o f aw ard in g [litig atio n atto rn ey ’ s ] f

ees to ” Gro u

p Disab ility

. Id

.

4 A s ex p lain ed in Mich a ,

G r o u p Disab ility is an em

p lo y ee w elf

are p lan

. . . m ain tain ed to p ro v id e disab i lity b en ef its t o [GOA ]

em p l o y ees

. . . . Gro u

p Disab i lity p u

rch ased a d isab i li t y p o licy f

ro m Su n L if e co v erin g GOA ’ s

em p l o y ees, in clu din g Dr. J o h n Mich a. Mich a s o u g h t d isab i lity b en e f

i ts f ro m Su n L if e. Wh en Su

n L i f e d en i ed t h e claim

, Mich a b ro u g h t su it ag ain st Su n L i f e

a n d Gro u p Disab ility

. S

ee 2 9 U.S.C. § 1 1 3 2 (a)(1 )(B ).

5 9 7 F. A p p’ x at 9 0 6 (f

oo tn ote o m itted ) (em

p h asis in orig in al). T h e ru le
req u irin g Mich a to su e Gro u p Disab i lity to o b tain b en ef its f ro m S u n L i f

e

w as ev en t u ally ab an d o n ed b y

th is co u rt sittin g en b an c:

In Everh a rt v. Allmerica Fin a n cia l Life In su ra n ce Co

. , 2 7 5 F.3 d 7 5 1
, 7 5 6 (9 th Cir. 2 00 1 ), th is co u rt h eld th at

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### W r it o f C er t i o rari, asserting the u npublished disposition in Mich a would have wide-rang ing repercussions. 5 

### B ut see id. Sun L ife’s petition for certiorari c laimed Micha would (1) increase litig ation over fee awards and ( 2 ) e x pand the class of individuals entitled to an award of attorney ’s fees, not

o n l y with r eg ard to ERI SA but also throug h “simila r attorney ’s fees claims being filed in federal courts outside o f the ERI SA contex t.” Group Disability filed an opposition to the p etition and the Supreme Court denied Sun L ife’s request for certiorari. 135 S. Ct. 2894 (2015).

Seeking a § 1132(g ) (1) award of appellate attorney ’s fees for prevailing in Micha

, Group D isability filed a Mo t i o n to Transfer Conside ration of Attorney F ees on Appeal to the District Court for Determination. See Ninth C i r

. R

. 39-1.8 (“Any party who is or may be elig ible f or a t t o r n e y s fees on appeal to this Court may

. . . file a motion to transfer

2 9 U.S.C. § 1 1 3 2 (a)(1 )(B ) “ do es n ot p erm it su its
ag ain st a th ird

- party in su rer to reco v er b en ef

its w h en th e in su rer is n o t f u n ctio n in g as th e p l an ad m i n istrato r.” In stead

, u n d er Everh a rt , th e ERISA p lan w as th e p ro per d ef en d an t in a su it f

o r b en ef its. Id

. A f

ter th e f ilin g of th e co m p lain t g iv in g rise to t h i s ap p eal, th is co u rt

o v erru l ed Everh a rt

. Cyr v. Relia n ce Sta n d a rd Life In s. Co

. , 6 4 2 F.3 d 1 20 2 , 1 2 0 7 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ) (en b an c).

Id

. at 9 0 6 n .1 (em

p h asis in o rig in al).

5 W e G RANT Gro u

p Disab ility ’ s Mo tio n to T ak e J u d icial No tice as to Ex h ib its 1 an d 2

. S

ee Ha rris v. Cty. of O ra n ge , 6 82 F.3 d 1 1 26
, 1 1 3 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) (“ W e m ay tak e j u d icial n o tice of u n d isp u ted m atters of
p u b lic reco rd

, i n c l ud in g d ocu m en ts o n f ile in f ed eral o r s tate co u

rts.” (citatio n o m itted )). W e D ENY th e m o t io n as to Ex h ib it 3 b ecau se th ose d o cu m en ts are u n n ecessary to th e d isp ositio n o f th is ap p eal. Su n L i fe’ s Req u est f o r J u dicial No tice is DENIED b ecau se it is u n n ecessary to tak e

n o tice o f d o cu m en ts co n tain ed in th is co u rt’ s d o ck et.

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### consideration of attorney s fees on appeal to the district court

. . . from which the appeal was taken.”). The panel g ranted the motion and before the district court Group Disability asked that its request f

or a ppellate attorney ’s fees be resolved with the five-factor test set out in Hummell

. 6 

### The district
court concluded that despite having achieved s o me success on the merits by prevailing on a ppeal, Group Disability was not entitled to a

ppellate a ttorney ’s f

e es u nder the Hummell factors. The d istric t c o urt reasoned as follows: (1) Sun L ife did not a ct in bad faith o r with c u lpability as to the prior appeal because that ap p eal presented a novel issue (i.e., whether a nominal defendant co u l d r ecover from a codefendant bas e d on the success of the plaintiff’s case); (2) Sun L ife’s ability to pay an award was uncont e s t e d

, but
not determinative; (3) an award of f ees would not deter future misconduct because (a) the prior appeal was n ot taken in b ad faith and (b) M

icha made clear th e “ f

acts of this case a

re unlikely to be r epeated”; (4 ) the fourth f actor, whether litig ation provided a benefit to all plan p a rticipants o r resolved a novel leg al issue, w a s n o t implicated b y Group Disability ’s fee request; and ( 5) the relative merits of the parties’ p ositions on appeal favored Group Disability

, but

6 T h e f iv e Hu mmell f

acto rs are:

(1 ) th e d eg ree o f th e o p p o s i ng p arties’ cu lp ab ility or b ad f aith ; (2 ) th e ab ility o f th e o p p o sin g p arties to satisf y an aw ard o f f

ees; (3 ) w h e t h er an aw ard o f f

ees ag ain st th e o p p o sin g p arties w ou ld d e t e r o th ers f ro m actin g u n d er s im i l ar circu m stan ces; (4 ) w h eth er th e p arties req u estin g f

ees so u g h t to b en ef

it all p articip an ts

an d b en ef

iciaries o f an ERISA p lan or to reso lv e a sig n if ican t leg al q u estio n reg ard i n g ERISA ; an d (5 ) th e relativ e m erits o f

th e p arties’ p o sitio n s.

6 3 4 F.2 d at 4 53

.

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### only slig h tly because Sun L ife’s prior appeal “was predicated
upon fa i rly d ebatable leg al a rg u ments involving a novel ERI SA issue.” As should b e clear from this recitation of the district c ourt’s reasoning

, i n a naly z ing the Hummell factors, the d istrict court focused ex clusively on Sun L if e’s actions and a rg uments on appeal in Micha and refused to c o n s i d er Sun L ife’s c o nduct in the underly ing suit Micha broug h t for disability benefits.

III. ANALYSIS

A. F orf e ited Bases to Reverse the District Court

1. Autom atic-Entitlem ent Rule

Group Disability asser ts we should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s automatic-entit l ement r ule and, on that basis,

reverse the district court’s denial of appellate attorney ’s fees. See Bandak v. Eli Lilly & Co. R e t

. P l a n , 587 F .3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[ A] ffirmance en t i tles an appellee who has properly been awarded an attorne y ’ s fee in the district court to an attorney ’s fee for successfully defending the district court’s judg ment in the court of appeals. O t h e rwise the
purpose of the initial award—to shift the cost of litig ation to the losing party

—would be imperfectl y achieved.” (quoting Sullivan v. W

illiam A. R andolph, Inc.
, 504 F

. 3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2007))). W e decline to consider this issue because it was

n e ver raised in the district c ourt. S ee Hillis v. Hei n e m a n , 626 F .3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). 7

7 It is, th eref

o re, u n n ecessary

to d ecid e w

h eth er ex t an t Nin th

Circu i t p reced en t w ou ld p rev en t th e ad o p tio n o f an au to m atic- en titlem e n t r u l e. In Cred it Ma n ag er

s A s s o c ia tio n o

f So u t h ern Ca lifo rn ia
, th is co u rt h eld th at “ [i]n co n sid erin g w

h eth er to aw ard a p p e l l ate f ees u n d er 29 U.S.C.

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### 2. P revailing-P arty P resum ption

Group Disability claims the district co u r t erred when it failed to apply a prevailing -party presumption in resolving its entitlement to appellate a t t orney ’s f ees. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. R et. Income Plan for Hour ly-Rated E m p s

. of ASARCO, Inc.
, 512 F .3d 5 55, 564 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (“[ A] s a g eneral r

ule, the prevailing party on an ERI SA claim is entitled to attorney ’ s fee s , unless special circumstances would render such an a w ard unjust.” (quotation o mitted)). This issue was raised for the first time in Group Disability ’s motion for rec o n s i d eration. Citing this court’s precedents, the district c ourt refused to consider the issue. S ee Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop

, 229 F .3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to r a ise arg uments or present e v i dence for first time when they could reasonably have b e e n r a i sed earlier in the litig ation”). W e review for abuse of discretion the denial o f

a motion for reconsideration. S m i t h v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp.
, 358 F .3d 1 097, 1100 ( 9th Cir. 2004). W e perceive no

§ 1 13 2 (g ), w e m

u st co n sid er th e f

iv e Hu mmell f

acto rs.” 25 F .3 d 7 4 3
, 7 5 2 (9 th Cir. 19 9 4 ); see a lso Op era tin g En g ’rs
, 9 11 F.2 d at 1 3 5 6

– 5 7 (sam e). T h ere is a k ey d istin ctio n b etw een th o se cases an d th is ap p eal. In bo th C red it Ma na g ers an d Op era tin g En g in eers th is co u rt w as d ecid in g

w h eth er to g ran t ap pellate f ees in ap p eals th at p resen ted ERISA m eri t s issu es. T h is case, o n

th e o t h er h an d , is th e ty

p e o f f ees- o n

- f ees case th at g av e rise to th e au to m atic- en titlem en t ru l e. T h e so le q u estio n b ef o re th e d istrict co u rt h ere w as w

h eth er Gro u

p Disab ility w as en titled to ap p ellate
atto rn ey ’ s f

ees f o r ach iev in g s o m e deg ree of s u c c e s s o n th e m erits in an ap p eal w h e r e t h e o n ly issu e w as th e ap p ro p riaten ess o f a d istrict co u rt’ s

aw ard of litig atio n atto rn ey ’ s f ees. W h eth er th at d istin ctio n i s m ean i n g f u l

en o u g h to allo w a p an el o f t h is co u rt to ad o p t t

h e au t o m atic- en titlem en t

ru le w ith o u t s u

p ersed in g in v o l v em en t o f th e en ban c co u rt is a m atter w e leav e f or an ap p eal w

h ere th e issu e is pro p erly

raised an d litig ated

in th e d istrict co u rt.

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### abuse of d is c r etion in the d istrict court’s refusal to consider

an issue that could reasonably h ave b ee n r aised in Group Disability ’s orig inal motion for appellate attorney ’s fees. 8



### B. Hum m ell ’s Multi-F a ctor Test

Group Disability asserts the district court’s analy sis of the Hummell factors is infected with leg al error and its denial of appellate attorney ’s fees is manifestly unreasonable. I n particular, Group Disability asserts the district court’s r efusal
to consider Sun L ife’s pre-appeal conduct improperly skewed its analy sis of the Hummell f actors in f

avor of Sun L ife. An award of attorney ’s fees is r e v i ewed f or abuse of discretion, thoug h “any elements of leg al analy sis and statutory interpretation which f

ig ure in the district court’s decision a re reviewable de novo .” Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir
, 631 F .3d 1299, 1 302 (9th Cir. 2011) ( q u o t a t i on omitted). Thus, in reviewing a district court’s denial of ERI SA a ttorney ’s fees, this court must reverse if the district court used incorrect leg al standards to reach its finding s. Hope v

. I n t ’ l Bhd. o

f Elec. W orkers

, 785 F .2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). F urthermore, this court will reverse a denial of fees if “it has a definite a nd firm conviction that the district c ourt committed a clear error of judg ment.” Unit e d S t a t es v. Tucor Int’l, Inc.
, 238 F .3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).

The district court erred w hen it refused to consider the full

course of the litig ation, specifically including Sun L ife’s preappea l c onduct, in apply ing the Hummell factors to Group

8 It is, th eref

o re, u n n ecessary to ad dress w h eth er th e p rev ailin g

- p arty p resu m p tio n set o u t in Un ited S teelwo rkers su rv iv ed th e Su

p rem e Co u rt’ s d ecisio n in Ha rd t , 5 6 0 U.S. at 2 4 4

– 45

.

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### Disability ’s request for appellate attorney ’s fees. 9 

### S ee S okol

, 812 F .2d at 561 (“F irst, the district court found that B ernstein had acted arbitrarily and capricious l y a n d

, thus, this appeal would not have arisen had it not been for his initial bad faith in handling the pension.”). 1 0 

### W eig hing the f i v e Hummell

9 T h e district co u rt ref

u sed t o co n sid er Su

n L if e’ s pre- ap p eal co n d u ct in w eig h in g th e Hu mmell f acto r s b e c a

u se Gro u p Disab ility p u rp o rted l y did

n o t raise th e issu e in its o rig in al re q u e s t fo r fees. T h e d i strict co u rt’ s p ro ced u ral ru li n g a s t o w aiv er o f t h e i ssu e i s erro n eo u s. In assertin g an

en titlem en t to ap p ellate atto rn ey ’ s f ees, Gro u p Disab ility sp ecif

ically

n o ted it ach iev ed

so m e su ccess o n th e m erits w h en it p articip ated in an d

su p p o r t ed Mich a’ s attem

p t to o b tain d isab ility b en ef its f ro m Su n L if e. G r o u p Disab ility claim ed th at b u t f o r Su n L if e’ s b ad f aith in d en y in g Mich a’ s ben ef

i ts claim

, it n ev er w o u ld h a v e “ b ecam e a v ictim to th e law su it.” T h e o n ly f

air read i n g o f Gro u

p Disab ility ’ s req u est f

o r ap p ellate f ees is th at Gro u

p Disab ility w as ask in g th at th e d istric t c o ur t k eep th e b asis f o r Gro u p Disab i lity ’ s su ccess f

irm ly in m in d as it m o v ed t h o u g h th e Hu mmell an aly sis.

10 In its ord er d en y in g f

ees, th e d i strict co u rt sta ted th at “ [w ]h ere an ap p ellee seek s atto rn ey ’ s fe e s a n d co sts f or serv ices p erf

orm ed in

co n n e c t io n w i th d ef

en d in g an ap p eal, co u rts i n th e Nin th Circu it rev iew

w h eth er th e ap pellan t p u rsu ed th e ap p eal in b ad f aith an d n o t w

h eth er th e ap p ellan t’ s co n d u ct, w

h ich resu lted in th e orig in al litig atio n , w arran ts a f in d in g o f b ad fa i t h o r cu lp ab ility .” No n e o f th e th ree cases th e d istrict

co u rt cited

, h o w ev er, su

p p o rt th at pro po sitio n

. T w o o f t h e cases, DeVo l l

v. Bu rd ick Pa i ntin g

, In c. , 3 5 F.3 d 4 0 8
, 4 1 4 (9 th Cir. 1 9 94 ) an d Op era tin g En g in eers , 9 11 F .2 d at 1 3 5 7
, in v o lv ed ERISA b en ef iciaries, w

h o , u n lik e th e p lan s at issu e h ere, are rarely ch arg ed atto rn ey ’ s f ees. S ee Op era tin g En g ’rs
, 91 1 F.2 d at 1 35 7 (n o tin g th at “ th e Hu mmell co n sid eratio n s v ery f req u en tly su g g est th at atto rn ey ’ s f ees s h ou ld n o t b e ch arg ed ag ain st ERISA p lain tif

f s”); F la n a g a n v. In l

a n d Emp ire Elec. W

o rkers Pen sio n Pla n & Tr.
, 3 F.3 d 1 2 4 6, 1 2 53 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) (“ [O]u r co m m o n p ercep tio n [is] th at atto rn ey ’ s f

ees s h o u ld n o t b e ch arg ed ag ain st ERISA p lain tif f s.”). A n d i n b oth DeVo ll a n d Op era tin g En g in eers , u n lik e h ere, th ere is n o in d icatio n th e ERISA b en ef iciaries acted in b ad f

aith or w ere cu l pab le at

an y po in t in th e litig a t io n , u n d erm in in g an y i n f eren ce th at th e o pin io n s ’ silen ce ab o u t pre- ap p eal co n d u ct in d icated su ch co n sid eratio n w as b arred

.

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### factors in lig ht of all of Sun L ife’s conduct, from its wrong f ul denial of Micha’s claim to its filing o f a petition for a writ o f certiorar i

, i t i s clear Group Disability is entitled to appellate attorney ’s fees.

1. Degree of

Culpability or Bad F aith

This factor strong ly favors an award of appellate fees a nd
costs to Group Disability

. G r o u p D isability was forced into this litig ation only after Sun L ife wrong fully denied d isability benefits to Micha. See supra note 3. Althoug h denominated as a “defendant” under this court’s then-prevailing Everhart decision, Micha concluded Group Disability w as, in r e a l i t y , a co-plaintiff fully supportive of Micha’s request for ERI SA benefits. 597 F

. App’x at 9 07. Sokol require s t hat courts weig hing the first H

ummell f ac t or consider any p r e-appeal bad faith or c ulpability on the part of the non-claiming party

.

In th e th ird case, Misic v. Bu ild in g S ervice Emp lo

yees Hea lth & W

elfa r e Tru st , 78 9 F .2 d 1 3 7 4
, 1 3 7 9 (9 th Cir. 1 9 86 ), th e d iscu ssio n o f ap p ellate
atto rn ey ’ s fe e s i s so lim ited

, i t sim p ly can n o t b e said th e case b ears

m ean in g f u lly o n t h e issu e at h an d

. It is clear, h o w ev er, th at b o th p arties in Misic p rev ailed in sig n i fi can t p art, castin g d o u b t o n th e n o tio n th at eith er p arty ’ s litig atio n p o sitio n in th e district co u rt am ou n ted to cu lp ab le b eh av io r. Id

.

T h e d istrict c o u rt, in d en y in g reco n sid eratio n o f its den ial o f f ees,

co n to rted its relian ce o n th o se th ree cases, stat in g th ey d em o n strated

m e rely “ th at co u

rts in th e N in t

h C ircu it m ay p ro p erly co n sid er ap p e a l

co n d u ct u n der th e Hu m mell f act o r s , ” b u t d i d n o t p reclu d e co n sid eratio n

o f p re- ap p eal co n d u ct, w h i ch it said co u ld b e, b u t d id n o t h av e t o b e,

co n sid ered

. Ev en w ere t

h e d i strict co u rt’ s dep ictio n o f Nin th Circu it law

accu rate, its ord er is silen t on w h y it relied o n th ree d istin g u ish ab le cases t o ig n ore S u n L if

e’ s b ad f aith rath er th an S

o ko l

, w h ich is d irectly

an alo g o u s to th is c a s e a n d

, as w e h o ld to day

, m an d ates co n sid eratio n of

an y p re- ap p eal b ad f

aith co n d u ct.

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### 812 F .2d a t 5 6 1

. T his rule prevents a party from insulating itse l f f r o m an award of appellate fees by merely identify ing

a n issue whose resolution is “sufficiently uncertain to hav e just i f i ed [ the party ag ainst which a n award o f litig a tion fees has been entered] in seeking appellate review

. ” Sullivan

, 504 F .3d at 672. A party like Sun L ife should not be able to appeal from a litig ation fee award, even o n an issue justify ing appellate review, and thereby impose sig nificant costs on the appellee in defending the fee award, while taking comfort in the knowledg e that any potential appellate fee award ag ainst it will b e judg ed solely on the basis o f its appellate arg uments on the fee issue. Id.

F urthermore, as this court’s memorandum disposition in Micha made cle a r , t h e underly ing fee appeal was a deadender, with no leg a l sig nificance to a n y body b ut the parties. 597 F

. App’x a t 906 n.1. Nevertheless, Sun L ife vig orously litig ated the matter on appeal, g oing so far a s to dubiously
assert in a petition for certiorar i t h at the memorandum disposition in Micha w ould have ex c e eding ly far-reaching implications for awards unde r v a r ious ty pes of fee-shifting
statutes. The first H

ummell factor weig hs heavily in favor o f an award of appellate attorney ’s fees to Group Disability

.

2. Ability to P ay

As noted by the district court, Sun L ife does n ot dispute its ability to satisfy a fe e a w a rd. At no point in its analy sis, however, did the district court indicate what weig ht, if any , it assig ned to this factor. This court’s precedents indicate that,
at least as to a suit involving an ERI SA b e n e f i ci ary as a plaintiff, a defendant-appellant’s ability to pay should weig h strong ly in favor o f an award of fees. See Smith v. CMTAIAM Pension Trust
, 746 F. 2 d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1984).

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### Althoug h Group Disability is not technicall y an ERI SA bene f iciary

, this Hummell factor still weig h s in favor o f an award o f f ees. I n affirming the district court’s orig inal award of litig ation fees in favor o f Group Disability

, Micha held a s follows:

Having c oncluded Micha’s ERI SA suit
ag ainst defendant Sun L ife and nominald e f e n d a n t / p l a i n t i f f

- i n

- i n t e r e s t G r o u p Disability is the proper vantag e from which to review the validity of the d i s t r ict court’s f ee award, this court easily rejects Sun L ife’s
arg uments as to success on the merits. Sun L ife conten ds that in deciding whether an att o r n ey ’s fee award was appropriate, the district c o u r t w as required to focus on the relief Group Disability o btained on it s o wn behalf. At each and eve ry point necessary , Group Disability supported Micha’s request for disability b e n efits as consistent with the insurance contract it purchased from Sun L ife. W h e n , in the course of the underly ing litig ation, the district court informed Sun L ife it had serious con c e r n s reg arding Sun L ife’s handling o f Micha’s c laim for d isability benefits, Sun L ife settled the suit. W hen it did
so, Sun L ife f

ully v i n d i c a t ed Group Disability ' s interests in the lawsuit.

597 F

. A pp’x at 907. According to Micha

, Group Disability ’s interests w ere identical to, a nd fully alig ned with, Micha’s interests in obt a i n i n g a p roper a ward o f disability benefits. That identity -of-interest did not d isappear w h en Sun L ife appealed the fee award in favor of Group Disability

. Sun L ife

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### has offered no r eason to c o nc l u d e that identity -of-interest disappeared w hen analy

z ing w h e ther the Hummell f actors weig h in f

avor of a

n award of appellate f

ees to Group D i sability

. That being the case, the r ule of law set o u t i n Smith weig hs in favor of an award o f fees in this p a rticular

case.

3. Deterrence

The d istrict court c o ncluded the deterre n c e f a c t or weig h ed
ag ainst an award of f

ees because: (1) the orig inal fee award sufficiently deterred insurance companies fr om deny ing leg itimate claims; (2) Sun L ife did not act in bad f a i th in bring ing its appeal because the issue r aised was n o v e l; a nd (3) the fact t h e c a s e only arose under the n ow-rejected Everhart decision, a situation that would not likely r e p e a t, meant a n award o f fees would have no deterrent v alue. The district court’s conclusion i n this reg ard is manifestly

u n reasonable. F irst, an award of litig ation fees and c o s t s i s not particularly meaning ful wh en a defendant can force the

ex p enditure o f sig nificant f ees on ap p e a l to defend that award. Thus, a proper aw a r d of litig ation fees that is not backed up by an a

w ard of ap pellate fees is g enerally not a sufficient deterrent to wr o n gf ul conduct on the part of an ERI SA defendant. Second, the district court’s consideration of bad faith is leg ally suspect because the d istrict court refused to c o nsider Sun L ife’s pre-appeal conduct which, a s discussed above, involve d b ad f aith. See supra n ote 3. F inally

, t h e d i strict court’s third consideration (i.e., that the relative unimportance of the decision in M icha limits the deterrent ef

f ect of any appellate fee award) is a rg u ably inconsistent wit h the district court’s determination that Sun L ife’s appellate conduct was taken in g ood faith because the is s u e o n appeal was novel. That is, the undeniable fact that

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### the district court’s orig inal award o f attorney ’s fees was entirely a pr o d uct of the now-discarded Everhart decision makes Sun L ife’s vig orous appellate a dv ocacy , ex e mplified by its petition for certiorari, all the harder to understand a nd all the more susceptible to the deterrent e ffect o f an award o f appellate f

ees. The district court abused i t s discretion in concluding this factor w eig hed ag a inst an award of f e e s. I nstead, an award of appellate fees in the circumstances present in this appeal would have a sig nificant deterrent effect

as to the bring ing of marg inal appeals after a misconductb a sed denial of ERI SA b enefits, see supra n ote 3
, led to a n award of litig ation fees and costs.

4. Signif

icance of Legal Issue/Benef

it t o All P lan P articipants

Micha held that the resolution o f Sun L ife’s appeal h ad no practical sig nificance to any body but the pa r t ies on appeal. 597 F

. App’x at 906 n.1. B ecause Sun L ife vigo r o u s l y pursued an appeal w ith limited practica l s i gnificance all the
way throug h a petition f or a w r i t of certiorari, this factor weig hs in favor of an award of fees to Group Disability

. 1 1

11 In co n clu d in g th i s f

acto r did n ot w eig h in f

av o r o f an aw ard o f f

ees, t h e d istrict co u rt stated as f o llo w s: “ G ro u

p Disab ility ad m its th at t h is f acto r do es n o t w eig h in f av o r of an aw ar d o f fees. In stead

, Gro u p Disab ility arg u es th at t h i s f acto r is larg ely i n ap plicab le in an i n d iv id u al d isp u te an d sh ou ld th eref

o re b e d eem ed in ap p licab le h ere.” T h e d istrict

co u rt’ s d ecisio n i s b ased u p o n a m isread in g o f th e reco rd

. In its req u est f o r f ees, Gro u p Disab ility sp ecif

ically arg u ed th at b ecau se th e litig atio n f ee aw ard w as w ell g ro u n d ed in law an d eq u ity

, Su n Li fe ’s ap peal f

ro m th at aw ard d id n o t p resen t a sig n if ican t l eg al issu e. It is certain ly t ru e th at in its rep ly in su

pp o rt o f an aw ard o f f

ees, Gro u p Disab ility co n ced ed th at th e o th er p o rtio n o f th is f

acto r, b en ef

i t to o th ers, w as irrelev an t. No t ab ly

, h o w ev er, t

h ere is n o th in g in Gro u

p Disab ility ’ s rep ly w ith d raw in g its
p r e v io u s arg u m en t th at b ecau se S u n L if e’ s ap p eal d id n o t p resen t a

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### 5. Relative Merits of t he P arties’ P ositions

Given that Group Disability prevailed on every matter at issue in Micha

, the d i strict court correctly concluded this factor favored an award of fees because Group Disability prevailed on appeal.

Properly v iewed, e ach of the Hummell factors weig hs in favor of an appellat e f

ee award to Group Disability

. The district court’s contrary conclusion and denial of an award o f appellate attorney ’ s fees amounts to an abuse of discretion.

IV. CONCLUSION

F or those reasons set out above, the district court’s denial of Group D isability ’s motion for appellate attorney ’s fees a nd
costs is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the district c ourt for the calculation of a r easonable award of fees and costs.

sig n if ican t leg al issu e, th is f

acto r still f

av ored an aw ard o f f

ees. T h u s, th e d istrict co u rt erred in co n c l u d i n g G ro u p Disab ility co n ced ed th e in ap p licab i l i ty o f th is en tire f acto r, in stead o f co n ced in g th e in ap plicab ility

o f th e b en ef it- to

- o th er- p articip an ts p o rtio n of th e f o u rth Hu mmell f

acto r.

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### B ERZ ON, Circuit J udg e , concurring :

I concur in the opinion with the following observations:

W e re we reaching the issue

, 1 

### I would hold that both Supreme Court precedent a n d o u r own case law compel the conclusion that ERI SA § 502(g )(1) fees should be aw arded

on appeal to a

party that successfully

defends the fees it was awarded at the district court. Put another way , “fees-on-fees” should be n ig h unto automatic, in ERI SA cases a s in others. W e should not troop throug h the H ummell factors, see Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co.
, 634 F .2 d 446, 4 53 (9th Cir. 1980), with reg ard to th e f e e s appeal—even thoug h, a s the opinion in this case illustrates, the result of doing so properly is likely another fee award.

The case law on fee-shifting statutes is well-settled. See,
e.g. , Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean
, 49 6 U

. S

. 154, 161–63 ( 1 990); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
, 4 96 U.S. 384, 4 08–09 (1990). “[ C] ourts have uniformly held that ti m e spent establishing the entitlement to and a m o u nt of the fee is compensable under federal fe e

- s h ifting provisions

. . . . ” Blixseth v. Y

ellowstone M

ountain Club, LLC
, 8 54 F .3d 626, 629 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2017). W e have applied this principle in

1 As t h e m ain o p in io n n o tes, Gro u p Disab ility af

f irm ativ ely in v ited

u se o f th e Hu mmell

f acto rs in an aly zin g f

ees f o r th e f ees ap p eal, arg u in g

ex clu siv ely o n th at b asis to th e district co u rt. S e e O p

. at 7

– 9

. O n ly on ap p eal d id Gro u

p Disab i lity assert th at ap p ell a t e f ees are n early alw ay s

av ailab le f

o r th e su ccessf

u l def en se o f a f ee aw ard

. W e h av e d iscretio n to

“ co n sid er an issu e raised f o r th e f irst tim e o n ap p eal if th e issu e p resen ted is p u rely o n e o f law an d th e o pp o sin g p arty w ill su ffe r n o p rej u d i ce as a

resu lt.” U n i t ed S ta tes v. Va ld

ez-No vo a , 7 8 0 F.3 d 9 0 6
, 9 14 (9 th Cir. 20 1 5) (in t ern al q u o t atio n m ark s o m itted ). T h e m aj o rity h as o p ted n o t to ex ercise th at d iscretio n

h ere. S ee Op . at 9 . I acced e to th at d ecisio n

.

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### numerous contex ts. See, e.g. , id

. ( fe e s under 28 U .S.C. § 1927); In re S. Cal. Sunbelt Developers, Inc.
, 608 F .3d 456, 462 (9th Ci r

. 2010) (fees following dismissal of an involuntary ba n k ruptcy petition); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.
, 523 F .3d 973, 978, 9 81 (9th Cir. 2008) (fees under the F air Debt C o l l e c t ion Practices A ct); see a lso Kinney v

. Int’l Bhd. of

Elec. W orkers

, 939 F .2d 690, 693 ( 9th Cir. 1 991) (common-law fee-shifting )

.

The u nderlying log ic is that unless securing a f ee entitlement on appeal is cost-free to the party awarded fees on the merits, the initial fee award will be effectively reduced o r eliminated, fundamentall y undermining the purposes of the fee-shifting provision. See B a ndak v. Eli Lilly & Co. R e t. Plan

, 587 F .3d 798, 8 03 (7th Cir. 2009); Camacho

, 523 F .3d
at 981. These purposes inc lude creating a n incentive for attorney s to provide representati on in cases where counsel mig ht otherwise be d ifficult to o b tain, or where it is particularly important that the represe n t e d p arty o btain the fu l l monetary amount due, without having to ex pend an additional sum to secure it. See, e

. g

. , Jean
, 496 U.S. at 164 (“I f the Government could impose the cost of fee litig ation on prevailing parties

. . . , t he financial deterrent that the EAJ A aims to eliminate would be resurrected.”); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted

, 831 F .3d 686, 724–25 (6th Cir. 2 016) (“[ D] iluting the o verall fee a ward by failing to provide f

ully compensatory fees for f ees undermines the cong ressional intent behind [ § 1988]
, which is to enc ourag e the private prosecution of civil rig hts suits thr o u gh the transfer of the
costs of litig ation to those who infring e upon basic civil rig hts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). I n such cases, if fee-shifting is to mean any thing

, it must me a n that the prevailing party actually obtains the benefit of its fee award, rather than depleting or ex hausting it in the inevitable f o llow-

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### on litig ation. Moreover, if the party prevailing as to fees will
not g et its full fees for d ef e nding the award, the opposing party has leverag e to f

orce a discount to the f

e e a ward in settlement, without pursuing an appeal and ex pending its o wn attorney s’ fees to do so. Husted , 831 F .3d at 724.

There is no doubt that the ERI SA fees provision a t issue here, 29 U .S.C. § 1132(g ) (1), is a fee-shifting provision o f the
sort covered by these precedents. The ERI SA fees provision contemplates that a court may award reasonab l e f e es a nd

cos t s “[ i] n any action

. . . by a participant, beneficiary

, o r f i d uciary .” Id. (emphasis added). A plain reading of t h i s lang uag e makes clear that Cong ress intended the fee-shifting provision to apply t o t h e “action” as a whole, rather than to discrete aspects o f it. Nor does any thing in the statute sug g e st that the fee award qua l i fi e s as d amag es or operates as a sanction; w here the f

ees are p art o f a damag es or sanction award, the party who w ins the f ee award is not entitled to fees incurred in defending it on appeal. Sunbelt , 608 F

. 3d at 464 (“The distinction . .

. is between those statutes which permit
recovery o f a ttorney ’s fees as damag es, and w hich a re therefore consistent with the American Rule, a nd those which permit the recovery of a ttorney ’s fees qua attorney ’s fees a nd theref ore create an ex ception to the American Rule.” (citations a

nd internal quotation marks omitted)); Blixseth

, 854 F .3d at 629 (“[ T] he Supreme Court [ h a s ] disting u ished fee-shifting provisions, w here elig ibility tu r ns on the merits

or outcome of the liti gation and costs are shifted for the litig ation as a whole, from sanctions statutes like the f ormer version of Rule 11, where elig ibility turned on whether a specific pleading was well-founded a nd c osts are shifted only for a discrete portion of the litig ation.”).

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### Moreover, the Supreme Court has referred to § 1132(g )(1)

as a “fee-shifting ” provision and a s a “sta t u t o r y deviation[ ] from the A meri can Rule.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.
, 560 U.S. 242, 253–54 (2010). And the standard for ERI SA fees under H

ardt focuses on the action as a whole, not

on success on any individual component of the action. “A claimant does not s atisfy th[ e] requirement [ of a chieving

some success on the merits] by achieving trivial success

. . . or a purely

procedural victory , but does satisfy it if the court

can fairly call the o utcome of the litigation so me success on the mer i t s w i thout conducting a leng thy inquiry into the question whether a particular party ’s success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.” Id. at 255 (emphasis added) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2



### The o pinion in thi s c a se g ets halfway to an “automatic entitlement rule” by concluding that the d i s trict c ourt was required to consider the entire litiga t i o n under its second Hummell analy sis. As long as the second Hummell analy sis 3

2 Ba ker Bo t ts L.L.P. v. AS ARCO, LLC
, 1 3 5 S. Ct. 2 1 5 8
, 2 1 6 4

– 6 6 (2 0 1 5), do es n o t su

p p ort a co n trary co n clu sio n

. Ba ker Bo tts h eld th at th e statu te at issu e in th at case

— § 3 3 0 (a)(1 ) o f th e B an k ru p tcy Co d e—w as

n o t a f ee-s h i ftin g statu te th at disp laced t h e o rd in ary A m erican R

u le. Id

. Sectio n 3 3 0 au th o r i z e s a co u rt to aw ard “ reaso n ab le co m p en satio n f

or actu al, n ecessary serv ices ren d ered ,” 1 1 U.S.C. § 3 30 (a)(1 )(A ), a p h rase th e Su p rem e Co u rt h e l d “n eith er sp ecif ically n o r ex plicitly au th o rizes

c o u r ts to s h if

t t h e co sts o f ad v ersarial litig atio n f ro m o n e sid e t o t h e

o th er.” Ba ker Bo t t

s , 1 3 5 S

. Ct. at 2 1 6 5

. C o n s eq u en tly

, th e Co u rt h eld

, th ere w as n o b asis to co n clu d e th at f ees- o n

- f ees w ere a llo wed u n d er § 3 3 0

. Here, b y co n trast, th ere is n o q u estio n th at th e p ro v isio n at i ssu e is a feesh if tin g p ro v isio n , f

o r w h ich f ees in cu rred o n

ap p eal are allo w ed

.

3 Or t h e th ird Hu mmell an aly sis. Or th e f o u rth

. A m o n g th e p ro b lem s

w ith rep eatin g th e Hu mmell an aly sis w ith ev ery f ee req u est is th at it f

o rces p arties b ack

to co u rt to ad

j u d icate f ees f ro m p rio r litig atio n

ad j u d icatin g

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### a c counts for every

thing that preceded it, a party ’s fe e entitlement isn’t likely to chang e from one stag e of litig ation to the nex t. The reasons for uphold ing fees from the district
court will apply e qually to g ranting them for the appeal. The result is, in e ffect, something close to the ordinary fee s

- o n

fees approach this c ourt h as applied in othe r f ee-shifting
contex ts.

B u t if the effect is larg ely the same, r efusing to adopt the

or d i n a r y approach is all the more difficult to justify

. A s

n o t ed, the ERI SA fees provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g )(1), i s not meaning fully different from any other fe e

- s h ifting
p r ovision controlled by Jean

. See Bandak

, 587 F .3d at 802–03. O f course, we do require a Hummell analy sis before ERI SA fees will b e awarded. Simoni a v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan

, 608 F .3d 1118, 1119 ( 9th Cir. 2010). B ut nothing in Si mo n ia requires that the Hummell analy sis be performed more than o n c e , or separately at the fees-on-fees stag e.

The a mount of a fee award may b e determined separately
at the fees-on-fees stag e, w ith the filing o f a n ew f ee application. See Jean , 496 U.S. at 163 (“[ N] o award of fees is ‘automatic. ’

. . . Ex orbitant, unfounded, or procedurally defective fee applications—like any other improper position that may unreasonably p rotract proceeding s—are matters that the district c ourt can recog niz e and discount.”). B u t a s Jean also stresses, the entitlement to fees-on-fe e s a nd the amount of such fees a

re distinct questions. Id. at 161–63; see also

f ees. T h e Su

p rem e Co u rt h as disap pr o v e d o f th is so rt o f “ Kaf k aesq u e j u d icial n ig h tm are o f in f

in ite litig atio n t o reco v er f ees f o r th e last ro u n d of litig atio n o v er fe e s

. ” Jea n , 4 9 6 U.S. at 1 63 (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s

o m itted ).

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### Atkins v. Apfel

, 154 F .3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1 998). Under a fee-shifting statute, the t h r e shold entitlement question is answered only

once.

As the opinion n otes, this court has previously conducted

a separate Hummell analy sis for fees awarded on a n E R I S A merits appeal. Operating Eng’rs Pension Trusts v. B & E Backhoe, Inc.
, 911 F .2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Op. at 9–10 n.7. 4 

### W e c ould, however, l i m it O perating Engineers to its procedu ra l p osture, a nd disting uish it from fees-on-fees disputes such as Micha’s

, w h ere the log ic underpinning the a

utomatic entitlement rule is particul arly compelling

. 5 

### See Voice v. S tormans Inc.
, 757 F .3d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014).

4 I am less co n f

id en t th an th e m aj o rity th at Cred it Ma n a g e r s c an b e d escrib ed as a m erits ap peal. S ee Cred it Ma n a g ers Ass’n o f S

. Ca l. v. Ken n esa w L i

fe & Acc. I

n s

. Co

. , 2 5 F .3 d 7 43
, 7 4 6 (9 th Cir. 19 9 4). Bu t

ev en as a f

ees- o n

- f ees case, Cred it Ma n ag ers d o e s n ot p reclu de an

au to m atic en titlem en t h ere. Cred it Ma n a g ers assu m ed Hu mmell
g o v ern ed

, w ith o u t co n sid erin g an y p o ssib le f

ees- o n

- f ees d istin ctio n

. Id

. at 7 5 2

. It is th eref

ore n o n p reced en tial o n th a t p o i n t. S ee So ren so n v. Min k

, 2 3 9 F.3 d 1 1 4 0, 1 1 4 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) (“ [U]n stated assu m p tio n s o n

n o n -litig ated issu es are n o t p reced en tial h o ld in g s b in d in g f u tu re d ecisio n s.” (citatio n o m itted )); Esta te o f Ma g n in v. C.I.R.
, 18 4 F.3 d 1 0 7 4
, 1 0 7 7 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 9 ) (“ W h en a case assu m es a p o in t

w ith o u t d iscu ssio n , th e case d o es n o t b in d f

u tu re p an els.”).

5 B ecau se Jea n req u ires a sin g le f e e en titlem en t d ecisio n u n der feesh ift i n g s t atu tes su ch as th is, th e ap pro ach tak en in Op era tin g En g in eers

— a sep arate en titlem en t an aly sis f o r d ef en d in g a m erits v icto ry

o n ap p eal—is alm o st certain ly w ro n g

. B u t as t

h e p resen t case co n cern s

o n ly f ees f o r a f ees ap p eal, Op era tin g En g in eers h as n o d irect ap plicatio n

. Mo reo v er, lik e Cred it Ma n a g ers , Op era tin g En gin eers assu m es, w ith o u t

ex p lan atio n , th at Hu mmell ap p lies a seco n d tim e to ap p ellate f ees, an d so lik ely do es n ot b in d fu t u re p an els. Op era tin g En g in eers , 91 1 F.2 d at 1 3 5 6

– 5 7 ; Esta te o

f Ma g n in , 1 8 4 F.3 d at 1 0 7 7

.

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### I n sum, had the automatic entitlement issue been raised at the district court, I would have taken this opportunity to make clear that parties who s e e k fees on a successful ERI SA fees

a p p eal are not required to prove their entitlement to f e e s a second time. As the issue w as not raised in the district court, and as the majority has opted not to ex ercise its d iscretion to decide a new issue raised for the first time on appeal, I c oncur in the opinion.