No. 86-561 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL 

HEALTH OF R.J.W., Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of McCone, 

The Honorable R.C. McDonough, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Allen Smith, Jr., Warm Springs, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

George Schunk, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, Montana 

Arnie A. Hove, County Attorney, Circle, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 5, 1987 

Decided: April 16, 1987 

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Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

RJW appeals an order from the Seventh Judicial District 

Court ordering his involuntary commitment to the Montana 

State Hospital. 

We affirm the commitment. 

The issues on appeal are: 

1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 

finding of the District Court that appellant is seriously 

mentally ill. 

2. Whether the District Court's findings are adequate 

under S 53-21-127 (2) (c) , MCA. 

Criminal proceedings were initiated in McCone County 

alleging RJW committed aggravated assault and carried a 

concealed weapon. The incident precipitating these charges 

occurred on May 11, 1986. The appellant, RJW, was walking 

down a street in Circle, Montana, when he was approached by 

his landlord, James Rau, and his landlord's wife, Eileen Rau, 

in their pick-up truck. James Rau made an adamant demand for 

overdue rent money and an argument ensued. The appellant 

attempted to unbutton his coat to show his landlord that he 

had a weapon. The weapon RJW was carrying under his coat is 

disputed. RJW testified at his commitment hearing that it 

was a Bowie knife or a "folding knife." The information 

filed by the county attorney charged that RJW was carrying a 

pistol underneath his coat which he reached for, causing 

reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in James Rau and 

Eileen Rau. RJW was charged and arrested at his home later 

that day. 
On motion of the county attorney, a psychiatric 

evaluation was conducted on the appellant at the Montana 

State Hospital. A report summarizing that evaluation was 

completed by Dr. John Van Hassel. That report, dated July 

29, 1986, concluded: 

In summary, it is the staff Is opinion that the 

patient does suffer from a mental disease or 

defect, namely chronic paranoid schizophrenia. As 

a result of this disorder, it is the staff's 

opinion that he does not have the capacity to 

understand the proceedings against him nor to 

assist in his own defense. Further, the staff 

believes that it is unlikely that he is capable of 

having a particular state of mind which is an 

element of the offense charged. That is, he is 

considered incapable of acting with knowledge and 

purpose because of the mental disorder. 

The diagnosis reached by Dr. Van Hassel was based in 

part on psychological observations contained in his report. 

Following receipt of the report by the District Court, 

the county attorney petitioned that appellant be declared 

seriously mentally ill within the definition of 5 

53-21-102 (4), MCA, and the criminal charges were dismissed. 

A hearing on the petition was held on August 14, 1986. 

Dr. John Van Hassel, McCone County Sheriff Robert Jensen and 

RJW testified. The report of Dr. Van Hassel was admitted 

into evidence. 

Dr. Van Hassel, a clinical psychologist at the Montana 

State Hospital and licensed professional person, testified 

that RJW was suffering from a mental disorder, chronic 

paranoid schizophrenia, which "is characterized not so much 

\, by general deterioration of his thought processes, but is 

5 characterized by a very elaborate and pronounced delusional 

system. " Dr. Van Hassel expressed his opinion that RJW was 

an imminent threat to others, particularly persons who 

challenge his alleged delusion about a trust fund. Dr. Van 
Hassel testified that RJW becomes angry and verbally hostile 

when his delusion is challenged. Dr. Van Hassel further 

testified that RJW had not made "a specific threat to harm 

anyone. " 

Robert Jensen, McCone County Sheriff, also testified at 

the hearing. He testified that he had served eviction papers 

to RJW and that RJW had a revolver in his possession when he 

was arrested at his home on the criminal charges. Sheriff 

Jensen further testified that RJW had made no specific 

threats against anyone on either of the above occasions. 

Upon the conclusion of Sheriff Jensen's testimony, the 

District Court denied. RJTJ's motion to dismiss the petition. 

RJW then testified on his own behalf. 

He testified that he had not threatened any person. 

When questioned as to whether he would harm someone who lied 

to him about his finances, he replied that he would raise his 

voice and call the person a liar. 

When questioned about the incident that precipitated his 

arrest, RJW testified that he did not have a gun with him. 

He testified that he had a knife on his belt, but that he had 

not threatened the landlord with it, and that he had in fact 

stepped back away from the landlord's truck because the 

conflict was escalating. When asked to clarify his response 

to a hypothetical question about whether he would harm 

someone, RJW testified that the person "would have to be, you 

know, confronting me and be specific about it." 

The court questioned RJW extensively about the existence 

of his alleged trust fund and ranch. The court learned that 

the appellant had previously accused his brother of 

attempting to poison him with rattlesnake venom contained in 

a sealed beer can, that one revolver had been taken away from 

him while he was living in Texas, and that the appellant had 
purchased another pistol after he allegedly had a beer spiked 

with drugs or poison. 

The court concluded that RJW was seriously mentally ill 

and posed an imminent threat to himself and others. The 

appellant was involuntarily committed to the Montana State 

Hospital following a discussion of less restrictive 

alternatives. 

RJW appeals this involuntary commitment order. He 

argues that the testimony shows that while he may have become 

angry and verbally hostile he did not commit overt acts which 

harmed anyone. RJW claims that when asked specific questions 

pertaining to specific persons and incidents, his testimony 

shows no evidence of threats or attempts to harm thus no 

overt acts occurred as required for a finding of serious 

mental illness. 

Appellant claims there simply was not sufficient 

evidence to support a finding that he was seriously mentally 

ill as defined in 5 53-21-102, MCA. 

Section 53-21-102 (14) , MCA, defines "seriously mentally 

ill" to mean a person is suffering from a mental disorder 

which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or injury to 

others or the imminent threat thereof or which has deprived 

the person afflicted of the ability to protect his life and 

health. 

Specifically, in order to commit someone, the State must 

prove : 

(a) the respondent is suffering from a mental 

disorder; and 

(b) the mental disorder has resulted in 

self-inflicted injury or injury to others or the 

imminent threat thereof or has deprived the person 

afflicted of the ability to protect his life or 

health. 
Section 53-21-126 (41, MCA. 

Upon review this Court must evaluate whether these 

statutory standards were met by the State as found by the 

District Court. 

RJW concedes that he suffers from a mental disorder 

under 5 53-21-126(4)(a), MCA, but he argues the State did not 

produce adequate evidence that one of the three possible 

statutory criteria resulted because of the mental disorder. 

The standard of proof is set forth in $ 53-21-126(2), 

MCA . 

The standard of proof in any hearing held pursuant 

to this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

with respect to any physical facts or evidence and 

clear and convincing evidence as to all other 

matters, except that mental disorders shall be 

evidenced to a reasonable medical certainty. 

Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury 

to others shall be evidenced by overt acts, 

sufficiently recent in time as to be material and 

relevant as to the respondent's present condition. 

On appeal this Court will look to the sufficiency of the 

evidence in reviewing this civil proceeding and will view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. 

Lima School District No. 12 and Elementary School District of 

Beaverhead County v. Simonsen (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 471, 41 

We note that 

. . . the law does not require proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt that an injury will occur in the 

future . . . The law requires only proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the threat of future injury 

presently exists and that the threat is imminent ... 

Matter of F.B. (Mont. 1980), 615 P.2d 867, 869, 37 St.Rep. 

1442, 1445. 

A careful review of the record indicates there was 

sufficient evidence on which the lower court could base a 
finding of serious mental illness. Among other evidence, the 

psychologist's report and defendant's own testimony are very 

revealing. The statute does not require a court wait until a 

person such as RJW takes the next step in a paranoid 

delusional scheme of reality and actually uses weapons owned 

by him against others. 

The trial court had the benefit of observing the 

demeanor and weighing the credibility of all the witnesses at 

the hearing. Since sufficient evidence existed on the 

record, this Court will defer to the decision of the District 

Court on this issue and uphold the finding that RJW is 

seriously mentally ill. 

Appellant next contends that the District Court erred by 

not entering into the record a detailed statement of the 

facts upon which it found the appellant to be seriously 

mentally ill. 

The statute governing civil commitment states that 

"[tlhe court shall enter into the record a detailed statement 

of the facts upon which it found the respondent to be 

seriously mentally ill. " Section 53-21-127 (2) (c) , MCA. The 

Montana Rules of Civil Procedure state that "the court shall 

find the facts specially" by oral statement and recording 

thereof in open court or by adopting the proposed findings of 

any party. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. 

In this case the court found that "the respondent is 

seriously mentally ill and is an eminent (sic) threat to 

himself and especially others." The findings of fact signed 

by the District Court state I1[t]hat based upon the testimony 

and the reports and pleadings on file [RJW] is seriously 

mentally ill." 

We do not believe this finding was a detailed statement 

of the facts as contemplated by $ 53-21-127 (2) (c) , MCA. No 

particular testimony or facts were referenced. Even though 
the transcript indicated the mental disorder resulted in 

imminent threat to appellant and others, the findings of fact 

failed to indicate which particular portion of § 

53-21-126(4) (b) was relied on for its determination of 

"seriously mentally ill." 

Given the detail in the record as a whole, we find that 

this was harmless to appellant under the facts here. Future 

findings of fact should more carefully detail the factual 

basis on which a finding of serious mental illness is 

premised. / 

The decision of the District 

We Concur: /9' 

e Chief A~TL 

Justice 

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' Justices /'