COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Chafin, Malveaux and Senior Judge Frank Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

WAYNE GIBSON WEIS, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0785-15-1 J UDGE MARY BENN ETT MALVEAUX OCTOBER 18, 2016 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF MATHEWS COUNTY Jeffrey W. Shaw, Judge Charles E. Haden for appellant. Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Wayne Gibson Weis, Jr. (“appellant”) was convi cted of assault and battery of a family member, in violation of Code § 18.2 -57.2. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike for cause a member of the ve nire who indicated during voir dire that he agreed with the statement that “no man ever has a right to raise a fist to a woman.” We find no abuse of discretion in the trial co urt’s refusal to strike the juror for cause. Ac cordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND December 7, 2013 Incident Prior to December 2013, Amanda Love had b een in a relationship with appellant for several years, and they had a child in common. Love and appellant had been living together for

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - about a year. On December 7, 2013, Love re turned to the couple’ s house and discovered appellant in the bedroom, naked, and in bed with another man. Love and appellant had different versions of what occurred after her discovery. Love testified at trial that she attempted to leave, but that she and appellant started to argue over a child car seat. Love started pulling at appellant’ s clothing to pull him away from her vehicle. Appellant pushed Love against her car, and they had a “tug of war” over the car seat. Appellant “body slammed” Love several times as she was tr ying to retrieve items from the home. They continued to argue, and appellant pushed Love in to the ground several times, grabbing her by her clothing and throwing her to the ground. By this point, Love was soaking wet and covered with mud. She went into the house and changed into one of appellant’s shirts. When she came out, appellant tried to take the shirt off of her. He said to her, “bitch, you wanna go swimming?,” and then attempted to drag her to a creek. He was unabl e to drag her there, so instead shoved her into a mud puddle. Appellant then let her get up, and she left the property. Love testified that she did not hit appellant during the incident. At tr ial, the Commonwealth in troduced photographs of Love showing cuts and ma rks from the altercation. At trial, appellant testified that Love wa s “assaultive” and “very ag itated” after she found him with another man. He said that they argued over the car seat and th at during this argument Love pulled appellant’s clothing off of him. He stated that he was afraid she would hit him in the face, so he “bear hug[ged]” her and put her down on the ground. He told her to stop hitting him and then released her. Love then got back up and attempted to take the keys to appellant’s truck. Appellant asserted that he grabbed Love ’s waist and got her down to the ground. Love got up and went into the house, and appellant trie d to leave, but Love got into her vehicle and blocked his truck from exiting. Love dragged appe llant out of the truck, and he “laid her down” again. Appellant testified that Love hit appellant in his neck, throat, and eye, and then left in her- 3 - vehicle. Appellant stated that he never struck L ove during the altercation. He said his actions in putting her on the ground were only to protect himself from her.
Voir Dire At trial, during voir dire , defense counsel asked the venire if the experien ce of having been in a physical fight would prevent them fr om being fair and impartial in judgment. In response, one member of the panel stated, “[I]t’s just my belief that no man ever has a right to raise a fist to a woman. So if that is what it will be, that wi ll cause a problem.” Three other prospective jurors said that they agreed with that statement, including Juror Owens. Appellant moved to strike Owens for cause, because of his be lief that no man has the right to hit a woman. Owens was brought back for further voir dire outside the presence of the rest of the venire, during which the following colloquy between the trial judge and Owens occurred: THE COURT: Maybe you grew up to be taught that boys aren’t supposed to hit girls, and tec hnically the law is that nobody is supposed to hit anybody unless there’ s justification. One of those justifications is what is called se lf-defense, that the law allows a person who has reasonable appreh ension of bodily injury to use force to prevent that, that’s the classic self-defense definition. Would you use a different standard or try to apply a different standard, depending on the sex of the person? In other words, would you apply a different standa rd if it was a man defending against a man, a woman defending against a man, or a man defending against a woman? Woul d any of those scenarios cause you to apply a different standard of proof or reason? What is your theory on that issue? [OWENS]: As you stated, I was ta ught all my life that you don’t hit a woman, you don’t hit a girl, so forth and so on. I do believe in self-defense. . . . [A]s far as how I would do if a woman was beating on me, I think I could c ontrol it without actually hitting her. THE COURT: That’s in your s ituation. But in the general situation, would you apply a different standard? [OWENS]: Well, it would depe nd on what the woman was doing. THE COURT: Okay.- 4 - [OWENS]: It would totally de pend on how much force I would need to defend myself or how mu ch force somebody would need to defend themselves. THE COURT: Is there a different standard then that you would apply for a man defending himself from another man versus a man defending himself from a woman? [OWENS]: Yes. THE COURT: You would a pply different standards? [OWENS]: Yes. After this exchange, the Commonw ealth’s attorney questioned Owens about his ability to follow the instructions given by the trial court. Owens responded, “I think so, yes,” when the Commonwealth’s attorney asked if he could follow an instruction from the Court on “what force is justified and what force is not justified” and give the defendant and Commonwealth a fair trial. Owens then agreed with the Commonwealth’s stat ement that he would hear the facts before reaching a verdict. Defense counsel then questioned Owens regard ing his earlier asser tion that he would apply a different standard in self-d efense for a man versus a woman. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I mean, this is not a normal situation that you find yourself in he re today, sir. So I don't want to how to -- how do I phrase th is? You know, I guess how do you reconcile the fact that you just said that you would put a different standard for a man versus a woman versus a man versus man following the law and being fair here today? [OWENS]: Men are stronger and bigger and can protect themselves from, you know. I don’ t exactly know how to answer that, but I have never been in that situation. So – [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, do you think based on that different standard that that c ould possibly cause you to be not entirely fair, considering in this case it’s alleged that it’s man versus woman?- 5 - [OWENS]: Well, I believe in de fending yourself. I don’t really know how to answer your question. But, no, I think I could give a fair judgment, the best I can tell you. THE COURT: Sir, if I understand what you are saying, though, as to what was reasonable force w ould be something you would have to consider? [OWENS]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: The whole scenar io would determine reasonable force? [OWENS]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But, J udge, can I have one follow-up? THE COURT: Yes, sir. DEFENSE COUNSEL: But do you belie ve that what is reasonable should be different depending on if the person is a man or if the person is a woman? [OWENS]: Well, a woman could pull a trigger as good as a man can. So I guess no. But a big man and a little woman, if you are going to come in here and fist fight, yes, I believe it should be different. During argument regarding whether Owens a nd another juror should be struck, appellant contended that “they’re going to hold a different standard . . . just based solely on the sex of one of the parties.” The court denied appellant’s motion to strike Owens for cause, stating that “Owens made it clear that he used the example of a woman can fire a gun just as much as man can. So I think he understood the distinction.” The court struck four ot her prospective jurors who expressed that they would us e a different standard for self -defense if a man was defending against a man rather than against a woman. The jury found appellant guilty of assault and ba ttery of a family member, in violation of Code § 18.2-57.2, and sentenced him to nine months in jail. Appellant a ppeals his conviction to
our Court.- 6 - II. ANALYSIS On appeal, appellant argues that the trial c ourt erred in denying his motion to strike for
cause Juror Owens. 1 Appellant alleges that the trial co urt failed to resolve a reasonable doubt regarding Owens’ impartiality after he expressed a belief that “that no man ever has a right to raise a fist to a woman.” On appellate review, we give deference to the trial court’s determination whether to exclude a prospective juror, because the trial court was able to see and h ear each member of the venire respond to the questions posed. Thus, the trial court is in a superior position to determine wh ether a juror’s responses during voir dire indicate that the juror would be prevented or impaired in performing the duties of a juro r as required by the court’s instructions and th e juror’s oath. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 164, 688 S.E.2d 220, 238 (2010) (quoting Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 510, 537 S.E.2d 866, 875 (2000 )). A trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause “will not be di sturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion.” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826, 553 S.E.2d 731, 732 (2001). The right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the Constitution of the United States and the Constituti on of Virginia. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Va. Const. art. I, § 8. “It is the duty of the trial court, through the le gal machinery provided for

1 On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that this assignment of error is procedurally barred. The Commonwealth contends that because appellant did not object to the seating of the jury containing Owens, appellant has waived hi s prior objection, citi ng in support Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 306-07, 384 S.E.2d 785, 793 ( 1989) (holding that a party waives a voir dire objection when he objects to ru lings on prospective jurors during voir dire but fails to object to the seating of that juror). We find Spencer inapplicable to the instant case. In Spencer, the defendant only objected to questions or limita tions on questions asked of individual jurors during voir dire . The defendant did not make a motion to strike a juror; he only objected to the trial judge’s ruling that his couns el could not ask a pot ential juror a certain question and on the phrasing of another question. He re, appellant, through his timely motion to strike a juror for cause, has afforded the trial court a fair opport unity to rule intelligently on the issue of the impartiality of the prospective juror.- 7 - that purpose, to procure an im partial jury to try every case.” Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 55, 60, 707 S.E.2d 27, 30 (2011) (quo ting Salina v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 92, 93, 225 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1976)). “Whether a juror is impar tial is a pure question of historical fact.” David v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 77, 81, 493 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1997). In determining whether a juror is impartial, we consider “the juror’s entire voir dire , not merely isolated statements.” Lovitt, 260 Va. at 510, 537 S.E.2d at 875. “[A]ny reasonable doubt as to a juror’s qualifications must be resolved in favor of the accused.” Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976). “Jurors are not expected to be learned in legal maxims.” Id. at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 736. “It is not uncommon to discover during voir dire that prospective jurors have preconceived notions, opinions, or misconceptions about the cr iminal justice system, criminal trials and procedure, or about the particular case.” Cressell v. Commonwea lth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761, 531 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2000) (quoting Griffin v. Co mmonwealth, 19 Va. App. 619, 621, 454 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1995)). “The opinion entertained by a juror, wh ich disqualifies him, is an opinion of that fixed character which repels the presumption of innocence in a cr iminal case, and in whose mind the accused stands condemned already.” Justus v. Commonwe alth, 220 Va. 971, 976, 266 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1980) (quoting Slade v. Co mmonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931)). “[T]he test of impartiality is whethe r the venireperson can lay aside . . . preconceived views and render a verdict based solely on the law and evidence pr esented at trial.” Griffin, 19 Va. App. at 621, 454 S.E.2d at 364. Evidence of a ve nireman’s impartiality “should come from him and not be based on his mere assent to persuasive suggestions.” Bradbury v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 176, 181, 578 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2003) (quoting Breeden, 217 Va. at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 736).- 8 - Here, taking into consideration the applicable legal principles, the tria l court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to strike, as Owens’ own statements demonstrated that he was able to sit as an impartial juror. While Owens initially agreed with the statement that “no man ever has a right to raise a fist to a woman,” as expressed by another juror during voir dire , his later statements established that he would use appropriate consider ations in determining whether appellant had a valid self-defense claim. When the Commonwealth’s attorney asked whether, if the trial court instructed him on what constituted justified force, he could follow that instruction and give both sides a fair trial, Owens responded, “I think so, yes, sir.” Owens then agreed that he would hear the facts before reaching a verdict. Owens himself stated that he believed in self-defense and thought that in a general situation, self-def ense would depend on what the woman was doing and how much force was needed for someone to defend themselves. Owens indicated that he would consider the size and strength of an in dividual in determining whether self-defense was justified. Finally, he stated that he did not think that whether an action constitutes reasonable force should depend on gende r, using the example of a woman “pulling a trigger as good as a man can.” Here, while Owens expressed a view that me n should be held to a different standard regarding self -defense, his statements, viewed in totality, simply demonstrate the legally permissible belief that size and st rength are factors that can be considered in determining whether self-defense is justifiable. 2 See Boblett v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 640, 649, 396 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1990) (finding no error in refusing to strike juror who initially

2 It is plain from the jury instructions that a finding of self-defense involved an evaluation of what was reasonable in light of all the circ umstances, including the re lative physical size of the parties. In this case, the jury was given tw o self-defense instructions, one with fault and one without fault. Both instructions direct the ju ry to find appellant not guilty if they find, amongst other requirements, that “he reas onably feared, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm ” and that “he used no more force, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, than was reasonably necessary to protect himself from the perceived harm.”- 9 - expressed a preconceived opinion ab out the insanity defense, but later expressed in his own words an ability to set that preconception asid e and follow the instructions of the court). Additionally, it is significant that many of Owe ns’ statements regarding self-defense were expressed by him, and were not “mere assent to persuasive suggestions.” Bradbury, 40 Va. App. at 181, 578 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting Breeden, 217 Va . at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 736). His answers, which were not merely “yes” or “no” responses to questions asked by the trial court or counsel, provided the trial court with eviden ce of his impartiality. In the instant case, the trial judge had the opportunity to observe Owens’ demeanor, to hear his responses, and to form an opinion as to whether he had a fair, impartial, and open state of mind. Based upon this record, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to strike Owens for cause.
III. CONCLUSION We find no merit in appellant’s contention th at the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Owens for cause. The deci sion of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.