No. 86-520 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

JOHN F. SCOTT, 

Claimant and Respondent, 

-vsUTILITY LINE CONTRACTORS, Employer, 

and 

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable 

Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich; John T. 

Dyre, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Geoffrey R. Keller, Billings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 5, 1987 

Decided: March 18, 1987 

MAR 1 8 1987. 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The State Compensation Insurance Fund (State Fund) 

appeals a summary judgment of the Workers1 Compensation 

Court. The court ruled that claimant John F. Scott had met 

the statutory requirements for making a workers1 compensation 

claim within one year by obtaining medical help which was 

billed to the Division of Workers1 Compensation, and by 

assisting his employer in completing an Employer's First 

Report form. We affirm. 

The issue is whether the Workers1 Compensation Court was 

correct in determining that Mr. Scott had made a "claim" 

within one year under § 39-71-601, MCA. 

A stipulated set of facts was submitted to the court 

below. On October 10, 1982, Mr. Scott injured his right arm 

and shoulder while shoveling heavy mud for his employer, 

Utility Line Contractors, in Colstrip, Montana. He did not 

seek medical help until October 13, 1982, when he went to the 

emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital in Billings, Montana. 

The State Fund paid that medical bill. On November 2, 1982, 

Mr. Scott assisted his supervisor in completing an Employer's 

First Report form, which was then forwarded to the Division 

of Workers1 Compensation. Mr. Scott has not completed a Form 

54 claim and presented it to the Division of Workers' Compensation. A Form 54 is the usual form filed by claimants to 

present their claims. 

Mr. Scott filed a petition for hearing before the Workers' Compensation Court on July 1, 1986. An issue arose as 

to whether he had met the one year limitation period set 

forth in S 39-71-601, MCA. Mr. Scott moved for summary 

judgment on this issue, with briefs and supporting exhibits 

filed by both parties. The court gra-nted summary judgment to 

Mr. Scott, and the State Fund appeals. 
The preliminary question of whether the summary judgment 

is now appealable is addressed in the State Fund's brief. It 

points out the usual requirement for Rule 54 (b) , M.R.Civ.P., 

certification of appeal of a partial judgment. However, the 

procedural rules of the Workers' Compensation Court do not 

allow for such certification. The State Fund argues that the 

factors usually considered by district courts ruling on Rule 

54(b) certifications support consideration of this appeal 

now. These factors include separability of this issue and 

the remaining unadjudicated issues, little possibility for a 

need for a second review of this issue, absence of a counterclaim set-of f factor, and considerations of delay and judicial economy. We conclude there is no just reason for delay 

in considering this issue. 

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in determining 

that Mr. Scott had made a "claim" within one year under 

§ 39-71-601, MCA? 

Section 39-71-601, MCA, provides: 

Statute of limitation on presentment of claim -- 

waiver. (1) In case of personal injury or death, 

all claims shall be forever barred unless presented 

in writing to the employer, the insurer, or the 

division, as the case may be, within 12 months from 

the date of the happening of the accident, either 

by the claimant or someone legally authorized to 

act for him in his behalf. 

(2) The division may, upon a reasonable showing by the claimant of lack of knowledge of disability, waive the time requirement up to an 

additional 24 months. 

There has been no allegation of a lack of knowledge on the 

part of Mr. Scott of his disability so as to waive the time 

requirement. Therefore, the question is whether Mr. Scott 

presented his claim within 12 months of the accident. 
The State Fund contends that determining Mr. Scott met 

the statutory requirement for presenting a claim is contrary 

to this Court's opinion in Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Co. 

(Mont. 1985), 697 P.2d 909, 42 St.Rep. 388. In that case, 

the claimant was injured at work in June 1973. He filed a 

claim for compensation after the accident. He was again 

injured in July 1974. He did not file a claim for compensation after that accident. In 1976, the claimant saw a doctor 

for medical problems he described as arising out of the 1973 

accident. In 1982, claimant's counsel brought an action for 

disability from the 1974 accident. The company denied liability because no claim had been filed within the one-year 

statute of limitations. The claimant argued that the company 

knew about the 1974 injury because his boss had filled out a. 

"Report of Alleged Injury" and he had seen a doctor shortly 

after the accident. Claimant asserted that these facts 

showed either that the company had accepted liability or that 

the statutory period was waived. This Court analyzed the 

elements of equitable estoppel and concluded that they were 

not met. Specifically, it held that there was no duty of the 

employer to advise the claimant of the availability of the 

compensation claim procedure. Since the employer was not 

therefore estopped from asserting the one-year bar, the bar 

was applicable. 

Here, the issue is not whether the employer is estopped 

from asserting the one-year bar. The Workers' Compensation 

Court decided this matter on another basis - that the actions 

taken were sufficient to constitute presentment of the claim 

within the year, as required by statute. 

Mr. Scott did not file the standard workers' compensation claim form for this injury. He did, however, seek 

medical care three days after the injury, and had the bill 

sent to the Workers' Compensation Division. He also helped. 
his employer fill out the employer's report form, which 

included his name, social security number, address, date of 

birth, and wages; information about how the accident occurred 

and how he was injured; the name of a witness; the name of 

the physician and the place the injury was treated; and 

information about the employer. On the bottom of that form 

appears an "Employee's Claim for Compensation" form, also 

denominated Form 54. That portion, which Mr. Scott did not 

complete, requests the claimant's education, other types of 

work which claimant has done, number of members in claimant's 

family, and information on former industrial injuries. The 

claimant argued, and the Workers' Compensation Court agreed, 

that the purpose of S 39-71-601, MCA, was met under the 

circumstances here presented. That is, notice has been given 

to the employer to allow it to investigate and prepare to 

defend on the claim. 

We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court was 

correct in determining that Mr. Scott presented his claim 

within one year. The Employer's First Report form completed 

by Mr. Scott and his supervisor contained ample information 

to clearly inform the employer and the division of the nature 

and basis of Mr. Scott's possible claim. The medical report 

prepared three days after the injury also gave indications 

that a claim could likely result out of this injury. This 

contrasts with the situation in Wassberq, where the claimant 

did not clearly show that the employer and the division were 

aware of his possible claim from the 1974 injury. Further, 

in Wassberg, the claimant had one year previously filed a 

claim for injury, yet failed to do so for the injury in 

question. This indicated that he knew how to file, but did 

not do so. That factor is not present here. 
We hold that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly 

determined that Mr. Scott met the presentment requirement of 

§ 39-71-601, MCA. 

We Concur: