J-S52021-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

N.G.C. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

C.J.C.

Appellant No. 2 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Civil Division at No(s): CV 3670-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2017

C.J.C. appeals from the final protection from abuse (“PFA”) order,1

entered against him in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(5). After careful review, we affirm. 

C.J.C. and N.G.C. were married in May 2013. The couple lived 

together in Newport News, Virginia, where C.J.C. was stationed with the U.S. 

Marine Corps. During their marriage, N.G.C. testified that C.J.C.’s actions 

“started out as emotionally abusive and then psychological and eventually it 

got physical.” N.T. PFA Hearing, 12/01/16, at 4. N.G.C. claimed that C.J.C. 

had locked her in closets, used pressure points to hurt her, held her arms 

behind her back, told her he could kill her and make it look like an accident, 

____________________________________________

1 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122 (Protection from Abuse Act (“PFAA”)). 
J-S52021-17

- 2 -

and took out a life insurance policy on her. Id. at 4-5, 9. C.J.C. denied 

every allegation of physical and psychological abuse. 

There was an incident in May 2015, where N.G.C. testified that the 

couple fought and C.J.C. bit her, which resulted in C.J.C. being charged with 

assault and battery. At trial on these charges, N.G.C. claimed that she 

testified to not remembering the incident because C.J.C. threatened her and 

she was scared. C.J.C. claimed the couple merely had had an argument that 

night and denied threatening N.G.C. not to testify. N.G.C. filed a PFA 

complaint against C.J.C. in Virginia; however, after a hearing in August 

2015, no order was entered against C.J.C.2 In May 2016, C.J.C. had an 

extra-marital affair and asked N.G.C. to move out of the house. While 

making arrangements to move out, N.G.C. stayed in a separate bedroom 

and testified that one night C.J.C. came into the room and forced her to 

have sex with him. 

In June 2016, N.G.C. left Virginia to return home to Chester County, 

Pennsylvania. On the day N.G.C. left, C.J.C. told her “he would get [her] 

back in the next ten years.” Id. at 11-12. N.G.C. testified that for the 

month before she left, C.J.C. carried a handgun on him at all times, which 

scared her because of C.J.C.’s previous threats. Although the couple did not 

____________________________________________

2 N.G.C. testified that the trial judge in Virginia did not grant the PFA order 

because there was already a military protective order in place preventing 

C.J.C. from contacting N.G.C., thus, there was no need for another one at 

that time.
J-S52021-17

- 3 -

see each other from the time N.G.C. left Virginia until the instant PFA 

hearing on December 1, 2016, N.G.C. claimed that when she first left, C.J.C. 

was calling her thirty times a day until N.G.C. blocked his phone number. 

C.J.C. also remained in constant email communication with N.G.C., 

admitting to sending her “around a thousand or 2,000 emails.” Id. at 43. 

N.G.C. testified that the emails were not threatening, but she felt threatened 

because C.J.C. was trying to figure out her location. C.J.C. claimed that his 

emails were about business, tax, and logistical issues related to property the 

couple owned together, and where he should send N.G.C.’s mail. N.G.C. 

testified that she told C.J.C. to send her mail to her grandmother’s house but 

C.J.C. continued to ask for her address. N.G.C. did not want C.J.C. to know 

where she lived because of his previous threats and felt threatened by the 

emails because she believed C.J.C. was looking for her.3 

N.G.C. filed a PFA petition against C.J.C. in the Centre County Court of 

Common Pleas on October 3, 2016. The court issued a temporary PFA order 

and scheduled a hearing for October 12, 2016. The hearing was continued 

until December 1, 2016, where the court ultimately entered a final PFA order 

____________________________________________

3 N.G.C. has been living in State College, Pennsylvania. C.J.C. stated in an 

email that he was coming to State College, which scared N.G.C. because she 

never mentioned to him that she was living there. C.J.C. claimed he goes 

there “one or two times a year to look over” his grandfather’s property. N.T. 

PFA Hearing, 12/1/16, at 45. However, N.G.C. claimed that the 

grandfather’s property was thirty miles from State College.
J-S52021-17

- 4 -

against C.J.C. for a period of three years. On appeal, C.J.C. raises the 

following issue for our review: 

Whether the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to 

support an order of protection from abuse pursuant to the 

Pennsylvania [PFAA] where the court based its finding of abuse 

on a repeated course of email communication from [C.J.C.] to 

[N.G.C.] but [N.G.C.] failed to introduce evidence of any 

threatening emails or other communication which placed the 

plaintiff in reasonable fear of bodily injury? 

Appellant’s Brief, at 6. 

“In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Drew v. Drew, 870 

A.2d 377, 378 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 602 

(Pa. Super. 2004)). The purpose of the PFAA is not to punish abusers for 

past violent behavior, but to advance the prevention of domestic violence 

from abusive perpetrators. Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. 

Super. 1999). The petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations of 

abuse by a preponderance of the evidence under the PFAA. See 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6107(a). When reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to 

support a PFA order, 

we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

petitioner and granting her the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences, determine whether the evidence was sufficient to 

sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the 

evidence.

Fonner, 731 A.2d at 161 (quoting Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 

A.2d 1252, 1255 (Pa. Super. 1995)). 
J-S52021-17

- 5 -

A “preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater 

weight of the evidence, [i.e.], to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or 

requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 

720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further, this Court defers to the trial court’s 

credibility determinations of the witnesses, and if the findings of the trial 

court are supported by competent evidence, we are bound by them. Coda 

v. Coda, 666 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. Super. 1995).

C.J.C. contends that N.G.C. failed to prove abuse by a preponderance 

of the evidence because the instant PFA order was based on N.G.C.’s 

allegations of past abuse and N.G.C. did not introduce evidence of any 

threatening emails or other communication that placed N.G.C. in reasonable 

fear of bodily injury. We disagree. 

Under the PFAA, abuse is defined as: 

The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between 

family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or 

persons who share biological parenthood:

* * *

(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or 

repeatedly committing acts toward another person, 

including following the person, without proper authority, 

under circumstances which place the person in reasonable 

fear of bodily injury. The definition of this paragraph 

applies only to proceedings commenced under this title 

and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions 

commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and 

offenses). 
J-S52021-17

- 6 -

23 Pa.C.S.A. §6102(a)(5). Instantly, the trial court reasoned that our

Court’s holding in Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260 (Pa. Super. 

2008), made N.G.C.’s allegations of past abuse “relevant to demonstrate 

[N.G.C.’s] state of mind and the manner in which she would receive any 

future threats.” Trial Court Opinion, 02/13/17, at 2. 

In Buchhalter, we concluded that past acts of violence are significant 

in determining the reasonableness of a PFA petitioner’s fear. Buchhalter, 

959 A.2d at 1264. The trial court, as fact finder, made a credibility 

determination as to N.G.C.’s testimony regarding C.J.C.’s alleged past 

abuse, and weighed the evidence accordingly. Although C.J.C. claims his 

thousands of non-threatening emails do not constitute a course of conduct 

that placed N.G.C. in reasonable fear of bodily injury, N.G.C. testified to past 

incidents of abuse, and C.J.C.’s threat of getting even with N.G.C. in the 

next ten years, which occurred just six months prior to the issuance of the 

instant PFA. See Raker, supra (petitioner proved imminent fear of serious 

bodily injury under section 6102(a)(2) where alleged abuser, who lived on 

other side of duplex, entered petitioner’s side of duplex in middle of night 

and fought with son-in-law, and petitioner testified to various other incidents 

of violence that occurred only four months prior). 

Moreover, N.G.C. testified that she is afraid to be alone with C.J.C. 

because of his previous threats and felt threatened by C.J.C.’s repeated 

emails because she feared he would find her location and go to her 
J-S52021-17

- 7 -

apartment. Because this Court has held that “[i]t is possible for a person to 

be placed in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury based on telephone 

calls, particularly when coupled with the alleged abuser’s past history of 

violence,” we likewise believe abuse can be established under section 

6102(a) based on an abundance of emails accompanying past abusive 

behavior. Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. 

2002). See also T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2017) (affirming 

PFA order where sufficient evidence established appellant continually stalked 

and harassed petitioner, although petitioner did not use specific word of 

“fear” when she testified, because petitioner’s testimony clearly indicated 

strong concern for her safety).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to N.G.C., we find 

that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s decision by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Fonner, supra.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2017