J-S49033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFREY A. GOODMAN 

Appellant No. 1833 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 17, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000213-2015

BEFORE: DUBOW, SOLANO, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017

Appellant, Jeffrey A. Goodman, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Venango County Court of Common Pleas. Following a jury 

trial, Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree,1and aggravated 

assault.2 Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for first degree murder3

and he was ordered to pay $8,440.00 in restitution. Appellant challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence and the discretionary aspect of his sentence. 

We affirm.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).

3 The trial court found that the conviction for aggravated assault merged 

with the conviction for first degree murder for sentencing purposes. See

Trial Ct. Op., 10/21/16, at 1.
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We glean the facts from the record. At trial, Police Chief Robert J. 

Wenner testified, inter alia, as follows:

[The Commonwealth:] Were you involved in the 

investigation into the death of Cathy Goodman?

A. I was.

 * * *

Q. Do you recall being dispatched to 142 Charlton Street, 

in Oil City?

A. Yes. . . .

Q. Do you recall what the dispatch was for at that time? 

What were you made aware of?

A. I was contacted by Officer [Robert Allen] Meehan, by 

phone, to advise me that they were responding to a 911 

call where a man had indicated he killed his wife and was 

still inside the house with the rifle.

Q. Did he give you a name at that point in time?

A. The address was familiar to me. I responded, and when 

I got on the air from my own vehicle, I asked if we were 

dealing with [Appellant] at 142, and they advised it was.

 * * *

Q. Now, upon arriving at 142 Charlton Street, . . . were 

you the only officer on scene at that point in time?

A. No. Officer Orr and Officer Rembold arrived prior to me 

. . . .

 * * *

Q. What was your first course of action when [Appellant] 

came out of the residence? 
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A. I asked [Appellant] to keep his hands up. He said, 

Wenner, come on, you know me.

 * * *

As he came towards us, he made the statements, I done 

it. I’ve had enough. I’m done. She’s dead.

 * * *

Q. What were your observations of when you first entered 

the residence of 142 Charlton Street?

A. As I crossed the threshold to the rear to that back door, 

I could smell the odor of gun powder, which is consistent, 

in my experience, with being discharged inside a home.

I moved through the kitchen area with Rembold . . . 

behind me. As we moved though the kitchen toward a 

short hallway. Upon entering the hallway, I began to see 

some blood spatter and bone fragments on the hall floor 

and on the hall wall.

As I went into the hallway that leads directly to the 

front door, with a set of steps to the second─to my left, 

there was an opening─a wide opening into what I would 

refer to as a living room or a TV room. And as I moved to 

my right, I observed the deceased, Cathy Goodman, on 

the couch with the rifle laying partially on her body and 

partially on the armrest to the couch.

 * * *

Q. Chief Wenner, is there anything, specifically, about the 

body that you recognized regarding injury?

A. There was extensive injury about the facial area, the 

skull. The majority of the face was gone. Other than 

her─the size of her body being consistent with Cathy 

Goodman, who was also known to me, it would have been 

difficult, if not impossible, to identify her facial features.

N.T., 3/14/16, at 39-42, 44. 
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Lieutenant Steven Hamilton testified as follows:

[The Commonwealth:] Now, you were the only person who 

showed up at the scene regarding evidence collection for 

the purposes of this crime; is that correct? Initially.

A. Initially, yes.

Q. Who else did you call in to assist you in collection of 

evidence of this homicide?

A. [A] decision was made that we would call the 

Pennsylvania State Police, their records and identification 

unit, to come and assist us with processing the crime 

scene.

Q. Now prior to their arrival did you at any point in time 

take a walk-through of the crime scene?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Who was it that led you through on the walk-through of 

the crime scene?

A. Chief Wenner . . . .

 * * *

Q. And you heard Chief Wenner’s testimony as to his 

observations initially when he went through the crime 

scene himself.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you believe his recollection of the crime scene is a 

fair and accurate rendition of your walk-through of the 

crime scene?

A. Yes, it is.

 * * *

Q. Now we’re going to go ahead and move to Photograph 

No. 10. Next slide if you would please.
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Photograph No. 10, could you describe for the jury what 

that depicts.

A. Yes. This would be the corner of that living room, and 

you would be looking to the right and that would be the 

couch that the─Cathy Goodman is laying on, and she’s 

covered with a white blanket there.

Q. Now I’m going to go ahead and have you move to 

Photograph 11.

Lieutenant, can you please describe for the jury and the 

[c]ourt what this photograph depicts.

A. This would depict the victim on the couch, along with 

the firearm, rifle, and this is─her purse is between her and 

the couch back itself.

Q. Okay. Now, the firearm itself, can you describe what 

exactly or where it’s positioned on the couch.

A. It’s positioned with the back end of it on the arm of the 

couch. And as you can see, the rest of the scope and that 

area was laying on the arm of Ms. Goodman.

 * * *

Q. I’m going to ask you specific questions regarding the 

crime scene after Cathy Goodman was removed from the 

couch.[4]

A. Okay.

Q. Is there anything in particular that came to your 

attention upon her removal from the couch?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. What was that?

 

4 The victim was taken to the coroner’s office in Erie. Id. at 96.
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A. We noticed a hole in the couch that would be at the 

back of the couch.

Q. If we could move to Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5, 

Photograph No. 14. Now, what does [it] depict?

A. It shows the exit─the trajectory the bullet took from 

front to back. This would be the photograph of the back of 

the couch, and it’s showing the fibers that are coming out 

of the hole in that direction.

Q. Was there a hole in the front of the couch?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. Did the trajectory of the hole in the front of the couch 

line up with the hole in the back of the couch?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. What was the significance of the fibers hanging out, as 

you described, in the hole in the back of the couch?

A. With the fibers hanging out, you could tell that’s the 

direction the bullet went. That was an exit─the back of the 

couch is an exit; the front of the couch is an entrance. . . .

Id. at 65-66, 80-81, 96-97.

Dr. Eric Vey, of the Erie County coroner’s office, “testif[ied] as an 

expert in the field of anatomical pathology and forensic pathology.” N.T., 

3/15/16, at 148. 

[The Commonwealth:] What was revealing, when you first 

saw this body, as to the extent of her injuries?

A. The overwhelming first impression was that she had 

sustained massive destruction to her head as a result of a 

gunshot wound. It was difficult to get an accurate 

assessment of her overall height because, essentially, the 

top half of her skull had been exploded as a result of the 
J-S49033-17

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gunshot wound so that multiple fragments of skull were no 

longer in their normal anatomic position.

In other words, . . . we had multiple resected 

fragments. That means that pieces that were normally in 

a place that they were supposed to be were displaced 

elsewhere.

Same thing with [sic] there was a large fragment of her 

scalp that had been resected as a result of the gunshot 

trauma too. So, essentially, from the level of her 

eyebrows up, everything was either collapsed in or 

resected out. So there was no bony structure left to the 

top of her head above the level of the eyebrows. And that 

was, again, as a result of the explosive effect from the 

gunshot wound.

The other thing I was going to say was that as a result 

of this explosive destruction to her head, the majority of 

her brain had been evacuated from her skull and was not 

present in her head at the time of the autopsy. The only 

thing left in her head, as far as central nervous system 

tissue went, was cerebellum and a little bit of brain stem.

 * * *

Q. Also, at the time of the examination did you notice any 

other, what looked like, gunshot wounds to any extremity 

in addition to her head?

A. Yes. She had a gunshot wound through and through─in 

other words, in one side and out the other─on the back of 

her right hand right over the pinky finger. . . . So there 

was, in association with that, a number of the skeletal 

structures─in other words, bones of the hand─had been 

blown out of that area as well.

Now, significantly, associated with this entrance wound 

right here, there were little punctate─in other words, little 

punched out─superficial abrasions scattered on the skin.

This is significant with respect to gunshot wounds 

because it provides a telltale assessment regarding the 

nature of those punctate abrasions. That’s called powder 
J-S49033-17

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tattooing or powder strippling. So that when a gun is 

discharged, coming out of the end of the muzzle, in 

addition to the bullet coming out, little fragments of burnt 

and unburnt powder, sort of like grains of pepper, come 

out as well.

And depending on how far away the end of the muzzle 

is from the target beyond a certain distance, those little 

grains [sic] pepper, the flakes of burnt and unburnt 

powder will, early on, have enough energy to impact the 

skin, but once you get beyond a certain range, they’ll fall 

away. They no longer have enough kinetic energy to make 

it to the skin surface.

So when there’s no powder tattooing, that defines 

what’s termed, in forensic pathology, as a distant gunshot 

wound. When there is powered tattooing, that’s diagnostic 

of an intermediate─or medium─range gunshot wound. 

And there are certain distances for handguns and rifles, in 

general, that allow a determination of range of fire. In 

other words, how far the end of the muzzle was to the 

target.

Now, based upon the presence of powder tattooing with 

a rifle, the distance then between the end of the 

muzzle─or the end of the barrel of the rifle to the hand 

that was struck by this gunshot wound is roughly between 

a foot and a half and 2 feet─I’m sorry, a foot and a half to 

2

1

/2 feet. Beyond 21/2 feet, there’s no longer enough 

kinetic energy associated with those little grains of pepper, 

the burnt and unburnt powder that comes out of the 

muzzle, to allow them to make it to the skin surface. They 

just fall away.

So that’s it, between about a foot and a half to 2 feet is 

the distance, based on the presence of the powder 

tattooing or the powder stippling that was present on her 

hand, in association with the bullet hole, scattered around 

there little punctate abrasions, like little salt and pepper 

grains imbedded right in the skin, you can’t wash them 

away, a foot and a half to 21/2 feet. . . .

 * * *
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Q. I’d like you to maybe identify, in your opinion, based on 

your examination, what the path of the bullet was in this 

case. Striking what part of her body first, then second, 

and then where the exit wound was.

A. Again, this case presented a challenge because, 

typically, with a handgun wound to the head at 

intermediate range you don’t get the degree of destruction 

to the head as you would get with a─with a high-power or 

hunting rifle. That has a lot more─a lot more umph behind 

it. So it became difficult because there was multiple─there 

were multiple large, gaping lacerations and complete 

disfigurement of the head from the level of the eyebrows 

to what was left above that.

But it’s possible, with collection of the pieces of scalp 

from the scene and then putting the large lacerations back 

together again, to establish where the entrance was. That 

entrance was located about 3 centimeters to the right, 

which is roughly─there’s 21/2 centimeters in an inch. So

that’s about an inch and a quarter to the right of the 

midline, or the middle, of her forehead. And it was 8 

centimeters, roughly, which is roughly─8 centimeters is 

about 31/4 inches above the bridge of the nose.

 * * *

So the overall path of this bullet, as it went through her 

head, was from her front to her back and her right to her 

left.

Q. On her body, was the first place it entered the head?

A. Well, this case presented evidence that, in fact, there 

was─we also had some stippling on her─some powder 

tattooing on her right and left upper forehead. But given 

the dense concentration of powder tattooing on her hand 

and the sparse distribution of the powder tattooing on her 

forehead, it looks as if the─Mrs. Goodman actually put her 

hand up in an attempt to shield herself.

 * * *
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Q. [D]o you have a determination as to the cause of death 

in this case?

 * * *

A. The determination is that Cathy Goodman died as a 

result of a gunshot wound to the head.

 * * *

Q. [A]s specifically as possible, could you please list, again, 

the traumatic events to the head that caused you to form 

your opinion.

A. Well, we had the entrance to the right upper 

forehead region, and then there was extensive destruction 

to the skull and scalp with multiple displaced and resected 

skull and scalp fragments and traumatic evacuation of the 

majority of the brain from the skull as a result of this 

gunshot wound. Therein lies the─you know, that is, 

indeed, the cause of death.

Id. at 154-59, 163-64.

At trial, Appellant testified, on cross-examination, as follows:

[The Commonwealth:] [Y]ou don’t deny that it was you on 

the 911 call when you called in to explain that you had just 

shot your wife?

A. Right.

Q. Okay. And again, during that 911 call, you answered 

her specific questions, whoever you were talking to, and 

followed her direction to go out the back door of the house 

when the police had arrived?

A. Yes.

 * * *

Q. When you were taken into custody, was Chief Wenner 

at least there?
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 * * *

A. I believe he was.

Q. And you were still on the phone, even as you came out 

of the residence, and that’s why it was found in the 

driveway where it was with the pictures that the 

Commonwealth offered, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. It was there that you first indicated to the Oil City PD in 

answering, I don’t have a gun. I shot my wife. It’s inside.

A. Yes.

 * * *

Q. You told Chief Wenner that night, on the video, that 

Cathy had been sleeping on the couch for the last four or 

five days; is that correct?

A. Yes.

 * * *

Q. And you also said, and I believe I saw on the video 

itself, that what really angered you was when she laughed 

at you. Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

 * * *

Q. Let me ask you this: What was it about her laughing 

that caused you to be so enraged?

A. Everything else, then laughing. You know with the 

affair, the crabs, being throwed [sic] out, having 

somebody move into my house.

Q. Your counsel was careful in his questions to say when 

the shells were put in the gun. I want to be more specific. 

In the video, you indicated that you went upstairs to the 
J-S49033-17

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attic, climbed up on the shelving and got the gun; is that 

correct.

A. Yes.

Q. At that time there were five shells, I believe, that you 

also got at the same time in the attic?

A. Yeah. There was [sic] five in a─that black case thing.

Q. On the way down from the attic, you went to the 

bedroom, where you took the case and three shells and 

put them in the drawer of your dresser?

A. Yes.

Q. And in your hand, when you took downstairs [sic] the 

gun─you had two shells in your hand; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you point the unloaded firearm at her first?

A. Yeah. To get her attention, I bumped her with the 

gun─unloaded gun.

Q. Okay. And you still had the two bullets in your hand?

A. Yes.

Q. And when she laughed at you, you took one of the 

bullets, put it into the breach of the gun and you activated 

the slide action on it to load it, correct?

A. Yes.

 * * *

Q. [W]hy would you put a loaded cartridge into the breach 

action of this gun, slide the lever, and point the gun at her 

head then if you had no intention to shoot her?

A. At that time there was.
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Q. You did have the intention at that time?

A. Because of after the affair and, you know, getting me 

throwed [sic] out of the house.

Q. On the video, we heard that after the first shot you slid 

the action again, ejected the spent casing, and then put 

the other live shell in, activating the lever to reload the 

gun.

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you do that?

A. It was for me.

Q. Well, you said in the video that you─

A. Right.

Q. ─weren’t contemplating committing suicide at any 

point.

A. Right.

 * * *

Q. Were you telling the truth that night, on the night you 

shot her, within two hours afterwards, or are you telling 

the truth here today?

A. Both.

 * * *

Q. I believe Chief Wenner also asked you in that video that 

night those questions that if the first round hadn’t gotten 

the job done, you were going to go ahead and reload that 

second just to make sure the job got done, and you 

affirmed that for him; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Id. at 220-24, 226-29, 231, 233.
J-S49033-17

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On March 16, 2016, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of 

murder in the first degree and aggravated assault. On May 17, 2016, 

Appellant was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment. Appellant filed a postsentence motion. Following a hearing, the post-sentence motion was 

denied. This timely appeal followed.5 Appellant filed a court-ordered 

 

5 We note that Appellant was sentenced on May 17, 2016. He filed a postsentence motion on May 27, 2016. On the same date, Appellant filed a 

motion to request relief to file a supplemental post-sentence motion and a 

motion for extension of time to file a motion to modify his sentence. On 

June 17, 2016, the trial court granted the motion and extended the time to 

file the motion to modify sentence until 20 days after the public defender 

has received all court ordered transcripts. The Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provide, inter alia, as follows:

The defendant may file a supplemental post-sentence 

motion in the judge’s discretion as long as the decision on 

the supplemental motion can be made in compliance with 

the time limits of paragraph (B)(3).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(b). The time limits provide as follows:

Upon motion of the defendant within the 120-day 

disposition period, for good cause shown, the judge may 

grant one 30-day extension for decision on the motion. If 

the judge fails to decide the motion within the 30-day 

extension period, the motion shall be deemed denied by 

operation of law.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a) (setting forth general 

rule that post sentence motions be decided in 120 days). Instantly, the 

supplemental post sentence motion was filed on July 19, 2016. A hearing 

was scheduled for August 30, 2016. The Commonwealth requested a 

continuance which the court granted on September 14, 2016. A hearing was 

held on October 12, 2016. The post sentence motions were denied on 

October 21, 2016. Thus, the court timely decided the motion within the 

thirty-day extension period. See id. 
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, and the trial 

court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.6

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

The evidence in this case was insufficient to support the 

murder and aggravated assault charges.

The sentence in this case was manifestly excessive and 

clearly unreasonable when the court sentenced [Appellant] 

to a period of incarceration and did not take into account 

mitigating factors such as [Appellant’s] background and 

the nature of the crime.

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

First, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the murder charge. He avers that

no direct evidence was presented which directly linked him 

to the possession of the firearm and the firing of it at the 

time that the victim was shot. Further, no direct physical 

evidence was presented that linked the firearm found at 

the scene of the crime to the killing of the victim. No 

direct evidence was presented to prove that [Appellant] 

had the requisite intent, mental state, or malice to kill Mrs. 

Goodman.

 * * *

[Appellant] points out that even though law 

enforcement could have tested the bullet and firearm for 

fingerprints linking him to holding that weapon or to 

ballistic tests to prove that the bullet that killed Mrs. 

Goodman was actually fired out of that particular weapon, 

none of those tests were run. Therefore, the 

Commonwealth was unable to link the shooting to 

[Appellant]. Further, [Appellant] seemed to be on good 

 

6 We note the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion incorporated its October 21, 

2016 opinion disposing of post-sentence motions. 
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terms with Mrs. Goodman, with no ill will stated to anyone 

that he was intending on harming her, so no evidence of a 

first degree intentional murder was actually presented.

While [Appellant] stated that the gun went off in his 

hands, this does not confirm intent. [Appellant’s] case 

seems to involve a heat of passion type of murder, rather 

than a premeditated, intentional killing, as [Appellant] was 

arguing with his wife and had previously learned that she 

was having an affair with someone else.

Id. at 14-15. 

“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not 

require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the 

evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to 

support the verdict. . . .

 * * *

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an 

appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and 

all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235-37 (Pa. 2007) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Section 2502(a) of the Crimes Code defines first degree murder:

(a) Murder of the first degree.─A criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed 

by an intentional killing.
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18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:

In order to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, 

the Commonwealth must demonstrate that a human being 

was unlawfully killed; the defendant was responsible for 

the killing; and the defendant acted with malice and a 

specific intent to kill, i.e., the killing was performed in an 

intentional, deliberate, and premeditated manner. Specific 

intent may be established through circumstantial 

evidence, such as the use of a deadly weapon on a 

vital part of the victim’s body. 

Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

omitted and emphasis added). “[T]he intent to kill may be formulated in 

seconds.” Commonwealth v. Baez, 759 A.2d 936, 938 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

The trial court found the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction 

for first degree murder. The court opined:

[T]here was a considerable amount of testimony and 

tangible evidence dedicated to establishing the physical 

circumstances of Cathy Goodman’s death. . . . Moreover, 

[Appellant] admitted via his voluntary statements to the 

police immediately following the incident that he did in fact 

shoot his wife, and he confirmed this fact on the stand 

both via direct testimony and on cross examination.

 * * *

[I]t was essentially uncontroverted at the time of trial that 

[Appellant] shot the victim; indeed, the only defense 

[Appellant] seriously advanced was whether he possessed 

the requisite mens rea to establish first degree murder. . . 

. In any event, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden 

by wholly circumstantial evidence. As such, we find the 

evidence more than sufficient to uphold the jury’s verdict 

both with respect to whether [Appellant] killed the victim 

and with respect to [Appellant’s] mental state in so doing.

 
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Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5 (citations omitted). 

Dr. Vey testified that Mrs. Goodman died as a result of a gunshot 

wound to the head. A conviction for first-degree murder can be sustained 

based upon circumstantial evidence where a deadly weapon was used on a 

vital part of the decedent’s body. See Ramtahal, 33 A.3d at 607. The 

intent to kill can be formulated in an instant. See Baez, 759 A.2d at 939. 

Moreover, Appellant’s suggestion that the killing case involved a heat 

of passion defense warrants no relief. The jury was instructed on voluntary 

manslaughter and was free to discredit Appellant’s testimony that the killing 

occurred during an argument regarding a previous affair. Even if the jury 

concluded that an argument occurred, there was a reasonable basis for the 

jury to conclude that Appellant did not actually respond in the heat of 

passion. See Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (“The test for a heat of passion defense used to reduce the degree of 

the offense is ‘whether a reasonable man, confronted with the same series 

of events would become impassioned to the extent that his mind would be 

incapable of cool reflection.’ Further, if sufficient provocation exists, the 

fact-finder must determine whether the defendant actually acted in the heat 

of passion.” (citations omitted)). The jury was also entitled to find that the 

argument was an insufficient provocation to warrant a reduced conviction for 

voluntary manslaughter, as Appellant knew the affair before the argument 

preceding the killing. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 656 A.2d 90, 92 
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(Pa. 1994). Thus, we find no relief is due. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 

1235-36; Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751.

Appellant avers the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated 

assault charge. He “again, argues that there was no proof presented by the 

Commonwealth that he was intending for any sort of serious bodily injury to 

happen to Mrs. Goodman, or even that he was the person who shot the gun 

that night.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.

“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . causes such injury 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting 

extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (a)(1). 

The Crimes Code defines “serious bodily injury” as “[b]odily injury which 

creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent 

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 

member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. “Bodily injury” is defined as 

“impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. “The intent to 

cause serious bodily injury may be proven by direct or circumstantial 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948 (Pa. Super. 

2012).

In Commonwealth. v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc), this Court found there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

for aggravated assault where the appellant

appeared before the victim without warning, pointed a gun 

at the middle of her forehead, demanded her keys, and 
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threatened to blow [her] head off if she did not comply. 

The victim indicated that [the a]ppellant grasped one end 

of keys while she held a key in her hand. She also 

estimated that the gun was less than a half inch from the 

area between her eyebrows at the time. Under such 

circumstances, [the a]ppellant was not merely pointing the 

gun at the victim while making a conditional threat. 

Rather, his simultaneous demand to her to act was direct 

and uttered while he constantly pointed his weapon 

squarely at a vital part of her body and while he was 

holding the opposite end of the keys that were also still in 

her hand. As such, we find there was sufficient evidence 

from which a jury could have found that [the a]ppellant 

attempted to cause serious bodily injury upon the victim.

We further find there was sufficient evidence from which 

the jury could have concluded that [the a]ppellant took a 

substantial step towards inflicting serious bodily injury 

since he pointed a gun at the middle of the victim’s 

forehead, threatened to kill her, and did not do so only 

because the victim fled. The only remaining step [the 

a]ppellant would have had to take to inflict serious bodily 

injury upon [the victim] would have been to pull the 

trigger on the gun, which would have obviously caused 

serious bodily injury.

Id. at 986-87 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court opined:

We find the sufficiency argument as it relates to 

[aggravated assault] unavailing on similar grounds [as to 

the conviction for first degree murder]. . . . Given the 

jury’s verdict, and the Commonwealth’s entitlement to 

every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, we find 

that [Appellant’s] shooting the victim, thereby causing her 

death, form an adequate evidentiary basis to sustain his 

conviction [for aggravated assault].

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6. 

In the case sub judice, Appellant inflicted serious bodily injury having 

killed the victim with a gunshot wound to her head. See Fortune, 68 A.3d 
J-S49033-17

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at 986-87; Martuscelli, 54 A.3d at 948. We find no relief is due. See 

Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36; Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751.

Lastly, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspect of his sentence. 

Appellant contends

that he should receive a maximum sentence not to exceed 

twenty years, and a parole date not to exceed ten years. 

The law provides that a person convicted of first 

degree murder will receive life imprisonment. 

However, [Appellant] requests that the [c]ourt consider 

mitigating factors, such as his lack of intent, in order to 

grant him a shorter sentence.

Appellant’s Brief at 16 (emphasis added).

The sentence for first degree murder is statutorily mandated as 

follows:

(a) First degree.─

(1) Except as provided under section 1102.1 (relating to 

sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, 

murder of an unborn child and murder of a law 

enforcement officer), a person who has been convicted 

of a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law 

enforcement officer of the first degree shall be 

sentenced to death or to a term of life 

imprisonment in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 

(relating to sentencing procedure for murder of the first 

degree).

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added). Appellant was convicted by a 

jury of First Degree Murder, and as such was sentenced to life in prison. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.. § 9711 (upon a conviction for first degree murder, the 

defendant may either be sentenced to death or life in prison).
J-S49033-17

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“Challenges to a trial court’s application of a mandatory sentencing 

provision implicate the legality of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 

960 A.2d 160, 167 (Pa. Super. 2008). Since the sentence imposed in this 

case for first degree murder is a mandatory sentence, there is no basis upon 

which to appeal the imposition of a life sentence as an abuse of discretion. 

See id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(a). For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm 

the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/13/2017