NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRELL D. JOHNSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

official capacity; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-55654 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-07296-BRO-JPR 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 11, 2017**

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges. 

Terrell D. Johnson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the 

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal 

and state law claims in connection with his arrest and conviction. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-55654 

F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s action because success on 

Johnson’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and 

Johnson failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. See Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the 

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”). Because the district court 

did not specify whether the dismissal of Johnson’s action was with or without 

prejudice, we treat the dismissal as being without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of 

Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissals under Heck are without 

prejudice).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Johnson’s

amended complaint without leave to amend because Johnson was provided with 

one opportunity to amend and further amendment would be futile. See Cervantes 

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting 

forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is 

proper when amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 
3 16-55654 

Inc., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already 

granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to 

amend is particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration because Johnson failed to 

demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. 

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of 

review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).

AFFIRMED.