In the Court of Criminal 

Appeals of Texas

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No. PD-0936-20

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JEREL CHINEDU IGBOJI,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

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On State’s Petition for Discretionary Review

From the Fourteenth Court of Appeals

Fort Bend County

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YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and 

KEEL, J., join.

The Court remands this case to the court of appeals to continue 

to wrestle over whether the officer’s conduct in this case was justified 
IGBOJI – 2

under the Fourth Amendment. I am inclined to be more decisive. This 

appeal was first filed in the court of appeals in 2017—nearly five years 

ago!1 The court of appeals’ majority opinion has already expressly 

acknowledged: (1) the existence of facts that demonstrate probable cause 

to believe that evidence relevant to the crime would be found on 

Appellant’s phone; (2) the existence of facts showing that Appellant was 

aware that police considered him a suspect; and (3) the existence of facts 

demonstrating that Appellant had both the ability and incentive to 

destroy any incriminating evidence on the cell phone had he been able 

to retain it while a search warrant was being sought. We should simply 

acknowledge that those facts demonstrate that the seizure of the phone 

was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, reverse the court of 

appeals’ judgment, and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Because 

the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.2

1 If the court of appeals takes another year to dispose of this case on 

remand, and then a second round of petitions for discretionary review ensues, 

this case could last up to seven years in appellate orbit. 

2 Because the Court nevertheless remands this case for further 

examination by the court of appeals, it may also be important to observe that 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence was denied by the trial court. That 

being the case, the court of appeals was bound to uphold the trial court’s 

decision to deny the motion to suppress on any basis supported by the facts 

and the law. See State v. Castanedanieto, 607 S.W.3d 315, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2020) (“The ‘Calloway rule’ dictates that a claim of reversible error on direct 

appeal should be rejected if the trial court’s ruling is correct ‘on any theory of 

law applicable to the case’ even if ‘the trial court did not purport to rely on that 

theory’ and the prevailing party did not explicitly raise the theory.”) (quoting 

State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85−86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). But the court 

of appeals does not yet seem to have considered whether the trial court’s 

decision to deny the motion to suppress might have been correct for other 

proper reasons.
IGBOJI – 3

FILED: March 8, 2023

PUBLISH

For example, even assuming the officer’s seizure of Appellant’s cell 

phone was technically erroneous, did the seizure itself actually lead to the 

discovery of any evidence admitted against Appellant at his trial? See Segura, 

468 U.S. at 815 (“The illegal entry into petitioners’ apartment did not 

contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant; it 

is clear, therefore, that not even the threshold ‘but for’ requirement was met 

in this case.”) (majority opinion). And, even if it did, was any taint from that 

erroneous seizure attenuated by the fact that the contents of the phone were 

not searched until after a warrant was executed authorizing the search? See 

Id. at 814 (concluding that a “valid warrant search was a ‘means sufficiently 

distinguishable’ to purge the evidence of any ‘taint’ arising from the [unlawful] 

entry”). If, on remand, the court of appeals persists in concluding that the 

seizure of the cell phone in this case was unlawful, it ought to then consider 

such questions. My resolution of the case would obviate that need.