IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 EASTERN DIVISION 

KEITH CRABBS, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-1126 

 Judge Watson 

 Magistrate Judge 

SHERIFF ZACH SCOTT, et al., 

 Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff 

Keith Crabbs’ Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendant Zach Scott

(“Plaintiff’s Motion”), Doc. No. 38, defendant Sheriff Zach Scott’s 

response, Defendant Scott’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Compel Discovery (“Defendant’s Response”), Doc. No. 48, and 

Plaintiff’s Reply, Doc. No. 49. For the reasons that follow, 

Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

I. Background 

 The Complaint, Doc. No. 1, alleges that, in December 2010, 

plaintiff was indicted in Franklin County, Ohio, on a charge of 

voluntary manslaughter; he surrendered to the Franklin County Sheriff, 

and was thereafter released on bond. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 13-14, 17. A 

criminal trial against plaintiff commenced on March 12, 2012 in the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Id. at ¶ 18. On the second 

day of trial, plaintiff’s bond was revoked and he “was returned to 

custody of Defendant Scott for the remainder of the trial.” Id. at ¶¶ 

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20-22. On March 16, 2012, a jury acquitted plaintiff and the trial 

judge issued an “order directing that Plaintiff be immediately 

released from custody.” Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiff was then returned 

to “the jail,” where he was detained until DNA was forcibly collected 

from him. Id. at ¶¶ 28-34. Plaintiff’s DNA was then recorded in 

state and national databases. Id. at ¶¶ 35-37. 

The Complaint alleges that plaintiff’s detention and the 

collection of his DNA when there were no criminal charges pending 

against him and he was not under suspicion for the commission of any 

crime constitutes a violation of his rights under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also asserts a claim of retaliation 

in contravention of his rights under the First Amendment. The 

Complaint names as defendants officials of the Franklin County 

Sheriff’s Department, the Ohio Attorney General, and the 

Superintendent of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation and 

Identification. Defendant Scott is sued in his official and 

individual capacities. Id. at ¶ 2. 

II. Standard 

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a 

motion to compel discovery when a party fails to provide a proper 

response to an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33. Fed. R. Civ. 

Pro. 37(a)(3)(B). “The proponent of a motion to compel discovery 

bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is 

relevant.” Martin v. Select Portfolio Serving Holding Corp., No. 

1:05–cv–273, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68779, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 

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2006) (citing Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 186 F.R.D. 

154, 159 (D.D.C. 1999)). 

Rule 26(b) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery 

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 

claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance for discovery 

purposes is extremely broad. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 

F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). “The scope of examination permitted 

under Rule 26(b) is broader than that permitted at trial. The test is 

whether the line of interrogation is reasonably calculated to lead to 

the discovery of admissible evidence.” Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, 

Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1970). However, “district courts 

have discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information 

sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce.” 

Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 

(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)). See also Lewis, 

135 F.3d at 402 (determining the proper scope of discovery falls 

within the broad discretion of the trial court). In determining the 

proper scope of discovery, a district court balances a party’s “right 

to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’” Conti 

v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Inc., 326 F. App’x 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998)). 

Finally, the party moving to compel discovery must certify that 

he “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person 

or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to 

obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). See also

S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.2. This prerequisite has been met in this case. 

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III. Discussion 

Plaintiff seeks to compel response by defendant Scott to 

Interrogatory No. 5, which asks the following: “With regard to each 

person from whom, following acquittal, DNA was collected and processed 

pursuant to your policy or policies,” identify (1) the person’s “full 

name, SSN, last known business and/or residence address and date of 

birth,” (2) “the date of acquittal and the date the DNA was collected 

and processed,” and (3) “the charge for which the individual was 

acquitted.” Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 4-5. The parties disagree 

whether the information sought is relevant. Plaintiff argues that the 

requested information is relevant to his Fourth Amendment claims 

because it will show “that the seizure [of plaintiff’s DNA] was the 

result of animus.” Id. at p. 7. According to plaintiff, “[i]f it is 

found that [he] is the only acquitted defendant from whom DNA was 

seized following acquittal and order of release, the implication that 

he was targeted by Defendants is virtually inescapable and goes 

directly to the elements of proof of intentional deprivation of 

constitutional rights.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff also 

appears to argue that the information sought may reveal a pattern or 

practice of constitutional deprivations. See id. at p. 8. Defendant 

Scott argues, without further explanation, that the information sought 

is “not germane to the issues presented in this case or the named 

defendants.” Defendant’s Response, p. 3. Defendant Scott also argues 

that response to the interrogatory would be unduly burdensome. Id. at 

pp. 3-5. 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, binding 

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on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[t]he 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “̔[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper 

function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but 

against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or 

which are made in an improper manner.’” Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 

1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 

(1966)). “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate 

measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 

‘reasonableness.’” Id. (quotations omitted) (quoting Vernonia Sch. 

Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)). “In some 

circumstances, such as ̔[w]hen faced with special law enforcement 

needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the 

like, the [United States Supreme] Court has found that certain 

general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search 

or seizure reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 

326, 330 (2001)). “Even if a warrant is not required, a search is not 

beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its 

scope and manner of execution.” Id. at 1970. 

In the case presently before the Court, plaintiff argues that the 

requested information is relevant to proving animus and the 

“element[]” of intentional deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff’s Motion, p. 7. Plaintiff’s arguments notwithstanding, 

however, the motivation underlying a search is not relevant to whether 

a search is “reasonable in its scope and manner of execution.” See 

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King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970. Animus or intentional deprivation is, 

however, relevant to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. See 

Complaint, p. 15. Further, evidence of a pattern or practice of 

deprivations is relevant to plaintiff’s official capacity claim 

against defendant Scott. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 41. Plaintiff’s official 

capacity claim is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a 

suit against Franklin County. See Briner v. City of Ontario, 370 F. 

App'x 682, 699 (6th Cir. 2010) (“An official capacity suit is, in all 

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the 

entity.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). To 

prevail on his § 1983 suit against this governmental entity, plaintiff 

must prove that a constitutional violation actually occurred and that 

it was a policy or custom of the county that was the “moving force” 

behind the constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The information sought by plaintiff is 

certainly relevant to this inquiry. 

Having determined that the information sought by plaintiff is 

relevant, and within the ambit of discoverable information, the Court 

must now consider defendant Scott’s arguments that the request is 

unreasonable and that response to the interrogatory would be unduly 

burdensome. Defendant’s Response, pp. 3-5. Rule 26(b) provides that 

“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 

that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). However, courts have discretion to limit the scope of 

discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would prove 

unduly burdensome to produce. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); Info-Hold v. 

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Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Surles 

ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 

2007)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct courts to limit 

discovery where its “burden or expense . . . outweighs its likely 

benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 

the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 

action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). “Although a plaintiff should not be 

denied access to information necessary to establish h[is] claim, 

neither may a plaintiff be permitted ‘to go fishing and a trial court 

retains discretion to determine that a discovery request is too broad 

and oppressive.’” Surles, 474 F.3d at 305 (quoting Marshall v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978)). 

 Defendant Scott argues that plaintiff’s discovery request is 

unreasonable and unduly burdensome because (1) plaintiff’s request is 

not limited by time, (2) the Franklin County Sheriff’s computer and 

record keeping systems are designed to facilitate jail business, not 

discovery, and (3) the information plaintiff seeks is in paper files 

and would require a “monumental” expenditure of time and resources to 

produce. Defendant’s Response, pp. 3-4. Defendant Scott further 

argues that, if plaintiff’s request seeks records after July 1, 2011, 

production will require reviewing a minimum of 1539 inmate slates, 

containing at least 3000 pages, and comparing the inmate slates to 

identification master files. Id. This task, defendant Scott argues, 

“will consume inordinate man hours and resources of the Franklin 

County Sheriff.” Id. at p. 5. 

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 Defendant Scott has persuaded the Court that plaintiff’s 

discovery request is overly broad. Specifically, plaintiff’s request 

is not limited by time, and technical compliance with the request, 

which potentially seeks information about every acquitted criminal 

defendant who has ever been in the custody of the Franklin County 

Sheriff, would undoubtedly require an expense that far outweighs any 

likely benefit. Plaintiff does not address a potential time 

limitation in Plaintiff’s Reply. The Court will therefore limit 

plaintiff’s request, for purposes of Plaintiff’s Motion, to 

information relating to those persons whose DNA was collected and 

processed on or after July 1, 2011, i.e., the date, the parties agree, 

that Ohio’s DNA collection law changed. See O.R.C. § 2901.07(B)(1). 

Defendant’s Response, p. 3. 

In arguing that the current request is also unduly burdensome, 

defendant Scott assumes that plaintiff’s interrogatory has been 

limited to those persons whose DNA was collected and processed since 

July 1, 2011. However, defendant Scott has not demonstrated that the 

interrogatory, as so limited, would be unduly burdensome to answer. 

First, defendant Scott’s uncorroborated and undocumented warnings 

of “monumental” expenditures of resources and time are insufficient to 

establish an undue burden. Second, the mere fact that a party’s 

records may not be geared to the demands of discovery does not alone 

insulate those records from all discovery efforts and does not itself 

establish that the current discovery request is unduly burdensome. 

Furthermore, it is not apparent to the Court that the burden or 

expense of reviewing approximately 3,000 pages of information and 

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comparing that information with inmate master files does not outweigh 

its likely benefit, especially considering the constitutional rights 

at issue in this case. 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion, Doc. No. 38, is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. Defendant Sheriff Zach Scott is ORDERED to 

respond to plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 5, limited to those persons 

whose DNA was collected and processed on or after July 1, 2011. 

August 9, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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