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ETHIOPIA AFTER MELES: THE FUTURE OF

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 20, 2013

Serial No. 113–71

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................................... 6

The Honorable Earl W. Gast, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, 

U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................... 15

Berhanu Nega, Ph.D., associate professor of economics, Bucknell University ... 26

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic 

Council .................................................................................................................. 44

Mr. Obang Metho, executive director, Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia ........................................................................................................................ 60

Mr. Adotei Akwei, managing director for government relations, Amnesty 

International USA ................................................................................................ 71

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement ................................. 8

The Honorable Earl W. Gast: Prepared statement ............................................... 17

Berhanu Nega, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 30

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 47

Mr. Obang Metho: Prepared statement ................................................................. 63

Mr. Adotei Akwei: Prepared statement ................................................................. 73

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 96

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 97

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, and responses from: 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto ................................................................. 98

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D. ........................................................................................... 101

Berhanu Nega, Ph.D. ........................................................................................... 104

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith: Written testimony of the Oromo Democratic Front ........................................................................................................... 106

(1)

ETHIOPIA AFTER MELES: THE FUTURE OF 

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:28 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order and good morning, and I deeply apologize for the lateness in starting. 

We never know, when we put together a hearing, what the voting situation will be like on the floor. We just had 14 votes and we 

have more, unfortunately, in the not too distant future. So I apologize in advance for the delay. 

Today’s hearing will examine the human rights and governance 

situation in Ethiopia and the status of U.S. relations with Ethiopia. 

Given Ethiopia’s important cooperation in opposing Islamic militants in Somalia as well as its cooperation in other counterterrorism and peacekeeping efforts, the administration, has been reluctant, in my opinion to seriously hold the Ethiopian Government 

to account for persistent egregious human rights violations, including the inability of the opposition political parties to function, restrictions on civil society organizations, journalists that are prevented from operating freely, and forced removals of citizens from 

their lands. I know they’re raised but my hope is that additional 

weight will be given. 

According to USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl 

Gast—and we’re very delighted to have you here—USAID believes 

that open channels of communication with the Ethiopian Government create opportunities to influence democracy rights and governance issues and I know that is a very real and powerful belief 

and it may work. 

But, unfortunately, we haven’t seen the fruit. However, Amnesty 

International will testify today and I quote, ‘‘[s]ince 2005 the 

human rights situation in the country has deteriorated still further 

with significantly increased restrictions placed on freedom of expression, association and other rights. Sadly, the Ethiopian authorities have not acted in a vacuum during this period.’’ According 

to Amnesty, the U.S. ‘‘and others in the international community 

have failed to raise concern over the government’s systematic violaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Nov 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\062013\81570 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

tion of human rights and flouting of its international obligations. 

The failure to speak out and press for change has emboldened the 

government and has allowed Ethiopia to set a dangerous example 

for other governments in the region to emulate. It is critical that 

the United States and other members of the international community,’’ Amnesty goes on, ‘‘press the Ethiopian authorities to address 

human rights concerns and repeal and reform key legislation and 

policies.’’

Amnesty also notes that in its testimony that ‘‘[f]or Ethiopians 

held in detention, conditions continue to be extremely harsh. Torture is regularly reported to take place during interrogation in the 

initial stages of detention, often before the detainees have access 

to their families or to legal representatives. Prisoners have been 

slapped, suspended from the walls and ceilings by their wrists, 

beaten with various objects, denied sleep, electrocuted, and had 

weights suspended from their genitalia. Solitary confinement for 

extended periods is often reported. Within prison facilities, sanitation was often reported to be poor. Amnesty International has received reports of medical resources being withheld and reports of 

deaths in custody.’’

I would note parenthetically, and I’ll never forget it, in the 1980s 

as a relatively new Member of Congress—I was elected in 1981—

reading Amnesty’s report called ‘‘Tortures in the 80s’’ and it talked 

about what was going on in certain African countries including 

Ethiopia and barbaric mistreatment of detainees and, sadly, as 

they will say today, it continues in Ethiopia today. 

Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country after Nigeria, 

as we all know, and the United States considers its government to 

be an important development and regional security partner, as it 

is. 

Ethiopia plays a key leadership role in the region, hosts the African Union headquarters, and is a major troop contributor to U.N. 

peacekeeping operations. 

According to the State Department, the three pillars of bilateral 

relationship with Ethiopia are economic growth and development; 

democracy, governance, and human rights; and regional peace and 

security. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in Human Rights and Labor, 

Karen Hanrahan, stated in October, in a speech that ‘‘advancing 

democracy and human rights is one of our highest priorities in our 

engagement with Ethiopia.’’

Nevertheless, it has been difficult to get cooperation from the 

current and previous administrations in confronting the Government of Ethiopia. As you know, Ambassador Yamamoto, under the 

Bush administration I actually introduced the Ethiopia Human 

Rights Act because of that lack of cooperation and that lack of 

progress. 

In June 2005, following a contentious election in which Prime 

Minister Meles and his party seemed to suffer unexpected losses, 

demonstrators led by college students took to the streets to protest 

a delayed release of the election results. 

The government’s reaction was to deploy snipers who shot and 

killed protestors and to jail hundreds of others. An increasingly violent response to protests took place in November of that year. The 

3

death toll resulting from both protests was put at 193, but the 

numbers arrested has never been confirmed. 

In the summer of 2005, I travelled to Ethiopia, along with Greg 

Simpkins, to assess the situation and to meet with Prime Minister 

Meles, members of his government, political opposition leaders, including one of our witnesses today, Berhanu Nega, civil society representatives, the religious community, and the diplomatic community as well. 

What I found was a government leader who was arrogant in his 

certainty that he could arrest his political opposition whenever and 

wherever he wanted. 

I also found a political opposition convinced that they had won 

a majority in the legislative elections of that year. Unfortunately, 

the government’s view won the day and I do say, Ambassador 

Yamamoto, I know you spoke out here as well as in Addis over and 

over again expressing the consternation and the opposition of the 

administration and, of course, of the State Department and I always will thank you for that. 

Mr. Nega and other political leaders were arrested and held in 

jail for more than a year on charges that they had to continually 

be changed due to the repeated failure to convict them. 

Some of them who managed to be released from jail found themselves forced to live outside the country, such as Mr. Nega. The political space for opposition parties, as you say in your testimony, is 

restricted. 

The imprisonment and prosecutions of political prisoners has dissolved parties and caused reformulations that also weren’t able to 

continue. 

Mr. Nega founded Ginbot 7, a new political party in Ethiopia, but 

2 years ago it was declared a terrorist organization by the Meles 

government and not only was it unable to operate openly but Ethiopian journalists were prevented from reporting on the party or on 

its statements. 

Similarly, the Government of Ethiopia, according to the State Department’s human rights report, continues to imprison more than 

400 opposition leaders, activists, and local journalists by the end of 

2012, many on vague national security-related charges. 

As of 2011, the Ethiopian Government had completed long-term 

cheap land leases on more than 3.6 million hectares, equivalent to 

the size of the Netherlands, mainly to large-scale foreign agricultural investors. In addition, 2.1 million hectares of land have since 

been made available for such leases to foreigners. 

An estimated 1.5 million Ethiopians in four regions have been 

displaced, many of them subject to a supposedly voluntary program 

known as ‘‘villagization.’’

Other displaced due to these land leases, or because of major 

dam projects, now reside in refugee camps in Kenya. 

Despite an unacceptable political human rights environment in 

Ethiopia, we hold out some hope that the post-Meles government 

may yet change. 

I remember when you testified, Ambassador Yamamoto, in 2006, 

you talked about being at a crossroads and the hopes for change. 

We’re right back there with that hope for change. 

4

Earlier this month, thousands of Ethiopians protested political 

repression in the capital city of Addis Ababa. Under the late Prime 

Minister Meles, such a show of defiance likely would have been 

met with official violence, snipers, and mass arrests. 

But the government of the current Prime Minister, Hailemariam 

Desalegn, did not react that way and this is an encouraging sign. 

Our witnesses today include the former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, the U.S. official in charge of our significant aid portfolio to 

Ethiopia, the former elected mayor of Addis Ababa, a member of 

the first U.S. delegation to meet with the current government, and 

a long-time Ethiopian activist on human rights. I look forward to 

your testimonies and yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for having this 

meeting. I want to get quickly to the witnesses so I just want to 

make a brief statement. 

One, I had the privilege and honor of being in Addis Ababa a few 

weeks ago at the 50th anniversary of the African Union along with 

Ambassador Yamamoto, and it was exciting to be there and I look 

forward to going back in August for a seminar with the Aspen Institute. 

I think that there are a lot of exciting things happening in Ethiopia—the economy. I’m hoping that things will be worked out with 

Egypt over the development of the dam and as we think about the 

economic progress and I think, you know, most folks around the 

world do celebrate that, I do have to say that from the district that 

I represent in Los Angeles there’s an area of my district that’s 

called Little Ethiopia. 

And I know we debate as to who has the largest Ethiopian population outside of the country but I know that L.A. is either number 

one or number two behind the District of Columbia. 

And I will tell you that since I have represented the area—I’ve 

been in Congress 3 years but I was in the state legislature for 6 

years before that and for all 6 years I heard from the Ethiopian 

residents who have consistently expressed their concerns about the 

human rights issue, especially after the ’05 election. 

I was actually preparing to go and then the election happened 

and it, clearly, became a situation where I couldn’t travel there. 

But over the years, I have heard about a number of the human 

rights abuses that the chair described. 

There have been people that have visited Los Angeles who have 

been persecuted in the country and came to, one, see if we would 

be able to support them in the United States, and I know many of 

my constituents feel that they can’t even go home to visit. 

And so I’m looking forward to the testimony. I want to get to 

that. As the chair said, we probably are going to be interrupted 

again. I’m hoping we’ll be able to get through both panels before 

we have to go back for an even longer series of votes. 

So I thank the witnesses for coming this morning. I look forward 

to hearing what you have to say, as I always do, especially from 

the two of you. 

But, you know, I really would like to take the opportunity of this 

hearing to drill down and find out exactly what the situation is, 

what our Government is doing about it and what the future might 

hold. 

5

So thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, Ethiopia is a critical U.S. ally and they have 

helped us oppose, you know, Islamist militants in Somalia, they 

host the African Union headquarters and, as has been mentioned, 

the second most populous country in Africa. 

So they’re the key to the Horn of Africa and the—also the key 

to East Africa and to some extent the Arabian Peninsula, and even 

yesterday we heard about attacks at the UNDP office in 

Mogadishu. And this region as a whole is still very volatile and so 

the importance of an ongoing relationship with Ethiopia cannot be 

overstated. 

And so that’s why it’s disheartening to see some of the problems 

that we still need to address there. One party, as has been mentioned, dominates Ethiopia’s political system. The media is often 

harassed. Basic freedoms are still restricted. 

So these are real concerns and as Ethiopia’s Parliament passes 

new, regressive laws we need to see steps forward and I am hoping 

to hear today from you those steps that we can take that will move 

forward and that exist. 

And as Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of U.S. bilateral 

assistance in Fiscal Year 2012, as we continue to look to Ethiopia 

to be a good friend we want to make sure that those relationships 

are not only good for the United States but for the people of Ethiopia as a whole. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Meadows. 

I’d like to now welcome our very distinguished witnesses, beginning with Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, who is no stranger to 

this subcommittee, having testified before us several times in the 

last session of Congress and again a few weeks ago. 

He is now serving with distinction as the Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S. Department of 

State. 

His prior assignments included serving as U.S. Ambassador to 

Ethiopia as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau for 

African Affairs and most recently as Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary in that bureau. 

He also served in Djibouti, Eritrea, Japan, and China and, again, 

has had a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service. 

We’ll then hear from Mr. Earl Gast, who is USAID’s Assistant 

Administrator in the Bureau for Africa and his work at USAID is 

leading development programming, especially in post-conflict and 

transitioning societies. 

He’s also been a frequent witness before this subcommittee. We 

always benefit from his insights and counsel. Prior to his current 

position, Mr. Gast served in Afghanistan, Colombia, Eastern Europe, and Rome. 

Mr. Gast was also one of the first USAID employees stationed in 

Iraq. He played an equally important role in developing the postcrisis strategy for Kosovo, overseeing all mission operations. Most 

prominently, he received the Agency’s Award for Heroism and the 

Distinguished Unit Award. 

6

Gentlemen, please proceed, beginning with Ambassador 

Yamamoto. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, 

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and the other honored members, and I ask for 

submission of my full statement for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. On my oral presentation I want to add points 

that are kind of different from the statement that I’ve submitted. 

Today’s hearing raises issues that will advance the hope of Ethiopia’s people for the future of their country yet the path that lays 

ahead will be marked on how the people, the government, the opposition, and civil society can work cooperatively and harmoniously 

together to come to terms not only with Meles’ legacy but how they 

will work together to define or possibly redefine the future course 

for Ethiopia. 

What Meles achieved when he was the Prime Minister for Ethiopia was economic growth, set political policies that have guided 

Ethiopia since the fall of the Derg, and the establishment of Ethiopia’s regional and international importance. 

The Prime Minister became the indispensable negotiator in Somalia, the critical mediator in Sudan, the eloquent spokesperson 

for all of Africa on climate and development challenges. 

He proved to be an effective person whose persuasive and forceful negotiation style and intellectual depth of understanding of 

issues set the tone and course of discussions on important domestic 

and regional issues. 

His articulate discussions of issues with crystal clear and insightful assessment distinguished him as a political leader and also 

brought Ethiopia and Africa heightened respect and authority. 

However, the cost of his efforts also raised concerns. As Ambassador, I raised, on behalf of the United States, our voice on the narrowing of political space and we spoke clearly and decisively that 

the laws in—which were passed in and by themselves may appear 

logical and necessary but when taken together and implemented 

without judgement or judicious temperament could prove not only 

a severe obstacle to personal freedoms and economic independence 

but also, if pursued without wisdom, could significantly alter Ethiopia’s image in a profoundly negative manner. 

How Ethiopia’s people, political rulers, opposition groups, and 

civil society work together to deal with not only the legacy of Meles 

but to define where the country moves—either forward in a hopeful 

direction or into gridlock of political partisanships dominated by 

uncompromising views where alternate views or voices are based 

on what is merely wrong rather than what needs to be done, what 

must be achieved to realize a more democratic and hopeful future 

for Ethiopia, remains a challenge. 

Ethiopia, again, I believe, is at an important crossroads in which 

the country, mindful of its past, has the opportunity to move forward. As Congresswoman Bass said, she and Secretary Kerry were 

at the African Union Summit and there Prime Minister 

7

Hailemariam as President of the African Union outlined a key direction not only for Ethiopia but for all of Africa. 

That is to invest in the economy, to realize a transformation to 

a more technical world, investment in technology and vocational 

education, commitment to infrastructure development, overcoming 

bureaucratic red tape and unreasonable laws and, finally, to promote democratic values. 

These are great challenges as well as great hopes. If not handled 

astutely and with great political skill as well as with courageous 

and decisive action, Ethiopia may also go down a very different 

path in which its future could be sacrificed to partisan politics. 

It will take much understanding, compromise, tempered by deep 

commitment to achieve what is in the interests of the people of 

Ethiopia and not in deference to political positions or personal preferences. 

And so the United States will forever remain dedicated to the 

core values and goals of democratic values and human rights policies as well as economic prosperity and security. 

We stand firmly with Ethiopia, its people, its future generation 

to achieve together a better future for Ethiopia and for Africa, and 

I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

8


81570a-1.eps

Testimony 

Acting Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto 

Bureau of African Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Betore the House SUbcOllliTuttee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights 

and Tntemational Organizations 

June 20, 2013 

Fthiopia after Meles Zenawi 

Mr. Chainnan and Members of the Comnuttee, thank you tor inviting me to 

discuss the situation in Ethiopia since the death in August 2012 of Prime Minister 

Meles Zenawi. Post-Meles Ethiopia presents the United States with a significant 

opportlmity to encourage Ethiopia to improve its human rights record, liberalize its 

economy, and provide increased space for opposition parties and civil society 

organizations. Post-Meles Ethiopia also presents a significant challenge since 

Ethiopia plays an important role in advancing regional integration and mitigating 

regional conflict in Somalia and Sudan. Our partnership with Ethiopia balances 

these interests by focusing on democracy, govemance, and human rights; 

economic growth and development; and regional peace and security. 

Ethiopia and the United States enjoy strong ties on several levels. More than 

one million people of Ethiopian origin live in the United States. Many of these 

individuals are retuming to their homeland to expand the political and economic 
9


81570a-2.eps

ties between our two countries. A wide range of groups and individuals in the 

United States provide humanitarian support to Ethiopians. Ethiopia is also home to 

one of the oldest Peace Corps programs. 

Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights 

Ethiopia's weak human rights record creates tension in our relationship and 

we continue to push for press freedom, appropriate application of anti -terrorism 

legislation, a loosening of restrictions on civil society, greater tolerance for 

opposition views, and religious dialogue. The ruling Ethiopian People's 

Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) controls all aspects of govemment, 

including the legislative branch where the EPRDF and its allies hold 545 of 547 

parliamentary seats. Political space in Ethiopia is limited and opposition 

viewpoints are generally not represented in government. in recent years, Ethiopia 

has passed legislation restricting press freedoms and NGO activities. On Jlme 2, 

several thousand demonstrators calling for the release of political prisoners, an end 

to interference in religious atJairs, action on unemployment and comlption, and an 

end to illegal evictions marched peacefully through the capital, without 

govemment interference. This was the first such political demonstration ofticially 

pennitted by the Ethiopian government since 2005. 

2 
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81570a-3.eps

Economic Growth and Development 

Ethiopia ranks among the ten fastest-growing economies in the world, 

averaging 10 percent GDP growth over the last five years. State-run infrastructure 

drives much ofthis growth. Our bilateral trade and investment relationship is 

limited by investment climate challenges and the lack of market liberalization. The 

main sectors of interest to US. companies are telecommunications, financial 

services, logistics, and wholesaling. US. finns have a significant competitive 

advantage in these areas. These sectors, however, are closed to foreign investors 

and US. firms are discouraged by Ethiopia's relatively weak private sector and 

state-dominated economy. These issues are compounded by macroeconomic 

challenges that include volatile inflation, a shortage of foreign exchange, lack of 

capital, financing, and logistical bottlenecks. Despite the challenges, however, 

there are clearly opportunities and US. business is taking advantage ofthem. 

Currently about 100 U.S. companies are represented in Ethiopia. Total U.S. 

exports to Ethiopia in 2012 were $l.29 billion; imports from Ethiopia totaled $183 

million. Ethiopian Airlines is an important customer for Boeing, with over one 

billion dollars in recent purchases, supported in part by the Export-Import Bank. 

Ethiopian Airlines was the third airline to purchase the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and 

the first to get it back into service following the F ederal Aviation Administration's 

temporary grounding. Ethiopia will also host the Africa Growth and Opportunity 

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81570a-4.eps

Act Forum on August 12-13 this year, as we begin the dialogue on renewal of 

AGOA in 2015. 

Ethiopia is a significant recipient of US. foreign aid, having benefited from 

over $740 million in FY 2012 assistance, primarily in health (under the President's 

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Global Health Initiative, and the President's 

Malaria Initiative), agriculture and food and nutrition security (through Feed the 

Future and the G-8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition), basic 

education, and food aid. Other major donors include the United Kingdom, the 

World Bank, the European Union, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and 

Malaria. As a matter of policy, the Ethiopian govermnent is focused on eventually 

eliminating the need for donor assistance. The Ethiopian government co-hosted 

the Child Survival Call to Action and has emerged as a leader on the push to end 

preventable maternal and child deaths. 

Regional Peace and Security 

As chair of the African Union, Ethiopia will playa key role in deternlining 

AU priorities on peace and security and development and govemance. Ethiopia 

views Somali instability and al-Shabaab and other Islamic extremist groups as 

serious threats to its national security. Though not a troop contributing country for 

the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMTSOM), Ethiopia expends significant 

resources to support the AMISOM-led campaign against al-Shabaab including 

4 
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81570a-5.eps

deploying its own forces to tight alongside the Somali National Army and 

AMISOM. Expansion of US. funding of Somali National Army forces in the 

Gedo region is appreciated by Ethiopia and helps keep Ethiopia active in the fight 

against al-Shabaab. Ethiopia maintains strong relations with both Sudan and South 

Sudan and is the sole troop-contributor (4,200 increasing to over 5,000 shortly) to 

the UN Interim Stabilization Force in Abyei (UNISFA), where an Ethiopian 

peacekeeper was killed and two others were seriously injured in an attack on May 

4. Since he took oUlce, Prime Minister Hailemariam has organized two slUllmits 

ofthe leaders of the Sudan and South Sudan to facilitate negotiations; pressed 

Sudan to negotiate with rebels from the Sudan People's Liberation MovementNorth; and urged Sudan to allow humanitarian aid into Blue Nile and South 

Kordofan. The Govemment of Ethiopia has also contributed more than 2,000 

persOlmel to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). 

Ethiopia continues to receive and welcome a stream of refugees from Eritrea, 

Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. 

AdvanCing Our Relationship 

Mr. Chainnan, members ofthe Committee, Ethiopia is an important U.S. 

partner and we value continued cooperation on a range of mutually important 

objectives. 

5 
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81570a-6.eps

As Secretary Kerry noted when he met with Prime Minister Hailemariam 

Desalegn at the 60th mmiversary of the Orgm1ization of African Unity sunmut on 

May 25, Ethiopia plays a crucial role in fostering peace and stability across the 

volatile Hom of Africa, particularly in weakening al-Shabaab in Somalia m1d 

helping n1itigate conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. While the country 

boasts one ofthe fastest growing economies in the world, our evolving c011l11lercial 

and business relationship is limited due to restrictions on foreign investment, 

investment climate challenges, m1d the Ethiopim1 government's strict control ofthe 

economy. In advancing our policy objectives in Ethiopia, we focus simultaneously 

on improving cooperation in security and counterterrorism, strengthening 

economic growth and development, and pushing for greater respect for human 

rights, stronger govemance, and democratic principles. 

We appreciate Ethiopia's in11uential role in ensuring regional peace and 

security, and we will continue to work closely with Ethiopia to coordinate 

cooperation in Somalia, in the Sudm1s, and throughout the region. 

We are also committed to expanding our bilateral trade and investment 

relationship, as a key driver for broad-based economic growth. To that end, we 

will encourage Ethiopia to work toward greater market liberalization, including 

progress towards World Trade Organization accession. Recent successes on the 

economic front include a May 13-15 trade mission sponsored by the State of 

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81570a-7.eps

Illinois and a November 2012 agricultural investment conterence sponsored by the 

Corporate Council on Attica. We are working closely with a major u.s. company 

to secure multi-million dollar deals in support of several key infrastructure 

development projects, and American companies have signed letters of intent and 

committed to investments in support of Ethiopia's country Cooperation Framework 

under the G8 New Alliance. 

On democracy and human rights, we recently secured agreements to do 

media development training and open two commlmity radio stations. Mechanisms 

such as our bilateral Democracy, Govemance, and Human Rights Working Group, 

bilateral Economic Growth and Development Working Group, and Bilateral 

Defense Committee are useful tools for advancing our policy objectives in our 

three focus pillars. At the same time, we are public in our support tor an improved 

environment tor civil society, those we believe to have been subjected to 

politically-motivated arrests, inclusive democratic processes, and rule-of-law. 

Making progress on this area will continue to be challenging and will require a 

great deal of creativity. 

Thank you very much. I will be pleased to take your questions. 

7 
15

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Gast. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL W. GAST, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. GAST. Good morning, Chairman Smith, good morning, Ranking Member Bass and good morning to all other members of the 

subcommittee, and thank you very much for inviting me here to 

speak before you today on an important topic, and that is Ethiopia 

after Prime Minister Meles. 

The death last year of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi marked the 

end of an era in Ethiopia. Fully half of the population had never 

known another leader or another style of leadership and his passing brought with it hope and trepidation for the country’s future. 

Ten months later, the ruling EPRDF remains firmly in control of 

all organs of government. In recent years, Ethiopia has experienced 

a period of relative stability, marked improvements in the well 

being of its people and an increasingly important position in the 

international community. 

The government’s productive safety net program, or PSNP, which 

provides food and cash in exchange for building community infrastructure, helped provide 7.2 million persons with income and 

sources and prevented them from slipping into crisis during the 

2011 to 2012 drought. 

The availability of education and health services has flourished. 

Even in remote communities, economic opportunities are expanding 

for youth and women. Ethiopia is also one of the United States’ key 

African partners in fighting terrorism, promoting national and regional food security and providing peacekeepers in some of the 

most difficult locations in Africa. 

But at the same time, the Ethiopian Government systematically 

limits space for political parties, independent media and civil society to operate, significantly constraining the ability of people to influence government decisions and hold their government accountable. 

In USAID, we have a two-pronged approach to democracy, 

human rights and governance issues. The first integrates these 

issues into our core programs, in other sectors to support social and 

economic resilience and encourage communities to participate in 

decision making. 

For example, by supporting the creation of decentralized financial systems at 76 government hospitals, USAID not only improved 

the quality of medical services but we also strengthened these institutions in financial management, accountability and transparency. 

The second prong of our approach in Ethiopia capitalizes on opportunities as they rise to promote respect for human and civil 

rights. Toward this end, we support political dialogue, legal education and court reforms through a variety of organizations and 

through the government itself. 

Although there are major impediments to working with Ethiopian civil society groups, we do support the organizations that acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Nov 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\062013\81570 HFA PsN: SHIRL
16

countability—that accountably deliver services in a manner that is 

respectful to human rights. 

Our strategy is capitalized on Ethiopia’s commitment to poverty 

reduction by supporting sustainable development through community-based decision making and public involvement in every area of 

our work whether it’s agriculture, economic growth, health, education. 

We encourage social accountability mechanisms such as scorecards and participatory budgeting that helps citizens hold government accountable for service delivery and institute the practice of 

participation and dialogue. 

And by working together with the Government of Ethiopia on our 

shared agendas to advance economic growth and development, we 

are fostering opportunities for dialogue about public participation 

and transparency while having real positive effects that will accumulate over time into significant change, change that will increasingly enable and encourage democratic governance. 

Ongoing dialogue with the Ethiopian Government creates opportunities to advocate reforms that will hold government accountable 

and gradually expand political rights and civil liberties. 

By integrating democracy and governance work into the significant investments that we’re making, USAID is—we are gaining important opportunities to support social and economic resilience in 

Ethiopian society. 

I very much welcome this opportunity to discuss our programs in 

greater detail. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]

17


81570b-1.eps

Testimony of U.S. Agency for International Development 

Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl Gast 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, 

Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 

June 20, 2013 

"Ethiopia ASter Meles: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights" 

Good morning Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank 

you for inviting me to speak with you today. It is always an honor to have the opportunity to discuss 

USAID's work with you, and for me personally, it is a pleasure to appear before you again. 

The death last year of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi marked the end of an era in Ethiopia. Fully 

half of the population has never known another leader or another style of governance, and his 

passing brought with it both hope and trepidation for the country's tuture. Ten months later, the 

ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) remains finnly in control of 

all organs of government. This includes the Parliament, which selected a new Prime Minister, 

Hailemariam Desalegn, and Deputy Prime Minister, Demeke Mekonnen, during an extraordinary 

session on September 21, 2012, marking Ethiopia's first peaceful political transition in modern 

history. It is significant that neither Hailemariam nor Demeke is a member of the TPLF (Tigray 

People's Liberation Front), which led Ethiopia since the 1991 overthrow of the Mengistu 

communist regime, nor are they members of the Orthodox Church, unlike all of their predecessors. 

Tn recent years, Ethiopia has experienced a period of relative stability and marked improvements in 

the well-being of its people. For example, the Government of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net 

Program (PSNP), which has provided food and cash in exchange for building community 

infrastructure, helped prevent 7.2 million people from slipping into crisis during the historic 2011-

12 drought. The availability of education and health services has flourished, even in remote 

communities. Ethiopia is one of the United States' key African partners in fighting terrorism, 

countering the effects of global climate change, promoting food security, and providing 

peacekeepers in some of the most ditlicult locations in Atrica such as Dartur and Abyei. In fact, 

USAID's programs in Ethiopia have seen remarkable results. At the same time, the Ethiopian 

government has systematically limited space for political parties, independent media, and civil 

society to operate, significantly constraining the ability of the people to influence government 

decisions and hold their government accountable. 

US AID believes that open channels of communication with the Ethiopian government create 

opportunities to influence democracy, rights, and governance issues. Bilateral engagement on 

development issues and donor forums are some of the avenues through which the United States 

brings concerns to Ethiopian otlicials. By working with the Ethiopian Government to meet its 

stated commitments to improve governance and ensure that the population transparently and 

accountably receives improved services, the U. S. Government safeguards its development 

investments and encourages democratic opening. 
18


81570b-2.eps

US AID uses a "two-pronged approach" to address democracy, human rights and governance issues 

in Ethiopia. The first prong integrates democracy, human rights and governance approaches and 

outcomes into the significant investments USAlD is making in other sectors (such as health, 

agriculture, and climate change) to support social and economic resilience in Ethiopian society and 

to encourage communities to participate in decision-making. The second prong promotes respect 

for human and civil rights, capitalizing on opportunities that arise. In this vein, USAID supports 

political dialogue, legal education, and court reforms through a variety of groups, including with 

civil society organizations that have exemptions to the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP), 

universities that are not covered by the CSP, and the Government directly. Although there are major 

impediments to working with civil society organizations in Ethiopia, it is in the interest of the 

United States to fund these civil society organizations that deliver services in a manner that is 

accountable to the citizenry and respectful of human rights. 

USAID has taken advantage of Ethiopia's commitment to poverty reduction to build a strategy that 

supports sustainable development through community-based decision-making and public 

involvement in every area of our work-from agriculture and economic growth to health and 

education. We encourage social accountability mechanisms such as scorecards and participatory 

budgeting to help citizens hold government accountable for service deli very and institute the 

practice of participation and dialogue. 

The Ethiopian Government's comprehensi ve development plans focus on agriculture-led economic 

growth as a long-lasting solution to Ethiopia's chronic poverty and food insecurity. Ethiopia was 

one of the tirst African members of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a 

commitment by G8 members, Athcan countries, and the private sector to reduce poverty through 

inclusive agricultural growth. Under the New Alliance, the Government of Ethiopia and G8 

members have endorsed a country-specific cooperation framework, through which the Government 

of Ethiopia has committed to specific policy actions that will improve the environment for private 

investment that will help Ethiopian farmers increase their productivity. 

The G8 New Alliance in Ethiopia is making progress in all commitment areas. An integral seed 

policy commitment has been completed and other commitments in private sector investment and 

land certitication are undenvay. Select multinational and local companies are making progress on 

their investment commitments. For example, USAID, the Government of Ethiopia, and 

DuPontiPioneer recently started an enterprise that will boost maize productivity among smallholder 

farmers and increase food production for local communities by building on DuPontiPioneer seed 

and production technologies. 

Through Feed the Future-the United States' initiative through which it carries out its New 

Alliance commitments-USATD supports Ethiopia's priorities for agriculture-based economic 

growth by improving crop and livestock production, promoting private sector engagement, 

supporting research and development, and improving market activity. Staff of the new Agriculture 

Transformation Agency, the Government's Central Statistics Agency, and the Ethiopian 

Agricultural Research Institute benefit from USALD training to assist them in becoming more 

effective and informed administrators who are accountable and more open to input from civil 

society. Our support also helps the Government survey its citizens on etfectiveness of agriculture 
19


81570b-3.eps

development programs and policies. USALD works with hundreds of farmer cooperatives and 

business associations to improve transparency with improved internal auditing systems, the creation 

of bylaws for election and operations of governing boards, and increased female participation. We 

support dialogue between civil society and federal and local governments, assembling hundreds of 

stakeholder meetings involving government otlicials, cooperatives, agribusinesses, and farmers to 

discuss issues that inhibit the growth of the agriculture sector. 

Tn response to the serious drought that affected Ethiopia in 2011-12, USATD expanded efforts to 

build resilience and reduce the impact of future droughts. Major investments are being made to 

assist the livestock sector to be more sustainable, to help fonner herders to transition to new 

livelihoods, and to tackle nutrition problems. This is part of a multi-donor effort, developed in 

cooperation with the Ethiopian government, which is investing over $1 billion on resilience in 

Ethiopia. The recent creation of a State Minister for Livestock in the Ministry of Agriculture 

demonstrates their increased commitment to tackling these issues. 

The PSNP and emergency food assistance are also critical to continuing Ethiopia's improvements 

in food security and to protecting vulnerable households from shocks. The PSNP-which USATD 

helped design and is now its most significant donor-was one of the first major efforts to introduce 

local safeguards that allow beneficiaries to air their grievances through district and sub-district 

appeals committees. It also promotes civic participation by including communities in district and 

sub-district food security groups that select beneficiaries for the program, develop community 

plans, and choose public work projects. 

USATD's larger effort to improve the health of Ethiopians will also help build resilience to shocks. 

Despite major strides over the last decade, the Ethiopian people still face high rates of death and 

disease. About 350,000 children die each year, and more than 90 percent of child deaths are due to 

preventable or treatable causes such as pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, malnutrition and HTV/ ATDS 

Ninety percent of births occur without the assistance of a skilled health professional, and as a result, 

19,000 new mothers die each year. 

At the African Leadership on Child Survival meeting hosted by the Government of Ethiopia earlier 

this year, the consensus reached by over 20 African countries present was both significant and 

historic. The participating countries declared that they are committed to developing and 

implementing country-led roadmaps that integrate ongoing efforts to accelerate progress to end 

preventable deaths among children by 2035, and reduce the mortality rate to below 20 per 1,000 

live births in all African nations. With support from USATD, Ethiopia has been at the forefront in 

working toward the achievement of these goals. 

USAID's integrated health care program focuses on improving maternal, neonatal, and child health; 

voluntary family planning and reproductive health; preventing, controlling, and treating infectious 

diseases including mv/ ATDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; increasing access to clean water and 

sanitation; and improving the nutritional status of women, infants and young children. USAID also 

supports the development of much needed human resources and health systems. USALD helped 

train and deploy over 32,000 health extension workers and 4,000 health officers, greatly increasing 

the reach of primary health services. USATD also supported the creation of decentralized financial 

systems at 76 government hospitals and 934 health centers, resulting in improved service quality 

and financial management. 
20


81570b-4.eps

These programs are implemented alongside complementary etlorts to improve the governance of 

the health sector and citizen participation in decisions about their local health systems. USAlD 

helped the Government of Ethiopia adopt legislation promoting workplace and community-level 

health insurance, the first of its kind in the country. We are strengthening social accountability by 

supporting civic participation in facility governance boards, which allow communities to take 

ownership of the facilities and demand better quality of services and more transparency in budget 

allocation. An improved health management information system that provides more accurate and 

timely information will improve evidence-based decision making, planning, budgeting, and 

transparency. At the same time, USAlD grants strengthen the technical and organizational capacity 

oflocal nongovernmental organizations to more etlectively deliver health services while also 

strengthening local civil society. 

Similarly, USAID has worked closely with the Government of Ethiopia to improve its education 

system, with impressive results. Over the past 15 years, the Government of Ethiopia has achieved 

unprecedented growth in uni versal primary enrollment, which now averages around 95 percent. 

This effort included a massive initiative to build new schools and alternative basic education 

centers, decentralize the administration of sector, and conduct national campaigns on the 

importance of education. Today, Ethiopia has nearly achieved the second Millennium Development 

Goal, to achieve universal primary education. 

However, three USAID nationalleaming assessments revealed that the quality of that education 

remains well below standards. Rapid growth in enrollment, large classes, and a lack of teaching 

materials hampered efforts to improve educational quality. The number of years a child spends in 

school and the quality of that schooling have a direct impact on a country's future growth and 

stability, so education, especially high-quality education, will be a major factor in reaching 

Ethiopia's goal of achieving real and long-lasting development. Without an educated citizenry, 

Ethiopia cannot expect employees or entrepreneurs to periorm at maximum capacity, or its public 

servants to deliver high-quality services. 

Therefore, USAlD is complementing efforts to get and keep millions of Ethiopian students in 

school with programs that build the capacity of teachers and institutions with the acti ve 

involvement of communities. One USATD program to improve primary school management is also 

building accountable and participatory school leadership while emphasizing strong and continuous 

monitoring of student and school progress. Another program helps to build civic participation 

among Ethiopia's primary school children in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, 

Regional Education Bureau, and the Ethiopian Scout Association. Through this effort, USAlD 

helps youth understand social, economic, and political systems and have pride in their heritage. It 

also enables them to develop a keen respect for the basic human rights and prepares them to become 

leaders in their society. Dunia, the l4-year-old "Finance Minister" of one of the student councils 

benefiting from the support, said that "we collect money in a model banking system, where each 

pupil records their deposits in a banking book and at the same time providing services within the 

school to generate income. The saved money could be used to cover school expenses and assist the 

needy." 
21


81570b-5.eps

To close the education gap between boys and girls, USAID identifies gender-related obstacles and 

implements remedies to remove and overcome them. Better education, especially for girls, has been 

proven to result in better health and nutrition, higher infant birth weight, age-appropriate entry into 

school, lower risk of contracting HlY/AIDS, and lower infant mortality, due in part to delayed 

marriage and child bearing. 

To fuel its development efforts in health, education, and economic growth, Ethiopia plans to 

increase its installed power production capacity from its current 2,000 MW to 10,000 MW by 

2015-a goal that will require a $7 billion investment. To reduce the amount of government 

financing necessary to bridge this gap, the United States is working with Ethiopia to open up the 

power sector to private power providers. Tn early June, USATD signed a memorandum of 

understanding with the Ministry of Water and Energy that will serve as the foundation for a multiyear program to strengthen the ability and capacity of the Government to negotiate and close deals 

with private power developers. 

Sustainable development requires good governance and accountability. By continuing to work 

together with the Government of Ethiopia on our shared agendas to advance economic growth and 

development, we are fostering opportunities for dialogue about public participation and 

transparency while having real, positive effects that will accumulate over time into significant 

change-change which will provide an enabling environment for democratic governance. Ongoing 

dialogue with the Ethiopian Government creates opportunities to advocate reforms that will hold 

government accountable, and gradually expand political rights and civil liberties. By integrating 

democracy and governance work into the significant investments USATD is making in other sectors, 

we are gaining important opportunities to support social and economic resilience in Ethiopian 

society. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, and members of the Subcommittee for inviting 

me here today and for your continued support of US AID's work. 
22

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Gast, thank you so much. 

Mr. GAST. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Out of deference to our second panel, I’ll only ask one 

question because we have so little time because of about 2 hours 

of voting that’s pending, I should say. 

You mentioned that sustainable development requires good governance. We know that for the Fiscal Year 2013, the actual money, 

of the $351 million in total aid, $1 million has been reserved for 

democracy type programs and you emphasized the importance of 

balance. 

Can that be beefed up or are there opportunities that are going 

awry? And as you know, when it comes to child survival and trying 

to mitigate the problems of HIV/AIDS and all the others, I take a 

back seat to no one, but it seems to me that helping get that good 

governance has to be an equal high priority with those other 

things. 

Secondly, on torture, same question or if you could answer it at 

the same time. I’ve authored four torture victims relief bills to help 

people who have suffered PTSD and all of the physical and psychological deleterious effects from torture. 

I have met with torture victims everywhere in the world. I’ve had 

hearings where we’ve heard from them and yet people today in 

Ethiopia are being tortured. What are we doing to stop that? 

Mr. GAST. Thank you for your questions, Chairman. 

Working in Ethiopia truly is a dilemma. We, as an agency, are 

elevating the importance of human rights in all of our programming. It’s a key component of our democracy, human rights and 

governance strategy. 

And the dilemma really is that we’re seeing a government that 

is investing in its people. It is doing the right things in terms of 

social investment and social accountability. 

Yet, on the other hand, when we look at specific instances that 

you mentioned—that I know Ambassador Yamamoto will talk 

about and then when we look at indices that measure human 

rights and governance and independent media, we see that space 

is closing and continues to close. 

So it is a dilemma for us and it’s a debate that we have internally and we also have with our State Department colleagues as 

well as people in the White House. 

So our approach has been to support the good things that are 

happening to support people. That would be in education, and 

when you look, Chairman, at 5 years ago where enrollment rates 

were only at about 20 percent and you see that enrollment rates 

are now at 90 percent, when you see the significant rise not only 

in literacy in the country and among students but especially among 

girls and women, and we look at other health statistics including 

child survival and also maternal mortality, we know that the government is making investments. 

Mr. SMITH. But on the education front, even in your testimony 

you say that Ethiopia has nearly achieved the second Millennium 

Development Goal to achieve universal primary education, but, 

then the big but, that it is inferior. The quality of education is well 

below standard. 

23

So with every seemingly good thing, there’s seemingly down side 

to it. 

Mr. GAST. Sure, but literacy rates are high and so what we’re 

doing as an agency is focusing on outcomes. The numbers are good. 

Now we need to focus on the qualitative aspects and we’re doing 

that in partnership with the government in training 20,000 teachers throughout the country and truly emphasizing learning outcomes. 

Mr. SMITH. And are we visiting political prisoners, Ambassador? 

I’m sorry. There’s so little time. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes, we are and, of course, when I was the Ambassador there we had many discussions and visits to the prisons 

to not only look at the conditions of the prisons but also to look at 

how we can stop any abusive behavior there and to investigate and 

that’s what we’ve been doing quite——

Mr. SMITH. I have several questions that I will submit just because of time. 

I yield to Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. I will try to be quick also. I wanted to know if you 

could say—and if you can’t and we need to talk afterwards let me 

know—but what happens when we raise the issues of human 

rights? I mean, what’s the basis of the contradiction? 

You know, you describe and I’m, you know, aware too of Ethiopia’s great progress. You mentioned several indices. So why is the 

government so fearful? What is—what’s the basis of the problem 

and what happens when we—when we raise it with them? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I’ll give a couple of examples. During 2005 when 

probably about 30,000 people were detained after that election and 

the violence that subsequently followed, there were about 71 political prisoners and one of them is going to be on your second panel. 

We worked very hard behind the scenes to work with them and 

the government to get them out and also to visit them in prison 

and we did that. 

I think the issue is that the laws that were passed—the terrorist 

laws, the NGO laws, et cetera, had been very restrictive and it goes 

back to where is the comfort level for the government and how they 

can balance between what is security related and what really is 

openness. 

I mean, when you have a country that doesn’t even have Internet 

connection from Blackberry——

Ms. BASS. I was going to get to that. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yeah. So that comes to is why. I mean, why not 

have the openness, and those are things that we’re working with 

the government behind the scenes and also in public and to show 

them how the benefits are for these issues. 

Ms. BASS. So the basis of the fear? I mean, it seems to me that 

that’s the reason for this. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It is. It’s——

Ms. BASS. You know, my constituents had asked me—when I was 

in the state legislature they had wanted me to do a resolution and 

then in thinking about it, it might have been a resolution in support of what you were doing with the human rights bill. 

We weren’t able to do that because it—you know, we just dealt 

with state issues. We didn’t get into foreign policy. 

24

But, you know, again, when I talk to constituents they just paint 

such a very different picture and so the basis of the fear is a fear, 

first of all, and the basis of it is——

Mr. YAMAMOTO. As I said, this is a crossroad. I mean, if Prime 

Minister Hailemariam said at the AU, in front of everyone, democratic values are important, unreasonable laws are not good, let’s 

do it. Let’s test it. Let’s move forward. I think that is what we need 

to do. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Meadows. 

Ms. BASS. I think Mr.——

Mr. SMITH. Oh, I’m sorry. 

Mr. GAST. We have also seen some recent openings and so, for 

example, the Ethiopian Government has invited some experts, foreign experts, to come in to look at registration of religious organizations in the country. So we see that as an opening. 

A second one is that we are allowed to work with civil society organizations that are doing peace building—community peace building activities. 

And then the third thing that’s happening is a forum that will 

be taken around the country to review and discuss the Charities 

and Societies Proclamation and that’s the one that severely limits 

the ability of development agencies of working with civil society organizations. 

I can’t say that it’s a perfect picture. It’s nowhere near a perfect 

picture. But there are some openings, as Ambassador Yamamoto 

cited. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Ambassador, I have one question that I’d like 

you to address today, if we can. 

Ethiopia, as we’ve mentioned, is a de facto one-party country and 

you’ve noted in your—that the ruling party, you know, controls 

every aspect of government. I think it was 545 of 547 seats on their 

Parliament. 

What can we do to help facilitate healthy opposition and if there 

is real—a real opposition party that emerges do you see that destabilizing the country or help push for human rights or both? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And that’s an excellent point and that’s the dilemma that we face. After the elections we talked to the Prime 

Minister at that time and said we were very, very disappointed in 

that result because we made so many gains in 2005 though there 

were problems on violence. 

Are we going backwards? We need to move forward and those are 

the areas that I think we’re working with this new government and 

the Prime Minister, Hailemariam. 

How do you develop the opposition to be a very forceful voice for 

the people and how can you allow them to be that forceful voice. 

Those are the areas that we’ve been trying to work very keenly on 

our democracy issues but also behind the scenes and with the government in private. 

It’s going to take time and but we are pushing very hard on various programs and opportunities. I’ll give you a couple examples. 

One of the things in all of Africa, not just Ethiopia, is the violence 

25

against women. We have started with USAID this hotline for battered women to call in and to get because that’s an opening. 

Another issue is to have the judiciary process to help with 

women and minority groups and others. That’s another opening. So 

if we can push things to the—keep on pushing things maybe those 

will be areas for openings to help not only the government but also 

the general atmosphere. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So do you see an opposition party helping with 

that, with the human rights? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes, but I think what the opposition—and I 

defer to Dr. Berhanu Nega, who has better views—is how can we 

help this, because one day the opposition will be the government 

party and vice versa. 

We’ve told that to the Prime Minister. We’ve told that to the government. You’ve got to prepare. You cannot rule consistently forever. It’s impossible, and that’s an issue that they understand. But 

how they actually build that confidence and that’s, I think, the 

challenges we face. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So do you think they are fearful of an unstable 

environment? Is that the major opposition to having a viable twoparty system? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think that’s one part. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. All right. Thank you both. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Meadows. In conclusion, 

I just want to thank you again. Ambassador Yamamoto, when you 

testified on March 28th, 2006, and I know you did this with the 

utmost sincerity, but you talked about hope for democracy, a new 

chapter, crossroads, and my hope is—hope that springs eternal—

that we will be dogged in our efforts to ensure that this time that 

Ethiopia gets it right for the people’s sake and for basic fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. So thank you. 

Many questions will be posed. I wish we could do it today. Thank 

you so much for being here and for working so closely with us. 

I’d like to now introduce our second panel beginning with Dr. 

Berhanu Nega, who is a Bucknell University associate professor of 

economics. 

He is also the current chairman of Ginbot 7, the Movement for 

Justice, Freedom and Democracy, is one of the leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy, and served as campaign manager for 

the party’s successful effort during the 2005 elections. 

He was the first freely elected mayor of Addis Ababa in the 2005 

election and along with all the leadership of the CUD, he served 

21 months in prison after winning the election. 

I would note parenthetically that when Greg and I visited in 

2005, Dr. Nega and Greg got in a car to go one place, I got in a 

car to go somewhere else and right behind them was a group of secret police who monitored every move that they made. It was telling. It was over the top. 

Dr. Peter Pham, again, welcome back. Dr. Pham is the director 

of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in 

Washington. He is the incumbent vice president of the Association 

for the Study of Middle East and Africa, an academic organization 

26

that represents more than 1,000 scholars, and is editor in chief of 

the organization’s Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 

Dr. Pham was the winner of the 2008 Nelson Mandela International Prize for African Security and Development. He has authored half a dozen books and chapters, concerning Somali piracy, 

terrorism and stabilizing fragile states, as well as more than 80 articles in various journals. 

We’ll then hear from Mr. Obang Metho. Mr. Metho is the executive director of the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia, a social justice movement of diverse interests. 

He has tirelessly advocated for human rights, justice, freedom, 

the environment, and enhanced accountability in politics and peace 

in Africa for over 10 years. 

He has briefed and met with leaders and officials at the U.N., 

European Parliament, State Department, the U.S. Congress, the 

World Bank, and the Council for Foreign Relations, among others. 

He defends the fundamental respect for human life and is committed to work for the reconciliation, forgiveness, and healings of 

affected people in order to create a positive future. 

Then we’ll hear from Mr. Adotei Akwei, who is the managing director for government relations for Amnesty International. He rejoined Amnesty in 2010 after serving as senior policy advisor for 

CARE. 

In this capacity, Mr. Akwei helped develop and implement advocacy on CARE’s priority issues toward the U.S. Government. Before 

joining CARE he worked with Amnesty International USA for 11 

years. 

He also served as the Africa director for the Lawyers Committee 

of Human Rights, now Human Rights First, and previously served 

as the research and human rights director for the American Committee on Africa and the Africa Fund. 

So Dr. Nega, if you could begin. 

STATEMENT OF BERHANU NEGA, PH.D., ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY 

Mr. NEGA. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 

Bass, distinguished members of the House Subcommittee on Africa. 

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. 

It is indeed a great honor and privilege to have the opportunity 

to appear before you to discuss issues related to the future of democracy and human rights in Ethiopia. 

Democracy and human rights have direct implications for Ethiopia’s survival as a nation. The existence of a democratically elected 

and accountable government that strictly adheres to the rule of law 

and respects the basic rights of its citizens is the only arrangement 

that will assure Ethiopia’s stability and prosperity in the long 

term. 

A stable and prosperous Ethiopia contributes to the prosperity 

and stability of the region. An unstable Ethiopia has the potential 

to destabilize the whole Horn of Africa. 

Issues ranging from religious extremism, potential conflict over 

fresh water usage, crippling poverty and looming environmental 

challenge could threaten the livelihood of the people in the region 

and such challenge requires the attention and resources of the 

27

international community in partnership with responsible and accountable leaders in the region. 

It is, therefore, in the economic and national security interest of 

the U.S. and its Western allies to ensure that Ethiopia achieves durable stability which can only come from genuine democratization 

rather than settle for a short-term tenuous peace that is falsely 

projected by dictatorships and that could collapse with the slightest 

challenge from a fed-up and angry populace. 

Having said that as an introduction, let me quickly and directly 

address the topic at hand. There are three interrelated issues. The 

first deals with the government’s observance of human rights and 

democratic principles after the days of Meles. 

This is a topic that is least controversial and I have addressed 

it in detail in the written testimony that I have submitted for the 

record. 

Suffice it to say that in every major category of human rights 

and democratization, things are as bad as they were during Meles’ 

tenure or even worse in some cases. 

Award-winning journalists are languishing in jail. Ethiopia is 

very close to Iran, Cuba, and Somalia in the number of journalists 

jailed or exiled. 

As a cruel reminder of the elections in communist Soviet Union, 

the ruling party allegedly won 99.6 percent of the parliamentary 

seats under Meles in 2010. As if to outdo Meles, in the most recent 

local elections the ruling party and its allies won all of the 3.8 million seats. 

The Independent Election Commission called it a manifestation 

of the maturity of Ethiopian democracy. The government is simply 

allergic to the presence of independent organizations. 

It decides on who should be the leaders of religious institutions 

and has the audacity even to attempt to pressure Ethiopian Muslims to abandon their faith and convert to a new sect that it somehow favors. 

It purposely fosters conflict among different cultural and religious communities. Ethnic cleansing of the Amhara from the south 

and Benishangul regions which started under Meles hasn’t 

stopped. The forced eviction of indigenous people from the Omo 

Valley and Gambella regions has intensified. 

The judiciary, like all state institutions, is completely captured to 

a point where the faith that people might have in finding justice 

through formal state institutions has been obliterated. 

Mr. Chairman, the potential for reforms under the current government, which forms the second part of this discussion, is at once 

very critical as well as potentially controversial because a discussion about the future by its very nature is speculative. In my mind, 

this issue has two parts. 

The first is my own assessment of the possibility of reform under 

the current regime. The second is a follow-up to the first. If there 

is no reforms, what is going to happen to Ethiopia in the future? 

Let me address both of these issues candidly. Much as I wish it, 

I don’t see the possibility of an internally driven reform leading to 

a genuine democratic dispensation in Ethiopia. 

The ruling clique have committed too many human rights crimes, 

have accumulated too much wealth through rampant corruption 

28

and have antagonized the population too much to feel that they can 

continue to enjoy a peaceful life after relinquishing power, which 

they know would happen if there was to be a truly free and fair 

election. 

Instead, they believe that they can somehow survive through 

total repression insofar as they can get the foreign aid resources as 

well as the diplomatic support they need to help them keep the 

lead on any potential resistance to their power. 

The only change that Meles’ death has brought to the situation 

is that it has revealed the tenuous nature of this calculation as it 

has exposed the internal conflict and bickering within the ruling 

coalition. 

This takes me to the second part of the issue. So what is going 

to happen if there is no possibility of reform coming from the government? Will Ethiopians simply accept tyranny and live this 

humiliating existence indefinitely? If I know anything about the 

Ethiopian character, that is one bet I’m not willing to take. 

That is why, unfortunately, my assessment is rather pessimistic. 

I think the government’s capacity for total repression is going to be 

challenged rather dramatically in the near future. 

As the government simply refuses to reform, intensifies its repression, deliberately decimates the legal opposition and continues 

to antagonize people in all parts of the country, armed resistance 

has become an acceptable form of struggle. 

The various armed groups have started to talk seriously about 

unifying their actions and their vision for a democratic future as 

the public’s attention shifts from the peaceful opposition to the 

armed groups as their last best hope for ending their humiliation 

and freeing themselves from tyranny. 

Mr. Chairman, it is painful to see my country go through such 

turmoil in order to achieve the most basic rights that all people in 

this day and age routinely expect and deserve. 

I wish there could be a peaceful way out of this quagmire but I 

feel that is unlikely. This has serious implications for U.S. foreign 

policy. The current policy of shoring up and bankrolling authoritarian rule with the hope that it could achieve a modicum of stability in the region is going to face a serious challenge. 

Will the U.S. and its allies continue to support a brutal regime 

that is sure to be unstable as the armed resistance against it intensifies? 

Will such support ensure the stability of the regime over the long 

run? If the opposition is committed to a pluralist democratically 

elected government in Ethiopia wouldn’t it be a better and more 

durable ally than the current regime? 

This takes me to my last point regarding what the U.S. can do 

to ensure reforms. If reform leading to genuine democratization is 

sought, clearly, the policy followed by the U.S. and its allies in the 

past 21 years has not worked. 

The policy of constructive engagement which hopes to cajole the 

government to implement some reforms in exchange for financial 

and diplomatic support has simply failed to achieve its objectives. 

Instead, the current policy might unwittingly increase instability 

in Ethiopia. On the other hand, there is a very strong argument 

29

both on national security and humanitarian grounds to keep the 

situation from deteriorating even further. 

Contrary to prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ethiopian Government is amenable to pressure, especially financial pressure. A 

coordinated no-nonsense financial pressure that conditions Western 

aid on clear verifiable measurable time bound political reforms that 

could lead to a democratic dispensation is, in my view, the only 

mechanism that could avert the potential crisis that is looming in 

Ethiopia. 

Mr. Chairman, working toward such an outcome is not only the 

right thing to do but also the smart thing to do. The world community has enough experience by now to know that doing nothing at 

the early stage of a crisis would prove to be extremely costly later. 

A crisis is looming in Ethiopia and if we act wisely now we can 

avoid a lot of pain and suffering later. I hope the United States will 

play its part to bring about a peaceful and sustainable solution. 

Such an outcome is good for the international community, good 

for regional stability and certainly good for Ethiopia. I know, Mr. 

Chairman, under your leadership your committee in this House 

will do its part for the well being of the Ethiopian people. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nega follows:]

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Testimony ofBerbanu Nega, Ph.D 

Associate Professor of Economics, Bucknell University 

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations 

June 20, 2013 

"Ethiopia After Mcles: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights" 

Good Morning Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, Distinguished Members 

ofthe House Africa Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you 

today. It is indeed a great honor and privilege to have the opportunity to appear 

before you to discuss issues related to the future of Democracy and Human Rights 

in Ethiopia. 

1. The State of Human Rights and Democratization in Ethiopia 

As you are aware Mr. Chairman. hmnan rights record is abysmal by 

all accounts and continues to deteriorate. The current regime, which has been in 

power tor the last 21 years, continues to engage in the systematic violation of 

international standards with regard to ftmdamental human rights. The most 

significant assault on human rights include restrictions on: 

1) Freedom of expression; 

2) Freedom of association and political rights; 

3) Interference in religious affairs; 

4) Ethnic cleansing against Amharas and the forced displacement ofindigenolls 

people from ancestral lands; 

5) Manipulation ofthe justice system tor politically motivated charges and 

trials 

Following the death ofMeles Zenawi, many hoped that there would be an 

opportunity tor an opening in the political space. However the current regime 

continues to tlout international standards. Indeed, the climate post the much-
31


81570c-2.eps

anticipated National Elections of2005, widely acknowledged as the most contested 

election in Ethiopian histolY, culminating in bloodshed and vote rigging, has 

produced severe govemment clampdown on basic freedoms, particularly freedom 

of expression and association, increased police monitoring of peaceful and lawful 

activities, arbitralY arrest of human rights defenders, opposition leaders and attacks 

on civil society. 

With the passage of the draconian Charities and Societies Proclamation 

(CSO law) and Anti-Terrorism law in 2009, independent civil society and nongovemmental organizations NGOs (domestic and intemational) have been forced 

to ccase their due to these very restrictive new effectively 

criminalizing intemationally recognized rights. I 

The brazen and relentless assault on free expression and access to 

information, arbitrary detention of human rights activists, civil society and 

opposition leaders has severely compromised the electoral enviromnent in 

Ethiopia. There is little independent criticism and virtually no political opposition 

in the countlY. 

Freedom of Expression 

The Ethiopian govenUllent censors free speech by routinely blocking 

websites, closing publishing houses, contiscating newspapers, imprisoning 

journalists and jamming intemational media such as the Voice of America (VOA) 

as well as diaspora based independent media such as Ethiopian Satellite Television 

(ESA T). Joumalists, brave enough to practice their trade with integrity risk 

i mpri sonment. 

According to the Committee to Protect Joumalists (CPJ), Ethiopia is the 

leading jailer ofjoumalists in Sub-Sal1ara Africa and ranks among the top ten in 

the World. Among the most noted joumalists languishing in jail are award winning 

Columnist Iblogger Eskinder Nega2

, the recipient ofthe 2012 PENlBarbara 

2 
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81570c-3.eps

Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award and Reyot Aiemu3

, wilmer of the 2013 

UNESCO-Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize. Last year, the Intemational 

Women's Media Foundation bestowed Courage in Joumalism Award on Ms. 

Alemu in absentia. 

Two Swedishjoumalists (freed in 2012) who entered the cOlmtry illegally to 

report on the ongoing conflict in the Ogaden were among the imprisoned 

journalists. 4 

Ethiopia also ranks 3rd in the world in tenns of countries from which 

journalists have fled, with 49 journalists that have been exiled as a result of 

govemment persecution and iron fisted control of the independent media. 5 

The widespread intemational condemnations and repeated calls from various 

rights groups and influential Parliamentarians for the release of Ethiopian 

joumalists have been completely ignored by the regime in power6 

Continued U. S. support of a regime that represses a free press is also in 

violation of its own constitutional guarantee of the right to free speech. It is clear 

that the Ethiopian people need infomlation to make infonned participatory 

decisions about their fom1 of govenm1ent, leaders and lives. Effectiveness of 

access to a free press cannot be evaluated m1til such time as the people have the 

right to free media. 

Freedom of Association and Political Rights 

Political space has been severely curtailed in Ethiopia. So much so, that in 

the Parliamentary Election of201 0, which was conducted in an environment that 

3 
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was not conducive to free and fair elections, the ruling party "won" by a jawdropping 99.6%. As a result, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic 

Front (EPRDF) controls 545 ofthe 547 seat in Parliament to remain in power until 

2015. The 2010 election gives ample evidence that Ethiopia is an authoritarian 

dictatorship that holds sham elections every 5 years and has failed to develop 

democratic institutions in the two decades that EPRDF has been in power7 

By all reasonable accounts, EPRDF has been rolling back the clock to the 

country's dictatorial Derg era. The remains ofpopular 

participation and even more so politics. It has successfully excluded, 

implisoned, or exiled many who could possibly challenge its authority. The ruling 

party continues to command an unchecked monopoly on the militmy and security 

forces. Under these stifling conditions and with very little chance for political 

reform, the prospects for genuine democracy in Ethiopia remains bleak. 

The death ofMeies, last year, has not changed the nature ofthe one party 

state that he cm'efully and brutally constructed. In the recent 2013 nationwide local 

election, the ruling party ran by itself to "win" almost all of the 3.8 million 

supposedly contested seats. 96% ofthe candidates were from the ruling party and 

the remaining 4% from its atliliated parties. The opposition didn't even compete in 

the election. The "independent" election board called it "a confirmation of the 

maturity of democratization in the country." 

Interference in Religious Affairs 

Article 27 orihe Ethiopian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and 

delineates the strict separation of church m1d state. However, the Ethiopian regime 

in contravention to its own constitution has consistently interfered in the affairs of 

both the Christian mld Muslim religions. The government has etlectively used the 

Ethiopian Orthodox Church as a tool for political control by manipulating the 

leadership of the powerful church. This included election ofthe former Patriarch 

Abune Paulos and the new Patriarch Abune Mathias. This gross interference in the 

affairs ofthe Orthodox Church has resulted in an unfortunate split of the Holy 

4 
34


81570c-5.eps

Synod into two competing power centers inside Ethiopia and in the diaspora with 

the influential Orthodox Church in Ethiopia aligning itself with the EPRDF 

regIme. 

Religious leaders (Orthodox, Muslim, Protestant, and others) are often 

pressured to issue broadcasted statements and messages of support for major 

EPROF actions, with the govemment seeking support of their religious 

communities. 8 

In 2012, the regime put forth plans to build a sugar iactOlY, sugar cane 

plantation and an irrigation dam on the property of the Waldeba MonastelY in 

Gondar --Northem Ethiopia, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christendom. III 

order to make way for the constmction, the regime brazenly desecrated grave sites 

and destroyed three historical churches on the grounds orthe famolls Monastery. 

Monks who reside on the property were forcibly removed to make way for 

this massive project The unprecedented assault on the monastic community's way 

oflife and its religious leaming centers is deeply disturbing and reprehensible. 

Even the communist Derg regime respected the sanctity of the Waldeba Monastery 

and in no way interfered in its internal atlairs. Even when the monks were resisting 

this forced eviction and desecration, the church hierarchy was compelled to 

officially condone the actions of the government. 

Ethiopian Muslims as well have been engaged in peaceful protest against 

government interference in their religious affairs since 2011. The leaders of the 

protests accme the government to the a1-

Ahbash Islamic sect on the Muslim community, which 

practices the Sutl form ofIslam. 

The to Ahbash Ethiopian Muslims is not 

'-'VlV"""'U. The protesters oppose the blatant interferem:e of the state in their 

finance, and 

this version while attacking the more 

and local variant as tainted with "extremi,f' views with a political y 

8 hHp://news,yahoo.comiethiopia-elects-leader-Orihodox-church-172547906.html 

9 b:l:tp://www.i,-innew5.org!reoor:!l2§7871 

5 
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Instead of resolving the conflict peacefully, the regime resorted to a brutal 

crackdown against the peaceful protestors by arresting their leaders and closing 

their newspaper. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has strongly denounced the 

politically motivated detention and trial ofthe Muslim leaders. 10 Such brazen 

interference on religion is bound to have serious consequences to the stability of 

the country in the future. 

Ethnic Cleansing of Amharas and Forced Displacement of Indigenous People 

From Ancestral Lands 

Article 32 of the Ethiopian Constitution guarantees freedom of movement 

within the national territory. Ethiopia is also a signatory to several conventions, 

including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Intemational Convention on 

Civil and Political Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which, 

clearly state that a citizen has the right to work and live in any part of his or her 

country. 

However, ethnic Amharas have been subjected to forcible eviction from 

Guraferda 13ellch-Maji in Sou1hem Stale as well as from Beni Shangul 

regions of West em Ethiopia since 2012. Targeting Amharas, one ofthe largest 

ethnic groups in Ethiopia, for illegal deportation, is a barbaric act that will have 

dire consequences for fostering ethnic han110ny in Ethiopia. Stoking hatred will 

only serve to destabilize the country. 

6 
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In interviews with ESAT, victims, mostly women and children, provided 

horrific details about being dragged from their homes with nothing else but the 

clothes on their back. Although the exact number of displaced families is hard to 

come by due to news black outs, the estimates are in the high thousands according 

to clandestine radio interviews with some victims. II 

Displacement of indigenous people is rampant in Afar, Gambella and Omo 

regions as a result of ancestral lands being sold to investors by the government 

without compensation or even a modicum of consultation with the affected 

population. The lmprecedented land giveaway is also taking place, at a massive 

scale, mainly in the lowlands of Ethiopia where the country's minority etlmic 

groups and pastoralists live. These forced displacements of indigenous people are 

in contravention of most recognized hmnan rights standards. 

Human Rights Watch has documented in its report that the land grabs are 

being carried out in contravention of domestic and international human rights 

standards and without meaningful consultation, consent, or compensation for loss 

ofland, livelihoods, food security, and access to vital subsistence resources. 12 

The Oakland Institute, an influential and highly respected think tank, has 

issued a comprehensive report on the land grab issue and its consequences on 

vulnerable cOlmmmities in Ethiopia. 13 

7 
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Manipulation of the Justice System for Politically Motivated Charges and 

Trials 

Article 78 of the Ethiopian constitution promulgates the establishment of an 

independent Judiciary. In reality, the judiciary is the most politicized branch of the 

government with loyal, hand-picked judges that serve as the hand maiden of the 

regime. The justice system has been used time and again as a tool of "persecution 

by prosecution" of real and perceived political enemies of the regime. Most 

Ethiopians have little confidence in the impartiality and neutrality of the judiciary 

and it is widely regarded as an institution that has become a mere extension of 

ruling party power. 

2. The Possibility of Reforms after Meles 

The potential for reforms lllder the current government, which forms the 

second part ofthis discussion, is at once very critical as well as potentially 

controversial because a discussion about the future by its very nature is 

speculative. In my mind, this issue has two parts. The first is my own assessment 

ofthe possibility of internally driven reform initiated by the current regime. As I 

will detail in a minute, I don't believe such refornl is possible. So the second issue 

is a follow up to the tlrst, in case my response is in the negative. If no reform, what 

is going to happen in the near future? Let me address both ofthese issues candidly. 

Much as I wish, I don't see the possibility of an internally driven (by the ruling 

party) reform leading to a genuine democratic dispensation in Ethiopia. The regime 

has much to lose through such a refornl. The ruling elite have conmlitted too many 

human rights crimes (in the Ogaden, in Addis Abab~ Oromia ... etc.) and have 

aCClllmlated too much wealth through rampant corruption. Indeed, they have 

antagonized the population too much to feel that they can continue to enjoy a 

peaceful life after relinquishing power--which would be inevitable ifthere was to 

be a truly free and fair election. Instead, they believe that they can somehow 

survive through total repression, in so far as they can get the foreign aid resources 

as well as the diplomatic support that would help them keep the lid on any 

potential resistance to their power. 

The only change that Meles' death has brought to this situation is that it has 

revealed the tenuous nature of this calculation as it has brought to the open the 

internal conflict and bickering within the ruling coalition. In the absence ofMeles' 

clever manipulation ofthe international community, it is not entirely clear how 

8 
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long the West will be willing to bankroll a regime as the instability starts to 

publicly manifest itself. 

This takes me to the second part of this issue. So, what is going to happen if 

there is no possibility ofrefornl coming from the government? Would Ethiopians 

simply accept tyranny and live this humiliating existence indefinitely? If I know 

anything about the Ethiopian character, that is one bet that I am not willing to 

take. That is why, unfortunately, my assessment is rather pessimistic. I think the 

government's capacity for total suppression is going to be challenged rather 

dramatically in the near future. Even ifthe govermnent can put a lid on the urban 

based opposition to its rule (which could have led to a potentially peaceful 

transition), its only effect is going to be to further legitimize an arnled resistance 

against its rule. 

Of course, armed resistance against the regime is not new. From the Ogaden 

to Afar and Gambella there are all kinds of amled opposition groups that are 

waging low intensity armed struggle against the regime. All these, however, were 

more narrowly based and without a broad societal appeal to mobilize a unified 

opposition across the country. Most people opposed to the regime, lmtil recently, 

believed that a peaceful resistance, led by the legal opposition, could lead towards 

peaceful change and that this is the preferred outcome as it avoids potential 

bloodshed. 

But, as the government simply refuses to refornl, intensifies its repression, 

deliberately decimates the legal opposition and continues to antagonize people in 

all parts of the country, armed resistance has become an acceptable fonn of 

struggle. In some parts ofthe country aggrieved people have started to simply go 

into the bushes, without even taking an organized form. Furthermore, the various 

armed groups have started to seriously talk about unifYing their actions and their 

vision for a democratic future, as the public's attention shifts from the "peaceful 

opposition" to the armed groups as their last best hope for ending the hlllniliation 

and freeing themselves from tyranny 

3. "Vhat Can the ITS and Its Allies Do to Llll!;""WCi Reform? 

The Ethiopian regime has created a stitling environment wherein those 

within the prison walls and those outside of them are terrorized by the brutal acts 

of a regime that has continuously been censured by respected rights groups for its 

lack of adherence to international human rights standards. 

9 
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permeates and the party has been unable and 

to create a broader political base in this complex and diverse country. 

The leaders ofthe Liberation Front 

within the EPRDF coalition came to power 

therefore its leaders bell eve in the of force. 

control, limited popular participation, and crony 

a civil war, 

also believe in strong 

that allows Jar 

a strong presence ofthe state in the economy to distribute rent among the 

elite. 

The regime uses this ill-gotten wealth to hire PR fimls and Lobbyists in the 

West, particularly in the United States, to promote Ethiopia's image as a modem 

and modernizing cOlmtry lmder TPLF/EPRDF tutelage. The message is repeated 

and consistent at vaIious international torums where officials speak at great length 

of Ethiopia's virtues -- its steady economic growtb, its supposed political stability 

and its bright future. However, none ofthese virtues is real. 

Present day Ethiopia is not a contldent, growing, dynamic, modern cOlmtry. 

Rather, it's fast becoming a police state ruled by a regime tbat is weak, fearful, 

paranoid and intolerant of dissent. A democratic multi-party system, enshrined in 

the constitution ofthe Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia adopted in 1994 

remains all empty rhetoric as long as TPLF (with its atliliates) is deternlined to 

remain the "ruling party for life." The government is skilled at using the rhetoric of 

democracy and good govemance in order to assure the continuation of support by 

the international donor community, but such statements rarely lead to tangible 

refoml. 

Even if we accept the Ethiopian government's dubious and controversial 

claims of rapid economic growth in the past decade!4 Ethiopia remains ranked 

among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. Tn the 2012 Human 

Development Index, Ethiopia raIlli:ed 173 out of 186 countries. The so-called 

economic growth has not filtered down to the poorest people in Ethiopia that are 

14 B.Nega "No Shortcut to Stability: Democratic Accountability and Sustainable Development in Ethiopia 

Social Research Vol.77, No.4:Winter 2010 

10 
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mired in abject poverty. Corruption is rampant and the scope of Ethiopia's capital 

flight is frightening. 

According to a recent report by Global Financial Integrity, Ethiopia lost 

$11.7 Billion to outtlows of ill-gotten gains between 2000 and 2009. 15 One of the 

authors ofthe report, Sarah Freitas, wrote, "The people of Hthiopia are bemR bled 

dry, no matter how hard they try tofiRht their way out of absolute destitution and 

poverty, they will be swimming upstream against the current of illicit capital 

leakage. "The level of illicit leakage out ofthe country reached a mind blowing 

$5.6 Billion in 2010 alone, a sum greater than the value ofthe country's total 

exports combined with the total foreign aid it received from abroad tor that year. 

As further testament to the unwillingness ofthe regime to democratize the 

country, the TPLF has engaged repeatedly in electoral corruption and brutal 

repression. It rules effectively by force and has consolidated its power at the 

expense of the overwhelming majority of Ethiopia's large and diverse population. 

The repressive stability that exists in Ethiopia today is detrimental to the long term 

internal as well as regional stability of the Hom of Africa. 

Clearly, this state of atfairs cannot continue. If it does, it can only end in a 

massive conflict with a potential to destabilize the whole region. Something must 

be done urgently to avoid a looming disaster. So, what can the US do to change 

this trajectory? Tn my view, the obvious starting point is to acknowledge the fact 

that the current policy of "constructive engagement" with this brutal regime has 

not worked to produce the desired results of stability in the cOlmtry and the wider 

region. instead, it has emboldened the regime to continue to do what it has been 

doing in the past. A reconstructed policy for Ethiopia, T believe, should be 

anchored in both the core values ofthe United States, as well as on the basis of 

strategic national security considerations. T submit that both ofthese considerations 

require that Ethiopia become an internally peaceful, stable and democratic country 

that contributes positively to the stability ofthe region. Ifthis is a reasonable 

policy position consistent with US long term strategic interests, then there is a lot 

15 http://blogs.ws i. com! corru pti on-cu rre nts!20 11/12/05/ e th i 0 pia n-; II i cit -0 utfl ows-do u b led-; n-2009-

neVJ-Teport-5aY.!d?mo~~'"-~12IQg 

11 
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81570c-12.eps

that the US and its allies can do to push the current regime to move in that 

direction. 

Ethiopia suffers from an absence ClP1i'Yl{)("I'C,"<r and the United States 

government. on democratic governance, 

respect for the rule oflmv and the and of human 

Support for democracy, respect for flmdamental human rights and the rule 

oflaw are core American values. The US and its allies will do well to recognize 

more firmly that Ethiopian aspirations for democracy are genuine and legitimate. 

The United States Government, along with its allies, consistently display a 

politically weak reaction to the profound abrogation of Ethiopia's obligations 

under international law, not to mention its own constitution by turning a blind eye 

to the very repressive environment that exists in Ethiopia today. The United States 

Government should use its foreign aid to reward cOlmtries that govern themselves 

well and not use its foreign aid to prop up regimes like the regime in Ethiopia that 

has become the poster child for repression and brutality throughout Africa. 

Furthennore, the United States Government should review its development 

aid policy towards Ethiopia so that aid can be used more effectively to advance the 

cause of human rights and respect for the rule oflaw along with other humanitarian 

considerations. Lack of sanction for human rights abuses encourages tyranny and 

will not help economic wellbeing in the long run. Only severe rebuke from and 

withdrawal of financial support by the United States Government and its allies will 

deter the Ethiopian government from its current trajectory. 

It is also advisable for the United States Government, to press persistently 

and publicly for good and sustainable governance reforms in Ethiopia and work 

from the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation in a spirit of critical 

partnership. 

It's understandable that the United States Government recognizes and 

respects the sovereignty of nation-states and seeks not to intervene unless its 

national security is at stake. However, where one is a donor entity (in fact the 

largest donor) to a government that continues to flaunt not only internationally 

recognized rights but also American standards, the United States Govennnent is 

12 
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compromising its stated mission and core values by aligning itself with and 

flmding a brutal regime. Not giving your money to support repression is no 

intervention. Equally importantly, at least in this case, there is a large national 

security stake in the stability of Ethiopia, which can only come from meaningful 

and inclusive democratization. 

A government that subjects its citizenry to its own brand of terrorism cannot 

be entrusted to safeguard the interests ofthe United States Govenunent. The status 

quo in Ethiopia is intolerable and unacceptable. In a de facto one-party state like 

Ethiopia, where opposition parties have been systematically decimated, there is no 

one to represent the dreams, expectations and criticisms ofthe public. Loss of hope 

towards a peaceful transition to democracy is rapidly influencing people to 

consider alternative means of struggle. 

With patience running out and frustration taking hold among the population, 

more and more political organizations are considering armed strugglc (Ogadcn 

National Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front, Tigrai People's Democratic 

Movcment, AFAR-Gadille, Gambella Nilotic Movement... etc.) as the only option 

to gct rid of the bmtal dictatorships. Recent disturbing repOlis from Agew ZoncNorthern Ethiopia and from parts of Gambella and Afar indicate that ordinary 

peasants have started to aml themselves to challenge the government by force. 

Ethiopia's heterogeneous society and the political elite are deeply divided. The 

inflexible political attitude and the monopolization of power in the hands ofthe 

current regime has left a majority of the population excluded from political 

participation or access to economic benefits. As a result, violent clashes are going 

to be more common in the near future leading to internal instability in the most 

populous country in East Africa. The Hom of Africa is of significant geostrategic 

value to U. S. interests and any type of instability in Ethiopia will have dire 

consequences for the entire region. 

The current policy of cajoling the government to reform without in any way 

reducing the resources it receives from the West is not working. It is time for the 

United States Govemment and its allies to take a tough and principled stand 

against the excesses of the de facto one-party state in Ethiopia and use their 

tinancialleverage against the regime to persuade it to change before it is too late. I 

believe such a coordinated financial pressure by western allies will work to make 

the regime change its ways. Some ofthe needed reforms might take some time to 

implement, but the govemment's willingness to implement meaningful refomls 

13 
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81570c-14.eps

can be measured by a number ofveritiable actions that it can take immediately. 

These include, for example: 

• To rescind the repressive (CSO and Anti-Terrorism) laws, to stop the 

persecution of political dissidents subject to using trumped up terrorism 

charges to prevent the country from descending into political turmoil that 

will have dire consequences for the region and the Continent as a whole; 

• To adhere to human rights principles in actions and not merely in words; 

• To release all political prisoners, journalists and human rights defenders; 

• To cease engaging in acts which violate internationally recognized human 

rights including: freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of 

assembly and political rights, 

• To open up the political space as well as the government owned media so 

that Ethiopians will participate fully in the governance of their COllltry; and 

• To call for an open and constructive dialogue with all the opposition forces 

(both at home and abroad, arn1ed and peaceful) in order to chart the 

COllltry'S future together. 

I know, Mr. Chainnan, under your leadership your conunittee and this House will 

do its part for the wellbeing ofthe people of Ethiopia. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairnmn and members of the committee for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I stand ready to answer any questions you might have. 

14 
44

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Nega, thank you very much for testifying. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. SMITH. The committee will be in order. Thank you. 

Dr. Pham. 

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. 

ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. PHAM. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the political developments in the Federal Democratic 

Republic of Ethiopia, especially as they relate to democracy and 

human rights since the death last year of the last Prime Minister 

Meles Zenawi. 

With your permission, I’ll present a summary of my analyses on 

these questions and ask that my prepared statement be entered 

into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your statement and all the other 

distinguished witnesses’ statements and any attachments they 

would like to submit will be made part of the record. 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you. 

In addressing Ethiopia’s political evolution, and there has indeed 

been a shift even if at times the changes have been rather subtle, 

it’s incumbent upon us to recall the enormous importance of Ethiopia both in its own right and relative to the national interests of 

the United States and Africa in general and in the geopolitically 

sensitive Horn of Africa in particular. 

That context is especially important if any of the resulting proposals are to be relevant, realistic and perhaps most importantly 

strategic in the fullest sense of the term. 

Moreover, while it’s perhaps too soon after the passing of the late 

Ethiopian Prime Minister to either have sufficient time or requisite 

historical perspective to render anything approaching a definitive 

judgment on the man and his legacy, it’s worth the effort to at least 

establish some context by recalling just how far Ethiopia has come 

since the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Soviet client regime in 1991. 

One does not have to agree with all or even any of the specific 

policy choices made by the Ethiopian Government during the last 

two decades to nonetheless acknowledge the historic achievements, 

including the peaceful succession of Eritrea in 1993, the introduction of legally recognized linguistic pluralism and ethnic federalism 

in 1994 and the economic miracle one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and, indeed, the world in recent years which, notwithstanding the struggle that life remains for many Ethiopians, 

has nonetheless lifted millions of others out of abject misery in just 

a generation. 

And if it’s too soon to properly judge the legacy of the late Prime 

Minister Meles, it certainly is premature to attempt to render anything beyond a very initial assessment of his successor, 

Hailemariam Desalegn, who was only confirmed by Parliament in 

his ministerial tenure on a permanent basis on September 21, 

2012, and subsequently elected as chairman of the EPRDF by the 

congress of the governing coalition in Bahir Dar in the last week 

of March of this year. 

45

That being said, however, there are several positive and indeed 

tantalizing indications that while the new Prime Minister had 

promised to maintain his predecessor’s policies, he is also slowly 

blazing his own trail. 

These include a cabinet reshuffle that rebalance the representation within the governing coalition and offered recently reaffirmed 

to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to open a dialogue with 

Eritrea without preconditions, a crackdown on corruption that’s included the arrest of the ministerial-ranked Director General of the 

Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority and the recent allowing, as other witnesses have indicated, of the largest anti-government demonstration since 2005, an event which I’ve been assured 

by senior officials can and will be allowed to reoccur as long as the 

organizers give local authorities sufficient notice in order to make 

necessary logistical accommodations. 

To these modest points of data, I would add a brief personal observation from having had, even before he became Prime Minister, 

the privilege of discussing a broad range of issues with 

Hailemariam Desalegn. 

He is a man of great intelligence and he’s cognizant of the challenges before him. On the other hand, one should also recognize the 

political, institutional and other constraints which someone in his 

position faces, especially until such time as he’s able to win an electoral mandate in his own right. 

With all this in mind, permit me to conclude by commending to 

the subcommittee’s consideration five principles to guide U.S. policy toward Ethiopia, which I offer in line with the prudent norm 

embraced by President Obama in last year’s U.S strategy toward 

sub-Saharan Africa. 

Addressing the opportunities and challenges in Africa, the President wrote, requires a comprehensive U.S. policy that is proactive, 

forward looking and that balances our long-term interests with 

near-term objectives. 

So, first, understand that Ethiopia is an ancient country populated by proud peoples imbued with a deep sense of history and nationhood, all of which has a profound impact on the current political reality. 

Secondly, recognize both the opportunities within the historic 

moment and the delicate balance that needs to be maintained. One 

should be leery of any actions which might upset the careful political balance being struck. 

Thirdly, be realistic about what the United States can and cannot do with respect to the direction of social, economic, and political 

developments in Ethiopia. 

It goes without saying that America has influence and where 

possible that influence should be brought to use judiciously for 

good. However, our room for maneuver is tighter than ever and 

America’s overall leverage significantly diminished by the combination of our own general cutbacks in foreign assistance. 

When one looks at the actual figures, there’s virtually nothing 

that’s discretionary that could be cut back in our aid to Ethiopia, 

and the emergence of other countries and actors able and willing 

to work with the Ethiopian Government, as witnessed by the Prime 

Minister’s visit last week to China. 

46

Fourth, take advantage of Ethiopia’s application to join the 

World Trade Organization to constructively engage with the country’s government not only about economic liberalization but other 

rule of law and governance concerns. 

Even if the publicly-stated goal of completing accession by 2014 

is unlikely to be achieved, the effort does present the United States 

and other international partners with a unique opportunity for a 

more intense dialogue with their Ethiopian counterparts, contributing to the enhancing of technical and administrative and regulatory capabilities and advance policy objectives ranging from liberalizing the banking and telecommunication sectors to securing private property and other legal rights. 

And fifth, become more engaged in Ethiopia’s rapidly transforming higher education sector. Ethiopia has gone from having 

three national universities in 2001 to 31 this year. 

If the United States Government could encourage American colleges and universities to become more engaged with their Ethiopian counterparts, there’s the prospect over the long term of considerable return both in terms of consolidating the cultural and political bonds between our countries and people as well as advancing 

democratic and human development. 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, it goes without saying 

that there are a number of things one might wish to see done differently, perhaps even better with respect to the ongoing social, 

economic and political development of Ethiopia. 

Nevertheless, the context in which the post-Meles transition and 

other developments are occurring needs to be taking into account 

an objective progress both in absolute terms and relative to the rest 

of a very troubled but geopolitical strategic region. 

In that perspective, it behooves us to keep in mind Voltaire’s 

warning, le mieux est l’ennemi du bien—the best is the enemy of 

the good—and allowing a healthy dose of political realism about 

our own interests and those of the peoples of Ethiopia to temper 

judgmentalist impulse and direct our energies instead where they 

can be most effective in encouraging, facilitating, and sustaining 

continued stability and progress in Ethiopia and beyond. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]

47


81570d-1.eps

Prepared Statement of 

Dr. J. Peter Pham 

Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center 

Atlantic Cauncil 

before the 

on 

"Ethiopia After Meles: 

The Future of Democracy and Human Rights" 

Thursday, June 20, 2013, 

10:00 a.m. 

Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2172 

Washington, D.C. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the subject of political 

developments in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, especially as they relate to 

democracy and human rights, since the death last year of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. 

Ethiopia's Importance 

However, before addressing the country's political evolution-and there has indeed been a 

shift, even if, at times, the changes have been so subtle as to be imperceptible to those who do 

not track developments closely, to say nothing of those who view them through ideological 

blinders-I do think it is incumbent upon us to recall the enormous importance of Ethiopia, 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

June 20, 2013 

both in its own right and relative to the national interests of the United States of America in 

Africa in general and in the geopolitically sensitive Horn of Africa in particular. That context is 

especially important if any resulting proposals are to be relevant, realistic, and, perhaps most 

importantly, strategic in the fullest sense of that term, rather than token, ineffectual, and, at 

worst, downright counterproductive to the achievement of overall objectives which I would like 

to believe are shared by everyone appearing before the Subcommittee today. 

With an estimated 93 million people, Ethiopia is the second most populous country on the 

African continent. Its 5,328 kilometers of land borders put it adjacent to some of the most 

politically and economically challenged states on the continent, including Djibouti, Eritrea, 

Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. 

Ethiopia is the source of Blue Nile, which traces its remotest source to the Felege Ghion spring 

held sacred by the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, as well as of the Nile River's other 

major tributary, the Atbara River, which likewise originates in the heart of the Ethiopian 

highlands near Lake Tana; together, the two streams account for nearly 90 percent of the water 

and over 95 percent of the sediment carried by the Nile proper. The ambitious hydropower 

construction program undertaken by the Ethiopian government to harness the potential of this 

flow bears the promise of clean, renewable energy not only for Ethiopia, but for many of its 

neighbors in a region where access to electricity remains an aspiration for hundreds of millions 

of people. 

In terms of regional security, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has played key roles 

both in Somalia, where Ethiopian troops recently were able to turn over several towns in the 

Bay region to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers, and in the 

disputed Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan, where the 3,860 ENDF as well as 

Ethiopian police and civilian personnel make up more than 95 percent of the United Nations 

Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Against predictions by skeptics that it would get 

mired down in an intractable conflict, UNISFA has for two years now managed to prevent the 

escalation of violence and keep open a fragile humanitarian space in the territory, albeit not 

without sacrifice-as we were reminded just last Friday, when one Ethiopian peacekeeper was 

killed and two others wounded in what was apparently a rebel mortar attack on a football 

stadium that hit their base instead. It should be noted that, overall, Ethiopia is the fourthlargest global and largest African contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

With the exception of the period when Mengistu Haile Mariam and his Marxist military junta, 

the Derg, aligned the country with the Soviet Bloc and welcomed tens of thousands of troops 

dispatched by Fidel Castro, Ethiopia has historically been a strong ally of the United States. Our 

countries fought on the same side during World War II and, during the Korean War, the 

Emperor Haile Selassie sent the famous "Kagnew Battalion" of the l't Division of the Imperial 

Bodyguard to fight alongside America's 7th Infantry Division, most famously at Pork Chop Hill. In 

more recent times, the Ethiopian government worked with the United States in the 1990s to 

contain the threat posed by the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum as well as embraced 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

June 20, 2013 

the global effort against terrorism after the September 11, 2001, attacks by al-Qaeda on our 

homeland. And, in the last few years, Ethiopia has hosted a discrete US military presence in the 

southern part of the country where service personnel maintain several unmanned aerial 

vehicles assigned to counterterrorism missions in East Africa. 

Nor is security the only area of strong bilateral cooperation between the United States and 

Ethiopia. In August, the Ethiopian government will host the 2013 US-Sub-Saharan African Trade 

and Economic Cooperation Forum, also known as the AGOA Forum, a ministerial-level event 

built around America's signature trade initiative with the continent that will include high-level 

dialogue on the future course of US-African economic and commercial relations as well as 

various civil society and private-sector events, including a meeting of the African Women's 

Entrepreneurship Program (AWEP) and a US-African trade exposition. 

The legacy of Meles Zenawi 

While it is perhaps too soon after the passing of the late Ethiopian prime minister-today, 

perhaps not entirely coincidentally, is the tenth-month anniversary of his death-to have either 

sufficient time or the requisite historical perspective to render anything approaching a 

definitive judgment on the man and his political legacy, it is worth the effort to at least 

establish some context by recalling just how far Ethiopia has come since the overthrow of 

Mengistu Haile Mariam's Soviet client regime in 1991 by a coalition of oppositions groups led 

by the Tigrayan People's liberation Front (TPlF), whose political wing today forms part of the 

governing Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). 

After overthrowing the Ethiopia's millennia-old monarchy in 1974, the Derg, backed by massive 

Soviet support and tens of thousands of Communist Cuban troops, had launched the "Red 

Terror" that saw thousands of Ethiopians killed outright and, following the Stalinist-style forced 

resettlement of peasants on collective farms, millions more reduced to mass starvation in the 

mid-1980s. Meanwhile, the Derg and its Cuban mercenaries fought a brutal counterinsurgency 

campaign that reduced whole provinces of the country to wasteland. 

Today, barely two decades after the unlamented demise of what was a real totalitarian 

dictatorship, it is expected that the country will end its current 2012-2013 fiscal year on July 7 

having seen its economic growth accelerate to 10 percent, thanks largely to improved 

agricultural output combined with heavy public investments in infrastructure. This comes on 

the heels of 8.5 percent growth in 2011-2012, which made it one of Africa's fastest growing 

economies last year. While life remains a struggle for many Ethiopians, millions of others have 

been lifted out of abject misery in just one generation. Anyone who has visited the country 

more than once notes the transformation taking place constantly as infrastructure is built out, 

and will remark on the dynamism of the people. 

On the political front, Ethiopia under Meles likewise came a long way since 1995, when the 

country held the first-ever free and democratic elections in its millennial history. In the May 

2005 elections, which I witnessed firsthand, over 90 percent of registered voters went to the 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

June 20, 2013 

polls after a vigorous campaign. According to official returns, the ruling EPRDF coalition won 59 

percent of the vote and 327 seats in the 547-seat House of Representatives, while the two 

largest opposition groups, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United 

Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), together won 30 percent of the vote and 161 seats. 

Altogether, however, the gains made by opposition parties, which went from 12 members in 

the previous parliament to 174 members in the legislature elected in 2005, were significant and 

represented a clear step forward, although it was regrettable that a number of the opposition 

representatives ultimately refused to take up their seats. 

While one might regret the way the late Prime Minister Meles responded to opposition 

provocations in the wake of the 2005 poll and even find discomfiting the lopsided results of the 

2010 elections-the EPRDF won 499 seats, while seven other parties or coalitions and a lone 

independent picked up 48 seats-one ought to, in all fairness, compare Ethiopia's electoral 

record to that of its neighbors, in contrast to whom it appears in a far more favorable light. The 

northwestern region of Somaliland being the notable exception-and, even in this relative 

oasis, there has been a regrettable recent inability to hold legislative elections in a timely 

manner-and setting aside the capacity for self-delusion of certain aspiring statesmen looking 

for stories of "success" to spin, "Somalia" and "political process" are terms which probably 

should not be used simultaneously even if the current regime is, admittedly, an improvement 

over its thoroughly corrupt and utterly ineffective predecessor. In Eritrea, Isaias Afewerki's 

rather ironically-named People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has been in power 

since independence in 1993 and has yet to hold national elections of any kind. The 2010 

elections in Sudan (including South Sudan) just a month before the Ethiopian poll that same 

year were a farce that, if anything, speeded up the country's break up. South Sudan, which 

became independent in 2011, does not even have an elected legislature. Kenya's 2007 elections 

degenerated into an orgy of violence for which its current president and deputy president, 

among others, have been indicted by the International Criminal Court. 

One does not have to agree with all or even any of the specific policy choices made by the 

Ethiopian government during his tenure to nonetheless acknowledge the historic achievements 

of Meles Zenawi. In the two decades since he led the coalition of forces that toppled the Derg, 

the late prime minister presided over the peaceful secession of Eritrea in 1993, the introduction 

of legally recognized linguistic pluralism and ethnic federalism in 1994,' and the first multiparty 

elections in the millennial history of the Ethiopian state in 1995. And while the timing and 

manner of his passing were, most certainly, not what any imagines the deceased leader had in 

mind when he repeatedly assured often skeptical interlocutors that he intended to step down, 

both as head of the EPRDF and prime minister before the next elections, his exit was, in some 

respects, a final legacy insofar as, having accomplished much of what he had set out to do in 

what President Obama has described as "his lifelong contribution to Ethiopia's development." 

and being perhaps unable because of his background and times to go any farther with respect 

1 See J. Peter Pham, "African Constitutionalism: Forging New Models for Multi-Ethnic Governance and SelfDetermination," in A/rica: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law, ed. Jeremy I. Levitt (Oxford: Hart 

Publishing, 2008), 183-203. 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

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to liberalization, he left the path open to his successors to take the country's development and 

political evolution to its next stages. 

Hailemariam Desalegn: A Very Initial Assessment 

If it is too soon to properly judge the legacy of the late Prime Minister Meles, it most certainly is 

premature to attempt to render anything beyond a very initial assessment of his successor, 

Hailemariam Desalegn, who was only confirmed by parliament in his prime ministerial tenure 

on a permanent basis on September 21, 2012, and subsequently elected as chairman of the 

EPRDF by the congress of the governing coalition which met in Bahir Dar during the last week of 

March 2013 (although he did assume the chairmanship of the African Union three months 

earlier on January 27). 

That being said, however, there have been several positive and, indeed, tantalizing indications 

that while the new prime minister has promised to maintain his predecessor's policies, he is 

also slowly blazing out his own trail. These include: 

On November 29, 2012, the Ethiopian parliament approved Prime Minister Hailemariam 

Desalegn's reshuffle of the Council of Ministers, which reaffirmed the EPRDF's multi-ethnic 

framework to give each of the parties in the coalition at least a deputy prime ministerial-ranked 

position. The prime minister himself hails from the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 

People's Region and previously led the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement 

(SEPDM), while Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen is leader of the Amhara National 

Democratic Movement (ANDM). Civil Service Minister Muktar Kedir of the Oromo People's 

Democratic Organization (OPDO) and Minister of Communications and Information Technology 

Debretsion Gebremichael, deputy chairman of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 

were confirmed as ministers with the rank of deputy prime minister. While seemingly cosmetic, 

the appointments potentially represent a balancing of governing coalition which has 

traditionally been dominated by the TPLF. 

On April 29, 2013, during the course of his meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 

Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus reiterated the offer made by Prime 

Minister Hailemariam in December to open a dialogue with Eritrea without preconditions 

"anytime, anywhere and at any level." While, regrettably, the Eritrean regime has not 

responded to the invitation to parley, the mere fact that an offer has been tabled represents a 

not insignificant improvement of the prospects for peace. 

On May 10, just days after Prime Minister Hailemariam gave an address denouncing corruption 

in government, the ministerial-ranked director-general of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs 

Authority (ERCA), Melaku Fenta, and two other ERCA officials, along with nine other people, 

were arrested on suspicion of corruption. Melaku, a senior EPRDF member, is the most highprofile official to be arrested since Siye Abraha, a former defense minister, was charged with 

abuse of office in 2002 (and, it should be noted that Siye, who was subsequently convicted and 

jailed for six years, had already left government at the time of his arrest). While Ethiopia's 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

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ranking of 113th out of 176 states in Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions 

Index puts its above its immediate neighbors, the arrests of Melaku and his alleged cohorts as 

well as the subsequent arrests of more than fifty people by Ethiopia's Federal Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission clearly signal a determination on the part of the new administration to 

tackle the problem. 

On June 2, several thousand demonstrators led by the chairman of the Semayawi ("Blue") 

Party, Yilkal Getinet, peacefully marched down Addis Ababa's Churchill Avenue to demand the 

release of prisoners and to protest unemployment and alleged state meddling in religious 

affairs. While the number of those who turned out was relatively modest, the march was 

nonetheless the largest anti-government demonstration since 2005. Moreover, the protesters 

encountered no police interference-nor, as I have been assured by senior officials, will there 

be any should the Blues decide to hold more marches as long as organizers respect the 

requirement that local authorities be given sufficient notice in order to make necessary 

logistical accommodations. If this proves to be the case, it will certainly be indicative both of 

the confidence of the new prime minister and his government in the country's overall stability 

and of a new opening in its political space. 

To these modest points of data, I would add a brief personal observation from having had, even 

before he became prime minister, the privilege of discussing a broad range of topics with 

Hailemariam Desalegn. It is well known that the prime minister comes from the Wolayta, an 

ethnic group that barely approaches 2 percent of the total Ethiopian population. Less well 

known is the fact that his family is affiliated with a "Oneness" Pentecostal denomination that is 

itself a small minority within the Protestant minority among Ethiopian Christians. Moreover, I 

have been rather impressed by not only how well informed Prime Minister Hailemariam is on a 

variety of issues, but also the methodological rigor of his thought process which allows for a 

dispassionate examination of problems-perhaps a legacy of his academic and professional 

background as a civil engineer specializing in water and sanitation projects. 

While as a political analyst and not a psychological one, I try not to overemphasize factors like 

these, one likewise ought to not arbitrarily discount their influence on the perspective any 

person brings to bear on the questions he or she confronts. In particular, it should be noted 

that, by and large, those occupying almost all the leading positions in the current Ethiopian 

government are, unlike their predecessors, not former combatants from the long struggle to 

overthrow the Derg. On the other hand, one should also be cognizant of the political, 

institutional, and other constraints which someone in Hailemariam Desalegn's position faces, 

especially until such time as he or she is able to win a full electoral mandate in his or her own 

right. 

Clarifying Some Contentious Issues 

There are several contentious issues which are often either misunderstood or otherwise taken 

out of context for which some clarification may contribute to a more complete assessment of 

recent developments in Ethiopia as well as to the Subcommittee's deliberations as it carries out 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

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its oversight responsibilities with respect to US policy towards the country in general and 

questions of democratization and human rights in particular. 

"Lond grabs." For several years now, there have been a steady stream of sensationalist reports 

in the media about so-called "land grabs" which are alleged to have forced tens-if not 

hundreds-of thousands of people off their land in order to lease it to foreign investors. Many 

of these reports originate in the press releases of self-appointed "watchdog" groups seeking 

publicity for the extended op-eds masquerading as scientific studies which are the stock in 

trade of a number of these organizations. For all the rhetorical bombast, the facts on the 

ground simply do not support the narrative. Ethiopia has exactly 100 million hectares of land, of 

which it is estimated that more than 70 million hectares are arable, although not all of it is 

currently under permanent cultivation. Following an exhaustive assessment process by the 

federal government with the regional governments, some 3.67 million hectares of arable 

land2

-less than 4 percent of the country's total land mass-was identified as underutilized and 

uninhabited and, consequently, designated as available for large-scale agriculture investment 

which would, moreover, help assure Ethiopia's food security. In the several years that this 

program has been in place, the total amount of land which has been leased to the grand total 

of 234 foreign investors, including members of the Ethiopian diaspora, is 395,000 hectares3

-

just over 10 percent of land eligible for such leases under the government's program and barely 

half of 1 percent of the total arable land in the country. Thus if this issue is even relatively 

significant enough to raise among the other pressing concerns in our bilateral relationship with 

Ethiopia, we ought to at the very least ensure that the discussion is grounded in empirical 

facts-not alarmist headlines and emotional hype-and the amount of time, energy, and 

political capital dedicated to it commensurate with that reality. 

Agricultural policy. Ethiopia's robust economic growth owes a great deal to the strong 

performance of its agricultural sector, which is another reason it is rather unlikely that the 

country's government has it "in" for the estimated 13 to 15 million smallholders who produce 

more than 95 percent of agricultural output, which in turn contributes nearly half of national 

GDP and even larger proportions of employment and export earnings. If anything, facilitating 

the transition of subsistence farmers into the commercial economy would pay rich cross-sector 

dividends-to say nothing of the political advantage to be gained by whatever administration 

presides over the shift. In many respects, the government's infrastructure program with its 

expansion of roads as well as the power grid and market networks is already benefiting 

farmers. In addition, the country's current Five-Year Growth and Transformation Plan aims to 

2 The land identified as underutilized and uninhabited and, consequently, available for lease to large-scale 

agricultural projects is found in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region (1,148,852 hectares), Gambella Regional State 

(1,226,893 hectares), Dromia (1,069,967 hectares), Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region (209,725 

hectares), and the Amhara Region (6,183 hectares). 

3 Overall, some 470,000 hectares were leased to foreign and diaspora investors, but 75,000 hectares was 

repossessed because the leaseholders either failed to develop the land as agreed upon or violated environmental 

regulations. These 75,000 hectares have been returned to the pool of land that is potentially available for largescale agricultural development. 

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double the national economy by doubling agricultural output and, simultaneously, to 

sustainably increase both rural incomes and national food security. 

The Nile. It is beyond the scope of this hearing to go into the complex issues relating to the use 

of waters of the Nile River, questions concerning which have been unhelpfully muddied by the 

overheated rhetoric-and, indeed, threats of violence-pouring forth from Egyptian President 

Mohamed Morsi and other politicians in Cairo. 

At a certain level, the bombast is not surprising since it may be all they have. First, insofar as it 

has a legal case at all, Egypt's claims rests on rather weak foundations. During the colonial era, 

a May 1929 exchange of notes between Egyptian Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmoud Pasha 

and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, stipulated that no projects 

affecting the Nile flow would be undertaken in Sudan, then under the Anglo-Egyptian 

"condominium," or any other territory then under British rule without the agreement of the 

Egyptian government which asserted its "natural and historical rights" over the river. Following 

Sudan's independence, that country signed the Nile Waters Agreement with Egypt in 1959, 

which allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of water annually to the Egyptians and 18.5 bcm 

to the Sudanese. Second, nemo dat quod non habet ("you cannot give what you do not have [or 

own]") is a bedrock principle of classical international jurisprudence. The lack of reference to 

other riparian countries and their interests leaves open the question of the Nile Agreement's 

legal validity to bind any parties other than Egypt and Sudan which, moreover, contribute 

virtually nothing to the river's flow. Ethiopia, the source of an overwhelming part of the Nile's 

water, was never a party to either of the agreements, although it was an independent state at 

the time of both-in fact, at the time of the 1929 accord, Ethiopia had been a full member of 

the League of Nations for some six years, while Egypt, then under a quasi-protectorate, was not 

accepted into the organization as a full-fledge sovereign member of the international 

community until 1937. Moreover, Burundi, the Congo, Eritrea, and Rwanda, are likewise not 

parties to the accords, having been ruled by other colonial regimes-thus the British did not 

have any pretext by which to sign away the water rights of those territories. Third, for the talk 

in Cairo about keeping "all options open" and the armchair speculation about possible attacks 

against the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the Morsi regime's threats are as empty 

as its treasury: quite simply, the Egyptian military does not have the aerial refueling capability 

for its aircraft to even make it into Ethiopian airspace, much less bomb the project and return 

home.4 

However, the issue of the GERD-which, when completed in 2017, will be Africa's largest 

4 It is another matter entirely whether the Egyptian regime, unable to achieve its goals any other way, might resort 

to covert action, such as supporting and even arming dissident groups seeking the overthrow of the Ethiopian 

state, irrespective of their prospects for success. It is possible to interpret along similar lines the visit two weeks 

ago of a high-level Egyptian military delegation to Mogadishu where its members were reported to have expressed 

interest in equipping and training the Somali regime's forces for possible action against the unrecognized, but de 

facto independent Republic of Somaliland-which, coincidentally, is one of landlocked Ethiopia's vital accesses to 

the sea. 

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June 20, 2013 

hydropower plant-and the rest of Ethiopia's ambitious plans for the use of its natural 

resources also serve to highlight two positive policy developments. First, last week the 

Ethiopian parliament unanimously ratified the Nile River Cooperative Framework Agreement, 

which has also been signed by Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda (the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo and South Sudan have also announced their intention of joining the 

pact), thus opening the way for what could prove to be a new era of broad cooperation across 

the region. Second, even as it was ratifying the deal with its upper riparian partners, the 

Ethiopian government went out of its way to reach out to downstream countries, including 

representatives from Sudan and Egypt as well as international members in the International 

Panel of Experts that recently reported on the impact of the GERD. This unprecedented 

openness on a question of core national interest is a most welcome development, as is the new 

agreement, reached on Tuesday following the Egyptian foreign minister's visit to Addis Ababa, 

for the three countries to conduct further impact studies. 

Muslim protests. To do justice to the Ethiopian government's decision to take a more proactive 

stance to counter radicalization among the country's Muslims beginning about two years ago 

and the protests last year over the elections to the country's Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, 

or Majlis, would perhaps require the Subcommittee to schedule a separate hearing. It is, 

however, worth noting that worry over the threat posed by well-resourced extremists to which 

has been Ethiopia's hitherto laudable tradition of peaceful coexistence and, indeed, respect 

between the three Abrahamic religions is a concern among both scholars and policymakers, 

predating the more recent controversies. I treated it at some length in the entry on "Ethiopia" 

in the 2011 edition of the World Almanac of Islamism s and I would add that Ambassador 

Donald Yamamoto had the occasion to engage this issue during his tenure as the United States 

ambassador in Addis Ababa in a series of three cables which were subsequently published by 

WikiLeaks. Without justifying the unauthorized release of classified US diplomatic reports, since 

the documents have now been widely disseminated, I would respectfully call the 

Subcommittee's attention to two passages, one descriptive and the other diagnostic: 

Conflicts within the Muslim community have also arisen over control of mosques, which 

imams should be allowed to preach, and over control of Islamic education. The [Majlis] 

wants to build an Ethiopian Muslim theological school so that young Ethiopian men will 

not have to go to the Middle East to study in preparation for becoming Imams, as they 

must now. These young men are increasingly studying in Saudi Arabia due to the 

generous scholarships and subsidies available there and when they return to Ethiopia to 

take up their posts in new Saudi-funded mosques, they continue to receive subsidies 

from Saudi Arabia or Islamic NGOs. Unfortunately, the Sufi-dominated Muslim 

community in Ethiopia does not have sufficient funds to start their own theological 

school, nor can they counter the financial advantage Wahhabis have in Ethiopia. 

Ethiopia's delicate Muslim/Christian balance and historic attitudes between the faith 

5 See J. Peter Pham, {(Ethiopia/ in World Almanac of fslamism 2011/ ed. Ilan Berman and Jeff M. Smith (Lanham, 

MD: Rowman & Littlefield), 261-370. 

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June 20, 2013 

communities regarding tolerance and mutual respect are being challenged} thereby 

undermining US interests in the region. 

Consequently, it would behoove us to keep this larger strategic context in mind in evaluating 

some ofthe issues which have arisen a propos. 

Recommendations for US Policy 

With all this in mind, permit me to conclude by commending to the Subcommittee's 

consideration five principles to guide US policy toward Ethiopia, which I offer in line with the 

prudent norm embraced by President Obama in last year's U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan 

Africa: "Addressing the opportunities and challenges in Africa requires a comprehensive U.S. 

policy that is proactive, forward-looking, and that balances our long-term interests with nearterm imperatives." 

First, understand that Ethiopia is an ancient country populated by proud peoples imbued with a 

deep sense of histary and nationhaad, all of which has a prafound impact an current palitical 

reality. This statement is not just trope, but rather key to even beginning to grasp what is 

arguably the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that is the product of history and geography, 

rather than being "!"itat impart,§" willed into existence and preserved because some colonizer 

drew an imaginary line on a near-empty map. While the Ethiopian central state's internal unity 

and its control of peripheral regions has waxed and waned in the many centuries since the glory 

days of the kingdom ofAxum, "the core fact of regional politics is the Ethiopian state, lineally 

descended from the empires that have controlled the northern highlands over some two 

thousand years, and in the process extended their dominion, to the extent that they were able 

to do so, over their less densely populated peripheries.,,6 In short, unlike some of its neighbors 

and notwithstanding the fevered delusions of some who do not wish it well, Ethiopia is a viable 

state inhabited by people with a vibrant underlying sense of nationhood and identity who can 

be expected to overcome divisions and other challenges. 

Secand, recagnize both the opportunities within the historic mament and the delicate balance 

that needs to be maintained. There is no denying that, whatever one's view of the late Prime 

Minister Meles, his passing after more than two decades at the helm is a historic turning point 

for Ethiopia. However, like all transitions, it is fraught with both opportunities and challenges. 

While one can have confidence in Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, his abilities, and his 

vision, one should not ignore the fact that, at least through the national elections due in two 

years' time, he has his work cut out for him, both internally and externally. One should be leery 

of any actions which might upset the careful political balance being struck. Rather, what needs 

to be appreciated is that Ethiopia is at a crossroad and how its partners manage their relations 

with the country may well influence which direction it takes. Nagging, hectoring, and threat 

making will likely result in the opposite of the outcome sought, while patient and supportive 

diplomacy may reap considerable fruit. 

6 Christopher Clapham} ItEthiopia: The Perils of Reform,u in On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions 

within Societies, ed. Jeffrey Herbst, Terence McNamee, and Greg Mills (London: Profile, 2012),138. 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

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Third, be realistic abaut what the United States can and cannot do with respect ta the directian 

of social, economic, and political developments in Ethiopia. It goes without saying that America 

has influence and, where possible, it ought to be used judiciously for good-as long as it does 

not imperil what Hans Morgenthau characterized as the "moral duty for a nation to always 

follow in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule 

for action, THE NATIONAL INTEREST.,,7 However-and perhaps these are notions somewhat foreign 

to us as modern Americans both used to instant gratification and unaccustomed to limits, 

political as well as fiscal-we need a healthy sense of humility about what we can hope to 

accomplish. A few years ago, Ambassador David Shinn published a short commentary, the 

salient points of which it would be useful to recall: 

Those in the Ethiopian diaspora who oppose the Ethiopian government usually suggest 

that American assistance to Ethiopia can and should serve as the leverage for forcing 

change in the country. The level of u.s. assistance in recent years has been impressive. 

In fiscal year 2007, it was about $474 million and in fiscal year 2008 about $456 million. 

It is important, however, to look more closely at this assistance ... 

In fiscal year 2008, by my calculations, 73 percent of USAID's budget for Ethiopia went 

to HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, 12 percent to child survival and health, 9 

percent to development assistance, 5 percent for food aid and less than 1 percent for a 

combination of foreign military financing (FMF) and international military education and 

training (IMET). The amount for FMF was $843,000 and for IMET $620,000. 

This is not an assistance program that has significant political leverage. In 2007, almost 

95 percent of the assistance program went to HIV/AIDS, emergency food aid and child 

survival. In 2008, the figure was about 90 percent for these programs. There are very 

few members of Congress and even fewer in the Executive Branch who are interested in 

cutting funding for HIV/AIDS, child survival and emergency food aid in an effort to 

change governmental policies in Ethiopia. 8 

The thrust of Ambassador Shinn's argument is as valid today as when he made them. If 

anything, room for maneuver is even tighter and America's overall leverage significantly 

diminished by the combination of our own general cutbacks in foreign assistance-in the 

current fiscal year, total US assistance to Ethiopia amounted to some $351 million before 

sequestration, down approximately one-fourth from the levels just five years agog-and the 

emergence of other countries and international actors able and willing to work with the 

7 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New 

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 241-242 

8 David H. Shinn, "U.S. Aid Has Its Limits," The Official Blog of Amb. David H. Shinn, November 2, 2009, 

Of this total, 26.1 percent went to development assistance in governance, education, and economic growth and 

agriculture; 15.4 percent went to HIV!AIDS programs; 30.4 percent went to global health programs; and 27.9 

percent went to emergency food relief-and one-tenth of 1 percent, some $500,000, went to military training and 

education-mostly to areas like border security in which the United States has an interest and which were 

exempted by Congress from restrictions . 

. ----.. - .. - ...... -.-.--... ----.... ---- Page 11 
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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

June 20, 2013 

Ethiopian government-as underscored by Prime Minister Hailemariam's visit to Beijing last 

week and the high-level meetings he had there with Chinese political leaders as well as bankers 

and other investors. 

Fourth, take advantage of Ethiopia's application to join the World Trade Organization (WTOj to 

constructively engage with the country's government not only about economic liberalization, 

but other rule of law and governance concerns. While Ethiopia applied to join the bloc a decade 

ago, the application has acquired greater momentum in recent months with the government 

pulling out all stops to be in a position to present its initial offer on trade in services in the 

coming months as a basis for bringing forward its negotiations with WTO member states. In 

Addis Ababa last month, Secretary of State John Kerry stated, "We also support Ethiopia's 

accession to the WTO, and we are going to work with Ethiopia in an effort to try to help that 

transition." This is the correct position, not only in its own right with respect to promoting 

business and investment-as Secretary Kerry noted, "our private sector businesses need to 

focus on Ethiopia and recognize the opportunities that are here and hopefully we can 

encourage more companies to come here and be engaged and help take part in this"-but for 

the "knock-on" effects of integrating the country into the global trade framework. Even if the 

publicly stated goal of completing accession in 2014 is unlikely to be achieved, the effort does 

present the United States and other international partners with a unique opportunity for more 

intense dialogue with their Ethiopian counterparts, contribute to enhancing the latter's 

technical administrative and regulatory capabilities, and advance policy objectives ranging from 

liberalizing the banking and telecommunications sectors to securing private property and other 

lega I rights. 

Fifth, become more engaged in Ethiopia's rapidly transforming higher education sector. Ethiopia 

has gone from three national universities in 2001 to thirty-one this year-a rapid expansion 

that is perhaps unique in the world and certainly among developing countries. Some 20 percent 

of Ethiopia's national budget is spent on education, a commendable investment in the 

country's future. Both Prime Minister Hailemariam, who spent most of his early career in 

different academic and administrative posts at what has become Arba Minch University, and 

Deputy Prime Minister Demeke, a onetime high school biology teacher and former minister of 

education, have backgrounds in the classroom. If the US government could encourage 

American colleges and universities to become more engaged with their Ethiopian counterparts, 

there is the prospect over the long term of considerable return, both in terms of consolidating 

the cultural and political bonds between our countries and people as well as advancing 

democratic and human development. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: 

In the u.s. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, the President acknowledged that "it is clear 

that Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international 

community, and to the United States in particular." What is true of the continent is, if anything, 

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J. Peter Pham Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Ethiopia After Meles" 

June 20, 2013 

even more the case with the country that hosts the seat of the African Union. 

It goes without saying that there are a number of things that one might wish to see done 

differently, perhaps even better, with respect to the ongoing social, economic, and political 

development of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the context in which the post-Meles transition and 

other developments are occurring needs to be taken into account and objective progress, both 

in absolute terms and relative to the rest of a very troubled, but geopolitically strategic, region. 

In that perspective, it would behoove policymakers and analysts in the United States and 

Ethiopia's other international partners to keep in mind Voltaire's warning that "Ie mieux est 

I'ennemi du bien" and, allowing a healthy dose of political realism about their own interests and 

those of the peoples of Ethiopia to temper judgmentalist impulses, devote their energies 

instead to where they can be most effective in encouraging, facilitating, and sustaining 

continued stability and progress in Ethiopia and, beyond it, in the Greater Horn of Africa. 

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60

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Pham, thank you very much. 

Mr. Metho. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OBANG METHO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ETHIOPIA 

Mr. METHO. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting us to come 

here about the—talking about Ethiopia. I would like my statement 

to be submitted in the record and I think that the speakers before 

me have already said a lot and I will try to summarize. 

From what we heard going back to the subject of Ethiopia after 

Meles, I think we need to go back what happened when Meles was 

here and I think that this is something that most of us need to be 

aware of. 

When Meles was alive or when he went to the bush he went with 

an organization called Tigrayan Liberation Front to liberate a section of a country, not to liberate Ethiopia. And when they took over 

they did not change it. 

They have created what they call EPRDF, to fool the outsider 

that Ethiopians are united while they’re still running the ethnic 

base. 

I think this is something that we need to not dismiss. In Ethiopia today, for the last 20 years, is being led by an ethnic base and 

this is something that we should not miss. 

So when Meles was alive, he was being known and I think 

Yamamoto put it very well—charming to the West, brutal to Ethiopia. 

Saying that lie, a war on terror, he’s terrorized his own peoples. 

Saying that the economy grew, it’s booming——

[Applause.] 

Mr. METHO [continuing]. Saying that economy grew, booming, 

just ask other Ethiopians that were being displaced from their 

land. Food aid that’s been given has been used as a tool. 

The list can go on, when Meles was alive. Now, let me come back 

what has changed. Last time—and, again, I thank you, Mr. Smith, 

for your extraordinary leadership—8 years ago when there was a 

briefing here I came and testified for 424 people from my own ethnic group and from Gambella where 193 Ethiopians were killed, for 

the Ethiopian political prisoners including Dr. Berhanu Nega, who 

is beside me. 

That was 8 years ago. Yamamoto was with me. He said there 

was a crossroads. Eight years—can you not cross this road? 

[Applause.] 

Mr. METHO. Yamamoto claimed that by that time Ethiopia at the 

beginning of a new chapter. This book—there have never—any 

other chapters since then. 

The point I want to make is this. I agree with some of the peoples. I disagree with some. The USAID talked about progress in 

Ethiopia. Peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia there’s antiterror 

laws. 

It is against the law for reconciliation, child rights, woman 

rights, disabled—the value that which really the Americans depend 

on and we call that there’s progress in the country. 

These are some of the issues that I want to mention. In my point 

I am speaking as human rights and I am speaking as an Ethiopian 

61

because if something is happening in Ethiopia to the outside it’s 

happened to Ethiopia and to me, it’s happened to my family members and this one point that I need to mention. 

One point that I need to not miss in Ethiopia the journalists are 

locked up in jail. In Ethiopia, what we need, the Ethiopian people, 

are simple things. We need to be given a choice. 

All of you who are sitting, Mr. Smith, some people—you are representing people. In Ethiopia we are denied to have our own submit that we choice and that what we are asking for, nothing less. 

In that matter, right now Meles is gone, the regime is in place 

but at the end of the day the Ethiopian problem will not be solved 

by the outsiders but the Ethiopian. 

We had many chances. When the king, Haile Selassie, collapsed 

we missed that opportunity. When the Derg collapsed we missed 

that opportunity. At that time there were a gentleman in this 

House. The thing he predicted is what’s going on today. 

Right now, Yamamoto may say that Ethiopia is a cause lost but 

Ethiopian is different and I will like to now read a statement that 

I would like for all of us to know. 

The reason why I say that it’s not an American—the simple 

things that we are asking we are not asking Americans or the 

Western to free us. We are asking them not to be a roadblock to 

our freedom. We can free ourselves. 

And how do we do that? It’s simple. For the last 12 months, the 

Ethiopian Muslim Brothers were protesting just to choose the leaders who can preach them. 

Ethiopia denied them their free protesting peacefully. The government want to divide them and say that the Ethiopian Muslim 

are radical extremists and I say that they are not. 

The Muslim and as a Christian and Ethiopian we don’t share 

faith. We don’t share land. We share blood and the blood cannot 

be taken away from us. We are one people. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. METHO. The hope and the change I’m seeing—just a few 

weeks ago the Blue Party have took the leadership to bring Ethiopia out. They call the people and Ethiopians show up. And before 

they show up let me read a statement I got from one young man:

‘‘Dear Obang, it is now just 4 hours before we go out to rallies. I don’t know what will happen. This may be my last message. The last time I went out, 2005, with three of my friends 

I was the only one that came back. This time I may not come 

back. I’m looking forward to this. It seems like going to a war 

zone. The only difference is the other side have guns. I have 

nothing. 

‘‘If they shoot I have nothing else to deliver. This is the kind 

of country that we are living in, Obang, but higher moral 

ground and that’s why I’m going out and I’m not afraid and I 

want somebody to know.’’

This is the kind of government that the U.S. is funding. And this 

is the point that I just want to conclude, Mr. Smith. 

The Ethiopian we have enough opportunity. We have enough, 

many Ethiopians. What we need is to work together, people to people, and those peoples they’re not the one in Addis Ababa. The 

62

Ethiopian taxi driver who will pick you up, the Ethiopian who are 

working at Starbucks serving you coffee, the Ethiopian that are 

working at a parking lot, the Ethiopian in DC, they want freedom 

like everybody else. We are not begging. When Obama run for 

President he said that we need change. 

Some Ethiopians who were working minimum wage pay and hoping that they will hear from Obama. We never heard that. We are 

not disappointed. We will free ourself. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Metho follows:]

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Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Africa p Global Health, Global Human Rights 

International Organizations 

Date: 

June 20, 2013 

Given by: 

Mr. Obang O. Metho, Executive Director 

Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia 

S.M.N.E 
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"Ethiopia After Meles: 

The Future of Democracy and Human Rights" 

I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congressman Edward Royce, 

and all ranking members of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and 

International Organizations for this important opportunity to examine the Ethiopian Government's 

observance of democratic and human rights principles in post-Meles Ethiopia. 

I want to especially thank Congressman Christopher Smith, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa 

for his extraordinary leadership in bringing the case of Ethiopia to the attention of this subcommittee once 

again: particularly in light of the many pressing global issues. In 200(', Congressman Smith worked hard 

to bring this issue all the way from subcommittee to the House, where it faced obstacles and died. I hope 

this time, something more concrete and productive can be accomplished for the betterment of both our 

countries. 

In 2006. I gave testimony at that previous hearing in regards to the massacre of 424 members of my own 

ethnic group. the Anuak. in 2003, perpetrated by members of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces. I 

also testified regarding the ongoing crimes against humanity and destruction of property and 

infrastmcture in the Gambella region of Ethiopia; however. because similar abuses were being perpetrated 

in other places in the country, I also spoke of the 193 peaceful protestors who were shot and killed as they 

peacefully protested the results of the flawed 2005 national election and the repression in Oromia. This 

also included testimony regarding the imprisonment of opposition leaders, including Dr. Berhana Nega, 

who is sitting next to me today. 

Now T am here once again to testifj' about these same kinds of issues because Ethiopians have on(v 

.\'een increa,'iing re,litrictions to their freedom and II continuation of government-,\ponsored human 

rights violation . ." in every' region of the country. This includes the illegal eviction of great numbers of 

Ethiopians from their ancestral homes and land, causing great hardship to the people. It also includes 

egregious human rights atrocitie" ill places like the Ogadell [Somali] region, which is hlockedfrom the 

outside world by the regime. It has obstructed the media from reporting on the great suffering of the 

people being perpetrated by government forces, which has been described as a silent genocide. Two 

Swedish journalists were arrested. detained and charged as terrorists before being released last year. 

However. the Ogaden is not alone for every region of the counlry has become a victim to this regime. 

Sadly, little, in terms of rights, has changed post-Meles. The only change is that he is no longer here. 

Although the rapid decline in freedom and rights was led by Meles, he and his cabinet and ministers 

estahlished all apparatus of strong-armed control that cOlltinues to reach from the top offices of the 

federal government to rural villages throughout Ethiopia. l1tat il~frastructure of repression, which 

carries out much of the day-to-day enforcement of EPRDF control and the perpetration of human 

rights violations, is still in place and marks the near achiL'vement of a secretive and chilling plan put 

into motioll in June 1993 tinder the name: TPLF'EPR])F"-~lrolegi;!siiJrEllabfjslling iiSJ{egef[IOlevd:. 

P€ll'flIlOli!1jr..ilsR"le', which was said to have been given to all their cadres for its execution. An abridged 

translation of the 68-page Amharic document is now available online. 
65


81570e-3.eps

This plan, based on Marxist ideology, was brought to our attention by one of the members of the TPLF 

who reported to us strict adherence to this plan by its cadres. The plan aligns closely with the nature of the 

TPLF when they were still fighting in the bush as well as the Ethiopia oftoday. 

Prior to defeating the brutal Derg regime in 1991. Meles led the Marxist-Leninist based rebel group. the 

Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), also so known for its brutality in the bush that the U. S. State 

Department had classified them as a terrorist group at the time. When they took over power, they formed 

a new coalition party made up of separate ethnic-based parties. It was called the Ethiopian Peoples' 

Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and was meant to appear to be a multi-ethnic govermnent but 

in fact, it has been controlled from the beginning by the TPLF who have never abandoned the goal of 

perpetual hegemony. 

The EPRDF's structure was based around ethnically defined regions and political parties, but at the 

gra.\'.'.root.\' level, all region,,. and parties, though appearing to he led by leader . ." of the same ethnicity as 

the region, were instead pro-TPLFIERPDF puppets, who implemented their policies. By its nature, this 

division of Ethiopia hy ethnidty was a guise meant to dupe the public and the we.,t by its appearance of 

being democratic; however, in practice, it has contributed to the prolongation of ethnic-based divisions 

while strengthening the power of the TPLF, ll,\'.\'uring its control of the EPRDF e,,'en though Tigrllyan . ." 

are a minori(v, making up only 6% of the total population. However, this does not mean the TPLF 

speaks for many Tigrayans who have become disillusioned with the TPLFIEPRDF. 

Tn short, the TPLF's plan of revolutionary democracy, which is more closely aligned with the Chinese 

model than the liberalism of the west, was clearly designed to achieve perpetual hegemony over every 

aspect of Ethiopian life. Tn the above-stated plan, they wam that they can achieve their goals "only hy 

winning the elections succeSSively and holding power without let up." They warn. "if we lose in the 

elections even once. we will encounter a great danger .. [soJ we should win in the initzal elections and 

then create a conducive situation that will ensure the establishment of this hegemony." In 2010, the 

TPLF/ERPDF successfully accomplished this goal and won their fourth election with an alleged 99.6% of 

the votes and all but one of the 547 scats in the Ethiopian Parliament. 

democratic rhetoric. 

The TPLF IEPRDF is more in control today than it was in lOOG and continues to hold that power despite 

the death of their central figure. It ha.' become near to impos.,ible to find any political .'pace jfJr the 

development of a viable alternative to the TPLFIEPRDF because di.,senters, activist., or anyone 

speaking for change will be put in jail. it has become a full-blown autocracy. Anyone who attempts to 

speak ap is silenced. All has been jastified hy saying that Ethiopia has doahle digit economic growth 

and that they have met their millennium goals and that the people are too ignorant to understand how 

the']' will eventual(l' henefit; however, the people know that this is not balanced growth hut instead has 

'~filled the pockets and bellies" of government supporters as laid out in the 1993 plan. Claims of 

economic gains also serve to minimiLc or cover up the reality on the ground of the increased poverLy of 
66


81570e-4.eps

the majority. Supporters of the TPLF/EPRDF policies and tactics are rewarded while non-supporters are 

penaliLed in a variety of ways. The most marginaliLed masses arc ignored unless tiley become an 

impediment to the TPLF/ERPDF plan of exploitation of land or natural resources. Here is an explanation 

ofiliat strategy l[om the original TPLF/ERPDF plan: 

The combined strength of the S'wte and Revolutionary TJemocra(), 's economic institutions should 

be used either to attract the support or to neutralize the opposition of the intelligentsia. We 

should demonstrate to it that our econornic strength could serve its interests, and. in the event (~f 

its opposition to us, u, belly and pocket could be made empty. 

Examples of tile practice of the above strategy are rampant. According to a ULllna" Jtiglll~ W.atchH report, 

following the 2010 election, even humanitarian aid was linked to party membership. 

Record numbers of refugees arc leaving the country, regardless of the risks, because so little opportunity 

exists for the average person, let alone for more outspoken dissenters, Laws such as the <::harilicslll19 

S()ci,eti~§PrQclml1?11()11m have literally closed down civil society, replacing institutions with TPLF/ERPDF 

controlled look-alike organiLations. A vague ?JJli.-tc;ITQri;il}l Juv{" has been used to silence jOLtnlalisls, 

editors, democracy activists, religious leaders and opposition members by intimidating them, arresting 

them or charging and imprisoning thelTI as terrorists. Examples are our heroes of freedOlTI such as 

Eskinder Nega, Reeyot Alemu and Andualem Arage. 

Into this highly controlled milieu, the new Prime Minister, Hailemarianl Desalegn, has emerged. He is 

neither Tigrayan nor is he part of the old guard of TPLF loyalists but instead comes from tile South, 

helping to counter accusations ofTPLFdominationoftheEPRDF. Reportedly, his appointment was holly 

contested: however, because he had held the position of Deputy Prime Minister it may have provided the 

least controversial transition. Insider information reporls he has litLle power and that his actions arc all 

closely monitored by the TPLF eentra[ committee, As another means of control, three depaty prime 

ministers of different ethnicity were appointed and are said to hold more power than the prime 

minister, Reports have also surfaced that power struggles within the party leadership have split the top 

power holder.\' and remain unresolved These intraparty conflicts could deepen a.\' the next election 

comes closer, with anpredictable, but possib(v dangerous results, Hoping that this problem will resolve 

on its own is unrealistic and a recipe/or di,'taster. 

The TPLF/ERPDF has so effectively constructed a system of repression in Ethiopia that it will likely 

carryon for awhile; however Meles, the driving force who chamled Ll,e west while terroriLing the people, 

remains their main visionary leader. Billboards around Addis Ababa show his picture and the 

TPLF/ERPDF continues to elevate his legacy, possibly because no one else within the party has been able 

to articulate another~ more timely or urgently-needed vision. This open.\' them up to new challenges from 

the di",mtisfied majority that they may not he ahle to dodge, Tntraparty conflicts may also fiLTther 

exacerhate the situation, Add to that pressure from the outside, like from Egypt, neighboring countries or 

others and the situation may either explode or implode without reforms. Although the TPLFIEPRDF has 

shown little openness to reforms, with enough pressure from the people and donors like the U.s" it 

might create a win-win situation to bring about such r~forms without violence, chaos and a spillover 

~ffect in the Horn of Africa, 
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81570e-5.eps

The road to democracy and respect for human rights in Ethiopia must be solved by Ethiopians, but the 

U.S. has a role to playas well. I believe the current U.S. policy of quiet diplomacy will actually contribute 

to a worse outcome. We should learn from what happened in the Arab Spring, when forces of a frustrated 

public joined together to oust Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It took many by surprise. especially 

those who had sided with an authoritarian regime rather than the people, thinking Mubarak was so 

powerful that he could not be brought do\Vn. This alliance with an authoritarian regime makes it much 

more difficult in the aftennath to reestablish a meaningful partnership with Egyptians that goes beyond 

giving large amounts of foreign aid. 

Undoubtedly, many Ethiopians attribute U.S. support to Ethiopia, including partnership in the War on 

Terror, as a means that has prolonged the life of a repressive, undemocratic regime. Will the U.S. be proactive in aligning with the people; something that will help sustain a long-term relationship with 

Ethiopians? Unfortunately, the tendency of most entrenched groups lind their supporters, foreign or 

native, is to continue the status quo without any change; however, in Ethiopia, there is a window of 

opportunity before the ne.;y;t election in 2015 to set the stage for meaningjili reforms, The U,S, and 

other donor countries should not simply stand by, using the rationale that there is no viable alternative 

to work with because the TPLFIERPDF ha.v heen.Wl effective in h/ocking acce.", to politicul.vpace and 

will not easi~)' give up on this, This must be taken into consideration for how can you build an 

alternative in this kind of repre,'i...,ive environment'! You cannot put someone out in the middle of 

nowhere with no material and tell them to build something. It will not work. 

With these limitations in mind. the Ethiopian public, both at home and in the Diaspora, arc now working 

to bring the change. Some of that change can be seen from what happened last week in Addis Ababa 

when Ethiopians came out in mass numbers to peac~ful~)' ral(l' for freedom and justice in Ethiopia 

ha.ved on a call from the newly emerging Blue party, With minimal re.Wlurces, the Blue party reached 

oat to the public in an inclusive way and the groundswell of response /i-om ethnicanv, politically and 

religious(l' diverse Ethiopians surprised even them, They called on the people and the people answered. 

Yet, the TPLF/ERPDF warned that Muslims who joined together with Christians and others in the rally 

were extremists. This defies the reality on the ground. 

For the last year, Ethiopian Maslims have been peac~ful()' ral(ving in their compound, asking for 

freedom to practice religion without government interference into their internal affairs, In violation of 

the Ethiopian Constitution, the TPLFIERPDF hm heen choo.,ing their reiigiou.v leader.>, en.mring 

those leaders were pro-government, The TPLF IERPDF has done the same within the Ethiopiml Orthodox 

Church leading to the church breaking into two divisions-the government approved church in Ethiopia 

and the other in exile here in the U.S. - a divide and conquer strategy of gaining hegemony of religious 

groups addressed in the TPLF/EPRDF master plan of 1993. Within that plan, religious groups were to be 

"used to disseminate the views of Revolutionary Democracy ... and if that is not possible we should try to 

curtail theIr ohstructionist activities ... Without denying them due re,\pect. H'e should mold their vinvs, 

curtail their propaganda against Revolutionary Democracy. and even use them to serve our end. . 

The TPLFIERPDF government will do an)'thing to label the Muslims as extremists and radiculs to be 

feared h)' the west; however, Ethiopian Muslims, Christiam and ,Tews have lived together for 

thollsanli.\' ofyellr.\' in harmony. We do not only .\'hllre the land but we .\'hllre blood. We lire afamily. We 

are brothers and sisters. 
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81570e-6.eps

In twelve months of ral()'ing, these peaceful Muslim protestors have never destroyed anything or hurt 

another person. They are 1I0t makillg a stalldfor Sharia law but illsteadfor a secular state where all 

people will befree and where there is no government interference ill the practice of any religioll. Yet, 

the TPLFIEPRDFfears ulli~r betweell diverse religious groups. 

Reports have emerged of the TPLF/ERPDF's intentions to divide people of different religious faith and to 

alarm the west by staging events themselves while blaming others. For example, inside reports allege that 

when Ethiopian Muslims were going to rally in front of the U.S. Embassy. they found out that progovernment forces were going to burn the American flag so they called off the entire rally. An eyewitness 

to the killing of Christians in 2007, reported to be by Muslims in U,e Oromo region of U,e country. were 

recognized by a relative to not be Muslims at all but government supporters. 

I personally spoke to U,at survivor. II preceded the invasion into Somalia and is seen as an attempt to dupe 

the west. It must be understood that it profits this regime to do violence in the name of their opponents. 

Here is another example reported in Wikileaks where the l1.S. had knowledge that the TPLFIERPDF 

government had .\'et the bombs in Addis Ababa several year.'" ago so us scapegoat government 

opponents. 111ey used it to justify the arrest of Oromo leaders as terrorists and to show a rising 

incidence of terrorist acts in Ethiopia, even though it wu,\" phony. Duping the west into .\'upporting the 

TPLFlERPDF was part of their origillal strategy laid out ill the 1993 plan and is part of the reason for 

becoming a pseudo-democracy. 

Division between ethnicities. regions, political parties and religious groups is the lifeblood of the 

TPLF/ERPDF. For the government to gain power and control, they are trying to alienate the people 

from each other and .\pread rumors regarding the makeup of tho,\'e who are protesting . .Tu.\'t as they are 

calling Muslims extremists and terrorists, they are now trying to label the Blue party, to separate them 

from others, hy accusing them of heing funded hy foreigners like Eg.l1Jt. The fact that Christians and 

Muslims are ral(ring together for freedom and justice for all Ethiopians is a real threat to their 

existence. These kinds of tactics by U,e government arc a sign that the status quo cannot continue and will 

be challenged in increasing unity anlong Ethiopians. l1u donor countries, including the US, should 

align with the people. This means supporting the people who arc working from wiU,in and those who arc 

trying to resolve the problem peacefully. wiUlOut violence. 

The proper sequence of reforms is critical to the success of the outcome. 
69


81570e-7.eps

Poverty and corruption in Ethiopia will also increase the pressure for explosion. Recently, Kofi Annan 

spoke about the cost of cormption to the African people. Ethiopia is a primary example. Although many 

quote statistics of economic growth in Ethiopia, most of it is in the hands of a fe". Prior to the rclease of 

the the Global Financial Task Force in their report titled: Ilji0LfituJ17fiEIJ2lit!lri)1'c'_JrcH"-

)oo'L they stated on December 5, 2011 the following 

to Ethiopia: 

"The people of Fthiopia arc heing hied dry. No matter how hard they try to fight their way out of 

absolute destitution and poverty. they will be ."rimming upstream against the current of illicit 

capilalleakage. "v 

Their report reveals that Ethiopia lost US 11.7 billion in illegal capital flight from 2000-2009 and illicit 

financial outt1ows from Ethiopia nearly doubled in 2009 to US$3.26 billion-double the amount in the 

two preceding years-with the vast majority of that increase coming from eormption. kickbacks and 

bribery_ \Vhen it comes to transparency, it does not exist in Ethiopia 

Here is another example. HLUnan Rights Watch found evidence that World Bank money, which was to be 

used for services. was instead used by the govennllenl 10 displace the people from their land. later given 

to foreign and crony investors. Five villages in the Gambella region, hard hit with land grabs, 

accompanied by hlUllan rights violations, made an appeal to the World Bank regarding the improper use 

of its funds. An independent inspection panel investigated the grounds for the appeal for the World 

Bank. After meeting with the local people who had heen displaced to refugee camps in Kenya and 

South Sudan, they recommended afull investigation after finding substantial evidence of the misuse of 

World Bank funds. Now the Ethiopian government has r~fused to cooperate. All donors to the World 

Bank should look into thi.' hemu.,e this is your money. If they have nothing to hide, why would they 

not allow an investigation? 

People on the ground in Ethiopia live in fear of this regime. but many are coming to the point that they 

can no longer endure life without change and are willing to take a stand. Prior to the Blue party' s recent 

rally. a 26-year-old rccent graduate sent me his thoughts. He said: 

Ohang. it is nov!.' just fhur hours hejiJre )ve go (Jut to rally. We don 'f hww ·what wU/ happen hut 

this may be my last message because the last time I went out I went with three o(,myJi'iends and I 

was the only one lvho came hack. That 1-vas seven years ago (rfter the 2005 election. J may he the 

one not come hack this time hut I am not afraid. I am looking at it like going into a war zone. hut 

the only difference is the other side has a gun and we have nothing. If they shoot. I have nothing 

to deliver. This is the kind of country we live in. But. we have the moral high ground and this is 

'f1/hat is mahng me go (Jut. J H'{mt someone to lmow. 
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81570e-8.eps

Ethiopia is a country which relies on the US as its number one supporter and here is one of their 

brave, but peace-loving heroes, going out not knowing what will happen to him and those with him. 

Most of you have met Ethiopians here in Washington D.C as thousands of Ethiopians live and work in 

this city. 17zey pay taxes to the same government that for too 10llg has overlooked the serial violations 

of human rights and the emergence of afull-blown dictatorship. 

Ethiopians have struggled under dictatorship for 40 years. With the death of Meles and the appointment 

of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn until the next election in 2015, Ethiopian., may have been 

given the most opportune moment in 21 years for change; however, if Ethiopians-or donor countries 

genuine(y wantillg to see democratic reforms-step back, waiting to see what will happen under this 

new arrangement of power, rather than active(y creating a process of change that is owned and 

managed by the people of Ethiopia, this opportunity will most like(y be hiiacked and the "system" of 

repression will continue with the same or new "strongmen" at the helm. 111e on(v acceptable outcome 

for the Ethiopian people is nothing short of the transformatioll (!f Ethiopia to an,,",,' societ), and a N,,'W 

Ethiopia where humanity COllles before ethnicny or any other distinctions t(1r no one is 

rrcc~ 

until all are 

This is a time when the U. S. should use their influence to put pressure on the Ethiopian government for 

reforms rather than waiting for simmering tensions to explode. Support for a people-driven process is the 

best allernative to bring lasting change to Ethiopia, more sustainable peace La the Horn and a better 

ongoing partnership with the US. 

Thank you! 

Please do not hesitate to email me if you have comments to: Mr. Obang Melho, the Executive Director of 

the SMN E at QPlll1g(11~g1iiJ!!rityn1QITt1}(;J1t2rg 

:,~:fJ;,~~~:~:'~~~ift:~:~:::~~~~~D,eyeIOpment Without Freedom: How Aid 

repressive 200913\v against civil 

society, the Charities and Societies Proclamation now prohibits any organization that receives more than 10°'0 of its budget from 

foreign sources from (a) advancing human and democratic rights. (b) promoting cquality of nations. nationalitics. peoplcs. gcndcr 

and religion. (e) promoting: the rights ofthe disabled and children, (d) promoting eonllid resolution or recOlKlliation and, (e) 

promoting the efficienc:-' of justice and law enforcement services. 1I1 This has meant the closure of most every independent civic 

organization. Tn thcir place. thc rcgimc has creatcd pscudo-organizations controlled by the rcgimc. Allh", lasl lally Ihis indlld",d 

o'l/",r 2,000 oq,lani/Cllions. Th", hw canit"s harsh nirniuallwnahin rorviolalors. 11 is Ils",d ror polillcal purpos",s ;md has paralyz",d 

Clvil sociely. Tn ils pl;]ctc, I()ok-aliktc pS"'1\(lo-in~lillll10nS havtc sllJlmg IIp, all CTt";]I",d and conlroll",d hy Ih", gc)v",rrnrltcnl, ofltcnliHltcS 

It'gitimaktooutsidf"rs. 

ht;.jJ:/Jy,!v\!~.fj.0.~n.fial!.a_s~fQT~~·.orEl~9).lj.HLQ~ji!tLc_~t::fi~9Q~i?!-9_l!!noY-:'~-frocn::cJhjgQi9::ne~!Jy~.!i9.l!J~J~q-!~~.2.QQ9::!o-.u~~-lEiQjJJ.Lqr.-r~v~.:!~ r]~tJ.::glQq.'i!::. Ur.~ Laj::L-l;gl{rlLY::l§QortL 
71

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Metho, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. Akwei. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ADOTEI AKWEI, MANAGING DIRECTOR 

FOR GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 

USA 

Mr. AKWEI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Bass. Amnesty International continues to look forward to working with you 

and to thank you for your leadership on behalf of the issues in Africa as well as on human rights. 

I’m going to be very, very brief because I know that we’re running out of time but I think the panelists who spoke before me 

have already said that this is a window of opportunity and that it’s 

closing fast. 

This is an opportunity not only for change in Ethiopia but also 

for change here in Washington in terms of U.S. policy toward the 

country. 

What we have seen not only in Ethiopia but in other parts of the 

world is that history shows that governments tend to harden as oppose to soften if they are not—if they do not seize the opportunity 

for reform at the beginning, at the start. 

And so I would urge that this committee and Congress push the 

administration to recalibrate and to revisit what it is exactly is 

going on in Ethiopia, what the government’s genuine commitment 

in Ethiopia is to human rights and the rule of law, all of which are 

going to be critical and essential in terms of its future whether as 

a democracy or, as the first panelist said, where it’s the alternative 

future, which nobody here wants. 

I would also say that there are many levers that the United 

States has not yet used in terms of applying or challenging the 

Addis Ababa regime to meet its human rights obligations. 

For example, the Ethiopian Government is a party to the ICCPR, 

to the Geneva Conventions, to the Convention Against Torture, to 

the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. The Ethiopian 

Government is also a party to the African Charter on Democracy, 

Elections and Governance. 

All of these are very clear in what governments are supposed to 

do in terms of creating free and fair conditions and basic accountability by the ruling government to respect human rights and free 

expression. 

Despite that—and excuse me, the Ethiopian Constitution also 

has at least 30 human rights provisions in it that speak to fundamental freedoms and rights. 

Despite this, the litany of human rights concerns and abuses is, 

sadly, very depressing and these are issues that are not only reported by Amnesty International but by other human rights groups 

and the United States Department of State, which puts out its annual Human Rights Report—very specifically, issues of freedom of 

expression, crackdowns on human rights defenders, torture and ill 

treatment, which you mentioned earlier, the conflict in the Somalia 

region, which my colleagues have also referred to, the issue of 

villagization. 

But the others are even more profound—for example, the lack of 

effective institutions. The Ethiopian judiciary continues to lack 

72

independence and resources and, as has been illustrated in recent 

trials, is not yet a guarantor of rights or justice for the Ethiopian 

people. 

The National Human Rights Commission is also severely lacking 

independence. Amnesty International believes that political will is 

the biggest obstacle to effective independent human rights and 

democratic institutions, and while the current political mind frame 

of the government remains unchanged it will be extremely difficult 

if not impossible for effective institutions to exist and to operate. 

The final human rights concern that I would like to raise, obviously, is precedent and that has already been discussed—the 2005 

elections and the crackdown that happened afterwards. 

Those are not things that were ever accounted for. The numbers 

were never fully clarified and, certainly, there was never accountability. 

Those are things that this government still is accountable for and 

has to answer to. I would just go, finally, to close to just try and 

remember that we’re dealing with human beings and individuals—

lots of them but, indeed, precious in their individuality. 

Eskinder Nega, Debebe Eshetu, Yusuf Getachew, Akmel Negash, 

Yishak Eshtu, Temesgen Dessalegn—all of these are just a few of 

the names of Ethiopian heroes who are challenging and fighting for 

individual rights and the rule of law in their country who have suffered the brunt of the government’s crackdown and its repression. 

There are thousands more like them and some of them we don’t 

even have the names on. 

Mr. Chairman, we believe that without the full enjoyment of 

human rights by all Ethiopians it will be hard to see how the country will fulfil the promise of individual freedom and dignity that it 

has claimed to espouse since the ouster of Mengistu in 1991. 

Since 2005, the human rights situation in the country has deteriorated further with significantly increased restrictions on freedom 

of association, expression and other rights. 

As I said and as Chairman Smith also noted, this has not happened in a vacuum and the international community is also in need 

of looking deeply into its policies and changing them. 

The failure to speak out and press for change by the Ethiopian 

Government is critical and it has allowed Ethiopia to set a dangerous example for other governments in the region and has kept 

Ethiopian people themselves at risk of human rights violations and 

repressive governance. 

We hope that the President will speak to some of these issues on 

his upcoming trip to the continent, in particular, the issue of civil 

society and the important and legitimate role that it plays in a 

healthy democracy and in the enjoyment of human rights by citizens and peoples in a particular country. 

But we also hope that the discussion of legislation and of policies 

that are being conducted by the Meles regime—by the post-Meles 

regime including the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, the Charities 

and Societies Proclamation and other laws will also continue to be 

raised not only by Congress but also by the administration. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akwei follows:]

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81570f-1.eps

Human Rights: The Missing Ingredient in Ethiopia's Effort to Build Democracy 

Testimony by Adotei Akwei, Amnesty International USA1 

before 

the House Subcommittee on Mrica, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations 

June 20, 2013 

1 Prepared \\'id~ d~e help of Claire Bestan, Samantha Singh and Ben De"mre 
74


81570f-2.eps

T.~ 

II. An1nesty Internati()l1,ll (t110 our \vork on Ethiopi'l 

TTI. The Political Transition - Business as Csual 

IV. The Ethiopi;m C;overnment's Human Ril'hts Oblil'ations 'T. Key TTurnan Rights issues 

VI. The Human Cost of the Ethiopian C;ovemment's Repression Some 

Tndividual Cases 

V 11. Conclusions and Recornlnendacions 

VIII. 
75


81570f-3.eps

T.~ 

2012 marked the end of the 21 year reign of Meles Zenawi. ender his tenure, the Ethiopi;U1 

govemment restricted human rights, aggressively curtailing dIssent. Despite thIs, the Ethiopian 

government e enjoyed strong support fron1 donors, in particubr the United States, based on 

Ethiopia's support for secunty operations deerncd critical by \\lashington and also seerningly 

based on its econotnic perfonnance and potential as a significant future tnarket. This 

clarnpdown was exernplified by the governrnent's brutal retribution against its political 

opponents and critics follmv~ng its victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections and by the passage 

and ag;gressive irnplcrnentation of the Anti- Tcrrorisrn ProcLunation and the Charities and 

Societies Proclamation, both passed in 200~. The govemment has used these laws to gut the 

independent nledirl ,lnd throttle hun1an rights orgrlniz,ltions rlnd other sectors of civil society. 

The succession ofPrirne I\Tinister TTaiknlariarn offers a window for the international 

community, including the United States, to revisit policies and rel:!tionships with the Ethiopi:!n 

governtnent and press -L\ddis Ababa for change. 

II. ~~rnnesty International mH .. l our work on Ethiopia 

Amnesty Intematiomu is the world's largest human rights org;mization, with more than 3 million 

supporters in nl0re th,ll1 1 SO nrltions and territories. There ,Ire 80 country sections of An1nesty 

Tntemational; here in the Cnited States we have nearly 500,000 supporters whose dedication to 

human rights has impacted both policv and practice :!round the world. 

AI has docunlented hun1an rights concerns ,1nd conln1uniclted our recomn1endations to the 

Ethiopian authorities since 1961. Tn the I nos Amnesty Tntemational reported on abuses under the 

Dergue government of fonner head of state Haile Mengishl Mariam, including the persistent pattern 

of arbitrary detentions, torture, Idisappeacll1ces" cmd extrajudicial executions, \vhich peaked in the 

"Red Terror" campaign against goven1tnent opponents. Tn the 1980s /\tnnesty Gltnpaigned against 

the systetnatic yiolation of hUll un rights both in war Lones mid in the rest of the country.2 In the 

1990s AI offered specific recommendations to promote and protect human rights to the new 

governn1ent in Eritre,l, headed by President Is,lias Afel\verki rmd to the Ethiopian People's 

RevolutIonary DemocraTIc Front (F.PRDF) led by the late vleles 7enawi who headed the 

Transitional Covernment in 1991 before being elected Prime "linister in 1995. AI was denied 

permission to visit the country until 1997, after which sporadic visits were conducted, but during; the 

2000s the EthIopia researcher was banned from visitmg the country. c\ttempts to visit continued 

were but in 2011, our current Ethiopia researcher was expelled fronl the country and Al currently 

has no access. Despite this, /\mnesty has continued to tnonitor, report and advocate to the 

Ethiopi;m authorities on hunlan rights concerns in the country. 

TTL The Political Transition - Business as Usual 

Ethiopia is headed by Hailen1rlri;'ln1 L)e~(llegn, \vho \V~lS :l fornler Deputy Prinle _\'1inister ,lnd 

lvlinister of l,'oreig;n Affairs from 2010 to 2012 under the late Prime _vli!lister Meles Lenawi. 

Following vfeles' death in !\ugllst 2012, Hailemariam was appointed c\cting Prime Minister, before 

2 Ethiopia: Rnd of an em ofhmtal repression .. a new challcejor human n"ghts, May 1991 (AT Tnue'\: AFR 25/05/91) 
76


81570f-4.eps

being elected as the Chair of the ruling party, the Ethiopi~lll People's Revolutionary Denl0cratic 

Front (FPRDF), and being appointed Prime Minister on September 15, 2012. 

IV. The Ethiopian C;ovemment's Human Rights Oblig;lt1ons 

The Ethiopian gO\'errInlcnt has cornrnittcd itself to tlUnlcrous interrIational and regional trcaties, 

including the Internation,ll Coven(l11t on Civil and PolitiGJ Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the 

Convention Ag,linst 'l'orture rlnd (jther Cruel, InhumrU1 or DegLlding' l'reatnlent or 

Punishment, the i\frican Charter on Human and Peoples RightsThte hum:lD rights standanb by 

out d:c (If dIe Ltl1.1oplJrl {ulJun,;S uther pnI111:Jtt." aud 

Iwd 

government is also ,i 

Elections i1tld Go\crnancc which spells 

l~ir and tt'anspa.fCnt C'lcctlons:~ 

the rights 10 freeriolTI expresslOn, 

;ltTest and dercllhon, [Ortutt: 

free, 

clearly the obligation to encourage 

of dcJllocracy ~UJd respect for human rights, ihe 

for. and the of the 

;.,[10,.1 to [)ronli )te the 

adlhortty of rcpreScl1taLi\ c \vcll 

Clurter :lbn edis fl)f rht:: ,md prutecrlnrl the inJepcnJerKt: 

the establishnwnt of tlll: nCCl':.;s;try c~)ndjrj()ns to fo"kr citizen rnrttCipAtinn. 

to infnll11:lt1nn) freeclorn of· the press and ac::r)unrabthty in the: ITI:1n:lgement 

Finally the Fthiopian Constihltion includes a list of at least 30 human rights provisions in 

Chapter 3. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.' 

V. Key TTuman Rights issues 

Freedom of Expression: 111roughout 2011 and 2012, numerous attempts were made by the 

governnlent to restrict freedonl of ~lssoci~ltion, expression, and of the press. On the \vhole, 

Ethiopian authorities yigorously starnped out alllcvcls of dissent and criticisrn, whether in the fonn 

of protests, politiGll activities, or media reports in ne\Vsp(lpers or on the internet. The issues listed 

here only touch some of the human rights concems c\mnesty Tntemational has with the Fthiopian 

governn1ent. J\Llny of these issues are mirrored in reports by other hun1rln rights orgrlniz~ltions ~llld 

the U.S. Department of State's Country Report for TTuman Rights Practices since 1991. 

• _\[any Journalists and opposition party leaders were put in Jail on charges of terrorism, largely 

for cotnmitting such acts as calling for refonn, criticizing the govemtnent, or being involved 

in pellce!ul protests. As well having their rights violated because of their political activities 

3~'\[ric:m COIIlmission on Hum:m and Peoples' RighLs, hllp:/ /www.achpr.OIg/i1lSlnl1nellls/charLer~democracy/ 

I I :!hiopiall COlls!illl!ioll, adop!cd J)cLClllbcr 1994, Ill!p./ /W\v\\'.~cn·aLllllibc.Lh/icl/dOO()()O_.bITlll 
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81570f-5.eps

;-ll1d exercise of the right to freedon1 of exrression, their su bsequent trials \.vere marred by 

serious irregulttrities. This included a retlJsal on the part of the court to further investigate 

allegations of torture, severe restrictions or outright denial of access to legal counsel, and the 

use of confession:, obtained under coercive interrogative ll1ethods as ;-ldlnissible evidence in 

court 

• llundrcds of Muslims werc arrested between July and 'io\'embcr of 2012 for participating in 

nationwde protest rallies. Police openly beat some of these protesters in the street, and 

several incidents openly fired against theIn, resulting in deaths and several injuries. These 

protests \vere sp(trked by iJleged governn1en'tll restrictions on freedoll1 of religion. In July 

the govertlnlent arrested inany of the leaders in this protest and at least one journalist, and 

the det:linees \vere suLseCjuently charged under the Anti-'l'errorisn1 ProcLlmat.ion. 

Correspondents fronl T/oice ~Jf-/l!lJetha were detained and interrogated ternporarily for 

intervie\\~ng p:rrticipants in the protests. 

• During 2011 and 2012, the Ethiori;-ll1 authorities continued t·argeting the Y~U1ishing !:"emnants 

of independent rnedia. For instance, an independent journalist nan1ed Ternesgen Desalcgn 

\V,lS crin1in'11ly ch'lrged in ..'\ug"ust for publishing piece~ that \vere critictJ or- the governn1ent 

and that advocated for peaceful protests against the authorities. One tnonth after the 

incident \vith L\lr. Des(tiegn, directives \vere issued to rrint.ing houses (Kross the country, 

requiring an in1t11cdiate rcrnov-:al of all inforrnation cleerncd C(illeg,lL" The unduly bro:axl 

provisions of the Anti-Terrori~m Proclamation lneimt that much leg-iti1nate content could be 

dccmccl illegal. 

• Besides these specific injustices, the Ethiopian government has issued a number of s\veeping 

restrictions, such as blocking a number of politics, ne\vs, and hun1,ln ritr,hts \.vebsites. 

Human Rights Defenders: 

• In addition to systen1(ltic rlttacks on freedon1 of exrression, Ethiorirln authorities directly 

attacked the ability to function of human rights groups in the country. The Charities and 

Societies Proclamation, a 2009 edict, severely hampers the work of human rights groups, 

particularly by denying them access to essential flmding and through the creation of a 

government rebrubtory agency \.vith excessive r0\.vers of interference in the ul11ning rtnd 

activities of human rights organizations. The law continues to inflict harm upon groups like 

the Human Rights Council and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers ~',.ssociation. During 2012 

both these organi:.-mtions continued to see large an10unts of their assets fro:;;en because of 

this !tt\v. 

Torture and other III Treatment: 

Uor Ethiori(lns held in detention, conditions continue to be extren1ely hrtrsh. 'l'orture is 

regularly reported to take place dunng interrogation in the initial stages of detention, often 

before d1e detainees have access to their families or to legal representatives. Prisoners have 

been slapped, suspended from the walls and ceiling by tllelrwrists, beaten with various 

objects, denied sleep, electrocuted, ,md had weights suspended from their genitllia. Solitary 
78


81570f-6.eps

confinement for extended periods is often reported. \X':ithin prison facilities, s~lnit<ltion \V~lS 

often reported to be poor. -L'\mnesty Inten1ationttl has received reports of tnedical resources 

being wid,held, and reports of deaths in custody. Food and water is often in short supply, 

;U1d is supplemented by visiting family members where access is permitted. 

Conflict in the Somali Region: 

• '1"he Ethiopian government has been in a ~vo-decade long cont1ict with the Clgaden National 

Liberation Front (ONT.F) in the Sornali region . .''\rnnesty Tnternational continues to receiYe 

re,guhr infornl,ltion of the c0ITll11ission of serious crimes by the nation,ll ttrnlY, ,1nd its proxy 

militia, d,e Liyu police, against the civilieUl population. Allegations regularly reported include 

arbitr~lry detention, extrtljudici,ll executions, ~l11d rt1pe, ~lll on a signiticant scale. Torture and 

od,cT ill-treatment of detainees were wlliely reported. Talks between d,e government and the 

Ogaden "ationa! Liberation Front collapsed in October 2012. 

Forced Evictions: 

_A progranl GLUed "vilhgiz'ltion" h,ls led to the disphcenlent of hundreds of thoustl11ds of 

people. jlJthough this program ostensibly declares such displacement to be voluntary and for 

the purposes of incre~lsing access to infLlstructure rl11d senTices, there hrlve been mrU1Y 

reports of people being forcibly removed from their homes and land. 

The legacy of previous elections on Ethiopia's future 

\vl1ile 2012 did not include any elections, the legacy of d,e 2010 and the 2005 elections remam a 

profound challenge to the rule of law and accountable government. The 2012 Department of State 

Reports for Hunlan Rights PL1ctices entry for Ethiopia noted th,lt concerns by sonle obsenTers fronl 

the European Union about intitnidation, harassment and a climate of apprehension that had to be 

considered in assessing to o\'erall eleccion. 5 

The violence rollo'wing the 200.0 elections was even more abrming. The 200.0 Report on Country 

Practices reported that the governnlent of Prinle ..\linister Nleles comnlitted serious hunlrln rights 

abuses including: 

"lilnitatl0n on cit-i7.ens' righ<:: fn ch,mgc their governtYlent, unh\\~Cul ki1l1ngs~ including alleged 

killings, and beating, ahuse, ':l11d 111isrre:lt111ent of detainees ;l11d supporters by 

[1)1"(('5, 'a_rbitl'ary arrest a~ld detention of tll'JUS~UHJS of persons, tiv)se 

or being nlembers of rhe oppo:-;irion, of thousrmds 

detention, gOVC!11n1cnt infi.1tlgcnlcnt on citiL::cns' tights, and frequent refusal 

to thc la"\y regarding search "\YJrr·.1nts~ governlTIent on ft\-'Ccl01TI o~ the press; atTest, 

l~(-'tel1tjon, and rULhsment of jOl.ltrLlli:-:rZ' for r'ublishing- ;·Irticles criticil of the "()ycrnr11t'nt: 

Self-cet1r;orshlf' by jOUiTlalists) restrictions on frff'dotll 

permits, or refusal to pruvide assembly halls to opposition 

5 http://www.state.gov/i/drl/rls/hrrpt/hurnanrightsreport/i nd ex. htrn#wra pper 
79


81570f-7.eps

and ;It time:;; u~t' l)f t'xct'sstye force Tn di~per~t' dt'n10nstrAti()ns~ 

of :]ssoc18tion and goyerntnent interference in union activities. 

V 1. The 1 Iuman Cost of the Ethiopian Government's Repression - Some Individual Cases 

Eskinder Nega, a journalist and writer imprisoned for alleged terrorism-related activities. 

Eskinder was "rrested (for the eighth time) on 1-l September 2011 after publishing" column 

that critici/:ed both the Ethiopian governDlcnt's dctention of journalists as suspectcd 

terrorists and the arrest of actor and activist Debebe Eshetu. :\mnesty Tnternational 

believes the charges against Eskinder were politically nlotivated. lIe was found guilty in June 

2012, and was sentenced to 18 years' irnprisonrnent. 

In July 2012, members of the committee selected by the 'vluslim community to present their 

grievances to d1e government, along willi Editor Yusuf Getachew , of the 11IlIJliJJl A/lain 

I\ifagazine, "\-vere arrested, and "\vere subsequently charged "\vith terroristn offences. 

Two other journalists t-rom V[uslim ·\fEairs mag:lzine, Akmel Negash and Yishak Eshtu 

left the country for fear of arrest. 

On AUi-,'llst 9 charges were tiled "g"inst Feith editor in chief Temesgen Dessalegn for 

allegedl y inCIting the youth to panticipate in violence. Bail was denied due to concerns that he 

might continue to write articles offending the government if released. 

On January 19"',2012: journalists Woubishet Taye and Reyot Alemu, and opposition 

leader Zerihun Gebre-Egziabher Tadesse were convicted on terrorism charges and given 

lcngd1y prison terms. TIley were tried and convicted alongsIde Himt Kifle Woldeyeslls a 

former opposition men1her,and journalist (lnd hlo~~er Elias Kifle "\vho "\V,lS convicted in 

absentia on saD1C charges. 

In July, Jemal Kedir was charged lU1d sentenced for sending text messages supporting the 

release of the N[uslim protest tnovement detainees. 

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 

lvlr. Chairman, Amnesty International's focus is on human rights. We believe thatwilliout the full 

enjoy,nent of those rights, by all Ethiopians, it will be hard to see how the country will ti.lltill the 

promise of individual freedom and dignity d,at has been espoused since the ouster of I Iaile Mariam 

Mengis tu in 199 I. 

Since: 2005 the human rights sialation in the: country has deteriorated still further, with significantly 

increased restrictions phced on freedom of expression, assocl,ltlon and other rights. Srldly the 

E iliiopian audlOrities have not acted in a vacuum during d1is period. The lnited States and others in 

the intenlational cotntnumty haye failed to raise concenlS over the governtnent's systetnatic violation 

of human rights and flouting of its international obligations_ The failure to speak out and press for 

6 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm 
80


81570f-8.eps

change has en1boldened the government ~l11d ~tlso allo\.ved Ethiopia to set ~l dangerous eX;-lmple for 

other governments in the region to emulate. It is critical that the Cnited States and other members 

of the international con1HlUnity press the Ethiopian authorities to address hun1<:111 rights concerns 

and repeal and refonn key legislation and policies. 

Specitlcally Amnesty Intemational urges the Cnited States to: 

Urge the Ethiopian gm~ernment to respect, protect and fulfill the right to freedom of 

expresslOn, as it is obliged to do under domestic and international law. :\s a first step toward 

that end, it should immediately end the practice of arresting those who hold difFerent 

political opinions: 

Call upon the Ethiopi;ln authorities to ce,lse the t(lrgeting of journalists \.vho are conducting 

their legitimate professional work, which includes reporting on peaceful protests and 

reporting on the activities of opposition groups, ,lrn1ed groups ,lnd groups proscribed ,1S 

terrorist organizations; 

Urge the Ethiopian authorities to cease the use of criminal prosecutions to silence the 

treedom of expression of opposition politicians, independent media, and other groups 

criticli ()f the g()vernment; 

Urge the Ethiopian authorities to amend the "1nti~Tel,"fi"1Jj Pmdull/utiofl to remove provisions 

that do not conforn1 to rights of freedonl of expression bTLuranteed in international hU111an 

rights law. Pending such legal refonn, do not usc charges that criminalize legitimate exc:rClse 

of the nght to freedom of expression: 

Crge Ethiopian authorities to anlcnd the CbalitieJ' ami Sodetiej' PrvdamatiOli to rernove the 

restrictions on hunl~ln rights activities, ~lnd to recognize, respect ~ll1d protect the vitll \.vork of 

hUllutl rights defenders; 

Crge the Ethiopian (lUthorities to ensure that (111 detainees are pronlptly ch(lrged \vith a 

recogni~ablc criminal offense or arc released immediately and unconditionally; 

lrge the Ethiopian Government to initiate prompt, dlOrough, effective and impartial 

investigations into allegations of torture or other ill-trcattncnt rnade by detainees, and ensure 

that, should there by enough admissible evidence, suspected perpetrators "re prosecuted :l11d 

tried in a fair trial in accordance \\!ith 1JltcITlational standards; 

Call upon the Edliopian authorities to make available full details of all those arrested in 201 j 

and 2012, including members of politIcal parties and students. Infonnation must include d1e 

n,lnles, current location ;l11d detention status of all det(linees. 

Call upon the Ethiopian authorines to guarantee that arrested persons arc never detained in 

un-g~lzetted phces of detention. Imnledi~ltely mo\-e ,lny detainees currently held in ~111 

unofficial place of detention to a recogni7,cd detention center. 
81

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much for your testimony. I regret that 

there are a series of votes that will take about an hour so I’ll be 

very brief. 

If anyone would like to stay, I’ll be back in an hour but I know 

that’s presuming on your time, and maybe Ms. Bass can come back 

too. I’m not sure what her schedule might be. 

But let me ask some very quick questions. First of all, Mr. 

Akwei, I think your point about a window closing is a very, very 

important one. 

If the international community coalesces and somehow accepts 

the egregious human rights abuses as okay, if little changes around 

the edges bring about a great deal of positive feedback from the 

international community, this has not been helpful. That includes 

during the Bush administration, as well as now during the Obama 

administration. I would suggest that for those who are suffering 

torture—and there are 400-plus political prisoners in Ethiopia—

and everyone else who is suffering, delay is denial. 

You said it very well, political will, I would say paraphrasing 

you, is a decision which can be made and that’s what leadership 

is all about. You don’t lead from behind. You lead by being the 

Prime Minister who says we are going to change this. 

I announce today we are going to reintroduce the Ethiopia 

Human Rights Act with very serious benchmarks——

[Applause.] 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. And about the balance that the administration spoke about, I think it is unbalanced, I agree with combatting the HIV/AIDS pandemic and all the other humanitarian initiatives but the political side, the changes, the good governance, is absolutely a prerequisite, as was said by Mr. Gast as well, to the sustainability of all of those other programs as well. 

The Charities and Societies Proclamation, that is an outrage. 

The journalists point that Dr. Nega talked about, he knows about, 

he suffered in prison. He knows what it’s like. He knows what fellow inmates suffered at the hands of Meles and people continue to 

suffer today. 

When you pointed out that Ethiopia is the leading jailer of journalists—and I hope the media takes note of this—in sub-Saharan 

Africa and ranks among the top ten in the world, that has to 

change. 

An unfettered press keeps checks on the Congress, on the President. It needs to do the same in Ethiopia. So thank you for your 

testimonies. They were very, very strong. 

You said, Dr. Pham, tantalizingly, I would hope that for Prime 

Minister Hailemariam, that things will move in the right direction; 

but still, friends don’t let friends commit human rights abuses. 

We have waited. We’ve talked about this. When do we do an 

Ethiopia hearing? We had hoped that there would be changes sooner rather than later and as you said, Dr. Akwei, that window is 

closing and it’s not opening to reforms and that’s what we need to 

fight for. So thank you so much. 

Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Yes, and I’m——

[Applause.] 

82

Ms. BASS [continuing]. I’m so sorry that we do have to leave to 

go to votes and unfortunately I won’t be able to return but—and 

I’m hoping though that maybe we can have another hearing on 

Ethiopia soon to follow up with this. 

You know, Dr. Nega, you mentioned a term that sent chills up 

me, frankly, which was ‘‘constructive engagement’’ because I think 

I’ve heard that term before, and so that’s a very chilling notion. 

I wanted to know, though, if you would comment on a couple of 

things that Dr. Pham said. You know, you certainly pointed out all 

of the difficulties but you did say that you thought it was a little 

bright light that organized opposition was allowed—the protests 

that just happened—and I guess there’s a window that there could 

be more protests in the future, and then also higher education. 

And I wanted to know if you could just comment on those, and 

let me just say that I just really appreciate everybody’s participation and everything and I just hope that we’ll be able to return and 

have a more lengthy hearing. 

Mr. NEGA. Thank you. Let me just very quickly say something 

before I go into the specific question about the statistics and the 

data that you hear about improvements and things of that sort. 

I would like to suggest to anyone who is dealing with Ethiopia 

to be very, very cautious about what kind of numbers they are 

playing. I mean, according to official data right now, Ethiopia has 

less poverty than Mexico. It has less poverty than Botswana. It has 

less poverty than a number of European countries. 

That is official data. You know, in 2010, they came up with a 

number in one region in Afar where they said 5 million kids are 

going to school that year. The total population of Afar is 1.4 million. That’s how absurd this data is. 

And that is the kind of numbers that you hear these international experts come up and then talk about how things are improving. I would really—it is very hazardous. 

I’m an economist by training and I know how these numbers are 

put together. So it would be better to be careful about that, cautious about that. 

But to the question about improvements, I really want you to 

take something very, very seriously, Ms. Bass. What I see is conflict. What I see is war. What I see is a civil war coming to Ethiopia. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. NEGA. In fact, that’s one of the reasons why I want to testify 

today and I want you to take this seriously because this country 

is not going into the same way that it has gone over the last 21 

years. 

I think people are fed up, I think people are going to fight and 

nobody can blame people for fighting against tyranny. That’s where 

it’s going. 

Ms. BASS. Do you think that there is an organized—do you think 

the opposition is organized enough to——

Mr. NEGA. Yes. 

Ms. BASS [continuing]. Actually wage that——

Mr. NEGA. I do—I do believe that the opposition——

Ms. BASS. Do you think there is conflicts in the—conflicts in the 

existing government then? 

83

Mr. NEGA. Yes. I do believe that the opposition that was fractured has started to seriously talk about mounting a unified challenge. 

That’s what is going to happen and that’s why I’m trying to be 

more, you know, if you might call it alarmist in the sense that if 

people in the policy making apparatus think that you can just keep 

going the way you are going about it, a surprise is coming to you. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. NEGA. That is a very, very dangerous game that people are 

playing. 

So that’s why I say, you know, did it allow this demonstration 

recently? They did. But are they going to allow in the future? I 

don’t think they will. 

Ms. BASS. So one more quick question. I know when I talk to my 

constituents they believe that we should cut off all foreign aid and 

I feel a little conflicted over that, considering the humanitarian 

challenges, the food insecurity, the HIV and maybe, you know, 

other panelists could comment about that. Is that what the U.S. 

should do, end all foreign aid? Yes. 

Mr. METHO. I think that the U.S. has the leverage and the leverage that the money that we’re giving I think that earlier when we 

heard from the USAID they’re saying that they give $300 million 

for a democratic process. 

Where? Where is democratic process in a country where we know 

that, you know, almost every seat is held by the same government? 

So that kind of funding going for that that’s not going to go and 

help with the poor Ethiopian. That is helping the regime. 

That’s a leverage that this money that we give for the regime, 

you know, it’s—there are a lot of money which is really not going 

to the peoples. 

The money that goes for the people we should give it to the people. The second thing too is lack of transparency and accountability, and this is a clear cut that most of the time people don’t 

talk about this. 

Just recently examples, people were displaced in some—in the 

west part of Ethiopia. The World Bank inspector finally went to investigate. The Ethiopian Government they don’t want to cooperate 

with the World Bank. 

Just like me giving you—you give me the money to feed my family, you say did you feed my family I say none of your business. 

So there is a way that the funding—when I say earlier we need 

the U.S. support you can—this has been done in Burma. It’s been 

done in other places. 

There’s no political space. There’s no, really, any media at all in 

Ethiopia. You know, the journalists are being accused as a terrorist. People who are activists, just like me. Like in Ethiopia, for 

example, even all of these journalists if they were in Ethiopia they 

will be accused of it generally. 

For me, I never held a gun. I never talk about any war or anything. But the Ethiopian Government labelled me. Among the 24 

people who wear labels I was one of them just because I speak the 

rights. 

So the point is going back to what Dr. Berhanu said. Before it 

go to war Ethiopian people have suffered enough. Reconciliation 

84

can be done. The people in Ethiopia there are some moderates 

within the government. 

There are some moderates within the opposition. That if the U.S. 

take that initiative—we had enough blood. We have—HIV and lack 

of food is killing us. We cannot kill each other but what we are asking is reconciliation is possible. It’s never been tried before and 

there’s no way one cannot do it. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, I apologize. If you could hold that. We’re out 

of time for voting so Ms. Bass and I have to run over to vote. 

There’s seven votes and eight in succession. They should be rather quick but then there’s another series of votes about 20 minutes 

to 30 minutes after that. 

If you can stay I would ask you to. We’ll come back, ask some 

additional questions. You might want to elaborate, and then we 

will have to conclude the hearing. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will resume its sitting and, Dr. Nega, 

thank you for your patience. I, again, deeply apologize for these 

interruptions with votes. 

We have been joined by Congressman Stockman, who has been 

a leader on African issues. He is a new member, but not a new 

member to this work. He’s back, on a return trip to the House, and 

I yield to my good friend. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you for coming out. I’m really serious 

about thank you for your patience. We normally don’t have that 

many votes in a row and—but I’ve been to your beautiful country 

and I appreciate you coming out today. 

And we always have in this committee very good staff, very good 

people and an excellent chairman. I’m biased but I think he’s a 

great chairman, and but one of the things we always like to hear 

from the witnesses is how we can help you achieve goals in your 

country. 

Sometimes Americans are interpreted as being too interventionist, where we’re criticized if we go in, such as Iraq, and then 

now we’re criticized for not going in Syria. So we’re kind of damned 

if we do, damned if we don’t. 

So we want to get from you what the proper temperature we 

should do and what kind of things we can do to facilitate freedom 

in your country. It’s disappointing that it’s gone this way in this 

direction and that you had to suffer so deeply. 

So I will yield to you the direction you should give us. 

Mr. NEGA. Thank you, Congressman Stockman. 

I understand perfectly that realistic politics is a difficult business. I mean, it’s not an easy thing. Intervention always have a 

problem especially if it has something to do with intervening by 

force and things of that sort. 

What we are talking about now is the degree to which American 

taxpayers’ money can be used to effect some of the basic principles 

and values that this country holds dear. 

Unfortunately, what has been going on in Ethiopia is that the 

U.S. taxpayers’ money is being used to shore up a dictatorship 

that’s so brutal that raises quite a lot of questions in the minds of 

85

Ethiopians that, you know, this is not the America that we know. 

This is not the America that we understand and American relationship, as you know, goes a long way, although some people really 

understand the realistic issues that are involved in terms of national security reasons in the region and things of that sort. 

What people don’t understand is where is it that countries would 

start to say enough is enough. Now, and what I submitted today 

is this is not just about Ethiopia and humanitarian issues in Ethiopia. 

Now it has become a serious geostrategy issue for the United 

States because Ethiopia is roughly about 93 million, 90 million people, the largest country in the region. A destabilized Ethiopia is 

going to destabilize that whole region. 

It’s a very serious issue and all U.S. strategic interests are going 

to be affected by what happens in Ethiopia. 

So the question is if we let things go the way they are would we 

at least achieve the strategic objectives of the U.S., which in this 

case means a stable Ethiopia that can—that can support the 

antiterrorist struggle in the region. 

And the answer to that, I believe, is unfortunately the way 

things are going that’s not going to happen because Ethiopia itself 

is going to be destabilized because after 21 years people have become so traumatized. 

People have literally given up hope that there is a possibility of 

peaceful transition that there is now more recourse toward armed 

resistance against the state. 

Now, you can imagine once armed resistance starts you don’t 

even know which direction it takes. I mean, if there is anything 

about Syria that we can talk about, you know, it started as a 

peaceful resistance. 

The state refused to relinquish power. You know, one thing leads 

to another. People start to get fed up and they go into this—then 

at that point you don’t even know who is—which one you are going 

to be able to influence. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. I have limited time. I guess what I’m asking you, 

if you were in my shoes and you were given this guidance on a bill 

we could write what would you recommend that we put in that bill 

to facilitate a positive outcome in Ethiopia? 

Mr. NEGA. A very clear targeted time bound set of issues that 

leads toward meaningful democratization in the absence of which 

U.S. foreign aid to Ethiopia would be seriously endangered. That’s 

number one. 

Two, the U.S. work with other allies, especially the European 

Union, to work toward this objective because Ethiopia is really 

amenable to financial pressure. 

This is not a government that could just brush away—you know, 

although they say this always that, you know, you can take your 

money and, you know, we can tell you what—that is not a government that can allow that. 

So use your financial support to the government to good end. Use 

it to effect substantive change in the behavior of the state. That is 

what I would say. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Do you think a delegation from United States 

would impact, if we visited there and said we have these concerns? 

86

Mr. NEGA. If the statement is very clear, if it is something that 

you can back it up. I mean, this is not the last delegation that go 

to the U.S. I mean, Congressman Smith has been there repeatedly. 

Donald Payne has been there. I mean, there are Congress people 

going always. 

The point is they will always tell you exactly what you want to 

hear and the minute you leave they go on behaving the way they 

are behaving. 

Unless otherwise you have a tangible set of measures that you 

would take—unless otherwise, X, Y, or Z happen. And in that case 

what you are saying is then our money, our taxpayers’ money, is 

not going to be used for this. 

You can do whatever you want. We will not intervene militarily 

or anything but our money will not be used unless otherwise X, Y, 

Z. Release prisoners. We’ll give you X amount of time. Introduce a 

series of reforms. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Release the press that they have——

Mr. NEGA. The press that the government owns that is not used 

for anything else. Respect your constitution. Just respect the constitution that are written. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. We’re trying to get that done here. No, no, no, 

I’m just——

Mr. NEGA. But, you know, the national election board, these institutions, the justice system, you know, there are things that can 

be done to actually introduce a set of reforms so that people can 

start to play by the rules. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. The intervention in Somalia, how much does that 

affect the economy and the budget of Ethiopia? 

Mr. NEGA. You mean—I don’t think that was fought from Ethiopia’s purses. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Well, I understand there’s—you have some soldiers in another country. How much does that cost the government? 

Mr. NEGA. But I don’t think the Ethiopian Government pays for 

it. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Oh, you think United States does? 

Mr. NEGA. I can tell you that the Ethiopian Government is not—

in almost every place that the Ethiopian army is it is either the 

U.N. or the U.S. or somebody else paying. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Well, even the U.N. I think we end up paying 

for. 

Mr. NEGA. Exactly. Indirectly you’ll start paying for it, yes. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. So it’s not coming out of the pocket—there’s no 

impact on the budget? Okay. Except for life and time and material. 

Mr. NEGA. Yes. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. So your suggestion is we—if I understand correctly, if I hear you correctly, is that we say if you don’t have free 

elections release the press, release the prisoners, then we will cut 

it by a third by next year. 

We’ll cut it by another third the year after that and then cut it 

all off if you don’t receive it in 3 years or something like that——

Mr. NEGA. Yes. 

Mr. STOCKMAN [continuing]. Timetable? We would direct the 

State Department and other agencies to that effect? 

87

Mr. NEGA. Yes, and very importantly coordinated with other allies, particularly the European Union. When we talk to the European Union they always say that the U.S. has to take a lead on 

this, that if the U.S. takes a leadership position on this the European Union follows. 

Then literally that’s the whole aid money that’s going to the 

country and it’s not going to happen. Trust me, it’s not going to 

take a year or two before the government starts responding because they cannot survive without that aid money. They just can’t. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Okay. Well, that’s helpful because as we’re—I 

think you need to take a standing—I appreciate the audience’s participation too. 

But I’m glad you’re directing us because, honestly, from this side 

of the table we can’t do it without input from people that have been 

there and know what’s going on and we don’t want to go too far 

one way or not do anything and I really appreciate you taking the 

time and staying so long. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Let me just ask some final 

questions and then I will ask if you have any final comments you’d 

like to make. 

How would you assess President Obama’s assessment of the situation on the ground and his policies, particularly as it relates to 

human rights and governance? 

Mr. NEGA. Well, I think for the Ethiopian community in general 

President Obama’s policy has been a bit of a disappointment in the 

sense that, you know, if you remember the first few speeches that 

the President has made in relation to freedom and liberty and democracy in Africa—I mean, the Ghana speech and, you know, everybody was hoping that a new day is going to come in Africa because we all know at the end of the day even the economic issues 

that we face are directly tied to these issues of governance and 

human rights and things. 

So everybody thought not only our politics is going to change, not 

only human rights is going to be respected but even prosperity can 

come. Corruption can be tackled. You know, when you have an accountable government a whole host of issues. 

So everybody was hoping that President Obama would follow on 

what he has said and one of the biggest disappointments for most 

Ethiopians, I would say, is precisely the fact that it has become an 

administration that cannot follow on what it promises to do and it’s 

always disappointing when you hear that. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask a question with regards to the 21 

years that Ethiopia has been headed by a minority ethnic group. 

After being in power for the past 21 years, it is well positioned 

to remain in power without the leadership of an internationally 

known Prime Minister. How do you see the ethnic politics in Ethiopia playing out in the years to come? 

You’ve talked about this cauldron. Are we missing the signs? We 

missed them in Egypt. When the people took to the streets of 

Egypt, I heard euphoria at the State Department, the White 

House, and here in Congress. 

I said this is the bridge of the Muslim Brotherhood and I held 

three hearings on Egypt and about how Islamists would crowd out 

88

moderate Muslims very quickly, as well as Coptic Christians. Sure 

enough, now Egypt is far worse than it was under Mubarak. 

I don’t see that kind of thing happening in terms of an Islamist 

type of movement, although there are always threats, I know all 

of us would like to see, an absolutely peaceful transformation. 

But if we miss the signs and don’t take the steps that we need 

to take, unwittingly, I think, we can enable that. What’s your view? 

Mr. NEGA. There are two parts—two parts to this, Congressman 

Smith. One is on the side of what the government is doing and 

other one is on the side of what the people and you are not doing. 

For the government, it was part of its raison d’etre to divide people along ethnicity, along religious lines because the only way that 

a minority government, a government that represents 6 percent of 

the population ruling strictly on the base of ethnicity—strictly, I 

mean, this is a government that says your identity is your ethnicity. 

You cannot even say you are an Ethiopian. You have to say you 

are from a particular area. This is the politics that they have introduced into this country. 

The only way that they can survive with that kind of policy was 

if they could divide the society. So purposely calculatively they 

have divided society so that one ethnic group would be against the 

other. 

Now, the chickens are coming home to roost. You know, this has 

now stayed for over 20 years. People have started to think of themselves in terms of ethnic groups and they try to foment conflict. 

Recently, as you have seen, they kicked out Amharas from the 

Benishangul in the southern region so that deliberately there is 

that hostility. That is the bad part. If the government—if things go 

the way the government wants them to go, Ethiopia is on a very, 

very treacherous dangerous course. 

The good sign, on the other hand, is on the side of the public. 

Despite all this repeated deliberate fomentation of hatred and difference, people keep saying no, we still want to keep our country 

peaceful. We still want to live with other ethnic groups in peace. 

All we want is our rights to be respected. 

The other very good thing that’s happening is at least among the 

opposition we have started for the first time hearing that these different ethnic-based organizations have come together and say at 

the end of the day what we want is a real democracy in our country. If a real democracy comes, then these ethnic conflicts can be 

seriously addressed. 

So those are the two trends that are taking place and my hope 

is that the opposition gathers the strength so that it can stop this 

deliberate conflict that’s being created by the government. 

Mr. SMITH. Earlier today, Amnesty International’s representative, Mr. Akwei, spoke at great length, particularly in his written 

submission, about the use of torture. I’ve raised torture many 

times. I’ve written laws to combat torture, raised it in our Ethiopia 

Human Rights Act, as one of the conditionalities. 

Why were people so disbelieving or why did they look askance? 

I’m talking about our own Government under President Bush as 

well as under President Obama. You know, it’s there in black and 

89

white and it seems to get looked over. We look askance. Why is 

that? I’m baffled by it. 

Mr. NEGA. Honestly, Congressman Smith, I honestly think certainly it’s part of human nature. You want to believe what you 

want to believe. 

You want to believe not the facts on the ground, not what you 

see, but what you think is the thing that you need to believe in 

order to do what you are doing continuously. 

The U.S. administration has historically been interested in Ethiopia on security and other grounds. The U.S. administration wants 

to continue the relationship with Ethiopia. In order to do that it 

has to come to terms with this issue of a brutal regime that is torturing its own people, that’s killing its own people. Then how do 

you—how do you merge the two? 

Usually, the human mind, I think, plays tricks on you and you 

say it’s not happening, I mean, you know, or you try to ignore it. 

You try to think as if it is not happening. It is denial. 

That is exactly what is going on in the policy making circles of 

the United States and Europe. They just don’t want to believe what 

they see because then they have to do something about it. 

Then they have to do something real about it and they can’t do 

anything real about it. They don’t want to do anything real about 

it. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you, you spent some considerable time in 

your testimony on the interference in religious affairs and you 

talked about the manipulation of the leadership of the Patriarch of 

the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 

Could you expound upon that? Because that is a very serious assertion and it seems to me that, you know, we do have the International Religious Freedom Act. 

There is a commission which has written about these issues before relative to Ethiopia. It would seem to me this should be an engraved invitation to do it again to them, and we also have the 

international religious freedom office at the U.S. Department of 

State. In your view, how bad is it? 

Mr. NEGA. Oh, it’s really bad. I mean, it’s bad to the point 

where—I think the U.S. institution that deals with religious freedom recently had a hearing, I think, on the issue of the Muslims 

and for the first time openly acknowledged that this was a gross—

a result of gross intemperance, in fact, a deliberate taunting as if, 

you know, because when you say Muslim and terrorism the two 

come together and the Ethiopian Government thinks that by calling them terrorists while it actually is taking away their own religion and trying to impose its will on them. 

With the Orthodox Church, this is the first time in Ethiopian 

history that the Orthodox Church is openly split into two. There is 

the patriarch elected by the government and its supporters and an 

exiled patriarch. 

As you know, the basic rule in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church 

is you don’t change a patriarch until the patriarch dies. This government came and changed the patriarch while he was still alive 

and the patriarch left and he has now created, you know, around 

him another synod where most people in the Diaspora are now settled. 

90

This is the first time in Ethiopian history that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was purposely split. The same thing they are trying 

to do with the Muslims. 

It is—you see, this is—as I said in my written statement, it is 

a government that is allergic to the existence of any independent 

body, whether it’s religious, whether it—they have to be under 

their control. 

That’s what they are doing. Unfortunately, as you know, religion 

is a very sensitive thing. As you push people then they start to resist. That’s exactly what the Muslims are doing. That’s what we 

will expect that the Christians will be doing too. 

Mr. SMITH. One or two final questions on the Charities and Societies Proclamation, which I think gets very little notice in Washington. It gets some, but it seems to me it ought to be getting much 

more because it does have an antiterrorism component, and under 

the rubric of antiterrorism, a whole lot of bad things can be 

pushed. Could you tell us what you think are the worst aspects of 

that law? 

Mr. NEGA. The worst is that there are these five areas in the law 

that deal with any institution that deals with human rights, that 

deals with children’s rights, that deals with reconciliation, that 

deals with—I forgot the other two—anything that has to do with 

human rights and any institution that deals with these issues cannot get foreign funding, period. 

Now, anybody who knows Ethiopia, all NGOs, all these institutions, operate on the basis of projects that they put to foreign donors. All of them are closed now. Ninety percent of these institutions are closed. 

So if I have to pick one terrible aspect of this law, it is the fact 

that everything that has to do with human rights and good governance is completely out from Ethiopia. 

But let me say one last point about this. It is very important, 

Congressman Smith, to realize that the Charities and Societies 

Proclamation is one part of a broader capture of institutions in 

Ethiopia. 

There cannot be independent institutions so far as this government is in power. They cannot allow independent institutions. That 

is what this law is about. 

Mr. SMITH. Yesterday the U.S. Department of State in a very, 

very important ceremony, and I was there with Secretary of State 

Kerry, released this year’s Trafficking in Persons Report. 

Parenthetically, I’m the author of the law that authorized that 

report and addressed many other aspects on combatting human 

trafficking. 

It’s known as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. 

Ethiopia was given a Tier II rating, which means that it has a serious problem with trafficking, but that it is making or taking actions to combat it. 

And I have been in at least one of the USAID-supported shelters 

in Addis Ababa on one of my trips there so I know we are trying 

to provide aid to help the victims and to more effectively end trafficking there. 

Have you had the time, and I know it only came out yesterday, 

so you might want to take this question and take a look at the narVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:17 Nov 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\062013\81570 HFA PsN: SHIRL
91

rative that’s in the TIP Report, but are you satisfied with that rating? I would have hoped to have asked some of our other witnesses 

this as well. 

It had the same rating when we had our hearing in 2006, Tier 

II. Are they making progress, serious and sustained? 

Mr. NEGA. Congressman Smith, this is in fact—I think it was 

last week that the Ethiopian Government officially for the first 

time talked about the problem of human trafficking officially, for 

the first time, and the Ethiopian Government including the Prime 

Minister were on TV saying this is the fault of those who are leaving because they don’t know how good they have it in Ethiopia. 

That was their understanding of what actually is going on when 

tens of thousands of Ethiopian young women go to these Middle 

Eastern countries. While some of them were thrown from three or 

four stairs, killed, raped, and this is what the government knew 

was going on. 

I mean, if you go to the Ethiopian immigration authority office, 

the line that you’d find is kilometers of these young women coming 

from rural areas, urban areas, trying to get the hell out of that 

place, and there are officially organized institutions that are actually doing this—government-owned government-sponsored institutions. 

So they talk about human trafficking and anybody believes that 

they are really against human trafficking? It really is mind boggling how the West wants to believe this when actually thousands, 

tens of thousands of people, are leaving the country under organized trafficking of human beings in Ethiopia. 

Mr. SMITH. In the 2 years leading up to the so-called Arab Spring 

when Egypt went from Mubarak to Morsi, the amount of money 

the U.S. Government dedicated to civil society and democracy 

dropped significantly and it’s a matter of record. 

Many of us complained. Yes, foreign aid has been cut so there 

are difficult choices that often need to be made. I asked earlier 

today about the balance that Ambassador Yamamoto and Mr. Gast 

talked about. In 2013 we’re spending $351 million in total aid given 

to Ethiopia, $1 million of which is for civil society. 

That’s a Congressional Research Service number and maybe 

there’s further explanation for that and maybe it’s more but that’s 

their number. 

I’m wondering, and I did ask that question, whether that shows 

some disproportionality and perhaps the lack of focus on building 

up civil society as a bulwark from authoritarianism or worse. 

Mr. NEGA. What they don’t tell you in the testimony the numbers 

tell. The $1 million out of the $350 million tells a much bigger 

story than what they will tell you because I think—I think the 

international community has given up on the possibility of change 

through civil society institutions. I think after the Charities Proclamation they have said there is nothing you can do about it. 

In fact, Congressman Smith, that’s exactly why I said if you look 

at the lay of the land in Ethiopia, the possibility of change through 

a peaceful mechanism, through using civil society institutions, is 

gone. 

92

That’s why the West has stopped funding them. That’s why the 

whole thing is moving into—so for Ethiopians any hope that there 

could be any change through that route is gone. 

So the choice that they have is either you fight to protect your 

liberty or to get your liberty, or you die as a slave. You die as, you 

know, a subject. 

And that’s why I said so far as I know I don’t think Ethiopians 

are going to accept tyranny forever. I think the little hints that we 

were seeing in 2005 is now gone—the possibility of change through 

a peaceful mechanism. 

The money that you quoted is simply a reflection of that. Everybody has given up. They will tell you all kinds of things—yes, we 

are working on it on this side. The money says there is no work 

done toward building civil society toward democratization in any 

form or shape. 

They have given up. The only thing that is left for Ethiopians, 

that’s why, is to fight. There is nothing else left. That’s why this 

policy—I mean, while they look at it, it is going in that route and 

they cannot do anything about it. That’s what is sad about it. It 

really is sad. 

Mr. SMITH. Hopefully, as Amnesty’s witness said, while the window is closing, there is still time. I think it behooves us on this 

committee to redouble our efforts and I will. 

We hope to work with a large number of people and get input 

on benchmarks and reintroduce, as I said before, the Ethiopia 

Human Rights Act. Before I close the hearing, Mr. Stockman? 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to say thank you for taking your time doing this. 

There’s 435 members and I’m honored to serve with you on this 

and I’m really touched that we’re going to make real impact in the 

world. I’m just honored to be here with you. Thanks. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much to my friend and colleague. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. SMITH. I would, without objection, ask unanimous consent 

the two testimonies be included in the record. 

And I would like to give you the final word and then this hearing 

is adjourned. 

Mr. NEGA. Yes. And very quickly, Congressman Smith, I mean, 

I have no words to thank you about what you have done and what 

you would do, and let me assure you this is not just about Ethiopia. 

This is about the U.S. interests, and it’s very important that people realize that this is about U.S. strategic interests. An unstable 

Ethiopia is going to be a very dangerous place but that’s where 

we’re heading. 

So if something is going to be happening it has to happen soon. 

It has to happen as quickly as possible because people have waited 

for 21 years. I have no basis to believe that they will continue to 

wait for that moment. 

So what you have started in terms of introducing this legislation 

I think is going to be very important. I hope it has a bite. I hope 

it’s not just a statement. 

I hope it has a very clear, as I said, clear benchmarks, clear 

measurable elements in it and in doing so you have or you will be 

contributing to maybe, maybe a peaceful transition to democracy. 

93

But at least you have done your part. At least you have done 

your part. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(95)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE Of REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON. DC 211515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global HUIDlm Rights, and International Orglmizations 

ChristolJher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

June 18. 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requesled to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs_ to be held b) the 

Subcolllmittee on Africa, Global Health. Global Human Rights, and Intcmational Organizations in Room 2172 of the Rayburn 

HOllse Office Building (and 3yailablc liyc on the Committee ,,.,.-cbsitc at :~y j"i:-,r~jgLljillJi;~·s.hotl:'-.(;~) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, June 20, 2013 

[0:00a.m. 

Ethiopia After Meles: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights 

Panel T 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto 

Acting Assistant Secrelary of State 

Bureau of Africul1 Affairs 

U,S. Department of State 

The Honorable Earl W. Gast 

Assistant Administrator 

Bureau for Africa 

U.S. Agency [or 111temalionai De\,eiopment 

Panel II 

Berhanu Nega, Ph.D 

Associate Professor of Economics 

Bucknell Uniyersity 

J. Peler Pham_ Ph.D 

Direclor 

Michael S. Ansari Africa Center 

Atlanlic Council 

Mr. Obang Metho 

Exccutiyc Director 

Solidarity Movement [or a Ne\\ Ethiopia 

Me. Adotci Akwei 

Managing Director for Go\ernmenl Relalions 

Amnesty International USA 

By Direl1ion of 1he Chairman 
97

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

I\1JNUTES OF SUI3COl\1l\1ITIEE ON Africa, Glolud H~althJ Global /Tilman Riglrt'~J alll{~'Jernationlrl Organizations HEARING 

Day_----"T."''h .. u''-rs'''d"a .... l' __ Dalo June 20, 2013 ____ ~Rvvm 2172 Ravburn HOB 

Starting Time 11·28 a m Ending Time 2:31 v.m. 

Roe ... es 1_1_: (12:47102:112.) L-Io -----> ( __ to _~) L-to _~) L-to _~)( __ to __ ) 

Pn,iding Member(s) 

Rep. Chris Smith 

Chec:k all oj tlte jo//owing Ihat app(v: 

Open Session GJ Exocntive (closed) Session 0 Televised GJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record~taped) GJ 

Stenographic Record lLJ 

Ethiopia After Meles: 'The Future of Human Rights and Democracy 

SUBCOMI\IJTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Ba"", Rep. Meadows, Rep. Weber, Rep. Stockman 

NON-SUIlCOMMITTF:1C M~;MlmRS PR~;SICNT: (.-\1arkwith an * if/hey are no/members of jill! committee) 

Rep. Royce 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting nvtice attached? Yes EJ Nv 0 

(If "no ", please list belolV and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List Gt(y slalemenl, submitledfor the recurd.) 

Questions for the Record from Rep. Smith for Amb. YU11l111fWto 

Questions for {he Record from Rep. Smith for Dr. Phum 

Que,tions for the Record from Rep. SmUh for Dr. Nega 

Statementfrom the Oromo Democratic Fronl, S'IIbmilted by Rep. Smith 

TIM~: SCHlCnULED TO RECONVICNF. ___ _ 

or 

TIM!': ADJOURNIW 2:31 p.III. 

s';ili;:ori{l~itfee 

(2~'j t 

StaffDirec 

Se-,/1o or ~ 
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81570g-1.eps

Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Ambassador Donald Yamamoto 

Chairman Chris Smith (#1) 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, 

and International Organizations 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

June 20, 2013 

Page 1 of3 

You were U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia at a very troubling time in that country. From what you 

saw of the late Prime Minister Meles, what are you seeing in the current government that gives 

you hope that political and economic reform is possibleo 

Answer: 

Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn was elected to office in a peaceful transition in September 

2012. He and his cabinet deliberately retleet the ethnic and religious diversity of Ethiopia. 

Promoting democracy, human rights, and governance are fundamental aspects of our bilateral 

relationship. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) continues to 

dominate the government, but it is noteworthy that Hailemariam is not a member of the Tigrayan 

Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), one offour ethnically based parties that has traditionally led 

the EPRDF. Opposition groups and individuals remain restricted from exercising their 

constitutional rights to freedom of expression and association. Ethiopia's Charities and Societies 

Proclamation severely limits the operations of civil society and human rights organizations. 

Regular protests by Muslim activists against government interference in religious affairs 

continue, and tensions have been aggravated by government prosecution of Muslims accused of 

terrorist activity under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP). 

We have seen encouraging signs. On June 2, the Government of Ethiopia permitted a large 

demonstration to proceed, - the first officially authorized protest since 2005 - and there have 

been others since then. It also released its highly anticipated National Human Rights Action Plan 

in March, and continued to prosecute individuals for corruption. Under Hailemariam's 

leadership, the government has not levied any new charges under the A TP against journali sts or 

opposition political figures, though they continue to be subject to arrest and detention. 

To promote the development of the private sector, Hailemariam organized two large, public 

meetings (October 24,2012, and June 27, 2013) with representatives of Ethiopia's business 

community to solicit its input and concerns. The government's opening to increased private 

sector development creates opportunities for the United States to advocate for economic reform 

and greater U.S. investment. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Ambassador Donald Yamamoto 

Chairman Chris Smith (#2) 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, 

and International Organizations 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

June 20, 2013 

Page 2of3 

This Administration and the one that preceded it always referred to the positive contributions of 

the Ethiopian government, but acknowledged our government's concern over restrictions on 

opposition political parties and civil society organizations. What steps are we taking to promote 

reform in Ethiopia? How receptive has the government been to our efforts in this regard? 

Answer: 

In Washington and in Addis Ababa, we actively promote the importance of civil and political 

rights with the Government of Ethiopia. The Embassy maintains an active dialogue with 

opposition political parties and leaders, civil society organizations and members, human rights 

groups and advocates, and religious groups and figures. We have facilitated dialogue between 

the government and opposition political parties; introduced senior government officials to 

western academics with expertise on the liberalization of dominant political parties; and shared 

comparative legal expertise to advocate the diminution of regulation of non-governmental and 

religious organizations We periodically train members of Ethiopia's media, and have aided the 

establishment of two community radio stations. Our Speaker and International Visitor programs 

promote U.S. values. We build linkages between Ethiopian and U.S. universities, assist 

university women so they can stay in school and succeed, and promote English language 

acquisition and library access. These activities expose young Ethiopians to the marketplace of 

ideas and allow them to see a real democracy in action. The Government of Ethiopia has not 

impeded these efforts, and is particularly responsive to empirical examples of how other 

developing countries have managed political and economic transitions. 
100

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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Ambassador Donald Yamamoto 

Chairman Chris Smith (#3) 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, 

and International Organizations 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

June 20, 2013 

Page 3 of3 

Dr. Berhanu Nega has predicted a violent uprising in Ethiopia as a reaction to repression. How 

concerned is the Administration about such an outcome because of the restriction of political 

space in Ethiopia, especially in light of the ongoing low-level conflict throughout the country? 

Answer: 

The current restrictions on political space in Ethiopia deprive Ethiopians of opportunities to 

express dissent constructively, pursue desirable political adaptation and policy change, and 

strengthen democracy generally. The U.S. government focuses on expanding political space as 

part of our engagement with Ethiopia. The Government of Ethiopia, through the vehicle of its 

fi ve-year Growth and Transformation Plan (20 I 0-20 15), is primarily focused on achieving UN 

Millennium Goals, especially in health, education, food security, and poverty reduction. U.S. 

assistance efforts support achievement of those goals. The GOE recognizes that advancement in 

the population's education, economy, and social development will foster a citizenry that 

demands greater civil and political rights. U.S. advocacy presses the GOE to permit the full 

exercise of constitutional guarantees of basic human rights. 
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Page 10f3 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF THE HONORABLE CHRIS SMITH 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

"Ethiopia After Meles: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights" 

June 20, 2013 

Questions for Dr. J. Peter Pham 

You seem to downplay the serious restrictions of political space in Ethiopia and referred to 

the "opposition provocations in the wake of the 2005 poll." Both the Jnne and November 

demonstrations against the delayed release of election results were peaceful until 

government forces opened fire. Snrely you're not saying that the Ethiopian government 

was justified in a response to dissent that resnlted in nearly 200 deaths. Could yon explain 

yonr position fnrther? 

As I stated in my written testimony, I am not defending every action taken by the Ethiopian 

government under the late Prime Minister Meles, much less trying to justify those which 

followed the elections in 2005. What I am trying to do is to put things into context and to 

respecttully point out that, without excusing any specitic actions on the part of the government, 

one should also not give the opposition a pass. While there is seems to be little doubt about 

opposition victories in Addis Ababa and other urban centers, the opposition clearly did not do so 

well in rural areas where an overwhelming majority of Ethiopians live. I was in the country in 

the weeks before, during, and immediately after the vote. I met with a number of opposition 

leaders, including some subsequently jailed, before and after the poll. It was clear that while they 

had made signiticant advances, they did not win the elections nationally; in fact, they did not 

even mount a serious campaign in many constituencies. Thus the claims made by some to have 

won against all evidence to the contrary could certainly viewed as provocative, especially by an 

incumbent government which was as surprised as anyone by the relative strong showing of the 

opposition. The same could be said of the blatant ethnic appeals made by some members of the 

opposition. Furthermore, the willingness at the time of some opposition leaders to align 

themselves with Ethiopia's foreign enemies-a collaboration which, regrettably, seems to 

continue today as we have seen recently with the apparent acknowledgement by Dr. Berhanu 

Nega to having accepted funds from the regime in Eritrea-contributed likewise to the climate in 

which events unfolded. 

As you stated, waters passing throngh Ethiopia acconnt for nearly 90% of the water and 

95% of the sediment carried by the Nile River. The Grand Renaissance Dam project in 

Ethiopia has can sed great concern in Egypt over the flow of the Nile, and another dam 

project, Gibe III could have a damaging impact on Kenya. Has Ethiopia taken carefnl 

consideration of the impact of its water and electrification projects on its neighbors? 

There are two separate issues which need to be disentangled. 
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Page 20f3 

The first is legal right. Absent a negotiated agreement to the contrary that is valid under 

international legal nonns-which the Anglo-Egyptian deal on the Nile waters is not for the 

simple reason that one cannot give away what one does not possess title to-there is no doubt 

that Ethiopia has the sovereign right to do whatever it wants with the water in its national 

territory. For more than eight decades, Egypt counted on a weak Ethiopia and, ignoring what is 

black-letter law, refused to negotiate a reasonable accord based on recognition of Ethiopia's 

legitimate rights. Now, with Ethiopia's growing economic and political strength, the weakness of 

that obstinacy shows itself in the bind which Egypt finds itself in, isolated from the upper 

riparian states. Going forward, any negotiation must necessarily begin with the 

acknowledgement of Ethiopia's legal right. 

Of course, the second point is that just because it can legally do so does not make it politically 

sustainable for Ethiopia to ignore the concerns of its neighbors. And, to their credit, the current 

Ethiopian leaders have not done so. It has entered into a multilateral framework with its upper 

riparian neighbors to better manage the use of the Nile and its resources and has even reached 

understandings with Sudan, which had long opposed the Grand Renaissance Dam project, to 

include the latter country in studies of impact. Egypt is thus the diplomatic outlier. However, 

even here progress is being made and trilateral talks between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan are 

expected towards the end of August. 

I would also like to avail myself of the opportunity to add that I believe that, as a matter of 

policy, the United States should actually look favorably on the Grand Renaissance Dam project. 

Once it is completed, Ethiopia will become a net energy exporter in a part of the world where the 

chronic lack of dependable electricity not only discourages investment and development, but, in 

all too many cases, endangers the lives and health of ordinary citizens who do not have the 

means to afford their own private---and carbon footprint-heavy--generators. Moreover, the water 

stored in the reservoir can help alleviate the droughts that occur with too much regularity in this 

region, causing humanitarian crises across the Horn of Africa. And, once the reservoir is filled, 

the flow of the Nile will not be diminished in any appreciable amount. 

As for the Gibe III project and concerns that it may endanger Lake Turkana, it should be recalled 

that this dam is being built for hydropower generation and the electricity produced will not only 

benefit Ethiopia, but potentially also northern Kenya. Because this dam is designed for water 

flow in order to generate electricity and not for irrigation, the water will continue to flow. The 

question is the period of time required to fill the dam. Ethiopian authorities have acknowledged 

the environmental impact if they were to stop the water altogether during this period and, 

because of this awareness, have repeatedly given assurances that they will opt to fill the reservoir 

over a longer period of time in order to maintain a flow into the lake. Rather than give into 

alarmism or sensationalism, the most constructive approach should be the one President Reagan 

adopted with respect to arms control: "Trust, but verify." 

I might add that, insofar as it maintains its position as a friend to the governments involved, the 

United States is well-positioned to help not only facilitate the diplomatic process along, but also 

provide some of the technical expertise in helping achieve solutions that benefit all parties. In 

this respect, the patient work and efforts over many years ofthe U.S. State Department in general 
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and, in particular, of its special coordinator for water resources, Dr. Aaron Salzberg, should be 

commended. 

Many were impressed with the lack of violent government reaction to the June 2

nd 

demonstration as opposed to those in 2005. However, while you cite government 

assurances of no police interference in future demonstrations, there are reports that the 

government has decided not to allow future demonstrations. What makes you certain that 

the assurances you received are accurate? 

1 can, of course, offer no guarantees about the future conduct of either the Ethiopian government 

or of members of the opposition, but only the perspective that in my experience with them, those 

officials who told me that future peaceful demonstrations which observe basic requirements of 

pre-notification in order to minimize disruptions of traffic and other such public order concerns 

will be permitted have been straightforward and candid and, consequently, 1 have no reason to 

approach what their assurances with a henneneutic of suspicion. Time will tell and, as an analyst, 

1 am prepared to amend my conclusions as the evidence warrants. 

Moreover, 1 would emphasize that Ethiopia has a new prime minister and, along with him, others 

of a younger generation of the ruling coalition, many of whom are certainly more progressive 

than their predecessors, are moving into positions of influence. While the speed with which they 

are moving may be slow to some, they are much more open to our concerns-including on 

human rights and political freedom-as long as the United States is seen as a friend willing to 

give them a chance, rather than a hostile critic. 
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OUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF THE HONORABLE CHRIS SMITH 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

"Ethiopia After Meles: The Future of Democracy and Human Rights" 

June 20, 2013 

Questions for Dr. Berhanu Nega 

Since the troubled aftermath of the 2005 elections in Ethiopia, political leaders such as 

yourself have been jailed, forced into exile or both. What do you see as the prospects for 

the political opposition to make any significant inroads in next year's elections? 

Answer: 

As 1 said in my prepared remarks, 1 don't expect any fundamental change that would come out of 

the election. For the elections to be meaningful, the institutions of state that not only conduct the 

elections (the election board) but all the other institutions that make open and meaningful contest 

possible (the judiciary, the media ... etc.) have to function properly. What is clear from the history 

of the ruling party is that it will never allow these institutions to function independently as 

stipulated in the constitution. So, the coming election is going to be a total farce as were the past 

elections. In short neither 1 nor any serious observer of current events in Ethiopia will expect any 

change coming from this coming election. 

In light of the many opposition political parties and coalitions that failed to succeed over 

the past decade, why did you decide to establish Ginbot 7? Since the party has been 

banned, what are the next steps to pursue the political goals your party had established? 

Answer: 

Ginbot7 was established as a movement to bring the various political organizations and the 

public at large to focus on two important issues that we believe are critical for the long term 

survival and stability of the country. These two issues were an agreement on meaningful 

democratic politics with all its facets and the unity and sovereignty of the nation. We felt that 

addressing the politics of identity within a unified country can only be achieved through a 

meaningful and accountable democratic politics. Focusing on these two issues, we felt, would 

put the question of political power in the back burner to be decided by the public once the 

institutions of democracy are put in place. This is a task we tal<e seriously and that we are 

working on diligently. This requires bringing the various political organizations and civic groups 

to work together for a common objective. 

Although the party is banned by the authorities, that does not in any way limit our activities other 

than prohibiting us from participating in the elections which, as I stated above, we don't take 

seriously as a conduit to the desired change. So, we continue our activities by working with other 
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legally registered organizations or civic groups inside the country as well as organizations that 

are banned like us that operate from outside the country to put pressure on the government to 

change its ways or to change the government through popular resistance. As we have observed in 

the Arab Spring, such pressures are the only way to usher in democratic politics when the 

government in power refuses to submit to the will of the people and abuses the rights of its 

citizens with impunity. 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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multinational federalism. The lack of democracy within the EPRDF coalition is the most 

important factor standing in the way of achieving such a breakthrough Ethiopia. The EPRDF, 

itself being an undemocratic entity, cannot function as a democratizing agency. 

The reason why democracy has to be stifled within the EPRDF coalition can be stated very 

clearly. It is to make the coalition an instrument for imposing and sustaining domination by 

the minority Tigrean elite. Weare concerned that this lack of internal democracy within the 

EPRDF may be fanning a steadily rising frustration by the non-TPLF members, which does 

not bode well either for the coalition or for the country at large. 

We believe that it is necessary and possible to create an internally democratic replica of the 

EPRDF coalition that would take Ethiopia into the next phase of the evolution of its political 

life. In this next phase, the multinational federation needs to be democratized. And we would 

like to work with the EPRDF and all stakeholders to achieve this breakthrough towards both 

democracy and genuine federation. 

We are convinced that those wishing to preserve the slallls quo should recognize that 

instituting some changes may be necessary for achieving such an aim. Similarly, those 

seeking change should realize that preserving aspects of the slatus quo may be necessary for 

such a purpose. In short, the devastating practice of sweeping away all institutions associated 

with the incumbent, which has recurred in Ethiopia's history, should come to an end. The 

positive aspects of the slatus quo should be distinguished from the negative ones and 

preserved while the latter are made the subject of discussion and reform, 

Structuring Ethiopia as a multinational federation was a step in the right direction, What 

needs to be addressed now are the factors that stand in the way of democracy. After being at 

the helm for more than two decades and amassing significant gains for themselves and their 

primary constituency, TPLF leaders should be persuaded that it is in their interest to engage 

other stakeholders in talks with the view of steadily leveling the playing field, They should be 

made to realize that obstinately trying to keep all may culminate in losing all, 

The passing away of their long-time leader and ruler of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, sad though it 

is, should serve as an opportune moment for ret1ecting on these ditlicult choices. The TPLF 

used to have a collegiate leadership style in which equals could openly debate issues, After 

the TPLF captured central power in 1991, this collegiality started experiencing steady erosion 

and finally came to an end subsequent to the internal party crisis of2001 during which some 

important challengers of Meles Zenawi either left or were expelled, 

Thereafter, Meles Zenawi dominated both the party and state institutions and gradually came 

to personify them. He positioned himself at the nexus where the state and party institutions as 

well as the military/security and civilian state organs intersected, And as the architect of these 

diverse institutions, he was more knowledgeable about them than anybody else and was thus 

eminently able to smoothly orchestrate them, 

Hence, one scenario appears plausible after his departure from the scene, Nobody else would 

be able to conduct this orchestration with the same ease and finesse. And any slight 
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incoherence in this delicate orchestration could likely snowball into an ever-rising 

institutional discord. Tn these kinds of tightly centralized dispensation, a slight ripple in one 

corner could reverberate throughout the network of inter-linked institutions creating 

dishannony. 

Meles Zenawi was anned with a sharp intellect, which he continuously honed through 

voracious reading. This fact enabled him to intellectually dominate his immediate colleagues 

and to win their respect. He ended up cultivating a relationship with them that came to 

resemble that between a teacher and his pupils, as stated by one of his fonner TPLF 

comrades. However, this dominance had a downside. The other members of the leadership 

often left deep and creative thinking to him and expected him to come up with solutions to 

challenging policy issues. His death has robbed them of this reliable fountain of wisdom and 

knowledge thereby likely exacerbating their lack of confidence. 

Meles Zenawi 's perfonnance on the international scene was quite impressive. His articulate 

delivery won him the respect and admiration of his interlocutors. As a salesman who could 

sell sand to the Sahara and water to the Oceans, he was able to successfully give explanations 

that were expected to refute external criticisms of his administration's handling of domestic 

crises. No one among his colleagues could have done the same after the bloody crackdown 

following the disputed elections of 2005. 

Consequently, his successors could be more apprehensive when confronting similar crises. 

Whether this would deter them or drive them to become even more brazen, only time will tell. 

But one thing is certain. They will be measured internationally by the degree to which they 

could fit into Meles Zenawi's shoes. And there is no question that none would likely to 

succeed in this regard. Handicapped by the loss of their greatest diplomatic asset, they could 

become increasingly defensive. 

Like his predecessors, Meles Zenawi may have expected that the respect and admiration he 

earned abroad would redound to his domestic stature. However, this did not happen. Meles 

utterly failed to have an efl'ecti ve communication with the Ethiopian public. His 

communication style was often seen as being abrasive and even abusive by an audience that 

expects decorum from its leaders. Even when he won public debates, which he routinely did 

in the rare instances that they took place, he tended to anger most Ethiopian listeners. Hence, 

he was disparaged at home as much as he was lauded abroad 

Authoritarian regimes often develop an insatiable appetite for control. And the instruments for 

achieving this ever-tightening control are their ever-burgeoning security and military 

apparatuses. In these kinds of dispensations, individuals who benefit from reporting potential 

causes of insecurity proliferate. Such individuals have a vested interest in identifying one 

social category or another as the source of threat. 

And this process has been gathering momentum ever since the TPLF/EPRDF came to power. 

This has now culminated in an extreme fonn of micromanagement of society. The system has 

now reached a stage in which out of every five families/individuals one is reportedly made an 

infonner. This obsession with security often proves counterproductive. The system could 

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become obese by eating up every available resource and to thus grow increasingly 

cumbersome. 

The military is the instrument that stands behind this pervasive eavesdropping. But the 

military and security apparatuses may not be satisfied in simply serving as an instrument for 

civilian leaders. They could, in due course, come to harbor the aspiration of having a direct 

say, in one way or another, on policy issues. Whether the civilian leadership would 

accommodate this desire or not is dimcult to say at present 

But one choice is clear for all involved. Either consent is allowed to steadily replace coercion 

or coercion continuously rises until the very instruments for imposing it take center stage. The 

latter scenario appears more likely unless the regime is persuaded to start instituting 

democratic reforms. 

The regime can start signaling its willingness to institute refOTIllS by taking the following 

concrete confidence building measures: 

r Release all political prisoners; 

p.. Revoke all laws hampering the freedom of expression, association and peaceful 

assembly; 

r Revoke the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO) and Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 

0[2009. 

r Stop interfering in the internal affairs of all religious organizations; 

Mr Chainnan and Other Members of the Subcommittee, 

Ethiopia once again stands at a crossroads subsequent to the death ofMeles Zenawi The 

regime can continue doing more of the same or could re-evaluate its position and launch a 

turnaround in order to put back on track a democratization process that got derailed as long 

ago as 1992. We are willing to work with the TPLFIEPRDF in designing a process that would 

result in such a turnaround. We hope this Subcommittee also would work with us in 

persuading the regime that achieving such an aim is in its best interest. 

Finally, thank you for giving me this opportunity to submit our written testimony 

Beyan H. Asoba (1 D.) 

Head: Department of Foreign Affairs 

Oromo Democratic Front 

Date: June 19,2013 

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