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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 4, 2013

Serial No. 113–94

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Judith Cefkin, Senior Advisor for Burma, Bureau of East Asia and 

the Pacific, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 8

Mr. Vikram J. Singh, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and 

Southeast Asia, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian 

and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ............................... 22

Mr. Gregory Beck, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, U.S. 

Agency for International Development .............................................................. 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Judith Cefkin: Prepared statement ................................................................ 11

Mr. Vikram J. Singh: Prepared statement ............................................................ 24

Mr. Gregory Beck: Prepared statement ................................................................. 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and responses from: 

Ms. Judith Cefkin ................................................................................................ 58

Mr. Vikram J. Singh ............................................................................................ 64

Mr. Gregory Beck ................................................................................................. 66

Written responses from Mr. Vikram J. Singh to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Arizona .................................................................................... 72

(1)

OVERSIGHT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

I would like to welcome everyone. Our colleagues will be here 

shortly. We are going to have votes here that is going to interrupt 

this probably any minute. And then I am going to try to get my 

statement in and probably the ranking member’s as soon as he gets 

here. 

We would like to welcome the folks here, the witnesses, and the 

members of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 

The ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega, is not able to be here 

today, so Mr. Bera will sit in his place this afternoon. Mr. Bera and 

I will make opening statements and other members will be recognized for 1 minute, assuming the timing goes right for all of this. 

In many ways, the Burma we see today is much different than 

the one we knew only a few years ago, at least at first glance. The 

sudden and unexpected democratic transition, which opened Burma’s frontier to the world, was welcomed by democracy advocates 

everywhere. In fact, I traveled to Burma in August of last year and 

saw a number of these changes. 

To be sure, we are all pleased that Nobel Peace Prize winner 

Aung San Suu Kyi is finally free and a duly elected member of Parliament. The same can be said of the regime’s actions to release 

nearly 30,000 jailed citizens, of which 1,071 were political prisoners. 

However, as we have seen, the political and social situation in 

Burma is extremely fragile, and there is still much work to be 

done. The escalation of human rights abuses committed by the Burmese military and the civil unrest between Burma’s Buddhist majority and Muslim minority is threatening the progression of future 

political reforms. Regrettably, the rise of anti-Muslim violence has 

so far displaced over 250,000 individuals, destroyed over 10,000 

homes, and killed nearly 300 people. Evidence shows the Burmese 

military perpetrated some of these attacks directly. In other situaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120413\85789 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

tions, the military and police just stood by and watched the violence unfold. 

What is not often mentioned is that over the last year or so, 

nearly 1,000 Rohingya and 200 Kachin prisoners of conscience of 

have been arrested and detained for their religion or ethnicity, or 

for practicing their right to freedom of assembly. This, I think, 

most would agree, is unacceptable. 

A year ago, President Obama received 11 commitments from 

President Thein Sein, which were reaffirmed in May when he made 

an official visit to the White House. However, those commitments 

remain largely ignored. These unfulfilled promises include establishing a U.N. High Commissioner for human rights office, allowing 

international humanitarian access to conflict areas, taking decisive 

action in the Rakhine State to end discrimination of the Rohingya 

Muslims, and ending illicit weapons deals with North Korea, 

among others. 

Despite substantial evidence that reforms are languishing behind 

a corrupt governing system that is still being manipulated by the 

veiled hands of the military, the Obama administration has moved 

forward with offers of more rewards, deals, and concessions. Over 

the last year, the administration has lifted investment sanctions; 

lifted import bans; allowed Burma’s military to observe COBRA 

GOLD—the largest military exercise in the world; lifted visa bans 

on top Burmese politicians; hosted President Thein Sein at the 

White House; signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; began the process of admitting Burma into the Generalized 

System of Preferences program; and initiated military-to-military 

engagement. 

It is, as a result of these actions, that today’s hearing is being 

called to examine the administration’s decision to transition from 

an ‘‘action-for-action’’ engagement strategy to one that I believe it 

labels as ‘‘proactive.’’ This contrasts with America’s longstanding 

Burma policy that enjoyed support on both sides of the aisle. Years 

of bipartisan cooperation in Congress, which resulted in the imposition of widespread sanctions on Burma, is now, I am afraid, being 

overlooked. 

As the administration has raced to turn Burma into its success 

story, I believe its engagement strategy has lost sight of the realities on the ground, and has become hasty and I am afraid also misguided. I do not believe the administration has provided enough 

time for nascent political reforms in Burma to take route. As a result, it is premature to assess whether the changes we have seen 

are genuine because Burma has not yet demonstrated it is committed to a long-term path of democratic governance. Constitutional revisions that implement reforms at the central and local 

levels have not occurred. So until this happens, all the optimism 

and hope is purely speculation. 

Specifically, I want to focus on the administration’s unilateral decision to pursue engagement with Burma’s military. As we have 

seen elsewhere in the world, unconditioned military assistance can 

lead to unanticipated outcomes. Absent any fixed expectations or 

benchmarks to measure reforms, the U.S. is throwing away what 

may be, since most sanctions have been lifted, its last point of leverage that could help foster further reforms in Burma. 

3

In early June, then Secretary Leon Panetta stated that the U.S. 

was interested in improving its military ties with Burma if that 

country continued implementing democratic reforms and improved 

its human rights record. Less than 6 months later, reforms have 

stalled, and the country faces a situation U.S. Ambassador Mitchell 

calls ‘‘two steps forward, one step back,’’ and human rights abuses 

continue. Nevertheless, the U.S. is still moving forward on a policy 

fueled by hope. 

The administration’s decision to pursue a military-to-military relationship with Burma ignores and disregards the concerns of Burma’s ethnic minorities who continue to express their opposition. 

They believe pre-conditions must first be met before these relations 

progress any further. With that in mind, I hope today’s witnesses 

will finally detail the administration’s short- and long-term plans 

to implement its policy, including how military engagement will 

end the Burmese military’s perpetration of human rights violations, help Burma achieve national reconciliation, reform Burma’s 

Constitution, or create an independent judiciary. I hope we can 

learn how it plans to proceed in working with military leaders who 

have not demonstrated a sincere interest in reforms, have not 

ended violations of human rights laws, have not adhered to 

ceasefire agreements, and have not held their own accountable for 

their horrendous crimes. Without such a roadmap, it remains very 

unclear whether future reforms in Burma will be consistent with 

goals established under U.S. laws. 

Lastly, the reopening of the USAID mission in Burma was an 

important step in our engagement strategy because there is a critical need for Americans on the ground to assess what is actually 

happening there. At the same time, with all of these lingering concerns about Burma’s future, it is prudent that U.S. assistance is 

targeting those areas and helping those communities in most need. 

So I hope today’s witnesses can also provide us with more details 

about the growing foreign assistance budget for Burma, and those 

areas where additional funding has been requested. 

I would also note that we will be welcoming the gentleman from 

New York, Mr. Crowley, and the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, this afternoon. They will be joining us. I ask unanimous 

consent that they be permitted to speak and ask questions after 

members of the subcommittee have done so. Without objection, so 

ordered. 

Mr. Bera is not here yet this afternoon. Mr. Brooks, would you 

like to make an opening statement? Okay. We will go into recess 

here while we go vote. We will be back in a little while. We have 

two votes, so I am guessing it will be approximately 1⁄2 hour. I 

apologize for any inconvenience to everybody. It is kind of these 

‘‘hurry up and wait’’ things, but votes have been called, so we have 

to go and do our constitutional duty. We will be back shortly. 

We are in recess. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come back to order. 

I have already given my opening statement. I would now like to 

recognize Ami Bera, who is filling in for Mr. Faleomavaega this 

afternoon as the ranking member. We have already recognized that 

Mr. Crowley of New York and Mr. Franks of Arizona will be able 

4

to speak. If they would like to give an opening statement for 1 

minute, they have that opportunity as well. 

I now recognize Mr. Bera for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, and thank you 

for the witnesses on this incredibly important hearing. 

Obviously, as we look to Burma as a country and future democratic ally, it is a nation that is at a crossroads, you know, emerging from, you know, what certainly has been a difficult past and 

hopefully a future filled with promise. But certainly that opportunity is not without challenge, and I certainly look forward to 

hearing your testimony as witnesses of how we, as a nation that 

fosters democracy, advance in that challenge. 

The last couple of years the Burmese Government has certainly 

made progress in instituting a number of democratic practices and 

a number of democratic reforms. Certainly, the release of political 

prisoners, the inking of a ceasefire agreement, and allowing the opposition to participate in Parliament are noteworthy events that occurred in Burma. 

That said, despite this progress, the challenges in building a nation that celebrates its rich and ethnic and religious diversity remain. You know, a few weeks ago, maybe a few months ago, we 

had a prior hearing on some of the ethnic issues and faith-based 

challenges that are occurring in the northern part of Burma, and 

certainly those challenges remain of great concern to most of us on 

this committee. We certainly are concerned about the ongoing violence and human rights abuses that we see occurring in Burma. 

Also, as the world’s greatest democracy, you know, we have to 

have a role, and I do believe our Burmese engagement policy 

should continue to be committed to seeing national reconciliation, 

transparency, and ethnic equality. We have also got to send a very 

clear message that we will not tolerate these human rights abuses 

and oppression. 

In addition, if military engagement continues with Burma, this 

arrangement must be strategically tailored with firm and clear 

human rights benchmarks aimed to drive the political reform that 

we hope to see. The U.S. needs to remain a strong supporter in 

South Asia and a leader in the global community in order to advance the respect and rule of law and human rights. 

I look forward to hearing your positions. I look forward to reviewing our positions and policies on Burma, and, you know, our role 

as the world’s leading democracy and continuing a peaceful transition for the military repression to a country of democratic rule. 

Thank you, and I will yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Bera. I appreciate it. 

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for the 

opportunity to raise such a critical issue and one here where the 

United States can have a truly serious impact. 

One of the topics of this hearing will be how the Department of 

State and the Department of Defense are reviewing military-tomilitary engagement with the Burmese army or the Burmese military. The Burmese military happens to be one of the worst oppresVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120413\85789 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

sors of human rights in recent history, and I urge the administration work closely with Congress throughout this process. 

The U.S. needs a policy response that is more long-term than 

just lifting military sanctions and setting broad objectives for milto-mil engagement, especially if we intend to be a leader in the region and help Burma become a more rights respecting country. 

We must have clear benchmarks for the Burmese military before 

any sanctions on the military are lifted. We know that the Burmese 

military wants the relationship with our military. Our actions must 

incentivize the military to reform. Benchmarks should focus on the 

implementation of constitutional reforms that curb the military’s 

control over the civilian government, transparency and accountability by the military, and to end abuses of ethnic and religious 

minorities. 

I recently returned from a congressional delegation to the Philippines. And among the many things I learned there during that 

trip was how the U.S. can have extensive impact on these countries 

in southeast Asia. The U.S. now has an opportunity to make a positive impact in Burma, but we must proceed extremely wisely and 

leverage the relationship we now have with Burma to encourage 

the necessary reforms. 

I thank you, Chairman Chabot, for the opportunity to speak 

today, and for addressing this very vital topic in your hearing. And 

I thank all of you for being here. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for 1 

minute to make an opening statement. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also, if I could—if 

you could pause the clock for a moment, I did note that you referred to me as Mr. Moakley. 

Mr. CHABOT. I apologize. 

Mr. CROWLEY. If I could be compared to any great Irish-American, it could be Mr. Moakley. So thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. That is what I had in mind. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I thank you for holding this hearing today, as well 

as my colleagues for being here, particularly Mr. Ami Bera, Congressman Bera from California, for his interest, and Mr. 

Faleomavaega from our side as well. Eni Faleomavaega has been 

a great champion of the U.S.-Asia relations for many, many years. 

I am sorry he can’t be here today. 

Many of you know that I am the lead sponsor of legislation that 

imposed many of the sanctions on Burma, the Block Burmese 

JADE Act in particular. I worked on this with our then-ranking 

member Tom Lantos, and fully took the responsibility of the legislation on after his passing. I also worked very closely with Mr. 

Lantos on the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. 

He was someone who was a true champion for human rights 

throughout the world, and Burma was no less a place of interest 

for Mr. Lantos. We miss him. 

As you know, the position of the Special Envoy to Burma, the list 

of individuals targeted for sanctions called the Specially Designated 

Nationals, or SDN list, and many other sanctions were created by 

the JADE Act, which I authored. 

6

All that being said, I have to be honest, I am increasingly concerned about the approach our administration has recently begun 

to take with respect to Burma, especially our apparent plans for 

mil-to-mil relations and the furtherance of them. And keep in 

mind, I am someone who initially supported the administration’s 

policy of action for action, but I think we are going well beyond 

that now. 

I am not opposed to talking to the Burmese regime, but I am 

against unilaterally lifting all sanctions and pressures and granting much sought after military training, if the situation in Burma 

is stalled or further rolled back. 

I have a more extensive opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I 

won’t read all. But, once again, focusing on I think a premature 

stage of moving toward more open relations, mil-to-mil relations, 

really from—going from DIILS to EIMET too soon, in my opinion. 

There has not been enough action for action. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I welcome 

them today. But I look forward also to the question and answer period in which I will be a little bit more direct. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And without objection, the 

gentleman’s full statement will be entered into the record. 

I would now like to turn to the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Rohrabacher, who is the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats Subcommittee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If 

there is a message the Government of Burma needs to hear from 

the Congress, it is you are not ready to be accepted into the family 

of free nations yet. You have made progress, but not enough, and 

we expect certain things to be addressed if you are indeed to be accepted as a legitimate democratic government, as with the other 

democratic governments in the world. 

The Burmese military is still conducting brutal and bloody operations against the ethnic peoples on the Thai-Burma border. The 

Burmese Government is permitting genocidal brutality against the 

Muslim population living in the western part of their country. And, 

again, I might add, Mr. Chairman, if indeed the Muslims of the 

world who are trying to—the moderate Muslims who are opposing 

radical Islam in this world are to take the West seriously, we must 

make sure that we are loud and clear when Muslims are being 

murdered genocidally in countries like Burma. 

So we need to step up, and we cannot start treating Burma as, 

I say, a democratic country where their job is done until we see 

some progress, especially in those areas. The Burmans—one last 

point, sorry. 

The Burmans were repressed by that horrible government that 

I was proud to have stood with these people for 20 years. They 

stood against this brutal dictatorship, but now what we have—see 

emerging is a country in which the Burmans are free but the Muslims are not, and the ethnic tribal people are not. That is not acceptable to the people of the United States if Burma is to be treated like any other democratic country. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

7

I would also like to recognize the presence this afternoon of Congressman Perry from Pennsylvania and I understand that no opening statement is necessary. Thank you very much. 

Before I introduce the witnesses, I would also like to recognize 

that we have a number of Burmese parliamentarians with us here 

this afternoon. If they want to stand up and be recognized, we 

would like to welcome you to the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 

Asia and the Pacific. If you would like to stand, we can recognize 

you. Thank you for being here. Thank you very much. [Applause.] 

I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel here this 

afternoon. We first have Judith Cefkin, who is a career member of 

the Senior Foreign Service. Prior to assuming her duties as Senior 

Burma Advisor, she served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. 

Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, from 2010 to 2013. She previously 

served as the Ambassador’s staff assistant and as a political officer. 

Since entering the Foreign Service in 1983, Ms. Cefkin has had 

overseas postings in Mexico City, Paris, and in Manila. She has 

also served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina; and as a desk officer for Rwanda, 

Burundi, and the Central African Republic; Deputy Director of the 

Office of Western European Affairs; and as Director of the Office 

of Nordic and Baltic Affairs. She received a B.A. in government 

from Smith College, and a master’s in international relations from 

the London School of Economics and Political Science. We welcome 

you this afternoon. 

I would also like to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary Vikram 

Singh. He is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and 

Southeast Asia within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Singh serves as 

the principal advisor for all policy matters pertaining to development and implementation of defense strategies for the South Asia, 

Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Before his appointment in April 

2012, Mr. Singh served as Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Policy on Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He was 

the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at 

the Department of State. Mr. Singh lived and worked in Sri Lanka, 

where he ran a Ford Foundation program on minority rights and 

conflict in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and 

reported on the Sri Lankan civil war. He holds degrees from the 

University of California at Berkeley and Columbia University. We 

welcome you here, Mr. Singh. 

Finally, we have Deputy Assistant Administrator Gregory Beck, 

who serves as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia. His management and oversight responsibility includes all USAID programs 

in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. He has over 15 years 

of senior-level leadership experience in development and in conflict 

and post-conflict environments, including in Asia, Africa, and the 

Balkans, and Caucasus’. He was formerly Director of the Office of 

Humanitarian Assistance with CHF International and he held a 

number of positions with the International Rescue Committee, including as Senior Regional Director of Asia and Country Director 

in Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Croatia. During Mr. Beck’s career 

with the IRC, he led emergency response teams in Somalia, Rwanda, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma. Mr. Beck has a master’s deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120413\85789 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

gree in environmental engineering from the California State University at Humboldt and a bachelor’s degree in foreign service and 

international politics from Pennsylvania State University. He 

speaks Nepalese and has studied Thai, Kiswahili, Croatian, and 

Kenya-Rwanda. That is a mouthful. We appreciate your presence 

and we are looking forward to your testimony this afternoon. 

Ms. Cefkin, we will turn to you first. We do have the 5-minute 

rule in effect here. The yellow light will come on letting you know 

you have 1 minute to wrap up, and then the red light will come 

on. We would appreciate it if you would complete your testimony 

at that time, if at all possible. 

Ms. Cefkin, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. JUDITH CEFKIN, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR 

BURMA, BUREAU OF EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. CEFKIN. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Bera, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about U.S. policy toward Burma and the important transition that is underway in that country. 

Members of Congress, and particularly those on this committee, 

have been powerful proponents of human rights and democracy in 

Burma over the past two decades. I know that we share the goal 

of supporting reforms that complete Burma’s transition to become 

a democratic, peaceful, prosperous member of the world community. We tackle this test cheered by the advances that have been 

made, yet cognizant of the substantial challenges that remain. 

Thank you for your past and future partnership in supporting Burma’s reform progress. 

When then-Assistant Secretary Campbell testified before this 

committee in April 2012, a historic—by election had just brought 

Aung San Suu Kyi and 42 other members of the opposition, National League for Democracy, into government, but the NLD members had not yet taken their seats in Parliament. Today, they are 

active leaders there. 

Since 2011, the Government of Burma has released over 1,100 

political prisoners. It has substantially eased media censorship. 

Burma has signed the International Atomic Energy Additional Protocol and taken steps toward fulfilling its obligation to implement 

U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea. And the 

government and ethnic armed groups have intensified efforts to 

achieve peace and national reconciliation. 

Nearly 4 years after we started down the path of principled engagement, the culture of reform in Burma is increasingly self-driven, yet Burma’s transition remains fragile. The lifting of the authoritarian regime’s heavy hand has exposed long-standing challenges, including a struggle to define national identity. 

Communal conflict and anti-Muslim discrimination have been 

unleashed in Rakhine State and across the country. Rule of law, 

including efforts to promote justice and accountability, continue to 

be inadequate, and the military remains closely tied to politics and 

the economy. Power and the benefit of Burma’s vast natural resources remain concentrated in the hands of a few. 

9

These challenges will be neither quickly nor easily remedied. 

Nevertheless, our surest road to helping Burma comes through a 

strategy of engagement that seeks to assist the country proactively 

in its transition to democracy and development. This is a unique 

opportunity in modern Burmese history. The people, the country, 

are calling for enhanced U.S. engagement in virtually all sectors, 

and we must work tirelessly to ensure that the reforms become irreversible. 

I would like to briefly touch on four key pillars of U.S. policy. 

The first is promoting national peace and reconciliation. This is 

Burma’s defining challenge, a challenge that has eluded the country since its independence. Without peace and national unity, other 

reforms will be at risk. To support the peace process, our Ambassador, Derek Mitchell, and his Embassy team meet regularly with 

the government and with ethnic representatives of all ethnic 

groups to encourage an inclusive, transparent peace process. We 

are supporting efforts to rebuild trust, and we continue to urge all 

parties to respect the human rights of civilian populations. 

To counter the disturbing communal violence and anti-Muslim 

discrimination that has racked Burma, particularly in Rahkine 

State we are promoting messages of tolerance, and we continue to 

urge the government to improve security for all vulnerable populations and to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access to conflict 

areas. 

In addition, we are urging efforts to reintegrate communities, 

and we are pressing the government to implement a path to citizenship for the Rohingya. 

Turning to a related area of focus, supporting democracy and 

human rights remains a critical pillar of our policy. We continue 

to press for the release of all political prisoners and to advocate for 

the opening of a U.N. Office of Human Rights. We are implementing programs to strengthen civil society and build a democratic institution. We are also encouraging the revision of laws necessary to protect democratic rights. 

The need for constitutional reform to allow citizens to freely elect 

the leaders of their choice, to recognize the rights of minorities, and 

to establish civilian control of the military is part of this discussion. 

And this leads me to mention the importance we attach to promoting security sector reform. 

A military under civilian control that protects the people, promotes human rights, and respects international law is a pillar of 

democracy and essential to the success of the reforms. Our voice 

must be heard on this critical issue. 

We believe that a carefully calibrated military engagement to 

share lessons of how militaries operate in a democratic framework 

will strengthen the hand of reformers and is one of the best tools 

for shaping Burma’s most powerful institutions at this juncture. 

My colleague, Vikram Singh, will elaborate on this, including the 

benefit Title 22 authorities would offer to provide Burmese military 

more consistent and structured exposure to international human 

rights and military justice standards. 

Let me just briefly touch on two other policy areas. one is supporting——

10

Mr. CHABOT. If you could wrap up, because you are actually over 

time now. 

Ms. CEFKIN. Okay. Supporting Burma’s transition to a transparent open market economy that promotes sustainable growth, 

and the last is also to highlight—I would highlight Burma. We 

want Burma to be a contributor to regional and global security. 

And just to say that our continued engagement to effect positive 

change in Burma is grounded in our strategic interest and a successful politically, economically progressive Asia Pacific region, and 

in the fundamental values that go to the core of who we are as a 

nation. 

So to prevail and keep our focus on long-term goals, we feel that 

we must have a strategic approach that is steady and considered, 

but flexible in implementation, to keep pace with conditions on the 

ground. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continued consultation and cooperation with you on these important issues. And I want to thank 

you again for inviting me to testify today, and I will look forward 

to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cefkin follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Singh, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. VIKRAM J. SINGH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST 

ASIA, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I really want to thank you for inviting me to speak with 

you today about our engagement with Burma. And I will be summarizing my comments in an effort to stay under 5 minutes. 

Congress has been instrumental in shaping U.S. policy with 

Burma, and the Department of Defense views Congress as a critical partner in developing and implementing a strategy for careful, 

calibrated reengagement with the military in Burma. The military 

in Burma remains critical to the ultimate success of reform efforts 

and a full transition to democracy. 

We believe the Burmese military is positioned to continue supporting the government’s reform program and is interested in taking steps to modernize, professionalize, and reform itself. At the 

same time, we are fully cognizant the military in Burma retains a 

prominent role in political and economic life, faces allegations of 

ongoing human rights abuses, and retains ties to North Korea. It 

is very clear that a meaningful and sustainable transition for this 

country and for its military will take many years. 

Given this complex reality of the military’s role in Burma, our 

policy supports two clear goals. First, encouraging the military to 

continue its support for reforms; and, second, enhancing the military’s understanding of and ability to respect human rights and civilian authority and control. 

The Department of State has worked closely with—the Department of Defense has worked closely with the Department of State 

to develop a limited and calibrated set of engagements with the 

Burmese military in support of these goals. The steps we are taking are in line with the recommendations of a range of Burmese 

stakeholders, including members of the opposition and ethnic 

groups, who urge us to carefully engage the Armed Forces to build 

their support for the reform agenda and to help the military itself 

modernize and transform. 

So far, DoD’s only interactions in the last 2 years have been limited diplomatic engagement, including, through the U.S.-Burma 

human rights dialogue, and pull-asides with Burmese counterparts 

at multilateral meetings. The resumption of accounting operations 

for U.S. personnel missing from World War II and unaccounted for 

in Burma. 

Workshops and exchanges by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security 

Studies on rule of law, civil-military relations, and civilian control 

of the military. Supporting Thailand’s request to have Burmese observers at COBRA GOLD to observe just the staff planning and humanitarian portions of that exercise. Initial exchanges by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies to share views on 

human rights law and the law of armed conflict. 

23

These interactions have been largely symbolic. They have not included any training or education. Under current restrictions, we 

cannot undertake training or education programs, such as DIILS 

courses on human rights and international humanitarian law. But 

our limited engagements we feel have begun to expose the military 

to international norms and behavior and to foster some new trust 

and understanding. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, the Department does not seek and is not recommending the full normalization 

of bilateral defense ties with Burma at this time. We are not suggesting the resumption of foreign military financing or full international military education and training, otherwise known as 

IMET. 

Barring significant further progress, the engagement we seek 

will be limited and calibrated. Over the next year, we hope to continue the existing activities we have started and to expand DIILS’s 

engagement, to include some formal training in human rights and 

other related areas for Burmese military officials. 

We see value in engagement that would support institutional 

changes required to promote better civil military relations, increased transparency, and greater civilian oversight. We also recommend initiating steps to build Burma’s capacity for disaster relief, to deal with things like Cyclone Nargis in 2008. 

The Department looks forward to working with Congress to craft 

these engagements appropriately. All engagements we will do will 

fully adhere to relevant sanctions, policy restrictions, and vetting 

requirements. It is important to note that under current sanctions 

we lack any dedicated mechanism for this kind of reform-oriented 

engagement with the Burmese military. 

The main tool for this kind of process is expanded IMET, which 

is a scaled and targeted subset of IMET that allows only education 

and training related to civilian control of the military, improving 

military justice in accordance with internationally recognized 

human rights, proper management of defense resources, and cooperation between the police and military for counternarcotics. 

We look forward to working with Congress on some version of 

this kind of programming, so reform-focused engagement can be 

more transparent and regularized. 

I know I am coming to the end of my time, Mr. Chairman. You 

mentioned examples of benchmarks we would want to see. Those 

are many of the same things that the administration looks for, humanitarian international—access for international humanitarian 

organizations, accountability in the Burmese military. 

And given that I am coming to the end of my time, I also just 

want to acknowledge that I recognize there is considerable skepticism about what value this kind of military engagement might 

provide. We believe that this kind of engagement is part of our 

principled stance with regard to reform and supporting democracy 

and reform in Burma, and we know there can be no guarantee that 

our engagement will bring about the changes we seek. 

But we do believe we have an opportunity to engage for the first 

time in decades with a military and government in Burma open to 

implementing reforms and accepting U.S. advice to that end. We 

believe we need to move forward with that opportunity in a careful 

24

way, in close consultation with the Congress and our friends and 

allies who share these objectives. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking questions 

from you and the subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]


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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Singh. 

Mr. Beck, you are recognizing for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY BECK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. BECK. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on USAID’s work in Burma. 

I would like to first acknowledge the role that this committee 

and Congress have played in our engagement and our advocacy of 

human rights, democracy, national reconciliation, and economic reform. We believe the recent historic reforms can be sustained with 

continued targeted efforts that support the needs and aspirations 

of the people of Burma. However, we remain conscious of the fragile state of reforms and reconciliation taking place in the country. 

Since the reopening of USAID’s mission over a year ago, and 

under the strong leadership of Ambassador Mitchell, USAID’s activities have been focused on supporting the U.S. Government’s priority policy objectives in Burma. Specifically, they reinforce the 

four principles outlined in the U.S.-Burma Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity, the principles of inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and local empowerment. 

In the spirit of these principles, we are targeting our programming toward four key areas at this critical juncture in Burma’s 

transition—democratic reform, national peace and reconciliation, 

economic reforms toward inclusive growth, and building healthy 

and resilient communities. 

In partnership with the people of Burma, we are helping to build 

a foundation for a peaceful and sustained transition to democracy. 

Our assistance supports strengthening Burma’s nascent democratic 

and political processes and institutions by promoting free and fair 

elections, supporting political party development, building the capacity of Parliament, and providing broad assistance to civil society. 

As an example, a USAID program brought civil society and Parliament together for the first time to draft national legislation. The 

result of this historic collaboration was a new association law that 

is more in line with international standards and gives a greater 

voice and strength to civil society. This process was hailed by both 

civil society and members of Parliament as a model for the future. 

Through direct engagement with the people, USAID is ensuring 

that Burma adopts legitimate and sustainable processes that enable the pursuit of national reconciliation. For instance, our Project 

for Local Empowerment is working in conflict-prone regions of 

Burma to create linkages between local border groups, communities, and government officials that promote trust and cooperation. 

We have partnered with over 100 local organizations from 

human rights groups to humanitarian assistance providers to help 

them carry out their vision for Burma. 

Looking forward, the continued development of the Burmese 

economy requires responsible foreign and domestic investments. 

Reforms to the country’s legal system are needed to encourage investment that benefits the lives of the people of Burma, protects 

30

their environment, and encourages a transparent land tenure system. 

Towards these goals, we have assumed leadership of the donor 

coordination mechanism for agriculture, contributed significant 

input into the recently approved Farmer Rights Protection Act, and 

provided technical expertise on the developing land use policies. 

We have also forged milestone public-private partnerships between American universities and companies, such as Cisco, Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard, and provide leadership training, promote and encourage entrepreneurship, and assist small- to medium-sized businesses. 

But for all of our gains to take root, a healthy, resilient population is necessary for sustained economic growth. Over the past 

few years, USAID has become a leader in the health sector in 

Burma, making significant contributions toward combatting child 

and maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and drug-resistant tuberculosis. By focusing in these areas, we are reaching people who 

were previously unable to access basic health care. 

Beyond this, our multi-sector Shae Thot program works in over 

1,000 villages, bringing clean drinking water to over 300,000 people. Additionally, over 38,000 people have improved access to 

health care, 12,000 farmers are using improved agriculture technologies, and over 6,000 community-based organizations and women’s groups have received U.S. Government assistance to strengthen their ability to support their communities and to better engage 

with their governments. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, the USAID 

mission in Burma is well on its way to establishing a model mission that maximizes our investment by embracing partnerships 

and alliances in all that we do. Whether it be with the private sector, international organizations, academia, local groups, or civil society, the relationships and partnerships we forge will provide a 

catalytic platform for continued engagement to improve the lives of 

the people that live in Burma, and ensure a safer, more prosperous 

future for all. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beck follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate the testimony 

of the panel this afternoon and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of asking questions. 

Last week, Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech during her trip to 

Australia where she said,

‘‘Those of you who think that Burma has successfully taken the 

path to reform would be mistaken. If you want to know why 

you are mistaken, you only have to study the Burmese Constitution. If you read it carefully, you will understand why we 

can’t have genuine democracy under such a Constitution.’’

Burma’s Constitution has many severe flaws—no civilian control 

of the military, no independence of the judiciary, no protections and 

rights for minorities, 25 percent of the seats in Parliament are reserved for the military, and it bars Aung San Suu Kyi and others 

from becoming President. What is the administration doing to support the universal call for Aung San Suu Kyi and the people of 

Burma to advance constitutional reform before the 2015 elections? 

Ms. Cefkin, if you would like to take that. 

Ms. CEFKIN. Certainly. We very much agree with the priority you 

attach to that issue. And, first of all, you may be aware that there 

is a process underway in the country. The Parliament has established a committee to review the current Constitution and to make 

recommendations as to changes/amendments that should be considered. 

As you know, constitutional amendments can be a very challenging process in a number of countries, and in Burma it is no exception. It will require—first of all, changes will require a vote of 

75 percent of the members of Parliament, and then many of the 

issues, probably most of the issues, will have to go national referendum. 

We are engaged in the discussion, and we have made very clear 

our expectation that this has to be a priority, that Burma will not 

realize its full democratic potential until the Constitution is reformed. And the same issues you cited are issues that we regularly 

cite, the fact that it is absolutely critical, it will be critical that for 

the upcoming elections to be seen as credible that the country—the 

people of Burma are able to freely choose their leadership in free 

and fair elections. 

Of course, it is up to the people of Burma to choose their leadership, but they should have the right to choose their leadership, the 

candidates that they feel best represent them. There are a number 

of other issues that are equally important, and a key one is the 

rights of minorities. That will be part of the discussion that we 

hope will be launched very soon as part of the political dialogue for 

a durable peace. 

So that—of course there will be many aspects to that that, you 

know, will take time to determine what changes need to be made, 

but that is also a priority. And, as you mentioned, the civilian control of the military is another priority. 

So we, you know, have made clear our position, our expectations, 

our hopes for the country, and we are certainly willing to provide 

them technical assistance, if it is helpful to them as they undergo 

this very important challenge. 

38

Mr. CHABOT. Let me also ask, what are the implications of statements from the administration saying whatever reforms Burma 

achieves by the end of this year are the only reforms we are likely 

to see in Burma until the 2015 elections, because its government 

will be so focused on chairing ASEAN next year. Is the administration really willing to accept such lack of progress? 

Ms. CEFKIN. No, not at all. That is not anything that we would 

subscribe to. We do recognize there will be challenges, that the government is very focused increasingly on its ASEAN responsibilities, 

but that does not mean we will in any way flag in our—continuing 

our dialogue and our encouragement and pressure to them to move 

forward on the reforms. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Singh, I have only about a minute, so let me get quickly to 

a question. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2011 report 

to Congress on military and intelligence aid to Burma, Burma’s primary foreign suppliers of weapons and military-related technologies were state-controlled arms companies from China, North 

Korea, Russia, and Belarus. There is little doubt North Korean 

companies are still supporting Burma’s efforts to build and operate 

military-related production facilities. Although Burma signed the 

IAEA additional protocol on September 17, 2013, there is still no 

clear evidence that Burma has halted its military relationship with 

North Korea. A relationship between Burma and North Korea has 

been, and continues to be, entirely unacceptable. Does Burma intend to completely sever ties with North Korea or not? 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Burmese Government 

has decided to end the military relationship with North Korea. We 

believe that is the direction they are going. We do not believe that 

that is complete, and I would be very happy to discuss in more detail what we think to be true about this in a classified setting. 

We see of primary importance to us and actually many of our allies and partners the full severing of Burma’s ties to the DPRK as 

really critical to advancing beyond anything other than this initial 

reengagement we have been talking about. 

Mr. CHABOT. I would certainly agree that is critical. My time has 

expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BERA. All right. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. 

Let me direct my first question to Mr. Singh. Obviously, Burma 

sits at a very critical juncture between China—between an emerging relationship with India and offers some critical access to trade 

routes, and so forth. But from a military perspective, it certainly 

sits at a critical juncture. 

It does look like India is increasing some of its military sales to 

Burma, as well as, you know, offering assistance, and so forth, at 

a similar time that China obviously is providing a lot as well. How 

do you see this playing out in terms of vis-a`-vis some of the relationships between India and China as well? Just from your perspective. And then the U.S.’s role. 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Congressman Bera. I think I should—I 

need to just very briefly say hello to you from my mother-in-law 

and father-in-law, who are your constituents——

39

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. SINGH [continuing]. In California, Dr. and Mrs. Baumer. 

We really welcome the engagement of India with Burma. You 

know, India and the United States have long had very similar aspirations and goals for Burma, though we have often had very different policy approaches to it. We believe that overall India’s reengagement with Burma on a whole host of issues will be positive. 

I would say that we will probably have disagreements about specifics about what that looks like, so, for example, moves into arms 

sales and other things will be things that we might be concerned 

about. That said, I think it is incredibly important for Burma to 

start interacting with militaries other than those that have been 

their traditional partners and suppliers, and with governments 

that have been other than their traditional partners. 

So we welcome that development. We believe China will try to 

maintain a relationship with Burma, and Burma is finding itself 

having for the first time in many years to actually figure out where 

it wants to place its bets, where it wants to put its cards, who it 

wants to deal with. We would like to shape the kinds of choices 

that Burma makes through how we go through this delicate process of reengagement with supporting reform at the center of what 

we—of how we approach things. 

Mr. BERA. Great. 

Let me ask, Ms. Cefkin, with elections coming up—and the chairman touched on what—you know, how we shape free and fair elections—what would you define in 2015 as being a fair election in 

Burma, if we were to look for some standards that we would want 

to shoot for? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Yes. And let me also mention, and my colleague 

Greg Beck may want to elaborate, but part of our assistance actually is also working with the Election Commission in Burma to 

help approve its efficiency and ability to monitor and to help implement free and fair elections. 

We would want to see the ability of all Burmese citizens, obviously, to go to the polls, to register, to vote freely, and, evidence 

that there is, no fraud or very limited fraud in the conduct of elections, that the campaign was conducted in a free and transparent 

manner, absent intimidation, that candidates are able to access 

areas that they represent, and that the citizens of the areas they 

represent are able to get to the polls. 

I think, you know, a lot will depend of course on what changes 

they decide to advance as far as there has been discussion in the 

country, do they want to keep the current electoral system, or do 

they want to go to a proportional system? You know, those kinds 

of issues are issues for the people to decide. But in accordance with 

whatever system they do choose, ultimately that everybody is freely 

allowed to participate. 

That is a very broad, general answer to your question. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. Mr. Beck? 

Mr. BECK. I might add that we do have as part of our rule of law 

project, we are working with the Union Election Commission, helping to enhance their systems and processes, also to enhance to polling stations, working with civil society to build out on voter education, and also to work as monitors during the elections. 

40

Mr. BERA. Right. In my last 30 seconds, one thing we have 

talked about on this committee and in the full committee has been 

one of the core pillars of democracy is within the rule of law property right clause. Could you just briefly touch on, you know, any 

one of you, what property rights in Burma look like today? 

Ms. CEFKIN. That is actually a problem, and a problem that 

needs to be addressed. We do know that there are senior officials 

in the government that are grappling with it. My understanding is 

currently there are not really clear property rights in the country, 

and the problem of land seizures, land grabs, is a big problem. 

But we have heard, and certainly this will very much be tied to 

our development work in agriculture, that there needs to be clarity 

and there needs to be reform to provide for clear land rights. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. I would just note 

that the witnesses can definitely score points with the panels if 

they can send greetings from their parents. That definitely is a 

good move. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am particularly concerned or interested in the U.S. policy toward Burma. Some of the 

things I understand it seems like we are relaxing policy a little bit 

as a way of I guess turning the page. And I see where, at least as 

it describes in the document that I am looking at, you know, democratically elected civilian government, human rights, and those 

type of things, especially to ethnic minorities, but it doesn’t mention our policy regarding nuclear ambitions. 

And if you could, Ms.—I am sorry, Ms. Cefkin, if you can elaborate on that, I would appreciate it. 

Ms. CEFKIN. Well, that is—very much remains a very key policy 

priority area for us. As my colleague Vikram Singh said, we have 

seen positive steps that have been taken by the government to cut 

off the trade, the arms trade, with North Korea. But we have not 

yet—we cannot yet say that that has been completely implemented. 

As far as nuclear goes, I think at this point we could certainly, 

you know, arrange to come back in another setting to discuss in 

more detail. But the nuclear bit is less the concern than other systems I think at this point. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So do we have—is their relationship with 

North Korea, is that a showstopper for the United States? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Well, first of all, it is part of their international obligation to adhere to U.N. Security Council resolutions. So——

Mr. PERRY. But we have seen those kind of things erode in the 

past in other negotiations with other nations where we say ‘‘no further than this, unless you want to talk about it.’’ So——

Ms. CEFKIN. Right. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. What is our position? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Certainly, there are many things that we will not 

be able to do to engage them on absent their full compliance on 

that issue. And on the issue of military, that is very much true, 

that we cannot foresee a full normalization absent their having 

fully complied on that need. 

41

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So under human rights abuses, particularly 

with the ethnic minorities, the Christians, the Muslims, et cetera, 

and the military involvement in that, while I understand the increased dialogue, so to speak, as opposed to—you know, the stick 

as opposed to the carrot, so to speak—I mean, do we trust these 

folks enough to do that under dialogue as opposed to the boot? I 

hate to put it that way, but, you know. And do we have quantitative benchmarks, including a timeline, for their compliance with 

any of those things? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Let me start to answer, and I will turn to Vikram 

perhaps to add a bit more. I guess one thing to keep in mind is 

that they have been very, very isolated. They have not had exposure to Western ways of thinking of operating. So we do think that 

their exposure to our military, to see firsthand and to be offered 

that alternative vision for how militaries operate in a democratic 

framework will—has the potential to help move them away from 

their current patterns of behavior. 

We can’t be absolutely sure that it will succeed. But if we don’t 

try, we can be quite sure that it won’t succeed. So we do have obviously a number of changes that we are looking for from them before we would be able to move forward, and these include, obviously, respect for human rights, setting up systems such as ombudsman, inspector generals, mechanisms that would allow to address human rights when they do take place. 

We obviously need them to be in support of the reform process, 

in support of the peace process, to stop use of child soldiers, to—

we have talked about North Korea, stop dealings with North 

Korea, and to develop more transparent systems, budgeting, personnel, and the big difficult issues, tackle the big difficult issues of 

their role in politics and the economy. 

There are a number of issues out there. We do feel that certain 

issues may be easier to tackle than others, and we do want to retain some flexibility going forward as how we sort of leverage, you 

know, our requests and what we are able to provide in exchange. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Thank you. I see my time is about to expire. 

I am interested in pursuing a further discussion on the previous 

questions under the appropriate setting. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Crowley, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to express 

I feel—it is a homecoming for me. I served for 12 years on this 

committee, and I am getting my legs back. It is great to be back 

here. Thanks again to all of you for participating today. 

As you can tell by my opening statement, I am a bit skeptical 

about the advances that have been made, both on the ground in 

Burma and our interaction with the junta, the Burmese regime. 

Mr. Singh, particularly, do you have plans to proceed to full 

IMET? I ask this because originally the State Department told us 

that our involvement would be limited to the DIILS program before 

it proceeded to IMET. Now, however, I believe you are seeking 

EIMET funding, which subsequently could change. I can only asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Jan 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120413\85789 HFA PsN: SHIRL
42

sume you will be quickly changing to full IMET request. Is that 

correct? And under what conditions would you consider IMET 

training? 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Congressman. We are not seeking full 

IMET, and we would not seek full IMET. I will——

Mr. CROWLEY. Are you seeking EIMET? 

Mr. SINGH. I will defer to my State Department colleagues—this 

is a Title 22 authority, not a Title 10 authority, for specific details. 

But EIMET exists simply as a subset of IMET, but some form of 

IMET authorization is required to have EIMET or anything—you 

know, anything like that. 

What I would like—what I believe is necessary is the ability to 

engage in some limited amounts of training and education narrowly targeted that are things that are like what we have in other 

settings used EIMET for. We are not particularly determined to 

pursue one specific way of doing that. What we would like to do 

is work with Congress on what the most—you know, most appropriate way would be to ensure that we have clear authority, and 

that there is transparency, and that there is accountability. 

And so that would be one way that that has been—that we have 

done these sorts of activities, limited scope activities in the past. 

I would like to assure you that we do not see any danger. There 

is no one in this administration that is interested in moving down 

some slippery slope toward fully resuming IMET FMF and fully 

normalizing ties. 

Constitutional reform is out there, elections are out there. There 

are years between here and there, but we——

Mr. CROWLEY. Well, I appreciate that. 

Mr. SINGH [continuing]. Do need to have an ability to engage and 

talk and help a path. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you. Appreciate it. The time is very sensitive. Given the seriousness of the human rights situation in 

Burma, have you developed genuine benchmarks beyond broad 

ideas which we are talking about? We are talking about the broad 

idea of the Constitution. 

I know that this a workable Constitution for nascent democracy. 

You are being very generous, Mr. Beck. I appreciate that. It is very 

nascent. Can you tell me what—if there are benchmarks, what 

they are? I ask this because the training of the Burmese military, 

even if it is on a limited basis, is a huge win public relations-wise 

for the Burmese military and for the junta. 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you again, Congressman. I agree with you 

that there is a—you know, this is—it is complicated to do this kind 

of reengagement, and you don’t want to inadvertently send the 

wrong kind of signals. 

We believe that the kind of progress we are looking for would be 

through—to be more specific than these general terms, you know, 

full, open, regular, humanitarian access for U.N. and other nongovernmental organizations to vulnerable populations in conflicts 

area, transparency into military command structures and operations and how they work, some kind of independent internal review mechanism for accountability and military justice, so, you 

know, like an ombudsman, like what—we use inspectors general, 

those kinds of—something along those lines. 

43

Process to meet the commitment where they have made some 

progress—they have made progress, but process—progress meeting 

the commitment to end the use of child soldiers, an enduring commitment to the peace process. What we don’t have is sort of we do 

specifically this and then we expect specifically that. What we are 

doing is trying to have a very calibrated set of initial engagements, 

be able to talk about these things, and then be able to evaluate in 

a—you know, in a robust way what process has been made and 

whether additional steps should be taken. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the earnestness of Mr. 

Singh and all giving testimony today. I have many, many more 

questions. My time is running out. I personally don’t believe that 

the Burmese military needs to be trained to stop killing and raping 

and stealing lands from people within their own country. 

I do hope that if anything comes from the intersection of both our 

military and theirs is that they do stop those things, because that 

is what is happening in that country today, particularly in the 

Kachin region and, as was laid out earlier by my colleagues, in the 

Muslim states as well. Some outrageous and terrible and horrible 

things are taking place in our country. 

I have visited Burma, and I have a profound respect for the people in the country, certainly for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and those 

who every day sacrifice so much to bring democracy to the country. 

But I am concerned that our mil to mil is moving too quickly, because they feed off of this prestige. And I want us to not only visually but also in reality slow this down. I think it is important to 

get the reforms that we want, democratic reforms, constitutional 

reforms, to allow Daw Suu Kyi and others to run for office, because 

the Constitution will not be changed if left to the military device. 

They control 25 percent of the Parliament. They are in control 

of the constitutional changes, not the people of Burma. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

get straight where we are at, then, with Burma. Are we planning 

to have a relationship with the Burmese military in which we are 

providing them with certain weapons systems? No weapons? 

Mr. SINGH. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What are we going to be providing them? We 

want to have transparency, we want to be—accountability and everything. Are we going to give them anything in exchange for this 

reform? 

Mr. SINGH. Congressman, all we are talking about at this point 

would be continuing the initial engagements which have been conversations about things like civilian control of the military and the 

importance of that for a modern military, the rule of law, accountability, how we approach these things and how they approach these 

things——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we are asking——

Mr. SINGH [continuing]. We would be looking to move into——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are asking them good conversation. 

44

Mr. SINGH. Well, that is all we can do right now, sir, is have conversation. We are not able to even do training. What we would like 

to be able to do is actually do some training where our experts, like 

Captain Sanders here, who is the Director of the Defense Institute 

for International Legal Studies and is sitting behind me, where 

they could offer training, how does a modern military deal with 

something like——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So is there anyone—any of you three that are 

suggesting that the Burmese military is not now conducting operations against the ethnic tribal people? Have they ceased? Are you 

trying to tell us that they have ceased in these operations? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Congressman, if I may, no, we would not—we would 

not dispute what you are saying. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Ms. CEFKIN. But just to underscore the point that we are not 

talking about anything that in any way enhances their tactical 

warfighting ability. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, that is good. I am glad to hear that, because that is being more—that is being realistic. I don’t think good 

conversation accounts for anything, especially—in fact, good conversation with people who are in the process of conducting military 

operations that cause a great number of innocent civilians to die 

among the tribal populations, good conversation with those people 

might be seen as a sign of weakness and not of strength. 

Again, we should recognize that there has been progress. It 

seems to me that we are talking about only progress among the 

Burman population. And let us remember, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father was the President, was he not, and he was murdered by, what, 

his guards—correct me if I am wrong—when he demanded—when 

he led the effort to make sure that the Karens, and the Karenees, 

and the Shan, and the rest of those tribal people weren’t going to 

be able to run their own schools in their own language. 

I mean, it seems to me—I hope that we can—and I would—I am 

sorry that our friends from the Parliament had to leave—there 

won’t be—there will not be peace in Burma, for the Burmans or 

anyone else, until compromises are reached with living with those 

tribal people, and this is a 1,000-year-old situation. 

I am glad to see that our administration is dedicated to playing 

a positive role. Even conversation with a great emphasis is a positive role, as long as we don’t ignore those violations that are going 

on. 

About Korea, however, I am not quite understanding—they have 

not ceased their relationship with North Korea? 

Mr. SINGH. We believe they have taken steps, but we believe—

to end the military-to-military ties. They have a lot of contracts 

and supplies from North Korea that have been—that they have had 

over the years. We believe they have decided to end that, but we 

do not believe they have completed severing that entirely. So——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So——

Mr. SINGH [continuing]. And we are watching closely, and we are 

very happy to discuss this in a classified setting. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. They have given us some good conversation on how they are changing their conversation with Korea. 

45

Of course, maybe their relationship with North Korea goes beyond 

conversation, which what we are really concerned about. 

Well, has there been any—would you—Burma used to be infamous—I have got 30 seconds left—infamous for the drug trade that 

was coming out of some of the tribal areas in fact, as we know. Has 

there been any progress in that front? 

Ms. CEFKIN. That is still a very big problem. They are still the 

world’s second largest producer of opium poppy. I was in Burma at 

the beginning of November. I went to Karen State. I heard there 

some really very disturbing reports about the incidence of drug use 

among use, methamphetamines coming from the north. So it is a 

big problem. 

We would like—we have done some limited counternarcotics 

work with the Burmese. We are helping to finance an opium yield 

survey, and we would like to expand that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, the second most heroin-producing state is Burma, and I guess the most drug-producing would 

be Afghanistan. And I guess we have very little influence over 

there, don’t we? 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and welcome to our panel. Forgive me, I am running back and forth, but we have two subcommittee hearings at the same time. I belong to two committees. 

I believe no human problem or endeavor cannot substantially be 

improved with another hearing. 

Can you talk just a little bit, Mr. Singh, and maybe Ms. Cefkin, 

about the nature of what seems to be the spreading violence between Buddhists and Muslims in Burma. What is the source of it? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Yes, Congressman, it is a historical problem. It has 

existed—there is based on deep-seated prejudices. There have been 

waves of violence throughout history in the country, and these latest outbreaks in the past year have been very disturbing. 

We very much see this as rooted in popular suspicion and prejudices. And we think with the greater openings some of the authoritarian structures that were in place before were bad, but one thing 

they did do is tamp down some of these sorts of incidents. And now 

I think there is—people are searching for what their identity is, 

and unfortunately it has given rise to bigotry, you know, among 

certain segments of the population. 

But that I don’t think represents Burma. I think that there are 

voices for moderation there, but they have not been sufficiently 

heard. One thing we are doing is working with civil society to help 

them—give them more voice to speak up to counter this very 

xenophobic rhetoric, and we are working very closely with international humanitarian organizations to address the immediate humanitarian needs. 

We are working to try to build trust and confidence-building 

measures between the communities. And with regard to Rakhine 

State and the plight of the Rohingya specifically, we are pressing 

the government to move forward expeditiously to create a path to 

citizenship because we think that once that is established it will 

46

take away some of the underlying root cause that has given rise 

to the vulnerability of that group of population. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am glad you brought up the Rohingya, because 

Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s spokesperson recently said that she had little 

interest in supporting the Rohingya’s claims for rights and citizenship. That seems a surprising statement from a Nobel Laureate 

who was, and is, remains a real symbol of—you know, for democracy and freedom in Burma. 

Can you elaborate on our read of that statement? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Congressman, I think it does go back to the point 

I made about there being deep-seated society suspicions and lack 

of fully embracing the diversity of the country and the strength 

that that diversity can bring. 

And I think, you know, obviously in our conversations with all 

leaders, both in the government and the opposition, you know, we 

do urge them to speak up in defense of those rights, those human 

rights. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The New York Times recently had a story about 

a Buddhist monk, Ashin Wirathu, and the 969 Movement. And is 

it our view that the rather inflammatory sermons this Buddhist 

monk is recording and sharing are in fact incitement for more violence against non-Buddhists? 

Ms. CEFKIN. There is that risk. And I think that we have seen 

incidences where that kind of rhetoric has helped to instigate violence. I do think that we have seen signs more recently that the 

government is more seized with the importance of tamping down 

this kind of rhetoric. 

In my visit to Karen State, I had the opportunity to meet with 

religious leaders, including a prominent monk, a prominent imam, 

and they both told me that in the past months they had formed an 

interfaith council, that they met regularly, that in any instances of 

any perceived provocations the government was very quick to call 

this council to meet. 

And it seemed that, at least in that one instance, the situation 

had improved, and I think that sort of effort has—is taking place 

in many parts of the country, though it is still not yet sufficient to 

address the problem. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do we sense—yes, Mr.——

Mr. BECK. Congressman, I just wanted to add also we are working with youth to build their awareness of the core issue, and using 

social media, which they are increasingly accessing. So we are 

working through Facebook and other social media outlets to develop early warning systems, educate to bring people together, especially young people, young leaders, to begin addressing this 

issue, and to be able—when it becomes inflamed again, to address 

it and to initiate an early warning system. 

So the early warning system is working with faith-based organizations or with other civil society organizations and also working 

with the President’s office. It is becoming increasingly aware and 

building their capacity also to step in at the early moment. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there sufficient appreciation within the government that this violence, left unchecked, could significantly retard the ability of Burma, Myanmar, to reemerge in the family of 

nations. 

47

Ms. CEFKIN. I do believe there is recognition. Our Ambassador, 

Derek Mitchell, has been very prominent leading diplomatic efforts 

in the country. He meets regularly with other international partners to review the situation, discuss what should be done. He recently led a mission to Rakhine State, along with two key Burmese 

ministers, to get a better handle on the situation, where the problems are, where there are some signs of progress. 

I should mention also the State Department has—our Conflict 

Stabilization Office also has an officer based at the Embassy in 

Rangoon who is dedicated to this issue. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I thank the panel. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate 

you, again, for holding this important hearing, and thank you all 

for being here. 

Among the many challenges that some of us are concerned about, 

and probably one of the most significant concerns I have, is the 

Burmese military’s continued use of rape as a weapon of war and 

the recruitment of child soldiers. Despite a 2002 through 2012 U.N. 

action plan to halt Burma’s recruitment of child soldiers, this has 

continued. 

A little over a month ago, our office received yet another report 

that Burma army soldiers attacked predominantly Christian 

Kachin villages where they brutally gang raped two young girls. 

And these are, of course, just a couple of very well-documented patterns of sexual violence by the Burmese army. 

And Human Rights Watch has also closely documented how the 

Burmese military’s recruitment and use of child soldiers continues. 

So I guess I have sort of a series of three main questions, and I 

will direct them to you, Mr. Singh, if that is all right. 

First, how does DoD justify engagement with a military that has 

a long recent record of committing these what should be called 

crimes against humanity? 

And, second, considering the Burmese military’s history of failing 

to meet its requirements, what reassurances were given to the U.S. 

that the Burmese military will disband its child soldiers and use 

of rape as a weapon of war? 

And, finally, has the Obama administration implemented any 

strategies to effectively measure policies intended to decrease the 

number of child soldiers and the use of rape as a weapon of war? 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Congressman. I greatly appreciate your 

interest and your raising of what are among the most fundamental 

issues that face us and that face all of us as we think about what 

our policy toward Burma should be and how it should proceed. 

There is no doubt that the Burmese military has a long history 

of substantial abuses, and that human rights abuses continue, including the kinds that you have mentioned, the most disturbing 

kinds. We absolutely do not believe that it is time now for any kind 

of comprehensive reengagement beyond the areas that we think 

will help this military move toward reform. 

48

We do not believe that the military will stop being an important 

factor in Burmese society. We do believe it needs to find a way out 

of being in the political and economic life, and it needs to find a 

way to transform itself into a responsible, credible, accountable institution that will start protecting its people instead of persecuting 

and threatening its people. 

And it is our considered view that very limited, calibrated, engagement is actually better than non-engagement, with a clear 

sense that normalization would require a lot of things to happen, 

some of which I mentioned in earlier question and answer and in 

my earlier testimony. 

I would like to turn to——

Mr. FRANKS. Before you shift, but would those engagements consider implementing strategies to effectively measure policies that 

were intended to decrease the number of child soldiers and the use 

of rape as a weapon of war? 

Mr. SINGH. That would be—actually, I think I will turn to Judith 

for precisely that piece, about how we and the State Department 

together are looking at that exact issue. 

Ms. CEFKIN. Very much. That is very much, yeah, at the forefront, one of the conditions that are looking at. I will tell you possibly some glimmers of hope, that the government has signed up 

to a U.N. Action Plan to cease the use of child soldiers. 

Under that plan, there has been some limited progress of releases of child soldiers, and one of the sticking points has been allowing international access to military facilities to be able to verify 

whether or not there are child soldiers. That has been somewhat 

stalled, but just recently there was some limited progress of allowing international observers into some facilities. 

Possibly one thing worth mentioning, it is not only the Burmese 

military, but also some of the armed ethnic groups that have also 

been guilty on child soldiers, so that is another problem that needs 

to be tackled. 

Mr. SINGH. The only thing I would add to that, and USAID has 

programming that is also aimed at helping with this issue—and 

Greg might want to speak to it—but I want to also add that the 

government in Burma has taken a very strong stance, saying that 

they are going to address this problem. And then we want to help 

them live up to that commitment. 

They are going to address the problem of violence. They are 

going to address the problem of child soldiers. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just hope that these 

things could be kept in mind because, you know, America’s perspective if it is not clearly elucidated in these areas, then we really—

you have got to wonder why we are doing any of this. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to—we are just 

going to continue down this line. I think it is a line worth continuing. And you had—basically, the comment was just made, and 

one of the things I want to go back and frame just a little bit, I 

have listened in part of this, and I have been, like Mr. Collins, 

bouncing with a couple of other subcommittees. 

49

But one of the things that I have heard since I have been here, 

and also reading through testimony before, was—is we are engaging them. We are doing these things. It might be just a basic question, maybe it is just too basic, but what is their willingness to actually be engaged? And I think that is maybe a base question we 

need to ask here. Anybody want to try that one? 

Mr. SINGH. If we are focusing on military to military, I will certainly—I can certainly start with that. 

Mr. COLLINS. Try that. And then we will go to this——

Mr. SINGH. More broadly. So actually, you know, this is a very 

interesting moment. I mean, honestly, with many countries the 

kind of programming that I am talking about, starting some initial 

engagements and some initial trainings on things like the rule of 

law, human rights, and other things, those are often not very welcomed. 

And I would say, having joined the State Department for the 

first human rights dialogue in Burma a year ago or so, I was really 

surprised by the interest and almost enthusiasm about understanding what it is the United States is wanting to talk to them 

about in these areas. 

There are certainly going to be Burmese military officers who 

don’t want to reform and will cease a lot to lose. But we believe 

there will be those Burmese military officers and leaders who want 

to reform and see a path toward being a respected institution. And 

right now, there is an eagerness, a welcoming of this kind of engagement, and we believe that is an opportunity we should take 

advantage of. 

Mr. COLLINS. And before we—is that an eagerness on a lower—

being in the military, is it—I mean, is this a lower officer level, or 

a leadership level? Really, where was the engagement there? 

Mr. SINGH. I would say it has been both. We probably engaged 

more with some leadership, but the fact is this is an institution we 

hardly know. We have had no engagement for so long that we are 

in early days. And so leadership and sort of that middle and upper 

tier, we are definitely seeing indications that there is an interest 

in this kind of engagement, and we should—we believe we should 

see where it goes, but be—you know, one thing I would stress is 

be able to calibrate. We can do a little more, but if things don’t go 

right we can do a little less. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. Well, if we—or go ahead. 

Ms. CEFKIN. Certainly. No, I just—I was also going to make the 

point that the human rights dialogue was actually quite successful 

in terms of the candor of the discussion, including with the military. And we do sense, as Vikram Singh said, that there is certainly some quarters that are very receptive to the messages we 

have. 

I think it may be worth noting that those—many of those in the 

government leading the reforms currently are former military officers. So it seems to indicate that even before there were some beginning to think about the need to do things differently. And I 

think, you know, we shouldn’t underestimate their desire for international respect, which some realize requires a completely different 

mode of operation and behavior. 

50

Mr. COLLINS. Well, and I think the other thing here is we are 

dealing with a country that has had to deal—or has worked, you 

know, through many situations which are outside what I will call 

international norms, international—you know, of standing within 

the community. They may see it, but they see it from a different 

perspective than we do, as far as, how do you live among an international community, and what are those standards? Because of the 

violence, because of the drug trades, everything, and also just a 

part of the world that is very difficult. 

That is the concern that I have, and it is not to belabor this 

point, and I think what you—the only concern that I have in what 

I have heard is laying out—because undoubtedly if there is some 

interest to talk about these things—and, again, we can get into 

several that my friend from Arizona and others talked about—is 

having more tangible, as it gets to that point, benchmarks to say, 

‘‘If we come to here, then we can offer this.’’

And as we go forward—and I think that is because it did say 

when they joined the U.N. plan on this—you know, child soldiers 

is—I think your comment was is that, you know, limited progress, 

but yet what you said was is they really didn’t get on to verify. 

So my concern will be how we define ‘‘limited progress.’’ Does 

that mean we have got to go to the gate and look through the gate? 

Or do they actually let somebody in unfiltered? So, again, I appreciate your work there. This is not an easy part of the world. I am 

not saying there is an easy solution. 

And, really, that willingness to communicate sometimes is 

more—at this stage, may be more than what we can hope for. But 

I am sure we will do this, and, Mr. Chairman, I know you have 

been diligent in this category and will continue to look at this part 

of the world. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. 

We are going to have votes here in just a minute, so I just have 

a couple more questions and then we will wrap it up. 

This summer, during a trip to Europe, President Thein Sein 

promised to release all political prisoners by the end of the year. 

Subsequently, some—but not all—political prisoners have been conditionally released. At the same time, there has been a significant 

rise in political prisoners in the months following President Thein 

Sein’s pledge. More than 200 activists are now currently facing 

trial under old restrictive laws in the new Peaceful Assembly Act. 

In addition, more than 1,000 Rohingya have been unlawfully detained since mid-2012, and subjected to cruel and degrading treatment, in many instances. Well over 500 farmers face trespassing 

charges for their ‘‘plowing protests’’ over government confiscation of 

their land. 

Given that the release of political prisoners was a key factor in 

the decision to suspend sanctions against Burma, and increase our 

economic relationship with the Burmese Government, what 

changes, if any, will the administration make to address this troubling trend and double-talk by the Burmese Government? Ms. 

Cefkin? 

51

Ms. CEFKIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Let me just make a few brief 

comments, and I think my colleague, Greg Beck, may be able to 

add more. But you really hit the nail on the head when you talked 

about the arrests being made under old deficient laws. 

Fortunately, there is a recognition that those laws are deficient. 

There is an effort underway by Parliament to amend these laws to 

change—revise these laws, and we have some indications that 

there is progress being made on the assembly law that is the cause 

or the basis for many of the arrests you just cited. 

Mr. Beck already mentioned success that our USAID mission 

was very instrumental in facilitating, working toward a much better assembly law. So those are a couple of points. 

One other point I would make briefly is that one of the things 

the government has done is established a mechanism, a committee 

that is reviewing those currently incarcerated to determine which 

are prisoners of conscience, and that committee does include former 

political prisoners on the committee. 

We think it is a good mechanism, we think it is making progress, 

and we want to see it continue to operate and make progress. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Beck, did you want to add to that? 

Mr. BECK. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just add that, as part of 

the U.S. mission, USAID is pursuing a calculated policy engagement that really test the political will of the Government of Burma. 

So targeting these key areas that will affect the people in the 

most impactful way—agriculture, economic reform, media—we 

have been working very closely with the Parliament to draft laws 

of association, the Farmer Protection Act, land use policies that 

really rise to international standards. 

When they initially were drafted, they were horrible, but we 

have seen a willingness from some of the key reformers to listen 

and to engage with their citizens, and the end result has been a 

fairly significant and positive advancement on those particular 

laws that we think will be most effective in really addressing the 

priority issues of the people of Burma. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The bells you hear are the votes being 

called but I have two more questions. 

The State Department June 2013 report on human trafficking 

showed that in 2012 alone, Burma’s Department of Social Welfare 

received 195 repatriated victims. In addition, there are reports that 

the unofficial count could be higher, with UNICEF placing the estimated number of Burmese girls trafficked to the Thailand brothels 

at 10,000 every year. In light of this information, could you please 

outline the impact that existing initiatives have had on human 

trafficking in Burma? What does the State Department hope to see 

from the next anti-TIP dialogue? Ms. Cefkin? 

Ms. CEFKIN. Yes. I would say that somewhat in line with the 

human rights dialogue that we referenced a few moments ago, we 

actually were quite gratified by the level of the discussion that took 

place at the last TIP, Trafficking in Persons dialogue. And I think 

actually the ball is a bit in our court right now to follow through 

on some commitments that we made to identify funding necessary 

to help support the action plan that they derived to begin to seriously tackle this problem. 

52

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Thank you. Then one more question and 

we will let you go. In 2011, the GAO reported that U.N. and U.S. 

agencies assisted Burma after a devastating cyclone with about 

$335 million in assistance, but that U.S. agencies needed to 

strengthen their monitoring of assistance. The report detailed that 

USAID took actions to help ensure U.S. funds were used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities, but that it had some 

monitoring weaknesses. In light of the ongoing concerns with 

rampant corruption and efforts taken by the military to benefit 

from Burma’s new-found investment wealth, what actions has 

USAID taken to monitor its assistance to ensure it is reaching the 

intended recipients? Also, what effect, if any, has having an incountry presence had on USAID projects and programs aimed at 

addressing human rights issues? What progress have you achieved 

so far? 

Mr. BECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. BECK. As an aside, I did want to say that while I didn’t have 

an opportunity to present a welcome from my parents to my Congressman, I did want to introduce my daughter Tona, who is here 

with us today who has traveled——

Mr. CHABOT. That is even better. 

Mr. BECK. She has traveled to Burma, and she lived on the ThaiBurma border for 4 years. So this is an important issue for——

Mr. CHABOT. Excellent. 

Mr. BECK [continuing]. Our family. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, we welcome her today as well. 

Mr. BECK. Thank you. And thank you for raising this point. It 

is very important. Dr. Shah has been relentless in focusing on monitoring and evaluation of our programs for results as regards to 

Burma. 

We have actually increased our staffing from what we previously, 

21⁄2 years ago, one personal service contractor. We now have 24 

staff on the ground, foreign service officers and national staff. Allows us the ability to have much more access, to have the ability 

to be out there to monitor our programs, to build the capacity of 

both our international NGOs. 

But as part of USAID forward, we are also building the capacity 

of local organizations who have the contextual understanding, who 

understand the dynamics of the community, also are able to identify where those sort of rent-seeking opportunities are, and to be 

able to address those, recognizing what our regulations are. 

And so we really do monitor very closely—it is built into our 

grants, it is built into our contracts. So I think we have made tremendous progress since that report came out. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Just a little aside, for many years—I have been in Congress quite 

a few years and other offices prior to that. Sometimes I would 

speak at schools, and sometimes it was my kids’ schools, where I 

would recognize my daughter or son in the audience. Whenever I 

did, it was always, ‘‘Dad, why did you embarrass me like that?’’ So 

your daughter was blushing and very embarrassed, I am sure. Anything you want to say about your dad? [Laughter.] 

53

We do appreciate the panel’s testimony. It was very helpful this 

afternoon. I know some of the members were fairly aggressive, but 

that is the nature of the committee, as you probably know. I think 

you all handled yourselves very well. 

All members will have 5 days to supplement their statements or 

to submit additional questions, should they wish to do so. 

If there is no further business to come before the committee, we 

are adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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