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BANGLADESH IN TURMOIL:

A NATION ON THE BRINK

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 20, 2013

Serial No. 113–85

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ali Riaz, Ph.D., public policy scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center .......................... 6

Maj. General A.M.N. Muniruzzaman, president, Bangladesh Institute of 

Peace and Security Studies ................................................................................. 23

Mr. John Sifton, Asia advocacy director, Human Rights Watch ......................... 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ali Riaz, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 9

Maj. General A.M.N. Muniruzzaman: Prepared statement ................................. 25

Mr. John Sifton: Prepared statement .................................................................... 36

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 54

(1)

BANGLADESH IN TURMOIL:

A NATION ON THE BRINK 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. 

I am Steve Chabot, chair of the subcommittee. I want to apologize for not being able to start on time. We had votes on the floor, 

so that is the reason we are starting a little bit late. For any inconvenience to anybody, we apologize. 

I would like to welcome everyone, my colleagues and our distinguished witnesses to the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

hearing this afternoon. Mr. Faleomavaega, our ranking member, 

unfortunately cannot be with us today, but we are pleased to have 

Representative Tulsi Gabbard from Hawaii. She will be able to 

take the position as ranking member here this afternoon. We are 

also joined by Ms. Meng this afternoon. I ask unanimous consent 

that she be permitted to sit in with the subcommittee and be recognized to speak after all members of the subcommittee have been 

recognized. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

The Bangladesh story has been an impressive one. It is a nation 

that has worked hard to lift itself from the war-torn ruins left behind by its bloody 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. Over 

the last 20 years, there has been marked progress, especially on 

the economic front, as Bangladesh has grown into a crucial link between the dominant economies within the Indo-Pacific economic 

corridor. Strategically located between Asia’s two powerhouses, 

India and China, and promptly situated within the arc of Islam 

that extends from the Middle East into the Southeast Asia, Bangladesh plays a key role in maintaining regional stability. 

As a moderate, secular nation, Bangladesh has become an important security partner for the United States in the fight against terrorism and Islamic extremism in South Asia, as well as a collaborator on humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, and 

maritime security. 

2

While there have been some noteworthy economic and social improvements, particularly over the past decade, Bangladesh is still 

a very poor country with an estimated 153 million people who live 

in poverty. And, sadly, conditions for many working Bangladeshis 

remain dangerous and unhealthy. Six months after the tragedy at 

Rana Plaza, in which 1,127 Bangladeshi workers were killed, 

changes have been slow to materialize. 

Corruption also remains a significant obstacle to Bangladesh’s 

place in the world economy and the government’s sluggish efforts 

to combat it will only serve as a further impediment to its economic 

growth. 

As Bangladesh approaches its national elections, which are likely 

to take place in early January, the country is in a state of political 

turmoil. In Bangladesh, ‘‘politics as usual,’’ I am afraid, takes on 

a much harsher meaning than it does in many societies. As the 

major political parties ramp up their campaigns, operatives utilize 

strikes, riots, and blockades to destabilize the country and call attention to their grievances. 

When I visited Bangladesh about 2 weeks ago, we arrived at the 

onset of a 3-day general strike—essentially shutting down commerce—called by the opposition Bangladesh National Party, BNP. 

During our stay, there were numerous reports of violence. 

While in Dhaka, I had the opportunity to meet with both the 

Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, of the Awami League, and the opposition leader, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, of the BNP. 

During those meetings, I expressed my view that the national elections should be free and fair, transparent, and without violence. 

Both leaders were adamant in their positions. Sheikh Hasina insisted that provisions were in place to conduct a fair election. 

Madam Zia maintained that a fair election could not be held without a caretaker government in place to ensure transparency. As of 

today, the two sides remain at odds and it is still uncertain whether or not the opposition BNP will boycott the election. 

In meetings with the leaders, I stressed the need to curtail the 

growing violence, which can only bring about further instability—

possibly leading to the expansion of extremist groups and creating 

a vacuum that could create broader security risks for the region. 

I also expressed my concerns about Bangladesh’s International 

Crimes Tribunal, which was created by Sheikh Hasina in 2010 to 

investigate alleged crimes committed during the 1971 war for independence, about 42 years ago. Opposition leaders view the tribunal 

as a vehicle for the incumbent leadership to punish its enemies and 

strengthen its hand in the lead up to the elections. Since the tribunal began handing down death sentences in February, numerous 

outbreaks of violence have occurred. 

Critics of the tribunal, many of whom agree that trials should be 

held and that the guilty should be punished, maintain that international standards are not being applied. When I brought this up 

with the Foreign Minister, I was told, ‘‘We are actually creating 

new international standards.’’ Based on some of the reports I heard 

about the conduct of the trials, that response was not very reassuring, particularly in light of concerns expressed by U.S. Ambassador Steven Rapp, who heads the State Department’s Office of 

3

Global Criminal Justice and was a former prosecutor of the Sierra 

Leone and Rwanda trials. 

Ambassador Rapp, who has visited Bangladesh three times in an 

attempt to advise the ICT and the government on international 

standards, was largely ignored. Among the issues about which he 

expressed concerns were: Interrogation without cause, lengthy pretrial detentions, a lack of sufficient protections for witnesses and 

victims, and allowing prosecutors to call more witnesses than defendants were allowed to call. Hopefully, we can have some discussion about the court this afternoon among many other issues that 

we will be discussing. 

In a nutshell, I would say that Bangladesh has much going for 

it and much standing in the way of its continuing progress. I look 

forward to hearing from our excellent panel of witnesses here this 

afternoon and hope we can address some of the issues in greater 

detail. I would now like to call out the gentleman from California, 

the ranking member of the TNT subcommittee, Brad Sherman 

from California, to make a statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I regret my wife isn’t here; she spent a year working in Bangladesh with BRAC, the then Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. I regret I can’t spend time here, but I have 

got to go to our subcommittee to deal with Syria. 

I look forward to reading the transcript, and I hope the witnesses 

will focus on at least two points. One of those is the rights of Hindus in Bangladesh. I am glad to see that the Vested Property Act, 

which allowed the confiscation of property from a large number of 

Hindus, I believe has been repealed. But I am concerned that successive administrations have not taken steps to return the land expropriated from Hindus under the law. And I am concerned with 

the other human rights abuses I hear visited on religious minorities in Bangladesh. And that is why so many of us have cosponsored the bill to establish a separate office in the State Department 

to deal with religious minorities in the Middle East and South 

Asia. 

Second, I am concerned about Muhammad Yunus and the 

Grameen Bank, which, of course, won the Nobel Prize for their outstanding work in development. The government has moved toward, 

in effect, taking it over, pushing Yunus out as managing director. 

And I hope the witnesses will address that issue. I look forward to 

reading your comments. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentlemen. 

I would now like to recognize the acting ranking member today, 

Ms. Gabbard, for 5 minutes to make an opening statement. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your holding this very important hearing today and 

would like to also thank our witnesses for joining us and everyone 

who took the time to come to discuss these important issues that 

we all care very much about. 

There is no question, as the name and focus of this hearing suggests, Bangladesh is currently in a state of turmoil. As the country 

heads toward election early next year, there are many concerns 

about the stability of the country, which has come to share significant ties with the U.S. on so many fronts, whether it be counterterrorism or trade or the mitigation of natural disasters. As our relaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\112013\85642 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

tionship continues to grow, part of this growing friendship creates 

the opportunity for us to have candid conversations whenever there 

are concerns that arise, which we will have today. 

I am particularly concerned over issues, as Mr. Sherman mentioned, regarding religious freedom and specifically over attacks on 

the minority Hindu community remaining in Bangladesh today. I 

think it is unfortunate that sometimes perpetrators of crimes 

against this community go unpunished, and it is up to the Government of Bangladesh to act authoritatively against those who incite 

and commit violence against anyone and protect the rights of all 

minorities. I look forward to this subcommittee under the leadership of our chairman as well as another subcommittee for the Foreign Affairs Committee as a whole in taking up this issue in particular. 

Additionally, the languishing labor situation in this country is 

troublesome. Since the Rana Plaza tragedy in April, where over 

1,100 garment workers were killed and over 2,500 injured, there 

was a renewed focus on the labor sector by the government and the 

private sector. Both do carry a responsibility to ensure that worker 

rights and safety standards are being met in that country. 

Changes seem to be slow in coming. On November 18, the Wall 

Street Journal reported that Walmart found still more than 15 percent of the factories in its initial round of safety inspections in Bangladesh failed safety audits. The U.S. continues to be concerned 

about the political deadlock between the two major political parties, 

in particular around the upcoming elections and the increase in violence that this deadlock creates. 

Our Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Nisha 

Biswal, just returned from Bangladesh and reiterated the U.S.’s position that the opposing parties must come to an agreement over 

the elections to ensure that there is a prevention of any further violence. We hope that both parties engage directly in a constructive 

dialogue in order to create this environment for free, fair, and credible elections to occur. I think that this will be a critical measure 

as we look at the U.S.-Bangladesh relations moving forward. 

There are areas where Bangladesh has seen improvement. The 

economy has grown 6 percent per year over the last 2 decades, despite a range of challenges. The poverty rate has dropped from 40 

percent to 31.5 percent over just the last 5 years, lifting millions 

out of poverty. And it is important for us to take note of these 

metrics and to see how we can continue to grow in this area. 

I think Bangladesh’s long-term prospects are strong primarily because of the strength of its human capital. The population is young, 

hard-working, and the people as a whole are resilient. Overcoming 

these areas of concern to expand growth is key to ensuring the success of Bangladesh. I look forward to our discussion today to see 

how we can continue to engage to address some of the human 

rights concerns, the concerns around religious freedom and persecution, and make sure that all people are protected as this great 

country grows both economically and past political instability. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

I will now introduce our distinguished panel here this afternoon. 

I will begin with Dr. Ali Riaz, who is a public policy scholar at the 

5

Woodrow Wilson Center here in Washington. He is currently on a 

sabbatical leave from Illinois State University, where he is the 

chair of the Department of Politics and Government. Previously, 

Dr. Riaz taught at the University of Bangladesh, England, and the 

University of South Carolina. Additionally, he worked as a broadcast journalist for the BBC World Service in London and has a long 

list of publications focused on South Asia politics. We welcome you 

here this afternoon, Doctor. 

I would also like to introduce Major General Muniruzzaman, who 

is currently the president of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and 

Security Studies, as well as the current chairman of the Global 

Military Advisory Counsel on Climate Change. He is a former career military officer who served 37 years active duty and had the 

distinction of serving as the military secretary to the President of 

Bangladesh. General Muniruzzaman is a graduate of the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense College, National University of Bangladesh, and the United States Naval War 

College. He led the Bangladesh country contingent to the U.N. 

Transitional Authority in Cambodia and led the past election U.N. 

Mission in Cambodia to monitor the political and security situation 

in that country. He sits on the Board of Governors of Council for 

Asian Transnational Threat Research and is a frequent speaker on 

international security and policy issues. 

We thank you, General, for being here to afternoon. 

Our final witness is John Sifton, the Asia advocacy director at 

Human Rights Watch, where he works primarily on South and 

Southeast Asia. He previously served as the director of One World 

Research, a public interest research and investigation firm. Prior 

to that, he spent 6 years as a researcher in the Asia division at 

Human Rights Watch. Mr. Sifton also worked for the International 

Rescue Committee on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues and at a 

refugee advocacy organization in Albania and Kosovo. He holds a 

law degree from New York University and a bachelor’s degree from 

St. John’s College in Annapolis. 

We welcome you here as well, Mr. Sifton. 

This afternoon, we will be going by what we call the 5-minute 

rule. Each of you will have 5 minutes. A yellow light will come on 

when you have 1 minute left. Please try to wrap up by the time 

the red light comes on. We will give you a little leeway, but we ask 

that you wrap up as close as possible once the red light comes on. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding 

this hearing. Unfortunately, I have another commitment. I would 

ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be entered into 

the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection. 

If you would like to make a brief opening statement, I would 

allow it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am glad we are holding this hearing. I think 

Bangladesh is a very important nation, obviously, in Southeast 

Asia and with a lot of challenges but also enormous promise. So I 

applaud you and the ranking member for exploring those issues 

6

and hopefully working through our bilateral relationship to a more 

fruitful end. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Appreciate it. 

Okay. Dr. Riaz, you are recognized for 5 minutes. If you each 

would hit the button when you are testifying then the mike will 

start operating. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ALI RIAZ, PH.D., PUBLIC POLICY SCHOLAR, 

WOODROW WILSON CENTER 

Mr. RIAZ. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, the members of the 

committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the political situation in Bangladesh. I have submitted a written testimony. Please 

accept that one as my statement, and I will summarize some of the 

points that I have mentioned in my written statement. 

As we all know, Bangladeshi politics is once again at the crossroads. In recent months the situation has taken a violent turn as 

the opposition organized several general strikes, which led to death 

and destruction, and has threatened more in the coming days. The 

human cost of the violence is rising rapidly. 

The government, on the other hand, has used excessive force to 

quell the opposition and resorted to the prosecution of the opposition leaders. The immediate reason for the current political impasse can be traced back to the 15th amendment of the constitution, which removed the caretaker government, which ensured free, 

fair elections since 1996. The point of contention is whether the 

election time government should be comprised of political leaders 

or nonpartisan individuals. 

The opposition alliance led by the BNP insists that the government manned by politicians will influence the election result in 

favor of the incumbent. The fundamental reasons for the introduction of the caretaker government in 1996 were the absence of trust 

among the political parties and of strong institution that can be 

trusted to hold an acceptable election. While current incumbent 

and opposition parties have been in power since 1991, neither has 

tried to create necessary institution nor has the climate of mistrust 

changed. Public opinion polls since the removal of the system show 

an overwhelming support for a neutral caretaker government during the elections. 

And the second point is the importance of an inclusive election. 

The upcoming election is important at both domestic and regional 

levels with significance for the U.S.-Bangladesh relationship. Since 

transitioning from military rule in 1991, Bangladesh it had four inclusive election but didn’t produce a very significant democratic institution. 

One of the key issues is the International Crime Tribunal that 

you have mentioned. These trials are of those who perpetrated 

genocide and committed crimes against humanity during the War 

of Independence in 1971. Trying the war criminal was an election 

promise of the Awami League. Despite some reservations about the 

trial process, opinion polls have shown that the majority of 

Bangladeshi citizens support the work of the ICT. Whether it plays 

a role upcoming election or not, in my opinion, the trial of those 

who committed crimes against humanity in 1971 should continue. 

7

This was long overdue. Without dealing with the painful past and 

delivering justice, the nation won’t be able to move forward. 

What are the future trajectories? We see three options at this 

point, three possible scenarios. One is a routine election, participated by all parties. However, given the uncompromising positions 

of the ruling and opposition parties, it is an unlikely scenario at 

this moment. Accomodation of some of the demands of the opposition, perhaps a cabinet not headed by the incumbent PM is the way 

out within the current constitutional proviso. Opposition should be 

ready to make compromises. 

Number two, an election boycotted by the opposition. This scenario is close to what happened in February 1996, when the BNP 

unilaterally ran a sham election. Despite the apparent similarities 

between 1996 and 2013, the situation on the ground is different 

this time around. Few allies of the ruling party will join the election. The legitimacy of such an election is an open question. Such 

elections do not produce a durable Parliament nor bring political 

stability. 

Third option is the deferral of the election. It can be done within 

the purview of the current constitution or through extra-constitutional steps to be ratified post-facto by the next Parliament. One 

of the articles of the Bangladesh constitution stipulates that election will be held within 90 days after the dissolution of the Parliament. Therefore, if Parliament is dissolved, the window of time 

can be used to formulate a solution through mediation between political parties. 

Since the caretaker government issue was never placed before 

the public for approval, one way out could be a referendum on the 

issue during the extended period. The general election can follow 

based on the election results of the referendum. This would give all 

parties a sense of victory. Finally, the role of the international community. 

The United States and the international community can take the 

following steps that I would recommend. Number one, instead of focusing on elections every 5 years, as tension escalates, the United 

States should emphasize on the quality of democracy. Concrete action steps should be laid out to be followed by the political parties. 

For adherence to each step, the country should be rewarded with 

benefits that help the entire population or the most productive sectors of the country. For example, the restoring the GSP, easing the 

tariff barriers the productive sectors, especially ready-made garments. 

Number two. Building institutions for sustainable and quality 

democracy such as strong election commission should be the key 

focus of the international community, and commitment for longterm engagements is necessary. 

Number three. The United States should make clear statements 

in regard to the post-election tolerance, including safeguarding the 

weaker section of the society, particularly religious minorities and 

the results of those fallout. 

Number four, encourage all parties to agree on containing religious extremism. 

Number five, international community should neither franchise 

its responsibilities to regional powers, nor should the regional powVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\112013\85642 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

ers be excluded from this international effort. In particular, India’s 

valid security concerns must be addressed. An institutional structure should be created to ensure that domestic political environment in Bangladesh does not threaten its neighbor or the regional 

security. 

The present political crisis in Bangladesh can be turned into an 

opportunity to build a stable, democratic, prosperous country. Economic and social achievements of recent decades show that citizens 

are capable of taking steps in the right direction. It is time for 

Bangladeshi political leaders to take the right decisions. That is, to 

hold an inclusive election, agree on post-election tolerant behavior; 

rein in extremism; commit to address the issue of war crimes judiciously; and commit to regional peace. And it is time for the international community to help them in this regard. Thank you for this 

opportunity to testify. I will be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Riaz follows:]

9


85642a-1.eps

Congressional Testimony 

Bangladesh in Turmoil: A Nation on the Brink? 

Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

United States House of Representatives 

November 20, 2013 

Ali Riaz 

Public Policy Scholar 

Woodrow Wilson Center 

& 

Professor 

Illinois State University 
10


85642a-2.eps

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Faleomavagea and Members ofthe Committee, thank you 

for the invitation to discuss the political situation in Bangladesh. 

Bangladeshi politics is once again at the crossroads. The constitution requires an election to be 

held by 24 January 2014, but there is no agreement between the opposition and the ruling 

parties as to who will oversee the election. The ruling Awami League, members of the coalition, 

and the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina insist that there can be no alternative to an interim 

government of elected parliament members as stipulated in the constitution, and by 

implication, a government headed by the incumbent PM. The leader of the opposition Khaleda 

Zia, on the other hand, threatens to boycott the election if her demand that a non-partisan 

neutral caretaker be installed beforehand is not met. The point of contention is whether the 

government will comprise political leaders or non-partisan individuals. The Opposition alliance 

led by the BNP insists that if the government is manned by politicians it will influence the 

election results in favor ofthe incumbent. The PM, who previously maintained that the interim 

government would be formed only with her current coalition partners, offered the opposition 

parties an opportunity to join an all-party government to oversee the election. Accordingly 

new members have been inducted in the cabinet. However, the issue of the head of the interim 

government remained unspecified. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-Ied coalition 

rejected the offer. Calls from the US Secretary of State John Kerry, the UN Secretary General 

Ban Ki Moon, leaders ofthe European Union (EU) and many others to these leaders to engage 

in a dialogue have fallen on deaf ears. A 37-minute telephone 'conversation' between the two 

leaders in late October, an audio recording of which was 'obtained' by the press, was revealed 

to be little more than a litany of charges and counter-charges; no agreement was reached on 

any issue. The situation is reminiscent of 1996 when the position of the parties was reversed; at 

that time, the AL was demanding a neutral caretaker government while the ruling BNP was 

maintaining that no provision for such a measure had been made in the constitution. In recent 

months the situation has taken a violent turn as the opposition organized several general 

strikes which led to death and destruction and has threatened more in the coming days. The 

human cost of the violence is rising rapidly. With time about to run out, there is very little 

prospect of any compromise. That means that an inclusive and timely election in Bangladesh 

looks increasingly unlikely. 

The situation begs a few questions: How did Bangladesh arrive here? Why is this election 

important? What are the future trajectories? What impacts will the current political impasse 

have on regional and international political dynamics, particularly on the relationship with the 

USA? What the USA and the international community can do? 

How did the nation arrive here? 

2 
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85642a-3.eps

The immediate reason for the current political imbroglio can be traced back to the 15th 

amendment of the constitution. The amendment, which passed in June 2011, removed a 

system called the caretaker government (CTG) provision that had ensured three fair elections 

since 1996. The ruling party provided two justifications for its decision to abolish the CTG 

system. First, the verdict of the Supreme Court that the CTG system is 'unconstitutional', and 

the second that the immediate past CTG overstayed and pursued a political agenda. 

Before examining the justifications provided by the government it is necessary to recall what 

prompted the founding ofthe CTG system in the first place and what led to the annulment. 

Under intense pressure from the opposition led by the Awami League (and its allies the Jatiya 

Party (JP) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (Jill, violent street agitations between 1994 and early 1996 

and a sham election in February 1996, then BNP regime passed the thirteenth amendment of 

the constitution in haste on 26 March. The amendment inserted proviso for holding the 

election under an ll-member neutral caretaker government (CTG), as per the demand of the 

opposition. A parliament, which was elected through an election boycotted by all political 

parties and legitimacy of which was questionable, carried this out without any input from the 

opposition parties, civil society, higher courts or constitutional experts. 

The CTG system was flawed at various levels. For example, it was vague about the tenure of the 

interim government; involved the former Chief Justice and by extension opened the door for 

blatant politicization ofthe judiciary and therefore essentially blurred the separation between 

judiciary and executive; and created an opportunity wherein the power of the Prime Minister 

and the President can be concentrated in one individual. The opposition hailed this as a victory. 

It brought a temporary end to the bloodshed, but sowed a number of problems. However, the 

fundamental reasons for introduction of the system were the absence of trust among the 

political parties, and the absence of strong institutions that can be trusted to hold an 

acceptable election. 

In 2001, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in its second stint in power since 1991, took a 

step to ensure that it can manipulate the future caretaker government to its advantage. It 

passed an amendment to the constitution. The fourteenth amendment of the constitution, 

passed on 16 May 2004, raised the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges by two years with 

an eye on the next head of the caretaker government. Once again, the ruling party decided to 

change the constitution without any consultations - either with the opposition party or the 

members of the civil society. The super majority of the ruling party was abused. 

As the BNP's tenure was coming to an end in October 2006, the opposition led by the AL raised 

their objection to the appointment of the immediate-past Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, K 

M Hasan, as the head of the CTG, because of his previous involvement with BNP politics. The 

Opposition threatened to boycott the elections if Justice Hasan was appointed. The ruling party 

also appointed party loyalists to the Election Commission and civil administration positions 

crucial to holding the elections. In October 2006, violence spread through the country costing 

scores of lives. When Justice K M Hasan declined the position, President lazuddin Ahmed took 

3 
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85642a-4.eps

on the role, evoking the last option stipulated in Article 58 of the constitution. He, however, 

skipped a provision that requires him to invite other former Chief Justices to head the caretaker 

government. The assumption of the CTG chief's office by the President, in addition to his 

responsibil ities, was contrary to the spirit of the constitution, if not to the letter. President 

Ahmed assembled a 10-member cabinet, called an advisory council under the constitution, with 

a few neutral personalities but the majority seemed to be BNP sympathizers. Soon it became 

evident that Ahmed was acting on behalf of the previous regime. The simultaneous resignation 

of four advisors in early December and their public comments confirmed what was suspected -

the strings were being pulled by the former PM and her close aides, who were not willing to 

create a level playing field. It also came to light that the voter roll was filled with 'ghost voters.' 

The opposition withdrew all its candidates and called for a boycott of the election. Against this 

background the military stepped in to take charge on 11 January 2007, compelled the President 

to declare a state of emergency and appointed a new cabinet with the former head of the 

central bank as its chief. The caretaker government of lazuddin Ahmed between 29 October 

2006 and 11 January 2007, made a mockery of a system which until then, despite its limitations, 

had served the country well. 

The military-backed caretaker government that assumed power on 12 January 2007 under the 

state of emergency had both legal and moral legitimacy, but had neither a defined tenure nor a 

clear agenda. The primary responsibility was to create an environment for a free and fair 

election in which all parties could participate. This required reforming institutions such as the 

Election Commission (EC), the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and bring changes to the 

acrimonious political culture. An immediate task was to prepare an error-free voter roll. While 

some expressed apprehension that a new phase of long military rule had begun, others 

expected that this would be the opportunity to begin a new era of accountable politics. The 

government embarked on various tasks - from an anti-corruption drive to exiling two former 

prime ministers (popularly known as 'minus-two') to a half-hearted effort to establish a 'King's 

party'. It mistook the warm welcome extended to it by citizens at large as an open mandate for 

an indefinite period. The actions taken, while many were necessary and well meaning, soon 

made many suspicious of the regime's intent and provided an opportunity for political activists 

to mobilize. This led to the decision to arrange an election and hand over power to an elected 

political regime. The regime's legacy, if any remains, is an error-free voters list with photos 

enabling an acceptable election; but it is also is a reminder that an overreach - an effort to do 

so many things in a short time that leaves you with few accomplishments, - may create more 

problems in the long run. 

The elections held in late 2008 delivered a four-fifths majority to the AL led alliance and marked 

the transition from an unelected government to an elected popular government. The BNP 

experienced its worst electoral performance ever. The hope was that the two-year hiatus, the 

growing demand for political reform and democratization of political parties, the necessity for 

continued efforts against corruption and a tolerant democratic culture would be the lessons 

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learned by the politicians. That it would herald a new era of Bangladeshi politics was the 

expectation across the society. But the euphoria did not last long. Hope was replaced by 

despair. The belligerent posturing returned and so did the old practices, the long absences of 

the opposition party from the parliament is a case in point. It was in this context that the ruling 

party decided to amend the constitution. 

The AL, with its super majority, began the process in July 2010. Although it was apparently due 

to the annulment of the fifth amendment of the constitution by the court that a parliamentary 

committee was formed to propose amendments to update the constitution, the committee 

soon became the vehicle for making drastic changes in the constitution. A fifteen member 

constitution amendment parliamentary committee was appointed in July 2010, in which the 

BNP declined to participate. A bill was placed before parliament on 29 June 2011 and passed 

the next day. With the assent of the President, the bill became law. The 15th amendment of the 

constitution removed the CTG system and stipulated that the parliamentary election will be 

held within 90 days prior to the completion of the tenure (or within 90 days of the dissolution 

of parliament, if the parliament is dissolved before completion of its tenure). Although it is not 

specifically referenced the cabinet during the pre-election and election-time, the assumption is 

that the incumbents in cabinet will continue to serve up to the time of the election, and that 

the parliament will continue to function. Since then the PM stated that there will be no sessions 

oft parliament in the 90 days prior to the poll, but she later reneged and the parliament 

continued to perform. The other aspect of the amendment is that it stipulates an election will 

be held while the current parliament will still remain effective. Which is contrary to the level 

playing field necessary for ensuring an acceptable election. 

Two arguments were made by the ruling party for their decision to abandon the CTG system: a 

court verdict in May 2011, and the overreach of the CTG during 2007-08. Both deserve 

examination. 

The legal basis of the annulment of the CTG system, as argued by the ruling party, is the verdict 

ofthe Supreme Court on 10 May 2011'. On that day the court issued a summary verdict. The 

summary stated that "The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 1 of 1996) is 

prospectively declared void and ultra vires the Constitution." But it also stated that, "The 

election to the Tenth and the Eleventh Parliament may be held under the provisions of the 

above mentioned Thirteenth Amendment." The court also asked the parliament to amend the 

1 nle caretaker system was fjrst chalienged in 1996 (Writ Petition No, 1729 of 1996) in the Court Division. The 

High Court rejected the petition, In January 2000 a Supreme Court lawyer challenged the amendment ag31n in 

tile High Court in a writ petition saying the change distorts the principle that the republic will be governed by an 

elected government. The High Court rejected the petition in 2004 (57 DLR 171). However. after the petitioner died, 

another Supreme Court lawyer filed an appeal in June 2005 against the High Court ruling in the Supreme Court. In 

2011, the Supreme (ourt, heard the appeal beginning 1 March. for 10 days opinions and arguments from eight 

amici curiae, and thE=: counsels for both sidl?s of the appeal were heard beforp. thp v0rdict was rp.achf'd, 

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constitution to make sure that former chief justices or any other Supreme Court judges are not 

chosen as heads of caretaker governments in case the system is kept for another two 

parliamentary elections. During the hearing the court heard opinions of eight amici curiae 

(friends of the court) of whom seven supported the continuation of the system. Despite the 

enormous significance of the verdict and its implication, unfortunately, the court took 14 

months to deliver the full text of the verdict - it was signed and delivered on 16 September 

2012. 

The full text ofthe verdict revealed that there was no consensus among the justices as to 

whether the 13th amendment was unconstitutional. Of the seven judges of the apex court, four 

were in favor of declaring the caretaker provision unconstitutional; two dissented; and one 

opined that the matter should be left to parliament. But there was unanimity on two issues. 

Firstly, that the system should be kept for two more elections. Secondly, in their joint 

observation, the judges concurred with the concerns of the amicus curiae that an election 

under a party government is a recipe for disaster. The judges observed: "The senior lawyers of 

the country expressed apprehension that there would be anarchy ifthe ensuing election is held 

under party government. And we cannot ignore their view." 

These observations and the grounds of the dissenting opinions are important and have serious 

consequences. But it took 14 months to be completed and made public, and by then the 

parliament had already annulled the system and the downward spiral of Bangladeshi politics 

had already begun. We will never know whether the situation would have been different if the 

full verdict was released earlier but we know for sure that the government neither waited for 

the full verdict nor did it adhere to all parts of the short verdict. 

The second argument that the CTG overreached its mandate is well-founded. Although the CTG 

did not violate the law by ruling the country for two years, it made policies that were not within 

the intended purview of a caretaker regime. One can argue that necessity prompted the CTG to 

overstay, but it remains contentious from the political parties' point of view. 

However, the larger question is whether the annulment of the CTG reflects the decision of the 

parliamentary committee. The proceedings of the committee show that it had unanimously 

concluded that the CTG system should be maintained and that a strict limit of 90 days be 

imposed on its tenure. In its 27 meetings between 21 July 2010 and 29 May 2011 the 

committee gathered opinions from three former chief justices, ten constitutional 

lawyers/experts, representatives from six political parties (including the AL, which was 

represented by the PM), eighteen intellectuals, editors of eighteen newspapers and media, and 

the leadership of the sector commanders forum (an organization of the commanders of the 

freedom fighters of 1971). Most of them urged the committee to look into the inadequacies of 

the caretaker system, only a few suggested a complete abolition of the system. 

Accordingly, the committee formulated its recommendation on 29 May 2011 regarding Article 

58(B) and 58(0). It recommended that no more than 90 days be added to 58 (B) as the tenure 

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ofthe CTG. Additionally, it recommended that clause 58(D)(3) be added that forbids the CTG to 

sign new agreements with any foreign governments. The government will be allowed to renew 

any existing agreement if its term expires, but the renewal will have to be placed before the 

parliament for its ratification after a new parliament is elected. A day later the committee met 

the PM and decided to make a U-turn: Article 58 will be scrapped altogether (For details of the 

committee proceedings, see Badiul Alam Majumdar, 'Which Constitution? Whose 

Constitution?' Prothom Alo, 28 October 2013, p 8). A bill to that effect, the fifteenth 

amendment to the constitution, was placed before parliament. In the absence of the 

opposition, the bill was passed by a 291-1 vote; the lone dissenter was Mohammad Fazlul Azim, 

the only independent Member of Parliament. 

Was the decision made to reflect the popular mood? Available opinion surveys in this regard 

suggest otherwise. Four opinion surveys since 2011, commissioned by the leading Bangladeshi 

newspaper Prothom Alo and conducted by the international survey organization Org-Quest 

Research (with a sample of 5000 Bangladeshis in each cycle), is instructive in this regard. The 

preference for a caretaker government during the election among the respondents was 73% in 

2011,76% in 2012, 90% in April 2013 and 82% in October 2013. Daily Samakal, another 

Bangladeshi newspaper, conducted two surveys, in late 2011 and in late 2012. These surveys 

revealed that 55% and 62% respondents, respectively, contend that a fair election without a 

caretaker government is not possible. The opinion polls conducted by AC Nielsen for the leading 

English newspaper in Dhaka, the Daily Star, shows overwhelming support for the CTG: 73.9% in 

December 2011 and 67% in December 2012. The Daily Star - Asia Foundation Survey in October 

2013 shows a 77 % support for the CTG. A report of surveys conducted by US AID, Democracy 

International and UK Aid show that in July 2013, 59% respondents preferred a CTG during the 

election while 33% preferred the incumbent government to remain in charge. The report 

further informs that in April 2013 approval for elections under the present government stood at 

32% while under the CTG it was 68%. Drawing on the polls since December 2011, it is evident 

that popular support for a CTG is significantly high and that the majority of Bangladeshis 

continue to support the CTG as an election-time government. 

Why is this election important? 

The upcoming election is important at both domestic and regional levels with significance for 

the US- Bangladesh relationship. 

It's a cliche to say that an election alone is not democracy, democracy requires more than 

elections. However, elections are important elements of any democracy and in many ways 

reveal the nature and quality of democracy. In the past decades we have learned that for 

transitioning to and consolidation of democracy election is a critical test. Samuel Huntington 

suggested the "Two Turnover Test." He argued that when a nation transitions from an 

"emergent democracy" to a "stable democracy," it must undergo two democratic and peaceful 

turnovers to opposition and back. He said that after an emergent democracy's first turnover, 

the new administration often reverts to authoritarian rule, trampling on democratic institutions 

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and undermining the rule of law. Therefore the nation must undergo a second turnover. Only 

after passing the Two Turnover Test can it move to the next stage, a stable democracy. Despite 

four elections since the downfall of the military ruler, and alteration between the two major 

parties, the Bangladeshi electoral system has failed to produce a stable democracy, primarily 

because each regime has tried to manipulate the constitution and electoral process to return to 

power. Except for one occasion, each election has engendered instability and uncertainty. 

Incumbents have attempted to change the rules of the game in their favor. Each election came 

as an opportunity, the perennial optimism of the Bangladeshi citizens that the political parties 

will get it right this time turned out to be wrong. The alternations in power precluded a 

complete reversal, but nothing more. 

In the clientelist political culture of Bangladesh the state has remained the principal source for 

dispensation of patronage. The two major political parties in Bangladesh have used and abused 

resources in the past for personal gain, and in order to maintain the party machines and their 

hold over the party activists. Notwithstanding the high level of corruption, the state also 

provides impunity to ruling party activists. Therefore, each election becomes a 'zero-sum' game 

and all parties fight hard. Additionally, ruling parties use the state machinery for reprisals 

against the opposition. That makes an election a matter of existential struggle. Corruption and 

abuse of power make each incumbent a legitimate candidate for prosecution, but often threats 

of prosecution and courts and laws are used as instruments of harassment. No political party, 

its leaders and activists are willing to endure this suffering. Therefore, both incumbent and 

opposition view winning the election as their only safeguard against possible post-poll adverse 

situation. This can be described as 'cost of defeat'. 

The 'cost of defeat' or the perception thereof by the parties and their activists, is greater this 

time around. In the past five years the society has become more polarized than ever before. 

The hostility between the AL and the BNP has reached new heights: the telephone conversation 

between the PM and the leader of the opposition provides some indications. In such a hostile 

environment, a defeat could expose the vanquished to the wrath ofthe ruling party. 

Additionally, in the case of the AL perhaps to the Islamists, and in the case of the BNP, perhaps 

to those who feel that the party has provided shelter to Islamists. The BNP has remained out of 

power for seven years and it is afraid that another term out of office will bring about 

fragmentation. The mal-governance and scale of corruption under the AL has grown and 

therefore, party leaders are concerned about their fate post-election. The International Crime 

Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to try those who committed crimes against t humanity during 

the war of independence in 1971, has widened the schism within the society. The Jamaat-iIslami (JI) views the ICT and legal and extralegal actions against its leadership as an existential 

threat. The violent reactions of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the rise of the Islamist political 

organization named the Hefazat-i-Islam (HI) have made the secularists worried that the AL's 

defeat will enhance their strength and erode the secular basis of the state. The members of the 

civil society who have sided with one party or the other are concerned that the authoritarian 

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tendencies that have been institutionalized through various laws will be used against them with 

vengeance. 

Political instability has always affected the security of religious and ethnic minorities. Members 

of religious minorities in various places were attacked after one of the verdicts ofthe war crime 

tribunal in late February. Continued violence against members of the Hindu community for 

almost a week caused loss of life, and damage to homes and temples. Similar attacks have been 

reported in recent weeks. If the present stalemate continues and eventually an election 

without the participation of all takes place, minorities will become the principal target. The 

Opposition and the ruling party will blame each other. But it will do little to protect the 

minorities from opportunists and religious zealots. 

While the volatile political environment, violence, and breakdown of governing institutions 

have frequently drawn the attention of the world's media to Bangladesh, we should not lose 

sight ofthe fact the country has also produced a development success story. Acccording to the 

World Bank, "Bangladesh is 1 of only 18 developing countries with an annual growth rate that 

has never fallen below 2 percent" World Bank, 'The Bangladesh Conundrum: 2006 

b.ll.i1.;Uweb.worldbank.org/WB5iTE!EXTERNAL!EXTABOUTU:dj:XTAN.NREP/EXTANNREP2K6/0,£ 

.£!J1e ntM D K: 2105 2781'~pagePK :64168445 NpiPK :64168309~t~ePK :2838572,00. html). 

Economic growth, annually over 6% in the past decade despite the global economic downturn 

and the reduction in the incidence of poverty from an estimated 70% in 1971 to 31.5% in 2010, 

the country "has achieved rapid and spectacular improvements in many social development 

indicators during the last two decades or so" Wahiduddin Mahmud, "Social Development: 

Pathways, Surprises and Challenges", Indian Journal of Human Development, Jan-June, 2(1): 79-

92,2008.) The decline achieved in maternal mortality (from 322 per 100,000 in 2001 to 194 in 

2010) (US AID, 11 March 2011, http://blog.usaid.gov/2011/03/bangladesh-maternal-deaths-decline-by1Q.~rcent-lD.:less-than-lQ.:v!".e.rlli, in infant mortality (from 97 per thousand in 1990 to 37 in 

2011), children under five years mortality rates (from 139 in 1990 to 46 in 2011), (Unicef, 

Bangladesh, 2013, http://www.unic2f.org/infobycnuntry/bnngladeshbangladeshstatistics.html". and 

in increasing equitable access in education (Net Enrolment Rate: 98.7 percent; girls: 99.4 

percent, boys: 97.2 percent), are noteworthy. According to the 2013 Human Development 

Report of the UNDP, between 1980 and 2012, Bangladesh's life expectancy at birth increased 

14 years, a notable achievement indeed. The dramatic decline in the Total Fertility Rate, a key 

component in addreSSing population growth, is astounding: 6.9 in 1971 to 4.4 in 1991 to 2.2 in 

2010. These successes demonstrate the resilience and ingenuity of Bangladeshis. The country 

has offered the world a model for alleviation of poverty called microcredit. Despite adverse 

global trade conditions, thanks to Bangladeshi entrepreneurs and 3.6 million workers (of which 

2.8 million are women), the Ready Made Garments sector has emerged as the second largest 

exporter of the world. 

Although these socio-economic achievements have been made despite poor governance, 

further violence and uncertainty will not only hamper progress but impose reversion. This trend 

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in the world's eighth most populous country, with limited natural resources, will exacerbate the 

schisms within the society, contribute to economic disparity and may serve as a source of 

radicalization in the future. To think that the adverse impacts will remain within the boundaries 

ofthe country is wishful thinking. This is particularly important because the country has already 

experienced a variant of Islamist militancy between 2004 and 2007 and a low intensity leftwing 

radicalism is present. Islamist militant groups such as Harkat-ul Jihad allslami (HUJI), Jamaat-ul 

Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) has its genesis and ties to external groups. Regional militant 

groups such as Laskar-e-Tayeba (LeT) have tried and are trying to use Bangladesh as a 

recruitment center and launching pad for attacks within India. The country is located within an 

arch of insurgency from Afghanistan to Myanmar with Pakisan and India in between. The 

insurgency in northeast India and growing Maoist radicalism throughout India is yet to 

influence Bangladeshi society, but it does not mean that it will remain so forever. Rohingya 

rebels continue to use the southeastern hills of Bangladesh as bases to continue their 

operations inside Myanmar. The Myanmar government's complicity in the anti-Muslim pogrom 

is fueling discontent among Muslims in Myanmar but also among some Bangladeshis. A chaotic 

and violent political situation in Bangladesh will create a hospitable environment for both 

domestic and regional extremist groups. 

Understandably security concerns are playing a key role in the policies of Bangladesh's 

neighbors, particularly India. The rise of militancy, the presence of some regional militant 

groups and the use of Bangladesh as a sanctuary by Indian insurgents in the past has caused 

Indian policy-makers some concerns. There has been some progress in addressing these issues 

in recent years. Economic cooperation between two countries has grown; but enormous 

potential remains untapped. Unfortunately, the Indian government has not reciprocated 

Bangladeshi goodwill in equal measure; failure to sign the Land Border Deal, sharing of waters 

of common rivers, and unabated killings on the border by Indian border guards are cases in 

point. India looms large in Bangladeshi foreign policy and domestic politics; it is best 

characterized as a 'love-hate' relationship. The relationship is steadily transforming into stateto-state relations. This election provides a critical test for the relationship. While Bangladeshi 

political parties must show maturity in dealing with the big neighbor, Indian policy makers 

should be cognizant of the long term implications of their policies. Political instability in 

Bangladesh will not only jeopardize the future relationship but may reverse some progress. The 

actions of the Indian state -leading to, during and post-election - are critical for public 

perception and popular articulation of attitude towards India. 

The election also has implications for US-Bangladesh relations. The relationship has flourished 

in the past decade, as reflected in the two rounds of US-Bangladesh Partnership dialogue, two 

rounds of Bilateral Defense Dialogue and Military Planning Talks and Bangladesh's agreement 

to sign TICFA. Bangladesh is a major partner in US global counter-terrorism efforts. A deal to 

that effect was signed in October this year. But both countries have some reservations about 

steps taken by the other state; the cancellation of the GSP by the US on the one hand while the 

Bangladesh government's steps towards the Grameen Bank on the other have created some 

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strains. With the increasing importance of Asia and the Indian Ocean in the global economy and 

politics, Bangladesh's importance has grown. Bangladesh has a potential role in helping 

Myanmar's slow transition to democracy and integration to the global economy. US strategic 

interests rely on a stable, prosperous and democratic Bangladesh. Absence of democracy or 

prolonged instability will not only be detrimental to economic interests but also destabilize 

regional dynamics. With imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan and unpredictable relations 

with Pakistan, the US cannot afford to lose a partner in South Asia. 

War Crime Trials and its impacts 

One ofthe key current issues of Bangladeshi politics is the International Crimes Tribunal (lCT) 

and its potential impact on the election. The tribunals were established in March 2010 to 

prosecute those accused of committing war crimes (including collaborating with Pakistan) 

during Bangladesh's war of independence in 1971. The tribunal was established on the basis of 

the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 included in the Bangladesh constitution and as 

amended in 2009. Trying the war criminals was an election promise of the AL. Since the 

establishment of the ICT, the JI has alleged that it is politically motivated, and demanded that 

the tribunal be scrapped. The BNP, until early 2013, maintained an ambivalent position towards 

the trial saying that it supports trying war criminals but arguing that the current tribunal lacks 

transparency and the process is not consistent with international standards. The tribunal has 

also attracted criticisms from outside the country on procedural matters and allegedly not 

maintaining international standards. Despite some reservations about the trial process, opinion 

polls have shown that the majority of Bangladeshi citizens support the work of the ICT. The 

2013 opinion poll by Prothom Alo revealed that 80% of people are supportive ofthe process. 

Thirty-nine percent of respondents to an opinion poll conducted for the Daily Star in late 2012, 

identified the trial as one of the key successes; in late 2011, respondents identified the trial of 

war criminals as the top success point of the government with a 29.7 percent rating. Since 

February 2013, eight current and/or former Jlleaders and 2 BNP leaders have been sentenced 

to death or given long terms of imprisonment. Demand for the death sentence for some of the 

accused has engendered a grassroots movement on the one hand while the JI has unleashed 

violence after each verdict on the other. The BNP has shown either a muted reaction or 

maintained a dubious silence. 

The ruling party insists that a victory of the BNP (and the JI as a coalition partner) will be an end 

to the trial process; and that they will free the convicted. There hasn't been any clear statement 

from the BNP in regard to the future ofthe tribunal. While the issue will remain present during 

the election, the likelihood of this being a determining factor is slim. Given the popular support 

and emotional attachment to the issue, apart from the JI, no party will be able to take a public 

stance against the tribunal. But in the event of an election participated in by all parties, the 

issue will be a focus of the ruling AL and its allies as their distinguishing feature. Whether it 

plays a role in election or not, the trial of those who perpetrated crimes against humanity in 

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1971 should continue. This was long overdue. Without dealing with this painful past and 

delivering justice, the nation won't be able to move forward. 

Future Trajectories and the way out 

At the time of writing the statement there are three possible scenarios in regard to the 

election. 

1. A routine election participated in by all parties. However, given the uncompromising 

positions of the ruling and opposition parties, it is an unlikely scenario. Accommodation 

of some of the demands of the opposition, for example a cabinet not headed by the 

incumbent PM during the election, may be a way out within the current constitutional 

proviso. 

2. An election boycotted by the opposition. This scenario is akin to February 1996, when 

the BNP unilaterally arranged a sham election. Despite apparent similarities between 

1996 and 2013, the situation on the ground is different this time around; few allies of 

the ruling party will join the election. Besides, the issue of ICT was not present in 1996 

or 2006. The legitimacy of such an election is an open question. Elections held without 

the participation of the opposition, in 1986 and 1988 under the military rule of General 

Ershad and in February 1996 under the Khaleda Zia regime, had neither produced a 

durable parliament nor brought political stability. Such elections have previously 

engendered violence; the intensity has grown since. In recent months hundreds of 

people have been killed, as on the one hand the opposition has resorted to violent 

tactics to create a climate of fear and the government has used excessive force to quell 

the opposition and resorted to the persecution of opposition leaders, on the other. 

3. The deferral of the election. It can be done either within the purview of the current 

constitution or through extra-constitutional steps to be ratified post-facto by the next 

parliament. Article 123 (3) (b) stipulates that the elections will be held within 90 days 

after the dissolution of the parliament. Therefore ifthe parliament is dissolved the 

window of time can be used to formulate a solution through mediation between the 

political parties. 

The third scenario, although it appears to be a suspension of democratic process, has a 

significant benefit and may provide an opportunity to scale down the current hostility between 

the government and the opposition. Three constitutional amendments - one created the 

system with loopholes (13th amendment), the other made it open to petty party interests (14th 

amendment) and the third abolished it altogether (15th Amendment); but none was ever placed 

before the citizens for their approval, no political parties ever included the issue in their 

electoral manifestos. Thus one way out could be a referendum on the issue of caretaker 

government during the extended period that the constitution will allow after the dissolution of 

parliament. A general election can follow based on the results of the referendum. This will give 

all parties a sense of victory and a way out of the current impasse. This will require post-facto 

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legitimation through changes in the constitution; but perhaps there is no better use of the 

'doctrine of necessity' than in this instance. 

What Can the United States and the International Community Do? 

While Bangladeshi political leaders must act responsibly to avoid a political meltdown and the 

impending chaos, the international community should not idly sit by. As I have discussed, the 

upcoming election and the present political crisis has implications beyond the borders of 

Bangladesh, therefore it is clearly in the interests of the international community to act. The 

exemplary progress made by the Bangladeshis has demonstrations effect all over the 

developing world. Reversal of these will stifle progress elsewhere. Continued instability may 

create spaces for non-state actors with regional agenda. The international community should 

act in unison so that it is not perceived to be an aggressive posture of a single country. The US 

should take a leading role in bringing the international community together in earnest to 

prevent further escalation of the volatile situation. 

I recommend that the United States and the International community take the following steps: 

1 Instead of focusing on elections every five years as tension escalates, the US should 

emphasize on the quality of democracy. Concrete action steps should be laid out to be 

followed by the political parties. For adherence to each step the country should be 

rewarded with benefits that help the entire population or the most productive sectors 

of the country, for example restoring the GSP, easing tariff barriers for Bangladeshi 

products. 

2 Building institutions for sustainable and quality democracy such as a strong Election 

Commission should be the key focus of the international community and commitment 

for long term engagements is necessary. 

3 The United States should make clear statements in regard to the post-election 

tolerance, including safeguarding the weaker sections of society, e.g., religious 

minorities, and the results of fall-out. 

4 Encourage all parties to agree on containing religious extremism. 

S The international community should neither franchise its responsibilities to regional 

powers, nor should the regional powers be excluded from this international effort. In 

particular India's valid security concerns must be addressed. Institutional structures 

should be created to ensure that domestic political environment in Bangladesh does not 

threaten its neighbor or the regional security. 

Conclusion 

The present political crisis in Bangladesh can be turned into an opportunity to build a stable 

democratic prosperous country. Economic and social achievements of recent decades show 

that the citizens are capable of taking steps in the right direction. It is time for the Bangladeshi 

political leaders to take the right decisions - to hold an inclusive election, agree on postelection tolerant behaVior, rein in extremism, commit to address the issues of war crimes 

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judiciously, and commit to regional peace, and it is time for the international community to 

help them in this regard. 

14 
23

Mr. CHABOT. General, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GENERAL A.M.N. MUNIRUZZAMAN, 

PRESIDENT, BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. Mr. Chairman, and honorable member, 

thank you again for inviting us to testify before this committee. 

What I would like to start by saying that I shall cover some of the 

salient points of the recent testimony that I have given and address the main issues of the questions that are posed to me. 

It is important to say that a combination of multiple forces of political violence, weak governance, corruption, poverty, and rising Islamic militancy is very rapidly haunting the very core of the 

Bangladeshi state and turning it into a fragile state. The lack of 

political trust between the two political parties and particularly between the two leaders of the parties has meant that democratic 

process in the country is dysfunctional. The current state of political impasse comes with a very resolution that was passed and the 

amendment that was passed in the Parliament of the 15th amendment, which people perceive was done by the government with ulterior motives. The result of protests by the opposition and its allies, including the Jammat-e-Islami, has brought widespread violence on the street and has resulted in over 200 deaths in the last 

few months and injured many more. 

Experience of Bangladesh’s history of elections shows that incumbent government has the capacity and the means to manipulate and rig election. Therefore, a wide majority of the people want 

a neutral caretaker government to hold elections. And that is only 

way out of the current political impasse in the country. The country has had weak governance for many years and the state of law 

and order was poor and crime was on the rise. There were political 

force disappearances over the last few years; industrial labor standards were very appalling, resulting in Rana Plaza incidents with 

impunity. We also saw the squeezing of the space of civil society, 

and the role of civil society has been curbed over the last few years. 

And the freedom of press and expression is under threat, as journalists are in jail for expressing their opinions. TV channels and 

newspapers have been closed. And the culture of winner-take-all 

approach has made the government’s position very rigid. 

There is also widespread corruption in the country, and the prevalent crony capitalism persists. It is also important to say that the 

property reduction that has taken place over the last few years has 

also been hit by the government stance against the Grameen Bank 

and politically against Professor Yunus. 

I would like to say that there is the riding tendency of Islamic 

militarism in Bangladesh, and that is going to hit at the very core 

of the Bangladesh’s stand as a secular and a moderate state. The 

reasons for this rise is due to a multiple forces of internal impacts 

and external impacts. But the part that I would like to very much 

emphasize here before this committee is that the current state of 

political intolerance by the government toward its opposition and 

the current state of the political violence that persists in the country, if this continues, the country will soon enter a phase of instability. And any instability in Bangladesh will create the ground for 

24

militant parties and organizations to thrive and expand their scope 

of operation within the country. 

We also see that any militant operations in Bangladesh will have 

impacts on the regional security particularly because of the 19th—

2014 withdrawal of the U.S. Forces from Afghanistan, where the 

security of the region will become very fragile. I would also like to 

say that in this state of fragility, the relationship between the 

United States and Bangladesh needs to be observed very carefully. 

A question was also posed, what needs to happen for a stable, 

secure, and accountable government in Bangladesh? What I would 

like to say that we first need a change of political culture. We need 

important government organizations to be reformed, including the 

judiciary, which has to be free and accountable. We need enforcement to make election commission, anti-corruption commission, 

and other bodies more functional. There has to be a definite role 

of the civil society in expanding the space and making the government accountable. The system of impunity by government and its 

cronies has to stop so that the rule of law can be established. And 

we need a free and a robust media, and media should not be hampered by the government. We also need political forces on issues of 

state, and we need national policies, not personal and private policies. We need an educated population to enforce that the governments are held accountable. 

A very interesting question was also posed to me saying that in 

this current of state of the impasse and the political violence that 

persists in the country, will it raise the army coming into play in 

a military coup? My answer to this question, the military does not 

have a role in solving political problems in a democratic country. 

And having seen the experience of 2007, I also feel that the military does not also have the appetite for that. But the fact remains 

that the military remains the only credible and acceptable institution in the country. In spite of the politicalization of all state institutions by the current government, the military has remained apolitical, and therefore, the military should play the role that is in 

the best interests of the country, but I presume that if the violence 

persists, the military at a time may be sucked into the process. But 

that is not something that you should welcome. I once again say 

that thank you for the hearing. And I would hope that our international friends and partners continue to engage Bangladesh so 

that Bangladesh doesn’t slip into a state of violence and become, 

say, fragile to a failed state. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, General. 

[The prepared statement of General Munruzzaman follows:]

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Name: 

Title and Organisation: 

Name of the Committee: 

Date and Title of the Hearing: 

Cover Sheet 

Major General A N M Muniruzzaman (Retd). 

President, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security 

Studies (BIPSS) 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

November 20,2013; 'Bangladesh in Turmoil: A Nation 

on the Brink'? 
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ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF U.S HOUSE SUB COMMITTEE ON ASIA AND PACIFIC BY MAJOR 

GENERAL A N M MUNRUZZAMAN NDC, PSC (RHD) , PRESIDENT, BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

AND SECURITY STUDIES (BIPSS) 

-How is the confluence of politicol violence, weak governance, corruption, poverty and Islamic 

militancy threatening impacting Bangladesh and its future relationship with the U.S? 

Political violence, weak governance, corruption, poverty and Islamic militancy have been vividly present 

in the socio-political domain of Bangladesh in recent times. The country is passing a difficult time fraught 

together with multiple issues. 

Political Violence 

The level of political violence was very high in the past year for three main reasons: opposition called 

protests against the dissolution of the election time Care Taker Government (CTG); Jammat-e-Islami (JI) 

opposition to the verdicts of the war crime trial, including its call for a fair trail; and orthodox Islamist 

protests against perceived apostles, atheist and defamers of Islam. The latest cycle of strikes and 

violence is due to a clamor for the restoration of CTG. 

The main parties, the Awami League (AL), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and the Islamist Jamaat-eIslami (JI) have their organization sprouted in every locality of Bangladesh, and the nature of political 

clashes result in widespread violence and destruction. There were clashes in most cities, towns and even 

in many villages. The BNP and JI seem to have converged in their protest against the government in 

demand of a fair election, and that makes the potential for violence much more then what it would have 

been otherwise. 

A serious lack of trust persists between the two major parties and their leaders in Bangladesh. The 

present crisis originates in the unilateral abolition of CTG system by the incumbent government through 

the 15'h amendment. CTG was an established and well-accepted system in the political crisis-prone 

Bangladesh. The ruling party has offered their explanation for why they scrapped CTG system, 

referencing the overstay of last CTG and the Supreme Court dictate. This rationale for the dissolution of 

CTG through overwhelming parliamentary majority by the government doesn't appear to be a strong 

and convincing one} and was not accepted by the large majority in the country. 

Experience and history in Bangladesh show that the incumbent government in Bangladesh has the 

record and capacity to manipulate elections. In the absence of a strong Election Commission, a fair 

election can only be conducted by a neutral non-party government. 

The government's heavy handed and repressive handling of opposition political activities has also 

resulted in reactionary political violence. 

In reaction to verdicts of the War Crimes Tribunal, at least 150 people including some security force 

members have been killed in clashes between January 2013 and October 2013, after the court began 
27


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handing down death sentences on accused JI leaders. Jls organizational power to conduct violent 

protest as well as government's disproportionate use of force was instrumental in such heavy causality. 

The Hefazat incident in the heart of Dhaka saw 15 deaths as per government sources. The figure is 68 

according to the human rights group Odhikari. 

From January to November 2013, an estimated 120 people died in clashes with police by the protesters 

and between rival political parties. In one recent strike, 20 people died and 30 people suffered severe 

burns. Around 265 people were injured across the country due to unremitting strikes on that single 

occasion. The violence was carried out by both the major parties and the JI. Buses, cars and other 

transports were also vandalized during strikes. Recent strikes and violence have adversely affected 

Bangladesh's economy to a great degree. The strikes, violence and turbulence of the past several 

months have thwarted growth, driven away both domestic and international investment. The situation 

has created greater risk for existing economic activities and undermined prospects for success. Export 

and import trade faces setbacks, production and supplies get disrupted, and future investment becomes 

uncertain in this political culture of 'strike'. Small business enterprises are the worst victims of the 

'strike' programs. 

Weak Governance 

Most neutral economists and political analysts have rated the performance of the government as 

average to poor in most sectors, and moderately good in some sectors. With high expectation in the 

people's mind due to lofty pre-election promises by the ruling party, an average performance 

automatically evokes anti-incumbency sentiment, which exists in Bangladesh right now. 

Some notable progress was made in few sectors like power generation, urban communication, junior 

education, public health and agriculture etc. In most other sectors the performance was average to 

poor. 

State of law and order was poor; crime rates have been on the rise; crime prevention and justice system 

were pathetically slow despite the handful of high profile cases. Forced disappearances linked to 

political rivalry were high. Even an influential and well-known opposition leader who was a member of 

parliament in the last house, Mr. M lIiyas Ali, disappeared a couple of years back and was never found 

again. 

Industrial and labor safety has been in a horrible and appalling state, and no checks or balances have 

worked. Hundreds of people died in accidents like the ones in Rana Plaza and Tajrin Garments. 

Space for civil society has also been reduced due to the incumbent government's deliberate lack of 

attention to this segment of society. 

Free expression by public and media has taken a blow. A journalist couple was murdered little more 

than a year back. It is believed that they had been investigating a top-level governmental nexus of 

cronyism, and that the perpetrators are known and linked to the government/ruling party. No progress 

was made in the subsequent police investigation. 

Some TV channels like Channel One, Diganta TV and newspapers like AmarDesh and ShirshoKhobor have 

been suspended from operating for many months now. For Channel One it has been few years already. 
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The legal basis for their suspension was not clear. A popular editor was put behind the bars for many 

months now and the charges against him aren't very clear. 

The political approach of the government has established the wrong principle that 'winner takes all' 

which is a root cause of current strikes. Respect for the government, which commands the support of a 

sizable proportion of the citizenry, is very low. Political space for opposition activities has increasingly 

been reduced and hardly any atmosphere has been maintained for good democratic practices. 

Although the War Crimes Trials was a priority agenda in the AL election platform, the procedure and 

conduct of it has remained questionable. Some domestic and international observers have expressed 

their reservations about the standards of the trial. 

There is a divisive streak in the political approach of the incumbent government instead of much needed 

reconciliatory one. The Bangladeshi Foreign Minister has recently circulated a communique to different 

foreign missions in Bangladesh mentioning that Bangladesh exists in two forms - one liberal and secular, 

and the other being orthodox Islamist and militant. 

Vital constitutional bodies like the Judiciary were also allegedly being politicized. Other important 

constitutional bodies accused of being politicized are Public Service Commission (PSC), Election 

Commission (Ee), Anti-Corruption Commission (ACe), etc. Many crucial state organs like administration, 

military, police, etc. had also been hugely politicized. This engineered decay of institutions has reduced 

the state's capacity to act properly, and makes it worse in a crisis situation. 

Corruption 

The incumbent AL promised for a hard and real time action against all forms of corruption in their 

election manifesto, but the government has failed to deliver on this. Widespread corruption prevails 

mostly through cronyism and political favor. Evidence has emerged that senior government figures or 

party associates were involved in high-profile scams like market share engineering; the Padma bridge 

conspiracy for corruption; Hallmark Group's and Bismillah Group's corruption with alleged quid pro quo 

with senior government figures; Destiny multi-level marketing scam; etc. 

In the investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), conspiracy of corruption was found 

in the acts of the concerned Canadian farm and senior Bangladeshi governmental figures. A senior 

government official, under investigation of his involvement in this scam, is already in Bangladeshi jail. 

The Canadian investigation also pointed finger towards possible involvement of the Bangladeshi Prime 

Minister's family members in this. 

Proper and honest procedures do not seem to have been followed in awarding governmental contracts. 

People and farms affiliated with the ruling party seem to have received most of the deals. For example a 

disproportionate bulk of power generation contracts have gone to Summit Power Company of the 

current Civil Aviation and Tourism Minister, Farukh Khan, who is believed to be an inner-circle person in 

the exclusive top brass of the ruling party and its leader. 

Since the inception of this government, the student wing of the ruling party had been involved 

extensively in forcible grabbing of governmental tenders at lower levels, extortion, intimidation, land 

grabbing and many other crimes. 

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Act was amended so that permission of the government has to 

be sought for investigating and trying governmental officials. This seems to be aimed at creating a 
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situation to allow for collaborative corruption by the politicians and the bureaucracy. This amendment 

renders the ACC to be a toothless body. 

Politicization of state organs and institutions are an area of major non-monetary corruption. There is a 

sense in Bangladesh that no organs were spared from politicization beginning with the judiciary, police, 

military, public administration up to autonomous bodies like never before. Retaining state power at any 

cost is suspected as the purpose. 

Poverty 

Despite a reasonably consistent high growth rate above 6%, the government failed to create any 

mechanism to foster a faster trickle-down effect of this prosperity to the massively underdeveloped 

class of the extremely poor. Economic progress was confined to a certain affluent section and the 

associated middle-class. 

Activities of NGOs and donor agencies have been instrumental in some poverty alleviation at rural 

grassroots level. However} the government targeted the largest and most reputable microfinance 

institution, the Nobel Peace Prize winning Grameen Bank and its main architect Dr. Yunus, the co-winner 

of that honor. Evidently, the prime reason of such targeting and harassment was jealousy of his fame 

and curbing his political potential through this unethical trick. 

Unnecessary political turmoil and faulty economic strategy has gravely damaged the scope of faster 

growth and resulting poverty alleviation. 

According to the HDR 2013 and UNDP, Bangladesh's HOI value for 2012 is 0.515, which puts the country 

in the low human development category as usual. No significant improvement has been made in this 

ranking over last few years despite Bangladesh being dubbed as one of 'Next 11' by Goldman Sachs few 

years back. 

Islamic Militancy 

Although the government had operational control over the terrorism situation in Bangladesh, it failed to 

wipe Islamist militant elements completely out from society. This is evidenced by the recent emergence 

of Islamist splinter terrorist groups like Ansarullah Bangia Team, BEM, Tamir-ud-Deen, etc. 

Government handling of Shahbag- (so called) Atheist/ Defamers of Islam-Hefazat affair was inept and 

has resulted in some commotion amongst the orthodox Islamist segment of the society. This is perilous 

and may result in sporadic militancy. 

Threat to Impact Bangladesh 

All these together are already threatening to destabilize Bangladesh to a heightened scale. 

Increased instability in Bangladesh means a hampering of the commercial functions, investment, trade, 

services and, above all, massive disturbances in normal life and subsistence activities of millions of poor 

and middle-class ofthis overpopulated nation of 160 million. Death, injury and destruction follow in big 

numbers in such situations in Bangladesh. 
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A destabilized Muslim majority nation is a breeding ground of fundamentalism, militancy and even 

terrorism. Bangladesh is no different. 

In a worst-case scenario, some spillover effect can't be ruled out to neighboring provinces of bordering 

nations. 

Future Relations with the US 

The u.s has been consistent on certain foreign policy issues like democracy, human rights, 

counterterrorism, development of the underdeveloped nations, etc. Same is the case with Bangladesh. 

A destabilized Bangladesh may not be ideal for useful partnership from the US in terms of aid, 

development partnership, security and intelligence cooperation, trade, commerce} etc. Any absence of 

real democracy would contradict the principles followed by the U.S and thus may create a relationship 

gap between Bangladesh and U.S. On the other hand, Bangladesh government's inability to handle the 

majority sentiment may push the U.S to maintain a distance, as the US traditionally prefers to see a 

balanced and stability focused approach. 

-How are the extremist groups expanding their influence and popularity? What implications does this 

have for Bangladesh's future and spread of terrorism throughout the region? 

Bangladesh has been confronted with a serious challenge from terrorism and violent extremism for over 

a decade. Despite efforts by successive governments to curb the operational abilities and strategic reach 

of these groups, the threat remains significant. There has also been a lack of strategic countermeasures 

against these groups. In order to understand the expanding influence and popularity of these groups, it 

is important to look beyond their ideological pull factor. Akin to terrorist and extremist organizations 

worldwide, groups such as Harkatul Jihad AI Islami - Bangladesh [HUJI-B] and Jama'at ul-Mujahideen 

Bangladesh [JMB] promote their ideology in order to attract followers and bolster their ranks. However, 

they also exploit the socio-economic issues plaguing Bangladesh. Such groups are increasingly talking 

about the governance deficit and lack of service delivery. In the aftermath of cyclone Sidr that hit 

Bangladesh in 2007, many extremist groups expeditiously rushed to the affected areas to provide relief. 

In certain places, they tried to exploit the grievances of the local populace due to the poor service 

delivery of the local administration. 

The strategic intent of these groups is to create a state and society that will be purely theocratic in 

nature. Our research on JMB and HUJI-B literature has highlighted that they identify the entire state and 

society as taghoot. Loosely translated it means that the entire state and society is corrupt, which 

according to their ideological belief requires a transformation through the creation of an Islamist state. 

These groups continue to highlight is the lack of service delivery by the judicial system. Hence, in their 

target selection judges and symbols of the judicial system such as court houses have always featured 

prominently. We also need to look at the increasing activity of these groups in the backdrop of the 

acrimonious political climate that pervades Bangladesh. As the overall political system appears 

increasingly dysfunctional and creates a sense of disillusionment, groups such as JMB will flourish. It will 

be erroneous to underestimate the operational capability and strategic acumen of these outfits. They 

were able to carry out a large number of attacks from the period 1996 to 2007, including major incidents 

such as the serial bomb blasts in 2005 during which 463 explosions occurred in 63 of 64 districts across 

the country. Despite the fact that sustained operational measures have resulted in degradation of 
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extremist groups overall capability, a study of foiled plots will show that they are still active and 

continue to pose a threat. 

In the recent past some major trends have been noticed which also merit attention. Historically the 

Qaumi Madrasas (which are not regulated by the government) have been the breeding ground for 

militancy and terrorism. Over the last couple of years, the center of gravity has noticeably shifted to the 

private universities and other tertiary institutions attended by urban youth. Therefore, the threat of 

urban radicalization is a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, one that has serious ramifications. Groups 

such as HizbutTahrir Bangladesh (banned since 2009) mainly operate in the urban space and target a 

demographic that has not been associated with terrorism. It is important to note that, HizbutTahrir has 

been quite active despite its ban. 

Bangladesh in many ways is quite unique in the sense that the ethno-linguistic identity cohabits 

harmoniously with the religious identity of its citizens. Maintaining that balance is pivotal towards 

ensuring Bangladesh's moderate character. Unfortunately, some steps taken by the present government 

towards enforcing 'aggressive secularization' of the Bangladeshi polity has resulted in creating an 

imbalance. Such events will also result in reducing the space for the liberal polity and provide a boost to 

ultra-orthodox elements within society. The rise of Hefazat-e-Islam is a case in point. A group which was 

unknown even a year ago has now emerged as a major actor within the Islamist political space. 

Hefazat's rise to its current position is directly attributable to the inept handling of the Shahbagh 

movement and some other un-pragmatic policies taken by the government. 

In order to analyze the national and regional impact of terrorism and extremism in Bangladesh the 

following aspects need to be considered: 

a. An increase in the level of extremism across society could potentially result in the erosion of the 

moderate and secular principles of the Bangladeshi state. 

b. Islam in Bangladesh, which is based on a Sufi tradition, has borrowed extensively from the overall 

society and various cultural values. The type of religious practice espoused by the extremist 

organizations is therefore at odds with the overall nature of the society. Thus, rising extremism has 

serious societal ramifications. 

c. Bangladesh could be divided into two major fragments exacerbating the divisiveness that already 

exists in the Bangladeshi state. 

d. As the NATO-led ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and the wider region are in a 

particularly vulnerable situation. Unless terrorism and extremism are checked in Bangladesh, it could 

spillover into other countries in the region, especially India and Myanmar. 

e. A trilateral convergence of terrorist groups in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh could emerge post 

2014. The major Islamist groups in these three countries trace their origins back to the Afghan Jihad or 

the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Their historical association is manifested in the operational 

linkages between Lashkar-e-Tayeba (LeT) and groups in Bangladesh. 

f. These groups are fundamentally opposed to the enhancement of relations between the United 

States and Bangladesh. Hizbut Tahrir in Bangladesh for instance has been vociferous in its opposition for 

stronger military ties between the two countries. These groups also have the ability to reach out to the 

masses through their strategic communication techniques and could potentially increase sentiments 
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against the United States, which is generally quite low. Sowing seeds of suspicion in the minds of the 

people will set back the process of enhancement of ties between the United States and Bangladesh. 

g. The writ of the state needs to be maintained at all costs. Unless these groups are controlled and 

countered, they could seek refuge in remote corners of the country and a repeat of the situation that 

prevailed in Swat and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (before the military operation) 

could be witnessed in Bangladesh. Due to Bangladesh's geographic contiguity with five states of India, it 

will pose a direct threat to India's security as well. 

Therefore, there is an urgent need to move away from an operational outlook on counterterrorism and 

towards a non-kinetic approach. A whole of government and a whole of society approach towards 

counterterrorism along with an overhaul of the national CT architecture are absolutely critical. There is 

also a need to take counterterrorism above and beyond the political fray and fashion a bipartisan 

approach towards this issue. Inability to effectively curb on terrorist and extremist activity in Bangladesh 

could be cataclysmic not only for Bangladesh but for the wider region especially for India and Myanmar. 

As the NATO led ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, the region is in a highly vulnerable 

situation and Bangladesh could be confronted with a renewed challenge from terrorism. 

-What are the ramifications of growing level of intra-communal and sectarian violence against the 

minority Hindu community in Bangladesh? 

The recent violence against the minority Hindus, although isolated in nature, reveals that their 

persecution hasn't stopped, despite the Awami League government's perceived pro-minority stance. 

Although some good numbers from minority communities can be seen in some important governmental 

positions at various levels, the general persecution and discrimination against Hindus at the grassroots 

level in the society didn't change significantly towards any good. On many occasions, some ruling 

secular AL party members were also seen usurping minority properties alongside opposition linked or 

independent communal criminals and Islamist extremists. The establishment is less active in prevention 

in the latter cases. 

The recent riots based on false propaganda against the minorities, both Hindus and Buddhist, are also 

tying down a significant amount of security forces who otherwise could have been employed in their 

normal duties or counterterrorism roles. The incident of Ramu where Islamist thugs of all parties, 

including the AL, attacked and destroyed Buddhist temples and properties, basing their attack on just a 

rumor. This demonstrates the delicacy and charged up environment in society at present. 

In some cases there are accusations that the ruling party is deliberately conducting some communal 

attacks in disguise on the minorities to defame the opposition. In one occasion a proven arsonist of 

Hindu property was found to be a ruling party activist, and was seen recently with the state minister for 

home affairs in an open event. The police have not arrested him. 

The violence and resulting suffering or migration of Hindus, although normally confined to few sporadic 

incidents, is damaging Bangladesh's reputation as a tolerant and moderate Muslim majority country. 
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85642b-9.eps

-What needs ta happen in Bangladesh ta ensure that a stable, secure and accauntable gavernment 

develops? 

Bangladesh lacks miserably in healthy political culture. Bangladeshi politicians have not developed fair 

and just rules of the game. Politics in Bangladesh is fraught with unprecedented personal animosity and 

trapped in the cycle of vengeance. Grabbing power and retaining it by any means appears to be the 

purpose of the major political parties in Bangladesh. 

Development of right political culture and a functional system of power transfer, through a fair and 

credible election, is imperative. There is also a need to have a clear divorce from past animosity so as to 

push reform and confidence building measures forward. 

Constitutional bodies and important state/governmental organs must be reformed and reorganized with 

objectivity, and right spirit of propriety has to be injected into those bodies. Indispensible institutions 

like Judiciary are in a sorry state and measures must be taken to bring back public confidence on those. 

Space for freedom and activities of civil society must be expanded so as to allow checks and balances in 

the system. 

Political reforms are required to take place to put Bangladeshi democracy in line with international 

standards and conventions. Interparty democracy must be a criterion to be in politics in Bangladesh, 

which will have the chance of ensuring accountability and rational political behavior free of personal 

disposition and subjectivity. 

Political focus should be recast on public welfare, economic growth, services etc mainstream issues, 

instead of secondary issues and issues of personal interest. 

Initiative for all these mentioned 'to dds may come either from Bangladeshi politicians, which is less 

likely at this point of time, or from civil society, international community and donors working together to 

push reforms into the system and get the politician aboard quickly or gradually, as practicable. 

-Is communal and political violence increasing the risk of an army coup ta ensure elections accur? 

All stakeholders, domestic or international, in relation to Bangladesh, should put their best effort to 

make the politicians reach a negotiated political settlement and conduct a fair election under a neutral 

government. 

However, an uncompromising belligerent state and increased political violence may suck the military 

into the crisis. If the military is asked to act against any popular uprising by the incumbent government/ 

it may arise a heightened public expectation for rescue from the crisis by the military, and could evoke a 

coup. 

In either case, there is likely to be a military backed interim civilian government to hold fair election and 

transfer power to the elected. Any prolonged stay of such government beyond 6 to 8 months would be 

harmful for Bangladesh. 
34

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Sifton, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN SIFTON, ASIA ADVOCACY 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. SIFTON. Thank you for inviting me to testify today at this 

very well-timed hearing. The other witnesses have already discussed Bangladesh’s dire political situation and the risks it presents. 

I would like to focus on the specific human rights issues that the 

current political impasse has brought to bear and describe in more 

detail exactly how they will be affected by the events of the hour. 

So let me first discuss the key human rights issues in play in 

this current political impasse. The parameters of the standoff are 

well documented. The ruling party, the Awami League, has refused 

the BNP’s demands for a caretaker government. As a result, and 

as the other witnesses have already said, there is a very real possibility that the BNP and most of its political allies will boycott the 

election, and thus the subsequent Parliament and the government 

that those elections would create. 

So let’s discuss what that will lead to. With that instability will 

come political volatility. In boycotting before and after the elections, the BNP and its allies will presumably hold protests, cartels, 

shutting down transit, and economic activity in key urban areas. 

And in response, state security forces will use force of varying 

types; some of it responsive, some of it proactive. And perhaps none 

of this would be too worrisome in the abstract were it not for the 

fact that cartels and security forces’ responses to them are almost 

always accompanied by violence. Mob attacks by the political factions and excessive use of force by state actors. And some of the 

worst violence so far this year occurred between gangs of rival 

party activists, both from the Awami League, BNP, and Jamaat, 

none of whose leaders, it should be noted today, have done much 

to restrain their supporters during that violence. 

Many people are likely to be injured in the future political violence that would accompany a boycott and likely a large number 

of people will be killed. Many people will also be detained. And I 

want to emphasize that this political violence is illegal violence. 

Every government is entitled, even obligated, to use police powers 

to maintain order, even the use of force, so long as it is proportional and not excessive. 

The problem is that in Bangladesh, security forces usually don’t 

exercise force and measured and proportional way. Human Rights 

Watch has documented Bangladeshi security forces using excessive 

force in responding to street protests for years, but including major 

violence this year, for instance, the violence in early May that 

killed approximately 50 people. By our estimates, security forces 

have killed almost a 150 people and injured as least 2,000 since 

February of this year. And while large numbers of protesters have 

been arrested, the Bangladeshi authorities haven’t held anybody 

accountable among the security forces for excessive force. 

So this political instability is going to make matters worse. And 

if the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, we have 

very serious causes for concern. 

35

But the violence is not the only concern. Heightened political volatility in coming weeks and months is going to lead to other kinds 

of abuses of civil and political rights. Crackdowns on freedom of 

speech, harassment of journalists’ activities, civil society groups. 

This is already underway. The committee is aware, of course, that 

a key human rights group in Bangladesh, Odhikar, had several 

members jailed this year. One remains in custody. The harassment 

of Odhikar continues. I went to Odhikar’s offices last week in 

Dhaka during a passing visit to Bangladesh, and there were two 

men on each corner of the street who, from looks and manner, I 

took to be plainclothes police officers. Their overt surveillance was, 

frankly, pathetic and thuggish. If nothing else comes of this hearing, we can at least call on Bangladesh’s Government to end this 

shameful harassment of civil society groups. 

The committee is also aware that overbroad and vague laws, 

such as the Information Communication Technology Act, are being 

used to target groups simply for acts of free speech. This act has 

been used not only against Odhikar but against journalists and 

against bloggers in recent months. The breakdown of the political 

order in Bangladesh is also going to have knockoff effects on other 

human rights issues beyond the political realm. There are many 

other human rights issues in Bangladesh, as the committee is 

aware. Women’s rights issues, which Human Rights Watch has reported on; the labor rights issues that are the issue of the day; and 

international justice issues connected to the tribunal. 

Human Rights Watch has supported and continues to support efforts to hold perpetrators responsible for the terrible crimes of the 

1971 conflict. But as the chairman has made clear already, that tribunal has been marred by deficiencies which have undermined the 

integrity of its processes. And since this process includes the death 

penalty, there is good reason for human rights groups, such as 

ours, to be quite concerned. 

So all of these important human rights issues will be impacted 

by the possible breakdown of political order in Bangladesh. The 

consequences are clear. 

So what can be done to address all of this? Well, the United 

States and other governments have already stated their concerns 

from Secretary of State Kerry writing to Sheikh Hasina and the 

leaders of the opposition to your visit 2 week ago to secretary—Assistant Secretary Nisha Biswal’s visit just this past weekend. The 

message has been delivered. But it will help for Congress to further 

reinforce that message and back up those concerns with warnings 

about the consequences to Bangladesh if this political crisis spins 

out of control. Everything Bangladesh wants and needs today, tariff reductions, goodwill in Europe to maintain low tariffs there, continued use of Bangladesh military forces from U.N. Peacekeeping, 

which is a key source of revenues of the military, involvement in 

regional security and strategic frameworks, all of this will be put 

at risk if Bangladesh suffers a political implosion. And, on some 

level, Bangladesh’s leaders already know this, but it always helps 

to remind them. 

And I hope that this committee hearing does that today. Thank 

you for allowing me to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sifton follows:]

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85642c-1.eps

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Hearing of November 20, 2013 

Bangladesh in Tnrmoil: A Nation on the Brink? 

Testimony of John Sifton 

Asia Advocacy Director 

Human Rights Watch 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today at this well-timed hearing. Human rights issues are a 

central topic of any proper discussion of Bangladesh's current situation, and Human Rights 

Watch appreciates the opportunity to highlight key areas of concern. 

Other witnesses have discussed Bangladesh's dire political situation and the risks it presents. 

would like to focus on the human rights implications of the current political impasse, and 

describe in more detail what human rights issues will be affected or impacted by events in the 

next few months. I will also discuss a few key human rights issues-not as high profile but still 

important-that are likely to be ignored or upstaged by political events in the near future. 

Let me turn first to the political situation, and layout what Human Rights Watch believes are the 

key human rights issues in play. The parameters of the standoff are well known: Bangladesh's 

ruling party, the Awami League, has refused the opposition party BNP's demands for a caretaker 

government to administer elections next year. As a result, there is a very real possibility that the 

BNP, and most of its political allies, will boycott the elections and thus the subsequent 

parliament and government those elections create. 

With this instability will come political volatility. In boycotting before and after the elections, the 

BNP and its allies will presumably hold protests-hartals in the Bangladesh vernacularshutting down transit and economic activity in key urban areas. In response, state security forces 

will use force of varying types, some of it responsive to events, some of its pro-active. 

Perhaps none of this would be too worrisome in the abstract, were it not for the fact that hartals 

and security forces' responses to them are in almost all cases accompanied by violence: mob 

attacks by political factions, and excessive use of force by state actors. Some of the worst 

violence so far this year occurred between gangs of rival party activists from the Awami League, 

BNP and Jamaat-none of whose leaders, it should be noted, have done much to restrain their 

supporters. Many people are likely to be injured in future political violence, and likely a large 

number of people will be killed. Many people will also be detained. 

T want to emphasize that much of the potential violence T am discussing here would be violence 

in violation of law. Every government is entitled, even obligated, to exercise police powers to 

maintain order-even the use of force, so long as it is proportional and not excessive. The 

problem is that in Bangladesh, security forces don't usually exercise force in a measured and 

proportional way. On the contrary, as Human Rights Watch has repeatedly documented, 
37


85642c-2.eps

Bangladesh security forces have a long track record of using excessive force against protestors, 

even targeting them intentionally-as well as arresting and abusing detainees. To put in simple 

tenns, they shoot people, sometimes intentionally, and often with extreme reclJessness. 

Human Rights Watch documented this year that Bangladeshi security forces frequently used 

excessive force in responding to street protests, including major violence between lslamist 

protestors and security forces in early May that killed approximately 50 people. By our 

estimates, security forces have killed almost 150 protesters and injured at least 2,000 since 

February 2013. And while large numbers of protesters have been arrested at various points this 

year, the Bangladeshi authorities have made no meaningful efforts to hold members of the 

government's own security forces accountable for the frequent exercises of excessive force. 

Current political instability willlikel y make matters worse. If the best predictor of future 

behavior is past behavior, Bangladeshi security forces' record is serious cause for concern. The 

ruling Awami League knows the record itself quite well: when it was in opposition, their 

members suffered the same abuse, and Human Rights Watch was there to document it. 

Violence is not the only concern. Heightened political volatility in coming weeks and months is 

also likely to lead to other kinds of abuses of civil and political rights. Not only are opposition 

political leaders likely to be detained and abused, there is also a high likelihood of crackdowns 

on freedom of speech-harassment of journalists' activity and civil society groups in particular. 

The committee is aware of course that officials from a key human rights group in Bangladesh, 

Odhikar, were jailed this year-one remains in custody. The government has used overbroad or 

vague laws, such as the Information Communication Technology Act, to target groups simply for 

acts of free speech. In the government's view, it seems to be a crime to publicize facts or 

opinions that the government does not want to have publicized. The ICT Act, amended with new 

provisions in August of this year, now poses a serious threat to the exercise of the right to 

freedom of speech in Bangladesh. The law has been used to charge not only the two Odhikar 

officials, but also Mahmdur Rahman, editor of the Amar Desh newspaper, and four bloggers who 

have been accused on the vague charge of defaming Islam. The Bangladesh government also 

closed two television stations, Diganta TV, and Islamic TV, while they were broadcasting 

images of the police operations against Islamist protesters in central Dhaka in May 2013. 

A breakdown in the political order of Bangladesh is also likely to have knock-off effects on other 

important human rights issues. There are many other human rights issues at stake in Bangladesh. 

Women's rights issues, for instance---the scourge of domestic violence and the need for 

important refonns to family law. Human Rights Watch recently documented, for instance, how 

lack of regulation and proper laws on marriages and divorces is a key contributor to violence 

against women, and called for key legal refonns. 

Tahor rights. Worker safety has been much in the spotlight in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza 

factory collapse and Tazreen factory fire, and small improvements have been observed in the 

ability of workers to organize. But key institutional changes still need to occur. The right to fonn 

unions, for instance, cannot be founded simply on new corporate sensitivities and the goodwill of 
38


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factory owners and corporate buyers. The government must institutionalize labor protections, 

and guarantee effective enforcement oflabor laws, which means recreating government 

institutions that oversee labor issues and making rights enforceable. Workers need to be able to 

call upon state institutions to protect their rights when those rights are being violated. 

Jnternatiol1Clljllstice. Human Rights Watch has supported and continues to support efforts to 

hold perpetrators responsible for the terrible crimes of the 1971 conflict that led to Bangladesh's 

independence. The tribunal that has been created to hear those cases, however, has been marred 

by serious deficiencies which have undennined the integrity of its process and the soundness of 

the tribunal's judgments-which have included, in eight cases, the death penalty. The tribunal's 

judgments have profound impact on Bangladesh's political scene, which is why observers have 

offered their constructive criticisms of the process-criticisms which have not been accepted. 

All of these important human rights issues will be impacted by the possible breakdown in the 

political order in Bangladesh. Important legal reforms needed to safeguard women's rights will 

be imperiled by entrenched political crisis. Labor rights concerns will suffer as continued 

protests further hurt production levels and lead to a contraction in labor needs, which in tum will 

weaken the capacity of workers' rights groups. The tribunal too will suffer as its decisions are 

increasingly seen as politicized, and cynicism dulls good faith efforts to fix its deficiencies. 

The consequences are clear. So what can be done to avert the worst outcomes" 

The United States and other governments have stated their concerns. Secretary of State Kerry 

raised all of these issues in a letter to Sheikh Hasina and the leader ofthe opposition, Khaleda 

Zia, earlier this year. Ambassador Dan Mozena has been vocal-as have you, Mr. Chairman, in 

your recent visit. Assistant Secretary of State Nisha Bilwas reinforced the message during her 

visit this past weekend. 

It will help, however, for Congress to further reinforce the message, and back up the concerns 

with warnings about the consequences for Bangladesh if its political crisis spins out of control. 

Everything Bangladesh's government wants and needs today-tariff reductions in the 

Generalized System of Preferences, good will in Europe to maintain low tariffs there, continued 

use of Bangladesh military forces for U.N. peacekeeping (a key source of revenue and national 

pride), involvement in regional security and strategic frameworks-all of this will be put at risk 

if Bangladesh suffers a political implosion. On some level, leaders in Bangladesh already know 

this-but it certainly helps to remind them. 

Thank you allowing me to testify today. 
39

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Sifton. 

Now members of the panel will have 5 minutes to ask questions 

of the witnesses. I will begin. 

It is too soon to say exactly how the elections will unfold in January. As history has shown, virtually anything is possible under 

Bangladeshi politics. However, we know that opposition leader 

Khaleda Zia met with Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina 2 days ago, I 

believe, in which apparently some encouraging words came out—

maybe a step forward. But at the same time, they split without an 

agreement, and Khaleda Zia still demands that Prime Minister 

Hasina step down from office and the caretaker government be put 

in place to oversee the national elections. 

Mr. Sifton, you already gave your analysis of what might happen. 

I would be interested to hear what Dr. Riaz and General 

Muniruzzaman think is the most likely scenario in your opinions 

to play out here? If you had to, what do you think is the most likely? 

Mr. RIAZ. I mean, lately the meeting between opposition leader 

and the President, the President has a very limited constitutional 

power. In that case, how much he would be able to intervene in 

this kind of situation is not very clear. Previous situations in the 

history tell that it is not. But he has moral power. There is no 

doubt in my mind that the President does carry some moral power 

if he wants to, a very limited constitutional one. 

And going forward, in terms of these three scenarios that are 

mentioned, I am not very much optimistic about an inclusive election at this point, unless something dramatic happens, and that is 

why I was suggesting that at least some form of accommodation of 

the opposition’s demand, including at least a cabinet not headed by 

the incumbent PM, prime minister, would be an option or deferral 

of the election, but the likely scenario is a non-inclusive election 

that Bangladesh is going to experience. I wish I am wrong, but as 

of today, that is what it looks like. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. General? 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

My first scenario is that Prime Minister Hasina will try and 

push toward a one-party election with disastrous consequences for 

country because if she does that, then the country will move in the 

path of instability because the post-election violence is going to be 

even higher than the preelection violence. 

The second option that I see is that if she finds it absolutely difficult to push toward the one-party election, which is her first desire, then she will probably ask the President to declare a state of 

emergency, by which she can stall the elections, buy more time for 

herself and perhaps think that she can bid up on the opposition 

and civil society to soften the stun and then come back to elections 

maybe after a year or a year and a half. 

The third option that I see is that the level of violence goes so 

high that the military reluctantly is sucked into the process to restore some bit of stability in the country and provide security to 

citizens. But that is the third option that I see. 

But in total, the current government’s stand in trying to solve 

the problem doesn’t seem to be apparent because prime minister in 

the last couple of days in forming the so-called interim government 

40

has shown that she does not really care about what sort of accommodation is needed to solve the problem. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Sifton, having heard the two comments there, what do you 

think the U.S. and the world’s response ought to be either in advance of the election or afterwards, depending on which option occurs? 

Mr. SIFTON. Well, in the coming weeks and months, just because 

the leadership of the Awami League so far has not heeded the 

warnings that so many people have given doesn’t mean the message shouldn’t continue to be delivered. I think, at some point, 

Sheikh Hasina will have to come to terms with the reality that if 

she forces through a one-party government, that it will only lead 

to unended, open-ended protests, which will put at stake everything that Bangladesh wants and needs right now. She may not realize it today, but she eventually will have to realize it. The question is, will it be too late by the time she realizes it? 

So, in any case, I think the message just needs to be brought 

again and again and again. She does not have within her own cabinet and government enough people telling her what to do. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time is expired. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Kind of the general thread that has been common through each 

of your testimonies has been your pessimism at a fair election and 

an open election as well as your agreement that if this does not 

occur that the post-election violence is likely to occur. 

I am wondering if you can tell me a little bit about that post election violence. Who is the target? Based on the scenarios that you 

are talking about, what constituencies are targeted in that scenario? 

Mr. RIAZ. The violence that is anticipated is mostly the post-election violence. If you look back, in 2001 and previous elections it 

was largely the religious minorities, ethnic minorities; they become 

a target of all these attacks that we have seen previously. In case 

of an election, if it is a non-inclusive election or unilateral election, 

however we identify it, definitely it would be the opposition activist 

political activists who would become target. 

But even before we reach to that kind of a situation, post-election 

situation, the election itself would be very violent if this is a noninclusive election because the opposition will tend not only call for 

a boycott, they might try to resist and hence the violence will 

spread. And I am afraid the violence might not stay within the 

boundaries of Bangladesh border. That is the most worrying part, 

and given the history of Bangladesh, of Islamist militancy, with left 

wing radicalism present, all these things are recipe for disaster. At 

this point, those are the ones that need to be taken into account 

as well. 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. This time, the political violence in the 

post-election period is not only going to be resisting the government 

by the opposition, it will be a question of existence of the opposition 

forces within the country. There has been statements given out by 

members of the current government that this is the last election 

41

between what they call pro forces and anti forces. So it is not going 

to be a political process of protest, but it is going to be a fight for 

existence of forces which are not included within the government. 

I also see that the level of protests can go so violent that there 

would be widespread loss of life and property within the country. 

And this has ramifications of spillover beyond the borders of Bangladesh, and Bangladesh, which is so closely bordering with Indian 

state and the level of violence that exists in the fenced border between India and Pakistan, where India and Bangladesh, where Indian border guards regularly kill Bangladeshi citizens, it is likely 

that the spillover impacts would have a tremendous amount of negative impact on the Indian state and the Indian side. 

I also see impacts on minorities, both religious minorities and 

ethnic minorities. So, therefore, it is going to become extremely 

fragile and volatile in the post-election period. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. Sifton, if in your answer you could also include your 

thoughts or your assessments of how the India-Bangladesh relationship is currently, especially as we are moving into this period. 

Mr. SIFTON. Well, first, about the election being unfair, it is not 

even necessary that the election be unfair for there to be protests. 

Suffice it to say, if the election is run by a government which is 

not bipartisan, multipartisan, it will be perceived to have been unfair, and that is all that really counts. There will be protests even 

if the election was run fully fairly and freely. So it is really about 

the perceptions. 

Second, about the violence that would occur, who would be targeted? I think it is important to understand that a lot of the violence during hartals is not directed. It can be—innocent people can 

be caught up in it. During hartals, many victims are ordinary civilians who are just going about their business trying to get around 

from point A to point B. It depends on what time of day it is. There 

are a lot of factors there. But it really is important to understand 

it is not necessarily violence directed at particular forces but rather 

widespread chaos where loss of life will be high. 

It is also important to recognize that it is not just political forces 

who have been targeted. The security forces themselves get targeted, and although they have a long track record of abuse, they 

are also are killed in this violence, ordinary police officers are 

killed. 

As far as the India-Bangladesh relationship goes, it is a very 

complex one. And I think it is full of, there are a lot of 

misperceptions about what India wants. It is very difficult to know 

exactly what India wants. But the important thing is for India to 

play a constructive role here and not back a winner or decide 

things like, but to insist that a process be run that mitigates and 

lessens the likelihood of widespread chaos and violence. That is the 

most important thing, not to pick a winner but to mitigate and 

lessen the likelihood of massive violence and human rights abuse. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

42

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate it. I have been moving in and out of meetings today 

as you well know. A couple of questions for any of you to answer 

and preferably all, Bangladesh has had a growing extremist movement pushing toward Islamic policies to be implemented. In that 

process, how likely is it that we would see civil strife between secular and religious groups to the extent that we have seen in some 

Middle Eastern, Egypt, other places where there is a growing problem? In your opinion, is that a growing problem? If so, and it was 

just mentioned in your testimony just a second ago about religious 

minorities. I would like to get your ideas, all three of your ideas 

on that. 

Mr. RIAZ. The conflict between the secularists and the Islamist 

forces, particularly in the past years, we have seen the rise of 

Islamist forces in Bangladesh; perhaps for a decade we have seen 

that. 

However, I would not say that it has reached to a point that 

there would be a conflict as we have seen in case of the Middle 

East. It is my understanding, and my understanding based on my 

research and others that there would be a growing tension, and 

that tension is already present in the case of Bangladesh. But all 

other political uncertainty may contribute to this kind of situation. 

And that is a worrying part of it. 

By itself, this is not going to transform into a conflict between 

the Islamists and the secularists. But if there is continued uncertainty, violence and political situations, instability within the political situation that might contribute to that kind of a conflict in future. But in short term, I don’t see that becoming a major element, 

though it would remain, constantly it will remain, as a reminder 

of Bangladeshis, I would say the issue of identity is there; of 

course, political ideological differences are there. And over a period 

it has grown. It might continue. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Mr. RIAZ. Thank you. 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. Thank you, sir. 

What I would like to say, what I said in the beginning, I emphasize again, any state of instability within the country by running 

a one-party election that the government plans now will have created a space for nonstate actors and extremist forces to thrive. And 

we already see some early signs of that in the form that there has 

been resurgence of small, splinter terrorist organizations which are 

surfacing in the last couple of months were completely not present 

in the scene before. 

We also see that there has been impact of the return of migrant 

workers in the country who bring a different kind of ideology of 

Islam back to Bangladesh which is based on the principles of Sufi 

Islam, and there is a silent clash of the Sufi Islam and Wahhabi 

brand of Islam that comes back with the migrant workers. 

We have also seen the impacts, without solid proof, of some Middle Eastern NGO money coming into Bangladesh and having its 

impact. We see that there has been a marginalization of people at 

the grass root and nondelivery of services by the state to its own 

citizens and people, so, therefore, the space has been created by 

that kind of a state of what I call the Hamas impact, where the 

43

state does not exist; the nonstate actors exist. Therefore, that kind 

of a situation is also bringing the specter of Islamic forces coming 

into the play and creating more space for themselves. But I don’t 

really see the kind of play that we are seeing in the Middle East 

or in the Arab Spring coming to Bangladesh any time soon. But I 

see that there will be a resurgent forces of Islamic elements coming 

into the fore if the government persists with the one-party election 

and destabilizes the country. 

Mr. SIFTON. I think it is a question of what it means to thrive. 

There is thriving and then there is thriving. It would be a mistake 

to fear a situation in which established political forces are so weakened that they cease to exist, and there is a vacuum which can only 

be filled by radical Islamist groups which suddenly come on the 

scene. That is not going to happen. The two established political 

entities, whatever happens, are going to remain on the scene for 

some time. What will happen, this thriving that the other witnesses are talking about, doesn’t necessarily mean thriving politically, but the bigger fear is that there are radical groups which 

would ally themselves with the established political orders. The established political groups would ally themselves with radical 

groups in order to gain political strength. 

Mr. COLLINS. But could we also be, in your testimony, could you 

be giving more of a Western thought of what thriving politically is 

and what may be thriving as they are mentioning in the destabilization and in an environment that is, we think of thriving——

Mr. SIFTON. They are not going to win elections. 

Mr. COLLINS. Right. But they don’t have to——

Mr. SIFTON. To be dangerous. 

Mr. COLLINS. So I think sometimes when we look at this, that 

is the sphere of us looking at it from American policy eyes that we 

look at it in terms of our, what we believe through the elections 

process they are talking about, it is interesting to hear the dichotomy here of the two answers there is a problem from our perception and the perception on the ground. So, Mr. Chairman, I think 

that is something that, if my time is over, I think that is something 

that I think has infiltrated this region for a long time and is understanding the ground work on definitional issues and things that we 

can work on, you know, from American perspective and a foreign 

policy perspective and also from the indigenous perspective as well. 

So I appreciate your having this hearing, and I thank you very 

much. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for his comments. 

The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Meng, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Ranking Member. 

As we all know, Bangladesh is an important partner for the 

United States both as a strategic geographical ally and as a nation 

that yearns for the political and cultural tolerance, values that here 

in America we work tirelessly to promote abroad. 

My first question concerns accidents in manufacturing sites, like 

Rana Plaza and Tajrin Garments, reflecting a system of workers’ 

protection and labor standards that require improvement. Mr. 

44

Sifton has outlined the need for government institutionalized labor 

reform, like the formation of unions in his written testimony. 

How can the United States facilitate the explicit writing and passage of such reform and what are some other avenues through 

which we can incentivize real and quantitative labor reform? 

Mr. SIFTON. So what is going on right now with the GSP road 

map to return Bangladesh to getting GSP is the best leverage to 

get the legal reforms and the institutional reforms that Bangladesh’s Department of Labor to the labor law itself. The fact of 

the matter is the federations on the ground and the other institutions, labor rights organizations on the ground, know fully well exactly what is wrong with Bangladesh’s labor law and what needs 

to be fixed. 

They have written memos on it with recommendations. It is just 

a question of getting those political changes made to the law and 

getting the department of labor in Bangladesh to make institutional changes to make those labor law provisions, you know, real, 

so that workers are actually protected. 

But all of that will be put at risk if there is a political crisis in 

Bangladesh and that is why this is such a serious moment in the 

political realm. 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. Bangladeshi labor standards have a lot 

of questions to be answered. On this, I suggest that our international friends and partners, particularly the United States and 

the bigger markets where Bangladeshi goods go, particularly the 

ready-made garments, there has to be also positive kind of engagement both on a public and private sector involvement with our industry in Bangladesh. So I am calling for the U.S. Government to 

engage Bangladesh and its industry. I am also calling for the U.S. 

private sector, the retailers, the big Walmarts of the world, to come 

forward and engage Bangladesh effectively and positively. 

So there has to be a bipartisanship kind of effort in trying to look 

at the problem and solving the problem. The labor standards are 

in a very sorry state. We need labor law reforms. We need the federations to come and play effective roles. But the existing laws that 

exist in the country are also very laxly implemented. So we need 

better governance by the government to implement the existing 

laws so the existing laws also are not bypassed by the people and 

the industry, and we don’t want to see the kind of crony capitalism 

where industrialists close to the government in power can do 

things and go about doing things with impunity. Thank you. 

Mr. RIAZ. It is largely a matter of shared responsibility. What 

happened in Bangladesh, the ready-made garment sector, for example, is a result of private entrepreneurship, and it has benefitted 

from this lax administrative and labor laws. But it is time to utilize 

those, implement those. And more importantly, it cannot be done 

only from within the country. Given that it is largely for the export 

sector, there has to be some commitment from outside, and here I 

see the role of international community, particularly the United 

States and the European Union, given the European Union is the 

largest market of ready-made garments, there should be political 

engagement. Penalizing is not going to help at this moment. More 

positive engagement is necessary, not only at the government level 

but at the civil society level and also with those who own the inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Jan 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\112013\85642 HFA PsN: SHIRL
45

dustry, the entrepreneurs that make contributions and the laborers, basically who have built this industry from absolutely nothing. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you so much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady yields back. 

We will begin a second round now. I will recognize myself for 5 

minutes. 

I would now like to focus at least my attention on Bangladesh’s 

international criminal tribunal. 

Mr. Sifton, if I could start with you, what actions might the U.S. 

Government take at this point to urge the Government of Bangladesh to bring the tribunal into compliance with international 

standards, assuming that they are not yet, given the Bangladeshi 

Government’s unwillingness thus far to implement the recommendations of U.S. Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice, 

Stephen Rapp, which were offered at the request of the 

Bangladeshi Government about a year and a half ago? What would 

your comment be on that? 

Mr. SIFTON. Well, again, as with a lot of other issues, the patient 

isn’t taking the medication, so it is very tough to know exactly 

what to do in that context. 

Ambassador Rapp has made some very good recommendations. I 

feel that Human Rights Watch has made some very good recommendations. But they haven’t been taken to heart. There is no 

leverage as there is with the Cambodian tribunal with funding because there is no international funding for the tribunal so there is 

very little left to do except continue insisting on it. 

But the one key thing that really drives home the reality is the 

depoliticization. It is one thing to talk about the shortcomings, procedural shortcomings of the tribunal. It is another to talk about the 

execution of defendants, the death penalty, in a political context. 

And I think there is a place where the European Union, which is 

opposed to the death penalty, and the U.S., which has a more 

nuanced view, can get together and say, whether you support the 

death penalty or not, carrying out death sentences, executions, in 

a political context either in the lead up or the immediate aftermath 

of an election is a bad recipe for the perception that there is real 

justice going on. And that is a warning that the EU and the United 

States can make together. Even India could say that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Let me ask any of the witnesses who would like to comment on 

this, there have been reports about several disappearances of witnesses for the defense, one of whom turned up apparently without 

explanation in an Indian jail. There are reports about the forced 

resignation of the supreme court justice over allegations of inappropriate conversations outside the courtroom with prosecutors, allegations about the defense being limited in one case to about three 

witnesses, and then the prosecution having far more witnesses 

than that. 

Are there any comments on those? Are they true as far as we 

know? What concerns relative to fairness and international standards do they raise? Especially, as was indicated, when we were 

dealing with potential death sentences here. I would be happy to 

hear from any of the witnesses that might want to comment. 

46

Mr. SIFTON. One just quick factual point is that the supreme 

court justice in question who resigned did not deny the allegations 

that he had improperly communicated with prosecutors. These 

were conversations that were intercepted by some means and given 

transcripts to the Economist magazine, which published them, and 

in resigning, he never denied the substance of those. So those allegations are out there. They haven’t been rebutted, and they are 

very, very serious, but I just wanted to factually state this. 

Mr. CHABOT. So they are not necessarily just allegations that this 

happened, at least in that case? I guess the witnesses either were 

allowed three witnesses and the other side allowed more or they 

weren’t; these are facts that can be determined independently, I am 

assuming. 

Would any of the other witnesses like to comment on this? 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. Although there is widespread acceptance of the trial in Bangladesh by the Bangladesh citizens, but 

many Bangladeshis are not comfortable with the kind of standards 

that we have maintained in the trial because to bring closure to a 

case of historical proportion, we have to have standards at the 

highest order of international standards of legal practices. 

The questions that you, Mr. Chairman, point out were allegations which were not clarified by the government, so, therefore, 

there is a wide perception that perhaps those happened. And if 

those are true, then even many citizens would become very uncomfortable when such sentences are going up to the level of death sentences passed against the people who are convicted. 

I think we, not only as citizens, but as international friends who 

observe the trials, we should continue to engage Bangladesh Government in trying to encourage them to have high moral standards 

of international legal standards in the courts and the practices. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Doctor, did you want to comment? 

Mr. RIAZ. I will briefly state that two things are here: Procedural, some of them procedural problems that we have seen. Of 

course, that needs to be recognized and therefore international engagement with international crime tribunals need to be continued. 

However, at the same time, we need to put this in the historical 

context of Bangladesh that over the past 42 years. These trials are 

also a matter of closure of the Bangladeshis of the past. 

This needs to in some way, a nation was a victim in 1971, and 

I personally don’t consider it as a victim of one individual who was 

killed. The issue of what crime is largely related to the nation, and 

that is why it needs to be put into this historical context and understand why this was necessary, and why there is a widespread 

support. 

So, procedural questions notwithstanding, it should not be separated from the issue of justice for the victim, and here I see victim 

the whole nation as a victim rather than individuals. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

My time is expired. I now recognize the chairman of the Foreign 

Affairs Committee, Ed Royce, the gentleman from California. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

47

I would like to get down to the bottom line in terms of what has 

happened in Bangladesh and what I think is the underlying reason. I don’t think it is dissimilar to what I have seen in Pakistan. 

In Pakistan, you have the Deobandi schools, and out of these 

particular 600 that we are most concerned about are graduated 

young men who believe in a jihadi philosophy. Now they are able, 

because of their use of tactics of terror, to then move against a domestic population that maybe does not share their same views, and 

they usually target their wrath against, well, in Pakistan, it was 

Hindus and Christians and others. 

In Bangladesh today, if we go back to 1947 and we know a lot 

of this happened at the outset, but you have a total of 49 million 

Hindus missing from the rolls. Many of them of course went to 

India, but recently, we have a situation where you have got 1,500 

Hindu homes, 50 Hindu temples burned to the ground, and it is not 

just Hindus. It is also Christians. It is also atheists. It is also 

animists. It is those who do not take the most fundamentalist viewpoint. 

Now that is not most people in Bangladesh. It is a small percentage of the population. But it is that population that has been 

radicalized and has not been given an education, a wider, broader 

education. Indeed, the books that they study in are not even in the 

Bengal language. They are not even in the Bangladeshi tongue. 

They are studying something that they don’t even understand. 

They don’t know Arabic. So, when they graduate, they don’t know 

anything except what they have been brainwashed to believe, 

which is that it is their mission to go out and try to force conversions. And they do that by oftentimes by kidnapping girls or kidnapping women. They do that also by sowing terror. 

And we have a situation also where local police sometimes blame 

the Hindu population, despite what I have just described to you, 

all of that destruction, when that last came, up a mob of thousands 

descended on the capital, as you know, thousands of radicals, demanding a change in the constitution, demanding that basically 

their views supersede the views of the wider community. But some 

police said, well, you know, we have a situation where the Hindus 

created some of the violence because they originally interfered with 

the construction of a mosque. 

Now, unless the state in Bangladesh is ready to come forward 

and close these particular Deobandi schools, the ones that have 

been identified as the most radical, the ones that are telling their 

charges, their graduates, to go out and commit this kind of violence, Pakistan, like Bangladesh, are going down roads here where 

the consequences will eventually engulf the state itself. You can see 

what is happening over in Pakistan when you don’t confront it, and 

many, many times we have raised this with officials inside Pakistan because we have seen the results. 

It is the same schools, right? It is the same movement. It is the 

same tactics. The results are going to be the same. You have a continued, effective removal of people who do not adhere to the views 

of the radicals. 

So just a quick response if you will, and do you think my judgment is correct here? Is this the wider, deeper problem? 

48

Mr. RIAZ. The schools that you are referring to, Congressman, 

are the Deobandi schools. There is a large number of them, of 

course. This issue has been addressed in some ways but not necessarily as robustly as it should be. There should be reform of education sector, and more importantly, these are the schools, the 

madrases, which are producing youth who are not exactly being 

able to participate in the economic activity. So there needs to be 

a reform. 

But at this point, I will say this is small numbers, and whether 

Bangladesh should travel the path that Pakistan has already traveled depends on the political will and overall political circumstances as well. And that is where I see this instability in Bangladesh is contributing to this kind of situation. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, you are down to a Hindu population that 

is now at 8.5 percent, and on an ongoing basis, we see the plight 

of minority populations. So the government is not doing enough to 

protect them. And part of that protection is to do something about 

these schools. 

Mr. RIAZ. I completely agree with you, Congressman. There have 

been structural issues. The Bangladeshi population, if you look into 

as I have done, from 1951 it has been, you know, the dwindling 

population, which I call the missing millions. And the state has 

never done what they should be doing. Irrespective of the political 

party in power, the Bangladeshi state has failed to protect this minority, not only the Hindus; as we have seen this situation, in the 

Buddhist population lately in Ramu that is what we have seen. 

This is an absolutely terrible situation that we are witnessing. 

Unless the state steps up and protects this one and that is why 

when Congresswoman asked about the issue of the post election violence, these are the most vulnerable populations that we see. And 

they become the first target of this kind of situation. So, not only 

in the context of the election, overall, these are the issues that need 

to be addressed. And we need, you know I would urge the international community to work closely with not only the Bangladesh 

Government but the civil society to make sure that these things are 

not repeated. We have seen it enough. And at some point, 

Bangladeshis and its partners and wellwishers need to stand up 

and say enough is enough. And this is the time we should say 

enough is enough. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Doctor. 

I appreciate it. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate our full committee chairman’s remarks of really taking the long view on this and looking at the root cause of some of 

these problems we have seeing the symptoms of and think it has 

to be included in the conversation. 

I wanted to pick up a little bit further on the issue of the tribunals. Despite the obvious flaws with the tribunals, clearly, this is 

an issue of bringing about justice 40 years later that is absolutely 

necessary for these heinous acts of violence against humanity. 

A little bit of a two-part question. It is my understanding that 

there was violence against Hindus and other minorities after recent 

49

rulings by the crime tribunal convicting some of these prominent 

leaders who were complicit in the 1971 attacks. 

If you could talk to me about how the government responded to 

these attacks in any way, if they did, and what more could be done 

to reduce them further? As well as what other forms of justice can 

be brought about for the families of the over 3 million victims of 

the massacres during that 1971 liberation movement? 

You can start, Dr. Riaz. 

Mr. RIAZ. Thank you. 

In regard to the violence that we have seen post the verdict 

throughout the whole country, and there has not been any effective 

measures from the government, and unfortunately, the government 

not only failed to protect them; subsequently, the government has 

not provided any support to them. The lip service is all that we 

have seen, same we have seen from the opposition party. 

So, at this point, it is not only we cannot simply wait and see 

what the government is going to do. It is more important that the 

civil society and particularly those NGOs who are active the rural 

areas, they need to work very closely in somehow preventing those 

kinds of things. Instead of waiting until the next thing happens, it 

needs to be preemptive rather than post-event some sort of support. 

So that is an issue that, going forward, one of the reforms of election and post-election situations are there. It is not only about 

today. It is not about tomorrow. There has to be some kind of an 

arrangement and it is an international support that Bangladesh 

needs, and civil society needs to be included in this. 

As for the international crime tribunal, as I have mentioned, and 

as, Congressman you have mentioned, that it is about the justice, 

and the heinous crime that has been perpetrated 42 years ago, the 

nation became a victim and there has to be justice. And this cannot 

be simply seen as a procedural matter one trial at a time. I think 

it is a matter of historical proportion, and that is why when we are 

talking about this 3 million people who have been killed, millions 

have been suffered, all things need to be taken into account. And 

there needs to be a closure, and that is what this trial is all about. 

That is how I see it. That is my opinion, although I have reservations about the trial process. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

General MUNIRUZZAMAN. In the violence that took place against 

minorities, not only Hindus by particularly also against Buddhists 

in the Ramu temple area, the government completely failed to protect minority rights and their property and their lives. But I would 

also like to mention here that minority casualties and violence did 

not only take place by Islamic elements in Bangladesh. It was a result of the very confrontation nature of politics between the two 

parties. So, therefore, a lot of violence was perpetrated by both the 

parties. In the case in Santhia, there were press reports evidence 

that the violence against the Hindus in the Pabna district recently 

was carried out by members close to the government’s ruling party 

and the press evidences came out where the Bangladesh Human 

Rights Commission had charged the government to say that the 

perpetrators must be brought to justice. 

50

So there is a kind of a proxy war that is going on between the 

two political elements or the two preliminary coalitions and parties, 

and somehow, the minorities happen to be in the middle, and they 

become the victims. 

I would urge that the Government of Bangladesh take a solid 

stand in protection of minorities who are very much a part of Bangladesh. 

Mr. SIFTON. I would only add to those excellent remarks by both 

witnesses that the issue really boils down to the politicization of 

the process. It has become politicized, and that has hurt it. It has 

hurt it as a vehicle for justice, as a vehicle for truth, as a vehicle 

for healing, everything, because it has been politicized, that has 

been impacted. 

The fact that the government is allergic to any kind of criticism 

whether it comes from Human Rights Watch or in publications by 

the Economist or by Stephen Rapp, it is in some cases an indicator 

of that. 

On the issue of violence against minorities, it is a serious problem. And I think Mr. Royce is right to bring it up, you are all right 

to focus on this. The government has an obligation to stop violence 

against minorities, whether it is committed by political parties or 

by more radical elements. 

The only thing I would observe, though, is that there is a distinction here between Pakistan. In Pakistan, you have a government 

security forces, parts of which are supporting radical elements 

within the government. 

Thankfully, we do not yet have any evidence of that sort of thing 

going on here, where the apparatus of state security services is actually fomenting radical groups for their own proxy reasons. If that 

were to occur, then you we really have a very dangerous situation. 

But thankfully, it has not yet. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

I would like to thank our panel this afternoon for their testimony. I think it was excellent. I want to particularly thank the 

General for flying all the way from Bangladesh to be present at 

this hearing. 

Members will have 5 days to supplement their remarks or submit questions. If there is no further business to come before the 

subcommittee, we are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

52

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85642n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

u.s. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman 

November 20, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2172 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

\V\\",'i foreignaft'air§liUllsc"goV): 

DAn:: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, November 20,2013 

2:00 p.m. 

Bangladesh in Turmoil: A Nation on the Brink? 

Ali Riaz, Ph.D. 

Public Policy Scholar 

Woodrow Wilson Center 

Maj. General A.M.N. Muniruzzaman 

President 

Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies 

Mr John Sifton 

Asia Advocacy Director 

Human Rights Watch 

By Direction of the Chairman 

The Committee O/J Po, eJ;;n ,..,'f(LJIiS seeb !rJ JIluke JTI ,;lClld!es acces.\Jhlc m peJ.lOns WlTh dlsu'/nlme.1 l(you me In need of.\peclul acc()Jl1lnOdaTlO11.1 pl&wc call 

2U2'225-5U21 at il',l)rjollr hlHmesr dm"s III advance afthR I'W'Iif, 1thRIJC"'v'('f praCticohil'. QlJemon~ wIth rrgord to ~pecl<ll {l('commodatlOm In genl'loi (inc/IJdmg 

avmlablhty 0/ Conmnttee matenais In alternatl1'e/ormots and 03S1Sttve I1stemng di?17Ces) may be directed to the CO!lJlmttee. 
53

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85642m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ________ A"'"c.:,h:.;, &:;.::;.:Ih~e p=-'''''''''ifi'''c _______ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date ___ I"'I"-/,"'-:2"'OI-"I"'3 ___ Roomc ___ -"'2"-1J..,72"----__ 

Starting Time 2'5111 m Ending Time 4:11 p.m 

Recesses ~I ( __ to __ ) L-to __ ) L-to __ ) L-to __ ) L-to __ ) L-to __ ) 

Presiding Mcmbcr(s) 

Chairman Steve CllUhot (R-OH) 

Clteck all of tlte followillg tltat apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised [ZJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Bangladesh in Turmoil: A Nation on the Brink? 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Recol'd~taped) [ZJ 

Stenographic Record [{] 

Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI), Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), Rep. Gerald Connolly (D-VA), Rep. Doug Collins 

(R-GA) 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members offull committee.) 

Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA), Rep. Grace Meng (D-NY) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes 0 No D 

(If "no ", please list below and include title, agency, deparlmenf, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statelllents submitted/or the record.) 

Rep. Gerald Connolly's (D-VA) statement!or the record; 

1\ 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

01' 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 4'_'I~lp,-I_" __ 

Subconimil'tec St'aff Director 
54

printed here but is available in subcommittee records.]

[NOTE: Material submitted by the Hindu American Foundation (HAF) is not ref

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85642d.eps