COMBATING 

TERRORISM

DHS Should Take 

Action to Better 

Ensure Resources 

Abroad Align with 

Priorities

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2013

GAO-13-681

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-681, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2013

COMBATING TERRORISM

DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources 

Abroad Align with Priorities 

Why GAO Did This Study

Combating terrorism is a governmentwide effort, to which DHS contributes. 

In such efforts abroad, DHS partners 

with the Department of State (State)—

the lead agency at U.S. missions. DHS 

deploys resources abroad to carry out 

programs and build capacity within its 

areas of expertise—border, maritime, 

aviation, and cyber security; 

immigration; and law enforcement. 

GAO was asked to examine DHS’s 

efforts abroad to combat terrorism. 

This report answers the following 

questions: (1) What programs, 

activities, and resources does DHS 

have abroad to help combat terrorism? 

(2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed 

to U.S. missions and what, if any, 

factors have affected contributions? (3) 

To what extent has DHS aligned 

resource use abroad with strategic 

priorities?

GAO analyzed DHS expenditures for 

fiscal years 2008-2012, personnel data 

for May 2013 and documents, such as 

national strategies and management 

directives. GAO also interviewed DHS 

and State officials in headquarters and 

10 countries, selected on the basis of 

factors such as the size of DHS’s 

presence. The results from site visits 

cannot be generalized but provided 

insights. GAO also surveyed DHS and 

State personnel in all 57 U.S. missions 

where DHS has a presence.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS establish

(1) department-wide strategic priorities, 

(2) an institutionalized mechanism to 

review resource alignment abroad, and 

(3) a method to collect reliable and 

comparable cost data for resources 

abroad. DHS concurred with these 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carries out a variety of programs 

and activities abroad within its areas of expertise that could have the effect of 

thwarting terrorists and their plots while also combating other categories of 

transnational crime, and DHS expended approximately $451 million on programs 

and activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. For example, through the Visa Security 

Program, DHS has deployed personnel abroad to help prevent the issuance of 

visas to people who might pose a threat. As of May 2013, DHS has stationed 

about 1,800 employees in almost 80 countries to conduct these and other 

activities. In addition, DHS has delivered training and technical assistance in 

areas such as border and aviation security to officials from about 180 countries to 

enhance partner nations’ security capacities.

GAO identified five types of contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions (e.g., 

embassies and consulates), 12 factors that support DHS’s ability to contribute, 

and a range of challenges and impacts related to DHS contributions. On the 

basis of surveys of DHS and State officials abroad, GAO found that DHS has 

significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of 

the types of contributions GAO identified, including building relationships, 

identifying threats, and sharing information. The factors GAO identified that 

facilitated DHS’s ability to contribute fell into two general categories: (1) 

facilitating a collaborative climate and (2) leveraging resources and clarifying 

roles and responsibilities. GAO also identified a variety of challenges, including 

DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with personnel abroad and 

partners at U.S. missions understanding of DHS’s role. Fewer than half of 

respondents identified any challenge as moderate or significant. For impacts 

arising from these challenges, less than one-third of respondents identified them 

as causing a significant or moderate impact.

DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment, 

but has not established mechanisms to ensure that resource use abroad aligns 

with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. DHS has a stated 

objective to improve alignment across the department, and Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement mechanisms 

to help ensure achievement of their objectives. Although DHS conducted a onetime review of the department’s international footprint and created a departmentwide international engagement plan, DHS has not established mechanisms to 

help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad—which are made at the 

individual component level—align with department-wide and government-wide 

strategic priorities. Specifically, DHS (1) has not established department-wide 

strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of 

activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) does not have 

a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and 

strategic priorities; and (3) does not have reliable, comparable cost data for its 

programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized 

framework to capture these data. Strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely 

monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, 

and reliable cost data could provide DHS with critical information to make 

informed resource deployment decisions and help achieve its objective to 

improve organizational alignment across components.

View GAO-13-681. For more information, 

contact David Maurer at (202) 512-9627 

MaurerD@gao.gov or Charles Michael 

Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 

JohnsonCM@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Letter 1 

Background 6

DHS Conducts Mission Activities and Capacity Building Abroad 

That Can Help Combat Terrorism 11

DHS and State Identified Five Key DHS Contributions to U.S. 

Missions and Multiple Factors and Challenges That Affected 

Contributions 21

DHS Has Acted to Enhance Department-wide Alignment, but Could 

Have Better Assurance That Resources Abroad Support Highest 

Priorities 32

Conclusions 38

Recommendations for Executive Action 39

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 42

Appendix II Training or Technical Assistance and Expenditure Data for 

Figures 1 and 3 50

Appendix III Elements of Expenditures Included in Data for Expenditures 

Abroad by Component 61

Appendix IV Complete Survey Results for Contributions, Challenges, and 

Impacts 62

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 69

Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 71

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Tables

Table 1: Examples of Department of Homeland Security 

Component Mission Responsibilities Related to Combating 

Terrorism Abroad 7

Table 2: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Programs and 

Activities Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism 11

Table 3: Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat 

Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Components within Our Review 15

Table 4: Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad for 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of 

International Affairs and Components within Our Review, 

by Component, May 2013 20

Table 5: Data for Figure 1, Countries Participating in Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Training or Technical 

Assistance that Can Help Combat Terrorism in Fiscal Year 

2012 50

Table 6: Expenditure Data for Figure 3, Expenditures Abroad in 

Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time-Equivalent Employees 

(FTE) Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs (OIA) and 

Components within Our Review 55

Table 7: Full-Time-Equivalent Employee (FTE) Data for Figure 3, 

Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and FTEs Abroad 

in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Office of International Affairs and Components within Our 

Review 58

Figures

Figure 1: Countries Participating in Training or Technical 

Assistance That Can Help Combat Terrorism from 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components 

within Our Review, Fiscal Year 2012 14

Figure 2: Expenditures Abroad from Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and 

Components within Our Review, Fiscal Years 2008 

through 2012 17

Figure 3: Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-TimeEquivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad in May 2013 for 
Page iii GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of 

International Affairs and Components within Our Review 19

Figure 4: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in 

the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy 

Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a 

Significant or Moderate Contribution 22

Figure 5: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland 

Security Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions’ 

Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of 

Deputy Chiefs of Mission Indicating Them as Very 

Important 24

Figure 6: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions’ 

Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of 

DHS Attachés Indicating Them as Very Important 25

Figure 7: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Deputy Chiefs 

of Mission as Presenting Some Level of Challenge to the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Ability to 

Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating 

Terrorism Goals 29

Figure 8: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Attachés as Presenting Some 

Level of Challenge to DHS’s Ability to Contribute Its 

Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals 29

Figure 9: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. 

Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by 

Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some 

Level of Impact 31

Figure 10: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. 

Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by 

Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of 

Impact 32

Figure 11: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) as Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in 

the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy 

Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a 

Significant or Moderate Contribution 62

Figure 12: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in 
Page iv GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of DHS 

Attachés Responding that DHS Has Made a Significant or 

Moderate Contribution 63

Figure 13: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to 

Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of 

Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of 

Challenge 64

Figure 14: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to 

Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of 

DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Challenge 66

Figure 15: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. 

Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by 

Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some 

Level of Impact 67

Figure 16: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. 

Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by 

Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of 

Impact 68
Page v GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Abbreviations

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CSCS Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program

DCM deputy chief of mission

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FTE Full-Time-Equivalent Employee

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICS Integrated Country Strategy

ICASS International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

MRR Mission Resource Request

OIA Office of International Affairs

QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

USSS United States Secret Service

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Page 1 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 25, 2013

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Duncan

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight 

 and Management Efficiency

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Peter T. King

Chairman

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

 and Intelligence

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid, coordinated, 

and effective effort that uses the resources of the entire government to 

mitigate threats to national and homeland security.1

 

1

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism supports the National Security Strategy, 

which lays out an approach for advancing American interests, including the security of the 

American people. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism sets out the approach to one 

of the President’s top national security priorities—disrupting, dismantling, and eventually 

defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. It also acknowledges the need to 

counter other transnational terrorist networks. See White House, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: June 2011) and White House, National Security 

Strategy (Washington D.C.: May 2010).

The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS)—with its specific knowledge and skills in 

border, maritime, and aviation security; immigration; and law 

enforcement, among other areas—contributes to the U.S. government’s 

efforts to combat terrorism. In pursuit of this objective, DHS seeks to 

identify security vulnerabilities and interdict threats at the earliest possible 

point with the aim of making the nation’s physical borders the last, not the 

first, line of defense.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

The Department of State (State) leads U.S. diplomatic efforts and has 

established U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates) in foreign 

nations.2

One current priority of DHS leadership is better aligning its efforts across 

the department with the aim of strengthening effectiveness, improving 

decision making to address shared issues— such as managing 

international affairs and combating terrorism —and prioritizing resource 

use in an era of fiscal constraint. In this context, you asked us to examine 

DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism abroad and how DHS’s resource use 

abroad aligns with other U.S. efforts, including those carried out by U.S. 

missions. This report answers the following questions:

One aim of these U.S. missions is to enhance national security 

by strengthening the relationship between the United States and other 

nations. State—through the U.S. missions—coordinates most U.S. 

international efforts. Therefore, U.S. missions are uniquely positioned to 

provide leadership, resources, and knowledge to U.S. efforts to combat 

terrorism, in collaboration with various other U.S. government agencies 

working abroad, including DHS, as well as with foreign partners.

1. What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to 

help combat terrorism?

2. How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat 

terrorism, and what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those 

contributions?

3. To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad 

with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities?

To address our questions, we reviewed key government-wide strategies 

related to combating terrorism, including the May 2010 National Security 

Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. We 

reviewed documentation such as DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review (QHSR) and DHS component documentation describing goals, 

 

2

The State Department operates more than 270 diplomatic offices—embassies, 

consulates, and other diplomatic posts—worldwide to support the achievement of U.S. 

foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national 

security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening 

the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of 

the rest of the world. For the purposes of this report, a U.S. mission refers to the entire 

diplomatic representation in a given country, including the embassy, as well as all other 

diplomatic offices, staff, and assets.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

objectives, and operations for DHS programs abroad.3 We also 

interviewed officials with responsibility for programs and activities abroad 

in DHS and component headquarters offices for the six operational 

components that have missions related to combating terrorism—U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). In addition, we interviewed 

officials in DHS’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) and DHS’s Office of 

Policy-Counterterrorism division, who have department-level 

responsibilities for DHS’s deployments abroad and counterterrorism 

policy, respectively. We reviewed documentation about State programs 

and activities on which DHS collaborates and interviewed officials in 

Department of State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, 

and Consular Affairs, because DHS coordinates and collaborates with 

them in its activities abroad. We also reviewed our prior work on specific 

programs related to activities DHS carries out abroad, such as container 

security, visa security, and foreign airport assessments.4 In addition, we 

reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS Office of Inspector 

General officials responsible for a 2008 report that made a number of 

recommendations designed to enhance DHS’s management of 

international affairs.5

To address the first question, we first developed an operational definition 

of combating terrorism, using information from government-wide strategy 

documents and from interviews with DHS officials with responsibility for 

programs abroad that have a nexus with counterterrorism and 

 

3

Pursuant to section 707 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security is to conduct a review of the homeland security of the 

nation—referred to as a quadrennial homeland security review— beginning in fiscal year 

2009 and every 4 years thereafter. See 6 U.S.C. § 347. In each quadrennial review, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security shall, among other things, “delineate and update, as 

appropriate, the national homeland security strategy,” and “outline and prioritize the full 

range of the critical homeland security mission areas of the [n]ation.” 

4

For example, see GAO, Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Address Challenges and 

Potential Vulnerabilities Related to Securing Inbound Air Cargo, GAO-12-632 

(Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012), and Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program 

Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide, 

GAO-11-315 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011).

5

DHS Office of Inspector General, Management of Department of Homeland Security 

International Activities and Interests, OIG-08-71 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

antiterrorism efforts. We then identified the programs and activities DHS 

carries out abroad that met that definition and verified the list of programs 

and activities with officials in DHS OIA and the six operational 

components in our review. Because many of DHS’s missions involve 

carrying out the same set of activities with multifaceted purposes—such 

as facilitating legitimate trade and travel while countering threats to the 

homeland—we determined it would not be possible to isolate 

expenditures for combating terrorism-related activities abroad from other 

DHS activities abroad. Instead, we collected from each component in our 

review expenditures for all activities conducted abroad for fiscal years 

2008 through 2012. We collected data on full-time-equivalent employees 

(FTE) from DHS’s Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator report for 

May 2013, the most recent month available at the time of our work.6

To address the second question, we visited U.S. missions in 10 countries 

where one or more DHS components had FTEs stationed. We selected 

the locations based on a range of factors, including the nature and scope 

of DHS presence abroad; indicators of terrorist activities; and logistical 

concerns, such as security and the opportunity to leverage resources. At 

these locations we conducted interviews with DHS officials and State 

officials about the opportunities for and the quality of collaboration 

between DHS and other federal partners. The results from our visits to 

these 10 countries cannot be generalized; however, the interviews 

provided insights into how DHS contributes to U.S. missions’ combating 

We 

reviewed the expenditure and FTE data provided for reasonableness and 

discussed the actions taken to help ensure its reliability with 

knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the expenditure and 

FTE data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting general 

information about DHS expenditures abroad and the number of FTEs by 

country for a specific point in time. We also collected, from each of the six 

operational components in our review, information on training and 

technical assistance activities. Because of challenges such as 

inconsistent data definitions, we determined that there were not 

sufficiently reliable and comparable data to allow us to report 

expenditures specific to training and technical assistance abroad, but 

information could be reported about the foreign nation whose officials 

have received the training and technical assistance.

 

6

The Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator is maintained by DHS’s Office of 

Operations and Coordination Planning and updated through self-reported data from the 

components on a monthly basis.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

terrorism efforts, what is working well, and any barriers to effective 

contributions.

We conducted two surveys to collect information about the kinds of 

contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions, the factors that were 

important to facilitate DHS’s contributions in the U.S. mission 

environment, challenges DHS and the U.S. missions faced facilitating 

DHS’s contributions, and the impacts of any such challenges. We 

administered one survey to all DHS attachés and the other to all deputy 

chiefs of mission (DCM) at all U.S. missions where DHS has permanently 

stationed FTEs in the embassies—57 U.S. missions in total.7

To address the third question, we analyzed prescriptions in the February 

2010 QHSR for maturing the department. These prescriptions include 

improving organizational alignment—particularly among operational 

components—and enhancing programmatic alignment to the homeland 

security missions. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government calls for control activities—that is, policies, procedures, 

techniques, and mechanisms—to enforce management’s directives.

The overall 

response rate to the surveys was 82 percent for DHS attachés and 72 

percent for DCMs.

8

 

7

This population excluded countries where DHS’s only FTE presence was to carry out a 

specific programmatic activity outside of the embassies and consulates—such as CBP’s 

Container Security Initiative, which operates out of the ports— and did not routinely 

participate in the country team.

In

this respect, we evaluated the extent to which DHS had control activities 

to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment 

and efficient, effective management processes around its resource 

deployment abroad. To do this, we reviewed documentation, such as 

DHS’s Management Directive describing roles and responsibilities for 

DHS’s international affairs. In addition, we interviewed officials in OIA and 

the six DHS components in our review about the extent to which they 

undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and organizational alignment 

across the set of resources and efforts DHS deploys abroad. We also 

interviewed officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy about how 

DHS and government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use 

decisions. For more information on our scope and methodology, see 

appendix I.

8

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
 

Page 6 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DHS conducts four main types of efforts abroad that can help to combat 

terrorism by thwarting terrorists and their plots before they reach the 

homeland:

• deploying programs and activities abroad—especially screening and 

targeting programs, along with select immigration benefit 

processing—to help interdict people who present a threat to the 

homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out 

terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas sooner in the trade, 

travel, and immigration cycles;

• working with and sharing information with international and federal 

partners to help counter terrorism and other international crime;

• working alongside foreign officials to support them in assessing their 

own security vulnerabilities and implementing mitigating actions; and

• helping other nations strengthen their security infrastructure by 

providing training and consultations, conducting assessments, or 

providing equipment.9

 

9

In general, DHS does not have specific statutory authority to provide training and 

technical assistance abroad directly and does not receive appropriations specific to this 

purpose. Rather, any assistance DHS provides abroad is typically at the request of and in 

coordination with other federal partners such as the Department of Defense and the 

Department of State.

Background 

DHS’s Strategic 

Framework and Efforts 

Abroad to Combat 

Terrorism
 

Page 7 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

DHS component agencies and offices have primary responsibility for 

conducting activities that correspond with their particular missions, 

including those that help to combat terrorism.10

Table 1: Examples of Department of Homeland Security Component Mission Responsibilities Related to Combating Terrorism 

Abroad

As shown in table 1, six 

operational components in our review have mission responsibilities in 

border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law 

enforcement that contribute to DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism. DHS 

components are generally responsible for making operational decisions—

such as how to allocate resources, both domestically and abroad—to 

meet component and DHS mission needs.

Component Mission responsibilities related to combating terrorism abroad

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP)

As the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders, CBP has mission 

responsibilities related to preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United 

States.

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE)

As the federal agency with primary responsibility for investigating a wide range of domestic and 

international activities arising from the illegal movement of people and goods into, within, and out 

of the United States, ICE has mission responsibilities related to combating worldwide criminal 

enterprises that seek to exploit the United State’s legitimate trade, travel and financial systems and 

enforcing U.S. customs and immigration laws, regulations, and policies.

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA)

As the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing U.S. transportation systems, TSA has 

mission responsibilities related to ensuring the security of U.S.-bound flights and trains. 

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) As the federal agency with primary responsibility for safeguarding U.S. maritime interests and 

homeland security efforts in the maritime domain, USCG has mission responsibilities related to 

assessing the security of foreign port facilities and U.S.-bound commercial vessels, coordinating 

maritime information sharing efforts, and promoting domain awareness in the maritime 

environment.

U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS)

a

As the federal agency with primary responsibility for overseeing lawful immigration to the United 

States, USCIS has mission responsibilities related to strengthening the security and integrity of the 

immigration system.

 

10DHS is made up of eight operational components—CBP, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, ICE, USSS, TSA, 

USCG, and USCIS—along with a number of headquarters offices, including, among 

others, the Office of Policy, which houses OIA and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy. 

Each of the operational components has at least some FTEs stationed abroad. However, 

not all carry out missions that fall within the combating terrorism definition for this report. A 

few of the headquarters offices, such as the National Protection and Programs 

Directorate, may also assign FTEs to be stationed abroad to carry out specific program 

objectives.

DHS’s Roles and 

Responsibilities for 

Combating Terrorism and 

International Affairs
 

Page 8 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Component Mission responsibilities related to combating terrorism abroad

U.S. Secret Service (USSS) As the federal agency with primary responsibility for safeguarding the U.S. financial infrastructure 

and payment systems and for protecting U.S. leaders and high-profile events, USSS has mission 

responsibilities related to combating transnational criminal enterprises seeking to exploit U.S. 

financial institutions and operations, investigating money laundering activities, cyber-related 

crimes, counterfeiting of U.S. currency and obligations, as well as conducting security operations 

around the world.

Source: GAO analysis of agency missions

a

DHS’s counterterrorism efforts are coordinated by DHS’s 

Counterterrorism Coordinator through its Counterterrorism Advisory 

Board. The board is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Policy and 

the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis and also includes 

component heads. According to Office of Policy officials responsible for 

working with the board, it meets weekly to discuss and develop plans and 

strategies related to counterterrorism. The Office of Policy, through the 

Counterterrorism Policy Office, also coordinates DHS participation in 

White House and interagency policy planning meetings related to 

counterterrorism. OIA is also a member of the Counterterrorism Advisory 

Board.

Maritime domain awareness is the understanding by stakeholders involved in maritime security of 

anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, 

safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 

DHS’s OIA has primary responsibility for coordinating all aspects of 

department international affairs, but does not have operational oversight 

of component activities. In August 2012, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security signed the DHS International Affairs Management Directive. 

Consistent with the Management Directive, the Assistant Secretary for 

International Affairs, in coordination with the heads of DHS’s operational 

and support components, establishes strategies, plans, and appropriate 

activities for DHS to develop foreign partner security capabilities and 

international cooperative programs that align with DHS strategic planning 

documents.

The Secretary of Homeland Security has testified that to achieve its 

mission more effectively, it is important that DHS both identify and 

operate as “One DHS” in pursuit of its overarching homeland security 

missions. To that end, OIA is responsible for developing, coordinating, 

and executing departmental international policy, including reviewing 

departmental positions on international matters, negotiating agreements, 

developing policy and programs, interacting with foreign officials, and 

working with DHS personnel abroad. Although operational decision 

making and resource use are generally the purview of the individual 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

components and offices, OIA is responsible for reviewing component 

requests to State for international deployments.

Two White House strategies outline government-wide goals for promoting 

national security and combating terrorism at the highest level—the May 

2010 National Security Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism. The National Security Strategy articulates a strategic 

approach for advancing U.S. interests, including security, economy, and 

values. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism focuses more 

specifically on one of the National Security Strategy’s priorities—

disrupting, dismantling, and defeating terrorist networks.11

DHS coordinates its efforts abroad to combat terrorism with State and 

other federal partners. State is the federal agency responsible for 

coordinating and supervising efforts led out of U.S. missions—like 

combating international terrorism—in collaboration with various other U.S. 

government agencies working abroad, such as the Department of 

Defense, Department of Justice, and DHS, as well as foreign partners 

that are facing terrorist threats. When conducting efforts abroad, DHS 

operates under the authority of the chief of mission (typically an 

ambassador). Chiefs of mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. 

missions and have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of all government executive branch employees in that 

country, with some exceptions, like personnel under the Department of 

Defense’s Combatant Commanders.

Both national 

strategies call for a whole-of-government approach to help secure the 

nation and combat terrorism. They each also call for contributions that are 

in line with DHS activities abroad—carrying out programs to limit the 

movement of people and goods that pose a threat to the homeland and 

helping other nations build capacity to detect, deter, and capture such 

people and goods to limit their global movement.

12

 

11In addition to these broad strategies, the National Counterterrorism Center, which 

coordinates interagency counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the White House National 

Security Staff, has developed regional and threat-specific counterterrorism strategies. The 

mission of the National Counterterrorism Center is to lead the U.S. effort to combat 

terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing threats, sharing that information with U.S. 

partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. See 50 

U.S.C. § 3056.

The staffing levels of a U.S. 

12See 22 U.S.C. § 3927.

DHS Collaboration with 

State and Other Federal 

Partners Abroad
 

Page 10 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

mission are determined by the chief of mission through the National 

Security Decision Directive-38 process.13

DHS also collaborates with State and other federal partners that provide 

the funding to support personnel who make the contributions. For 

example, many of the activities to build capacity and provide training 

abroad are funded through State programs. In some cases, DHS also 

collaborates to share information, knowledge, and skills, where 

appropriate, with other federal personnel operating abroad—for example, 

contributing border security expertise in Department of Defense capacitybuilding efforts or sharing information with other law enforcement 

personnel stationed at the same diplomatic U.S. mission.

This directive, issued by the 

President, authorizes the chief of mission to determine the size, 

composition, or mandate of personnel operating at the U.S. mission.

At each U.S. mission, State requires mission management to lead, in 

consultation with relevant stakeholders, two processes to identify 

strategies, priorities, and programming needs for the efforts that are to be 

carried out through the mission—including combating terrorism. The 

first—the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)—is a multi-year plan that 

articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. It is a single overarching 

strategy, completed every 3 years, that encapsulates government-wide 

policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic 

engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve 

them. The second is the Mission Resource Request (MRR), which is a 

budget document that explains and justifies the resources required to 

achieve a given mission’s highest foreign policy and management

objectives, as drawn from the ICS. The MRR is submitted annually.

 

13Consistent with National Security Decision Directive-38, dated June 2, 1982, agencies 

with staff operating under authority of chiefs of mission will ensure that, in coordination 

with State, the chief of mission approves any proposed changes to the size, composition, 

or mandate of the agencies’ staffing elements at the post before they are made. See also 

22 U.S.C. § 3927a.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

The DHS components within our review carry out programs and activities 

abroad within their areas of expertise—border, maritime, aviation, and 

cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement, among others—that 

are designed to limit the movement of people and goods that could pose 

a threat to the homeland before they reach the United States. They also 

deliver training and technical assistance designed to enhance partner 

nations’ ability to limit such movement globally. According to our analysis 

of expenditure data and FTE data provided to us by DHS, DHS OIA and 

the components within our review spent approximately $451 million 

dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012 and had about 1,800 FTEs 

stationed abroad in almost 80 countries as of May 2013.14

DHS conducts certain programs and mission activities abroad to prevent 

people and goods that would pose a threat from reaching the homeland. 

Table 2 details the mission activities falling within the definition of 

combating terrorism used in this report—that is, they have the potential to 

thwart terrorists and their plots whether designed specifically for that 

purpose or not.

Table 2: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Programs and Activities Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism 

Program / initiative Description

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) 

Container Security 

Initiative

The Container Security Initiative is a bilateral government partnership program through which CBP 

officers stationed at foreign seaports identify U.S.-bound shipments at risk of containing weapons of mass 

destruction or other terrorist contraband. See 6 U.S.C. § 945.

CBP Pre-inspection and 

Preclearance Programs

Through its pre-inspection and preclearance programs, CBP makes admissibility decisions abroad at last 

points of departure for the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7), 19 U.S.C. § 1629. See also 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 235.1, 235.5; 19 C.F.R. §§ 148.22, 162.6, 162.8.

Under pre-inspection, CBP officers make passenger admissibility decisions abroad, but the inspection of 

accompanying goods, baggage, and passenger vehicles takes place upon arrival in the United States.

Preclearance is the process by which CBP officers stationed abroad inspect and make admissibility 

decisions about non-U.S.-citizen travelers and their accompanying goods or baggage heading to the 

United States before they leave a foreign port. CBP officers retain the authority to inspect these travelers

and their accompanying goods or baggage after arriving in the United States should inspection be 

warranted. 

 

14All DHS expenditures abroad have been adjusted for inflation and are stated in fiscal 

year 2012 dollars.

DHS Conducts 

Mission Activities and 

Capacity Building 

Abroad That Can Help 

Combat Terrorism 

DHS Carries Out a Variety 

of Programs and Activities 

Abroad That Can Help 

Combat Terrorism
 

Page 12 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Program / initiative Description

CBP Immigration Advisory 

Program 

Through its Immigration Advisory Program, CBP partners with foreign governments and air carriers to 

identify and prevent high-risk, improperly documented travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, though 

Immigration Advisory Program officers themselves may not exercise U.S. immigrations and customs 

authority in the host country. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7). For example, if a traveler would likely be 

deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States on terrorism-related grounds (8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(3)(B)), an Immigration Advisory Program officer will make a “no board” recommendation to the air 

carrier and host government that may result in the air carrier not permitting a traveler to board a flight.

Immigration Advisory Program officers have established working relationships with foreign law 

enforcement and counterterrorism officials and facilitated a direct link and real-time communication 

among foreign counterparts, the U.S. mission, and CBP’s National Targeting Center.

CBP Secure Freight 

Initiative 

The Secure Freight Initiative is a pilot program intended to test the feasibility of scanning all containers 

bound for the United States before they are loaded onto vessels at foreign seaports. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 

981-82. As required by statute, DHS established pilot projects at a small group of strategic seaports. As of 

2013, Secure Freight Initiative protocols are in effect in only one location.

CBP Air Cargo Advance 

Screening Pilot

Participants in CBP’s Air Cargo Advance Screening pilot submit specified data elements as early as 

possible before cargo is loaded onto an aircraft (i.e., at a point earlier than current regulations require) to 

more readily identify high-risk cargo for additional screening prior to departing from foreign airports to the 

United States. See 19 U.S.C. 2071 note. See also 19 C.F.R. § 122.48a.

U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) Visa Security 

Program 

ICE deploys personnel to U.S. embassies and consulates to assist in the administration and enforcement 

of U.S. immigration policy by, among other things, conducting security reviews of visa applications, 

initiating investigations, and coordinating with other law enforcement entities. See 6 U.S.C. § 236.

ICE Investigations Abroad ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations directorate investigates a wide range of domestic and 

international activities arising from the illegal movement of people and goods into, within, and out of the 

United States. Sometimes these investigations are conducted in partnership with Transnational Criminal 

Investigative Units, which are composed of vetted foreign prosecutors and law enforcement, customs, 

immigration, and intelligence officials who help make sure that ICE investigations are in compliance with 

host country laws, agreements, and treaties. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)-(3), 1357, 1446; 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1589a, 1701.

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) 

Foreign Airport 

Assessments

TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S. air carrier, from 

which a foreign air carrier serves the United States, that pose a high risk of introducing danger to 

international air travel, and as considered appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security. See 49 

U.S.C. § 44907.

TSA Air Carrier 

Assessments

TSA conducts assessments of U.S. and foreign air carriers that service the United States from foreign 

airports to ensure that air carriers certified or permitted to operate to, from, or within the United States 

meet applicable security requirements, including those set forth in an air carrier’s TSA-approved security 

program. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903, 44906; see also, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3, 1546.3.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

International Port Security 

Program 

The International Port Security Program’s primary goal is to reduce the risk of terrorism to the nation and 

its maritime transportation system. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70108-09. The International Port Security program 

assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in the overseas ports of U.S. maritime trading 

partners or countries deemed as possibly posing a security risk to international maritime commerce by 

visiting these countries, sponsoring foreign port threat assessments, and monitoring other security 

information about them. In addition, the Coast Guard imposes conditions of entry on vessels arriving to

the United States from ports with inadequate antiterrorism measures, requiring those vessels to take 

additional security precautions while in those foreign ports. See 46 U.S.C. § 70110.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Program / initiative Description

USCG Port State Control 

Examinations

USCG officials examine foreign vessels entering U.S. waters that have departed foreign ports to 

determine if they comply with international safety and security conventions. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. pt. 104 

(establishing security measures for certain vessels calling at U.S. ports). Although these examinations are 

usually conducted on foreign vessels that have entered, or are about to enter, U.S. ports, USCG units in 

Europe and Asia also occasionally examine foreign commercial vessels that plan to trade in the United 

States.

U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services 

(USCIS) Immigration 

Benefits Processing

When processing applications for immigration benefits, USCIS officers conduct fraud reviews and perform 

national security vetting, including background identity and security checks and watchlist screening. See, 

e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1446 (requiring the investigation and examination of applications for naturalization).These 

reviews and vetting serve to verify information provided in the benefit requests and identify any potential 

national security concerns. If applicants for immigration benefits are identified by USCIS as known or 

suspected terrorists, officers put these cases through an additional review process where specially trained 

officers vet and deconflict information of national security concern with appropriate law enforcement or 

intelligence officials. In addition to sharing information with U.S. agencies, DHS has bilateral informationsharing agreements with other countries, and is able to mitigate risks by sharing critical information with 

these partners.

U.S. Secret Service 

(USSS) Investigations 

Abroad

USSS pursues criminal investigations targeting transnational criminal enterprises engaged in highconsequence cyber-related crimes, counterfeiting of U.S. obligations, and money-laundering operations. 

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 3056. 

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO work and program documentation with verification by DHS officials.

Within its areas of expertise, DHS also provides training and technical 

assistance activities—often at the request of and in coordination with 

other federal partners such as State or the Department of Defense—

which are designed to help other nations build capacity and address 

vulnerabilities in order to limit the movement of people who present a 

threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to 

carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas. Figure 1 

shows that in fiscal year 2012, the DHS components in our review 

conducted training and technical assistance to help combat terrorism with 

partners from about 180 countries.15 See appendix II for data associated 

with figure 1.

 

15Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have 

included it as a separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or 

relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms 

shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan 

is included as a country. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we 

have included it in this report as a separate country because it is an economic entity 

separate from the rest of China and is able to enter into international agreements on its 

own behalf in commercial and economic matters.
Page  GAO-- '+6(IIRUWV$EURDGWR&RPEDW7HUURULVP

Source: GAO analysis of DHS’s component training and technical assistance data for fiscal year 2012; Map Resources (map).

Afghanistan

Albania

Algeria

Angola

Anguilla

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Aruba

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bahamas

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belarus

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bermuda

Bolivia

Bonaire 

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burma 

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Cape Verde

Cayman Islands

Chile

China

Colombia

Cook Islands

Costa Rica

Croatia

Cuba

Curaçao

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic 

 of Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Indonesia

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Ivory Coast

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Kiribati

Kosovo

Kuwait

Kyrgyzstan

Laos

Latvia

Lebanon

Lesotho

Liberia

Libya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macedonia

Madagascar

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Ethiopia

Federated States of 

 Micronesia

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guadeloupe 

Guatemala

Guinea

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong

Hungary

Iceland

India

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives 

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova

Monaco

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Nigeria

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Palau

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Republic of Congo

Romania

Russia

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Maarten

Saint Vincent and 

 the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Serbia

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

South Africa

South Korea

Spain

Participated in 6-10 activities (40)

Participated in 10+ training activities (23)

Participated in 1 activity (27)

Participated in 2-5 activities (88)

Suriname

Swaziland

Sweden

Switzerland

Taiwan

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Timor Leste

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Turks and Caicos 

 Islands

United Arab Emirates

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

Vietnam

Virgin Islands (British)

Yemen

Zambia

Interactive graphic Figure 1: Countries Participating in Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat 

Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components within Our Review, 

Fiscal Year 2012

Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, table 5.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Table 3 provides additional detail about the types of training and technical 

assistance that each DHS component in our review provided in fiscal year 

2012 to help combat terrorism abroad. Combined, TSA’s and ICE’s efforts 

to help foreign partners build capacity and address vulnerabilities in 

transportation security, transnational crime, and immigration and customs 

enforcement account for more than half of total foreign partner 

participation in training and technical assistance activities.

Table 3: Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Components within Our Review 

Component Training and technical assistance activities description

U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection 

(CBP) 

Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners improve border security. Fiscal year 2012 

trainings focused on topics such as fraudulent documents; port security; and international air cargo, rail, seaport, 

border, and X-ray interdiction. Technical assistance included border security consultations and seaport 

assessments. 

U.S. Immigration 

and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE)

Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners combat international crime, including terrorism. 

Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics such as cross-border financial investigations, which included 

sessions on combating terrorist financing; fraudulent document detection; and analyzing trade data to identify 

transactions that may warrant investigation for money laundering or other trade-related crimes, which have been 

used to finance terrorism. Technical assistance included advising foreign governments on cross-border financial 

investigations and providing biometric collection equipment to foreign governments to identify known or 

suspected terrorists and other individuals of interest in collaboration with U.S. partners.

Transportation 

Security 

Administration 

Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners improve aviation security. Fiscal year 2012 

trainings focused on topics including cargo security, preventive security measures, airport security management, 

access controls, checkpoint layout design, screening techniques, and improvised explosive device mitigation. 

Technical assistance included security assessments of airports that are a last point of departure to the United 

States and air carriers flying routes to the United States from last point-of-departure airports.

U.S. Coast Guard Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners improve port security and the enforcement of 

maritime law. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics including port security; risk assessment; cruise ship 

security; and maritime law enforcement, which can include sessions on security and combating terrorism. 

Technical assistance included security assessments of foreign ports.

U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration 

Services 

Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners develop and strengthen their own immigration 

controls and systems. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics such as detecting fraudulent documents and 

impostors, interviewing techniques, and combating immigration fraud and trafficking. Technical assistance 

included advising foreign partners on how to develop and strengthen their immigration controls.

U.S. Secret Service 

(USSS) 

Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners protect government leaders and financial 

infrastructure. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics including investigative techniques for combating 

counterfeiting of U.S. obligations, transnational organized crime, and conducting cyber investigations. USSS 

also provided briefings on terrorism trends and tactics to foreign partners through its Critical Protective Analysis 

Group. The briefings covered how attacks were planned and executed, the perpetrators, and weapons used. 

Source: GAO analysis of component training and technical assistance data for fiscal year 2012, program documentation, and interviews 

with component officials. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

According to our analysis of expenditure data provided to us by DHS OIA 

and the components within our review, DHS spent approximately $451 

million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. Some but not all of 

these expenditures were dedicated to combating terrorism.16 The budget 

for these expenditures comes from various sources, including annual 

appropriations, user fees collected, and interagency reimbursements. 

Expenditures increased from about $391 million to about $451 million 

over the 5-year period from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, as shown in 

figure 2. In pursuit of their different mission goals, each DHS component 

in our review conducts different activities abroad and tracks related 

expenditures accordingly. Although each DHS component in our review 

generally included salary and benefits, International Cooperative 

Administrative Support Services (ICASS),17 Capital Security Cost-Sharing 

Program (CSCS),18 travel, and operating costs in their data for 

expenditures abroad,19 some components included additional 

expenditures. For example, CBP includes expenditures in direct support 

of the Immigration Advisory Program and preclearance activities abroad, 

while other components do not include expenditures in direct support of 

programs and activities abroad. Appendix III shows the various elements 

included in each component’s expenditure data.

 

16Because DHS missions are multifaceted and often serve dual purposes, like limiting 

threats to the homeland while facilitating legitimate activities, DHS and its components do 

not track personnel and expenditures for combating terrorism separately from other 

activities. Therefore, we obtained data from DHS and its components for all expenditures 

and FTEs abroad.

17ICASS is an interagency system established by State in 1997 for distributing the cost of 

administrative services at foreign posts. It seeks to provide quality services at the lowest 

cost while ensuring that each agency bears the cost of its presence abroad.

18CSCS is a program established by State to distribute the cost of embassy construction 

costs amongst agencies with a presence abroad. It seeks to fund construction of new, 

secure foreign posts and provide an incentive for all departments and agencies to assign 

only the number of staff needed to accomplish their missions abroad.

19We define operating costs to include expenditures such as facilities or space, rent or

lease, vehicles, supplies, equipment, and utilities.

DHS OIA and Components 

in Our Review Spent about 

$451 Million in Fiscal Year 

2012 and Have about 1,800 

Full-Time-Equivalent 

Employees Abroad
 

Page 17 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 2: Expenditures Abroad from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office 

of International Affairs and Components within Our Review, Fiscal Years 2008 

through 2012

Note: Figure 2 includes DHS OIA, CBP, ICE, and USCG expenditures that are reimbursed by State

and the Department of Defense. DHS OIA expenditure data are not available for fiscal year 2008.

From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, CBP consistently accounted for 40 

to 50 percent of DHS expenditures abroad, which was generally due to 

the high number of FTEs dedicated to CBP airport preclearance and port 

security programs. Preclearance countries—Aruba, the Bahamas, 

Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland—account for more than 500 of the nearly 

700 CBP FTEs abroad. These countries also account for about $117 

million of CBP’s $187 million fiscal year 2012 expenditures abroad. About 

$49 million of these expenditures were funded by user fees.

In some cases, DHS’s expenditures abroad are reimbursed by State and 

the Department of Defense. For example:
 

Page 18 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

• State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and Regional Strategic 

Initiative provide funding for DHS training and technical assistance 

activities abroad that can help combat terrorism.20

• The Department of Defense and State provide funding for USCG 

personnel who fill positions in their programs abroad, including those 

that can help combat terrorism.

• State provides funding for all DHS personnel and activities in 

Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2012, State provided about $13 million that 

largely supported CBP, ICE, and TSA efforts to share intelligence with 

other federal partners and target illicit activities such as fraudulent 

visa applications and human smuggling; transportation of drugs, 

weapons, and precursor material for improvised explosive devices; 

and illicit use of nontraditional money transfer networks.

Figure 3 shows expenditures abroad by country and component in fiscal 

year 2012, as well as the locations of DHS FTEs stationed abroad as of 

May 2013. In fiscal year 2012, DHS expenditures were highest in the 

following five countries: Canada, Mexico, Bahrain, Germany, and the 

Bahamas. These expenditures were generally associated with high 

numbers of FTEs in each country. In Canada and Mexico, expenditures 

supported a range of efforts to expedite the legitimate cross-border flow 

of people, goods, and services and to interdict and prevent the illicit 

cross-border flows of people, weapons, drugs, and currency. In Bahrain, 

Germany, and the Bahamas, expenditures were primarily dedicated to 

force protection of U.S. naval vessels (which is reimbursed by the 

Department of Defense), aviation security efforts, and preclearance 

efforts, respectively. See appendix II for data associated with figure 3.

 

20The Antiterrorism Assistance program serves as the primary provider of U.S. 

government antiterrorism training and equipment to law enforcement agencies of partner 

nations. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa-2349aa-10. This program helps partner nations to deal 

effectively with security challenges within their borders, to defend against threats to 

national and regional stability, and to deter terrorist operations across borders and 

regions. The Regional Strategic Initiative seeks to build regional cooperation to constrain 

terrorist activities. Under the authority of the chief of mission, it brings embassy officials 

and military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies together to collectively assess 

the threats, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies and action plans.
Page 19 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Source: GAO analysis of DHS component expenditure data for fiscal year 2012, and DHS overseas personnel and 

activities locator report, July 2013; Map Resources (map).

Afghanistan

Argentina

Aruba

Australia

Austria

Bahamas

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Bermuda

Brazil

Bulgaria

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

China

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Curaçao

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Indonesia

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kenya

Kuwait

Lebanon

Liberia

Malaysia

Malta

Estonia

Ethiopia

France

Gabon

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Guatemala

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong

Iceland

India

Mexico

Morocco

Nepal

Netherlands

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russia

Rwanda

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Singapore

Slovakia

South Africa

South Korea

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sweden

Switzerland

Taiwan

Tanzania

Thailand

$2,000,001-$5,000,000 (26)

$5,000,000+ (18)

$1-$500,000 (25)

$500,001-$2,000,000 (25)

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

U.S. Virgin Islands

Venezuela

Vietnam

Yemen

Interactive graphic Figure 3: Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time-Equivalent Employees Abroad 

in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review

Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, tables 6 and 7.
 

Page 20 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Note: Figure 3 includes DHS Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and United States Coast Guard expenditures and FTEs that 

are reimbursed by State and the Department of Defense. DHS OIA expenditure data are not available 

for fiscal year 2008. Also, in fiscal year 2012, DHS components within our review expended about 

$29 million for activities abroad that they do not attribute to an individual country and therefore are not 

included in figure 3. These expenditures included approximately $3 million for work with Department 

of Defense combatant commands, $26 million for expenses in direct support of programs and 

activities abroad, $400,000 for USCG Far East Activities and Marine Inspection Detachment Unit and 

$13,000 for CBP multicountry activities. Data on FTEs abroad are self-reported by components, and 

may capture some personnel on travel duty in addition to permanently deployed FTEs.

According to DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning data, 

as of May 2013, DHS OIA and the six DHS operational components in 

our review had approximately 1,800 FTEs in almost 80 countries to help 

combat terrorism and achieve other mission goals.21 Employees include 

DHS and component attachés, program personnel, and locally employed 

staff.22

Table 4: Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad for Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review, 

by Component, May 2013

Some DHS employees also travel regionally and from the United 

States on a more temporary basis to conduct capacity-building activities. 

Table 4 shows the breakdown of FTEs by component for May 2013.

Component

Federal 

FTEs

Locally 

employed staff 

FTEs

Number of 

countries 

FTEs stationed

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 613 85 44

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

218 148 48

Transportation Security Administration 63 26 24

U.S. Coast Guard 391 0 29

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services 

71 108 24

U.S. Secret Service 62 30 21

 

21The DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning maintains the Overseas 

Personnel and Activities Locator, which tracks all DHS personnel deployed abroad. The 

locator is updated monthly with self-reported data from the components, which may 

capture some personnel on travel duty in additional to permanently deployed FTEs.

22U.S. missions are staffed by both federal and locally employed staff. Locally employed 

staff are individuals who are hired locally to work at U.S. missions, and whose salaries 

and benefits are paid for out of a specific post’s budget. Costs for locally employed staff, 

who do not receive the same benefits and allowances as U.S. direct-hire staff, are often 

significantly less than for direct-hire staff.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Component

Federal 

FTEs

Locally 

employed staff 

FTEs

Number of 

countries 

FTEs stationed

DHS Office of International Affairs 4 3 5 

Total 1422 400

Source: DHS Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator report, May 2013.

Note: A country can have more than one FTE. The total number of countries with FTEs stationed is 

76.

On the basis of two surveys and interviews conducted with embassy 

personnel, we found that DHS has made contributions to U.S. missions in 

five key areas. We also identified 12 factors that facilitated DHS’s 

contributions to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism goals. A majority of 

DCMs and DHS attachés responding to our surveys reported that the 

factors we identified were significantly or moderately important. They 

most frequently identified as very important a set of factors that relate to 

supporting a climate of collaboration at the embassy. We also identified a 

variety of challenges DHS and other personnel in the U.S. missions have 

faced. Although many of the DCMs and DHS attachés reported 

experiencing these challenges to some degree, our survey results 

indicate that a majority did not experience the challenges or their impacts 

as significant.

Using State’s and DHS’s goals, along with interviews conducted with 

DHS and State headquarters offices and interviews with embassy 

personnel, we identified five specific types of contributions DHS might 

make to a U.S. mission’s combating terrorism goals. As shown in figure 4, 

according to our survey results, the majority of the 41 DCM respondents 

indicated that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to 

combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions we 

identified.

DHS and State 

Identified Five Key 

DHS Contributions to 

U.S. Missions and 

Multiple Factors and 

Challenges That 

Affected 

Contributions 

Mission Management 

Reported That DHS Has 

Made Valuable 

Contributions to 

Combating Terrorism 

Efforts 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 4: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the 

Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate 

Contribution

Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a 

career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals 

with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.

Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every 

item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.

It is important to note that in some cases, DHS does not have the 

opportunity to make certain types of contributions. For example, the 

opportunity to negotiate bilateral information-sharing agreements may not 

exist in some locations, while other locations may not engage in any 

capacity building. Similarly, one DCM survey respondent noted that DHS 

does not have primary responsibility for combating terrorism-related 

activities at the embassy but plays an important supporting role and has 

negotiated memorandums of understanding with host government 

officials on immigration and customs enforcement. Another respondent 

said that although DHS has not negotiated formal agreements, it has 

improved counterterrorism cooperation with the host government through 

informal understandings and relationships.

As with our survey, DCMs we interviewed during our site visits also noted 

important contributions DHS has made to their mission’s combating 

terrorism goals in a variety of ways. For example, one DCM pointed to 

progress a DHS-affiliated law enforcement group had made to foreign 

partners’ ability to combat international crime. Another DCM said that 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

DHS brought new networks of contacts to the table and leveraged 

relationships with host country partners, including one recent substantial 

contribution to a major nonproliferation effort. An ambassador we 

interviewed stated that CBP has facilitated numerous weapons and other 

illicit material seizures, including improvised explosive device precursor 

materials.

By reviewing our prior work on interagency collaboration, along with 

information collected in our interviews with agency officials, we identified 

12 factors that could facilitate DHS’s ability to contribute to U.S. missions’ 

combating terrorism efforts.23

 

23GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, 

DCMs and DHS attachés we surveyed 

provided information about the extent to which they believe the factors we 

identified are important for DHS to be able to contribute its knowledge 

and skills. Figures 5 and 6 show the complete list of factors we identified 

and the extent to which DCMs and DHS attaché respondents to our 

survey identified them as important. Overall, a majority of respondents to 

both surveys reported that nearly all of the factors we identified were very 

or moderately important to facilitating DHS’s contributions to U.S. 

missions’ combating terrorism efforts.

GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012), and 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

These reports describe specific practices and considerations to help enhance and sustain 

interagency collaboration. We analyzed the application of these practices and 

considerations to DHS’s ability to contribute to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism efforts 

and included key concepts and principles in the survey language as applicable.

Certain Factors Facilitate 

Use of DHS Knowledge 

and Skills
 

Page 24 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 5: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland Security Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions’ 

Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Indicating Them as Very Important

Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a 

career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals 

with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.

Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every 

item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.
 

Page 25 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 6: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions’ 

Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of DHS Attachés Indicating Them as Very Important

Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents 

answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.

The 12 factors we identified generally fall into two categories: (1) efforts to 

foster a collaborative climate, and (2) mechanisms to leverage resources 

and clarify roles and responsibilities.

As we reported in September 2012, one of the key considerations in 

developing interagency collaborative mechanisms is whether the 

participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward 

collaboration. Another of these key features is bridging organizational 

cultures. We reported that different agencies participating in any 

Fostering a Collaborative 

Climate
 

Page 26 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

collaborative mechanism bring diverse organizational cultures to it. To 

address these differences, we have found that it is important to establish 

ways to operate across agency boundaries, by, for example, developing 

common terminology and compatible policies and procedures, and 

fostering open lines of communication.24

Three of the factors we identified—the 3 that were most commonly 

selected as very important by DCM survey respondents—related to 

fostering an organizational culture that supports collaborative behaviors—

(1) U.S. mission management promotes collaborative behaviors, (2) U.S. 

mission management actively seeks to help bridge organizational 

cultures, and (3) a culture of cooperation and informal information sharing 

exists. U.S. mission management promoting collaborative behaviors was 

most frequently identified as very important by both DCMs and DHS 

attachés. All 47 DHS attaché respondents identified it as very or 

moderately important, as did 40 out of 41 DCMs. A culture of cooperation 

and informal information was the second most frequently reported as very 

important for DCMs and third for DHS Attachés.

Echoing our survey results, officials we interviewed at one U.S. mission 

we visited reported a strong collaborative relationship between DHS and 

other federal partners, and attributed it, at least in part, to the “tone at the 

top”—including both rewarding collaborative behaviors and discouraging 

failure to collaborate. At another U.S. mission we visited, an official noted 

that the DCM had forbidden the use of acronyms in interagency meetings, 

which had the effect of helping to ensure that use of specialized 

vocabulary did not unintentionally exclude participants from collaborative 

discussions. This official at this embassy noted that the action may seem 

simple but was nevertheless a critical signal to all the federal personnel at 

the embassy that the management valued collaborative action.

Another related factor a majority of DHS attaché and DCM respondents—

33 of 47 and 34 of 40, respectively—identified as very important is having 

routine formal mechanisms for information sharing. One such mechanism 

U.S. missions use to facilitate effective contribution of DHS skills and 

expertise is law enforcement working groups focused on counterterrorism 

or security issues. Working groups, which are routine, formal meetings of 

diverse agency personnel with similar goals or functions, provide an 

 

24GAO-12-1022. 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

opportunity for parties carrying out ongoing activities to share information 

and avoid conflicts. At two U.S. missions we visited, officials we 

interviewed pointed to the working groups as an essential collaboration 

mechanism.

Our October 2005 work on practices to enhance and sustain interagency 

collaboration called for agencies to address needs by leveraging 

resources and agreeing on roles and responsibilities.25

During our fieldwork we saw variation in the extent to and manner in 

which U.S. mission management integrated DHS into planning 

processes. In addition, open-ended comments on our survey reflected 

some frustrations with DHS integration—though these concerns did not 

appear to be pervasive or systemic. We visited two missions where 

officials expressed positive remarks about DHS’s opportunities to 

collaborate with its federal partners in the respective U.S. mission. In both 

of these missions, the DCM stressed to us the importance of fully 

integrating the DHS attaché into U.S. mission strategic planning. At these 

same two U.S. missions, the DHS attachés said they make a focused 

effort to ensure that the other federal partners understand the roles and 

responsibilities of DHS and all of its components—whether or not their 

personnel are stationed at the embassy.

Among the factors 

we identified that relate to this is DHS’s participation in developing U.S. 

mission strategic goals, and 35 of 41 DCMs and 43 of 47 DHS attachés 

responded that the factor was very or moderately important in facilitating 

DHS’s contributions. With some exceptions, such as military activities, 

federal activities abroad are conducted through the embassies under the 

authority of the chief of mission. DHS receives funding from State for a 

number of its training and technical assistance programs abroad, through 

programs like the Regional Strategic Initiative and the Antiterrorism 

Assistance program. For State, funding decisions are based in part on the 

product of planning processes undertaken at each individual U.S. 

mission. Therefore, the ability for DHS and State to share information 

about both strategic and programming decisions, particularly through U.S. 

mission planning processes, is an important element in DHS’s ability to 

make the maximum possible contribution to U.S. mission efforts.

 

25GAO-06-15. 

Leveraging Resources and 

Clarifying Roles and 

Responsibilities
 

Page 28 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

At another U.S. mission we visited, the DCM told us that the DHS attaché 

had an opportunity to participate in a strategic planning process and was 

later able to comment on the final product. However, this DHS attaché 

told us that he did not fully understand the purpose of the planning 

meeting he attended nor did he believe he had been provided 

encouragement or channels for further participation beyond the single 

meeting. At this U.S. mission, DHS personnel reported frustrations about 

limits on their ability to contribute, while U.S. mission management raised 

questions about DHS’s value to their mission. At another U.S. mission 

with border security concerns, DHS officials said the embassy’s border 

working group had not been addressing DHS priorities or activities. 

According to the DHS officials, the embassy was not encouraging a 

“whole-of-government” approach that recognizes the value of DHS 

contributions.

Although few DCMs and DHS attachés reported that DHS does not 

participate in helping to develop U.S. mission strategic goals, some 

respondents discussed issues in open-ended comments with DHS’s 

integration and clarity of roles within U.S. missions. For example, in openended survey responses, one DCM said DHS personnel are individually 

cooperative, but internal stove-piping limits DHS’s ability to contribute. 

Another DCM commented that DHS is organized and deployed in a 

manner that limits its ability to bring its knowledge and skills to bear.

We identified 14 potential challenges that could hinder the contribution of 

DHS knowledge and skills abroad to combating terrorism efforts. Fewer 

than half of respondents identified any of the challenges as moderate or 

significant challenges. In most cases, more than two-thirds said the 

challenges were minimal or did not apply to them. Figures 7 and 8 show 

the top 5 (or 6 in case of a tie for fifth place) most frequently identified 

challenges that DCMs and DHS attachés identified as representing some 

level of challenge—significant, moderate, or minimal—ranked by 

frequency. See appendix IV for a list of all 14 challenges and the extent to 

which DCMs and DHS attachés reported experiencing them.

Survey Respondents 

Reported Facing Some 

Challenges, but Few 

Indicated Impacts Were 

Significant
 

Page 29 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 7: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Deputy Chiefs of Mission as Presenting Some Level of Challenge to the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals

Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a 

career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals 

with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.

Figure 8: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Attachés as Presenting Some 

Level of Challenge to DHS’s Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals
 

Page 30 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Some survey respondents elaborated, in written comments, about issues 

with DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with and 

leveraging personnel abroad.26

Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which the availability of 

U.S. mission resources to sponsor programs that would call for 

contributions of DHS knowledge and skills is a challenge. For example, 

one DCM respondent indicated that the embassy is an old facility that is 

not sized adequately to house all the federal agencies and space 

restrictions affect the U.S. mission’s ability to accommodate DHS’s 

presence. In addition, at two sites we visited, officials indicated that space 

is scarce, especially given rapidly growing needs, so making room for 

DHS staff, or any other federal stakeholder, is challenging and requires a 

strong cost-benefit case. In addition, officials we spoke with mentioned 

constrained or unpredictable budgets hampering planning and the ability 

to dedicate resources to DHS programs or personnel. One DHS survey 

respondent commented that with little to no budget, it is difficult to build 

For example, one DHS respondent stated 

that DHS domestic management, through contact with foreign embassies 

in the United States, has come into conflict with DHS operations in 

country. A DCM respondent indicated that when issues arise, they often 

originate from insufficient coordination with DHS domestic management, 

with State, and with DHS in the field. Another DCM respondent indicated 

that DHS domestic management regularly gets involved in international 

affairs without informing DHS field office or embassy management. In 

addition, a DCM respondent indicated that challenges come primarily 

from the U.S. side (rather than DHS personnel at the embassy). In 

addition, officials we spoke with mentioned that sometimes 

miscommunication or misalignment between DHS domestic management 

and embassies causes problems. For example, at one U.S. mission we 

visited, the DCM and DHS personnel described an instance in which DHS 

domestic operations took down a communication link used by 

transnational criminals in the country without consulting anyone at the 

embassy, including DHS personnel. However, DHS’s law enforcement 

partners were monitoring the link for more strategic purposes and the 

action negatively affected their operation—an outcome that DHS 

personnel at the embassy could have alerted them to had they been 

consulted.

 

26Throughout this discussion, for the purposes of this report, the term DHS domestic 

management means operational and policy decision makers who are not stationed abroad 

that may be acting on behalf of DHS or any of its components.
 

Page 31 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

contacts with foreign partners, effectively communicate meeting 

outcomes, and develop long term strategic plans.

Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which U.S. mission 

understanding of DHS’s role is a challenge. For example, one DHS 

respondent commented that in larger embassies the mission of 

counterterrorism is focused on other agencies, and DHS sometimes does 

not have the opportunity to discuss what it can offer. Another DHS 

respondent indicated that other mission personnel do not understand 

exactly the role of DHS and how it contributes to mission-related 

objectives.

We also surveyed DCMs and DHS attachés about the extent to which the 

challenges they have experienced have affected DHS’s ability to 

contribute—for example, by creating conflicts, missed opportunities, 

project delays, or unnecessary overlap. As shown in figures 9 and 10, for 

all impacts that might have arisen from the identified challenges, more 

than two-thirds of respondents said the impact was minimal or did not 

affect them.

Figure 9: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Governmentwide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Impact

Notes: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always 

a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and 

deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.

Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every 

item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.
 

Page 32 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 10: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Governmentwide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Impact

Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents 

answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.

DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic 

alignment for its resource use abroad—including establishing an 

intradepartmental governance board, reviewing the department’s 

international footprint, and creating a department-wide international 

engagement plan. However, DHS has not established mechanisms to 

help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad—which are made 

at the individual component level—effectively, efficiently, and consistently 

align with department-wide strategic priorities.

DHS’s QHSR calls for a specific focus on strengthening the homeland 

security enterprise, in part by maturing the department. According to the 

QHSR, critical aspects of maturing the department include (1) improved 

organizational alignment—particularly among DHS headquarters 

components—(2) enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland 

security missions; and (3) more efficient and effective management 

processes, including strategic planning, performance management, and 

accounting structures. To that end, DHS and OIA have taken three 

actions related to its resource use abroad since 2010.

DHS Has Acted to 

Enhance Departmentwide Alignment, but 

Could Have Better 

Assurance That 

Resources Abroad 

Support Highest 

Priorities

DHS Has Taken Some 

Actions to Enhance 

Department-wide 

Organizational and 

Programmatic Alignment 

across Its Resource 

Deployment Abroad
 

Page 33 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

• Establishment of the DHS International Governance Board in August 

2012. The board is chaired by the Assistant Secretary for International 

Affairs and composed of heads of international affairs from the DHS 

components. The board provides a formal organizational mechanism 

for the component heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate 

crosscutting policy issues related to international engagement. 

According to OIA officials, since its establishment, the board has met 

monthly to discuss and resolve issues like designating DHS attachés, 

expanding criminal history information sharing for law enforcement, 

responding to a new presidential directive that calls for interagency 

collaboration to enhance security capacity around the globe, and 

coordinating with State on DHS’s presence abroad. For example, in

May 2013 the group considered who should be designated the DHS 

attaché in a country where two components had recently established 

offices.

• Review of the DHS international footprint. Over the period spanning 

2011 and early 2012, DHS reviewed the department’s international 

footprint—the complete set of resources and efforts DHS had 

deployed abroad—with the intention of enhancing organizational and 

programmatic alignment. This “footprint review” was led by OIA, in 

coordination with component heads, and it evaluated the placement of 

resources on the basis of the QHSR’s five strategic missions, cost, 

and potential for engagement with host nations.27

• Creation of an international engagement plan. In March 2013, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security signed DHS’s first International 

Engagement Plan. To promote common international objectives and 

priorities across the department, the plan maps key activities abroad 

to DHS’s five strategic missions. It also includes specific strategies in 

separate international engagement plans for various regions of the 

world including Canada; Mexico; Latin America and the Caribbean; 

In at least one case, 

according to OIA officials, this resulted in components reducing FTEs 

in one country and increasing them in another—generally in response 

to the potential to achieve key strategic priorities by strengthening 

engagement in the country where they increased the resources and to 

realize cost savings.

 

27The QHSR lays out five key missions—(1) Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing 

Security, (2) Securing Our Borders, (3) Enforcing and Administering Immigration Laws, (4) 

Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and (5) Ensuring Resilience to Disasters.
 

Page 34 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Europe; the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia; and Asia Pacific.28

Each regional international engagement plan discusses DHS 

interests, challenges and opportunities, and strategic objectives, 

among other things. For example, the plan on Mexico states that the 

flow of goods and people through the Western Hemisphere and 

across the United States border, particularly those flows originating in 

or transiting through Mexico, represent both the most significant 

challenges and the best opportunities for DHS.

Although a stated goal of DHS’s QHSR is to strengthen the homeland 

security enterprise and mature the department through improved 

organizational alignment across the components and programmatic 

alignment to homeland security missions, DHS has not established 

mechanisms to help provide assurance of alignment of its resource use 

abroad with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. 

Specifically, it (1) has not established specific department-wide strategic 

priorities to guide organizational and programmatic alignment; (2) does 

not have an institutionalized mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring of 

alignment between resource use and strategic priorities;

29

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for 

agencies to implement policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms 

to enforce management’s directives—for example, to help achieve the 

goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, 

effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. 

In addition, the standards call for agencies to ensure that ongoing 

monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, is performed 

continually, and is ingrained in the agency’s operations. Finally, the 

and (3) does 

not have the means to produce reliable, comparable cost data to support 

analysis of organizational and programmatic alignment in its departmentwide resource use abroad.

 

28The International Engagement Plan also includes a section on the Visa Waiver Program, 

which currently allows eligible nationals from 37 countries to travel to the United States 

visa-free for up to 90 days for business or tourism. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (authorizing 

establishment of a visa waiver program).

29Institutionalization translates an organization’s code of conduct, mission, policies, vision, 

and strategic plans into action guidelines applicable to its daily activities. It aims at 

integrating fundamental values and objectives into the organization’s culture and structure.

DHS Has Not Established 

Mechanisms to Help 

Ensure Department-wide 

Organizational and 

Programmatic Alignment 

in Its Resource Use 

Abroad 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

standards say that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be 

available to help an agency achieve its objectives.30

Although DHS has a broad mission set and decision making about 

resource use abroad is decentralized, it has not established specific 

department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of activities or 

target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for resource use 

abroad to help promote organizational alignment in resource decision 

making. DHS is tasked with a variety of responsibilities that are not 

directly aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. In the course of efforts to 

secure the homeland, some activities focus more broadly on transnational 

crime such as narcotics and human smuggling, money laundering, and 

immigration fraud that could be, in some cases, enablers for terrorist 

networks. In addition, the QHSR notes that DHS’s missions are 

multifaceted by nature, and efforts to fulfill them also involve promoting 

legitimate trade, travel, and immigration.

DHS’s International Engagement Plan links the five QHSR missions to 

the kinds of activities that DHS conducts abroad. In this way, it helps 

ensure programmatic alignment to homeland security missions at a high 

level. However, it does not establish specific priorities to help guide 

resource decision making. For example, our analysis of DHS’s 

International Engagement Plan found that although there were goals 

listed for each region, there was no ordering of priorities by region, by 

source of terrorism, by function, or by goal (e.g., combating international 

terrorism). Because the plan covers all mission activities described within 

the QHSR without clear, specific priorities, it does not convey information 

about what might be most important when deciding how to deploy scarce 

resources.

The lack of specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use 

abroad also creates limitations in DHS’s ability to help ensure alignment 

of its priorities and abilities with government-wide efforts. Officials in the 

Office of Counterterrorism Policy and in OIA stated that DHS’s highest 

priority for resource use abroad is prevention of attacks on the homeland. 

Focusing on preventing attacks on the homeland is consistent with the 

National Security Strategy’s and the National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism’s calls for the use of homeland security tools to promote 

 

30GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

DHS Has Not Established 

Specific Department-wide 

Strategic Priorities 
 

Page 36 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

national security and counter terrorism. However, DHS’s Office of 

Counterterrorism Policy officials told us that because the regional plans 

within DHS’s International Engagement Plan covers all countries with 

which DHS engages, from Canada to Afghanistan, the plan does not 

represent a clear priority focus on countries with factors that represent 

more immediate threats to the homeland. They noted that in their 

engagement with the White House and other federal partners for 

government-wide counterterrorism efforts, DHS’s International 

Engagement Plan—because it covers all DHS missions, not just 

counterterrorism—does not help them demonstrate DHS’s 

counterterrorism priorities within its overall international engagement.

According to OIA officials, the International Engagement Plan lays out in 

one place for the first time all of DHS’s international activities in an effort 

to improve organizational and programmatic resource alignment. 

However, they acknowledged that it does not necessarily serve to identify 

a clear set of priorities and principles that would help to guide future 

resource decisions. Instead, it represents more of a compendium of the 

many activities and priorities each of the contributing components and 

offices within DHS already had planned or under way. They noted that 

having a crosscutting view of all the activities and goals across the 

international footprint is a significant step forward for the department. 

They also said that more clarity on strategic priorities in future iterations 

would help ensure better organizational and programmatic alignment, but 

current priorities are largely determined independently by each 

component, and the department has not established a routine and 

crosscutting process for clarifying department-wide priorities. Specific 

strategic priorities would provide DHS critical information to guide 

resource trade-off decisions and ensure that resources are directed to the 

highest homeland security priorities across the department and 

government-wide.

Although OIA conducted a one-time exercise to evaluate the 

department’s international footprint to try to bring it into better 

organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS has not established a 

routine or ingrained process that would continually assess the alignment 

between strategic goals and resource decisions. Each of the operational 

components we interviewed described different rationales and methods 

for deciding where and how many resources to deploy around the world.

OIA officials acknowledged the need for mechanisms—such as the 

footprint review—to be conducted routinely in order to meet the goal of 

facilitating enhanced organizational and programmatic alignment. They 

DHS Does Not Have an 

Institutionalized Mechanism to 

Monitor Organizational and 

Programmatic Alignment 
 

Page 37 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

also said the development of an institutionalized mechanism that includes 

department-wide methods and metrics that were meaningful to all of the 

components would help provide coherent strategic overlay to give the 

department better assurance of alignment between resource use and 

strategic priorities. These OIA officials added that they would like to 

enhance the rigor of the footprint review process and implement it on a 

routine basis, but have not done so because of resource limitations and 

competing priorities. Officials noted that ensuring a coherent departmentwide approach to resource use abroad is an important goal. However, 

they said the first review was a major undertaking. They stated they have 

not devised an approach for implementing a routine, ingrained process 

with department-wide methods and metrics.

Given that DHS’s components make individual decisions about resource 

deployment abroad, an institutionalized mechanism—whether it is 

enhancement and institutionalization of the footprint review or another 

control activity—to help routinely monitor and adjust organizational and 

programmatic alignment across the department would provide DHS better 

assurance that its strategic priorities translate to resource use decisions 

on an ongoing basis to support the QHSR’s goals.

DHS does not have comparable cost data for its programs and activities 

abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture 

these data to help inform resource decision making and to achieve 

management efficiencies when addressing issues that are common 

across the department. To achieve the organizational and programmatic 

alignment called for by the QHSR, it is important for decision makers at 

the component level to have information that helps promote such 

alignment on an ongoing basis and during routine monitoring activities.31

However, each of the components tracks its international expenditures 

differently, and according to OIA officials, the effort to collect comparable 

information that reliably informs management decision making has been 

 

31GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

DHS Does Not Have 

Comparable Cost Data to Help 

Inform Resource Trade-off 

Decisions 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

challenging.32 According to OIA officials, a standardized reporting 

framework for the costs of conducting activities abroad—for example, 

salaries, housing, and fees paid to embassies to cover certain 

administrative and security costs—across the department could enable 

OIA to identify best practices that could lead to cost savings in 

international deployments and enhance the ability to assess the 

outcomes and cost-effectiveness of programs and activities carried out 

abroad. A framework to help capture comparable cost data departmentwide could provide with DHS critical information to make informed 

resource trade-off decisions and increase cost efficiency.

Combating terrorism is a government-wide responsibility, which requires 

contributions from departments and agencies across the U.S. 

government. DHS and its components have made meaningful 

contributions by carrying out key homeland security activities abroad and 

through international engagement that helps other nations strengthen 

their security functions, making it harder for terrorists to operate globally.

Although the operational decisions to deploy resources abroad are 

generally made by individual DHS components, DHS’s QHSR calls for 

efforts to mature the department through improved organizational and 

programmatic alignment around specific mission objectives like 

international engagement and combating terrorism. DHS has made some 

progress toward such alignment across its international footprint with 

recent actions it has taken—like completing an international footprint 

review that provided the department with an opportunity to help ensure 

that resources deployed abroad are devoted to the highest departmentand government-wide priorities. However, the one-time review has not 

been established as an institutional process to help ensure alignment 

between priorities and resource decisions on an ongoing basis. 

Therefore, DHS does not have full assurance that department-wide 

priorities translate to resource-tradeoff decisions at the component level. 

Moreover, there are limitations that hamper DHS’s ability to consider two 

 

32We and the component budget offices encountered similar challenges producing cost 

data for this report. Although we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to 

report a general estimate of expenditures for programs and activities abroad, in many 

cases it took months to produce the expenditure data and some components reported to 

us that meeting the request was difficult. After attempting to collect separate expenditure 

data for training and technical assistance expenditures, we ultimately determined that 

sufficiently reliable data were not available.

Conclusions 
 

Page 39 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

key factors for resource trade-off decisions—strategic priorities and cost. 

Although DHS’s International Engagement Plan describes how 

programmatic activities abroad align with the five missions outlined in the 

QHSR, these documents do not establish clear and specific strategic 

priorities for resource deployment abroad.

In addition, without a common framework for tracking international 

expenditures across the department, DHS is limited in its ability to make 

informed resource trade-off decisions. An institutionalized process for a 

routine strategic review of DHS’s international footprint, supported by 

clear and specific priorities to inform trade-offs and a framework to 

capture comparable and reliable cost data across the department could 

help provide better assurance of organizational and programmatic 

alignment.

In order to help ensure that DHS’s resource use abroad aligns with the 

highest department-wide and U.S. government-wide priorities, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following 

three actions:

• establish specific department-wide priorities for resource use abroad;

• establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of 

the department’s resource use abroad with the highest departmentwide and government-wide strategic priorities; and

• establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of 

reliable, comparable department-wide cost data for resource use 

abroad.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and received written comments, 

which are reproduced in full in appendix V. We also provided a draft of 

this report to State and the Departments of Defense and Justice, which 

did not provide written comments. DHS and State provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

DHS concurred with all three recommendations, noting that it will take 

steps to implement them. With respect to the first recommendation, DHS 

stated that it will shape its International Engagement Plan into a more 

specific, comprehensive, and strategic plan for resource allocation abroad 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 40 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

across the Department’s international organizations, with an estimated 

completion date of March 31, 2014.

Regarding the second recommendation, DHS stated that it will develop a 

methodology and system for tracking newly identified strategic priorities 

and objectives that meet DHS and U.S. Government-wide priorities 

related to counterterrorism, with an estimated completion date of 

September 30, 2014.

Finally, for the third recommendation, DHS stated that it will establish a 

working group to focus on a Department-wide system to capture 

individual component expenditure data and represent the information in a 

cohesive, comparable manner, with an estimated completion date of 

September 30, 2014. 

We believe these actions, if fully implemented, will address the intent of 

our recommendations.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to Secretaries of Defense, 

Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney General; selected 

congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 
 

Page 41 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please 

contact Dave Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov, or Charles 

Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or JohnsonCM@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to 

this report are listed in appendix VI.

David C. Maurer

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade Team
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) What

programs, activities, and resources does the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, 

has DHS contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat terrorism and 

what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those contributions? (3) 

To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad 

with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities?

To define the scope of activities and resources to be included in this 

performance audit, we reviewed and analyzed key government-wide 

strategies related to combating terrorism—the May 2010 National 

Security Strategy and the July 2011 National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism. We also reviewed DHS documents designed to establish its 

mission and goals such as the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review (QHSR), DHS’s Strategic Plan FY2012-2016, and DHS’s 

Performance and Accountability Report 2011-2013. Additionally, we 

reviewed DHS program documentation related to activities established in 

those documents. We also reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS 

Office of Inspector General officials responsible for a 2008 report that 

made a number of recommendations designed to enhance DHS’s 

management of international affairs.1

We also interviewed officials in DHS Office of International Affairs (OIA) 

and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy within DHS’s Office of Policy 

about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS 

counterterrorism activities. In addition, we interviewed officials from the 

Department of State’s (State) Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic 

Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of their 

coordination between their efforts and DHS efforts abroad, because these 

bureaus have efforts that involved collaboration with DHS abroad. On the 

basis of those document reviews and interviews, we determined that the 

DHS operational components with mission activities most relevant for a 

review of DHS efforts abroad to combat terrorism included U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. 

Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS).

 

1

DHS Office of Inspector General, Management of Department of Homeland Security 

International Activities and Interests, OIG-08-71 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

To identify the programs and activities that DHS has to help combat 

terrorism abroad, on the basis of our interviews with the DHS components 

and offices and the State bureau officials, we established a definition of 

combating terrorism for the purposes of identifying and collecting data on 

programs and activities: Any DHS program or activity that in the course of 

its normal operation may have the effect of thwarting terrorists or their 

plots whether designed solely and specifically for that purpose or not. 

Using that definition and through reviews of our prior work and DHS 

program documentation, we independently identified the list of programs 

and activities that constitute DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism abroad. 

We then verified the list with DHS officials responsible for various 

programs, refining it, as appropriate.

To identify resources used abroad in support of these programs and 

activities, we asked DHS to provide expenditure and related data. On the 

basis of our interviews with OIA and budget officials from the six DHS 

operational components in our review, we determined that because 

DHS’s missions involve carrying out activities for multifaceted purposes, it 

would not be possible to isolate expenditures abroad for combating 

terrorism from expenditures abroad to carry out other mission activities. 

Therefore, we asked OIA and the six operational components in our 

review to provide data separately on all expenditures abroad, as well as 

data specific to training and technical assistance activities that met our 

definition for combating terrorism, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012.

For the 5 years of expenditure data, we checked for consistency and 

reasonableness and discussed data reliability controls with OIA and each 

component office that provided it to determine how the data were 

collected and what controls were in place to help ensure its accuracy, 

among other things. We found that because of the differences in missions 

and methods for tracking expenditure data, the data sets provided by the 

components had some variations in the elements included in the data 

sets and limitations in the ability to isolate expenditures by country. In 

these cases, we attempted to harmonize the data definitions across the 

component data sets and worked with DHS component officials to agree 

on methods for estimating expenditures by country. For example, the 

individual country break-down of travel costs in USCIS’s Refugee Affairs 

Division was not consistently tracked separately by country, because the 

program’s activities commonly involved multicountry trips. To obtain travel 

costs for this program, USCIS joined three different sets of data: 

obligations, itineraries, and the central bill account for travel 

reimbursements. In fiscal year 2012, there were approximately 500 

international travel authorizations. Of these, about 400 were for a single 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

country. For the remaining multicountry itineraries, USCIS calculated 

expenditures by country by using the number of days spent in each 

country to calculate a percentage and divide the total itinerary cost. For 

example, on a $10,000 trip visiting country A for 4 days and country B for 

6 days, expenditures would be calculated as $4,000 in country A and 

$6,000 in country B.

We noted any remaining differences among component expenditure data 

sets, as necessary (see also app. III). On the basis of our discussions 

with knowledgeable DHS officials and the actions we took, we found that 

the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing a general 

estimate of expenditures abroad for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, with 

the additional information provided. The full-time-equivalent employees 

(FTE) stationed abroad are monitored at DHS through its Overseas 

Personnel and Activities Locator, which is maintained by DHS Office of 

Operations Coordination and Planning. The locator is updated monthly 

with self-reported data from the components, which may capture some 

personnel on travel duty in additional to permanently deployed FTEs. We 

collected these data for May 2013, the most recent month for which DHS 

was able to provide the data during the period of our study. On the basis 

of discussions about the system and relevant control activities with the 

responsible officials, we determined that these data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of reporting FTEs abroad during the specified 

month in which they were collected.

For the data we gathered on training and technical assistance activities 

for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, we attempted to obtain the number of 

personnel and expenditures dedicated to staff who conducted training 

and technical assistance on a temporary basis, but some components 

were unable to provide data for multiple fiscal years, and we encountered 

numerous challenges, such as inconsistent data definitions and lack of 

confidence by DHS officials in the accuracy or completeness of the data. 

As a result, we did not include this information in our report. However, we 

determined that information the six DHS operational components in our 

review were able to provide was sufficiently reliable for the purpose of 

reporting the foreign nation whose officials received DHS-delivered 

training and technical assistance. We made this determination on the 

basis of checks for reasonableness and discussions with responsible 

DHS officials about the steps taken to help ensure accuracy of the data.

To examine how DHS has contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat 

terrorism and the factors that have facilitated or hampered those 

contributions, we reviewed documentation about DHS’s component 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

activities abroad and State programs and activities on which DHS 

collaborates. We also relied on our interviews with agency officials and 

web-based surveys of deputy chiefs of mission (DCM) and DHS attachés 

in U.S. missions where DHS components were stationed in the embassy. 

We interviewed officials from DHS OIA and the Office of Counterterrorism 

Policy with DHS’s Office of Policy; the six operational DHS operational 

components; and the State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic 

Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of DHS 

activities abroad and coordination with State.

We visited 10 U.S. missions where FTEs from one or more DHS 

components were stationed. During these visits, we interviewed officials 

from DHS, generally including the DHS attaché and other senior DHS 

officials at the U.S. mission. We also interviewed State officials, including 

the DCM at each mission and other senior officials with responsibility for 

programs abroad that involve coordination or collaboration with DHS. On 

the basis of advice from State and DHS personnel at each U.S. mission, 

as well as availability and relevance, we also interviewed some officials 

from the Departments of Defense and Justice that may collaborate with 

DHS abroad. We conducted a total of 70 interviews. During these 

interviews, we asked questions and gathered specific examples of how 

DHS works abroad with federal partners under the authority of the chief of 

mission to help support government-wide efforts to combat terrorism.

To provide balance and diversity, we selected the 10 U.S. mission sites 

based on a range of factors, including

• the nature and scope of DHS’s presence abroad—for example, the 

number of components represented and the size of the overall DHS 

deployment;

• indicators of terrorism risk—specifically we considered (1) inclusion in 

CBP’s Aliens from Special Interest Countries,

2

 

2

CBP has identified 35 countries and two territories as special interest countries. For any 

person taken into custody at the border from one of the countries or territories, agents are 

required to undertake specific measures.

(2) State’s country 

reports on terrorism, (3) designation as a terrorist safe haven, and (4) 

advice from DHS and State subject matter experts;
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 46 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

• safety, security, and related logistical concerns—based on State 

advice; and

• the opportunity to leverage resources.3

We visited Mexico City, Mexico; Panama City, Panama; Buenos Aries, 

Argentina; Manila, the Philippines; Tokyo, Japan; Jakarta, Indonesia; 

Singapore; Amman, Jordan; Kabul, Afghanistan; and Abu Dhabi and 

Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The results from our visits to these 10 

countries cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided insights on 

how DHS contributes to U.S. mission combating terrorism efforts, what is 

working well, and any barriers to effective contribution.

We analyzed the responses to our interviews about the nature and scope 

of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities with State 

and DHS officials at headquarters and with federal officials in the first 3 of 

the 10 site visits, to identify types of knowledge and skill contributions 

DHS has made to U.S. missions and any challenges and impacts DHS 

and its federal partners have encountered. We also relied on this set of 

interviews to identify factors that helped to facilitate DHS contributions in 

the U.S. mission environment. Because a U.S. mission is an inherently 

interagency environment, in addition to the interview responses, we 

considered the practices and considerations for promoting effective 

interagency collaboration outlined in two prior GAO reports when 

identifying factors that facilitate DHS’s ability to contribute its knowledge 

and skills.4

We used this analysis to develop two web-based surveys to be 

administered to all DCMs and DHS attachés in U.S. missions where one 

or more DHS components had FTEs stationed in the embassy. We 

 

3

We coordinated with two other GAO engagement teams who were also conducting 

international travel to arrange for them to conduct interviews with DCMs and key DHS 

officials in five of the countries we visited.

4

GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012), and 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

These reports describe specific practices and considerations to help enhance and sustain 

interagency collaboration. We analyzed the application of these practices and 

considerations to DHS’s ability to contribute to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism efforts 

and included key concepts and principles in the survey language as applicable.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 47 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

identified all DCMs and DHS attachés meeting this definition from lists 

provided to us by State for DCMs and DHS OIA for DHS attachés. Our 

final survey populations included DCMs and DHS attachés in 57 U.S. 

missions. We selected DCMs to provide a perspective from State 

because the DCM supervises department heads within the U.S. mission 

and handles many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the 

mission. We selected DHS attachés to provide a perspective from DHS 

because these officials act as the in-country representatives for DHS.

We conducted survey pretests with five DHS attachés and three DCMs, a 

mix of officials with whom we had already met and with whom we had 

never discussed the purpose of our evaluation. During the pretests, we 

worked with the respondents to ensure the clarity and appropriateness of 

the language and questions in the survey. We also discussed with 

respondents the comprehensiveness of the lists we had developed—DHS 

contributions, facilitation factors, challenges, and impacts. On the basis of 

pretest feedback, we further refined our analysis of these items. In 

addition, to provide further assurance that our analysis was 

comprehensive in identifying DHS contributions, facilitation factors, 

challenges, and impacts, we included in our survey questionnaires openended questions that allowed respondents to provide additional 

information about these items.

We administered the surveys between April 16, and July 19, 2013, to 

DCMs and DHS attachés in the 57 U.S. missions. We sent follow-up email messages on April 24, 2013, May 1, 2013, and May 13, 2013, to 

those who had not yet completed the survey. Overall, we received 

responses from 41 DCMs and 47 DHS attachés, yielding a response rate 

of 72 percent and 82 percent, respectively. We ran comparative tests on 

the responses for factors, challenges, and impacts on the responses 

provided by DCMs and DHS attachés, and found no significant 

differences between the two groups. Additionally, in the survey we asked 

both groups to identify which facilitation factors were important, and in 

separate questions asked them to identify which were in place and 

operating effectively. We checked the responses for the factors most 

frequently identified as important against the factors in place and 

operating effectively and found no meaningful systematic trends 

indicating that any single factor was not in place across the embassies we 

surveyed.

Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors. 

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce 

errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 48 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information 

available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing 

them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took 

steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing 

them to minimize such nonsampling errors. In addition to pretesting our 

survey questionnaires as already mentioned, we worked with our social 

science survey specialists to design the questionnaire, and the 

questionnaires went through internal reviews with independent survey 

experts. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all 

computer programs. Since this was a web-based questionnaire, 

respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic 

questionnaire, eliminating the need to key data into a database, 

minimizing error. See appendix IV for survey results for contributions, 

challenges, and impacts.

To evaluate the extent to which DHS has taken action to align its 

resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic 

priorities, we analyzed DHS’s QHSR, in particular its prescriptions for 

maturing the department. These prescriptions include improving 

organizational alignment—particularly among operational components—

enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions, 

and more efficient and effective management processes, including 

strategic planning, performance management, and accounting structure.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for control 

activities—that is policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms—to 

enforce management’s directives.5

 

5

In this respect, we evaluated the 

extent to which DHS had control activities in place to help achieve the 

goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, 

effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. 

To evaluate the extent to which DHS had mechanisms in place designed 

to provide reasonable assurance of achieving its stated goal of 

department-wide organizational and programmatic alignment in the 

allocation and deployment of resources abroad, we reviewed 

documentation such as DHS’s Management Directive that describes roles 

and responsibility for managing international affairs. We also interviewed 

officials in OIA, the six DHS components in our review, and DHS’s Office 

of Policy about how decisions to deploy resources abroad are made and 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 49 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

the extent to which they undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and 

organizational alignment across the complete set of resources and efforts 

DHS deploys abroad. We also interviewed officials in the Office of 

Counterterrorism Policy within DHS’s Office of Policy about how DHS and 

government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use decisions.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 50 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Table 5 shows the number of training or technical assistance activities 

provided by components, by country in fiscal year 2012.

Table 5: Data for Figure 1, Countries Participating in Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Training or Technical Assistance that Can Help Combat Terrorism in 

Fiscal Year 2012

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS DHS Total

Afghanistan 3 5 1 9

Albania 2 1 1 1 5 

Algeria 2 3 5 

Angola 1 1 

Anguilla 1 1 

Antigua and Barbuda 2 2 1 5 

Argentina 1 6 1 1 9

Armenia 2 2 

Aruba 5 5 

Australia 1 5 4 10

Austria 1 1 1 3 

Azerbaijan 2 2 

Bahamas 2 15 2 19

Bahrain 2 1 3 

Bangladesh 2 2 

Barbados 3 2 4 3 12

Belarus 1 1 

Belgium 1 1 2 

Belize 5 1 6 2 14

Benin 2 2 

Bermuda 2 2 

Bolivia 1 2 3 

Bonaire 1 1 

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina

 2 2 

Botswana 5 1 1 7 

Brazil 3 10 3 2 18

Brunei 2 2

Bulgaria 1 3 4 

Burkina Faso 1 1 

Burma 2 2 

Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance and 

Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3 
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 51 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS DHS Total

Cambodia 1 3 4 

Cameroon 2 2 

Canada 25 1 26

Cape Verde 2 2 4 

Cayman Islands 1 1

Chile 1 2 3 

China 2 2 3 1 8 

Colombia 2 11 6 1 2 22

Cook Islands 2 2 

Costa Rica 10 3 3 1 17

Croatia 1 1

Cuba 1 7 8 

Curaçao 1 1 2 

Cyprus 1 1 2 

Czech Republic 1 1 2 4 

Democratic Republic of 

Congo

 1 1 

Denmark 1 1 1 3 

Djibouti 2 2 4 

Dominica 2 2 4

Dominican Republic 1 5 7 5 18

Ecuador 4 4 1 1 10

Egypt 1 2 3 

El Salvador 5 3 3 11

Estonia 3 3 

Ethiopia 2 1 3

Federated States of 

Micronesia

 7 7 

Fiji 3 3 6

Finland 1 1 

France 4 3 7 

Gabon 1 1 

Gambia 2 1 1 4 

Georgia 2 1 3 

Germany 3 2 5

Ghana 2 2 4 

Greece 2 2 2 6 

Grenada 1 3 4 
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 52 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS DHS Total

Guadeloupe 1 1 

Guatemala 5 4 2 2 13

Guinea 1 1 

Guyana 1 4 4 9 

Haiti 1 10 1 12

Honduras 3 1 4 2 10

Hong Kong a 1 1 1 3 

Hungary 8 1 9 

Iceland 1 1 2 

India 3 1 2 1 7 

Indonesia 2 2 4

Iraq 3 2 2 1 8 

Ireland 1 3 1 5 

Israel 1 1 2 

Italy 2 7 2 11

Ivory Coast 1 1 2 

Jamaica 2 5 5 12

Japan 15 15

Jordan 3 1 1 5 

Kazakhstan 1 1 2 

Kenya 1 2 1 1 5 

Kiribati 3 3 

Kosovo 1 1 2

Kuwait 5 1 6 

Kyrgyzstan 2 2 

Laos 1 1 

Latvia 1 1 2 

Lebanon 3 1 4 

Lesotho 2 2

Liberia 1 4 1 6 

Libya 2 2 

Liechtenstein 1 1 

Lithuania 1 1 

Luxembourg 1 1 

Macedonia 2 2

Madagascar 1 1 

Malaysia 3 2 1 6 
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 53 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS DHS Total

Maldives 2 2 

Malta 1 2 1 4 

Marshall Islands 2 1 3 

Mauritania 1 1 

Mauritius 1 1

Mexico 12 8 53 3 2 78

Moldova 2 2 4 

Monaco 1 1 

Montenegro 2 1 3 

Morocco 1 11 1 13

Mozambique 4 4

Namibia 1 1 1 3 

Nepal 1 1 

Netherlands 1 1 

New Zealand 1 1 2 

Nicaragua 2 1 2 1 6 

Nigeria 4 2 1 7

Norway 1 1 

Oman 5 5 

Pakistan 6 2 8 

Palau 2 2 

Panama 14 7 4 2 27

Papua New Guinea 2 2

Paraguay 8 1 9 

Peru 1 2 1 5 1 10

Philippines 2 4 3 2 1 1 13

Poland 3 1 4 

Portugal 2 1 3 

Qatar 1 1 2

Republic of Congo 1 1 

Romania 1 3 4 

Russia 3 1 1 5 

Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 4 1 6 

Saint Lucia 2 5 7 

Saint Maarten 2 2

Saint Vincent and the 

Grenadines

 2 2 
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 54 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS DHS Total

Samoa 2 1 3 

Saudi Arabia 1 1 4 6 

Senegal 3 1 2 6 

Serbia 2 1 3 

Sierra Leone 1 1 2

Singapore 1 1 

Slovak Republic 2 2 4 

Slovenia 1 1 

South Africa 2 1 4 2 1 10

South Korea 1 1 1 1 4 

Spain 3 1 4

Suriname 1 5 1 7 

Swaziland 1 1 

Sweden 1 1 

Switzerland 5 2 7 

Taiwan 2 b 1 1 1 5 

Tajikistan 3 3

Tanzania 2 6 8 

Thailand 1 1 3 6 4 2 17

Timor Leste 1 1 

Togo 1 1 

Tonga 1 1 

Trinidad and Tobago 2 4 1 7

Tunisia 1 1 

Turkey 2 1 3 1 1 8 

Turks and Caicos 

Islands

 1 1 

United Arab Emirates 3 3 3 1 10

Ukraine 2 2 4 

United Kingdom 6 1 7 

Uruguay 3 1 4 

Uzbekistan 2 1 3

Venezuela 2 2 

Vietnam 1 1 2 4 

Virgin Islands (British) 1 1 

Yemen 2 2 
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 55 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS DHS Total

Zambia 1 1 

Total Foreign 

Participation 

131 218 390 125 13 68 945

Legend: CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ICE = U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, TSA = Transportation Security Administration, USCG = U.S. Coast Guard, USCIS = 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, USSS = U.S. Secret Service

Source: GAO analysis of component training and technical assistance data for fiscal year 2012.

a

Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a 

separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter 

into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters.

b

Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a 

separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, 

nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. 

Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country.

Table 6: Expenditure Data for Figure 3, Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) 

Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs (OIA) and Components within 

Our Review

Dollars in thousands

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS OIA DHS Total

Afghanistan $2,267 $6,453 $4,128 $12,848

Argentina $578 $2,107 $593 $3,278

Aruba $3,764 $3,764

Australia $596 $833 $1,428

Austria $2,151 $791 $2,942

Bahamas $13,391 $329 $640 $1,790 $16,150

Bahrain $22,444 $17 $22,461

Bangladesh $1 $1

Barbados $616 $251 $867

Belgium $2,013 $1,821 $806 $304 $4,945

Belize $4 $1 $5

Bermuda $4,476 $4,476

Brazil $1,391 $1,909 $227 $1,622 $5,148

Bulgaria $1,298 $1,298

Cambodia $162 $162

Cameroon $11 $11

Canada $85,628 $5,193 $830 $641 $80 $2,507 $277 $95,156

China $1,824 $3,595 $836 $91 $2,608 $1,547 $10,500

Colombia $425 $5,150 $576 $1 $1,317 $7,470

Costa Rica $225 $9 $235
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 56 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Dollars in thousands

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS OIA DHS Total

Cuba $640 $1,304 $1,943

Curaçao $191 $191

Denmark $974 $10 $984

Djibouti $114 $114

Dominican Republic $981 $1,770 $307 $612 $3,670

Ecuador $148 $3,156 $154 $63 $3,521

Egypt $418 $1,142 $150 $1,709

El Salvador $1,703 $667 $2,370

Estonia $927 $927

Ethiopia $353 $353

France $1,392 $2,467 $631 $23 $3,895 $8,408

Gabon $21 $21

Georgia $122 $154 $275

Germany $2,320 $3,529 $7,832 $1,993 $1,508 $2,283 $19,465

Ghana $688 $688

Greece $970 $1,349 $2,319

Guatemala $1,561 $1,209 $2,770

Haiti $374 $1,068 $1,443

Honduras $170 $1,541 $461 $2,173

Hong Kong $2,001 a $2,935 $4,936

Iceland $103 $103

India $533 $1,135 $1,754 $3,422

Indonesia $839 $839

Iraq $2,510 $484 $2,995

Ireland $9,233 $9,233

Israel $29 $2,041 $2,070

Italy $2,268 $2,599 $636 $306 $3,227 $3,317 $12,352

Jamaica $668 $1,884 $250 $503 $3,305

Japan $3,570 $1,805 $636 $2,278 $8,290

Jordan $1,086 $484 $943 $295 $2,807

Kenya $508 $48 $613 $1,001 $2,170

Kuwait $495 $48 $543

Lebanon $353 $353

Liberia $510 $510

Malaysia $668 $401 $869 $1,938

Malta $154 $154
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 57 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Dollars in thousands

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS OIA DHS Total

Mexico $3,468 $15,592 $367 $530 $4,462 $1,073 $174 $25,667

Morocco $870 $870

Nepal $552 $552

Netherlands $1,646 $1,205 $743 $5,803 $364 $9,761

Oman $289 $289

Pakistan $144 $1,660 $1,803

Panama $1,454 $3,257 $262 $456 $5,428

Peru $164 $631 $1,652 $2,447

Philippines $3,053 $541 $969 $4,563

Poland $2 $902 $904

Portugal $254 $254

Qatar $274 $274

Romania $5 $1,357 $1,362

Russia $1,207 $2,374 $485 $4,067

Rwanda $67 $67

Saudi Arabia $3,057 $631 $3,688

Senegal $981 $257 $1,239

Singapore $1,541 $2,331 $4,289 $1,708 $9,868

Slovakia $8 $8

South Africa $667 $2,088 $508 $366 $1,247 $4,875

South Korea $1,128 $2,020 $204 $790 $4,141

Spain $1,621 $1,804 $426 $513 $4,364

Sri Lanka $460 $460

Sweden $195 $154 $348

Switzerland $57 $36 $93

Taiwan $1,437 b $1,437

Tanzania $35 $35

Thailand $697 $2,491 $471 $3,054 $1,185 $7,897

Trinidad and Tobago $368 $154 $521

Tunisia $310 $310

Turkey $103 $34 $657 $794

U.S. Virgin Islands $1 $1

Uganda $257 $257

United Arab Emirates $534 $2,992 $746 $8 $4,280

United Kingdom $4,324 $4,355 $614 $132 $705 $2,651 $594 $13,376

Venezuela $1,180 $132 $1,312
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 58 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Dollars in thousands

Country CBP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS OIA DHS Total

Vietnam $823 $823

Yemen $859 $859

Total DHS Expenditures $187,040 c $114,373 $25,225 $43,579 $38,728 $33,395 $5,477 $421,802

Legend: CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ICE = U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, TSA = Transportation Security Administration, USCG = U.S. Coast Guard, USCIS = 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, USSS = U.S. Secret Service

Source: GAO analysis of component overseas expenditure data for fiscal year 2012.

a

Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a 

separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter 

into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters.

b

Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a 

separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, 

nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. 

Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country.

c

Expenditures by country do not sum precisely with Total DHS expenditures because of rounding.

Table 7: Full-Time-Equivalent Employee (FTE) Data for Figure 3, Expenditures 

Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and FTEs Abroad in May 2013 for Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our 

Review

Country Total DHS FTEs

Afghanistan 25

Argentina 13

Aruba 18

Australia 3 

Austria 9 

Bahamas 62

Bahrain 270

Barbados 1 

Belgium 10

Bermuda 16

Brazil 15

Bulgaria 4 

Cambodia 2 

Canada 430

China 33

Colombia 26

Costa Rica 1 

Cuba 11
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 59 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country Total DHS FTEs

Denmark 2 

Dominican Republic 16

Ecuador 11

Egypt 9 

El Salvador 11

Estonia 4 

France 19

Georgia 1 

Germany 79

Ghana 4 

Greece 11

Guatemala 14

Haiti 8 

Honduras 12

Hong Kong 19 a

India 19

Indonesia 5

Ireland 36

Israel 8 

Italy 47

Jamaica 14

Japan 35

Jordan 9

Kenya 11

Kuwait 3 

Liberia 1 

Malaysia 4 

Malta 1 

Mexico 104

Morocco 1 

Netherlands 44

Netherlands Antilles 1 

Oman 2 

Pakistan 16

Panama 15

Peru 8 

Philippines 24
Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance 

and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3

Page 60 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Country Total DHS FTEs

Poland 3 

Portugal 1 

Romania 6 

Russia 13

Saudi Arabia 9

Senegal 2 

Singapore 35

South Africa 18

South Korea 22

Spain 16

Sri Lanka 3

Sweden 2 

Taiwan 9 b

Thailand 44

Trinidad and Tobago 2 

Turkey 1 

United Arab Emirates 14

United Kingdom 33

Venezuela 3 

Vietnam 5 

Yemen 2 

Total DHS 1,820

Source: GAO analysis of DHS FTE data, as of May 2013.

a

Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a 

separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter 

into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters.

b

Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a 

separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, 

nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. 

Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country.
Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures 

Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by 

Component

Page 61 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Component/office Elements of expenditures included

U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection 

(CBP) 

CBP Office of International Affairs expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, 

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program 

(CSCS), guard services, medical, and Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTSPO) 

expenditures by foreign post. In Kuwait, Office of International Affairs includes charges for personal service 

contractor moves. In Iraq, operating costs include travel, supplies, equipment, and training.

CBP Office of Border Patrol expenditure elements include personnel costs and travel expenditures by foreign 

country. In Mexico and Canada, Office of Border Patrol also includes program costs such as various program 

and operating costs.

CBP Office of Field Operations expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, ICASS, 

CSCS, guard services, medical, DTSPO, and training by foreign post. For the Immigration Advisory Program 

and Preclearance programs, Office of Field Operations also includes headquarters costs. For the Container 

Security Initiative, they also include charges for relocations, central circuits, travel, Container Security 

Initiative/ICE agent support, and other central expenses (information technology services and ICASS 

overhead) in support of foreign posts, but do not break these costs down by foreign post.

U.S. Immigration and 

Customs 

Enforcement (ICE)

ICE’s overseas expenditure elements by foreign post include salary and benefits, operating costs, 

dependent’s educational allowances, operational travel, permanent change of station moves (PCS), 

Department of State’s ICASS and CSCS charges for fiscal years 2009-2012, and purchase cards. ICE’s 

overseas expenditure elements also include Department of State’s ICASS and CSCS charges for fiscal year 

2008, which cannot be broken down by foreign post.

Transportation 

Security 

Administration (TSA)

TSA expenditure elements include payroll, travel, ICASS charges, embassy expenses, and CSCS by foreign 

post. 

U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG)

USCG expenditure elements include personnel costs, operating expenses, CSCS charges, and ICASS by 

foreign post.

U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services 

(USCIS) 

USCIS expenditure elements include payroll, general expenses, CSCS, ICASS, and travel by foreign post. 

USCIS also includes expenditures for total ICASS overhead costs in support of foreign posts.

U.S. Secret Service 

(USSS) 

USSS expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, travel, communications and rents, guard services, 

medical, permanent change of station moves, supplies, equipment, building and maintenance, contractual 

services, Department of State support services, physical examinations, ICASS, and training expenses by 

foreign post. USSS’s overseas expenditure elements also include other central expenses (such as information 

technology services, CSCS, and ICASS overhead) in support of foreign posts), which cannot be broken down 

by foreign post.

Office of International 

Affairs (OIA)

DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, ICASS, operating costs, guard services, 

medical, and DTSPO by individual country for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year 2008 data 

are unavailable. DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements also include CSCS, but those expenditures are not 

broken down by individual country.

Source: GAO analysis of component data on expenditures abroad.

Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures 

Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by 

Component 
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 62 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 11 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, 

how much, if at all, has DHS contributed to your mission’s combating 

terrorism goals?

Figure 11: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the 

Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate 

Contribution

Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a 

career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals 

with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.

Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every 

item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.

Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 63 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 12 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, 

how much, if at all, has DHS contributed in the following ways to U.S. 

government-wide combating terrorism goals in the mission for which you 

serve as DHS attaché?

Figure 12: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the 

Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of DHS Attachés Responding that DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate 

Contribution

Figure 13 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months, 

what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS’s ability 

to contribute its knowledge and skills to your mission’s combating 

terrorism goals?
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 64 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 13: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to 

Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Challenge

Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a 

career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals 

with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 65 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 14 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months, 

what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS’s ability 

to contribute its knowledge and skills to U.S. government-wide combating 

terrorism goals in the mission for which you serve as DHS attaché?
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 66 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 14: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to 

Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Challenge

Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents 

answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 67 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 15 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, 

if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in 

question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS’s contributions to 

U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals?

Figure 15: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. 

Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of 

Impact

Notes: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always 

a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and 

deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission.

Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every 

item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.
Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for 

Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts

Page 68 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Figure 16 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, 

if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in 

question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS’s contributions to 

U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals?

Figure 16: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Contributions to U.S. 

Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Impact

Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents 

answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 69 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 70 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 71 GAO-13-681 DHS Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism

David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contacts named above, Adam Hoffman and Jason Bair, 

Assistant Directors; Chloe Brown; Marc Castellano; and Kathryn Godfrey 

made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were 

Josh Diosomito; Lorraine Ettaro; Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Brandon 

Hunt; Thomas Lombardi; Alicia Loucks; Erin O’Brien; Anthony Pordes; 

and Christine San.

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441113)
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