SPACE ACQUISITIONS

Acquisition Management 

Continues to Improve but 

Challenges Persist for 

Current and Future 

Programs

Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m EDT

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

GAO-14-382T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-382T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

March 12, 2014

SPACE ACQUISITIONS

Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but 

Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, DOD spends billions of 

dollars to acquire space-based 

capabilities that support military and 

other government operations. The 

majority of DOD's space programs 

were beset by significant cost and 

schedule growth problems during their 

development. Most programs are now 

in production, however, and acquisition 

problems are not as widespread and 

significant as they were several years 

ago. In prior years, GAO has identified 

a number of actions DOD is taking to 

improve management and oversight of 

space program acquisitions. Facing 

constrained budgets and concerns 

about the resiliency of its satellites, 

DOD is considering potential changes 

to how it acquires space systems.

This testimony focuses on (1) the 

current status and cost of major DOD 

space systems acquisitions, (2) recent 

actions taken to further improve space 

systems acquisitions, and (3) potential

impacts of the direction DOD is taking 

on upcoming changes to the 

acquisition of DOD space systems. 

This testimony is based on previously

issued GAO products, ongoing GAO 

work on disaggregated architectures, 

interviews with DOD officials, and an 

analysis of DOD funding estimates 

from fiscal years 2013 through 2018. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this testimony. However, in previous 

reports, GAO has generally 

recommended that DOD adopt best 

practices for developing space 

systems. DOD has agreed and is in the 

process of implementing such 

practices.

What GAO Found

Most of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) major satellite acquisition programs 

are in later stages of acquisition, with the initial satellites having been designed, 

produced, and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design 

are being produced. A few other major space programs, however, have recently 

experienced setbacks. For example: the Missile Defense Agency’s Precision 

Tracking Space System, which was intended to be a satellite system to track 

ballistic missiles, has been cancelled due to technical, programmatic and 

affordability concerns; the Air Force’s Space Fence program, which is developing 

a ground-based radar to track Earth-orbiting objects, continues to experience 

delays in entering development; and the first launch of the new Global 

Positioning System satellites has been delayed by 21 months. 

Congress and DOD continue to take steps they believe will improve oversight 

and management of space systems acquisitions. In the past year, for example, 

DOD has updated its major acquisition policy with the goal of improving efficiency 

and productivity in defense spending. Among other things, the policy change 

adds a requirement for independent development testing for DOD acquisition 

programs, which officials believe will provide an independent voice on programs’ 

development. However, DOD still faces significant oversight and management 

challenges, including (1) leadership of a space community that is comprised of a 

wide variety of users and stakeholders with diverse interests and (2) alignment of 

the delivery of satellites with corresponding ground systems and user terminals. 

For instance, in some cases, gaps in delivery can add up to years, meaning that 

a satellite is launched but not effectively used for years until ground systems 

become available. One reason DOD has been unable to align the delivery of 

space system components is because budgeting authority for the components is 

spread across the military services. 

While most DOD major space system acquisitions have overcome development 

challenges and are currently being produced and launched, past problems 

involving large, complicated systems, coupled with the recent fiscal climate of 

reduced funds, has led DOD to consider efforts that could signal significant 

changes to the way it acquires and conducts space activities. DOD is considering 

moving away from its current approach in satellite development—building small

numbers of large satellites over a decade or more that meet the needs of many 

missions and users—toward a more disaggregated architecture involving less 

complex, smaller, and more numerous satellites. GAO has found that DOD does 

not yet have sufficient information to make decisions on whether to disaggregate, 

but it is in the process of gathering that information. In addition, in response to 

predictions of dramatic increases to the price of launching its satellites, coupled 

with restrained budgets, DOD has made changes to the way it procures launch 

vehicles, and is moving forward with plans to allow competition for launch 

services—a significant shift from past ways of doing business. According to the 

Air Force, other recent steps in launch acquisitions, including gaining significant 

insight into launch services cost drivers, have enabled it to achieve significant 

savings.

View GAO-14-382T. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov.
Page 1 GAO-14-382T 

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) space systems acquisitions. DOD spends billions of dollars each 

year to develop, produce and launch space systems. These systems 

provide the government with critical intelligence information, 

communication methods, and navigation information, which are vital to 

many military and other government programs. Because these systems 

can be highly complex, they require large investments of both money and 

time to develop, produce and launch. Given the expensive nature of 

space systems in today’s constrained government budget environment, it 

is essential that DOD manage the acquisition of these systems carefully 

and continue to address problems that have plagued space systems 

acquisitions in the past decade.

In the past, DOD has seen program after program experience significant 

cost increases coupled with schedule delays. However, in recent years 

these problems have largely been overcome for the programs currently in 

production, and additional satellites of the same design are now being 

launched. With the worst of their acquisition problems behind them, DOD 

is beginning to look at potential new directions for the national security 

space community, including options for meeting program requirements 

through the disaggregation1 of large space missions into multiple smaller 

satellites as a means to increase satellite resiliency and reduce 

acquisition costs and development time.2

 1 The Air Force defines space disaggregation as “[t]he dispersion of space-based 

missions, functions or sensors across multiple systems spanning one or more orbital 

plane, platform, host or domain.” Programs may consider disaggregation in the future 

because it allows for options within a system’s architecture to drive down cost, increase 

resiliency and distribute capability. Air Force Space Command, Resiliency and 

Disaggregated Space Architectures, White Paper (Aug. 21, 2013).

In addition, DOD has been 

introducing significant changes to the way it acquires space launch 

2 DOD Space Policy defines resilience as the ability of an architecture to support the 

functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of 

reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite 

of hostile action or adverse conditions. The policy further states that resilience may 

leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international 

capabilities. See Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, Space Policy (Oct. 18, 2012). 

However, Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials we spoke with stated 

DOD is in the process of refining the definition of resilience and determining a 

methodology for measuring it.
Page 2 GAO-14-382T 

services, by transitioning to a new acquisition approach with a longerterm commitment, and by taking steps to introduce competition to its 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, a major change from the 

last eight years of that program. These potential changes may provide 

benefits to DOD, but there are challenges to their implementation.

My testimony today will focus on (1) the current status and cost of major 

DOD space systems acquisitions, (2) recent actions taken to further 

improve space systems acquisitions, and (3) potential impacts of the 

direction DOD is taking on upcoming changes to the acquisition of DOD 

space systems. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued over the 

past 5 years on space programs and weapon system acquisition best 

practices, and on DOD reports. In addition, it is based on ongoing work 

conducted to address a mandate in the Senate Report accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 for GAO to 

review the potential benefits and limitations of disaggregating future 

space systems.3

 3 S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 165 (2013). The Senate Report mandated GAO to assess the 

potential benefits and drawbacks of disaggregating key military space systems and 

examine whether disaggregation and payload hosting (an arrangement where DOD 

instruments are placed on commercial or other agency satellites) offers benefits to cost 

and survivability of a constellation (a group of similar satellites synchronized to orbit the 

Earth in an optimal way).

It is also based on work performed in support of our 

annual weapon system assessments, as well as space-related work in 

support of our reports on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across 

the federal government. Finally, this statement is based on updates on 

cost increases and investment trends and improvement actions taken 

since last year. To conduct these updates, we analyzed DOD funding 

estimates for selected major space systems acquisition programs from 

fiscal years 2013 through 2018. More information on our scope and 

methodology is available in our related GAO products. The work that 

supports this statement was performed in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. DOD provided technical comments which were incorporated 

as appropriate.
Page 3 GAO-14-382T 

Over the last decade, DOD has been managing many challenging space 

systems acquisitions. A long-standing problem for the department is that 

program costs have tended to increase significantly from original cost 

estimates. In recent years, DOD has overcome many of the problems that 

had been hampering program development, and has begun to launch 

many of these satellites. However, the large cost growth of these systems 

continues to affect the department. Figure 1 compares the original cost 

estimates with current cost estimates for some of the department’s major 

space acquisition programs.

Figure 1: Comparison of Original Cost Estimates and Current Cost Estimates for 

Selected Major Space Acquisition Programs for Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018.

Note: Includes Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

(EELV), Global Broadcast System (GBS), Global Positioning System (GPS) II and III, Mobile User 

Objective System (MUOS), GPS Operational Control System (GPS OCX), Space Based Infrared 

System (SBIRS), and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). This chart does not include planned new 

space acquisition efforts—such as Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS), Space 

Based Space Surveillance Follow-on (SBSS), the Defense Weather Satellite Follow-on (WSF), or 

Space Fence—for which total cost data were unavailable.

Background
Page 4 GAO-14-382T 

The gap between the estimates in figure 1 represents money that the 

department was not planning to spend on these programs, and did not 

have available to invest in other efforts. The gap in estimates is fairly 

stable between fiscal years 2014-2018, a result of the fact that most 

programs are mature and in a steady production phase. This figure does 

not include programs that are still in the early stages of planning and 

development.

In past reports, we have identified a number of causes of acquisition 

problems. For example, in past years, DOD has tended to start more 

weapon programs than is affordable, creating a competition for funding 

that focuses on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound 

management. DOD has also tended to start its space programs before it 

has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved 

within available resources and time constraints. There is no way to 

accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a 

satellite system when key technologies planned for that system are still in 

relatively early stages of discovery and invention. Finally, programs have 

historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, 

regardless of the design challenges or the maturity of the technologies 

necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD’s preference to make larger, 

complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions has stretched 

technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases.

Our work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to 

address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended 

that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an 

incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and 

requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and 

demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We 

have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program 

manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of 

other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit 

space programs. DOD has generally concurred with our 

recommendations, and has undertaken a number of actions to establish a 

better foundation for acquisition success. For example, we reported in the 

past that, among other actions, DOD created a new office within the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to 

focus attention on oversight for space programs and it eliminated offices 

considered to perform duplicative oversight functions. We have also 
Page 5 GAO-14-382T 

reported in the past that the Air Force took actions to strengthen cost 

estimating and to reinstitute stricter standards for quality. 4

Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of 

acquisition, and some of the significant problems of past years, such as 

cost and schedule growth, are not currently as prevalent. Table 1 

describes the status of the space programs we have been tracking in 

detail.

Table 1: Status and Cost of Selected Space Systems Acquisitions

Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF)

(satellite communications)

Original total program cost: $6.7 billion

Current total program cost: $14.6 billion

Original quantity: 5

Current quantity: 6

Schedule: First launch occurred in August 2010, 6 years later than initially planned, and 

the second launch occurred May 2012. The third launch occurred in September 2013. The 

fourth satellite, currently in production, is scheduled to be launched in 2017.

AEHF satellites will replenish the existing Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, 

jam-resistant, worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 

warfighters. 

Global Positioning System (GPS) III

(positioning, navigation, and timing)

Original total program cost: $4.1 billion

Current total program cost: $4.4 billion

Quantity: 8

Schedule: The program recently experienced a 21-month delay due to a satellite anomaly, 

and the first satellite is now expected to be ready for launch in January 2016.

GPS III is to replenish a constellation of multiple generations of GPS satellites that provide 

global position, navigation and timing capability to both military and civil users worldwide.

 4 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but Faces 

Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments Are Optimized. GAO-13-508T. (Washington, D.C.: 

April 24, 2013) and Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits 

of Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 

2012). 

The Current Status 

and Cost of Space 

Systems Acquisitions
Page 6 GAO-14-382T 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)

(satellite communications)

Original total program cost: $7.1 billion

Current total program cost: $7.4 billion

Quantity: 6

Schedule: MUOS has launched two satellites. The third scheduled launch has been 

delayed 6 months to January 2015, as described in more detail below.

MUOS is expected to provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site 

terminal users with increased narrowband communications capacity and improved 

availability for small terminal users. 

Space Based Infrared

System (SBIRS)

(missile warning, infrared intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance)

Original total program cost: $4.8 billion

Current total program cost: $18.9 billion

Original quantity: 5

Current quantity: 6

Schedule: The first SBIRS satellite launched in May 2011—roughly 9 years later than 

estimated at program start. The second satellite launched in March 2013. The third 

satellite is expected for delivery in late 2015. The program plans to fully meet operational 

requirements in 2019 once it has established the full on-orbit constellation of highly 

elliptical orbit sensors, four geostationary orbit satellites, completion of its first two 

software blocks, and delivery of its mobile ground assets. The production contract for the 

fifth and sixth satellites is expected to be awarded in early 2014.

SBIRS is being developed to replace the Defense Support Program and perform a range 

of missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battle space awareness 

missions. SBIRS is to consist of four GEO satellites, two sensors on host satellites in 

highly elliptical orbit, two replenishment satellites and sensors, and fixed and mobile 

ground stations. 

Next Generation Operation Control 

System (GPS OCX)

(command and control system for GPS III 

satellites)

Original total program cost: $3.5 billion

Current total program cost: $3.5 billion

Original quantity: 1

Current quantity: 1

Schedule: The first GPS OCX deliverable is scheduled to be complete in November 2014. 

The second deliverable, which is to provide command and control for GPS III satellites, is 

scheduled to be complete in October 2016, 9 months after the first GPS III satellite is 

available for launch.

GPS OCX is to replace the current ground control system for current and new GPS III 

satellites.
Page 7 GAO-14-382T 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)

(satellite communications)

Original program cost: $1.3 billion

Current total program cost: $4.2 billion

Original quantity: 3

Current quantity: 10 (two funded by international partners)

Schedule: The first satellite was launched in October 2007, over 3 years later than 

estimated at program start. Currently, six satellites are on orbit. The seventh and eight 

satellites are in full production and scheduled for launch in 2016 and 2017.

WGS provides essential communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition 

partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

Note: Dollar figures are reported in fiscal year 2014 dollars.

While many programs have overcome past problems, some of the major 

space programs have encountered significant challenges in the last year 

and some delays in development and production. For example:

• The Air Force’s Space Fence program office is developing a large 

ground-based radar that is expected to improve on the performance of 

and replace the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which became 

operational in 1961 and was recently shut down. The Space Fence 

radar will emit radio frequencies upward to space, from ground-based 

radar sites, to detect and track more and smaller Earth-orbiting 

objects than is currently possible, and provide valuable space 

situational awareness data to military and civilian users. The Air Force 

had originally planned to award a contract for Space Fence systems 

development in July 2012, but due to internal program reviews and 

budget re-prioritizations, this date has been delayed to May 2014. In 

addition, the number of radar sites planned has been reduced from 

two to one, though DOD plans to have an option under the system 

development contract to build a second site if needed.

• In April 2013, DOD proposed canceling the Missile Defense Agency’s 

Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) because of concerns with 

the program’s high-risk acquisition strategy and long-term 

affordability. PTSS was intended to be a satellite system equipped 

with infrared sensors that would track ballistic missiles through their 

emitted heat. The planned satellite system would consist of a 

constellation of nine satellites in orbit around the earth’s equator. We 

reported in July 2013 that the decision to propose canceling the PTSS 

program was based on an evaluation of the acquisition, technical, and 
Page 8 GAO-14-382T 

operational risks of the PTSS program. Specifically, DOD’s evaluation 

assessed the PTSS cost, schedule, technical design, and acquisition 

strategy to identify whether risks could challenge the program’s ability 

to acquire, field, and sustain the system within planned cost and 

schedule constraints. The evaluation also determined that the PTSS 

program had significant technical, programmatic, and affordability 

risks. The program officially ceased operations in October 2013.

• The Air Force has nearly completed its analysis of alternatives to 

determine the direction for space based environmental monitoring, 

which will be a follow-on program for the Defense Meteorological 

Satellite Program (DMSP). Through this analysis, the Air Force 

analyzed various options that included, but were not limited to, a 

traditional procurement of a weather satellite similar to the existing 

DMSP satellites, or a disaggregated approach using small satellites 

and hosted payload opportunities. According to the Air Force, the 

study was completed in the fall of 2013 and is awaiting final approval.

• The MUOS program plans to launch a third satellite in January 2015, 

which represents a delay of 6 months due to a production issue on the 

third satellite. Specifically, the third satellite failed system- and 

subsequent unit-level testing after rework last year and the program 

determined the root cause to be a manufacturing deficiency on a 

component critical for the operation of the satellite’s ultra-highfrequency legacy communications payload. The program is replacing 

the component. According to the MUOS program office, the program 

is on track to meet the launch schedule of subsequent satellites, 

which is important because most of the communications satellites that 

MUOS is replacing are past their design lives. Synchronizing 

deliveries of MUOS satellites with compatible Army Handheld, 

Manpack, Small Form Fit (HMS) terminals remains a challenge. 

Currently over 90 percent of the first satellite’s on-orbit capabilities are 

being underutilized because of terminal program delays. 

Consequently, military forces are relying on legacy communication 

terminals and are not able to take advantage of the superior 

capabilities offered by the MUOS satellites. Operational testing and 

initial fielding of MUOS-capable HMS terminals is planned for fiscal 

year 2014, with a production decision expected in September 2015.
Page 9 GAO-14-382T 

We have reported in the past that DOD and Congress are taking steps to 

reform and improve the defense acquisition system, and in the past year 

additional actions have been taken towards these goals.5

In November 2013, DOD published an update to its instruction 5000.02, 

which provides acquisition guidance for DOD programs.6 With this 

update, DOD hoped to create an acquisition policy environment that will 

achieve greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending. Air Force 

officials noted that, for satellite programs, there are two major changes 

that they believe will improve the acquisition process. First, the instruction 

was changed to formally allow satellite programs to combine two major 

program milestones, B and C, which mark the beginning of the 

development and production phases, respectively.7

 5

According to the Air 

Force, satellite programs have typically seen a great deal of overlap in the 

development and production phases, mainly because they are buying 

small quantities of items. They are often not able to produce a prototype 

to be fully tested because of the high costs of each article, so the first 

satellite in a production is often used both for testing and operations. Air 

Force officials believe that this change to the acquisition guidance will 

allow for streamlining of satellite development and production processes, 

and provide more efficient oversight without sacrificing program 

requirements. GAO has not assessed the potential effects of this change. 

In the past, we have reported that committing a program to production 

GAO-13-508T. GAO-12-563T. 

6 Interim Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System para. 5.d.(10)(b) (Nov. 25, 2013).

7 In defense acquisitions, milestone B provides authorization for a program to enter into 

the system development phase, and commits the required investment resources to the 

program. Milestone C is the point at which a program enters the production and 

deployment phase.

Recent Actions 

DOD Believes Will 

Improve Space 

System Acquisition 

Processes, and 

Continuing Barriers to 

Program Oversight 

and Management

DOD Continues to Take 

Actions it Believes Will 

Improve Acquisition 

Oversight
Page 10 GAO-14-382T 

without a substantive development phase may increase program cost and 

schedule risks, and we plan to look at the impacts of this change as it 

begins to be implemented.

A second change made this year, according to Air Force officials, is the 

requirement that DOD programs, including space programs, undergo 

independent development testing. While development testing for DOD 

programs is not new to this policy revision, now the testing organization 

will be an independent organization outside the program office. For space 

programs, this organization will be under the Program Executive Officer 

for Space, and will report their findings directly to that office, providing 

what the Air Force believes will be an independent voice on a program’s 

development status. The Air Force is confident that these changes will 

provide benefits to program oversight, although because these are recent 

changes, we have not yet assessed their potential for process 

improvements.

In addition, DOD is adopting new practices to reduce fragmentation of its 

satellite ground control systems, which adds oversight to a major 

development decision. Last year we reported that DOD’s satellite ground 

control systems were potentially fragmented, and that standalone 

systems were being developed for new satellite programs without a 

formal analysis of whether or not the satellite control needs could be met 

with existing systems.8 In the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2014, Congress placed more oversight onto this process by 

requiring a cost-benefit analysis for all new or follow-on satellite systems 

using a dedicated ground control system instead of a shared ground 

control system.9

 8 GAO, Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices 

Could Improve DOD’s Operations, 

This new requirement should improve oversight into 

these systems’ development, and may reduce some unnecessary 

duplication of satellite control systems. According to Air Force officials, 

the first program to go through this process was the Enhanced Polar 

System, and all future satellite programs will include this cost-benefit 

analysis in their ground system planning. In addition, the Act directed 

GAO-13-315 (Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2013).

9 Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 822(a) (2013) (codified as amended at10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)).
Page 11 GAO-14-382T 

DOD to develop a DOD-wide long-term plan for satellite ground control 

systems.10

Additionally, the Defense Space Council continues with its architecture 

reviews in key space mission areas. According to Air Force officials, the 

Council is the principal DOD forum for discussing space issues, and 

brings together senior-level leaders to discuss these issues. These 

architecture reviews are to inform DOD’s programming, budgeting, and 

prioritization for the space mission area. The Council has five reviews 

underway or completed in areas such as overhead persistent infrared, 

satellite communications, space situational awareness, and national 

security space launches. They are also initiating a study of how DOD can 

assess the resilience of its space systems. DOD also recently held a 

forum on resiliency that included participation from senior leaders from 

several groups within DOD and the Intelligence Community to create a 

work plan towards resolution of critical gaps in resiliency.

Many of the reforms that are being initiated may not be fully proven for 

some years, because they apply mainly to programs in early acquisition 

stages, and most DOD space systems are currently either in the 

production phase or late in the development phase. We have not 

assessed the impact of actions taken this year, but we have observed 

that the totality of improvements made in recent years has contributed to 

better foundations for program execution.

While DOD has taken steps to address acquisition problems of the past, 

significant issues above the program level will still present challenges to 

even the best run programs. One key oversight issue is fragmented 

leadership of the space community. We have reported in the past that 

fragmented leadership and lack of a single authority in overseeing the 

acquisition of space programs have created challenges for optimally 

acquiring, developing, and deploying new space systems.11

 10 Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 822(b) (2013).

Past studies 

and reviews have found that responsibilities for acquiring space systems 

11 GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); and Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space 

Capabilities but, Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, 

GAO-10-447T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2010).

DOD Continues to

Face Barriers to

Program Oversight

and Management
Page 12 GAO-14-382T 

are diffused across various DOD organizations, even though many of the 

larger programs, such as the Global Positioning System and those to 

acquire imagery and environmental satellites, are integral to the execution 

of multiple agencies’ missions. This fragmentation is problematic because 

the lack of coordination has led to delays in fielding systems, and also 

because no one person or organization is held accountable for balancing 

governmentwide needs against wants, resolving conflicts and ensuring 

coordination among the many organizations involved with space systems 

acquisitions, and ensuring that resources are directed where they are 

most needed. Though changes to organizations and the creation of the 

Defense Space Council have helped to improve oversight, our work 

continues to find that DOD would benefit from increased coordination and 

a single authority overseeing these programs.

A program management challenge that GAO has identified, which stems 

from a lack of oversight, is that DOD has not optimally aligned the 

development of its satellites with associated components, including 

ground control system and user terminal acquisitions. Satellites require 

ground control systems to receive and process information from the 

satellites, and user terminals to deliver that satellite’s information to users. 

All three elements are important for utilizing space-based data, but 

development of satellites often outpaces the ground control systems and 

the user terminals. Delays in these ground control systems and user 

terminals lead to underutilized on-orbit satellite resources, and thus 

delays in getting the new capabilities to the warfighters or other endusers. In addition, there are limits to satellites’ operational life spans once 

launched. When satellites are launched before their associated ground 

and user segments are ready, they use up time in their operational lives 

without their capabilities being utilized. Synchronization of space system 

components will be an important issue for DOD in considering 

disaggregating space architectures, as the potential for larger numbers 

and novel configurations of satellites and ground systems will likely 

require the components to be synchronized to allow them to work 

together in the most effective way possible. As mentioned earlier, DOD is 

taking steps in response to improvements mandated by the Congress. 

But it will likely be difficult to better synchronize delivery of satellite 

components without more focused leadership at a level above the 

acquisitions’ program offices. For example, budget authority for user 

terminals, ground systems, and satellites is spread throughout the military 

services, and no one is in charge of synchronizing all of the system 

components, making it difficult to optimally line up programs’ deliveries.
Page 13 GAO-14-382T 

Fiscal pressures, past development problems, and concerns about the 

resiliency of satellites have spurred DOD to consider significant changes 

in the way it acquires and launches national security satellites.

Significant fiscal constraints, coupled with growing threats to DOD space 

systems—including adversary attacks such as anti-satellite weapons and 

communications jamming, and environmental hazards such as orbital 

debris—have called into question whether the complex and expensive 

satellites DOD is fielding and operating are affordable and will meet future 

needs. For example, a single launch failure, on-orbit anomaly, or 

adversary attack on a large multi-mission satellite could result in the loss 

of billions of dollars of investment and a significant loss of capability. 

Additionally, some satellites, which have taken more than a decade to 

develop, contain technologies that are already considered obsolete by the 

time they are launched.12

To address these challenges, DOD is considering alternative approaches 

to provide space-based capabilities, particularly for missile warning, 

protected satellite communications, and environmental monitoring. 

According to DOD, the primary considerations for studying these 

approaches and making decisions on the best way forward relate to 

finding the right balance of affordability, resiliency, and capability. These 

decisions, to be made over the next 2 to 3 years, have the potential for 

making sweeping changes to DOD’s space architectures of the future. 

For example, DOD could decide to build more disaggregated 

architectures, including dispersing sensors onto separate platforms; using 

multiple domains, including space, air, and ground, to provide full mission 

capabilities; hosting payloads on other government or commercial 

spacecraft; or some combination of these.

Our past work has indicated that some of the approaches being 

considered have the potential to reduce acquisition cost and time on a 

 12GAO, Briefing on Commercial and Department of Defense Space System Requirements 

and Acquisition Practices, GAO-10-135R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2010).

DOD Is Considering 

and Adopting 

Significant Changes 

to Space Systems 

Acquisitions

Potential Changes to 

Acquiring New DOD 

Space Systems
Page 14 GAO-14-382T 

single program. For instance, we have found that DOD’s initial preference 

to make fewer large and complex satellites that perform a multitude of 

missions has stretched technology challenges beyond existing 

capabilities, and in some cases vastly increased the complexities of 

related software.13 In addition, developing extensive new designs and 

custom-made spacecraft and payloads to meet the needs of multiple 

users limits DOD’s ability to provide capabilities sooner and contributes to 

higher costs.14 Last year, we reported that one potential new approach, 

hosted payload arrangements in which government instruments are 

placed on commercial satellites, may provide opportunities for 

government agencies to save money, especially in terms of launch and 

operation costs, and gain access to space.15

As new approaches, such as disaggregation, are considered, the existing 

management environment could pose barriers to success, including 

fragmented leadership for space programs, the culture of the DOD space 

community, fragmentation in satellite control stations, and disconnects 

between the delivery of satellites and their corresponding user terminals. 

For instance, disaggregation may well require substantial changes to 

acquisition processes and requirements setting. But without a central 

authority to implement these changes, there is likely to be resistance to 

adopting new ways of doing business, particularly since responsibilities 

for space acquisitions stretch across the military services and other 

government agencies. Moreover, under a disaggregated approach, DOD 

may need to effectively network and integrate a larger collection of 

satellites—some of which may even belong to commercial providers. We 

have reported that ground systems generally only receive and process 

data from the satellites for which they were developed. They generally do 

not control and operate more than one type of satellite or share their data 

with other ground systems. To date, however, DOD has had difficulty 

adopting modern practices and technologies for controlling satellites as 

well as difficulty in coordinating the delivery of satellites with the user 

terminals that must be installed on thousands of ships, planes, and 

 13 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic 

Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems, GAO-07-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).

14 GAO-10-135R.

15 GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 2013).
Page 15 GAO-14-382T 

ground-based assets. These are conditions that are difficult to change 

without strong leadership to break down organizational stove-pipes and to 

introduce technologies or techniques that could enable DOD to better 

integrate and fuse data from a wider, potentially more disparate, 

collection of satellites.

In light of suggestions that disaggregation could potentially reduce cost 

and increase survivability, the Senate Committee on Armed Services 

mandated that we assess the potential benefits and limitations of 

disaggregating key military space systems, including potential impacts on 

total costs.

16

To build consensus in the department, and to conduct a more rigorous 

analysis of options, DOD is currently in the process of conducting 

additional studies that will consider future architectures. Included in these 

studies are Analyses of Alternatives for future missile warning, protected 

satellite communications, and space based environmental monitoring 

To date, we have found that the potential effects of 

disaggregation are conceptual and not yet quantified. DOD has taken 

initial steps to assess alternative approaches, but it does not yet have the 

knowledge it needs to quantify benefits and limitations and determine a 

course of action. DOD officials we spoke with acknowledge the 

department has not yet established sufficient knowledge on which to base 

a decision. While DOD has conducted some studies that assessed 

alternative approaches to the current programs of record, some within the 

department do not consider these studies to be conclusive because they 

were either not conducted with sufficient analytical rigor or did not 

consider the capabilities, risks, and trades in a holistic manner. For 

example, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, a recent Air Force study that 

assessed future satellite communications architectures contained 

insufficient data to support the conclusion that one architectural approach 

was more resilient than others, and the cost estimates it contained did not 

consider important factors, such as ground control and terminal costs, in 

calculating the implications of changing architectures.

 16 S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 165 (2013).
Page 16 GAO-14-382T 

capabilities.17

Moreover, as DOD continues to build knowledge about different 

acquisition approaches, it will be essential to develop an understanding of 

key factors for decisions on future approaches that could impact the 

costs, schedules, and performance of providing mission capabilities. 

Some considerations for moving to a new or evolved architecture may 

include the following:

Among the range of alternatives these analyses are 

considering are approaches that keep the current system, evolve the 

current system, and disaggregate the current system into more 

numerous, but smaller and less complex, satellites. DOD has nearly 

finished the space-based environmental monitoring study and expects to 

finish the other two in either this fiscal year or next.

• Common definitions of key terms, such as resiliency and 

disaggregation, across all stakeholders, and a common measurement 

of these terms in order to compare architectural alternatives.

• The true costs of moving to a new architecture, including transition 

costs for funding overlapping operations and compatibility between 

new and legacy systems and non-recurring engineering costs for newstart programs, among others.

• Potential technical and logistical challenges. For example, with hosted 

payloads, our past work has found that ensuring compatibility 

between sensors and host satellites may be difficult because of 

variable interfaces on different companies’ satellites.18

 17 An Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is a review in the DOD acquisition process that 

compares the operational effectiveness, suitability, and lifecycle cost of solutions to satisfy 

documented capability needs. Factors considered in the AOA include effectiveness, cost, 

schedule, concepts of operations, and overall risk of each alternative. A GAO report in 

2009 found in many cases the AOAs did not effectively consider a broad range of 

alternatives and that DOD sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution before an 

AOA is conducted. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not 

Provided a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options, 

In addition, 

scheduling and funding hosted payload arrangements may be difficult 

because the timeline for developing sensors may be much longer than 

that of commercial satellites.

GAO-09-665 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 24, 2009). These AOAs are to investigate follow-on programs for SBIRS, 

AEHF and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. In addition to missile warning, 

SBIRS supports missile defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence 

missions. 

18 GAO-13-279SP.
Page 17 GAO-14-382T 

• Impacts to supporting capabilities, such as ground control and 

operations and launch availability, and long-standing challenges we 

have identified regarding how these have been managed.19

• Readiness of the acquisition workforce and industrial base to support 

a new architecture.

Given that DOD is in the early stages of assessing alternatives, our 

ongoing work is continuing to identify potential benefits and limitations of 

disaggregation and examine the extent to which these issues are being 

factored into DOD’s ongoing studies. We look forward to reporting on the 

results of this analysis this summer.

DOD has made some changes to the way it buys launch services from its 

sole-source provider, and plans to allow other companies to compete with 

that provider for launch services in the near future. DOD’s Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is the primary provider of 

launch vehicles for U.S. military and intelligence satellites. Since 2006, 

the United Launch Alliance (ULA) has been the sole-source launch 

provider for this program, with a record of 50 successful consecutive 

government missions. From 2006 through 2013, DOD had two types of 

contracts with ULA through which ULA provided launch services for 

national security space launches.20

In the last few years, though the dual contract structure met DOD’s needs 

for unprecedented mission success and flexible launch capability, 

predicted costs continued to rise for launch services. In response to these 

cost predictions, DOD revised its acquisition strategy to allow for a “block 

buy” of launch vehicles, where DOD would commit to multiple years of 

launch purchases from ULA, with the goal of stabilizing production and 

DOD utilized this dual-contract 

structure to achieve flexibility in launch schedules and to avoid additional 

costs associated with frequent launch delays.

 19 GAO-13-315. GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New 

Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information. GAO-11-641. (Washington, D.C.: 

September 15, 2011) and Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. GAO-08-1039. 

(Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008).

20 Under this two-contract structure, DOD bought launch capability on one series of 

contracts, and launch hardware on another series of contracts. Launch capability included 

things like overhead on launch pads, engineering support, and labor to conduct launches.

Recent and Upcoming 

Changes to the Evolved 

Expendable Launch 

Vehicle Program
Page 18 GAO-14-382T 

decreasing prices. In addition, and partially in response to GAO 

recommendations, DOD gathered large amounts of information on ULA’s 

cost drivers to allow DOD to negotiate significantly lower prices under the 

contracting structure.21 In December 2013, DOD signed a contract 

modification with ULA to purchase 35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 

5-year period, 2013-2017, and the associated capability to launch them. 

According to the Air Force, this contracting strategy saved $4.4 billion 

over the predicted program cost in the fiscal year 2012 budget. We 

recently reported on some of the changes included in this new contract 

from the prior contracts.22

In addition to this change in the way DOD buys launch vehicles, DOD is 

also in the process of introducing a method for other launch services 

companies to compete with ULA for EELV launches. Since 2006, when 

ULA began as a joint venture between then-competitors Boeing and 

Lockheed Martin, the EELV program has been managed as a sole source 

procurement, because there were no other domestic launch companies 

that could meet the program’s requirements. With the recent development 

of new domestic launch vehicles that can meet at least some EELV 

mission requirements, DOD plans to make available for competition up to 

14 launches in fiscal years 2015-2017. Any launch company that has 

been certified by DOD to launch national security space payloads will be 

able to compete with ULA to launch these missions. DOD is currently 

finalizing their plan for this competition, including what requirements will 

be placed on the contractors and how they will compare proposals from 

the contractors.

Based on our discussions with DOD officials, they plan to use a best 

value approach for this competition, in which price is not the only 

consideration. DOD will likely consider several factors when comparing 

proposals for launch services for the 14 booster core competition 

between ULA and new entrants, including price, mission risk, and satellite 

vehicle integration risks. DOD could require competitive proposals to be 

structured in several ways. If DOD requires proposals to contain both 

fixed-price and cost reimbursement features for launch services and 

capability, respectively, similar to the way it currently contracts with ULA,

 21 GAO-11-641.

22 GAO, The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive Procurement, 

GAO-14-377R (Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014).
Page 19 GAO-14-382T 

there could be benefits to DOD and ULA, but potential burdens to new 

entrants. For example, DOD is familiar with this approach and has 

experience negotiating under these terms, and ULA is familiar with DOD’s 

requirements given ULA’s role as the EELV’s sole launch provider. But 

use of a cost type contract may negate efficient contractor business 

practices and cost savings due to government data requirements under 

this type of approach, and it may give ULA a price advantage because 

DOD already funds launch capability for ULA. Alternatively, if DOD 

implements a fixed-price commercial approach to launch proposals with 

fewer data reporting requirements, DOD could lose insight into contractor 

cost or pricing, but may receive lower prices from new entrants due to 

these fewer data reporting requirements. DOD could also require a 

combination of elements from each of these approaches, or develop new 

contract requirements for this competition. We examined some of the 

benefits and challenges of the first two approaches, either of which can 

facilitate competitive launch contract awards, in a recent report.23

The planned competition for launch services may have helped DOD 

negotiate the lower prices it achieved in its December 2013 contract 

modification, and DOD could see further savings if a robust domestic 

launch market materializes. DOD noted in its 2014 President’s Budget 

submission for EELV that after the current contract with ULA has ended, it 

plans to have a full and open competition for national security space 

launches. Cost savings on launches, as long as they do not come with a 

reduction in mission successes, would greatly benefit DOD, and allow the 

department to put funding previously needed for launches into programs 

in the development phases to ensure they are adequately resourced.

DOD 

expects to issue a draft request for proposal for the first of the competitive 

missions, where the method for evaluating and comparing proposals will 

be explained, in the spring of 2014.

In conclusion, DOD has made significant progress in solving past space 

systems acquisition problems, and is seeing systems begin to launch 

after years of development struggles. However, systemic problems 

remain that need to be addressed as DOD considers changes to the way 

it acquires new systems. This is particularly important if DOD decides to 

pursue new approaches that could require changes in longstanding 

processes, practices, and organizational structures. Even if DOD decides 

 23 GAO-14-377R. 
Page 20 GAO-14-382T 

not to pursue new approaches, these problems must still be tackled. In 

addition, challenging budget situations will continue to require tradeoffs 

and prioritization decisions across programs, though limited funds may 

also provide the impetus for rethinking architectures. We look forward to 

working with Congress and DOD in identifying the most effective and 

efficient ways to sustain and develop space capabilities in this challenging 

environment.

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my prepared 

statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you and 

Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina 

Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to 

this statement and related work include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; 

Pete Anderson; Virginia Chanley; Erin Cohen; Desiree Cunningham; 

Brenna Guarneros; Kristine Hassinger; Laura Hook; Rich Horiuchi; Jeff 

Sanders; and Roxanna Sun.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements
Related GAO Products

Page 21 GAO-14-382T 

Introducing Competition into National Security Space Launch 

Acquisitions. GAO-14-259T. (Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2014).

The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive 

Procurement. GAO-14-377R. (Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014).

Global Positioning System: A Comprehensive Assessment of Potential 

Options and Related Costs is Needed. GAO-13-729. (Washington, D.C.: 

September 9, 2013).

Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Significant Funding for 

Launch-Related Activities. GAO-13-802R. (Washington, D.C.: 

September 9, 2013).

Missile Defense: Precision Tracking Space System Evaluation of 

Alternatives, GAO-13-747T. (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013).

Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial 

Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. (Washington, 

D.C.: April 18, 2013).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, 

but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments Are Optimized.

GAO-13-508T. (Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2013).

2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-13-279SP. 

(Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2013).

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-13-294SP. (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013).

Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R. 

(Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of 

Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. (Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2012).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge 

Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. (Washington, D.C.: 

July 26, 2012).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 22 GAO-14-382T 

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, 

and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. 

GAO-12-342SP. (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012).

Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and 

Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust. GAO-11-722. 

(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2011).

Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to 

Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404. 

(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering 

Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities. GAO-11-545. 

(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but 

Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T. 

(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New 

Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information. GAO-11-641. 

(Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies 

Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research Program. 

GAO-11-21. (Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2010).

Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading 

Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 

2010).

Briefing on Commercial and Department of Defense Space System 

Requirements and Acquisition Practices. GAO-10-315R. (Washington, 

D.C.: January 14, 2010).

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System 

Components. GAO-10-55. (Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009).

Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. 

GAO-08-1039. (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008).
Related GAO Products

Page 23 GAO-14-382T 

Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address 

Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. GAO-07-96. 

(Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006).

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