Editors:

Volker C. Franke

Robert H. Dorff

Conflict Management

and Peacebuilding:

Pillars of a New American 

Grand Strategy

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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 

AND PEACEBUILDING: PILLARS OF A 

NEW AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

Volker C. Franke

Robert H. Dorff

Editors

October 2013

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The Strategic Studies Institute and the co-editors of this volume join in thanking the faculty, students, and staff of Kennesaw 

State University (KSU) for their extraordinary efforts in organizing and implementing the symposium, and in the preparation of this book. We also extend a very special thanks to KSU 

President Dr. Daniel S. Papp and Dr. Richard A. Vengroff, Dean 

Emeritus of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences for 

their energetic support of and commitment to the event and the 

publication of this book. In addition, we would like to thank Dr. 
iii

Jeffrey D. McCausland, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Research and Minerva Chair at SSI; Mr. Doug Brooks, President 

Emeritus of the International Stability Operations Association; 

and Dr. Akanmu Adebayo, Professor of History and Director of 

KSU’s Center for Conflict Management, for their skillful moderation of the panels. We appreciate the assistance of Mr. Edward 

L. Mienie, INCM Ph.D. Candidate who, as graduate assistant for 

the symposium, helped coordinate the conference logistics and 

co-authored the conference brief; and INCM staff, including Program Administrator Rose Procter, Program Coordinator Chelsea 

van Bergen, and Student Assistant Audrey Adams, whose tireless efforts and great dedication ensured the successful organization and effective implementation of the symposium. Finally, our 

thanks go to the INCM Ph.D. students, all of whom volunteered 

to serve as program liaisons and campus guides to the panelists.

ISBN 1-58487-583-6

v

CONTENTS

Foreword .....................................................................vii

1. Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: 

 Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy ......... 1

Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff

2. New Threats; New Thinking ............................... 15

Frederick W. Smullen 

3. The Transatlantic Relationship: A Breaking 

 or Restorable Pillar of a New American

 Grand Strategy? .....................................................29

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

4. The Nature and Demands of Smart Power ........41

Robert Kennedy

5. A Future U.S. Grand Strategy: 

 Conflict Management Forever with Us, 

 Peacebuilding Not So Much................................. 99

Michael Lekson and Nathaniel L. Wilson

6. The Role of Peacebuilding and Conflict 

 Management in a Future American Grand

 Strategy: Time for an “Off Shore” 

 Approach? ............................................................133

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

7. Always an Outsider: U.S. Military Role in 

 International Peacebuilding ...............................159

William Flavin
8. Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: 

 A Grand Strategic Approach to Civil-Military

 Coordination in the 21st Century ..................... 193

Christopher Holshek

9. Peacebuilding and Development: 

 Challenges for Strategic Thinking .....................241

Fouzieh Melanie Alamir

10. Forces of Order and Disorder: Security 

 Providers and Conflict Management ................271

Michael Ashkenazi

11. Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response 

 Options: Addressing the Policy Challenges..... 295

Dwight Raymond 

12. The United States, China, and India 

 in the New World Order: Consequences

 for Europe ............................................................ 317

Liselotte Odgaard

13. Negotiating the Pitfalls of Peace and Security 

 in Africa and a New American Grand 

 Strategy: African Union Peace and Security 

 Architecture and the U.S.

 Africa Command .................................................339

Kwesi Aning and Festus Aubyn

14. U.S. Grand Strategy and the Search 

 for Partners: South Africa as a Key

 Partner in Africa ................................................. 369

Abel Esterhuyse

About the Contributors ............................................ 399

vi
vii

FOREWORD

On February 24, 2012, Kennesaw State University 

(KSU) and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC), conducted a symposium entitled “Peacebuilding and Conflict Management: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy.” 

The symposium built on the results of the 2011 KSUSSI symposium that examined the utility of the U.S. 

Government’s whole-of-government (WoG) approach 

for responding to the challenging security demands 

of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on this 

earlier evaluation of the benefits and shortcomings of 

the WoG approach in the field and the integration of 

operational and tactical demands generated by new 

security challenges, the 2012 symposium examined 

more closely the strategic objectives of interagency 

cooperation specifically in the areas of peacebuilding 

and conflict management.

In addition to the dual focus on peacebuilding and 

conflict management, the symposium was designed to 

examine one of the ongoing research interests in the 

SSI academic engagement series: the role of WoG efforts in addressing contemporary national and international security challenges and opportunities. In 

addition, the topics covered by the panelists created 

important synergies with SSI’s 2012 Annual Strategy 

Conference, which examined challenges and opportunities for the future of U.S. grand strategy in an 

age of austerity. Four symposium panels addressed 

the following topics: “The Role of Peacebuilding and 

Conflict Management in a Future American Grand 

Strategy,” “More than a Military Tool: Strengthening Civil-Military Cooperation in Peacebuilding,” 

“Peace and Development: Key Elements of a New 
viii

Grand Strategy,” and “Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and a New American Grand Strategy: Views 

from Abroad.”

The symposium discussions ranged from the 

conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in 

international interventions. Invited panelists shared 

their experiences and expertise on the need for and 

future of an American grand strategy in an era characterized by increasingly complex security challenges 

and shrinking budgets. Panelists agreed that taking the status quo for granted was a major obstacle 

to developing a successful grand strategy and that 

government, the military, international and nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector are all 

called on to contribute their best talents and efforts to 

joint global peace and security efforts. The panelists 

engaged the audience in a discussion that included 

viewpoints from academia, the military, government 

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. Despite the broad range of viewpoints, a number of overarching themes and tentative agreements 

emerged. The reader will find them in the chapters of 

this edited volume.

KSU and SSI are pleased to present this book, and 

we hope that readers will engage us further in the 

kinds of issues and debates that surfaced during the 

symposium and that are captured and extended in the 

pages that follow. In the interest of both national and 

international security, we must continue to debate issues pertinent to strategy and strategic decisionmak-
ix

ing and develop effective tools for the implementation 

and coordination of strategies of peacebuilding and 

conflict management.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

1

CHAPTER 1

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 

AND PEACEBUILDING: PILLARS OF A 

NEW AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

Volker C. Franke

Robert H. Dorff

The United States must renew its leadership in the 

world by building and cultivating the sources of our 

strength and influence. Our national security depends upon America’s ability to leverage our unique 

national attributes, just as global security depends 

upon strong and responsible American leadership.

 President Barack Obama,

 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy

INTRODUCTION

In June 2009, President Obama traveled to Egypt 

to make good on a campaign promise to mend U.S. 

relations with the Muslim world and to repair America’s tarnished image in the world. Immediately after 

taking over the White House, President Obama had 

launched a series of foreign policy initiatives—e.g., 

ordering the closure of the U.S. detention facility in 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; sending additional troops 

to Afghanistan while ordering the withdrawal of all 

combat troops from Iraq; promoting democratic reform, economic development, and peace and security 

across the Middle East and North Africa; and negotiating and ratifying a new Strategic Arms Reduction 
2

Treaty (START) with Russia1—that presented a sharp 

turn-around from the George W. Bush administration’s “go-it-alone” approach to fighting a global war 

on terror (GWOT) that had turned away allies and 

friends and angered public opinion worldwide. 

Indeed, Obama’s embrace of diplomacy and cooperation made him popular abroad and revived America’s image, eventually leading to him being awarded 

the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. The prize committee celebrated President Obama “for his extraordinary efforts 

to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples” and for giving people around 

the world hope for a better future “founded in the 

concept that those who are to lead the world must do 

so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared 

by the majority of the world’s population.”2

Despite obvious differences between the Obama 

and Bush administrations’ foreign and national security policies, both Presidents seem to share one common conviction: that other countries long for U.S. 

leadership and that U.S. policies ought to manifest 

America’s leadership position in the world.3 Notwithstanding mounting global criticism of American 

unilateralism and straining transatlantic relations, the 

Bush administration was convinced that friends and 

allies would eventually come around and rally to the 

side of the United States, even if they bristled at its 

actions, because they shared America’s goals and values and had faith in its motives. But flexing American muscles in Iraq and Afghanistan not only turned 

Washington’s partners away, it also led to nuclear saber rattling by Iran and North Korea and left the U.S. 

Government with a mounting deficit. 
3

As the 2008 election neared, it had become clear 

that the United States could no longer afford the Bush 

practice of “bullying other countries to ratify changes 

we hatch in isolation.”4 Instead, President Obama advocated “a strategy no longer driven by ideology and 

politics but rather one that is based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground and our 

interests in the region.”5

 Obama believed that a United 

States that listened more to others, stressed common 

interests and favored multinational action would command followers. In practice, however, Obama discovered that in a globalized world, where power has been 

more widely dispersed, many countries are indifferent to American leadership. In the same vein, describing the political and economic ascendance of countries 

such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, or South Africa, 

Fareed Zakaria has argued that the world is shifting 

from the hostile Anti-Americanism that characterized 

much of the Bush presidency to a post-Americanism 

where power is far more diffuse and dispersed across 

a wider array of countries.6 But not only that, nonstate 

actors are becoming increasingly important players in 

the geopolitical terrain as well.

“Even if Washington led wisely and sympathetically,” James Lindsay has argued, “others might not 

follow. Consultations could not guarantee consensus.”7

 Given these new global realities, how are U.S. 

interests to be promoted in a world in which others 

no longer blindly follow the single most powerful and 

influential country? What are the prospects for American leadership, and what are appropriate strategic responses to emerging security threats? What principles 

should inform the development of those responses? 

What, in other words, should be the elements of a new 

grand strategy guiding the formulation of American 

foreign and national security policy?
4

Since the end of World War II, U.S. policies have 

been informed by changing and at times competing ideas about America’s role in the world, shifting among visions promoting “neo-isolationism,” 

“selective engagement,” “cooperative security,” and 

“primacy.”8

 None of these visions, however, are sufficient to address the rapidly changing nature of today’s global security context and provide a coherent 

and comprehensive organizing framework to protect 

and promote U.S. national security at home or abroad. 

Unless the President—irrespective of party or political persuasion—finds a way to align foreign policy 

prescriptions with evolving global trends, Lindsay 

warns, “the gap between American aspirations and 

accomplishments will grow, and the prospects for 

successful US global leadership will dim further.”9

In an effort to discuss visions and ideas for a future 

U.S. grand strategy based on diplomacy and cooperation, on February 24, 2012, a number of leading civilian and military experts came together at a symposium held at Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, 

GA, to evaluate the usefulness and practicality of conflict management and peacebuilding as key pillars to 

the development of a new American grand strategy.10

The 2012 symposium built on the results of a successful 2011 symposium that examined the utility of the 

U.S. Government’s whole-of-government approach 

for responding to the challenging security demands of 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.11

This volume presents the central arguments and 

key findings of the 2012 symposium, tracing the central 

plans and policies that ought to comprise Washington’s efforts to harness political, military, diplomatic, 

and economic tools together to advance U.S. national 

interests in an increasingly complex and globalizing 
5

world. Authors contributing to this volume tackle 

strategic choices for effectively addressing emerging security threats, integrating conflict management 

approaches into strategic decisionmaking, sharing 

the burden of peacebuilding and stability operations 

between military and civilian actors, strengthening 

civil-military cooperation in complex operations, 

and enabling the timely scaling-down of military 

deployments.

The first part of this volume lays out some of the 

specific threats, challenges, and opportunities of the 

emerging strategic global security environment and 

offers some more general recommendations for strategic responses to those challenges. In Chapter 2, former Chief-of-Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 

Frederick W. Smullen III, presents a comprehensive 

overview of the challenges that characterize the global 

national security landscape—ranging from terrorism 

and piracy to hunger and humanitarian issues, to pandemics, climate change, energy and resource security, 

and the global economic crisis. Facing this plethora of 

challenges, Smullen advocates that the United States, 

as the remaining single global superpower, can and 

should lead by example, taking strategic advantage of 

a moment in history that offers the opportunity to heal 

America’s global image, strengthen its influence with 

like-minded nations, and (re)earn respect as a solid 

citizen nation of the world. 

Focusing specifically on challenges to transatlantic relations, in Chapter 3 former German Defense 

and Economics Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg warns of the danger of “disconnection through 

connection,” i.e., that new and intertwined global 

challenges and shifts of power risk marginalizing 

traditional partnerships and multinational institu-
6

tions. Identifying the paradox that the circumstances 

requiring better global governance—e.g., conflicting 

interests and incentives, divergent values, or differing norms—are also the ones that make its realization 

incredibly complex and often unpleasant, Guttenberg 

calls for a bold and long-term strategic vision that reinvigorates the transatlantic relationship by promoting 

a global democratic political culture based on respect 

for cultural differences. Any new American grand 

strategy, Guttenberg argues, ought to move beyond 

short-term thinking and ad hoc procedures to change 

the transatlantic narrative so national populations can 

understand the complexities and dilemmas within 

which institutions from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) to 

the European Union (EU) operate and reach out past 

the “old West” to bring emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, China, or India into the global dialogue, so 

they will shoulder greater global responsibility while 

recognizing the limits of their own power.

Although acknowledging the many and varying 

threats to U.S. national security in the years and decades 

to come, Robert Kennedy argues in Chapter 4 that perhaps the greatest challenge for the United States will 

arise from a continued relative shift in power from the 

world’s predominant political, economic, diplomatic, 

and military superpower to primus inter pares in world 

affairs. Thus, to meet the challenges ahead including 

its readjustment in status, Kennedy argues, Washington must wisely apply the instruments of national 

power—political, economic, psychological, and military. Chapter 4 addresses specifically the origins and 

nature of national power: its sources and the means by 

which those are transformed into preferred outcomes 

in the international arena and the instruments states 
7

use to do so, and examines the likely demands arising 

from soft and hard power to be molded into what is 

fashionably called “smart power.“

Presenting an overview of the origins, present 

state, and prospects of the international security order, Michael Lekson and Nathan Wilson conjecture in 

Chapter 5 that traditional peacebuilding in the sense 

of stabilization, institution building, and democratization, while remaining an active and important component of international relations, will decrease in importance to a future American grand strategy and an 

even smaller part in actual practice. Instead, Lekson 

and Wilson argue the need for conflict management, 

understood as a mix of defense and diplomacy, will 

increase in the future. As a result, both diplomats and 

the military will have to place a premium on flexibility 

and practice selective engagement, especially in an environment where threats and challenges are multifold 

and resource allocations remain tight. The adage “doing more with less,” Lekson and Wilson criticize, not 

only serves as a guide to policy but also as a convenient pretext to avoid prioritization. In short, the authors conclude, “There will be no shortage of conflicts 

to manage, and we will all need to keep getting better 

at it if we want this story to have a happy ending.”

Given the enormous cost in casualties and resources 

in America’s post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars, 

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. argues in Chapter 6, the United 

States needs to consider alternative approaches—to 

include especially peacebuilding and conflict management—to accomplish its strategic goals. Dunlap conjectures that it is incumbent upon the Armed Forces to 

develop methodologies to accomplish these missions 

in a way that is supportable by the American public. 

To achieve this, Dunlap proposes an “off shore” ap-
8

proach based on a light military footprint that leverages America’s asymmetric advantages in high technology as a means of addressing emerging security 

challenges without necessarily putting large forces on 

the ground. Off-shore peacebuilding and conflict management will not work in every instance, but can serve 

as a starting point when the next challenge arises. At 

the end of the day, however, Dunlap concludes, any 

off shore strategy must recognize that the central task 

of peacebuilding and conflict management must be 

developing local capabilities. 

International peacebuilding, William Flavin argues 

in Chapter 7, is at its heart a host nation challenge and 

responsibility, and national factors will shape its pace 

and sequencing. As a result, Flavin contends, the U.S. 

military will always remain an outsider to the peacebuilding process and the country it is trying to assist. 

Irrespective of what the military will try to do to shape 

the outcome, the host nation has its own objectives and 

ideas and, as the influence of the military force wanes, 

local imperatives will take over. Flavin cautions that 

the military can never have sufficient knowledge 

about the host country and the other international 

actors because of its own institutional processes and 

the temporary nature of its involvement. Nevertheless, its unique ability to plan, organize, respond, and 

mobilize resources ensures that the U.S. military will 

continue to undertake a wide variety of tasks beyond 

its basic combat skills, making short-term security the 

sine-qua-non and peacebuilding a secondary function 

of military operations in the future.

Given the grand strategic imperatives of the 21st 

century, Christopher Holshek contends in Chapter 8, 

the civil-military nexus of conflict management and 

peacebuilding is more relevant to international en-
9

gagements and American grand strategy today than 

ever before. However, America’s current civil-military approach to foreign policy and national security 

remains largely based on an outdated national security paradigm, itself predicated on Cold War thinking, 

that has been revitalized since 9/11. Instead, Holshek 

calls for a more enlightened approach to civil-military 

coordination that is not based on a tradeoff between 

idealism and realism, but one where those who bring 

democracy serve as true ambassadors of the concept 

and exemplify its tenets in their daily interactions 

with local populations. Such applied civil-military coordination must mirror the civil-military relationship 

in democratic societies and the actions of uniformed 

personnel must be consonant with the values of the 

democratic societies they represent. When Americans 

think globally and act locally, make their actions consonant with their core values, and embrace a new ethos 

of engagement, they can transform both their environment and themselves. However, failure to recognize 

this, he warns, risks further deterioration of American global leadership and the security and prosperity 

resulting from it.

Examining the strategic challenges at the intersection between peacebuilding, development, and security, Melanie Alamir argues in Chapter 9 that strategic 

thinking that tends to treat actors and societies in developing countries as mere objects in pursuing their 

own countries’ national interests, contradicts the key 

development tenet of local ownership. Strategic thinking that is marked by a general confidence in instrumental rationality that for the most part disregards 

the relevance of perceptions, emotions, identities, 

and beliefs, and is characterized by an “engineering” 

mindset based on hierarchy, predictability, order, and 
10

sequence cannot be applied to planning for peacebuilding and development. Instead, it tends to take 

political decisions for granted, focusing on how to 

implement them rather than to question their wisdom. 

Peacebuilding and development, however, require 

permanent monitoring, evaluation, and the flexibility 

to question not only tactics, but also goals, if needed. 

Alamir concludes that strategic thinking needs more 

flexibility, making the likelihood of delay, setbacks, 

detours, or failure integral elements of any effective 

future grand strategy. The main challenge, she conjectures, is to reconcile dominant top-down approaches 

along with their “engineering logic” with the ambiguity, unpredictability, and uncontrollability of contemporary security threats and challenges.

Heeding Alamir’s call for a more flexible and sensitive strategic approach to peacebuilding, Michael 

Ashkenazi argues in Chapter 10 for greater nuancing 

in the strategic discourse particularly by recognizing 

how interactions between low-level actors—individuals and small groups—can have major impacts on 

the outcomes of strategies. Ashkenazi examines his 

claim by developing a concept of security providers 

encompassing different types of more or less structured formations that engage in security. Using identifiable rewards—cash, emotional gratification from 

association, legal support, and ideology—Ashkenazi 

contends that variations in the relative strength of 

these rewards over time cause formations to move 

in the mapped space toward one or another of the 

four ideal types. Ashkenazi concludes that identifying these rewards and manipulating them over time 

must be incorporated into strategic thinking. Where 

an international actor such as the United States has a 

strategic interest in ensuring stability, peace, develop-
11

ment, democracy, and other social goods, it is crucial 

to identify and resolve micro-level problems that, in 

the aggregate, can cause a strategy to fail. 

Examining America’s strategic efforts specifically 

in the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide, 

Dwight Raymond reviews in Chapter 11 the policy 

formulation contained in the government’s recent 

Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options 

(MAPRO) planning process.12 Raymond criticizes that 

competing national interests oftentimes dissuade action, that risk-averse bureaucracies tend to support 

status quo approaches, and that the complex nature of 

security problems may not be conducive to clear-cut 

decisions in the interest of stopping perpetrators and 

protecting innocent victims. Reviewing the recently 

released MAPRO Handbook, Raymond provides an 

outline for effective interagency cooperation to help 

policymakers wrestle with MAPRO decisions and associated risks—although much of the Handbook is 

also applicable to other complex situations involving 

conflict—by providing a rational yet feasible process 

for contingency planning as well as crisis response. 

The final part of this volume examines how America’s strategic choices are perceived from abroad. 

Evaluating Washington’s reorientation away from 

the Atlantic to the Pacific, especially with China and 

India as rising competitors, Liselotte Odgaard contends in Chapter 12 that any future world order will 

be dominated by America’s pursuit of an integrationist world order and China’s pursuit of a coexistence 

world order. The different U.S. and Chinese versions 

of international order give rise to an international 

system without clear rules because of the lack of one 

coherent set of principles of international conduct. 

In this in-between system, she argues, India and Eu-
12

rope will be takers rather than makers of that future 

order, facing the challenge of carving out a position 

in-between these two competing world orders, and 

security threats will be addressed primarily through 

ad hoc frameworks of conflict management.

Turning to Africa, Kwesi Aning and Festus Aubyn 

examine in Chapter 13 the history of U.S. engagements 

in Africa, especially in the peace and security arena 

and juxtapose America’s grand strategic calculations 

with Africa’s own perceptions of and responses to its 

security challenges. In addition, Aning and Aubyn explore how in the face of common challenges both the 

African Union (AU) and the United States can identify 

and respond to their security challenges in a manner 

that makes this relationship a win-win one instead of 

the present one driven by suspicion, competition, and 

outright hostility. Unfortunately, Aning and Aubyn 

conclude that U.S. policy toward Africa has remained 

largely intact under the Obama administration, still 

pursuing that same militarized and unilateral security approach toward Africa policy employed by the 

Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. It 

is important, Aning and Aubyn conjecture, for the 

United States not to see Africa at the periphery of its 

foreign policy engagements but rather to devote resources to strengthening the operational and tactical 

components of AU peace support operations, focus on 

bolstering the civilian capabilities for the AU’s conflict 

management activities, increase its economic support 

to bridge the AU’s bureaucratic and institutional capability gaps in conflict management, and reconcile 

its interest with African human security needs such 

as poverty, unemployment, access to clean water, and 

the HIV/AIDs pandemic.
13

Dove-tailing on the geopolitical challenges outlined by Odgaard and the African context presented 

by Aning and Aubyn, Abel Esterhuyse examines in 

Chapter 14 specifically the role of South Africa as a key 

partner in the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in Africa. Reviewing the historically rather limited involvement in African security by either country, Esterhuyse 

contends that perceptions in South Africa about the 

United States and, specifically how the United States 

prefers to conceptualize and respond to perceived 

threats, have been shaped predominantly by the kinetic-driven U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan 

and, more recently, Libya. The creation of U.S. Africa 

Command (AFRICOM) further reinforces this perception. South Africans view their own military involvement in Africa as human security-related and that of 

the United States as military security-orientated. For 

the current Action Council of Nigeria (ANC) government, U.S. military involvement in Africa is seen as 

a force of destruction shaped largely by conventional 

warfighting applications, while South African military involvement is driven by the human security and 

peacetime applications of military force. As a result, 

as long as these perceptions remain, strategic cooperation between both countries will be difficult to achieve.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. A comprehensive list of foreign policy initiatives is available from www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy. See also James 

M. Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of 

US Global Leadership,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011, 

pp. 765-779.

2. The text of the Nobel Prize citation is available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/09/us-nobel-peace-citation-text-sbidUSTRE5981RA20091009.
14

3. See Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the 

Future of US Global Leadership.”

4. Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, July-August 2007, pp. 2-16.

5. Ryan Lizza quoted in Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack 

Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership,” p. 773.

6. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, London UK: 

Norton, 2009.

7. Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future 

of US Global Leadership,” p. 779.

8. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions 

for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 

Winter 1996/97, pp. 5-53.

9. Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future 

of US Global Leadership,” p. 779.

10. Details of the 2012 KSU-SSI Symposium is available from 

www.kennesaw.edu/ksussi/2012/index.php.

11. For details of the 2011 KSU-SSI Symposium, see Volker C. 

Franke and Robert H. Dorff, eds., Conflict Management and “Whole 

of Government”: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy?

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2012, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=1102.

12. Dwight Raymond, Cliff Bernath, Don Braum, and Ken 

Zurcher, Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): 

A Policy Planning Handbook, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, available from pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/collaborative/collaborativereview.cfm?collaborativeID=11.
15

CHAPTER 2

NEW THREATS; NEW THINKING

Frederick W. Smullen

The author paints a picture of a global national security landscape as he views it, what the challenges 

are, and what can be done, so readers can ponder what 

these challenges mean to citizens who care about our 

welfare, our security, and the safety of this country 

and the world at large. Therefore we should look at 

the global landscape to try and make sense of it and 

ponder what it bodes for the future. It would be easy 

to dismiss current events simply by saying, “We live 

in interesting times,” as went the old Chinese proverb. 

The truth is, we’ve always lived “in interesting times.” 

If you think about it, the challenges that face us today 

seem so broad and so interconnected. They increase, 

they evolve, but our thinking evolves as well. 

Let’s take a closer look at the environment and 

times in which we find ourselves. The world of today is a crucible of challenges. This is an era in which 

problems and threats have become global concerns in 

ways once unthinkable. As a nation, we have always 

known crisis and always will. But what is different, if 

anything, about the crises of today compared to those 

of the past? For one thing, most crises in the past had 

a beginning and an end. Although painful along the 

way, you knew they would not, indeed could not, 

last forever. Today’s crises tend to defy predictability. They rise up in larger numbers, many occurring 

simultaneously, and they seem to persist far longer. 

Some are unforeseen and difficult to prepare for; others loom as threats that draw our attention. At the top 
16

of many threat lists is terrorism, something that shook 

our national sense of invulnerability on September 

11, 2001 (9/11) and captured our call to action so as 

to protect the homeland from the likes of al-Qaeda, 

which is evolving. Our thinking needs to evolve too. 

Even before the killing of Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda had changed. Their operational planning capabilities, including the attack on the USS Cole, the World 

Trade Center bombing, and the subsequent 9/11 attacks, bruised and rallied a nation. Once a formidable 

terrorist organization with a media wing, it is now 

more of a media organization with a terrorist wing. 

Yet grave threats remain: lone wolf attacks, such as 

the so called “underwear bomber” on Christmas Day 

2009, the attempted Times Square bombing in 2010, an 

attempted bombing in 2011, and an attempted bombing of the U.S. capital in 2012 by a Moroccan citizen 

who had been living in the United States illegally for 

the past 12 years. These threats loom and will stay 

with us. There has been a rise in prominence of al-Qaeda inspired and affiliated groups, such as al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). We cannot be lulled 

into thinking that these groups are only concerned 

with local and regional grievances. The package bomb 

plot emanating from Yemen in 2010 is proof that this 

force can be projected. We must strive to understand 

these groups better, and work toward the eradication of the root causes of extremism that give rise to 

these groups. Ironically, before his death last year, the 

spiritual leader of AQAP was Answar Al-Awlaqi, an 

American of Yemen descent, who inspired Islamic terrorists to take action against the West. Make no mistake about it, Osama Bin Laden may be dead, but his 

legacy lives on.
17

Global piracy is a swiftly moving threat. Piracy 

threatens and slows down commercial shipping, has 

a chilling effect on world trade, increases commodity 

prices, and contributes to regional insecurity. Pirates 

have thrived in recent years, maintaining a high level 

of attacks for the fifth straight year. In 2011, pirates 

attacked 439 ships and took 802 people hostage. The 

threat continues in 2012, as 37 attacks took place in 

January alone. Pirates currently hold hostage 10 ships 

and 159 crew members of various nationalities. Somali pirates remain the biggest threat accounting for 

54 percent of all global attacks. But the dangers of 

piracy were brought closer to home in January 2012 

when an American citizen was rescued in Somalia by 

U.S. Navy Seals after being held captive by pirates 

for 3 months. The ransoms are also growing bigger. 

In mid-November 2010, a South Korean supertanker 

anchored for months off the city of Hobyo in central 

Somalia fetched a $10 million ransom. Raids by South 

Korean and Malaysian commands in January 2012 

have taught us that we need to deal differently with 

these pirates, and what do I mean by that? We need to 

take, in my view, the fight to them before they reach 

the high seas. We need to get them where they live, 

where they grow, each and every day. It is a growing 

problem, and one that we need to be concerned about.

Hunger and humanitarian issues do not seem as 

threatening but do pose problems. The humanitarian concerns of the so-called “bottom billion,” those 

people living on less than $1 a day, and the plight of 

internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as 

those suffering from hunger, lack of clean water, and 

basic medical care are concerns. The nearly two billion 

undernourished people in the world call for urgent 

government action to ensure the future sustainability 
18

of the world’s food supply. If you think about it, the 

Middle East is a classic case. A related concern is the 

rising price of food, which is increasingly in shorter 

supply. It is a historical truth that when food prices 

rise, conflict increases. Many of these issues create the 

conditions that are fertile breeding ground for dangerous ideologies.

Pandemics pose an entirely new set of challenges, 

and ones that evolve constantly. The threat posed 

by pandemics, be they naturally occurring or human caused through the use of a weaponized biological agent, is astronomical. The speed with which 

naturally occurring crises may be evolving may be 

directly related to the speed of travel and mobility 

of people in today’s world. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China in 2003 

illustrated that.

In this increasingly interdependent world, the effects of climate change and the persistently slow responses to it are a concern. Even if the current pace 

of emissions reductions continues, the earth will be at 

least 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer 

at the end of this century than at the start of the industrial revolution. The devastating effects of climate 

change do not just bring humanitarian crises to the developing world, they affect how humans live and will 

live in the future. Natural disasters around the world, 

like the powerful tsunami in Japan, the earthquakes 

in New Zealand, the floods in Thailand, and the hurricanes and tornadoes in America were very visible 

reminders, yet again, that the concerns of the world’s 

people are often interconnected. Those global calamities in 2011 alone caused an estimated $350 billion 

in damage. 
19

There will be other threats, less bellicose but 

threats nevertheless. Demands for highly strategic 

resources including energy, food, and water outstrip 

available supplies. Our quest to develop new sources 

of energy, even as we continue to exploit existing 

ones, is certainly not without challenges. There will be 

a predictable transition away from oil toward natural 

gas, coal, and other alternatives. Demand for food will 

increase as populations rise. Stable supplies of water, 

especially for agricultural purposes, will reach critical proportions. Will we mobilize a global economy 

to ensure energy sustainability through renewable resources and transition away from oil toward natural 

gas, coal, and other alternatives? 

A crippling cyber attack on our nation’s electronic 

infrastructure could have devastating consequences; 

cyber warfare and cyber espionage threaten privacy 

and personal security, economics, governments, and 

businesses. Our reliance upon these systems has 

grown exponentially over the years, and security must 

keep up with the new challenges presented every day 

as, increasingly, government and corporate internet 

sites are being hacked.

The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), such as nuclear, chemical, and biological, is 

unthinkable. Nation states must work diligently and 

work together to decrease proliferation of these arms. 

The imperative is to prevent these materials from falling into the hands of nonstate actors whose irrational 

actions could truly jeopardize our way of life and 

place other international actors, ally, and adversary 

alike, in catastrophic situations.
20

PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE

Our nation’s Armed Forces, the finest and bravest in the world, have seen over a decade of multiple 

deployments that have left our force depleted. Yes, 

we are no longer in Iraq and we are redeploying from 

Afghanistan, but care must be given to not break the 

force. Besides the nearly 6,200 killed and more than 

47,000 wounded, thousands upon thousands have 

returned from these conflicts victims in other ways; 

missing limbs and suffering catastrophic brain injuries, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and high 

depression and suicide rates, which hit another record 

high of 164 active-duty Army in 2011. There were 124 

in the National Guard and Reserves nonmobilized 

who took their lives. Another alarming statistic is 

that in 2011, military divorce rates hit their highest 

level since 1999, with a divorce rate of 3.7 percent and 

nearly 30,000 marriages ended in 2011. We must ensure that these men and women receive the finest care 

in return for the service they have given our nation in 

some of our darkest hours over this past decade. In 

the memorable words of Winston Churchill, “Never 

have so many owed so much to so few.” We must also 

ensure as the military grows smaller—and the announced reduction is 80,000 Soldiers down to 499,000 

from a current strength of 570,000 by 2017—that we 

do not emasculate the force. 

GLOBALIZED ECONOMIC CONCERNS

One of the lessons of the global economic downturn and melt-down has been that risk, as much as 

and perhaps greater than reward, is globalized. The 

interconnected global market place is an amazing 
21

generator of wealth, but it becomes threatening when 

systems become unhealthy. The economic downturn 

has strained relations with some close allies, and care 

must be taken to work cooperatively to meet global 

economic challenges. 

DISAFFECTED YOUTH

In the midst of these challenges, the youth of the 

world struggle to come into their own and make their 

way through this complex environment, often facing 

challenges not of their own choosing or design. The 

world’s youth who are growing up in threatening environments are at the greatest risk of falling under the 

sway of dangerous ideologies. Beyond this, they are 

not allowed the conditions to meet their full potential 

and, once again, their concerns are our concerns. 

Old challenges and the rise of new powers constitute potential threats that require new thinking. The 

world at the end of the first decade of the 21st century 

is a map of challenges and opportunities. Some of the 

players are new, and some are not new at all. Without 

doubt, the Arab world is an immediate challenge not 

only to itself but to the rest of the world as well. Given 

the unrest and turmoil in the Middle East, that region 

has become a boiling cauldron and a huge national 

security concern for the U.S. Government. Our strategic interests are many with friends and foes alike in 

that part of the world, not just in Tunisia, Libya, and 

Egypt, where reform movements helped depose leaders in these countries, but elsewhere as well. Clearly, 

the instability in the governments of Syria and Yemen 

remain at the top of the list of concerns at the moment. 

Is there still the risk of this instability creating similar 

rebellions in Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, and Su-
22

dan? Should others like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the 

United Arab Emirates be concerned about the unrest 

spilling across their borders? The U.S. Government 

needs to invest now in rigorous strategic thinking to 

determine how our vital national interests will be affected and how we can protect them. Whether these 

countries lean toward or bend away from democracies and favorable relations with America and the 

West can have an enormous influence on our strategic 

ties to nations of the region. 

China, a country that currently has 115 billionaires 

and can erect a 15-story building in 6 days, has experienced meteoric economic growth in recent years and 

has seen its ability to affect and influence, both regionally and globally, increase. Some economists suggest 

China could become the world’s largest economy by 

2027, if not before. Our economies persist in requiring 

each other to cooperate. Meanwhile, China’s military 

is growing stronger with time. It has constructed the 

world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, has developed 

a stealth fighter plane, and has launched its first aircraft carrier; impressive toys to accompany a new 

assertiveness. As China builds up its military, other 

nations in the region—India, Japan, South Korea, 

Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia—are amassing 

weapons of their own at a frenzied pace, causing a 

shift in the world’s military balance and altering security concerns in the Asia Pacific region.

Russia, too, has attempted re-emergence on the 

world stage as evidenced by some of its actions, accompanied by the return of fierce nationalist sentiments expressed by Russia’s government. As Russia 

enters an uncertain period of new leadership, headlined by the return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency this year, we can expect Russia to take a more 
23

hard-line position toward the United States. Problems 

continue in its restive border regions and could place 

the country on a collision course. We share with both 

China and Russia a mutual need for the world’s resources, so we must cooperate, or compete. Can we do 

so responsibly?

Israel and Palestine are nagging problems. When 

Secretary of State Colin Powell and the author went to 

the State Department in 2001, the Israel-Palestine situation was at the very top of our list. We knew it had to 

be resolved, and we worked very hard to contribute 

to that resolution. Our very first trip overseas was to 

both Israel and the Palestinian territories to see if we 

could broker a dialogue and a relationship between 

those two forces. We failed, and we have been failing 

dramatically ever since. Peace in the Middle East remains an elusive dream. Ensuring security for all peoples living in this region, while preventing extremism, 

must continue to be a focus moving into the future. 

The threat of failure is simply too great.

Far to the east, North Korea just experienced a 

rapid change in its leadership, with Kim Jong-il unexpectedly dying of a heart attack and the reins handed 

to his youngest son, Kim Jong-un. New leadership can 

often be a time of muscle flexing and that has already 

begun with not totally unexpected hostile rhetoric 

spewing from Pyongyang. Missile tests and border altercations such as those in 2010 must not be repeated 

and allowed to drag this region back into conflict, nor 

decrease the security of our allies. Interestingly, when 

we sat down in Beijing with our representative to 

North Korea and the North Korean representatives to 

talk about common concerns, one of which was their 

need for food, we expressed our desire to have nonproliferation be a prominent way of life. This desire 

was not considered at that time. 
24

The world stage has also welcomed new powers: 

nations such as Turkey, and Brazil, who both project 

influence. The privileges of this newfound power must 

always be balanced with responsibilities. New powers must act as agents of cooperation and prosperity, 

rather than increasing polarity and tension. Pakistan, 

at the heart of a region that has experienced so much 

conflict, remains a key player. Tactics used against 

extremist ideologies can work against our tenuous relationship. The aftermath of a recent NATO airstrike 

that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and increasing efforts 

by Congress to decrease aid to Pakistan continue to 

threaten an already precarious situation. Neighboring 

India has grown into an economic powerhouse, yet 

tensions remain on the border with Pakistan. This relationship grew more tense after 2008 when Pakistani 

extremists attacked Mumbai with devastating results.

The world remains watchful of Iran as it continues to develop its technologies and flexes its muscles 

toward the West. We must keep a careful watch with 

respect to its nuclear agenda, its provocative actions 

in the straits of Hormuz, and its apparent willingness to conduct an attack against the United States. A 

recent assessment by James Clapper, the Director 

of National Intelligence, suggests the Iranians have 

“changed their calculus and are more willing to conduct an attack in the United States as a response to 

real or perceived actions that threaten the regime.”1

 It 

further shows Iran’s hostility toward the United States 

and its interests in this hemisphere. Questions remain 

about Iranian ambitions. Can international cooperation in the form of sanctions keep this situation from 

jeopardizing international security? 

Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued to weigh us down. For all intents and purposes, 
25

a complete redeployment of troops from Iraq took 

place at the end of 2011. Yet Iraq is a nation struggling 

to find its identity, and the 1,000-person embassy in 

Baghdad will be challenged. Meanwhile, our strategic 

attention has turned now to the situation in Afghanistan where there were 90,000 troops, although a drawdown to 68,000 by the fall of 2012 began in July 2012.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has declared that 

by mid- to late-2013, our combat mission will decline. 

Nation-building continues in these two laboratories. 

We remain committed to the mission required of the 

United States and the international community. The 

consequences of failure are too great.

Closer to home on our own border with Mexico, 

drug-related violence and crime continues to escalate 

significantly. Confronting this spillover of violence 

only treats the symptom. The root causes remain and 

must be addressed. In September 2010, when asked 

“What is the greatest threat or concern that keeps 

you up at night?” Admiral James A. Winnefed, Jr., 

Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied 

“Drugs.” We have not done a very good job with the 

Mexican military and the Mexican government. They 

blame us for demand, and we blame them for supply. Unfortunately, we have not been talking to one 

another. We have not been creating an atmosphere 

where we can solve this problem.That is a growing 

concern, and one that we must attack.

I have created a picture of gloom here; however, 

I would say there is cause for hope. Interesting times 

have always inspired new thinking, and we must remain dedicated to constantly challenging our assumptions to ensure that the uncertainties of the future can 

be met. America can and should take a lead role in 

projecting the kind of global thinking and leadership 
26

that garners respect. That means being ready and willing to make decisions that are courageous. America 

needs to stand out as a beacon of what is right in and 

for the world. Call it a grand plan or a grand strategy, 

but Obama must be always looking at the world as it 

exists yet have a vision of what it is likely to look like 

in the following years.

That starts with a coherent strategic planning process and the will to devise and follow through on a 

strategic plan that prioritizes challenges and responds 

over time to meet them successfully. Rigorous strategic planning can help avoid preventable crises. As 

he does the people’s business, the President needs to 

define our vital national interests and resources available, establish our objectives, and develop a set of foreign and domestic policies that will advance America’s interests and ideals. 

The broadest objective of any such strategy should 

be to make an honest appraisal of where the world is 

today, and what it is likely to look like tomorrow. I call 

it looking beyond the horizon for potential destinations. Incumbent in this appraisal process, there needs 

to be a serious and vigorous national debate about the 

ends or the means or the exits in places of commitment like Pakistan and Afghanistan. I have been very 

critical of our government. Did we have this debate 

before we went to Afghanistan? No. Did we have this 

debate before we went to Iraq? No. We did not have 

this in Congress. We did not have it in the media. We 

did not have it among the American people who have, 

and should have, a voice.

The goal of any grand strategy should be to stabilize the current world order and create mechanisms 

through which change can occur. Ideally, this grand 

strategy would be for the greater good of America 
27

and the like-minded nations of the world by having 

a framework that promotes the global system and 

betters the prospects for trade, commerce, diplomatic 

contact, pluralism, and liberty. To succeed, it will 

need the active support and participation of many of 

the other 195 countries of the world and would seek 

involvement of others in a collaborative effort to deal 

effectively with a whole host of problems. One of the 

fundamental tenets of this grand strategy must be that 

the United States cannot protect every sea lane, broker 

every deal, or fight every terrorist group alone. The 

age of unilateralism is past.

The United States can do a lot but can do even more 

with willing partners. Speaking at the West Point graduation in May 2010, President Obama said, “America 

has not succeeded by stepping outside the current 

of international cooperation. We have succeeded by 

steering those currents in the direction of liberty and 

justice.” But the United States can and should lead by 

example. It remains the single global super power, one 

that can have a unique role in this emerging world order, one that has enormous convening, agenda-setting 

and leadership powers. For the world, the challenges 

and consequences of the moment are enormous. For 

the United States, this moment offers the opportunity 

to bind the wounds to our reputation with decisions 

that can heal our image and strengthen our influence 

with like-minded nations. Doing so can responsibly 

contribute to making the world a better place and at 

the same time earn respect as a solid citizen nation 

of the world. It is a watershed moment that cannot 

be squandered.

This is a rare and unprecedented time in history. 

It holds unparalleled importance with respect to the 

opportunity to help stability, prosperity, and dignity 
28

to billions around the world by making good leadership and management decisions. The same is true for 

companies with respect to their research, their development, and the technologies they advance for the 

good of their clients and customers. They need to be 

willing to explore new partners and adjust to the ever 

changing economic climate and dynamic national security environment. If history is any indicator, which 

I believe it is, then perhaps the most important people, places, and events that will shape our future are 

things we cannot know in advance; only prepare for. 

In the age of exploration, a saying that described these 

unknown factors was inscribed at the edges of their 

maps: here there be monsters.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 2

1. James Clapper, Testimony before the U.S. Senate, 

February 2012.
29

CHAPTER 3

THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP:

A BREAKING OR RESTORABLE PILLAR

OF A NEW AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY?

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

The foreign policy community has probably heard 

more speeches about transatlantic relations than we 

have grains of sand on the shores of both sides of the 

Atlantic Ocean. Many of them are inspired by romantic, 

even nostalgic thoughts. Aside from relatively uninspired references to shared values and interests, there is 

still a propensity to state the unrivaled global influence 

of the so called “West.” This tendency demonstrates an 

astonishing hubris.

A notable number of manuscripts still reflect on 

the effects of a mainly bipolar, cold war-influenced 

world. It is remarkable that we are still adapting to 

realities that have had their first turning point almost 

a quarter of a century ago. 

Certainly, the annomination of the dates 11/9 

(November 9, 1989) or 9/11 (September 11, 2001) is 

familiar. But they are neither synonyms nor parallels. 

The first date has been the rootstock of a significant 

global geopolitical shift. The other, as horrific as it 

was, serves less as a source for a new world order than 

as the poisonous blossom of a long-time neglected, 

fast growing plant that only partly has the same or 

similar roots. Although the significance of both dates 

is widely understood, many strategic answers—irrespective of whether they emerge from the United 

States or Europe—are still comparatively unsatisfactory, specifically regarding long-term perspectives. 
30

Some refer to these developments as moving from 

a symmetric world order to a new age of asymmetry 

and to the consequence of seeking ad hoc solutions. 

Others refuse to bear the burden of a comprehensive 

and methodical stocktaking (or evaluation)—not only 

of current and forthcoming global challenges, but 

also of their interdependencies. Therefore, the fundament for any long-term assessments or solutions is already porous, and the basis of any pillars of so-called 

“Grand Strategies” that we are discussing is of limited 

firmness. One slogan could be: Disconnection through 

Connection—new, intertwined global challenges and 

global shifts of power imply the risk of a marginalization of traditional partnerships and multinational 

institutions. Or: As the world grows together, it is also 

growing apart.

Four major developments—global governance 

failures, the global shift of powers, global political 

awakening, and economic disparity (within and between countries)—influence the evolution of a variety 

of other global risks, and, ironically, a considerable 

number of those risks can further magnify the four 

overarching developments.1

What are the risk scenarios that have emerged or 

will evolve beyond the four cross-cutting global developments? We face at least five major risk clusters 

that are tightly connected to each other, intertwined, 

and often overlap into other clusters.

1. Geopolitical risks: We have been talking for 

years about fragile, failing, and failed states and the 

consequences, ranging from terrorism, proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illicit trade, 

and organized crime, to piracy or corruption. Furthermore, this cluster includes all sorts of geopolitical 

conflicts besides classic scenarios to even such areas as 

space security.
31

2. Economic risks: As the results of fiscal crises (we 

have not seen the last one) or as to their reasons, one 

could name asset price collapses, extreme currency, 

and price volatilities (on energy, commodities, or 

consumer prices), liquidity and credit crunches, infrastructure fragility, regulatory failures, etc. Let us also 

not underestimate a certain retrenchment from globalization going along with these phenomena—and a resurgence of nationalism and populism. In this regard, 

Europe is not the only union of countries that serves as a 

shining example.

3. Societal risks: here we have to take into account 

all challenges that are linked to demographic developments and their effects like energy, food, and water security as well as chronic, infectious, and—in 

our hemisphere—so-called lifestyle diseases (public 

health expenditure in the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries has 

risen at twice the rate of economic growth). Western 

society has already undergone a dramatic change in 

its age structure. Some call it the “age-quake.” The 

World Health Organization (WHO) uses the phrase “a 

silent social revolution.” This silence echoes (yes, even 

silence has an echo!) political shyness and inabilities. 

We must not forget migration and the subsequent urban development (in the future, intercontinental migration will become increasingly important).

4. Societal risks lead us to environmental risks. I 

am still surprised about the degree of ignorance—or 

let’s put it more mildly: unawareness—in high level 

political circles in this country when it comes to the 

question and aftereffects of climate change. Topics like 

biodiversity loss, melting of the polar ice-caps, flooding, air pollution, waste management, and a growing 

number of storms and cyclones also merit mention.
32

5. Technological risks: cyber war is as much a reality as threats from new technologies (including the invisible threat of immaterial environmental pollution, 

e.g., by electromagnetic radiation). All of this is no longer a “Buck Rogers” fantasy. The chances of a critical 

information infrastructure breakdown have not been 

reduced during the last couple of years (the successful cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 should have been 

a wakeup call). Online data and information security 

is a mega-topic nowadays, and so are the paradoxa 

that go along with the call for freedom of the Internet 

on one hand and the criminal misuse of the net on the 

other. We see the triumph of open networks—with 

major complexities that are almost impossible to control responsibly, for those who want to.

Indeed, this is an incomplete list, though it still 

shows the range of challenges we are facing today 

and tomorrow. 

What has the transatlantic community to offer 

when it comes to the question of how to get a firm 

grip on the intertwining lines between and within the 

clusters? Generally, we could find quite a spectrum of 

possible measures, if more and explicitly coordinated 

efforts were to take place. But do we see anything inspiring, anything creative in the political, academic or 

cultural arena that aims at the challenges mentioned 

above? Not much, I am afraid. Nonetheless, it is necessary to assess the “epicenter” of the transatlantic relationship first, which is—it may sound simplistic—the 

people on both sides of the Atlantic.

However, a new generation of policymakers, scholars, and commentators shows a changed attitude and 

approach toward the Atlantic connection. One reason 

is that the background and the scope of experiences 
33

of many has changed or is at least in an evolutionary 

phase. In contrast to the second half of the 20th century, many young, even influential Americans have 

never been based or stationed in Europe. A growing 

number has an Asian or Latin American heritage. 

Think about the students of today in Europe. 

Many of them were born after 1989. They have never 

had the existential experience of what it meant to live 

in a surrounding that urgently needed a functioning 

transatlantic partnership—imagine their upbringing and environment. A good number come from the 

former Eastern Europe, others are second or first generation Europeans originating from Turkey or North 

Africa, with different cultural roots. All this is not 

problematic at all—on the contrary, it is enriching and 

a source of inspiration—but it has to be understood 

and accepted when it comes to a new definition of 

transatlantic ties.

Second, among the younger generation, pragmatism seems to replace emotions—superficially, this 

finding is not a political disaster, but rather influences the value-driven approach to the relationship. 

Ask someone younger about these values, and you 

will still get the answer: democracy, human rights, 

rule of law, etc.—but ask the same person how these 

principles correspond across the Atlantic or to what 

extent they are implemented at home, and you may 

get a fascinating, wild mixture of imprecise semi-intellectual sound bites. A clear response would have 

to imply uncomfortable considerations like aspects of 

a democracy crisis now faced in certain parts of the 

Western world. Additionally, negative emotions seem 

to function quite properly across the ocean; positive 

sentiments are rarely expressed routinely, if at all.
34

The last outstanding transatlantic hope and expectation from the European side was connected to 

Barack Obama (but it was tied to a character and not 

to a traditional political and cultural construct). Today 

it seems that many Europeans turned their hope into 

disillusion. When it comes to the current President, 

some parts of the European foreign policy community 

draw the conclusion that an internationally celebrated 

political rockstar turned out to be a one-time Grammy, 

respectively Nobel prize winner, at least on the 

diplomatic platform.

Nevertheless, with respect to foreign affairs capacities, I do not see many auspicious alternatives 

right now. The range of knowledge in international 

matters among the remaining Republican presidential candidates is currently only beaten by the overall 

quality of the TV debates. It is, by the way, an exceptional experience for a European to be bashed again 

and again by such a spectrum of arguments. All in 

all, this is a very promising outlook for a flourishing 

transatlantic perspective.

What is left of the myth of existing transnational 

institutions? What is left of a creative transatlantic influence on the substance and structure of other international organizations?

First, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) has been struggling to adapt to the new security challenges for years and has only selectively 

widened its scope. Cyber war or energy scarcity may 

serve as examples, though they have not efficiently 

been implemented yet. National interests perform as 

impressive road blocks. The Libya Operation, by the 

way and despite all songs of praise, is not a NATO 

success, if you take the decisionmaking behavior of 

important member states into account. NATO can 
35

never win in Afghanistan, and the remaining chance 

of not losing will probably be sacrificed to accommodate the mood of the voters at home. If I had to define 

cynicism to my children, I would start with our current Afghanistan policy.

Second, certain structures of the United Nations 

(UN) remind me of an iceberg drifting into waters with 

unpredictable warm currents, while the journey of the 

iceberg started in 1949. However, beneath the iceberg, 

a rather stable raft appears, unfortunately with only 

five admittedly quite comfortable seats. The only recognizable transatlantic structural attempts to expand 

the raft are monuments of standstill and stagnation, 

artistically inspired by France, the United Kingdom 

(UK), and the United States and knowingly attracting 

China and Russia as well. It is not only desperate Syrian hands that slide off the slick side planks of the raft.

Third, I do not want to elaborate in detail on the 

European crisis, which is worth its own conference. 

But the current crisis—which is not only a debt crisis or fiscal crisis, but also a crisis of understanding 

and therefore still a crisis of political leadership—is 

destabilizing the core concept of the EU as well. I am 

deeply concerned about the future of the achievements of the EU—achievements that too many people 

in Europe take for granted. Needless to say, such a 

crisis has spillover effects for the transatlantic partnership. It strengthens our ominous culture of mutual 

finger-pointing. 

Finally, even organizations of more limited, though 

significant, scope are struggling, just to name the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 

not to mention the Doha development round. Somehow logical, looser concepts like the G20 are gain-
36

ing ground, even though the last meeting in Cannes, 

France, reminded me more of the Film Festivals that 

usually take place there. So some traditional multior transnational frameworks and concepts are on the 

verge of decay. Does the transatlantic community offer any viable answers? I doubt it. Do we understand 

the paradox that the circumstances that make better 

global governance imperative—be they conflicting interests and incentives, divergent values, or differing 

norms—are also the ones that make its realization so 

incredibly complex and often unpleasant? I doubt it 

as well.

Eventually, what are the consequences for Europe 

and the United States? Will the transatlantic relationship remain a core element of Western political influence or is it in agony because of a “Pacific and Asian 

21st Century”? Can the undoubtedly growing transPacific importance be an excuse at all? By no means. 

It may be one out of many more or less good reasons, 

but it is also a cheap plea.

So what to do? What are possible steps to avoid a 

sidelining of the Atlantic perspectives?

• Accepting a new dynamic of multipolarity may 

sound difficult, but is essential.

• The same is true for the understanding that 

global stability can be promoted and progressed only through larger scale cooperation 

and not through imperial behavior or domination (Zbigniew Brzezinski).2

• In any case, Europe has to accept trans-Pacific 

ambitions and should enlarge its own strategic 

scope. On the other hand, the United States 

could acknowledge the possibilities of closer responsible European-Russian relations. Both do 

not necessarily weaken transatlantic relations. 

On the contrary, they could offer opportunities 
37

for stronger common strategic approaches and 

for revisions of certain, sometimes archaic, instruments or strategies (EUSS [Eastern Europe 

Security System]).

• In a mid- to long-term perspective, a broader 

cooperation between the so-called “old west” 

and the “new east” does not have to be a daydream any longer. We could mutually benefit 

from respective impulses and experiences by 

fostering a regional cooperative model in a 

multi-polar and increasingly complex geopolitical setting.

• In addition, a bold and long-term strategic vision for the transatlantic community needs to 

reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship by 

promoting a global democratic political culture 

(that respects specific cultural aspects). But 

we also have to engage in a self critical debate 

about the state of democracy—led by democratic countries! Existing rifts in this context are 

not insurmountable.

• Regarding the risk clusters described, we 

must confront the respective publics with the 

truth, and not with shimmering party and 

election programs.

Looking at the United States, a new grand strategy should offer more than an accumulation of unfinished diplomatic bits and pieces. I still have problems 

trying to figure out the overall logic behind this administration’s foreign policy. Where are the connecting lines between the President’s Cairo speech and 

the present Middle East policy? Where is the rationality besides ad hoc procedures? The same questions have to be asked with respect to the EU foreign 

policy approaches.
38

To be fair, governments will probably never resolve the dilemma between short-term thinking and 

the obligation to think in longer strategic terms and to 

firmly undergo explanatory work. They usually have 

to concentrate on the more immediate conflicts and 

disagreements. But this doesn’t exclude the willingness 

to form groups and initiatives that include knowledge 

and experience, but also young ideas that range from 

academia to culture, and to those people who tend to 

see themselves in a complementary role. All this can 

only happen if traditions continue to develop and contribute to diversity instead of seeking a uniform global 

culture. I call it “the expansion of tradition.” 

Some thoughts that such groups or initiatives 

would have to cover are more than obvious for me:

• Regarding the span of the global risks and 

challenges, a well-informed and well-mobilized global public opinion, sharing values 

and norms of a “global citizenship” (but not a 

“uniform global culture”), would be certainly 

desirable, but is still closer to Utopia than to realization. Notwithstanding, in this context the 

modern means of digital communication could 

be used much more creatively.

• By accepting the differences, we need to work 

on our cultural ties. We tend to underestimate 

them, and they have significantly changed.

• Two rather banal aspects are essential. First, we 

need to bridge the existing uncertainty among 

rising powers to shoulder a greater share of 

global responsibilities. Second, the established 

powers have to surmount their reluctance to 

recognize the limits of their own power.

• We have to reach out way past the “old west.” 

Engaging China, Russia, as well as Brazil, In-
39

dia, or South Africa and Indonesia and others 

is key. Some European governments still have 

credibility in areas where the U.S. reputation 

is—let’s say it diplomatically—at least strained.

• Not only does the transatlantic relationship 

need a new narrative (as a first step toward revised concepts), but so do institutions such as 

the EU, NATO, UN, etc., because we will not 

achieve any long-lasting changes without giving our population the opportunity to understand and accept certain obvious complexities 

and dilemmas.

Such a transatlantic community could serve as a 

“pulse generator,” as a “source of inspiration instead 

of a source for strategic despair.”

To conclude, we need to show both pragmatism 

and emotions. Pragmatism without emotions hamstrings creativity, and, of course, uncontrolled emotions have led to historic conflicts. I propose to strive 

for an “emotional pragmatism.” The transatlantic relationship deserves a serious endeavor to attain it.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. See also on some of the following risk scenarios, Global Risks 

Report, World Economic Forum, held at Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, in January 2011.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis 

of Global Power, New York: Basic Books. 2012.

41

CHAPTER 4

THE NATURE AND DEMANDS OF 

SMART POWER

Robert Kennedy

It is often noted that the threats, potential threats, 

and challenges that confront and will continue to confront the United States today and in the decades ahead 

are far more complex than those during the Cold War. 

Indeed, in the decades ahead those threats and challenges will pose a severe test for American leadership 

in global affairs, whether they arise from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, and know-how; 

chemical or biological weapons; terrorist organizations, transnational criminal groups, drug cartels, and 

individuals of malevolent intention; tribal, ethnic, or 

sectarian strife; or from rising regional powers, failing 

governments, cross border conflicts, global economic 

disturbances, environmental degradation, pandemics, 

or climate change. However, perhaps the greatest challenge of the 21st century will arise from the continued 

but slow relative shift from the world’s predominant 

political, economic, diplomatic, and military superpower to primus inter pares in world affairs. 

Following the devastation resulting from World 

War II, the United States emerged as an economic and 

military superpower.1

 Its economy was larger, and 

the country was richer than any other in the world. 

In terms of industrial strength, the United States was 

at an absolute and relative advantage over its allies as 

well as its enemies.2 Moreover, it was sole possessor 

of the “bomb.”3
42

Today the United States produces about 20 percent of the global economic output, with predictions that soon its economy will fall second to that of 

China. While the United States and Russia remain the 

predominant nuclear powers, there are three other 

so-called “declared” nuclear weapons states under 

the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT)—China, France, and the United Kingdom 

(UK); three additional states that have tested nuclear 

weapons—India, Pakistan, and North Korea; Israel 

(believed to have nuclear weapons); and Iran (an NPT 

state) that is believed to be seeking to develop nuclear 

weapons.4

 Though U.S. military forces measured in 

total manpower remain second only to those of China, 

with India in a close third, economic pressures are 

likely to force a reduction in the overall size of U.S. 

Armed Forces in the years ahead. U.S. military forces 

can neither be everywhere all of the time nor resolve 

all conflicts without the assistance of others. Thus, to 

meet the challenges ahead, including its relative readjustment in status among nations, the United States 

must wisely apply the instruments of national power 

(political, economic, psychological, and military). This 

chapter addresses the nature of national power: its 

sources, the means by which the sources of a nation’s 

power are transformed into preferred outcomes in 

the international arena, the instruments states use to 

do so, and what is demanded if soft and hard power 

are to be molded into what is now fashionably called 

“Smart Power.”

ON POWER

In its simplest form, power is the ability to achieve 

what one seeks to achieve. Though there are many definitions of power,5

 in an international context power is 
43

generally considered to be the ability of a nation-state, 

group of states, or nonstate entities to impose its/

their favored outcome on a given situation or prevent 

another state, group of states, or nonstate entity from 

doing so. It has a deliberate, active connotation. For 

example, French philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel, 

writing over a half century ago, noted: “When Power 

addresses itself to a foreign state, the weight behind 

the words is proportional to its ability to make itself 

obeyed and win from that obedience the means of action.”6

 It is in getting one’s way, in “making” others 

conform to one’s will, in its active, deliberate sense 

that power is most often understood. 

Yet power has always had a much broader connotation. It is true in one sense, as de Jouvenel argued, 

that power “turns on obedience,” and he “Who knows 

the reasons for that obedience knows the inner nature 

of power.”7

 Indeed, history is marked by states employing their power to force other states to their will. 

However, there is more to the essence of power than 

can be gathered under the umbrella of obedience. Obedience, or to put it more directly, an action undertaken 

by Party B that is favorable to Party A is not always 

the result of active efforts on the part of Party A to 

seek obedience from Party B. A painting can have the 

power to produce a series of thought patterns or emotions or move the viewer to action. The picture is powerful. It has power so-to-speak. But it has not made or 

commanded the viewer to obey. The power it has on 

the viewer is often noncognitive, frequently related to 

the emotive aspect of a viewer’s personality, though 

there can be cognitive, rational components based 

on the attitudes and/or beliefs or on the physical or 

psychogenic needs of the viewer. Similarly, in international affairs, for example, though an individual, 
44

say from Nation B, may risk his life providing intelligence to Nation A because of bribe or threat, that individual may well do so for quite different reasons such 

as respect for Nation A’s objectives or perceptions of 

shared values, a commonality of ideals, beliefs, and/

or interests. He does not obey or comply, rather he 

volunteers. Of course de Jouvenel recognized this aspect of power in his exploration of the nature of obedience.8

 Moreover, it is this aspect of power, the power 

of attraction or seduction (particularly in its passive 

sense), that Joseph Nye, Jr., first introduced in 19909

as “soft power” and further developed in 200410 and 

2011.11 As Nye put it in 2004 in answering the question, “What is soft power?”

It is the ability to get what you want through attraction 

rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and 

policies.12

Nye distinguishes this so-called soft power from 

hard power. Hard power “rests on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”).”13 It is “Command power . . .

the ability to get desired outcomes through coercion 

and payment.”14 On the other hand, soft power is “the 

ability to get preferred outcomes through co-optive 

means of agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction.”15

Soft power, in general, is based on less tangible 

sources of power than is hard power. So what, then, 

are the sources of a nation’s power and what means 

can be used to translate those sources into preferred 

outcomes in the international arena?
45

Sources and Means of Power.

The sources on which a nation’s power is based 

are many and varied. They include such factors as: 

a nation’s geography; natural resources; size, nature, and health of its economy; industrial capability; 

quality of education; population; culture; traditions; 

language; history; level of technology; ability to innovate; internal organization; the quality of its diplomacy; the size, composition, training, and leadership 

of its military, as well as the nature and effectiveness 

of its weapons and equipment; its legal institutions; 

the efficiency and effectiveness of its government; political, economic, and social resilience; sound strategy; 

and national will. These are the sources or what are 

sometimes called the elements upon which a nation’s 

power rests. Some of these sources can be objectively 

measured—e.g., landmass; population; resources; 

gross domestic product; external trade; and numbers 

of military aircraft, tanks, artillery, and manpower. 

Some are primarily subjective—e.g., quality of leadership, effectiveness of the diplomatic corps, morale 

of troops, quality of military training, and national 

will. However, both objective and subjective sources 

of power are the building blocks of a nation’s soft, as 

well as hard, power. 

Whether objective or subjective, the sources of 

power seldom function independently. For example, 

a nation may be blessed with a vast expanse of territory that might strain an invading army’s logistical 

reinforcement to the breaking point. However, in the 

absence of a capable military, the defender might not 

be able to put up effective resistance. A nation may 

have an abundance of natural resources, but a weak 

and ineffective economy, poor governance, or corrup-
46

tion may inhibit or sap the ability of a nation to translate its natural resources into power. A nation with a 

strong economy may not be able to translate its economic strength into a tool for pressuring another state 

to action or inaction through the use of economic sanctions without effective diplomatic efforts to garner the 

support of other nations to join in sanctions. The most 

technologically advanced army with poor leadership 

or faulty strategy may fall to a less advanced army 

with good leadership and a sound strategy.

Success in translating the sources of power into 

preferred outcomes in the international arena depends in large measure on a nation’s ability to influence, persuade, coerce, deter, and/or compel the actions/behavior of other international actors. Power 

measured in resources does not necessarily equate 

to power measured in preferred outcomes.16 An understanding of these means or methods reveals essential differences between what is meant by soft and 

hard power.

Influence.

Influence is the ability to produce an effect without the apparent need to act, exert force, or use threats 

or commands. Influence is a principal aspect of “soft 

power.” Influence depends heavily upon the perceptions of others. Influence can be indirect and passive or 

direct and active. Passive or indirect influence generally depends on existing relationships among nations 

and peoples and is the result of perceptions by others 

of an affinity for or attraction to such things as one’s 

culture, traditions, language, values, institutions, or 

policies, or from respect by others for a nation’s political, economic, or military power. For example, the 
47

UK, with a culture, language, traditions, values, and 

institutions similar to those of the United States, has 

an influence on U.S. behavior beyond that of the UK’s 

military or economic power. Had the UK not sided 

with the United States in going to war against Iraq, it 

is questionable whether the administration could have 

gained the support of Congress for that effort. Similarly, a sense of shared values and similar, if not identical, democratic institutions between most European 

nations and the United States affords the United States 

an influence in Europe beyond its military might. Of 

course, America’s economic strength and military 

capabilities played a major role during the Cold War 

confrontation with the Soviet Union and continue to 

do so today. This fact, however, in no way detracts 

from the general affinity that affords the United States 

and the democratic nations of Europe influence over 

each other’s actions.

Indirect or passive influence can also have negative effects. Where values, institutions, cultures, etc., 

diverge, a nation’s influence in a given situation may 

be negative. The late Samuel P. Huntington postulated a “Clash of Civilizations: The great divisions 

among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural,”17 thus signaling that differences 

of culture can trigger not affinity but dislike, rejection, 

even hatred.

Influence can also be direct or active. For example, 

a nation can use public diplomacy in order to promote 

its image. Treaties, alliances, and executive agreements also can provide a nation with direct influence 

on the behavior of others. 
48

Persuasion.

Persuasion is the ability to move by argument, 

entreaty, or expostulation another party to a belief, 

viewpoint, or political position, or to undertake or not 

undertake (dissuade) a course of action. Persuasion 

involves active, intentional efforts. Like influence, its 

success or failure often depends on previous relationships, and like influence it is an exercise in soft power. 

However, persuasion depends heavily on a nation’s 

diplomatic skill in translating knowledge of another 

country’s interests, objectives, and concerns into effective augmentation in support of a preferred outcome. 

Persuasion demands actual leverage in the logic of argumentation. Thus it demands in depth knowledge of 

potential social, economic, political, and/or military 

consequences of the action contemplated, as such consequences are likely to be viewed from the target nation’s perspective. 

Because of the existence of multiple voices emanating from varying sectors of society that lie beyond 

the government’s ability to control, democracies have 

an inherently more complex task in using a nation’s 

diplomatic skills in attempts to persuade others to its 

position. Differing interpretations of events, differing 

evaluations of options, and different desired outcomes 

from different sectors of society, often from different 

departments or branches of government, complicate 

a nation’s ability to speak with one voice as it articulates its position, and may reinforce uncertainties in 

the minds of those one is trying to persuade. Leaks 

of information from within the nation’s bureaucracy 

suggesting different courses of action can further 

complicate the task. 
49

Coercion.

Coercion is the ability to demand another to undertake or not undertake an action through threat, intimidation, or bribe. Coercion is active in nature. It is 

a deliberate attempt to pressure another party to act 

in ways that advance one’s preferred outcomes and, 

as such, falls in the category of hard power. Coercion 

may be direct, for example, through the threat of political, economic, or military consequences the other 

party would find undesirable. It also may be indirect, 

for example, through the leaking of a memorandum 

or media releases provided as background or deep 

background18 information, suggesting that such undesired consequences are being considered.

For coercion to be successful, actual power (political, economic, and/or military) or the perception that 

the coercing nation has the actual power to affect undesired consequences and the will and determination 

to do so are generally necessary. As with persuasion, 

in democracies the ability to coerce may be weakened, 

as parliaments or Congress debate the merits of potential threats or where parliamentary or congressional 

approval may be required to carry threats into force.

Deterrence.

Deterrence is the ability to discourage another from 

undertaking an action they might otherwise prefer to 

undertake. Deterrence generally falls into the category 

of hard power, primarily because it entails a threat to 

produce undesired consequences should the other fellow decide to act. It is usually understood in its passive context and generally has an effect on a state’s 

cost versus benefit calculations under a given set of 
50

circumstances. For example, a state might be deterred 

from acting because of the existence of countervailing 

nuclear or conventional forces, as a result of potential 

economic or other sanctions, or because it perceives 

the potential loss of some promised or extant benefit, 

any and all of which might suggest costs in excess 

of benefits. Of course, the classic case of deterrence 

took place during the Cold War when presumably 

the Soviet Union was deterred from using its nuclear 

weapons against the United States because the United 

States possessed countervailing nuclear capabilities.

Deterrence also can be active, for example, by 

promising a desired good to another state for its inactivity. Here the line between deterrence, coercion, and 

persuasion becomes somewhat blurred. In one sense, 

it could be argued that in offering a desired good for 

inactivity, one is attempting to use the soft power of 

persuasion to convince the other party that it is in its 

interest to act accordingly by altering perceptions of 

interest. It also could be argued that one is using the 

promise of a benefit as a hard power bribe in order to 

place pressure on political decisionmakers in the target country in order to coerce them into not taking action. It perhaps could be equally argued that one state 

is deterring another from an action that it might otherwise take by altering their cost benefit calculations. 

Like coercion, deterrence usually requires actual 

power, or the perception on the part of an opponent, 

that one has the power—political, economic, and/

or military—and the will and determination to bring 

about the undesired consequences or to provide a desired good. Generally speaking, deterrence relies on 

hard power. This is not to say that deterrence per 

se is an exercise in hard power. Extant political, economic, or military power affects perceptions. As such, 
51

others may be deterred from acting, for example, not 

because Country A deployed a naval force to a region 

to discourage some particular activity, but because the 

very existence of that force in that region has structured perceptions that serve to discourage actions by 

others. In such a case, there is no hard power threat. 

The threat, if any, exists in the perceptions of others. 

They may perceive the existence of the deployed force 

as a threat, as an exercise in hard power. But the existence of military forces, per se, does not constitute 

an exercise in hard power. Indeed, deploying military 

forces for humanitarian purposes is an exercise in 

soft power. 

Compellence.

A term usually attributed to Thomas Schelling, 

compellence is the ability to secure one’s preferred 

outcome through the direct application of force—political, economic, and/or more often than not, military. It is the opposite of deterrence. It requires actual 

power to force an opponent to act. It is the ultimate 

expression of hard power. Some confuse it with coercion. For example, one definition contends: “It is compellence when the classic lawman threatens a suspect 

with death if he does not surrender.”19 Yet this is better understood as coercion. The suspect has not been 

“forced” to surrender. Rather he is encouraged to do 

so by virtue of threat. The suspect still has a choice. 

He can surrender or take his chances. On the other 

hand, if the lawman physically grabs the suspect or 

shoots him in the legs so he cannot move, there is no 

choice involved. He has been compelled to surrender. 

If Country A with a superior military force destroys 

Country B’s advancing army, it has compelled that 
52

army to halt. If Country A threatens to destroy Country B’s army if it fails to stop, it is attempting to coerce 

it to stop its advance. Both examples, of course, are 

examples of uses of hard power.

Instruments of Power.

The instruments of power are those tools—political/diplomatic, economic, psychological, and military—a nation employs to transform some, though 

not all, its sources of power into preferred outcomes 

through the use of the above noted means. However, 

a nation’s ability to affect a particular behavior in a 

given situation may not depend, solely or at all, on the 

active use of the instruments of power. As was mentioned earlier, the ability to influence has a passive 

side, that of attraction and seduction, that exists prior 

to any attempts to induce a specific behavior on the 

part of another. This is the “soft power” that Nye so 

often trumpets. Nevertheless, though the instruments 

of power are active by nature, they can be employed 

to produce soft as well as hard power. Moreover, they 

often can make use of the soft power of attraction and 

seduction as they are employed, for example, in soft 

power efforts to persuade. 

Political-Diplomatic.

Political-diplomatic power is the ability to achieve 

one’s ends through reason, symbols, and/or through 

emotive elements of human nature. It generally resides in the land of discussions, negotiations, and 

demarches designed to inform, persuade, or gather 

information. But its reach goes well beyond the government demarche. Diplomats and their supporting 
53

elements in the various agencies of government help 

set the tone and tenor of relations between states and 

other international actors. They wallow in soft power. 

Their success and the success of their mission often 

rely on knowledge and understanding of the culture, 

history, traditions, norms, values, and language of 

their assigned country, as well as that country’s political processes, players and their personalities, and 

the issues they are confronting. Political-diplomatic 

power need not be exercised directly with those who 

make decisions. It often functions effectively through 

an understanding of the milieu surrounding those 

making decisions and by focusing on those who exercise influence over decisionmakers in a given polity.

Success in employing the political diplomatic instrument of power also relies on a thorough understanding of the objectives and concerns of the country, 

countries, or other entities involved, and the capabilities those entities have to meet their objectives and alleviate or mitigate their concerns. For example, prior to 

Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the George H. W. Bush 

administration misread, with the help of some Arab 

allies, Saddam Hussein’s intentions and sent mixed 

signals to him that may have helped pave the way for 

Hussein’s final decision to invade—an evident diplomatic failure on the part of the Bush administration. 

Following the invasion, the Bush administration successfully used the political-diplomatic instrument of 

power to build not only a supportive domestic coalition, but also an international coalition supportive and 

contributing to the ultimate use of hard military power 

to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Knowledge of the 

predispositions of the audiences involved played an 

essential role. In that immediate post-Cold War environment, the Bush administration built a domestic as 
54

well as European coalition for action by equating Saddam Hussein to Hitler and evoking concerns over appeasement and further conquest. Appealing to those 

same audiences, as the price of a barrel of crude oil 

jumped nearly 50 percent during the month following 

the invasion, members of the administration also were 

quick to point out the potential economic implications 

should a significant amount of Middle East oil fall under the control of one man. 

On the other hand, to Arabs, unlikely to be moved 

by the Hitler analogy, and with some perhaps happy 

to see higher prices for their crude oil and with many 

not greatly enamored by what they perceived as a 

generally haughty attitude on the part of Kuwaitis, 

the naked aggression of one Arab state against 

another played well. 

The political-diplomatic instrument of power can 

also have a hard power coercive face. The withdrawal 

of the American diplomatic mission to Syria in February 2012, for example, was an effort to coerce the 

Syrian government to step down or alter its policy of 

killing those who oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad. 

Leaks to the press, statements by policymakers, comments by diplomats, official demarches, and such 

that suggest the possibility of economic sanctions or 

military action fall under the hard power rubric of 

political coercion.

Political-diplomatic power originates at the highest offices of government, flowing through a variety of 

agencies and their representatives that deal with other 

nations, international organizations, and nonstate actors. As noted above, the political-diplomatic instrument is often significantly augmented by affinities 

that exist between the peoples and governments of 

the entities involved. In that sense political-diplomat 

power begins at home.
55

Economic.

When one thinks about the economic instrument 

of power, one frequently thinks of economic “carrots” 

and “sticks.” Carrots and sticks are what one party 

uses to coerce another party to undertake an action 

that they might not be inclined to undertake. Carrots, 

for example promises of trade, economic assistance, 

debt forgiveness, access to technology, and the provision of resources such as military hardware, are the 

“sweeteners” meant to encourage a specific action. 

“Sweetener” is a euphemism for the word “bribe.” 

Sticks, such as the declared intent to withdraw economic assistance, impose economic sanctions, and/or 

trade embargoes, are threats a state may use to elicit a 

certain behavior. Since carrots and sticks are unlikely 

to alter basic attitudes and beliefs about a given situation on the part of those to whom they are directed, 

they are in essence coercion instruments that reside 

in the realm of hard power, whether during the offer, 

threat, or implementation stage.

The economic instrument of power, however, 

should not be confused with the normal ebb and flow 

of trade, technology, economic aid and/or developmental assistance, and certain forms of security assistance, such as assistance provided to improve the 

professionalism and capabilities of police forces. The 

size of a nation’s economy, the volume and patterns of 

trade, and the quality of its economic interaction in the 

world arena underwrite its ability to elicit the behavior of others. Such activity may provide a soft power, 

passive ability to influence behaviors. Economic assets 

and capabilities become instruments of hard power 

when used subtly or otherwise to deliberately bring 

about actions congruent with one’s preferences, as, 
56

for example, is the case in U.S. efforts to get Iran to 

cease activities the United States and others consider 

are aimed at producing nuclear weapons.

Of the instruments of power, the successful use of 

the economic instrument has a checkered past. First, 

because it can have a damaging effect on a target nation’s economy and thus result in the suffering of 

innocents, the economic instrument applied by one 

state can be used by the target state to unite its citizenry against those who reduce economic assistance 

or impose sanctions or embargoes. Another impediment to the successful employment of the economic 

instrument is the negative consequences it can have 

on the initiating country or countries and their allies. 

Employing the economic instrument seldom comes 

without pain. For example, attempting to coerce Iran 

into meeting its obligations under the NPT by placing an embargo on Iranian oil, if effective, is likely 

to result in a painful increase in the price of crude 

oil with potentially serious negative implications for 

the world economy. Despite such potential undesired 

consequences, the economic instrument has become 

an aspect of hard power that often for political and 

psychological effects must be employed. States need 

to believe that everything that could be done has been 

done before agreeing to the use of military force.

Psychological.

The psychological instrument of national power 

relies on the perceptions of others. It finds its roots 

in both soft and hard power, covers a wide spectrum 

of activities, and has a passive and active aspect. Psychological appeal is a primary ingredient of influence. 

Its passive aspect frequently is a byproduct of other 
57

factors and activities.20 For example, in the aftermath 

of the industrial revolution, the theories of Karl Marx, 

two world wars, strong economic growth at home, 

and Soviet support internationally for those seeking to break the bonds of colonialisms, among other 

things, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 

and its communist model enjoyed wide psychological 

appeal. The psychological impact of Soviet successes, 

by military or other means, certainly played a role in 

President Dwight Eisenhower’s espousal of the “falling domino” principle.21 Similarly, the psychology of 

people was on his mind in a 1955 letter to Sir Winston 

Churchill in which he noted that any further victories 

for communism would have an adverse impact on the 

minds of neutrals.22

In the post-Cold War era, the glaring success of the 

U.S. military in defeating in 100 hours what was then 

the world’s fourth largest army had an enormous impact on the perceptions of America’s military might. 

Though affecting the perceptions of others may not 

have been the driving force behind the U.S. use of 

force in the 1991 Gulf war, perceptions of a technologically dominant, militarily powerful America willing to stand up to aggression and committed to a new 

international cooperative system emerged. Such perceptions surely contributed to America’s soft power 

ability to influence other players in the international 

arena. Today, by virtue of such factors as size, population, and expanding economy, China has affected 

the perceptions of others about its current and future 

power and its appropriate place in the world hierarchy of nations. Thus nations are becoming more deferential toward China than in years past.
58

On the other hand, the psychological instrument 

of power includes deliberate efforts to manipulate 

the attitudes, beliefs, and emotions of others to create favorable impressions. This is the active aspect of 

the psychological dimension of power. Since it relies 

on perceptions, it finds its roots in both hard and soft 

power. Thus there can be, and usually is, a psychological aspect to efforts to influence, persuade, coerce, 

and compel the behavior of others. For example, just 

before the end of the Vietnam War, the Four Party 

Joint Military Team, established under provisions of 

the January 1973 Paris peace accords, met in Hanoi. 

At that meeting, Colonel Harry Summers, Chief of 

the Negotiations Division of the U.S. Delegation, in 

a conversation with Colonel Tu, Chief of the North 

Vietnamese Delegation, remarked: “You know you 

never defeated us on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu responded: “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”23

It was irrelevant because the war was fought not just 

at the military level, but also at the soft power psychological level. General Vo Nguyen Giap’s forces may 

not have defeated the Americans on the Vietnamese 

battlefields, but they won on the psychological battlegrounds in Washington, DC, on college campuses, 

and in the streets of America and thus, in a sense, 

compelled a change in U.S. behavior. 

Similarly, as Iraqi troops broke ranks, withdrew, 

and surrendered en masse during the 1991 Gulf War, 

they did so not only because they were defeated in 

battle, but also because of the psychological effects of 

America’s superior technology. When in the middle of 

a quiet night, the tanks to left and right explode under 

attack from seemingly nowhere, the psychology is not 

to stay in your tank and fight, but to abandon the next 

obvious target and run. That is the ultimate in hard 

power battlefield coercion.
59

On the soft power side, the official diplomatic corps 

as well as a nation’s public diplomacy play major roles. 

The diplomatic corps not only help shape perceptions 

of one’s nation among a target nation’s leaders, but 

also play a role in public diplomacy, the task of which 

is to help shape perceptions among leaders and the 

populace in target countries through the provision of 

information. Mary K. Eder, an authority in strategic 

communications, writes:

All communication conducted with intent does more 

than merely inform. It educates, reveals, restricts, and 

can elicit strong emotion. Most important, information as an element of national power also influences 

and can powerfully inform governments, direct public 

opinion, affect international relations, result in military 

action, and build or deny support.24

Among the least costly and most useful instruments of public diplomacy that have been created in 

the post-Cold War period are the Department of Defense (DoD)-run regional centers. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies, The Center for 

Hemispheric Defense Studies, The Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies, and the Near East South Asia Center 

for Strategic Studies bring together leaders from their 

respective regions to examine jointly many of the complex issues that confront our nations. Discussions at 

these centers are characterized by openness and honest attempts to understand differing points of view. 

Value is ascribed to individuals and their ideas irrespective of the nations from which they come. Thus, 

they provide a window on American society and its 

values and add dramatically to the reach of America’s 

soft power.
60

However, both the passive and active aspects of 

the psychological dimension of power can be fleeting. For example, as the Soviet economy began to 

wane under the weight of its own contradictions in 

the late 1960s and early 1970s and as the repressive 

nature of the Soviet system became more clearly visible to others, the psychological appeal of the Soviet 

system diminished. Similarly, when the United States 

and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) attacked Yugoslavia from March to 

June 1999, the favorable image that many Russians 

had of the United States following the end of the Cold 

War soured. One observed a similar phenomenon in 

other parts of the world when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, without United Nations (UN) 

authority, with a justification unsatisfying to many, 

and against the recommendation of many of its allies 

and friends. As a result, American soft power was 

significantly diminished.

Similarly, public diplomacy caught in a deliberate 

lie can raise suspicions and undermine years of efforts. To highlight the difference between truth and 

propaganda, Edward R. Murrow, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) director from 1961-64 said:

American traditions and the American ethic require 

us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that 

truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To 

be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable 

we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. 

It is as simple as that.25

Military.

The military instrument of power is usually thought 

of as “hard power”—”the capacity to use violence for 

protection, enforcement or extension of authority.”26 It 
61

clearly operates in the realms of deterrence, coercion, 

and compellence. In a world of independent sovereign 

states, perpetually in competition for scarce resources 

in an environment where there is no acknowledged 

higher authority, military power is seen as the Ultima 

Ratio Regum.

27

One has little difficulty understanding hard power 

aspects, for example, of allied military forces compelling the surrender of Nazi Germany during World War 

II; or the hard power value of U.S. strategic nuclear 

forces as deterrents to a Soviet nuclear attack on the 

United States during the Cold War; or, for that matter, 

the hard power used to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait 

in 1991. 

However, there are other dimensions to the military instrument of power. Today, the purely “kinetic” 

(a word in modern military parlance as used by Bob 

Woodward in his Bush at War) aspects of the military 

instrument—killing and/or destroying if you will, is 

often seen as increasingly less useful in solving many 

of the security problems nations and peoples confront. 

Even during the height of the Cold War, there were 

those who believed that the forces amassed by the 

superpowers had markedly limited utility. In 1968, 

Harvard professor Stanley Hoffmann wrote that the 

superpowers:

. . . enjoy an exceptionally high negative productivity 

but suffer from a low productivity of power. . . . [They 

are] able to prevent each other (as well as, a fortiori, all 

others) from achieving their goals sought by force . . . 

[however, they are unable to] fully resort to coercion in 

order to force another into agreement or submission.28
62

With the Cold War now more than 2 decades behind us, further questions have arisen concerning the 

utility of military forces. Many argue that the international environment is less dangerous today than it 

was during 4 1/2 decades of Soviet-American confrontation. Gone are the massive Soviet military forces 

threatening Western Europe. While there are significant policy differences between the United States and 

Russia and China, war with either seems highly unlikely. Of course, the United States does face dangers 

that could have devastating consequences, particularly 

should terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) or from states such as North Korea or Iran, 

should they acquire nuclear weapons and associated 

delivery systems. However, none of these dangers or 

their potential consequences is likely to be anywhere 

near the same magnitude as those that existed during 

the Cold War. Thus today, many question the need for 

large nuclear and conventional military forces. They 

see the primary value of nuclear weapons as resident in their utility as a deterrent. They contend that 

since they fail to meet just war criteria, their use, even 

threatened use, is not credible during lesser conflicts 

or confrontations. Raymond Aron once noted: 

Ballistic missiles . . . have less influence on the course 

of events than the English fleet sitting at anchor may 

have had during the 19th century. . . . They do not permit either of the great powers to dictate to their allies 

or clients instructing them on how they must conduct 

themselves. . . .29

This point made many years ago remains no less 

true today and readily applies to modern nonstate 

actors. Indeed, the real hard power value of military 

forces in the 21st century is more often likely to be 
63

inversely proportional to their destructive potential, 

with strategic nuclear forces as least useful and special 

operations conventional forces as most useful. Moreover, with such conflicts in mind as Algeria in the late 

1950s, Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and perhaps in 

such contemporary conflicts as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, those who question the utility of military 

power are quick to note that even a preponderance of 

conventional forces cannot always or easily be translated into political victory. Indeed, in ideological, ethnic, and sectarian quarrels, as well as in dealing with 

terrorism, the military instrument may be the least appropriate, though sometimes necessary, instrument. 

Ideas, it is said, cannot be defeated by force of arms.

There is much truth in such arguments. Nevertheless, the military instrument of power cannot be understood in its entirety simply as the employment of 

hard power. Rather, it is a multifaceted instrument 

that can play a role in advancing a nation’s interests 

from soft power influence to hard power coercion and 

compellence. As Michael Howard, speaking about 

military power, noted some years ago:

Indeed, it is not easy to see how international relations 

could be conducted, and international order maintained, if it were totally absent. The capacity of states 

to defend themselves, and their evident willingness to 

do so, provides the basic framework within which the 

business of international negotiation is carried on.30

Such factors as size, readiness, disposition, and 

perceived or demonstrated effectiveness, as well as 

perceptions of future capabilities can have an enormous psychological impact on friend and foe. The 

soft power influence of the military begins with investments in military research and development 
and is further nurtured by the acquisition of military 

systems; both of these are often seen as statements 

of future intent as well as capabilities. Soft power 

psychological aspects of military power also are often advanced by the temporary, as well as relatively 

long-term deployment of forces abroad. Perceptions 

of highly competent and effective military forces 

deployed to a region can help shape (influence) the 

views of others. For example, in December 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched an armada of 16 

battleships of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet on a 14-month 

trip around the world. The purpose of the voyage 

was to showcase America’s growing military power, 

particularly its newly acquired blue-water navy, its 

industrial prowess,31 and its ability and determination 

to protect American interests around the globe. Belching black smoke, this steam-powered, steel armada, 

later dubbed the “Great White Fleet” because the 

ships were painted white with gilded scrollwork on 

their bows, traveled 43,000 miles and visited 20 ports 

of call. Save for a donnybrook in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 

the voyage was generally a diplomatic success, with a 

Chilean cruiser guiding the fleet through the Straits of 

Magellan, a 9-day celebration of George Washington’s 

birthday in Callao, Peru, and with more than 250,000 

people staying up all night so as not to miss the fleet’s 

arrival in Sydney, Australia. Perhaps the most dramatic success came with the Great White Fleet’s visit 

to Yokohama, Japan. A flimsy arch set up to honor the 

arrival of the Fleet caught fire. Atop the pole on the 

arch was mounted a Japanese flag. Before the flames 

could reach the flag, a U.S. Marine from the Fleet, 

climbed up the side of the arch that had yet to catch 

fire and dramatically rescued the flag. The observing 

Japanese crowd went wild, hoisting the Marine onto 

their shoulders and parading through the streets.32

64
65

Roosevelt also dispatched these great dreadnoughts to impress upon the Japanese, who were in 

an expansionist mood, still chafing over their failure 

to get all they wanted out of the Roosevelt-mediated 

1906 Treaty of Portsmouth that ended their triumphant 

war with Russia, and irritated over anti-Japanese riots 

that were sweeping California, that the United States 

could protect its interests in the Pacific Ocean even 

though the bulk of its blue-water naval assets were 

located in the Atlantic Ocean. Shortly after the fleet’s 

October 18-25, 1908, visit to Yokohama, the Japanese 

ambassador in Washington, DC, received instructions 

to reach an agreement with the United States that 

would recognize the Pacific Ocean as an open avenue 

of trade, and promise equal opportunity in China. The 

ensuing Root-Takahira agreement was signed on November 30, 1908.33 This was a classic exercise in the 

soft use of the military instrument of power to win 

friends and influence people. There was no threat, no 

bribe, and no effort to compel.

During the Cold War, the United States deployed 

hundreds of thousands of land, air, and sea forces to 

Europe. Those military deployments eased security 

concerns among Western Europeans and freed them 

to focus their efforts on post-war economic recovery. 

Both directly, through close military collaboration and 

the political collaboration that such military collaboration spawned, and indirectly, through the feeling 

of security U.S. military forces provided, the United 

States and Western European states and peoples 

forged close relationships. Psychologically comforted 

by the U.S. military presence, Europeans were often 

willing to let the United States take the lead on security matters, even in some cases on foreign political issues. Thus, the United States influenced the behavior 
66

of these states simply by virtue of the presence of its 

military forces. 

Similarly, deployments in the Persian/Arabian 

Gulf and elsewhere provide a sense of security and 

stability that often serves as the glue of civil relations 

among states in those regions and accrues influence to 

the United States. Admittedly, however, in some cases 

one or more states (e.g., Iran in the Persian/Arabian 

Gulf) or nonstate actors (e.g., Somali pirates) will see 

such deployments as coercive in nature. Thus deployments can serve simultaneously as instruments of 

both the soft power of influence with friends and hard 

coercive power with adversaries.

Perhaps an important additional benefit to the deployment of U.S. military force abroad is the apparent 

direct effect on growth. A 2007 study of U.S. military 

presence in 94 countries from 1950 to 2000 revealed 

that putting U.S. forces in a country over time was associated with an increase in the per capita growth rate 

of that country by an extra 1.8 percentage points per 

year. Perhaps more interesting, the study found that 

military, economic, or social aid was not a good substitute. The authors found “more troops predict more 

growth, but more aid does not.” Furthermore, the 

study revealed that usual explanations for this phenomenon—the multiplier effect of spending by U.S. 

forces on the local economy have a short-term effect, 

but robust long-term growth correlates more with the 

exemplar effect. When locals saw how the U.S. military did business, it changed the business culture and 

courts, with salubrious effects on commerce.34

The soft aspect of military forces is also evident 

in such activities as the U.S. training and education 

of foreign militaries whether in the United States or 

abroad, as well as other forms of security assistance, 
67

including U.S. participation in joint exercises, and U.S. 

involvement in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. In each of these cases 

the U.S. military is often seen as providing a good 

that meets the needs of others and thus helps shape 

the views of those directly assisted, as well as others, 

about the nature of American society and its values.

The Demands of Smart Power.

Smart Power has been defined as the skillful combination of hard and soft power.35 The Center for 

Strategic and International Studies Commission on 

Smart Power noted: “Smart power means developing 

an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to 

achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard 

and soft power.”36 If these are the objectives of smart 

power, what are the essential demands of smart power 

that must be met if the United States is to achieve 

these objectives?

Vision. 

The United States must have a vision of the kind 

of domestic environment and international order it 

hopes will emerge in the decades ahead. Without such 

a vision, it will be unable to further develop its domestic sources of power and focus the instruments of 

soft and hard power “smartly” in ways that support 

the achievement of its international vision. It will not 

be able to balance often competing, short, medium, 

and longer-term objectives, prioritizing and sacrificing what it must to achieve more important objectives 

and thereby encouraging movement within the international community in the desired direction. 
68

Investing in the Sources of Power.

If the United States wishes to remain a dominant, 

if not always predominant, international player in the 

21st century, it must further develop the sources of its 

soft and hard power. While it can do little to alter its 

geography and the provision of natural resources, the 

ability to develop its other sources of power is only 

limited by the wisdom and imagination of its national 

and local leaderships. For example, ensuring a healthy 

economy will require a wise balance between the 

further development of business and industry and 

environmental concerns such as air, water, and soil 

pollution that undermine the quality of working and 

living conditions, which add long-term, though often 

immediate, costs to health care, and often lower labor 

productivity.

In an increasingly globalized economy, U.S. success will demand stronger investments in education. 

To many, the current system increasingly appears to 

be broken. According to rankings released by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Programme for International Student 

Assessment, which compares the knowledge and 

skills of 15-year-olds in 70 countries around the world, 

the United States has fallen to “average.” The OECD 

reported further noted that investment in education is 

paid back many times over. For example, according to 

the report increasing U.S. reading, math, and science 

scores by 25 points over the next 20 years would result in a gain of $41 trillion for the U.S. economy over 

the lifetime of the generation born in 2010. Bringing 

the United States up to the performance of the best 

performing education system among OECD members 
69

could result in economic gains up to as much as $103 

trillion.37 The report further notes that the quality of 

education depends on several factors. First, an actual rather than rhetorical commitment to education 

as weighed against other commitments, for example, 

as expressed in terms of pay versus the pay of other 

highly skilled workers, or as expressed in terms of 

how education credentials are weighed against other 

qualifications when people are considered for jobs. 

Second is “clear and ambitious standards that are 

shared across the system, with a focus among other 

things on higher-order thinking skills.” Third is high 

quality teachers and principals—“student learning is 

ultimately the product of what goes on in the classroom.” Last, but not least, world-class education systems deliver high-quality learning outcomes consistently across the entire education system.38

The United States may not be in as precipitous 

decline in technology and innovation as Thomas L. 

Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum suggested in 

That Used to Be Us. According to one recent study, it 

still ranks first in patents per capita. It is sixth in economic output devoted to research and development 

investment and seventh in scientific and engineering 

researchers per capita. Combining all three measures 

in a broad assessment of the technological and innovative capabilities of the world’s leading nations, 

the United States ranks third. In each category, the 

so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and 

China) fall far behind.39 Nevertheless, future competitiveness in a globalized world economy demands that 

the United States vigorously encourage and support 

technological innovation. In many ways, America’s 

technological future is highly correlated to its educational system at all levels. While the U.S. university 
70

system remains the best in the world,40 the university 

product remains dependent on inputs from primary 

and secondary schools. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the United States is ranked 48th 

in the quality of mathematics and science education. 

Though there are significant questions about the validity of WEF opinion-based ratings, nevertheless, the 

ratings are generally in line with OECD rankings. This 

does not bode well for the future.

Re-examining the educational processes for U.S. 

diplomats and military leaders is also warranted. 

Once inducted into the Foreign Service, U.S. diplomats 

find the educational opportunities somewhat limited. 

There is nothing comparable to the through-career 

educational programs available to advance the professional skills of military officials. On the other hand, in 

an increasingly complex world where the demands on 

military personnel go well beyond battlefield skills, 

the military educational system has become increasingly focused on operational issues, often providing 

little time for education and training on issues associated with the broader aspects of national strategy, national military strategy, and the military’s role in soft 

power projection.

Finally, when viewed from afar, what appears to 

many Americans as a dysfunctional political system 

is likely to be taken by proponents of more authoritarian models of governance as an example of the failings 

of democracy style government. On the other hand, 

other non-Americans may simply take it as the rough 

and tumble of democratic (republic style) politics. In 

either case, the long-term effects of apparently disappearing concepts of compromise within the American 

political system may well undermine the domestic 

effectiveness and efficiency of the United States and, 
71

in turn, the ability to use its soft and hard power in 

pursuit of American interests abroad. Political parties 

had yet to be formed when the U.S. Constitution was 

written and debated. However, in Federalist Paper #10, 

James Madison warned of the dangers of “faction.” By 

faction, he meant: 

a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and 

actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 

interest, adversed [sic] to the rights of other citizens, 

or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 

community. 

However, he assumed that the problem would be 

mitigated in a republic of vast citizenry and territory, 

where interest would be diffuse and the prospect for 

faction diminished. The republic thus would be saved 

from faction by compromises made to advance the 

broader community. Indeed, in a democratic republic, 

by definition there can be no absolutes. Such a system 

is based on finding a common way ahead. Today, in a 

political system where political parties are increasingly 

dominated by extremes, where elective politics seems 

to demand that the supposedly wiser representatives 

of the people reflect rather than inform extremes and 

where compromise has become a bad word, gridlock 

dominates to the detriment of the nation. Should this 

continue, America will find itself weaker in most, if 

not all, sources of its soft power.

Commitment to a Norms-based International Community.

The United States is unlikely to remain the only 

or predominant “superplayer” in the international 

community. If it wishes to have its interests pro-
72

tected and perhaps advanced in the future, it will 

need to continue the development of a norms-based 

rather than interest-based international community. 

As World War II was drawing to a close, the United 

States established itself as the preeminent advocate 

of a norms-based international environment, with its 

efforts to establish such organizations as the UN, the 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Monetary 

Fund (IMF). Following the war, it played a major role 

in the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade 

Organization (WTO). In the drafting of such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 

modeled in part after the U.S. Bill of Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 

and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and in advancing 

global guidelines for land use and property rights, the 

United States also has played a key role in advancing international law, an essential basis for a normsbased international community. Norms set by these 

institutions have served the United States very well. 

They have established mechanisms for dialogue on 

issues of international concern. They have provided 

for economic stability and development. They have 

advanced America’s long-standing preference for free 

and open trade among nations, as well as concepts of 

human rights in peace and war. 

However, for much of the first decade of the 21st 

century, it appeared to many that the United States, 

now the world’s most powerful nation, was drawing 

back from its commitment to international norms as 

guides to the behavior of states. The United States 

failed to join such internationally favored agreements as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the 
73

International Criminal Court, and the Anti-Personnel 

Mine Ban Convention. This, coupled with the Neoconservative harangues against the UN, multilateralism, evident preference for unilateral action, and 

perceived willingness to interpret international law to 

suit U.S. purposes regardless of commonly accepted 

understandings, led some to conclude that the United 

States had come to prefer a self-interest-based international community, where to quote Thucydides, “the 

strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 

they must.”41

In an increasingly interdependent world, where 

achieving one’s objective will almost always require 

the assistance or as a minimum the acquiescence of 

others, policies fundamentally guided by self-interest 

will win few friends, gain influence among few nations or peoples, do little to advance the nation’s 

soft power, raise concerns about America’s ultimate 

aims, heighten perceptions of the abuse of its power, 

undermine its ability to use hard power when it may 

be necessary, and thus be largely counterproductive. 

Joseph Joffe, publisher-editor of the German weekly 

newspaper, Die Zeit, writing about the United States 

over a decade ago, correctly noted:

To the extent that the United States turns unilateralism 

into a habit . . . others will feel the sting of American 

power more strongly. And the incentive to discipline 

Mr. Big will grow.42

Investment in the Common Good.

U.S. successes in the post World War II Cold War 

era owe as much to its efforts to provide for the 

common good as to its military and economic clout. 
74

Indeed, for most of the post World War II era, “the 

United States has acted as the foremost producer of 

global/regional public goods.”43 By shaping its foreign policy agenda to advance not only its own interests but also those of others, it was able to grow 

its soft power global influence. By holding the value 

of the dollar currency artificially high following the 

war, Americans would be encouraged to buy foreign 

products, helping others get their post-war economies going again. By providing them a security shield 

and money through the European Recovery Program 

(Marshall Plan), the United States freed Western European nations from the burden of heavy defense expenditures and thus allowed them to focus their limited 

resources on economic and social recovery. Moreover, 

many of the institutions the United States advanced 

not only helped establish norms for international behavior, but also provided for the common good. The 

World Bank provided loans for post-War reconstruction and development. The IMF stabilized exchange 

rates, making trade among nations more predictable. 

GATT lowered barriers, encouraging greater trade 

among nations and stimulating economic development. The WTO continues the processes set in motion 

by GATT.

Such efforts have built a better world and have 

contributed greatly to America’s stature in the past. 

Continued investment in the common good is essential if the United States hopes to retain its primacy in 

the international community. But as Joffe has said:

Primacy does not come cheap, and the price is measured in the currency of obligation. Leaders succeed 

not only because of their superior power, but also because they have a fine sense for the quirks and qualities 

of others--because they act in the interest of all [empha-
75

sis added]. Their labor is the source of their authority. 

And so a truly great power must not just prevent but 

pre-empt hostile coalitions—by providing essential 

services. Those who respect the needs of others engage 

in supply-side diplomacy: They create a demand for 

their services, and that translates into political profits, 

also known as “leadership.”44

In short, investing in the common good generates 

gratitude among those affected, opens avenues for 

influence, often predisposes others to political/diplomatic overtures, and thus contributes to a nation’s 

soft power.

Knowledge.

In the decades ahead, nothing will be more important than knowledge. Knowledge of the interests of 

other states and nonstate actors, their objectives and 

concerns, and the skillful management of a nation’s 

public diplomacy to translate such knowledge into a 

favorable view of the United States will be required.

Moreover, to choose wisely among the instruments 

of national power and the means of their employment 

in any given circumstance, a thorough understanding 

of the individuals and/or groups of individuals a nation wishes to affect is a necessity. If the United States 

is to have an immediate effect on the behavior of another state or nonstate actor in the international arena, 

it must be able to identify those likely to be able to 

directly or indirectly affect the decisions to be made. 

This requires in-depth knowledge of the attitudes, beliefs, and predispositions of those likely to be involved 

in the decisionmaking process or the so-called “proximal” decisionmaking environment. It also requires an 

understanding of the more emotive aspects of the per-
76

sonalities involved. This places an enormous task on 

the intelligence community, not only on their ability 

to directly gather information needed to make appropriate judgments, but also to analyze that intelligence 

along with information garnered from the wide range 

of academics who have engaged in such efforts. Where 

efforts to affect the behavior of others is long-term and 

likely to involve the use of public diplomacy, an understanding of attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, and 

emotive aspects of not only the proximal, but also 

distal environment of the target country is required. 

In democracies, such a distal environment includes 

a wide range of groups and, of course, the public in 

general, upon whose consent the government often 

relies. In authoritarian regimes, the scope of the distal 

environment is likely to be more circumscribed.

Investments in education and intelligence are 

among the most valuable investments a nation can 

make if it wishes to use its soft and hard power wisely. 

It is the basis upon which one chooses which instrument or combinations of instruments of national power 

(political, psychological, economic, and/or military) 

to use in a given situation, as well as over time, and 

which means or combination of means (influence, persuasion, coercion, deterrence, and/or compellence) to 

employ on which international actors when and how. 

Integration of the Instruments of Power. 

As suggested above, smart power requires that the 

instruments of national power be fully integrated. The 

political, economic, psychological, and military instruments, deployed to influence, persuade, coerce, deter, 

or compel, may be used individually, in tandem, or 

jointly, depending on the nature of the issues to be 
77

addressed. This will require cooperation and coordination across the agencies of government involved, 

particularly between the departments of State and 

Defense, but also others such as Homeland Security, 

Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Justice. It also 

will require the cooperation of Congress: at minimum 

a Congress knowledgeable enough and determined 

enough to serve as a check on executive actions, while 

acting in an efficient, nonpartisan manner to support 

executive branch efforts when warranted. 

More than a decade ago, the Hart–Rudman Commission signaled the need for “strategic fusion of all appropriate instruments of national power:” 

The nature of the future security environment appears 

to require advanced, integrated, collaborative planning 

and organized interagency responses beyond what is 

possible under the current interagency system.45

More recently, the 2009 DoD Quadrennial Roles and 

Missions Review Report also highlighted the need “to 

increase unity across the government for addressing 

common national security problems.”46

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also 

highlighted the need for integrative efforts:

One of our goals coming into the administration was 

. . . to begin to make the case that defense, diplomacy 

and development were not separate entities, either 

in substance or process, but that indeed they had to 

be viewed as part of an integrated whole and that 

the whole of government then had to be enlisted in 

their pursuit.”47

However, such integration is an enormous task. 

It will require addressing a wide range of issues that 
78

I have attempted to identify elsewhere.48 In particular, it will require the education of a wide range of 

government professionals, as well as diplomats to 

manage the processes at home and abroad. Such an 

education may require a Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 style professional education 

for selected nonmilitary, as well as military officials. 

Invest in Public Diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is usually understood to be the 

means by which governments seek to advance their 

nations’ interests through understanding, informing, 

and influencing the views of broader publics in foreign countries.49 Among the principal tasks of U.S. 

public diplomacy are communicating American values, ideas, and policies and their rationale. It includes 

a wide variety of efforts, which span a spectrum from 

student exchanges to public media releases to the information provided by civilian and military officials 

of the government. 

During the Cold War, it was hard to measure 

the benefits of such public broadcasting efforts as 

the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio 

Liberty. We do know that those broadcasts not only 

shaped U.S. images but also often highlighted, by 

virtue of implicit example, the failings of many of the 

authoritarian regimes that fell to their coverage. It is 

equally difficult to measure the success of such programs as the Peace Corps, the Department of Staterun participants programs, the various DoD-run regional education centers, as well as the Fulbright and 

other exchange programs. But those programs not 

only provide many Americans, often captive of their 

own insularity, an opportunity to better understand 
79

the culture, languages, and perspectives of other peoples and nations, but also advance an understanding 

of American culture, traditions, values, and, perhaps 

above all, concepts of freedom and openness to others 

around the globe. 

Public diplomacy can be a powerful tool in advancing the interests of the nation. In the media age, 

with the emergence of a multiplicity of communications means, where news and entertainment are often 

merged and news blurred, and competing and sometimes misleading information has become increasingly 

common, a strong investment in public diplomacy is 

essential. It is in such an environment that the battle 

of ideas and thus the battle for the hearts and particularly the minds of others take place. If the United 

States is to be successful, it will need to do a better job 

coordinating its efforts among the various agencies 

of government. This neither means that all those who 

venture abroad on U.S. programs receive indoctrination on U.S. policies, nor does it mean that there needs 

to be one truth on all issues. Rather, there needs to be 

a greater unity of effort in communicating to foreign 

peoples those issues of strategic importance and sustained education of those civilian and military officials 

in regular contact with the media that provides them 

with the tools necessary to be effective communicators via the various instruments of the modern media. 

As Mary K. Eder has written: “At issue is the concern 

that America does not communicate clearly with the 

world. It often seems that the U.S. government sends 

‘mixed messages’ or fails to clearly and consistently 

communicate policy.”50
80

Humility.

During one of the presidential debates before 

his election as President, George W. Bush, speaking 

about the reactions of others to the United States, commented: “If we are an arrogant nation, they’ll view us 

that way, but if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect 

us.”51 This must have been sweet music to many in 

the world who have tired of America’s claims of exceptionalism. Of course, such claims have deep roots 

in the American psyche, reaching back to 1630. John 

Winthrop, still aboard the flagship Arabella en route 

to New England, delivered a sermon to future Massachusetts Bay colonists, remarking that “the Lord will 

be our God and delight to dwell among us . . . wee 

shall be as a Citty upon a Hill.”52 The idea of American 

exceptionalism has often been advanced. Among others, President-Elect John F. Kennedy quoted Winthrop 

in a January 1961 address to the General Court of 

Massachusetts. President Ronald Reagan repeatedly 

referred to the United States as the “shining city upon 

a hill.” Presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000 

remarked: “Our nation is chosen by God and commissioned by history to be a model to the world.”53

The United States is exceptional in many regards. 

Many non-Americans see the United States as the 

land of freedom and opportunity. The United States 

has much to be admired. Nevertheless, the old adage 

“self-praise stinks,” applies both at home and abroad, 

and both among individuals and between and among 

states. Loch Johnson has labeled arrogance as one of 

the seven sins of American foreign policy.54

America might well keep in mind that the United 

States is ranked fifth in world competitiveness, 16th in 

national infrastructure, 39th in institutions , and 42nd 
81

in health and primary education.55 The United States 

also is ranked 49th in infant mortality and 50th in life 

expectancy, lagging behind all Western European 

states, except Turkey.56 While one may take exception 

to one or more of the rankings, this is the way many 

others see us. Indeed, according to Johnson: 

there is a perception around the world that the United 

States has grown too big for its britches, that it has 

failed to live up to its noble rhetoric as a peace-loving 

power with lofty ideals, that it thinks its views are superior to other nations.57

Thus, a little humility would go a long way in advancing America’s soft power and likely make applications of hard power more palatable. 

Humility is demonstrated in many ways, for example, knowledge of the history, culture, traditions, 

language, and current issues and concerns of others; 

soliciting and listening to the views of others; and 

perhaps above all, seeing others as equals, with something to contribute to the discourse among nations 

and peoples. Even U.S. diplomats might benefit from 

further education on some of these before assignment, 

especially those who serve as political appointees.

Recognize the Limits of Power.

If the United States is to use wisely the instruments 

of national power, it must recognize that it cannot 

solve all of the problems all of the time. It may be able 

to solve some of the challenges it confronts by itself. 

It may be able to solve some problems with the help 

and/or cooperation of others. Some problems it may 

not be able to solve at all.
82

Smart power not only requires an understanding 

of such elementary truths, but also the knowledge 

needed to differentiate among the challenges and the 

wisdom to act only where the available resources, 

means, and instruments of power are likely to yield a 

reasonable probability of success. Humanitarians and 

hawks sometimes join hands advocating intervention where authoritarian regimes abuse their power 

and inflict gross violations of human rights on their 

people, recently, for example, in Libya and Syria. In 

such situations, if the United States is to use its power 

wisely, good counsel suggests caution. Quick action, 

without a well-thought-through plan that promises a 

reasonable end game and a reasonable probability of 

politically desirable outcomes, can spell disaster.

Furthermore, efforts to act everywhere or near everywhere are likely to be met with suspicion followed 

by pushback from others. There always exists within 

the international community the concern that the 

“strong are always inclined to abuse their strength. 

The more obvious their superiority, the more suspect 

they become.”58 The obvious military strength and 

past history of U.S. involvement makes it an especially 

prominent target for such suspicion. 

Thus the United States must choose carefully 

where, when, and how it will become involved, particularly in the use of its hard power. An intemperate America wears out its own reputation and hence 

its ability to influence others. Moreover, efforts to act 

everywhere all of the time are costly in terms of a nation’s economic, military, and human resources. Furthermore, if ever there was an axiom of state behavior, 

one that can be counted on 90+ percent of the time, it 

is that if one state is always ready and willing to do 

what is difficult and costly, other nations will let that 
83

state take care of the dirty laundry, saving themselves 

from the economic, military, and political costs. 

Act Within the Limits of Resources.

 Great powers have come and gone. One certainty 

is that if a nation exhausts its resources, it will face 

decline. It would be difficult to measure the long-term 

costs to the United States of its wars of choice in lives 

lost and the resultant drain on national treasure and 

the American psyche. Americans are a resilient and 

optimistic people. But surely the United States would 

be in a better position today if it had been more discrete in its choices of wars to fight. There is, of course, 

the argument that wars stimulate the economy 

through production and therefore wars, rather than a 

drain, can be good for the economy. This view is often 

supported by the argument that it was World War II 

that finally got the United States out of the Great Depression, not the New Deal spending of Franklin D. 

Roosevelt. However, I find irony in this argument that 

those who decry government spending often so argue. 

Nevertheless, if true, would not spending on domestic 

programs be better? 

Of course, wars of choice are not the only drains 

on the nation’s resources, spending more than you are 

willing to pay for can run up the national debt to levels 

from which recovery can only be achieved by taxing 

the future health and welfare of the nation. Indeed, the 

combined domestic and foreign spending including 

recent wars has run up the national debt from almost 

$6 trillion in 2001 to over $15 trillion today, jumping 

to nearly $10.7 trillion during the Bush administration and the rest during the first 3 years of the Barack 

Obama administration.59 True, some of that spending 
84

was on efforts to stimulate the economy. On the other 

hand, engaging in two wars without raising taxes to 

cover costs has surely affected the U.S. resilience in 

recovering from the great recession and contributed to 

perceptions both at home and abroad of an American 

decline. U.S. soft power potential has been weakened, 

and with the economic recession its future hard power 

capabilities will surely be reduced.

Maintain Sufficient Military Hard Power.

Military forces equipped and trained to address 

the challenges of the 21st century are essential. However, smart power demands that if America’s resources are to be wisely husbanded, military forces 

should be designed to meet the probable threats, not 

all possible threats. The latter is a prescription for unbounded military expenditures. Today U.S. military 

expenditures are about 43 percent of the world’s total. 

By comparison, China spends about 7.3 percent, Russia about 3.6 percent, France about 3.6 percent, and 

the UK about 3.7 percent.60 From an average of about 

$450 billion (in 2012 dollars) during the Cold War, the 

U.S. defense budget soared following the September 

11, 2001 (9/11) attacks to over $700 billion. 

Furthermore, today the United States has 11 nuclear powered aircraft carriers. In terms of size and 

striking power, no other country has a comparable 

ship. Several countries do have aircraft carriers. However, none presently has more than two, though India 

and Australia have three under construction.61 The 

currently projected cost of the new Gerald R. Ford class 

carrier now under construction is about $13.5 billion. 

This does not include the cost of approximately 90 onboard aircraft, nor does it include the cost of accom-
85

panying forces that compose a carrier strike group—

usually one or two guided missile cruisers, at least 

two destroyers and/or frigates (for example, Zumwalt 

Class approximately $6.5 billion and the Burke Class 

approximately $2 billion), and, on occasion, submarines.62 The United States also has:

• Ten large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea bases for helicopters and verticaltakeoff jets. No other navy has more than three, 

and all of those navies belong to U.S. allies or 

friends. The U.S. Navy can carry twice as many 

aircraft at sea as all the rest of the world combined.

• Fifty-seven nuclear-powered attack and cruise 

missile submarines. More than the rest of the 

world combined.

• Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped combatants that 

carry roughly 8,000 vertical-launch missile 

cells. In terms of total missile firepower, the 

United States arguably outmatches the next 20 

largest navies.

• A battle fleet displacement—a proxy for overall 

fleet capabilities— that exceeds, by one recent 

estimate, at least the next 13 navies combined, 

of which 11 are U.S. allies or partners.

• A 202,000-strong Marine Corps, which is the 

largest military force of its kind in the world 

and exceeds the size of most world armies.63

• Arguably the finest air forces in the world, with 

an estimated 160-200 flying hours per year for 

tactical crews, compared to 100-150 for China 

and 25-40 for Russia.

• A tactical aircraft inventory of about 2,650 Air 

Force, 900 Naval, and 371 Marine combat aircraft and including today about 140 F/A 22s 
86

with a final purchase of 183—one of the finest, 

if not the finest, aircraft in the world. It is in the 

process of acquiring about 2,400 F-35 aircraft as 

a replacement for its older aircraft at a fly-away 

cost of over $200 million per copy.

• The best equipped Army in the world.

All of this raises the reasonable questions of “How 

much is enough?” “How little is too little?” “How 

much is overkill?” With an over $15 trillion national 

debt and, as of late, annual $1 trillion federal deficits, 

the United States is obliged to ensure that military 

expenditures are still sufficient to protect America’s 

vital interests. However, as has often been noted in 

the past, interests tend to expand to meet available 

resources. Therefore, it is useful to keep in mind as 

the United States sizes and equips its military forces 

that all interests are not vital and that military expenditures must be balanced against other expenditures 

that protect the homeland from attack and add to 

America’s ability to have a favorable impact on world 

affairs. The United States is not deficient in offensive 

military striking power. Indeed, it is likely to remain 

superior in offensive military capabilities, even far 

superior to any likely military adversary for some 

years to come. Indeed, if there are serious weaknesses 

in America’s security, they may well be in the ability 

of the U.S. to defend against crippling cyber attacks 

on U.S. infrastructure and in its ability to employ its 

military forces effectively. Such deficiencies demand 

significant attention.

Today the DoD Budget request for Fiscal Year 

(FY)2013 is about $614 billion, including $88.5 billion 

for overseas contingency operations, including those 

in Afghanistan and Iraq.64 By way of comparison, the 

President’s FY2013 budget for the Department of State 
87

and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), including Overseas Contingency Operations 

to support the extraordinary and temporary costs of 

civilian-led programs and missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is $51.6 billion.65 That’s less than 

1/10 of the Defense budget. Looking to the future, 

among the most important military investments are 

those made in the research, development, testing, and 

evaluation (RDT&E) of military hardware, in military 

training, and, increasingly today and in the future, 

in cyber security. Investments in RDT&E permit the 

United States to remain technologically superior to 

potential adversaries. Military training and use of advanced cyber techniques are force multipliers, so-tospeak. Such force multipliers often permit the United 

States to operate successfully against larger militaries, 

as was the case in Iraq in 2003. 

It is instructive to note that President Eisenhower 

cut the defense budget by 27 percent. However, he 

also doubled funding for RDT&E in order to maintain 

the U.S. technological edge over the Soviet Union. 

President Richard Nixon also reduced defense spending, but ushered in the “Total Force” concept, which 

gave a significant role to Reserve and National Guard 

forces in times of conflict.66 This would suggest that the 

question of military funding in terms of smart power 

is what is the appropriate balance between funding for 

forces in being versus RDT&E. That is to say, should 

forces in being be sized downward while keeping the 

R&D base hot? It also raises questions as to how much, 

more or less, should be borne today by Reserve and 

National Guard forces? However, the larger question 

is: What is the proper balance of expenditures not only 

among the various foreign and security policy institutions, but also between expenditures on those institu-
88

tions and expenditures on securing and improving 

U.S sources of national power?

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The challenges of coming decades are likely to 

be more complex and in many ways more demanding than those the United States confronted during 

the Cold War. Future successes in providing for U.S. 

national security and advancing American interests 

abroad will demand the wise application of both soft 

and hard power. As a minimum, this will demand 

that the United States have a clear vision of the kind 

of domestic and international environment it seeks to 

nurture in the decades ahead. Henry Kissinger noted 

over 40 years ago: “We will never be able to contribute 

to building a stable and creative world order unless 

we first form some conception of it.”67 His observation 

remains as true today as it did in 1968 and pertains 

equally to the domestic as well as international environment. Indeed, success internationally will depend 

heavily on success at home. It also will demand that 

the United States invest carefully in the sources of its 

power both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, even more so than in the past, in an 

era of globalization, future American power will depend heavily on the strength of the nation’s economy 

and, as it rebuilds its economy, on finding an appropriate balance between the further development of business and industry and environmental concerns that 

often have less noticed but none-the-less detrimental 

long-term effects on the economy. America’s ability to influence events abroad also will demand that 

the United States vigorously encourage and support 

technological innovation at home, as well as invest 
89

substantially in R&D, in the education of its people 

in general, and in the education of its diplomats and 

military leaders. The latter may require a GoldwaterNichols DoD Reorganization Act style specialized 

professional education for select nonmilitary, as well 

as military officials engaged in foreign and security 

policymaking. Perhaps above all, the future of U.S. 

power—both soft and hard—will depend on effective 

governance. Democracy eschews absolutes. Rather, 

it demands compromise among competing interests 

in order to achieve a consensus for advancement. A 

“my way or the highway” attitude among competing 

political factions is a prescription for decline, both at 

home and abroad.

Internationally, the wise application of the instruments of American power will depend, among other 

things, on cooperative efforts on the part of those 

agencies of government involved in foreign and security affairs in order to integrate effectively the instruments of American power. It will demand an unwavering investment in the intelligence community and 

in developing an understanding of the motivations of 

other international actors, a commitment to a normsbased international community, investments in the international common good and public diplomacy with 

a touch of humility, and a recognition of the limits of 

the ability of any single nation to solve all the world’s 

problems and of the need to work with others within 

the limits of available resources. The application of 

smart power to protect U.S. interests abroad will also 

demand that the United States maintain sufficient military hard power to deter and, if necessary, defend its 

vital interests, as well as the ability to protect Homeland infrastructure and U.S. military forces from crippling cyber attacks. However, many of the challenges 
90

that lie ahead are likely to be more effectively addressed through the use of soft power than through 

the application of hard power. Thus America’s stature 

in the global arena and its ability to protect and advance its interests and those of its allies and friends 

demands a proper balance of expenditures among the 

various U.S. foreign and security policy institutions, 

especially those that strengthen America’s soft power. 

Indeed, it is worth keeping in mind that it was not 

hard power that brought about the collapse of the Soviet empire. To be sure, hard military power played 

an important role. Nevertheless, Eastern European 

peoples did not toss the yoke of communism because 

of American military efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin 

America. Mikhail Gorbachev didn’t seek to reform the 

Soviet system because he had been defeated militarily 

or because the United States had halted the expansion 

of communism through the use of its military might. In 

fact, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the United 

States lost the very military conflict in which it had 

invested most heavily during the Cold War period. 

Rather, it was the inability of the communist system 

to deliver to its peoples the promises made of a better 

life, juxtaposed against the success of the West. It was 

the inherent attractiveness of the West and America 

and its soft power that won the day—the strength of 

its economy, the attractiveness of its political system, 

its commitment to international institutions and international law, and its inherent vitality. Thus while hard 

power will remain a must, in the decades ahead, smart 

power demands significant investments in America’s 

soft power. 
91

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. U.S. gross national product was about $200,000 million in 

1940. By 1950, it was about $300,000 million (greater than half of 

the world’s gross national product) and more than $500,000 million by 1960. See “World War II and the Post-War Boom,” available from www.nestlepurina.com/postwar.aspx; and The Post War 

Economy 1945-1960, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 

available from economics.about.com/od/useconomichistory/a/post_

war.htm.

2. Christopher J. Tassava, The American Economy during World 

War II, Economic History Association, available from EH.net at 

eh.net/encyclopedia/article/tassava.WWII.

3. By 1970, U.S. GDP measured by purchasing power parity 

(PPP) represented about 24 percent of the world total; nominal 

U.S. GDP as a share of the world’s total measured at official exchange rates peaked in 1985 at 32.74 percent, while remaining 

at about 22.5 percent at PPP; by 1997 it had shrunk to about 21 

percent at PPP. See Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 

Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, February 1999, p. 

6 available from permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps2917/hies.pdf. The U.S. 

economic output is slightly below that level today. The global economic product in 2010 was estimated to be about $63 trillion (using 

official exchange rates) or 76.16 trillion (using purchasing power 

parity), while the U.S. was estimated to be $14.82 trillion or about 

23.5 percent at official exchange rates or 19.5 percent at PPP of the 

global product, respectively. See The World Factbook, Washington, 

DC: Central Intelligence Agency, available from https://www.cia.

gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. Moreover, 

some 2012 forecasts see China’s GDP surpassing the United States 

by some estimates as early as 2019 and by 2025, with the United 

States producing about 18.3 percent of the world’s output and 

China about 21.8 percent. See “Global Economic Outlook 2012,” 

The Conference Board, available from www.conference-board.org/

data/globaloutlook.cfm.

4. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, there is a reasonable probability that other states in the region will seek to acquire 

them. Moreover, any further proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

materials, and know-how increases the likelihood that such capabilities will fall into the hands of terrorist or criminal groups. 
92

5. For example, see Kenneth E. Boulding, Three Faces of Power, 

Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989, pp. 15-18. 

6. Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power: Its Nature and the History of 

Its Growth, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1962, p. 17.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 17-26.

9. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 

American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990.

10. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 

Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

11. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power, New York: Public 

Affairs, 2011.

12. Nye, Soft Power, p. x.

13. Ibid, p. 5.

14. Nye, Future of Power, p. 16. 

15. Ibid.

16. Nye, Future of Power, p. 155.

17. Samuel P. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign 

Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 22.

18. Information provided by government officials as “background” usually refers to information that the media can provide 

the public, but without quoting the name of the official providing 

the information or the office of government he/she might represent. Information provided on “deep background” can be provided by the media to the public, but without any attribution to 

the government at all.
93

19. For example, see “Compellence” available from 

en.citizendium.org/wiki/Compellence.

20. Joseph Nye’s three aspects of relational power, the ability to command change, particularly affecting other’s preferences, 

control agendas, and establish preferences, are, in a large sense, 

by-products of previously established relationships that find their 

roots in soft and hard power, but often in soft power’s ability to 

influence behaviors. See Nye, The Future of Power, pp. 10-11.

21. President Dwight Eisenhower’s News Conference, April 

7, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 382.

22. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical 

Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 131.

23. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in 

Context, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 1981, p. 1.

24. Mary K. Eder, Leading the Narrative: The Case for Strategic 

Communications, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2011, p. xi.

25. “Public Diplomacy,” available from www.usdiplomacy.org/

diplomacytoday/contemporary/public.php.

26. Michael Howard, “Military Power and International Order,” International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3, Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 1964, p. 405.

27. King Louis XIV of France (1643-1715) had the saying, 

Ultima Ratio Regum (last Argument of Kings), stamped onto the 

barrels of all canons that were forged during his reign.

28. Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles, New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1968, p. 34.

29. Raymond Aron, “Richard Nixon and the Future of American Foreign Policy,” Daedalus, Fall 1972, pp. 15-16.

30. Howard, “Military Power,” p. 405.
94

31. Eleven of the 16 battleships had been constructed in U.S. 

shipyards between 1904 and 1907. See JO2 Mike McKinley, “The 

Cruise of the Great White Fleet,” Washington, DC: Department of 

the Navy; Naval History and Heritage Command, available from 

www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf_cruise.htm.

32. Ibid.

33. Thomas Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Shane J. Maddock, 

Debra Kisatsky, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations: 

Volume 1: A History to 1920, 7th Ed., Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 

2010, p. 255.

34. Garett Jones of George Mason University and Tim Kane of 

the Kansas City, MO-based Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 

undertook the study. See Amity Shlaes, “Why Obama’s Pullout 

Push May Harm Rather Than Help,” Atlanta Journal Constitution, 

February 18, 2012. Also see Garett Jones and Tim Kane, “Defense 

and Peace Economics,” Online: Taylor and Francis, 2012.

35. “CSIS Commission on Smart Power,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 

2007, p. 7.

36. CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure 

America, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2007, p. 7. 

37. Karin Zeitvogel, “US Falls to Average in Education Ranking,” December 7, 2010, available from www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5juGFSx9LiPaur6eO1KJAypB2ImVQ?docId

=CNG.5337504e8f65acf16c57d5cac3cfe339.1c1. Also see PISA 2009 

Results: What Students Know and Can Do—Student Performance in 

Reading, Mathematics and Science, Vol. 1, OECD 2010, available 

from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/61/48852548.pdf.

38. PISA 2009 Results, p. 4. 

39. Charlotte Mellander and Kevin Stolarick, “Creativity 

and Prosperity: The Global Creativity Index,” Toronto, Canada: 

Martin Prosperity Institute, January 2011, pp. 3-7, available from 

martinprosperity.org/media/GCI%20Report%20Sep%202011.pdf.
95

40. See for example, “World’s Best Universities: Top 400,” 

U.S. News, 2011, available from www.usnews.com/education/worldsbest-universities-rankings/top-400-universities-in-the-world.

41. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Chicago, 

IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., The Great Books, 1952, Sec 

5:89, p. 505.

42. Joseph Joffe, “Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big,” The National Interest, Summer 2001, available from findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_

m2751/is_2001_Summer/ai_76560814/pg_10/?tag=content;col1.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 

Hart-Rudman Commission, April 15, 2001, Vol. 1, pp. xi, 4.

46. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2009, p. 31.

47. Address by Secretary Hillary Clinton, Washington, DC, 

Brookings Institution, May 27, 2010.

48. “National Security Reform: 12 Central Questions for Responding to the Security Challenges of the 21st Century,” in Robin Dorff and Volker Franke, eds., Conflict Management and “Whole 

of Government:” Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy? 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

April 2012.

49. “Public Diplomacy.”

50. Eder, p. 19.

51. Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch, New York: Routledge, 

2004, p. 53, quoted in Paterson, et al., American Foreign Relations, 

p. 483.

52. See John Winthrop, City upon a Hill, 1630, available from 

www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/winthrop.htm.
96

53. Important Believers & Quotes, available from www.

originofnations.org/books,%20papers/quotes%20etc/quotes.htm.

54. Loch K. Johnson, Seven Sins of American Foreign Policy, 

New York: Pearson Longman, 2007, PP. 249-275.

55. Professor Klaus Schwab, ed., Global Competitiveness Report 

2011-2012, Geneva, Switzerland, 2011, P. 362.

56. World Factbook, CIA.

57. Johnson, Seven Sins, p. 249.

58. Raymond Aron, On War, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & 

Company, Inc., 1958, p. 99.

59. “US National Debt by Presidential Term: Per Capita and 

as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product,” available from www.

skymachines.com/US-National-Debt-Per-Capita-Percent-of-GDP-andby-Presidental-Term.htm.

60. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 

Military Expenditure Database 2011, available from milexdata.sipri.

org displayed in Anup Shah, “World Military Spending,” Global 

Issues, available from www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending. 

61. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, available from the Gaylord Convention Center, National Harbor, 

MD, May 3, 2010, available from www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.

aspx?speechid=1460.

62. For cost data, see “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2012 

Pentagon Spending Request, Feb 15, 2011,” The Cost of War. available from costofwar.com/en/publications/2011/analysis-fiscal-year2012-pentagon-spending-request/.

63. Remarks by Gates, May 3, 2010.

64. “Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request,” Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, p. 1-1, available from comptroller.defense.

gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
97

65. “State and USAID—FY 2013 Budget,” Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of State, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

ps/2012/02/183808.htm.

66. For a brief historical comparison of defense budgets, see 

Lawrence J. Korb, Laura Conley, and Alex Rothman, “A Return to 

Responsibility: What President Obama and Congress Can Learn 

About Defense Budgets from Past Presidents,” Washington, DC: 

Center for American Progress, July 14, 2011, available from www.

americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/defense_budgets.html.

67. Henry Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Kermit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation, Washington, 

DC: The Brookings Institution, 1968, p. 614, cited in Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 66. See also Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy

3rd Ed., New York: Norton, 1977, p. 97.

99

CHAPTER 5

A FUTURE U.S. GRAND STRATEGY:

CONFLICT MANGEMENT FOREVER WITH US,

PEACEBUILDING NOT SO MUCH

Michael Lekson

Nathaniel L. Wilson

“The world is too much with us,” as Wordsworth 

noted in a time of political and industrial revolution.1

 More than 2 centuries later, the world is still 

very much with us, and convulsed by a wide range of 

rapid changes, few of them seeming to be positive and 

most of them posing challenges, and sometimes direct 

threats, to U.S. national security. While it is never fair 

to require a national strategy to be sized to fit a bumper 

sticker or a tweet, it has rarely been harder than now 

to summarize the essential elements of the overarching principles underlying U.S. interactions with the 

wider world, along with the prioritized policies with 

which the U.S. will seek to manage those interactions. 

The times certainly call for a grand strategy. Whether 

or not the U.S. is likely to develop and implement one 

(both much easier to write about than to do), it ought 

to be a useful “thought experiment” to explore what 

such a strategy might look like. In particular, two potential elements of such a strategy—peacebulding and 

conflict management—have grown in importance in 

recent years, and it is worth considering whether this 

trend is likely to continue in any future strategy. The 

context in which these questions will be addressed 

is one in which the overall attitude of the American 

public might well be characterized by a classic country-western song: “Make the world go away.”2

 At the 
100

time of this writing, with the second longest sustained 

overseas conflict in U.S. history still underway3 and 

facing record budget shortfalls, American attitudes 

are decidedly not oriented outward. A January 2012 

Pew Research Center poll on public priorities noted: 

“The public’s concerns rest more with domestic policy 

than at any point in the past 15 years.”4

 Nonetheless, 

the world shows no signs of going away.

This chapter first defines the terms and delineates 

the contours of the concepts described. The subsequent section briefly describes some of the ways in 

which U.S. strategy has been formally articulated. 

Since strategies need to be forward-looking, the problems inherent in predicting the future are explored, 

and the present state of affairs is described. The penultimate section argues that although American power 

has been the common thread tying together the global 

governance institutions and regimes since the end of 

World War II, their institutional effectiveness is fraying and the post-World-War-II security order is in 

unprecedented trouble. Finally, the conclusion speculates on the respective places of conflict management 

and peacebuilding in a future grand strategy at a time 

when prioritization will be a grim reality rather than a 

rhetorical aspiration in managing U.S. relations within 

a world that will continue to be very much with us.

DEFINING THE TERMS

In considering the roles of conflict management 

and peacebuilding in a future U.S. grand strategy, at 

least three terms in the preceding clause would benefit from clear definitions. This chapter is premised on 

somewhat broad definitions for the first two (both excerpts from the definitions in “Peace Terms” booklet 
101

produced by the United States Institute of Peace), and 

adopts a standard definition of the third.

Conflict Management: 

is a general term that describes efforts to prevent, limit, 

contain, or resolve conflicts, especially violent ones. . . . 

It is based on the concept that conflicts are a normal 

part of human interaction and are rarely completely 

resolved or eliminated, but they can be managed.5

This concept can apply either to conflicts within 

states or subunits thereof, or to conflicts between or 

among states or alliances thereof.

Peacebuilding:

Originally conceived in the context of post-conflict 

recovery efforts to promote reconciliation and reconstruction, the term peacebuilding has more recently 

taken on a broader meaning. . . . It also includes conflict 

prevention in the sense of preventing the recurrence of 

violence, as well as conflict management and post-conflict recovery. In a larger sense, peacebuilding involves 

a transformation toward more manageable, peaceful 

relationships and governance structures.6

To a much greater extent than with conflict management, even in its expanded form, the term “peacebuilding” remains much more tied to the nationbuilding or stabilization context.

Bassani describes Grand Strategy as: 

An overarching concept that guides how nations employ all of the instruments of national power to shape 

world events and achieve specific national security ob-
102

jectives. Grand strategy provides the linkage between 

national goals and actions by establishing a deliberately ambiguous vision of the world as we would like 

it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and resources 

(means) we will employ in pursuit of that vision. Effective grand strategies provide a unifying purpose 

and direction to national leaders, public policy makers, 

allies and influential citizens in the furtherance of mutual interests [emphasis added].7

In addition, we argue that if a strategy is truly 

“grand,” it is not about how to solve today’s problems. 

A grand strategy needs to be developed to deal with 

the future, not to provide tactical prescriptions for the 

present, which need to be devised within the context 

of whatever grand strategy was developed in the past. 

Let us first address the strategy question, then the issue of the future.

WHAT IS OUR STRATEGY?

In the post-World-War-II era, there have been 

authoritative highly-classified documents that made 

serious efforts to establish an overall national security strategy, most notably National Security Council 

(NSC)-68 during the Harry Truman administration. 

Whether NSC-68 was truly a “grand” strategy, the 

claim of its successor documents to grandness has become decreasingly plausible. The comprehensiveness 

implicit in the utilization of “all of the instruments of 

national power” has generally been achieved at the 

expense of coherence. Since it was mandated by the 

1986 Goldwater-Nicholas Act, each U.S. President has 

been required to issue a National Security Strategy of the 

United States, which is the closest approximation to a 

U.S. grand strategy that is publicly available.8

 To the 
103

best of our knowledge and recollection (supplemented 

by some research), these national security strategies 

have not been truly strategic, but rather have tended 

to become laundry lists (or policy compendia, if that 

sounds better). While we express some uncertainty 

about the art of prediction, we feel fairly safe in predicting that this pattern will continue.

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies 

four “enduring national interests”: security, prosperity, values, and international order.9

 At that level of 

generality, there probably would not have been much 

dispute that our strategy sought to preserve, protect, 

and defend those interests during the past 30 years, or 

even the 30 years before that. It is tempting to predict 

that this consensus will continue for the next 30 years, 

as well, although, as will be seen, we are less confident 

that there will continue to be an international order 

to preserve.

In any case, while these post-1986 strategy documents have had varying degrees of influence over 

how the executive branch organizes itself and justifies budget requests, their actual strategic content is 

hard to pin down. The justifiable concern that security 

not be too narrowly defined provides entrée to almost 

anything for which there is a need, an argument, or 

a constituency to be presented as promoting national 

security. Bureaucratic, institutional, budgetary, and 

political constraints conspire to create a document 

that may identify a large number of goals, and a number of things to do that may have some bearing on 

trying to achieve each of them, but does not actually 

describe the way from here to there.10 In addition, the 

messiness of the outside world, domestic political reality, and the interagency clearance and coordination 

process combine to elevate everything into a priority, 
104

even when these priorities are mutually incompatible for reasons of policy, resources, or both. In these 

circumstances, we should be grateful for what does 

ultimately emerge from this process, which is by no 

means without its utility, and should resist the temptation of critiquing these documents too harshly from 

the armchair strategist’s perspective. But, on those occasions when it does appear that for a time the United 

States actually had a grand strategy and actually followed it, that strategy has generally been most clearly 

articulated in memoirs after its protagonists had 

left office. 

THE FUTURE AIN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE

For a grand strategy to deal effectively with the future, it must be based on some idea of what that future 

will be, which for most mortals must be founded on 

extrapolating from the present and the past, drawing 

on both what has been personally experienced and 

what has been learned from history. Let us start with 

two inspirational texts: “That men do not learn very 

much from the lessons of history is the most important of all lessons that history has to teach us” (Aldous 

Huxley).11 “The law of unintended consequences is 

the only real law of history” (Niall Ferguson).12

What are the threats, the challenges, and the opportunities that a grand strategy should be designed 

to manage? No one truly knows what the future holds. 

One of the most thought-provoking essays on the general subject of planning for the future is the “Overture” 

to The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century, by 

George Friedman of STRATFOR. He opens by briefly 

revisiting the 20th century, examining how the world 

looked at 20-year intervals to those in charge of strate-
105

gizing. He asks what were the threats, challenges, and 

opportunities that they faced, and that they devised 

their strategies to confront. Almost invariably, what 

they were concerned with was either misconstrued or 

faded either into the background or away altogether, 

while problems that did not loom large, if they were 

noticed at all, became central to international security 

within the 2-decade time tranche. Of course, there 

were some positive surprises as well as the many 

negative ones.13

Looking even 2 decades ahead is quite a stretch 

for contemporary strategists. But the world may be at 

a point where much longer trends are about to have 

a decisive impact. At the conclusion of Why the West 

Rules—for Now, a 663-page analytical survey of world 

history from the days of the Neanderthals to the present, British archaeologist Ian Morris considers existing 

trends and outlines three possible futures, one mainstream and two outliers: More of the same, only with a 

richer China; the Singularity; or Nightfall. To expand 

just a little on his mainstream prediction, the methodology that Morris follows over the millennia to measure “social development” suggests that, no later than 

2103 (and probably earlier), the East (especially China) 

will surpass the West.14 On the simpler metric of total 

economic output, he cites various experts as putting 

the point where China surpasses the United States at 

2016, 2020, 2025, 2027, and 2036. If that is, in fact, the 

shape of things to come, it should serve as a basis for 

developing and implementing a grand strategy.

However, the other two alternative futures which 

he presents as serious possibilities are stark contrasts, both to the mainstream projection and to each 

other. “The Singularity” as a term derives from the 

concept of gravity established in Albert Einstein’s the-
106

ory of general relativity; to quote Stephen Hawking, 

it is “a place where the classical concepts of space and 

time break down, as do all the known laws of physics 

because they are all formulated on a classical spacetime background.”15

In the analogous sense that it is used by Morris, 

it pertains not to fundamental physical properties of 

the universe, but rather to the advance of human technology. In this context, it is a concept long familiar in 

science fiction (it is said to have been coined by author 

Vernor Vinge,16 but the underlying idea antedates 

him) and is perhaps most closely associated now with 

Ray Kurzweil,17 a futurist whose particular vision of it 

sees machine-based intelligence as growing so rapidly 

that within a few decades, it will absorb and redefine 

humanity, transcending biology, and thus effectively 

invalidating all that we know and can project from 

history or the social sciences.18

“Nightfall” is also a science fiction reference, in 

this case to a story by Isaac Asimov in which, due to 

developments beyond its control or understanding, an 

advanced civilization on another planet goes mad and 

destroys itself.19 While the particular trigger for night 

to fall in the story would not apply in our solar system, 

Morris devotes 15 pages to exploring some of the very 

down-to-earth ways that Nightfall could come about 

for us (including disease pandemics, famine, nuclear 

war, and the negative consequences of rapid climate 

change, among other potential catastrophes).20

Both Nightfall and the Singularity are presented as 

serious possibilities, and while we are less confident 

than some that the latter would be benign, we believe 

they should be treated as such. Nonetheless, trying to 

develop a grand strategy that can encompass dealing 

not just with the mainstream “rise of China” prospect, 
107

but also with the actual advent of these much more 

cosmic prospects, is not likely to produce anything 

that in bureaucratese, would be considered “actionable.” However, serious thought needs to be given to 

the issues they raise, even as grand strategies are developed that assume, rightly or otherwise, that we are 

not headed for such discontinuous developments.

Retreating from the cataclysmic, it would still seem 

that any responsible grand strategy needs to take into 

account not just the projection of China’s outpacing 

the United States, but also the very real possibility that 

China will instead fall victim to a failure to surmount 

its governmental, demographic, and environmental 

problems, or will fall short of the heights to which it 

now aspires for some other concatenation of not fully 

foreseeable factors. Whatever happens with China, the 

consequences for U.S. national security will be huge.

With all due respect to both Morris and Friedman, 

we would personally give more weight than they respectively do to contingent developments that can, 

albeit rarely, make a major difference (two examples 

important to the context of this chapter would be 

Adolf Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United 

States after Pearl Harbor, and the Democrats’ 1944 

decision to replace Henry Wallace with Harry Truman).21 Morris is doubtless correct that the vast majority of what we see as decisive turning points in history 

are more accurately understood as slight twists and 

turns in a river which is going to keep on running toward the sea, even if, like the mighty Mississippi, it 

may take the long way around.22 But for the purposes 

of would-be grand strategists, as for General Ulysses 

Grant trying to take Vicksburg, those bends in the 

river are often exactly what they need to be concerned 

with, even while keeping the long-term direction of 
108

flow in mind. Some of these happenstance events are 

not the freely-made decisions of great leaders, but 

are intrinsically not predictable for other reasons. 

This is well articulated by none other than Sir Harry 

Flashman:

If I had been the hero everyone thought I was, or even 

a half-decent soldier, Lee would have won the battle of 

Gettysburg and probably captured Washington. That 

is another story, which I shall set down in its proper 

place if brandy and old age don’t carry me off first [unfortunately, they did], but I mention the fact here because it shows how great events are decided by trifles. 

. . . Scholars, of course, won’t have it so.23

The key point is that even if one can see a trend and 

project from the past where history seems to be heading, human developments can, not always but sometimes, be altered by small but significant events. But 

taking a step back from the occasional accident (most 

of which do not have the kind of ramifications that 

resulted from whatever Flashman did or did not do at 

Gettysburg), there is a major problem for devising any 

kind of strategy, let alone a grand one: the strong tendency for human beings to take things for granted.

24 We 

are not aware of anyone, ourselves included, who is 

free of this trait, although levels of awareness do vary. 

Of course, this propensity is in effect the downside of 

a positive capability—the ability to generalize, to learn 

from experience, and to extrapolate from present perceived reality—the absence of which is certainly not 

going to produce a useful grand strategy, or much of 

anything else. 
109

THE END OF AN ERA?

With the above in mind, we would suggest that we 

may be coming to the end of the post-World-War-II 

order. With every passing day, the ranks dwindle of 

those relative few who remember how nations used 

to interact before there was an “international community,” with structures that underpin it and norms 

that seek to give it purpose and coherence. Anyone 

who was 10 years old when the United Nations (UN) 

Charter entered into force in 1945 would be nearing 

80 today. Virtually everyone of that age and younger 

takes the current international security order for granted. 

But should we? We all grew up with it, so it seems the 

natural order of things. But is it natural and guaranteed to last, or just the temporary product of equally 

temporary circumstances?

This issue is most commonly addressed in terms 

of whether America is “declining,” in either absolute 

or relative terms. There have been a number of books 

written on this subject recently. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 

National Security Adviser to President Carter, thinks 

the post-World War II structure—with the United 

States at the top—is uncertain in the future but for 

now remains: 

The more immediate risk of the ongoing dispersal of 

power is a potentially unstable global hierarchy. The 

United States is still preeminent but the legitimacy, effectiveness, and durability of its leadership is increasingly questioned worldwide because of the complexity 

of its internal and external challenges. Nevertheless, in 

every significant and tangible dimension of traditional 

power—military, technological, economic, and financial—America is still peerless. . . . This reality may not 

endure for very long, but it is still the current fact of 

international life.25
110

In line with this assessment, the authors of Bending History contend that the United States is well 

situated as the preeminent global power. Moreover, 

it can remain so even in a precarious time on the 

international scene:

We believe that even though the world is undergoing 

rapid, sometimes tumultuous change, it is doing so in 

ways that are broadly compatible with the Americandesigned post-World War II order, and that America 

is well placed to manage the ongoing changes in the 

international system as long as it remains strong, respected, and confident. . . . Gradual, managed change 

that accords greater constructive roles to others as they 

become successful economies and polities is very much 

in America’s national interests.26

This is not the place, and we are not the authors, 

to document how this international order developed. 

But it is worth noting that it started with the evolution 

of the UN alliance of countries that were the victors of 

World War II27 into a UN organization whose mission 

was to keep the peace, with that mission entrusted to 

a security council that was given the unprecedented 

mandate to determine whether and when sovereign 

states could use force for purposes other than individual or collective self-defense (and it appears to 

govern and place limits even on that right [which it 

does recognize as inherent], although legalistic analysis and diplomatic rhetoric have far outpaced actual 

state practice in this regard).28 That organization in 

turn grew into a truly global but increasingly feckless parliament of almost all the nations of the world. 

The UN provided the context for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many more such state-
111

ments of good intentions over the years. Similarly, an 

unprecedented U.S. political commitment to Europe 

in the immediate aftermath of the war grew into an 

economic commitment with the Marshall Plan and a 

security commitment with the North Atlantic Treaty, 

which in turn gave rise to a real military alliance 

with forward-deployed American troops as part of 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All 

this gave rise to a genuine feeling—at least, most of 

the time, among a majority of the political leadership 

in Europe and North America that took an interest 

in such matters—of a joint transatlantic community, 

confronting a common danger and sharing not just a 

common purpose but common values. This transatlantic alliance was focused on, but not limited to, the 

military dimension and to countering the threat posed 

by the Soviet Union. On neither side of the Atlantic 

was this in keeping with historical tradition, but by 

now we all think of it as normal.29

This chapter will also refrain from documenting 

the roles of the Bretton Woods System, or the World 

Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), two 

other global structures that have played a major role 

in the post-World War II order. Meanwhile, the end 

of (primarily European) imperialism and colonialism 

brought well over 100 new nations into the UN and 

other political, security, and economic systems and 

structures that had not been designed with their membership in mind. It also helped alter both the economies and aspirations of the European states themselves, which began an unprecedented continental 

process of unification based on free decisions rather 

than conquest, leading from the modest coal and steel 

communities to the European Union (EU), whose integrated economy is larger than that of any country in 
112

the world. A general move in the direction of increasingly open world trade and globalization has brought 

the “creative destruction” of free markets to all quarters of the globe, with the aggravation of those feeling 

the pain often much more acute than the satisfaction 

enjoyed by the usually greater numbers enjoying the 

gain. While globalization had happened before, the 

end of colonialism made it much more a world-wide 

reality than the early 20th century precedent, which 

was supposed to make general war impossible, but 

came to a bad end in 1914 and suffered further indignities following 1929.

Perhaps the single deadliest challenge emerging from World War II—the threat posed by nuclear 

weapons—has been handled successfully so far, 

though only in part by the sort of institutional arrangements outlined above. After it became clear that there 

was not going to be any kind of international authority managing them30 and with the end in 1949 of the 

American nuclear monopoly, the solution ultimately 

developed was deterrence—direct deterrence for both 

the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), plus extended deterrence provided by 

the United States for its NATO and Pacific allies. The 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968, 

provided a basis both for slowing the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, and for a gradual process of negotiated limits and then reductions of both 

American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals.

One thing all these developments and more had 

in common was a strong American hand in bringing 

them about, followed by a continuing U.S. commitment to their success. One could argue that this was 

motivated by a combination of idealism, realpolitik, 

and enlightened self-interest, plus whatever other fac-
113

tors the reader might wish to ascribe.31 Whatever else 

may be said (and much has been and will be), in the 

immediate period following the end of World War II, 

the United States dominated the world both economically and militarily—in a way that it had not before, 

that it has not since, and will not likely happen again—

and chose to demobilize its military and to create 

multilateral institutions to share the task of preserving the peace. Another thing that all the institutions 

mentioned in the preceding three paragraphs have in 

common, from the UN to the NPT, is that they are in 

serious trouble. The difficulties are both financial and 

institutional; the problems that the key organizations 

confront include not having the ability to achieve or 

in some cases even define their very mission and purpose. To add a further complication, without delving 

deeper into economic/energy/environmental issues, 

the conventional view of trends on those fronts would 

seem to suggest a range of major challenges to world 

order and international security.32

PRESENT AT THE NONCREATION

If the current international security order is in perhaps terminal trouble, what will happen next? While 

nothing is certain in politics, we feel confident in 

predicting that it will be a long time, if ever, before a 

U.S. President is elected on the platform that America 

will be the world’s policeman, let alone the world’s 

social worker. This is not because America is necessarily doomed to decline, but because as a result of 

brute political and fiscal reality, neither the will nor 

the resources will be present, either to sustain the order, which may now be coming to an end, or to create 

something to replace it.
114

The fiscal facts speak for themselves. America’s financial house is not in order. Even “smart power” is 

not free, and the military component that makes smart 

power possible comes with a price tag whose figure is 

more than the market will bear.

As for the political situation, judging both from 

historical trends and current realities, the argument 

being made here is that it is highly unlikely that there 

would be sufficient support for the kind of world role 

the United States has been playing even if the money 

to do so had not run out. There has to be a politically 

compelling reason for any democratic country, and 

certainly for the United States, to wish to play the sort 

of role that it has taken on since 1945. The U.S. unity of 

purpose of World War II was unprecedented—starting with 1776, no other foreign or domestic conflict 

has ever enjoyed such solid support among the American people. The international order outlined above, 

whose foundations were laid during World War II 

and which was constructed in the immediate post-war 

years, helped to lock in that support in a way that so 

conspicuously did not happen after World War I. This 

was possible in large measure because Americans saw 

themselves facing a post-war threat from a hostile and 

expansive Communist ideology embodied in a nuclear-armed, continent-sized superpower. The result 

was an acceptance of continued international commitments and engagements alien to American tradition. 

But even at its height, the unity of American purpose 

during the more than 40 years of Cold War was never 

comparable to that of the 4 years of World War II. It 

frayed badly during the Vietnam War and never fully 

recovered. It nonetheless proved sufficient to the task, 

until a confluence of underlying trends and what 

were called earlier in this chapter “contingent events” 
115

produced a peaceful and successful outcome of that 

global conflict.

The unifying theme of American foreign policy in 

the 1990s was to do some good in the world, political support for which was never very strong or deep 

once the various price tags were attached. Following 

September 11, 2001 (9/11), there was a brief period of 

unity of outrage, but there has been very little lasting 

unity of purpose. Whatever else they have achieved, 

the two major military conflicts that the United States 

fought in the past decade have neither strengthened a 

sustainable international security order nor bolstered 

any sense by American voters and taxpayers that they 

want to make any further sacrifices in pursuit of such 

an order. In the latter case, the result has been very 

much the reverse. 

“Present at the Creation” moments are very rare, 

and usually follow the sort of destruction that is announced with a bang, not a whimper. Two of the best 

known such instances—the Congress of Vienna and 

the period from 1945 to roughly 1952—each came at 

the end of a major armed struggle, with clearly defined victors and vanquished, with the former in a position to establish structures, such as the 1815 Concert 

of Europe and the 1945 UN Security Council, which 

are by no definition “fair.” Following World War I, 

the effort at Versailles to replicate the success of Vienna a century earlier failed for a number of reasons, 

including in part that what seemed fair to one party 

did not seem so to others, and in particular that the 

vanquished were not resigned to that fate and that the 

principal victor with a vision did not stay the course—

precisely because what was being called for was so 

alien to the U.S. sense of its role in the world. 
116

Whether the end of the Cold War offered a lost opportunity for the establishment of yet another enduring security order is debatable but doubtful. As with 

Versailles, though for very different reasons, the nature of the victory was not conducive to reinventing 

a sustainable and effective international system. Nor 

(and in this case, the post-World-War-I situation is a 

closer analogy) was the American body politic receptive to the idea of new overseas entanglements, and 

neither Japan nor Europe had the means to play an 

appropriate role, even if on some occasions they were 

not without motivation. The much less ambitious 

idea that did emerge, of a “new world order” based 

on an empowered UN and an increased reliance on 

principled multilateralism, can hardly be said to have 

enjoyed more than an occasional success. 

The record of effectiveness of the much less structured components of “global governance” that have 

grown up in the penumbra is even less impressive. 

The failure of global governance was taken as a given 

in Chapter 3 authored by Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg 

in this volume. A stern but not unfair assessment of 

this concept is offered by Professor Randall Schweller:

Most new treaty-making and global-governance institutions are being spearheaded not by an elite club 

of great powers but rather by civil-society actors and 

nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] working 

with midlevel states. Far from creating more order 

and predictability, this explosion of so-called globalgovernance institutions has increased the chaos, randomness, fragmentation, ambiguity and impenetrable 

complexity of international politics.33

There are two potentially interrelated possibilities 

that are worth consideration as a basis for a new international order that might have a serious prospect of 
117

meeting the challenges that appear to be overcoming 

the current one: that the international organizations 

and institutions that are depicted above as faltering 

and potentially on the verge of mission failure can be 

replaced by new ones, better attuned to current reality, or that as America does less to sustain whatever 

international order there is, others will do more. Neither seems likely.

As suggested above, the sort of circumstances that 

would offer the prospect of a serious Creation moment—on the order of 1815 or post-1945—are simply 

not in existence now, nor is there any reason to expect 

(though as noted more than once above, accidents will 

happen) that they will come about in the time that a 

new grand strategy needs to address. It is easy to argue 

that major changes are desperately needed. It is next 

to impossible to imagine how they can actually come 

about, at least in a positive direction. A reinvented UN 

would need to be established by the same countries 

that have failed to make the current UN work. If there 

is a politically feasible way to reform the UN Security Council to make it more fair, no one has found 

it. Making it more effective is even further out of the 

question. 

The need to reform both the structure as well as 

the operational effectiveness of the UN has been 

recognized for decades, as documented in and demonstrated by the bipartisan 2005 UN Task Force. An 

excerpt from the foreword to its report (written by 

co-chairs Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell) sets 

the tone: 

As it approaches its sixtieth anniversary, the United 

Nations needs reform and reinvigoration. Otherwise, 

the organization risks declining credibility, and its own 

future will be at risk.34
118

The Task Force cited a long string of reports calling 

for reforms in UN management dating back to the late 

1940s, but achieving little or nothing, being bogged 

down under the weight of the institution’s enormous 

inertia, a record that reinforces the point that real reform is not going to happen. The values that underlay 

the UN charter were not universally shared at the time 

that it was written, nor are they today. “Responsibility to Protect” may have found its high-water mark 

in Libya, along with the overall concept of “brother’s 

keeper” internationalism as an actual practice rather 

than a noble aspiration. The very role of the UN, the 

importance of the P-5 (the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council), and the 

unique standing of the Security Council in legitimizing force or other hostile actions against recalcitrant 

states are all part of the post-World War II order. This 

is not the way that international conflict was managed 

at any time before 1945. The UN is not working effectively for its primary purpose. For varying reasons, 

those in a position to make it less ineffective by paying 

the bills and providing the other resources (including 

but not limited to military ones) appear by their actions to have concluded that it costs more than they are 

willing or able to provide. In some cases, they feel that 

they are being asked and expected to pay at a level that 

ought to but does not grant them the corresponding 

status in the structure that they believe they merit. It 

would be surprising if the UN itself does not continue, 

but its ability to be a practical rather than symbolic 

center of an international security order, which never 

really took hold in the Cold War years, has continued 

to deteriorate following a brief period of better times 

in the early 1990s. It would be even more surprising if 

that trend does not continue.
119

Like the UNSC, the NPT is the product of the situation at the time of its creation (the NPT came into being 

when there were five nuclear-weapons states, which 

happened to be the same as the UN Security Council’s P-5 victors of World War II). Both the UN Security 

Council and the NPT can be logically portrayed as intrinsically unfair. But, as with the UN Security Council, the same countries that find fault with the NPT, 

whether members or not, will be the ones that have 

to create any plausible amended or successor treaty 

regime, which will also need to be satisfactory to those 

who are not unhappy with the current arrangements. 

While it is not difficult for experts to imagine a revised 

or replaced NPT regime that would be both fairer and 

more effective, it is virtually impossible, for us at least, 

to imagine how to reach universal agreement to any 

change that would actually strengthen it. 

One assumption implicit in all of the above is 

the continuing centrality of the nation-state. Despite 

the importance of issues that regularly cross borders 

(which is one of the major reasons for having multilateral organizations in the first place), and of transnational belief systems, both religious and ideological, 

which can inspire both states and nonstate actors, the 

fundamental security structures continue to be states, 

and, in some special cases (NATO being the most 

prominent and most successful), assemblages thereof 

that scrupulously respect their members’ sovereignty. 

For a time, there was a feeling that an ever deeper EU 

might invalidate this observation. The Euro crisis is 

a strong counterargument. Whether nation-states 

are here to stay, they will retain their central role in 

international security for at least as long as any new 

grand strategy remains relevant, and probably much 

longer. It is more difficult to predict the nature of the 
120

structures in which states will aggregate themselves 

in quest of security. Survival is a core interest. Thus, 

over a finite period of time, in the presence of a clearly 

defined threat or threats, a collective security arrangement can continue, if the cost is not too high. In the case 

of NATO and the EU, among others, shared values 

also have strengthened the bonds among their founding states and thus of the organizations themselves, 

and the accession process has fortified those values in 

many of the states that sought to join both organizations over the years. But both have now reached the 

point where further expansion is decreasingly plausible, and the bruised feelings of unsuccessful aspirants 

to membership will be reflected in new geopolitical 

fault lines. 

Although NATO and the EU have never been immune to a similar failing, the UN’s concept of universal membership soon made it impossible to conceal the disjunction between noble aspirations and 

frequently ignoble reality, especially as related to the 

conduct, both internal and external, of member states. 

Moreover, while actually acting on the basis of shared 

values can in many circumstances increase the attractiveness of such organizations, both the costs and risks 

of doing so, the many incomplete successes, and the 

painful reality that good deeds are rarely done consistently can undercut internal cohesiveness, especially 

with respect to perceived “free riders,” including 

those in positions of authority. Institutional inertia 

and clever efforts at reinvention can keep organizations going much longer than many might have predicted, but such measures can sometimes conceal the 

fact that the organizations themselves are hollowing 

out. The League of Nations did not formally disband 

until 1946, but beginning with the Japanese invasion 
121

of Manchuria in 1931, it had ceased to be a serious part 

of the security landscape. 

Looking forward, global power is realigning itself, 

and not in a peacebuilding-friendly way. Even more 

than was the case in the 1990s, neither Europe nor Japan has the resources or the domestic political base 

to take on additional international burdens, either to 

maintain or reinvent the international security order. 

None of the newly aspiring powers of the 21st century, even China, is going to achieve the level of global 

dominance that, combined with an attractive set of 

political, economic, and cultural ideas, made possible 

America’s post-1945 creation moment and sustained 

it thereafter. Even in the unlikely event that some 

partial, and probably fragile, successor order were to 

emerge, anyone expecting that it would be based on 

the values that have underlain the post-World War II 

order as described above should examine the reasons 

for making such an assumption. 

QUO VADIMUS?

Following this rather melancholy overview of the 

origins, present state, and prospects of the international security order, any who have read this far might 

well wonder what this all portends for peacebuilding 

and conflict management as part of a future American 

grand strategy, even keeping in mind the difficulties 

of political prediction.

Referring back to the way those terms were defined 

at the outset of this chapter, “peacebuilding”—in the 

sense of outsiders moving into a troubled nation-state 

to end its conflicts, stabilize its society, build its institutions, and set it on a secure path to democracy and 

prosperity—is likely to play a very much decreased 

part of such a strategy, and an even smaller part in 
122

actual practice. Peacebuilding in this sense is simply 

not an endeavor which there is any good reason to expect that the American body politic can be persuaded 

is a good investment of scarce discretionary resources. 

With the possible exception of Bosnia, popular support for serious and sustained efforts in this regard has 

come about only when they have been seen as an element of the active conduct of a specific kind of armed 

conflict (primarily Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan)—the 

sort of conflict for which popular support can be guaranteed to wane over time, with a consequent collapse 

of support for the peacebuilding supplement to the 

military mission. But in the coming years, this sort of 

peacebuilding is not likely even to be given a chance 

to have the rug pulled out from underneath it, since 

for political, economic, and military reasons—and in 

the expected absence of anything comparable to the 

Cold War “containment of Communist expansion” 

argument that underlay Vietnam, or the 9/11-related 

rationales for Iraq and Afghanistan—the political and 

economic barriers to American entry to another conflict of that sort are now so high as to be almost insurmountable, and are likely to remain so for the life of 

any potential new grand strategy.

Nonetheless, peacebuilding will remain an active 

and important component of international relations. 

This is particularly true with regard to work done by 

NGOs around the world. A wide range of organizations specialize in different facets of peacebuilding. 

Much of their funding comes from U.S. agencies, or 

counterparts from other developed countries, as well 

as from various parts of the UN family. This will likely 

continue, although probably at reduced levels. There 

is a vibrant peacebuilding community, which has 

developed increasing and impressive coherence and 

patterns of collaboration.35 This kind of peacebuilding 
123

work will continue to be noted in future National Security Strategies of the United States, along with many 

other important endeavors. But to the extent that 

these documents actually reflect a governmentally 

crafted and executed grand strategy to which major 

government resources are devoted, peacebuilding is 

not likely to be a central element of it.

Humanitarian relief (as distinct from humanitarian 

intervention) will continue to enjoy popular support, 

to a much greater extent than traditional development efforts. However, for either relief or development, both the executive and especially the legislative branches are likely to be increasingly tight-fisted 

with funding, and ever vigilant against being drawn 

down the slippery slope into stabilization, let alone 

counterinsurgency. This will almost certainly mean 

that many dangerous situations threatening American interests will not be directly addressed, and that 

the hard-learned lessons of how to do these jobs right 

will not get a chance to be applied. Failed, failing, and 

fragile states are not conducive to international stability, but from a cost-benefit standpoint, Americans 

(or Europeans, Japanese, Australians, or Canadians) 

are not likely to devote much beyond token resources 

to trying to address this problem. To put it mildly, 

peacebuilding success stories are scarce, at least on a 

strategic scale, and money is even more scarce. When 

it comes to peacebuilding, we should thus expect to 

see a lot less of the same.

“Conflict management,” however, was defined in 

a broader way. Conflict itself is not going away, and 

there will be an abiding U.S. concern to protect, and if 

possible advance, its own interests and equities. For 

reasons of self-interest (enlightened or otherwise), it 

will wish to try to help keep such conflicts from turning violent, particularly (perhaps almost exclusively) 
124

between and among states. Conflicts of particular concern as of this writing would include the nuclear proliferation-generated standoff between Israel and Iran, 

the perennial enmity between India and Pakistan, and 

Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the South China 

Sea. More could be added to the list even now, and if 

the argument outlined above about the potential end 

of the post-World-War-II security order is valid, other 

sources of conflict, including some problems long 

thought resolved or even forgotten, could well join 

the list in coming years. Economic and resource conflicts—not always violent, though often having that 

potential, but in any case directly threatening domestic prosperity in the United States and elsewhere—

also loom on the horizon. 

The need to manage such conflicts is likely to be 

much more compelling, and the prospects of success 

to appear at least somewhat less unpromising, than 

on-the-ground peacebuilding. Not long after the fall 

of the Berlin Wall, one of the few American diplomats 

who foresaw that development told one of us that the 

coming years would bring a return to traditional diplomacy, by which he meant a much more complex set of 

international interactions than those which had been 

governed by the structure that the East/West divide 

had provided during the Cold War. For those who experienced it, the Cold War was complex enough, and 

the risks of getting it wrong were sometimes quite 

high. It took a bit longer than the diplomat anticipated 

for what he predicted to come about, with much of 

one decade taken up with efforts at what was referred 

to above as “brother’s keeper” internationalism, and 

much of another focused on trying to solve problems 

in and emerging from the Islamic world. Neither of 

these two attempts at a unifying principle has proved 

a satisfactory basis for an international security order, 
125

and neither is likely to provide a central principle for 

any U.S. grand strategy.

What we are likely to see instead is the need for 

even more conflict management, if this is understood 

as a mix of at least two of the three D’s (defense and 

diplomacy—as indicated above, we are less sanguine 

about the role of development). Recalling the concerns explored above both about the dangers of taking 

trends for granted and the possibilities of contingent 

events having disproportionate consequences, both 

the diplomats and the military will have to place a 

premium on flexibility.36 They will also need to practice selective engagement, since the threats and challenges will be multifold and all elements of national 

power are going to be on tight rations for some time 

to come. “Doing more with less” is a fine phrase, but 

as a guide to policy, it is too often used as a pretext to 

avoid prioritization. 

While keeping in mind the precursors to the 

“Nightfall” threats noted above, as well as the rise of 

China (see Chapter 12 by Liselotte Odgaard in this 

volume) and, the decline and possible fall of the postWorld War II security order, challenges that a U.S. 

grand strategy will need to address include aggressive nonstate actors of all kinds (including, but by no 

means limited to, terrorists); the possible end of the 

taboo on the actual use of nuclear weapons, which, 

paradoxically coupled with the extended deterrence of 

the U.S. nuclear guarantee, has been a key element of 

the post-World War II order; revolutionary developments in technology; the vulnerability of Information 

Technology (IT)-centric infrastructure; and continuing 

uncertainty over whether economic growth can be restored, sustained, and made more widespread, as well 

as how to manage access to vital and sometimes scarce 

natural resources. (The reasons why a would-be grand 
126

strategy becomes just another policy compendium are 

all too apparent.) Recalling the comments earlier in 

this chapter about the difficulties of prediction, there 

will be many developments that in retrospect may appear obvious, but which to those who have to discern 

them looking forward are not obvious at all. In short, 

there will be no shortage of conflicts to manage, and 

we will all need to keep getting better at it if we want 

this story to have a happy ending. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. The title of a sonnet by English poet William Wordsworth, 

first published in 1807. It is readily accessible in print and online.

2. Written by Hank Cochran, sung by artists ranging from 

Elvis to Ray Price to Dean Martin and, of course, Willie Nelson; 

Eddy Arnold took it to #1 in 1965. Available from en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/Make_the_World_Go_Away.

3. While Vietnam still holds the distinction of being the longest war in American history, the overall context in which Americans confront the issues addressed in this chapter needs to be 

appreciated. In his presentation at the XXIII Annual Strategy Conference held at the U.S. Army War College on April 10-12, 2012, 

Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work distributed a chart that 

compared the war-to-peace ratio of the Cold War and post-ColdWar periods. For the 506 months of Cold War (starting in 1950, 

and including both Korea and Vietnam), the United States was 

“at war” for 138 months. For the 271 months looking back from 

April 2012, the United States had been at war for 130 months “and 

still counting.” The Cold War ratio was thus 1 month at war for 

every 2.67 months at peace. What the chart called the post-1990 

“Forever War” ratio was 1 month at war for every 1.08 month at 

peace. By April 2013, that latter ratio of war-to-peace was greater 

than 1:1. The full set of slides for Under Secretary Work’s presentation is available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/

files/2012-strat-conf-work.pdf.

4. The report is available from www.people-press.org/2012/01/23/

public-priorities-deficit-rising-terrorism-slipping/.
127

5. Dan Snodderly, ed., Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, Washington, DC: Academy for 

International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United 

States Institute of Peace, 2011, p. 15.

6. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

7. Joe Bassani, Jr., “Saving the World for Democracy: An Historical Analysis of America’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” 

Thesis, Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School, 2005, p. 2, available from www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/ndu/bassani_jaws_american_grand_strategy.pdf. 

8. James Locher, “Are We Strategically Inept?” speech, XXIII 

Conference, “The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Austerity: Challenges and Opportunities,” Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 11, 2012; John K. Bartolotto, “The Origin and Developmental Process of the National 

Security Strategy,” Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. 

Army War College, May 3, 2004, p. 1. In particular, this and the 

next two paragraphs draw extensively on the Bartolotto paper. 

9. Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United 

States, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 17, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_

security_strategy.pdf. 

10. A paraphrase of Locher.

11. Andrew Roberts, ed., What Might Have Been: Leading Historians on Twelve ‘What Ifs” of History, London, UK: Phoenix, 2005, 

p. 8. Roberts takes the quote from “a framed letter written by Aldous Huxley in 1959” which he has “by my desk at home.”

12. Niall Ferguson, “Europe’s Lehman Brothers Moment,” 

Newsweek, June 18, 2012, pp. 34-37. Quote is from p. 37.

13. George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st 

Century, London, UK: Allison & Busby, 2010, pp. 1-13. In pp. 1-3, 

Friedman looks back at the 20th century. The remaining 10 pages 

of the “overture” look forward.
128

14. Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of 

History, and What They Reveal About the Future, New York: Farrar, 

Straus, and Giroux, 2010, pp. 582-583. His “social development” 

metrics are explained in an appendix, pp. 623-645. See also pp. 

591 and 608.

15. Stephen Hawking, “Breakdown of Predictability in Gravitational Collapse,” Physical Review D, Vol. 14, No. 10, 1976, p. 2460, 

doi: 10.1103/PhysRevD.14.2460; Hawking deals with this concept 

in a way more accessible to the general reader in A Brief History 

of Time: The Updated and Expanded Tenth Anniversary Edition, New 

York: Bantam Books, 1998.

16. Vernor Vinge, “The Coming Technological Singularity,” 

presentation, VISION-21 Symposium, NASA Lewis Research 

Center and the Ohio Aerospace Institute, Westlake, OH, March 

30-31, 1993, available from www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/

singularity.html; James Gardner, “The Intelligent Universe,” Steven J. Dick and Mark L. Lupisella, eds., Cosmos & Culture, Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

2009, p. 366. 

17. Morris, p. 593 et seq.

18. Ray Kurzweil describes the Singularity thus: 

It’s a future period during which the pace of technological 

change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will 

be irreversibly transformed. Although neither utopian nor dystopian, this epoch will transform the concepts that we rely on 

to give meaning to our lives, from our business models to the 

cycle of human life, including death itself. Understanding the 

Singularity will alter our perspective on the significance of our 

past and the ramifications for our future. To truly understand it 

inherently changes one’s view of life in general and one’s own 

particular life.

See also Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, New York: Viking Penguin, 2005, p. 7.

19. “Nightfall,” first published in 1941, can be found in a 

number of science fiction anthologies, as well as in Asimov’s 

own collections. The Science Fiction Writers of America (SFWA) 
129

professional association voted it “the best science fiction story of 

all time,” where “story” means short story and “all time” means 

1929-64, following which the SFWA began making annual awards. 

Together with the other stories that were selected, “Nightfall” can 

thus be found in Robert Silverberg, ed., The Science Fiction Hall 

of Fame, Vol. I, New York: Tor Books, 2003 [orig. 1970]). Morris’s 

bibliography cites Isaac Asimov, The Complete Short Stories I, New 

York: Bantam, 1990). 

20. Morris, pp. 598-613. 

21. Since, as will be seen, the central importance of the legacy 

of World War II is one of the premises of this chapter’s analysis, two further “what if’s” are noted from Roberts, p. 3, citing 

Conrad Russell: 

If we [the British] had not invented, during the winter of 1938/39, 

a new alloy and a new furnace to make it which hardened the 

propeller casing of the Spitfire, and made it 50 m.p.h. faster than 

the Messerschmitt instead of 50 m.p.h. slower, it is surely likely 

that Hitler would have won the war. 

He also cites, pp. 11-12:

. . . what so nearly happened on Thursday 16 October 1941, a 

date that some historians . . . see as the most important date of 

the twentieth century. For it was on that day that Stalin decided 

not to take the special train that he had made ready to get him 

out of Moscow to beyond the Urals, but instead to stick it out in 

the capital, come what may.

22. Morris, p. 29. Morris draws on the fields of biology, sociology, and geography, broadly defined to include human/economic as well as physical geography, to explain humanity’s development paths.

23. George MacDonald Fraser, ed., Royal Flash: from the 

Flashman Papers, 1842-3 and 1847-8, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

1970, p. 3.

24. Aldous Huxley, “Maine de Biran: The Philosopher in History,” Collected Essays, New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 

1959, p. 226.
130

Most human beings have an almost infinite capacity for taking 

things for granted. By the mere fact of having come into existence, the most amazing novelty becomes in a few months, even 

a few days, a familiar and, as it were, self-evident part of the 

environment. 

25. Zbigniew Brezezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, New York: Basic Books, 2012, pp. 21-22.

26. Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. 

O’Hanlon, Bending History, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p. 279.

27. “Declaration by the United Nations,” The American Journal 

of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 3, Supplemental: Official Documents, July, 1942, pp. 191-192, available from www.jstor.org/stable/2213575. One lesson that President Roosevelt appears to have 

learned from President Wilson’s ill-fated League of Nations was 

to use the same name for the wartime alliance that would also be 

used for the peacetime collective security arrangement.

28. Mark P. Popiel, “Redrafting the Right of Self-Defense in 

Response to International Terrorism,” Gonzaga Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2002, pp. 7-9, available from www.gonzagajil.org/pdf/volume6/Popiel/Popiel.pdf, see especially pp. 4-12. 

Chapter 5: The Security Council, Article 23, Charter of the United 

Nations, June 26, 1945, available from www.un.org/en/documents/

charter/chapter5.shtml.

29. For an interesting history of transatlanticism, see Kenneth 

Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 

2009. Whether or not we are in the early years of a possible “Pacific Century,” it is very hard to imagine the circumstances which 

would generate a “transpacific community” or an awkwardly 

pronounceable “transpacificism.” This is at least partially due 

to the geographic factors (“it was maps, not chaps”) that Morris 

(Chap. 8) identifies as the primary reason, in contrast to culture, 

the actions of individual leaders, and happenstance for the fact 

that Europe rather than China reached, conquered, and colonized 

the Americas, helping ensure the subsequent 500-year ascendance 

of “the West.”
131

30. Accounts of the efforts to put atomic energy and associated weaponry under international control include John H. Barton 

and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds., International Arms Control: Issues 

and Agreements, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, p. 70; 

United Nations Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970, New York: 

United Nations, 1970; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My 

Years in the State Department, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, pp. 149-156.

31. For a provocative discussion on this topic, see Michael 

Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath, New York: Public Affairs, 2005. 

There is no shortage of books, articles, studies, and the like to support any perspective that appeals to the reader.

32. While rendering no judgment on the pros and cons of 

“peak oil” or other such arguments, it should be noted that there 

are a number of nongeological reasons why counting on cheap oil 

(or any kind of cheap energy) is a risky proposition. It is worth 

citing a recent judgment in The Economist: “Just as the industrial 

revolution was built on coal, the post-second-world-war economy 

was built on cheap oil. There will surely be a significant impact if 

it has gone for good.” “Feeling Peaky,” The Economist’s Buttonwood’s Notebook Blog, April 21, 2012, available from www.economist.com/node/21553034. On the other hand, a more upbeat look at 

our energy future is now beginning to gain some prominence; as 

of this writing, the most interesting thinking of its implications for 

international security that we have seen has been done by Walter 

Russell Mead, “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century,” available from blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/

the-energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/. As noted, energy issues, although highly important, are beyond the scope of this 

chapter, as reflected in their being addressed only in a footnote. 

Mead notes, as do others writing about tar sands, shale oil, and 

the like, that “it is too soon to tell just how much of this potential 

can be unlocked,” and that there are environmental issues that 

will need to be addressed. From the standpoint of this chapter, 

and on first consideration, there does not appear to be any intrinsic reason why Mead’s vision of the United States as an energy 

superpower would entail its adopting what he might call a “Wilsonian” approach to multilateralism, rather than a “Hamiltonian” 
132

commitment to open markets. Our initial assessment is that while 

there are many reasons to welcome a possible future of U.S. “energy abundance,” in and of itself such a development is not likely 

to remedy our economic woes, nor to turn back the receding tide 

of political support for maintaining the post-World War II international security order as described below. In any case, even the 

cursory treatment of this footnote illustrates the importance of 

carefully considering what one is taking for granted when thinking about the future. 

33. Randall L. Schweller, “Ennui Becomes Us,” The National 

Interest, December 16, 2009, January-February 2010, available 

from nationalinterest.org/article/ennui-becomes-us-3330. 

34. Task Force on the United Nations, American Interests and 

UN Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations, Washington, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2005, esp. pp. 

41-61. This quote is from p. vi; those in the following sentence 

are from p. 43. The report is available from www.usip.org/files/file/

usip_un_report.pdf. Further information about the UN Task Force 

is available from www.usip.org/node/3690.

35. For example, see Steven Ruder, “Peacebuilding Expands 

Across Disciplines, Study Shows,” available from www.usip.org/

publications/peacebuilding-expands-across-disciplines-study-shows.

36. In this regard, it is worth exploring the emergent phenomenon of “collective conflict management” characterized as 

a relatively new pattern of cooperation in international affairs 

with no organizational center or universal rules of the road. . . .

A defining feature of these relatively cooperative ventures is 

that they span global, regional, and local levels in terms of their 

institutional membership or actor composition.

Quote is from Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World, 

Washington, DC; The United States Institute of Peace Press, 

2011, p. 545.
133

CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF PEACEBUILDING 

AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

IN A FUTURE AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY:

TIME FOR AN “OFF SHORE” APPROACH?

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

As the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan wind down, it is the right time to 

examine the role of peacebuilding and conflict management in a future American grand strategy. With 

the enormous cost in blood and money these efforts 

have tallied, it seems clear that nations, to include especially the United States, need to consider alternative approaches to accomplish their strategic goals. 

As unpopular as the recent conflicts have become in 

the American body politic, it seems inevitable that 

circumstances arise where peacebuilding and conflict 

management operations are needed.

Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the Armed 

Forces to develop methodologies to accomplish these 

missions, and to do so in a way that is supportable by 

the public. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 

what that approach might be and how it might address the existing deficiencies in peacebuilding and 

conflict management techniques, and to do so in the 

context of an American grand strategy. It will propose 

an “off shore” approach, one that leverages American 

asymmetric capabilities, while realistically assessing 

the difficulties occasioned by manpower-intensive 

approaches that are extant. The chapter begins with 
134

a discussion of the threshold questions, the ones that 

will provide the necessary context for the proposal: 

What is grand strategy? Does America have one? 

WHAT IS GRAND STRATEGY?

Answering this question presents a daunting challenge, as there are so many respected authorities who 

believe that America does not have a grand strategy 

now, and has little prospect of formulating one that is 

suitable for planning purposes in the near future.1

 Yet 

definitions for grand strategy exist. For example, the 

American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University defines grand strategy as a “quintessentially interdisciplinary concept, approach, and field of study.”2

 It 

goes on to say that:

• Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends 

and means. It involves purposive action—what 

leaders think and want.

• It operates in peacetime and wartime, incorporating military and nonmilitary tools and 

aggregating subsidiary tactics, operations, and 

policies.

• Grand strategy begins with theory: leaders’ 

ideas about how the world is, or ought to be, 

and their states’ roles in that world. Yet it is 

embodied in policy and practice: government 

action and reaction in response to real (or perceived) threats and opportunities.

• It lends itself to vigorous interpretive academic 

debates, yet it is so realistic that practitioners 

can and must contribute for it to be properly 

understood.3
135

With that understood, the Duke program defines 

American grand strategy as: 

the collection of plans and policies by which the leadership of the United States mobilizes and deploys the 

country’s resources and capabilities, both military and 

nonmilitary, to achieve its national goals.4

One might say, then, that American grand strategy 

simply seeks to create an environment where American values can flourish, to include especially the free 

enterprise system as well as a liberal democratic polity. This is not intended to be yet another expression 

of American exceptionalism, but rather a manifestation of the idea that these two principles offer the best 

hope of realistically harnessing human nature for not 

just American interests, but for the global common 

good writ large.

This is not to advocate unbridled free enterprise. 

Free enterprise that is exploitive of individuals, especially those in a society who—for any number of reasons—feel themselves dispossessed or unable to access the means of upward mobility, can be the source 

of societal discontent and disorder. Additionally, free 

enterprise that is indifferent to the environment in a 

world increasingly aware of the global consequences 

of environmental mismanagement can generate hostility across a range of actors from individuals to nongovernmental groups to nation-states and even to 

consortiums of nation-states.

Democracy, qua democracy, can itself be the source 

of alienation if it is permitted to devolve into majoritarian tyranny. Liberal democracy, with its respect for 

individual rights and the rule of law, has an architecture that includes freedom of the press, an indepen-
136

dent judiciary, and other attributes that help to avoid 

the kinds of pressures that can manifest themselves in 

violence when individuals and groups feel hopelessly 

subjugated by governments who simplistically cater 

to an undifferentiated version of “popular” will.

Yet it is nevertheless true that these concepts—free 

enterprise and liberal democracy—when tempered 

by the considerations just discussed, provide the best 

hope of reconciling mankind’s inherent impulse to act 

in its own best interests, with a parallel need to act collaboratively in a complex and interconnected world. 

Certainly these values have imperfect characteristics, 

but overall, they have proven superior to other concepts of human organization.

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 

AND CONFLICT

Quite obviously, the values of an American grand 

strategy so defined thrive best in a conflict-free environment. Historically—and, indeed, to this day—the 

primary purpose of the state is to create that environment. The means of doing so frequently was—and, it 

seems, still is—to organize the means of violence on behalf of the state—or collection of states—and to apply 

it whenever the condition of peace was disturbed or 

threatened. In a perfect world, individuals and states 

inclined to disrupt peace would be deterred from doing so by the prospect of conflict that, as a matter of 

logic, would be an inefficient and cost-prohibitive 

means of resolving disputes.

It is not, of course, a perfect world. Some individuals and states have perceived, and likely will continue 

to perceive, a security asymmetry that can be exploited 

to their benefit. What is more, for a variety of reasons—
137

religion, ideology, cultural identity, and more—they 

can rationalize a sense of entitlement of superiority for 

themselves. Such perceptions can translate—however 

illogically—into a belief that those so disposed possess the power to achieve their ends by force. Efforts 

to dissuade such conclusions can be effective, but have 

their limits simply because intransigence can also be a 

feature of the human mind, and one that can contaminate the thinking of entire societies, to include those 

who are otherwise cosmopolitan and even generally 

pacific.

Plato reportedly adroitly observed that “only the 

dead have seen the end of war.” Thus, we must accept 

that the nature of the human condition is such that 

for the foreseeable future—irrespective of any grand 

strategy—the vagaries of the human condition—not to 

mention humanity’s aggressive impulses—will continue to challenge the success of an American grand 

strategy as I defined it. 

Yet the inevitability of human conflict does not 

mean we should abandon efforts to avoid it. Every 

instance of success represents lives saved and futures 

preserved. Even where violence cannot be avoided, 

efforts to ameliorate and limit its effects are patently 

worthy endeavors because they readily encourage a 

minimization of human suffering, as well as help create a space, so to speak, for liberal democracy and free 

enterprise to take root and prosper.

The question then is how best to create those 

spaces in an era of the ever present risk of violence? In 

an interesting article in the March/April 2012 issue of 

Foreign Affairs entitled “A Clear and Present Safety,” 

the authors Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen assert that America is safer and more secure than ever 

before, and faces no great power rival and no serious 
138

threats.5 According to Zenko and Cohen, the United 

States needs a foreign policy that reflects that reality.

The article also contends that: 

because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States, Washington overemphasizes 

military approaches to problems (including many that 

could best be solved by nonmilitary means).6

It goes on to insist that:

although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly 

through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors.7

Zenko and Cohen are not alone in their views. In 

his recent book, Winning the War on War, Joshua Goldstein made a similar claim, arguing that, “in fact, the 

world is becoming more peaceful.”8 Goldstein gives 

great credit not to the United States, but to the United 

Nations (UN) for its peacekeeping and other operations that he argues could be even more successful 

were they better funded and supported.

While there is much to commend about Zenko 

and Cohen’s essay (as well as the Goldstein book), the 

problem with the thesis that both propound is the insufficient appreciation of what the world will be like 

if U.S. military power is perceived as compromised. 

If that were to become the case, there is the extraordinarily dangerous prospect that opportunistic nations 

will destabilize the world if they get the impression 

that U.S. military power is on the wane, let alone being deliberately diminished. Some around the globe 
139

may cheer but, unfortunately, many are not necessarily the friends of peace.

The real value of U.S. military power is that its mere 

existence in many instances permits—and gives gravitas to—the very civilian/nongovernmental organization (NGO) soft power concepts Zenko et al. endorse. 

To be sure, it is quite true that many successes in the 

past were the product of diplomatic, humanitarian, 

economic, and other distinctly nonmilitary efforts, but 

they were accomplished in a world where enormous 

American military power was always lurking in the 

background. The reality, as uncomfortable as it may 

be for many, is that the U.S. military is the irreplaceable peace enabler in today’s world. 

There is little reason to assume that the same kind 

of soft-power victories that Zenko and others celebrate 

would be possible if the military equation is altered 

in a serious way. Should the overwhelming U.S. conventional—and unconventional—capability recede, 

adversaries may see opportunity, perhaps not today, 

but in the foreseeable future. Once a capability is dismantled—as has been done by the United States with 

the F-22 manufacturing line9—it is very difficult, if not 

impossible, to resurrect it. We must never forget that 

U.S. military power takes the military option off the 

table for many competitors. Economic, social, political, etc., competitions remain, but creating an environment where the military option becomes conceivable 

is hardly a desirable outcome.

To be clear, one might rightly agree that U.S. military spending must come down to some degree in order to help get our economic house in order, and that 

the nonmilitary elements of American power need to 

be better brought to bear in the execution of American grand strategy in the years to come. Yet, some still 
140

believe that U.S. military might must remain the fundamental—if not central—element of American grand 

strategy for as long as we can imagine.

PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT 

MANAGEMENT: THE LESSONS LEARNED

Of course, devising a fresh approach to peacebuilding and conflict management requires an unvarnished 

examination of the operations of the past decade, and 

there are certainly many lessons to be learned from 

the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The effort to reorient entire societies in Iraq and Afghanistan via a 

strategy that was manpower-intensive and groundcentric has proven to be flawed. 

Certainly, the American Soldier, given enough 

time and enough resources, can accomplish almost 

anything, to include the remaking of entire countries. 

The problem is that doing so first requires the application of military force to the existing ruling cadre and 

its instruments of power so sternly and persistently as 

to imprint upon the society a sense of defeat so complete that the environment is created where a completely new and—it is to be hoped—more peaceful 

and democratic society can emerge and the likelihood 

of resistance is markedly diminished.

Norman Friedman suggests this in his 2004 article 

Is Modern War Too Precise?10 In it, he indicates that for 

all its faults and shortcomings, the devastating World 

War II aerial bombardment of Germany may not have 

won many “hearts and minds” among the German 

people “but it did help preclude any post-surrender 

violence like what is now being seen in Iraq.”11 Regrettably, in Iraq, an ill-considered “race to Baghdad” in 

2003 stretched logistic lines and enabled Saddam’s Fe-
141

dayeen to achieve some tactical success against support troops poorly prepared for infantry combat. This 

became something of a “proof of concept” for Iraqi 

insurgents that U.S. troops were, in fact, vulnerable.

It would have been far better to have exercised 

more patience and allowed American air and artillery to progressively devastate Iraq’s elite military 

formations. Instead, they were allowed to melt away 

and form the core of the insurgency, which was never 

really crushed in nearly a decade of occupation. The 

Iraqi people—to include especially those who became 

the resistance—never internalized the shattering sense 

of defeat that enabled the Germans and Japanese at 

the end of World War II to abandon their deeply embedded militaristic, racist, and totalitarian ideologies. 

Despite the experience with Japan and Germany, 

American leaders do not seem to fully comprehend 

what it takes to truly transform entire societies in a 

timeline shorter than several generations. Curiously, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey admitted that the aim of purging Afghanistan of the Taliban could have been achieved militarily, since the United States: 

could have started at one end of Afghanistan and fundamentally overrun it, destroyed it, created a situation where we would make it a near certainty that the 

Taliban couldn’t come back, because there wouldn’t be 

anything to come back to. . . .12

General Dempsey hastened to add that such a 

forceful effort was “not who we are.”13 There are, of 

course, several observations to be made here, starting with the idea that American values extant during 

World War II are not necessarily ones to be abandoned. 

More specifically, if the suggestion is that focusing 
142

on the destruction of the enemy—the Taliban in this 

instance—invariably involves the wholesale obliteration of civilians and their property, he underestimates 

the revolutionary capabilities of a technological revolution that allows force to be applied in a discrete 

way that is fully lawful and moral. That technological revolution has, according to retired General Barry 

R. McCaffrey, “fundamentally changed the nature of 

warfare” by allowing the rise of persistent, long-term 

reconnaissance and precision strikes.14

It is becoming increasingly clear that force—particularly in counterinsurgency (COIN) situations—is 

the proven solution, especially when rapid results are 

needed. As Professor Anna Simons of the Naval Postgraduate School contends:

Not only does COIN’s own history reflect the need 

for a stunning amount of brutality, but the fact that in 

campaign after campaign, commanders have found 

themselves desperate to be able to apply decisive force 

reveals what every generation ends up (re)discovering the hard way: soft approaches don’t impel enough 

people to change their ways fast enough.15

Her conclusion fits with that of an ever-widening 

range of experts. Jill Hazelton of Harvard’s Belfer 

Center contends, contrary to popular wisdom, that 

[s]uccess in COIN does not require the protection of 

the populace, good governance, economic development, or winning the allegiance or the loyalty of the 

great majority of the population.

Importantly, she says it “does not require building up all of the institutions of the state.”16 The grim 

realities of which she speaks should give pause to 
143

COIN theorists who disparage the efficacy of force. 

In April 2011, the Washington Post reported that in 

Afghanistan, the: 

security improvements have been the result of intense 

fighting and the use of high-impact weapons systems 

not normally associated with the protect-the-population 

counterinsurgency mission.

17

Nevertheless, because the U.S. military establishment was dominated by ground-centric thinkers, the 

“solution” to the challenge of peacebuilding and conflict management necessarily had to involve ground 

forces, and lots of them. In the case of COIN, that solution doctrinally eschewed force. Such was the nature of Field Manual (FM) 3-24,

18 published in 2006. It 

was, as one pundit put it, “warfare for northeastern 

graduate students” and other “people who would 

never own a gun.”19 Among other things, it called for 

enormous numbers of counterinsurgents (to comprise 

about 5 percent of the populations), with each Soldier 

prepared, as the FM said, to become “a social worker, a 

civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.”20

Nation building quite obviously was a critical element 

of the doctrine.

Executing the doctrine espoused in FM 3-24 justified huge increases in the size of American ground 

forces. Unfortunately, it ignored some key history 

about COIN operations and the presence of a large 

number of foreign troops. COIN expert William R. 

Polk insists that the “fundamental motivation” for 

insurgents is an “aim primarily to protect the integrity of the native group from foreigners.”21 Likewise, 

in 2008, former Army Chief of Staff General John 

Wickham warned that “[l]arge military forces alien-
144

ate local populations, succeed less and cost more.”22

More recently, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 

pointed out: 

Countries typically don’t want foreign soldiers in their 

cities and towns. In fact, large, intrusive military deployments risk playing into al-Qa’ida’s strategy of 

trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us 

financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire the next generation of terrorists.23

THE FUTURE: “OFF SHORE” 

PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT 

MANAGEMENT 

So what does all this mean for the future of peacebuilding and conflict management, given the grand 

strategy I have outlined? At the outset, it is essential 

to understand that it does not mean that the United 

States should abandon peacebuilding and conflict 

management efforts. Nor does it mean that it is utterly inconceivable that the United States might again 

conduct a large-footprint operation à la Iraq or Afghanistan. What it does mean, however, is that largefootprint operations for peacebuilding and conflict 

management missions need to undergo fundamental 

rethinking. 

Part of this requires the acceptance, however unwanted, of certain cold political realities, which include the fact that public support for the large-footprint war in Afghanistan is collapsing. Not only do 

78 percent of Americans favor withdrawing troops,24

66 percent believe that the war has not been “worth 

fighting.”25 With respect to the latter, beyond the human cost, our present strategy is extremely costly. The 
145

expense of deploying one American Soldier to Afghanistan for 1 year has ballooned to $1.2 million,26 a 

figure to which planners must be especially sensitive 

now that the U.S. public is supporting substantial cuts 

in defense spending.27

While it does seem that it might be cheaper to 

deploy civilians to accomplish many of the nationbuilding tasks currently performed by the military, 

the viability of that option is suspect.28 As a Congressional Research Service report dated February 2, 2012, 

entitled Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress, reveals, the U.S. Government’s ability to conduct such 

missions remains deeply flawed, if not in disarray.29

In any event, there is a tyranny of numbers involved, 

as even the most optimistic assessments do not contemplate many more than 2,000 experts would be 

involved, even if resources outside of government 

were tapped.30

Just as problematic is the sheer difficulty of peacebuilding and conflict management in deeply flawed 

societies under circumstances where, as indicated 

above, the political decision has been made not to use 

force to the extent that has proven successful in past 

situations, even if it can be applied in a way that is 

fully lawful and moral. Still, in conflict management 

situations, force will necessarily have to be employed, 

but likely not via large numbers of American ground 

forces. The models for the future are more likely to be 

along the lines of the Kosovo intervention of the late 

1990s and Libya in 2011. As the New York Times put it:

Libya proved that the leaders of some medium-size 

powers can be overthrown from a distance, without 

putting American boots on the ground, by using weap-
146

ons fired from sea and air with the heaviest load carried by partner nations—in the case of Libya, European 

allies and even some Arab states. 31

In essence, this might be called “offshore conflict 

management.” This is not an especially new concept, 

and has been suggested for a number of scenarios of 

potential conflict. Retired Marine Colonel Thomas X. 

Hammes has, for example, developed a proposal he 

calls “Offshore Control” aimed at leveraging U.S. technical advantages as a means of addressing the security 

challenge of China without necessarily putting a large 

mass of American troops on the Chinese mainland.32

In a sense, options for conflict management that 

avoid large troop deployments seem consonant with 

the Barack Obama administration’s emphasis on counterterrorism operations aimed at key enemy leaders 

conducted by drones and special operations forces. 

In fact, the President recently explicitly stated that 

in Afghanistan, his “goal is not to build a country in 

America’s image” but rather “to destroy [al-Qaeda].”33

To the extent this involves drone attacks against alQaeda leadership, it has enormous support from 

the American people, with 83 percent approving of 

their use.34

Of course, not all conflict management can be 

accomplished by drones, or even special operation 

ground strikes like that which eliminated Osama bin 

Laden. That does require American ground forces, but 

with rare exceptions, the face of such operations ought 

to be indigenous personnel. In order to build the kind 

of capacity that host nations need, on-site trainers and 

mentors may be required, as is currently being done 

in Afghanistan. On-site mentorship does, however, 

carry an increased risk of a rogue killing a foreign 
147

trainer. As of this writing, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) lost 19 soldiers to such attacks 

in 2012 alone.35

A FRESH ENVIRONMENT

How, then, to do it? Perhaps what is needed is a 

massive program to take people out of their environment—to include even to the United States—so they 

can focus on the kind of transformative training, indeed, thinking that is essential to truly reforming and 

remaking the societies of failed or failing states. Doing 

so can also facilitate access to the necessary training 

personnel and resources. This would be as applicable 

for building expertise in the civilian sector—government administrators as well as people from private 

enterprises—as it would be for the security services.

There is strong rationale for such an approach. 

Now retired Army Colonel-turned-university professor Peter Mansoor noted in a 2005 interview that training Iraqi forces outside of Iraq had its benefits:

The great advantage is the security is much better. You 

don’t have to guard the installation to the degree you 

have to in Iraq. . . . Another advantage is if it’s staffed 

by foreign officers, they don’t have to come into Iraq 

and become targets in order to teach. Also, existing 

facilities can be used that don’t require a lot of renovation or rebuilding, as is the case with many buildings 

in Iraq.36

Obviously, a similar approach elsewhere would 

not eliminate the risks. But the chance of a rogue arising in such an environment can be minimized with 

careful vetting. The advantages are, in any event, 

manifold. For example, the difficulties of recruiting 
148

and deploying skilled and experienced civilians to 

remote and dangerous locales would be markedly 

eased, especially if facilities could be located in the 

United States. Importantly, there are models already 

existing in the U.S. military of such programs working 

successfully. For example, the U.S. Air Force operates 

the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Lackland 

Air Force base in San Antonio, Texas, where technical courses are taught, “in Spanish and in English, to 

students from more than 22 countries every year.”37

To be successful, the scope of such schools and 

other educational facilities must be large and diverse. 

Even for a country the size of Afghanistan, this could 

involve tens of thousands of individuals each year. 

While certainly costly, it can hardly compare with 

the $1 million plus cost of sending a U.S. person to 

Afghanistan for a peacebuilding operation. Creating 

such a structure within the United States (or, perhaps, 

another country) may not be practical, but it may be 

possible to build a dedicated program within the existing American educational structure. For example, 

a program for advanced education might be constructed under the aegis of Kennesaw State’s Program 

in International Conflict Management, where international students are given the opportunity to learn in 

the relative safety and security of an authentic American setting—and evaluate for themselves the potential 

application to their native country.

An important element of such an “off shore” approach would be the availability of training and education in the native language of the students, while 

at the same time making English-language instruction 

available. Further, opportunities could be crafted for 

the students to learn about American culture and values. This is, emphatically, not intended to displace the 
149

culture and values of the students’ home countries, but 

rather to help dispel the misperceptions of the United 

States that can arise in nations needing peacebuilding 

and conflict management.

This educational process can be supplemented by 

in-country and online programs (in the indigenous 

language) by means of equipment and facilities supplied by the United States but manned by local nationals. Moreover, mentoring relationships can be built 

and maintained through daily interactions via Skype 

or similar technologies, to include social media formats. Again, the physical presence of some U.S. personnel cannot (and, likely, should not) be eliminated, 

but the numbers could be reduced to the level that realistically can be accommodated by programs such as 

the Civilian Response Corps.

CONCLUSION

The proposal this chapter advocates is certainly not 

a perfect one and will not satisfy every stakeholder. 

Unquestionably, for example, this kind of “off shore” 

proposal can be rightly criticized as a too lengthy, 

costly, and political capital-consuming methodology. 

Yet this back-to-basics approach may be the only way 

to realistically create the environment for genuine 

change, a process that can well take several generations. The “quick fixes” (e.g., build a school, equip a 

clinic, or grade a road) so attractive to the American 

mindset just do not work as effectively as one might 

hope.

Consider the work of researchers Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Although not focused 

on peacebuilding qua peacebuilding, their research 

leads them to the relevant observation that nations 

fail “when they have extractive economic institutions, 
150

supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth.”38 This cannot 

be offset merely by digging wells, building clinics, or 

even economic development projects; it may necessitate dramatic changes in attitudes among leadership 

and other elites. Indeed, without appropriate institutional leaders, any physical assets provided become 

yet one more cause for conflict as corrupt power brokers scramble for control of anything of value.

It is a mistake to underestimate the difficulty of 

rooting out venality writ large in less than a generation. This is one reason our efforts in Afghanistan 

remain stymied. As General David Petraeus said in 

2010, “there’s no question that corruption has been, 

for however long this country has probably been in 

existence, been part of the–literally the culture,”39 a 

point reiterated recently by former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.40 Indeed, “too much corruption,” 

along with “too many Afghan deserters” and “too few 

NATO trainers,” has been reported as a key obstacle 

to training Afghans to take over security duties once 

NATO departs.41

Even those disposed to be optimistic about the 

outcome in Afghanistan have no illusions about the 

depth of this societal flaw and what it will take to overcome it. Major General H. R. McMaster, who led a task 

force to root out corruption, was recently reported as 

saying that:

[T]he root of Afghanistan’s corruption problem goes 

deeper, to three decades of ‘trauma that it’s been 

through, the legacy of the 1990s civil war . . . [and] 

the effects of the narcotics trade.’ Add to that the unintended consequences of sudden Western attention 

starting in 2001: ‘We did exacerbate the problem with 

lack of transparency and accountability built into the 
151

large influx of international assistance that came into a 

government that lacked mature institutions.’42

While it may not necessarily take decades to excise 

the corruption endemic to Afghan society, it is clearly 

a long-term task. Selected uses of force employing offshore and light-footprint capabilities for conflict management can help buy time for nonmilitary processes 

to work if, and only if, a major effort is made to grow 

the next generation of political, military, and economic leaders with a sophisticated understanding of 

the damaging effects of corruption on Afghanistan’s 

future. Much the same can be said for other—and future—“Afghanistans” around the globe.

There are many unique factors about Afghanistan 

that make it an imperfect example of the kind of peacebuilding and conflict management issues that will 

arise in the coming years as the United States grapples with building an approach that meets the needs 

of U.S. grand strategy, yet is one that is sound in the 

political reality of an austere funding environment. To 

be politically viable, we must develop options that are 

less demanding in blood and money. 

Off-shore peacebuilding and conflict management will not work in every instance, but the basics 

of it—that is, the idea of a light footprint approach 

that leverages America’s asymmetric advantages in 

high technology43—might perhaps be a useful starting 

point when the next such challenge arises, as it inevitably will. At the end of the day, the approach must be 

grounded in the idea that notwithstanding whatever 

assistance any outside entity can provide, the ultimate 

responsibility is upon the people themselves, and developing their capabilities (as opposed to ours, per se) 

is the central task of peacebuilding and conflict management as we look ahead.
152

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. See, for example, Rosa Brooks, Obama Needs a Grand 

Strategy, Foreign Policy, January 23, 2012, p. 1, available from 

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/23/obama_needs_a_grand_

strategy?page=0. 

2. What is Grand Strategy? Durham, NC: Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, available from www.duke.edu/

web/agsp/index.html#grandstrategy.

3. Ibid.

4. Duke American Grand Strategy, Durham, NC: Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, available from www.

duke.edu/web/agsp/index.html.

5. Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, “A Clear and Present 

Safety,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, p. 79.

6. Ibid., p. 81.

7. Ibid., p. 91.

8. Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Boston, MA: Dutton/Plume 

(Penquin), 2011.

9. John Tirpak, “The F-22 and Clout Deficit,” Air Force Magazine, July 23, 2012, available from www.airforce-magazine.com/

DRArchive/Pages/2012/July%202012/July%2023%202012/TheF22andCloutDeficit.aspx, quoting Air Force Chief of Staff Norton 

Schwartz as saying there is “no chance” of restarting the F-22 

manufacturing line. 

10. Norman Friedman, “Is Modern War Too Precise?” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2004, p. 4.

11. Ibid.
153

12. A Conversation with General Martin Dempsey, Washington, 

DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1, 2012, 

available from carnegieendowment.org/files/050112_transcript_

dempsey.pdf. 

13. Ibid.

14. As General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) has observed:

We have already made a 100 year war-fighting leapahead with MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Global 

Hawk. Now we have loiter times in excess of 24 hours, 

persistent eyes on target, micro-kill with Hellfire and 500 

lb. JDAM bombs, synthetic aperture radar, and a host of 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] sensors and communications potential that have fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.

General Barry R. McCaffrey, Memorandum for Colonel Mike Meese, 

United States Military Academy, Subject: After Action Report, October 15, 2007, p. 5 (italics added), available from www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pages/documents/AirForceAAR-101207.pdf.

15. Anna Simons, “Soft War + Smart War? Think Again,” ENotes, Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 

2012, available from www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.simons.softwar-smart-war.html.

16. Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “The Hearts-and-Minds Approach 

Versus The High-Force Low Accommodation Approach,” Compellence and Accommodation in Counterinsurgency Warfare, September 

2010 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (Italics added).

17. Rajiv Chandrasekaren, “In Afghanistan’s South, Signs 

of Progress in Three Districts Signal a Shift,” Washington Post, 

April 16, 2011, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/

in-afghanistans-south-signs-of-progress-in-three-districts-signal-ashift/2011/04/14/AF7gBwqD_story.html (Italics added).

18. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, U.S. Department of 

the Army, December 15, 2006, p. D-8 (hereafter FM 3-24), also des-
154

ignated by Headquarters Marine Corps Development Command, 

Department of the Navy, as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 15, 2006, p. 1, available 

from www.scribd.com/doc/9137276/US-Army-Field-Manual-FM-324-

Counterinsurgency.

19. The full paragraph stated:

[The COIN Manual’s] reception reflected Petraeus’s considerable media networking skills as well as the appeal of 

counter-insurgency doctrine among sections of the country’s liberal-minded intelligentsia. This was warfare for 

northeastern graduate students—complex, blended with 

politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy 

them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never 

own a gun. The field manual illustrated its themes with 

case-study vignettes whose titles suggested the authors’ 

ethical ambitions: “Defusing a Confrontation,” “Lose 

Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War.”

See Steve Coll, “The General’s Dilemma,” The New 

Yorker, September 8, 2008, available from www.newyorker.com/

reporting/2008/09/08/080908fa_fact_coll?currentPage=all.

20. FM 3-24, note 18, para 2-42.

21. William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, 

Terrorism & Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq, 

New York: Harper, 2007, pp. xiv-xv.

22. John A. Wickham, “Why a Smaller Footprint is Good,” 

Arizona Daily Star, November 9, 2008, available from gunnyg.wordpress.com/2008/11/15/large-military-forces-alienate-local-populationssucceed-less-and-cost-moreby-john-adams-wickham/.

23. Remarks of John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy 

of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Washington, DC: The 

Wilson Center, April 30, 2012, available from www.wilsoncenter.

org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. 
155

24. Fox News Poll (conducted by Anderson Robbins Research 

(D) and Shaw & Company Research, April 22-24, 2012, available 

from www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.

25. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, April 5-8, 2012, available 

from www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.

26. Todd Harrison, Analysis of the 2012 Defense Budget, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, July 

15, 2011, p. 7, available from www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/

uploads/2011/07/2011.07.16-FY-2012-Defense-Budget.pdf.

27. R. Jeffrey Smith, “To Trim the Deficit, Americans Favor 

Much Deeper Reductions at the Pentagon than Their Leaders Do,” 

iWatch News, Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, May 

10, 2012, available from www.iwatchnews.org/2012/05/10/8856/public-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts.

28. Yochi Dreazen, “Afghanistan’s Civilian Surge Comes with 

Enormous Price Tag and Uncertain Results,” The National Journal, 

September 8, 2011, available from www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/afghanistan-s-civilian-surge-comes-with-enormous-pricetag-and-uncertain-results-20110908.

29. Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towells, Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals 

and Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, January 23, 2012, available from fpc.state.gov/documents/

organization/183725.pdf.

30. Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict 

Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2012, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/

RL32862.pdf.

31. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Seeing Limits to ‘New’ 

Kind of War in Libya,” New York Times, October 21, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/nato-war-inlibya-shows-united-states-was-vital-to-toppling-qaddafi.html.
156

32. Thomas X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy,” Infinity Magazine, Spring 2012, p. 10, available from www.infinityjournal.com/article/53/Offshore_Control_A_Proposed_Strategy.

33. Transcript of President Barack Obama’s speech from Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, available from worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/01/11492424-transcript-of-president-barack-obamas-speech-from-bagram-air-base-may-2?lite (Italics 

added.)

34. Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, “Poll Finds Broad Support 

for Obama’s Counterterrorism Policies,” Washington Post, February 8, 2012, available from www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pollfinds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/

gIQAFrSEyQ_story.html.

35. “NATO Soldier Killed in Afghan Shooting,” Aljazeera, May 6, 2012, available from www.aljazeera.com/news/

asia/2012/05/201256131119330234.html.

36. Lionel Beehner, Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor on 

Training Iraqi Forces, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 

October 6, 2005, available from www.cfr.org/publication/8984/interview_with_colonel_peter_mansoor_on_training_iraqi_forces.html.

37. See Inter-American Air Forces Academy, U.S. Air Force, 

Lackland AFB, TX, available from www.lackland.af.mil/iaafa/

index.asp.

38. Warren Bass, Book Review of Why Nations Fail, by Daron 

Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Washington Post, April 20, 

2012, available from www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/

book-review-why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson/2012/04/20/gIQAcHs8VT_story.html (quoting the authors).

39. Kate McCarthy, “Petraeus Denies Resignation Threat; 

Backs President Karzai,” ABC News, December 5, 2010, available 

from abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/12/exclusive-gen-david-petraeus-denies-resignation-threat-backs-president-karzai/.

40. Secretary Panetta Interview with Judy Woodruff at the 

Pentagon, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 
157

3, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.

aspx?transcriptid=5025:

Corruption, you know, has been part of that culture, just 

as it was in Iraq, just as it is in other areas of the Middle 

East. It’s one of the things you’ve got to deal with. If you 

eventually want to develop a stable, governing operation 

there that provides stability, they’re going to have to do 

a better job in trying to control the level of corruption 

that’s there.

41. Julie Cavanaugh, “Why It’s So Hard for NATO to Train 

Afghan Forces, Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 2012, available from www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/1202/

Why-it-s-so-hard-for-NATO-to-train-Afghan-forces.

42. David Feith, “H. R. McMaster: The Warrior’s-Eye View 

of Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2012, available from 

online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230445110457739228114687

1796.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop#printMode.

43. See, for example, General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF and 

Major Wendell S. Holmes, “Haiti Relief: An International Effort 

Enabled through Air, Space, and Cyberspace,” Air & Space Power 

Journal, Winter 2010, p. 5, available from www.airpower.au.af.mil/

airchronicles/apj/apj10/win10/2010_4_03_fraser.pdf.

159

CHAPTER 7

ALWAYS AN OUTSIDER:

U.S. MILITARY ROLE

IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING

William Flavin

The U.S. military has been involved in peacebuilding for most of its history. The U.S. military developed 

the Western United States, supported Reconstruction 

in the Southern United States after the Civil War, supervised the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930s 

and assisted with other depression era programs. 

However, these activities inside the United States in 

support of the building of the U.S. nation differ from 

what was called for in the overseas adventures in 

Mexico, the Philippines, Central America, Cuba, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Africa, the Balkans, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan where the U.S. military action was 

transitory and alien to the culture and society. This 

chapter will look at the challenges and opportunities 

that the military must face when attempting to support international peacebuilding enterprises. 

International peacebuilding, at its heart, is a 

national (host-nation) challenge and responsibility, and national factors will shape its pace and sequencing. Even though the international community 

will be directly engaged in assisting a country, local political processes will be fundamental for success and will include extensive political mediations 

and compromises. 

The U.S. military will always remain an outsider to 

this peacebuilding process and the country it is trying 

to assist. It can never have sufficient knowledge about 
160

the host country and the other international actors because of its institutional processes and the temporary 

nature of its involvement. The military will be asked 

to undertake a wide variety of tasks beyond its basic 

combat skills because of its ability to plan, organize, 

respond, and mobilize resources. It is an institution 

noted for seizing the initiative, taking action, and getting results. Those are the qualities that will be most 

needed initially in stabilizing a situation and allowing 

peacebuilding to proceed. 

This chapter will consider just what can be known 

by the U.S. military about another society, its structural issues, its resilience, its long-term grievances, 

and its vision for the future. What can the military realistically be expected to understand about the other 

international and regional actors? By its actions, the 

military will have an effect on the host nation but is 

it capable of understanding and controlling what that 

effect will be? How much is the military self-aware of 

the consequences of its actions in supporting peacebuilding? Does the military have institutional inhibitors that proscribe what it can reasonably be expected 

to do? It is an organization whose main focus is on 

finding, fixing, fighting, and finishing an enemy. How 

does this institutional bias advance or retard peacebuilding? Does the military’s culture prevent that 

level of collaboration that is needed within the whole 

of U.S. Government and with the nongovernmental 

organization (NGO) and international government 

organization (IGO) community to support successful 

peacebuilding missions? 

In many instances the military will be necessary, so 

the chapter will propose a way ahead, building upon 

the strengths of the military institution. It will look at 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the military 
161

can and should possess and how to address the gaps 

that will exist. 

UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS 

Understanding the problem is always the best 

place to start. Any number of frameworks, assessment 

tools, and methodologies has been developed to determine drivers of conflict and long-standing structural grievances of the host nation. Yet even with all of 

these tools, there is a limit to what can be understood 

by military units and acted upon.1

The Type of Intelligence that the Military 

Traditionally Collects Does Not Support 

Peacebuilding.

Military intelligence has traditionally been focused 

on the “threat” rather than on the environment. Even 

though the doctrine on stability and counterinsurgency stresses the need to look deeply into the people 

among whom the military is operating, the institutional default position is threat based. The most recent 

description of these shortfalls was identified by Major 

General Michael Flynn, the Chief of CJ2, International 

Security Assistance Force, and CJ2, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, in his paper titled Fixing Intel: 

Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to our 

overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming 

majority of our collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental 

questions about the environment in which we operate 

and the people we are trying to persuade. Ignorant of 
162

local economics and landowners, hazy about who the 

powerbrokers are and how we might influence them, 

incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation of 

villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan 

soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do 

little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information 

they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency2

Any number of frameworks and approaches has 

been tried, from the Interagency Conflict Assessment 

Framework to the District Stability Framework. All of 

these tools are great innovations trying to get at the 

essence of determining what is driving the conflict, 

but they require understanding, finesse, collaboration, 

and time. Their value is enhanced if the analyst possesses linguistic and cultural skills and direct knowledge of the piece of the earth in question. Those who 

can successfully implement such tools are few and far 

between and are difficult to recruit and retain. The 

U.S. military has tried to obtain such knowledge by 

developing ad hoc organizations such as the “Human Terrain Teams,” a program employing personnel 

from the social science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies, and 

linguistics to provide military commanders and staff 

with an understanding of the local population and the 

environment. The results of this initiative have been 

mixed, but the commanders have gotten some benefit 

out of the attempt. These tools have their limitations, 

depending upon the willingness of the various peoples and factions in the host nation to cooperate.
163

Visitors Are Only Told What the Host Wants 

Them to Know.

The military force engaged in peacebuilding that 

attempts to transform conflict will always be an outsider, a temporary visitor in the country. The military 

personnel may only be in the country for a few months 

or a few years. At best, they can acquire an incomplete 

knowledge of the host government and its people. 

The knowledge they do acquire will be influenced by 

the source of information. In the fractured society in 

which the military will be required to operate, there 

will be many competing elements trying to fill the 

gaps and exploit the opportunities created in the wake 

of major conflict. Each will be providing the military 

key bits of information designed to enhance their position. The United Kingdom (UK) Doctrinal Manual 

on Military Support to Stabilization discusses this very 

challenge. It identifies at least three major groups with 

which the military must deal: the government, elites, 

and the general population. All of these groups have 

objectives they will be trying to pursue and will be 

trying to see how they can leverage the military forces 

on their behalf. The military will be trying to leverage 

these groups, while at the same time trying to understand what is going on. This tension will always be a 

problem for the outsider.3

The U.S. military occupation force that landed in 

Korea in 1945 was ignorant of even the basic information on Korea. Thousands of soldiers had been trained 

to understand Japanese customs and organization by 

the U.S. Army Military Government School, but policy 

prohibited the study of Korea in Army Schools. There 

was no adequate intelligence, so the XXIV Corps, 

fresh from the fighting in Okinawa, arrived hungry 
164

for information. The source of their information was 

to be the former Japanese occupiers, Koreans who had 

collaborated with the Japanese, and Korean elite who 

possessed an excellent grasp of English. Each of these 

groups had an agenda, and the military force was not 

able to clearly understand to what extent they were 

being manipulated. The U.S. military government 

formed their initial ideas about Korea during the first 

months of occupation on the 350 separate memoranda 

drafted by Japanese officials. Based on this biased 

input, the U.S. occupational command looked upon 

Korea as “hopeless as a society,” and this informed 

future planning and decisions. Many of the crises and 

problems faced by the United States during the occupation, and their approaches to those problems, were 

based on questionable local sources of information, 

each of which had an agenda.4

There are symbols, rituals, behavior models, and 

linguistic practices that take many years to master, 

and the military just does not have the time to develop 

such an understanding. Additionally, the military 

must depend on sources that may be hostile to military 

forces in general. Many times, external sources must 

be relied upon that may not be telling the complete 

story. It is also in the host nation’s interest to maintain 

the initiative so that the outcomes can be shaped in accordance with its agenda and therefore will shape the 

information provided. The host nation knows that the 

U.S. military will not be there forever and therefore 

must continually shape its environment for life when 

the U.S. military departs.
165

Policymakers Develop Goals Based on this 

Inadequate Understanding and Wishful Thinking. 

Richard Millet’s study of the U.S. engagements between the Spanish American War and World War II in 

nation building and constabulary development makes 

the point that reality on the ground at times does not 

get in the way of policy in Washington. When assessing the U.S. Policy toward Cuba, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, Millett 

makes the following observation:

But, when polices were being formulated, no American 

official, civilian or military, appears to have asked if replacing such forces with a better trained and equipped 

constabulary would change their relation to the rest of 

society or in any way alter the traditional political equation which made force the final arbiter. Nor does there 

appear to have been any questioning of how nationalist sentiments would react to a foreign-created security 

force, or how that force, itself, would react once foreign 

control was ended. . . . Instead of asking such questions, policymakers seem to have assumed that a constabulary created with American instructors and under 

American-imposed regulations would behave like an 

American military force. There was no understanding.5

There have been many studies on the lack of 

knowledge and invalid assumptions that framed the 

U.S. approach to both Iraq and Afghanistan and the 

subsequent struggle to gain situational understanding. Many times, the policymakers will assume that 

the U.S. systems and procedures are superior to those 

of the host nation, and therefore all that needs to be 

done is to introduce the locals to the U.S. systems 

and procedures.6

 In her article in Prism, Laura Cleary 

makes this point as she examines what is and is not 
166

possible in exporting the U.S. model of civil military 

interaction to another country. There are differing cultural reference points between the U.S. military trainers trying to impart a concept of a military in a democratic society to another country that has a different 

historical perspective. It will not be enough just to 

professionalize the host nation’s military force. Millet 

has recorded how the United States professionalized 

several militaries in Central America, only to see them 

impose military rule.7

The Military Force Will Have an Incomplete 

Knowledge of the U.S. Government and the 

International Community.

Ever since the 1994 engagement in Haiti, the U.S. 

Government has attempted to develop a whole-ofgovernment approach to coordinate its actions and 

share knowledge among the agencies of government. 

Various presidential directives and proposed congressional legislation have been developed to encourage 

the agencies of government to cooperate with each 

other. There have been a number of initiatives designed to increase the knowledge, understanding, and 

coordination for the whole of the U.S. Government. 

Still, there is a challenge among all agencies to understand what each is about. The U.S. Government was 

designed to ensure that power would not be consolidated in the hands of the few in order to protect the 

liberty and freedom of the many. There are obstacles 

embedded in the U.S. governmental system that work 

against coordination and understanding. Overcoming 

these obstacles requires a significant political price; 

one that most are unwilling to pay. This presents a 

challenge, as institutions are chartered as stovepipes 
167

and provided requisite authorities and funding that 

reinforce separation. Over time, the U.S. bureaucracy 

has grown into a maze of overlapping, redundant, 

and conflicting structures that has compounded the 

challenge. A study of complex contingency operations 

found that: 

a key lesson learned has been that personnel in the 

various agencies and military services involved do not 

possess an adequate knowledge of the function, organization, capabilities, and limitations of the other entities with which they are expected to coordinate their 

activities.

A study by the joint staff revealed that 35 percent 

of Joint Staff officers were working directly with the

interagency for the first time; 70 percent of them said 

that they had received no formal training in joint, 

multinational, or interagency activities. Seventy-six 

percent of senior leaders said that their staff officers 

required improved skills in supervising interagency 

personnel.

8

Military Forces Are Not Aware of the Impact of 

Their Actions. 

Additionally, the military force itself is not selfaware. It most often does a poor job at understanding 

what effect its presence is having on the situation. 

In support of the 1994 Unified Task Force (UNITAF) deployment to Somalia, the United States established its support function in Mogadishu with no 

assessment on how this would affect the local social 

and economic situation in the country. Young Somali 

males were encouraged by the prospects of U.S. employment and moved into the city. Few of them were 
168

hired. But the result was that they left their traditional 

clan areas and the influence of the clan elders and 

became the unemployed, shiftless, and desperate elements in the city. Here, war lords such as Mohammad 

Farah Aidid could prey upon them. The U.S. military 

force was unaware that the presence of their support 

base was destabilizing the social contract within Somali society and that the lure of filling contracts was 

having a destabilizing social impact.9

The problems can be even more subtle and can influence ideas and attitudes and affect the legitimacy of 

the operation. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, rumors 

were started at various times that the U.S. command 

was contracting local men to work in the dining facilities, forcing these devout Muslims to handle pork. 

Many of the workers that were actually employed 

were third country nationals, some of whom were 

indeed Muslim. Additionally, many Muslim contractor employees who were secretaries and support staff 

ate at these dining facilities where forbidden fare was 

served. The “All American Food” served at the dining facilities by the contractor not only provided fare 

for the propagandist, but also failed to build the local 

capacity that the mission was all about. 

None of the succulent tomatoes or the crisp cucumbers grown in Iraq made it into the salad bar. 

U.S. government regulations dictated that everything, 

even the water in which hot dogs were boiled, was to 

be shipped in from approved suppliers in other nations. Milk and bread were trucked in from Kuwait, 

as were tinned peas and carrots. The breakfast cereal 

was flown in from the United States, made in the USA. 

Fruit Loops and Frosted Flakes at the breakfast table 

helped boost morale.10
169

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is 

substantially engaged in development activities enabled by a significant funding tool, the Commanders 

Emergency Response Program (CERP). Over 60 percent of the U.S. funds supporting reconstruction in Afghanistan are allocated via the Department of Defense 

(DoD). The effects of this funding on Afghanistan are 

significant. Yet by all accounts, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been an inability to determine 

just what effect this spending has had in the long term 

on accomplishing the overall U.S. objectives. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 

has conducted over 370 audits and inspections, five 

lessons learned reports, and hundreds of investigations, and has had problems connecting programs 

with outcomes. There have been repeated calls to better monitor these programs so as to understand the 

connections between the actions of the U.S. military, 

who are addressing the drivers of conflict, and others, who are building the appropriate local capacity to 

reach sustainable peace.11

Military Tends to Stereotype New and

Unfamiliar Environments.

Prejudices and stereotypes are always there and 

hinder peacebuilding. The effect of stereotyping can 

lead not only to a failure of programs and long-term 

success, but also to violence, discontent, and the loss of 

legitimacy for the mission. There are many examples 

from the early engagements in Latin America and the 

Philippines. Post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), the military has come with the stereotypical approach to the 

Arab world that is shared on main street America, and 

that a number of cultural awareness programs have 
170

attempted to address. Sebastian Junger, in his book 

“War,” records these stereotypes, prejudices, and the 

effects they have on the relationships with the people 

and the ability to gain valuable information from the 

people. This also relates to the ability to use the language. Again, the need for interpreters also isolates 

the Soldier. The interpreter creates his own reality, 

manipulating both sides of the engagement, either 

intentionally or unintentionally. There are many examples of this happening. The U.S. military has attempted to deal with this issue by arranging training 

sessions with interpreters, but usually only for staff 

and commanders and not for the infantryman who is 

in contact with the locals.12

Members of the U.S. military will come with an understandable cultural bias about how a military force 

should be organized and the relationship of that force 

to the democratic organs of government. That bias will 

inform their approach toward the security force assistance mission. The recipient military may come from 

an entirely different tradition with an entirely different outlook. Unless that bias can be overcome and a 

workable solution reached, skills can be transferred, 

but transformation will not be achieved.13

INSTITUTIONAL REALITY

The military is a “can do” positive organization 

that is oriented toward results. Inadequate information is not a deterrent for action. Militaries abhor vacuums and disorder. Militaries will impose order first 

and ask questions later. 
171

The Military Is Used as a Stop Gap Because of Its 

Response and Resources.

The military has been called upon to make the 

trains run in Kosovo, run the banking system in the 

Dominican Republic, and conduct agricultural extension services in Afghanistan. None of these are core 

competencies of the military but, because of the wide 

range of expertise that can be resident in the military 

and the can do attitude in dealing with any demand, 

the military fills in when civil expertise is either not 

available or inadequate. This may be better than letting situations disintegrate, but all of the studies and 

after action reports clearly state that early transfer 

from the military to a whole-of-government approach 

is the only hope for balanced development. The United 

States Institute of Peace (USIP)/U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(PKSOI) Guidelines for Stabilization and Reconstruction

is clear that a comprehensive approach is the only 

way to attain a viable peace. When the military is left 

to run projects other than training military forces or 

when even the training of military forces is not part 

of a comprehensive security sector reform, the results 

have not been encouraging. Historians of the U.S. military interventions in Latin America have concluded: 

“Efforts to change a society by altering one institution 

never produce the desired effect and inevitably bring 

undesired effects.”14
172

Military Designs Measurements to Meet Its Needs 

and End States.

Because the engagement of the military is temporary and the units themselves rotate throughout 

this engagement, this tends to drive the various units 

toward achieving objectives in the short term. The 

military must achieve results on the watch of the current commander. The commander and unit will get 

graded on their performance, and therefore they will 

be results oriented. Therefore, the military will seek 

metrics that can demonstrate success not just for the 

organization, but also for the leaders whose careers 

depend upon such success. The tendency is to focus 

on measures of progress rather than effectiveness, 

given that the latter have an incubation period longer 

than individual unit deployments. Peacebuilding is 

a long-term venture the time horizon of which does 

not fit the military deployment schedule. Therefore, 

units tend to look at high visibility projects that can 

have immediate impact. The initial focus of projects 

in Afghanistan in 2002 was to search for quick impact 

programs that would provide the most visibility for 

the limited funds available and “win the hearts and 

minds” of the people in support of the United States. It 

was not focused on performing surveys and establishing long-term projects in coordination with the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID). Over 

time, this mind set shifted. Still, by 2007, commanders 

were still being evaluated for committing all of their 

commander’s emergency response program monies 

and starting more projects than the previous unit.15
173

Military Focus Is on Short-Term Security as the 

Sine-Qua-Non, and Peacebuilding Is Secondary, 

Supporting, and of Lesser Importance. 

This is reflected in the organization and orientation of the military. For example, the development of 

police forces in Afghanistan under military lead resembles auxiliary infantry to fight insurgents rather 

than community police. This tendency was also present in the development of constabularies in the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti earlier in the century. 

Because of the lack of civil affairs structure, the military assigned civil military duties to other branches. 

For example, in Afghanistan, artillery officers would 

be assigned the duty of negotiating with local authorities to establish the conditions for peaceful conflict 

transformation. They were provided with money and 

instructions but little or no training for this most sensitive and strategically significant job. They often had 

no experience dealing with interpreters, other governmental agencies, and local political situations. Obviously, these jobs were considered less important than 

combat-related jobs because the military would never 

have taken a civil affairs officer and placed him in an 

artillery position without extensive training. Yet, they 

thought nothing of taking anyone and placing them 

into a civil military position.16

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) in its 

survey of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) observed that the structure of the units facilitated a kinetic maneuver approach to security first and the rest 

of the peacebuilding activities secondary. Although 

the Diplomacy, Defense, Development (3D) approach 

was the overall objective of the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, his civil/military 
174

plan was not being implemented properly because 

structurally and procedurally units are optimized for 

combat. The S-3 Operations section focused on security, and other parts of the civil/military approach 

were run out of the civil military operations (CMO) 

section that was separated from the operational section. In traditional military staffs, the S-3 runs the 

operation and has primacy, so naturally, security in 

a military sense takes priority. How a unit organizes 

and assigns responsibilities for security and peacebuilding functions does not reflect current Army doctrine as found in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability, or 

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, but reflects the structures 

that were developed post-World War II where CMO 

became a separate but subordinate staff section.17

The military focus on the security sector tends 

to force the other sectors to a secondary status, and 

this can influence other actors’ approaches with unfortunate long-term results. Javid Ahmad and Lousie 

Langeby of the German Marshall Fund make this very 

observation about Afghanistan. They conclude that the 

focus on security has placed economic development 

secondary, and the development that was done was 

based around the international security presence.18

Similarly, reports from some members of the Human Terrain Teams support the observation that, institutionally, military forces focus on short-term stability rather than long-term peace building. Mathew 

Schehl, who ran a Tactical Human Intelligence Team 

in Central Iraq during 2003-05, wrote in his blog that 

commanders he dealt with were focused on the immediate, and not the long-term, transformational aspects 

of the mission:
175

“Success” is defined in the short term . . . specific objectives are pursued without necessary regard for longterm implications. 

Information produced will tend toward a narrow conception of culture and social systems, i.e., that information which is only as relevant as its immediate utility to 

the field commander, fostering a simplified ideation of 

“good guy, bad guy,” without regard to social or historic contexts and processes. . . .

The utilization of such information is subject to the 

whims and spot decisions of the field commander.19

Military Excels at Transferring Technical Skills but 

Transferring Values is Difficult.

Military forces have demonstrated that they can 

transfer technical skills quite well to other countries. 

Many of the forces in Asia and Latin America have 

been recipients of this technical training. But how well 

are values and understandings transmitted and internalized? How well are they taken on board? How long 

do those values last beyond the engagement period? 

Without a long-term commitment, such as the extensive program of in-country engagement and training 

of officers in the United States extended to the Korean 

army for over 30 years, it is difficult to affect values in 

a short-term post-conflict environment. 

Military and Community Police Frameworks Clash.

The military framework is to organize the world 

into friends, enemies, and others. The approach is to 

find, fix, fight, and finish the enemy. Collateral civilian damage and death is considered a risk that can be 
176

accepted to finish the enemy and is sanctioned under 

international law. Police framework is to protect civilians and property, while bringing violators of the law 

into the justice system. Collateral damage is not acceptable, and the focus is not on finishing an enemy, 

but arresting a suspect and allowing a rule of law system to process that suspect. 

Information is handled differently in each system. 

In the military, intelligence is developed to find and 

fix the enemy so that enemy can be defeated. In the 

justice system, information is gathered to prosecute a 

suspect. That information must meet the criteria of the 

rule of law system to be admissible. 

The military has often been required not only to 

perform police duties, but also to train and equip police. This is caused either by a lack of civil police assistance or frustration of the military with the progress of 

police development. The results have not always been 

successful. Based on the frameworks above, police 

trained by the military tend to resemble mini-infantry 

units. In Afghanistan, they were designed to supplement the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. Police 

trained solely by the military, and not as part of a comprehensive security sector reform package, tended not 

to be responsive to local controls, and they exhibited 

centralized control outside of state controls. Order and 

security often trumped justice and the development of 

a rule of law system. It sought to increase the power of 

the central government to provide security but ended 

up supporting nondemocratic processes.20
177

Reality of Long-Term Development Clashes with 

Short-Term Reality of Military Engagement. 

There are many stories of locals taking advantage 

of the short-term focus of the military force. The Office 

of the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) in Iraq has recorded many such incidents. For 

example, three separate commanders of three different units that replaced each other spent Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) monies for 

a local generator that was never purchased. No one 

was in one place long enough to follow through. That, 

coupled with inadequate records, lack of good metrics for evaluating peacebuilding activities, lack of a 

whole of U.S. Government oversight, and a short-term 

time horizon for each military unit, has allowed such 

situations to develop.21

TIME AND RESOURCES

There will not be enough time or resources to do 

the job the way it should be done. Therefore, there will 

always be pressure to hurry up, when hurry up is often the wrong approach. 

Goals Established Do Not Match Realistic Time 

Frames Nor Resources. 

The time needed to transform a post-conflict country though peacebuilding methods is often underestimated. It is not realistic that broken societies and 

dysfunctional systems of governance can be altered in 

a few years. Often, the goals laid down are unrealistic, 

and the influence of outsiders exaggerated. These issues were demonstrated with the building of the Af-
178

ghanistan and Iraq armies. The initial approach was a 

quick fix to get into the field forces capable of handling 

the insurgent threat. Both programs went through 

growing pains requiring restarting the programs with 

more realistic objectives and longer lead times. 

When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

for Iraq was established in 2003, it had neither the time 

nor the resources to plan and execute effectively. The 

CPA was asked to provide results immediately but reality overcame the enterprise, and the largest rebuilding program in history grew far beyond what was 

envisioned. Between May and July 2003, planned U.S. 

expenditures had increased nine-fold over what was 

anticipated. The story of the mismatch between goals, 

time, and resources in both Afghanistan and Iraq has 

been described by many SIGIR reports and in other 

books and journals.22

Rotation of Forces Limit What Is Possible.

The force generation of the military rotates forces 

and individuals from 2 to 6 to 12 months and occasionally 24 months. Given the long time needed to 

transform post-conflict societies, this rotation places 

constraints on what is possible. Each unit must demonstrate progress and let the command know that it 

has done better than the previous unit. This has led 

to new programs being started and existing programs 

being modified. The story of the generator noted 

above is emblematic of a deeper problem and a source 

of tension between the military and the development 

community. Time horizons between what the military 

would like to see to stabilize a situation and what the 

development community needs to prove to be successful are a constant source of friction. The implementa-
179

tion and expectations of programs that are, in essence, 

development programs take many years to be proven 

successful.23

Political Pressure to Withdraw Trumps All.

Once the national policy starts to shift, and over 

time it will, then the pressure to get out will overwhelm all of the concerns. Vietnamization was a case 

study. The goals were to: 

expand, equip, and train South Vietnam’s forces and 

assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the 

same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat 

troops.

The first was: 

strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese 

in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills. 

The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. 

The first was achievable, but it would take time. 

For the United States, it was trivial to have a U.S. helicopter pilot fly in support, but helicopter operations 

were too much part of ground operations to involve 

U.S. personnel. As observed by Lieutenant General 

David Palmer, to qualify an Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam (ARVN) candidate for U.S. helicopter school, 

he first needed months of English language training to 

be able to follow the months-long training, and then 

additional field time to become proficient. In other 

words, adding new capabilities to the ARVN would 

often take 2 or more years. Palmer did not disagree 

that the first component, given time and resources, 

was achievable. 
180

Pacification, the second component, presented the real 

challenge . . . it was benevolent government action in 

areas where the government should always have been 

benevolently active . . . doing both was necessary if 

Vietnamization were to work.

But the U.S. domestic shift away from support 

for the war was translated down to the troops on the 

ground as pass and run. End date rather than end 

state became the reality.24 Such pressure has already 

been applied to Iraq and Afghanistan.

WHAT IS POSSIBLE

Knowing the Unknowns. 

As discussed above, although it will not be possible to understand all the nuances involved in dealing with a host nation, there are some steps that can be 

taken that will reduce the level of uncertainty. Working toward an agreed whole-of-government assessment tool, improving education and training in the 

areas of stability concepts and doctrine, broadening 

assignment opportunities with other U.S. agencies, 

increasing engagement with other countries and cultures, enhancing the whole-of-government scenarios 

and training opportunities at military training centers, 

incorporating cultural and social aspects into appropriate training venues, and seeking every opportunity 

to expand the intellectual horizon of the military will 

go a long way toward nurturing understanding of 

what is possible and what is not possible when engaged in supporting peacebuilding. 

The last attempt to create a whole-of-government 

assessment tool was in 2008 with the Interagency 
181

Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). It was based 

on USAID’s conflict assessment framework that borrowed from the World Bank’s tools. It was the basis for 

the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) 

and the subsequent District Stability Framework used 

in Afghanistan. Its purpose was to develop a common 

understanding among all agencies of government of 

the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict. 

Although approved by the Deputies Committee and 

written into the stability doctrine of the military, it has 

not found universal application. It has been used in 

support of embassies over 35 times since its inception, 

but there is neither systemic application nor training 

in the U.S. military on its application. This initiative 

needs to be continued and improved.25

Leader education is key and essential to understanding. The Center for New American Security’s 

February 2010 report, Keeping The Edge: Revitalizing 

America’s Military Officer Corps, concludes that the 

education for officers is inadequate to address the current and emerging security concerns, and an overhaul 

of the education programs is essential.26

There is substantial tension in officer training programs 

between cultivating excellence in tactical and technical competencies and developing the qualities needed 

for operating in complex environments in concert with 

multiple partners. A more holistic officer development 

program is required to counteract a disproportionate focus on tactical training over strategic education. 

Strategy and warfighting are integrative tasks, requiring not only the ability to operate specialized equipment or to command a tactical unit, but also an understanding of how different pieces fit together to ensure 

the achievement of national objectives.27
182

There are other calls for action along with several 

recent articles to institutionalize proper education at 

all levels of military officers that address full spectrum operations. The Winter 2009-10 issue of Parameters, U.S. Army War College, devoted a major section 

toward developing the strategic leader. The articles 

have identified the challenge in the past in institutionalizing such subjects as cross-cultural understanding that are critical for full spectrum operations and 

recommending solutions. Additionally, the House of 

Representatives Report on Professional Military Education

examined to what extent the U.S. military services are 

incorporating irregular warfare and stability into their 

curricula. It concluded that although there has been 

some progress, it is not enough. It stated that the: 

Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) has no distinct Learning Area for stability operations, despite those operations being recognized as a 

core military mission comparable to combat operations 

since 1995 by Departmental policy, which directed 

that stability operations be ‘explicitly addressed and 

integrated across all DOD activities,’ including those 

involved in education.”28

To fight stereotyping, there are a number of cultural tools and courses that have been developed as 

a result of the U.S. engagement in Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Centers such as the Air Force Cultural 

and Language Center have many products and outreach to deal with stereotyping and help the military 

understand the environment.

How can the military know itself? This is the most 

difficult problem, but, again, there are tools. Knowing 

yourself is part of the standard doctrine for deception. 
183

That doctrine stresses the need to understand how your 

unit and its actions appear to the enemy before you 

can hope to manipulate the enemy’s perceptions. The 

same concept of understanding yourself and the consequences of your actions should be applied concerning peacebuilding. The most basic question should be 

asked: What are the indirect effects of conducting operations like running a fire base? Just the presence of a 

large logistical military footprint in a country can alter 

the operational environment. If the command has not 

completed an in-depth assessment as the framework 

requires, then it will be operating in the blind and executing support contracts that will counteract what 

the comprehensive development programs are trying 

to achieve. Displacement of local capacity or alteration 

of the social economic factors needs to be considered 

when building a large U.S. footprint in a country. This 

understanding of the force must include contract support. Direct contracting affects the host government, 

the elites, and the people of the country and therefore can have immediate and long-term impact. The 

purpose of this contracting is to interact directly with 

the locals to produce an effect that supports mission 

accomplishment. Examples are training, educating, 

and advising host nation military, paramilitary, and 

police forces; training, educating, and advising all 

ministries of the government, both national and local, on conducting security sector reform that includes 

reform of penal, judicial, and legal codes as well as 

disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating into civil 

society; assisting in intelligence operations to include 

interrogations, providing security forces, both static 

and mobile, in support of the movement and delivery 

of people and goods; and establishing and managing 

command, control, and communication centers. These 
184

are the contractors that are most likely to be armed 

and the most likely to use deadly force. All of these 

activities directly advance the U.S. mission in theater. 

This effort must focus foremost on building effective, 

legitimate, and resilient states. The ultimate responsibility for the stabilization and reconstruction process 

belongs to the host nation. This means all efforts of 

both the U.S. Government and their contractors must 

assist the host nation government and civil society 

to ensure that they lead and participate in both planning and implementation. Utilization of host nation 

processes and structures, both formal and informal, 

builds ownership. The key issue is how to meet immediate needs, yet also build long-term capacity. There 

is a tradeoff between relying on private contractors 

or U.S. governmental agencies to meet the immediate 

needs of the population and thereby reduce the risk 

of instability; while laying the more time-consuming 

groundwork for state institutions to deliver essential 

services and strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of a nascent democracy. The other concern is determining what tasks should be contracted and what 

tasks need to remain in the hands of U.S. governmental agencies. The tendency in Iraq and Afghanistan has 

been to use the United States or third country nations 

as an immediate solution to obtain stability. As of June 

2009, nearly 88 percent of the contractors in Iraq and 

Afghanistan were third country nationals, only 8 percent were local, and the rest were US nationals. What 

are the implications of using third country nationals?29

The division between what should be a U.S. Government face versus a contractor face must be determined by the outcomes. The U.S. objective is to instill 

a concept of democratic governance that is responsive 

to the needs of the people. A U.S. governmental face 
185

in key advisory positions sends a different message 

from a contractor face, even if that contactor is a subject matter expert. There must be a collaborative approach and a determination as to what messages need 

to be sent to achieve the effect desired. A combination 

of current federal employees and contracted personnel providing expert assistance can work well to instill the ideas of democratic control. It becomes difficult to convince local governors, chiefs of police, and 

politicians in Afghanistan not to hire their own illegal 

and unlicensed private military companies (PMCs) 

when the United States leads by example in its dependence on such organizations. Dennis Keller made 

the following evaluation of the U.S. role in foreign 

police training: 

Simply using a contracting mechanism to conduct police training does not create the kind of institutional capacity in the USG that is required for a consistently effective approach to enable local police to establish and 

maintain a safe and secure environment in a recovering 

state. Contracted police trainers often cannot or will 

not operate in non-permissive environments, thus confining their training to the capital city or secure areas, 

leaving unsecured remoter areas of a country without 

desperately needed police trainers and mentors, as is 

often the case in Iraq and Afghanistan today. If a particular contracted police trainer/mentor is identified as 

having superior ability to impart police skills and values in a foreign environment, there is no mechanism to 

keep that person on at DoS INL [Department of State, 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs] or elsewhere in the USG to help establish institutional knowledge and long-term capacity to 

manage and conduct foreign police training. 

While DoS INL seems to be most involved in foreign 

police training, with Department of Justice’s ICITAP 
186

[International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program] somewhere behind it in this arena, 

neither of these offices nor any other USG agency has 

assumed a definitive lead role for foreign law enforcement assistance to coordinate the diverse, multi-agency 

array of foreign police training that has slowly grown 

as a result of institutional creep to fill a police training void created by the U.S. Congressional cutoff of 

USAID police training activities in 1974. The lack of a 

lead agency with overall responsibility for foreign police training, similar to DoD’s responsibility for foreign 

military training, carries with it a number of consequences. The USG has no International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program-equivalent to systematically bring police officers to the U.S. for training, 

such as DoD has for foreign military officers. The USG 

does not have a comprehensive assessment program, 

though one is in development, to identify the state of 

law enforcement and police in a foreign country. The 

USG has not developed what the military would call 

“doctrine,” or agreed upon procedures and principles, 

to integrate State INL’s emphasis on the enforcement 

aspect of police training, with USAID’s community 

policing and overall justice sector and ministerial 

reform programs.30

CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING AND 

DEALING WITH INSTITUTIONAL REALITY

Understanding what the institutional constraints 

and restraints are and understanding what is possible 

and not possible is a starting point. Efforts to change 

a society just through the military changing its security force or providing a temporary safe and secure 

environment never produces the desired effect. Using 

the comprehensive approach always works better as 

the USIP’s Guidelines for Stabilization and Reconstruction have amply illustrated. The United Nations (UN) 
187

capstone doctrine states under the Peacebuilding 

Activities section:

While the deployment of a multi-dimensional United 

Nations peacekeeping operation may help to stem 

violence in the short-term, it is unlikely to result in a 

sustainable peace unless accompanied by programmes 

designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict.31

No matter what the military will try to do to shape 

the outcome, the host nation has its own objectives 

and its own ideas, and over time as the influence of 

the military force wanes, local imperatives take over. 

Host Nation ownership is a key principle in both the 

U.S. and UN doctrine, and the military must be comfortable with that concept. What the military builds 

will, over time, evolve into something else. Korea is 

the case in point. At the end of the day, Korea exerted 

its national agenda. But the United States maintained 

a long-term relationship with Korea, and that helped 

shape the outcome.

Primum non nocere is a Latin phrase that means 

“First, do no harm.” This is one of the key tenets of 

physicians and first responders, and should be considered when dealing with the military contribution 

to peacebuilding. There is no standard approach nor 

formulas that can apply in each situation. The military 

must not only try to understand local conditions, but 

also their own institution and what effects it is having 

on the environment. Great attention should be paid 

to unintended consequences of actions that may affect 

power relationships, societal dynamics, and even policymaking in capitals. This concept needs to be considered in the doctrine, planning, and training of military 

forces and will require an adjustment. This “do no 

harm” approach should also be in collaboration with 
188

the whole of the U.S. governmental approach and the 

host nation itself so that at the end of the day, the host 

nation will have ownership with the ability to deal 

with drivers of instability.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Some examples of assessment tools are the Interagency 

Conflict Assessment Framework developed by USAID, the District Stability Framework developed by ISAF in Afghanistan, 

Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments by USIP, and the 

Conflict Assessment Framework by the World Bank.

2. Major General Michael Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and 

Paul Batchelor, Fixing Intelligence: A Blue Print for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Afghanistan: ISAF, January 10, 

2010, p. 1.

3. United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine 

Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, UK: The Development Concepts and 

Doctrine Center, November 2009, pp. 2-24 and Chap. 3.

4. Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Post War Asia, New York: Random House, 

2007, pp. 150-153. 

5. Richard L. Millett, Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines, Occasional Paper 30, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010, p. 124. 

6. Author’s experience as a Special Forces Staff officer in U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM). In 1983, after the attempted 

coup by the Kenyan Air Force, a Special Forces advisor team was 

sent to the country. The Chief of Special Operations for CENTCOM, without any knowledge of Kenyan society or the structure 

of the Kenyan armed forces, presented a plan for the restructuring of the Kenyan armed forces. When the author asked how he 

could do that without any local understanding, he stated that the 

U.S. model was the best in the world, so there was no need to 
189

understand local issues. If the Kenyans would just adopt the U.S. 

model, all would be OK. Kenya rejected this recommendation. 

7. Laura R. Cleary, “Lost in Translation, The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, 

March 2012, pp. 25, 33.

8. Joint Staff J-7, Joint Staff Officer Study: Preliminary Findings, 

PowerPoint Presentation, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Defense, March 10, 2008; Center for Law and Military Operations, 

U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook, February 24, 2004; William J Olson, 

“Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence 

of Indecision,” Gabriel Marcella, ed., Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, December 2008, p. 223; Nora Bensahel 

and Anne M. Moisan, “Repairing the Interagency Process,” Joint 

Force Quarterly, Vol. 44, 2007, pp. 106–108. 

9. Walter Clarke, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Somalia, during Operation RESTORE HOPE, and Mark Walsh, District Administrator in Baidoa, Somalia, for the UN Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), interviewed 

by the author at PKSOI in 2000, where all three were employed. 

10. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Excerpt: Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone,” October 10, 2007, linked 

from Media Bistro Home page available from www.mediabistro.

com/articles/cache/a8798.asp. 

11. Cleary, p. 95; Stuart W. Bowen, “No More Adhocracies; 

Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2012, p. 4.

12. Sebastian Junger, War, New York: Hachett Book 

Company, 2011.

13. Cleary, p. 25.

14. Richard L. Millett, “Limits of Influence, Creating Security 

Forces in Latin America,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 42, 3rd Quarter, 2006, p. 15. 
190

15. William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute, March 23, 

2004, pp. 20-21; Captain Devin Flavin, artillery office, 173rd Afghanistan, 2007, interview by author in Carlisle, PA, 2010.

16. Flavin, interview with author.

17. Dale Erickson, “CivMil in the U.S. Sector Afghanistan,” 

briefing to PKSOI by the Center for Complex Operations, National 

Defense University (NDU) at PKSOI, Carlisle, PA, June 15, 2011. 

18. Javid Ahmad and Louse Langeby, “Can the Afghan Economy be saved?” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2012, e mail message to 

author dated February 5, 2012.

19. Roberto J. Gonzalez, American Counterinsurgency: Human 

Science and the Human Terrain, Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm 

Press, 2009, p. 69. 

20. Dennis E. Keller, U.S. Military Forces And Police Assistance 

In Stability Operations: The Least Worst Option To Fill The U.S. Capacity Gap, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2010, p. 18. These institutional shortfalls in U.S. capacity for police training were identified by a State Department official at the Conference for Building 

Capacity in Stability Operations: Security Sector Reform, Governance, and Economics, jointly sponsored by the Association of the 

United States Army (AUSA), Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), 

and PKSOI, Washington, DC, April 6, 2009.

21. Cleary, p. 95.

22. Ibid; Bowen, p. 6.

23. Major Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, Julie 

Walz, “CERP in Afghanistan; Refining Military Capabilities in 

Development Activities,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2012, p. 85.

24. David Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978 , pp. 219-220.
191

25. Caroline Earle, “Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in 

Stability Operations,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2012, pp. 41-42.

26. Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton, ed., Keeping The 

Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps, Washington DC: 

Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

27. Ibid., p. 6.

28. Allison Abbe and Stanley M. Halpin, “The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development,” Parameters, Vol. 39, No 4, Winter 2009-10, p. 29; U.S. House 

of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols,

Washington, DC: April 2010, p. 73.

29. Joint Forces Command, Handbook for Private Security 

Contractors in Contingency Operations, III; Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background 

and Analysis, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

December 14, 2009, p. 11; Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress, Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, December 19, 2010, p. 8.

30. Dennis E. Keller, U.S. Military Forces And Police Assistance In Stability Operations: The Least Worst Option To Fill The U.S. 

Capacity Gap, Carlisle, PA: PKSOI, U.S. Army War College, April 

2010, p. 18. These institutional shortfalls in U.S. capacity for police training were identified by a State Department official at the 

Conference for Building Capacity in Stability Operations: Security 

Sector Reform, Governance, and Economics, jointly sponsored by 

AUSA, CNA, and PKSOI, Washington, DC, April 6, 2009.

31. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, New York: United Nations, Department of Field Support, 2008, p. 25.

193

CHAPTER 8

THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY:

A GRAND STRATEGIC APPROACH TO 

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION 

IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Christopher Holshek

Thank God we’re a great country. We can stand a lot of 

this nonsense. But let’s not test it too closely.

 

 General Andrew Goodpaster

Given the grand strategic imperatives of the 21st 

century, the civil-military nexus of conflict management and peacebuilding is more relevant to international engagements and American grand strategy 

than ever. However, the U.S. civil-military approach 

to foreign policy and national security needs overhauling because it remains largely based on an outdated national security paradigm, itself predicated 

on an imbalanced interpretation of the fundamental 

civil-military relationship in American society that 

was forged under the exigencies of the Cold War era 

and revitalized since September 11, 2001 (9/11). There 

is plenty of evidence for this growing incongruity as 

of late, given the tremendous difficulties, for example, 

in post-conflict Iraq, in stabilizing Afghanistan, in 

counterterrorism operations in Africa, and in the military’s strained relations with many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).1

 Given the constraints and 

restraints of the emerging strategic and operational 

environments, however, the full potential of the civilmilitary nexus in international engagements cannot 
194

come to bear unless: first, civil-military coordination 

is seen as strategic rather than merely operational or 

tactical; and second, that civil-military coordination 

must essentially be the application of the democratic 

civil-military relationship—and thus military action is 

through, and in support of, civilian organizations and 

local government entities. This is in the best interest 

of all stakeholders, especially the military. To attain 

such economies of effort, cost, and risk at all levels, 

the actions of uniformed state instrumentalities must 

be consonant with their own societal values. In policy 

and practice, civil-military coordination has to walk 

the talk. 

This is actually good news for the United States, for 

no other nation is better suited to lead this transformation, given its dynamic, multicultural civil society and 

its democratic national values and tremendous social 

capital, as well as the U.S. military’s extensive institutional experience in civil-military coordination—

if, of course, the United States makes the necessary 

adjustments.

This strategic opportunity requires exploring: first, 

how the grand strategic context for civil-military coordination has changed between the 20th and 21st 

centuries; second, the U.S. civil-military relationship 

over this time; third, understanding civil-military coordination strategically—i.e., “thinking globally”; and 

fourth, understanding civil-military coordination in 

application—i.e., “acting locally.”

A TALE OF TWO CENTURIES

The global context for civil-military coordination2

has changed. Top-down, power-driven Western notions of national sovereignty and security of the 20th 
195

century are less relevant than the emerging, valuesbased, bottom-up human security actualities gaining ascendency in a now hyper-connected, globalized world—in other words, the referent for security 

is increasingly the individual or community rather 

than the state.3

 The constraints of this transformed 

international environment, along with the restraints 

of growing resource scarcity and capital shortages 

for the United States, other Western countries, the 

United Nations (UN), and the wider donor community form the two grand strategic imperatives of our 

times. These have correspondingly transformed the 

functioning paradigm for security, humanitarian relief, and development across the full range of conflict 

prevention and management as well as for peace operations, with associated changes in the approach to 

the civil-military nexus as a whole. 

From a broader perspective, the fundamental shift 

in the international order between the 20th and 21st 

centuries has been more inflective than intrinsic, particularly in the balance and interplay between what has 

been called “soft” (coercive) and “hard” (persuasive) 

power. National power in both its source and application is characterized by an industrial-era, state-centric, 

top-down, zero-sum, empirical, and calculable game 

of war and peace played largely by diplomats and soldiers, interest-driven, and manifested mostly in hard 

currency and armies. It reached its zenith in the 20th 

century. What is now beginning to hold greater sway 

is influence, derived from national, societal, and organizational strengths, rather than state-centric power—

post-industrial, bottom-up, and values-based involving myriad nonstate and intrastate actors across an 

ambiguous spectrum (or cycle) of conflict and peace 

and associated complexities. In this new “ecosystem,” 
196

Napoleon’s observation that “in war, the moral is to 

the physical as three is to one” takes on an even more 

appropriate meaning.

Concentrated military, financial, and other forms 

of coercive power are the ultimate expression of a 

state-centric international order. But what now increasingly characterizes that order is the warp and 

woof of a struggle for sociopolitical and economic organization in the spaces beyond and between states, 

amplified and accelerated by the 24/7 media and social networks that make “the narrative” predominant. 

In the 21st century, coercive power is losing both its 

dominance and appropriateness. Hard power is more 

threats-based, resource-intensive, zero-sum, reactive, 

and short-term (i.e., tactical). It is, however, fasteracting, more controllable, and more measurable. Soft 

power, in turn, is more suitable to collaborative, human security settings. It is community-based, largely 

resident in civil society and the private sector, and is 

more adaptable, economical, renewable, engaging, 

synergistic, and durable (i.e., strategic). It is normally 

slower to take effect across a broad, unpredictable 

front, although social networking technologies as of 

late have had accelerating and amplifying effects.

This is not to say that hard power is obsolete—just 

no longer as overriding. In truth, this rebalancing is a 

return to a historical American grand strategic equilibrium predating the Cold War. Despite National Security Council (NSC)-68’s emphasis on diplomacy’s continued lead in American grand strategy and George 

F. Kennan’s refrain to “first use moral authority,” the 

“militarization” of applied American power in the latter half of the 20th century had soft power (in policies, 

programs, and budgets) functioning more as a “combat multiplier.” In form as well as function, the face of 
197

U.S. foreign policy has been a military one. In truth, 

what brought down the Berlin Wall was the tipping 

point of rising expectations of Eastern Europeans (not 

unlike the social unrest seen in many places today), 

while allied military power contained the Soviets. In 

other words, hard power was the holding—or containing—action, while soft power was the offensive 

dynamic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

(NATO) vast arsenals enabled what NSC-68 called the 

“corrosive power of freedom” to go to work on the 

self-contradictions of the Soviet state over time. Selfdetermination, an ideal first socialized on an international scale by President Woodrow Wilson in the wake 

of World War I, became a prime security mover. With 

the collapse of that order, the recontextualization and 

rebalancing that should have taken place as far back 

as 1989 is now more obvious a quarter-century later.

This epochal reality is truer for the United States 

than any other country, as the world’s only global 

power for the last generation. But its national strategic 

style goes much further back in history. Since the Civil 

War, the United States has looked to win its wars, deter its adversaries, and assure its allies through overwhelming industrial and technological superiority 

predicated on an abundance of cheap resources, cheap 

labor, cheap energy, and cheap capital—it could afford a wasteful, surplus mentality. Since 1945, it had 

been the dominant power in the world—it could afford its own interpretation of “exceptionalism,” while 

everyone else was internationalizing.

Of equal importance to the grand strategic imperative of environment constraints are resource restraints. 

For the first time in centuries, the United States is entering a newfound era of relative strategic scarcity. It can 

no longer take an abundance of resources for granted. 

The economic and financial basis of traditional state-
198

centric power is diminishing through a globalization 

process that the United States itself has largely set in 

motion. Beyond reducing America’s throw-weight in 

general, it is translating into an end of unilateral freedom of action. “Asymmetric” threats and the rise of 

regional powers have already been mitigating longstanding U.S. advantages, while global competitors 

can now better bankroll their own agendas. Perhaps 

most importantly, information and social networking 

technologies and low-cost socio-cultural enterprises 

now present inexpensive equalizers to older, more 

costly, and more centralized industrial-era forms of 

power. The moral, or psychological, is now plainly 

overtaking the physical.

In the 21st century, there is no dominant power as 

seen in the prior century. Although the United States 

will remain the premier world power for decades to 

come, its ability to wield especially more traditional 

forms of power will be much more constrained and 

restrained by factors less and less within its span of 

control. Indeed, the heyday of state-centric power

per se in the new international arena is diminishing. 

Power is dissipating into more distributed forms. As 

the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa are 

demonstrating, the dynamic is now more about the 

strength, influence, and reach of ideas, globally archetypical but community-based. More importantly, it is 

about how these ideas communicate and work in people’s lives—in a word: innovation. In fact, the power 

of nation-states alone is becoming less relevant than 

the influence of people and organizations networked 

outside of and within governments. These are almost 

entirely civilian.

In the much more chaotic, unpredictable, and uncontrollable international order of the 21st century, 
199

the United States no longer dominates. It can still lead, 

albeit with a more strategic, rather than tactical, leadership style. You can use a more coercive and directive style when you dominate; but when you do not, 

you have to lead more persuasively—from behind as 

well as the front—as will be explained later.

Along with the changed context for national and 

international power is the changed nature of security. Security has become more than globalized; it 

has also become more humanized, civilianized, and 

democratized. Waves of popular unrest in response 

to everything from jobs, food prices, public pensions, 

poor educational and job opportunities, wealth disparities, and energy and the environment evince a 

groundswell of discontent with the inability of elites 

to deliver on socioeconomic fundamentals and essential public services. Security, prosperity, and social 

welfare are increasingly intertwined, making it everybody’s business. In the American psyche, security was 

something someone else in a uniform did somewhere 

“over there.” But in an intricate, hyper-connected 

global ecosystem where minor disturbances can have 

worldwide ripple effects in a matter of hours, this is 

all changing.

In Africa, for example, home to the bulk of security, 

development, and civil-military challenges for decades, “human security”—termed “civilian security” 

by the U.S. State Department in predictably exceptionalist fashion—and civil society problems such as poverty and food security, rule of law and justice, governance, economic development and job creation, and 

public health have long defined the security problem,4

calling for approaches going well beyond “whole of 

government” to “whole of society.”5 Comprehensive 

and collaborative approaches to conflict prevention 
200

and post-conflict operations in multilateral, human 

security settings are everyday for civil society organizations working there and elsewhere. They stress the 

long-term, legitimacy, and relationship-building characteristics of development. In this more normative 

paradigm, development, appropriately done, is therefore not a component of security, it is security. This 

is vital to understanding the difference from security 

in the 21st century not as simply an expansion of the 

state-centric national security paradigm into social 

disciplines—which seems to be the current interpretation in the United States government. Rather, U.S. 

development policy is seen more as an instrument of 

foreign policy, serving national (security) interests 

and aimed at the proliferation of the American model 

of political order. 

Given the growing limitations of hard power commensurate with the rise of soft power, increasing 

interconnectivity of global communities, the integration of security and development, and burgeoning 

resource restraints—all driving more comprehensive, 

collaborative, and coordinated approaches, the recontextualization, rebalancing, and proper alignment of 

the civil-military nexus remains at the locus of international intervention, whether for humanitarian, development, or reasons of state interest. 

Yet, the instrumentalities featured in the American approach to the world—indeed, the entire foreign policy and national security apparatus of the 

United States—remain predicated on a 20th century 

paradigm for which “national security” concerns have 

trumped all other prerequisites. This national security 

paradigm, which has pervaded practically all aspects 

of applied U.S. foreign and national security policy, 

is itself predicated on an interpretation of the funda-
201

mental civil-military relationship in American society 

that was forged under the exigencies of the Cold War 

era and revitalized since 9/11. (The last major overhaul of the organization of U.S. national security was 

the National Security Act of 1947.) It should therefore 

be no wonder that most U.S. civil-military approaches 

to applied foreign and national security policy are correspondingly out of synch.

Beyond Eisenhower’s prescient warning about the 

“military-industrial complex,” Americans are now accustomed to a vast national security state that, with 

the war on terrorism, permeates life at home and not 

just in policies abroad:

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has created or reconfigured at least 263 organizations to tackle 

some aspect of the war on terror. Thirty-three new 

building complexes have been built for the intelligence 

bureaucracies alone, occupying 17 million square 

feet—the equivalent of 22 U.S. Capitols or three Pentagons. The largest bureaucracy after the Pentagon and 

the Department of Veterans Affairs is now the Department of Homeland Security, which has a workforce of 

230,000 people. The rise of this national security state 

has entailed a vast expansion in the government’s powers that now touch every aspect of American life, even 

when seemingly unrelated to terrorism. Some 30,000 

people, for example, are now employed exclusively to 

listen in on phone conversations and other communications within the United States. In the past, the U.S. 

government has built up for wars, assumed emergency 

authority and sometimes abused that power, yet always demobilized after the war. But this is, of course, 

a war without end.6

The biggest reason for this has been in how U.S. 

grand strategy since World War II has been threat-
202

based, fear-driven, and enemy-centric, embedded in 

American culture:

Since the end of the Cold War, America has been on 

a relentless search for enemies. I don’t mean a search 

in the sense of ferreting them out and defeating them. 

I mean that America seems to have a visceral need 

for them. Many in the United States have a rampant, 

untreated case of enemy dependency. Politicians love 

enemies because bashing them helps stir up public sentiment and distract attention from problems at home. 

The defense industry loves enemies because enemies 

help them make money. Pundits and their publications 

love enemies because enemies sell papers and lead eyeballs to cable-news food fights.7

THE FAULT LIES NOT IN OUR STARS . . .

Most scholars and commentators on the subject of 

the civil-military relationship in the United States turn 

first to Samuel Huntington’s seminal work, The Soldier and the State, to begin discussion. It is more fitting, 

however, to go back nearly two more centuries to the 

Constitution of the United States, whose division of 

powers and authority, along with its system of checks 

and balances, “has succeeded not only in defending 

the nation against all enemies foreign and domestic, 

but in upholding the liberty it was meant to preserve.”8

The American way of the civil-military relationship is 

thus fundamental not only to the profession of arms; 

rather, it is fundamental to American civil society:

Civil-military relations in a democracy are a special application of representative democracy with the unique 

concern that designated political agents control designated military agents. Acceptance of civilian supremacy 

and control by an obedient military has been the core 
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principle of the American tradition of civil-military relations. U.S. military officers take an oath to uphold the 

democratic institutions that form the very fabric of the 

American way of life. Their client is American [civil] 

society, which has entrusted the officer corps with the 

mission of preserving the nation’s values and national 

purpose. Ultimately, every act of the American military professional is connected to these realities [that] he 

or she is in service to the citizens of a democratic state 

who bestow their trust and treasure with the primary 

expectation that their state and its democratic nature 

will be preserved.9

This was, by and large, the civil-military consensus in the United States until after World War II. Until 

then, the typical pattern was to maintain a small, professional force, which could be augmented in the event 

of national emergency through the militia (today’s Reserves), thus placating the general distrust of the military among the American public (reflected, arguably, 

in the Second Amendment). In the wake of World War 

II—for the first time in U.S. history—a large, standing (and eventually professional) peacetime military 

force has persisted. Huntington’s book appeared in 

1957, the same year as Sputnik, when, also for the first 

time in its history, the United States was faced with 

the clear and present danger of nuclear Armageddon. 

Given this historic departure and the existential 

exigencies of the Cold War, Huntington’s interpretation of the civil-military relationship is understandable. Paradoxically, Huntington concluded that to 

preserve democracy, society should grant the military substantial autonomy in managing international 

violence, in exchange for submission to civilian direction. For his theories, critics excoriated Huntington as 

overly militant, students staged protests during lectures, and Harvard fired him.10 Huntington’s model, 
204

which suspended the traditional consensus and balance of the American civil-military relationship, made 

more sense under the conditions of the Cold War and 

the international order it maintained. Once those conditions changed and that order began to break down, 

however, first with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then 

resuming with the difficulties of applied American 

power in the post-9/11 years (as explained above), 

the inherent flaws of Huntington’s model became increasingly obvious: “the most significant shortcoming 

of Huntington’s construct was its failure to recognize 

that a separation between political and military affairs 

is not possible—particularly at the highest levels of 

policymaking.”11 In other words:

Huntington’s claim that an autonomous military profession should . . . develop its expertise free from outside involvement is also problematic. For one thing, 

it underestimates the impact of service culture and 

service parochialism. Left to their own devices, the 

services may focus on the capabilities they would like 

to have rather than the capabilities the country needs. 

Even beyond this concern, an emphasis on autonomy 

heightens the risk of creating a military unable to meet 

the requirements set out in the U.S. military’s own 

doctrine, which talks of the need to integrate all instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, 

military and economic) to further U.S. national interests. . . . Effective partnerships in war are likely to require collaborative education, training, planning and 

capabilities. . . . This applies to foreign partners—military and civilian—as well as American. . . . This logic 

led Huntington to the extraordinary argument in his 

concluding chapter that the solution was for American 

society to become less liberal and more like the military 

in its culture and values. This proposed solution is extraordinary because it is a clear reversal of ends–means 

logic: instead of the military serving to protect Ameri-
205

can values, American society should change its values 

to serve the interest of military effectiveness. Only the 

existence of an existential threat would seem to justify 

such a proposition.12

This idea of the military as social role model is not 

as arcane as one might think. President Barack Obama 

expressed similar ideas in his 2012 State of the Union 

address. After beginning his speech by lauding the 

achievements of the U.S. Armed Forces, he said: 

At a time when too many of our institutions have let 

us down, they exceed all expectations. They’re not consumed with personal ambition. They don’t obsess over 

their differences. They focus on the mission at hand. 

They work together. Imagine what we could accomplish if we followed their example.13

With the popularity of the military in American 

society at an all-time high and that of politicians at an 

all-time low, the civil-military societal imbalance that 

began with World War II is now over 70 years old:

The veneration and outright hero-worship, now at a 

crescendo, is an unhealthy distortion of our time-honored yet taken-for-granted civil-military relationship, 

for a number of reasons . . . over time, it has also lent 

to a psychology of greater readiness to call upon the 

military in the pursuit of our national interests abroad, 

or to perform tasks, such as humanitarian or disaster 

relief or nation-building—contributing to the ‘militarization’ of our foreign policy and the ‘securitization’ of 

foreign assistance. We have even seen a greater presence of the National Guard in our relief responses at 

home, despite the intent of the Posse Comitatus Act of 

1878. Another is the perpetuation of a military industrial complex that is now a detriment to our prosperity 

and which we can less afford.14
206

This decoupling and distortion of the traditional 

American democratic civil-military relationship is not 

only manifest in the horizontal dysfunctions of interagency and civil-military coordination, it has also contributed to a vertical imbalance with an overemphasis 

on operations and tactics, leading to what strategist 

Colin S. Gray has called “a persistent strategy deficit” 

in the United States, pointing out that: 

If you do not really function strategically, it does not 

much matter how competent you are at regular, or irregular, warfare—you are not going to collect the political rewards that American blood and money have 

paid for.15

Interestingly, Gray points out that the “awesome” 

tactical power and performance of the U.S. military, 

in contrast to its strategic retardation, is similar to that 

seen by Germany during World War II—of course, 

a nightmarish case of civil-military “co-ordination” 

(Gleichschaltung)16 that proved catastrophic. James R. 

Locher III, principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and President of the now-defunct Project on National Security Reform, further notes that, in 

addition to having no grand strategy since the Cold 

War, the United States has had no national security 

strategy, either:

Yes, we have had a document that we call the ‘National Security Strategy.’ But it is a collection of goals 

and objectives without any actual plans for achieving 

them. The 2010 National Security Strategy is more of the 

same. It is a strategic-communications document—not 

a strategy. It was even written by the Strategic Communications Directorate of the National Security Staff, 

not the Strategy Directorate.17
207

The vertical disparity between policy and operations is thus very real, underscoring the connection 

between the global and the local, between the strategic 

and the tactical:

As military organizations expand their work into civil 

governance areas, it is not only the distinction between 

soldiers and civilians that blurs. It is also the social coding that military and nonmilitary agents use to describe 

the military organization and its particular ethos and 

rationality. As a result, it become unclear what kind 

of organization the military is and what it could and 

should be used for. It becomes difficult to communicate in an exact manner about military affairs.18

THINKING GLOBALLY: UNDERSTANDING 

THE CIVIL-MILITARY NEXUS AS

FUNDAMENTALLY STRATEGIC

In truth, the alignment of civil and military inflections of power and influence has always been the 

central challenge to anyone and everyone involved in 

trying to prevent, mitigate, or manage conflict and enforce, keep, or build peace. Given the grand strategic 

imperatives of the 21st century, however, this locus 

has only grown in significance. Context being what it 

is, if there is to be a paradigm shift in civil-military approaches—viewed from both sides—more in line with 

the emerging Zeitgeist, then two fundamental realities 

must be appreciated. First, civil-military coordination 

(cooperation and operations) is inherently thinking 

globally (or strategically). Second, to be both effective 

and credible, civil-military coordination must be an 

application of the democratic civil-military relationship that is morally consistent and symmetric—as 

above, so below.
208

With respect to the first insight, when looking from 

the more global, human security vantage point of the 

21st century, a more comprehensive and collaborative 

understanding of civil-military engagement becomes 

possible. As such, context takes precedence over content, partnership more than predominance, strategy 

more than operations and tactics, and human more 

than organizational enterprises. In the information 

age, legitimacy and credibility—expressed through 

and conveyed in “the narrative”—preponderates. 

This is no doubt especially true in the culturally 

charged Muslim world, where the United States, having broken the eggs of autocracy in Iraq, can perhaps 

help Arab civil society make the omelet of self-governance, albeit in a more indirect and limited way. Ironically, a good example of the moral over the physical is 

how the United States is currently paying for its less 

than credible image on the Arab Street earned over 

the years, especially in its inability to be an agent of 

change in Egypt. In this sense, therefore, the most 

important lesson of the war in Iraq is not that better 

planning, operational approaches, and tactics may 

have changed its outcome. “Instead, the real solution 

is re-thinking American grand strategy.”19 This insight 

may be leading the Obama administration, for example, to shift delivery of aid and technical assistance 

through international civil society organizations, the 

UN, and other partners rather than directly from U.S. 

Government run programs—in a sense, “leading from 

behind” in fostering peace as it did in supporting the 

war in Libya. The Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund proposed for Fiscal Year 2013 will also 

work much this way.

It is also true, as the United States shifts its global 

geopolitical priorities away from its near-obsession 
209

with the Middle East and Central Asia to East Asia 

and the Pacific: “When the only global power becomes obsessed with a single region, the entire world 

is unbalanced. Imbalance remains the defining characteristic of the global system today.”20 The growing 

competition between American and Chinese models 

in Asia-Pacific societies and bodies politic will define 

the real, ongoing challenge there, as opposed to the 

latent contingency of some kind of great showdown 

between U.S. and Chinese forces. In fact, civil-military 

coordination as a “strategic enabler” for the U.S. Pacific Command took place more than a half-dozen 

years before the Obama administration. Within the 

context of its theater engagement strategy, the Pacific 

Command has long been conducting “civil affairs 

projects” to help secure basing rights and, conversely, 

deny them to potential adversaries such as China.21

The relevance of human security is most apparent 

in the weak and fragile states of Africa—more important than a lower-level U.S.-Chinese competition than 

in the Asia-Pacific region. Africa, where the nationstate is hardly the established operating organizing 

principle of governance (and in some places may never 

be), is where the majority of conflicts, fragile and failing states are concentrated globally.22 Particularly in 

Africa, security is as much a socio-psychological issue 

as it is a power political issue:

Most of today’s African fighters are not rebels with a 

cause; they’re predators. That’s why we see stunning 

atrocities like eastern Congo’s rape epidemic, where 

armed groups in recent years have sexually assaulted 

hundreds of thousands of women, often so sadistically 

that the victims are left incontinent for life. . . . Child 

soldiers are an inextricable part of these movements. 

The LRA, for example, never seized territory; it seized 
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children. Its ranks are filled with brainwashed boys 

and girls who ransack villages and pound newborn 

babies to death in wooden mortars. In Congo, as many 

as one-third of all combatants are under 18. Since the 

new predatory style of African warfare is motivated 

and financed by crime, popular support is irrelevant to 

these rebels. The downside to not caring about winning 

hearts and minds, though, is that you don’t win many 

recruits. So abducting and manipulating children becomes the only way to sustain the organized banditry. 

And children have turned out to be ideal weapons: 

easily brainwashed, intensely loyal, fearless, and, most 

importantly, in endless supply.23

While the kind of human security challenges such 

as youth and gender-based violence in Africa may 

characterize the greatest threats to international security, they simultaneously present the greatest opportunities for influence and partnering on many levels 

and in many ways. The development community’s 

greater attention to and collaboration on these two 

issues is one evidence of this. 

Despite numerous advances in policy and doctrine, the “paradigm shift” in U.S. international security approaches has yet to occur. Not until changes 

in policy and doctrine are reflected in programs and 

budgets: Dollars continue to flow overwhelmingly to 

defense over diplomacy and development—throughout American involvement in Afghanistan, “the vast 

majority of aid went to the Afghan security forces and 

not development.”24 The military, for quite understandable reasons, has espoused many tasks civilian 

agencies have been either slow or incapable of taking 

up. The truth of the matter is that, while commentators argue that a deeper merging of civil and military 

objectives and capabilities has taken place, evidence 

from the ground informs us that the sophisticated 
211

wording of academics and policymakers (such as 

concerted action, integrated approach, ‘3D’, holistic 

approach, security-development nexus) seldom find 

their way into the concrete conduct of applied civilmilitary relations—or civil-military coordination.25

The problem with the “militarization of foreign 

policy” and the “securitization of aid,” of course, is 

that the U.S. military’s chief focus is security, so its 

relief and development activities emphasize winning 

the ‘hearts and minds’ of a population, not the humanitarian imperative of saving lives, doing no harm, and 

ensuring local ownership of reconstruction efforts.26

This largely explains the rub with humanitarian 

organizations. Yet, size or assignment should not matter—with the possible exception of major combat operations, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not (nor 

should ever be) the lead agency. Even then, beyond 

Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is 

merely an extension of policy by other means,” strategist B. H. Liddell Hart reminds us that “the aim in war 

is to achieve a better peace.”

Yet, “bad-guy baiting” has long been the way 

for congressional appropriation of national security 

driven security assistance or foreign aid funding. U.S. 

operations abroad thus remain threats-based and 

command-and-control managed. They are primarily 

operational and tactical in their focus, and rarely representative of regional let alone grand strategy. It is 

not only that such “legacy” approaches to security and 

civil-military coordination are less and less effective—

witness the growing realization of the inefficacy and 

ephemeral effects of “winning hearts and minds”—

they are no longer affordable.27 Civil-military coordination and other engines of 21st century collaboration 

must be more strategic from the outset. In fact, Soldiers themselves must become “post-modern.”28
212

The potentialities and economies of effort, cost, 

and risk at all levels of the central civil-military nexus 

of international engagements cannot, therefore, reach 

fulfillment unless this nexus is understood from a fundamentally strategic perspective:

• Civil-military coordination is inherently comprehensive and collaborative. Like strategy itself, it is holistic, cumulative, and convergent in 

ends, ways, and means. It is best suited to manage the seams of power and the gaps between 

organizations and processes.

• Civil-military coordination inherently bridges 

(state centric) whole of government with the 

whole-of-society/community. It leverages all 

forms of power and inflections of influence 

at all levels in order to create conditions for a 

transition to greater civilian lead and control 

and promote self-sustained civil society. In 

doing so, it keeps hard power more implied 

than applied at best; or at worst, minimizes 

or mitigates its costs and risks when it must 

be applied.

• Civil-military coordination is inherently informational—a human search engine that 

evaluates and offers a coping mechanism for 

uncertainty and complexity. As such, it helps 

minimize fog and frictions existing in seams, 

gaps, and transitions, as well as facilitates collaborative decision cycles—a key strategic and 

operational advantage over competing entities.

• It is synergistic, innovative, and persuasive—

enabling, moderating, and balancing. It promotes unity of purpose and economy of effort 

while managing change, risk, and expectations. 

Like “Generation Flux,” it draws together dis-
213

parate players across “stovepipes” toward a 

medium of cooperation and crowd wisdom 

largely through brainstorming and co-creation—but for which information transparency 

and sharing is absolutely vital.

• Civil-military coordination is inherently sociocultural. Because it is a human enterprise, it is 

in essence about relationship-building, which 

is how things get done in human security environments. Because it involves engagement of 

the local populace, it demands cultural awareness, helping the credibility and legitimacy of 

the whole effort.

• By enabling a more proactive use of civilian and 

soft power, it elicits the military principle of offense. By enabling more effective leveraging of 

less costly and more sustainable civilian power 

over more costly and risk-laden hard power, it 

evokes the military principle of economy-offorce (or economy of effort, cost, and risk).

• Civil-military coordination is inherently anticipatory (and less reactive) due to the need to 

collaborate in advance in order to reach desired 

common objectives or manage disparate interests. It calls for an approach more like Hall of 

Famer Wayne Gretzky, who observed: “A good 

hockey player plays where the puck is. A great 

hockey player plays where the puck is going to 

be.” In other words, it induces its practitioners 

to think and act with greater foresight.

• Applied civil-military coordination involves a 

strategic, enabling style of leadership, invoking 

persuasion, political bargaining, collaboration, 

consensus and relationship-building. Another 

way to describe the strategic leadership style 
214

is “leading from behind”—creating conditions 

for the success of others so the full menu of options may be brought to bear (and blood and 

money spared). Moreover, it should emphasize 

managing expectations all-around.

• Finally, it is adaptive and co-creative, more 

characteristic of learning organizations,29 as it 

is inherently a learning activity, constantly conscious of situation and environment.

In essence, civil-military coordination at its best is 

a form of applied grand strategy. In other words, it 

is thinking globally and acting locally—or, in military 

terms, thinking strategically at the operational and 

tactical levels. It is a compass, not a cookbook; a mindset, rather than a skill set.30

The paradox of strategically applied civil-military 

coordination is that, while it can generate transformative outcomes, the operational purpose of civilmilitary coordination is not to transform the host 

country—only the host country can do that, with the 

assistance of external actors, among them a foreign 

military. The purpose of civil-military coordination 

is more pragmatic—to channel the military’s engagement efforts in such a way as to maximize their impacts while minimizing the commitment of military 

resources, preserving them for core security tasks.

ACTING LOCALLY: THE APPLIED 

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 

AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES

In order to realize the above potentialities of civilmilitary coordination, policymakers and practitioners 

need to do more than think globally (or strategically). 
215

Civil-military coordination in local action must, in 

turn, be reflective of and conducive to this strategic 

conscientiousness. The focus here is thus on the nature of the relationship between civil and military elements and players. 

This is where one aspect of Huntington’s analysis 

of the civil-military relationship is constructive:

The military institutions of any society are shaped by 

two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the 

threats to society’s security and a societal imperative 

rising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions 

which reflect only social values may be incapable of 

performing effectively their military functions. On the 

other hand, it may be impossible to contain within the 

society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces 

is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations.31

What we could say about the current imbalance in 

terms of civil-military coordination is that there has 

been too much emphasis on the functional imperative 

in an era when the societal imperative is more appropriate. What we could also say is that, as in civilmilitary relations, strategically driven civil-military 

coordination is managing the tensions between those 

two imperatives. Thus, civil-military coordination in 

practice (in whatever form or institutional point of reference) is mainly about two things:

• First, managing the relationship and interaction 

between civilian and military actors that maximizes the comparative advantages of these actors as they apply to the situation; and,

• Second, enabling, shaping, and supporting the 

process of transition to peace, stability, and 
216

self-sustained development along civil-military 

lines, with the aims of “civilianizing” external 

assistance and “localizing” essential internal 

public services and governance functions.

Civil-military coordination is thus first and foremost a management function—specifically, the riskreward structure. As the private sector is teaching us:

What accounted for fundamental shifts in longer term 

advantage was not operational-level innovation. It 

wasn’t technology or product innovation, or new business models, or a new way of thinking about the whole 

industry. Again and again, it was management innovation—breakthroughs in how to organize and mobilize 

human capabilities.32

Given an understanding of the “nub” of civilmilitary relations, the basic management functions 

of civil-military coordination, and a more global and 

strategic understanding of civil-military coordination 

in an environment mostly in human security terms, 

it becomes clear that civil-military coordination is 

not just a matter of linking strategy and tactics, security with development, and hard and soft power. It 

is a matter of “how to organize and mobilize human 

capabilities.”

Thus, the replication of the civil-military relationship in democratic societies in operational approaches 

in human security settings becomes all-important. It 

demands unprecedented moral and ethical commitments, in which the military is subservient to and 

supportive of “civilian power” (to use the term in the 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review) and 

that the military’s role—as the major (but not leading) 

civil-military actor—is that of an enabler, especially 
217

with respect to the security sector. More appropriate civil-military approaches are thus an application 

of Liddell Hart’s strategy of the indirect approach, 

demonstrably placing the military in a supporting 

and not supported role. They are less concerned with 

“winning hearts and minds,” which is a tactic and not 

a strategy:

The goal is not simply to be liked. It is to be more influential and therefore more effective at lower cost. In a world 

where foreign public opinion has ever greater impact 

on the success or failure of vital American national 

interests, it should be weighed in making policy decisions and should shape how the United States pursues

its policies and how U.S. leaders talk about American 

policies. Listening, understanding and engaging makes 

for better policy, helps to avoid unnecessary conflicts, 

and should ideally allow policymakers to foresee and 

pre-empt objections to policies that sound worse in the 

field than they do in Washington.33

More democratic civil-military approaches have 

currency and effect on the narrative not because of 

their direct appeal to democracy per se, but because 

they resonate with more universal values, such as 

those encoded in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights, that lead to democracy. Even in hard 

power terms, it appears to be no coincidence that 

democracies are unusually successful in war. The 

reasons for this seem to be superior human capital, 

more harmonious civil-military relations, and Western cultural values and norms—once again, invoking 

Napoleon’s dictum.34

Civilian control of the military is inclusive within 

and not exclusive from civil society—something very 

much taken for granted in the United States but yet 
218

far from a given in most developing countries. Yet, 

“civilian control means more than the absence of a 

military coup. As long as the military possesses autonomous decisionmaking power, the democratically 

elected authorities’ power to govern and the quality 

of democracy remain limited.”35 Harmonized with the 

democratic civil-military relationship, civil-military 

coordination as explained in this chapter is an application of democratic values, a way to an end and not 

an end in itself. More importantly, it helps to close the 

“say-do” gap that has bedeviled especially American 

applied foreign and national security policy for decades. It also reduces the image of U.S. domination 

and strong-arming and facilitates internationalizing 

the overall effort, thus giving it greater cumulative 

power, persuasiveness, and influence and making it 

much more difficult to counter. Moreover, it helps 

promote a democratic culture in general in which the 

military itself becomes a civil society organization:

Democratic military professionals do not pursue their 

responsibilities to the state in isolation. They are part 

of a broader national security community comprised 

of national security professionals from both the civilian 

and military spheres, other actors such as journalists 

and academics who contribute intellectual capital and 

foster debate, legislative bodies with constitutional responsibilities to oversee and provide resources for national security policy, and, finally, the public at large 

to whom all of the above are ultimately responsible.36

Whether for us or them, the full integration of the 

military in civil society, and reflexively its integration into the engagement of that society, including its 

government institutions and the private sector—with 

the all-important caveat of the primacy of civilian 
219

authority—will ensure that the civilianization of security occurs more than the militarization of aid and 

development. The idea of “third-generation” civilmilitary coordination is intriguing, and deserves further examination. The Focused District Development 

(FDD) program in Afghanistan, as an example of this 

approach, is certainly more collaborative, partnering, 

and “broadens the civil-military relationship contact 

face to local governance and political authorities.” 

However, “the FDD is a military-driven police mentoring program.”37 Thus, precisely because the distinction between military and civilian work practically 

vanishes under this concept, the supreme qualifier of 

civil authority becomes even more vital:

If militaries are to be mobilized to assist in addressing 

the challenges facing much of Africa, the clear expectations need to be established and safeguards need to be 

put in place. . . . Trust can only be built if the military 

communicates effectively and regularly with the population. . . . In pursuing this mobilization goal, the essential element that helps ensure success is maintaining 

civilian oversight of the military and its projects. Doing so begins with clearly defining the military’s new 

role as temporary and supplemental to the public and 

private sectors. Projects should be designed in such a 

way that it is always clear that the military is not taking over or dominating but rather is assisting the other 

sectors and alleviating the pressure being placed upon 

them. . . . The circumstances in which the military can 

be mobilized to deal with nontraditional security concerns need to be clearly outlined in the state’s national 

security policies and in law.38

Although a more democratic approach to civil-military coordination has yet to be socialized across the 

board, there are numerous examples of exceptional 
220

best practices, including the author’s own experience 

as Chief of Civil-Military Coordination for the UN 

Mission in Liberia:

. . . the CIMIC [civil-military coordination] intent in Liberia has been to use the capabilities of the Force to ‘. . . 

enable and multiply civilian initiatives, and conducted 

in coordination with the UNMIL [United Nations Mission in Liberia] civil component (jointly) and UN agencies as well as NGOs and the GoL (collaboratively).’ 

This entails a more indirect role for military assets—

more clearly in support of civilian agencies and leading 

less from the front and more from behind the UNMIL 

civil component, UN agencies, and the GoL, aligned 

with them and their frameworks and benchmarks, in 

order to promote local ownership of civil administration and essential public services responsibilities, and 

to help build civil authority and public confidence. To 

de-emphasize ‘winning hearts and minds,’ the moniker for UNMIL CIMIC became: ‘it’s not about us; it’s 

about them.’39

Like good aid workers, good practitioners of civilmilitary coordination engage in an enabling process 

of helping their civilian partners build local capacity 

as well as confidence—teaching locals how to fish 

rather than simply giving them a fish. As a former 

Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan stated: “At the end of 

the day, it’s not about their embrace of us, it’s not 

about us winning hearts and minds; it’s about the Afghan government winning hearts and minds.”40 Put 

another way:

Military involvement in aid is driven in part by the 

‘winning hearts and minds’ (WHAM) theory. This 

operates on the basis of a charity paradigm, which 

sees beneficiaries as the deserving poor, and provides 
221

handouts and services while ignoring the complexity 

of the local context, and the unintended consequences 

of injecting resources into conflict-affected communities. NGOs have been working for many years to erase 

the handout mentality, emphasizing the importance 

of ‘ownership,’ involvement and empowerment of 

beneficiaries.41

The visualization of this more strategic, indirect, 

and democratic approach to civil-military coordination, as applied in Liberia, is depicted in Figure 8-1. 

The idea is to work the military out of a job by providing its stabilization efforts increasingly through civilian and local entities in an enabling process.

Figure 8-1. Civil-Military Echelons of Assistance.

Another important aspect of this approach is that, 

in order to facilitate the end state depicted in Figure 

8-1, the military must adopt the rule sets, ways, measures, and means of the civilians it is supporting. Another CIMIC aphorism used at UNMIL: “Their game 

plan is our game plan.”

While this model was designed originally with 

transitional civil-military coordination (the second 

major management function of civil-military coordination) in mind, the principles of “civilianizing” ex-
222

ternal assistance and “localizing” essential internal 

public services and governance functions by gradually placing the military to the rear of the assistance 

chain (behind civil society organizations and local 

government structures) and taking on an increasingly 

indirect and enabling role do not apply just to postconflict transition management. Indeed, it could apply 

to conflict prevention and “building partner capacity” 

efforts such as in the Horn of Africa and the TransSahel. U.S. involvement, for example, in low-level 

counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines after 

9/11 eventually took the approach of following local 

lead in civil action programs. “Filipino doctors, dentists and veterinarians come in to provide free care. Of 

utmost importance . . . is putting a Filipino face on all 

these operations.”42

Perhaps even more illustrative of the shifting paradigm is the U.S. civil-military response to the earthquake in Haiti, where the military clearly played a 

supporting role, and the U.S. Government sought to 

work within multilateral frameworks rather than expend the resources to create a parallel structure, exemplifying a prepositional term that has gained currency 

among U.S. civil affairs and other special operations 

personnel—”by, with, and through”:

Early on, the United States decided not to create a 

combined Joint task force. With the UN already on 

the ground, a robust multinational force was in place. 

In addition, MINUSTAH countries contributing additional resources and personnel already had links to 

their local UN representatives. Creating a combined 

Joint task force would have conflicted with those efforts. Instead, Joint Task Force-Haiti deployed to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response 

operations. The purpose of Joint Task Force-Haiti was 
223

to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term 

human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and 

USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities 

that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for 

relief and reconstruction are best left to nonmilitary 

government agencies.43

As mentioned earlier, however, the paradigm has 

not yet shifted for everyone. From its inception, AFRICOM has been beset with problems of credibility on 

the continent, due largely to the “say-do gap” of an essentially military organization—a regional combatant 

command—that originally tried to look and act like a 

whole-of-government organization.

The new U.S Africa Command was created with the 

intention of a more deliberate (rather than ad hoc) civilmilitary and interagency teaming approach—from the 

top down, and with a much heavier civilian content 

and lead, and thus with more soft than hard power 

at play, than in other combatant commands. . . . The 

real problem, however, at AFRICOM is that, despite its 

large civilian component, it still largely serves military 

missions (in particular, counterterrorism) rather than 

vice-versa—at least on the ground. This conflicts with 

AFRICOM’s central message. By and large, the military staff there defines security requirements. This is 

one of the reasons why AFRICOM has had such great 

difficulty in gaining credibility and acceptance in Africa—the greatest evidence for which is that it is still 

headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. This is a strategic and not an operational issue.44

Indeed, focusing more on the democratic civilmilitary relationship as an operational application, 

not only in terms of security and defense sector reform and partnership capacity development but also 
224

under the rubric of the country team, can only improve the strategic effectiveness of “comprehensive 

engagement” as defined in the 2010 National Security 

Strategy. This is because by walking the talk, closing 

the say-do gap, and leading through civilian power, 

U.S. civil-military practitioners would then be doing 

abroad what they do at home, clearly connecting strategy with operations and the whole-of-society with the 

whole of government.

It does more than this. With respect to building partnership capacity, demonstrating the democratic civil-military relationship helps address the 

concern expressed by former Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gate’s admonition that, beyond the traditional national security centric tendency to focus almost exclusively on operational development of the 

armed forces: 

. . . there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills 

and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the 

long term.45

In Liberia, for example, the Office of Security Cooperation is synchronizing AFRICOM’s Operation 

ONWARD LIBERTY program designed to enhance 

military institutional leadership and DoD’s Defense 

Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI, similar to the Ministry of Defense Advisory program in Afghanistan) 

to build capacity among the Ministry of Defense staff 

providing civilian oversight. This kind of applied 

foresight and synchronization of stovepipes, however, was more the result of personalities than policies 

or programs.

Systemically, U.S security assistance efforts in 

places like the Horn of Africa and particularly the 
225

Trans-Sahel, are based on a counterterrorism model—

the coup in Mali being only the latest example of a 

problematic approach to U.S. security sector reform 

focused almost entirely on operational rather than 

institutional capacity building and with almost total 

disregard of the civil-military relationship:

. . . something is very wrong about the U.S. approach to 

counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel. . . . Indeed. 

The two-pronged military-civilian strategy has been to 

(a) build security capacity of the Malian and other regional militaries to control territory and fight terrorists 

and (b) take steps to prevent the spread of violent extremism. . . . Unfortunately, the early signs aren’t good 

that the USG really recognizes the scale of the problem. 

. . . If we really believe that fighting terrorism in Africa 

is in our national interest, then the disaster still unfolding in Mali begs for an honest and aggressive rethinking of both the what and the how.46

Another outcome of a more democratic approach 

to civil-military coordination is that it tends to go far 

to mitigate the nettlesome strains from military force 

employment of humanitarian methods to “win hearts 

and minds” in the face of the NGO claim of exclusivity 

in humanitarianism. Such a civil-military approach is 

inherently more supportive of the efforts of these organizations, which are more appropriate for humanitarian and nation-building tasks formerly performed 

by military organizations, at least in U.S. experience.

On the other hand, civil society organizations must, 

in turn, recognize that military organizations, for better or worse, are themselves extensions of civil society and thus have a role in making peace, albeit more 

indirect than direct. More pragmatically, it facilitates 

an eventual relationship with indigenous military, 
226

paramilitary, and police forces and encourages them 

to maintain an appropriate balance between Huntington’s imperatives in their own security sector, having 

seen that example in foreign forces. Beyond helping 

external militaries work their jobs, it helps achieve a 

more sustainable security sector reform process and a 

more secure and stable environment for both the civil 

society organizations and the emerging government 

institutions long after those forces leave.

Thus, both kinds of entities need to employ a qualitative blend of realism and idealism, respecting and 

accommodating, as best as possible, particular principles and equities. This can only come through establishing relationships, dialogue, and even rule-sets for 

operational civil-military interaction in order to learn 

about comparative advantages as well as limitations:

CSOs generally take a long-term, relationship-based 

approach to development. Because of security, political and economic pressures, U.S. government and military officials often attempt shorter-term, quick-impact 

development. The challenge is to design short-term 

programming that contributes toward long-term goals 

and to design long-term programming that supports 

short-term objectives. Addressing the contradictions 

in timeframes requires more extensive discussion between CSOs and ISAF policymakers.47

Another insight thus comes into play—what you 

do in the steady state (strategically) cultivates the 

capital you draw upon for crisis response or in the 

field in general (operationally). It is mainly because, 

in the 21st century security and development engagement environment, relationships, and influence matter more than throwing weight. This critical strategic 

and operational capital—beneficial to both sides—is, 
227

at best, difficult to obtain once the operation begins. 

This is a common, yet still underappreciated, lesson.

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

All of this is actually good news for the United 

States. Despite the incongruities of its overwhelming national security, hard-power psychology, the 

United States, whose foundation of strength in its 

national ethos of e pluribus unum has been always 

morally based, is still the most ideally suited lead 

nation. Its dynamic, multicultural civil society and 

its democratic national values represent tremendous 

social capital. The democratic civil-military ethos of 

the United States is most clearly depicted in a symbol 

more than 2 centuries old—namely, the obverse of the 

Great Seal of the United States. The state, symbolized 

by the eagle, aspires for peace and civil society, looking in the direction of the olive branches in one talon 

while holding the arrows of war in reserve (or support) in the other. The Great Seal elegantly illustrates 

the alignment and application of these civil-military 

priorities. (See Figure 2.)

More concretely, for example, the United States 

possesses a unique comparative advantage, as it is already demonstrating in isolated cases, in assisting foreign governments and militaries in improving civilmilitary linkages and mechanisms, at all levels, due to 

its own program equities in areas like civil affairs. The 

problem is that these equities are not consistently arrayed in a comprehensive and coordinated way, in accordance with the realities of the 21st century and the 

need to find more democratic balance in Huntington’s 

imperatives as applied overseas.
228

Figure 8-2. Great Seal of the United States.

Besides addressing the sheer imbalances in budgets 

and authorities, “civilianizing” security, “demilitarizing” foreign policy and “developmentalizing” foreign 

aid, there are other areas to address. There are no civilian counterparts, for example, to the geographic 

combatant commander at the Department of State or 

the U.S. Agency for International Development, let 

alone a counterpart regional coordination entity, that 

would go far to facilitating a more comprehensive, 

civilian-led U.S. strategy in the geographic regions of 

the world.48

Civil affairs—the only true civil-military coordination entity in the U.S. Government, going back over 

a century, has evolved from military government, 

which is a suspension—not an extension—of democracy. Civil affairs must also transform from recent 

“bad guy” centric counterinsurgency and counterterrorism and become more strategic than tactical, 

with greater steady state linkages to and operational 

partnering with, for example, the State Department’s 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, from 

which civil affairs should take greater strategic direc-
229

tion. In yet another example, there should be a more 

strategically-driven synchronization of programs such 

as DoD’s DIRI program and the State Department’s 

Global Peace Operations Initiative and Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance program in 

order to build partnership civil-military teaming capacity and confidence in the civil-military relationship 

in democratic societies.

There are many more changes to mention. Moreover, their scope and extensiveness spell implications 

for U.S. foreign policy and national security are profound and far-reaching. This runs not just from Washington to the field, but from the field to Washington. 

Locher remarks that:

We have always been able to win ugly by throwing 

money at a problem, but that is no longer the case. We 

have lost our margin for error and we are headed for 

a decade of austerity, when even great programs are 

being killed. The times call for a national security system that is effective, efficient, participatory and agile. 

Unfortunately, we don’t have it—we have the opposite of that, a system that is archaic, designed 63 years 

ago, that still clings to Cold War concepts. At PNSR, we 

have a saying, ‘How can we secure our children’s future with our grandparents’ government?’ We are not 

going to win the future with that government.49

There is greater impetus for this kind of transformation not only from the strategic imperatives observed abroad, but from the American people themselves. In a remarkable study conducted by the Fund 

for Peace, involving scores of town hall type meetings 

around the United States held over a 2-year period, a 

major conclusion was that, while Americans still expected the United States to maintain its global leader-
230

ship role, “It leads best when it’s true to its values and 

when it works with others.” Additionally:

. . . there was remarkable consistency that America 

must lead in the world—but it leads most effectively 

when it ‘walks the talk,’ i.e., adheres to its own stated 

principles. . . . America’s ideals impel it to lead in the 

world, and the world looks to America to play that 

role. But how America leads is as important as whether 

it leads. . . . Reorienting American policy priorities not 

only would enhance U.S. global leadership, but was 

seen as yielding lasting influence. . . . America was a 

stronger nation when it listened to people, and indeed, 

could learn from different countries, cultures, and experiences. . . . Finally, there was significant discussion 

in most forums about the differences between ‘American power’ and ‘national strengths.’ Many participants 

associated the former with an emphasis on coercive 

behavior in the world, while they viewed the latter as 

concerning principles and values, such as democracy, 

liberty, and tolerance. While coercive means might 

be necessary in some cases, an over-reliance on them 

was seen as counterproductive and even disastrous; 

whereas pursuing policies on the basis of the nation’s 

strengths was seen as the most effective way to produce lasting influence in the world. In addition, people 

viewed a predominantly coercive approach as out of 

touch with new global realities.50

While the perils of the 21st century are coming 

more or less on their own, the promises emerging 

from the same paradigm are not as such. This calls for 

greater, not less, American international leadership, 

for no other nation is better suited to exploit and lead 

this transformation.

There was nothing inevitable about the world that was 

created after World War II. No divine providence or 

unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of 
231

democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee 

that their success will outlast the powerful nations 

that have fought for them. Democratic progress and 

liberal economics have been and can be reversed and 

undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the 

republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving 

liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s 

and 1930s. The better idea doesn’t have to win just 

because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to 

champion it.51

The qualitative difference between then and now, 

however, is that “real leadership is not dominance.”52

Every military officer learns that the most effective, 

persuasive, and durable form of leadership is by example—whether from the front or behind. This is as 

true for nations as it is for individuals. Practicing at 

home what you preach abroad is a demonstration that 

what matters over there also matters over here, as 

Harry S. Truman observed in his message to Congress 

that launched the civil rights movement, in which he 

concluded: 

If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose 

freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to 

those who have already lost their civil liberties, if we 

wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct 

the remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy. We know the way. We need only the will.53

When Americans think globally and act locally, 

making their actions consonant with their core values 

and embracing a new ethos of collaborative engagement, in view of adversaries and partners alike, they 

transform both their environment and themselves. A 

more enlightened approach to civil-military coordina-
232

tion is not a tradeoff between idealism and realism, it 

is a fusion of both. It is a fusion of art and science that 

combines practical critical thinking with an imaginative synthesis of the most appropriate methods. It is 

at the heart of American grand strategy for the 21st 

century. Failure to recognize this risks further deterioration of American global leadership and the security 

and prosperity that comes with it.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. For a more detailed discussion, see Christopher Holshek, 

“Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan—Looking from Outside the 

Box,” Volker C. Franke and Robert H. “Robin” Dorff. eds., Conflict Management and "Whole of Government": Useful Tools for U.S. 

National Security Strategy? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 275-305; also see Christopher 

Holshek, “From Afghanistan to Africa: Civil-Military Teaming in 

a Whole New World,” Jon Gunderson and Melanne Civic, eds., 

Unity of Mission: Civilian-Military Teams in Complex Operations, 

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, forthcoming.

2. The author uses the term “civil-military coordination” not 

as an operational or doctrinal term, but rather in a much larger, 

grand strategic sense that includes the coordination of civilianbased and military power and influence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

3. The United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report is considered a cornerstone publication 

for defining “human security” as including economic security, 

food security, health security, environmental security, personal 

security, community security, and political security as its main 

components—precisely how most underdeveloped nations, particularly in Africa, define “security” for them writ large. See Mahbub ul Haq et al., Human Development Report 1994, United Nations 

Development Programme, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

4. Mahbub ul Haq.
233

5. For a detailed explanation, see Lisa Schirch, “Where Does 

Whole of Government Meet Whole of Society?” Franke and Dorff, 

eds., Conflict Management, pp. 127-152.

6. Fareed Zakaria, “Fareed’s Take: U.S. has made war on terror a war without end,” CNN GPS, May 6, 2012, available from 

globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/06/national-security-state/.

7. David Rothkopf, “The Enemy Within,” Foreign Policy, 

May-June 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/the_enemy_within_0; accessed 1 May 2012. 

See also Christopher Holshek, “The Enemies We Love,” The Huffington Post, 4 May 2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/

christopher-holshek/defense-spending_b_1472725.html.

8. Richard H. Kohn, “The Constitution and National Security: 

The Intent of the Framers,” Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United States 

Military Under the Constitution of the United States, New York, New 

York University Press, 1991, p. 87.

9. Marybeth Peterson-Ulrich, “Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps,” Don M. Snider and 

Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd Ed., 

New York: McGraw Hill, 2005, p. 655.

10. Robert D. Kaplan, “Looking the World in the Eye,” Atlantic 

Monthly, December 2001, pp. 70-72 (interview with Huntington). 

Huntington published The Soldier and the State while an assistant 

professor of government at Harvard. The book was initially dismissed as propagandist by skeptical academics, and so infuriated 

his colleagues that they voted to deny him tenure 2 years later. 

Forced to leave, he joined the faculty at the University of Chicago. 

In 1962, Harvard realized its mistake and lured him back as a full 

professor. Students on campus staged protests during his classes, 

so his graduate students organized details to patrol the halls so 

lectures could proceed. Huntington continued teaching at Harvard for the next 4 decades, twice chairing the same department 

that once rejected him.

11. Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider, eds., American 

Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 387.
234

12. Suzanne C. Nielson, “American Civil–Military Relations 

Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The 

Soldier and the State,” International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2, 2012, pp. 

372-373.

13. Barack Obama, “The 2012 State of the Union,” January 25, 

2012, available from www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-theunion-2012.

14. Christopher Holshek, “National Service Day,” The Huffington Post, November 11, 2011, available from www.huffingtonpost.

com/christopher-holshek/national-service-day_b_1086206.html. For a 

discussion of the democratization of both sacrifice and service, see 

also Christopher Holshek, “Standing Up for All the Fallen,” The 

Huffington Post, May 25, 2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.

com/christopher-holshek/memorial-day_b_1538896.html.

15. Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: 

Can the American Way of War Adapt? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2006, p. 5.

16. The German term, Gleichschaltung, or “co-ordination,” 

refers specifically to the Nazis systematic co-opting of the major 

institutions of German society, among them the military, into the 

expanded German state in the 1930s. The case of the military, the 

politicization of its leadership, and the swearing of allegiance to 

Adolf Hitler rather than the nation characterize the logical conclusion of a process, begun in the 1920s, of the metamorphosis of 

a highly professionalized military into what was more famously 

known as a “state within a state.”

17. See Richard Weitz’s blog on Locher’s April 11, 2012, keynote presentation at the U.S. Army War College annual strategy 

conference, in “The U.S. Strategy ‘Deficit’: The Dominance of Political Messaging,” Second Line of Defense, available from www.

sldinfo.com/the-u-s-strategy-%E2%80%9Cdeficit%E2%80%9D-thedominance-of-political-messaging/. Quote obtained from Mr. Locher’s personal notes for his April 11, 2012, presentation provided 

to the author.

18. Frederik Rosen, “Third-generation Civil-Military Relations: Moving Beyond the Security-Development Nexus,” Prism, 

Vol. 2, No. 1, December 2010, p. 28.
235

19. Stephen M. Walt, “Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2012/03/20/top_ten_lessons_of_the_iraq_war?page=full.

20. George Friedman, “The State of the World: A Framework,” 

STRATFOR, February 21, 2012, available from www.stratfor.com/

weekly/state-world-framework.

21. Robert D. Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The 

Atlantic Monthly, June 2005, available from www.theatlantic.com/

magazine/archive/2005/06/how-we-would-fight-china/.

22. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and 

The Shrinking Costs of War, Human Security Report Project, available from www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx.

23. Jeffrey Gettlemen, “Africa’s Forever Wars,” Foreign Policy, March-April 2010, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars.

24. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The US Cost of the Afghan War: 

FY2002-FY2013,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 15, 2012, available from csis.org/publication/

us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002-fy2013?utm_source=The+US+Cost+of+th

e+Afghan+War%3A+FY2002-FY2013&utm_campaign=The+US+Co

st+of+the+Afghan+War%3A+FY2002-FY2013&utm_medium=email. 

25. Rosen, p. 31.

26. Samuel A. Worthington, “Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face 

of the U.S. Military,” Book Review, Prism, Vol. 2 No. 1, January 

2010, p. 167.

27. See Holshek, “Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan—Looking from Outside the Box” and “From Afghanistan to Africa.” 

See also Paul Fishbein and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and 

Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts 

University, January 2012; as well as Mark Bradbury and Michael 
236

Kleinman, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship 

between Aid and Security in Kenya, Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, April 2010.

28. For a detailed discussion of the idea of a “postmodern military” whose soldiers are more internationalized and civil-military minded, see C. C. Moskos, J. A. Williams, and D. R. Segal, The 

Postmodern Military, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000.

29. For a greater understanding of the term “learning organization” in application, for a military perspective with respect to counterinsurgency operations, see John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 

Press, 2005; for a civilian bureaucratic perspective, see Thorsten 

Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The Evolution of Organization Learning in UN Peace Operations Bureaucracy, 

Berlin, Germany: Global Public Policy Institute, 2011, 

available from www.bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/pdf-docs/

berichtbenner2.pdf.

30. For a more detailed discussion of the strategic nature 

of civil affairs and civil-military operations, see Christopher 

Holshek, “Civil-Military Power and the Future of Civil Affairs,” 

Reserve Officer Association National Security Report, The Officer, 

May 2007, pp. 45-48. The full version, based on a U.S. Army War 

College Strategic Research Project, appeared as “The Scroll and 

the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military Power,” Cornwallis Group 

XI: Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions, Nova Scotia, Canada: 

George Mason University–Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 2007.

31. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1985, p. 2.

32. Gary Hamel, “Management Must Be Reinvented,” 

World Innovation Forum 2008, available from www.youtube.com/

watch?v=TVX8XhiR1UY.

33. Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lynch, America’s Extended 

Hand—Assessing the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement 

Strategy, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 

June 2010, pp. 10-12, 16.
237

34. Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and 

Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look,” The Journal of Conflict 

Resolution, August 2004, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 525-546.

35. Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz, “Breaking with the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia,” Policy Studies Vol. 63, Honolulu, HI: EastWest Center, 2012, p. ix.

36. Peterson-Ulrich, p. 656.

37. Rosen, p. 33.

38. Birame Diop, “Sub-Saharan African Military and Development Activities,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 1, December 2011, p. 94.

39. Christopher Holshek, “Civil-Military Coordination and 

Transition Management: The UNMIL Experience, Conflict Trends, 

Issue 3/2011, September 2011, p. 47. The quotes are from the UNMIL Force HQ CIMIC Force Directive for the Conduct of CIMIC 

by the UNMIL Force for the Drawdown Phase, Version 2, June 15, 

2009, p. 6, which the author wrote while serving as UNMIL Chief 

of CIMIC in 2008-09.

40. General David Petraeus, transcript of interview with 

David Gregory on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” August 15, 2010, 

available from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38686033/ns/meet_the_presstranscripts/.

41. Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Mirwais Wardak, Idrees 

Zaman, and Annabel Taylor, Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations, London, UK: British and Irish Afghanistan Agencies Group (BAAG) and European 

Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA), 2008, p. 7.

42. Stew Magnuson, “U.S. Special Forces Target Hearts and 

Minds,” National Defense, February 2008, available from www.

nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/February/Pages/U2357.

S2357.Special2357.aspx.

43. Lieutenant General P. K. Keen, Major General Floriano 

Peixoto Vieira Neto, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Nolan, Lieu-
238

tenant Colonel Jennifer L. Kimmey, and Commander Joseph Althouse, “Relationships Matter—Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” Military Review, May-June 2010, p. 8.

44. Holshek, “From Afghanistan to Africa.”

45. Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: 

The Future of U.S. Security Assistance, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, 

No. 3, May-June 2010.

46. Todd Moss, “Lessons from Mali’s Debacle: Time to Rethink Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Rethinking U.S. Foreign 

Assistance Blog, Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 

May 10, 2012, available from blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/2012/05/

lesson-from-malis-debacle-time-to-rethink-counterterrorismcooperation.php.

47. Lisa Schirch, “The Civil Society-Military Relationship in 

Afghanistan,” Peacebrief, Vol. 58, Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace, September 24, 2010, p. 4.

48. See Retired Ambassador Edward Marks, “A ‘Next Generation’ Department of State—A Proposal for the Consolidation of 

the Management of Foreign Affairs,” American Diplomacy, March 

2010, available from www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0103/

oped/op_marks.html. 

49. James R. Locher III, quoted in Kathryn Boughton, “National Security Expert Who Spoke in Kent Says bin Laden Outcome the Exception; National Security System Flawed,” Litchfield 

Country Times, May 2, 2011, available from www.countytimes.com/

articles/2011/05/02/news/doc4dbf1e831ef1e702049372.

50. Will Ferroggiaro, The Use & Purpose of American Power in 

the 21st Century—Perspectives of Americans from the 2008-2009 National Dialogue Forums, Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, June 

2010, pp, 15-16, 32.

51. Robert Kagan, “Why the World Needs America,” The 

Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2012, available from online.wsj.

com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.

html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories.
239

52. Christopher Holshek, “Over There Matters Over Here,” 

The Huffington Post, March 22, 2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-holshek/us-super-power_b_1362816.html.

53. Harry. S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on 

Civil Rights,” February 2, 1948, Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, available from www.trumanlibrary.org/

publicpapers/index.php?pid=1380&st=&st1.

241

CHAPTER 9

PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT:

CHALLENGES FOR STRATEGIC THINKING

Fouzieh Melanie Alamir

PROBLEM STATEMENT

It has become commonplace in the international 

strategic discourse to underline the importance of development aspects in international conflict and crisis 

management. This has been promoted by concepts 

such as Human Security,1

 the Whole-of-Government 

Approach (WoG),2 or the Comprehensive Approach 

(CA),3 and most recently reflected in the U.S. National 

Security Strategy of 2010.4

 Going back to the mainstream of U.S. national security thinking during the 

Cold War in terms of instruments of power (diplomacy, information, military, and economy [DIME]),5 

the latter two concepts implicitly presume that military strategic thinking can be utilized as a generic 

method to achieving broader policy goals. They imply 

that the comprehensive set of civilian and military instruments at the disposal of a nation-state can be employed in the same manner as military instruments. 

Development policy instruments in this context tend 

to be regarded as a lever, which can simply be added 

to the list of the other instruments of national power. 

All too smoothly, development policy domains such 

as the fight against poverty, promotion of human 

rights, good governance, democratization, or capacity building, have been lined up with security policy 

fields of action such as anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, or cyber security without reflecting whether the 
242

character and principles of development policy can be 

simply subsumed under this header.

It goes without saying today that peacebuilding efforts and development policy should be key elements 

of an up to date grand strategy. The question remains 

however, whether the approaches and cognitive premises of strategic thinking6

 are capable of capturing and 

embracing the characteristics of peacebuilding and 

development as policy domains sui generis.

This chapter argues that peacebuilding and development policy elude traditional presumptions and 

patterns of strategic thinking in numerous ways and 

analyzes why. Following a brief sketch of the cognitive premises of modern strategic thought, I will discuss how strategic thinking is challenged by several 

distinctive features of peacebuilding and development processes. The concluding section summarizes 

the findings with regard to adjustments required by 

strategic thinking.

COGNITIVE PREMISES OF MODERN 

STRATEGIC THOUGHT7

Although the logical structure of strategic thinking 

does not differ from other logical social science constructs, it is largely shaped by the professional selfconception, premises, and operational requirements 

of military actors. The point of departure of strategic 

thinking is the nation-state and its national security 

interests defined in predominantly realist terms of 

balance of power, territorial integrity, sovereignty, 

protection of the political and economic order, and 

availability of human and natural resources as prerequisites of sustained existence. Seen from this statusquo oriented and state-centric perspective, the strate-
243

gic environment tends to be captured in elementary 

categories of risks, threats, power structure, allies, or 

adversaries. This neglects the complexity, dynamics, 

inconsistency, and ambivalence of social and political 

challenges relevant in peacebuilding and development contexts. However, scholars of strategic studies 

often stress that military power is but one means to 

achieve political ends and howsoever sophisticated 

and differentiated the categorical grid of assessing 

strategic environments, the major interpretation pattern in strategic thinking for locating phenomena in 

the strategic environment remains the power balance 

and risk-threat scheme.8

Moreover, derived from military professional selfconceptions, the major point of reference of strategic 

thinking is the question of whether and what action is 

required. This action orientation implies another key 

characteristic of strategic thinking, namely the premise of unlimited feasibility as long as—given political 

determination—it is technically and physically feasible. This, in turn, compounds a focus on those phenomena, which can be influenced by the given means 

and instruments, at the expense of those that cannot be 

immediately influenced or are not fully understood. 

In addition, it abets a widespread but false conclusion that those with high operational skills must also 

be good strategists, or, in other words, that strategy 

development can be handled in the same manner as 

operational management.

Another feature of strategic thinking that has been 

assigned by military thinking is the general confidence in instrumental rationality. It disregards the 

relevance of irrational elements in politics, is inclined 

to take political decisions for granted, and focuses on 

how to implement them rather than to question their 
244

wisdom. In the same vein, strategic thinking depends 

on clear goal formulation in order to derive strategydriven action, even if the exact goals are not known. 

In consequence, blurred ends tend to be substituted 

by a focus on ways and means. A good example to 

demonstrate this is the prominence of the WoG/CA 

debate. While WoG/CA are useful concepts to improve how we implement policies, they do not reflect 

whether we are pursuing the right goals. However, 

both concepts have gained the status of almost strategic paradigms, indicating, in fact, a roll back of strategic thinking.9

 Furthermore, it is the military’s need for 

hierarchy, predictability, order, simplicity, precision, 

and sequence—all derived from military operational 

requirements—that can be traced in strategic thinking, 

too. The military approach to compartmentalize processes and to break the processes down to hierarchical 

command and control patterns can also be found in 

the “engineering” mindset of strategic thinking. Last, 

but not least, strategic thinking is prone to focusing on 

hard facts and figures rather than on soft factors like 

will, perceptions, and emotions, thereby underrating 

the tremendous power the latter might engender. 

Eventually, although it does not describe a cognitive premise but rather a condition, strategic thinking 

suffers from the same circumstance as military reasoning about ends, ways, and means, which is that it 

does not enjoy great popularity among policymakers. 

Having said this, it should be emphasized that strategic thinking is regarded from a cognitive-structural 

perspective without claiming to do justice to specific 

products of strategists. Moreover, there is no criticism in stating that strategic thinking has been coined 

by military thinking. On the contrary, it is acknowledged that strategic thinking has historically evolved 
245

in a military context, and that it naturally had to take 

account of military operational planning and execution requirements. The question is, however, whether 

peacebuilding and development objectives can be 

adequately pursued on the basis of these cognitive 

premises.

WHY PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT 

ELUDE CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC 

THINKING

Before going into the details of the argument, our 

understanding of peacebuilding and development 

policy needs to be clarified. As with most generic 

concepts, there is no commonly accepted definition 

of peacebuilding. The mandate of the United Nations 

(UN) Peacebuilding Commission highlights four aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery: 

integrated strategies, reconstruction and institution 

building, sustainable development, and coordination 

of all relevant actors.10 The former President of the 

Alliance for Peacebuilding, a nongovernmental advocacy organization, described peacebuilding as “the set 

of initiatives by diverse actors in government and civil 

society to address the root causes of violence and protect civilians before, during, and after violent conflict. 

. . . ”11 Both definitions put emphasis on the long-term, 

comprehensive interagency and structural approach, 

as well as on tackling the root causes of violent conflicts. It is the focus on these aspects that marks our 

understanding of peacebuilding as a developmentoriented concept different from peacemaking, stabilization, or peacekeeping. Although not explicitly 

stated, the reference to sustainable development or 

the root causes of conflict indicates the close link be-
246

tween peacebuilding and good governance; human 

rights; and political, economic, and social development as ingredients of sustainable development.12 In 

other words, peacebuilding and development are inextricably linked. The Journal for Peacebuilding and Development13 mirrors this understanding in its very title. 

Peacebuilding in poor and conflict prone societies is 

not feasible without a broader development framework, although peacebuilding and development are 

distinct policy domains. Whereas peacebuilding focuses on establishing mechanisms of peaceful conflict 

resolution, development creates the social, political, 

and economic conditions that enable and sustain 

them. While peacebuilding is a thoroughly civilmilitary endeavor with prominent contributions to 

be made by the military, the role of military actors in 

development is marginal and limited to military roles 

in security system reform. Peacebuilding can be seen 

as the element linking peacemaking, stabilization, and 

peacekeeping efforts as primarily military tasks to the 

broader development efforts. Regarding our question, however, peacebuilding and development pose 

a common set of challenges to strategic thinking and 

will therefore be dealt with in tandem.

How Do Ownership and Legitimacy 

Fit into a State-Centric Scheme?

As mentioned above, strategic thinking has a statecentric and status quo oriented bias that clashes with 

several tenets of peacebuilding and development policy. First, there is a clash of perspectives. Due to its 

inherent point of departure, strategic thinking tends 

to treat actors and societies in countries of concern as 

objects in relation to their own national interests. In 
247

contrast, peacebuilding and development rely on indigenous actors and societies as their principal acting 

subjects. The notion of local ownership and legitimacy 

(not in the eyes of the international community, but in 

the eyes of local constituencies) as core development 

principles and precondition claims the right of selfdetermination of concerned polities on the one hand, 

while reminding them of their responsibility on the 

other. Moreover, it implies that external actors need 

to accept taking a backseat. In scenarios where external actors have not only spent human and technical 

resources to intervene in a crisis militarily, but have 

also sacrificed lives and are under political pressure 

to make the engagement a success, the temptation to 

impose policies is high. Combined with the often displayed unwillingness or incapacity of local actors to 

agree on peaceful conflict resolution and to manage 

basic stabilization requirements, it is not hard to imagine why principles of local ownership and legitimacy 

are easily abandoned and cause international donors 

to either impose conditions and/or rely on bridgeheads. Yet, ownership and legitimacy are necessary to 

ensure sustainability and to avoid the peril of getting 

trapped in long-term engagements abroad.

Second, due to the state-centric bias of strategic 

thinking, the dynamics of awakening civil societies, 

the peace potential of opposition groups, the influence 

of individuals beyond the official political system, or 

socio-cultural sensitivities, tend to be overlooked. As 

external actors often lack knowledge and understanding of societies alien to their own cultural context, they 

tend to interpret phenomena within the parameters of 

their own system of meanings. For example, our reliance on documents in political and administrative 

processes in the form of policy papers, memoranda 
248

of understanding, contracts, reports, etc., is not necessarily shared in other parts of the world. People there 

have learned that signing a document is necessary to 

receive material benefits, but a signature may have a 

less binding character to them than a gift, a handshake, 

or a word of honor. In addition, the state-centric perspective abets a focus on actors who are in power, or 

at least in command of armed forces, without asking 

too many questions on how they came to power or 

how they use their power. This is in conflict with the 

general people-centered orientation of development 

policy and its human security approach where the 

conventional instruments of power encounter their 

limits. This applies even more so when it comes to the 

particular concern of development policy for vulnerable groups such as the poor, women, children, disabled, or other minorities. 

Strategic thinking will not be able to overcome the 

limits of its state-centric and status quo oriented bias 

unless it opens up for civil societies and organized 

groups beyond the official political system as potential partners in creating stability and peace. This also 

requires more careful and more critical examination 

of the roots, background, power base, goals, methods, 

ideological reference, and possible future profile of 

those who receive backing or support. 

Facing Dynamic Complexity and Cultural 

Outland—Are Conventional Methods of Acquiring 

Knowledge Up to the Task?

Strategy development begins with an analysis of 

the strategic environment. Based on the premise that 

“facts are value neutral,”14 categories for analyzing the 

strategic environment in conventional strategic think-
249

ing are the physical environment, the national character, the interplay between states, balance of power 

considerations, and the nature of conflict.15 Although 

Colin S. Gray highlights the necessity of a skeptical 

mindset and creative thinking for strategists,16 in practice it tends to be neutralized by the requirements of 

operational command, which hardly leave space for 

lengthy reflections or thinking out of the box. Hence, 

although clear-sighted scholars suggest otherwise, the 

process of strategy-related knowledge development 

in actual practice is at best stuck in limited conceptual frameworks or, more often than not, overshadowed by short-term constellations and interests which 

rather blur than enlighten the view. 

Moreover, as data collection, collation, and interpretation in general cannot be “neutral,” products of 

analysis always mirror underlying premises, hypothesis, interests, and cultural parameters of the analyst. 

Apart from general epistemological problems that are 

not going to be reflected here and that are not specific 

to strategic analyses, the methods and approaches to 

gaining awareness and understanding of the strategic 

environment face particular challenges, namely the 

problems of complexity, dynamics, and bias. 

As strategic thinking is preoccupied with risks, 

threats, and power structures, it tends to neglect the 

complexity, dynamics, inconsistency, and ambivalence of social and political processes and phenomena, which characterize peacebuilding and development processes. Since they are all but consistent, 

linear, simple, and definite, the methods of analyzing 

and understanding peacebuilding and development 

issues through the lens of strategic thinking require 

modifications. 

In order to better grasp complexity and understand the interdependencies, linkages, and cumula-
250

tive effects, systemic analysis will yield better results 

than conventional approaches. To capture dynamics, 

knowledge development should be a concomitant 

process throughout the different stages of strategy 

development and implementation. Effects achieved 

should be under recurrent review and reappraisal as 

to whether the overall objectives are still valid and 

whether the general approach is still appropriate. 

The integration of periodic assessment and evaluation loops has long been established in developmental 

project management methods. If we want to minimize 

bias, misinterpretations, or false conclusions, we need 

to include experts and actors with genuine insider 

perspectives into the very process of analysis and understanding. This is where the inclusive, cooperative 

approach of development policy comes in. This approach may not be immediately transferrable due to 

security regulations, but it calls for the development 

of new formats and procedures that enable more direct involvement of subject matter and first-hand expertise into strategy development processes.

Goal Formulation—Can We Know 

Where We Are Heading To?

“To travel the correct road, you need to know where 

you are going.”17 All literature on strategic thought 

concurs with this formula. There is also consensus that 

political goals are to be set by politicians and hence 

are sometimes not sufficiently clear to derive strategic guidance. Therefore, the task of the strategist is to 

translate political goals into strategic guidance, which 

may sometimes require entering into a dialogue with 

policymakers and demanding a clarification of political goals. As strategy makers are familiar with a cer-
251

tain tension between policy and strategy, this tension 

increases when it comes to formulating peacebuilding 

or development goals.

In most recent international crisis management scenarios, peace arrangements were highly volatile and 

foresaw specified goals only for the relatively short 

immediate stabilization period. The reasons were 

manifold. In Kosovo, for example, the major bone of 

contention, namely the question of status, had been 

deliberately excluded because the Dayton Accord 

could otherwise not have been signed. The Pretoria 

Accord, signed by warring Congolese parties to end 

the fighting and establish a government of national 

unity, was flawed from the outset as none of the conflict parties had been sincerely interested in the establishment of a stable central state, and as fighting was 

ongoing in the East. Major conflict parties had been 

excluded from the process that led to the Petersberg 

Agreement for Afghanistan and international postconflict reconstruction efforts.

These examples should suffice to point out that 

strategic goal formulation in the immediate aftermath 

of war is almost impossible. In most cases, peace agreements are nothing but a respite, a door opener under 

more or less conducive conditions for potential future 

comprehensive conflict solution and reconciliation. 

Realistic political visions, and the road thereto can 

hardly be anticipated in the face of destroyed economies, humanitarian catastrophes, socio-psychological 

legacies of war, and a fragile truce with armed factions 

about to regroup, just waiting for the spark that reignites the fire. As conflict parties are not able and often 

also not willing to formulate political visions, external 

actors are in an even weaker position to do so as long 

as they do not intend to fully take over responsibility.
252

With regard to goal formulation as a precondition 

for strategy development, peacebuilding and development leave us in a very uncomfortable position. 

The subject, and our role as external actors, deny the 

development of clear and realistic strategic political 

goals. But how can external actors who claim to be 

strategy-driven engage under these circumstances? 

What happens, in fact, is that the long-term strategic 

horizon is often curtailed and, lacking political visions, is replaced with short-term objectives. The supposedly top-down approach of strategy-driven policy 

is turned upside down and replaced by a bottom-up 

approach with open ends. This is understandable 

and, given the structural conditions of international 

politics, to a certain extent inescapable. However, for 

external actors this bears high risks of long-term engagement without a clear exit, mission creep, or political entanglement, which make pro-active moves ever 

more difficult. 

Strategic thinking cannot really overcome this dilemma. But it should not surrender the claim for political vision all too easily. The very existence of a vision, 

even if it does not find the necessary political support 

and may seem rather academic than politically realistic, might positively shape the debate. Moreover, 

strategic thinking can install systematic and perpetual 

risk assessment as an integral element of the strategy 

development and implementation process. Since we 

seem to be doomed to bottom-up approaches to a certain extent, we should at least conduct recurrent review loops to early identify those effects that may undermine what has already been achieved or that may 

increase risks and vulnerabilities of the peace process. 

In this context, the systematic use of simulation methods to anticipate possible effects and outcomes might 

provide added value.
253

How Should Guidance be Given to Actors 

That Cannot Be Guided?

The previously cited formula from Robert Kennedy 

“to travel the correct road, you need to know where 

you are going” also implies a claim to provide comprehensive strategic guidance. As strategic thought to 

date has predominantly given strategic guidance to 

the military instrument of power—true also for grand 

strategy—the potential tension between policy and 

strategy making has been relatively easy to overcome. 

The military as an instrument can be deployed and 

commanded top down along clear principles.

However, if strategic guidance is sought for the 

complex set of civilian instruments that come to bear in 

peacebuilding and development processes, the vagueness of political goals compounds the inherent blur of 

roles and responsibilities. Compared to the military as 

a quasi unitary actor, civilian actors comprise national 

and international governmental organizations (IGOs) 

and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), civil society groups and organizations (CSOs), as well as private enterprises. These actors work in vastly different 

areas such as humanitarian relief, economic recovery, 

institution building, education, reconciliation, gender 

balance, child protection, and many other areas. Apart 

from the diversity of actors, there are no guidelines or 

binding arrangements regulating who gets engaged 

where, how, and for how long. Moreover, there is the 

problem of ensuring that actors at least do not work 

in opposite directions, if not share common political 

goals. Only governmental agencies can be politically 

controlled to make sure they follow the same objectives. NGOs, as long as they work with governmental 
254

donor funds, can be controlled to a limited extent via 

budgetary instruments. The bulk of the remaining actors, however, can at best be controlled via indirect 

levers (bilateral voluntary agreements, public pressure, voluntary adherence to norms, etc.), or not at all 

since they do not operate within common structures 

or rules of political hierarchy and accountability.

Against this background, the very idea of any kind 

of comprehensive strategy for civilian programs and 

activities in peacebuilding and development processes 

seems to be forlorn. This, in consequence, makes it 

very difficult for implementing any broader strategy. 

We lack institutional or procedural levers to translate political goals into strategic guidance beyond the 

traditional diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic instruments of power. Being aware that the 

better part of activities able to support and/or induce 

sustained peace and development do not fall into this 

category of instruments, means to accept that we lack 

direct steering mechanisms for many relevant peacebuilding and development activities. 

This does not mean, however, that there are no 

possibilities of improving political coherence among 

the multiple actors and agencies. But it should be 

clear that we might at best get closer to assembling 

NGOs, CSOs, or private business actors under the 

banner of a unified effort, whereas we may never 

achieve any organizational setting similar to a unified command. As this cannot be imposed upon 

independent actors, the only way to gain better political coherence is to build long-term institutional 

relationships and mutual trust. We can do so by improving mutual knowledge and common situational 

understanding, by including actors and building 

consensus early on, and by developing institution-
255

alized formats of consultation and cooperation in 

all phases. 

For strategic thinking, again this requires learning 

from approaches and procedures that are common 

in development policy. Nevertheless, we face clear 

limits to what can be achieved in this respect from a 

strategist’s point of view. Apart from security considerations, conflicting policy and institutional interests 

between actors and agencies involved will most likely 

impede more than temporary coalitions of the willing. Hence, if more control is wanted, international 

donors would have to dedicate significantly more 

governmental resources, and by the same token take 

over extensively more political responsibilities in international conflict and crisis management: But this 

would very likely exceed existing capacities and political will. Otherwise, whether we like it or not, we will 

have to live with the fact that only a limited number 

of activities (and thereby outcomes) can really be subjected to (grand) strategy-driven action and steering 

mechanisms, i.e., we will have to learn to live with a 

considerable extent of anarchy. 

Which Instruments Does Strategic Thinking 

Have to Create Political Will and 

Influence Perceptions?

Strategic thinking is characterized by an instrumental logic18 that is applied not only with regard to 

the mode of utilization of instruments at one’s disposal, but also with regard to the way of achieving 

effects. It aims at diminishing the scope of maneuver 

of adversaries, influencing their behavior, and preventing them to achieve their goals mainly by denial 

of opportunities. Another feature of this instrumental 

rationality is its inclination to disregard the so-called 
256

soft factors in politics such as perceptions, emotions, 

identities, and beliefs.

Peacebuilding and development, on the contrary, 

are primarily about setting up opportunities, about 

creating ownership and encouraging political will 

to reform, whereas influencing the activities of local 

actors is of secondary importance. Peace and development cannot be simply engineered by combining 

a blueprint with resources, instruments, and manpower. They rely to a large extent on hopes and fears, 

on the capacity and credibility of local stakeholders to 

mobilize, lead and convince people, on the strength of 

identities, the willingness to tolerate frustrations, on 

the belief that the future holds better prospects. 

But can ownership and political will to reform be 

created by external actors at all? The instrumental logic 

of strategic thinking clearly reaches its limits when it 

comes to creating opportunities and incentives for 

local ownership and reform-oriented political intentions. Development policy has been dealing with the 

challenge of creating local ownership and engaging 

local stakeholders for many years, but has not come 

to satisfactory conclusions yet. Practical levers are 

limited to participatory methods of program planning 

and implementation.19 Empirical analyses have shown 

that despite efforts to improve inclusive methods, the 

relationships between donors and local stakeholders 

often remain asymmetrical and, moreover, participatory approaches often exclude civil society.20

Can the soft factors in politics be influenced by the 

traditional instruments of power? Public information, 

intelligence, cyber operations, psychological and information operations—all of which can be subsumed 

under the information instruments of power21—would 

be considered the most suitable levers to tackle per-
257

ceptions, beliefs, and emotions of people. Indeed, their 

potential impact should not be underestimated as long 

as the following conditions are met: messages are understood in the local context, messages are credible in 

the local context, and messages are consistent with the 

behavior of the sender. However, perceptions, beliefs, 

and emotions are inextricably linked to expectations, 

and if expectations are not met, they easily reverse 

to the opposite. That means, in a peacebuilding and 

development context, traditional information instruments of power can and should be utilized, but need 

to be handled with particular care. If they are not, they 

are likely to produce rather short-term effects, whereas 

influencing soft factors of politics also require instruments with more long-term effects such as basic and 

political education, societal discourses, reconciliation 

processes, or the like.

In consequence, it seems strategic thinking has 

to cope with the dilemma of investing resources and 

sacrificing lives in international crisis management, 

while not being able to fully control processes. We are 

often forced to take a backseat, particularly when taking account of the frequently witnessed unwillingness 

or incapacity of local actors to make peace or manage 

peace processes. This dilemma cannot be overcome. 

This means that strategic thinking requires more systematic risk analysis, and either more courage to nonaction if we cannot estimate the risks, or more courage 

to name and face the possible negative effects. 

How Can Strategic Planning Cope 

with the Unforeseeable?

Closely linked to the instrumental logic described 

above is the “engineering” mind set of strategic thinking, characterized by hierarchy, predictability, order, 
258

simplicity, precision, and sequence—all derived from 

military operational requirements. Consequently, 

the process from strategic planning to actual implementation breaks the complexity of reality down to 

operationally manageable levels, units, and activities. 

Although the operational and tactical level may considerably shape the situational picture generated at the 

strategic level through the data they provide, strategic 

planning essentially remains a top-down process. 

In stark contrast, peacebuilding and development processes can by no means be compartmentalized and broken down to hierarchical command and 

control relationships of a military operation. Because 

more often than not, it is uncertain who the stakeholders are and what goals they pursue, i.e., the level of 

contingencies is very high and can be compared only 

to counterinsurgency operations in urban terrain in 

military terms of complexity of the operational environment. Most peacebuilding and many development 

scenarios lack an established common set of norms 

and rules, a precondition for reliable command and 

control mechanisms. The simultaneous challenges of 

maintaining peace, diminishing humanitarian crises, 

creating viable institutions, alleviating poverty, encouraging economic recovery, fostering reconciliation, 

and allowing for better overall living conditions evade 

any attempt to fit peacebuilding and development 

processes into any setting of sequential steps. Orderly 

top-down planning and implementation procedures, 

particularly if we take into account the diversity and 

huge number of actors involved, are not applicable 

under the given circumstances.

Peacebuilding and development processes take 

place in multilevel, multiactor, and multinational contexts that lack all preconditions to apply top-down, 
259

hierarchical, orderly, sequential, or precise unified 

command and control. This forces strategic planning ambitions to confine themselves to giving guidance to those actors who are willing and able to act 

in a concordant effort. Realistically, in most cases this 

will be governmental actors representing one donor 

state only.

How Can Strategic Thinking Cope with 

Conflicting Time Rhythms?

Presuming a defined strategic end-state, strategic 

thinking, and even more so strategic planning, needs 

clear timelines to allocate budgets, ensure political acceptance, and set up activities. While operational and 

tactical goals remain to be specified by subsequent 

planning stages, a guiding vision of the political endstate is supposed to inform strategic planning and the 

overall time frame of implementation. Programs, campaigns, and operations are implicitly assumed to be 

terminable within the legislative period of the initiating government.

Peacebuilding and development policy, on the 

other hand, follow a somewhat converse logic. Due 

to their high level of contingency, the anticipatory 

focus lies on short- to mid-term objectives at best, 

while the political end-state remains diffuse with the 

responsibility to carve it out in the hands of local actors in a remote and uncertain future. Consequently, 

while strategic planning often tends to fall behind the 

actual dynamics and requirements on the ground, 

peacebuilding and development processes with their 

bottom-up logic tend to undermine the pace and time 

frames of budgetary planners, administrative procedures, and legislative periods. 
260

In particular, progression of political attention in 

donor countries does not conform to the needs of recipient peacebuilding or developing countries. In the 

immediate aftermath of conflict, political attention 

and acceptance levels of home constituencies are high, 

but rapidly wane, be it due to a “normalization” of 

conditions, due to fatigue, or simply due to the emergence of new crises on the international agenda that 

overlap the images of the former. But peacebuilding 

and development processes require political attention at a constantly high level by international donors 

for much longer periods than those shaped by mass 

media and election cycles. When it comes to early 

recognizing and reacting to negative dynamics that 

may imperil what has already been achieved, political 

mechanisms to readjust strategic guidance are slow. 

In addition, expectation management, pertaining to 

home constituencies as well as the populace of recipient countries, is often neglected in strategic thinking.

For strategic thinking, political and procedural 

time frames of the political system in general and 

the particular administration in charge have to be 

taken as a given, i.e., there is little room for realistic 

changes with regard to domestic political and procedural conditions for strategy formulation and strategic planning. Therefore, the scope of adjustments to 

strategic thinking so as to better cope with conflicting 

time frames is limited. Certainly, systematic expectation management can and should be improved. The 

dynamics of political attention and levels of acceptance of domestic audiences can be anticipated to a 

large extent and should therefore be more systematically included as a potential constraining factor that 

requires systematic coping strategies. The expectations of audiences in recipient countries can be better 
261

managed by unanimous and honest communication. 

Unanimous communication can best be assured by 

making strategic communication an integral part of 

not only the military, but all strands of international 

crisis management activities.22 Particularly, messages 

to recipient country audiences have to be unanimous 

among national and international donor nations and 

organizations.23 Honesty in strategic communication 

is about caution with regard to what we promise to 

audiences in recipient countries and how we explain 

our own motives of engagement, but even more so it 

is about congruence between what we say and what 

we do. 

CONCLUSION

We have shown that peacebuilding and development processes evade the cognitive premises and conventional approaches of strategic thinking in many 

respects. Strategic thinking, therefore, will have to adjust in order to better cope with the challenges posed 

by peacebuilding and development. 

With regard to one of its fundamental tenets, 

namely its state-centric reference point, strategic 

thinking will have to adapt to a more open reference 

framework, accepting civil societies and organized 

groups beyond the official political system as potential partners in creating peace and development. This 

implies more attention and more thorough scrutiny of 

the roots, background, power bases, goals, methods, 

ideologies, and possible future roles of those who are 

chosen as partners and who receive political backing 

and development aid. Though practical constraints 

often do not allow us to be too select in the choice of 

local partners, more attention should be lent to their 
262

adherence to the norms and principles we intend to 

foster, and it should be more carefully examined to 

show whether they are part of the solution rather than 

part of the problem. After all, backing elites, who are 

not interested in peace and pursue only self-seeking 

interests, not only imperils the peace process, but also 

calls into question the credibility and legitimacy of international engagement as a whole.

Procedures for gaining awareness and understanding of the strategic environment can be improved by 

systematically applying systemic analysis approaches. 

Knowledge development should be a concomitant 

process throughout the different stages of strategy 

development and implementation. Moreover, the 

volatility and dynamics of peacebuilding and development processes require recurrent review processes 

of the effects achieved and open-ended political reappraisals on whether the overall objectives are still valid 

and whether the general approach is still appropriate. 

Last, but not least, knowledge development, as well 

as monitoring and evaluation, require more and systematic inclusion of subject matter experts from many 

disciplines and actors with genuine insider perspectives in order to minimize bias and avoid misinterpretations or false conclusions. Promising approaches 

of improving knowledge development as a distinct 

method and perpetual process, accompanying strategic and operational planning, have been developed 

and tested within the military domain,24 but have to 

date never gained attention in the interagency arena.

The challenges of formulating strategic goals pertaining to a highly contingent and volatile subject like 

peacebuilding and development processes can, if not 

fully tackled, at least be addressed by strategic thinking via systematic and perpetual risk assessments. 
263

The latter should be integral elements of strategy development and implementation. Combined with recurrent review loops to early identify effects that may 

undermine the intended direction of the peacebuilding or development process, this will help avoid the 

wrong path, dwelling on the wrong path for too long, 

or quickly adjusting strategy. In this context, the systematic use of simulation methods to anticipate possible effects and outcomes—not only at the military 

strategic and operational planning levels, where it has 

been established for decades, but also at the political 

strategic level—might provide added value.

When it comes to the political and structural constraints of unifying diverse actors behind a common 

strategic guidance, one of the very premises of strategic thinking has to be questioned. More control of 

a peacebuilding or development scenario for international actors requires more donor resources, and by 

the same token, the political will to take more political 

responsibilities. Otherwise, we will have to live with 

the fact that external actors can be subject only to a 

limited number of activities (and thereby outcomes) 

and to some form of political steering mechanisms. 

In consequence, we will have to say good-bye to 

the strategic premise of “anything goes” and learn 

to live with a considerable extent of anarchy and 

uncontrollability.

Another cognitive premise of strategic thinking 

that requires adjustments is the instrumental logic. 

We cannot overcome the dilemma that one of the 

main challenges of peacebuilding and development 

processes, i.e., the creation of political will on the side 

of local elites, is not feasible with the conventional instruments of power. One conclusion is to reconsider 

the DIME concept of instruments of power and re-
264

lated concepts.25 Another conclusion is that we will 

have to live with a backseat role in many cases, even if 

local actors display unwillingness or incapacity to act. 

The only lever for strategic thinking, therefore, is—

again—to include more thorough and more systematic risk analysis prior to a political decision to engage. 

Political decisionmakers need more courage to decide 

either not to engage if risks cannot be estimated or are 

too high, or more courage to face and prepare for the 

possible negative effects. 

By the same token, the engineering logic of strategic thinking and planning needs a review when it 

comes to peacebuilding and development processes. 

If we acknowledge that multilevel, multiactor, and 

multinational contexts lack all preconditions to apply 

top-down, hierarchical, orderly, sequential, or precise 

unified command and control, strategic planning ambitions will have to be confined to giving guidance to 

those actors who are willing and able to act in a concordant effort. This limits the scope of actors that can 

be subjected to any form of coordinated planning and 

implementation to governmental actors representing one donor state. The recent debate on WoG approaches in international conflict and crisis management shows, however, that the concept does not meet 

the high expectations connected to it when it comes to 

practice. 26 Hence, the limits of achieving greater coherence even among the governmental actors of one 

donor country remind us to be realistic and humble. 

Finally, the range of options for adjustment in strategic thinking is also limited with regard to conflicting 

time rhythms between domestic political decisionmaking processes and dynamics of peacebuilding and 

development processes. As political and procedural 

time frames of the domestic political system in gen-
265

eral and the particular administration in charge are a 

given, there is little room for realistic changes. However, much can be improved with regard to systematic 

expectation management. The dynamics of political 

attention and levels of acceptance of domestic audiences should be anticipated and more systematically 

taken into consideration as a potential constraining 

factor requiring coping strategies. Audiences in recipient countries can be better addressed if coordinated strategic communication is an integral part of 

all strands of international crisis management activities. In addition, strategic communication should be 

carefully designed with regard to what we promise to 

audiences in recipient countries and how we explain 

our own motives of engagement. Most importantly, 

the gap between what we say and what we do must 

not widen under all circumstances, as this undermines 

our credibility. 

In a broader perspective, we may need to accept 

that there are things we will never understand, and 

that many people may not want to share our norms 

and values. Having said this, strategic thinking in 

general needs increased flexibility regarding basic 

assumptions and cognitive patterns, making the possibility of delay, setbacks, detours, or even failure, integral elements of our thought. The main challenge is 

to reconcile top-down approaches and the instrumental/engineering logic of strategic thinking with the 

ambiguity, unpredictability, and uncontrollability of 

peacebuilding and development processes. We may 

also have to reconsider our understanding of feasibility in international politics in general and learn to better live with contingency and risks. All in all, strategic 

thinking would be well advised to adopt more humility in its outlook on the world.
266

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. As the most prominent example, the European Security 

Strategy puts high emphasis of aspects of human security though 

it does not explicitly refer to the concept. See A Secure Europe in 

a Better World, Brussels, Belgium: European Security Strategy, 

December 2003, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. In its guidelines on preventing violent 

conflict, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 

explicitly refers to the Human Security concept. See “Helping 

Prevent Violent Conflict,” OECD DAC Guidelines, Paris, France: 

OECD DAC, 2001, available from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/

1886146.pdf.

2. The WoG concept has been utilized in different contexts. 

See, for example, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States,

OECD DAC Reference Series, Paris, France: OECD DAC, 2006, 

available from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf; Joseph 

R. Cerami and Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethinking Leadership and 

“Whole of Government” National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, 

and Prospects, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, May 2010, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ada522339.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; 

Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff, eds, Conflict Management 

and “Whole of Government“: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security 

Strategy? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, April 2012, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1102; or the most prominent example: U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/

files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

3. The Comprehensive Approach is a concept that has evolved 

and is being used mainly in the NATO context. See Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement in Stabilisation and 

Reconstruction, available from www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/

pdf_2011_09/20111004_110922-political-guidance.pdf.
267

4. U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/

files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

5. Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Claswon, “Tuning the Instruments of National Power,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, 

pp. 82-88. 

6. When we speak of strategic thinking, we refer to the discourse on grand strategy or national security strategy in the context of strategic studies as a subject in Armed Forces colleges and 

the like.

7. For the purposes of this chapter, literature on teaching 

strategy was the main source of reference. Among many others, the following works were particularly useful: Grand Strategy: 

Theory and Practice, No. 8802, Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 

Command and Staff College, unknown date, available from www.

au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/csc_8802_lesn1_grand_strat.pdf; U.S. 

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MSDP) 1-1, Strategy, Washington, DC: November 1997, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

jel/service_pubs/mcdp1_1.pdf; John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand 

Strategy?” Paper prepared as the Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture, Duke University, February 26, 2009, the keynote address for a conference on “American Grand Strategy after 

War,” sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies 

and the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, 

available from www.duke.edu/web/agsp/grandstrategypaper.pdf; Colin S. Gray, Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century 

Conflict, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, November 2009; Gabriel Marcella, ed., Teaching Strategy: 

Challenge and Response, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, March 2010.

8. The author of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff 

College manuscript of a seminar on grand strategy admits that 

“[A]lthough strategy is as much about peace as it is about war, 

it is generally recognized that, if we fail to properly manage the 

former, we must be prepared to execute the latter.“ See “Lesson 

Introduction,” Lesson 1: Grand Strategy: Theory and Practice, 

first paragraph.
268

9. Fouzieh Melanie Alamir, “Security System Reform in Weak 

or Fragile States Implemented Through a Whole of Government Approach: A Threefold Challenge,” Franke and Dorff, eds., 

pp. 153-184.

10. General Assembly Resolution 60/180 on the UN Peacebuilding Commission, December 30, 2005, available from www.

un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/180.

11. Chic Dambach, former President and CEO, quote available from www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/?page=aboutmission.

12. For this understanding of development, see the European Consensus on Development, Official Journal of the European 

Union, C 46/01, February 24, 2006, available from ec.europa.eu/

development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf.

13. A publication hosted by the American Unversity`s Center 

for Global Peace and the Peacebuilding and Development Institute, in partnership with the University of Peace, available from 

www.journalpeacedev.org/.

14. Robert Kennedy, “The Elements of Strategic Thinking: A 

Practical Guide,” Gabriel Marcella, ed., p. 27. 

15. The MCDP 1-1 understands the national character as being derived from the location, the language, the culture, the religion, the historical circumstances, and other factors specific to a 

state or political entity (p. 23). By assessing the nature of conflict, 

it considers questions like these: What value do both sides attach 

to the political objectives of the war? What costs are both sides 

willing to pay? What is the result of the “value compared to cost” 

equation? What material, economic, and human sacrifices will the 

participants endure? For how long? Under what circumstances? 

Will the societies expect regular, measurable progress? Will they 

patiently endure setbacks and frustration? (p. 81). See MSDP 1-1.

16.Gray, p. 47.

17. Kennedy, p. 30.

18. See also Gray, p 8.
269

19. See, for example, Handbook on Stakeholder Consultation 

and Participation in ADB Operations, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia: 

African Development Bank, 2001, available from www.afdb.org/

fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Handbook%20

on%20Stakeholder%20Consultaion.pdf.

20. Tobias Pietz and Leopold von Carlowitz, Ownership in Practice: Lessons from Liberia and Kosovo, Berlin, Germany: Deutsche 

Stiftung Friedensforschung, Georgsmarienhütte, 2001, available 

from www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/Pietz_von_Carlowitz_2011_Ownership_in_Practice.

pdf; Hannah Reich, “Local Ownership in Conflict Transformation 

Projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage?” Berghof Occasional Paper No 27, Berlin, Germany, Berghof Research Center 

for Constructive Conflict Management, September 2006, available from www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/

boc27e.pdf.

21. Jeffrey L. Caton, Cori E. Dauber, Jeffrey L. Groh, and David J. Smith, “Information as Power. An Anthology of Selected 

United States Army War College Student Papers,” Vol. 4, Carlisle, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, January 2012, available from www.

carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Information%20as%20Power%20

Vol%204%20(web-final).pdf.

22. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Washington, DC: Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

September 2004, available from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/

commun.pdf; “Principles of Strategic Communication,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2008, available from 

www.au.af.mil/info-ops/documents/principles_of_sc.pdf.

23. See U.S. Public Diplomacy. Interagency Coordination Efforts 

Hampered by the Lack of a Communication Strategy, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2005, available 

from www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf.

24. In the context of military concept development and experimentation, the Multinational Experimentation Series (MNE) 

served as a framework where the method was developed and 

tested over several years. Concepts and findings of this process 
270

have influenced NATO and NATO member-state approaches to 

gaining situational awareness and understanding, but have not 

been taken up by civilian agencies.

25. Related concepts are the so-called 3D (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense) concept that is being used at the politicalstrategic level, or the Political, Military, Social, Economic, Information, and Infrastructure (PMSEII) concept developed in the 

context of operational planning for courses of action.

26. Franke and Dorff, eds., see especially chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 10. 
271

CHAPTER 10

FORCES OF ORDER AND DISORDER:

SECURITY PROVIDERS AND CONFLICT 

MANAGEMENT

Michael Ashkenazi

The author would like to thank Volker Franke for 

the opportunity to write this chapter, and S. M. Stirling 

for In the Court of the Crimson Kings, which stimulated 

the concept of “security provider.” The participants 

of the 2012 KSU-SSI Symposium, “Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American 

Grand Strategy,” at Kennesaw State University, are 

thanked for their comments. Particular thanks go to 

Dr. Andreas Heinemann-Grueder for incisive and 

supportive criticism of an earlier draft. All errors and 

misrepresentations are my own.

INTRODUCTION

The term “security” is a notably contentious one 

(e.g., Huysmans, 1998). In the traditional realm, security implied first the security of the state and its institutions, and then, in some but not all conceptualizations, 

the security of the individual from violence or harm 

not directly mandated by the state. In the past decade, the 

interpretation of the term “security” has expanded to 

encompass virtually all aspects of human life—security from hunger, want, and lack of education.

Crucially, most security (in the state sense) has 

been in the hands of security specialists: individuals 

and organizations specializing in providing security. 

As noted, this is, of course, challengeable: What is it 
272

that these specialists actually provide and to whom, 

has been an enduring issue (Krahmann, 2008; Shearing & Wood, 2007). No less crucially, it is these same 

security specialists—security providers in the terminology used here—that have been at the core of insecurity

in two related ways. On the one hand, toward “nonmembers” however defined, historically, the military 

(a type of security provider) have at all times been the 

major threat to individuals’ lives, bodies, and property. On the other, internal security providers—police, 

the military, and guerillas—have been major forces 

threatening the integrity of individual bodies, rights, 

and property within many polities. 

The recent concept of conflict management implies, sometimes is even predicated, on the presence 

of individuals and groups who will, following some 

principle, effectively provide this security (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009; Elde et al., 2005; Miall et al., 

1999). This chapter will demonstrate that this perception—that security providers will automatically be 

positive vectors in conflict management—needs some 

serious rethinking. The features of security providers 

will be described and characterized, notably those in 

less-developed and fragile states (LDFS). Varied and 

sometimes unexpected interests of these security providers help “manage” conflict, albeit in ways that the 

theoretical genitors of the concept might not like. Both 

the terms “security” and the nature of the security 

providers need to be approached from a different 

perspective.

Much of the data is derived from studies by myself 

and others in less-developed and post-conflict countries. From 2009 to 2011, I conducted field studies on 

security providers in several countries in Asia and 

Africa. Some of the issues arising from those studies 
273

are raised here. For the rest, I rely on the vast mass 

of publications on the militaries, traditional defense 

organizations, and commercial security formations 

in LDFS.

MANAGING CONFLICT 

The idea that conflict is “manageable” in some form 

encompasses a wide range of possible activities and 

potential outcomes. Conflict management is an activity that is poly-specific: most primates engage in processes of conflict management, both to avoid conflict 

and to mitigate its effects (Aureli & de Waal 2000). That 

human primates do so as well should be no surprise. 

Peacekeeping by United Nations (UN)-mandated and 

other forces constitute part of the repertoire of international conflict management. Positive reinforcement 

comes in the form of economic aid, trade, and other rewards. The establishment of legal agreements (albeit, 

often buttressed by either the threat of force or economic reward) constitute a third part of conflict management. Whatever the peace management paradigm 

involved, the actual application relies on individual 

and collective security, which, in turn, is a function of 

police agencies (local or international) internally, and 

military or quasi-military agencies against external 

threats. Both of these types of organizations—police 

and military—are engaged within the conflict management process as security providers. Security providers are individuals and institutions that are able to 

bring force to bear to ensure that conflict parties actually abide by “the rules,” whatever they may be, or by 

the decisions of whomever is attempting to manage 

conflict in the society concerned. Given that conflict is 

endemic in human societies, it is unsurprising to find 
274

that most violent conflict management requires some 

form of executive force in potentio.

While all the elements of conflict management are 

worthy of study, this chapter addresses the issue of 

individuals and groups that are able to bring force to 

bear to ensure that conflict parties actually abide by 

the rules, whatever they may be, for conflict management in the society concerned. At the lower levels of 

organization—inter-individual and community levels—these enforcers may be neighbors, kin, bystanders, village elders, or groups assigned to this role by 

custom and local law (e.g., Evans-Pritchard, 1949; 

Barth, 1959). At higher levels of organization—tribe, 

ethnic organization, and nation-state—the role is assigned to organized formations: police, military, and 

international peacekeepers. In other words, all conflict 

management depends, to some degree or another, on 

security providers. Reorienting the discussion of conflict management in this way forces us to consider the 

point that security providers are a multi-faceted and 

compound category that dispense both security and 

insecurity. Understanding how such organizations 

and individuals shift their “output” between some degree of security and some degree of insecurity is necessary if we are to ensure that conflict management 

goes beyond theory and planning into the realms 

of practice.

It is useful to recognize and accept some basic behavioral statements as framing conditions to help in 

understanding security providers:

• People make conflict. Conflicts are not created, 

sustained, or carried out by abstractions such 

as states, but by real people.

• People manage conflict. Managing conflict is 

something that all primates, including humans, 
275

engage in. If they do not, they stand likely to 

suffer as a community (or troop, in the case of 

primates, Aureli & De Waal, 2000).

• Conflict management depends on culturally 

defined roles. We can identify several generic 

roles that are expressed culturally in all conflicts among humans: the conflict parties, mediators and enforcers, and onlookers.

Certainly, the analysis above points to a major assumption: that security providers should contribute to 

managing and abating conflict. However, in practice, 

this is not necessarily the case. Several case studies of 

security providers will be examined to understand 

why this is not the case and to show the limits of their 

contribution to conflict management.

CHARACTERIZING SECURITY PROVIDERS

A security provider is an individual or formation 

that purports to be engaged in activities that affect the 

degree to which groups and individuals can ensure 

(or at least predict to some degree) their physical, social, and material integrity. By defining both security 

providers and security in this fashion, I am able to 

avoid the lengthy arguments about the nature of security, to encompass broader strategic understanding 

of security such as “human security,” and to use the 

definition to encompass a range of security providers 

beyond the commonly accepted one.

Following this approach, at least four different 

types of security providers, distinguished by their 

formal and their substantive characteristics, can be 

identified. State security providers are individuals and 

formations mandated by the state and, in theory, con-
276

trolled by its governing bodies, to provide security. 

Commercial security providers are formations who are 

involved in security activities in return for monetary 

payment. Traditional security providers are mandated 

by the social and cultural systems of pre-modern 

and local social organization. Finally, Out-law1

 security providers encompass a wide range of formations 

that either engage in negative security (they actually 

threaten physical, social, and material integrity), or 

conditional security (“us or no one”).

State Security Providers.

State security providers encompass all types of 

legally mandated forces that we are familiar with: 

police, military, gendarmerie, prison guards, and, in 

at least one case, the fire brigade. These formations 

are characterized by functioning on the basis of legal 

frameworks, mandated and paid for by the state. Often (e.g., the military), there is a psycho-social dimension to their activities that is motivated by, and makes 

strong reference to, positive ideological and moral 

support, downplaying financial rewards (Franke, 

1997). State security is supposed to provide universal

service: a public good. In practice, this is, of course, 

not always the case. State security providers are also 

expected to provide homogenous services; that is, all 

beneficiaries are supposed to be protected to the same 

degree. Certainly, since early in the 20th century, public, state-provided security has been viewed as a public good to which all are entitled (Mandel, 2001).
277

Commercial Security Providers.

While strictly speaking, security organizations motivated overtly and strictly by financial rewards are 

not a new phenomenon (landsknecht and condottieri

in Renaissance Europe), commercial security formations providing internal policing services have been 

relatively uncommon until the middle of the 20th century (Mandel, 2001). Commercial security formations 

in the modern state are typically organized as profitmaking corporations operating to supplement internal 

security forces. They are also, in theory and often in 

practice, regulated by a state authority, and the scope 

of their action is typically restricted by a state authority. Commercial security formations provide restricted

service. That is, they choose to provide security to particular individuals or groups, depending on their fee. 

Thus their services are specific and particularistic. 

Traditional Security Providers.

The twin and related problems of internal and 

external security provision did not spring into being 

in the 20th century, and nonmodern states and other 

political and social structures have needed to provide 

security for themselves. This has usually been solved 

by diffusing security provision among a number of 

different systems, appealing to self-help being the 

first. To avoid confusion, traditional security providers in this chapter refers to formations, rather than individuals (or kin groups) acting on their own to ensure 

self-help (see Fry 2002 for a concise classification). 

Many such formations of security providers are based 

on the recruitment of young men as they make their 

life’s journey. Age-grade groups (lo-mua in China, 
278

wakamono-kai in Japan, elmorani in East Africa) where 

young men of given age cohorts are expected to perform public service, performance-based groups (dog 

soldiers among the Cheyenne), or voluntary societies 

(so-called “Secret Societies” in many West African societies) are common bases for recruitment and organization of traditional security providers. Typically, 

such formations’ authority is based on community 

consensus bolstered by ritual (that is “appeal to traditions and practices encoded by remote, often moot beings”) (Guthrie, 1980). Traditional security providers 

provide a community service: those outside the community, physically or socially, may not benefit, and 

may even suffer, from their activities.

Out-law Security Providers.

Predation on others is a universal fact of life. Both 

externally and internally, where groups and individuals prey on their neighbors, they are actors within 

what we can call the security network—those actors 

concerned with security activities. Out-law security 

providers affect the provision of security in many 

ways. The category includes out-and-out predators 

who provide no services to their victims (Vikings and 

Somali pirates). Many, however, provided restricted 

security, whether in the form of banditry (Hobsbawm, 

2010) where they support and enjoy class or ethnic 

solidarity, or in the form of protection services (“you 

pay me, and nothing will happen to you, and I will 

keep other predators away”) such as a traditional 

Mafia source of income (Gambetta, 1996). At the far 

side of the predatory scale are OAGs, the “wannabes” 

who would like to be able to have a monopoly of force 

(and sometimes have it locally), and who prey on their 
279

neighbors, albeit with excuses (the Maoist insurgents 

in Nepal gave out formal receipts for extortion money 

“valid against extractions by other units of the PLA”2). 

Out-law service is opportunistic and situational. 

To the degree the state actually owns a monopoly 

on violence, out-law security providers largely provide negative security. However, where the state does 

not have an effective, substantive monopoly, out-law 

providers become one of a mass of commercial and 

even traditional security providers.3

SECURITY PROVIDERS IN ACTION:

SOME EXAMPLES

To draw together the strands raised to this point, 

it is useful to provide some empirical examples. In 

each case, I have tried to demonstrate the mutability

of the role any particular security provider formation 

assumes. As we can see, we always need to account 

for multiple rather than single action types. Moreover, 

we need to try and understand, globally, how and why

security providers change what they are doing, since 

they constitute, in some situations, a positive vector 

for conflict management, and in almost but not quite 

identical situations, a negative influence on conflict 

management. Several examples, all from recent studies, bolster the argument that we need to look very 

carefully at the implications of different types of 

security provider.

State Providers: Post-Soviet Policing in Albania, 

Georgia, and Afghanistan.

I rely here heavily on a study by Stephan Hensell 

(2011), as well as some first-hand observations from 
280

Afghanistan and elsewhere. With the emergence of 

post-Soviet states, the position of the police as security providers changed radically. Their secure position as guardians of the state’s interests was replaced 

by a variety of arrangements in which the police were 

either heavily politicized (in Albania, for instance) 

or were forced to become entrepreneurs, using their 

privileged position as security providers to engage in 

economic activities (as in Georgia). In the latter form, 

internal security services typically “rent” areas of activity—traffic control, border control, and issuance of 

licenses—by paying a tribute to a superior (leading 

all the way to the presidency). They finance this, and 

themselves, by extracting fees for activity in their “assigned” areas. Lucrative positions are competitively 

sought after. 

Kabul airport is an example in miniature. Formal 

security practices are set in place: security check of 

luggage and of persons, border control (exit permit 

and exit stamp), and customs. This is part of local and 

international security provisions with which we are 

all familiar. At Kabul airport, however, one can hire 

an armed individual policeman as a security provider: 

that individual will whisk the client through all the 

security checks in 10 minutes flat, rather than the 2 

hours that are not uncommon.

In both cases, the issue here is not corruption, however defined. What is important is how a particular 

type of security provider—a state provider—assumes, 

for whatever environmental or structural reasons, a 

posture that would be located more closely to commercial and out-law security provision than the universalistic state mode. 
281

Traditional Security Providers: Mafias and Chiefs.

In common with many other East and Southeast 

Asian societies, in village society in Timor Leste, 

young men between puberty and marriage are exofficio members of village and neighborhood youth 

groups. These groups serve partly as a socialization 

medium and partly as a village defense force against 

fires, floods, and external attack. Members often train 

in the local martial art (Timor Silat in this case, though 

taekwondo is increasingly popular). The Timorese protest that they always settle disputes peacefully. Yet, 

the youth groups engage in both culturally permissible 

violence and petty harassment to establish their claim 

to being “security providers” for the community. 

Youth unemployment is very high in Dili, the Timorese capital. Commercial security is the major cash 

employment sector (that is, aside from subsistence 

farming. See Ashkenazi and Boemcken, 2011). Every 

suco (neighborhood) in Dili has groups of unemployed 

young men sitting around, playing football, and generally idle. In Timor Leste, as in many other places in 

South East Asia, neighborhood/village security is entrusted to young men. This perception still exists. We 

collected numerous reports of incidents where newcomers (mainly foreigners) to neighborhoods were 

subject to minor harassments—stones thrown at the 

roof at night and small items misplaced—until they 

hired a local guard through the mediation of the xefe 

da suco (neighborhood head).4

Traditional security provision is focused on protecting the community, not individuals within it. Provided the community’s interests are not at stake, a 

certain amount of violence can be shrugged off. The 

youth groups may defend themselves and their turf or 
282

attack others, so long as the community-first principle 

is maintained. The groups do so through providing 

the threat and actuality of force, as well as through 

ensuring social and even economic support to groups, 

households, and individuals within the community. 

Commerce Is About Profits; Commercial 

Security Is About. . . .

In 2011, we surveyed commercial security in 

Timor Leste and Liberia (Boemcken and Ashkenazi, 

2011). Crucially, while commercial security seemed 

to offer a halo effect5

—commercial guards did report 

on the commission of crimes even in properties they 

were not protecting—the actual process of protection 

against deadly force was restricted to their clients, by 

definition, the richer segment of society. It needs to be 

mentioned that both societies are extremely poor least 

developed countries (LDCs). 

In Dili, where the institution of neighborhood 

guards has a lengthy cultural history as noted previously we found a full spectrum of commercial security that blended on the one end with traditional security provision by neighborhood and village youth 

and on the other with state security provision. Over 

9,000 guards employed by three commercial security 

companies vastly outnumber the 6,000 or so state security organs (military, police, and gendarmerie). To 

add to that, some households hired members of youth 

groups from the community to protect their property. 

Most households relied on the presence of the young 

men in the streets—reinforced by occasional public 

events and support activities by the neighborhood 

headmen—for security. At the other end, the commercial security formations were considered, and be-
283

lieved themselves to be a supplementary part of the 

state security forces. In a third direction, there is evidence that some of the neighborhood youth groups in 

Dili are adopting a security posture that brings them 

closer to the fourth corner of potential security formation postures.

Out-laws Want To Be . . .

While a great deal of criminal activity is just that—

criminal—some of it must be looked at with more nuance. Out-laws, such as some of the Timorese youth 

groups and so-called Martial Arts Groups (MAGS), 

survive by skirting close, or allying themselves with 

criminal activity (Scambary, 2006). They have been 

linked to smuggling, prostitution, and street intimidation. Most of these groups still claim adherence to 

traditional norms, and cite the need for kampong protection as a cause for their activities. 

Other examples can also be found, the most extreme of which is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 

in Uganda. Led by a charismatic prophet-general, Joseph Kony, the LRA is an offshoot of traditional Acholi 

conflict management (Allen, 2005). Crucially, because 

many out-law groups are “wannabe” state authorities, 

they mix structures and practices of order and disorder. Even out-and-out bandits, as Hobsbawm points 

out, can be strongly embedded within their societies 

as providers of security. (2010)

An interview in Dili with the xefe da suco of a centrally located neighborhood is instructive:

I am responsible for order in the suco. The young men 

want jobs. They see the private security guards make 

good money, but the demand for such jobs is great, the 
284

supply limited. Some of the young men have started 

pressuring local merchants to give them jobs as guards. 

There have been cases of minor irritation—throwing 

stones and so on—but also cases of major intimidation. 

If the government wants to ensure peace and law, it 

should channel some of the money through the suco

structure. I know who these young men are, I know the 

merchants, and I can ensure that the young men do not 

behave like criminals, and the merchants get the good 

protection they need for their goods and shops.6

This example highlights what would otherwise 

be called a “hybrid” system, between criminality and 

traditional security. In practice, I argue, what we are 

looking at is the fourth of four possible “postures” 

that any security provider must adopt.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY 

PROVIDERS

The field of conflict management is a growing 

body of knowledge that is speculative, proven, and, 

sometimes frankly hopeful. In this section, I want to 

address the role of security providers in conflict management, as reflected in the literature. As can be seen 

from the examples above, the role that any particular security provider can play varies extensively. The 

problem, from a strategic perspective, is that there are 

many motivations that drive even the purest example 

of a particular type: a state army or police force, a 

group of traditional warriors.

The strategic problem of managing conflict thus 

becomes an exercise in identifying what these influences are, what their relative weight is, and how they 

can be strengthened or weakened (by no means a puerile task), and trying to provide necessary reinforce-
285

ments to ensure the particular formation is assisting 

in transforming the conflict in a particular direction. 

Given that there are often many players in a particular 

conflict (not all of them security providers, of course), 

this is a daunting task. To add to the problem, a particular organization can easily morph from one type 

to another: from state to commercial, for example, or 

vice versa.

Security Provider Structure Dynamics.

To explain these somewhat different phenomena, 

and to relate the empirical evidence to the issue of 

conflict management, it is important to look at the 

dynamics of security provision as a series of potential points, or “postures” on a plane defined by four 

ideal types: state, commercial, traditional, and outlaw security providers (see Figure 10-1). Under an appropriate external stimulus, any group may drift from 

a position near one of the ideal poles into a position 

closer to any of the others. State security providers 

can become involved in the provision of services-forcash (commercial security), or into outright predation 

(out-law security). Traditional security providers can 

morph into state militias or out-law security providers. Commercial and out-law security providers can 

approach other roles, including becoming state security apparatuses themselves.
286

Figure 10-1. Dynamics of Security Formation Type.

Posture.

To clarify what I mean by morphing into another 

form, I want to introduce a concept I call posture. 

Posture is a composite of tendencies that position any 

particular security formation on the two-dimensional 

surface. Two critical variables (and they may not be 

the only ones) are financial/ideological motivation 

and legal/associational motivation. Any randomly selected security formation is influenced by both, albeit 

to different degrees. 

Out-law formations can be influenced largely by 

cash (in the case of criminal gangs). State security 

providers by ideology (national police) but there will 

always be some mixture: an ideological or cash component. Similarly, the associational understructure may 

be based purely on social needs or on legal formulaLegalistic

Associational

Cash

State

Traditional

Ideology

Out-law

Commercial
287

tions, but in practice, there is some degree of mix even 

at the poles. 

The dynamics—how an organization changes its 

posture toward one or another of the poles, depends 

on what influences the particular organization. “Influenced” in this case means that the organization 

(or individual) receives rewards in one of those two 

dimensions. The rewards—which are the equivalent 

of behaviorist positive reinforcement (Skinner, 1978) 

may be in cash or in social esteem, authority, services, 

goods, etc. As the formation accrues more positive reinforcements of one or another of those two variables, 

its posture (its location on the notional plane) will tend 

toward one or another of those four types.

Timorese neighborhood defense group A can serve 

as an example. ‘A’ essentially has four models to follow. One is that of a pure neighborhood defense group 

(rewarded by social esteem, some handouts, and wide 

social network support). The other is as a commercial 

company (rewarded by cash, and by social and presentation benefits). The third is out-law, in which cash 

rewards and individual machismo constitute the major rewards. As a state mandated group, the rewards 

are access to power, public ideological support (“defenders of the nation”), job security, and potential promotion. We can examine the group’s options in terms 

of the kinds of reinforcement they receive and can 

foresee receiving. In practice, a neighborhood youth 

group receives a certain amount of social recognition 

and support. However, this is diffuse, highly conditional (on their being trouble-free), and does not solve 

the major problem of most members: making a living. 

The possibility of becoming a state group is nonexistent: the state is poor, and state security formations 

have been filled by former guerillas (in the army, po-
288

lice, and gendarmerie). This particular neighborhood 

in the center of Dili, does have, however, a resource: 

a commercial sector of small and larger retail shops. 

Cash reinforcement can be manufactured by offering 

security services to local merchants, and when these 

do not agree to pay the (nominal) fee, incidents can 

be arranged to demonstrate that security by the local 

youth group is really necessary. Now, this would be 

simply a tale of extortion (that is, the traditional group 

is changing its posture to out-law) except for the intervention of the xefe da suco and his council. These have 

argued against both the merchants and the youth group

that the youth group has a traditional role to play in 

neighborhood security, and that the merchants must 

pay for this service, via the traditional neighborhood 

administration. Community members, on the whole, 

agree with this formulation (and indeed, so do the 

merchants). The youth group is on the verge of becoming an extortionate network. However, by reasserting 

the authority of the suco, the xefe offers them a lower 

income but additional social reinforcement. Had he 

not done so, the youth group would have become an 

extortionate gang, (as have others in Dili). 

Conflict management depends highly on being 

able to offer combatants or opposed sides reinforcement for appropriate behavior. Reinforce aggression 

and violence, and groups will become more aggressive and violent, and other groups, too, will become aggressive and violent. Moreover, contemporary conflict 

management is highly reliant on an assumption that 

the four types of security providers will act as they do in 

Western societies, including the United States; that is, that 

they are close to their Weberian ideal type. This is not 

necessarily the case. Professional commercial security 

organizations in Timor and in Liberia see themselves 
289

as an informal, but nevertheless essential, part of the 

state security apparatus. The Lou Nuer White Army 

see themselves as protecting traditional privilege and 

activity, not as out-laws. Indeed, both of these types of 

security provider (as well as others such as the police 

in Georgia and Albania) have multiple reinforcements 

and consequently multiple roles.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What policy implications can we draw about conflict management from the above? There are three 

general implications we need to keep in mind. 

1. Security providers (whether the individuals who 

make them up or the groups that structure individual 

activity) operate on the basis of a variety of reinforcements. Economic reinforcements are important, even 

crucial, but other factors such as social approval have 

great consequences as well. 

2. The more reinforcements of a particular sort are 

received, the more the form of the security provider 

morphs toward a particular pole: offering cash to traditional security providers will very quickly bring 

them to adopt a commercial posture. Reduce their 

prestige and social approval, and they easily become 

out-law. 

3. As with all forms of reinforcement, there is a 

need to refresh reinforcement from time to time. In 

the real world, this means one cannot say, “the job is 

done,” and turn away.

We also need to recognize some more specific issues having to do with the connection between security 

providers and conflict management. Crucially, since 

the posture adopted by a security provider is plastic, 
290

the time and resource dimensions need to be assessed. 

To ensure that security providers have a posture that 

supports the goal of conflict management, one needs 

to ensure that resources can be allocated for the long time; 

that is, not years, but decades. This implies, in the interests of continuity, that these resources are generated from inside the system (the state or community) 

and not gifted from the outside, since the latter will, 

inevitably, end. Second, working on that basis, we can 

look at how security providers can be induced to participate in conflict management. Conflict management 

is a practice that emerges from and reflects internal 

dynamics, while also affecting them. The situation 

will remain dynamic and unstable, unless underlying 

issues, which push potential security providers into 

other profiles, are dealt with society-wide. While external reinforcements may be necessary, what is desirable are internally generated reinforcements that will 

ensure a more-or-less homeostatic situation of low or 

no conflict.
291

REFERENCES

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Uganda: An Assessment Of The International Criminal 

Court’s Intervention. London, UK: London School of 

Economics. 

Ashkenazi, Michael and Marc von Boemcken. 

2011. “Timor Leste.” Pp. 21-34 in Marc von Boemcken, 

ed., Commercial Security and Development Findings from 

Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru. Brief 45. Bonn, Germany: 

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

Aureli, Filippo, and Frans de Waal. 2000. Natural 

Conflict Resolution. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1959. Political Leadership among Swat 

Pathans. London, UK: School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology. The Athlone Press.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. 2009. Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, 

Methods, and Approaches. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 

Michigan Press.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1949. “Two Nuer Ritual 

Concepts.” Man, Vol. 49. pp. 74-76.

Eide, Espen Barth, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karin von Hippel. 2005. Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendation. ESS Reports. New York: United Nations. 
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Franke, Volker C. 1997. “Warriors for Peace: The 

Next Generation of U.S. Military Leaders.” Armed 

Forces & Society, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 33–57. 

Guthrie, Stewart Joseph Agassi, Karin R. Andriolo, 

David Buchdahl, H. Byron Earhart, Moshe Greenberg, 

Ian Jarvie, Benson Saler, John Saliba, Kevin J. Sharpe 

and Gambetta, Diego. 1996. The Sicilian Mafia: The 

Business of Private Protection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 

Hensell, Stephan. 2011. “Privatizing the Police: 

The Political Economy of Law Enforcement in Eastern 

Europe.” Security and Peace, Vol. 4, pp. 237-243.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1992. “Inventing Tradition,” pp. 

1-14, in Hobsbawm, Eric J., and Terence O. Ranger, 

eds., The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. 2010. Bandits. London, UK: 

Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Huysmans, Jef. 1998. “Security! What Do You 

Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier.” European 

Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1, 

1998, pp. 226–255. 

Kondoch, Boris. 2001. December 1. “The United 

Nations Administration of East Timor.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 6, No. 2 December 1, 2001, 

pp. 245-265. doi:10.1093/jcsl/6.2.245.

Krahmann, Elke. 2008. “Security: Collective Good 

or Commodity?” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 379–404.
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Mandel, Robert. 2001. “The Privatization of 

Security.” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 28, No. 1, 

pp. 129 –151. 

Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse. 1999. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The 

Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly 

Conflicts. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

Scambary, James. 2006. A Survey of Gangs and 

Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste. Canberra, Australia: 

AusAID.

Shearing, Clifford and Jennifer Wood. 2007. Imagining Security. Portland, OR: Willan.

Skinner, B. F. 1978. Reflections on Behaviorism and 

Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Smith, Daniel Jordan. 2004. August. “The Bakassi 

Boys: Vigilantism, Violence, and Political Imagination in Nigeria.” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 19, No. 3, 

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294

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. The hyphen is intentional, since a major characteristic of 

these formations is that they operate outside government or local 

legal sanction.

2. Question to the American readers: could you itemize this as 

a valid expense for the IRS?

3. The Bakassi Boys in Nigeria (Smith 2004), who provide security, but also engage in extortion are one example. A nascent 

system evolving in Dili, Timor Leste, is described below.

4. It should be noted that these guards take their job seriously, 

and that given their ability to rapidly mobilize their peers, and

the social supervision of the neighborhood elders, the service rendered is quite good.

5. That is, security is enhanced even in properties not formally 

protected by the hired guards, since the mere presence of a uniformed observer tends to deter crime.

6. “Author’s diaries. Interview with xefe da suco ‘‘C’, 

August 6, 2010.”
295

CHAPTER 11

MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION AND 

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

ADDRESSING THE POLICY CHALLENGES

Dwight Raymond

BACKGROUND

Strategy entails choices to integrate ends, ways, 

and means in order to pursue national interests that 

are often conflicting. The National Security Strategy

states:

The United States is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, 

in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.1

Also referenced in documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), mass atrocity 

prevention has been more recently emphasized in a 

Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD10) and subsequent governmental efforts to respond 

to the PSD. PSD-10 states that “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest 

and a core moral responsibility of the United States” 

and “requires a level of governmental organization 

that matches the methodical organization characteristic of mass killings.”2

This chapter describes a policy formulation methodology and relevant considerations contained in Mass 

Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): A 
296

Policy Planning Handbook, which is intended to help 

policymakers address these issues comprehensively. 

After providing an overview of mass atrocities, it 

identifies guidelines, a proposed framework for policy 

formulation, interests, how elements of national influence can be employed, and the risks and challenges 

associated with efforts to prevent or respond to mass 

atrocities. 

One of the prominent themes of mass atrocity literature is that national governments and the rest of 

the international community are disposed toward inaction.3

 This is due to several factors, such as competing national interests that dissuade action, risk-averse 

decisionmaking and bureaucracies that support status 

quo approaches, and the often-complex context of potential problems that may not be reducible to a clearcut case of stopping identifiable evil perpetrators and 

protecting innocent victims. As described in one masterpiece of political satire, governments often appear 

to follow a four-stage approach to crisis management:

• Stage 1: We say that nothing is going to 

happen.

• Stage 2: We say that something may be going to 

happen, but we should do nothing about it.

• Stage 3: We say that maybe we should do 

something about it, but there is nothing we can 

do.

• Stage 4: We say that maybe there was 

something we could have done but it is too late 

now.4

The list of mass atrocities since the end of the Cold 

War is disturbing, including Rwanda, Srebrenica, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Darfur, other parts of the Sudan, South Sudan, the Congo, Sri Lanka, the Lord’s 
297

Resistance Army (LRA) activities in Uganda and 

elsewhere, and others. In part because of these crises, 

and the checkered results of the international community in addressing them, an expanding community 

of interest has developed on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in general and mass atrocity prevention in 

particular. This community of interest includes past 

and present representatives of national governments, 

human rights advocates, scholars, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

and the media. The United Nations (UN) and some 

national governments have created focal points to 

coordinate collective efforts regarding mass atrocity 

prevention and response. Other developments have 

also contributed to improving the international community’s will and capacity to address mass atrocities. 

Despite continuing harsh criticism of the UN, to 

include from some of its staunchest advocates, that 

institution has been steadily pursuing peacekeeping 

reform initiatives since the 2000 Brahimi Report on UN 

Peace Operations, which essentially concluded that 

without marked transformation, the UN would recede 

into irrelevance. Subsequent related efforts include the 

“New Horizons” report, the Considerations for Mission 

Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 

and emphasis on PoC and robust peacekeeping. 

In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released The Responsibility to Protect,

5

 a study that changed the terms 

of the debate about when outside actors have the right 

to intervene in a sovereign country’s internal affairs. 

The ICISS report concluded that sovereignty implies 

responsibility and, in the case of serious harm when 

the state is unwilling or unable to protect its population from extreme harm, the principle of noninter-
298

vention yields to the international responsibility to 

protect. The report developed a three-stage approach 

for the responsibility to protect, including prevention, 

reaction, and rebuilding. 

The Responsibility to Protect concept (also known 

as R2P or RTP) was subsequently endorsed at the 2005 

UN General Assembly Summit and, within the UN, 

later evolved into a framework of three “pillars:”6

• Pillar 1: Protection Responsibilities of the State.

• Pillar 2: International Assistance and CapacityBuilding.

• Pillar 3: Timely and Decisive Response.

In 2008, the first UN Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect who collaborates closely with 

the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 

(first appointed in 2004), was designated. Despite tangible steps toward institutionalizing R2P, however, 

many have strong reservations about its implications 

for state sovereignty, its potential license for intervention, and the extent to which “responsibility” translates into a legal international obligation to act. 

In the United States as well, incremental steps have 

been taken to improve the government’s coherence 

regarding mass atrocity prevention and response. 

The most noteworthy catalyst was the 2008 Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) report, Preventing 

Genocide, which included 34 recommendations.7

 Since 

the publication of the GPTF report, government documents, including the National Security Strategy, the 

QDR, and the QDDR, have referenced mass atrocities. 

On December 22, 2010, Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 on Genocide Prevention provided additional 

emphasis, and PSD-10 specified the creation of an 

Atrocity Prevention Board, in accordance with a GPTF 

recommendation.
299

Mass atrocity mitigation is also included in military references including the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Army Operating Concept. The 2010 publication of the unofficial 

Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) military 

planning handbook was followed by a MARO appendix in the new Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 Peace 

Operations.

8

 These documents are intended to assist military commanders and staffs in the planning 

and conduct of operations to prevent and respond to 

mass atrocities. 

The MAPRO Handbook9 was published in March 

2012 as a reference for members of the policy community. It is intended to support recommendations from 

the GPTF report and to assist with the implementation 

of PSD-10’s intent by supporting informed and structured policy formulation. The Handbook addresses 

considerations for mass atrocity situations, describes 

a policy formulation process, and provides templates 

that can be adjusted as necessary. While it primarily addresses mass atrocity situations (arguably the 

worst-case threats to peace and development), much 

of the Handbook is also applicable to other complex 

situations involving conflict because many of the national interests, actors, policy processes, potential lines 

of effort, and potential elements of national influence 

are similar. Indeed, mass atrocity situations will often 

have to be addressed as a part of the wider context 

within which they occur, such as insurgencies, civil 

war, or interstate conflict. 
300

MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION AND 

RESPONSE OPTIONS

Genocide was defined at the 1948 Convention 

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 

Genocide as: 

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 

or religious group, as such: Killing members of the 

group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group 

conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures 

intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly 

transferring children of the group to another group.10

It notably includes intent to eliminate some groups. 

Strictly speaking, genocide does not apply when an 

eliminationist intent is not present, or if the groups 

targeted for elimination fall outside of the categories 

included in the definition (e.g., political groups, economic classes, sexual orientation, or others).

A mass atrocity may be defined as: 

Widespread and systematic acts of violence against 

noncombatants including killing; causing serious 

bodily or mental harm; or deliberately inflicting conditions of life that cause serious bodily or mental harm.11

Mass atrocities include genocides as well as cases 

that are excluded by the 1948 definition of genocide. 

There can be a blurry line between mass atrocities 

and other problematic situations such as atrocities, 

massacres, political violence, and large scale human 

rights violations. Additionally, atrocities can include 

acts such as rape and torture, and are not necessarily 

limited to killing. 
301

MAPRO may be defined as: 

U.S. Government efforts to anticipate and prevent 

when possible and—if prevention fails—to respond by 

mitigating or stopping genocide or mass atrocities.12

MAPRO includes relevant policies and programs 

regarding general government capacity and its efforts 

regarding particular mass atrocity situations. Mass 

Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) is a related 

subset of MAPRO and refers to “Military activities 

conducted across the operational spectrum to prevent 

or halt mass atrocities.”13

MAPRO Guidelines. 

Effective policymaking for mass atrocity mitigation should adhere to the following six guidelines:

• Prevention is preferable to response.

• The United States has a wide range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic 

tools that should be considered and integrated.

• Policymakers must understand the complete 

context of the situation.

• Quick action is important to address concerns 

and take advantage of opportunities.

• Multilateral efforts are preferable to unilateral 

action.

• Planning for transitions and endstates should 

begin as early as possible.

Prevention Is Preferable to Response. 

Prevention is superior to response for three main 

reasons, the first of which is that effective prevention 

implies that large-scale human suffering has been 
302

avoided. The second reason is that the resources required for prevention are likely to be modest in comparison to those required for a major intervention 

and post-crisis reconstruction. Finally, prevention 

precludes the requirement to obtain political and international support that could prove elusive when 

a controversial response is contemplated. Prevention, however, poses its own challenges; it requires 

a pre-crisis investment of attention and resources 

that must compete with other issues that may be 

more immediate.

The United States Has a Wide Range of Diplomatic, 

Informational, Military, and Economic Tools that 

Should Be Considered and Integrated. 

The GPTF report famously stated that the United 

States has “a wide range of options between the extremes of doing nothing and sending in the Marines.”14 Various diplomatic, informational, military, 

and economic (DIME) measures can mitigate mass 

atrocity situations by addressing underlying conditions; exposing, dissuading, stopping, isolating, or 

punishing perpetrators and their enablers; establishing the resolve, credibility, and capability of the U.S. 

Government or the international community; protecting or empowering potential victims; diminishing 

perpetrator motivation or capability to conduct mass 

atrocities; or convincing bystanders and other actors 

to take constructive action or refrain from supporting 

perpetrators. It should be noted that military tools are 

not limited to coercive interventions; lesser operations 

can be quite useful in supporting diplomacy.
303

Policymakers Must Understand the Complete 

Context of the Situation. 

A mass atrocity situation will frequently occur 

within the context of a broader conflict such as civil 

war, insurgency, or interstate conflict. Regional and international dynamics will be relevant, and a particular 

situation will both be influenced by recent experiences 

and will influence future situations (e.g., the 1994 international response to Rwanda was in part shaped by 

experiences in Somalia, and Libya 2011 subsequently 

affected Syria in 2012). Policymakers must understand 

the different actors (perpetrators, victims, interveners, 

bystanders, positive actors, and negative actors), although actual categorization to include perpetrators 

who may have some legitimate or understandable objectives and that their cooperation may be required to 

achieve a peaceful settlement. They must also comprehend the geographic, political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational considerations 

(especially those that affect conflict dynamics). Local 

and community contexts will often be significant.

Quick Action Is Important to Address Concerns 

and Take Advantage of Opportunities. 

Country teams are often in the best position to 

monitor developments and act expeditiously, while 

anticipating unintended second-order effects. Delayed 

action may encourage perpetrators, allowing them 

time to build strength and mobilize, while allowing 

potential victims to become even more vulnerable. 

Appropriate quick action is facilitated by a responsive 

policy formulation process that efficiently provides 

information and options to senior decision makers 

and secures their rapid guidance and decisions.
304

Multilateral Efforts Are Preferable to Unilateral Action. 

Multilateral prevention and response efforts tend 

to have greater legitimacy, reduce the likelihood that 

U.S. DIME measures will be diluted by circumvention, spread the cost and burden of the actions (and 

any post-conflict stabilization efforts), and reduce the 

likelihood of negative consequences, such as regional 

anti-Americanism that might arise from a unilateral 

approach. Moreover, some nations may be more capable than the United States of taking effective action 

in some situations. A UN Security Council Resolution 

provides the preferred level of mandate legitimacy. In 

its absence (for example, if a resolution is vetoed by 

one of the permanent five members), majority votes 

in either the Security Council or General Assembly or 

backing from a regional or sub-regional organization 

may be an acceptable alternative.

Planning for Transitions and Endstates Should Begin 

As Early As Possible. 

The main focus in a mass atrocity situation is to 

prevent or halt the atrocities. However, policymakers may also have to address the aftermath including: 

prevention of mass atrocity recurrence; the root causes 

of the crisis; or achieving a peaceful, stable, and just 

political settlement. The former government may or 

may not remain in power. The country’s territory may 

or may not remain under unified governance. Perpetrators may or may not be brought to justice, and 

compensation to victims may or may not be arranged. 

Policymakers in the U.S. Government, other national 

governments, and international organizations should 

develop plans and make the necessary arrangements 
305

regarding post-crisis roles, responsibilities, and authorities. Situations and plans are likely to change, 

but policymakers ideally should shape these changes 

rather than merely watch them occur. 

MAPRO Policy Planning.

The MAPRO Policy and Planning Framework generally conforms with various interagency planning 

processes that have been advanced in recent years. It 

is suitable both during deliberate contingency planning for hypothetical situations as well as when planning for short-term crisis situations. The MAPRO 

Handbook supplements the framework with formats 

and examples of planning products, such as briefings 

and memoranda, which can be tailored as necessary. 

While such guidance may seem mundane and pedantic, it is useful for structuring efforts and to minimize 

floundering.15

MAPRO Policy and Planning Framework.

Continuous situational understanding is critical, 

and it is particularly important to have an appreciation of relevant actors and the U.S. national interests. 

Actors may, however loosely, be categorized as perpetrators, victims, interveners, and others (including 

bystanders, positive actors, and negative actors).16

U.S. national interests in a specific situation will 

be among the most important determinants in formulating policy. These interests may often conflict 

with each other and policy should reflect how the 

interests are balanced and weighted. Mass atrocity 

situations are likely to involve any of the following 

national interests:17
306

• Escalation or resumption of violence is 

prevented.

• Conflict spillover into the wider region is 

avoided.

• Effects on transnational issues such as terrorism are minimized.

• Timely and effective humanitarian aid is provided to save lives and alleviate suffering.

• Rights of refugees, displaced persons, and vulnerable populations are protected.

• Political stability and good governance are supported.

• Economic interests are secured by promoting 

stability and rule of law, or by averting crisis.

• U.S. citizens and property are protected.

• U.S. actions do not have unacceptable adverse 

impact upon relations with allies, regional 

countries, or other nations.

• The international community, (particularly the 

UN or relevant regional organization) takes 

appropriate action in concert with the United 

States.

• The United States acts in accordance with its 

values and maintains its credibility and legitimacy.

• Refugee/Internally Displaced Persons/humanitarian crisis is avoided.

• U.S. willingness to protect civilians and support 

international laws and norms is demonstrated.

• Perpetrators are delegitimized.

• Human rights violators are brought to justice.

• Terrorist threats are reduced.

• The anticipated costs (including money, personnel, and other resources) of U.S. actions are 

acceptable.
307

A MAPRO plan may be structured in accordance 

with Figure 11-1. A key inference is that thoughtful 

advance planning may result in effective prevention 

measures that preclude any need to implement the 

later stages of the plan.18

Figure 11-1. Suggested MAPRO Plan Phases.

A MAPRO plan should address the critical Lines 

of Effort (LOEs) that comprise the necessary and sufficient elements (or functions) required for success. The 

LOEs should include a concept for implementation, 

relevant activities and objectives, and lead and supporting agencies. A representative set of LOEs may 

include the following: 

• Situation Understanding;

• Diplomacy & Strategic Communication;

• Unity of Effort;

• Military Efforts;

• Economic Efforts;

• Safe and Secure Environment;

• Governance and Rule of Law;

• Social Well-Being.19

Phase I: Prevention

• Stage IA: Steady-State Engagement

• Stage IB: Targeted Prevention

• Stage IC: Crisis Management

Phase II: Response

• Stage IIA: Stop Mass Atrocities

• Stage IIB: Stabilization

Phase III: Transition

• Stage IIIA: Build Host Nation Capacity

• Stage III B: Transition to Steady-State Posture
308

APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL 

INFLUENCE

Approaches to mitigate a mass atrocity situation 

may be broadly categorized as suasion, which involves 

persuasion, dissuasion, and deterrence; compellence,

which incorporates higher levels of pressure and sanctions; and intervention, in which a solution is imposed 

to include through the use of coercive military force. 

In practice, these approaches may not have clear distinctions between them. During a response, the role 

of discrete actors such as the United States could, in 

turn, be generally viewed as that of a bystander, enabler

of other actors, leader of a multinational effort, or unilateral actor. The approach and role of U.S. efforts will be 

determined by U.S. interests; the urgency of the situation; other issues that must be addressed; the potential 

leverage possessed by the United States and other actors; the likelihood that the United States can achieve 

constructive results without undesired second-order 

consequences, domestic political considerations, and 

the opinion and actions of the international community including the UN and regional organizations.

A wide array of DIME tools can be employed to 

prevent, respond to, and aid in the recovery from mass 

atrocity situations. Many of these are included in Figure 11-2, and are roughly grouped in accordance with 

the general approach that the tools support. In general, “suasion tools” are less resource-intensive, incur 

less risk, and are not as intrusive on host nation sovereignty as are the “compellence” and “intervention” 

tools. They can be integrated into a “carrot-and-stick” 

approach and, of course, there is no requirement to 

exhaust all less extreme measures before firmer tools 

are attempted. 
309

Figure 11-2. Diplomatic, Informational, Military, 

and Economic (DIME) Tools.20
310

The MAPRO Handbook discusses several “cross-cutting considerations” when policy is formulated and 

DIME tools are applied. These are: 

• Host Nation Ownership and Capacity;

• Political Primacy;

• Legitimacy;

• Unity of Effort;

• Security;

• Conflict Transformation;

• Regional/International Engagement;

• Strategic Communication.21

Policymakers will be confronted with hard choices 

and tough decisions during a mass atrocity situation, 

and the decisions are apt to become more challenging 

as circumstances change and the situation develops. 

It will be difficult to predict the outcome with any 

real certainty, requiring continual reassessment of the 

problems, the desired endstate, and the solution set. 

Some of the potential anticipated policy decisions are 

as follows:

• Whether to treat the host nation government as 

a partner or adversary.

• How to handle setbacks (e.g., mass atrocities 

that occur).

• Whether to commit additional resources.

• Whether to transition from one phase to another.

• When to transfer responsibility to another actor 

(e.g., the UN or host nation).

• Whether to modify the plan radically (e.g., 

change objectives).

• Whether to intervene (in fact or appearance) on 

one side of the conflict.

• Whether to await a UN Security Council 

Resolution.
311

• Whether to intervene without a clear exit 

strategy.

• Whether to develop or implement a branch 

plan.

• Whether and to what extent to accommodate 

concerns expressed by other actors.

• How to gain/sustain domestic and international support.

• Whether to sacrifice political goals, such as 

bringing perpetrators to justice, to stop conflict 

or maximize humanitarian benefit.

MAPRO-related decisions will incur risks regardless of whether action is taken or not taken. Policymakers should attempt to anticipate the major risks 

(that is, what can go wrong?) and identify measures 

to lessen the probability of the risks or their impact 

if they, in fact, materialize. Negative second-order 

effects are particularly difficult to predict.22 In some 

cases, policymakers will have to accept risk, but they 

should do so with an understanding both of the risks 

and the potential consequences. Some of the general 

potential risks in a mass atrocity situation include 

the following:

• Ineffectiveness (especially if actions are too 

little or too late).

• Unintended Escalation.

• Collateral Damage.

• Anti-Americanism or Anti-American 

Sentiment.

• Quagmire and Mission Creep.

• Losses.

• Increased Resistance because of Pride or 

Nationalism.

• Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance.
312

• Negative Second-Order Effects.

• Risks of Inaction.

RECOGNIZING THE MAPRO CHALLENGES

There are three inherent difficulties associated 

with a mass atrocity situation: (1) recognizing that a 

genocide or mass atrocity situation potentially exists; 

(2) deciding what to do about it, and (3) mobilizing, 

deploying, employing, and orchestrating the complex 

set of resources necessary to address the situation.

The first difficulty can be partially remedied by institutional measures such as identifying, monitoring, 

and interpreting early warnings and indicators. Part of 

the solution includes responsive information sharing 

with other governments, international organizations 

such as the UN, NGOs, and civil society within the 

country of interest. However, policymakers and their 

constituencies will demand a high level of certainty 

regarding mass atrocity situations, and perfect information will never be possible (particularly for events 

that have not yet occurred or which may be masked 

by an existing background of political violence or human rights violations). Perpetrators will also conceal, 

obfuscate, deny, minimize, or rationalize their actions 

(e.g., claiming that any casualties are insurgents or 

violent protestors, not helpless victims). 

The MAPRO Handbook is intended to assist policymakers as they wrestle with MAPRO decisions and 

the associated risks by providing a rational yet feasible process for contingency planning as well as crisis 

response. The framework discussed in the Handbook 

is generally suitable for other interagency planning 

efforts that require a structured approach to complex 

strategic issues. By itself, however, it is not a pana-
313

cea for effective government action to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. It can support the necessary 

fusion of three governmental groups: those in government who are experts about a particular country or 

region, those who focus on transnational functional 

matters (such as international law, financial sanctions, 

war crimes, military operations, or peacekeeping), and 

those who make policy decisions within an extremely 

diverse portfolio. 

Effective policy planning requires a modest commitment of resources, perhaps not quite “a level of 

governmental organization that matches the methodical organization characteristic of mass killings,”23 but 

the resources are needed nonetheless. The rudimentary requirements include dedicated planning space, 

a handful of dedicated planners with senior leader 

access and clearly delineated authorities (particularly 

necessary when mass atrocities are but one dimension 

of a complex situation and multiple department and 

intergovernmental agencies are stakeholders), and the 

active participation of other “part-time” planners who 

contribute their expertise when needed. 

More importantly, planning’s effectiveness hinges 

on senior leader involvement. Senior leaders must devote the time to understand the planning process and 

plans (shaping both as they so desire), provide guidance, approve planning products, make decisions, 

and ensure that their organizations are providing adequate support and participation. If senior leaders are 

not involved in policy planning and do not seriously 

expect a high quality process, they in effect are saying 

that they do think that planning is really that important. If they do not think it is important, it will not be. 
314

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, p. 48.

2. Barack Obama, Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, Washington, DC: The White House, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities.

3. See, for example, Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell, 

New York: Basic Books, 2002.

4. Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, Yes Prime Minister, Topsfield, MA: Salem House Publishers, 1986, p. 160.

5. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, Canada: International 

Development Research Center, 2001.

6. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary 

General A/63/677, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, New 

York: The United Nations, January 12, 2009.

7. Genocide Prevention Task Force, Madeleine K. Albright 

and William S. Cohen, Co-Chairs, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint 

for U.S. Policymakers, Washington, DC: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, 

and the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2008.

8. Sarah Sewell, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin, Mass 

Atrocity Response Operations (MARO): A Military Planning Handbook, Cambridge, MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2010. 

9. Dwight Raymond, Cliff Bernath, Don Braum, and Ken 

Zurcher, Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): 

A Policy Planning Handbook, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College 2012, available from pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/collaborative/collaborativereview.cfm?collaborativeID=11.
315

10. The text of the Genocide Convention is available from

www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html.

11. MAPRO Handbook, p. 10.

12. Ibid.

13. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Peace Operations, Draft, p. GL-5.

14. GPTF, p. xvii.

15. See MAPRO Handbook, Part II and Annex D.

16. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

17. Ibid., pp. 32-32.

18. Ibid., pp. 61-64.

19. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

20. Ibid., p. 84. See pp. 84-120 for a brief description of each of 

the tools.

21. See MAPRO Handbook, pp. 73-77, for discussion of the 

cross-cutting considerations.

22. For example, a second-order effect of the 2011 Libyan 

intervention was the 2012 coup in Mali; mercenaries employed 

by the Gaddafi regime left Libya with large quantities of heavy 

weapons and joined the Tuareg insurgency. Mali military officers, 

contending that their government was not providing adequate resources to counter the insurgents, overthrew the democraticallyelected President.

23. Obama, Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities

(PSD)-10, August 4, 2011. 

317

CHAPTER 12

THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND INDIA

IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER:

CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPE

Liselotte Odgaard

INTRODUCTION

In the debate on a new world order, policymakers 

and analysts appear to focus on three developments. 

First, the U.S. reorientation away from the Atlantic to 

the Pacific is at the center of the debate. This reorientation has come about because the geographical center 

of gravity in the new world order has moved away 

from Europe with the implosion of the Soviet Union, 

and over to Asia with the rising power of countries 

such as China and India. This development raises the 

question of the extent to which Washington will pursue Asian integration into the existing world order or, 

alternatively, treat Asia’s rising powers as opponents. 

The growing economic challenges faced by the United 

States make it clear that in the coming decades, Washington will increasingly direct its resources toward 

Asia. Second, China’s growing economic and military 

capabilities are major topics in the debate on the future 

world order. The economic reform process that was 

set in motion under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping 

in 1978 has led to consistently high economic growth 

rates and a military modernization process that has 

caused the rest of the world to consider the extent to 

which China will embrace or reject the liberal international order of integration. Third, subsequently India 

has joined the club of rising economic powers, with 
318

annual economic growth rates of 8-9 percent.1 This development has raised the issue of whether India might 

gradually overtake China as the main rising power. 

This chapter makes the argument that the U.S. 

pursuit of an integrationist world order and China’s 

pursuit of a coexistence world order will dominate 

the future world order. India and Europe will be takers rather than makers of order, facing the challenge 

of carving out a position in-between these two competing world orders. The remainder of the chapter 

first outlines the characteristics of the integrationist 

value-based order pursued by the United States. Second, I describe the characteristics of the coexistence 

interest-based order pursued by China.2

 Third, I argue 

that India’s rise is limited and does not translate into 

growing strategic influence on the future world order. 

Fourth, I discuss the implications for Europe of an order dominated by two incoherent alternatives. 

THE U.S. INTEGRATIONIST WORLD ORDER

The United States pursues a strategy of influence 

suitable for a great power that aims to consolidate the 

existing world order beyond its position of superior 

power. The United States remains the only full-blown 

global great power, with a gross domestic product 

(GDP) of $14.256 trillion in 2010, which is approximately three times as large as China’s GDP of $5.068 

trillion in 2010.3 Militarily, superior capabilities, combined with a global alignment system, means that U.S. 

power projection remains second to none, and this 

system forms the principal basis for Washington’s 

world-wide politico-strategic influence. At the same 

time, the United States is a great power in decline, with 

estimates of U.S. GDP at only two-thirds of China’s 
319

GDP in 2050, if current economic growth rates continue to apply.4

 Although this time frame is too long to 

predict that Washington will lose its status as a global 

great power, these prospects influence Washington’s 

concern to consolidate the existing world order. In 

particular, the United States is concerned to preserve 

its influence on right and wrong international conduct 

beyond its position of dominant power.5

The United States took the lead in formulating 

Western political aspirations as a program aiming at 

enhancing international integration.6

 The world order 

pursued by the United States is based on liberal values, and its central principles are well-known. These 

are, first, that market economic structures form the basis of international integration because they engender 

transnational links, which allegedly promote greater 

wealth for all. The liberal idea of the market entails 

that economic growth is the road to prosperity. This 

economic philosophy implies that the state plays a minor role in the economy, which allows the decisions 

of market agents to engender the most effective use 

of resources. A second principle is that democracy 

engenders peace and stability by virtue of its reliance 

on popular opinion and checks and balances on political authorities. The liberal idea of democracy declares 

that the people are sovereign and that the will of the 

people is respected by means of the right to elect representatives for the management of political authority. 

In essence, the liberal democratic model implies that 

political structures are established that allow adult 

members of society to pursue their interpretation of 

the good life and how it is realized. A third principle 

is that the interpretation of the United Nations (UN) 

Charter should be revised so as to allow for compromises with absolute sovereignty in the event of seri-
320

ous breaches of individual civil and political rights. 

In other words, states may intervene in the internal 

affairs of each other if incumbents managing sovereignty fail to provide basic security for their citizens, 

even if the regime in the target state has not endorsed 

intervention from external parties. Liberal state-society relations take the individual rather than the state 

as the fundamental unit whose rights are to be protected. This requires the protection of civil rights by 

means of law to ensure the right to life and property 

as well as the obligation to respect agreements. No 

entity, not even the state, ranks above the law, and, 

as such, the state apparatus itself is also obliged to respect the law. A fourth principle is that the U.S. alignment system based on liberal democracy and civil and 

political rights defines the states that form the core of 

world order. In other words, U.S. allies subscribing to 

the liberal economic and political integrationist values 

are entrusted with primary responsibility for promoting and securing world order. 

The United States considers itself to have a mission to build and preserve a community of free and 

independent nations with governments that answer 

to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. Thus, 

the 2012 Strategic Guidance for the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DoD) states that the United States seeks: 

a just and sustainable international order where the 

rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are 

upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being.7

Because democracies respect their own people and 

their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to 

peace. The United States believes in the concept of 
321

democratic peace, meaning that international peace 

is best engendered by democracies governed by law. 

Such states are less likely to go to war against each 

other because they consider each other legitimate entities behaving in accordance with common rules of 

state conduct.8

 Democracies committed to the rule of 

law are less likely to go to war against each other since 

democracies are seen as entities that play by the rules. 

They are considered less legitimate targets of enforcement strategies by default because it is not merely 

the government, but the people represented by the 

government, whose decisions and activities are consequently called into question, since, in democracies, 

governments are answerable to their citizens.9

 The 

U.S. goal of spreading democracy may be traded in 

for stability in the short term, but it remains the longterm goal of the U.S. Government. This is the case 

even for the Barack Obama administration, which 

inherited the problems of peacebuilding emerging in 

the Afghanistan operations and has tended to prioritize stability rather than democratization. On the basis 

of the logic that peace and international stability are 

most reliably built on a foundation of freedom defined 

as democracy, the United States has been heavily engaged in fighting terrorism and rogue regimes such 

as Gaddafi’s rule in Libya. Military means are applied 

with the intention of creating the preconditions for the 

spread of liberal democracy in the long run. 

One core element in Washington’s program for 

international order is the U.S. alliance system. It originates from the Cold War threat of Sino-Soviet expansion and does not merely encompass the customary 

understanding of alliances as pacts of mutual military 

assistance. Rather, the United States developed an extensive system of alignments of which the actual mili-
322

tary alliances formed the iron core. Initially, the Soviet 

Union was surrounded by a virtual power vacuum 

along its entire periphery, from Scandinavia and the 

British Isles, along the rim lands of Eurasia, to Japan 

and Korea. The United States therefore established 

and maintained a substantial military presence in and 

close to the chief Eurasian danger areas, projecting U.S. 

power across the water barriers.10 After the Cold War, 

the U.S. alliance, or perhaps more precisely, alignment 

system, has remained in place. One of the core strategic objectives of U.S. national defense is to strengthen 

the country’s security relationships with traditional 

allies and to develop new international partnerships, 

working to increase the capabilities of its partners to 

contend with common challenges. The U.S. overseas 

military presence operated in and from four forward 

regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. The United 

States has embarked on a comprehensive realignment 

of the U.S. global defense posture to enable U.S. forces 

to undertake military operations worldwide, reflecting the global nature of U.S. interests. 

The means used by Washington to pursue the consolidation of this liberal world order are to expand the 

role of the liberal world order as the basis of interaction in Asia. This strategy encompasses entering into 

free-trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asian countries strengthening economic 

and military cooperation with Asian democracies, restructuring the U.S. alignment system so as to place 

the U.S. Pacific Command at the center, and involving Asian countries in peacemaking operations where 

grave breaches of civil and political rights are seen 

to engender threats to international peace and stability. Liberal economic globalization is, by and large, 
323

accepted around the world, including in China, as a 

role model for other states and nations to imitate. The 

United States considers China’s intentions, with its integration into global economic market structures, to be 

potentially disturbing; however, Washington’s liberal 

understanding of international relations encourages it 

to entertain the hope that China’s economic integration will socialize the population into adopting a positive view on the political ideas of liberalism. Therefore, 

the United States adopts a positive attitude toward the 

fact that contemporary China is fully integrated into 

the international economic system. Thus, the element 

of market economic structures is not at the top of the 

U.S. security agenda, although issues of contention remain, such as Beijing’s reluctance to include the Chinese currency, the renminbi, in a system of floating exchange rates. By contrast, liberal democracy and legal 

globalization have yet to take root and hence remain 

a long-term goals of U.S. Governments. The U.S. aim 

to spread democracy across the world is, however, not 

necessarily pursued by peaceful means. The war on 

terror was principally conducted by military means, 

but they are considered an element in creating the preconditions for the spread of liberal democracy and the 

rule of law in the long run. In the U.S. Defense Strategic 

Guidance dated 2012, it is formulated as the belief that: 

[r]egime changes, as well as tensions within and among 

states under pressure to reform, introduce uncertainty 

for the future. But they also may result in governments 

that, over the long term, are more responsive to the 

legitimate aspirations of their people, and are more 

stable and reliable partners of the United States.11

So the United States supports democratic reform. 

Elections are vital. However, democracy also requires 
324

the rule of law, the protection of minorities, and 

strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a 

single vote. In general, the eradication of terrorism is 

one of several ways by which stability at the domestic 

and international level is promoted. Stability is seen as 

a precondition for democratization since it is difficult 

to bring about lasting changes in governmental and 

legal practices without some measure of predictability 

in the basic political and military structures. Stability 

may entail working with authoritarian political establishments in the short run to pave the way for longterm liberal political and legal reforms. The enhanced 

prioritization of the Asia-Pacific in the U.S. military 

force posture testifies to the fact that this region is of 

primary significance to U.S. interests. As such, it is 

pivotal for the United States to assure partners, dissuade military competition, deter aggression and 

coercion, and be able to take prompt military action 

in this region. The continued U.S. ability to perform 

in these capacities constitutes the structure that aids 

Washington’s attempt to implement the other aspects 

of its program for international order. 

The U.S. world order is called integrationist because it is based on values. The drawback to this type 

of order is that it is fairly rigid in its definition of legitimate and illegitimate conduct, and it excludes numerous states from becoming core members due to the 

economic, military, and political structures that form 

the basis of state-society relations. The strength of 

this order is that the limits of acceptable behavior are 

clearly defined. Only democracies subscribing to market economic principles can form part of the core of 

the liberal world order. It is also clear that the agenda 

of this world order is extensive in the sense that integration toward a community of states operating on the 
325

basis of the same values is the long-term objective. The 

liberal basis of world order also clarifies the purposes 

of the U.S. use of its great power since the objectives 

and values are clearly defined and have already been 

pursued for decades, especially after the implosion 

of the Soviet Union in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, the standard by which U.S. performance is 

measured is well-defined. Washington may often fail 

to live up to its standard of free economic competition, 

democracy, and civil and political rights, but the standard itself is clearly defined and well-known. 

CHINA’S COEXISTENCE WORLD ORDER

China pursues a strategy of influence suitable for a 

power that does not yet have the material capabilities 

to claim great power status. In economic terms, China 

only has a GDP that is one-third the size of the United 

States. At the same time, China has all the problems of 

developing countries on a large scale, including corruption, pollution, malfunctioning health care, socioeconomic inequality, and insufficient social security. 

These issues lead to fast growing problems of social 

unrest that threaten the political authority of China’s 

Communist Party. In military terms, ongoing military 

modernization is reflected in an estimated defense 

budget growth of 7.5 percent in 2012. Nevertheless, 

China’s defense budget, which is estimated to be 

$98.36 billion in 2009, remains more than six times below the levels of U.S. defense spending.12 In addition, 

China does not have an alliance system and hence its 

power projection capabilities remain strictly limited.

In terms of economic and military capabilities, 

China has risen in the group of secondary powers. 

Beijing has not yet reached global great power status. 

However, in terms of political power, China already 
326

exercises influence at global great power level. After 

the implosion of the Soviet Union, China seemed like 

the best bet for a great power successor, and China 

has been skillful at filling this role without having 

the capabilities basis to play the role of a global great 

power. Beijing has done this by gradually developing 

a coexistence type of world order that has emerged 

as an alternative to the U.S.-led world order. It is a 

coexistence type of proposal in the sense that it aims 

at limited cooperation to avoid great power conflicts 

that jeopardize international order. This type of order 

is designed to avoid China losing its current global 

political great power status and descending into secondary power status rather than continuing its rise 

to full-blown great power status. In view of China’s 

numerous domestic social and economic challenges, 

Beijing sees it as imperative to spend the bulk of its 

resources to this end. 

The world order pursued by China is based on 

the common interest of numerous developing states 

in peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence encompasses noninterference in the internal affairs of others, 

mutual nonaggression, equality and mutual benefit, 

and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. These principles correspond to the rules of the 

game of the UN system. China’s concern to limit the 

use of force in the international system and to demonstrate its commitment to international law means 

that the UN system has become an important factor in 

China’s attempt to revise the existing international order to suit Chinese interests and world views. China’s 

numerous domestic socio-economic problems prompt 

Beijing to promote peace and stability and try to avoid 

the use of force in external relations. Instead, China 

focuses on the common responsibilities between con-
327

tending states to produce peaceful conflict management that respects the Cold War principles of absolute 

sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs 

of other states. For example, after the Cold War, Beijing has been reasonably successful in its attempts to 

avoid zero-sum contests and the use of force over relative territorial and maritime gains in negotiations on 

border disputes.13

Peaceful coexistence at a more practical level of 

implementation involves four types of practices. One 

practice is to aim for compromises between conflicting positions when there is a risk of use of force that 

involves the United States and China. Due to China’s 

modest economic and military capabilities, Beijing 

cannot afford to end up in a great power conflict that 

involves the use of force. For example, in the case of 

Taiwan, China reserves the right to use force against 

what it considers to be a province under the jurisdiction of mainland China. However, Beijing stops short 

of exercising this alleged right in practice. Instead, in 

the post-Cold War era Beijing has gradually adopted 

a pragmatic approach of policy coordination and negotiation to avoid using force against an entity that 

is likely to be defended by the United States. Second, 

China requires consent from host governments to 

accept peacemaking operations unless the UN system and its affiliated institutions present evidence of 

threats toward international peace and security. For 

example, China has accepted Chapter VII operations 

in the case of Sudan when irrefutable evidence has 

been presented by the UN or by UN-affiliated institutions that regime behavior engenders threats to international peace and security. At the same time, China 

has succeeded in limiting the number and scope of 

UN-approved punitive actions by insisting on con-
328

sent from the government in Khartoum. Third, China 

pursues equality and mutual benefit as a top-down 

principle that involves treating states rather than individuals as legal equals and promoting social and economic development. For example, China’s involvement in activities in Sudan such as building schools 

and a new presidential palace and in reducing import 

tariffs contrasts with the U.S. calls for punitive actions 

directed against excluding the Khartoum regime from 

international relations. Also, China supports the efforts of regional and functional organizations of the 

UN system to help with conflict management and to 

determine when threats to international peace and 

stability require intervention. For example, in the 

run-up to the UN Security Council vote on establishing a joint UN-African Union (AU) hybrid force in 

Darfur in July 2007, China’s special envoy to Darfur, 

Liu Guijin, commented that “It is not China’s Darfur. 

It is first Sudan’s Darfur and then Africa’s Darfur.” 

According to Guijin, peace negotiations need to be 

prioritized over peacekeeping efforts to ensure that 

real and long-lasting peace could be restored to the 

region.14 Fourth, China defends the fundamental status of absolute sovereignty in international law. For 

example, in the case of Myanmar China has accommodated the concern of developing countries about 

the regime’s violations of civil and political rights 

by endorsing nonbinding presidential statements on 

the unsolicited domestic use of force. Such actions 

strengthen China’s image both as a principled power 

whose political practice corresponds to the principles 

of international conduct that it promotes, and also as 

a pragmatic and equality-oriented power that listens 

to the demands of secondary and small powers. This 

set of coexistence principles is a mixture of a conser-
329

vative defensive form of diplomacy based on old UN 

principles and an offensive form of diplomacy, which 

involves revisions of the old UN system. China’s version of international order receives widespread support in non-Western regions of the world and justifies 

China’s status as a maker rather than merely a taker 

of international order. China’s influence is based on 

its relations with secondary powers such as Indonesia 

and Russia and its engagement in regional security 

institutions all over the world such as the AU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These 

are used as a basis for exercising politico-strategic influence on a par with the United States. This network 

of engagement in regional security institutions constitute Beijing’s alternative to the global U.S. alignment 

system. As a consequence, Beijing is able to participate 

in defining the rules of the game of international politics and thereby determine the foreign policy choices 

that are open to other international actors. 

The advantages of China’s coexistence version of 

world order is that it is inherently flexible because it 

refrains from defining values requiring implementation of specific economic, military, and political state 

structures to form part of the order. China’s world order allows for a plurality of political systems and swift 

adjustments to changes in the international context. 

The drawback to this type of order is that it does not 

involve clarifying Beijing’s long-term objectives. Insofar as China achieves full-blown global great power 

status, we do not have substantial objectives comparable to those derived from U.S. liberal standards that 

can give an idea of what kind of global great power 

China will be. China is undergoing a transition from 

communism as the basis of legitimacy to a new ide-
330

ological basis that has yet to be clearly defined. The 

Confucian concept of harmonious society remains a 

rhetorical device without much practical applicability. 

The idea has not been translated into essential political structures, such as feedback mechanisms from society to government agencies, or into processes, such 

as the use of elections in facilitating political succession. The absence of a strategy at this level means that 

in the interim, the Chinese Communist Party relies on 

continued economic growth and improved standards 

of living to secure its domestic legitimacy. 

During this process, which is likely to take decades, 

China’s identity as a great power is unknown, and we 

have no standard by which to measure China’s performance beyond pure Sino-centric national interests in 

restoring what China defines as its motherland. Sociopolitical transition, combined with Sino-centric interests, means that the majority of secondary and small 

powers will not become loyal to China to an extent 

that will allow Beijing to replace Washington as the 

dominant power in the international system. The secondary and small powers are more comfortable with 

the United States as the dominant power since it is the 

devil they know compared to the enigmatic quality of 

China’s great power ambitions. 

INDIA’S SECONDARY ROLE IN THE GLOBAL 

WORLD ORDER

The debate about India’s rise is based on high 

economic growth rates of 8-9 percent per year. However, even if India sustains these growth rates for the 

next 40 years, it will remain below the U.S. GDP in 

2050 at current economic growth estimates. It is also 

worth remembering that if we take the GDP of the 
331

five BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 

South Africa), India’s share of GDP as a percentage 

of the BRICS total in 2009 constituted 13.6 percent 

against China’s 51.9 percent in 2010.15 Militarily, India proceeds with military modernization. In 2009, 

the defense budget for personnel, operations, and 

maintenance was $23.1 billion, and for procurement 

and construction, $8.5 billion. In 2010, the budget for 

personnel, operations, and maintenance had risen to 

$25.3 billion, and for procurement and construction 

$13.1 billion.16 This modernization process is predominantly intended to enable India to match the Chinese 

and Pakistani military build-up, which is partly directed against India. India’s long-standing border 

dispute with Pakistan is more serious than ever following Pakistan’s engagement in Afghanistan with 

the emergence of the Taliban as a political movement. 

China has deployed medium-range ballistic missiles 

in the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. In turn, this has caused 

India to consider acquisition of an anti-missile defense system. China spends over four times as much 

on defense as India. In addition, China has established 

strategic partnerships with states such as Pakistan, 

Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh along the rim of the 

Indian subcontinent, which will allow China to move 

down alongside India westwards in the Arabian Sea 

and eastwards in the Indian Ocean. This has caused 

India to draw closer to the United States, Southeast 

Asia, and Japan for purposes of getting access to arms 

and counter the political-strategic influence of China 

in India’s backyard. Despite these efforts, China’s influence is growing, whereas India’s influence is waning. New Delhi’s rapprochement to states such as the 

United States and Japan indicate that India becomes 

less and less able to manage peace and stability on 
332

the subcontinent on its own and has to look for partners that can help India counter the growing Chinese 

influence.17

Despite New Delhi’s recent rapprochement with 

the United States and its continuous disagreements 

with China over their mutual border and resentment 

on both sides over issues such as Tibet and Pakistan, 

India has an independent identity that will ensure that 

the country maintains a distance to both great powers, much in the same way as Russia does although 

by different means and for different reasons. India is 

often seen as the exemplar of democracy in the developing world, being a secular democratic republic 

with a parliamentary form of government.18 India has 

had aspirations to cash in on this status not by moving 

closer to the West, but by playing a leading role as a 

representative of developing countries in forums such 

as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN. 

However, NAM never took off as a political force in international relations, and India’s bid for a permanent 

seat in the UN Security Council remains an aspiration 

rather than a reality. India is a secondary power that 

maintains relations with China as well as the United 

States without choosing sides. Consequently, India 

will remain a secondary power in the current world 

order, predominantly playing the role of a taker rather 

than a maker of order. 

CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPE

The different U.S. and Chinese versions of international order give rise to an international system without clear rules of the game because of the lack of one 

coherent set of principles of international conduct. In 

this in-between system, security threats are addressed 
333

by means of ad hoc frameworks of conflict management. The membership and rules of these frameworks 

are defined on a trial-and-error basis. Also, in this system secondary and small powers are quite influential 

because the United States and China compete for their 

backing and loyalty. This enables secondary and small 

powers to maximize their influence by gravitating 

toward both the U.S. and the Chinese order without 

choosing sides. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 

2011 intervention in Libya may provide clues as to the 

consequences for Europe of the existence of two competing international orders. Despite the difficulties 

with contributing to civil and political rights regimes 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Western U.S.-led grouping continues to pursue a greater role for humanitarian 

intervention. This implies that the United States and 

Europe will continue to pursue liberal value-based 

objectives as alliance partners. On the other hand, 

European leadership in the military intervention in 

Libya implies that the Western countries support the 

calls for regionalization of UN Security Council security management that has formed part of China’s 

program for international order for some time. Consequently, the United States is not likely to take the lead 

in this type of operation outside of the core of the U.S. 

sphere of interest in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, Germany’s agreement with China’s abstention regarding 

UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on the grounds 

of unwillingness to authorize the use of force in Libya 

indicates that the dividing lines between those supporting an integrationist order and those supporting a 

coexistence-style order are becoming more and more 

blurred. This development does not indicate a merger 

between the U.S. and Chinese-led programs for inter-
334

national order. Instead, it indicates that increasing regionalization is necessary in the absence of one coherent set of principles that universally define right and 

wrong international conduct.19

Germanys’ UN Security Council abstention also 

implies that Europe is not a unitary actor. Europe appears to be in disagreement over the future direction 

of cooperation at a time when two competing international orders are on offer. The United Kingdom’s 

(UK) refusal in December 2011 to consider European 

Union (EU) plans to tighten budget controls to fix 

the Euro is an example of this problem. Moreover, as 

indicated by Germany’s abstention on the UN Security Council 1973 Resolution, individual countries in 

Europe appear to align themselves in different ways 

with respect to the U.S. and the Chinese version of 

global order. Another example is the Greek decision 

to assist China in its operation to lift Chinese nationals 

out of Libya. The May 2012 election in Greece, putting 

the country’s future in the Euro zone at risk, threatening to revive Europe’s debt crisis and forcing a new 

election to be held in June 2012, testifies to the severe 

problems facing European cooperation and the future 

of the regional integration aspirations. The economic, 

financial, and political challenges facing the region 

point to the possibility of a disintegrating Europe of 

individual countries that reorient themselves toward 

Washington and Beijing on the basis of different interests and values. In this environment, European 

states may continue to engage in conflict management in their near abroad in the Balkans, the Middle 

East, and Africa to promote stability in the region’s 

periphery. However, the days of major peacebuilding 

efforts such as those undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to be over because a fragmented Europe 
335

is becoming unable to muster the unity and long-term 

commitments that such efforts involve. 

The fundamental issue that is raised by developments in the post-Cold War global order is whether 

the Western order can survive a disintegrated Europe 

with different policies toward China. Will the United 

States have faith in European countries that side with 

China and oppose the United States on some issues? 

Will Europe be able to remain sufficiently coherent 

that Washington and Beijing will continue to see the 

EU as a unit to be reckoned with in international politics? It remains to be seen to what extent Europe will 

remain a unitary actor. However, by now it is already 

clear that the principal challenge for Europe is to find 

a place in the new international order on the basis of 

a reconsideration of what Europe has to offer in the 

economic, military, social, and political sectors that 

addresses the interests of China without compromising Europe’s position as core member of the Western 

liberal order. Despite China’s rising power, U.S. ideas 

and ideals remain prominent in the global landscape 

due to the innovative and problem solving qualities of 

the U.S. economy and society.20 As a consequence, it is 

pertinent for Europe to continue to remain an attractive partner to the United States at the same time as it 

addresses the rise of China in a constructive manner. 

Only in this way is Europe likely to position itself as 

an independent voice in international politics that is 

seen as important by the United States and China. 
336

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. GDP growth estimates from the Royal Danish Embassy in Beijing listed on the basis of data from the International 

Monetary Fund. 

2. The arguments on the U.S. integrationist and the Chinese 

coexistence world order are pursued in detail in Liselotte Odgaard, China and Coexistence: Beijing’s National Security Strategy 

for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 

Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.

3. GDP at MER (2009 USD bn), PWC World in 2050 & Goldman Sachs, and the Royal Danish Embassy in Beijing. 

4. Ibid.

5. A similar argument has been made in Ian Clark, ”China 

and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2011, pp. 13-28.

6. The approach to liberal integration used in this article is 

based on G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 3-79.

7. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

8. Francis Fukuyama, “Democratization and International 

Security,” Adelphi Paper No. 266, London, UK: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991/92, p. 18. The democratic 

peace argument has been defined and tested by Zeev Maoz and 

Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 

Peace, 1946-1986,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 

3, September 1993, pp. 624-638. The origins of the democratic 

peace argument can be found in Immanuel Kant, Den evige fred 

[Zum ewigen Frieden] (The Eternal Peace), Copenhagen, Denmark: 

Det sikkerheds- og nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1990 [1795/

1796], p. 29, who argued that a republican constitution would 

promote peace. 
337

9. See, for example, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic 

Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1993. 

10. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 

pp. 206-209.

11. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership. 

12. For purchasing power parity estimate, see The Military Balance 2011, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011.

13. Liselotte Odgaard, China and Coexistence: Beijing’s National 

Security Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, Washington, DC: 

Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 

2012, pp. 87-127.

14. Su Qiang, “Confrontation over Darfur ‘Will Lead Us Nowhere’,” China Daily, July 27, 2007, available from www.chinadaily.

com.cn/2008/2007-07/27/content_5445062.htm.

15. The data comes from the Royal Danish Embassy in Beijing, which has based the calculations on data from the International Monetary Fund. 

16. The Military Balance 2011.

17. Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US-China Policies on Regional Order, London, UK: Routledge, 

2007, pp. 157-160.

18. Sumit Sarkar, ”Indian Democracy: the Historical Inheritance,” Atul Kohli, ed., The Success of India’s Democracy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 23-46.

19. Liselotte Odgaard, ”China’s National Security Strategy and Its UNSC Policy on Libya,” AMS-ISDP Joint Conference 

Proceedings 2011, The Situation in West Asia and North Africa and 

Its Impact on the International Strategic Configuration, Conference 
338

held in Beijing, People’s Republic of China, September 15-17, 

2011, pp. 36-39.

20. Fareed Zakaria, ”The Future of American Power: How 

America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, 

No. 3, May/June 2008, pp. 18-43. 
339

CHAPTER 13

NEGOTIATING THE PITFALLS OF PEACE 

AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

AND A NEW AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY:

AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY 

ARCHITECTURE AND THE 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Kwesi Aning

Festus Aubyn

INTRODUCTION

With the failure of the Organization of African 

Unity (OAU) to fulfill the ambitions, expectations, and 

optimisms stimulated by its establishment in the 1960s, 

it was finally transformed into the African Union (AU) 

in 2002, which sought to respond to Africa’s multifaceted security challenges through expansive and 

deepening multiple institutional processes. Establishing a security architecture through which the AU and 

its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are building blocks would respond to these challenges. These 

robust initiatives have been introduced concurrently 

with partner states and institutions, both offering support while at the same time implementing their own 

national strategic interests. One such critical partner 

has been the United States, which through multiple 

engagements and its own grand strategies has become 

one of the key partners of the AU’s institutionalization 

processes. But over the past decade, following such 

pathways has not always been mutually beneficial to 

either the AU or the United States. In this chapter, we 

explore and examine the history of U.S. engagements 
340

in Africa, especially in the peace and security arena, 

and juxtapose such grand strategic calculations with 

Africa’s own perceptions of and responses to its security challenges. Furthermore, we explore how, in the 

face of common challenges, both the AU and United 

States can identify and respond to their security challenges in a manner that makes this relationship a winwin one instead of the present one driven by suspicion, competition, and outright hostility.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first 

section examines U.S. security policy toward Africa in 

the post Cold War era, with particular emphasis on the 

various training programs and initiatives. The second 

section explores the present state of American grand 

strategy and how the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) fits into it with respect to Africa. 

To demonstrate how Africa is responding to its 

own security challenges, the third section focuses on 

the new AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 

The fourth section assesses how AFRICOM is enhancing Africa’s emerging peace and security architecture 

and the drawbacks. The chapter concludes that U.S. 

interests in Africa would be best assured not by using 

military means to check China or the terrorist activities 

of al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab on the continent, but rather 

by looking to meaningfully address and reconcile its 

interests with the continent’s human security needs. 

Africa is also advancing democratically, economically, 

and developmentally and, as such, it is essential that 

the United States engage the continent not as conflictridden, but as a mutual partner in advancing global 

peace and stability by pursuing long-term strategic 

objectives that address both U.S. and African interests.
341

U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD AFRICA 

AFTER THE COLD WAR

Africa has historically remained in the periphery 

of American foreign policy interests except where a 

specific American interest or objective was at stake 

(e.g., containment of Soviet expansion). After the Cold 

War, Africa was seen by many U.S. policymakers as insignificant to U.S. strategic interests. However, attention 

toward the continent was reinvigorated by a presidential directive known as the National Security Review 30: 

American Policy towards Africa in the 1990s (NSR 30) that 

assessed America’s policy toward Africa.1

 This presidential directive concluded that post-Cold War developments in Africa provided both “significant opportunities for, and obstacles to, US interests” and that the 

United States should remain militarily engaged on the 

continent.2 Consequently, in 1992, President George 

H. W. Bush responded to the humanitarian crisis in 

Somalia by launching Operation RESTORE HOPE, 

which was made up of 25,000 troops from 24 countries.3

 Also known as Unified Task Force (UNITAF), 

Operation RESTORE HOPE was later transformed in 

1993 to the United Nations Operations in Somalia II 

(UNOSOM II). Sadly, with few of the mission mandate objectives achieved, UNOSOM II was terminated 

in 1994 after the death of 18 U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu, which led to the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. 

troops.4

 Thereafter, in 1994, President Bill Clinton’s 

Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) decreed that 

the United States would not intervene in any future 

crisis situation in Africa unless American interests 

were directly threatened.5

 The United States became 

very reluctant to intervene directly or support UN interventions elsewhere in Africa, notably in Rwanda, 
342

where its interests were not directly at stake. But although the horrors of the Rwanda genocide and the 

subsequent crises in Burundi led to a partial reversal 

of this policy, the United States did not revert to direct military intervention in Africa even in the postSeptember 11, 2001 (9/11) period.6

 Instead, U.S. policy 

shifted toward developing the capacities of African 

countries to undertake peace operations under the 

guise of “African solutions to African problems”—a 

notion that some viewed as a convenient alibi for U.S. 

inaction.7 These capacity-building initiatives centered 

on bilateral-level engagements, with a limited focus 

on the regional and sub-regional groupings. They included several training programs meant to build the 

capacity of individual African countries to participate 

in multilateral peace operations.

The first of such training programs was the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) proposed by former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. ACRF 

was to consist of an African force that could be rapidly 

deployed in a theater of conflict primarily to protect 

civilians in designated areas. However, this training 

program was not well received by most African states, 

as some African Leaders like Nelson Mandela saw it 

as a U.S. excuse to establish its foothold in Africa after the U.S. failure to intervene in Rwanda.8

 In deference to African sensitivities, the Clinton administration launched the African Crisis Response Initiative 

(ACRI), incorporating some elements of ACRF in 1996. 

Unlike ACRF, ACRI was embraced by several African 

countries and had the possibility of direct military assistance to sub-regional bodies such as the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), although it also operated at the bilateral level. The main 

objective of ACRI was to train African contingents for 
343

Chapter VI-style peacekeeping on the continent and 

also to enhance their humanitarian relief capacity. 

Although many African countries such as Mali, Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania benefited from 

this training program, others like Nigeria and South 

Africa remained opposed to what they described as 

a foreign initiative that did not address African conflicts.9

 Other important programs initiated by the U.S. 

Government include the International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Enhanced International 

Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, and the 

Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP) program.10 Collectively, these initiatives contributed immensely to 

building the military capacity of African states for 

peacekeeping operations in accordance with Chapter 

VI of the UN Charter.

In response to the growing trend toward robust 

peacekeeping in Africa, ACRI was later transformed 

in 2004 to African Contingency Operations Training 

and Assistance (ACOTA) by the George Bush administration. According to the U.S. Department of State, 

the mission of ACOTA is to: 

enhance the capacities and capabilities of African militaries, regional institutions and the continent’s peacekeeping resources as a whole so that they can plan 

for, train, deploy and sustain sufficient quantities of 

professionally competent peacekeepers to meet conflict transformation requirements with minimal NonAfrican assistance.11

In contrast to ACRI, and perhaps one of the most 

significant innovations of ACOTA, was the training for 

multinational peace support operations and the provision of nonlethal military weaponry to undertake these 

peacekeeping operations.12 Moreover, it was also tai-
344

lored to match the individual needs and capabilities of 

each recipient country, an innovation that was missing 

in the previous programs. Under ACOTA, the United 

States also provided financial and logistical support to 

the AU missions in Darfur, Burundi, and Somalia. The 

regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS, 

were also provided with training and other capacitybuilding assistance through its member states.13 By 

2008, a total of approximately 45,000 African soldiers 

and 3,200 African trainers were educated under the 

program and deployed to peacekeeping operations in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Burundi, 

Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur, Somalia, and Lebanon.14 However, like all previous training programs, ACOTA suffered from limited funding, which affected its depth 

and sustainability.15 Another weakness was that private security firms instead of uniformed U.S. personnel were used to implement the training program, and 

most recipient states objected to this.16

In 2005, ACOTA became a constituent part of the 

multilateral 5-year Global Peace Operation Initiative 

(GPOI) program of the Bush administration, which 

aimed at improving the supply of personnel for peacekeeping operations.17 Although it was designed as a 

program with worldwide reach, its emphasis was on 

Africa. The primary purpose of the GPOI program 

was to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations. 

One major innovation of the GPOI was its recognition of the strategic significance of developing the 

capacities of regional and sub-regional institutions to 

ensure “sustainability and self-sustainment.”18 GPOI 

also supports efforts to operationalize the African 

Standby Force (ASF) and regional and sub-regional 

logistics depots. In the post-9/11 period, as a result of 
345

the U.S.-led war on terror and concern about the potential threats that can be posed by failed and fragile 

states, the United States focused on strengthening indigenous capacity to secure porous borders and help 

build law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure 

to deny havens for terrorists.19 Various states such as 

Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger were provided 

with equipment and training through the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and the PanSahelian Initiative (PSI). The United States provided 

weapons, vehicles, and military training to counter 

terrorism in these countries.

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

There is widespread uncertainty about the present 

state of American grand strategy. Does it exist or not? 

Grand strategy is all about the necessity of choice. According to Niall Ferguson: 

Today, it means choosing between a daunting list of 

objectives: to resist the spread of radical Islam, to limit 

Iran’s ambition to become dominant in the Middle 

East, to contain the rise of China as an economic rival, 

to guard against a Russian “reconquista” of Eastern 

Europe and so on.20

Colin Dueck, for example, argues that: 

great power counterbalancing against the United 

States is by no means inevitable. It can in fact be prevented through the use of careful strategy. If, however, 

the United States acts aggressively and unilaterally, it 

is likely to “undermine the sources of its own success.21
346

Grand strategy is a term of art from academia and 

refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, 

military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to 

advance that state’s national interest. Grand strategy 

is the art of reconciling ends and means. It involves 

purposive action—what leaders think and want. Such 

action is constrained by factors that leaders explicitly 

recognize (for instance, budget constraints and the 

limitations inherent in the tools of statecraft) and by 

those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cognitive screens that shape worldviews).22 But efforts 

to identify and assess the state of current U.S. grand 

strategy raise several questions. For example:

• Is there a new pragmatism that delineates U.S. 

action in Africa since Barack Obama has taken 

office?

• Is this reflected in a “new strategic isolation” 

within a broader receding West characterized 

by a United States beset by relative economic 

decline and dysfunctional politics?

• To what extent does the Obama administration’s foreign policy vision of “leading from 

behind” become evident?

• Is there a distinctive Obama approach beginning to emerge? Can we speak of the “D” word, 

the emergence of an Obama doctrine—namely 

“a new form of high tech, low-budget, and politically astute intervention that maximizes U.S. 

influence while minimizing cost for a cashstrapped government”?23 There seems to be an 

emerging new approach described by Zbigniew 

Brzezinski as “discriminating engagement,”24

which in practical terms refers to a new approach in dealing with trouble spots around 
347

the world, characterized by U.S. economic and 

political realism. If this new “discriminating 

engagement” is implemented, then where does 

the much-hyped new Africa Command fit into 

this grand strategy with respect to Africa?

• To what extent does this approach focus on using other tools of national power to determine 

and achieve outcomes that do not have a sole 

focus on the use of military might, but also 

use diplomatic tools to get others to pull their 

weight? From the above, there is an indication 

that recent discourse on such grand strategy 

raises more questions and does not provide 

clear-cut concrete answers. Previously, we 

have attempted to raise some of these questions 

and ideas.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM) 

Created by a presidential order in 2007, AFRICOM 

is one of the nine Unified Combatant Commands of 

the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The establishment of the Command was the direct result of Africa’s 

increasing strategic importance to the United States 

and also signified a new phase in U.S. foreign policy 

engagement with Africa. It became fully operational 

in October 2008, just a month before the election of 

President Obama. The command is currently headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and is responsible to 

the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 

54 African countries.25 According to President George 

W. Bush, the idea behind the creation of AFRICOM 

was to strengthen America’s security cooperation 

with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster 

the capabilities of African partners.26 Additionally, the 
348

Command will enhance U.S. efforts to bring peace and 

security to the people of Africa and promote common 

goals of development, health, education, democracy, 

and economic growth in Africa.27

Other countries such as Nigeria, Morocco, South 

Africa, Algeria, and Libya made policy statements 

that AFRICOM will not be welcomed on their soil. Nigeria in particular, rejected AFRICOM because it was 

believed to be counterproductive, unnecessary, and a 

derogation of the sovereignty of African states.28 Many 

African governments also feared that AFRICOM will 

be used to destabilize and even overthrow regimes 

that the United States does not approve. 

Before the creation of AFRICOM, the administration of U.S.-Africa military relations was divided 

among three different commands: European Command (EUCOM) located in Stuttgart, Germany; Hawaii-based Pacific Command (PACOM), and Central 

Command (CENTCOM) based in Tampa, Florida.29

This division of responsibility of Africa among these 

three commands was reported to have posed some 

coordination challenges for the DoD. Therefore, as 

former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued,

the establishment of AFRICOM was to enable the 

United States: 

to have a more effective and integrated approach than 

the current arrangement of dividing Africa between 

several commands.30

Its formation was to give Africa the attention that 

it deserves and also to demonstrate the importance of 

Africa for U.S. national security. According to DoD, 

the primary mission of the command is to:
349

Protect and defend the national security interests of the 

United States by strengthening the defense capabilities 

of African states and regional organizations and, when 

directed, conduct military operations, in order to deter 

and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and 

development.31

The Command works jointly with other U.S. agencies such as the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the 

United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and U.S. embassies to support the implementation of U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa. In 

reality, AFRICOM is a diplomatic, developmental, 

and economic mission. The programs that AFRICOM 

monitors and assists include, among other things, 

the Pan-Sahelian Initiative (PSI), ACOTA, and GPOI. 

The activities of the command are meant to: build the 

capacity of partner conventional forces and security 

forces; conduct defense sector reform; counter transnational and extremist threats; foster regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability; 

and contribute to the stability in current zones of conflicts.32 These cooperation programs are all executed 

by AFRICOM’s subordinate commands located in 

Italy, Germany, and Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.33 The 

focus of U.S. AFRICOM capacity-building programs 

and activities is to address three primary capacitybuilding functions that include operational capacity 

building, institutional capacity building, and developing human capital.

Some of the programs designed to address operational capacity constraints include the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), Exercise Flintlock, and 

Exercise Natural Fire.

34 The APS program for instance 
350

is a multinational security cooperation initiative that 

aims to improve maritime safety and security in 

Africa and focuses on addressing four primary areas: maritime professionals, maritime infrastructure, 

maritime domain awareness, and maritime response 

capability. OEF-TS also supports the U.S. Government’s Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership 

(TSCTP) program to help deter the flow of illicit arms, 

goods, and people and to preclude terrorists from establishing sanctuaries in their countries.35 Ten African 

countries are currently part of this program: Algeria, 

Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

The institutional capacity building programs include Operation ONWARD LIBERTY (OOL), the 

Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) Program, the Pandemic Response Program, and 

the PILOT-Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and Tactics.36 While the OOL program supports the DoS broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) 

program in Liberia, the AMLEP program on the other 

hand addresses illicit transnational maritime activity, 

such as drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement, at 

the bilateral level. The programs designed to develop 

human capital comprise the International Military 

and Education Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET 

(E-IMET), The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 

Africa (CJTF-HOA), and the Partner Military HIV/

AIDS Program (PMHAP).37 The IMET and E-IMET 

are the most widely used military assistance programs in U.S. AFRICOM’s area of responsibility and 

aim at professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the 

democratic value of elected civilian authority.38 The 

PMHAP aims at mitigating the impacts of the disease 

on African military readiness. The CJTF-HOA located 
351

at Camp Lemonnier also builds partner security capability, capacity, and infrastructure through regional 

cooperation, military-to-military programs, civilmilitary affairs projects, and professional military 

education programs. 

In Fiscal Year 2010, AFRICOM received $274 million, and the Obama administration requested $298 

million for the command for Fiscal Year 2011.39 As 

of April 2011, AFRICOM had approximately 2,100 

personnel, consisting of both military and civilian 

personnel from DoD and non-DoD agencies of the 

U.S. Government. In 2011, AFRICOM undertook its 

first major military operation named Operation ODYSSEY DAWN during the Libya crises, in which the 

AU became a mere observer, incapable of playing any 

major role. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was the U.S. 

support to the multilateral military efforts to enforce 

a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1973.40 Before 

NATO’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya, 

AFRICOM also supported the U.S. humanitarian 

response in Libya through the delivery of relief supplies and the evacuation of foreign nationals fleeing 

the violence. 

EVOLUTION OF THE NEW AFRICAN PEACE 

AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The transformation of the OAU into the AU generated expectations that Africa’s premier international 

institution would have the strength and capacity to 

deal with the peace and security challenges facing the 

continent.41 While the OAU had achieved its stated objectives of decolonization, eradicating apartheid, and 

maintaining the colonially inherited boundaries at 
352

independence, the proxy wars in which Africa got entangled during the period of the Cold War resulted in 

the diversion of attention from the core economic and 

security challenges that the continent faced. By 1993, 

there was political recognition that the rhetoric of economic development could not be achieved if the conflicts that hounded the continent were not decisively 

dealt with. Consequently, the Mechanism for Conflict 

Prevention, Management and Resolution was established 

with the purpose to anticipate and prevent conflicts 

on the continent. Therefore, 1993 became the decisive 

year when the shift to the recognition of a need for a 

structured security architecture started to take shape. 

A decade later, with a Constitutive Act defining the 

parameters of a new AU, a Protocol establishing a Peace 

and Security Council (PSC) for the AU was promulgated in 2002 and eventually ratified by enough member states to make it operational. At its launch in May 

2004, the PSC was characterized as “marking a historic watershed in Africa’s progress toward resolving 

its conflicts and building a durable peace and security 

order.”42 The AU’s new security regime is premised on 

several norms and principles that are both old (based 

on the Charter of the OAU) and new (emanating from 

the Constitutive Act).43 They include: 

• Sovereign equality of member states (Article 

4a);

• Nonintervention by member states (Article 4g);

• African solutions to African problems;

• Uti possidetis (Article 4b);

• Nonuse of force/peaceful settlement of disputes (Articles 4e, 4f, 4i);

• Condemnation of unconstitutional changes of 

government (Article 4p); and,

• The AU’s right to intervene in a member state 

in grave circumstances (Article 4h).
353

A combination of these values and norms plus 

the institutional mechanisms has given the AU an 

institutional vibrancy that creates opportunities for 

proactive responses to some of the continent’s security challenges.44 A case in point was the AU’s deployment of peacekeepers to Burundi and the Sudan 

Darfur region to prevent a situation it terms as posing 

significant threats to legitimate order to restore peace 

and stability.

In addition to the Constitutive Act, which is the core 

document that defines the principle and objectives of 

the AU security policy and the PSC protocol, a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) 

was adopted in 2004. In particular, the PSC protocol 

and the CADSP together form the critical pillars underpinning the new AU peace and security architecture. The fundamental philosophical idea underlying 

CADSP was that of human security, based not only on 

political values but social and economic imperatives 

as well.45 This notion of human security embraces such 

issues as: human rights; the right to participate fully 

in governance; the right to equal development, access 

to resources, and basic necessities of life; the right to 

protection against poverty; the right to education and 

health care; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of gender; and protection against 

natural disasters and ecological and environmental 

degradation.46 These issues represent Africa’s primary 

security concerns that pose major threats to the stability of states and not the excessive focus of AFRICOM 

on terrorism and other transnational organized crimes 

on the continent.

The CADSP also aims to address some of the common security threats facing the continent such as the 
354

proliferation of small arms and light weapons, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict 

rehabilitation and reconstruction, terrorism, humanitarian issues, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other infectious diseases.47 Its 

objectives and goals include: ensuring collective responses to both internal and external threats, advancing the cause of integration in Africa; enhancing AU’s 

capacity for, and coordination of, early action for conflict prevention, containment, management, and resolution; and promoting initiatives that will preserve 

and strengthen peace and development in Africa. 

KEY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND 

MECHANISMS OF THE NEW APSA

The APSA is made up of a multifaceted set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function 

at the continental, regional, and national levels.48 The 

AU member states form the national-level actors that 

house a majority of the capabilities relevant to conflict 

management on the continent. At the regional level 

are the regional economic communities (RECs), which 

constitute the building blocks of the continental security architecture. At the continental level, a variety of 

institutions and mechanisms coordinated by the AU 

PSC comprise the new APSA.49 The Protocol Relating 

to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) establishes the PSC as a standing decisionmaking organ for the prevention, management, and 

resolution of conflicts. According to article 2 of the 

protocol, the PSC is meant to be a collective security 

and early warning instrument for timely and efficient 

response to both existing and emerging conflict as 

well as crisis situations in Africa.50 The powers of the 
355

PSC are extensive, dealing not only with “hard” peace 

and security issues, but also “soft” security or any aspects that influence human security. This enables the 

PSC to monitor elections and address issues of food 

security, natural disasters, and human rights violations.51 It is supported by the AU Commission, a Panel 

of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an 

African Standby Force (ASF), and a Special Fund. 

Among other things, the objectives of the PSC are to 

promote peace, security, and stability in Africa.52 It is 

composed of 15 members, of whom 10 are elected for a 

2-year term, while the remaining five are elected for a 

3-year period on the principle of equitable representation of the five regions: North, West, Central, East, and 

Southern Africa. 

The critical peace and security decisionmaking institutions include the Assembly of Heads of State and 

Governments (AHSG) of AU, the Executive Council, 

the PSC, and the Commission of the AU. Although 

the AHSG makes the final decisions on important 

peace and security issues such as the intervention in 

member states of the AU, the PSC is empowered to 

take most decisions on security issues on behalf of the 

AHSG.53 The Chairperson of the AU Commission also 

plays an important conflict management role under 

the new APSA. The Chairperson assisted by the Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security is responsible for bringing issues to the attention of the PSC, 

the Panel of the Wise, and other relevant stakeholders 

and for ensuring implementation and follow-up actions.54 The chair of the Commission performs this advisory role by relying on the information provided by 

the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which 

aims to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of 

conflicts (Article 12). The CEWS consists of a situation 
356

room located at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, 

Ethiopia, and is responsible for data gathering and 

analysis. It is linked to the early warning mechanisms 

of the RECs such as the ECOWAS, South African Development Community (SADC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 

The Panel of the Wise, which is composed of five 

highly respected African personalities selected on the 

basis of regional representation, is tasked with advising the PSC and AU Commission Chair on any or all 

matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of 

peace and security in Africa. The Panel of the Wise 

could also be deployed to support the efforts of the 

Peace and Security Council (Article 11). Another important institutional mechanism of the APSA is the 

ASF (Article 13). It is established to enable the PSC to 

perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support operations and interventions 

pursuant to Article 4 (h) and 4 (J) of the AU Constitutive Act.55 The ASF provides for five sub-regional 

stand-by arrangements, each up to a brigade size of 

3,000-4,000 troops, which will combine to give the AU 

a total of 15,000 to 20,000 troops who will be trained 

and ready to be deployed on 14 days notice.56

It was conceived to conduct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping missions in responding to emergency situations anywhere on the continent requiring 

rapid military response. The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) in Addis Ababa is the coordination mechanism and is expected to command 

an African-wide integrated communication system 

linking all the sub-regional brigades. Although the 

ASF was envisaged to be operational by 2010, challenges of coordination between the regional economic 

communities, finances, logistics, and equipment have 
357

prolonged its implementation.57 But without doubt, 

the ASF represents a critical component of the APSA 

that will enhance the AU’s capabilities to intervene to 

protect people in grave circumstances and to provide 

a prompt and robust response to manage and resolve 

conflicts on the continent. There is also the Military 

Staff Committee (MSC), which consists of senior military officers from PSC member states. When called 

upon, the MSC advises the PSC on questions relating 

to military and security issues that are on its agenda.58

AFRICOM AND APSA: WORKING 

TOWARD A COMMON END STATE 

Traditionally, U.S. engagement with Africa has 

been on the bilateral level, supporting its allies with 

little focus on regional organizations, especially the 

AU. But the establishment of AFRICOM has led to a 

deepening interaction with the AU, an indication of 

its growing confidence in the organization as a crucial player in the maintenance of peace in Africa. According to Michael Battle, the U.S. Ambassador to the 

AU, this emerging partnership demonstrates how 

the U.S. Government sees the AU as being “critically 

important” to the development of its policy toward 

the African continent.59 AFRICOM is currently offering enhanced support for many of the AU peace and 

security initiatives through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. At the bilateral level, AFRICOM is 

focusing on improving the capabilities of individual 

member states of the AU to field well-trained and 

well-equipped troops for peace operations through 

programs such as EIPC, ARP, ACOTA, IMET, and EIMET. These capacity-building programs and activities have significantly enhanced the operational and 
358

tactical dimensions of AU peacekeeping missions. 

For example, AFRICOM provides bilateral support 

to the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) of the AU 

mission in Somalia (AMISOM) such as Burundi and 

Uganda, through the provision of equipment, logistics 

support, advice, and training.60 The AU/UN mission 

in Darfur is also being supported by AFRICOM. Between 2005 and 2010, the United States provided more 

than $940 million to support the AU missions in Darfur and Somalia, as well as capacity building through 

the ACOTA program.61 The United States is also providing counterterrorism training to some selected military units in the Sahel and East Africa such as Mali, 

Chad, Niger, and Mauritania through the TSCTI and 

PSI programs. 

AFRICOM is also supporting AU’s effort to operationalize the African Standby Force through capacity 

building at the continental and sub-regional level, as 

well as AU member states.62 These capacity building 

initiatives are targeted toward strengthening the capabilities and interoperability of the African Standby 

Force (ASF) and its sub-regional elements. Computers, software, and communication equipment have 

also been provided to bolster the CEWS and communication between the AU and regional ASF brigades. 

In order to build the capacity of the AU Secretariat to 

plan, manage, and sustain peacekeeping operations, 

the United States has provided a full-time Peace and 

Security Advisor to the AU Peace Support Operations 

division in Addis Ababa.

While all of these programs signify a significant 

milestone in U.S. support to the implementation process of the APSA, the limited nature of these training 

programs makes it difficult to see a clear cause and 

effect relationship between the training offered and 
359

the actual performance of troops trained under them 

in the field.63 Moreover, the disproportionate focus 

on the training of U.S. allies at the expense of all AU 

member states affects the rapid impact on African 

peacekeeping. The nature of the relationship between 

the AU and the United States has also not been clearly 

defined. The relationship between the two has largely 

been ad hoc and crisis-driven, partly due to the U.S. 

failure to construct a coherent or sustained policy toward Africa. This is actually reflected in the shifting 

and changing nature of its security strategies toward 

the continent. Instead of giving more substantial support to the AU, the United States has rather focused on 

supporting individual countries that benefit its interests.64 This for example, has reinforced the perception 

that AFRICOM is meant to serve U.S. interests rather 

than Africa, and makes some Africans even question 

the real motivations behind the creation of AFRICOM. 

Moreover, despite the objectives of AFRICOM that suggest that it will go beyond traditional security concerns 

by addressing nontraditional security issues, it remains essentially a military organization. 

Like its predecessor programs, AFRICOM is also 

threatened by inadequate funding and political commitment, insufficient interagency coordination, as 

well as a failure to harmonize activities with international partners to achieve maximum impact and eliminate duplication.65 In particular, the financial support 

of AFRICOM has been vulnerable to raids from other 

budget lines, and remains uneven from year-to-year.66

But this is not surprising, given the parlous state of 

the economy inherited by President Obama and the 

fact that his administration has to focus on the recovery of the U.S. economy. The inconsistencies in U.S. 

military engagement in Africa have also raised serious 
360

concerns about its commitment to the attainment of 

peace and stability on the continent. While the United 

States was quick to intervene in the crisis in Libya, it 

was largely absent when it came to the post-electoral 

violence in La Cote d’Ivoire; again reflecting the dominance of security interests in U.S. engagement with Africa, including the removal of “out of favor” regimes, 

in this case Muammar Gaddafi, and replacing them 

with loyal governments with the aim of controlling 

resources.67 Thus, though in Libya, the United States 

adopted a military posture to oust President Gaddafi, 

this was not the case in Cote d’Ivoire where the main 

approach used was a combination of quiet diplomacy 

and economic sanctions even when people were dying 

from clashes between Alassane Ouattara’s supporters 

and that of Gbagbo. 

CONCLUSION 

To a great extent, AFRICOM has significantly enhanced and improved the tactical and operational 

dimensions of AU peacekeeping missions. Nevertheless, it is necessary for the Command to consider how 

it can effectively complement rather than undermine 

the efforts of the AU’s nascent peace and security architecture. Evidently, U.S. policy toward Africa has 

remained largely intact without any dramatic change 

under the Obama administration. It is quite clear that 

President Obama is following the militarized and unilateral security policy that had been pursued by the 

Clinton and Bush administrations toward Africa.68

But it is significant for the United States to note that 

its security needs in Africa would be best assured by 

looking to meaningfully address and reconcile its interest with the continent’s human security needs such 
361

as poverty, high levels of unemployment, access to 

clean water, and the HIV/AIDs pandemic.69 These are 

the issues that confront and threaten the survival and 

the existence of most African states and make them 

vulnerable to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. 

It is also important for the United States not to see 

Africa at the periphery of its foreign policy engagements. Now opportunities for progress in Africa 

abound due to rising regional institutions, expanding 

economies, increasing democratization, and emerging 

security institutions. For example, the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that in 2011, against a 

threatening global backdrop, most economies in subSaharan Africa turned in a solid performance with a 

growth rate averaging more than 5 percent.70 Most importantly, the AU and the RECs, especially ECOWAS, 

have developed very robust peace and security architectures to deal with African security challenges. It is 

therefore imperative that Africa is not seen or engaged 

by the United States as a conflict-ridden continent 

but as a continent that is advancing democratically, 

economically, and developmentally.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. See “National Security Review 30: American policy towards Africa in the 1990s,” Washington, DC: The White House, 

June 15, 1992.

2. Kwesi Aning, “African Crises Response Initiatives and the 

New African Security (DIS) Order,” Africa Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2001, p. 45; Benedikt Franke, Enabling a Continent to help itself: US Military Capacity Building and African Emerging Security Architecture, Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary 

Conflict, 2007, p. 2.
362

3. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, “US Peace Operation 

Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, p. 119.

4. Ibid.; for more information, see Adekeye Adebajo, UN 

Peacekeeping in Africa: From Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2011.

5. Ibid; see also Ivor H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No: 

The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping,” William Durch, 

ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 

1990s, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 35–67.

6. Mark Malan, “US Response to African Crises: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis of ACRI,” ISS Occasional Paper, 

No. 24, 1997.

7. Bah and Aning, 2008; Kwesi Aning, Thomas Jaye, and Samuel Atuobi, “The Role of Private Military Companies in US-Africa 

Policy,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 118, 2008, 

pp. 613-628.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Franke, “Enabling a Continent to help itself.”

11. “African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 

(ACOTA),” Washington, DC: U.S Department of State, available 

from www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota/.

12. Aning, Jaye, and Atuobi.

13. Ibid; see also Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, “Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities,” Geneva, Switzerland/Pretoria, South Africa: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000, pp. 267–290.

14. U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, “FACT SHEET: Africa 

Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA),” 

Stuttgart, Germany, June 15, 2008. 
363

15. For more information, see Sarjoh Bah and Aning, p. 122.

16. Aning, Jaye, and Atuobi. 

17. Nina M. Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: 

Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009. 

18. Ibid., p. 1-2; Bah and Aning, p. 123. More information is 

available from www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/.

19. Ibid; Aning, Jaye, and Atuobi.

20. Niall Ferguson, “Wanted: A Grand Strategy for America,” 

Newsweek, February 13, 2011.

21. Colin Dueck, “New Perspectives on American Grand 

Strategy: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, 

2006. See also Charles Kupchan, “Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Issue No. 23, 

Winter 2012.

22. Peter Feaver, “What is Grand Strategy and Why Do We 

Need It?” Foreign Policy, January 6, 2012.

23. Anna Field and Geoff Dyer, “The ‘Obama Doctrine’ Begins to Take Shape,” Financial Times, October 24, 2011, p. 6. 

24. Field and Dyer, p. 6.

25. Available from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.

26. “President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,” Washington, DC: 

The White House, available from www.africom.mil/getArticle.

asp?art=3152&lang=0.

27. Ibid.

28. Christopher Isike, Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, and Lysias Gilbert, “The United States Africa Command: Enhancing American 
364

Security or Fostering African Development?” African Security Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2008, p. 31. 

29. EUCOM had responsibility for most of the continent, thus 

42 states out of the 54 in Africa; PACOM administered military 

ties with Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, and other Islands in 

the Indian Ocean; and CENTCOM oversaw Egypt and the Horn 

of Africa region, together with the Middle East and Central Asia.

30. See “U.S. Creating New Africa Command to Coordinate 

Military Efforts,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 

available from usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?1⁄4washfileenglish&y1⁄42007&m1⁄4Febaruary; Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, February 6, 2007.

31. See “AFRICOM Mission Statement,” USAFRICOM, Stuttgart, Germany, 2008, available from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp; Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” CRS Report 

for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

2011, pp. 1-4.

32. Ibid. 

33. They include the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), Vicenza, 

Italy; U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), Naples, Italy; U.S. Air 

Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA), Ramstein Air Base, Germany; U.S. 

Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF), Stuttgart, Germany; 

Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAFRICA), Stuttgart, 

Germany; and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 

(CJTF-HOA), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

34. See “About U.S. Africa Command,” available from www.

africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.

35. See “OEF-TS Fact Sheet and the TSCTP Fact Sheet,” available from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.

36. “About U.S. Africa Command.”
365

37. See “IMET Fact Sheet and PMHAP Fact sheet,” available 

from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.

38. Ibid. For critical articles on the efficacy of these programs, 

see Alhaji Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, “US Peace Operations 

Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM,” Ian Johnstone, ed., 

US Peace Operations Policy: A Double-Edged Sword? London, UK, 

and New York: Routledge, 2009; Kwesi Aning, Thomas Jaye, and 

Samuel Atuobi, “The Role of Private Military Companies in USAfrica Policy,” Review of African Political Economy, 2008.

39. See “FACT SHEET: United States Africa Command,” 

available from www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644.

40. Ploch. 

41. On May 25. 2004 (Africa Day), the PSC was officially inaugurated with fanfare to replace the “Mechanism on Conflict 

Prevention, Management and Resolution,” which had been established in June 1993 in Cairo, Egypt, under the umbrella of 

the OAU.

42. AU doc. PSC/AHG/ST(X, para. 1, May 25 2005.

43. Kwesi Aning, “The African Union’s Peace and Security 

Architecture: Defining an Emerging Response Mechanism,” Lecture Series on African Security, No. 3, Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic 

African Institute, and Stockholm, Sweden: The Swedish Defense 

Research Agency, FOI, 2008.

44. Ibid., p. 3. 

45. See the Solemn declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), 2004, available from www.iss.

co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/cadspjan04frm.pdf; see also 

Aning, p. 5. 

46. See the AU’s CADSP, p. 3.

47. Ibid. 
366

48. Paul D, Williams, “The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities,” Working Paper, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011.

49. Ibid., p. 6.

50. See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace 

and Security Council (PSC); See also Kwesi Aning, “The UN and 

African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture: Defining and 

Emerging Relationship?” Critical Currents, No. 5, October 2008. 

51. See PSC, Articles 3, 4, 7.

52. Paul D. Williams, “Thinking about Security in Africa,” International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007, pp. 1021-1038.

53. See PSC, Article 7; see also Kwesi Aning and Samuel Atuobi, “R2P in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union ́s Peace and 

Security Architecture,” Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, 2009. 

54. Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, “The Regional Roots of the African Peace and Security Architecture: Exploring Centre-Periphery 

Relations,” South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No 

2, August 2011, pp. 169-189; Tim Murithi, “The African Union’s 

Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in 

Darfur,” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 14, 2009.

55. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Acts states that the AU 

has the right to intervene in member state conflicts with respect 

of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes 

against humanity; while Article 4 (j) gives the right to member 

states to request the intervention from AU in order to restore 

peace and security.

56. Williams, “Thinking about Security in Africa,” p. 10.

57. See International Peace Institute, “Operationalizing the 

African Standby Force,” Meeting Note of the High Level African Civilian and Military Leaders Retreat in Kigali, Rwanda, 

January 2010.
367

58. Since its establishment in 2004, the MSC has been engaged 

in providing advice on the PSC’s authorized peace operations in 

Burundi, Sudan, Darfur, Comoros, and currently Somalia.

59. See “U.S. Mission to African Union Shows Commitment 

to Africa,” available from www.usau.usmission.gov/commitment-toafrica.html.

60. Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 

personnel, for instance, provided military training and assistance 

to Burundian and Ugandan forces who were deployed to Somalia. Since 2007, the United States has contributed over $250 million 

to AMISOM. See Paul D. Williams, “The African Union’s Conflict 

Management Capabilities,” Working Paper, New York: Council 

on Foreign Relations, 2011.

61. See “TRANSCRIPT: Ambassador Anderson on African 

Union Peacekeeping Operations,” available from www.africom.

mil/getArticle.asp?art=5475&lang=0.

62. Ploch.

63. Aning, Jaye, and Atuobi. 

64. Stephanie Hanson, “The African Union,” available from 

www.cfr.org/africa/african-union/p11616. 

65. Ploch.

66. For more information, see Alexis Arieff et al., “U.S. Foreign 

Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: The FY2012 Request,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2011.

67. For more information, see “The Crisis in Libya: the Imperative of rushing the ASF,” available from www.currentanalyst.

com/index.php/opeds/158-the-crisis-in-libya-the-imperative-of-rushingthe-asf.

68. See Daniel Volman, “Obama Expands Military Involvement in Africa,” available from ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50898.
368

69. Bah and Aning; Isike, Okeke-Uzodike, and Gilbert.

70. Available from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/

car011012a.htm.
369

CHAPTER 14

U.S. GRAND STRATEGY AND THE 

SEARCH FOR PARTNERS:

SOUTH AFRICA AS A KEY PARTNER IN AFRICA

Abel Esterhuyse

In an age of austerity, the United States needs partners. More specifically, for a grand strategy to be effective, a country like the United States should be able 

to shape its security and foreign policy environment 

in cooperation with key partners. South Africa and 

the United States are both important role players in 

Africa in general, and in African security in particular: 

South Africa as regional and to some extent also continental hegemon, and the United States as the sole hyper power in the world. Neither South Africa, nor the 

United States necessarily has a long positive history of 

constructive engagement in Africa. Yet, their involvement in Africa, and African security, raises questions 

about a possible competition or confluence of security 

and other interests and questions about similarities 

and differences in their approaches in the pursuance 

of these interests. More importantly, are they cooperating in the case of a confluence of interests, or are 

the United States and South Africa, even in cases of a 

confluence of interests, each walking its own path in 

pursuing these interests? 

This chapter aims at providing a descriptive analysis of the divergence and/or cooperation between 

South Africa and the United States in their contributions to African security. The first section considers 

the role of Africa in South African security and foreign 

policy outlook in general and in the worldview of the 
370

reigning African National Congress (ANC) government in particular. In the second section, a brief analysis is provided of U.S. involvement in African security. The discussion concludes with a consideration of 

possible cooperation and/or discord between South 

Africa and the United States in Africa.

INTO AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA’S 

STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

The focus on Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy 

is undeniable. The strategic plan of the South African 

Department of International Relations and Cooperation is explicit in noting that South Africa’s foreign 

relations are anchored in a prioritization of the African continent and in strengthening the political and 

economic integration of the South African Development Community (SADC).1

 However, South African 

interests in Africa are not that clear. South Africa does 

have economic interests in Africa.2 However, those interests are limited and more or less restricted to the 

SADC region.3

 There is also, for example, a considerable imbalance in South Africa’s trade relationship 

with Africa. This ranges from 9:1 in trade with SADC 

countries, and 5:1 in trade with Africa as a whole.4

Compared to its economic relations with other parts 

of the world, its economic relations with Africa are 

growing, although they are still relatively limited.5

At the same time, South Africa’s security is not being 

challenged by any African country or specific threats. 

In short, there is reason to doubt whether the South 

African focus on Africa is interests-driven. 

It is possible, though, to explain the South African 

foreign policy focus on Africa in terms of a number 

of considerations. The first is domestic politics. The 
371

worldview of the South African (ANC) government 

is shaped by the need for a so-called “National Democratic Revolution.” Linking the three words, national, 

democratic, and revolution, is in itself of great significance and provides at least some insight into the ANC 

mindset. Like most South African political concepts, 

the National Democratic Revolution is rooted in the 

legacy of apartheid and, in this case, a revolutionary-oriented East-bloc approach to politics that was 

formed during the Cold War anti-apartheid struggle.6

Today, the South African domestic political landscape is still colored by the legacies and realities of 

apartheid. Apartheid defines the ANC’s view of the 

country and the world. Apartheid is still the tool for 

mobilization of the masses, on which the ANC as a political party relies. The ANC, as the government, thus 

manages a unique paradox. On the one hand, they 

need to cleanse the South African society of apartheid 

and eradicate the legacy and influence thereof. On the 

other, though, keeping the “fight against apartheid” 

alive is an integral part of the ANC’s philosophy and, 

more specifically, keeping the tripartite-alliance7

 together. The fight against apartheid has always been 

the central organizing concept for the ANC and the 

reason for its existence. The ANC has to use the 

structural legacy of apartheid to explain the disparity between what is, or what was, and what could 

have been.

At present, the process to address the legacies of 

apartheid is playing itself out predominantly in an 

economic policy of black economic empowerment 

(BEE) and the application of affirmative action (AA) 

to ensure representivity8

 and deal with the economic 

inequalities in society. The National Democratic Revolution, thus, needs to provide many who have been 
372

excluded from the productive economy with a pathway to, what in the West at least, would be considered 

as development and life improvement. Representivity 

and AA action have become important pathways in 

making this happen for the masses. Of course, a small 

number of so-called “black diamonds”9

 have benefitted from BEE. Certain elements within the ANC are, 

however, increasingly calling for more drastic measures and, as a consequence, the debate on nationalization is heating up in South Africa.10

As a matter of irony, the need for representivity 

and AA have driven many experienced and capable 

workers out of the public sector, leading to serious 

service delivery problems for the ANC government—

especially in the rural areas.11 A growing bureaucratic 

inefficiency increasingly underpins a view of government as ineffective and incompetent. Many South 

Africans thus tend to view the National Democratic 

Revolution with skepticism and as a metaphor for 

government inaptitude.12 The need for representivity 

and AA, at the same time, developed into an attitude 

of entitlement in the constituency of the ANC-led tripartite government. Of course, an attitude of entitlement absolves people from action, while the service 

delivery problems reinforce an attitude of powerlessness and victimhood.13

Why is this important? The need for a national 

democratic revolution, AA policies, and the acceptance of inadequacies in many areas of government is 

informed by the importance of Africa. It underpins a 

government approach that highlights the need to emphasize the African dimension and identity in South 

African society to the detriment of many considerations that others may consider more important. The 

ANC domestic political discourse and the domestic 
373

political agenda of the ANC government are informed 

by “Africa” and the need to emphasize the importance 

of Africa. This orientation toward Africa in domestic 

politics, by design, also informs the foreign policy 

stance of the South African government. In a multicultural and multiethnic society, this is an important 

message from government to both its domestic and 

foreign audiences. 

A second consideration is geography. A previous 

South African president, Thabo Mbeki, found it necessary to deliver a speech on “I am an African” in the 

South African parliament.14 He had to make the point 

explicitly in the South African parliament that South 

Africa is part of Africa! Why? From a geographical 

perspective, South Africa is not only part of Africa, 

but its position at the southern tip of the continent is 

also a blessing and a curse. With some of the world’s 

most important minerals, the country has very long 

open borders to the north and has to police a coastline 

of more than 3,000 kilometers (km) on one of the naval choke points of the world. The recent instabilities 

in the oceans around East and West Africa, together 

with subsequent increase in sea traffic around Africa, 

highlight this reality. 

Geopolitics dictate that the South African government should commit itself to a prioritization of the 

African continent in general and in strengthening of 

the political and economic integration of the SADC in 

particular. It is no surprise, then, that South Africa’s 

foreign policy has a very explicit focus on Africa in 

general, and the SADC in particular, in “consolidation of the African Agenda.”15 The geographical emphasis on Africa, like the domestic political agenda, 

also encases South Africa’s African identity. This 

explicit alignment with Africa is in stark contrast to 
374

the focus of the apartheid government that projected 

itself as part of the European civilization. The apartheid government projected the South African sea lines 

and minerals as important to the West. For the ANC 

government, it is part of Africa’s rich reserve. Thus, 

identity politics drive the South African geostrategic 

orientation toward Africa.16

History is a third consideration in South African 

foreign policy orientation toward Africa. The apartheid government never steered away from political, 

economic, and military coercion in Southern Africa. 

The ANC is inspired by the need to mend these injustices. Its history of resistance against apartheid (the 

so-called struggle history) left the ANC with a responsibility to repay many African countries for their services as sanctuaries to ANC cadres during the antiapartheid struggle. 

History, of course, also shapes South African strategic engagement with the rest of the world: from 

support to controversial “underdogs” such as the 

Palestinians and, more recently, Muammar Gaddafi, 

to a very strong anti-American and anti-West stance 

in general, and an emphasis on South-South relations 

in particular.17 The South African orientation to the 

West in general, and the United States in particular, 

is driven by Africa’s colonial heritage and U.S. support to the apartheid government during the Cold 

War. The very strong anti-American sentiments of 

the South African government were clearly demonstrated through the latter’s reactions to the creation 

of the U.S. Africa Command18 (AFRICOM) and the 

positioning of the Libyan crisis as American neo-colonialism.19 In both cases, the South African government 

furiously denounced the decisions and actions by the 

U.S. Government.20
375

South African foreign policy therefore contains 

a very explicit grounding in an Africanist and antiimperialist agenda. Greg Mills notes, for example, 

“there is a visceral genuflection to interpret, label and 

dismiss Western actions on the African continent as 

imperialistically intended.”21 Thus, an Africanist and 

anti-imperialist stance is, in essence, about being antiWest. This foreign policy agenda contains an implicit 

expression of both anti-Americanism and solidarity 

with allies around the world from the period of national liberation. Liberation movement politics of sentiment and solidarity are also an important drivers of 

the South African strategic orientation toward Africa 

and its role on/toward the African continent.22

The nature of global governance is a fourth factor 

underpinning the emphasis on Africa in South African 

foreign policy. Liberation politics and the Africanist 

and anti-imperialist agenda support the strong emphasis of the ANC government on a just global order and 

an effort to change the international structure. South 

Africa’s aggregate capabilities in terms of economic, 

diplomatic, and military capacities in relation to other 

African countries led to a view of South Africa’s role 

in Africa as that of pivotal state, regional power, and 

hegemonic state. Of course, each description contains 

some truth about South Africa’s role in Africa. At the 

same time, though, this also masks a constraint of 

South African involvement in Africa: the possible perception of South Africa as a big brother using bullying 

tactics. The perception explains, at least partly, South 

Africa’s cautious handling of the Zimbabwean crisis 

in general and Robert Mugabe in particular.23 It is a 

reality that the South African government deliberately 

portrays a selective image of multilateral engagement 

through political partnerships and (sometimes) re-
376

gional leadership. This self-imposed perceptual constraint is a reality of South Africa’s engagement and 

role in Southern Africa.

South Africa, supported by others, mainly Nigeria, has become the key driver and competitor in the 

reconstruction of Africa’s institutional architecture. 

This specifically pertains to the creation of the African 

Union (AU) and the hosting of the African Parliament 

in South Africa. In July 2001, the Assembly of African 

Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia, 

also reached a decision on the New Partnership for 

Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic 

cooperation and integration among African countries. 

This corresponded with the vision of the then South 

African president Mbeki of an African Renaissance to 

confront the challenges of the African continent. South 

Africa was also the key actor in transforming the South 

African Development Coordinating Conference into 

the South African Development Community, which, 

in August 2008, launched the Southern African free 

trade area. These continental and regional institutions 

became an important part of South Africa’s approach 

of multilateral engagement in shaping its immediate 

geostrategic environment. The country’s support for 

and role in the establishment of regional and continental institutions, together with the substantial financial 

support to the AU, the NEPAD Secretariat, and the 

Pan-African Parliament, not only demonstrate South 

Africa’s leading role in Africa, but also the country’s 

commitment to the African agenda (identity politics) 

and in helping Africa (enlightened self-interest).24

South Africa uses its geopolitical position in 

(Southern) Africa as a means to popularize Africa’s 

potential and challenges on global forums and insti-
377

tutions. As a result of South Africa’s efforts, Africa 

features increasingly on the agenda of the United 

Nations (UN), the G8 (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 

the United Kingdom [UK], and the United States), the 

World Trade Organizations (WTOs), the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The extent to which South Africa, for example, was willing to 

give up or sacrifice reputation and respect outside of 

Africa during its tenure at the UN Security Council in 

its search for a mediated solution in Zimbabwe, once 

again demonstrated South Africa’s commitment to the 

African continent.25

Compassion and humanitarian considerations 

may provide a fifth explanation for South Africa’s focus on Africa. There is no doubt that South Africa under ANC leadership is committed in its search for an 

end to conflict and violence and a move toward sustainable peace on the African continent. Over the last 

number of years, South Africa has provided considerable funding, military resources, and political energy 

in places such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo, and Sudan to create what can only be 

considered fragile peace settlements. Conflict resolution and the utilization of its military in peace missions in Africa have come to symbolize South Africa’s 

search for African solutions for African problems. The 

military has become, specifically under the Mbeki regime, the most prominent (and preferred) South African foreign policy tool in Africa. With the decision 

by the South African government to make the military 

once again responsible for the safeguarding of South 

Africa’s borders, the South African military presence 

in Africa is set to decline. The South African military 

is overstretched, underfunded, and, the Army in particular, in dire need of new equipment. The South 
378

African government will continue its role as a peace 

broker on the continent and to use the country’s considerable political leverage as a means to stabilization. 

In this regard, the South African military places a high 

emphasis on so-called defense diplomacy.26

South Africa is without doubt a key state, not only 

in the SADC region, but also on the Africa continent 

as a whole. South Africa’s position in Africa is to a 

certain extent comparable to that of the United States 

in the global arena—if you act, you are in the wrong, 

and if you do not act, you are also in the wrong. A 

key strategic question pertains to the extent to which 

South Africa has to prove its commitment to Africa—a 

continent that is already suffering under the burden of 

a continent-wide inferiority complex and bad leadership in its interaction with the rest of the world. On 

a continent that is in dire need of constructive leadership, South Africa seems to offer itself as a willing leader; often to the detriment of its own position 

and image.

In the absence of clear identifiable interests and a 

wide variety of factors underpinning South Africa’s 

explicit commitment to the African continent, a lack 

of focus is to be expected. It is thus no surprise that a 

mixture of geopolitical and historic realities, domestic and liberation politics, and Africanism and antiimperialism seems to drive the unpredictable and 

inconsistent nature of the ANC government’s foreign 

policy agenda in general, and on the African continent 

in particular. Such an array of factors is responsible 

for the description of South African foreign policy as a 

“bit of this, bit of that.” Making sense of such a foreign 

policy approach will always be difficult. 
379

INTO AFRICA: THE U.S. (RE)DISCOVERY 

OF AFRICA

Until fairly recently, Africa did not feature very 

prominently on the political radar screens in Washington.27 This has always been a logical outcome of 

U.S. global strategic, political, and economic interests, 

which are profoundly Eurocentric by nature. Salih 

Booker, for example, argues that there has always 

been a denial of most U.S. interests in Africa.28 Booker 

is of the opinion that America reluctantly identifies 

with Africa in spite of the dramatic changes that have 

taken place in Africa over the last decades and also 

in the status of Africa’s descendants in the United 

States itself.29

Except for the slave trade, the United States does 

not really have historical ties with Africa. For a variety 

of reasons, the United States has not been involved in 

the “scramble for Africa.” America did not challenge 

European influence in Africa; in exchange, it is argued, for dominance in the Western hemisphere.30 In 

the aftermath of World War II, Africa became more 

important for the United States, not only because of 

the creation of the UN and the independence of so 

many (UN-voting) African states, but in particular because of the geopolitics of the Cold War. The creation 

of the Bureau of African Affairs in 1958 serves as an 

example of the growing concern in Washington at the 

time about what was happening in Africa, the increasing Soviet influence in Africa in particular.31

The end of the Cold War led to renewed disengagement of the United States from Africa, reinforced 

by the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia. 

The 1994 Rwanda genocide did not attract much political attention (or action) in and from the United States. 
380

Until the creation of AFRICOM in 2007, the U.S. approach to Africa was characterized by the promotion 

of democracy and the development of trade relations 

by means of initiatives such as the African Growth 

and Opportunity Act.32 During most of these times, 

two particular considerations shaped U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. First, the color line has always been 

an important factor. Before and during the Cold War, 

America predominantly identified with Europeans in 

Africa.33 Second, economic factors reign supreme. The 

question of how America will gain economically from 

Africa has always directed its foreign policy toward 

the continent.

The United States always experienced some difficulty in developing a coherent policy toward Africa. 

This difficulty is rooted in a number of realities. First, 

before the eruption of the War on Terror, the United 

States had few concrete, material interests in the continent.34 Africa is perhaps the only sizable inhabited 

geographical region that has never really been vital 

to U.S. security interests. While clear identifiable interests provide policy with a solid foundation and coherence, a lack thereof normally leads to ambiguity, 

debate, and vulnerability to changing political moods. 

In the case of Africa, this particular reality linked U.S. 

policy closely to global geopolitical developments. In 

addition, U.S. African policies very often reflect an indifference to indigenous African political realities and 

an inability to predict the probable impact of specific 

policies on interstate relations among African states.35

Second, it is difficult for the average American 

citizen to relate to the diverse, sometimes chaotic or 

anarchic, and often depressing realities of the African 

continent.36 The public idea of Africa, so successfully 

sustained by Western media, is rooted in an image 
381

of conflict, disaster, challenges, and hopelessness. In 

the United States, no news is better than good news 

from Africa. Thus, many Americans have a “National 

Geographic” image of “Africa”—as if Africa does 

not consist of different countries with a huge diversity of nations and peoples, rich and poor, developed 

and underdeveloped, who have a variety of interests, 

opinions, and prejudices. U.S. involvement in Africa 

is underpinned by media coverage of humanitarian 

catastrophe and public pressure on the U.S. Government to react to the human need. U.S. engagements in 

Africa are mostly episodic, short-lived, and inconsistent. Egregious suffering without media coverage will 

most probably be ignored.37 Washington deals with 

“Africa” as if it is a single country and search for “a 

single African voice” to guide them in dealing with 

this diverse continent. The search, of course, is both 

futile and dangerous.38 Though hegemonic states such 

as South Africa have tried to do this in the past, there 

is nobody who speaks for or who can speak on behalf 

of “Africans.”39

Third, there is an absence of a powerful and cohesive domestic constituency in the United States to 

maintain pressure on Washington for an effective 

policy toward different countries in Africa.40 This reality has its roots in the lack of common personal and 

professional commitments, interests, and linkages 

between the civil societies of most African countries 

and the United States. Many Americans refer to themselves as “Afro-Americans” as if Euro-Africans or 

Arab-Africans do not exist and as if Afro-Americans 

have closer ties with the African continent than their 

fellow Americans.

Last, until the creation of AFRICOM, U.S. policy 

toward the majority of African countries was, to a 
382

large extent, the responsibility of the bureaucratic 

middle echelons in Washington that practiced the art 

of bureaucratic conservatism. These bureaucrats operate within a framework of do not spend too much 

money, do not take a stand that might create domestic 

controversy, and do not let African issues complicate 

policy toward other, more important, parts of the 

world.41 This bureaucratic approach to U.S. policy 

formulation led to a situation where the United States 

had to “rediscover” Africa at several junctions during 

the post- World War II era.42 U.S. engagement with 

Africa has often reflected rather different approaches 

and intensities between the Department of State, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

and the Department of Defense (DoD). This very often 

results in some confusion about U.S. interests, objectives, and motives.43

Obviously, the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist 

attacks, the consequent U.S. War on Terror, and more 

specifically, U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan dramatically impacted the U.S. geostrategic 

outlook. It is possible to argue that U.S. foreign policy 

is shifting attention away from the Middle East to, inter alia, Africa. There is a clear growth of U.S. interests 

in Africa, and Africa is on the rise on the U.S. security agenda. Different factors are driving current U.S. 

interests in Africa: oil and global trade, maritime security, armed conflicts, violent extremism, and HIV/

AIDS.44 This growth in interests is rooted in two very 

specific global geostrategic considerations: the continuing global economic meltdown that, specifically 

in Europe and the United States, reached new heights 

during 2011, and the power shift away from the north 

Atlantic to the Indian Ocean rim with India and China 

as the two main players. These two considerations are 
383

closely interwoven in the competition for African resources and markets.

There is no clearer indication of “ a more focused 

strategic approach toward the continent”45 than the 

creation of AFRICOM and, more specifically, the nature of that command. The unique blending of the U.S. 

military and diplomatic apparatus in AFRICOM is itself a reflection of the elevation of U.S. security and 

other interests in Africa, a more aggressive U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, and, most importantly, a 

new militarized approach in dealing with Africa.46

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 

UNITED STATES IN AFRICA:

PARTNERS OR COMPETITORS

The most outstanding feature about both U.S. and 

South African involvement in African security is the 

prominent role of the military. Of course, neither of 

the two would like to be seen as being overtly militarily involved in African security. There is also no doubt 

that there is a confluence of U.S./South Africa interests in African security. U.S. interests in Africa have a 

visible focus on security. This specifically concerns the 

need to address maritime security, armed conflicts, 

and violent extremism in Africa.

The Strategic Plan of the South African Department 

of International Relations and Cooperation explicitly 

identified the “continued prioritisation of Africa” 

as the first of its “overarching priorities.”47 The Plan 

continues to explain that the focus of South Africa’s 

engagements on the African continent is to promote 

development, contribute to the resolution of conflicts, 

and build an environment in which socio-economic 

development can take place. Whereas in the case of 
384

the United States, the emphasis in their engagement 

with Africa is centered on security, in the case of South 

Africa, it is on development.

Of course, it is quite easy for both the United States 

and South Africa to identify Africa as a strategic priority. However, explaining why Africa is or should be of 

vital strategic interest is not that easy. From an African perspective, U.S. interests in Africa, irrespective of 

what is said in the halls of politics, are rooted in access 

to African oil and mineral riches, the need to pursue 

the War on Terror in the African battlespace, and the 

continued inroads into African markets by peer competitors such as China and India. Identifying the interests of a fellow African country is a more sensitive and 

complex issue. Not only is African politics sometimes 

difficult to disaggregate, but South Africa is in many 

ways Africa’s economic super power with a history of 

destabilization on the continent. South African interests in Africa center on the history of the governing 

party, identity politics, and geostrategic realities. The 

South African government, very much like that of the 

United States, is very cautious not to be seen as “exploiting” Africa for its own selfish economic interests. 

Thus, South African economic interests in Africa (and 

these are real vital interests!) are coated in the jargon 

of socio-economic development since “socio-economic 

development is critical for addressing the root causes 

of conflict and instability” in Africa.48 This difference 

(security vis-à-vis socio-economic development) may 

provide an important first clue in understanding the 

reluctance of the South African government in working with the United States in Africa. 

The U.S. 2010 National Security Strategy stresses 

the need to “embrace effective partnerships” and for 

a consultative approach on the African continent to 
385

facilitate access to open markets, conflict prevention, 

global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the protection of vital carbon sinks.49 Similarly, the February 

2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the 

fact that American efforts in Africa “hinge on partnering with African states . . . to conduct capacity-building and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism, 

and address humanitarian crises.”50 The need for partnerships is also highlighted in the most recent U.S. National Military Strategy to preserve stability, facilitate 

resolutions to political tensions that underlie conflicts, 

and to foster broader development. The National Military Strategy stresses the need to: 

identify and encourage states and regional organizations that have demonstrated a leadership role to continue to contribute to Africa’s security.51

The 2010 National Security Strategy placed specific 

emphasis on South Africa as “a critical partner” in 

“charting a course toward improved governance and 

meaningful development” in Africa. According to the 

National Security Strategy, South Africa often serves as 

a springboard to the entire African continent. Thus, 

the U.S. need is to work with South Africa to “pursue 

shared interests in Africa’s security, growth, and the 

development of Africa’s human capital.”52

The United States, however, does not feature in 

South African foreign policy documents as a key partner in Africa. The first priority for the South African 

government is to pursue the so-called African Agenda 

through the political and economic integration of Africa and to defend Africa’s geostrategic interests to be 

“among equals in the global architecture.”53 The European Union Strategy for Africa, the New Africa-Asia 
386

Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD), 

and the Africa-India Forum and the Forum for China 

Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are mentioned as key 

pathways for development and cooperation in Africa. 

This raises questions about South Africa’s perception 

of the U.S. role in Africa. An outstanding feature of 

South Africa’s involvement in Africa is the emphasis 

that is placed on the role of SADC, the AU, and the 

UN “to bring peace, security, and stability to the African continent.”54 In the description of its relations with 

the United States, the need is emphasized to maintain 

the key U.S. role in the fight against communicable 

and infectious diseases and to nurture and utilize the 

U.S. commitment to Africa to promote peacekeeping, 

post-conflict reconstruction and development, skills 

development, capacity building, and trilateral cooperation.55 Nowhere is the need expressed to work with 

the United States in Africa. From a geopolitical perspective, the South African disregard or indifference 

toward the U.S. role in Africa is quite obvious. Clearly, 

although the United States recognizes the importance 

of South Africa on the African continent and the need 

to work with South Africa in addressing African challenges, the same cannot be said of the South African 

government. Partnering with the United States is not 

only bad domestic politics for the ANC government; it 

also does not resonate and correspond very well with 

South Africa’s image in the rest of Africa.

There is no doubt that the current South African 

ANC government has what the United States would 

see as “a terrorist background.” The ANC, to be specific, not very long ago, was listed by the United States 

as a terrorist organization.56 South Africa has not been 

the most energetic partner in the U.S. War on Terror. 
387

Concerns have obviously been raised—at least by the 

U.S. intelligence community—about South Africa as a 

possible recruiting and training area for international 

terrorists. South African passports are relatively easily 

available on the black market and have been found 

in the possession of al-Qaeda suspects.57 Moreover, 

while South Africa is not directly threatened with international terrorist activity, it may well be a safe haven for international terrorists. The most important issue concerning the U.S./South Africa terrorism nexus, 

though, is the reality that South Africa does not share 

the U.S. outlook on terrorism. In the ANC worldview, 

at least, a sharp distinction is made between international terrorism and the use of terror as a weapon in 

the armed struggles of the anti-colonial and national 

liberation movements. The use of terror in these 

struggles for liberation is morally and legally just in 

the ANC worldview. The ANC, thus, distinguishes 

between international and revolutionary terrorism. 

Terrorist violence is described as “indiscriminate, violent attacks on the civilian population.”58 According 

to the ANC, these kinds of attacks are not being used 

by armed liberation movements and run counter to 

their ethos. 

Thus, the ANC viewed the 9/11 attacks against 

the United States as wrong but, at the same time, the 

terrorist tactics of the Taliban and the revolutionary 

forces against the United States in Afghanistan and 

Iraq as justified. This also holds true for the support by 

the ANC for terror tactics by the Palestinians against 

Israel. There is no doubt that the ANC government 

in South Africa, albeit tacitly, views the U.S. security 

objectives in Africa in the War on Terror as imperialist by nature.59 According to this view, the United 

States used the events of 9/11 very cleverly to its own 
388

advantage. Instead of focusing on those immediately 

responsible for the attack, the United States used military expansionism to strengthen its economy through 

the acquisition of markets and oil-rich areas. The War 

on Terror, according to ANC logic, has become a U.S. 

excuse to gain control of strategic oil supplies and 

markets in Africa.

The perceptions of the ANC are grounded in its 

revolutionary background and experiences. Whether 

those perceptions are rooted in reality is absolutely irrelevant. The ANC understands the notion that there 

is always, at least, some truth in any perception. The 

perceptions about the creation of AFRICOM are a good 

example in this regard. To be more specific, the interwoven nature of the military and diplomatic instrument within AFRICOM positioned the U.S. military 

as the primary instrument of U.S. foreign policy on the 

African continent. The U.S. military is thus seen as the 

lead instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Africa—or it 

is portrayed by the South Africans as the leading foreign policy instrument. The reaction from the South 

Africa government to the creation of AFRICOM was 

one of outrage. At its 2007 Polokwane Conference, for 

example, the ANC accepted a resolution that “urges 

Africa to remain united and resolute in the rejection of 

the African Command Centre (sic) (AFRICOM).”

At the same time and as a matter of irony, though, 

the South African National Defence Force became, for 

all practical purposes, the leading South African foreign policy instrument in Africa during the Mbeki administration.60 The human security paradigm is supposed to inform South African military involvement 

on the continent, and the South African armed forces: 
389

have to be transformed from an instrument of aggression to an instrument of protection [in] the development of the individual and the community.61

As a consequence, both the U.S. and the SA militaries are actively involved in African security. Yet, 

the South Africans view their military involvement as 

human security-related and that of the United States 

as military security-orientated. For the ANC government, South African military deployments into Africa 

are meant as a force of good, while the U.S. military 

instrument in Africa is seen as a force of destruction. 

More specifically, the U.S. force utility, according to 

ANC logic, is shaped by conventional warfighting applications, while South African military involvement 

is driven by the human security and peacetime applications of military force. The differences between 

perceptions and reality in the South African and U.S. 

military involvement in Africa may thus raise questions of South African hypocrisy in the United States. 

CONCLUSION

This discussion was intended to provide an overview of possible areas of cooperation or disagreement 

between the United States and South Africa in Africa 

in general and African security in particular. South 

Africa’s economic and security interests are to a large 

extent restricted to Southern Africa. Yet, Africa features very prominently as a foreign policy focus area 

in South African foreign policy. The explicit focus on 

Africa has very little to do with South African interests 

in Africa and is only explainable within the context of 

domestic politics, geostrategic realities and identity 

politics, historical considerations of struggle politics 
390

and alignment with the underdogs of the world, the 

current imbalances in global governance, and a commitment to end conflict and violence in a search for 

peace and stability on the African continent. This conglomerate of factors makes the development of consistency in the South African foreign policy toward 

Africa extremely difficult and the policy itself very 

complex and complicated. It is difficult to understand 

and to predict future actions and reactions. 

Until fairly recently, Africa did not feature very 

strongly on the U.S. political agenda. That, though, 

seems to be changing, and Africa is increasingly becoming a priority region for the U.S. Government. The 

increasing prioritization of Africa seems to be rooted 

in geopolitical changes and the rising interest of China 

and India in African resources and markets in particular; the U.S. need to achieve its objectives in the 

Global War on Terror in Africa; and to secure access 

to Africa’s oil resources. Thus, both the United States 

and South Africa seem to have limited but growing 

interests in Africa. As a non-African country, the U.S. 

approach to Africa is rooted in caution and a search 

for key partners, South Africa being one. The militarypolitical nature of AFRICOM demonstrates the U.S. 

caution toward and recognition of the uniqueness 

of Africa. 

South Africa, as an identified key partner in Africa, 

has not always been very positive about U.S. military 

involvement in Africa. South Africa is using its own 

military as a key component of its own foreign policy 

engagement on the African continent. Though South 

Africa seems to be more open and accommodative of 

U.S. economic involvement in and support to Africa, 

U.S. security involvement in Africa is not very positively considered. More specifically, South Africa ap-
391

pears to look toward its own military use in Africa as 

something positive that is contributing toward peace 

and security in Africa. That is not necessarily its view 

of U.S. military involvement in Africa—something 

that is perceived as neo-colonial in nature.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. South African Government, Department of International 

Relations and Cooperation, Strategic Plan, 2010–2013, 2010, Pretoria, South Africa, p. 7, available from www.dfa.gov.za/department/

strategic%20plan%202010-2013/index.htm.

2. For statistics in this regard, please see the South African 

Department of Trade and Industry, available from apps.thedti.gov.

za/econdb/raportt/rapregi.html.

3. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 

is an intergovernmental organization in Southern Africa and is 

headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana. The purpose of SADC is 

to further socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as 

political and security cooperation among its 15 member states. 

The member states are Anglo, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 

Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Seychelles, and Madagascar. 

4. S. Naidu and J. Lutchman, “Understanding South Africa’s 

engagement in the region: Has the leopard changed its spots?” 

Stability, Poverty Reduction, and South African Trade and Investment 

in Southern Africa, Proceedings of a conference presented by the 

Southern African Regional Poverty Network and the EU’s CWCI 

Fund, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, South Africa, 

March 29–30, 2004, p. 12. 

5. See C. Alden and M. Soko, “South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2005, pp. 367–392.
392

6. This is clearly demonstrated through the ANC’s political 

lingua franca, addressing each other, for example, as comrades.

7. The South African government consists of the ANC, the 

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the 

South African Communist Party (SACP) in a tripartite alliance.

8. The word representivity (verteenwoordiging in Afrikaans) is 

deeply imbedded in the South African lingua franca as a way to 

explain the need for representativeness in society at large. It is 

widely used throughout society and is seen as the driving need 

underpinning affirmative action and equal opportunities for all 

in society.

9. The term “Black Diamonds” is a collective term used in 

South Africa to refer to members of the new black middle and 

ruling class who, in many instances, benefited from the affirmative action policies of the post-1994 ANC government and who 

became very rich and influential in a relatively short period of 

time. Depending on the circumstances, it is used in a derogatory, 

complimentary, or lighthearted manner. 

10. The voice of the ANC Youth League and its leader, Juluis 

Malema, has been very strong in this regard. 

11. See the service delivery plans of the Department of 

Public Service and Administration, available from www.pmg.

org.za/minutes/20070528-service-delivery-improvement-plans-sdipdpsa-closeout-report. 

12. See, for example, the opinion piece of Moeletsi Mbeki on 

South Africa’s “Tunisia Day,” available from www.businessday.

co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=133902. Also see the view expressed 

by the Rector of the University of the Freestate, available from 

www.iol.co.za/news/politics/government-has-f-you-attitude-1.1182705.

13. A. Van Zyl, “Hope can help overcome ‘conditional helplessness’ in SA,” The Sunday Independent, Opinion and Analysis, 

November 6, 2011, p. 17.

14. Speech by the Deputy President TM Mbeki, on behalf of 

the ANC, on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional 
393

Assembly of The Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill 1996, 

May 8, 1996, available from www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/orders/

new2002_mbeki.htm.

15. Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 

Strategic Plan, 2010–2013, Pretoria, South Africa: South African 

Government, 2010, p. 7, available from www.dfa.gov.za/department/

strategic%20plan%202010-2013/index.htm.

16. E. Sidiropoulos, “South African foreign policy in the postMbeki period,” South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 

15, No. 2, p. 114.

17. See, for example, the negative reference to the United 

States in terms of the “unique dominance of one ‘hyper power’” 

in the world. African National Congress (ANC), Resolutions, 52nd 

National Conference, Polokwane, South Africa, 2007, p. 37, available from www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference52/.

18. Ibid, p. 43. It is noted that “[t]he conference urges Africa 

to remain united and resolute in the rejection of the African Command Centre (sic) (AFRICOM).” 

19. T. Mbeki, “Africans must guard as new colonialism walks 

roughshod over international law and human decency,” The Sunday Independent, Analysis, November 6, 2011, pp. 8–9.

20. For a detailed exposition of the South African reaction to 

the creation of AFRICOM, see A. J. Esterhuyse, “The Iraqization 

of Africa? Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 

111-130. 

21. G. Mills, “SA’s ‘bit of this and bit of that foreign policy,” 

Sunday Times, Times Live, November 27, 2011, available from 

www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2011/11/27/sa-s-bit-of-thisbit-of-that-foreign-policy.

22. Sidiropoulos, p. 116. Also see African National Congress 

(ANC), Resolutions, p. 37.
394

23. South Africa is often criticized for its preference to remain 

silent on the controversial land distribution and other contentious 

policies of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe. 

The Mbeki Administration was known for its so-called “Silent Diplomacy” toward the Zimbabwe crisis.

24. Sidiropoulos, p. 116.

25. This is a typical example where the importance of development and democracy had to bend the knee and make provision 

for African solidarity, Africanism, and a general anti-colonial and 

anti-western sentiment.

26. Department of Defence, Strategic Plan (MTEF FY 2010/11 

to FY 2012/13), Pretoria, South Africa: South Africa Government, 

p. 23, available from www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/100303dodplan.doc.

27. See, for example, the United States Security Strategy for SubSahara Africa, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office 

of International Security Affairs, August 1995. For a chronology 

of U.S. involvement in Africa, see U.S. Africa Command, “Fact 

sheet: U.S.-Africa relations chronology,” available from www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1645.

28. Booker is the executive director of the Washington-based 

Africa Policy Information Center and the New York-based Africa 

Fund (ACOA).

29. S. Booker, “The colour line: US foreign policy and national 

interests in Africa,” South African Journal of International Affairs, 

Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 2001, p. 2.

30. A. J. Esterhuyse, Die militêre betrokkenheid van die Verenigde 

State van Amerika in sub-Sahara Afrika: 1993-2001 (The Military Involvement of the United States of America in Sub-Saharan Africa: 

1993-2001), Unpublished MSS thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa, September 2003, pp. 52–53.

31. See the Bureau of African Affairs, May 14, 2007, available 

from www.state.gov/p/af/.
395

32. J. E. Frazer, “African affairs,” US foreign policy in the 21st 

century: Regional issues, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, September 2006, pp. 4–5, available from usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0906/ijpe/ijpe0906.pdf.

33. Booker, p. 3; D. A. Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Sahara Africa, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985, p. 172. 

34. M. Clough, Free At Last? US Policy Towards Africa and 

the End of the Cold War, Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press, 

1992, p. 3.

35. Dickson, p. 173. 

36. Clough, p. 3.

37. E-mail correspondence with Dr. Dan Henk, U.S. Air War 

College, July 30, 2007. 

38. Clough, pp. 20–25.

39. Dickson, p. 170; 

40. Clough, p. 3.

41. Ibid, p. 2.

42. P. J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: 

Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change, London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 2.

43. See the discussion of this phenomenon in D. Henk, “The 

environment, the US military, and Southern Africa,” Parameters, 

Summer 2006, pp. 101–102.

44. L. Ploch, “Africa command: U.S. strategic interests and 

the role of the U.S. military in Africa,” CRS Report for Congress, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2011, 

pp. 13–19, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.

45. Ibid., p. 14. 
396

46. M. Malan, AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Washington, DC: Refugees International, Testimony before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, August 1, 2007, available from foreign.senate.gov/imo/

media/doc/MalanTestimony070801.pdf.

47. Strategic Plan, 2010–2013, p. 7.

48. Ibid., p. 8.

49. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, May 2010, p. 45.

50. Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 61.

51. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military 

Strategy of the United States: Redefining America’s Military Power, 

Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 8, 2011, p. 12.

52. National Security Strategy, p. 45.

53. Strategic Plan, 2010–2013, p. 8.

54. Ibid., p. 9.

55. Ibid., p. 17.

56. BBC News, Mandela taken off US terror list, available from 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7484517.stm.

57. F. Osman, “Is South Africa joining the American-led war 

on terrorism?” Media Review Network, March 19, 2008, available 

from www.mediareviewnet.com/index.php?option=com_content&task

=view&id=20&Itemid=38. 

58. J. Duncan, “With us or against us? South Africa’s position in the ‘War against Terror’,” Review of South African Political 

Economy, Vol. 34, No. 113, September 2007, p. 514.

59. Many ANC leaders were explicit in labelling the NATO 

action against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi as imperialist. 
397

In South Africa, a clear line is not necessarily drawn between 

what NATO is doing and what the United States is doing as part 

of NATO. See, for example, the article in the influential Business Day, available from www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.

aspx?id=156734. 

60. See the consecutive strategic plans of the South African 

Department of International Relations and Cooperation, formerly 

known as the Department of Foreign Affairs. For the most recent 

strategic plan, see South African Department of Relations and 

Cooperation, Strategic Plan 2009–2012 (n.d.), available from www.

dfa.gov.za/department/stratpla2009-2012/strategicplan2009%20-%20

2012.pdf.

61. “Chapter 6: Defence—A defence perspective on the 2007 

State of the Nation address,” Strategic Plan of Parliament, Pretoria, South Africa: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 

2007, available from www.parliament.gov.za/content/07_Chapter%

206~2.pdf8.

399

CONTRIBUTORS

FOUZIE MELANIE ALAMIR has worked as an academic researcher and lecturer at the University of 

the Armed Forces and the German Federal Staff and 

Command College from 1997 to 2002. After an assignment with the Federal Ministry of Defense from 2002 

to 2004, she joined the German Agency for Technical 

Cooperation as a Program Manager for Security Sector Reform. From 2006 to 2011, she worked for the 

private enterprise, IABG, as Head of Comprehensive 

Security. Following a period of work as a private consultant from 2011 to 2012, she assumed the position 

of Head of Competence Centre “Security Sector” at 

the German Agency for International Cooperation in 

January 2013. Dr. Alamir has field experience in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Ghana, and Indonesia, among 

others. In 2006, she worked as a Political Advisor to 

the Senior Civilian Representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) HQ, Kabul. Her fields of 

expertise cover a broad range of security policy issues, 

including the security-development nexus, civil-military interfaces, aspects of comprehensive security and 

interagency cooperation in the context of international 

crisis management and peacebuilding. She is familiar 

both with military and civilian approaches to crisis 

management and peacebuilding at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Dr. Alamir has published 

numerous articles in books and scientific journals.

EMMANUEL KWESI ANING is a Clinical Professor 

of Peacekeeping at Kennesaw State University and the 

Provost and Academic Vice President for all academic 

programs at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeep-
400

ing Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana. His rich 

experience in security issues has been tapped by a 

number of organizations including the United Nations 

(UN), where he wrote a Secretary-General’s report in 

2008 for the UN Security Council on the relationship 

between the UN and regional organizations on peace 

and security, especially the African Union, leading 

to the establishment of the Prodi Commission; the 

African Union, where he served as its first Expert on 

Counter-terrorism, peace, and security; and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). 

Dr. Aning is currently a member of the World Economic Forum’s Council on Conflict Resolution. He 

has written numerous book chapters, monographs, 

and articles in several international peer reviewed 

journals. Dr. Aning holds a B.A. from the University 

of Ghana, a Master of Philosophy (Cand. Phil) and a 

Ph.D. from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

MICHAEL ASHKENAZI is the Program Leader for 

SALW Control at the Bonn International Center for 

Conversion, a German applied research center focusing on security and development. He has conducted 

research in Afghanistan, China, Guinea Bissau, Japan, 

Korea, Liberia, Nepal, South Sudan, Timor Leste, and 

Uganda. Dr. Ashkenazi’s current research interests 

range from traditional security providers through 

arms and ammunition storage, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD&R), security sector 

reform (SSR), to the effects of small arms and light 

weapons (SALW) on societies and development. He 

has previously worked on Japanese religion, food 

culture, and business culture, and on migration. Dr. 

Ashkenazi’s research has been disseminated through 

numerous publications, including the Training and 
401

Education on Small Arms (TRESA) publications and 

numerous courses across the world, including in Colombia, Germany, Ghana, Mozambique, South Sudan, 

and UN Headquarters. Audiences range from police 

and military officers through nongovernmental organization (NGO) members to parliamentarians. Previous to working for BICC, Dr. Ashkenazi was professor 

of anthropology, teaching graduate and undergraduate students at universities in Canada, Israel, and 

the UK. He has also served as infantryman, platoon 

and company commander, and in staff positions. Dr. 

Ashkenazi was educated in Israel, Japan, and the 

United States.

FESTUS KOFI AUBYN is a Research Fellow at the 

Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR) 

of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana, and a Doctorial Candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University 

of Ibadan, Nigeria. His research interests are in the 

areas of conflict, peace and security in Africa with a 

particular focus on transnational organized crimes, 

peace operations and election security. Among Mr. 

Aubyn’s recent publications are “Ghana” in Alex J. 

Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of UN Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford University Press, 2013); 

“Unconstitutional Changes of Government: Confronting Africa’s Democratic Paradox” (AU Herald, Vol. 3); 

and “Africa’s Resistance to Peacekeeping’s Normative Change” (CSS ETH Zurich and Geneva Centre for 

Security Policy, Policy Paper, 2013).
402

ROBERT H. “ROBIN” DORFF is Dean of the College 

of Humanities and Social Sciences (CHSS) and Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs. He joined KSU as Dean of CHSS in 

July 2012 from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at 

the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), where he was 

Research Professor of National Security Affairs (2007-

12) and also held the General Douglas MacArthur 

Chair of Research since 2009. Dr. Dorff held faculty 

positions at Michigan State University and North 

Carolina State University. He has served on the USAWC faculty as a Visiting Professor (1994-96) and as 

Professor of National Security Policy and Strategy 

in the Department of National Security and Strategy 

(1997-2004), where he also held the General Maxwell 

D. Taylor Chair (1999-2002) and served as Department 

Chair (2001-04). Dr. Dorff has been a Senior Advisor 

with Creative Associates International, Inc., in Washington, DC, and served as Executive Director of the 

Institute of Political Leadership in Raleigh, NC (2004-

06). Dr. Dorff remains extensively involved in strategic leadership development, focusing on national security strategy and policy, and strategy formulation. 

His research interests include these topics as well as 

failing and fragile states, interagency processes and 

policy formulation, stabilization and reconstruction 

operations, and U.S. grand strategy. He has published 

and lectured frequently on these topics and has spoken all over the United States and in Canada, Europe, 

Africa, and Asia. Dr. Dorff holds an M.A. and Ph.D. 

from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.

CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., is a Visiting Professor of 

the Practice at Duke Law School and the Executive 

Director of its Center on Law, Ethics, and National Se-
403

curity. Prior to retiring as an Air Force major general 

in June 2010, he assisted in the supervision of more 

than 2,500 military and civilian attorneys worldwide. 

His 34-year career included tours in both the United 

Kingdom and Korea, and he deployed for military operations in Africa and the Middle East. Totaling more 

than 120 publications, General Dunlap’s writings address a wide range of topics, including various aspects 

of national security law, airpower, counterinsurgency, 

cyber power, civil-military relations, and leadership. 

General Dunlap speaks frequently at professional 

conferences and at numerous institutions of higher 

learning, to include Harvard, Yale, MIT, UVA, and 

Stanford, as well as the National Defense University 

and the Air, Army, and Navy War Colleges. He serves 

on the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New 

American Security. General Dunlap is a distinguished 

graduate of the National War College and holds an 

undergraduate degree from St. Joseph’s University 

and a law degree from Villanova University.

ABEL ESTERHUYSE is an associate professor of strategy in the Faculty of Military Science of Stellenbosch 

University at the South African Military Academy. Before joining the Faculty of Military Science, Professor 

Esterhuyse served as a lieutenant colonel in the South 

African Army. He teaches a wide variety of courses in 

the School for Security and Africa Studies of Stellenbosch University, regularly publishes on contemporary military issues, and has a keen interest in (South 

African) military history. He is the editor of Scientia 

Militaria: The South African Journal of Military Studies. 

Professor Esterhuyse is a graduate of the summer program in military history at the U.S. Military Academy, 

West Point, and the program on the analysis of mili-
404

tary operations and strategy (SWAMOS) of Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace 

Studies. He holds an M.S.S. from Pretoria University 

and a Ph.D. from Stellenbosch University.

WILLIAM FLAVIN is the Division Chief of the Doctrine, Concept, Education, and Training Division at 

the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute (PKSOI), located at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, since July 2007. Previous assignments include a senior foreign affairs analyst with 

Booz Allen and Hamilton on contract to assist PKSOI 

for doctrine development. From 1995 to 1999, he was 

a colonel in the U.S. Army serving as the Deputy Director of Special Operations for the Supreme Allied 

Commander of Europe at the Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Powers Europe. He was a senior fellow at CSIS 

for his Army War College year and then taught at 

the Army War College. Colonel Flavin holds a B.A. 

in History from VMI and an M.A. in History from 

Emory University. 

VOLKER C. FRANKE is Special Assistant to the Vice 

President for Research and Graduate Dean for Strategic Partnerships and Associate Professor of Conflict 

Management at Kennesaw State University. He is the 

Founding Director of the Ph.D. program in International Conflict Management at Kennesaw State University (2010-12) and served as Director of Research at 

the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), 

one of Germany’s premier peace and conflict research 

and capacity building institutes (2006-08). From 1998 

to 2007, he was Director and Managing Editor of the 

National Security Studies Case Studies Program at 

Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship 
405

and Public Affairs. Dr. Franke is the author of Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value-Orientations, and 

Professional Military Education (Praeger 1999) and more 

than 30 journal articles, book chapters, case studies, 

and research reports on issues related to peace and 

security studies, conflict management, civil-military 

relations, development policy, and social identity. He 

is also the editor of Terrorism and Peacekeeping: New Security Challenges (Praeger 2005), Security in a Changing 

World: Case Studies in U.S. National Security Management (Praeger 2002), and co-editor (both with Robert 

H. “Robin” Dorff) of Conflict Management and “Whole 

of Government:” Useful Tools for U.S. National Security 

Strategy? (SSI, 2012). Dr. Franke holds an MA in political science and sociology from Johannes Gutenberg 

University in Mainz, Germany; an M.P.A. from North 

Carolina State University; and a Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School.

KARL-THEODOR zu GUTTENBERG served as German Federal Minister of Defense from 2009 to 2011 

and as Federal Minister of Economics and Technology 

from February 2009 to October 2009. As Minister of 

Defense, zu Guttenberg led the most significant structural reform to the German Bundeswehr since 1955, 

particularly leading the effort of transforming the 

Bundeswehr from a conscription-based army to an 

all-professional military. He also served as a member 

of the German parliament or Bundestag from 2002 to 

2011 and as a leading member of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee from 2005 to 2008. Minister 

zu Guttenberg is leading a new transatlantic dialogue 

initiative at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) which will bring European and American thought-leaders, practitioners, and officials to-
406

gether on a variety of security and economic related 

issues to develop a bold, new strategic vision to reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship and prevent 

strategic drift. By exploring the global shift of power, 

the increased global economic and market instability 

and the challenge to multilateral institutions, the focus of the project will examine how the transatlantic 

relationship can lead in this increasingly complex geopolitical setting.

CHRISTOPHER HOLSHEK is an international peace 

and security consultant focusing on civil-military relations in policy and practice as well as peace operations 

related civil-military training and education. A Senior 

Fellow with the Alliance for Peacebuilding and a civilmilitary strategic analyst with Wikistrat, he was recently a Senior Associate with the Project on National 

Security Reform as well as Country Project Manager 

in Liberia for the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Institutional Reform Initiative working in Africa 

on defense ministerial capacity development in order 

to promote civilian oversight of the military. A retired 

U.S. Army (Reserve) Civil Affairs (CA) officer, Mr. 

Holshek has 3 decades of civil-military experience at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in joint, 

interagency, and multinational settings across the full 

range of operations, among them command of the first 

CA battalion to deploy to Iraq in support of Army, Marine and British forces, as the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) 

Civil-Military Liaison Officer to the UN Mission in 

Kosovo, and in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, and as 

Senior U.S. Military Observer and Chief of Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) for nearly 2 years in the 

UN Mission in Liberia, where he broke new ground in 

applying CIMIC concepts central to the development 
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of UN civil-military policy and training. In his final 

tour as Military Representative at the U.S. Agency for 

International Development for USEUCOM/SHAPE, 

Mr. Holshek helped link security and development at 

the national strategic level in an interagency setting as 

well as stand up the National Response Center for the 

Haiti earthquake.

ROBERT KENNEDY, a former senior government official, returned to his position as Professor in the Sam 

Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, in January 2003 after serving as director of the joint German-American 

George C. Marshall European Center for Security 

Studies in Germany. In nearly 35 years of government service, Dr. Kennedy has also served as Civilian Deputy Commandant, NATO Defense College, 

Rome, Italy; Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies at the USAWC, researcher at 

the U.S. Army SSI, Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency; an enlisted man in 

the Army; and a command pilot on active duty with 

the U.S. Air Force and later with the Reserve forces. 

Dr. Kennedy’s most recent works are Of Knowledge and 

Power: the Complexities of National Intelligence (2008), 

“The Elements of Strategic Thinking” in Gabriel Marcella, ed., Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response

(2010), The Road to War: Congress’ Historic Abdication of 

Responsibility (2010), and “National Security Reform: 

12 Central Questions for Responding to the Security 

Challenges of the 21st Century,” in Volker Franke and 

Robin Dorff, eds., Conflict Management and “Whole of 

Government:” Useful Tools for U.S. National Security 

Strategy (2012).
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MICHAEL LEKSON is director of gaming for the 

Academy for International Conflict Management and 

Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace. United 

States Institute of Peace. He joined the Institute’s 

Professional Training program in 2003 as a program 

officer. He came to the Institute following a 26-year 

career in the Department of State, where he was deputy assistant secretary of state for arms control, overseeing all multilateral arms control negotiations and 

treaty implementation. Prior to that, Mr. Lekson was 

deputy to the special representative of the president 

and the secretary of state for implementation of the 

Dayton Peace Accords. He was also director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs, where 

he helped develop and implement policies to adapt 

NATO to the post-Cold War world, and of the Office of 

United Kingdom, Benelux, and Ireland Affairs, where 

he worked intensively on the Northern Ireland peace 

process. During his Foreign Service career, Mr. Lekson 

served as a consular officer in Bilbao, Spain, and as a 

political officer in U.S. embassies in Costa Rica, Peru, 

and the United Kingdom. He was deputy U.S. representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during that organization’s 

augmentation of its democracy building, conflict prevention, and conflict management efforts in formerly 

communist countries, especially in the Balkans and 

Central Asia. Prior to joining the Department of State, 

he served 2 years in the U.S. Army as a field artillery 

officer. Mr. Lekson has a B.A. in English from Princeton University and a master’s in linguistics from 

Stanford University.
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LISELOTTE ODGAARD is an Associate Professor at 

the Royal Danish Defence College. Her most recent 

international position was in 2008-09, when she was 

a residential fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. Her areas 

of expertise include International Relations, Asia-Pacific Security, and China Studies. Ms. Odgaard’s most 

recent monograph is China and Coexistence: Beijing’s 

National Security Strategy for the 21st Century (Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University 

Press, May 2012). Ms. Odgaard has been selected to be 

a contributor to the 2014 Nobel Symposium.

DWIGHT RAYMOND joined PKSOI at the USAWC in 

July 2009 after retiring from the Army as an infantry 

colonel. His military assignments included infantry 

leadership, command, and staff positions; faculty positions at the United States Military Academy and the 

USAWC; theater-level plans positions in Korea; and 

training and advisory assignments at the National 

Training Center and in Iraq as an advisor to an Iraqi 

Army brigade. He has developed military doctrine related to the Protection of Civilians, and is one of the 

primary authors of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Military Planning Handbook. Mr. 

Raymond has a Bachelor’s Degree from the United 

States Military Academy and master’s degrees from 

the University of Maryland’s School of Public Affairs, 

the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 

and the USAWC.

F. WILLIAM SMULLEN III is Director of the Maxwell School’s National Security Studies Program and 

a member of the faculty of Syracuse University’s S.I. 

Newhouse School of Public Communications as a Pro-
410

fessor of Public Relations. Prior to his appointment at 

Syracuse University, he was the Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell beginning in January 

2001. A veteran of 30 years in the U.S. Army, his last 

active duty assignment was Special Assistant to the 

11th and 12th Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NATHANIEL L. WILSON is a Program Assistant in 

the Academy for International Conflict Management 

and Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace. He currently works on development of a Countering Violent 

Extremism course curriculum to be delivered internationally. Previously, he was a Research Assistant 

at the Partnership for Global Security in Washington, 

DC, and at a different position, he spent a summer 

working on civil rights issues in Israel. Mr. Wilson 

also undertook translation work and research for the 

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

the Reponses to Terrorism (START) at the University 

of Maryland-College Park. He has an abiding interest 

in the Middle East and is learning Arabic. Mr. Wilson 

holds a B.A. in political science from the University of 

Missouri-St. Louis and an M.A. in international relations, U.S. foreign policy specialization, from American University’s School of International Service. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editors

Dr. Volker C. Franke

Dr. Robert H. Dorff

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE