# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O


## . 11-0079

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

# O N C O R 

# E L E C T R IC 

# D E L IV E R Y 

# C O M P A N Y 

# L L C , P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v . 

# D A L L A S 

# A R E A 

# R A P ID 

# T R A N S IT A N D 

# F O R T 

# W O R T H 

# T R A N S P O R T A T IO N 

# A U T H O R IT Y 

# , R E S P O N D E N T S

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## F I F T H 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued January 11, 2012

J U S T I C E 

## H E C H T 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court.

A n e le c tr ic u ti lity sued two reg ional public transporta tion auth o r it ie s , w h ic h a r e g o v e r n me n ta l entities, to condemn an ease ment acr oss their land for use in cons t ru ct ing a transmission line
approve d by the P ublic Utility Commi ssion (“PUC”)

. A divided court of appea ls upheld the
authorities’ asser

tion of g overnme ntal immunit y and dismiss ed the case
. Whil e the utilit y ’s petition 1


## for revie w was pending in this Court, the L eg islature enac ted House Bill 971, which extends an elec tric corpor ation’s power of eminent domain to include the acquisition of “all public land, except land owned by the state, on which the [P UC] has approve d the construction of [a transmi s s i on]

3 3 1 S

. W

. 3 d 9 1 ( T e x . A p p
. – D a l l a s 2 0 1 0 )

. 1

## line.” The utilit y asks that we vacate the court of appea ls’ judgme nt and rema nd the case to the trial 2



## court to consider the eff

ect of the new statute. The authorities object that the statute is inapplicable. We ag ree with the utilit y . I
Oncor Electric De l i v er y Company L L C owns and operates the larg est elec tric di stribution
and transmission sy stem in Texas, delivering power over some 117,000 miles of lines to about three
milli on homes and businesses. Oncor applied to the P UC fo r ap p roval to construct a new transmission line serving Dallas County

. The P UC considere d sever al diffe rent route s, weig hing 3


## the co s t s to consumers and the impact on local communities and proper ty owner s. After leng thy
proce eding s, it approve d one that crosse d over a public commuter rail line betwee n Dallas and For t Worth that is jointly owned and opera ted b y Da l l as Are a Rapid Transit (“D ART”) and the For t Worth Transpor

tation Authority (collec tively , “the A u th o r it ie s ” ), both reg ional public transporta tion
authorities under Texas law. All interested parties wer e notified of Oncor ’s application, and many 4 5


## landowner s participate d in the PUC procee dings. The Authorities did not.

A c t o f M a y 2 7 , 2 0 1 1 , 8 2 n d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 9 4 9 , § 1 , 2 0 1 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 2 4 0 0 , 2 4 0 0 [ h e r e i n a f t e r “ H o u s e B i l l 2 9 7 1 ” ] , c o d i f

i e d a s T E X
. U T IL
. C O D E § 3 7

. 0 5 3 ( d )

. S e e T E X
. U T IL
. C O D E § § 3 7

. 0 5 1

- 3 7

. 0 6 1 ( d e t a i l i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a p p l y i n g f

o r a c e r t i f

i c a t e o f 3
c o n v e n i e n c e a n d n e c e s s i t y f r o m t h e P U C )

. A r e g i o n a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a u t h o r i t y “ i s a p u b l i c p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y a n d c o r p o r a t e b o d y [ t h a t ] h a s p e r p e t u a l 4
s u c c e s s i o n [ ] a n d

. . . e x e r c i s e s p u b l i c a n d e s s e n t i a l g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s
. ” T E X
. T R A N S P
. C O D E § 4 5 2

. 0 5 2 ( a )

. S e e T E X
. U T IL
. C O D E § 3 7

. 0 5 4 ( “ ( a ) W h e n a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c e r t i f

i c a t e i s f i l e d , t h e c o m m i s s i o n s h a l l : ( 1 ) 5 g i v e n o t i c e o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s a n d t o t h e o f f i c e ; a n d ( 2 ) i f r e q u e s t e d : ( A ) s e t a t i m e a n d p l a c e f o r a h e a r i n g ; a n d ( B ) g i v e n o t i c e o f t h e h e a r i n g
. ( b ) A p e r s o n o r e l e c t r i c c o o p e r a t i v e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n m a y i n t e r v e n e a t t h e h e a r i n g
. ” )

. 

### 2

## Oncor attempted to neg otiate wit h the Authorit ies for an aer ial ease ment and right- o f- way

over approximately 0.37 acr es of their rail line. Although Oncor and its prede cessor had succe ssfully
neg otiated s imilar rig hts-of-wa y with DART hundreds of t imes befor e, thi s time the parties could
not rea ch an ag ree ment, and Oncor sued to condemn the ease ment. Oncor invoked Section 181.004 6 

## of the Utilities Code, which states:

A g as or e lectric corpor ation has t he right and power to enter on, condemn, and appropr iate the land, rig ht-of-w ay , ease ment, or other proper ty of any person or corpor ation. 7


## The Authorities are g overnme ntal entities and pleade d immunit y from suit. The trial court denied 8


## their plea and ref

used to dismiss the case , and the Authorities appea led. A divided court of appea ls 9


## held that g overnme ntal entities are immune from suits fo r c o n d emnation, that Section 181.004 does 1 0

T h e A u t h o r i t i e s t e l l u s t h a t t h e y “ d o n o t s e e k t o c h a n g e O n c o r ’ s r o u t e
. . . a s e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e [ P U C ] ” a n d 6 t h a t “ D A R T a n d O n c o r ( o r i t s p r e d e c e s s o r , T X U E l e c t r i c C o m p a n y ) h a v e e n t e r e d i n t o o v e r 8 0 0 a g r e e m e n t s f o r O n c o r ’ s l i n e s t o c r o s s D A R T p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t t h e u s e o f e m i n e n t d o m a i n
. ” R e s p o n d e n t s ’ B r i e f o n t h e M e r i t s 2

.

T E X
. U T IL
. C O D E § 1 8 1

. 0 0 4 ; s e e i d

. § 1 8 1

. 0 0 1 ( d e f i n i n g “ c o r p o r a t i o n ” a n d “ e l e c t r i c c o r p o r a t i o n ” f o r p u r p o s e s 7
o f c h a p t e r 1 8 1 ) ; i d

. § 1 8 1

. 0 0 1 ( 2 ) ( “ ‘ E l e c t r i c c o r p o r a t i o n ’ m e a n s a n e l e c t r i c c u r r e n t a n d p o w e r c o r p o r a t i o n
. ” )

.

T E X
. T R A N S P
. C O D E § 4 5 2

. 0 5 2 ( c ) ( “ A n a u t h o r i t y i s a g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i t u n d e r [ t h e T e x a s T o r t C l a i m s A c t ] , 8
a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e a u t h o r i t y a r e n o t p r o p r i e t a r y f u n c t i o n s f

o r a n y p u r p o s e i n c l u d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f [ t h e A c t ]

. ” ) ; D a l l a s A r e a R a

p i d T r a n s i t v
. A m a l

g a m a t e d T

r a n s i t U n i o n L o c a l N

o
. 1 3 3 8 , 2 7 3 S

. W

. 3 d 6 5 9 , 6 6 1 ( T e x . 2 0 0 8 ) ( “ D a l l a s A r e a R a p i d T r a n s i t i s a r e g i o n a l p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a u t h o r i t y t h a t p e r f o r m s o n l y g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s a n d i s i m m u n e f r o m s u i t u n d e r T e x a s l a w . ” ( f o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d ) )

. T E X
. C IV
. P R A C
. & R E M
. C O D E § 5 1

. 0 1 4 ( a ) ( 8 ) ( a u t h o r i z i n g a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l f r o m a n o r d e r t h a t “ g r a n t s 9
o r d e n i e s a p l e a t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n b y a g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i t a s t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n [ t h e T e x a s T o r t C l a i m s A c t ] ” )

. 3 3 1 S

. W

. 3 d 9 1 , 9 7

- 1 0 0 ( T e x . A p p
. – D a l l a s 2 0 1 0 )

. 10


### 3

## not waive g overnme ntal immunit y , and that the PUC’s authority to approve transmission lines does 1 1 

## not pree mpt imm unity

. Acc ording ly , the cour t dismi ssed the ac tion. 1 2


## Oncor petitioned this Court for revie w, and we reque sted briefing on the merits. But befor e Oncor filed its brief, the L eg islature enac ted Ho u s e Bi ll 971, adding Section 37.053(d) of the
Utiliti es Code, which pr ovides in part:

For transmission f

acilities order ed or approve d by the [P UC]

. . . , the rig hts extended to an elec tric corpor ation under Section 181.004 include all public l and, ex ce p t l and owned by the state, on which the commission has approve d th e construction of the line. 1 3


## I n its brief, Oncor arg ued that the court of appea ls’ opinion and judgme nt should be vacated and the

case rema

nded to the trial court to consider the eff ect of the new statute. Oncor rese rv ed its
arg ument for reve rsal of the court of ap p ea l s ’ opinion. The Authorities responde d that Section 37.053(d) cannot aff

ect this case for three rea sons: (1) the statute does not clea rly and unambig uously
waive immunit y any more than does Section 181.004; (2) the statute should be applied prospec tively only ; a nd (3) the Authorities, as political subdivisions of the State, have the same immunity as the
State and there fore fall wit h in the statutory exception for State-owne d land. We g rante d Oncor ’s petition. We addre ss eac h of t he Authoriti es’ arg uments in turn. We assume, without deciding ,

1 4 

## that g overnme ntal entities are immune from conde mnation suits.

I d

. a t 1 0 0

- 1 0 6

. 11

I d

. a t 1 0 6

- 1 0 7

. 12

T E X
. U T IL
. C O D E § 3 7

. 0 5 3 ( d )

. 13

5 5 T e x . S u p
. C t

. J

. 2 ( S e p t

. 3 0 , 2 0 1 1 )

. 14


### 4

## II

We h av e long held, and the L eg islature has more rec ently come to expressly require of 1 5 

## itself, that a waiver of g overnme ntal immunit y must be clea r and unambig uous. Were we to apply 1 6



## t h at s t an dard to Section 181.004, our analy sis would proce ed along these lines. Section 181.00 4
confe rs on g as and elec tric utilit ies a power of eminent domain over the “prope rty of any person or
corpor ation.” Since the adoption of the Code C o n s t ruction Act in 1967, the L eg islature has
instructed that in construing its codes, the word “per son” includes the “g overnme nt or g overnme ntal
subdivision or age ncy” “unless the s tatute or context

. . . re q u i res a differe nt definition”. But in 1 7 

## 2001, the L eg islature added that “the use of ‘per son’

. . . to include g overnme ntal entities[] does not indicate leg islative intent to waive sovere ign immunit y unless the context of the statute indicates no other rea sonable construction.” These direc tives do not establish whether Section 181.004 waives 1 8


## immunit y and shed no light at all on what the L eg islature intended by its use of the word “per son” in ge nera l statutes — not codes — ena cted in 1911, whe n the predece ssor to Section 181.004 was

W e l c h v
. S t a t e , 1 4 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 6 , 8 7 9 ( T e x . C i v . A p p
. – D a l l a s 1 9 4 1 , w r i t r e f ’ d ) ( “ A l t h o u g h t h e L e g i s l a t u r e 15 i s a u t h o r i z e d t o w a i v e t h e S t a t e ’ s i m m u n i t y f r o m s u c h l i a b i l i t y , i t s i n t e n t i o n t o d o s o s h o u l d a p p e a r b y c l e a r a n d
u n a m b i g u o u s l a n g u a g e
. ” )

.

T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 3 4 ( “ I n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ’ s i n t e r e s t i n m a n a g i n g s t a t e f i s c a l m a t t e r s 16 t h r o u g h t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n s p r o c e s s , a s t a t u t e s h a l l n o t b e c o n s t r u e d a s a w a i v e r o f s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y u n l e s s t h e w a i v e r i s e f f e c t e d b y c l e a r a n d u n a m b i g u o u s l a n g u a g e
. ” )

. A c t o f M a y 2 4 , 1 9 6 7 , 6 0 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 4 5 5

. § 1 , 1 9 6 7 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 1 0 3 6 , 1 0 3 6 , c o d i f i e d f o r m e r l y a s 17 T E X
. R E V
. C IV
. S T A T
. A N N
. a r t

. 5 4 2 9 b

- 2 a n d n o w a s T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 0 5 ( 2 ) ; s e e a l s o T E X
. U T IL
. C O D E § 1

. 0 0 2 ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e C o d e C o n s t r u c t i o n A c t “ a p p l i e s t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f e a c h p r o v i s i o n i n [ t h e U t i l i t i e s C o d e ] e x c e p t a s o t h e r w i s e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d b y [ t h e U t i l i t i e s C o d e ] ” )

.

A c t o f M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 1 , 7 7 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 1 5 8 , § 8 , 2 0 0 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 2 5 7 0 , 2 5 7 2 , c o d i f i e d a s T E X
. 18 G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 3 4

. 

### 5

## first enac ted. The court of appea ls was not persua ded by Oncor ’s arg uments that a utilit y ’s power 1 9



## to condemn public lands was reco gn i z ed i n ear ly case law. And while the Authorities are 2 0


## “cor por a te b o d [i e s ]” , one may cer tainly question whether that statutory descr iption of their capa city 2 1 

## bring s them within the entities whose proper ty can be condemne d by a g as or elec tric corpor ation.
I n short, whether Section 181.004 clea rly and unambig uously waives a g overnme nt lan d owner ’s
immunit y is a difficult question. 2 2


## And i t is one we need not answe r here because our focus instead i s on Secti o n 37.053(d).
That statute provides that “the rig hts extended to an elec tric corpor ation under Section 181.004”

— which by the latter’s terms are the rig hts “to enter on, condemn, and appropr iate

. . . land, [a] rig htof-wa y , [an] ease ment , or other proper ty ” — “include” cer

tain “public land” in cer tain
circ umstances. Section 37.053(d) ap p l i es o n ly to elec tric corpor ations, not g as corpor ations also

cover ed by Section 181.004. The rig hts confe rre d do not extend to all public land but only to public
land not owned by the State. And those rig hts exis t only when construction of transmission fac iliti es on the land is PUC-approve d.
Had Section 37.053(d) g one on to state “immunity is waived” , its eff ect would be perf

ectly
clea r. But as we have observe d, not all statutes are so expli cit, and “[t] he rule requiring a waiver of

A c t a p p r o v e d M a r c h 2 5 , 1 9 1 1 , 3 2 d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 1 1 , § 4 , 1 9 1 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 2 2 8 , 2 2 9

. 19

3 3 1 S

. W

. 3 d 9 1 , 1 0 0

- 1 0 6 ( T e x . A p p
. – D a l l a s 2 0 1 0 )

. 20

T E X
. T R A N S P
. C O D E § 4 5 2

. 0 5 2 ( a )

. 21

W e n o t e t h a t c o n d e m n a t i o n o f p u b l i c p r o p e r t y g e n e r a l l y i n v o l v e s a n u m b e r o f o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , s u c h a s 22 t h e n a t u r e o f

t h e c o n d e m n o r , t h e s c o p e o f i t s a u t h o r i t y , a n d a n a s s e s s m e n t o f c o m p e t i n g p u b l i c u s e s
. S e e g e n e r a l l y 1 A J U L IU S L

. S A C K M A N , N IC H O L S O N E M IN E N T D O M A IN § 2

. 1 7 ( 3 d e d

. 2 0 1 1 )

. 

### 6

## go v er n mental i mmunity to be clear and unambig uous cannot be applied so rig idly that the alm o s t

cer tain intent of the L eg islature is disreg arde d.” We think Section 37.053(d) is cle ar e noug h. A 2 3


## gen er al p ro vision that elec tric utilit ies can condemn public land might be construed mere ly t o

rec og nize a power that cannot be exercised without a specific waiver of immunit y , just a s a statute authorizing a g overnme ntal entity to “be sued” does not waive immunit y for all suits. But Section 2 4 

## 37.053(d) is very specific : only elec tric corpor ations, only some land, and only with PUC approva l.
A statute cre ating specific , restric ted “rig hts”, as Section 37.053(d) does, cannot rea sonably be rea d
to tacitly condition their exercise on a separ ate waiver of immunit y . The obvious purpose of Section 37.053(d) — indeed, its only appar ent purpo s e

— i s to provide for rig hts that can actua lly be
exercised. “I f a statute leave s no rea sonable doubt of its purpose, we will not require perf ect clar ity , even in de termining whether g overnme ntal immunit y

has bee n waived.” 2 5


## I n apply ing the clea

r-a nd-unambig uous standard, “we must look at whether a statute makes
any sense i f i m m u n i ty is not waived.” We think Section 37.053(d) does not. Acc ording ly , we 2 6


## conclude that it waives g overnme ntal immunit y .

C i t y o f L a P o r t e v
. B a r

f i e l d , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 2 8 8 , 2 9 2 ( T e x . 1 9 9 5 )

. 23

T o o k e v
. C i t

y o f M e x i a , 1 9 7 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 5 , 3 4 2 ( T e x . 2 0 0 6 )

. 24

B a r f i e l d , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t 2 9 2

. 25

K e r r v i l l e S t a t e H o s

p
. v
. F e r n a n d e z , 2 8 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 6 ( T e x . 2 0 0 0 )

. 26


### 7

## III

The Authori t i es arg ue that the L eg islature did not intend for Section 37.053(d) to apply in

a case filed befor e it took eff ect and that such application would violate the constitutional prohibition
ag ainst retroa ctive laws. 2 7


## The L eg islature has direc ted that in construing its codes, “[a] statute is presumed to be
prospec tive in its opera

tion unless expressly made retrospe ctive.” House Bill 971 enac ted Section 2 8 

## 37.053(d) and two other provisions. Of the other two, the Bill expressly made one applicable only
in future PUC proce eding s an d t h e o t h er in pending and future PUC proce eding s. Otherw ise, 2 9


## Section 5 provided that the Bill should take eff ect immediately if it rec eived a two-thirds vote in both
houses of the L eg islature, which it did. Thus, Section 37.053(d) was ex p re s s ly made eff ective 3 0 

## immediately

in all proce eding s. Apply ing the statute in this proce eding does not violate the Constit ution. “The prohibition
ag ainst retroa ctive application of laws does not apply to proce d u ra l, reme dial, or jurisdictional statutes, b ec au s e s u ch statutes ty pically do not aff

ect a vested rig ht.” I mmunity from suit is a 3 1



## matter of jurisdiction. Fur thermore , “cha

ng es in the law that

. . . have littl e impact on prior rig hts[ ]

T E X
. C O N S T
. a r t

. I , § 1 6 ( “ N o
. . . r e t r o a c t i v e l a w . . . s h a l l b e m a d e
. ” )

. 27

T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 2 2

. 28

H o u s e B i l l 9 7 1 § § 2 ( b ) & 4

. 29

I d

. § 5

. 30

U n i v
. o

f T e x
. S w
. M e d

. C t r
. a t D a l l a s v
. E s t a t e o f A r a n c i b i a , 3 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 4 , 5 4 8 ( T e x . 2 0 1 0 )

. 31


### 8

## are usually not unconstitutionally retroa ctive.” “A g overnme ntal entity ca n not complain of a 3 2



## retroa ctive waiver of immunit y , since all g overnme ntal immunit y d er i v es from the State, and a
g overnme ntal entity

acquir es no vested r ights a g ainst the State.” 3 3


## Acc ording ly , we c onclude that Sec tion 37.053(d) applies in this case

. IV Finally , the Authorities arg ue that their proper ty falls within Section 37.053(d)’ s exception
for “land owned by the state”. They concede, as they must, that they are not the State, but they 3 4


## arg ue that beca

use t heir im munity is derive d from the State, they should share the exception. But the exception is based on owner ship, not the source of immunit y , and plainly , the State does not own the Authorities’ rail line. Moreove r, if the exception applied to the proper ty of ever y g overnme ntal entity with State-der ived immunit y , it would apply to all public land and would swallow the rest of
the provision, deny ing it eff ect. We must presume that the L eg islature intends its enac tments to be
eff ective. Consequently , we c annot construe the exception to include the Authorities’ pr operty

.

3 5


## * * *

R o b i n s o n v
. C r o w n C o r k & S e a l C o
. , 3 3 5 S

. W

. 3 d 1 2 6 , 1 4 6 ( T e x . 2 0 1 0 )

. 32

T o o k e v
. C i t

y o f M e x i a , 1 9 7 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 5 , 3 4 5 ( T e x . 2 0 0 6 )

. 33

C f

. M o n s a n t o C o
. v
. C o r n e r s t o n e s M u n
. U t i l

. D i s t

. , 8 6 5 S

. W

. 2 d 9 3 7 , 9 3 9

- 9 4 0 ( T e x . 1 9 9 3 )

. 34

T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 2 1 ( 2 ) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t , w h e n a s t a t u t e i s e n a c t e d , i t i s p r e s u m e d t h a t “ t h e e n t i r e 35
s t a t u t e i s i n t e n d e d t o b e e f f e c t i v e ” )

. 

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## For these re asons, we va cate the opi nion and judgment of the c ourt of appe als and re mand
the ca se to the trial cour

t for fur ther proc eeding s. 3 6



## Nathan L . Hec ht

OP INION DELIVERED : J une 22, 2012

S e e T E X
. R

. A P P
. P

. 6 0

. 2 ( f )

. 36


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