Filed 12/6/13

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

MANUEL ALFRED ROCHA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H038703

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. C1103705)

A jury convicted defendant Manuel Alfred Rocha of residential burglary and 

interfering with a police officer based on evidence that he entered a homeowner’s garage 

and carried away an impact wrench belonging to the homeowner. On appeal his chief 

contention is that the court erred in admitting evidence of a 2009 burglary, also of a 

residential garage, to show that defendant committed the present burglary with the 

requisite larcenous intent. Defendant contends that the circumstances of the earlier 

burglary were too dissimilar from the charged offense for it to possess substantial 

probative value, and that its potential for prejudice preponderated over whatever 

probative value it might have. He also contends, and respondent concedes, that the trial 

court overstated the time to be deducted from defendant’s credit for presentence 

confinement due to a contemporaneous parole hold. We will direct a modification of the 

judgment to award additional credit, but will otherwise affirm the judgment. 
2

BACKGROUND

Around 8:00 on the morning of Saturday, March 26, 2011, Gilberto Gonzales, as 

was his custom, opened the door of the garage attached to his San Jose home. The garage 

was used to do laundry as well as to store personal property, including many tools 

Mr. Gonzalez owned for working on cars and in construction. He usually left the door 

open when he was home. Toward noon he drove to the auto parts store.1 A few minutes 

later, his wife Denise and daughter Bianka stepped out of the house to have a smoke.2 

Almost as soon as they did, Bianka heard a noise in the garage. Bianka described the 

sound as “[l]ike going through things; making noises, closing and opening doors,” also 

“like people scattering things, opening drawers.” She thought the noises were being 

made by her father, which was odd because he had “just left.” Meanwhile Denise saw 

the “shadow of a person” in the corner of the garage. She too thought her husband had 

returned, so she went back into the house on the way to the back yard, because her 

husband did not like smoking in front of the house. 

Bianka reentered the house and opened a door connecting into the garage, 

apparently expecting to see her father. Instead she saw defendant, a complete stranger, 

standing about 10 feet away, “opening drawers.” He turned to look at her; neither of 

them spoke. According to Denise, Bianka called out that someone other than her father 

was present. She ran to the phone and called 911. While on the phone, she went out the 

front of the house and saw defendant emerge from the garage and walk down the 

driveway and then the street. He appeared to be holding a bulky boxlike object to his 

chest, apparently wrapped in a sweater or jacket. He was walking slowly. He seemed 

 

1

 Mr. Gonzales initially thought it might have been around 9:00 in the morning, 

but agreed that it “might have been” more like 11:30 a.m., which is apparently more 

consistent with police dispatch records. 

2

 Denise testified that she stepped outside alone. 
3

“calm, cool, collected.” He also struck her as “disorientated,” though she could not 

describe this impression more particularly. She thought he was on drugs. She was 

familiar with people who use methamphetamine and had seen them under its influence, 

though she had no formal training in its effects. 

Bianka described the intruder to the 911 operator, who relayed it in turn to San 

Jose Police Officer Cooley, who was patrolling in the area. Within 10 minutes, he saw 

defendant—who matched the description—in a trailer park a few blocks from the 

Gonzalez home. Defendant was carrying a black case resembling a lunch pail. Officer 

Cooley followed him into the mobile home park. When defendant saw him, he froze, and 

then—disregarding Officer Cooley’s command to stop—bolted, dropping the case to the 

ground. Additional officers were summoned to surround and search the mobile home 

park. About an hour later, they found defendant standing inside a metal shed. In the shed 

they also found a pair of pliers and a screwdriver. Officer Cooley did not perceive 

defendant as “disorientated,” confused, paranoid, hallucinating, delusional, or exhibiting 

other physical or mental signs of being under the influence of methamphetamine. From 

Officer Cooley’s experience, defendant “had the loo[k] of like he was caught.” 

About 15 minutes after defendant was captured, San Jose Police Officer Vela 

brought Bianka to the mobile home park for an in-field showup. She saw defendant 

standing by a police car in handcuffs. She apparently identified him as the man she had 

seen in the garage.3

 

3

 Although one of the prosecutor’s questions to Bianka obliquely assumed that 

she had in fact identified the suspect as the man she saw in the garage, the prosecutor 

neglected to directly ask her whether that was the case. Officer Vela was asked, “[D]id 

Ms. Gonzales provide you any identification,” to which he answered, “Yes.” But when 

he was asked, “What did she say,” his answer, as transcribed, was this: “[W]hen I asked 

her if that was the individual that we were detaining? And her immediate response was, 

yeah, that’s him.” Whether or not this was his actual testimony, the jury could 

reasonably infer from the evidence as a whole that Bianka identified defendant as the 

man she saw in the garage. 
4

Defendant was taken into custody by San Jose Police Officer Jennings, who had 

arrived at the scene of the capture almost immediately after it occurred. Defendant 

initially refused to identify himself to Officer Jennings, but did so after the officer 

explained that since he was going to be fingerprinted and identified anyway, he should 

“just avoid the delay and let us know who you are.”4 Maybe 10 to 15 minutes elapsed 

between his initial refusal and the yielding of his identity. During this time he sat in the 

back of Officer Jennings’s patrol car. He seemed calm and resigned, exhibiting no signs 

of mental or emotional upset. The same was true during the 10 minutes it took Officer 

Jennings to drive him to the “preprocessing center,” and once there, throughout the 

officer’s questions about things like his address and occupation. Nor did he exhibit any 

untoward behaviors while a phlebotomist took a blood sample. In total Officer Jennings 

spent perhaps four hours in defendant’s presence. Defendant might have exhibited some 

symptoms consistent with methamphetamine intoxication, but the officer did not see 

anything that would have led him to charge defendant with being under the influence. In 

particular, defendant had dry mouth, but while this was consistent with present 

methamphetamine use, it could also be explained by past or chronic use, or the use of 

other drugs. Methamphetamine remains detectable in the blood for 24 hours after 

ingestion and in the urine for four days. 

The case defendant had abandoned contained a tool variously referred to in the 

record as an impact wrench or drill. Officers showed this to Mr. Gonzalez, who said it 

was his. He said the pliers were not his. He initially identified the screwdriver as his. 

But when it was shown to him at trial, he denied that it was his. 

 

4

 Defense counsel twice asked questions insinuating that defendant might have 

professed to be unable to remember his name. However, no evidence to that effect was 

adduced.
5

After the incident it appeared that several things in the garage had been moved, 

presumably by the intruder. A bike, normally kept near a washer and dryer along the 

back wall of the garage, had been left near the main garage door. The bike was not 

functional, having a broken chain. A “TV screen box,” also previously located near the 

back of the garage, was found next to the bike. Some tools normally kept on top of a

desk or dresser near the center of the garage had been scattered, and various cabinets and 

drawers were open. 

It was stipulated that a blood sample drawn from defendant about 2:45 p.m. on 

March 26th, 2011, tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. 

A search incident to defendant’s arrest yielded a Costco membership card in the 

name of Curtis Pembrook. Mr. Pembrook testified that the card had been in his wallet 

when the wallet and his cell phone were taken from his car by persons unknown while the 

car was parked in front of his home on the morning of February 17, 2011. 

Defendant was charged with (1) first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling 

house (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), with an allegation that the house was occupied 

at the time of the burglary (id., § 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); (2) receiving stolen property (Pen. 

Code, § 496, subd. (a)); and (3) obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148 , subd. (a)(1)). 

It was further alleged, by way of enhancement and to establish ineligibility for probation, 

that defendant had previously been convicted of first-degree burglary and of grand theft, 

and that he was on both parole and probation when he committed the charged offenses. 

The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree burglary and obstructing an officer, 

but not guilty of receiving stolen property. Defendant made a motion to strike his prior 

conviction for first-degree burglary under People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The 

court granted the motion for reasons stated in a written decision. The court sentenced 

defendant to the lower term of two years, plus a five-year enhancement under Penal Code 
6

section 667, subdivision (a). The court allowed credit for presentence confinement of 

376 actual days plus 49 days conduct credit. Defendant filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of Prior Burglary

A. Background

Prior to trial the prosecutor moved to admit, and defendant moved to exclude, 

evidence of a 2009 burglary in which defendant was found to have stolen two pairs of 

speakers from a residential garage in Gilroy. The trial court ruled that evidence of the 

prior burglary was admissible to show that defendant possessed the intent to steal when 

he entered the Gonzalez garage. The court observed that both crimes “involv[ed] single 

family residences, entering through an open garage door, taking property from the 

garage.” In addition, both offenses “occur[red] during the daytime when the resident was 

home.” “All these factors,” the court found, “support a strong inference that the

defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance.” The court further found 

that the evidence possessed substantial probative value that was “not substantially 

[out]weighed by any prejudicial effect, nor would it require undue consumption of time, 

nor is it likely to confuse the issues or mislead the jury.” Accordingly, the court 

concluded, “the uncharged theft related offense may be admitted to prove intent.” 

At trial Michael Loebs testified that in the early afternoon of November 13, 2009, 

he noticed a van driving slowly up and down the street in front of his Gilroy home.5 He 

worked in loss prevention, and the van’s behavior made him suspicious. He went out of 

the house and got into his car where he watched a man whom he “knew didn’t belong 

there” going in and out of the garage attached to the home of his neighbor, Michael 

Johnson. He was unable to identify defendant as the man at trial, but at the time of the 

 

5

 So he first testified. When asked on cross-examination whether the van was 

“driving back and forth on your street,” he said, “It was driving in one direction.” 
7

event he described the man as an adult Hispanic male. He saw the man make four of five 

trips from the garage to the van, carrying items including two speakers and a gray box.

He took down the van’s plate number. A couple minutes after the man left, Mr. Johnson 

arrived and Mr. Loebs asked him if somebody was supposed to be going through his 

garage grabbing stuff. Johnson checked his garage, then called 911. Perhaps 15 minutes 

later, an officer arrived and drove Mr. Loebs to a location about three blocks away, where 

he identified defendant as the intruder. He also identified a van as the one driven by the 

intruder. He later learned that the name of the intruder was Manuel Rocha. 

Michael Johnson testified that a night or two before November 13, 2009, a 

washing machine had flooded his garage, forcing him and his family to remove 

everything from the garage and dispose of items, such as carpet, that were ruined. In the 

early afternoon of November 13, he went to the hardware store to work on some shelving 

that had been made accessible by the evacuation. He left the garage door open. Before 

he returned he got a phone call from a neighbor asking if he had hired someone to haul 

material out of his garage. He raced home to check on his sick daughter, whom he had 

left there alone, and then he called the police. Later he went to where the intruder had 

been apprehended, and he recognized a grey box containing Polk Audio speakers and a 

white box containing Pioneer speakers, both of which were items he had moved earlier 

that day. 

Defendant had been apprehended while driving a van about seven minutes after 

the Johnson burglary was reported, and six to eight blocks from its location, by Gilroy 

Police Officer Basuino.6 Mr. Johnson came to the scene and identified two speaker boxes 

 

6

 The name appears as “Basuino” in the reporter’s transcript’s table of contents 

and throughout the clerk’s transcript. When defense counsel asked the witness how to 

pronounce his name, the answer (as transcribed) was “Bas-suino.” This did not deter the 

reporter from rendering the name throughout his testimony and closing argument as 

“Bausino.” 
8

in the van as his. At some point defendant told Officer Basuino that “he buys tools cheap 

and resells them.”7

It was stipulated that defendant was charged with first degree burglary in 

connection with the 2009 incident and was convicted of that charge in June 2010 on a 

plea of no contest. 

The jury was instructed that if it found defendant had committed the 2009 

burglary, it could “consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or 

not the defendant acted with the intent to commit theft in this case.” (See CALCRIM 

No. 375.) It was told to consider the degree of similarity between the two offenses in 

evaluating this evidence. (Id.) It was told not to consider the evidence for any other 

purpose, and not to conclude that defendant had a bad character or criminal disposition. 

(Id.) Finally, it was told that the evidence was not sufficient by itself to establish the 

requisite intent. (Id.) 

B. Section 1101

“Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of propensity or disposition 

to engage in a specific conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person’s conduct on 

a specified occasion. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence that a person committed 

a crime, civil wrong, or other act may be admitted, however, not to prove a person’s 

predisposition to commit such an act, but rather to prove some other material fact, such as 

that person’s intent or identity. (Id., § 1101, subd. (b).) We review the trial court’s 

decision whether to admit evidence, including evidence of the commission of other 

crimes, for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 

841.) 

 

7

 The court granted a defense motion to exclude evidence that defendant had a 

number of used tools in the van and that when Officer Basuino first contacted him, 

defendant volunteered the statement, “Is this about the tools?” 
9

Here the evidence of the 2009 burglary was offered on the rationale that it tended 

to establish the requisite mental element for the charged burglary, i.e., that when 

defendant entered the Gonzales garage he possessed the intent to steal. (See Pen. Code, 

§ 459 [defining burglary as entry into specified structure or area “with intent to commit 

grand or petit larceny or any felony”].) Numerous decisions have upheld the admission 

of prior burglaries on a similar rationale when, as here, a defendant contests the 

sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to establish the required intent. (See People v. 

Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 804, 842 [evidence of prior burglary admissible to show 

larcenous intent where “[i]n both cases, defendant entered a woman’s dwelling within 

walking distance of his own apartment at night, and stole several items”; defendant’s 

commission of earlier burglary “supports the reasonable inference that he also intended to 

steal from [second victim’s] apartment”]; People v. Delgado (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 

1837, 1846 [prosecutor was properly allowed to ask questions designed to show prior 

burglary resembling charged offense in that both involved entry through a window, theft 

of a VCR in payment of a debt, and asportation of VCR and jewelry in a pillowcase]; 

People v. Wilson (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1210, 1216-1217 [where defendant claimed to 

have entered acquaintance’s residence to wait for her, while intoxicated on alcohol and 

drugs, evidence of earlier burglary conviction involving similar circumstances and excuse 

was properly admitted as evidence of larcenous intent]; People v. Nible (1988) 200 

Cal.App.3d 838, 846-850 [where defendant introduced evidence of extreme intoxication 

at time of entry into victim’s bedroom through window, court properly admitted evidence 

of earlier intrusions through bedroom windows with apparent intent to commit sex 

offenses]; People v. Dowdy (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 180, 188 [in prosecution for burglaries 

of jewelry and pet stores, evidence of prior burglary of clothing store was properly 

admitted to show defendant’s larcenous intent; facts were “strikingly similar”]; People v. 

Enos (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 25, 36-37 [where defendant claimed to be looking for 
10

someone when surprised in garage by homeowner, and defendant placed intent in issue at 

trial by claiming to have been looking for a friend, prosecution was properly allowed to 

adduce evidence of prior conviction for possessing property stolen from two residential 

garages, plus incident where defendant was found prowling around residence and 

professed to be looking for friend]; People v. Curcio (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 183, 185-

186 [in prosecution for burglary arising from theft of radios from distributor’s warehouse, 

trial court properly admitted evidence of prior theft from another radio distributor’s 

warehouse using similar technique]; People v. Romero (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 495, 498-

500 [evidence of three previous burglaries properly admitted where defendant claimed 

that he was too intoxicated to form intent necessary for burglary]; People v. Rosenfield

(1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 60, 68-69 [where defendants testified that they entered victim’s 

apartment solely to recover funds he had stolen from one of them after she performed act 

of prostitution, trial court properly allowed evidence of previous incident in which that 

defendant’s solicitation of act of prostitution led to armed robbery by other defendant], 

disapproved on another point in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 381-382; 

People v. Kerns (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 [where defendant denied larcenous 

intent and attributed presence in store to inveiglement by mysterious female, trial court 

properly admitted evidence of prior attempted break-in which defendant also attributed to 

encounter with mysterious female]; People v. Bonilla (1932) 124 Cal.App. 212, 215 

[evidence of prior burglary of dry goods store properly admitted to rebut defendant’s 

denial of knowledge that goods he hauled away from service station were stolen].)

Defendant contends that the two incidents here were not sufficiently similar to 

justify the inference held permissible in cases such as the foregoing. He asserts that the 

trial court’s stated finding of “several” similarities rests on “the parsing of a single factor 

into multiple parts.” The question, however, is not the number of points of similarity but 

their logical relevance to establish the mental element of the charged offense. The 
11

rationale for introducing uncharged misconduct to show intent has been said to be that 

“ ‘if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in 

each instance’ . . . . The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit 

such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at 

the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the 

prosecution.” (People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879 (Robbins).) This inference 

in turn depends on “ ‘the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical 

process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the 

same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all. Without 

formulating any accurate test, and without attempting by numerous instances to secure 

absolute certainty of inference, the mind applies this rough and instinctive process of 

reasoning, namely, that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in 

one instance, but that the oftener similar instances occur with similar results, the less 

likely is the abnormal element likely to be the true explanation of them. [¶] . . . In short, 

similar results do not usually occur through abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a 

similar result (here in the shape of an unlawful act) tends (increasingly with each 

instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other 

innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) 

the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act; and the force 

of each additional instance will vary in each kind of offense according to the probability 

that the act could be repeated, within a limited time and under given circumstances, with 

an innocent intent.’ ” (Id. at pp. 879-880, quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 

1979) § 302, p. 241; see Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged 

Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character 

Evidence Prohibition (1990) 51 Ohio St. L. J. 575, 593 (Uncharged Misconduct).)
12

Professor Imwinkelried, upon whose treatise the Supreme Court relied in Robbins, 

supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 879-880, has suggested that the intermediate inference 

justifying proof of intent by evidence of uncharged misconduct is “the objective 

improbability of the accused’s innocent involvement in so many similar incidents.” 

(Imwindelrid, supra, at p. 594, fn. omitted.) In his view, such an inference is supportable 

only if three threshold criteria are satisfied: (1) each uncharged incident must be 

“roughly similar to the charged crime” (id. at p. 595, italics omitted); (2) counting both 

charged and uncharged incidents, the accused must have been “involved in such events 

more frequently than the typical person” (id. at p. 597, italics omitted); and (3) the 

existence of mens rea “must be in bona fide dispute,” such that the prosecution has “a 

legitimate need to resort to the uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent” (id. at p. 

598, italics omitted). 

Here we have no difficulty in concluding that all three of these criteria were 

satisfied. First, the trial court could quite properly find the charged and uncharged 

offenses materially similar in that both involved defendant’s nonconsensual entry into 

residential garages belonging to complete strangers, the doors of which garages had been 

left open. Defendant asserts that these similarities were negated by differences between 

the two incidents: “In the prior case, Mr. Rocha was in a vehicle, he drove by the 

residence more than once before stopping and entering the garage, and he took stereo 

components while ignoring the tools that were in the garage. When contacted by the 

police, he did not evade and was cooperative. In this case, Mr. Rocha was on foot, took 

tools and appeared to be prepared to take a bicycle, attempted to avoid the police and was 

uncooperative.” None of these distinctions defeats the extraordinary circumstance of 

having twice entered strangers’ garages and carried away property belonging to them. 

Under Professor Imwinkelried’s analytical framework, the events need only be “roughly 
13

similar,” i.e., similar enough to make it unlikely that each, or any, of them occurred 

innocently. The two incidents at issue here meet this criterion.

Professor Imwinkelried’s second factor—extraordinary frequency—gives us some 

pause, for we are concerned with only one uncharged incident, making two incidents in 

total. But the Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that the doctrine of chances 

cannot justify admission of a single incident of uncharged misconduct, stating, “We agree 

with the Oregon Supreme Court that ‘no categorical statement can be made one way or 

the other. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, sometimes one prior similar act 

will be sufficient . . . . A simple, unremarkable single instance of prior conduct probably 

will not qualify, but a complex act requiring several steps, particularly premeditated, may 

well qualify. These decisions must be made case-by-case . . . .’ ” (Robbins, supra, at 

pages 880-881, fn. 5, quoting State v. Johns (1986) 301 Or. 535 [725 P.2d 312, 324].) 

Neither of the incidents here may have been a particularly “complex act,” but both were 

sufficiently remarkable to trigger an inference that neither could have been innocent. 

Moreover, they occurred within two years of each other, and even one such entry is more 

than a “typical person” would be likely to make in a lifetime. And while the 

circumstances of the second, charged entry do not affirmatively suggest “premeditation,” 

the circumstances of the first entry—defendant’s apparent reconnoitering of the 

neighborhood—do indeed raise such an inference. 

As for Professor Imwinkelried’s third factor—a bona fide dispute as to the mental 

element of the charged offense—defendant certainly put that issue into controversy. His 

entire defense was that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

he entered the Gonzales garage with larcenous intent. Defense counsel argued to the jury 

that defendant “could have been a homeless drug user, looking for a place for shelter, 

respite or suffering from delusions or paranoia [induced by methamphetamine use] . . . . 

It is quite possible that Mr. Rocha . . . as a drug user, . . . saw an open garage and looked 
14

for a place for shelter.” Later he said, “Mr. Rocha may have been high, compromised, 

confused, hearing voices, delusional, not knowing where he was or where he was or who 

he was when he entered that garage.” Consistent with this theory, the jury was instructed 

that it could consider the effects of voluntary intoxication in determining whether the 

prosecution had satisfied its “burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant acted with the intent to commit theft.” 

We detect no error in the trial court’s ruling that the prior burglary was admissible 

under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 

C. Section 352

Even when evidence of uncharged conduct is otherwise admissible, it must be 

excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its potential to prejudice the factfinder 

against a party, to confuse the issues, or to consume undue amounts of time. (Evid. 

Code, § 352; People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1130.) The trial court’s decision 

to admit evidence over an objection on this ground is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

(See People v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 842.)

In a flight of hyperbole, defendant characterizes the evidence here as “highly 

inflammatory.” Evidence may be fairly so characterized only when it might be expected 

to outrage the jurors’ sensibilities, i.e., to so “inflame” their sentiments as to render them 

incapable of objectively evaluating the evidence before them. The evidence here could 

hardly have that effect. It was about as innocuous as evidence of uncharged crimes can 

ever be. No one was injured or even threatened with injury in either case. In both 

instances, defendant simply strolled into an open garage, took some property, and left. 

The nearest suggestion to any kind of threat or menace was the alarm Bianka Gonzales 

must have felt when she opened the door into the garage and saw a complete stranger 

rummaging through her father’s tools. This is hardly the stuff of which inflamed 

sentiments are made.
15

Nor does defendant identify anything particularly prejudicial about the evidence 

here. He therefore falls back on the threat of prejudice inherent in all evidence of 

uncharged misconduct. He cites a recent decision by this court in which we

acknowledged that in view of this inherent risk, such evidence may be admitted “ ‘only if 

[it has] substantial probative value.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 

715, quoting People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1331.) But as we also noted there, 

a substantial part of the risk said to be inherent in such evidence is that it “breeds a 

‘tendency to condemn, not because [the defendant] is believed guilty of the present 

charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from other offences [sic] . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) 

The court obviated this risk here when it informed the jury, by stipulation, that defendant 

had been charged with burglary as a result of the 2009 incident “and was convicted of the 

same on June 29th, 2010, after defendant plead [sic] no contest to the charge.” 

At the same time, the court could quite reasonably conclude, as it manifestly did, 

that the evidence possessed substantial probative value in responding to the defense 

theory, which depended on raising a substantial possibility that defendant had entered the 

garage in a bewildered state and had decided to steal something, if at all, only after 

finding himself there. In an attempt to lend substance to these possibilities, the defense 

elicited testimony from a county criminalist that a “chronic user of methamphetamine, 

over time . . . can have paranoia and delusion.” An example of such paranoia might be 

where a person talking to a methamphetamine user puts a hand in a pocket and the user, 

thinking a knife or gun is being drawn, strikes the person. The user may thus 

“misunderstand, misinterpret or over-react to things around them.” A delusion, in turn, is 

“a strong feeling about, something that is not really true or despite of the evidence that 

what he believes is not true.” (So transcribed.) An example would be an insistence that 

the earth is flat, “something totally off the wall type of belief because of what is going on 

in the brain.” A methamphetamine user’s thoughts may be “confused and disorganized.” 
16

Counsel also cited the testimony of Bianka Gonzales that defendant struck her as 

disoriented and that she thought he was on drugs. 

Based on this evidence, defense counsel asked the jury to entertain the possibility 

that defendant had wandered into the Gonzales garage in a state of drug-induced 

befuddlement, perhaps “looking for a place for shelter, respite or suffering from delusions 

or paranoia.” The evidence that he had, on another occasion, entered a garage with a 

preexisting intent to steal tended strongly, through the doctrine of chances, to controvert 

this hypothesis. A drug-addled wanderer might stray into a stranger’s garage for a first 

time; but if he has previously entered such a garage for purposes of theft, and has been 

apprehended and punished for such conduct, he is hardly likely to do it again with 

innocent intent, however bewildered he may be. In a sense the defense theory may be 

characterized as one of mistake, i.e., defendant entered the garage without understanding 

what he was doing, and thus without the intent to steal, or any other objectively coherent 

intent. The fact that he had previously engaged in identical conduct with larcenous intent 

did not conclusively refute this hypothesis; but that was not required. All that was 

required was that the fact of the prior burglary have a substantial tendency in reason to 

establish that defendant entered the garage with knowledge of what he was doing and 

with intent to do the only objectively advantageous thing he could do there: steal 

something valuable, as he had done before in another garage That at any rate was an 

inference the jury could reasonably draw, and one for which the prosecution was entitled 

to lay the evidentiary foundation. Its probative value arose from the very theory 

proffered by the defense.

Defendant suggests that the prejudicial potential of the evidence was unnecessarily 

heightened by the manner of its presentation, i.e., the prosecutor was permitted to 

“virtually retry” the earlier case by presenting three witnesses to that incident. No 

alternative method of proving the relevant facts has been suggested here or below. Nor 
17

does defendant otherwise elaborate upon this suggestion. We therefore pass it without 

further consideration. 

Defendant complains of the fact that evidence concerning the 2009 burglary “was 

not presented in a discrete portion of the prosecution’s case, but . . . piecemeal[,] with 

testimony concerning other events occurring between witnesses describing the prior 

burglary.” No attempt is made to build a syllogistic argument on this fact, but defendant 

goes on to note the trial court’s obligation to “consider not only the lack of particular 

probative value but also facts showing that the use of the evidence could confuse the jury 

and overly complicate the issues at trial.” He acknowledges the court’s express finding 

that these factors did not warrant exclusion of the evidence, but he implies that the court 

should have explained that finding in more detail. The court was under no obligation to 

do so. In any event, having reviewed the whole record with some care, we see no 

significant risk that the evidence as presented confused the jury, or otherwise diverted it 

from the proper discharge of its duties.

Defendant alludes to testimony by the officer who arrested him for the 2009 

burglary that defendant made a comment at that time reflecting his familiarity with the 

fact that used tools could be profitably sold. This is not charged as a separate error but 

apparently offered to substantiate defendant’s claims of undue prejudice. We fail to see 

how it can have that effect. The trial court carefully limited the testimony so as to convey 

nothing more than defendant’s familiarity with the possibility of profitably selling used 

tools. This was obviously relevant to motive, which in turn supported an inference of 

intent. We again decline to discuss in depth an argument defendant has not troubled to 

articulate.

We find no error under state law in the court’s admission of the evidence of the 

2009 burglary. 
18

D. Due Process

Finally, defendant contends that admission of the evidence of the 2009 burglary 

violated his right to due process. In the one federal case he cites where such a conclusion 

was reached, the court found that the evidence of uncharged misconduct had served no

legitimate purpose and thus operated only to invite an “impermissible propensity 

inference.” (McKinney v. Rees (1993) 993 F.2d 1378, 1383.)8 Here, as we have noted, 

the evidence was relevant to support a legitimate incriminating inference independent of 

any consideration of propensity. The cited case therefore provides no ground for 

reversal.

Defendant also cites People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, for the 

proposition that “a trial court’s improper application of Evidence Code section 352 may 

also rise to the level of a due process violation.” What the court actually held there was 

that after a defendant’s Evidence Code section 352 objection had been overruled, he 

could—despite failing to mention the due process clause in the trial court as a separate 

ground of objection—“make a very narrow due process argument on appeal,” i.e., “that 

the asserted error in admitting the evidence over his Evidence Code section 352 objection 

had the additional legal consequence of violating due process.” (Ibid.) The holding of 

 

8

 Defendant also cites Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476, 

for the proposition that “[w]hen no permissible inference may be drawn from the 

misconduct evidence, the error transcends mere evidentiary error and violates the 

constitutional proscription against trial by character assassination.” We reject this 

interpretation of the cited decision, in which Justice Jackson declared much of the thicket 

of common-law rules then governing the introduction of character evidence to be 

“archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational 

advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counter-privilege to the other.” (Id.

at p. 486.) The court nonetheless declined to modify this “grotesque structure” by 

“pull[ing] one misshapen stone out of” it. (Ibid.) The court therefore affirmed a 

conviction in which the prosecution had been allowed to ask character witnesses, called 

by the defendant, whether they knew about a prior conviction that the Court of Appeals 

found too remote and dissimilar to have any rational bearing on the case. 
19

that case cannot come into play unless the Evidence Code section 352 objection was 

overruled in error. Here we have concluded that the court did not err by overruling the 

objection. Therefore no due process claim can be predicated on the holding of Partida.

Defendant’s final argument is that the asserted error in admitting this evidence was 

prejudicial. It is of course unnecessary to reach this question in view of our 

determination that no error occurred. We do wish to acknowledge, however, defendant’s 

concern that the jury “struggled with the issue of intent,” thus indicating the critical role 

of that question in its verdict. It would hardly be surprising if the jury focused on this 

issue, since it was essentially the only ground of defense. But the evidence cited by 

defendant indicates that insofar as the jury “struggled” with this issue, it was dealing with 

the legal parameters of burglarious intent and not their application to the evidence 

presented. Thus the jury foreperson did submit an inquiry to the court expressing 

“confus[ion] about ‘intent to commit burglary.’ ”

9 But the note referred to an instruction 

which, as originally given, invited confusion on this subject by enumerating the elements 

of theft as if they were elements of burglary—which of course they could not be, since 

burglary does not require a completed theft but only an entry with intent to steal.10 In 

 

9

 The note read, “We are confused about ‘intent to commit burglary.’ According 

to Penal Code 459 [which was referenced in the relevant instruction], items 1 through 4 

must be satisfied to convict. In addition the 1st sentence after items 1-4 says, ‘A burglary 

was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit theft.’ Is this last 

sentence a fifth condition of burglary? Both the prosecutor and the defendant’s attorney 

said that burglary is committed when the defendant intends to steal as he crosses 

threshold. Please clarify.” 

10

 The written instruction, CALCRIM No. 1700, was available to the jury during 

deliberations. It stated:

“The defendant is charged in Count 1 with burglary in violation of Penal Code 

section 459.

“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:
20

response to the jurors’ question, the court furnished them with a new instruction, 

directing them to substitute it for the original instruction and to “[d]isregard the old 

instruction . . . in its entirety.” The new instruction clarified that the elements of theft 

were relevant only to determining whether defendant “intended to commit theft,” and not 

as elements of the offense in their own right. 

 

“1. The defendant entered a building;

“AND

“2. When he entered a building, he intended to commit theft.

“To decide whether the defendant intended to commit theft, the People must prove 

that:

“1. The defendant took possession of property owned by someone else;

“2. The defendant took the property without the owner’s or owner’s agent’s 

consent;

“3. When the defendant took the property he intended to deprive the owner of it 

permanently or to remove it from the owner’s or owner’s agent’s possession for so 

extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of the 

value or enjoyment of the property;

“AND

“4. The defendant moved the property, even a small distance, and kept it for any 

period of time, however brief.

“A burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit 

theft. The defendant does not need to have actually committed theft as long as he entered 

with the intent to do so. The People do not have to prove that the defendant actually 

committed theft.

“Under the law of burglary, a person enters a building if some part of his or her 

body or some object under his or her control penetrates the area inside the building's 

outer boundary.” 
21

The record provides no basis to suppose that the jurors’ “confusion” about the 

intent element had any bearing at all on its evaluation of the defense theory. So far as the 

record shows, the jury sought clarification only because the original instruction conflated 

the element of intent, which was necessary to convict, with the elements of a completed 

theft, which was not. 

II. Presentence Custody Credits

Defendant contends that the trial court shortchanged him on credit for presentence 

confinement by denying credit for the entire period he was also subject to a parole hold. 

Defendant contends that 41 days of this time were solely attributable to the conduct 

underlying the present charges, and therefore seeks additional credit of 41 actual days and 

6 days conduct, for a total of 47 days. Respondent concedes the point. We accept the 

concession. The crucial premise, which respondent concedes, is that under the governing 

guidelines, “only 9 months of the 12-month parole term could have been based on the 

absconding charge,” such that “3 months of the term must have been solely attributable to 

the burglary offense.” Since defendant was released from the parole term after serving 

166 days, a proportionate fraction of that time—one-quarter, or 41 days—must be 

attributed solely to the burglary charge. We will direct a modification of the judgment 

accordingly.

DISPOSITION

The trial court is directed to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect an 

additional 41 days credit for actual time in presentence confinement, plus 6 days conduct 

credit. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
22

______________________________________

RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

 

____________________________________

PREMO, J.

____________________________________

ELIA, J.

People v. Rocha

H038703
23

Trial Court: Santa Clara County

Superior Court No.: C1103705

Trial Judge: The Honorable Teresa Guerrero-Daley

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant David S. Adams

Manuel Alfred Rocha: under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal for Appellant

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent Kamala D. Harris

The People: Attorney General

Dane R. Gillette,

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Gerald A. Engler,

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Seth K. Schalit,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Leif M. Dautch,

Deputy Attorney General

People v. Rocha

H038703