Research Product 80-4a

HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN

CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS:

Volume 1.

HUMAN PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES

MANPOWER AND EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

TECHNICAL AREA

1!>.. December 1979 c

C-,*

tA

Ito,

* U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INS717071 for the BEHAVIORAL and SOCIAL SCIENCESM~"

A - - "AgQroved for Public release; distribution unlimited - --- p
.. 

·•· 

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST 

QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY 

FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED 

A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF 

PAGES WHICH DO NOT 

REPRODUCE LEGIBLYo 
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

FRANKLIN A. HART

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel, US Army

Te~chnical irector Commander

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION Primary distribution of this report has been made by ARt. Pleae address Correspondence

concerning distribution of reports to: U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.( ATTN: PERI-TP, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria. Virginia 22333.

FINAL DISPOSITION This report may be destroyed when it is no longer neeided. Pllean do not return it to

the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTEi The findings in this report are not so be construed as an official Department of the Army position. unless so designated by other authorized documents.
Unt"_oi_=if ied

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE lhern fat. ntered)

READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGi /.Q BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

I. REPORW NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3, RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

Research Product 80-4a /t,

41 TTLE f'WTs-3rsrnteW 5. TYPE aOFRIT"OT & PER40D CeCVE-ffO

'Human Performance in Continuous Operations:

Volune I. Human Performance Guidelines

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(.) B. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(.)

Arthur I. Siegel, Mark G. Pfeiffer, Felix F. /

Kopstein, arrd Lawrence G./Wilson CAPS); Halim DAHCl9-77-C-0054

4zkaptan /(ARI)

9. "]IERFOMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK

Applied Psychological Services, Inc. AREA A WORK UNIT NUMBERS

Science Center

Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087 2QI63743A774

I I. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS I "PORT DATEDec~atb 1979

Combined Army Combat Development Activity 13. NUMBER OF PAGES

Fort Leavenworth, KS 6602i 533 .

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different Irom Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this rapore)-

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences

Alexandria, Virginia 22333 -IS. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING

SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, It different from Report)

IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree aide If neceaery aid Identify by block number)

Human Performance Human Factors Training Requirements

Stress Management Performance Maximization Training Methods

Unit Development Performance Degradation Battle Management

Performance Analysis Vulnerability/Survivability Performance Support

Continuous Operations Work/Rest Cycles Work Aids

2 ,- TACT rC u - rem aie nIft M e Idearlif y block namber)

t-This document provides guidelines to the military commander on expected

human performance degradation of continuous ground combat. Degradation

projections are based on extrapolations from scientific literature and

realistic scenarios of continuous operations.

The advantages and application of task restructuring, task reallocation,

and work rest management concepts in the continuous operations context are

presented along with considerations for training, system design, and

performance support,--

JPO 73 ~ UNCLASSIFIED

~J~~i7. [SECUrTv CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When, Date Entered)

yr
I Aqi fiPd

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEI'1hmn Da Eri.md)

20. Comprehensive tables show anticipated performance degradation for specific

duty p. sitions in the mechanized infantry, artillery, armor, and FIST

categories. Methods are discussed for minimizing the anticipated degradation.

ii Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(W1.n Data Entered)

41 -1
Research Product 80-4a

HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS:

Volume I. HUMAN PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES

Arthur I. Siegel, Mark G. Pfeiffer, Felix F. Kopstein

and Lawrence B. Wilson

Applied Psychological Services, Inc.

and

Halim Ozkaptan

Army Research Institute

MANPOWER AND EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

December 1979

AQmrovd for oublic rsaus: distribution unlimited.

LILii
FOREWORD

Night and continuous operations place new and unique demands on

operating personnel. Effective doctrine and tactics cannot be formulated unless human capabilities and limitations in this environment are

understood and accomodated through equipment aids, new operating procedures, and special training, as well as revised manning and rotation

cycles.

The most recent product of research on Human Performance in Continlious Operations consists of three volumes. This document, Volume I,

presents Guidelines to the military user on expected human performance

capabilities during continuous combat. Volume II provides a Management

Guide on how to minimize expected performance decrements during continuous operations. Volume III, Technical Supplement, depicts the technical

aspects of the development and background data for the information

contained in Volumes I and II, and describes the methods employed for

predicting performance degradation. Together they update and replace ARI

Research Product 79-8, "Human Performance in Continuous Operations Guidelines," and Technical Report 386, which provided background data. The

three volumes provide a body of general and highly specific information

about the soldier's tasks on which degraded performance can be anticipated during continuous operations. Such information will be useful to

tactical planners, training specialists, and design engineers.

The research was conducted under Contract DAHC 19-77-C-0054, as part

of Army Project 2Q163743A774, Man-Machine Interface in Integrated Battlefield Control Systems, FY 1978 Work Program. The research was supported

by CACDA/CATRADA at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which was the TRADOC

sponsor. Special thanks are due to Colonel Robert N. Morrison, Major

Michael G. Jones, and Major Robert 0. Livingston for their recommendations and cooperation.

(JO EPH Z L--NER

"-echnical Director

iv
PREFACE

This volume presents a compendium of data and projections of h'iman

performance degradation to be expected in the course of continuous ground

combat operations. Data were derived from various sources in the scientific

literature, arid projections were guided by the reference framework of realistic scenarios which reelect the continuous operations concept.

The continuous operations concept has been variously defined. Regardless of definition, the concept implies combat operations at about the same

level of high intensity throughout the 24 hour day over extended periods. Accordingly, the soldier will be required relentlessly to carry out tire function--

of combat through day and night, in any weather, and with no .-lackening of

pace. In this context, the human element will be a dominant factor in the success equation; the consequences of progressive attrition in human performance

capability may be more serious even thc.. scope of sustained casualties and

losses of equipment.

The present volume, along with a set of companion volumes, is intended to furnish guidance to military planners and formulators of doctrine

for, continuous operations. Each volume in the set complements the others.

Each provides a separate substrate of considerations which will be valuable

in achieving and maintaining readiness for continuous operations and in successfully carrying out continuous operations during combat.

A second volume, Human Resources Management Guide - Human Performance in Continuous Operations, delineates the human resources management issues in anticipation of and during continuous operations. It also outlines the management actions designed to maximize human resources and to

conserve them thereafter.

A third volume, Background Data for Human Performance in Continuous Operations, summarizes the data and findings of the scientific literature

on which both of the other two volumes are based. Its content and format are

primarily oriented toward the technical/scientific reader rather than the military operational one.

These Guidelines are intended as a handbook for military planners and

managers. The first chapter presents an elementary introduction to human

factors in continuous operations and the combat scenarios which serve as the

framework for subsequent data. Chapter II presents the scenario from which

critical tasks are derived and against which subsequent human performance

forecasts are made. Several subsequent chapters present human performance

projections for critical tasks. The projections are made for up to 120 hours

(five days) of continuous, unrelieved combat. Mechanized infantry, armor,

fire support team, and artillery units are successively considered. A set of

V

___________________________________________________________________
final chapters presents data and information for various approaches to counteracting human performance degradation: restructuring of responsibilities, training operations, system design and performance supports, and work-rest-sleep

management. Chapters may be consulted individually or the text can be read

as a whole.

One of the frustrations experienced in predicting human performance

under the stress of real-life situations is that man is highly adaptable and

seemingly capable of enduring unusual degrees of stress and fatigue when necessary. When a soldier is driven by the motivation to survive, by exemplary

leadership, or by commitment to value, predictions from laboratory data often fail. Man has exceptional resources of energy and ability in reserve for

the crises of life. The cost at which such sustained performance is maintained

is not yet properly understood, and therefore, difficult to predict. These difficulties have been accepted as a challenge.

In a sense, these Guidelines represent a degraded mode analysis for

the soldier. A human performance reliability of unity cannot be assumed

for the soldier under all conditions. And, it is the performance reliability

of the soldier and of his equipment, in combination, which determines the

reliability of the man-equipment system. To this end, the Guidelines present those tasks which various soldiers must perform, an indication of the

anticipated performance effects of various impacting factors, nomographs

for calculating performance decrement, methods for correcting various shortfalls, and a cross reference index for easy access.

We can think of no better criterion against which to judge this volume

than a quote from a review* specifying the desirable characteristics of a handbook:

"A handbook should be not a random collection

of articles but a mosaic depicting the domain,

central concerns, and contributions of its field.

It should consolidate methods, theory, and data

that are scattered over a vast primary literature. It should instruct neophytes and increase

the sophistication of practitioners . . . Ideally,

it should also inspire and focus the attention of

the leaders in the field from whom future advances must come.

*Ross, L., & Cronbach, L. J. Review of Handbook of Evaluation Research

by Marcia Guttentag & Elmer L. Struening. Educational Researcher,

1976, 5, 9-19.

Vi

-if
Quite obviously, the development of a comprehensive handbook has

depended on the contributions of a number of persons. The work of Dr.

Donald P. Woodward, Office of Naval Research, and Captain Paul D. Nelson,

Naval Medical Research and Development Command, was adapted and relied

on heavily in developing the concluding chapter of this volume. We express

our indebtedness to Major M. Jones, Major R. Livingston, and Colonel

H. N. Morrison, CACDA/CATIRADA for their perceptive comments and early

recognition of human resources issues arising out of continuous operations in

future warfare.

Arthur i. Siegel

Mark G. Pfeiffer

Felix F. Kopstein

Lawrence B. Wilson

APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, INC.

December 1979

vii
Rules of Thumb

for

Counteracting Human Performance Deterioration

Attendant on Continuous Operations

The capability to perform a host

of critical combat tasks degrades to inadequacy due to the depression of requisite critical abilities by adverse factors

engendered by continuous operations.

Counter measures must address themselves to enhancing and supporting these

abilities. For this reason the rules of

thumb listed below are categorized by

critical abilites.

viii

'?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
('OM MUNICATION

* Establish a feasible maximum of SOPs together with a brief code dcsi.-

nation for each.

* As much as possible communicate only codes repre !senlIIg pf'(.stablished

SOPs.

" Through anticipations or questiorns, prompt the attempts of xhaus1'ed persons to formulate a message.

* For maximum likelihood of comprehension in the presence of noise, establish and use the smallest feasible standard vocabulary.

" Also, repeat critical words and, if feasible, provide a context for better

intelligibility.

" As much as possible, duplicate/augment critical message elements in alternate communications channels (e. g., verbal and visual).

* Establish standard message formats (e.g., order of message elements)

for standard purposes (e.g. , target descriptions, relocation directions).

DYNAMIC PRECISION

* Provide a great deal of practice in aiming/firing tasks at night and from

unstable platforms.

* Enhance visual cues (e.g., aiming stakes) and provide alternate ones

(tactual, auditory) to guide performance.

* Provide extensive practice in aiming/firing while simultaneously maintaining body balance (e.g., narrow ledge).

* Provide extensive practice in aiming/firing with restricted "elbow room."

* Provide extensive practice in tasks requiring prolonged tracking of fast

moving targets.

ix

4r-----~-Y -.- ~----------__________________
AS 111~fU, 11 US pOS,-il)h ' 0fl11U ' Illul llat VisibIilt ol 01' k, apal j ib I i-1i.

* \\ i'l[i 11 i04 for, faii sounds, lake' ackoull itof soti !11 ii p011:o ~ III till' (11V11011i1111 (b sh sils, et. and Illauilll aill a tt'al' n0IIUIU1 l

" Exicosiv,,Iy prac tice re( all of standard items (SOP6, noment( la LOIt"

Ods, e~c.)

" H etuin, at all timas, provisions for r-ecording infoi inationi to beL ILtilint c(

oy101. a shor-t time (C~. not(, pad).

" Develop coding schemes which makes sense to the user.

* Us( re-dundanc v to inc cease me mory.

* AMemqory loss that ocuirs as a function of time may be reduced through

ovuci training~.

" A standard oper-ating procedure of solutions may be employed- to lessen

need for- memory of details.

0 As a technique to improve immediate memory the chunking or grouping

of' items may be employed.

NUMERICAL FACILITY

0 As much as possible do not rely on "mental arithmetic," but externali,e

steps (e.g.,I onl paper) of calculational process.

*Arrange for double check on numerical results throubhj repetition or by othe rs.)

*Similarly, guard against digit reversals or transpositions in numerically

encoded information.

*As much as possible reduce numerical operations to the simplest level,

e. g. , counting rather than adding, adding rather than multiplying, etc.

x
ORIENTATION

" Extensively practice use of sun, moon, and stars as dir'ectional indicators.

* Select most prominent landmarks that will be visible under virtually any

conditions (night, fog) and relate to maps, charts, or terrain sketches.

* Extensively praCtice standard procedures for regaining orientation.

* Whenever feasible, double check orientation with that independently established by another.

* During movement: practice progress evaluation, e.g., by counting steps,

and assessment of angular shifts, e.g., using clock face imagery.

• Identify, in advance, personnel who possess a high level of orientation ability.

Individual differences in this ability are great.

PERCEPTUAL SPEED

* Brief personnel in advance on expected targets and their expected patterns

or distribution.

B EASONING

* Develop and practice standard schemes for evaluating common types of

situations or problems.

* Prepare and use decision aids for standard types of problems (nomographs,

Lables, or, when practical, computer programs).

* Rely on parallel, but independent reasoning (two persons) in reaching decisions; compare results and evaluate discrepancies.

" P, ovide maximum rest for decision makers.

VISION

" Rotate target detection vigilance tasks among two or more people in brief

(e. g., five minute) intervals.

" Take account of moon's (or other light source's) position in night time tar- ki get detection vantage points, i. e. , strive for maximum contrast of the enemy.

i Xi
* Preestablish expected visual characteristics of targets to b,' dI.te'. i 'd.

* Extensively practice systematic scanning of terrain; at night Ionstantlv

shift slightly left and right from line of scan.

* Avert flash blindness through monocular vision and rapid averting of

eyes from flash direction.

GENERAL

" Use mild exercise to increase the arousal level of fatigued, but temiporarily

physically inactive personnel.

* When personnel, are dgraded, make assignments in pa'allel duplicate performance.

" As an alternate to parallel assignments, practice task sharing.

* When preparing for continuous operations, assure that personnel are overt'-

trained and cross trained.

" Practice critical tasks under degraded visibility conditions and practice

first those tasKs which are most vulnerable to the performance degradation

resulting from continuous operations.

" Use performance supports for critical tasks.

* Provide iest whenever possible.

• Major performance decrement can be anticipated after 18 hours of continuous operation; there is considerable across task variability in anticipated

performance decrement.

" Tasks which are most vulnerable to performance decrement are characterized by work pacing, time sharing, high work load, continuous attention, lack of feedback, and problem solving/decision making requirements.

* Recovery of performance after sleep loss of 48 hours will require 12 hours

of sleep.

xii

- -4
TABL. OF ()ONTENTS

(IA PTEIi I - INTIIODICTION ....................... 1

tl-Il(]L1P CM I)IIuOUS 0I)eailiOtS Co11ditionS .. ...........

,cl( vani luman Abilitie. . .. .. . . ... . .. .. ... .. 4

Ecl)lS ulltaivl:. '.l'O . .... . .................... q

TaI.-ks Lists for, .Methanized Infaativ, Tank (Crtv, Ai- ilh.'

Bati-,iy, and FIST .S.S.... . . ... ..... ..

Tlic Pc iforinanu., Effectiveness indtcx (E) ...........

I) ili .. . ......... ...........................

('IAPTEI 1i - SCENARIOS ......................... i5

Prin(,iples of A( tive Defense .......... ... ....... 3;

Conk ept of the Defense .*.. ............ ... 36

Defense Against E,.lieloned Attacks .............. 3T

l'undamentals of the Activc Defense .............. 7

Conduct of the Active Defense by a Battalion Task

J"oice: General Situation ......... ................... 3U

l)efcnsive Order . ......... ....................... .... 40

Initial Sequence of Events ....... ................... ... 40

Summary of Opposing Forces ........ ................. 41

Part 1--Narrative of TF 4-78 Defense ....... ............... 41

Part 11--Nai-rative for Team ACE (Mechanized-Infantry) ..... .... 49

Platoon Action 1, Repel an Enemy Assault from a

Battle Position ......................................... 49

Platoon Action 2, Create and Defend a Strongpoint ......... 54

Platoon Action 3, Disengage and Occupy a New Battle

Position ......... ............................ ... 60

Part 111--Narrative for Team ACE (TK PLT) ..... ........... 63

Platoon Action 1, Repel an Enemy Assault from a BP . . . . 63

Platoon Action 2, Create and Defend a Strongpoint ......... 65

Platoon Action 3, Disengage and Occupy a New BP ......... 67

Part IV--Narrative for Team ACE Fire Support Team (FIST) 68

Platoon Action 1, Repel an Enemy Assault from a BP . ... 69

xiii

1 -
FABLE Of CONTENTS (ont.)

Platoon Action 2, Create and ).f'tnd u St'Oll,,poilit .. ..... 72

Platoon Action 3, liing an. Oc' upv a N' 1 .P ..... T

Palt V--Nau'ralive for 155mm 1)ii't Support Artil[ct'y

Battuv'y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

ClI-PTEH' Ill - MECHJANIZED INI.'ANTH'Y PE!'FOfl MANCE. ..... 75

Summary of Continuous Opurations "ffe.cs .........

Digest of Critical Tasks and Thi P.fo.manc ...... C;t

CtAtPTEk IV - TANK C1-E'W PE I 2IOIHMAN('F ................. ... 225

Summar'y of Consquen11cs fot' Pe 'formanc.e, of Continuous

Operations ........... ............................ ... 225

Digest of Ci'itical Tasks and Their Performance .......... 236

CHIAPTER V - FIRE SUPPOT TEAI (FIST) PE1FOY1M:-NCE..... :301

Suminary of Consequences for Performance of

Continuous Operations ......... ................... 301

Digest of Critical Tasks and Their Performance ........ 314

CHAPTER VI -- ARTILLE3Y BATTERY PEIFOHfMANCE ........ ... 375

Summary of Consequences for Performance of Continuous

Operations ............. ........................... 375

Digest of Critical Task and Their Performance ......... ... 388

CHAPTER VII - RESTRUCTURING OF RESPONSIBILITIES ......... ... 439

Assumption ........ .......................... .... 439

Method ......... ............................. ... 440

Approaches to Estimating Effects of Restructuring ....... 440

Task Interchange/Reallocations ..... ................. .... 441

Mechanized Infantry ...... ...................... .... 441

Tank Platoon ........ ......................... ... 441

FIST .......... .............................. ... 441

Artillery ......... ........................... ... 441

Discussion ........... .......................... 448

Paralleling Task Performance ...... .................. ... 448

p. xiv

t/ . "
TABLEr 01('ON FENTS.- (Coit.)

. . .) . . . . . . . . . . . 453!

shilill- T ask 3!f k al .e .t . .a . -5

SUIIM UVa iv . .......... 4,55

('IALPTEh \'Ili - TR71AINING OIBATlONS ANI) (ONI)1ITIONS .. . 457

Ox~~~ ag............ . .i .A . ..... .. .. .. . .........

Put~ I'lls of Piac .ii .... ... ... . 45:

S'oint, Usctul Training Pi jiipics and . . .l.i. . 4 5

1Priaco In All iDei-aded Visibilit v C(idiA ions ......... 4 59

2 (hadulldv Increoase Sc-veritv Of Conditionis And IDilffictt'.v

Of' Tasks . ............................ 45)

:3 Maximize Practice- Of Vlnecrable Tasks.. ............ 45!_

4 Simul-ate Critical le(atUic(s U1o' Pl'ac,'ice .............. 460

5 Provid c A mpit litinfovcecme nt (11o\evd ) ID uringtia P . 4 6 0

Vulneirability And Cross Training Pr-ioriti-s .. ......... 46(3

Mechanlized Infantry Task Vuilnerabilit ... .. .. ......... 466

Armor Task Vulnerability. .. .................. 4741

FIST Task Vuliierabilit . .. ................... 4711

Artillery Task Vulnerability................... .. .. ...... 4711

Other Determiners. .. ...................... 471 1

CHAPTER LX - SYSTEM DESIGN AND P~ERFORMANCE SU PPORT . . . 473

System Design. .. ........................ 47 4

Performance Supports. ..................... 475

Relief/ Support for Critical Abilities .. ............ 475

CI A P T ER X - WORK/ REST/ SLEEP MANAGEMENT L/. .......... 485

Task Interest and Complexity. .. ............... 485

Type of Task. .. ......................... 486

Mission Duration .. ....................... 487

Amount of Sleep-Loss Required to Degrade Performance .. 489

Work-Rest Schedules and Performance. .. ........... 492

Duty Schedules Most Vulnerable to Performance

Degradation .. .. ....................... 493

Recovery from Sleep-Loss Effects.. .. ............. 493

Methods for Counteracting Sleep-Loss Effects .. ........ 495

Procedures for Reducing Performance Degradation in

Continuous Operations. .. ................... 498

xv
TABLE 0-' CONTE-NTS (Cont.)

APPENDL\ I -GLOSSARY 01F MILITARY ABBR'EVITION\S

USED IN SCENAIO AND TASK LISTS .. . .. ..... .. 01

APPENDLX 11 CRITICAL TASKS AND ABILITIES D)EGRADEDJ BY

EACH DEBILITATING 1"ACTOR FOR EACH U-NIT/

DUTY POSITON. ..... ........ ........... 05

xvi
LIST O1,' TABLES

Table

1. 1 Numbe.r of Critical Tasks by Position/Unit ............ 11

1. 2 ('Cii'ialitv Ratings for Mechanized Infantrvy Tasks ........ 10

1. :3 Criticality liatings for Tank Tasks ................ 18

1.4 C iiticality Hatings for FIST Tasks ................ 24

1.5 Criticality Ratings for Artillery Battery Tasks .......... 30

3. 1 Effectiveness (E) of Mechanized Infantr'y: Duty Positions,

Squads, and Platoons in Different Platoon Actions and Over

Mission Days ........... ........................... 77

3. 2 Summarized Effectiveness (E) of Mechanized Infantry: Duty

Positions, Squads, and Platoons under all Combinations of

Adverse Conditions ....... ........................ ... 81

3. 3 Projec ted Effeutiveness (E) for Critical Combat Tasks:

Mechanized Infantry .......... ...................... 82

3.4 Mechanized Infantry: Summary of Significant Depressions of

Critical Abilities ........ ......................... ... 88

3.5 Summary of Factors Degrading Critical Abilities ........... ... 89

3.6 Mechanized Infantry: Index of Discussions of Effects of

Debilitating Factors on Critical Abilities ..... ............ 91

4.1 Effectiveness (E) of Armor: Tank Duty Positions, Crews and

Platoons in Different Platoon Actions and Over Mission Days. . 230

4.'2 Effectiveness (E) of Armor: Tank Duty Positions, Crews and

Platoons Under All Combinations of Adverse Conditions ....... 231

4.3 Projected Effectiveness (E) for Critical Combat Tasks: Armor

Tank Platoon Leader ....... ....................... .233

4.4 Armor: Summary of Significant Depressions of Critical

Abilities .......... .............................. .239

4.5 Armor: Index of Discussions of Effects of Debilitating Factors

on Critical Abilities . .................... 241

' ~x'ii
LIST O1' TABLES (cont.)

Table

5. 1 Effectivekness (E) of FIST: Dut- Posii.ions, Platoon ali

Company Level Teams in Different Platoon Actions ant

Over Mission Days ......... ........................ 3 3

5. 2 Effectiveness (E) of FIST: Duty Positions, Platoon and

Company Level Teams Under All Conmbinations of Advelrse

Conditions ........ ................................ 306

5.3 Projected Effectiveness (E) for Critical Combat Tasks: 'IST . . 308

5.4 FIST: Summary of Significant Depressions of ('ritical Abilities. 313

5.5 FIST: Index of Discussions of Effects of Debilitating Factors

on Critical Abilities ...... .......................... 315

6. 1 iPffectiveness (E) of Artillery: Duty Positions, individual Crew,

and Battery with Different Demand Levels and Over Mission

Days ............. ................................ 377

6.2 Effectiveness (E) of Artillery: Duty Positions, Pieces, and

Batteries Under All Combinations of Adverse Conditions ..... 380

6. 3 Projected Effectiveness (E) for Critical Combat Tasks:

Artillery . ............. ............................ 382

6.4 Artillery: Summary of Significant Depressions of Critical

Abilities .......... .............................. .387

6.5 Artillery: Index of Discussionsoof Effects of Debilitating

Factors on Critical Abilities ...... ................... .389

7.1 Mechanized Infantry: Effectiveness (E) with Task

Reallocations ......... ........................... .442

7. 2 Armor: Effectiveness (E) with Task Reallocations ........... 444

7.3 FIST: Effectiveness (E) with Task Reallocations ........... .. 445

7.4 Artillery: Effectiveness (E) with Task Reallocations .......... 446

7.5 Parallel Task Performance Effects ..... ................ 449

7.6 Shared Tasks Performance Effects ..... ................ .453

8. 1 Specific Training Recommendations ..... ................ .461

xviiiI
LIST O, FABLES (cont.)

Table

10. 1 Tasks Most Vulnerable to Sleep-Loss Effects .... .......... 41,0

10. 2 Types of Pe'forman,,e Degradation Most Likely from

Sleep Loss ........... ............................ 4)0

10.3 Amount of Sleep Loss Required to Degrade Perfotmance . . . . 401

10.4 Duty Schedules Most Vulnerable to Performance

Degradation .......... ........................... 4'1,3

10.5 Time Required for Recovery from Sleep Loss and for

Adjustment ........... ............................ 495

10.6 Procedures for Reducing Performance Degradation in

Continuous Operations ......... ...................... 49U

-F-x
LIST OF F-IGURYES

Figure Pg

2. 1 Initial BPs fop- teamns of 'F 1'4-78 and initial ent my

approach .. .. ........ ........ .... ..... 4

2. 2 The ceerrv reinfo'c es the advanc-ing tank rtegiiinen, wkith a

second r'egim-ent causing BP 46 to be, ome cru-iat io

stopping the biceakthrough attenapt .. .. ..... ........ 44

2.3 TMJ GREEN has occupied BP) 46. TM B3LUE has b,-en

forced to fight fr-om BP 45. .. ... ........ ....... 45

2. 4 TIM ACE moves to BP3 40. This rmve is described in

Platoon Action 3 .. .. ........ ........ ..... 46

2.5 Positions of TNs ACE, BLUE, and GREEN in finial defense against second enemy echelon. TF 4-78 has

reinforcing units on BPs 47, 48, and 49 .. ..... ..... 48

2. 6 TMJ ACE supports TMJ BLUE with long range AT fires and

dr awks suppressive fir-es itself. .. .. ........ ..... 50

2. 7 Threat r-einforces main attack wiPh second regiment and

attempts to penetrate near BP 46. South of BP 41

artillery separates threat tanks and BMJPs .. .. ......... 1

2. 8 TIM BLUE withdraws and 2nd regiment regains momentumn as

the intense AT fires of TM ACE mnomentarily blunt advance

of motorized regiment which dismounts. .. .. ...... .. 3

2. 9 TIM G;REEN occupies BP 46; TMJ ACE is under heavy attack

by tanks and infantry .. .. ..... ........ ....... 55

2.10 TINMACE onBP41 .. .. ....... ........ ....... 58

2. 11 Team ACE begins to disengage as threat forces close 61

in dismounted through the woods. .. ....... ...... 61

2. 12 TM ACE CDR orders tank PLT to hold until MECH PLTs 62

can complete withdrawal. F'PFs requested. .. .. ...... 62

2. 13 Communications nets in FIST model which are available

to request indirect fire .. .... ........ ........ 70

ii xx
LIST OF 1'IGItES ((on'.)

3. 1 Pcti'oi inanke dew.g aciation in inc ,hani.: ,6 ifa 'v

positions .. ...

3. 2 Pei.rfo ilil'lull degliadation ill Imncha,1u.:Q 'ii.a6 t v s1quads

and plal oons % Ith all adv cl'st fa ,0or s )istl ..

3. 3 P ojectd p l'forlnuce d(,gradation of mlchanl,:ed ifuan iv

s(uadS undei" "best" and 'wAoist" coilltioiis . ...... . .

3.4 Effect of elgaging in a complex visual tracking task fo'

long p, t'iods of titne. ..... ..................... .....

3.5 Effects of signal rate on detection piobabilit "

.... . ....... . 97

3.6 lReaction time with varying nu mbei's of alte'rnative

responses ......... ............................. 103

3. 7 Ability to identify one's relative position with practice for

self-reported good and poor sense-of-direction people. . . 106

3.8 Accuracy of detecting targets (including T-62 tank at 225 M)

moving toward or away from viewer at about 9km /hr . . . 111

3.9 Effect of using one versus two eyes on detecting movement

toward or away from a viewe.. .................. .... 111

3. 10 Effect of rate of movement oa movement detection ......... 111

3. 11 Average rate of work of enlisted men on night duty for

first and second week ...... .................... .... 117

3. 12 Deterioration of manual task performance as handskin

temperature falls .......... ...................... 125

3. 13 Increase in knot-tying time as a function of exposure to a

low handskin temperature .... .......... . . ....... 125

3. 14 The effects of sleep loss over 1 or 2 nights on auditory

vigilance ........... ............................ 127

3. 15 Relation between accuracy and duration of movement for

two light level conditions ........ .................. 130

3. 16 Intelligibility of words when perceived with and without

visual cues from observing the talker ............. .... 134

xxi "
LIST 01 rFIGU L'S - ((IZnt

3. 17 P'Effect of light leve'l on visibility a various ont rast

ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

3. 18 Perceptual motor skill over a 48 hour period Without

sleep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14G

3. 1U Iecommended hours of recovel'y as a function of sleep

loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

3. 20 Vigilance shooting under varying conditions of sleep loss 149

3. 21 Grouping capacity of soldiers uncer varying conditions of

sleep loss ............. ........................... 150

3. 22 Effects of fatigue on detection for vision, hearing, and

combined vision and hearing ..... ................. .... 154

3.23 The ability to detect detail in objects looked at off-cenelr

(as is necessary at night) ...... ................... .... 168

3.24 Upper limit of effective temperature for unimpaired mental

performance and physiological limit as a function of

exposure time.. ................................ .... 171

3.25 Effective temperature contours as a function of temperature

and relative humidity, little air movement ........... ... 171

3.26 Minimum allowable interference levels from noise ......... 177

3. 27 After effects of predictable and unpredictable noise on mental

performance ........ ......................... ... 184

3.28 Effect of dividing attention compared with a single information

source ......... ............................. .... 187

3.29 Percentage recall (left curves) and percentage of learning

trials to ielearn (right curves) for criterion of one correct

trial (no overlearning) and twice that learning period

(100% overlearning) ......... ...................... 191

3.30 Saving, that is, the reduction in relearning time (increase

in retention) over time ...... .................... .... 191

3. 31 Deterioration of perceptual speed and accuracy under varying

conditions of sleep loss ...... .................... ... 194

xxii

___ __ _ __L.
:3 :3 2 ) Ie ia to Ies~1t Lb I' IIi of 0 1u 1 ' wi1 os

Ofs ee p loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206'~

:3 . 3 4 Xl ),e rioruv oll a Of I 11c3 a ll wide!,00 0101 ~ id

irrietevant tasks inteifr i wkih leinoi-taioli.. . 12

3. G3 U"etatioiilip of flush 1kneIw Iv 1o iec(10011 1v timt 1or !at l s

t1 variiou s brigltiic.s . ...... 21 

3 . 37T Dist iartability Of soldt(I-'s Llidc 1 Vaiviil condfllos of150

sleep loss . ........... 2 -21

4. 1 P(t1rfoi11Mnt diaY)LdaliOn i ll dItI IO pi-10' Jositions . . . . 22

4. 2 P i-formatice degradation in tanik ciews and platooisi with

all adverise factoris pieseit ................... 228

4. 3 Projected pei-foi-mance de gvadation of tank vIews anld

platoons under best and worst c-onditions... .. .. .. ... 2 22h

5. 1 Perfoi-mnance degradation in FIST duty positions .. ...... :3 02

5. 2 FIST: Progressive degradation of effectiveniess-platoon

and company levels \X itli all adverse Cuktors preset . . :3 04

5. 3 [FIST: Effectiveness of teamns under best and worst

conditions. .. ......................... 305

6. 1 Artillery: Progressive degradation of effectiveness --

duty Positions .. ........ ............... :37 6

6. 2 Artillery: Progressive degradation of effectivenesspieces and batteries with all adverse factors present. . 378

6. 3 Artillery: Effectiveness of batteries under best and

worst conditions. ........... ........... 379

xxiii
LIS T 01.,'LU iI (Colot.

[.LIII'LLIh hS To dOLt . jiLlOl0-A11101 (lFik I'1aoo).. 4

8.3 Vulncwibiitits to ttOuV:.aaiioII-Fs iS....V . . . . h

n. 4 Xuti.Oi-bilmei hS - a A i.k .. . .' .a .~h .. . . 0i

lu . 1 su lmna uv Ask III mUla t i%-k [10LI 15 l OSi S i I It 'a S(2S -A)

LOS r ad u o1 htmv 15 It oy/houi sh 5Lu loss (OW r s

VaI v'iability V US s fllll ot101 Of d~d.a St~~O a

xxiv
IN -I')l C '~

This chapter introduces the continuous operations

concept and the attendant degradation of human perf -ormance

capability. Critical abilities and factors acting to depress them are outlined. Critical tasks in an active defense setting for mechanized infantry, armor, FIST, and

artillery are listed.

TIW(e (1uide'liIWS al t( c)ll ltlid With htiniai ).llUPllunt 41 InlLl 1 In't.

op-rltiulns. Its g)oal is 10 jpl sl (ollcept aiR dala, Int a 11Ilitigiti anditie

1,11! \%a v, whill1 de.pict the lfldltal pclfolllllt, LOlsidtaruiolls inllvtl-c III iiTI11 ( 0ntilltlous Opeletat 1015 Olckept is 110t neW% 11o1 is ih cotluct 01 M)0

elrat ton6 at night or over a Long) pur ad yet, iutlv teaui.K ed . Ye t, ill (ottiluiou,5

operations, hu man iiapabilit, %kwill be! degraded to a levi4 below that wich [is

SSIUllv found11 inl the' h1uan factor of the tot al mis sion su ecess equation. [h'e,

que.stionl, titelt, is one of, the, degree-t to which this cap~ability will be, ueg cadet

do ll igl con1tinluous operaItionls and, fu ithe i, to what deg lee call this lost capability bt e-nhaniced during continluotus operations?

In olderl to answer thecse questions, it is nekcessai v to knowk the~ colnstrajints that prevent attainmeint o1 mis sion goal6. Sonmc of the constra ints

are imposed by e njipInent. l"ot examrple, sortie equipilmentt requireS fre -

quent p leve ntive! maintenanc. But, the avectvhluming majority of -onStraints

are( Conc erned with thle soldier' himself. His ability to peliol n thle tasks niec -

essa ry to achieve mission goals may be severely limnited. 1lor examiple-, his

performance depends on acquiring information, proces sing it, and respond -

ing to it in ways that ate adversely affected by eonditions assoc:iated with .onltinuous operations. Thle human information acquisition system is anatomically

d esignle d to rely Onl vision ais thle priml-ary source of' iniformantionl about the environment. But, vision relies on certain minim-umn levels of' reflected light.

Such light is not available at night.

Some of these limitations have been identified and dealt wvith inl part

by equipment advances. 1For example, the problem of' vision at night has

been partially dealt with by the introduction over the years of increasingly

more sophisticated aids to vision (or' by information acquisition devices \'hich

replace the information usually obtained by vision). The devices have ranged

from pyrotechnic devices for providing near daylight illumination to vision

substitution devices such as radar.
Al'hout h a ii XV altt c int s at 011 icctinep heI( adv f t. st k ow in1n1-

(-us (-p)eUI at iolIls 01 hl M ani pe ifo imntceo h ave bee nn a d, o major 1) !-ob I)i -

have pieovt 14d muleC 1apiti advances. One is the lack of exist iniz knowiecLc

01' thlt exacl effet~k-s of IIIhadv ecse kOndiliolis assoc iu! ed ctP oitiuous 011

(Ia itiOns . Thi( other- is the( lac k of a (onisol idat d a tld 0W' i i ~ tI

knot' I -c ge ihit exssabout 1,1USC t ffe ets. The cHUIle-11 lt Illt acid ~5t5ht

Lacks.

Tl. (lecisiofi to Ocganil/( the- know ledget t ocke 111111 the ifis01

conditions associate(i xx ith -onltilnuous operlations 0il hitlinali p-1ifolimlant

of the tasks i-t qu liedl inl thos, opecationis waus, inl lg1eat pat t, thet rresull o:'

iccen lt chlanges inl S0vi(e militaiw thinking. The soviets api iy hav,,

mad e advance(s ill developing the2 i raiiniig, eqjuipmeInt, and acti s !o5 10contillUOtiS ope r1ation.

At cor-ding( to one stud e ni of' Soviet stcit gic ihinkiwv':

'Continuous land combat is an advanced concopt 0!,

miodern arar that is made possible by thet complette ifiech iallizalion of lanid (:oibal for-ces and by thet techiiolo-'v that

enables effective mnove menl and combat at night , ill poolwuathei-, and under- low visibility conditionis. Armiies- niow,

have ihe potential to filght Without let-tip de spite those re-tU

sons hlat have tr-aditionally foiteed a pause-darkness, faI igu , iesupply, i-estol-ationi, and reeryiouping-. The Soviets

hav-e recognized contlinuous comlbat as the main pl-ineijple

of their- combat doeti-ine and have been wor-king towar-d that

capability since 1954."

The Soviet eoneeL'pl is to echeclon for-ces so that the intensitY of' the

-omlbat offensive can be maintained at the points of contact.

I rom the hu man factot-s point of view, soldiers who tight in the continuious opel-alions situation will need to cope)( with the miuhtiude of sti-essor's associated with any battle compounded by the specific str-esses of -outinutous opr'atlonls.

These Guidelines,1 then, repr-esent anl intermedc~iate end pr-oduct of

wor-k to irelate what is known about the effects of conditions assoiciated with

continuous oper'ations on the( per-formnance of the soldier,. it pr-imar-ily is a

descr-iption of pr-oblemis. But, anl attempt is made to formt-ulate pr-escr-iptions for, resolving some of the adverse effects of those conditions. The

Guidelines may be updated as newv infor-mation is accumulated and as newv

scenar-ios alec developed. The Guidelines c-an be tised as a r-efer-ence sour-ce

by militar-y str-ategists, oirganizational planner-s, field commander-s, and

ti-aiing pr-ogr-am planner-s.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - i2
The kinds of human performance that ale ,.neompassod by coniuou.

ope:l ations cover the entire vange of human behavior. It would bt- quit, itilpossible to present the results of nearly 100 years of research in one, s.I o

(LuideLines. But there are, fortunately, celtain ec.ononmizing factors. These

Guidelines have economized by (.ol.ent rating on: (1) specific missions and

units, (2) those conditions that ale unique to human factors in cowinuots operations (as opposed to brief combat under ideal conditions), (3) th(, *\,nots

found in a representative scenario, and (4) only those human tasks judged to

be c. itical to successful mission accomplishment.

Given that not all missions and all units could be dealt with from the,

onset, the deternImination of which units and missions to c_-onsider was made

on the basis of a situation which seemed to deserve primary emphasis. In

light of evidence that the most likely initial encounter would be an active;

defense against a deliberate breakthroiugli attack by enemy tanks and motor'-

ized rifle divisions in a mid European environment, that site and situation

was selected for attention. Because much of the backbone of such a defense

will depend on combined arms teams of tank/TOW/mechanized infanlry with

FIST and artillery support, they were chosen as the units to be initially considered.

Unique Continuous Operations Conditions

The Guidelines are intended to consider only those conditions which

are unique to continuous operations. What is there about fighting at night and/

or fighting for prolonged period,, of time that differentiates such combat from

the more typical combat and which affects a soldier's ability to perform his

job? The following factors are considered to belong to that list and are the

factors whose effects are evaluated in the Guidelines:

Light Level--at night, the amount of light present to serve as

the medium for visual information is reduced to levels which

drastically alter man's capability for, accessing information

about his environment

Diurnal Rhythms--there are certain performance capabilities

that are impaired when they are required at times of day different from when they normally occur or when certain cyclic

behavior is disrupted (e.g., work-rest cycles)

Fatigue--the effects of fatigue are not new to combat; but

fatigue becomes an increasingly more important consideration for continuous combat over prolonged periods with little

or no sleep possible

i3
Cognitive Stress--continuous battle represents a constantly

changing battlefield imposing unremitting pressures and a

situation in which nighttime or lulls in the battle for purposes of evaluating the situation and planning missions will

not be available

Other Visibility Factors - -technological advances developed

to correct deficiencies introduced by the preceding factors,

such as night vision devices, contribute new problems, such

is the susceptibility of night vision scope users to flash blindness.

Relevant Human Abilities

The execution of any task is strongly influenced by relevant abilities

that are necessary f-.., its performance. Adverse factors which operate so as

to depress requisite abilities thereby produce degraded task performance. The

adverse factors inherent in continuous combat operations inevitably depress

critical fighting abilities and progressively degrade soldiers' combat performance. Any doctrine of continuous combat operations must come to grips with

the problem of minimizing these adverse effects on human performance.

What are the abilities critical to the performance of critical combat

tasks? To answer this question, a taxonomy of combat relevant abilities was

developed. The taxonomy included perceptual-motor, mental (cognitive), and

social abilities.

The perceptual-motor abilities included in the taxonomy are:

(a) Vision--the ability to detect visually objects and relations

among objects such as movement or relative distances

(b) Hearing--the ability to detect significant sounds amid

competing sounds

(c) Strength--the ability to move heavy objects using the body

and limbs

(d) Impulsion- -the ability to react quickly to light and sound

by making rapid movements such as running, and jumping

(e) Motor Speed--the ability to maintain a high personal tempo and perform accurately using arms, hands, and fingers

(f) Static Precision--the ability to maintain good body balance

and arm steadiness while aiming

(g) Dynamic Precision--the ability to maintain body balance

and make accurate aiming movements while the body is

in motion. 2 4
Fhe me ntal aibilities included in the oaxoroinv ire:

00 Numerlical F acilit v - -the zibi litY to add. s Ubtt rk aT, in ult iolv,

anI d d iVide (i I CLI d i I w henr the Ir~e )a r I1 of tirIerI o I e Iitionls such as finding ocntgsOr cos4ines)

G) V e rbal Fac ility - -thle abil1itv to ts(, ind under'sand wriitten

and spoken langulageC

(i Neiroi---the ability to ieineinber iniforination such ais

W() rdS, jtie, and p)r 0ccd nrc s

(kI O.rientatior- -the abilitY to Orient in three dilneisiornrlsac

(1) Re asoning - -the ability to apply rules to p roblemis and to

de rive answers or decis ions, or to comibine U iii t O f illf iination to formn a rAe 0o' to) produce a set of rules neces -

sarY to arrange things or actions in orderi

(in) P'erceptual Speed - -the ability to compare letter's, nurnherls,

obije t S;, pic ture s, or)I patterins, or esent or re mc nbc redc,

both quickly and accura' tely.

Th~e social abilities included in the taxonomy are:

(n) S ocial Coordination- -the abilitY to coordinate ac tivities5

with one or more member's of a gr'oup o' to gJive directionIs

or orientation to one or more mnembe rs of a group

(o) Commuication.- -the ability to transfer requrired and /or

relevant information in proper depth and scope at the

proper time.

R~epr'esentative Scenario

In order to provide a basis for pursuing the analysis which led to estimates of human performance capability under continuous operations conditions, a representative scenario was required. Such a scenario served to

provide:

0 coherence, that is, a unifying structure on which to btrjld the

analysis and for giving it direction and identifiable boundaries

* identification of the range of values taken on by the factors

listed previoUSly

5
* a narrative from which a list of tasks typically pe formed

by the individuals in a combined arms teani co1n('cting in

active defense in response to an enemy breakthrough attack could be derived

• a description of situations on which imidgments could be

based about the degree to which individual tasks were

critical to a successful defense relative to other tasks

* a flexible narrative which depicts events which could occur under any combination of conditions within the ranges

identified.

A scenario was written for mechanized infantry, armor, artillery

battery, and FIST teams. Each part of the scenario-* contains three narrative descriptions, in fine detail, of activities in support of the active defense

at various stages within the overall scenario. The three defensive actions

were chosen and written to capture the range of activities and conditions

which could occur so that an analysis based on these would be as complete

as possible. The three defensive (platoon) actions chu-cn :

(1) repel an enemy assault from a battle position

(2) create and defend a strongpoint

(3) disengage and occupy a new battle position.

Certain events were excluded, such as the use of nuclear devices or

the attrition of a platoon or squad to understrength level, in order to confine

the scenario to manageable prooortions. Future expanded scenarios will

need to deal with such important considerations.

Tasks Lists for Mechanized Infantry, Tank Crcw, Artillery Battery, and t.IST

Using the scenario as the boundaries, lists of tasks performed by a

mechanized infantry team, an M-60 tank crew, a FIST team and 155ram

artillery battery were generated using standard job analytic techniques.

To evaluate all tasks would be prohibitive. But, the tasks of intercst

are those tasks whose adequate performance is essential to the active defense.

In order to identify these critical tasks, criticality judgments about each task

were obtained from military technical advisors. These judgments ordered

the tasks in terms of their criticality with respect to the overall goals of an

active defense and the specific goals of each of the three defensive actions** in

which a given task was performed.

*The full scenario is presented in Chapter IV.

**These are fully described in Chapter I.

6

- r-- _
The term critical means that the iask in question 1,%a.s judged to be

highl important to the fulfillment of the ovecall ,:oals of n, (, ,f. c e ,

as well as to the fulfillment of the s5necific coatls a-:i' at least o11e of til' 'lee

platoon actions. The scale of criticality lies between 0 and 1M.

A suMnmarV of the number of critical tasks identified for e ahh :asitit

.ntudied is pres etited as Table 1. 1, and tiie c riticalitv iatin s for' '' o r -k

against general and specific mission goals anpears as l'ables 1.2, 1.J, 1.4,

and 1. 5.

The Performance Effectiveness Index (E)

In order to assess the implications of existing scientific literzatue

bearing on the issue of human performance effectiveness dur'ing c'ontinuous

combat operations, a scale or index of cffeclivencss was developed. [he effectiveness in question is that which rem ins after the debilitating fa:ctors

mentioned earlier have depressed the critical fighting abilities and, consequentlV, performance of the critical combat tasks.

The quantitative expression of remaining humlaI performance capabilitv

is the index of performance effectiveness "E' This index lies between () (,,,ern)

and 1. 00. For convenience, the decimal can be omitted. For practical !ut'-

poses, the index E might be considered as a percentage (actually a pronortion)

of effectiveness. If this is done, one must ask: percentage ()f what? The

percentage expressed by the value E is a relative one. An F value of " (zero)

does not imply an absolute absence of all performance capability (e. g. , a fatality), nor does an E value of 100 imply absolute perfection. Rather, the

limits of 0 (zero) and 100 re present the "worst' level and the "best" level of

performance respectively. The worst level vould be that in which all of the

debilitating factors--Fatigue, Diurnal Rhythmr, Light Level, Stress--are impacting so severely on critical abilities as to virtually nullify the abilities

and to degrade performance capability totally. The best level would be found

when these factors are absent. Accordingly, the best level might be observed

at the beginning of a field exercise, and the worst level might represent perforrnance of a difficult task on, perhaps, the fifth night of actual continuous

combat operations. Any value of E between 0 (zero) and 100 expresses the

"percentage" of effectiveness that can be expected when intermediate conditions

prevail and intermediate levels of performance are observed.

Utility

It is anticipated that the present work will have direct utility for:

Tactics--by knowing what the soldier can and cannot perform

under various conditions, it is possible to design tactics to

accom nodate these performance capabilities and limritations

Training--by knowing areas of required capabilities and limitations, training requirements become evident

- 7
Selection--by knowing required capabilities, selection requirements become evident

Equipment Design--by knowing which capabilities are de-

,iraded under various conditions, areas for needed equipment, which will allow the degraded soldier to function

effectively, become evident.

Accordingly, the Guidelines allow the user to answer questions such

as:

* Should this attack start now or should it be delayed to allow

a rest period?

* Should I increase my rate of fire?

* Can I reasonably expect my men to detect enemy movement

under these conditions?

* What will be the effect of cold on my unit's performance?

* Is overtraining required on this task?

* Should training on this task be emphasized?

* What shortfalls exist in my training program?

• What specific training will yield the maximum pay off?

• Where is cross training required?

* What modifications are needed in my selection policy?

• What men should I select for this mission?

* What type of man is preferred for this activity?

" What new equipment needs exist?

• What equipment do I need for successful completion of this

mission?

These Guidelines do not delineate military doctrine pertaining to human

resources in continuous combat operations. They merely provide some of the

substantive information necessary for the formulation of such doctrine. They

are intended to serve as an information resource to formulators of doctrine.

The consolidation of information, not otherwise easily accessible, will provide

the formulator with a set of considerations which are important facets of many

decisions. As such, the Guidelines help to provide a basis for a decision--the

decision itself is left to the formulator.

8
Table 1.1

Number of Criticai Tasks by Position/Unit

Arms Team/Position Critical Tasks

Mechanized Infantry (Total) 76

Platoon Leader 27

Squad Leader 17

Maneuver Team Member 15

Carrier TM'LDR/Weapons Operator 17

Vehicle Driver 0

Tank Platoon (Total) 58

Tank Platoon Leader 26

Tank Commander 15

Tank Gunner 5

Tank Loader 12

Tank Driver 0

FIST (Total) 59

FIST Chief 29

Forward Observer 27

Fire Support NCO 2

Radio Telephone Operator 1

Artillery Battery (Total) 48

Battery Executive Officer 6

Howitzer Section Chief 11

Gunner 17

Crew Member 14

9

7i ............... _
Table 1.2

( i I~ality 1l2 ings for' Aechani.:ed Infani 'v Tasks

• -' fl Goals of

" = Action VEHICLE DRIVER (DR) U O Action _______Q oo 1 2 3

Receive orders and plans from PL 73 86 42 57

Review terrain maps with SL 64 68 43 59

Check fuel supplies 54 83 62 62

Check vehicle use supplies (water, recovery

devices, etc.) 45 84 62 70

Check APC mechanical readiness 25 83 76 76

Load APC materials 23 35 66 68

Review SOPs and special orders with SL 09 44 62 56

Mount vehicle 18 71 61 66

Start engines 16 65 48 65

Drive under visual guidance, daytime 36 85 54 61

Drive under visual guidance, formation lights 23 84 44 62

Drive with NVDs 24 85 44 66

Drive in lead position 09 82 44 64

Drive under SL intercom control 07 80 44 63

Drive under PL hand signal control 09 - 39 73

Prepare to cross water 08 - - -

Cross water 23 - - -

Secure after crossing water 33 - - -

Drive over rough terrain 31 59 47 73

Position bounding vehicle 25 70 69 78

Position overwatching vehicle 39 72 67 78

Locate covered area 33 68 59 73

Position vehicle in covered area 33 61 65 73

Prepare APC for dismount 30 64 70 76

Move to PL directed location 57 83 54 77

Position hull down by G/CTL directions 37 - 69 79

Position hull down visually 39 - 70 79

Button up if needed 50 80 71 81

Monitor radios 50 84 69 79

Relay info to G/CTL or SL 65 85 50 76

Assist vehicle camouflage 63 - 53 80

Monitor radio 61 87 62 76

Feed ammo to G/CTL 36 63 74 69

Relocate vehicle 58 76 72 79

Move to assembly area 40 85 65 77

Position for remount 77 - 66 77

Prepare APC for remount 52 - 66 77

10
Vlablc 1. 2 (('urn.

I

Goals of

4 J N Action Q O 1 .2 3

Assist reloading of APC 29 - 66 58

Drive concealed to disengage 68 - 63 67

Drive visually to formation 83 33 66 67

Drive under G/CTL or SL control to formation 65 33 63 69

Check gear and vehicle for damage 69 77 55 61

Check fuel and fluid supplies 57 80 81 85

Make necessary field repairs 82 66 77 83

Report vehicle readiness to G/CTL 81 71 83 75

GUNNER/CARRIER TEAM LEADER/(G/CTL)

Receive orders and plans from PL 47 88 68 60

Review terrain maps with SL 68 87 84 60

Check condition of organic weapon 68 88 92 63

Check ammo supply 54 92 92 82

Check condition of NVDs 55 - 87 82

Check vehicle for equipment security 47 - 73 80

Assist loading of APC 42 - 77 66

Review SOPs and special orders with SL 53 - 77 74

Mount vehicle 66 - 7? 62

Observe terrain for navigational purposes 68 - 8? 92

Observe terrain for enemy presence 80 88 92 88

Observe PL hand signals 74 74 71 80

Observe PL flashlight signals 74 74 70 80

Intercom communicate with SL 82 - 83 74

Observe lead vehicle 82 77 77 74

Supervise water crossing 79 - - -

Detect direction of enemy ATs if encountered 84 82 66 76

Assist positioning of bounding vehicle 81 82 91 76

Fire from bounding vehicle 1 87 83 91 83

Overwatch bounding vehicle 2 87 82 91 83

Fire to protect bounding vehicle 3 90 87 64 83

Locate covered area 84 - 74

Direct positioning in covered area 82 85 74

Overwatch dismount 4 84 86 63 83

Direct positioning in hull down configuration 77 - 62 83

Mount NVDs if necessary 74 - 89 74

Receive PL regrouping plans 67 71 62 82

i.u v- --
l'abhr 1. 2 Wol'. (( 

cc

-U Z M Goals of

Action

1 2 3

Identify TRPs 75 83 67 84

Establish range cards 83 - 67 84

Assist in vehicle camouflage 81 - 91 75

Fire .50 cal at targets 82 87 89 85

Fire .50 cal at areas 5 85 86 89 85

Maintain fire per range cards 80 - 89 76

Use N.VDs 81 - 82 85

Coordinate firing with other vehicles & dismounted elements 6 86 87 90 85

Fire stationary 79 87 91 85

Fire in motion 83 85 93 89

Maintain knowledge of the~squads locations 7 88 83 92 87

Communicate with PL 8 91 83 92 86

Detect enemy movement 9 93 85 94 88

Determine need to relocate 10 89 85 90 74

Establish revised TRPs and range cards 11 92 89 90 84

Direct relocation or repositioning 12 90 90 94 80

Reposition to allow other SWs to fire as

needed 13 89 87 94 80

Locate assembly area 77 - 91 83

Overwatch remount 77 - 88 84

Cover disengaging squads 14 91 91 91 84

Maintain concealed disengagement 15 89 - 91 80

Receive PL regrouping instruction 90 - 88 81

Proceed to regrouping 90 - 87 76

Fire to protect regrouping 16 89 - 89 80

Check organic weapon's condition 78 90 91 67

Make repairs to organic weapons 79 88 91 72

Check ammo supplies 82 86 90 75

Report vehicle readiness to SL 17 86 84 88 78

INFANTRY MANEUVER TEAM MEMBER (MTM)

Receive orders and plans from P, 79 72 90 77

Check condition of weapons 18 88 87 90 77

Check ammo supplies 78 84 94 85

Chepk other gear as needed 78 80 84 87

Check NVDs 84 - 82 78

Load vehicle 35 - 77 80

Review SOPs and special orders with SL 60 82 82 80

12

LI _ __ _ _
"Lbti! 1. 2 (Wo11.

o z Goals of -4

4J - ) Action

M V0 1 2 3

Mount APC 73 82 73 83

Ride in APC 75 79 75 87

Remove web gear and securing for water

crossing 67 - - -

Support mounted organic weapon firing 83 80 92 -

Detect targets in exposed position bounding

vehicle 19 86 80 90 85

Fire weapons from bounding vehicle 20 85 83 92 85

Prepare to dismount 51 80 76 94

Execute dismounting procedure 59 - 76 94

Seek concealment 75 74 79 92

Plan fire effective positions 21 87 82 92 85

Coordinate weapon's locations 22 84 82 92 85

Carry weapons to locations 63 75 94 -

Reconnoiter subsequent positions 79 77 85 86

Mark routes between possible positions 23 86 76 86 88

Identify TRPs 24 84 78 86 85

Plan fire cover for possible relocations 25 86 83 89 88

Prepare range cards 81 - 89 83

Stake out range limits for weapons 77 - 89 81

Construct obstacles 73 - 91 82

Place obstacles 71 - 93 82

Plant mines 76 - 97 83

Camouflage 77 - 94 79

Learn routes to assembly area 79 - 82 76

Detect enemy arrival at effective distance 85 - 85 81

Fire on targets 26 89 82 94 81

Fire at areas 27 86 82 94 83

Communicate with SL via hand signals 82 68 77 81

Communicate with SL vocally 81 59 72 76

Communicate with PL by radio 81 89 91 82

Fire with NVDs 28 85 - 91 81

Feed enemy progress info to SL (or ?L) 81 84 92 83

Collect gear for relocation 77 54 72 78

Cover movement to new position 86 82 77 83

Move rapidly to new positons via marked

routes 29 89 80 77 88

Fire while relocating 30 88 84 80 83

Move to assembly area 31 88 - 80 86

Fire to cover move to assembly area 32 88 - 80 85

Fire from moving vehicle 88 74 81 82

Collect gear for remount 81 53 82 81

13

" I- _______--_ _n i
a bL,, 1. 2 (Co t.)

U Z Goals of

dU c Action

00 1 2 3

Remount rapidly 82 1i 73 66

Cover other remounting members 84 66 74 81

Stow gear correctly 56 32 62 69

Support organic weapons to cover disengagement 84 - 81 73

Move to assembly area 81 - 75 82

Fire to cover movement to assembly area 89 - 75 82

Check gear for damage 71. - 64 50

Check ammo supplies 83 83 56 57

Report readiness to SL 86 81 58 70

SQUAD LEADER (SL)

Receive orders and plans from PL 63 69 78 69

Review terrain maps with DR and G/CTL 60 68 79 72

Discuss material and weapons needs with PL 67 85 85 78

Check rosters for combat ready personnel for

weapons needed by mission 52 76 81 69

Check conditions of NVDs 59 - 80 81

Supervise loading of vehicles 63 72 79 78

Inspect vehicles for equipment and organic

security 48 70 80 78

Review SOPs and special orders with squads 53 70 81 81

Mount vehicle 59 69 72 83

Observe terrain for concealed movement routes 76 .78 85 86

Observe terrain for enemy presence 33 87 74 88 86

Direct DR 78 82 78 86

Observe PL hand signals 68 75 66 80

Observe PL flashlight signals 70 75 66 80

Coordinate defensive squad fire 80 78 92 81

Communicate with PL as needed 82 79 79 76

Maintain proper movement configurations 83 77 78 82

Direct squad to dismount configuration 70 80 87 85

Conduct dismount 73 84 78 85

Receive sector assignments from PL 81 80 87 85

Assign positions 77 82 90 94

Establish communication network 34 87 80 82 88

Identify TRPs 35 90 82 62 92

Prepare range cards 36 90 - 89 92

Establish routes to subsequent position 37 93 82 90 92

14

. . - - -- '- . . ._ ._.. _.. _
Table 1. 2 (('ot.

Goals of

a M Action

a 1 2 3

Supervise obstacle and camouflage

construction 38 85 76 90 82

Coordinate plan for assembly 87 80 79 83

Direct mounted vehicle to correct

configuration 81 79 53 84

Coordinate squad firing in range 81 84 90 86

Communicate with PL on progress 71 82 80 83

Report enemy status to PL 80 72 90 83

Ndjust firing as necessary 39 86 87 90 88

Coordinate squad relocation if necessary 40 85 87 91 88

Direct relocation fire 41 88 86 92 88

Make new range cards as needed 42 86 86 91 84

Direct movement to assembly area 43 88 86 91 88

Direct cover fire while moving to

assembly area 44 87 83 89 91

Assign exposed fire team as needed when

mounted 45 89 85 90 91

Coordinate fire needs per PL instructions

while mounted 46 86 80 89 55

Direct remounting 83 72 72 83

Coordinate cover fire during remount 87 71 77 -

Direct squad movement during disengagement 47 88 68 79 88

Communicate with PL during disengagement 48 88 - 72 88

Direct proper movement to regrouping 49 87 - 72 86

Assess squad's infliction of damage on

enemy 80 78 78 75

Assess squad's received damage 84 77 81 80

Report assessments to PL 65 78 84 67

PLATOON LEADER (PL)

Receive orders and plans from company 53 62 79 72

Discuss orders and plans with platoon as

needed 55 64 79 74

Discuss material and weapons needs with

SLs 79 79 90 80

Discuss attachments 80 80 90 84

Conduct reconnaissance 50 88 55 92 93

15
Tai~t~ 1. 2 ((ont.

U Z M Goals of

Action

W a a 1 2 3

Check accuracy of terrain maps 51 86 68 92 91

Check with SLs on readiness 83 55 86' 86

Check with company on SOPs and

special orders 82 55 86 84

Check on support fire availability 52 88 79 88 85

Mount APC 82 55 81 90

Communicate formation signals by hand to

SLs 62 49 70 80

Communicate formation signals by flashlight to SLs 67 45 70 80

Identify terrain reference points 83 61 87 85

Communicate with company as required 80 79 81 85

Communicate by radio/wire to squad&as

necessary 78 80 91 88

Decide to engage unexpected fire or not 53 85 82 91 88

Direct mounted defense 54 84 - 91 88

Communicate with OPs 55 85 - 93 89

Request possible support fire requirements

from company 56 84 83 94 89

Direct approach configuration to mission

area 74 82 80 91

Process plan changes from company 72 82 84 90

Select positions for cover, concealment,

observation and fire 57 86 87 95 90

Communicate positioning to SLs 74 82 94 93

Select OP sights and posts 81 - 94 94

Post OPs 09 - - 94

Establish inter-squad communication

network 58 85 83 84 92

Assign locations to SLs 59 84 83 92 92

Select subsequent positions 72 81 94 92

Establish transition routes 81 79 92 92

Establish TRPs 60 84 82 96 92

Assign fire zones and targets 61 84 83 94 94

Position squad-detached APCs 83 82 92 92

Communicate with company and/or artillery

as needed 62 85 86 94 90

Establish obstacles and camouflage needs 82 80 91 89

Direct preparations of squads 78 82 93 86

Choose assembly area 74 87 82 90

16
Talb Li 1.2 (C'on1.)

Goals of

.4 W Action

M 1 O 1 2 3

Instruct squads and G/CTLs on assembly plans 75 85 77 90

Inspect for readiness 69 81 78 81

Select firing configuration for mounted

defense 84 82 82 81

Direct vehicle firing locations 63 87 82 85 89

Direct vehicle movement patterns 64 84 79 91 89

Coordinate firing using visual signals 80 74 90 80

Call indirect fires according to plans 81 85 92 88

Communicate with OPs and company as

necessary 65 86 88 82 92

Decide when (or if) to relocate 66 88 88 84 93

Coordinate SL reports and G/CTL reports of

enemy progress 80 68 82 92

Order relocation 67 88 89 79 93

Direct relocation cover 68 90 85 79 93

Coordinate changes in TRPs etc., after

relocation 69 85 86 94 89

Order move to assembly area 70 87 83 84 93

Direct protective fire for move to

assembly 71 88 82 87 93

Direct squad fire zones while mounted 72 87 80 87 91

Direct squad fire requirements while

mounted 73 89 79 87 91

Direct remounting 74 62 78 86

Coordinate remounting protective fire 82 75 81 85

Direct disengagement 74 84 77 87 85

Call indirect fire required for disengagement 75 91 76 88 92

Recall OPs 09 - 92 - Coordinate regrouping 76 86 67 89 88

Assess damage inflicted on enemy 83 54 89 77

Assess condition of platoon 88 54 75 79

Report mission status to company 72 81 75 78

Prepare for next mission 90 81 73 78

17

- . -
Table 1. 3

( i-nicality Hatins for' Tank FaTsk;

u z co

o 4 Goals of

0 0 cd Action

TANK PLATOON LEADER (TK PL) 1 2 3

Receive plans and order from the CDR 53 72 90 72

Coordinate with other PL 53 72 86 71

Coordinate with FIST Chief 56 72 84 75

Request attachments 39 58 45 71

Issue warning order 55 72 50 75

Conduct reconnaissance 52 72 59 71

Confirm accuracy of terrain maps with

ground 53 62 48 73

Coordinate with 81mm FO (Fire Planning) 1 78 72 86 75

Coordinate with ARTY FO (Fire Planning) 2 78 72 86 75

Select firing positions for tanks 3 82 86 86 75

Select observation posts 4 78 84 67 71

Select routes 5 66 80 44 76

Select alternate positions 6 82 86 84 75

Select supplementary positions 7 82 86 84 75

Check with TK CDRs to determine unit

readiness 46 62 45 77

Order PLT forward 44 78 25 77

Direct tactical movement of PLT enroute 55 78 25 80

Communicate positioning of tanks to

the "K CDRs 8 68 78 42 80

Use hand signals 47 80 42 64

Use flag signals 47 80 42 64

Operate intercom/radio 9 67 80 87 64

Discuss local security requirements

with PLT 55 84 76 73

Discuss material and weapons requirements

with TK CDRs 49 60 35 61

Order hot loop be established 52 61 73 73

Communicate obstacle and camouflage

requirements to PLT 50 72 69 74

Supervise defensive preparations 10 78 76 79 73

Inspect for readiness 11 73 84 49 73

Approve TK CDRs' firing data 12 72 84 82 71

Approve FO's fire plan 13 73 84 90 73

Prepare PLT terrain sketch 47 75 71 77

Prepare PLT fire plan 14 73 82 81 73

Escort TM CDR during his inspection 49 62 66 71

Mount tank 24 50 61 55

Report enemy sightings 53 86 75 74

Acquire targets 15 75 90 88 74

18
i'able 1. 3 (Wor.

U 7 V Goals of 4.J (V Action

4 a)01 2 3

Determine when to commence engagement 16 80 78 86 73

Order FO's to adjust fires 17 84 90 83 74

Control employment of coordinated PLT

tank fires 18 78 90 87 73

Operate laser range finder 19 71 85 88 74

Operate CDR's cupola 58 85 75 64

Track targets using periscopes 58 85 77 64

Issue crew fire commands 64 90 87 73

Override gunner's traverse 20 72 85 79 74

Fire 50 CAL MG 21 67 90 90 74

Conduct immediate action to correct

50 CAL malfunctions 56 85 81 64

Decide when to (if) to relocate 22 70 88 81 79

Order relocation of vehicles 60 88 81 79

Control formations on the move 23 71 90 72 79

Communicate positioning to TK CDRs 57 90 69 79

Adjust indirect fires 24 87 90 90 78

Reload 50 CAL MG 59 85 77 67

Initiate radiological monitor 47 58 14 69

Troubleshoot sighting equipment 61 80 75 65

Replace sight components 51 80 33 65

Troubleshoot cupola malfunctions 43 80 71 65

Troubleshoot communications malfunctions 46 80 75 63

Troubleshoot electrical malfunctions 46 80 75 63

Encode/decode messages 53 85 30 63

Transmit situation reports to CDR 56 90 51 76

Issue fragmentary orders 25 85 95 87 76

Issue spot reports 26 75 90 79 71

Assess damage inflicted on the enemy 60 85 74 73

Assess status of TK PLT 63 90 76 79

Request resupply as needed 54 80 81 63

Request medical support as needed 51 80 35 63

Redistribute supplies 64 80 76 63

Prepare for next mission 58 75 66 63

Decontaminate self 42 77 54 77

Identify chemical agents 52 85 44 74

Escape from burning tank 24 37 10 75

Escape from overturned tank 24 10 10 75

Escape from sinking tank 24 10 10 75

*19
'l'1) ' 1. 3 ( onl.

M Goals of

Z -I Action

TANK COMMANDER (TK CDR) U H 1 2 3

Receive plans and orders from TK PL 53 72 90 72

Coordinate other TK CDRs 53 72 85 71

Coordinate with gunner 27 79 90 88 74

Coordinate with driver 28 67 81 71 80

Cordinate with loader 51 90 88 73

Inspect tank engine 45 70 47 69

Inspect tank suspension and track 45 70 47 69

Inspect tank sighting and fire control 52 80 50 67

Conduct communications check 50 80 61 63

Inspect armament/ammunition 62 80 69 64

Control tank enroute 43 85 61 73

Interpret positioning instruction of TK PL 47 90 70 70

Occupy firing position 29 65 88 87 59

Implement local security instructions 52 80 62 70

Implement barrier and camouflage

instructions 56 80 68 69

Direct clearing of fields of fire 59 85 72 71

Prepare tank range card 59 83 83 70

Select targets for main gun 55 90 81 74

Select targets for 50 CAL 56 90 82 74

Select targets for COAX MG 56 90 82 74

Plan fire controi measures 30 86 90 85 71

Escort PL or TM CDR during inspection 31 70 73 75 76

Mount tank 58 75 71 69

Report enemy sightings 32 74 90 81 73

Acquire targets 33 72 90 90 71

Engage targets on order 34 72 90 90 71

Adjust indirect fires 35 88 90 90 74

Operate laser range finder 36 81 85 90 74

Operate CDRs cupola 58 85 75 64

Track targets 58 85 90 64

Issue crew fire commands 37 65 90 90 73

Traverse turret with override 72 85 89 74

Fire 50 CAL MG 38 67 90 90 74

Conduct immediate action to correct 56 80 89 64

50 CAL malfunctions 56 80 89 64

Decide when to (or if) relocate 39 66 90 88 79

Order relocation of vehicle 50 90 88 79

Control driver actions when moving 40 71 90 83 79

Reload 50 CAL MG as required 59 80 84 67

Troubleshoot sighting equipment 61 80 74 65

Troubleshoot fire controls 62 80 74 65

Troubleshoot communications equipment 46 80 74 63

Troubleshoot cupola malfunction 43 80 74 65

Encode/decode messages 53 80 39 63

20
Tb 1. 3 W(oWl.

U M Goals of

a - Action

Wa a0 1 2 3

Transmit status reports to TK PL 55 90 56 76

Transmit spot reports to TK PL 41 75 90 75 71

Assess damage inflicted on enemy 63 80 72 73

Assess status of tank 63 90 80 73

Request resupply as needed 47 80 67 63

Request medical support as needed 51 80 34 63

Redistribute supplies 47 80 71 63

Prepare for next mission 58 75 60 63

Decontaminate self 42 79 54 77

Escape from burning tank 24 10 10 75

Escape from sinking tank 24 10 10 75

Escape from overturned tank 24 10 10 75

TANK GUNNER (TK GR)

Assist TK DR in vehicle maintenance 45 50 42 79

Boresight COAX MG 50 80 49 73

Boresight main gun 55 80 59 73

Zero COAX MG 50 80 49 73

Zero main gun 55 80 59 73

Operate tank intercom 56 82 77 77

Prepare tank range card with TK CDR 52 83 85 72

Operate ballistics computer 58 90 85 72

Operate azimuth indicator 58 90 85 72

Identify target reference points 59 79 75 70

Identify map symbols on the ground 59 65 61 76

Determine fields of fire for main gun 61 87 85 71

Determine fields of fire for COAX MG 62 87 85 71

Advise TK CDR of deadspace in fields of fire 57 78 76 73

Acquire targets 42 84 88 89 74

Track targets 43 84 88 89 74

Receive fire commands from TK CDR 44 82 81 89 73

Fire main gun 45 82 90 89 73

Fire COAX MG 46 81 90 89 73

Diagnose turret/maingun/traverse

malfunctions 57 75 78 74

Diagnose sighting and fire control

malfunctions 57 85 79 74

Diagnose recoil malfunctions 57 85 74 74

Diagnose commo malfunctions 51 75 71 73

Measure radiation 51 49 46 74

21

41 t %-Y~- 2 _1 _ _--
T" abIc 1. 3 (Cont.

U 7 0 Goals of

Action

-. I V 1 2 3

Decontaminate self 48 49 46 77

Escape from burning tank 24 10 10 76

Escape from overturned tank 24 10 10 76

Escape from sinking tank 24 10 10 76

TANK LOADER (TK LDR)

Assist TK DR in vehicle maintenance 45 50 42 79

Load ammunition on tank 53 85 84 73

Operate tank intercom 53 80 82 73

Load COAX MG 47 72 85 90 73

Load 50 CAL MG 48 72 85 90 73

Handle main gun rounds 49 82 90 83 74

Load selected rounds 50 82 95 90 74

Conduct WPN safety checks 51 77 90 85 74

Conduct communications operation checks 52 76 80 85 76

Set head space and timing on 50. 53 72 66 77 74

Inventory ammunition 67 70 61 73

Operate breach mechanism 54 76 90 85 74

Operate fire/safety switch 55 76 90 80 74

Advise TK GR when COAX and main gun

can fire 56 77 90 85 73

Conduct immediate action to correct

COAX malfunction 57 72 85 72 74

Unload unoperational main gun rounds 58 71 85 72 74

Dispose of expended round cannisters 22 60 50 69

Advise TK CDR of ammo status 59 80 80 76

Assist TK CDR with observation 52 45 66 68

Camouflage tank 38 54 45 69

Dismount tar.k for local security 60 49 47 73

Install/remove field phones 52 58 51 64

Install/remove wire 52 58 51 64

Erect obstacles 59 67 67 65

Diagnose breach malfunctions 57 71 79 64

Implace/recover mines 64 68 67 65

Measure radiation 51 41 46 74

Decontaminate self 48 41 46 77

Escape from burning tank 24 10 10 76

Escape from overturned tank 24 10 10 76

Escape from sinking tank 24 10 10 76

22
Fb1' I.3 -nV.(( 

,o 0~ U z Goals of

Action -' o 1 2 3

TANK DRIVER (TK DR)

Inspect tank engine 45 80 31 79

Inspect tank track 45 80 31 79

Assist crew in maintenance 45 50 31 79

Install/remove engine 45 52 31 79

Install/remove track 45 50 31 79

Drive tank on level terrain 53 64 69 80

Drive tank on steep grades 53 64 69 80

Drive tank during periods of darkness

or limited visibility 61 t6 74 80

Drive tank on slide slopes 53 64 69 80

Drive tank over water obstacles 53 66 59 80

Camouflage vehicle 38 72 45 77

Drive tank in mud/snow/sand/ice 53 66 74 80

Drive tank in convoy 53 20 17 70

Install periscopes 50 76 23 70

Install IR periscope 50 77 23 70

Conduct before/during/after operations

checks 49 90 71 79

Prepare tank for normal operations 49 77 77 79

Prepare tank for water operations 50 77 77 79

Prepare tank for cold weather operations 49 77 77 79

Prepare tank for hot weather operations 49 77 77 79

Operate intercom 50 79 71 74

Refuel tank 52 65 33 74

Dismount tank for local security 55 79 67 65

Erect obstacles 59 77 67 63

Implace/recover mines 64 76 67 63

Measure radiation 51 68 46 74

Decontaminate self 47 49 46 77

Decontaminate tank 42 49 46 79

Escape from burning tank 24 10 10 76

Escape from sinking tank 24 10 10 76

Escape from overturned tank 24 10 10 76

Prepare tank for recovery 48 75 44 79

Si 23
"'FabIt, 1.4

('I ltlalt" Wlliis fo "T STl, Tasks

U) Goals of

- 0 Ca Action

FIST CHIEF U & 1 2 3

Receive orders and plans from TM CDR 1 65 70 14 69

Coordinate with TM CDR 2 65 69 22 70

Coordinate with PLs 3 64 69 40 62

Coordinate with FSO 4 61 69 33 28

Coordinate with 4.2" FO 47 63 22 53

Coordinate with ARTY FO TIS 53 69 86 62 Coordinate with FS NCO 54 63 87 84

Coordinate with 4.2" FDC 56 63 44 47 Coordinate with 8 1mm FDC 56 44 44 34 Coordinate with DS BAT FDC 56 69 92 49

Conduct observation post reconnaissance 57 71 56 81

Conduct route reconnaissance 37 51 48 79 Confirm accuracy of terrain maps 37 25 44 68 Identify key TRPs 49 29 45 67

Select OPs 5 59 66 87 93 Identify targets 54 68 83 76

Transmit target intelligence 55 51 71 62 Establish TRPs 56 59 69 67 Establish FPFs 58 72 60 83 Establish TGPs 57 71 67 76

Plan WPN SYS, round, FUZE, MOE, & MOC for

each target 6 61 66 74 56

Use field binoculars 58 66 84 74

Operate NOD 58 66 84 74

Operate laser locator-designator 7 60 66 86 73

Operate digital message device 58 66 75 72

Use compass 54 48 60 56

Operate radio 54 55 79 61

Operate field telephone 57 68 72 9

Establish communications with the supported CDR

(wire & radio) 56 62 77 14

Establish communications with the ARTY FOs (wire & radio) 51 69 79 26

Establish communications with the ARTY FDC (wire & radio) 51 69 79 26

Use CEOI (book) 29 29 24 11

Orient for direction 8 64 90 76 73

24

2 _.. ..... _ _l
ldbL 1. 4 ((o-.

S Godls Of

U C: Action oo2 1 3

Determine exact position on the ground 9 59 90 76 65

Prepare a terrain sketch 54 64 75 81

Prepare initial target list 54 64 71 90

Prepare initial target overlay 54 64 72 90

Transmit target list to FSO 55 19 33 10

Encode target information using KAL61 66 19 27 60

Transmit hasty target lists using gridded

thrust line 57 19 27 70

Make use of CEOI extract of the gridded

template coding table 56 19 27 40

Acquire targets 55 81 82 82

Determine target range 45 81 85 82

Make appropriate call for fire (grid, polar,

shift, etc.) 56 79 92 82

Observe effects of fire 58 79 81 85

Correct for range 56 81 73 78

Correct for deviation 56 79 69 78

Adjust corrective fires 10 59 81 73 81

Engage targets of opportunity 11 59 85 69 81

Adjust CLGP (laser) 12 62 86 70 80

Adjust smoke missions 56 79 43 85

Adjust open sheaf missions 57 77 43 73

Adjust converging sheaf mission 54 62 69 60

Adjust irregularly shaped target 54 73 71 60

Determine when to request a fire for

effect 58 80 77 67

Determine when to request end of mission 13 67 80 77 67

Adjust registration mission 56 34 21 5

Adjust ICM mission 14 64 82 70 76

Adjust counterfire mission 15 63 84 45 70

Advise CDR in use of direct fire WPNS to

suppress EN 56 77 64 75

Adjust immediate suppression 16 59 75 64 75

Monitor FO CFF 59 47 33 64

Approve FO CFF 17 67 53 54 72

Redirect FO CFF 18 62 68 84 83

Request FSO provide GS artillery support 19 66 79 84 83

Adjust TACAIR 20 65 86 84 81

Adjust high burst 21 67 71 50 66

Adjust attack helicopters 22 65 86 84 81

Adjust naval gun fire 64 86 84 81

Adjust mortars 23 62 62 61 81

Mount APC 54 10 42 58

Adjust illumination 24 62 55 75 52

25

p *
Tabe 1. 4 (Con-.

UZ

_4 Goals of

r_ o Action

S 0 1 2 3

Adjust danger close 25 60 81 69 82

Adjust fire by sound 54 68 58 64

Adjust multiple missions 26 65 82 71 79

Direct actions of FS NCO 57 52 74 79

Diruct actions of RTO 54 26 46 74

Direct actions of driver 57 18 19 68

Report target engagement results 27 63 78 46 28

Order relocation of FIST 28 60 85 67 93

Relay calls for fire 29 67 81 79 80

Talk inexperienced observer through CFF 58 81 79 80

FORWARD OBSERVER (FO)

Receive plans and orders from FIST Chief 30 66 77 57 72

Receive plans and orders from PL 31 65 81 92 84

Coordinate with FIST Chief 32 62 72 43 52

Coordinate with PL 33 65 81 78 81

Coordinate with RTO 54 40 46 51

Coordinate with FDC 34 61 69 46 49

Conduct OP reconnaissance 57 39 60 67

Conduct route reconnaissance 37 39 39 84

Confirm accuracy of terrain maps 37 34 34 61

Identify key TRPs 49 34 35 61

Select OPs 35 59 78 85 86

Identify targets 54 65 88 73

Transmit target intelligence 53 48 71 69

Select TRPs 56 57 61 76

Establish FPs 58 72 78 89

Establish target groups 57 77 87 87

Use field binoculars 58 73 82 78

Operate NOD 58 73 82 78

Operate laser locator-designator 36 60 58 88 78

Operate digital message device 58 82 82 78

Use compass 54 58 72 68

Operate radio 54 59 82 73

Operate field telephone 57 56 77 50

Establish communications with FDC 51 73 76 68

Use CEOI 29 57 17 47

Orient for direction 37 64 90 85 82

Determine exact location on the ground 38 59 90 85 82

Prepare terrain sketch 54 64 62 82

Prepare target list 54 64 56 82

Prepare target overlay 54 64 56 82

Encode target information using KAL61 56 64 15 72

Transmit target list 55 64 26 82

26 2 _ _

t ~ Wi ,. ~ ' -'-~ ________------------------------- -.- _____
'IaLl, 1. 4 (('on.

U z o Goals of

S a) -4 Action -.c0 so 1 2 3

Transmit hasty target list using gridded

THRUSTLINE 57 64 29 82

Make use of CEOI extract on the gridded

template coding TB 57 64 25 72

Acquire targets 39 59 69 92 81

Determine range of target 40 59 69 88 81

Determine direction of target 41 59 69 88 81

Place appropriate CFF (grid, polarplot, shift, etc.) 56 85 91 81

Observe effects 58 85 81 76

Correct for range 56 92 83 81

Correct for deviation 56 87 82 79

Adjust fires 58 87 85 81

Engage targets of opportunity 42 59 87 80 89

Adjust CLGP 43 59 92 79 87

Adjust smoke missions 56 87 49 89

Adjust open sheaf missions 57 65 51 85

Adjust converging sheaf missions 54 65 79 86

Adjust irregularly shaped target missions 54 66 66 84

Determine when to request fire for effect 58 79 91 85

Determine when to request end of mission 44 67 50 73 85

Adjust registration missions 56 52 21 51

Adjust ICM missions 45 64 79 70 83

Adjust counterfire missions 46 63 57 45 87

Adjust immediate suppressive fires 47 59 74 64 87

Adjust TACAIR 48 65 85 84 87

Adjust high burst missions 49 67 71 50 71

Adjust attack helicopters 50 65 86 84 87

Adjust naval gunfire 64 86 84 87

Adjust mortars 51 62 63 61 87

Adjust illumination 52 62 55 75 51

Adjust danger close 53 60 84 69 90

Adjust fire by sound 54 68 58 63

Adjust multiple mission 54 65 85 71 81

Report target engagement results 55 63 78 46 28

Relay calls for fire 56 67 86 79 80

Talk an inexperienced observer through

a call for fire 58 81 79 80

t 27

1I-
I- A - 1. 4 ( l.

Goals of

SUPOT FSNC)Action

FIRE SUPPORT NCO (FS NCO) 1 2 3

Receive plans and orders from FIST Chief 57 66 67 55 90

Coordinate with FIST Chief 56 63 65 90

Supervise FIST driver 55 14 10 70

Supervise FIST RTO 57 14 39 63

Request FIST rations 30 5 5 15

Request FIST water 1 30 5 5 15

Request FIST fuel 30 5 5 15

Request FIST ammo 32 7 5 15

Procure FIST rations 32 5 5 15

Procure FIST water 32 5 5 15

Procure FIST fuel 32 5 5 15

Procure FIST ammo 32 7 5 15

Issue rations 31 5 5 15

issue water 32 5 5 15

Issue ammo 32 7 5 15

Supervise maintenance activities 27 10 5 35

Supervise camouflaging activities 51 22 21 16

Monitor communications on mortar PLT fire

control nets 47 69 58 71

Record target lists sent by mortar FO's

to FDC 58 75 37 71

Assist FIST Chief consolidate company

target list 58 75 38 71

Assist FIST Chief prepare target overlay 58 75 38 75

Coordinate with mortar PLT FDC Chief 54 76 74 61

Act as vehicle commander 38 34 26 71

Redirect FO CFFs 58 72 79 81 84

Mount vehicle 15 11 11 67

Prepare range card 47 54 14 49

Coordinate local security 48 51 18 53

Report results of mortar engagements to

FIST Chief 57 69 44 63

RADIO TELEPHONE OPERATOR (RTO)

Operate radio 52 83 82 79

Operate field telephone 59 60 77 70 64

Install remote communications device 58 76 42 50

Install secure communications device 58 77 42 48

Lay wire (WD/I) 56 76 42 49

Monitor radio communications 45 62 44 69

Monitor field telephone communications 45 62 44 63

Operate switchboard 43 58 42 54

Transmit messages 55 83 52 54

28 L 1'--- - - -
TabLe 1. 4 (Cont.)

o. U Goals of

S M Action CO Vo 1 2 3

Record messages 26 28 20 44 Repeat CFFs 40 83 81 65

Be prepared to adjust fires if ordered

to do so 54 87 90 87

-..

: " 29
Goals of

x C Act ion

BATTERY EXECUTIVE OFFICER (XO) U 013

Serve as acting battery CO 40 S2- Si

Supervise battery when it occupies a firing

position 1 80 82 S9 89

Lay the battery when it occupies a firing

position 2 78 90 89 89

Measure and report directions 3 68 66 66 79

Determine minimum quadrant elevation 60 i)6 66 79

Supervise section chiefs during boresighting 40 63 66 69

Control fires of the battery 4 83 90 90 89

Insure before, during, after DPS maintenance

is performed 35 48 30 64

Insure area improvements are completed in

accordance with BC's order 44 74 79 88

Insure sections store, segregate and protect

ammo 5 79 58 66 71

Render XO's report to FDC 56 48 90 60

Insure intra-battery communications are

established 65 77 72 62

Insure safe firing practices are observed

in battery 40 29 34 35

Insure each section chief knows location of

his supplementary position 62 72 84 89

Insure each section chief has reconned route

to supplementary position 62 72 84 89

Coordinate with ISG to determine fire sectors

for each Howitzer 60 72 85 89

Supervise section chiefs in preparing range

cards 52 52 75 79

Insure ammo is distributed in accordance with

anticipated needs of FDC 6 75 62 74 76

HOWITZER SECTION CHIEF (HOW SC)

Insure his weapon is properly emplaced 7 72 84 81 80

Insure weapon is ready for action 8 72 84 83 80

Lay weapon 9 73 84 90 80

Select aiming points for gunner 10 73 70 75 67

Site to the crest 11 77 70 75 67

:30
Tabk-' 1. 5 ((ont.

Goals of

Action

M J0 1 2 3

Order when to boresight 12 77 70 65 10

Order azimuths marked 13 77 63 78 10

Order the prefire checks performed 14 68 63 65 10

Position local security 51 61 78 83

Supervise camouflaging 44 10 40 83

Supervise construction of field

fortifications 5522 44 85

Measure and report site to the crest 15 77 43 75 61

Determine piece to crest range 16 77 43 75 61

Supervise section during firing 17 83 84 90 85

Observe and check functioning during

firing 44 15 61 75

Report observed malfunctions or errors 44 15, 61 75

Inspect ammo storage, segregation, and

protection 50 15 5 75

Inspect maintenance performed 60 5 5 22

Insure on board ammo and gear is stored

properly 53 10 5 21

Prepare range cards for all section crewserved WPNS 53 56 41 72

Control his howitzer fires during direct

fire engagement 50 86 68 90

Organize section for continuous operation 56 62 70 76

Maintain firing and maintenance records 24 5 5 24

GUNNER (GR)

Lay cannon on initial direction of fire with

aiming circle 18 75 87 86 89

Lay cannon on initial direction of fire with

compass 19 75 87 86 89

Lay cannon on initial direction of fire with

distant aiming point 20 75 87 86 89

Lay cannon on initial direction of fire by

reciprocal lay of another cannon 21 75 87 86 89

Verify direction of fire with reciprocal

check as control piece 22 75 87 80 84

Verify direction of fire with reciprocal

check as adjacent piece 23 75 87 80 84

Verify direction of fire with reciprocal

check using lighting device 24 75 87 80 76

Align collimater/aiming posts 64 64 59 62

31

P . ... 7.....................-- ~
Tabir 1. 5 (('ot.

U Z E Goals of

H 5 r Action

0o 1 2 3

Boresight the panoramic telescope with

the MAO aligrment device 25 72 64 78 87

Boresight the panoramic telescope with

a distant aiming point 26 72 64 78 87

Boresight the panoramic telescope with

the collimater 27 72 64 78 87

Boresight the panoramic telescope using

the testing target 28 72 64 78 87

Set/lay cannon for deflection 29 79 87 84 89

Sight on a target during direct fire with

panoramic telescope 52 90 82 90

Refer the piece 30 75 64 80 71

Determine the altitude of a point using a

map 30 5 6 27

Convert grid to magnetic azimuth 30 5 6 79

Convert magnetic to grid azimuth 30 5 6 79

Measure an azimuth on a map using a protractor 34 5 6 79

Measure ground distance on a map 34 5 6 79

Locate an unknown point on a map by intersection 30 5 17 79

Locate an unknown point on a map by resection 30 5 5 79

Orient a map with a compass 31 74 5 10 89

Orient a map by terrain association 32 74 5 10 89

Determine present location by terrain

association 33 79 5 6 89

Select movement route using a map 48 5 11 89

Navigate from one point to another using map

and compass 48 5 16 89

Locate a point on a map using the military gridref system 34 72 5 6 84

Lead a security patrol 41 5 20 58

CREWMEMBER (CM)

Prepare a position to receive/emplace a cannon 65 38 87 77

Guide vehicles using arm and hand signals 56 29 87 77

Guide vehicles using flashlight signals 56 29 87 77

Engage/disengage tube travel lock 23 5 6 49

Emplace/recover spades 35 5 15 49

Lay communications wire to FDC 35 82 38 35 35

Connect wire to telepost terminal on

vehicle 36 82 38 35 35

Emplace/recover collimater 37 71 29 35 18

32 r! A
I4

I['L 1.5 ((ori .

A Ct ic

Emplace/recover aiming posts 38 71 YO 5S

Boresight the direct fire telescope

using distant aiming point

Transport cannon ammo onto the vehicle 61 29 K Prepare cannon ammo for helicopter resupply 6- )4

Operate material handling hoist on M 548 cargo elq

Store ammo at a cannon position 39 6b 1 4 Protect the ammo 5O _,I)

Segregate the ammo by type 6 20

Monitor and relay fire commands 40 85 , Prepare ammo for firing 41 85 S , Recognize ammo types by color coding 42 85 f ,O , Identify fuzes and fuze wrenches by type 43 85 eli

Fuze the projectile 44 8- ., : Set the fuze using the proper fuze setter 45 83 j L, 1

Prepare propellant charge 46 85 sS .

Set!lay cannon for quadrant with the

range quadrant 47 75 6 ) " Measure the quadrant with the range

quadrant 65 65 -3 70

Sight on a target with a direct fire/elbow

telescope 55 75 7 81: 

Load a "prefixed" round 57 79 76 65

Load a "separately-loaded" round 57 79 76 65

Ram a projectile with the power rammer 57 79 h7 55

Fire the cannon 57 90 89 90

Place unfired powder increments in the powder

pit 23 5 5 13

Clear powder chamber 20 5 5 5

Command "check fire" when unsafe conditions exist 20 10 5 16

Clear and maintain victim's airway 20 5 5 35

Stop bleeding 20 5 5 35

Treat for shock 20 5 5 35

Decontaminate casualties 20 5 5 35 Recognize/mark CBR hazards 33 5 5 60 Mask on signal 27 5 5 60

Decontaminate self, equipment, supplies 27 5 5 78

Install and operate TA312/PT 46 45 71 5

Operate vehicle intercom 27 45 66 73

Lay and maintain wire 46 45 71 5

Measure magnetic azimuth with M2 compass 30 5 5 79

Measure ground distance by pacing 15 5 5 79

Report enemy information 61 82 78 83

Process and evacuate captured enemy 33 5 3 43

Identify personnel using challenge and passwork 32 5 5 33

Camouflage self, weapon, equipment 56 5 5 74

33 .

.7 -,- _
Table 1.5 (('owi.

-z Goals of - Action

4 C3 Hu a)c UC 1 2 3

Construct individual defensive position 45 5 87 58

Prepare range card 53 5 87 70

Cross danger areas 41 5 5 84

Use M16 rifle 48 81 76 75

Prepare to fire and engage target with LAW 49 81 76 80

Use M203 grenade launcher 49 81 76 80

Emplace/recover claymore mine 48 81 76 74

Use hand grenade 40 75 76 55

Operate M60 MG 48 81 79 79

Operate CAL 50 MG 48 82 79 79

Engage ground targets with M60 MG 48 82 79 79

Engage ground targets with CAL 50 MG 48 82 79 79

Engage aerial targets with M60 MG 48 79 79 78

Engage aerial targets with CAL 50 MG 48 79 79 78

Inspect and clean aiming posts lighting devices 22 5 5 5

Clean tube and chamber 29 5 5 5

Clean chamber evaculator, valves, muzzle brake 29 5 5 5

Operate Ml09Al Howitzer under unusual conditions 48 84 92 88 86

34

4r -- jr --.-- ~ ~ - ~ - _ _ _ __ _ - - --- -.- ~~ - _
CttAP'FtL II

SC ENA HIOS

An active defense scenario in a mid-European environment is presented. Beginning with the general situation it

focuses successively on a Brigade/Task Force, a combined

arms team within the Task Force, and on three types of defensive actions carried out by the various elements within the

team.

This chapter describes the actions of a combined arms team dt'rndinlo

against a breakthrough attack by numerically superior threat fo 'ces. The

chapter is divided into several parts, each dealing with the a(.tions of a separate tactical element of a combined arms team: a task force, a mechani,:edinfantry team, an armor platoon, a fire support team (FIST), and an artillery

battery. The evaluation of human performance in each of thesc elements,

described within the body of these Guidelines, is based on this four part scenatrio.

A brief description of the doctrine and principles on which the organization and use of forces described here are based prefaces scenario.

Part I of the scenario itself is a description of the general situation involving a battalion task force in the active defense. The focus of the team

level scenario is on the command and control measures used by the Team

Commander to influence the actions of his subordinate leaders and their units

in fighting the defensive battle. Because the execution of the active defense

during continuous operations depends heavily on the reorganization and redeployment of company-team size units, the questions of coordination and of

command and control demand consideration and examination.

Flowing from the scenario are three distinct platoon actions or missions: (1) repel an attack from a battle position, (2) create and defend a

strong point, and (3) disengage and move to occupy another battle position.

These three platoon actions are not all inclusive. Rather, they were selected as representative of the kinds of critical actions in which a combined

arms team would be involved during the execution of the active defense. The

actions are not to be thought of as sequential or in a plausible order. Rather

they are samples of activity that might occur at any time and in any order.

Part II of the scenario focuses on a subordinate unit of Team ACE,

i. e., mechanized infantry platoons. Each of the three platoon actions previously listed, is the basis of a separate platoon scenario.

__ 35__ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ __ I
SimfiliatiI, Par t III ot tii(, skenat-io desc tibes the actions taken by

lI antis inl siuppol-t 01 li ilpallv Itcainl dii i i each1 of thle ti e i is t mckI

itl&oon a ions111. Agtain, tis yields three tank stc-naiios.

1

Pa i IV is coick-iilied %%itli FIST' and Pait. V is clour red with the.

ations of theik howitzer section of a 155mmn- SP ar-tillery battery. Tile

di ie ic nt s.ittiat jolis d es c ibed differi slightly" from thle te ( fens ivo

plao ont actionis. The first artillery scena~rio deCscribes thle howitzer section

Cirli) ill supplort, 0f a tram that is under attack (without tile howkitzer section

A 1ii1alVli" )' 11de21 n1 altack itself). This corresp)onds to tilie maILneuver tIe,-

ii tt ~:liun attac-k. Ill the second artillery scenar-io, the howitzer

hill sn ppOlI of a mla lietivert i lit that is not. cuirrently under ttc

li ori-t spoid s approxim-alyl to the sitiuationl of a maneuveur platoon

Okc HI)Viil anld piprgto defend a battle position prior to being attacked.

[lially lt ihir-d artillery SLcnar'io describes thle howitzer section firing

iii sn upport of th-a in which is under attack while displac ing to avoid the

If ts of outtrbattery fires. This c~orresponds to the m-aneuver action

if ileitali aid withidrax\ int under pressure to ocup a new batl posit ion.

Pr-inc-iples of Active Defense

Slinc, the U.S. Armyv tlenents inl Europe wvill inevitably need to con-

(!Llt I illasSiveieesv operations duringr any next war, proper defense

aiAillSt aiid dief eat of enem-iy attacks wilbe of primec importance for the

initiaL 4k'8 to 72 hlours 01' thle -onlflict.

The scenario is based on a representative mid-European environmenit. It! purpose is to de-pict a phase of the conflict emphasizing the tankinchani: ed defensive operationis during a three to five dlay period of' prolonged 1-attic involving a wkide variety of environmental conditions. Starting

With tHeL active defense against deliberate attack, the scenario examines the

roles and activities of the combined arms task force, its company teams,

and finally, comiposite platoons.

Thet scenario assumes that the defense wil be outnumbered by a

ratio of six to One dlui'ing thle first 48 hours of the outbreak of hostilities.

Thell magnitude \% itli which these first operations are conducted is expected

to put etmestreUss On t',IC defenders.

Conkcept of thle Defense

hebattalion task force ofr the scenario is a part of a large force.

But, because of the need to limit the scenario, this TV' and thle activities

are considered to be representative of all operations. The defending TF

Must not only defe at the attacking enemy force, but it must also keep) its

own losses to a minimum. The most immediate challenges facing the deCfender are to:

36Li
(a) ilustiroy the enliemly

Mb wear- dowvn enemy f'orctes prior io a6s inimg the

offels u

(c) forrce the enemy to mauss so that firk (-arl be

cotirentirated onl him

(d) r-etain or- deny terriain, 1'acilities , installations,

and activitie s, or' pie'se rye, f'ort s os srntiai

to the mission

(e) gain timle for- activities etsexvhc u.

Becaus e wI anticipate that the cit (rd ing' f'oirk %%xill he( outnU In ht'I'O_

hede fulIlsk! is arlivU and ma~kes maIXiIIum 11f t v U.Se o1 its mobilit x and

fire p0w e 1*

iDef'etse Against Echeloned AttaCks

since the( opposing rot, , attacks in et hclons , 1.t (21u icti C at tt 0pt 5

to detl'at each echelon arid to hiay ral u effetive f'oic( ra(dy to oppose Cart 11

susequent echeclon. The battalion T 1 arnd its or-ganic c-ompanlytem -

gage', the attacking for-ce f-rm battle positions (13 Ps) or- strong~ points. Wi\hun

1Ii. resary, these def~ensive positions air mnoved d epending onl the thrteat xvii hin

the, d efenrs ive sector-.

At nighit black lights, artive N11li scopes, and nighlt vision oggirs aire

available to assist ill moving to altui-nate BPs. Given anl eliCry capaubility ' vo

advanicing live kphi at. nighit ag;i inst the cover-ing for-ce, the same spet-d oress (.rn be assumled f'or per-iods of' limited visibility wvhell oppiosed by a

cover-irig forre.

fin the scenario, thle def'endinig Division (om marid IC1, tisiri all avail -

able inteligenice, identities the 1st Brigade 's sertor' as thu( point of' tic birakthrough1101 attack k. The Corinmandei- plans to ronkcrnti-a' e his dorir risiv(, rutoi-ts

in this soctor'. The(, indicatedi initially unf'avor-able r-atio of six to one is i511lfedi iii this scetiario to have been redured by use 01' oflct o mbiltod

atrins f'ire to a manageable three to one( r-atio by the t ilml o0' this s'; r-laio.

Tie (Amrnnndvir is fared with conducting a l epreserintative, artive defrrisr .

[undamnentals of' the Active Defense

- The fundamentals of' the active dulense are( tile saime at night. as dtrring

the (day:

(1) Slow the enemny rate of' move!ment. Since lc he atnot 5( i-vic 0" all

the tar~gets at once, the defendert must slow the enemy diowvn to increcase target

exposure(- time and all- de fending gunner's to "'se r-vi('e more taiget s. (*onl4ventional inines and 01P'avles alev positioned onl anticipated enemy ave-nues of'

3~7
Lipp, (t.,i'i Iheroic thle bethc gins. Hio" ti, iwsuitv linpiced Obmalul.-

(s Ited In Ines) %%ill be eIn 1)oveti ill Li,0 ' it I, e Iih Ile (- LtI al iloV, Of

(2) Boeg itt attrtion 1017U the' 'lle l I ll-lin d As the h L I.It a I!)-

irwies the NI\1A, artillery fire fioin untils %ilhin ik, AeMA aug-inerr -h

it, o Ietltuit (j VA eleinerlls. Tactical aii is dit e eiagis .1 -

1, It ura ~ t-ii oIt as eniemy SPCOri ci* hitlon fore es a id shliftcd to stippotI 1

ilitnei%,,hent thieir situutiolls he(eo:ri( t ritieal.

(>) 1 itaihe -!i-m a -,,~ Iie naXitnurn11 effeet ivi rjllg of, tijicl fire

V. ap~77. li titi is; iauatli thtt axirnttun effeetive rantge of each

d'i t t6ltt % aupl lii l iittary z. cpon 0-steums1 thaI teteirmimt ho1w ii

1),l-,ai i no ide i fih. s t iii bat ii ale tanks, antlit ank gud i missiles,

,riti (iltecT .4th1i)[M t aitLILIet'.

(4) Atid V. 'apoils ss emis. "Elie dei 7diit battalion \%tvill ud V ajU

5151:ns Ailre aililleX %%ill be adited 1o the deedrsetor lby lalleral

I ''sioltlrille of 111115 ill adjacent S(ito5' arid by shifting fire from less

Vtr ratI kd a es . Art ier wvtill s10ow tanks byV use of smioke, imr7171 1)I0d

itjrviliiitionul mniitis, 'guidted prioje ctiles, iol)i eX[)Iosive- an-munition, and

1111-rdballe Mnes. (oMutritfre agai atta(Aking uitillery will reduce the

al ottillt () Stl.J)iWS1ii the twemyt ion diret Idaait-s the defentder arnd will

111 1 a Sth li bilil v of AIC; 'I to i lt4 014 earily and e rig age, anti "ill red In

iii- difitier's vlniecbility du 111 i repiiltining. Te cannton launiehed

rit'Iirrl irolilri sitl %%11ill giveA a tank killirng 1capability beyond the ranige of'

dire I iir WI ajiors. Ataick huelcopteis 11111 also ink1 rease the tank killing

r-Igair7ertclt tar71gLe OtTO tilre "17target s.nrvirg" pi-obleri. Attlack hliCopirs "AlQrHjlfom11 points out of rtige of e 171er71y artillery and

atiiioritl AT(; \ forces will be moved quitckly by heiope to tanik pr oo

ier vin ott the flaniks of' tireatk ned arteas Or added to thle ocsof' a sti-lngpo1)101

(5) Keep Ite defense flexible andi elastic. Thev most difficult task

lit dii- active defense is to inflict ruaxinurin dam age without bco(ming "SO

closely ertglage d that thle deferidete is fixed in position by enemy action. Thel(,

effetiveessof the active defense depends onl rn-ateuveirg battle positions

day. or night to orbit on the enemy force, creating strong p~oints only xhert

n((.essary to hold vital teli-ri or to provide a base or pivot arourid which

othrer forces (.a71 mtaneuver 01 counterattack. Companies will make rapid

arid often fighting moves to ne!w battle positions. Battaliorn corninanders ma-iy

lured compiarty tleams in their entirety, or they may permnit independent

operations al the comptlany level while they coordinate thle irnteraction of'

tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, and air support.

((3) Destroy weakened enemy forces. When the most advanced enemy

formations have been weakened by attrition, confused by the maneuvering active

defense and demoralized by losses, they will be destroyed. Defending elements

will maneuver to battle positions on the flank or to the rear of the enemy forces

where tank guns and missiles can attack by fire without physically closing with

38
,,1, lne my torIte. W\hen it becomes litcc 5 sal V ' to t lose! i.iti heU cltel(iM to

dc's t to Iis h torce, counter-attacks %% ill take, routes that provide ( over1 I'rv011

.,t.,mYfl ovcixxatc.hirg fire arid %%ill maximniz e the capability of tank and

AT \ ire betore closinig with thle t.ie mV. Companies oi- baitaliolls %x IL

ecUkIUte' these counlte -a ttac. ks ofttel.

Conduct of' th(t Attive Defense by a Battalion Task Fortce: ( ene cal Situation

The0 scenarLIio cont ainis re ferences to coordinatt 5 arid locations xxinchi

calbe id entified by ic Le ent e to the followingl map): ;rran,1 :25, 000,

C -2 (Cobuig) over-piiiited.

U. S. L'ortes. The 54th lnif Div (Mcch), part. of' the I U. S. Corps,

hias rahda tiine ioerially along thle northern side or' thle highxxu av wCiih

IlMIS from11 PA350665 to PA490650. At 081000 July, thle division waus inf'lrmt(d that. eIleents of' the I Corps to the ir east had reachekd lte Main I iv ci

and %%oeie precpa ring for a river crossing operation xvhith1 votrld ! ake plIace

in three days. I Corps elements to thle northwest of thle 54th lf lDiv ( Mech)

have met increasing opposition and have been ordered to coritinu,tri at, at k

tuntil 011 line wvithi the 54th lnf Div (_Mech). Thle 54th lnif Div (iMlech) has btrr~

or-dered to defend in its precsent location and to be prepared to attack onl

r-d er.

Enemy. Aggressor resistance incieased steadily as hie xvas driveni

south toxvard the 'Main River. Elemenrts of' the Aggressor 121 FtrsilierMotorized Rifle Division of the 19th Combined Arms Arm y have been

identified opposite thle 54th lnf Div (Mlech). Aggressor mnole is good and

his forces al-e at 90 pelrcent authorized strength. There ale no knoxvn

supply def'iciencies.

Air. Both friendly and enemny Forces have the capability of achieving

local air superiority for limited periods o1' time.

Nuclear Weapons. Both friendly and enemny fortes hav e a nIuclear

capability. Neither force has used this capability to date.

Weather. The weather forecast for the next four days is as folloxvs:

Rainy during the period 8-13 July with scattered cloud cover'. Severe

thunderstorms possible daily between 1300 and 1700. Ceiling during thundeistorms will be 500 feet. Visibility extremely limited in early morning

until 0700 due to ground fog. Excellent at other times except during heavy

showers. The wvind is out of the northwest at five to eight knots. Temperature ranges between 55 degrees F' and 75 degrees 1-1.

Terrain. The terrain in the brigade area is characterized by irolling, forested hills with steep slopes in some areas. The forests are generally cleared of underbrush; however, thle size and spacing o1' the trees

39

3 I
wilI post. soicm I, slik iuns on vehicular novem, n;. The soil in the l ox'.,':

aleas is ,omposed o: klay and silb alluvium deposited 1 the. sTI'eams.

-Xi hilil 't" e -alevaions, bIac.'k loam is prealent wine the plateaus at a

mixtur, of Lay, loam, and . ray, \. Man mad tel' 'ain fealur s inucjunt

villas'., road uis and e('mbankn III , I'ok'k %%alts, and roads. Ail of liet

sr',ams in :h a lea al'' fordable.. Th, 11 I ivel is fordable with diflic.ulTV

and \%ill lequil'e .- tnle eln)iter-n. %york to fa'ilitate ci-ossino.

)etfelnsive Older"

At 081015 July, the 1st BDIE, 54th lnf )iv ( Meeh) I c lves an order

to de eiid along the northern sice of the tailroad, lA40 864 to PA47 3665

1o appr'oximailcv three to five daYve.

Task Vorce Organi-alion, 1st BD"

The 1st BE is constituted as follows:

T V 4-78 .lTech heavy

TV'" 4-79 Mech heavy

TI" 4-80 Mech heavy

T I' 2-4 A rfmor heavy

TI-' - 9-50 VA (155, SI)

A Btry (-) (3-454) (V) (AD) (MS)

A/54 Engr (CBT) DS

cominmex. 'arn 54th ASACO.

Initial Sequence of Events

The enemy attacked with one division in two echelons of two regiments

each. On the West he used one tank regiment of about 100 tanks followed

and ovetwatched by another. On the East, because of closer terrain and

the rain, he attacked with one tank regiment followed by a motorized rifle

On the West, the long range fire of the HAWS and tanks from all thre.

positions have destroyed 40 to 50 tanks of the lead regiment near Both a

Vorst and the BDE CO reorients that portion of his defense.

TF 4-78 is defending the western section of the 1st BDE area and

is organized and positioned as follows: TM BLUE, BP 42; 'FM G-EEN, BP

45; and TM ACE, BP 41. The next level of the scenario will concentrate on

the teams of TV 4-78 (See Figure 2. 1).

Organization of TF 4-78. The following list shows the make-up of the

teams in TF 4-78:

40 A
TM ACE TM BLUE TM GREEN TM TANK TM CON

A/4-78(-) C/4-78(-) B/2-4 Armor(-) C/l-70th Armor(-) 1/A/54

3/C/2-4 Armor 2/C/2-4 Armor 2/C/4-78 Armor l/A/4-78 Eng (DS)

1 AT Section 2 AT Section 1 GSR Team I AT Sectiona

1 GSR Team

Thelie o loiii' nltotcs furtle' r 'xpandi T-" 4-78's -iiuatio::

(1) Since TMv-BLUE has the tauigest fielus of fi'' atI

contrtols the most likely tank approach into the area,

thu team has at least three tanks plus IIA\%S.

(2) TIM ACE has a forested area to its front and is

thel'efor'e subject to a mc c'hani., ed infantcV at ac k.

(3) TM G!-EE'N is in teserve; but if the situation %atrants, it Can be moved forward. Fot.'omost, hiie

team must be able to deliver, suppot'tig fi'e from

its location (BP 45).

Summary of Opposing Forces

The distribution of opposing forces is as follows:

(a) U.S. Battalion Task Force

37 tanks

13 APC/ M1CVs

8 TO's

12 Dragon's

(b) Enemy Breakthrough Division

325 tanks

90 infantry combat vehicles

105 ATGMs

Part 1--Narrative of TF 4-73 Defense

The tank regiment on the east is stopped by the terirain and wellplaced direct and indirect supporting fires. Nonetheless, the motorized

rifle regiment is able to move within 750m of TM ACE.

At this point TM BLUE is ordered to overwatch the movement of TAI

ACE as the latter shifts its long range fire into the flank of the enemy and

into the forrested area North of Steinig, PA 437663.

41
4941

437

- - - e 40

45I

Figre 1.Intia Ms' i fTF47 adiita neyaprah

1" - 46 414
T.M BLUE is under vcrv heavY aurtilltrv firt and -imok,,. Tih.

TV Commander:

(1) calls for artilhely cieliveid sk a'ltabl,, min no Ii

of Niderfullbacli ,illake

(2) c'alls for attack helicopters to engage tle, sconu

tank regiment in front (north of) Niederfullbach

village

(3) places heavy artillery and inortar fire in fiont

of TM ACE

(4) asks for smoke on possible enemy antitank gLlld(ed

missiles at position PA 425647

(5) instructs TM GREEN to overwatch the movemeut

of TM ACE as it shifts long range antitank fire

into the flank of' the enemy attack and around

Niederfullbach.

At this stage of the scenario, with U. S. Forces positioned as shown

in Figure 2. 1, it is possible to examine more closely typical platoon actions

that are critical to the active defense. "Platoon Action 1, " more fully described later in this chapter, presents a description of a platoon action to

repel an enemy assault from a BP.

In Figure 2. 2, the threat is shown as reinforcing the advancing tank

regiment with a second regiment to conc entrate thoir breakthrough attempt.

The TF Commander determines that BP 46 is crucial if the TV is to hold

its position and not to allow the reinfor(_.ing threat elements to complete their

attempted breakthrough. He directs that TM GREEN occupy BP 46 as a

strongpoint. "Platoon Action 2, " more fully described later in this chapter,

presents the platoon activities involved in creating and defending a strongpoint (as part of a larger force).

TM BLUE, however, has become closely engaged and finds it necessary to fight out of its position (see Figure 2. 3).

After TM GREEN moves to BP 46, the task force commander advises

them to cover the movement of TM ACE to BP 40.

TM ACE is occupying battle position 41 (Figure 2.4) with its tank

platoon on the left (west), one infantry platoon in the center, and another

on the right (east). The infantry faces the woodline 500-750m to the front.

The MAWs and a light tank section fire to cover the eastern tank approach,

while both HAWs and the heavy tank section cover the main tank approach on

the west.

43

a__
49

4 C40

II

/, CC )

2nd TANKRIFLE

REGT R EGT

N

Figure 2.)2' The enemy reinforces the advancing tank regiment with a second

regiment causing BP 46 to become crucial to stopping the breakthrough attempt.

44
49

_ -, 47

I 48

I' 40

446

TM BLE TM REENTM ACETAN K Q MITZD

TANK NKSRIFLE

N

Figure 2.3. TM GREEN has occupied BP '46. TM BLUE has been forced to fight

from BP '45.

4.5
446

TI? GREEN 3_ TMAC
As soon as TM GR GEN closes oil 1I 46 to the rk,. a, thek

force commander orders I' N :'E to disengage and withd irA. 1> tI

time, enemy infantry has closed to 30!0m and one my tanks Jirt, within

1, 000m to the southeast and 1, 500tm to tle 6outih\e~t.

TU ACE coininander calls for all available field ii-tiller v fi',i on

the enemy infantry to his front and smokes the threat tank pos itions to ic

southwest. ie brings his eight A 1'Cs up into hull down Pos itior; u I th' ,

join the field artillery in supuressing the enemy infantry to tile frout. [nde v

cover of this fire, both infantry platoons regain cover and mount lili' c.,' -

riers on the reverse slope. Trhe two platoons nlts the two HA\ squitds n;''',

rapidly to position 40 while covered by the tank platoon and by the fii'e of

FM GREEN on BP' 46 and TM BLUE on 45.

The sche matic diagram of 'm ACiEs move to B1' 40 is presented in

Figure 2. 4. "Platoon Action 3," more fully described later in this cha:)tur,

describes this action.

While 'FM ACE is moving, the task force commander learns that 1

fresh task force has arrived and is occupying battle positions 47, 48, and 49)

to the rear. The task force commander orders his teams to destroy as nlanv

enemy tanks and armored vehicles as possible in the pocket southwest of

Niederfullbach. Teams are to prepare to reoccupy nositions 41 and 42 or

counterattack weakened enemy forces in the

Fo help seal the pocket and to increase his antitank fire, the task

force2 commander requests the temporary attachment of the heavy tankteam ('FM TANK 70th Armor) which has just occupied 131' 47.

The request is approved and necessary coordination performed as

the enemy begins attacking southwest of village Niederfullbach (ligure 2.5).

This attacking enemy force is the second echelon tank regiment that was

weakened earlier by teams on BPs 41 and 42. The task force commander

decides that he can destroy the enemy force in the pocket by the combined

fire of his entire task force plus the attached team on 1' 47. fle orders FM

TANK 70th Armor to move forward about 1, 000m to good hull down firing

position from which it can engage the entire aftacking enemy force at long

range.

The task force commander, then coordinates the direct fire of all four

teams by assigning them sectors of the target, using a clearly visible terrain

reference point. He also calls for artillery and mortar fire (smoke and LiE)

to suppress overwatching enemy forces on BP 41 and in the woods to the north

and northwest. The combined fire destroys the attacking enemy force and the

remnants withdraw into the village.

.47
49

(48'

- 47

445

Figure 2.5. Positions of TMs ACE, BLUE, and GREEN in final defense against

second enemy echelon. TF 4-78 has reinforcing units on BPs 47,

48, and 49.

48
In this scenario, the following principles of active defei.sc we ,,

applied:

' the enemy rate of movement was slowed

* the enemy was engaged at maximum range

the defense was kept flexible and elastic

* teamwork between company teams was used to

coordinate fire and movement

weakened enemy forces were destroyed.

Part II--Narrative for 'Team ACE (Mechanized-Infantry)

Platoon Action 1, ReDel an Enemy Assault from a Battle Position

The goals of Platoon Action 1, repel on enemy assault from a battle

position, are to:

(1) block the penetration

(2) destroy or eject enemy

(3) reduce penetration

(4) regain lost portions of B]-.

TM ACE has had adequate time to occupy and prepare 1P 41.

Monitoring the BN/TF CMD NET, the TM ACE CDR hears the TM BLUE

CDR report that an intense artillery and smoke preparation has begun on his

BP. Shortly after this report, the HAW section sergeant reports on the TM

CMD NET he has sighted a large formation of enemy tanks moving rapidly

toward TM BLUE on BP 42 from the south, beyond the range of his HAWs.

The artillery FO attached to the TK PLT requests ICM; the FIST chief monitors and reports this request to TM CDR via wire (Figure 2. 6).

The second Mech PLT LDR reports sporadic but intense enemy artillery

fires starting to fall forward of his position. The TM CDR passes both reports

to the TF CDR. The HAW section sergeant requests permission to engage

enemy tanks that will be almost within maximum range of the planned oblique

fires of the TOWs. The TM CDR grants that request. One minute later, the

HAWs fire. The artillery FO with the TK PLT reports that the effects of the

1CM immobilized three enemy tanks and that the enemy is moving into an assault formation oriented on BP 42. (Figure 2. 7). The HAW section leaders

reports two tanks destroyed.

The TK PL reports observing several antitank weapon signatures on

overwatching positions southeast of BP 42. He requests 4. 2" mortars fire

immediate suppression of TRP 1. 4.2" FO requests TRP 1.

49
~{9Qo

rL

LLL

CM Co :3

500
CU

E.

CL

vca

0.

ro00

LC 

m

t0 C

51
The third PLT leader reports sigrhting three enemy tanks followed

by several BNIPs approaching BP 41 from tile south moving slowly th'ough

the woods. The second PLF leader confirms hearing tanks moving in the

woods, but reports no actual sightings. He requests TM CDR fire target

group 1 to force the enemy to deploy. The FIST monitors and directs a

call for fire to the FSO for a General Support Unit to handle.

T1 1'l. advised the TM CDR that tile enemy appeared to be reinforcing tile main attack on 'FM BLUE. Another large formation of enemy

tanks can be observed moving rapidly to the northeast in an attempt to

break thiough between TM BLUE and TM ACE (l'igure 2. 7). The IHAW

section leader advises the TM ACE CDR that he again fired on the tanks

attacking TM BLUE and is now receiving intense artillery suppressive

fires. He requests permission to withdraw to positions to the rear of BI'

41 before the enemy tanks close to within 1500 meters and gain a firtepower

advantage.

The TM CDR orders the H1AW ection to withdraw. The TK 'L, advises the TM CDH that he is engaging the tanks and estimates the enemy 's

lead vehicles to be 1500m southwest of BI' 41. The second 1'1. reports that

firing TCI' 1 stripped the BNil's from the tanks and damaged two or three

BMI's. He informs the CDR that he is engaging the damaged BM1's with

CLCI' and the tanks with NIAWs. The third 1l, reports destroying one tank

with MAWs and that he is receiving overwatching suppressive fires from

enemy antitank weapons and dismounted infantry in the woods (Figure 2. 8).

TK t'1, reports killing five enemy tanks and receiving heavy suppressive artillery fires. The heavy section alternates between primary and

alternate positions to engage the enemy. The second Il, reports that the

enemy has now dismounted after the second PL maneuver element engaged

the lead tanks with LAW flanking volley fire killing two tanks, lie requests

that the lI'[ P1K section be committed to provide him additional antitank and

suppressive fires. TM CDR orders the TK PL to commit LT [K section to

support second PL. The TK Il, orders the LT SEC LDR to orient his fire

on enemy tanks attacking the second PLT on the east.

The HtAW section leader reports that he is repositioned and has

started firing on enemy tanks. The second PLT LDR requests 4.2" support to engage infantry and his 81mm FO requests 81mm support to engage

dismounted infantry attempting to close on the platoon BP. The FS NCO

redirects the request for 4.2" support to the FSO and monitors the 81ram

request. The third PLT 81mm FO requests support and the FS NCO redirects the request to the FSO.

52

.'-i: ,-'.-----,- -i- - --,-- -
C EA I~b ,~~~ ~1 E

E

Ln

(0 N

E J

U

0'-

LC) :

LJ

U

Ho

53

'r A
'M -ACF: C)R advises T' ('Dl that he ongagt d ene my tank

regiments attacking TM B!.IE wiih IIA\V , I"! ,ind ICN, . It' is also

under heavv motorized infantry attack himself, but rias forc d tire rue mv

to dismount. ( Figure 2. 9).

The second ILF LI)M adviscs the 'M CI)H that several 'nemv

tanks are apparently attempting to by-pass his laton's kill zone and

move along the western edge of the tree line toward the TK 'I1'.

(Figure 2. 9). The TK 1'L reports that an estimated 10 to 15 onemv

tanks have closed to within 500m of his position on tie south, lie has

requested TR'I 4 and engaged the enemy. The TK I'I, requests that the

LIT SEC be committed now to overwatch the withdrawal of lieavy Sec'tion.

The TM C)H orders the FIST to request immediate suppression on RI'' 4

and directs the Heavy Section to withdraw.

The HA\V section reports that 1CM and intense : fires have blunted

the penetration of the second enemy tank r'egiment attacking IM HI 1'F.

The second IILT LDR reports that the enemy's volume of fire is increasing

as the dismounted infantry and BMIt s take up covered positions. The

second t'L requests TGP I be refired. The FISTr Chief monitors and advises

the TM CI)R he may refire TGCP 1 in two minutes. The TM CI)R approves

and advises the second Il. The FIST Chief orders the FS NCO to order

81am fire on TRE 1, the 4. 2" FO to fire on TRtE 2 and requests THP 3

for himself.

'UK E1L reports that the LT SEC has killed four enemy tanks and

that fires on THP 4 have rechanneled tanks into second ELT kill zone.

Trhe second I'L reports that the firing TGP 1 have stopped the momentum

of the enemy assault and the enemy is apparently withdrawing. The third

ITL confirms that the enemy is apparently withdrawing to regroup. The

'M C)R relays the casualty and damage estimates, and reports his status

to the TFF CI}H.

Platoon Action 2, Create and Defend a Strongpoint

The goals of Platoon Action 2, create and defend a strongpoint, are to:

(1) retain or deny terrain

(2) gain time

(3) wear down enemy attack force

(4) destroy weakened enemy forces.

54

?•.,- _ ____ ,-__ 
UO

uJ C

,Gc

iz

LO Uw mt.

55
L'he Task Force Commander iad ordered the iininediate im!,' -

mentaition of the task or'ganization :)rsented at the start of tue tjisk

forct'e sclario. TM ACE was ordered to detattc h one mechaniz ed :1 .' ii

and to have attached to it one tank platoon and o-.me he vY unfit aiik stcli n.

In addition, the heavy mortar platoon was to dismitch one toward ,sr'i-,

party to ITM A(E and the direct sup oort artiller Iv hatt aion was to -;tiid il

I I" to I'M AC V consisting of a three man tleadccualite 's s'o ti 'Oi ci iil'd',

t )ward observer parties.

Upon receipt of the TtV CDls order, the I'M A'I' ('1) i- ss' neia

["lRAGO detaching one of his organic inech platoons. T'hat loI. ill turn

ordered his platoon to make ready to move to tile vicinity -of I'M I'ANK

while ie 'econed a covered and concealed route. l Iaving done this, the

'1, returned and the mech platoon moved as quickly as possible to join I'Ml

TANK. The t'I. instructed his RvTEL LO to request permission frorn the

II'M ACE net control station to leave the F.N ACE command net and to thel

establish communication and enter the command net o)f I-M I'AN. 'he l'I.

ordered the 81im FO team from the company motar olatol to) i.tmulrn to) tu(

company CP to be reassigned to the TK PLT when it arr'ived. Sirnilair r' )-

cedures are executed by the TK PL at his location.

Meanwhile, the II AW section seriseant enroute with his 1h, ment to

join the 'I'M ACE requested perimission to enter the command net )f I'.M AC'E.

['he NC'S requested authentication and with authentication correctly given

allowed the HAW section to establish communication with TM ACE. Sim -

ilarly, the 4.2" mortar" FO was dispatched and moved to tile coimand post

of the TM ACE CDE. TFhe VTS'T Chief enroute, also contacted the TM \ACE

NCS and requested permission to enter the I'M ACE command net. The

FIST Chief was challenged, he authenticated properly and was allowed to

enter the net. [he FIS'i' moved to the TM ACE C11 to report to the TM ACE

CD H.

While awaiting the arrival of tie attached elements, the TM CDR

issued a warning order to his organic platoons and moved to recon tile

battle position he was ordered to occupy. There the TM ACE CDR determined the exact placement of each of HAW and considered the general positioning of each platoon based on his analysis of the military aspects of the

terrain in the vicinity of the BP. Next, he considered a general fire support plan and the location of observation posts. He selected a command post

location, supplementary positions, and reconed withdrawal routes. The TM

ACE CDR then began to prepare a terrain sketch depicting the BP and the

location of key weapons, )latoons, obstacles ard target reference points.

tie prepared his defensive operations order and a terrain model to use when

issuing the order to the subordinate leaders later.

5 6,
l'iJ, I I I ;•.:t'l:. ',\!1~ 1111' find. Df' lltt· :!ILtclt••cl ••lt'llli'IJIH !11 

1··· ·!1 1ip· 1'\l 11 ;: ''i'. 1''1•· Ti'.-1 ,\('1·: 1:-ic; t!ir·,.ct,.cl till' I·' I' p.tr·t.v ,,, tiw 

1'\: \1' 1· r'lJJ::- lw.•tit>l: :tl nJ• •II. Tilt• ·L2" !·'() par·tj· pr·n··,.t~d,.d tn tlw 

' : l ' ''-' i1' · r 't • t I w 'I \ l \ 1 • ! -: ( · I l 1·: q J i e J.:ly b rid<! d t II • · I· Tl an d o r· d c· r· :• d !t i '' • t n 

i~··:·,;Jl :.•·1•·•·1 i:tt.', \ .111i:q:,•· '" ,, .. ~ :. ";,: pl'l'f::tl'in~~ :1 tar·g1't li·'t. liP polntc>d 

"'II !!:•· ··:::w! l<w:,tir>ll ":· til•' •1. ~~~ 1•'1'1,. lw \'/:t~: l~t'alltr>d lly tlw '('j.' CI>H :1111i 

111k tl,•· .\ •.. ~·· 1-'rl ''1 :t<i,iu:-;t the l·'i>J•'. 

·<~!rl~':!:, :.f~:·;· t:l:t~. t:.c :·r~~~j' dt'J i.Vl.'d :tt !.!t~· rfvl J\(.'t•; (~'1 1 atlCl ',Va:-·; 

1 ii:·t·t:1.,•tl !.11 r:,,. < ·:JI::< )tlt·atinn hy the JSC. :\1Panw!dle, platoon guidt•s di:-.-

;>:ttvlll:d t•:trli•·r· !.•• !l:P T:d Cl' :)) c•ach platoon lr·:Jdr•r· lead the FIST FO 

:1;u·'i••:-: 1.11 :ll,·ir· :···:::H'l'tiv•· nwr·lw.t1iz••d plc:ttoort CPs. One• VIST FO purt.y 1'"-

:n:tin··d :ll. t!J!• ('I' :tw:titinl-~ tile ~rl'ival nf' U!t! TK l'L. 

\t U1•' rq' tl1•· T\1 CDH bl'iefpd tlw l•'IST Chief wlwn he :.trrived 

:tnd · •J'!:r• t·r·tl iri tn t n conr·dinatr' wi lh the ·1. 2' 1 1>'0 to r·ornplt>te the T M fin~ 

plan. 

Tile !I .\W :wcti•ln :n't'ivcd at the T!\1 Cl> and was also directed to 

T!Vf CUJ~c~ lnc:JtiOII, \Vilr·n t!w !JAW vehicles ar r·ived, the Tllll CDH pcmitinned the two v•·hiclt·s himself, ordereu the sc>c:tion sergeant to place nut 

observation posts :111d l<ecp watch in the most likely armor· avenue of approach. 

Finally, Uw TI-.: PLT arTivcd at the TM 1\Cfo: Cl'. The PL is joined 

il,v the B 1 mm H) :tlHi the FIST FO who accompany him to the TM J\C E 

CDL\s location. At tlu~ TM ClJHs hlcation tlw TK f>L reports to the CDH 

•.vho has ordcr·cd hi:-; rnechunizcd platoon leaders to jnin him with their FOs. 

The kr·y leac\C't'S :tssPmblecl, the TM CDH issues his defensive or·dcr using 

the pre pat'C'd tr'r'l'ain rnodr'l to clisrlay his proposed defensive deployment 

( 1•'i.gut'(' ~. l!l), ll•' orders the TK PLT to select positions on the wcster·n 

third of Bl' •tl ovc rwatching the HAW positions and having u primary sector 

of fire• towat'cl '!'l\1 BT.TTF toward the west. He orders the TK PL. to placz 

the ;;r :-ifo:C wlwn' it can overwatch the 2nd platoon which will be occupying 

:t nb~oon Bl' in tit" cr•nter of J3P 41 oriented to the south and located cast 

() i' t.IH • T !·~ l 'l , T. 

T'1c T\.1 ( 'Dn instr·ucts the 2nd platoon to position its support element 

i11 r·r~vr·r·sc ~do!''' h!.clc! positic>ns while the maneuver clements take positions 

i.n the v.r<lod:.; v:lw :·r> they can provide security for the tanks and block the 

inf'antr·y arpt'rl:t< h tilr·nttgll the woods so~th ~nd east of BP 41. One squad 

\'!ill he· rlr>tuc!wr! io sr·curr:> the H;\Ws and TKs. 

Tll·' T\I CDH nt·clers the 2nd platoon to occupy u BP on the north-

'':t:,;t t.hir·d nr nl' ·1! pL1dng the support elet11ent in reverse slope hide 

,,,·.sitinns allcl 1.\Jr~ manc!uvet· clement found in the woods oriented to the 

:-;r1 :tltC':tsV·rn inf;.mtr.v :.tpproach through the wnods, 

bi:::ST AVAILABLE COPY 

57 

J 

l' . 

l::;;~~~.~~i· 
0 U0

ODU_

0

U

.- rc . - -
The 81mm mortar is ordered to locate on the rever. reslo;:e ()f

the hill to the rear of PIP 4 1. All of tie platoons are ordered to lactc,

out security, prepare fields of fire, dig in and camouflage, establish

wire contmnications, and employ clayrnores and wire ohst kcles. ['he

executive officer is ordered to recon and mark nositions ol P1' 40.

Pl.s are ordered to be prepared to OCCUpy it on order. 'he cmirnmande r

instructs the 2nd platoon to adjust the 81mm F't-" 200in in 1'ront (.f 1' 41.

lie established the right limit of fire for the nlatoon and lAW-s, inform -

ing both that they have permission to request and adjust artillery fire w

to engage enemy tanks at maximum effcc' ive 'angtos fo'ward of' TAI1BPI'. The TM CD)3 orders the FIST Chief to consolidate the [NI target list

and overlay for dissemination to each leader', lie discusses tne I'M chain

of command, the CF location, and the use of contr'ol signals.

The Pl.s, upon receipt of the TM CDRs order, prepare a reye rsce

1lanning sequence and issue warning orders that they dispatch via m.ssungeris to thcir resp(crtivc platoons. They coordinate v. ith each otlihi

and the [I"SF Chief, then move to recon their respective platoon 1's.

Each F1. carefully selects the initial positions for his machine guns,

M:AWs, support vehicles and maneuver squads. Each I'l has the artillery

F'O and 81mm FO prepare a platoon fire plan and target list. I'he FIST

and the team CDR continue their fire planning activities by moving from one

platoon BI' to the next selecting Ors, covered and concealed routes, and

gathering target information from the FOs.

Finally, the TM CDR orders the TM to move to the B1'. The TM

moves forward under the control of the ISG and each PL takes charge of

his platoon when it arrives. As the PLs position their elements, the

TM CDR checks their position selections beginning with the TK PF since

the TK PL is unfamiliar with his company s operational procedui'cS.

The 'FM CDR inspects each platoon BI' making on the spot corrections

as required, lie checks to see that fields of fire are interlocking and mutually

sui)porting among the platoons. He determines whether the positions are

adequately prepared, covered, and concealed. He insured that wire communications are in place and operational.

The FIST submits the TM target list and overlay to the TM CDR for

approval. The TM CDR reviews it, makes necessary alterations, and orders

it forwarded to the FSO. Hle reports the mission status of his unit to the TF

CDR and requests any additional support he may need in preparing the defensive position such as mines or engineers and equipment. Finally, he

coordinates with his executive officer who has been given the task to recon

and make subsequent battle positions to the rear so as to facilitate withdrawal

and occupation later.

59

~i .1MW 1V~
Th(. L . of PIlAoori A(~o .1n3, 1VIQUO . ih o, 1: % I 

(2) ro~ol .s~vAt:i

(3) miaini ta' i, al. ubjt i iv s . U1

D~U- to .. unb loiwhlhri U: 'foi'u TF Ui, DR)

(I-- 100- to 11L~k t. Lall ACE~ i5~cg afl tlI aIuiu ani "o

(W, ulpy -k battl. posiiion to lie la o: 13P 41.

Tht, Ti- Cl)R oluers TAI GRlEE~N to o(kupy BP1 46 anu TM A(CE 10

W 1111(i la%. Io 131' 40. IheI A( L (i)1 oidt is lhi. 11A%\ 5tiol to uls -

eiia'e aiR splaw t_0t BP~ 40. IN: oidus the 3rd platoon to tiiscnglae,

iovt. I o 131' 40 and ove irat h the w 11110 awal Of tilt lest 01, the. .M.

(FI"guret 2. 10).

The, 2nid PII_ reports that the enemy has rt'5uined the assault be -

hind aim mnt us( aritille mry ba liage. The TA C\ (DR orders Whe 2nd PAL and

t!T K PITA to hold for 13 minutes. im Orders the F'IST to refiie, T 13 P 4

wkith smnoke and also to rfir,e Targ. 1 Group 1.

lh tAW s(,(tion leader reports that he is in position onl the BP.

The 3d PG. reports that he is enroute. The 2nd PL repOris that the enemyhas cnostd to less than 300m and he inquests 4. 2" and 81 mm FPF's. The

TK P-G1 reports that the Heavy Section is being torred to abandon its primiar

positions because of intense tank fire. The Light Section is overwatchiiig

that withdra% al.. FIST monitors and advises TM CDR3 to fire FPswithdraw the 3rd PLT while FIST adjusts IUXI and CLGP to cover the tank

pl1at oon.

te CDR3 orders F'Fs fired, order-s 2nd PLT to disengage and

move to the BP. The (,DR requests TMI GRIEEN and TM BLUE to engage

enemy tanks on the western edge of BP~ 41. The FIST Chief reports that

1CM has immobilized three enemy tanks and that he is engaging them with

CLGP as the F'S NCO adjusts 1C.M. Heavy AT Fiies from TM BLUE and

TM GHEEN combir !d with the intense art-illery fire finally pormited TK

PLT to disengage. FIST adjusts sm-oke while all of TMN ACE moves to occupy BP' 40 (Figure 2. 11).

60
Lii

CC

F. .0

0

00

L

L(JJ

DV

-U') 0

uLL

< LCO
fPrLU

LL-i

-

CU

ILL

CL

U00

cr- LL

62(.~
ll ) u!. 'ol 1.1, ' ,~Ila! 10 (1)1 15 1'il' LA(tki.- oh. TA M I IK ) I. F

In r p'!l1i i tU tit'mY a.S aul! )ii 13 1 41. 1' ih 1'~ ii. 1 U' _t I I t' i A'lIlI

'il g I aU Li ki~ I Itan tI1011 n n . IIks v. iu 1oiir4 IBL' aIIIj I1 I.& 5 ', '

~III5 ' t 0\'O. 11 OV , I'%% l Iri l 'Ill iratiu: (I plt ou .' ii i.s 1), 'iwi '.

litpI'bl'tlg to d''nId .so as lo rt.''art 11I) -1 It1 'IAI \A (cuMt~'

iIU*,( 131) 41, 1. e. , tlt \\ oocis to ilhu souilh WIII '112)l o 131) 41. Tito ' 1 11"'i'

li.s he' 'It posit lttd Listriidu. htf pr'itnt at' ltiOt' LiVt,'illl (11 Lpi jloaeit, 1. -

lilt oJ'Il lot.'tt illt to tIP:, SOUIlt Und %%i ('st o t 13l1 4 1. 1)ulm ,'aI'Ie '0 '1ilia -loll

with thei TM BI.UH (LIM, 'the TM] ACEt' C'1)1 (1.1i'iid Illiii a 11 i l " llt

hist tll-att flAds of' firet. for- tht- ianks and JIA\W s favo (,d its' ooh 0IIt jUk

fire s foiw ,a i' of TMY BLIU Es B P. '1ogeu hert tilt' two I'MA (1) I: S'2alih ail

Liit ttahf. r-ight tlmlit of ir t- for TM Al CE(' to 0 'cV. iU. i. ufiks and l IA k s

froi firin jinto 0I lB L UEs B31' but per'mittilt' TI A C to 'o g tvie:t

tanks attacking TX] BLUE at mnaxinum- effec(tiv railgcs. Th i' I U I,) hias

dir'ected that all TM s i'oncenti'attc AT ftits on thle aimor' ave nut- of aprioa'11,

snethat is whic2 thle elnmy penetration 'attemlpt will turns t likel% ccur.

Thie TM ACE CDR{ directs thle TK 111- to position his IHeav' -S.tior so

that its primary section of' fiv'e is across the front o1' BIP 42. H~e tells thi. - 'K

P'L to be prepared to engage eneiny tanks at n-laximifif effective mange,. Tlt'

pr'imar'y tank positions selected by thle TK 1'L should be as far i oow

BP? 41 as possible, COVe'-ed and conce4aled, and pro-0Vide long( I-anle fields of'

fire. Alternate positions should also be well l'oi'ward and pi'ovide long mange,

fields of fire in the same sector. Supplemental positions will. be selec'tedl onI

the eastern slope of BP 41 along the second mnost likel y enmy armnor aveIute

of approach. The TM ACE CDR3 order's the TN PL to position the light tank

se( tion where it can cover the armor' avenue of approachi into BI) 41 along

the western edge of the woods to south of TIM AC'Es position. Thet- TM ACE

CDR positions the two HlAW vehicles wvell forward onl BI" 41 and gives themi

the same section of fires as the tank H-eavy Section (See 1iguIre 2. 6).

The TK PLT LDRi selects the primary positions for his Heavy Section

on the reverse slope of a ridge in the tree line onl the Southwestern edge of B13

41. Each tank is capable of overwatchirg the two HAW vehicles which are

even farther forward. The Light Section is positioned on the rever-se slope of

BP 41 overwatching the Heavy Section and where it is capable of filing in support of the 2nd PLT which is deployed on the left to the east of thle TN PLT.

63
dnet a .. tat.a, , fot atlicn l , ttnl. lT Aanks t',.) titti aI a13 1iti 2 s,. l' t 

ul _ th i:,..ion ot B P 42. [l' \ , ,n ' : :i ':: '1. k p : : " T F) N, I

BI. F 'I) . Th'' T1M A('I ' s'~l "I,' i I A \\ %% ~ u. o n, ,, :.

ml h, t1t'!t V ltlkt ;()lltl i it .'l o5.)0 1 : hit." atli1 L' I 'tIks 11' I I It LAI I'.

Fh. TK PII. Of (,- . his gunltt-S atid o tnlianldt's tt'at 'k atn(i 'an (,. lilt t,. '2t\

Tani-lS, bu: 1() hold 11t'1-1 - utli'i. t- tai. ks at-'' v. ithin 1500mn. il' I.k\\

5 ,.< loll st ta.l t(',~pol'.t-, tw\ lats d,.st1'oyd b,) Lilt TO%% i's.

Th, TK PL ot'detis the, attillht'v F'O to e'titu,.st ind adjusl ICM oil ,,.

t'lt'tfl\ tdltn 5. Ilh, HlAW set' ion s,.I'"ttaf I'c 1011. w,, % lla t k killZ, a II

1hat It is no% ts t c lg n hta\ v ,llnemy supp '(.'ssi,, fites. it-' 1'quqtf.s III-/:

SMKE on TlPP 7. i"IST I'd lIt,' is thet call to the l"SO, and is t .nmit ti HeII 

b)u liT) sllokt.e

Th. TK PL oi-ders the: heavy Sec, tion to beg!in to etu.La', tilt' asSaUJtiltll

aLkS V.1 i11 all abliquCe volly while the IAW s.ctioll loves to its altt' 'llt

Ii'il.e positions. Afte' i'f'inm the fit'st volley, the [eavy " ectioll inli l dialtlllovts to its alternhate firing position and fires a scond oblique \olley. Titt.

TK PI. tel tots tou' appatent kills and ineffective at'tille'y fires ait,'ttptilni

l) su)pt'(,ss his p'itnaty position. The lAW section leports oil(, more tank

d,.s t'o''d and hea-' lein y antitank suppre ssive fi (s continuiti. to t-om,

uI)Onl his lh\ jositioF.

The 2nd PL requests tank support to combat tanks and moto'ized

illfatt tv that ate closing otl his BP through the woods. Th( TM ACE CDR

ordttis the TK PL to commit the Light Section. The "'I PL orders the Light

5( ( tion to ifovt, into filing positions frlom which it can support 2nd PLT.

The, ILA\V section sergeant advised the TM ACE CD1H that the enemy tanks

soon will be xxithin effective tank cantnon range of his position and requests

permission to disengage and withdraw before the eneimy tanks gain full fire

po% er advantage. The TM ACE CIDIH consents. The Heavy Section continues

volley fire; as liw( HAW section begins withdrawal.

The 2nd PL reports enemy tanks attempting to bypass BP 41 on the

western edge of the tree line south of the tank Heavy Section. The 2nd PL

requests TtP 4 be engaged with 1CM to blunt this envelopment. FIST directs

the C ['1 to its balttery and moves to another BP to observe effects. The TM

ACE CDR orders the TK PLT to cease oblique fires and to long range reorient

on the tank threat to the south of' BP 41. The TK PL with the Heavy Section reports is already heavily engaged with the head tanks of the enemy's enveloping

element. The TK PL requests artillery to cover his withdrawal, to his

original positions. The FIST monitors, requests ICM and smoke adjusted

from THP 4 to engage the approaching tank threat.

The TM ACE CDR orders the TK PL to have the Light Section reorient

its fires on the enemy tank threat, also. The TK PL reports the 1CM, smoke

and covering fires of Light Section have momentarily disrupted the enemy

64
alik lot111liol at1( ilaill Ilas l1110Vc siti..... sullx l) hu-i )i llI ii1

l)~)l'l~l.. Thu IA ACE CIi ji rhatIA Bl.ui, andi 'IAT ("M1.i\ nlo.

6 1o1-11111,' 10 bh-gil 10 tnga noV t. takls anl (-mp il- 'o nxjis:- ml -ho\i- 1r 31) 41 alono il, %'. ood ln . Tho LlA\X s-Ili 1-po!- I- L

ankls o: il, Siimx 5(ond (,khlk-oll aplwoa~liing T (I E A s

TM A 13-t L U ' CDN rt-p. orl . that the (nem ni lriil s ai i-:111L his, '. (1

have ri-ail(h il101flellui-ti sinflv ITM ACE AT Lii", vi oii ltk1'i aIS"*

il( l ank to 131)~ 41. TFMA BLUE CDL) H ipoil 5 Ilh( ia uUticinfl'. a 

ondk 016he(llonl ha\yk (.Ios,,d to less thai' 15~0011 of, TF\ Al A( inl 11f %%xx

Th, ii~my appealts still to i)'1 lakin', an atte nj11 to pptat1' FTm

B3LUE and TAT ACE.

AT. 'anw~ile(, TA\] (i E EN has be--n orcide id to occvupx BPT 46 to bloc-k

the penetration. AT fires from TAM GiE EN are used to t-ngag f 1lt he .-n.~

.-oth of' BP 41. TMT ACE FIST continues to request and( adjust smloke anld

1CM on the tanks west of BP 41. Together the AT fires and the ICATpv

vent the second echelon froni ctnelopitig B P 41 Oil the % ,eS . Ale anwhil- ,

2nd PLT has sceedin, stripping the eny infantry friomn the, e(1y x-,anks

east of' BP 41. The Light Section reports that is is pi-ovid ing hi,ily effective

overxvatching fires for the Heavy Section.

The TMI ACE CDE advises the TF CDR that the enemy has dismounted

to the southeast of BP 41 and closed to less than 300m- while the einmy tanks

continue to attempt to penetrate west of' BP 41. The BN/ T CI)H ordLi-s TAT

ACE to begin to disengage and withdraxv to BP 40.

Platoon Action 2, Create and Defend a Sti-ongpoint

This Tpart of' the scenario describes how the TK PLT is integrated into

the defense of the battle position. Techniques for controlling platoon fires,

for preserving the tanks themselves, for insuring freedom- to maneuver,

and for firing in support of the rest of the company/team are detailed.

Upon receipt of the Team Commander's order to occupy and prepare

BP 41, the TK PL issues a warning order to his platoon and proceeds to the

BP to conduct his reconnaisance. Based on the TM CD~s order, the TK PL

selects positions for his Heavy Section. The positions are oriented on th 2

enemy armor avenue of approach to the wvest and south. Each tank is given

a hull down position from which to fire that is concealed and provides long

range fields of fire. The positions selected also permit the tank fire to be

interlocking and mutually supporting. The PL surveys the platoon sector

and selects individual sectors for each tank. He determines the necessary

limits of fire, right and left, for each tank commander to observe.

65
This complctcci, the TK PL next lc.ons coveited and conc alu.d

Vo0Ut,.S 10 ne'aibv alteinatie filing positions. Ther.e he a,,ain sut'v,,yvs inc

plaloon Se toil to insuel that it is adequately covered by tiitus d(Iivei,d

fron tile alti'nate- position. l onl ith c h 1 oves to .tiuct pril-na'v and

alt,.vnat, positions and routs for the Light Section.

in both cases the TK PL directs ihe, 81inim FO and the artillr'v O

to p'eparu indirect fir'e plans to support his defensive position. Emphasis

h.is ou O selec ting tatgets on known, suspected, and lik.IY enCmy poslitlons

and to plan 1or targ ets in ft ont o, on top of and behind the TK PLT BP.

The LOs must also select observation posts and routes they can use tO Hove,

ilIn Oniei 1.O anlothei' as required.

Th, TK PL ord(ers the TK PLT forward and dirc.ts the- [Ieavy Setion

into the pre selectcd firing positions, ihe indicates the se-ctors of responsibilit v

for (eaih tank commander in both Light and Heavy Sections. The gunneris and

tank .omlanders place out local security and begin calculating ilange-, a.:imuth

and ballistics data for their sector targets.

The PL pr'epa'es a te:rrain sketch and consolidates the TK CDlHs

rang( and duplicates it into a platoon range caid, ie appl'oves the FO target

lists and oi'de's the list sent to the FIST. When the target lilu llb('1S hav(

been assigned by the ['SO and the list is returned he places them on his tal'g e

hue t Hcview ing the indirect and direc't fire target lists, the IL plans foc

the method of fire and the control measures he will use to coordinate platoon

fires alter the assault o his BP begins. lie plans for c tossing, flanking

oblique, volley, and individual tank fires. Ile plans for the employment of

oli alic illumination and for' artillery illumination. Thi r PL order-s that

hot loop communications be emplaced and quickly inspects the camouflaging

activities of his TK CiDHs.

Whenever, the PL is satisfied with the preparation of the primary

positions he will instruct the TK CDH s quickly to prepare the alternate

positions befoi - resting. Again the TK CDis and gunners pr-epare range,

aiimuth and ballistics data for sector targets. Wire will be laid so that it

is available for use when the alternate positions are occupied.

The PL indicates the routes and indicates the routes and individual

tank positions he selected at the supplementary location to the TK CDIs who

will prepare them while the TK PL coordinates with the adjacent PL and

FIST Chief. The leaders insure that local security, fire planning, and mutual

support are complete.

The placement of obstacles, minefields, and surveillance devices is

completed when the TK PLT firing positions are complete.

66
1PIaloon A(iioii 3, Ij iZgud Ok~i~ (1P LP\ B

h Il. h ol v um ! atill i nixd iesand thle malni aii vo tI au ald(

n ill( !)('sl ilioick 1() co%-,l 11 t , ithdi a%%I ot O'i'(I. !I'iu\ l n rs Tllil

scl i 1111051ti ol b % thek I alik platOOn l ;in inl St tIionls Lind nov i m,

bY boniid l(S effer'tivel1V ei ihes tilt, dis t .gaLLie Ik W of tilt, te aml.

Thie '1 P ('DI, or'delS tilt: 'M ACE ( D1 ',o diega id v. itiliai%

frm BP 41 to BP 40 before becoming ove-Li. The F TM AC E(II ot-uei

lte ILAW sect-ion to cisungagt- first and Set, upov11)ihii fiiets vii 1 40

o rover the xithd iawal of his TAM. Next he ord,2rs dhe leas, ng alged

platoon, the 3rid, to dis engagec anid begin the withd iau%%al to 1 40.

The- 2nd PLT and the TK PLT are to remain inl coillact tglit!

the. enem with intense direct and indirect fires. The TM ACE (W) aid ers

the FIST to request the 4. 2" IPI and the 81mmi FF prelj)ained 200m forward of 2nd PLT and tells the 2nd PLT to begin disenigagement as soon a.- thel'P~s are fired. The TMV ACE CDRA advises the TM leaders that he( is now%

moving to BP 40 with the 2nid PLT. The FIST remains to adjust filies 10

support the TN FLT with 1CMI and CLGP.

The TK PL advised the TM CDR that the enemny is continuing to close

rapidly and requests that smoke be laid down. The FIST had already_ anticipated that smoke would be needed and has obtained permission frloml thec

FS0 to use it. lie starts to establish a heavy_ Cloud amiong the_ ( enmy taniks.

The TK FL reports the smoke to be effective in disr-uptingo the enemy a nd

concealing his %kithdrawal along covered routes to BP 40. The TM ACE CfLk

ord,-i s the TK PL to hold on for a few minutes longer tintil the 2nid PLT canl

complete moving to and setting up into BP 40. The T'M CDIHt requests antitank fires from TM BLUE to cover the TN PLTs withdr-awal, lie is advised

the smoke has made target engagement difficult, but the teamns will continue

to support TIM ACE as best they can.

The 2nd PL reports he is in position and the TMI CDN orders the TN

PLT to begin withdrawing. The TN FL orders the Light Section to overwateh

as the Heavy Section maneuvers to an intermediate terrain feature between

BP 41 and BP 40 from which to cover the Light Section. The FIST requests

heavy smoke be sustained and starts to withdraw% to thle same terrain feature

along with the Heavy Section.

The TN PL upon arriving at the interm-ediate oveiwatca-,ing position

orders the Light Section to disengage and withdraw to BP 41. TM GREEN

is now providing intense antitank and artillery fires, having assumed responsibility for the engagement of the enemy as TM ACE comnpletes the withdrawal from BP 41.

67
The- Lig ht S 'u-tion bounds past tilt Ilcx'; eiik and 11'so Il 41)

v.iccthe TmX CD H dicec ts thu Lighit Su;ction inito 1)0oiltofl. 11W TM CI)

oi'durts thu TN PL to dsnauand join thu TAI on 1311 40, and Ihl[iSV

and IlavSuctioni withdraw Under thu fi'iv l's (thn of TAM G iM [EL

and TMJ ACE. Thu, TM CDi1, direct-s thu '1S and lbSv uk-iionl into

positions seluckt(Aci liut' and recconud by th(u TAI c-Xi 'uti% u011 fic..

Part lV--Nar rative faor Tuani ACE Fire Support Team (FIST)

This par', of' thu acti%-e dufunsk- scenar-io du,,sclibes thu, ations.- of iit

comipany fiflc support teaim (FIST) in support of each of the hi'pl ooli

actions discussed pruviously. The FIST considertud hc( consI-sls oi, a

threcci man headquarter-s elemunt and three suparatu twko man i'i'. i osui'x'i'I' tuams. The F"IST huadquar'turs element c-onsists ot the, FlS' Ci'!

Light Stion), the fire support NCO (SSG) and thu radio tcluphon.' op' iaT 01

(SP4). Each of the thruee [F0 tuan-s is comprisud of a foiwai-d obsil %-(I

(SGT) and a iradio telephone operator (PFC).

Thu FIST operates from a modified airnoled pursonul car 11cr that

contains the appropriate communications uquipment neudud tocimuca'

oil tho three fil-e Control nets found at the company/ team leveol and the comlpauny/

teaum commander's command net. The f-IST vehic-le also provides thu I'1ST

with adeuquate pr-otection on the battlefield and is sufficient maneuveriability

to move- with the m-aneuvel' company/ team- commander. Th- F"IST in thescenario will also make use of the digital msaedvc n h au

location designator to interface with the artiller-y battalionl's TACi"IHE

comiput C!'.

Other essential indirect fire support personnel mentioned in t:he scenario

include the Heavy Mortal' (4. 2") platoon forward observed team- which is colocated with the CO/TM CDR and the 81mm mortar' platoon forward observer

team whic-h is colocated with the PL. The 4. 2 " mortar' platoon t", 0uses the

file control net of the 4.2" mortar platoon from the Battalion! Task lor01ce

to support the CO/TM CDI3 when requesting indirect fire support. The 81mm

mortar FO uses the fire control net of the 81mm mortai' platoon of the cornpany/team to support the PL when requesting indirect fire. The F"IST F0

uses the artillery fire control net to request fire support for the PL to whomhe is assigned. The FIST Chief with the aid of the [FS NCO coordinates all of

the CO/TM indirect fire assests on behalf of the CO/TIM CDH1. The FIST

Chief determines the priority of' each call f'or fire, the type of weapon, the

types and number of r'ounds, and the unit that is best suited and available to

fire a particular mission. Using the digital message device, the FIST Chief

transmits the calls for fire directly to the dir'ect support artillery battery

fire direction center, whenever in his judgment the 155mmn weapon is best

suited to fire a mission.

68
Theb 10ci sli s of 011 ilIT Chi 'f %k ill be finial unls- !h,, VP >' I)

po l I Offtct r (F[SO) of 1h1m nlal LIV'' Battalion'Task f~o i' jt iv n

( l 1~, mod ilfv or 1.ec ir ii the- , Lll forf filr f'o in t.ho I' 1ST Uh'lr'. Fli

BN //TI- 1- So ooi'd mat''s all of hrk I-lST ('hi 's assig no d -to *-ah o:' (0

T 7 s of' the BN/ 1 " T . The >0'S is t in diroct kojita( i \\ith rarh of hr!(. I'I

(hi's on h loi'vf~ il fur- ,O rul nt.

At hel( rom1 pajjy/ trami lu-vtl, the F"'IST Chic' niunito, tOis h ari'tIliv

fii'' contriol net and the commiand net oft 'hr('/ T?'I) tM hr is ;u ppoi'ting.

Simultuntieousl V, the F'S NCO m1onitors the 81mmn motrtai' andith 4. 2'' mor''a:

platoon fir cOnti101 nets. The FIST Chief will inter'vrne onl ani'v oi' hr ir'

ront 'ol1 net~s Only to redirect onl FOs cail tl fire to ajiothoer fil' oi rtnwhnthe unit rerquested by the [F0 is already engage d irj ano' her fir''' iiis.-ioi.

In the- eve nt that all three fire support units available to thr r-um pany! train

at-e already fully committed when another (iFl is rrrrcivrd, the( ['1ST('if

will c'ontac~t the ['SO and r'equ est hie r'edirect the c-all for. fire to aniotlirr1 hat -

tery of a general support airtillery battalion which will fiur( the( missioni.

IFigur'e 2. 13 describes the communications nets in the I"is'F model.

The following fire Support Operations apply in the platoon actlion

scenar'ios: In Platoon Action 1, 'Rtepel an assault from a B13 " tihe engaged platoon has eompajiy/ team p riority o1' fires. The TI"' ('DRk has de -

legated authority to use sm-okc' to the BN/TF 1"SO who must authori, c all

requests for smoke missions.

In Platoon Ac'tion 3, 'Disengage and occupy a new battle position,

the platoon and team again have priority of fires, and the l"S0 delegates

authority to use smoke.

Platoon Action 1, Repel an Enemy Assault from a BP

The actions of the FIST while repelling an enemny assault ar-e detailed here. Emphasis is on the role of the forward observers in adjusting

fires on acquired targets and on the FIST Chief and ['S NCO in coordinating

the fires requested. In the scenario, the FIST Chief has his own vehicle

and sufficient radio capability to function in all iequired fire and comamand

nets.

The 2nd platoon, TM ACE is ordered to repel an enemy assault fromn

BP 41. The platoon is receiving intense suppressive fire from the ad%-ancingg

enemy motorized forces as they push toward the BP. The PL orders the

fir'st squad to move into a covered and concealed blocking position on the left

flank of the advancing enemy column, while the ovetrwatching squads aiid the

weapons squad return fire to suppress the enemy fi-e. To blunt the enemy

penetration, the PL orders thc FIST FO to call for V'GP 1 which consists of

three preplanned tar'get reference points along the enemy avenue of approach.

He instructs the 81mmn FO to be prepared to crall for fire on any enemy infantrymnen ttiat dismount to suppress friendly antitank fire.

69
81mm FIST PLT MORT FO LDR FO

81mm

FDC OCVTM 4.2'

CDR MORT

FO

FIST 4.2

CHIEF

DS

FA BAT

FDC BN/TF

FSO ----- monitor

-direct

GS

ARTY

UNITS

Figure 2. 1 Com,,iunicatio;)s nets ir. FIST model vhich are available

to request indirect fire.
The FIST F"O immediately requests imnmecdiate suppr,:ssion of

T(;P 1 using the artillery fire control net. The FIST Chief monitormg th,

call, contacts the BN/Tt F' "SO to get permisjion to fire the targe, group.

The 1iSO approves and directs the direct support artillery batteryv to !11*,, 'he, targt iYroup at his command. While this is taking place, th, PL ordlehs

his MAW 'cew s to engag h ie lead tanks with c rcssing fi',. The 155am

IIE/VT rounds impact on the three target reference points of the tar'g

group exploding among the BM Ps following the enemy tanks. This intense fire momentarily disrupts the- enemy's coordinated advanc,, scpaua! i02

the tanks from the BMPs. Two BMPs ar'e inmnmobili,,ed by the artillery firc

and the PL orders two carrier gunners to destroy the disabled BM Ps \%ith

CALi 50 fire. 'Fwo cal'ie's move forward from revterse slope posilions

into hull defilade, engage the BMPs, and destroy both. The MAW gunners,

firing as the artillery rounds impacted, destroy t\o tanks. The First SQD

opens fire fron the flank with light antitank weapons anid disables anoller

BM P.

Enemy infantrymen begin to dismount to suppress the friendly AT

Fire. The PL orders the MAW gutnners to move to alternate positions.

The PL and FOs "button up" and move to another- observation position as

intense enemy suppressive fires close in on them. The PL, while on the

mnove, orders the carrier gunners and the 160 gunners to engage the dismounted infantry. Monitoring the CO/TM net, the FIST Chief realizes the

2nd PLT is temporarily without indirect fire support as tile PL and lOs relocate. Having positioned himself where he can observe the 2nd PLTs

situation, the FIST Chief uses the laser designator to track an enemy tank

and requests destruction Fire with CLGP. He also directs the 4. 2" mortars

to shift fire from TRP 2 (one of the THPs of the original target group) to

hit enemy infantrymen dismounting fron the B.I\Ps. The CLGP destroys

the designated tank and the mortar Fire kills several exposed infantrymen.

The PL reports to the TM CDR that he is in position again and the

two FOs report their new location to their respective I'DCs. The enemy

tanks, separated from the dismounted infantry and slowed by the trees are

receiving intense antitank fire from squad LAWs. The enemy infantryman

supported by the BMPs which have now taken up defilade positions are

moving rapidly again to close the gap with their tanks. The PL orders the

MAW gunners to engage the remaining tanks and requests the TM CDU have

the FIST engage tanks with CLGP. The FIST FO requests a shift from TEP 3

to engage a BMP in defilade, while the 81mm FO requests a shift from THP 2

to engage dismounted infantry closing with the enemy tanks. Tie PL requests

the 4.2" mortars fire THP 1 to engage another group of dismounted infantrymen.

The FIST monitoring the PLs requests immediately uses the laser

designator- and requests CLGP to engage a tank. He also redirects the PLs

request for the 4. 2" mortar platoon to fire TRP I to the FSO, because the

4. 2" mortars are already firing a mission for the 1st PLT. The FS NCO

monitors the 81mm call for fire. All fires are effective.

71
The Task ['orce Commander direc'Is the 1'50 to plate smoke on

overwatching enemy antitank positions imnmdia~elY. The .'SO insTrlu't.s

the FIST Chiefs to have all ['Os adjust smoke on known or suspected

enemy antitank positions.

The F-IST FO informs the PL of the Tf ' CD's order and requests

snoke in effect on observed enemy weapons signatures in overwatching

positions.

The PL receives a situation report from 1st SL saying that large

numbers of enemy vehicles are attempting to bypass the kill zone by

maneuvering to the west. The PL requests THP 5 be fired in order 1o

ric.hannel the enemy column into the kill zone. The FIST Chief redirects

this request to the |"SO who sends it to tie GS artillery unit. Artillery

fiut, on THP 5 effectively rechannels the enemy into the kill zone of 2nd

pltaoon. Without effective antitank over 'atching fires, the enemy piess

foi\\ ard with heavy losses from friendly antitank fires. Infantry attempting

to dismount ar immediately engaged by machine guns and mortars. Hiowvir, the enemy is able to close within 300m and could still make a ptenctiation. l'ho PL ordlers the 81ram FO to call for the FPI', requests TM

('Di firte, 4. 2" F'PF in the platoon defensive sector and requests the artillery

acain fire TG 3. The FtIST Chief monitors the requests, redirects the TG, 3

rtqu.est to the ['SO for GS artillery to fire, informs the SO of TM (D~ls

decision to firte 4. 2" ["P' and of the PL's call for 81mm 'Pf1.

These intense, continuous, final protective fires comtpletely break

up the enemy formation forcing the surviving elements to attempt to withdraw. Observing the withdrawal the P1. requests the ['PP be ended, and

orders the F'Os to engage disabled vehicles with- destruction fire and the withdrawing enemy infantry with area fires until no targets can be observed.

Platoon Action 2, Create and Defend a Strongpoint

The role of the ['IST in preparing to defend a battle position is to

select observation posts, select target reference points, and prepare

a fire plan that supports the team commanders concept of the defense.

In addition, the FIST Chief will advise the Team CDR, as will the ['Os

and the PLs in how to make use of olganic suppressive fires in order to

free the indire:t fires for other targets.

Throughout the time the platoon is preparing the defetnsive strong

point. The FIST and the artillery ['Os are continuously engaged in fii e tlaiiiu lg

activities. The artillery P0 and the 81mm ['O prepare terrain sketches of the

strongpoint area and report the coordinates of the observation posts from which

they will be adjusting indirect fire to their respective IA's. The, FIST Chief

and F'S NCO monitor and record this information for future reference. The

72
PL orders the artillery "0 to ptan tile atlaitn'o' filr plan anu t he 81 in in

[.'0 to plan the antipe:rsonnel five plan. Each .O selects only readilv

id entifiable terrain ftatules, likely avenues 01 appr'oach and knolwn or

suspected cne m " locations. Iarg tS ale )atUlllld Oil top of tht -t l'ong -

point and behind it. Each FO trvansmits his essential taiget list to ti

FLA' using a secui t means. The it'IST C(hief and IS N( '0 monitor and :'kcoi-d thesc ta'get lists for futuie use. Each IDC compiles the target lists

of its FOs and submit tile list to the "SO who elitninatcs dul)lications, isigus

unlique tar'get number's, and plovides the l)'s and FOs \%ith a composite, list

of tile assigned target number's for each weapons system.

Base d on tile PLs and the team coillnaundel's deftnsive plan, the FIST

Chief and tile FOS plan targets \%hich \will requilte special adjust inoul 01 individual \Ieapons to achieve the dcsiied disper'sal of rounds at tilt a'gt.

The, PO adjusts tile individual weapons and the sight and gun data for teach

a icrcor-ded for- each special tal'get by the 'DC' and tile FIST. In coor'dinallon

\%ith the C'OTM C'Di% and the PLs, the FIST also groups tal"ge.S to I)tOVidc

intense pi'eai'itanged fires. The FIST ordel's that tile method of control for

such fiies %% il[ be "on call" or "at his coimmand" Mlitheve-l seelins apprOl)liatl -

to sup))ott the company level rnaii(Uuv leaders. The FIST ilstiu'es wilt 0inmunications ave established with the ar-tilety FO in the st iongpoint at eacih

ploposecd obser'vation post. The FIST coordinates \% ith the TM \jC P to insutce

the preplauned fives suppiorit the CO/TM commandeirs bari'ier plan. Arteas

where aritille ry delivered scatterable mines might be r-equired are planned fo.

Platoon Action 3, Disengage and Occupy a New BP

The FIST plays a crucial role during disengagement and withdraxal.

Prior fire planning makes the job easier. However, adjusting supporting fires

to block an advancing enemy must still be accomplished even when moving

a\ay from tie enemy. Artillery support must be continuous and flexible to

support the withdrawal. The actions of the FIST are described in this pa't of

the scenario.

The CDR of TM ACE orders the 2nd PL to disengage and move fr-om BP

41 to occupy BP 40. The 81mm mortar FO adjusts continuous mortar fire oil

the dismounted infantry. The FIST PO and the FIST engage enemy BMPs with

CLGP. The FS NCO also adjusts 4.2" mortar fire on enemy infantry. As

this intense indirect fire temporarily disrupts the enemy's coordinated advance,

the PL orders the 1st squad to remount in the predesignated PLT assembly

area. Immediately, the 1st squad's carrier moves to the assembly area using

a covered and concealed route and the dismounted squad members remount

the caririer. The SL reports to the PL that he is ready to move to BP 40.

The PL instructs the 2nd squad to remount in the designated assembly area.

Throughout the FOs and FIST continue to engage both enemy infantry and BM1's.

The PL requests that tire TM CDH have the tank PLT and HAWs cover the

disengagement of his 3rd squad and PLT antitank weapons. The FIST monitor'ing

73
the CO/TM command net reahi. es t1 VIST ['0 and 1min F['0 will be unable

to adjust fires while moving and ordeis the I.'S NCO to adjust both "te ,31mm

mortar and the 4. 2" mortar fire while he adjusts both DS and GS aitilLery

to maintain continuous intense indirect fire. The TN PLT and IAWs enguge

enemy BMPs and tanks as the 2nd platoon withdrawvs from BP 41 and moves

by cov(red routes to BP 40. Immediately upon arrival at BP 40, th,- l.aOs

begin fire planning in preparation for defense of the new BP.

Pa't V--Narrative for 155nm Direct Support Artillei'y Batterxy

The actions of the howitzer crews and the key ho\witl ,ei battery lcade')s

are desciibed in this part of the scenario. The F'D, and forward obsei-vipersonnel actions have been omitted. Attention is focused only on those involved directly with the laying, loading, and firing of the cannon themselves.

The scenario describes three different situations.

At the outset, the battery if called on to support a unit under attack

(medium demand). Next the battery is firing in support of a unit that is

preparing a defensive position (low demand). Finally, continuing to fire in

support of a maneuver unit under attack, the Howitzer section is itself for'ced

to displace to avoid the effects of counter battery fires (heavy demand). The

notion of platoon actions are not appropriate with respect to the batteJy.

Therefore, these three parallel battery actions are presented.

The direct support artillery battery commander orders the battery

executive officer to occupy a firing position to support the task force. The

battery XO with guides and the gunnery sergeant moves to position. There,

the XO selects exact gun positions while the gunnei y sergeant sets up the

aiming circle and declinates it. The XO orders the battery to displace by

echelon. When the first guns and ammunition carriers arrive at the firing

position the guides indicate the position for each and the general direction of

fire. The XO immediately begins laying the sections on the FDC determined

direction of fire using the aiming circle. Announcing deflections for each

cannon gunner. The XO lays each gun and announces the measurement to

the crest (minimum elevation for guns). Crew members place out the aiming

posts and the gunners acquire sight picture for later reference. Simulaneously

the ammunition carriers are readying ammunition for immediate use. When

the first echelon is laid, the XO orders the second echelon and FDC to displace

and move to the new firing positions. When the second echelon arrives, these

guns are laid in the same manner as the first.

Communications personnel lay wire between the guns and the FDC.

The XO renders his report to the FDC as soon as the sections are all ready.

74

--- j - __ _
CHAPTrER III

MECHANIZED INFANTRY PERFORMANCE

Projected performance degradation in mechanized infantry duty positions, squads, and platoons are summarized.

Detailed projections by tasks and defensive (platoon) actions are tabulated. Digests of adverse factors' impacts

on 76 critical tasks are provided.

Summary of Continuous Operations Effects

Of the four debilitating factors considered here, fatigue (sleep loss over

five days), light level (visibility), stress, and disruption of diurnal rhythms,

fatigue is expected to produce the greatest performance decrement among infantry pe'-sonnel. However, all tasks performed by infantry personnel are not

affected uniformly. While tasks that have a heavy cognitive or vigilance comnonent are expected to degrade in proportion to the amount of sleep lost, performance of motor tasks that are well practiced or routine is likely to deteriorate very little with increasing sleep loss over the first three days. Cognitive (mental) and perceptual tasks most severely affected by sleep loss are

encoding/ decoding, logical reasoning, and accurate perception/concentration.

Simple, as opposed to complex motor tasks, differ in their ability to resist

performance decrements. Such tasks can be distinguished by the following

example. While loading a weapon's magazine can be expected to show little

deterioration with sleep loss, a fine motor task such as stripping and assembling a rifle can be expected to deteriorate somewhat. Apparently, routine

motor tasks are extremely resistant to sleep loss. Even acutely sleep-deprived soldiers can be expected to maintain their ability to march across country. However, their SL may not be able to use a map effectively to orient the

squad.

Soldiers cannot be expected to function wel as fighting men for more

than two days without sleep. However, even totally sleep deprived soldiers

can be expected to satisfactorily perform routine motor tasks for as long as

five days.

In contrast, most cognitive and vigilance based tasks can be expected

to begin to deteriorate somewhat after the very first day of sleep loss and

significantly after 36-48 hours. Extreme environmental conditions such as

heat, cold, humidity, or noise can be expected to hasten the inevitable performance decrement. A summary of projected effectiveness of various positions of the mechanized infantry over 120 hours (5 days) of continuous combat

operations with little or no organized sleep appears as Figure 3. 1. The index

of effectiveness (E) lies between 0 and 100 (actually 0 and 1.00). An E-value

75

r-p.. 7 . - - .. .. .,
100

90

80

70

60

50

EFFECTIVENESS

4E) 4

30 - PL:

20 - G/CTL: -f

MTM:

10A

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 3. 1. Performance degradation in mechanized infantry positions

(PL = Platoon Leader, SL = Squad Leader, G/GTL -

Gunner/Carrier Team Leader, MTM =Maneuver Team

Mlember).

76

tjV WI:r-,4 r--~ -___
of 100 represents normal, routine tffctivl~unes of pdrfoimnn, evidut, ci, -

haps, in training exercises; a value of 0 lepf' SQrl 5 fOlilfo i ,m Tnhat is no

longer militarily useful, but does not imply an absence of aily and all Lt ivtt.

The infantry duty position expected to degrade most rapidly is that of

the SL, whose responsiblities (tasks) include a heavy cognitive component.

Degraded least is the position of .MT.M, whose tasks are more of a simpli,

motor type and well practiced or r'outine.

I,'igure 3. 2 presents forecasted effec(tiven(ess as a lunction of mISS1i1

duration for the mechanized infantly Squad and Platoon. The graph illustrates that the Squad degrades more rapidly than the Platoon as a whol, . Jffectiveness of the Squad under the "best" (no degrading conditions other han

sleep loss) and the "worst" (all potential impacts affecting all relevant abilities) conditions of debilitating factors is presented as .'igure 3. 3. Tl g aph

illustrates that the influence of debilitating factois (light level, str,,ss, dininal rhythms) is less than the influence of mission duration (sleep loss) in dograding performance effectiveness, Manning considerations can also afftect

pe rfo 1 iman c e.

Table 3. 1 presents the projected overall (summarized) effectiveness

of mechanized infantry Duty Positions, Squads, and Platoons for different

platoon actions and mission days (sleep loss). The results indicate that %lwde

variations in performance can be expected for different positions and platoor

actions. Best and worst performance ranges between ver'v effective, e.

* 90, and grossly ineffective, e. g., . 09, over five days.

Table 3. 1

Effectiveness (E) of Mechanized Infantry: Duty Positions, Squads, and

Platoons in Different Platoon Actions and Over Mission Days

Duty Position Infantry

Day PL SL MTM GR Squad Platoon

Platoon 1 88 55 92 69 72 89

Action 3 69 17 77 32 38 71

1 5 54 5 65 15 20 56

4 Platoon 1 88 74 86 77 83 91

Action 3 67 41 65 46 56 74

2 5 51 23 48 28 38 61

Platoon 1 62 71 81 93 86 76

Action 3 23 36 52 81 63 45

3 5 9 18 34 70 45 26

Platoon 1 78 66 86 79 80 85

Action 3 48 29 64 49 51 62

1,2,3 5 29 13 47 31 32 45

77

. .. - || l
too

90

80

70

60

50

EF FEC TVEESS

(E) 40

30 SQUAD:

LAON:

20

!o0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 3.2. Performance degradation in mechanized infantry squads and

platoons with all adverse factors present.

78 f
I001

90

80

70

60

50

EFFECTIVENESS

(E) 40 MECH. INF CNDITIONS

30 8EST: Q

WORST:

20

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 3.3. Projected performance degradation of mechanized infantry

squads under "best" and "worst" conditions.

1 79

.. t+ " _ _ _ _ _ __" 

__ . _ _ _ _
Table 3. 2 presents the effectiveness of mechanimzd ifant'iv 1)utv

Positions, Squad, and Platoons as a function of impat tino (dbilitalin-)

factors. While a mechanized infantry platoon normally consists of foui

squads, a somewhat understrength condition of only three, squads per platoon was assumed for the calculation of the effectiveness (E) valucs shown

in Tables 3. 1 and 3. 2. Since the scenario (Chapter I1) assumcd (6 to 1 odds,

this seemed to be a realistic assumption for mechanized infantlV fu'lction.

Similarly, a Squad was assumed to consist of only six members: a Squad

Leader (SL), a Gunner and Carrier Team Leader (G/(,TL), and four Maneuver Team Members (MTMs). A full strength squad consists of eleven meii.

In Table 3. 2, impacting factors are coded as follows:

F = Fatigue level in mission hours (24-120)

L = Light level: 1 =dark and 0 = light

S = Stress: 1 = stress present and 0 = stress absent

D = Diurnal rhythm: 1 = rhythm out of phase and

0 = rhythm in phase.

The tabled values suggest that fatigue (sleep loss over mission hours) is

more important in degrading performance over five days than any of the other factors. This corresponds to uniform experience whether from informal

observation or scientific study. Note that fatigue (sleep loss) levels are considered over five days (120 hours) of mission duration, whereas all other factors are binary (present or absent).

Also note that values of E (the effectiveness index) in Table 3. 2 represent all possible degrees or combinations in the impact of the debilitating

factors on performance. The least degradation occurs with the 24, 0, 0, 0

combination of debilitating factors, and the greatest degradation with 120, 1,

1, 1. Intermediate conditions lie between these extremes. The E-values

shown in Table 3. 2 represent the indicated hour, i. e. , the last hour of the

first, second, third, fourth, and fifth days of continuous combat operations.

Table 3. 3 presents the projected effectiveness (E) for each critical

combat tasks performed by the several duty positions of the mechanized infantry. Successive parts of Table 3. 3 present projected values of E for tasks

performed by the G/CTL, MTM, SL, and PL. Values of E are tabled for

each of the three types of platoon actions (1, 2, and 3) and for the average across the three types (Platoon Actions 1, 2, 3). In each case values are given

for the (last hour of) first, second, third, fourth, and fifth da3 of continuous

combat operations.

What most characterizes the pattern of projected values is the variability of effectiveness across tasks and platoon actions. While some tasks

are degraded only nominally over five days (120 hours) of continuous operations, others are projected to become very quickly degraded to unacceptable

levels. An example of a task degraded only nominally is No. 27 (firing at

80

4 _ _ _ _ _ _

g-7 ." . , "_ , - --,-- - -- w-- ,. . .
Table 3. 2

Suinmari/ed Effectiveiiess ( E) of Mechani.:ed Infantry:

)uty Positions, Squads, and Platoons under all

Combinations of Adverse Conditions

Impacting

Debilitating Factors Duty Position Infantry

F L S D PL SL MT GR Squad Platoon

24 0 0 0 93 85 94 92 92 95

24 0 0 1 89 79 94 90 89 93

24 0 1 0 86 78 91 87 87 91

24 1 0 0 88 78 90 86 87 92

24 0 1 1 82 73 90 85 85 88

24 1 0 1 85 73 89 83 84 90

24 1 1 0 82 71 87 81 82 88

24 1 1 1 78 66 86 79 80 85

48 0 0 0 72 56 81 73 73 81

48 0 0 1 69 53 81 71 71 79

48 0 1 0 67 52 78 69 70 77

48 1 0 0 69 52 77 68 69 78

4s 0 1 1 64 48 78 68 68 75

48 1 0 1 66 48 77 66 67 76

48 1 1 0 64 47 71, 65 66 75

48 1 1 1 61 44 74 63 64 73

72 0 0 0 57 37 70 57 58 69

72 0 0 1 54 35 70 56 57 67

72 0 1 0 53 34 69 54 55 66

72 1 0 0 54 34 68 53 55 67

72 0 1 1 51 32 67 53 54 65

72 1 0 1 52 32 66 52 54 65

72 1 1 0 50 31 65 50 52 63

72 1 1 1 48 29 64 49 51 62

96 0 0 0 44 25 60 45 47 59

96 0 0 1 42 23 60 44 45 57

96 0 1 0 41 23 58 43 45 56

96 1 0 0 42 23 58 42 44 57

96 0 1 1 39 21 58 42 43 54

96 1 0 1 40 21 57 41 43 55

96 1 1 0 39 21 55 40 42 54

96 1 1 1 37 19 55 39 40 52

120 0 0 0 34 16 52 36 37 49

120 0 0 1 33 15 51 35 36 49

120 0 1 0 32 15 50 34 36 48

120 1 0 0 33 15 49 34 35 48

120 0 1 1 31 14 50 33 34 47

120 1 0 1 31 14 49 33 34 47

120 1 1 0 30 14 47 32 34 46

120 1 1 1 29 13 47 31 32 45

81

4? 1 __ __________ ______
,l- c3-4 )c cjl ) 11) clr 11) C LQ DC'CC) C)a r.) v)

-4 -4 '4 ,-4 n I- I-- .-4 -4 C c-4 -4 C - c o t)

Cl -.- c r3 c) ) ) O)C- or) -C.) I' CC)C)C) cl (D -Icn InC')

-44 - -4 -4 -4 

r- r- rll40x) t- ~ C C)C QOZQ ( )- o -T (%

-4 v) 1) C' C) O( f-- .,) C r C OQC C C ) r- Zor-1C44 ~ -

.4 C1- r QQ r *.' - 0" C) DCD0C) C) 'J"In C C

- - - 4

C) c- ( 6c 4 C,-4.')C Cf)l ) ) OC)C) C)C) Irl)'J..- D

CD ( ')C O CK) ) O').~ 0 cf- C Qr ) QCDC ) r c'.~4 " ~-t C) r-I)Cl0 0r-) )- )C C) C)4 - or n -

r3 CI

2 cC-) C~oo oC CCl) c) oo oC- 4'-(00COQ CDC 0 --A-)(o 

Q ) (,I-- co C .n co 4C) C4-.ToojC C4" uj c4~ o -A- V)U'c

oo) Oo r, T o - m C)< l) -l '--4 

C) <3 f CD 10-Qr-.- .- T oo In- r- c r-.o C) ' 1) - n C'1 'n C

Vr r-D )< .)C ) C CD D C)C ~~-4- Cl)C4-C C)'f4C- C) J (C3C) .CC) -u '

-4~ -44 -4~

co - or , )C )c D C )C) (D ciU' C) o-; 0c

C) r- -Z- DC )C 3C ) - or - C)DC 4.-, 0

n C (D )C) (DC) C) ClC) C) () r-C), 0- 0n %0 It cncj0 )C )C C C )C) cor ))CC) 0 nI C-. 

) cli CC)A0~O C)C))CC C) C) C) C3C) f'l- I -rcn3f C).4 U

-IC)cl cl '- C) 'D C" c'4 -C) C) cDC) C)QC c r- ) -. n -4

0d (1 t-4 -l cj -4f -4) --- .-4 -4-I c1 

C)) 4 C -~~ r-D-4.. C)C)0)r. 0))))C 0.) 0~''C 0 0)) 0C) 0fU1f CC 0.0.

0) C)C)

Cl *.()CJ4C f-tCCJ.4 C)ICCC) r41)-c)82)Q C
C'I C00000 C C 0 000C)0 CO Jrn-.T 0'% 4f c C14C14In

Cl) C3C0000)(D c 0 00Cor- m-'.-4 00 ON 

-- 4 -4 -4 --4 -- f -- 4 -4 -- 4

4 00 0C D0000 C 33C)C 11O r- r- a%~or

- - - - 1- - 4 1 -4 .- 4 - - 41414

r-C~~ n C000C0C ) )0 C 000 n o00 C) C ~ lC

4 4 -4 -- -4 -4 .- 4-4 -4 

-4-4-4-4- - -4 - -4-- 

C14 -4 -- 4 -4-4- -4 -4- 1-4 - - -4 -4-4 _q- -

0l ----- 4 4-4 ~ - - -- 4 -4 - 444

'L" 00000 Cl'-O ,tC)-t - C 00 00 -, n C) C

0 -31 0 0 C:)C)C)C3 0 0 C 0 r- 0 0 00C> --0 A--f-.T 00r, - M Cf

a) -4 -4 -4 -4 -41 -4 -4 -44

Cd C:)0C 00 000 'T4-.~ 0 * 4 )C D )C Cl 0r-.--'Vicn

0-4 - -4-4 -4 -4 4 4-

- - - - - -4 -4-4 4 -4 .-

Cl 00 C 00 - 0 f -4-4. 00r-C% c 00 r-ON 0 0-4 0 - ~C31

o% 00000C)C) enc O-tCCl- % 00C 400 0%0 COtn-4DL0U'n

'A-4-4 -4 -4-44-444

to4 00 000r M t LfC"l Ln C LIC3 O 0 l 0 flO~-.O

-4--4-4 -44 -4 

0. .04 Ln -4 CCOl -t O V 4cOI t -O C-4Clf -OW

04 0 0 0 0 0 0l~ 0f-4 NU.0 C

4 -44-4--4--4 1--.

00 000 00

83
-4 -4 -4-4 1-4- -~- -

co D OO C C C)C) i )C) C C)C l qO 0C D-CIL

~-4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 - -- 4

~-4 -4 r-4 -4 -4 - -4 -- 4 -1

Co 0 C aC00 D1 01%OaCl) 00C000C)C3 -Tr 0000 ' o( 0000o0p D DC 0 ,10LI

--4 -4 -4 .- 4 -A ~- -4

-z. C3Il C3 Co C'j -4 C-. *. ('1C CD 3 C C ID C ) C- (N- 014 . C4 (D

-l) 04 UN n ON -40 - G0 C'or-c-- r -I'o C, cOC-D4C -Z . n N- C4CJ00 CI-OD -I Ct -4 C') 0 (D

C14 %D ci r-- m r- %. 0~CJ0 0 O,0C 4V

Iz L C A )C) %. T0' C'-4 C oCC - -10 . t q"--4

ell C40 C)-4D 'T C14 -LC )CNI : C)140C1C

0 C

CD *n .~ (-4C)O C0 ~ -N-C) 1-4o I 0 C) C LfCEn O'.3f')

-o CY

-- 'C -4 'A '4-40 -4r4CI4 - C'J-0 -4O C)

Cl 'D Cl Cfl C>~ D-C'J0 C-'D-04- 'C14 C tn Sfl CI~rlCJD

Cd C-J ) l(Dc 00 C3 V1 O CltcC14 C1400 CN-4C C - TC 0

H~ CC C)C C 101 C0000 Co~14 - c 0 0 C DIT0)C -

~--4 - " -4 -4- 444

-4 -4-4 -4 - 4- 4

-T 0000 C)LoCIC N-sCl 3C C 0-4 . 00O U C4V)COC4% Cl ( 0000 ) lC CD C3C C P , % 17 C MCC r %

1-4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -44- A

-4 -4 -4 -4-4 -4 -1-4 -4

0l 0 0 0000 0 z 0 0C'

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

. U -4 4 U -

84

t- r -. -
Mn CD- C (0 0nC00 % 0 Inr inO.t~~ I~'-n ID CI

'.l 00 )( C 000 )C I )C oC N00 r, no 1 NCIN0O r C~c) .- 1 -1 .- 4 - . -4 .4 - - -1

- r O CDCD C CO - 00r, 4N ' ~ f-( r--tf 0 I k N.00SO c

%D c) ( C 0C) r- %0 'TclC' toO-4..C) C:) rf- I()ztInC-4

-4 --4 -4 - -

C)C ) )C CD00 C0 C C 10jC -. 3 4 CDCl 4 4"I-z C -

-1 -4 -4 -1 -4 -1 -1 - -1--4 -

C'4 CI zr 00-1 n C 000100 0C ) )' ' o-.1 c-.tNt D I Sn 00 r- r- % 000 C)C.C ) 0r- r-D 0'ONco (oco -

-4 ~ 1 0 ~ C ~ -00 -- 0 -1r. t c-C-r-4

'.0 n D(")c cno'4 00000 C - 0C i)v r-- r- a

0D C)C 0000 : )C CO- 00 rON or nI -I No SC-o C7%'Cr4

'.0 C)C0CD(D00 r- -ztce' (ThIOO -C)C) C, 'T IN - -t

-A - -- 4sC. 1-4tf -1-C~- ~ t C'

tO i iC CO'L40~ ~C) -i Ino.S1O0 r--Sn-in '4 C )-Stf-.

In 00000 n n j 0C%00t 0 r- m C0 " Or- 4-if I

CID Z) c)0 C: C D 0C) C) C- o CO~ (7, :) -4 T r

*r- r- so -1 -4 -,t 00 00 - 's sO c-J c C 4O s r- In CD C rn

tO) \-,z cnCNJ-t r o-TcO)C'4 'C nc)- 4- CD kO-- cC4 -i

1.0 t 114 D co C) s -4 - n T C) (7% C1J4 0 C1 t I - - C)40~

Inanr tO C (D 0C00 C))0 O-4t- C) in, -4 Cr

0 C d I DC C D C C) - C4)-- 4 C,- 40 C1 40 oI - nC441

41 ~ In )DC) >C C DCD0C Ce1m)00eri c r4CC- % 0O O G0: 0

I C C 0000 ( C C C -ClC--4) I I IN C) 0 'l)00C'4.-400

to ) C) )C) -T .N-4CI 04 I-4 C:)C)C3 I CN -1 C) C

I 00000)C: c 00-,00 0 C'-1 CO.-4o r-oC14 0 O D -

-4 -- 4 -4 -1 '-A -1--4 -

- 00 )CIC 00 InoC14 oC In C1cro 0OCOOC W tel 1c' In

to) C00C C) C O I t- dlI r- if) c'44 00 r LO n ' -0 4 -44-1

0 0000C)C30 r'-sD-1-4 I , ~ O-4 - t r N-O'.'to nr,

teO 0000C)CD0 S.C11c-l4 %.D t'T CN r I C - C11 C4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

d41C 1.. 4, - S 

0 404< a4 < P..4 2<-

85
%O 00000DC)Cl C1 C14 r- r- ON -4 r- C)L) IT ITC) mc

r C) 4 C) -4) C)C ,-lc 1 r l - 4C _L)I 1 I

W). 0000 0000)coC: l 0 O 4 0r-a "c"J0C, . 0, C C3 -4 C3 -D C) -4C C 3 ) r-- I Y-44 0 -r

0

C; r- 00000)c)C C 000) ) )C)C ' C'1 '44 C) cor- oLI) -Z

C) )cCC C3 C) 0 C000 0 3 -Ir r cl) f-4'

-o0 r-. C003C)C00) C 00000 ) D - C4 -4C:) D - . 41-4 -q -4 -4 .- 4 -4 -1 -4 -4 -

-4

CD C0000C)0 0000DC 3 C1 00 'D m~4. r- 0 0 C C 0 ) C 0C00 3C C ncn14- ) 0 oU r -4 -- f-4 -4 -4 '-4 -4 -4~4-

0 000C 0 3 0 CC 0C %0 0 'y0 0 n -L C4mr r, 0000 C)0 00000 l ) 3 oOr- r- m00c

C'4 00 r- cn -4 -4 %D4 -4 !4 -4CIL C4- -C1 )V

%D - 4C 3C: Do n0 -4 ct) __4 C4 0 C) : C4 '-q C4- L )c.SJ 

Co C, - .;4 r0 T C 0 0 Cl -4r0 0 0cn - 'C D -4 C1 c

%a L C4 _40D0 00000>C)C: -r-400 c)% n 4" -4-4 -4 -4

4- 4 14- -4-4 -4-4 -4

o 0 0 0 0 0.0- .41 41 -4 4-.,4 4. -1 e

86
areas). A MTM usually performs this task. An example of a task quickly

degraded to an unacceptable level under the linflact of adverse factors is

No. 41 (directing relocation fire). This task is usually pe rformed by the

SL.

Table :3. 4 presents the debilitating factors which impact the c ritical

abilities for each critical task in each platoon action. The table heading shows

the abilities (see Taxonomy in Chapter 1) needed for task ixerformance and tue

debilitating factors (see Chapter I) impacting on these abilities. In the hody o f

the table, only the impacts are recorded. That is, the absence of an entry

may be due to the fact that: (a) the task in question is not critical in the riven

platoon action, (b) the ability in question is not critical for the given task, or

(c) the ability in question is not depressed in this '.ask and platoon action.

Where there is an entry in the table, a '1' denotes a significant (greater than

20'%) depression of the ability in Platoon Action 1, a "2" denotes the same for

Platoon Action 2, and a "3" for Platoon Action 3.

As well as a descriptive summary of adversely affected critical abilities in critical tasks, Table 3.4 serves as a cross-index. The following information can be obtained from the cross-index:

a. critical tasks performed by various duty

positions

b. source(s) of adverse impacts on critical

abilities

c. adversely affected (depressed) critical

abilities in critical tasks

d. adversely affected tasks in platoon actions

e. combinations of the above.

Accordingly, the cross-index can be used to answer various questions, such

as:

* who performs a given task?

* which critical abilities are depressed in

which task and which platoon action?

0 which conditions (debilitating factors)

determine decrements in which critical

ability(ies)?

* which tasks experience parallel patterns

of degradation?

Underlying Table 3.4 is the premise that a set of relationships governs

the depressive effect of the debilitating factors on the various critical abilities.

87
Table 3. 4

Mechanized Infantry: Summary of Significant Depressions of Critical Abilities

DIU2RNAL

TAS FATIGUE -RHYTM LH2T :.EVEL S3T.3ss

NO. V % SF PS 3 a1 27 2 0 N R ?S

012NE/ 1 12 2 12 12 12

CARRIER 2 2 2 12 12

TM-M 3 i 2 I i

L.EADIER 4 1 1 1

3 1 3 3 : 123 1 3 1 3 13 

123 3

9 123 123 123 123

10 12 12 1

1i 12 12 1 12 12 12 12 12 1 12 12 12 1 1 12 12 1 l i :2

13 1 1 1 12 I 12 1

14 12 12 1 t 12 12 12 12 1 12

13 5 2 2

16 2 2 2 2 2 2

17

ANETUVER 10 .. .2 1

TEAM 19 23 23 23 23 23 3 3

HEKBER 20 123 123 123

21 23 23 3 3 3

22 2 2 2 " 2 -

23 3 3 3

24 3 3 3 3 3

25 123 123 3 3 3 1 3

26 2 2 2 2 2 27

's 2 2 2

29 3 3 3 3

30 1 2 1 1 1 1

31 3 3

32 3 3 3 3 3 3

SQUAD 33 3 3 3 3 3 3

LEADER 34 3 3 3

35 3 3 3 3

36 23 23 23 23 3 3 3 23 3

37 3 23 23 23 3 3 3 23

38 2 2

39 123 123 1 3 1 3 1 3 123 123 123 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3

40 123 123 123 123 123 123 3 3 3

4i 123 123 123 123 12 123 123 123 1 3 2 13

42 23 12 12 12 1 1 12 12

43 123 123 3 3 123 1 3 1 3 1 3

44 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 133 1 3

45 123 123 1 3 123

46 2 2 2 2 2

47 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

48 3 3 3

49 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

rLATOON 50 23 23 23 23 23

LEADER 31 3 23 23 3

52

53 23 23 23 3

54 23 23 23 3 3 23 23 23 23 23 23 23

55 3

56 123 123 1 3 1 3 123 123 123 123

57 123 123 1I 1 3 1 3 123 3

58 3 3 3 3

59 1 3 123

60 3 3 23 3 3 3 23 3 3 3

61 13 13 13 13 3 3 13

62 1 3

63 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

64 3 3 23 23 23 3 3

65 3

66 1 3 1 3 3

67 3

68 13 12 13 3 1 13 33 1 13 13

69 1 3 1 3 3 123 1 3 12 123 12 123 123 1 3

70 3

71 3 3 3 3 3

72 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3

73 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

74 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2

75 3 3 3

76 3 3 23 23 23 23 3

88
l'he relation between debilitating factors and the critical abilities

on which thley act is summarized in Fable 1. 5. Fable 2. 5 sugests that each

of these factors does not affect each of the abilities, and only some debilitating factors affect some abilities. For example, Readoning can be degiraded

by Fatigue, Diurnal Rhythm, and Stress. However, %iemo' v is affected only

by Stress. In this analysis, the maximum nnumber of adverse i mpac ts on a

task (within a given platoon action) that is theoretically nossible is 16.

Fable 3. 5

Sumnmnary of Factors Degrading Critical Abilities

.0 qb

4,yy

ess e9 0

FATIGUE (SLEEP LOSS) /

DIURNAL RHYTHMS

LIGHT LEVEL/VISIBILITY / /

STRESS /

Accordingly, Table :2.5 constitutes one set of axioms for the formal (mathematical) model from which all quantitative projections in these Guidelines

derive.

Digest of Critical Tasks and Their Performance

Succeeding portions of this chapter present detailed descriptions of

what is known about how the conditions associated with continuous operations

affect the performance of each of the 76 critical tasks of the Mechanized Infantry. Derivation of task criticality is fully described in a companion report,

Background Data, Volume III Human Performance in Continuous Operations

Guidelines. Here, the performance of each task is reviewed in terms of its

behavioral requirements. For example, the G/CTL's Task No. 15, "maintaining concealed disengagement," requires the critical abilities, Orientation,

Memory, and Reasoning, which are affectedby Fatigue, Darkness (Light Level), and Stress.

89

p ,-
The relationships between a critical ability and one of the unique

stressors of continuous operations are presented with reference to one task

for which the ability is critical and which exemplifies the need for the ability

and the effect of varying the condition discussed. The remaining tasks show

an index which lists the critical performance abilities required, the conditions which affect them, and the critical tasks in connection with which the

appropriate relationships are discussed. Unless otherwise noted, the interpretations and implications for succeeding tasks are the same as for the task

under which they are discussed. Table 3. 6 identifies where a discussion

appears on how debilitating factors degrade the ability of Mechanized Infantry,

e. g., personnel to perform their tasks. This discussion is also relevant to

FIST, Artillery, and Armor personnel where tasks demand common abilities.

The task digests which follow provide, in each case, a compendium

of information pertaining to each of the identified critical tasks. Each digest

provides the basic identifying information: Task No., the Duty Position which

normally carries out this task, and the task title. Then, the type of defensive

(platoon) action in which this task is highly critical is indicated. Next, the

critical abilities required for task performance are listed together with the

adverse, dcbilitating factors impacting upon and depressing the abilities. Also

listed are those task numbers under which impacts of debilitating factors on

abilities are discussed. Where appropriate such a discussion follows within

the task digest.

90

: 1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'[able 3. 6

Mechanized Infantry: Index of Discussions of Effects

of Debilitating Factors on Critical Abilities

Debilitating Critical

Factor Ability Discussed Under Task No.

Vision 1, 30, 33

Hearing 19, 33

Numerical Facility 57, 66, 68

Fatigue Reasoning 57, 66, 68, 74

Perceptual Speed 29, 30, 57

Orientation 7, 29, 33

Diurnal Numerical Facility 11, 57, 61

Rhythm Reasoning 11, 57, 61

Vision 9, 26, 44, 72

Light Hearing 22, 33

Level Dynamic Precision 18, 20

Orientation 7

Memory 56, 59

Reasoning 45, 53, 54, 74

Stress Perceptual Speed 2, 6

Communication 48

NOTES% 1. Task Nos. in body of table refer to task digests

appearing hereafter in this chapter.

2. Discussions in task digests are also relevant to

Armor, Artillery, and FIST where common abilities

are required.

91
CRITICAL TASK 1

Position: Gunner/ Carrier Team Leader

Task: Fire From Bounding Vehicle

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

DISCUSSION

One of the critical abilities required to fire effectively the . 50 cal weapon

at a moving target from a moving vehicle or from a hull down vehicle is the ability to track visually a moving target. The following figures show how this performance will be affected in a situation such as a prolonged mounted battle, or, in

the case of the present platoon actions, a visual tracking task when the platoon

members are fatigued.

Interpretation

Figure 3. 4 shows that tracking performance deteriorates as a function

of time on the task. Both time off target and number of times off target (errors)

became more prevalent with prolonged execution of the task. Two important properties of this relationship are: (1) the deterioration is progressive over time,

92

T 7 - " -

-__,_"____ I"
and (2) a 15 minute rest period every five hours improves performance, but Jier - formance does not return to normal. The tracking behavior of a fatigued gunner, then, will be less precise than that of a rested gunner. The curves suggest up to a 25 percent decrement in visual tracking performance due to fatigue.

Implications

The cleat cut !rnplication is that tracking performance .vill be poorer for

the fatigued gunner. On the basis of the extracted estimate of a 25 percent decreinent. the effects on their 50/50 hit rate distance as compared with baseline 50/50

hit rate distance for first round firing are:

Target Baseline Fatigued

Stationary Point 500m 3 7 5mn

Vehicle Armored 800m 600m

Area 1000m 7 5 0m

loving Team-Size 300rm 2 2 5rm

Vehicle Squad-Size 500m 3 7 5m

The solution to this shortfall is to plan strategy such that effective rangxes for successful completion of a mission are adjusted to allow for the decrease in

hit rate distance. One such method would be to increase firing rates and to re- duce reliance on first hit success when gunners are fatigued.

90

so

L- 70

Cr

o EST REST

I, I I , , I ,I I , , - I

I 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 12 13 14 15

! 7 2 0

W.-

0 Lw 660

Z 0 600

La

540 REST REST

I 1, , .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 10 1 , 1 , I 14 1S

HOURS

Figure 3.4. Effect of engaging in a complex visual tracking

task for long periods of time.

93

I It -7 _ _ _ _
and (2) a 15 minute rest period every five hours improves performance, but performance does not return to normal. The tracking behavior of a fatigued gunner,

then, will be less precise than that of a rested gunner. TFhe curves suggest up to

a 25 percent decrement in visual tracking performance due to fatigue.

Implications

The clear cut implication is that tracking performance will be poorer for

the fatigued gunner. On the basis of the extracted estimate of a 25 percent decrement, the effects on their 50/50 hit rate distance as compared with baseline 50/50

hit rate distance for first round firing are:

Target Baseline Fatigued

Stationary Point 500m 375rn

Vehicle Armored 800m iOOrn

Area 1000m T50m

Moving Team-Size 300m 225m

Vehicle Squad-Size 500m 375 m

The solution to this shortfall is to plan strategy such that effective ranges

for successful completion of a mission are adjusted to allow for the decrease in

hit rate distance. One such method would be to increase firing rates and to reduce reliance on first hit success when gunners are fatigued.

~94
CRITICAL TASK 2

Position: Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Task: Overwatch Bounding Vehicle

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factor., aqsociated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Hearing Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

DISCUSSION

In a continuous operation, the platoons and teams may need to relocate

frequently. The resultant, ever changing battlefield will cause personnel (such

as the gunner) to be exposed to the performance of a given task under varied circumstances. Of interest here is the question of the effect of this changing battlefield and the repeated performance of overwatching a bounding vehicle under different circumstances on the gunner's ability to detect enemy forces which could

threaten the bounding vehicle. The variable of interest is expectancy. The proportion of enemy detections which occurred in preceding incidents of performing

this task will affect the expectations of such enemy detection in succeeding incidents of overwatching a bounding vehicle. Figure 3. 5 shows the effects of prior

detection on present, reported detections.

Interpretation

It is necessary to show the effect of expectancy in this somewhat theoretical way. However, the effect is well known. In the detection situation, the percentage of signals detected is shown to depend on the perceived likelihood of a

95

_ p- - . 11-_
'igo. d being- pr-es-et. The WI11 lm~in ()f s-igimls do(- nt miiii-'. It iS! tfilI-elative 1uroport'ionl that influenocs' ( Xjookt Lrit s "lt 'he oeF o eIu t

pi-mim-tion of eemy elico)Ufl s will jnfiueriie his e xt)ctat ionl ()1 L' e tic unto '.

This exlpetatioli, in1 tuti, will influience liii pi'obabilit , that the Olunni- WVill (hlet

!Ilk, ii'Oselict (0til1 eInemy elemewt which couild threatenl a bounduing vehlicle. If lihe

enem1Y was eni omntei'ed o)ften ini prteviouis movement, it i.s moi-e likely' trot het

guiluier' will detect the pi-esence o)f un enerm- element in suIccee'ding; encunteIS. 11 

If, on1 the OtherI hand, e 1ne1-mY eInconrIte i' was- infleq 110 nt , then the pi'obabil itv [Ii..,

the' go uIIner Will dc tec-' I ee pro serice is ie dtce d. xpe clt iof is tnot thre nil

fac tor' cOntribUt ing to he1 Jpobability of (deteection. Ho0w e xpec tation WVill afite ot

this pi obabi lity canont be stated quantit ive 'ly to r aill s;It ions. But illt tic a10I~jilt

sho(wnl, whenl 1 10 k nec tLAtiriI Was that a signlal (thet: LIaaog Of a to he de'tect 1( 'l ,iiet) would be or-es ont 50) lieice it of the timle, tire SiVI~ial Was do to c td Iii ghM1 l Letwee n 70( and 9tt pluis pe i'cent of the time. WVhen that s ane sigfnal was i lc\ i e

1 2 percent () the lime, the signal was dieteceted between 501 petrcen rnrd 71 e i-ce it

Of the timeW.

Ini1plural ions

A\lthiough the probability of detecting an eri y tar-get whichi could tltte aten

a b)ounding vehicle cannot be quantitatively r-elatedc to the gYuiei r' x pectat iof of

encounter-ing anl enemny, thre r~elationship) is dc ar-ly do monstirated. .Asetrues of

move ments iii which a gunne i' has not detected the pre se roe of enrie m' lemrients

which could thr-eaten a botinding vehicle will lead to a r-eduction in the pr-obability

that thre gunner' will detect an enemry elemrent on suibsequent Movements.

'ieapipiae corriection for, this potentially dange r'oiis effect is for' thle

PI, to advise the gunner of !how this expectation adversely affects his ability to

detect the enlemy and to comnIrnicate to the gunner the actual best estimate based

on ba"' efield intelligence of the probability of enemy detection during a specific

move me nt.

This icelationship as it affects this task anti all other- tasks subsequently

r-eferried to points to an impor-tant potential ti'aining ar-ea. Per-ceptual evidence

is often not clear cut. It is assessed in teirms of subjective expectation. TI'aining

tr-oops to r-ecognize this fact will be beneficial. And, it may be that specific pr~ogr~ams can be developed in combination with specific aids, such as specially pr-ogr-arnmed calculator-s, which will assist soldier's in prop,2t'Iy establishing plrobabilit ics.

96
90

0i

w

LL

tu CODITION 11 U 7

00

70 3 

HE-IUEEID FTS E~O

Fiue3 .Efcso inlrt ndtcinpoaiiy

Codto 4 vnt;5 ecn inl

C on iin1 2 vns)0pecn inl

Codto I 4 vnt;1 ecn inl

097
CRITICAL TASK 3

Position: Gunner/ Carrier Team Leader

Task: Fire To Protect Bounding Vehicle

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Hearing Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

98
CRITICAL TASK 4

Position: Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Task: Overwatch Dismount

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Light Level/ Visibility 22, 33

99
CRITICAL TASK 5

Position: Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Task: Fire .50 cal At Areas

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions:

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Dynamic Precision None

Vision None

Orientation None

100
CRITICAL TASK 6

Position: Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Task: Coordinate Firing With Other Vehicles and Dismounted Elements

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Dynamic Precision Light Level/ Visibility 20

Memory Stress 56, 69

DISCUSSION

In every battle, it is essential that the gunner coordinate his fire with that

of other vehicles, maneuver team elements, and other support weapons (tanks,

artillery, etc. ). In continuous operations, the battle scene will be highly mobile.

As teams move from position to position or platoons frequently relocate, the amount

of information that the gunner must consider in order that he can quickly and accurately coordinate fire increases greatly. The following relationship shows how the

speed with which a task such as this, which requires integrating information from

several sources and choosing one of several alternative responses to that information, is decreased as the number of alternative responses or courses of action increase.

101
In te I -p e tal 1011

Fiigure 3.6 shios that for tasks that reqluire v( quit' k l1!1''s a

flumberi of alte rnativ cs incrleases, so will the tinm it takes to formiule ua,

5 pn~e Ihe Ic ale timles 'Aoen,10 exa miple, theo, gulUlle I may d e te .t a possible,

('1liv large t. Hie mlust rapidly and ac( urately dlecide 'A hether 01- not it is in fact

the ney whet heli 01' not it is 'A ithin is .'Onle of' responsibility, whether. 11he tatgetO is 'A ithini lange, and %% hetheit or- not hec should enaethe taj-et . As tht, co[-

tinuous ope ration %% ca rli on, t ie itoe etual load involved in keeping t rk of*% who s

who and who's %% hk le XX ill cleak'tfIc C Ia 5 inlgly- large) nlumlberIs Of altel-nativ(es to

.Olisidet . Trho, g< aph shows that %% ha4t the gfunner coulId do ill less than two t ent hs

o' a serondl withi onl y one, alt(,rnative XX ill take XX eli over haltt a se-cond w ith sex l2n

of- morie alter(natives. 1 In many fli'lig situations, reaction t ilfies required wlli he

of, dte t ii 6 sshown d nd thle d ifferelnc e between'l two te nths of a second andl si% t~ iths

of a seconid (flay be vital.

IIi)1iat 10 ms

The sold ier in Continuous warfare will find that the continuously chan~lging,

baltictlefld %k ill Increase the number of perceptual alternative-s to be c~onsiderted

in tasks 'A icl-i requtire rapid pr'oc eSSinlg of the informl-ationl and extrem'lely rapjid IV -

5 pomses, such as those. Often required Of the gunner, in L.ooid ilia tinl~r his fire with

that of Othcl elemlenits.

1* IeqUeflt updating, inerain, and su1miarization of the overall and speific battle! situations, maximally informative range car-ds and Tk l' identificationls,

an mU wl thought out and developed SOl's represent methods forI minimnizing the det -

time otaL effect. of this shortfall.

This last point, the prepar-ation to be mnade beforehand, cannot be overecmphasiiedc. The thrust of the preceding remnarks is that the soldier should be: (1)

ove-r tr-ained for battle, (3) well-versed and rehearsed in appr~opriate procedures,

and (3) provided with the best decision making devices for updating in battle the

appropriate responses.

The training might involve the use of battle simulators, c-ase method study,

and maneuver practice. The important point is that cognitive practice as well as

per-formance practice must be given. Additionally, detailed briefings including

specific discussion of possible alternative courses of action will be helpful.

4'i 102
.6

0.5

i2

.4

2

.3

2

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to

NUMBER OFALTERNATIVES, LOG SCALE

Figure 3.6. Reaction time with varying numbers of alternative responses.

103

, _ _ I _ _ _ _ _ _ __II Ill I I . . .. .
CRITICAL TASK 7

Position: Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Task. Maintain Knowledge of Squad's Location

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

DISCUSSION

People differ in their ability to maintain orientation. The need to know

where one is and where other objects or persons are relative to oneself is exemplified in this task. The Carrier Team Leader must know where he is and where

he is going in order to complete effectively this task. The following relationship

shows how orientation ability relates to experience with the environment and to individual abilities.

Interpretation

Figure 3. 7 shows that there are two kinds of people: poor and good senseof-direction people. Those who have a poor sense-of-direction (and self evaluation

of ability in this regard is quite good) show no improvement in orientation after repeated exposures to the same environment. Those who have a good sense-of-direction become better in orientation with more experience with the same environment.

Experience provided by map familiarization, reconnaissance, and briefings will

help improve orientational performance.

104
There is some evidence that one of the operative factors that distinguish

good from poor sense-of-direction people is good versus poor memory.

Implications

Those individuals with the primary responsibilities for orientation, as

in the case of the Carrier Team Leader engaged in directing r-lo:ation or repositioning of his APC, should be preselected individuals eith a good sense-of-direction. To identify these individuals, tests of memory, and self-reports (which, surprisingly, are one of the best predictors). Orientation ability is severely affc,.Led

by sleep loss.

in tests conducted by the British Army, cognitive tasks most severely affected by sleep loss were encoding, decoding, logical reasoning, and accurate perception/concentration. All of these abilities are related to maintaining orientation.

At night the orientation problem becomes even mor'e severe. The Soviets are convinced that if orientation is lost at night, confusion, panic, and passivity may o'ccur.

Accordingly, they institute measures to maintain position, direction, and especially

orientation. To permit the dismounted infantry to guide on their fighting vehicle,

the Soviets have a shielded red light in the rear of their BMP. They also employ

identification lights--some combination of red, green, and amber.

Thu role of memory appears to be quite important, especially at night when

the visual cues to orientation will be diminished. Landmarks to be remembered

must be learned. When possible, as much experience as is possible should be given with the environment in which orientation is to be maintained. Extensive briefings with maps and photographs (or other topographical representations) should be

given.

Finally, aids, such as compasses, radar, and others, should be provided

and their use should be well learned.

4

105
I

60 so POOR SENSE-OF-D-R-ECTION

50

40

GOOD SENSE-OF-DIRECTION

0

2 0

IL

30

2 3

I- 20 z

a

0o

I 2 3 4

TRIAL

Figure 3 7. Ability to identify one's relative position with practice for

self-reported good and poor sense-of-direction people.

106

7- - - __ __
(9 2

o ~ Lo (1) 0~(

0 0) 0

o O 0 00- 0 LO~, C In cW t

* z

0) C::o ~ r (9C LUI 0

V)"- LU LU 0 (n .0 0

12) -,A'

0 0 54

C) 4141 L" CO

x > '4- ( 0) -14

000.0) m

Q) 41 , EC

C b0 V- W)

C.) 0 C: OW 0 Ct 0 U. w.I0)C

Z3 QO 4- 940

p4- 0 -0

to -OV 00 0.

4-1 )0

0)20)o0 0) 0i

f < I) Y o r

,-I CJ4 *-4 c'9 ho V)

(I)

<w

-

010
CRITICAL TASK 8

Position: Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Task: Communicate With PL

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

108

. .. .. , - - - - yr.... - - ' r .. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CRITICAL TASK 9

Position: Gunner/Carrier -eam Leader

Task: Detect Enemy Movement

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors ;ssociated with continuous combat operations.

Crl.'cai Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vi ,)Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

l'ai Ing Fatigue 19, 33

P ir-t'ptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

DISCUSSION

This task requires the carrier team leader to detect whether or not

an enemy target, such as a tank or BMP or other vehicle, is approaching

the gunner's location. The information presented in the following graphs

concerns the special case of detecting the movement of such a target toward

the gunner on a very dark night, i. e., on a night with a light level below

that given by a full moon.

Interpretation

Figures 3. 8-3. 10, taken as a group, indicate that the following factors

operate against the gunner in detecting an oncoming target in this situation:

* the target is too dim

0 the target is moving too slowly

0 the target moves over a small distance only

* the gunner uses (or must use) monocular vision.

109

t2

4 m n _. 9" 
While the situations, on which the figures are based, arce somewhat

artificial, the speeds, and sizes, and distances ace ,:quivaltent to a thrcat T-62

tank approaching from a distance of 225 M at a speed of 9 ki,,'hr.

Fl-ur' :3. 8 shows the detection probability for targets of varying brightness Which have travelled varying distances. The curve for a target of .001 ft.

L most closely r-epresents an approaching tank. Notice that at 9 km/hr, the tank

would have to approach nearly 45mi from a starting distance of 225m before the

:iak 'd rye will likely detect its approach.

Figur , 3. 9 shows the advantage of two eyes over one eye, an advantage

xxhich is especially great for dim targets such as an approaching tank at night.

'igutre 3. 10 presents the problem in terms of the viewing time necessary

to detect motion for varying target speeds. The data have been extrapolated for'

the case of the tank.

Implications

The major Implication of these relationships is that when insufficient

light is available for identifying the approach of an enemy tank (or any other

moving target) by comparing its relationship to other objects, then the

luminance of the target and its speed will limit the ability of the gunner to

detect its approach. In daylight, such movement could be detected in less

than a third of a second. At night it could take up to 6 seconds to detect the

mov,,ment. This amount of time could be critical if the target's movement

will dictate the unner's next response.

Suggestions for overcoming this problem involve training in the use

of minute cue such as the small change in size occurring because of an

object's approaching a short distance, training in the use of nonvisual cues

such as hearing, training in positioning oneself to allow contextual cues to be

present against which an approaching object's movement can be viewed, or

training to position oneself to take advantage of maximum ambient illumination,

such as in a location from which the moon, if piesent, is most likely to cast

the most light on an approaching tank.

The use of night vision aids or even binoculars will help immensely.

110..
CERTAIN--*O I00

31.5

90

oW 27.0 _Z1 UI Ul 0 s o • 22.5

010, L~

>j>70 w

COo 1.-35

Q- -- 6 TARGET BRIGHTNESS 0 60 uEQUALS X uW 9.0 z

IN FOOT LAMBERTS 4. 5

CHANCE-b 50

I 2 3 4 4 5 .0 0 1 .0 1 .1 1.0

MOON IMOON TWI*UGHT

DISTANCE TRAVELED IN METERS ON ON

EARTH I SHOW

LUMINANCE IN FOOT LAMBERTS

Figure (including 3.8. Accuracy T-62 tank of detecting at 225 M targets Figure 3.9. Effect of using one versus two ) moving eyes on detecting movement toward

toward or away f rom ~ewer at about 9 k/hr. or away from a viewer.

6.0

4.0

' 2.0

0

1.0 MON~OCULAR

0

OI- BINOCULAR

I- "[ -' ! L, l !

5 8 13 19 27 40

SPEED OF THREAT TANK IN KM/HR

Figure 3.10. Effect of rate of movement on movement detection.

-/. 111
NOItVnfldI''.J 3jJtA ]J

eo 8 o C- L) C, 0-

NOuinVfdINV'J SSOHO 'ADN31IIJ3

0

o 0 0 Ci 0 0

00

<La

0d

* ~c) *0 r_ 0-a

j ) 4 Hc i

4C w H O * l_3

4J -I F= 

4

-

(0432 C 4-4 )

w 4 r_~- 0 1 V

Q) (1) 41

04Z4)4 bO

C) 0 r- 0

41C 0. -C

-,A bO 4.1-0 C)

(42 (4 44 fd T

S) 4

4-4

4)bOO Z4- W .5L

- 4 r 4) :: 4-'

00 04 *--OD %r).-

,-4 4-' C -I ') ~ 

EnI LJ o

L)

112
1.0

U)

I..1 29

i

20

IB S

DISTANCE L3

0

TRAVELLED I6 x -2

BEFORE 14 - 2G

BINOCULAR 12 0 2 o 22

TAR GET DETECTION, 10Li 20

LUMINANCE, (METERS) L 1

X L3

FOOT 8Cl 1

Li 84

I-AMBERT 17 

.01

6

DIREC T/C/S

1. Select the target brightness.

2. Align a straight edlge with this value on its line

andI thle C('TltCV o thVC "X.

3. P oad the- di,,ta-ncf travolled beflore dtection,

1. mocuiar- id/cr i~,ihere w~nc the ;t ra i gt edge

c:(5,, Ifloil PPC PCcti vf 1 inr.or o.r;phratinq 1I:lyl~ big 'lli-v i-nd~ nmvcneitltt distonce requ irod

for d''icI n.60

113
CRITICAL TASK 10

Position: (unnr Carrier Feamn ltadei

Task: )t 'imine Need to fl~ oc ale

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

heasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Hhythmn 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

114

- -- - - ----------- - ____....
CRITICAL TASK 11

Position: Gunnei !Carr'ier Teain Ladet

Task: EsXtablish heviscd TI-P's and hatnge ca rds

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Nunerical[ Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

leasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diutnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

115

r _ _ _ _ _
DISCUSSION

This task requires reasoning and mental manipulation of nulbI's. I',

is likely that the effects on this task of diurnal rhythms and fatigue ar'e th,

same or similar for other intellectual tasks. Accordingly, the effects might be

considered as a general description of how performance will be modified by a

rapid change in the relationship between when the tasks have typically beeln performed (day or night) and when the contingencies of continuous operations

require their pei'for'mance.

Interpretation

The first point of interest is the effect of fatigue. Notice in .'igut'k, 3. 11

that during two duty weeks which were studied, as the night wore on, pel'ol'mahc,.

deteriorated. In both cases, performance decreased over the first 10 hours

and apparently became no worse during the remaining six hours.

The effect of inverting the diurnal rhythms is that an adjustment period

is necessary. This adjustment period is reflected by the relative superior

average performance in the second week compared with the first week. Over

long periods of time, people tend to perform given activities at specific times

of the day. One explanation for the effects of inverting diurnal rhythms says

that the set of environmental stimuli, including possible biological states

of the body which vary over a twenty-four hour period (called circadian rhythms),

are involved in the habits that people have developed. Accordingly, when one is

asked to do something out of phase with the customary time of performance, all

of the time-of-day related factors are no longer present to encourage maximum

performance. Whatever the explanation, the data clearly indicate that a drop in

performance is to be expected and must be overcome. The adjustment period

seems to be in excess of one week.

Implications

The clear implication is that a sudden inversion of diurnal rhythms

will result in a significant deterioration in mental performance. An adjustment

period in excess of one week, which exceeds the boundaries of the present

scenario, will be required.

The major keys to overcoming this problem are training md anticipation.

The kind of training required to correct this deficiency involves performance of

the relevant tasks at varying times of the day. The need to conduct training

operations as much at night as in the day may be the single most important

training recommendation to emerge from the human performance literature.

Anticipation of performance decrements that might result from performance of mental tasks out-of-phase relative to time-of-day is a helpful forewarning. Creating decision aids and devices for assisting in the performance

of these and other mental tasks will contribute toward nullifying the negative

effects of inverted diurnal rhythms.

116

t7•i V .- k--- m___ _ _
The present discussion was concerned with invrtcd diural! rhythms.

It presumed that some sort of cycle of behavior would h, perpctuat,,d that is

out of phase with its normal time of day. Wheii prolong(.d battle furc,..:

abandonment of the nornial cyclh. ; of behavior, a difft~rcnt probhm .xi st ,

called disruption of diurnal rhythms. Por a discussion of this p' ,, n, s,,

Critical Ta sk 61,

C)

300 DAYS 7TO 12

P 280

:X

C'. 260

26

' 240

DAYS 1 TO 6

220

2200 2400 0200 0400 0600

TIME OF DAY

Figure 3.11. Average rate of work of enlisted men on night duty for first and

second week.

117

-a __ - -- y - . - - -- _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 12

Position: (luntoi Ca rri1ei Teani [A'ad(i(

Task: I)ir'ect ,ltocation Or Lepositioning

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

EReasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Sti ess 48

118

' 1
CRITICAL TASK 13

Position: Gunner Cat iet Team Leader

Task: 1eposition To Allow Other' Weapons To Fii

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Or intation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Nu ein al Facility Diutnai Hhythrn 11, 57, 61

Iteasoning Diu nal l1hythin 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Cornnultications Stress 48

119

. - - _ ?.t~"wi: -, -r--- -- ,--' -~- -----........- - -
CRITICAL TASK 14

Position: Gunne r,'Car-icr Team Leadei

Task: Cover Disengaging Sauads

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

flearing Fatigue 19, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diuinal Bhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal lhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

120

.U _ __... .'
CRITICAL TASK 15

Position: Gunnei/Ca1rier" Teai i Leadei

Task: Maintain Concealed Disengagetment

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

121

.-:, ___
CRITICAL TASK 16

Position: Gunnei /Carrier Team Leadet

Task: Fire To Protct Regrouping

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 71

rumerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhy'hm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

122
CRITICAL TASK 1-

Position: Gunne 'Ca rier Tea-ni Ieader1"

Task: 1Wpoi'i Vehicle t-Zadifess to SI..

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Comv uiication Norae

123 -
CRITICAL TASK 13

Position: Maneuver Team Member

Task: Check Condition of Weapons

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Dynamic Precision Light Level/ Visibility 18, 20

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

DISCUSSION

A t"pial night battle will be fought in temperatures which are colder,

than daytime battle temperatures. As the hands are exposed to colder temperatures, the hand skin temperature (HST) drops. As the HST is lowered, the

hands become less efficient at almost any manipulative task. The Maneuver Team

Members will be required to check the condition of their weapons periodically.

This will includ, manipulating small items and will require manual dexterity. Figures 3. 12 and 3. 13 show the effects of a drop in HST on manipulative performance.

Interpretation

Even a slight drop in HST negatively affects performance. The amount

of strength as measured by a hand dynamometer and the ability to manipulate

large objects (large machine nuts) and small objects (small screws) are shown

to be impaired by a drop in HST. By the time HST drops below 150 C (60 0 F),

all three measures show a dramatic decrease in efficiency. The hand dynamometer and the manipulation of large objects show a 40 percent efficiency decrease; the manipulation of small objects shows a 60 percent decrease. Since

124
the latter two tasks V. ere performed in a fixed arnou lit of timte, the decr ca He

in efficiency can al-so be interpreted as an increase in the amount of time t-i -

quired to perforn the task. ,'igure 3. 13 shows a similar relationship ,)r knot

tying when t1SV is 130C (550F). It also shows thaL performan'c det(.riot'ates

with prolonged exposure to low IHSTs, and thal after 40 minutes exposure, the

decrement in performance will be at its maximum.

Implications

The Maneuver Team Members will require up to 60 percent more time

to check the condition of their weapons when their HST has dropped below 150C.

Nearly doubling the time required to perform these tasks is very dramatic.

The principle compensations for this decrement, unless the task can be performed with gloves on, is to be aware of its existence, to overtrain the task so

that the associated decrement will be adding time to a minimum base time, and

to provide some means of warming the hands before the weapons are to be checked

(e.g., assuring that all persons wear gloves before the weapon check and ciiecking

weapons with gloves off). Where possible, procedures can be designed to allo\V

more time for these tasks. Finaly, in the case of temperature reduction associated with nightfall, routine manipulative tasks, such as this, can be scheduled earlier--before the temperature drops.

OF 80 70 60 50 4C

S I I I 1

100

HAND DYNAMOMETER 0

V)

c MANIPULATIN 0 2o z

La LARGE MACHINE S60 60 NUTS LUL

NUT HAND-SKIN -, rTEMPERATURE

MANIPULATING = 130 C±2

40 SMALL SCREWS o = 550

F±4I IU

Z AI

20

I I I L I

°C 25 20 15 I) 5

SKIN TEMPERATURE OF HAND 0 20 o 60

EXPOSURE TIME, MINUTES

Figure 3.12. Deterioration of manual Figure 3.13. Increase in knot-tying

task performance as hand- time as a function of

skin temperature falls, exposure to a low handskin temperature.

125

I II
CRITICAL TASK 1

Position: \Iaieuve r Tcatin Memnber

Task: D)etect Tar-gets in Exposed Positioni fromi a Bounding Vehicle

Highly Critica! in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor (s) Discussed with Task No.

Visionl 1Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hlearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/1 Visibility 22, 33

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Memnory Stress 56, 69

D)ISCUSSION

Tl,,Mn ulxlV' c Tean r.Menirubs x ill be req'(Uired to (1e t0(- tar'get-S

a fit. 1pt rinds of sleep) loss. Somne of the targetA d et e A ioni Ma be audit oi\,, that

lh Ii-; sold iers \wit l i~tken for sounds %klihuhI inidicate eney Desihe Fiu

314 shot. s tlie (ffect of sleep- loss Onl audcitory, vigilance.

In' I-r it tat 10on

Th'le p)oinis onl Figure 3. 14 at 7. 5 hours sleep) represent the "nrinalT adult

sleep) requireme(nts. The other p)oints represent the amnount of sleep) allowed

onl the first nrigh t (labeled 1 night) anid onl each ot two nighits (labeled 2 nights).

126

rI
t.. th Jt1 t p I I epr'tsrp its a five hour atlditotY vi ilauI I I .iC Alcd for' a c tiffi. uP

auditory d, ,,t iton. Notice that tit( l:ss slep al[ov S I 1 t l'st niht, the

[W''" the det'ections that were made. Plerformata t di ti':n o aboLt 65

dct cttoiil 10 5)0Ih t 53 percent (tct ctionl. By the se( ohe n hI ft,.c s a L!

etn more, dramatic. Perfornance drops from i7 PC!"( ,r ! to 4, [)fc'( .

Implications

The effcct of reducing sleep to thi e,, houris or le;s a it g't will have

marked deleterious effect on auditory viltan r, e. Aft,: o1o night of such sI,:'ep

loss, the soldier's auditory detection abillt ill be im-pair.d Af te two nighi's

of such sleep loss, th(, impairment will be more marki-d. B',,:tid the st,, ond

night, one can expect further impairment.

The recoinmeidations for" correctig this shortfal arc to ridnce roliauce oil auditory detection, to coordinate the auditoryv %hl tatc.' of two or more.

soldiers, or to rely on intersensory validation. The valu., oi Itsrisorxvalidation is discussed under Critical Task 33.

As can be seen in this relationship, fatigue has far rtca hing effects.

In general and wherever possible, a staggered sleeping sc.hedule2 ,%ll help.

The idea is to use personnel who are most rested for those tasks adver.selyaffected by fatigue. Even brief, periodic catnaps just prior' to enga2,ing Il in uclh

tasks may be highly beneficial. Some adaptation during ti aming mayv be eikr.-

sary before individuals are able to catnap, for example, in a moving, noisy AP(.

70

2 NIGHTS

1 NIGHT

tn

z

o 60

Iz

Iw

LUCL0.

50

1 I , I I 1 I I

0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7.5

HOURS OF SLEEP ON IOR2 PREVIOUS NIGHTS

Figure 3.14. The effects of sleep loss over 1 or 2 nights on auditory vigilance.

127

. .... ...... - -- - - - - - - - - -
D, t7C T/OiVS

I. C, t 51 I o I I, Cr., v o,'.s night or

jach o pIev 02:?: t ,I 'I - .

?. Alivr I_ iC a ( I :ih Tis value llx .11 - 32

n -o- ai.. t c ter of zho "X."

3. 1ed tiC p e 'c,,I decre n-2n- in auditory

-5H C.- to c o whe r& th o it ra h. -'Fgc crosses 30

7 HR 28

26

6 HR 24

22

5HR PERCENT 20

DECREMENT

IN 18

HOURS AUDITORY

SLEEP 7.5 HR DETECTION

PREVIOUS 4 HR 16

NIGHT

-14

5HR

3HR 12

4HR X

-to

HOURS

2HR SLEEP 3HR

EACH OF

PREVIOUS

TWO 6

NIGHTS 2 HR

I HR

I HR

0

0 -

0

Noniorjrph rWIating amount of sfvep to aulIfitory detection performance

128
CRITICAL TASK 20

Position: Maneuver Team Member

Task: Fire Weapons From Bounding Vehicle

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Dynamic Precision Light Level/Visibility 18, 20

DISCUSSION

Firing weapons at areas at night involves directing the weapon at various

angles, loading the weapon, clearing jams, and other activities which require

dynamic precision. In at least some cases, the ability to line things up, based

on cues associated with hand-arm movements, will be crucial. It is well known,

of course, that such a task is difficult. We rely heavily on visual feedback for

most tasks involving manipulation. Figure 3. 15 shows the importance of visual

feedback.

Interpretation

Figure 3. 15 shows the performance difference when a task requiring precision is performed with the eyes closed or with eyes open. The eyes closed situation is equivalent to extreme darkness. Notice that tasks are performed considerably better when visual feedback is provided. '[he eyes closed situation provides a

baseline. In this case, in which movement was to be made in the amount of time

indicated, the error rate was about 7 percent. With eyes open, the error rate

dropped. Accordingly, the importance and beneficial effect of visual feedback

is clearly shown.

129

. .. . . .. . . . . . . . .
IIn pl I cat ions

Ther ( a re several solutions to the problem of doficient dv narnic precision

in the absence of visual feeudback. One solution is typically used for firing,

SOime weapontufls at nighit. The use of stake mnarkurs to dellimit the area to be

cov re L the %t' capon is an excellent examrple of providingy a tactilec, non-visual

ctthat du~s lrot d epenad Oil monvet meat feedbac-k. The general ways of en ape asaling

for such defril's A re,

(1) l iga %% eap~ors anad a rranle fir-ingf SU(h that visual feedback are 11U,

necessary because of the provision of' other feedback cues (auditory,

tactile, or other's)

(2) P1rovide artificial. visual aids such as night vision goggles

(3) Irtiethe relevant actions to the point of overlearning so that

each step requires no feedback.

This last suggestion can be understood by the exam-ple of a pianlist. The

piallist use;Ls auditory and m-ovement feedback cuei to learn a piece of mlu sic.

Bai everilua ltv the pianlist overicearms the 'task'' to the point where playing the

piece (olstitttes a miotor pr~ogramn. "Once this mnotor programn is initiated,

it followvs throughl to a conclusion wvithout feedback.

I0

0

Li EYES CLOSED

1 5 cr

EYES OPEN

.2 .4 .6 .0 1.0 1.2 1.4

TI ME PER MOVEMENT, (SECONDS)

Figure 3.15. Relation between accuracy and duration of movement for

two light level conditions.

130
tn %t ('J 0 a) 4"- to3 K)34')04

z0

14j C

414

00

> V)

0 rd

41 '0

H 0- 41

> 4- C) s-I oV E 4-u 3 4) .

41 (V J-- 

V3 4-1-0

0l 035. r 0 -C

(o Ci to.33)

C/) Q)- . -I03I

4- ( -, 4

03.O Lk IS -(

03131
CRITICAL TASK 21

Position: 'laneuver Team Membe'

Task: Plan lir PM,f'etiv e Positions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Nu111k .e l [-at ilitlt Fatigue 57, 66, 68

DiuLrnal l1hythm 11, 57, 61

-,.-i.ollilg Latigue 57. 66, 68, 74

Diurnal 1,hythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

132

-T * ,," , . - .. . . .- " . . . .... . . .... . . .
CRITICAL TASK 22

Position: Maneuver Team Member

Task: Coordinate Weapon's Locatios

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 22, 33

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Dynamic Precision Light Level/Visibility 18, 20

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Strcss 48

DISCUSSION

This task requires communication between leaders and Maneuver Team

Members and among several Maneuver Team Members. When this communication

is verbal, Figure 3. 16 shows the effect of background noise on the ability to hear

a speaker.

Interpretation

There are at least two ways in which the listener could be rendered

incapable of seeing the speaker's face: (1) the speaker's face is outside of the

field of view of the speaker, or (2) the light is insufficient to allow the listener

to see the speaker's face. Under most night conditions, the listener will not be

able to see the speaker's face. (Radio communication possesses additional intelligibility problems).

133
Note that when background noise incr eases to levels louder than the

spaker's voic e, the ability to hoar the speaker deteriorates .%hether or not

the listener can see the speaker's face. But, most importantly, note that

the detrimental effect of background noise is much greater for the listener

%kho cannot ste the speaker. Ihearing accuracy is reduced to near ;-:ero when

the background noise loudness is 16 to 32 times greater than the speakers

voice. A truck or bus passing by at 20 feet or a pneumatic drill is 10 times

louder than normal conversational speech. An elevated train is 32 times louder than normal conversational speech. An airplane engine (reciprocating) is

32 times louder than a shouting speaker.

Accordingly, a noisy battlefield environment at night will make voice

commands nearly impossible to hear correctly even when these same commands

could be understood in the daytime.

Implications

The major implication of this relationship is that at night reliance on

verbal commands will be detrimental when background noise is high. The

solution is to use a nonverbal command method. If giving away one's location

is not a problem, a little cue might be appropriate. In other cases, the use of

radio conmands through headphones which attenuate the background noise might

suffice. Other suggestions include such aids as developing and using a standardized, limited vocabulary; speaking louder or amplifying voice communication

where appropriate; restricting briefings to the daytime; using written communications; and reinforcing speech with a sign language. The development of

tactual or electrocutaneous signaling devices would also be helpful, ]'inally, the

need to use commands in such environments can be eliminated or reduced by

welt thought out SOPs.

NJOISE TO SPEECn RATIO

16 8 4 2 1

90

LISTENING, WITH

8o ENOUGH LIGHT TO SEE

70 SPEAKER

7- 0

,Lo. 50

1-8 40

0 -

-M LITENING ONLY

I.-

w 20

0

Ix

0 0 IO

-30 -24 -18 -12 -6 0 O

Figure 3.16. Intelligibility of words when perceived with and

without visual cues from observing the lalker.

134
L)00 0 0) 0 0 0 Um~~C U coU ')-

z z

(11 0 0 0 0 0

~, 4- 0) C3 r- (D Uin NC) Ci C

r- ) a) CT

4- CC) > 0

V )

-4/ C) 0 c

M >1 C) o

> -i O 3: 0

oCL. z U)

0) 0 )O

jk 5z: ) C

) (1) ~ 1) VciU ) -

Q4-'U' C)

'U", 0)i. .~:

UU C)0C00

C) C' W)CJ 

C)i

(2) 4 ) & )I ,c 4- Q):) .

+j C) V ) C: 0)

1 4- > A0

C) b00 Z:' C

e ) C) -14 V) U)

Ili L) 0)C

* ~~C CI).C <'4Li 

0 a- C:

C~j L co

LoC) i)

I 135
CRITICAL TASK -:

Position: 1 W 1V( -a1 \ 1(l 1-

Task: \.a rk 1-out, Betv' e,,n . , Localions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orieniation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Vision Light Level/Visibilit, 9, 26, 44, 72

I))narie P'eciision Light Level NVisibility 18), 20

136

4. ____
CRITICAL TASK 24

Position: \Liiuuvei "F,,ii \Iinb

Task: Idnt'lif\ T -

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

O'icntat ion Fatigue 7 , 29, 33

Light Leve' Visibility 7

Vision Light Levl/Visibility (9, 26, 44, 72

Memor\ Stress 56, 69

Perceptual 5peed Stress 2, 6

137

Af__ _

U .; ___
CRITICAL TASK 25

Position: \MIlMPUV,1M I ,a.UM Mke l l bt 

Task: M~an Fir'('v COVIz-ib1 ia? fwIo j~iLol5

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Nuineri'al Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 63

Diurnal Ihythm 11, 57, 61

R easoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diu ral lhvthrn 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Memory Stre6.s; 56, 69

138 ..

tf" P - -;- , -- . . . . . .. . . ... . . ..
CRITICAL TASK 26

Position: Uael Ta fl ,mbei

Task: I i'e on Taroets.

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Uatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

[learing Fatigue 19, 33

Per, eptula SI)ed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Memory Stress 56, 69

DISCUSSION

if effective fire is to be maintained, an atecurate assessment of the

points of maximum target vulnerability must be made. Several factors (ontributef to the likelihood of seeing a target well enough to fire effectively at the

target. The set of graphs shows the effect of light level, target size, and contrast ratio on the visibility of targets. Visibility is expressed here a- the

distanc( from the soldier at which a target will he seen. The effect of the size

of the target is shown by presenting visibilily data for- & large object (tank), a

medium-sized object (jeep), and a small target (person).

l3I

~1,3-9

t tI I - I
T1) LUll~e 1'allit ?he IfeAlIlI.Ig o1 ti'3t, graphsl, 11thel) ''tullla.-P 13, -od

1() bt uk.;illoi. Vales Of' ij tt owagul (OltS 11011 1 to 10, 000 ar ghnm1V2l het,

Thi )w ruW- \s vain oi' 10, 000 eeensa tarl \%hli is a little iop 12 thani

II oines as b)1 mii as its bat kg Iounld. For the value of 1, 000, 1lie blgh' 11ess

:nULiplie' is a lilte mltte 'hall 10; for tim vaueuc of 100, iP is 2. ioi title 10

pe!i*ll ,IIIdtill Ih 1o' it'tI cuves, the targtti is oither bighiei 01 dimmlfer than

'I IL 1 .,tCOIR, %k iii he diitlerlllt bol\twell thel, target bliglitn ss and back-

. IL Uid hI lI, ItIiloSS5 b1 ju 10 per(I eltu 01' 1 p12112 e'it 0 l' tihe I)kka a lrol lid h gtns

The glapil 5 -iil0\% IIIhe Illiillilfilt i distallcu eT a a hi( h I.ii 1 a I g 15 call 0ce

eI(09t per (,it It of tim tiine) at v arIious bac kgrloundl ighi Letvels.

Pic I Perk elit alal 10 curl tlves VePI'lselt tille tolt last that all

l ke In.; Vt k '11 to. o1 soldlo 112 aittl pi121 lit . i- he is atte fpt ilig to avoid det ectloll.

Notice that ai taitAiglit an ll emVr soldier or0 jeep N ill hot be seen beyond less

t hall 10011. Eveni Vn a bWight but Overcast day aln elm 11 soldic'i "ho is "eAN

ramtout tai (1 p1entU) "ill be e~tI-nmetv dificult to see if hie is beyond 300mn.

Xaltlo Sof 100 perenlt coltast o1 g Peal er \mtd he those as soiatted a Phi

a I itgll I t arIt I ejiie in a s ittuationl wVher 11Hh- 12um lie11 1 10 all 1 Ilptilg to a voi

ci tioll oP as a resul of aIt~iticat ilu Ifiialion piovided , perihaps, by flares.

hieo lie P c 10 o a 0111 last as h-igh as 10,000 perenlt cmdlt ever be achieved 011

a haittid has 1101. been establ-isheod. Buit given such shaq Ipoliist, even

unde n1h iua Iigi a [0111 a peso 151)12u1[i be soonl at :365mi. Tanks and jeeps wotd

pretsetl 110 jilobtl-or at ati upj to 2000111.

Onl these giarphs, wilel anl object's visibility beyond 2 2001ni is not

Limit ed by hal kglolid Ilti tIflinatiol), the gt-p PaIU does 110 etund beyond the loa est

hac1kgrPound light level at whiuih sueih light levet does l3imlit visibilit within 2 200mn.

The inlpleatiolls fol firing 1)11 talgets are e, LearP. At twVilig'ht levels and

below , targets cannlot be effeeti l engaged al applropliate distanceos using unaided \i.iol. There is 110 way o1 ill ovn thsiuto lce theUntg

fat mrs alt! envilofllnelntal IV imfposed . The olity soutions alc- t0 piovide at-tifit al ill umIfin~at10n (e. g. Us 115I o pv 10112 hllic s) .

140

'a -pen__ ____ 
2200

2000 1% CONTRAST 10

oo" CONTRAST

I600 Lu

24 00 Du

1200

1000

00

Boo PERSON

600

400

rr

200

I I S I .. IL..... ,

-5 -4 -3 -2 -I 0 I 21-5 -4 -3 -2 -- 0 I 2 LO

LIGIT LEVEL LIGHT LEVEL

I.-

O 2200

z

0 2000

100% CONTRAST 1000% CONTRAST UL 1800

I 1600 0C

11 1200 0

0 a C) 1- 14000 44 C) T

Ld Q)L

2 800 Lu'

600

400:

200

pI p p I I I I I I I I

-5 -4 -3 -2 -I 0 I 2 -5 -4 -3 -2 -I 0 I 2

ON I 0-"?!T I I O ,',"T LIGHT LEVEL

S'TARLIGIPi TILL PM¢JN EARLY OVI~GST ON ON WI LIGHT '0AP

SNO0"' SNO0W

LIGHT LEVEL

Figure 3. 17. Effect of light level on visibility at various contrast ratios.

141

ILI - U - -- -5 -4,~ -2 - 5 -4 - 2 -

EA•f EAT I DA I IIIH E E
U) L L -

< LI Li C)

~ m

o 0 0 0 0 IA o - U') Ir) N -

LiI 

0

00

(a Ld

4--,z .

(1) 4- 'V0 ' 

0- C.j 0u~ -

41 1 C) r --I (a Li

U3)-7' O 4J U1 4- C, o o

0~ ' H U ,

*0 0

Q) 44 040-

Pw C, -

IC (A' I) Cl) (

4-U' 9-t 0- 0 0

41 ) 4- 0_jIIC)W'WOr) L C) 

<- -: z 0j

ir U) J W a rr-J

L I < <

L,) LL0V )C

4r Cr- -
CRITICAL TASK 27

Position: mancuv,r rcan Menib,1

Task: Fire at Areas

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision None

IDynainic Precision None

Orientation None

143

p. •
CRITICAL TASK 28

Position: Manu . ' Teain Me mb( "

Task: [.'ire %%ilh XVDs

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Pice'1pLual Spjted Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Memory St ress 56, 69

144
CRITICAL TASK 29

Position: Maneuver Team Member

Task: Move Rapidlv to New Positions via Marked Routes

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/ Visibility 7

DISCUSSION

In continuous operations, members of fighting units will be required to

perform pei ceptual motor tasks which require rapid perceptual discriminations

when sleep periods have been reduced. The graphs show the effects of up to

48 hours without sleep on perceptual-motor performance and the recommended

recovery period for varying hours of continuous operations without sleep.

Interpretation

The first graph shows how sleep loss affects performance of the perceptualmotor requirements of the task. Notice that performance is not affected to any

marked degree through the first 17 hours. However, by 0900 of the second day,

there is a 45 percent increase in errors. This indicates that the level of performance on tasks which involve perceptual-motor ability, such as finding the route

markers while moving to a new position and maintaining the ability to detect

enemy presence enroute, would be welt normal performance level. Note that the

145
decr ement appears to level off at the end of day 2, perhaps even improve. This

rinu be due to a diurnal rhythm. By the beginning of day 3, after 48 hours without sleep, tile increase in errors on the perceptual-motor task is 120 percent

of baseline.

The second figure shows the recommended hours of recovery (sleep

and relaxation) for varying periods of continuous work without sleep. Notice

that after four days (96 hours) of continuous operations, a recovery period

of five days is recommended for complete recovery.

implications

The impli ations of Figure 3. 18 are that as sleep loss accumulates,

pcrceptual-motor performance and perceptual speed will be impaired. Route

markers may need to be two to three times more visible, in terms of size or

brightness, foi a soldier who has not slept for two or three days than for a

% ell-rested soldier.

Figure 3. 19 gives the recommended rest periods for complete recovery.

1'he suggestion is that if first echelon troops fight, say, for four days, they will

need a five day recovery period before they can be used with full effectiveness.

Rotation plans should be based, in part, on this consideration.

,20 "DAY 3 120

100 - 96

Id--

Cr 80 0_ 14 72

z DAY 2 0

I: 60 48

V 4

836

bJJ

U 12

n_ 20 i ! I

DAY I HOURS SLEEP LOSS

0900 1300 1700

TIME OF TEST

Figure 3.18. Perceptual motor skill over a Figure 3.19. Recommended hours of re48 hour period without sleep. covery as a function of sleep

loss.

146

7W

- 2, - r,. .- .. . . . . . .. .- . . . . ..
D IRECT/OVS

1. Select hours without sleep.

2. Align a strcaight edge with this value -)n

its line and the center of the "X."

3. Read the percent increase in errors over

base rate and/or the recommended hours or 9

recovery where the straight edge crosses; -heir

respective lines. 10

20 I;1

100 PERCENT 40

15 INCREASE

90 IN 60 ERRORS Is

OVER 80- BASE 8O

RATE 21

70 100

24

00

HOURS 60 x 1,20 -3

HOURS 50

WITHOUT

SLEEP -36 40

RECOMMENDED

HOURS -42

30 FOR

RECOVERY 48

20

-60

72

0

84

-96

108

AeO

Nomograph showing error rate and recommendecd rest tim.e as a

functiun of hours without sleep.

147

_? F .. . . < -j- ' - .
CRITICAL TASK 30

Position: \lanuuver zarn \clfmbc'r

Task: Firie While Relocating

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Ligrht Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Dynamic Precision Light Level/Visibility 18, 20

Memory Stress 56, 69

DISCUSSION

This task involves shooting at targets that have a brief and unpredictable

exposure. Figure 3. 20, based on British data, shows that the mean number

of hits deteriorates rapidly with sleep loss. The score recorded for each soldier

was the number of hits out of a total of nine. Portable electric targets, at ranges

of 100m, 200m, and 300m from the firing point, were exposed for 5 seconds at

time intervals varying between 10 seconds and 7 minutes. Each man had an arc

of fire of 622 mils. Accordingly, the soldiers required vigilance to detect the

target. The three goups received no sleep, 1.5 hours, and 3 hou s sleep per

night respectivly. All groups recovered after three days of rest.

148
Inrter pr eta tion

Th'le figure shows that the tiumnb, 1, otf hits det clioral es rapid ly \tith

stlee) toss. Ail inte re stinrg quest lul 1,' % \ n hefl] Is tilTh' shot 111112 5 kilt l cr iO! '*,S

the attention capacity of the sold icr so 01,i~rl a coiii1biiatron of hoth

produces the effect. Separate tests o-: cr00pimir capacity (\h ilc sliooyiim at

predictab!, targets) suggest thiat 15>1!Ll( vigilanco for- unpri'CL~ab'le tat s 7t.s

which deteriorates with sleep los;s.

TPhe two sets of -esults dliffer bec-tause one set is baseod onl a sel-ac<

task (shooting at predictable Targets) and the other set is atn IiIncrtlVpaced task with a high vigilance omponent (shooting at anl inpiedtictahie

target). While vigilance is senisitive to steep toss, welt l~earned tasks resist

sleep loss. Figure 3. 21 presents the results for preudictable targets. Hetre

sleep loss has rio influence on the ability of soldiers lo 1group their shots. One,

can not expect soldiers to remain vigilant for more than 20 minutes at a time.

Accordingly, fire rate must he increased as the continuous operation

time increases, if the kills are to remain constant. Less reliance should he

placed on first shot hit.

9- Sleep

H-rs/ Night

~ =0

1 1/2

7-7

%/

-

FIRST DAY /

WITHOUT SLEEP

cl C2 El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9~ C3 C4 C5

Performonce Sleeples, Days Prformonce

before oftIer

A Sleep Loss Recovery

Figure 3.20. Vigilance shooting under varying

conditions of sleep loss

149
0: Sleep

H-rs! Night

- = 0

-- ~ V12

3

LLJ

z

0

3--

FIRST DA4Y WITHOUT SLEEP

CI C2 El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 %C3 C4 C5

Performance Sleepless Days Prformonce

before after Sleep Loss Recovery

Figure 3.21. Grouping capacity of soldiers under

varying conditions of sleep loss

150
CRITICAL TASK 31

Position: Maneuver T.ain Mtninbt-i

Task: Move To Assembly Atia

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

151

2 I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
CRITICAL TASK 32

Position: Ilaneux , ' Tta ni M(,nber

Task: i'i,, To Covet PMove, To :\As in1bl, Area

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level Visibilitvy 26, 44, 72

tlfariig Fatigue 19, 33

Perw-eptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Memory Stress 56, 69

152
CRITICAL TASK :'3

Position: .', :ua l, , -,

Task: O zl\-| Iira1n [o! hrnt.m\ F!. i,

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vi. r( Faltigu,' 1, 30, 33

Light Level"Visibilit 9, 26, 44, T2

Waf Ing Fatigue 1 9, 33

Light Level./Visibility 22, 33

P.'r ,.ptlal Spee d Vatigue 29, 30, 57

Stre ss 2, (

DISCUSSION

In 'Ontinuous operations, the Squad Leader will spend a greal deal of

•le,' e,0,1.rmining whethe'r or not the enemy is present. The Leadel wvill us(

:,9 irh -senses, aided and unaided, as the situation requires. The following

,:-,1hey\,.s 1h(, effects of fatigue on detection, and the advantage of' multiple

i.J-. ii , i,, this regard.

.- *iii. hour watch that was studicd, the detection of visual signals

ill rpailred. I)etection dropped nearly 20 percent over the hour.

A,' rucor'y signals w-is impaired by less than 10 percent. And,

, :9ithd ( auditortv and visual signals was impaired less than

:111 ,)l tarll fqature is that, in all cases, combined auditory

riioii,. ft-4,uently dete(:ted than by either sense alone.

153
II fitiert, thef- huinar perncc-pluat 6,, tcrfli r'elis hteavil % on iiti-'-o.(

o perIat ion. Th'at is, we uurif'!,n informnation received by one sin> so h, -

Ision, by euoropar nl it With 1111'01 171ion,01 reQCeiVe'd by' anlother seise, suk as

auuditjii. F'or exairiple, an upproa.-hiflg tank not oily presents a visual targe-t,

but it alo akes noise. VWhlen an ipproachihg tiAnk is c anouflaged,( SCi-J in (1I4 !<rKness, its visual projection alomic :nay not be sufficient to assure (iettec' ion. Buit

when the noise of its engine.-s and tracks accomipany mIIIe near threshold v-isu-A

projection, the tank's probabilit o eing rep iited ris-: s sharply

I mplicat ions

Tfie imiplicationls are:

1) fatigue will. cause a decrement in the abilitv to detect targets

2) fatigue will have a greater decrem-ent on the visual detction of

targets than on the auditory detection of targets

3) the detrimiental effects of fatigue are dramatically offset by

iritersensory validation.

100

- COMBINED VISUAL AND

AUDITORY SIGNALS

o

t-y

4 AUDITORY SIGNAL.S

0 80

w

CL VISUAL SIGNZALS

0 10 20 30 40 SO 60

PRETEST MINUTES OF WATCH

Figure 3. 22. Effects of fatigue on detection for vision, hearing,

and combined vision and hearing.

154
co L, e 17) C

a 31:_3____ sii -ivnWi

C~ ( N lJ t- co 0 N'

I I t

0' n co 0) (n O ) C)

I L L I I I

>- 0

~ .I M W -J W

gi < 0 0 z <

CL z 0 uU L C3 0

0 ra 0d

C) C:

> 0 4p C

4-) 4-' U

*': -4 "1 3 0 '

0C 0

.*,- Cl) 0 4

1:4 O 1~ 0

W-dOt 0 () 0

cc o >r .r 0

~0)C4 ) 0

OIH 0iC) 0 A 9.

wl X

C)C 0 0 0 0

- 155
CRITICAL TASK 34

Position: Squad Leader

Task: Establish Cominunications Net%%ork

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communiation Stress 48

156 2 __ _
CRITICAL TASK 35

Position: Squald L(.ai.cit

Task: 1d1 i ' T- " 'I s

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orintation F-atigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level,' Visibility 7

157

4t _____ ...
CRITICAL TASK :36

Position: Squad Loaderi

Task: 1'hl~urt. Range Cuids

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fa tigu e 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Nur-nerirat 1'aility Fatigue 57, 66, G8

Diurnal Rhythms 11, 57, 61i

Reasoning Uatigue 5 7, 66, 6 8, 74

Diurnal Rhythms 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 5 4, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

158
CRITICAL TASK 37

Position: Squad Leader

Task: E-;tablish Rloutes To Subsequent P~ositionis

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor (s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigu e 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnial llhythrn 11, 571, 61i

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Fhythin 11, 57, 61l

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 3:3

Light Level/ Visibility 7

159
CRITICAL TASK 38

Position: Squad Leadir

Task: S11)".lvisf. O .sI h,. And Cam onlla age ons S :'u. lio0n

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2,

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numir' al [a.ilitY Fatigu, 57, 06, 68

lReasonings Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

160

7 -...... .______- -. _,.-- .. _ . . .
CRITICAL TASK

Position: S(i.jad Lade,

Task: \djust Firlg .\A Nt-.,,.s.'v

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal lhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

161
CRITICAL TASK 40

Position: -Squac! [.,'ii,.

Task: ('()o1rd t . (Iu:td l,o.allon It Nc.,.sai.

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Nurml, al I'acilitv Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level! Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

162
CRITICAL TASK 41

Position : Squad Lt(adei

Task: l)ir'ct el'iocation Ftite

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 26, 44, 72

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal hhythm 11, 57, 61

ieasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

163

_ _ _II I
CRITICAL TASK 42

Position : S ii d I QaS(i ('

Task: Miakt Xk,% lNlrnig ('ard .. s\c id

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vison "Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 7'2

NM I(aI iaitv I., tigu" 57, (66, 68

Diurnal 11hYthrn II, 57, GI

Hlkeasoninlg Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

D)iurnal Nhythtn 11, 57, 61

Orientation I.'atigue 7, 29, 33

Light L(evel/Visibilitv

164/i
CRITICAL IASK 43

Position: Squad IA'ade,,

Task: I)i"(eet Movement To Assembly Area

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2. 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Numrerical Iacility Miurnal l hyl h m 11, 57, 61

Heasoning l)iurnal Uhvthrn 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fa tigu e 7, 29, 33

Light Lev[/ Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Co nmunication Stess 48

A 165
CRITICAL TASK 44

Position: Squid I. ,

Task: )t,"! ( ,Ix ; X ui1' ]ov ilg To - In b A' l . '

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2. 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which ire affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Visiol Iatiguk, 1, 30, 33

Lighl l ,vel/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

f 'a 'itl< !" tigue 1',, 33

light LoveI,'Visibility 22, 33

Nt:;.it i-ik l i[il-,- Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal lhvtIm 11, 57, 61

I-, '>-Ionmg Fatigue 57 , G6, G8, 74

Diu rnal lhythin 11, 57, 61

S1l rss 45, 53, 54, 74

Pet( ptual petd Fatigue 2!), 30, 57

Sti ess 2, (6

Mi'morv StI'ss 56 69

Coin nunial ion Str .ss 48

166
1)1SC USSION

This task involves scanning %%ide areas under vall' la lielit levtls i orin ,it'

l0 detek-t enemy p )i't'senc,'e and friefndly el eiflelw locatiions. MNlalv ta, tlo-; optalt.

lo limit the ability !o s under low Iiilht levtls. On, Of l' h t1st i1n 1p)0!ani

uatlors is the struclure of' the e\ e itself. T!( patil o! Otn t,\t, ihOla! ,1\i , 115 ou0

best vision can only operate at light Levels equ ivaliii to a full 110011 oV,i SHOW o

br hluI c . Below that light level, be,'ausc the mOS n i\ . parit 0; I]l ' . , ain

no longer re 5pond, the part of the eve lhat i'c,pond.s is abou :300 u t lit on idt

of sl'iaight ahead. Figure 3.23 shows how vision in the retinal area and other

areas compares with vision in good liglt in 'he mlost sell.sitivc itiiloll of tile eve.

lilt erpretation

The figure shows how acuitv dCL e'ases as anl objectl is )l'0 nt ed at vai'vlili4

degrecs from the area of maximllln sensitivitv. otice that at 30 towaxid tile

eat , acuity is less than 10 percent of its maximumill. Staled in aniohliA.t Inaile ,

an object which can just be secen at tile point of llaximuln) night visiol sensilivit v

must be more than 10 times as large as it need be in daYlight as seen by tile

fovea, the area of maximum sensitivity of the eye.

Implications

The implications of the relationship shown are very straightforwarid.

Detail vision is poor at night. When the light level is below that of a full moon

on snow, vision is one tenth as good as in the daytime. All visual detail to be

detected must be 10 times as great. For the Squad Leader (and for everyone

using unaided vision), the task of detecting the enemy by unaided vision is at

least 10 times more difficult.

One can increase the probability of detection by moving the eyes

frequently. Training is indicated in this regard. But, if successful execution of

this task requires performance near daytime levels, the use o' a night vision

device is imperative. Devices ranging from night vision goggles or scopes to

flares, or even a pair of binoculars, will assist in overcoming the diminished

vision.

The observer can also position himself to best advantage and should be

trained to find positions which allow silhouetting of potential targets or maximize

the contrast of a potential target with its background. An example of the latter

suggestion would be positioning oneself so that the approach of enemy elements

would be viewed against a background of ripened wheat rather than a cluster of

trees, thus increasing the brightness contrast of the target and background.

It is also imperative that ovservers be dark adapted and remain so.

Full dark adaptation takes a minimum 20 miautes.

167

ft_ ;V '4__ __ __ ________ __ _ ___ __
100

80

WL 40 0

Or

CL

20

0

60 40 20 0 20 40

NOSE SIDE BLIND EAR SIDE

SPOT

DEGREES FROM THE EYE'S AREA OF BESi VISION

Figure 3.23. The ability to detect detail in objects looked at off-center (as is

necessary at night).

16G8 I 13
CL>

0

0-

0-

En 0 . ' 04 0 0 s 0 I) .0

W 1() 0

-4. r-Ut1 *H a

nO Q)+O 0)o

.C ) 4- ro Q) t hc-I

P %o ~ Q )z >1 

kl 41 ) r4 V 4- 4

K4i 4J > x ro X ' t

V) 41 -C rd

-4( ~ C4 - 4 0 4 4-J En

A - A , -

I L 0 L 0 r m 0 LI 0

o 0

z

o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0

In~~~~U "J0 C:) n U) I) t

169
CRITICAL TASK 45

Position: Squad Leader

Task: Assign Exposed Fire Team As Needed When Mounted

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

DISCUSSION

The Squad Leader will direct the mounted fighting of his squ, d under

conditions, at times, in which he is exposed to long periods of high ,mperature

and/or high humidity. The Squad Leader will make important decisions on the

basis of a considerable amount of information. In the presence of certain heat

and humidity conditions, the Squad Leader's ability to make these decisions \will

be impaired. Figures 3. 24 and 3. 25 show this relationship.

Interpretation

Figure 3. 24 is the one of importance here. Before the figure can be

used effectively, the concept of effective temperature must be introduced.

Figure 3. 25 shows effective temperature lines, which depend on temperature

and relative humidity. All points on a given effective temperature line are

perceived as being the same temperature. That is, they have the same behavioral

effect. As an example, an air temperature of approximately 890F at 60 percent

relative humidity and 75OF at 100 percent relative humidity. The temperature

sensed at 100 percent relative humidity is the numerical value given the effective

temperature which is felt at other levels of relative humidity. Accordingly, 110OF

at 100 percent relative humidity is 1100 ET (Effective Temperature).

170

1-0 7
Figure 3. 24 shows the upper limit o: u'impaird mental (i. e. , cognitiv,) pifornan.e as the effective temperature at .hi.h mental perfor'mance %.il re'naici

unimpaired for the duration of tim,: indicated. As an ,"xample, at 90 0 FT, mneta!

pe'rformance will be unimpaired for exposu res to this effective tmperature Of two hours or less. Beyond two hours, mental perfo.manr,.e wiIl be imnpairt,d.

Note first that for periods of time in excess o: four hours, 8501-'T s(-ens to be- the

upper limit. Note also that mental performance impairment is reach,,d before tht.

tolerable physiological limit is reached. This limit is the maximum combination £ of exposure time and effective temperature for a typical person.

I mplications

The Squad Leader will have difficult, making decisions when he is ex- posed to effective temperatures in excess of 850 for prolonged periods of time.

These temperatures may often be found during mounted combat. The two appropriate responses to this difficulty are:

(1) anticipate the impairment and provide decision aids and

information processing aids to help compensate

(2) make every effort to provide an environment during

mounted combat which does not exceed 85 0 ET for periods

of time that result in decreases in mental pertormance.

The second goal can be achieved by any of the following. Tactics and procedures should be developed to allow, where possible, frequent dismounting (at least once per hour). Light clothing, drinking water, fans, and other aids

to reducing body temperature should be liberally employed.

120 120 12

Cr MENTAL

.D --- PERFORMANCE I

ir LIMIT 110 L I I0 . I

> o TOLERABLE

PHYSIOLOGICAL

LIMIT _

'a

-J

S I I to

EXPOSURE TIME, IMINUTES

70

90 too I I0 120

Figure DRY-BUL" TE:APERATURE OF 3.24. Upper limit of effective tern- Figure 3.25. Effective temperature contours

perature for unimpaired men- as a function of temperature tal performance and physio- and relative humidity, little air

logical limit as a function of movement.

exposure time.

171
ViAL C710,'VS

1. Select dry bulb i e ;,. aid .ry iu1b

mi inus v:;t bUlb terp.

2. Ali n a sti ,' e with the; ' vaI tit

on thei r reLp ct ',' -, .

3. Road the change "n erfective emp. re

lat ive to dry bul e 2- ,he1r h t* 

st raJg ht edge cr o-:e 1t 5 s0 1 e. 

90

-30

CHANGE

IN 0

EFF ECTIVE 100 DRY

IEmPERATURE 10 BULB

RELATIVE -20 TEMPERATUPE

TO 30 (OF)

DRY BULB

TEMPERA-TURE DRY BULB

(OF) Z MINUS 110

WET BULB

TEMPERATURE, F

/0°

00

Nomograph for dcr;vinD effective lempcraturu.

172

7 _ __ __ _ __ __ __ _i_
It

t, cc cc c 2 7 c 2 2 7 =

22 2 2 2 

00 000 

- ..- ~ 0

0~* 0L dI 00

Vc Q) E

4- 4 L 0 

0 O 4) cl

) 'OW

r o M ) -

" .- 4 + ' 14a

-4C H- 4-'

0>

U) 0) V) ~U 0~~ 3I

4-11

C)u Li -0 0 

~ 'Ow . ,tu

17
CRITICAL TASK 46

Position: Squad Leader

Task: Coordinate Fire Needs 1et PL Inst ructiois W hile Mounted

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Namerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Heasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Str'ess 48

174

f . . - - _ _ - _...... ....
CRITICAL TASK 47

Position: Squad Leader

Task: )irect Squad Movement During Disengage nien

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Numerieal Facility Fatigue 57, 66 68

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 6 1

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

175

__ __ j
CRITICAL TASK 48

Position: Squad Leader

Task: Communicate With PL During Disengagement

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 22, 33

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Communication Stress 48

DISCUSSION

This task requires the SL to communicate vital information to the PL

during disengagement. Part or all of this communication is unaided verbal

communication. On a night which is darker than a night with a full moon over

snow, or in dense smoke, fog, or mist, visual cues will be limited. Background

noise will interfere further with communication. Figure 3. 26 shows the amount

of interference as a function of the distance between the speakers and the listener

and the intensity of common sounds.

Interpretation

The amount of interference will be greater as the 'istance between the

SL and PL increases. Even when shouting, a separation of 40 feet is enough

to allow a noise of only 50 decibels (db) to prevent full communication. Note

that 50 db at 40 feet is less loud than a conversational voice at five feet. On a

decibel scale of sound pressure, any addition (or subtraction) of six db represents

multiplication (or division) of the sound level by two. A difference of 20 db

represents a factor of 10.

176
I InplicatioliS

The ifajor implication to be dra n here is that the SL xN iIl probably ht,

unable to communicate (effectively \ih the PL if ihe separation is more than a

few feet. If' radio communication or vommullicalion with visual sigi> Is is pus- ihl.

the problh in is av eted. Alore typically, and in the presclit scc flario, it ml

necessary to avoid visual signals or radio signals w hich may reejI V he d.-1( nga~gem.et route. The most logical solution is well-thought out SOlP.- \x llh I,.

thue need for cornmunidation. Writien communicalion inight also ht, t o;iside.: i

LInder these conditions. Another solution is to supplenent o replae ,. b-,t

communication with sign language. 1inally, some othc'I form- of O IlIu1Il, -.",

could be employed such as an electrocutoneous cominan(i signal /amrua,.

O

U-140- JET W ITH AF7ERLURNER AT 2,) FT.

Z OO 130-

-- J 120- DC-7 AIRP LANE AT 20 FT.

-1 70 12 0

I00O- SU8WAY THAI N -AT20 FT.

60 90

nl 80-PASSINGTPW',K OR BUS Ar 20 Fr.

E

o J 50 70 3 60-CONVERSATIONAL VOIC'E AT 5 FT.

n 40 50

~40-OQUIET RESIDENCE

30 #30

2O-BROAD CAST STU IO

#30

6 2 3 4 6 8 I0 20 30 40 60 80 100

DISTANCE IN FEET BETWEEN TALKER AND LISTENER 0- THRESHOLD FOR I0S0 HZ2O E

(LG CAE)COMMON SOUNDS IN

DlELCI BE LS

Figure 3. 26. Minimum allowable interference levels from noise.

177

' ') -- P . . .. . .. -, . . .r'= . .... -, 0 . .. ...
C 0i 0 01 0 (1 U)m c c r '

0 ci to C C.

~i* 0 C) 0 n 0 I) 0 I.') 0 c

K)j to in L) LO U) r- N U:) to

00

LLI

od C) 0 <

u LJ < y

C2)

Eri L Lj

0 0- p I'- 

> 41 Q17 4 1) c

-4) 1 -

C) ) C) 0 +j 0

(L Q ) 41 .1 1 0 C) t'

>I CJ4 C)ri Y 0 -4-' Ci

4 .1 1 j ' 0 (0 c '-

vi r) t J171

41 Q () > 174-'-'4 4.1- _'71 +'1 . -,4C

-40 Ai -4 ti-t Ci Jr) A r vj ) 0

C. *-I C- CK -14 0J f7 r1

4- CI-- ) 04 4-' 0 ci

U C 4 / i l ' 0 0 0 - - '' ,'' O

(r 4C)OZ' Cc

rc

-- ~C >,h

178(2
CRITICAL TASK 49

Position: S(juad Leade

Task: l)it(UI lho0! , 1 ovt0\f ,i Fo H eioupin.,

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, G8

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diuirnal Rlhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

At 179

p
CRITICAL TASK 50

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Conduct Reconnaissance

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Light/ Visibility 7

Numerical Facility Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

180

r€ 'II
CRITICAL TASK 51

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Check '\ccuracy of Terrain Maps

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Stress 92 6

181

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 52

Position: Platoon L,,ade r

Task: Check On Support Fire Availability

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions.

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Coiniunication None

182 l

_ *r.jiI

1 " -7 . .. I = / .... " -- ' - . .. - . .. .. . .... : , " .p - !,-
CRITICAL TASK 53

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: l)i'ide To Engage Unexpected ['ire Or Nol

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

(,asoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal lihythm 1l, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

DISCUSSION

The PL will often be required to make decisions and analyze information

under less than ideal conditions. During continuous warfare, the PL will be

exposed for long periods of time to varying levels of noise. Much of the noise,

such as gunfire, will be intermittent. As for other abilities, noise will contribute

to deterioration in reasoning ability. Figure 3. 27 shows the effects of noise on

the ability to think and make decisions.

Interpretation

Noise has many dimensions. Figure 3. 27 shows how noise affects reasoning when it is either loud (108 db) or soft (56 db). The loud noise is nearly 400

times louder than the soft. Noise can also be predictable or unpredictable.

The ordering of the effects is quite clear. Unpredictable noise has the greatest

detrimental effect. A loud noise can degrade reasoning dramatically. In this

case it caused an error rate increase on the mental task from 27 percent to 42

percent. A soft unpredictable noise (and 56 db is not much more than half as

loud as a conversational voice) is more disturbing than a loud, predictable noise.

183

.ii . Air; : ,
ixn pl kat ionis

Once again, one of the ma ia im-plications is awareness of the pr-oblemn.

TIhe battlefield will provide a great deal of' intensely loud and unpredictable

noise in the formn of enemry fir e, aircraft, advehicrula r Sounds. Knowing that

this will offset reasoning is a forev.arning.

Other possible considerations are the follo..ving:

(1) welt-developed SOIPs, which circumvent the need for decisions

(2) noise insulation devices should be worn when possible

(3) training under noise conditions which simnulate actual

battlefield conditions

(4) developm-ent of decision aiding devices

40

LOUD= 108 db

SOFT= 56 db

0

0a3

00

LOU SOT LU30F OTO

UNRD2AL OIEPE)TRC O'E n OS

TYEO OS

Fiure32.Atrefcso rdcal n nrdcal

nos nmnalpromne

I18
CRITICAL TASK 54

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Direct Mounted Defense

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

rhe performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 2, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 69, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

f 185

4? 1 ___ ____ I *m
DISCUSSION

The direction of a mounted defense by the Platoon Leader requires integration from several sources. At times, the Platoon Leader will be required

to process information from more than one source at the same time. His ability

to do so will be less than his ability to pr'ocess information from a single source.

.igure 3. 28 shows the effect of time-sharing in this sense.

Interpretation

Figure 3.28 shows the effects of divided attention, that is, the difference

in the probability of correctly interpreting a message (in this case delivered

to the ear) when the listener was required to attend to either one channel alone

(one ear) or to two channels (both ears). The form of data presentation in the

graph is called an hOC curve (for Receiver Operating Charateristic curve).

When data are presented in such a fashion, a difference in the ability to perceive

and report a message accurately as a function of how well the message is received

is reflected in the difference in location of the curves being compared. The closer

the curve is to the upper left of the graph, the better the message is received.

It is quite clear that the divided attention curve reflects poorer message reception

and reporting than the single channel curve legended "control. "

Without going into highly theoretical detail, each curve, by itself, shows

that for a message of a given intensity (e.g. , loudness in the present case), the

listener's information processing also depends on other judgmental factors. The

result is that as the listener's proportion of correct reports increases because of

these judgmental factors, his proportion of false reports also increases. The

judgmental factors are often referred to as the bias.

Implications

The major conclusion to b( drawn is that as the intensity of the defense

increases, thereby forcing the PL (or anyone receiving and processing information

in order to make decisions) to attend to two or more sources of information

simultaneously, the correct perception of the information will decrease. The

further conclusion is that for any given level of information sensitivity, i. e. , the

clarity of a particular message for' a particular receiver, the bias of the receiver

will affect his probability of correct processing of the message. The exact bias

wilt havethe effect of raising or lowering both the probability of correct message

processing and incorrect message processing simultaneously.

The methods of dealing with this problem include providing training in

processing multiple information sources simultaneously such that sensitivity

(and/or ability) increases and the receiver learns the optimal bias to achieve

specific goals. Field training or case method training would be ideally suited

to this end.

186

01,_ - _ _
:\Iethod s of cconomicalLy presenting informatioti, stourig infortnation,

aiind sha ring- the inforina lion hanling- duties ainong~ mnembers Such as the PL, SL,

anid assistant SL will all aid in reducinig the dlifficuLties associated with the problemn

of' divided attention.

.995

.99

.99

I.-

U

0:

0

W .9

0

Ir

. tj 

PROBABILITY OF A FALSE REPORT

Figure 3.28. Effect of dividing attention compared with a single

information source.

6

187

V' _ _
CRITICAL TASK 55

Position: Platoon Leader

Task-. Communicate With OPIS

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Comnmunication Stress

188
CRITICAL TASK 56

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Request Possible Support Fire Roquirements From Company

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 2f ,

- 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

DISCUSSION

The Platoon Leader's execution of this task involves remembering a

great deal of information, including codes, coordinates, locations of various

elements, and a host of other variables. Memory is an important ability for

many tasks and is exemplified in this task. The need to recall codes, SOPs,

and other facts will be a crucial element in night/ continuous operations. Memory

is so highly complex that only very broad, general statements can be made in

this Guidebook. The present relationships concern recalling such information as

codes and the effects of mission duration and practice on the memory for such

learned material.

189

r A -- -- --- - -....... .
lte r pr eta tioli

Vigure 3. 29 concerns overlearuing and howe overleaning is relatcd

to recall. Ovcrtearnig is fr'equent rehearsal of llatel'lal evtci after it has

be(n lear'ned fla lesslv. The amount of tilme or" nullnbel of rehealrsals to rea 1

the level of a flay less recitation is tile "1o over-learining" condition. Sole )oo)pie

in tile study from which tile gr'aph was taken w ti et required to pi act.ice xhat they\"

had mile mnotri/,ed pelrfectly for as nuc h trlnle as it took iritiallv to master tile

matelial. This is the "100 percent ovca uienig" condition. Tile curves on tile

Ltt sli)w how much was remembe red at va rvir' rmtr mbi rs of' davs afleri tIle [dalillio -

day arnd clearily showvs tle advantage of ovc learrning. Tile cur've,,s on the riht

sho\ the per'entage of tile oliglna Ilea rning tirte i' tuleCd to ielca-n malt,.ial

after varyinfg numbers of days. Once again, the oveilearning gr-oup is clearly

superior ard retains mOre mlaterial over a longer time.

Figure 3.30 shows how something practiced each day for six days

to tile point of maste'y requires Less practice each day. In a sense then, something prac Licd to master'y ever\ day is a fortm- of ovenlearning.

The figutres t ombined t learly show that overlearned materia[ wilt be

terembered for longer periods of timne.

Implications

The iinplic.atioris fo" continuous operations are that information that

must be recalled Lrnder stress should be overlearned. Tile oveclearning can

be greater than 100 per-cent. But the improvement will not be much better than

with 100 percent overlearning attempted at one sitting. However, if the overlearning (an be engaged in b troops in, say, a second echelon who may have

several days to practice, their retention will be outstanding, as suggested by

Figure 3. 29.

The problem with attempting to describe the constraints on memory in

a setting such as this is the large number- of variables which affect memory and

the phenomena which are associated with memory. The best solution to consider ing

the implications of continuous operations and memory as an ability required in

many tasks is an evaluation of each task in terms of the type of information to be

remembered, the complete set of conditions under which it is to be remembered

and learned, and the history and training of the people involved with respect to

the information to be remembered. Following this evaluation, programs for

developing memory aids, training, and appropriate cueing material could be

developed.

190
I00 1 03 ;

80 - 80 :.

LJ <

o 60 63 LIj

60

<40 100%

LOVERLEARNING >-".OV-LE

0 NO OVERLEARNING

-NO OvERLEARNING

0 7 14 21 28 0 7 14 21 23

DAYS SINCE LEARNING DAYS 5hICE LEARNI%G

Figure 3.29. Percentage recall (left curves) and percentage of

learning trials to relearn (right curves) for criterion

of one correct trial (no overlearning) and twice that

learning period (1 0'o overlearning).

o- 100

z • 80

bj 5

60o

10R 40 F20 cI 2 3 5 6

DAYS

Figure 3.30. Saving, that is, the reduction in relearning time (increase

in retention) over time.

191
202

9-5-

85

25

12 80

. ""90

85 0

6 80- 80 60

90- ~ 75

70_

60 ~70

.t " :..: -! ; ." :: ., : . • " - :m.i ". • t 

I- ;:o

8-

3 300'-

60- 0

50 50 25

1~E2 80.~C,7

70.

TIC 2o sfVN 6 ~ -

SICE I7 Do 45_ -in 

< 85

EA? I NG 0VELA".,!%G '< un 45 u3 20.

9DAYS)0 - .- 15

35 - 5 .,

10 30- 5 1

300

.88O

20

.6 2 -I CC

26- 2 .4

8-

.3 -4

192-

.1L

T4t, S ,*-NO*...17. ,_I -
CRITICAL TASK 57

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Select Positions For Cove, , Concealment tFrom Observation, And

Fire

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Communication Stress 48

DISCUSSION

In selecting positions for cover, concealment from observation, and fire,

the PL Leader must take advantage of every ro, '-, tree, fold in the terrain, and of

all rubble and abandoned equipment. He insures that each position has cover

and concealment and at the same time, has a good field of fire to cover assigned

sectors of fire. If natural cover is not available he must construct frontal

parapet foxholes. Perceptual speed represents one critical ability required for

performing this task.

193 2t , _____

e.-- .. .. . ..-- .. - - - .. ..... .. . . .. .
P thI-. . sp k:d has biti toulid *t.) 1 h . i1i\ 'U i t ) .ti it

Ut diitnal 'hlldhns and -Li t S - Wi'h j)irtnI'o altt (, ,01 st ,,, 0)1.', (lA)L 00 and

7OU0 ho ts. in a British '(,.st, PIpl' pt) al[ itii." ut a V \C- < t La- a! i'tti l

Ut tiji loss. "I i tlest % as ou, .,i'0200 and 07100 h(L l t"' at -ho'..

a si)t[liti, anti detl ~rioratit iiwith stekp los. alid i InIla I th1\hn . h . 4d\ t, I k.

U fe \ol. asw pi"ttlco eve i'f tlt. ulotup)toLally up d,-tol\i of :ic. p (tliu A. Al).

On a cift-dttiatd steep[ sc'htudUli, a.l t'icltu}ts V'-' Ovtdt .X'l -I.. U ix\ ot' ''

To OeIUti( he h~ t, on~bi 1tt'11 iii!i it ya.ko aun tti ..

l iill\V uim'lw to shit'l fun lion's or e ul,[ov pilo(i, Ca t i mild I ly i ii

150. Sleep

Hrs/Night

\ .... = l0

I\- 1 1/2

S -\\ / L\i/o-- ''

u * .

:E FIRST DAY ,

WITHOUT " SLEEP",

5000,

Cl C2 El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 ,C3 C4 C5

Performance Sleepless Days Performorce before after

Sleep Loss Recovery

Ftgure 3. 31. Deterioration of perceptual speed and

accuracy under varying conditions of sleep loss

194 002

I , .M

,r p m I - . -r - -. . . -. ...

U
CRITICAL TASK 58

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Establish Inter-Squad Conmunication Network

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Nuinerhi al Facnilit" Fatigue 57, 66, 68

If-LtsonIln Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

195

4 • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 59

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Assign Locations To SLs

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

196
CRITICAL TASK 60

Position: PIatoon Leader

Task: Establish TRPs

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

197

P - i ;-
CRITICAL TASK 61

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Assign Fire Zones and Targets

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal hhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

DISCUSSION

The assignment of fire zones and targets, which is partially dependent

on reasoning and numerical ability, needs to be performed at various times

during a continuous operation and under various states of fatigue. Evaluating

fatigue, even as a function of sleep loss, is a problem since the PL and other

soldiers may find opportunities for rest. The effect of fatigue due to lack of

sufficient continuous sleep and the disruption of diurnal rhythms (behaviors

engaged in typically on a 24-hour basis) are difficult to assess. Figure 3. 32 helps

to provide an understanding of these problems.

198

• I" . . v.. :4 , .... . - ___ ___ __-- 
This figoure is drawn fromn a study wh %%Iil ivolv(ed 15 011ot n

houlrs on1-:wo hourvs off w ork seh edl e. 7[11 e 1h i I' ('I Is (Ir I' :

For ' his aroup of people, there was a peak itn p~totfiarichc . ' 2tOt)O i:l

2200 hourts the( first five dlays! and the disrted S ehedIuL( Iase UU t.k- (11 A

shift stigh tiv. More imlpor-tant lv, the d isrtupt ion of, diula . *tnI i)0

'Issi%(4% poorer perforniance. If the individlual e-urves 1,1 (iV I 1L

out OV't' a 15 cavperiod], one( wkouild see a cdeereasint2eu1itil' li

uonusty degraded protne.The 15 dlay ttt've \ %ottd sho0.% teaks ' tm!(i

2200 eae-h night, but teakvh peak onl each sue r2ed ingi diay %o% 111be 1) o'tt "'i

Ilt( pter forunlan1.e Onl ea h dlay.

In couititinon s opctat ionls, nuilnericat fa tity and tiu tula p :10 t intt.

in] geerlill (! 'teiorate, with the disi'tuptioti of (liirtial i thVinus Not: ilha,

the fouir onl - two off work eveie allows for sleep onie-thud( of, the 6ia. Y:

pettoinattee deteriorated. Not inueh t an be done to (0~'o rt 1,o1 D'~uS

itlttrodUred' b 'y the disrtuption o1 diniinal rhvth ins. Well tea sotlenC sol's and i tn41-

metit where possible wiekli atlow s noiat dinurnal aetiiv won h help.

125

20

La

DAS61

0

1;;~ 1-15

W

11 _ L L LL -13 100 20 10 6 10 00 20 40-20 00 60 _ 00

TIE F A

Fiue3 2 vrg ubro orc cmuain tdfeettmso a

duigtre0dyproso a1-a eid(- okrs

scheule)

19
0 -0I SAVO 'SS;3-.i%:iDJ.1 c ALI

o.C - P- v r- C)4 0

C) 00 0) t .

S-t SAVO 'SS:3N3AI.L:)3JJ3 3AILV-13d

v to co 0 0') OD t G) a m' G)0( -

41 II I

C)t

ECL

>: 1>0 Cc)bJ

(-4 4- C 7

ro (2) .0' .'

>u w~, U-)>'

23 0.Q i C

54 >>

> 4-1 4 U', C

lp (1) -4 .

ws to- c)H ao

C )) 1 0o)

. * 0 .. IJ v- fA) CDl

0 Cj

;EE

.C(3() 2..-0

4-' ,(3C200
CRITICAL TASK 62

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Communicate With Company And/Or Artillery As Needed

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

201
CRITICAL TASK 63

Position: PLLUiU- Leader

Task: Direct Vehicle Firing Locations

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

202

4 _ __" 4f_ __ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 64

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Direct Vehicle Movement Patterns

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

203

r r j ; ~ ? ~ r ~
CRITICAL TASK 65

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Communicate 'ith OPs and Company As Necessary

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

204

..i I II "
CRITICAL TASK 66

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Decide When Or If To Relocate

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diuinal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

DISCUSSION

Deciding when or if to relocate represents higher mental process which

could determine whether the platoon survives. In a study conducted by the

British Army, soldiers were deprived of sleep and their reasoning ability was

tested.

Interpretation

Figure 3. 33 illustrates that the per~ormance which is dependent on reasoning deteriorates with sleep loss. These results indicate that higher mental

processes are adversely affected by partial and total sleep deprivation. All

groups recovered after two days of rest.

To counteract the problem, training on comparable tasks to a high degree

of overlearning should be undertaken. Decision aid development is also indicated.

Full cross-checks of decisions based on complex reasoning should be instituted

205

2 _____

I. 7- - v--- - • •- - - --- -- -
Sleep

Hirs/Night

500

0

w

0 FIRST DAY N

WITHOUT SLEEP

0 . .. .

cl C2 El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 C3 C4 C5

Performance Sleepless Days Performance

before of ter

Sleep Loss Recovery

Figure 3.33. Deterioration of reasoning ability under

varying conditions )f sleep loss

206E
CRITICAL TASK 67

Position: Platoon L -ader

Task: Oroer Heocation

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

207

__ __ _ __ _"_
CRITICAL TASK 68

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Direct Relocation Cover

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

208
DISCUSSION

Tre( amility to enc~ode and dlec-ode is of obvious ili--O1in, III ' %7,1, l".

of' toibat tasks, and e spec-ially with res pec-t to m1a p or. hali t I 110! Ii, ('- 1.

is also a task that di-aws heavily on the (critical abllit is - of' Numi I, i I , III,.

anrd R ea sonling. While, both, encoding and det od ing a it aff(, 1ii, h; IFt

thle dec.remlent seems to be 11ort'( severe' for tuckodint . This t't aWlr-esu It frorm a studyv of thle effec~ts of s letep loss oil 1mili'l- p'.1titni

r he test of perforrnant e caai(twii m iplov\t i 3c'iad i,- >

subjects, (,oni itedl of 25 six-(iigit iiaifeente G'.. 5 1 l3 ) Lki 1 -)) . hid )IL

e.g. B I AN) that. had to be encoded arid c etocied , i. (. k t tl%*, t I 0111 (Jilt' a

the, other-, acc(ordigit to a c-omplic.ated s.1cme. Co0d1iriii lid d,"i odtlmii 12

ov'er. a 10 m route tirine (.00 rt.

l'igutre 3. 34 pr resents the, ave rage (mean) nu mbet. o1f o 0t" I, 'ttoii

Vor, all thr ee platoons under study, PC ifoir mane e de-te iiol-icd %%ithi sI1k cp los.

Cognitive furR-tionirig was adversely affected r-ather (juick klc- for thost -otall';,

d1ep~riv'ed of' sleep. Alt gioups r-ecover-ed afteri two day> ofiti

lirnpliha tionrs

To(- overcome the problem, the system could be redesignIed to torlpe~klisalt

for the types of errior-s most likely to occrui-. Alte rnativt-lv, task rotation a imotig

('1055-tr-ained criew might. also be employed to cont-ol. errIors. A c hal)0(, 01' ac' hvit V

often has a freshening affect1 on fatiguied oi- sleep-depivec peisoris. P~robably'

the best measure is to have the task performed indeperidentily by1, t\\o or- more.

people.

15Sle

Hrs/Niqht

0 - -1 1/2

3

% -

10%

0%

%.

z

4

lA FIRS TDAY(

WITHOUT SLEEP

Cl C2 El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 ES E9 C3 04 C5

perormnceSleepless Days Prformance

before ofter

Slep LssFigure 3.34 Deterioration of encoding under Rcvr

varying conditions of sleep loss

209
CRITICAL TASK 69

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Coordinate Changes In THPs After Relocation

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

210

4 -3 , .. -A,1 . . .. - .. ....-
DISC U SSION

The constantly charging battIef'fi'Id cotidit ions sul' in.< ,u mu111111o>U op' t!',!7.0o1n

differ from the usual because the inability to use nighttime jriods to assss

the status of the( battle imposes on all peisolniel, -specially t[lost! \\ ih , otrnl rid

responsibility, the need to commit information to me nio 'v fi,',jutri 'l%. ins

constiant p'ocess of nenlori.ation must take place duiring the bauil, in %%hi, i ilu'

P1. and the personnel must Cngage in a host of tasks. Ho much jfor taion

lnu -l be men t ioi'ized and how the ite if'eretnc, of oihtl' tasks a'fe( ts the nemu -

ri.atiori process is shown in tigure 3.35.

lIte r'pr'eta t ion

lFigur'e 3.35 shows how devasting engaging in a concomitant task ,an b,-

for' memorization. Each curve shows how much of the originally preset 'd

information is remembered after various periods of time engag111g I allrelevaril activity. The number of things to be remembered originally was differ,.tii"

for- each cu've, ranging from one item for the upper curve to five it ems for the

lower curve. Note that the more that has to be remembered, the greate. the

degrading effect of interfering tasks. The effect causes the ultimate amount of

interference and the rate of interference to be greater.

Implications

The co nclusions are that to the extent that the PL or other personnel

must attempt to engage in other- tasks while they are receiving information

that they' should commit to memory, their ability to memorize will be degraded;

arid, any information to be remembered should be memorized in a setting which

does not require performance of interfering tasks.

The following points should be considered in connection with the

memorization of information in the field:

(a) the information to be memorized should be kept to as small an amount

as possible, preferably two or three items at a time

(b) the rehearsal of information presented for memorization should

take place in a favorable environment that does not require attention

to irrelevant tasks

(c) wherever and whenever' possible, memory aids should be provided

and organized information storage and retrieval systems should be

provided.

211

41 ___ __L
100 1 ITEM

90 -

80 2 ITEMS

70

,,, 3 ITEMS x 60 FU

ii 50

8 40

I-Z 30 L)

rr 20

10

1 I I I 1 I I I

0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32

DURATION OF PERFORMANCE OF IRRELEVENT TASK (SECONDS)

Figure 3. 35. Memory for varying amounts of information

when irrelevant tasks interfere with memorization.

212

___ __ __ __ __ ___ I
o 0 0 0 C0 0 0 0 C C

('4 f) 'J C)CC

z

I- (3

W N

00

S4w 0

c. C) 0

CtC: Il C) 0~ r~l U) 1-'

4- - -P

C)*) % C ~-

o :Iti - 4

5, C)--

v o Q) 0

C)-4. 4

W) f) to E

u ) 4- )~'f

Q) f' In C) 

~C)b 4 4 )0i ,

a) C.4) I4r 

+-'EL a:)t

4) r0 b1 4O ) x to w c ,-l.Z.-J i~b

~0

Z IL N t.

213
CRITICAL TASK 70

Position: P-latoon Leader

Task: Order Move for Assembly Area

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

214
CRITICAL TASK 71

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Direct Protective Fire for Move to Assembly

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Orientation Light Level/ Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

215
CRITICAL TASK 72

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Direct Squad Fire Zones While Mounted

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Numerical Facility Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

DISCUSSION

The problem area concerns the effects of bright light flashes on visual

performance. The problem is theoretically the same for the unaided eye as

for the eye which is aided by a light Intensification device. However, when

using a night vision device, the problem becomes more serious. The effect of

flashes of light on visual performance is called flash blindness. Flash blindness

refers to the temporary decrese in visual ability which follows exposure to a

short duration, high intensity light. At night, the flash from the enemy's or one's

own fire may often be sufficient to cause flash blindness. Following a sufficiently

intense flash, there will be a recovery period as shown in the following figure.

216

__ ,,____ I.
Iite rp''tat ion

The highest flash encrgy shown in Figuie 3. 36 will cause permanent

blindniess. The only enounte 'ing of such a light is witnessing a nuclear d ,-

tonation with unprotected eyes. The Lowv est flash in the graph corresponds

roughly to a very minor flash, for K \ample, a cigarette lighter being ianit,.d.

The curves sho% that the more intense the flash, the longer it takes to regain

full visual acuity.

The curves also show that recovery time to see a dim target is longe'

than to see a light target. A biight target at daylight light levels (refe r to tie

curve labelled 2. 0 log mL/ sec) would be no less visible after a flash until the

flash is intense enough to cause eye damage or blindness.

The problem of night vision devices %\hich amplify or intensify the light

received at the eye must be evaluated in terms of each specific equipment. The

manuals for each device should be consulted to see if the flash blindness dangers

are spelled out. But, they will certainly be greater \ ith night \ision devices

than with the unaided eyes.

Implic ations

Several steps can be taken to diminish the effect of flash blindness.

The lIL should keep these methods in mind:

1) The PL should minimize the amount of time spent looking toward

enemy locations at night; obviously, if the PL reduces time spent

looking toward the possible source of a flash, the less the probability

of being exposed to a blinding flash.

2) The PL can immediately avert his gaze at the first hint of a flash;

if the PL trains himself to do this, he can learn to avert his gaze

in less than a quarter of a second. The light reflected by objects

will be much less and will not cause flash blindness.

3) The PL should keep someone close at hand while he is using a night

vision device who can immediately take over feeding vital visual

information to the PL during any recovery period following flash

0 blindness.

217

7

;I i ,
TARGET

100 LUMINANCE

LOG(ni-)

-1.0

80J 10 n SEC

FLASH EXPOSURE

1 610 

Li

2>>

0 It U 2.

2.0

VISUAL REACTION TIME

7 - I I, I I

f 2 3 4 5 6 7

ADAPTING FLASH - LOG(ML/SEC)

Figure 3. 36. Relationship of flash energy to recovery time for

targets of various brightness.

218
CRITICAL TASK 73

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Direct Squad Fire Requirements While Mounted

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

219

t -
CRITICAL TASK 74

Position: Platoon Lkadei,

Task: Direct Discngagement

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 30

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

Communication Stress 48

DISCUSSION

It is important for the leader of fighting soldiers to be able to think

clearly while under the stress of battle. If he is sidetracked by irrelevancies,

the result could be fatal. The results of a test of ability to resist distractions

under various conditions of sleep loss are presented in the figure.

220
o 111 1 1 ',1 h I *I : 1:L

% -

1!1-~ o' qi"1 !1)1)''

i 1) 1 . - Iin l 1 111 1 i , ~ 11- 111:

15C- Steep

Hrs/Night

---- 0 o - -- I 1/2 ,,..

i- - 3

1-

0

0 0

U-j

FIRST DAY

WITHOUT SLEEP

C) C2 El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 7 E8 E9

perfomonce Sleepless Days ~fryo~ before of ter

Slep Lss Figure 3. 37 DistraCtobility ot soldiers under Rcvr

varying conditions of sleep loss

221

r

At..",, / ___
CRITICAL TASK 75

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Call Indirect Fire Required for Disengagement

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

222

I;
CRITICAL TASK 76

Position: Platoon Leader

Task: Coordinate Regrouping

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this tasK requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

223

2 _

-Wi?
MXD1NG PAM Bi( - tic r nia'D AL

('1IAI' '1W IV

TANK ('ICIW PIH ['01 IANC'E

Projected performance degradation of armor units for

duty positions, tank crews, and tank platoons are summarized.

Detailed projections by tasks and defensive (platoon) actions

are tabulated. Digests of adverse factors' impacts on 58

critical tasks are provided.

SuninmlarV of' COlseq euc u es lo

Performanc e of' Continuous Opeoratiolls

As pointed out in the prtcedinlg cha)ter, of the ioui J ebilitatimm<

factots being considered fatigue (sleep-loss over 120 lour's), lilu LIV 1

or visibility conditions, stress and disruption of diu'nal h'h hus, fa igue

will be the dominant factor. This w ill be tl'uc for ana nd all olisommnih'I

regardless of the type of unit (infantry, armor, etc. ) to which they belong

and of the tasks they perform. It is also gener ally true tha: all tasks are

not affected in the same way by the debilitating facters inhere(nt in the

conditions engendered by continuous operations.

To recapitulate: tasks having a prepondeianc,, of cognitive oc

vigilance components can be expected degrade most as the cumulative

loss of sleep builds up. By contrast, simple motor tasks, ihat arc, highly

practiced and routine, are unlikely to deteroriate signifi cantly, at least,

during the first two or three days; thereafter, deterioration may be slight

to moderate depending on the degree of automaticity with which the person

performs the given task.

As applied to tank crews, for example, loading a weapons maga/ine

will show virtually no deterioration with sleep loss. Immediate actions,

such as correcting a COAX MG malfunction, are likely to dete riorate son,-

what. Even acutely sleep deprived Tank Gunners and Loaders are expectted

to perform their critical tasks with reasonable adequacy. On the other hand,

the TK PL will progressively use less than optimal judgmen on a task, such

as, "selecting firing positions for the tanks. " Since tank crew ad platoon

leadership involves a good deal of judgment and vigilance, the Tank Colnmanders (TK CDI1s) and TK PLs may begin to deteriorate after the very

first 24 hours of continuous operations.

A summary of the projected effectiveness of various positions of the

Tank Crew over five days of continuous operations with little or no organized

sleep appears as Figure 4.1. The position expected to degrade most rapidly is

the PL whose tasks include a heavy cognitive component. Degraded least is

225

- - - -_ _----t ---- -- -~..... ..... ..
80

70V

601

503

~EcT~1;:~SSARMOR

f E 40PL:

30- CR:

LR

20 LR

10

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 4.1. Performance degradation in armor duty Positions.

(PL = Tank Platoon Leader, CDR = Tank Commander.

GR =Tank Gunner, LOC Tank Leader)

226

2P
thet Tank Loader, ho engages mostly in motor tasks that atl oft k'n

\\ elI -practiced o' routine.

1igure 4. 2 presents forecast pc'foiman.e uffectiveness as a

function of mission days for the Tank C'e\ and Platoon. The graphs

illustrate that the Platoon degrades more rapicily than the cre.

Effectiveness of the TK PLT over mission days, contrasting best

and orst conditions of impacting variables is presented as I[iguie 4.3.

The graph illustrates that the influence of the debilitating factors (light

level, stress and diurnal rhythms) is less than the influence of fatigue

(sleep loss over five days) in degrading performance effectiveness.

This corresponds to uniform experience from informal observation as well as scientific studies. Also, fatigue levels correspond to

a progression over 120 hours, while the other debilitating factors are

viewed as either present (acting) or absent (not acting).

While a TK PLT normally consists of five tanks, a considerably

degraded condition of only three tanks was assumed for calculation of the

effectiveness values shown in Tables 4. 1 and 4. 2. Since the scenario

(Chapter Ii) assumed 6 to 1 odds, this suggested itself as a realistic expectation about TK PLT operations. Similarly, the tank crew was assumed

to consist of three, rather than the usual four persons: a TK CDR, a Gunner and a Loader. The six day Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that, with

some loss in mobility, even two man tanks are effective weapons if the

crew is cross-trained.

Table 4. 1 presents the projected effectiveness of Tank Positionsv

Crew, and Platoon for different platoon actions and mission days (sleep!

loss). The projected values indicate that wide variation in performance can

be expected for different positions and platoon actions. Best and worst performance can range between very effective, e.g., 100 and grossly ineffective,

e.g.,28, under different conditions.

Table 4. 2 presents the-effectiveness of Tank Positions, Crew, and

Platoon as a function of adverse impacting factors over five days of continuous

operations.

Debilitating factors are coded as follows:

F = Fatigue level in mission hours (24-120);

L = Light level: 1 dark and 0 light;

S = Stress: 1 - stress present and 0 =

Stress absent

D -Diurnal Rhythm: 1 -rhythm out of phase and

0 'rhythm in phase.

227
00

80

70F

60

50

EFFECT iV ElkESS

(E) 40

TANK

30 - CREW :

20 -PLATOON: A---

10

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 4.2. Performance degradation in tank crews and

platoons with all adverse factors present.

228
100

90

80

70

60

50

EFFECTIVENESS

(E) 40

30 PREVAILING CONDITIONS

BEST:

20 WORST: , - -A

'°0

SII I1

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 4. 3. Projected performance degradation of tank crews

and platoons under best and worst conditions.

229
Table 4. 1

Effcctiv(utess (E) of Armor: Tank Duty Positions, Crews and Platoons

in Diffei cit Platoon Actions and Over Missioi Days

Duty Position Tank

Day PL CDR LDR GR Crew Platoon

Platoon 1 77 81 99 100 93 87

Action 3 46 54 96 100 80 65

1 5 28 36 93 100 70 50

Platoon 1 94 97 100 100 99 97

Action 3 84 92 100 100 97 91

2 5 75 87 100 100 95 86

Platoon 1 87 95 100 90 95 92

Action 3 67 85 100 74 86 80

3 5 51 76 100 59 77 68

Platoon 1 86 91 99 97 95 92

Action 3 64 75 99 90 87 78

1,2,3 5 47 62 98 84 80 66

230

.3
TuIabl, 4.2

E~Iv II Cs, ( E ) o r : T L i k 1) u t I'o. i i 01,, o i i aiic k ) 1

UIndj,-' A\[ ('ombinLatioi j- of AdVt iS,: ('oidlitlmi u

Impacting

Debilitating Factors Duty Position Tank

F L S D PL CDR LDR GR Crew Platoon

24 0 0 0 95 97 99 99 98 97

24 0 0 1 92 96 99 99 98 96

24 0 1 0 91 94 99 98 97 95 24 1 0 0 92 94 99 98 97 95

24 0 1 1 88 94 99 98 97 93

24 1 0 1 90 93 99 98 96 94

24 1 1 0 89 92 99 97 96 94

24 1 1 1 86 91 99 97 95 92

48 0 0 0 81 88 99 95 93 89

48 0 0 1 79 88 99 95 93 88

48 0 1 0 78 86 99 94 92 87 48 1 3 0 80 86 99 94 92 88

48 0 1 1 76 85 99 94 92 86

48 1 0 1 77 85 99 94 92 87

48 1 1 0 76 83 99 93 91 86

48 1 1 1 74 83 99 93 91 85

72 0 0 0 70 80 99 92 90 82

72 0 0 1 68 80 99 92 90 81

72 0 1 0 67 78 99 91 89 80

72 1 0 0 69 78 99 91 89 81 72 0 1 1 66 77 99 91 88 80

72 1 0 1 67 77 99 91 88 80

72 1 1 0 66 75 99 90 87 79

72 1 1 1 64 75 99 90 87 78

96 0 0 0 61 72 98 89 85 76

96 0 0 1 59 72 98 89 85 75

96 0 1 0 58 71 98 88 85 74 96 1 0 0 59 70 98 88 84 75

96 0 1 1 56 70 98 88 84 73

96 1 0 1 58 70 98 88 84 74

96 1 1 0 57 68 98 87 83 73

96 1 1 1 55 68 98 87 83 72

120 0 0 0 52 66 98 86 82 70

120 0 0 1 51 65 98 86 81 69

120 0 1 0 50 64 98 85 81 68

120 1 0 0 51 64 98 85 81 69

120 0 1 1 48 64 98 85 81 67 120 1 0 1 49 64 98 85 81 68

120 1 1 0 48 62 98 84 80 67

120 1 1 1 47 62 98 84 80 66

23 1
Htere, too, the tabled values indicate that fa i~jm (sleep loss over' mission

days) is more important in degi'ading performance over' five days than any

of the other factors.

Htere, again, it should be noted that values of E (the effectiveness

index) in Table 4. 2 repr-esent all possible degrces or combinations in the

impact of the debilitating factors on pcrfoi'mance. The least aegradation

occur's with the 24, 0, 0, 0 combination of debilitating factors, and the

greatest d egiadation with the 120, 1, 1, 1 combination. Intermediate conditions lie between these extremes. The E values shown on Table 4. 2

represent the indicated hour, i. e. , the last hour of the first, second, third,

fourth and fifth days of continuous combat operations.

Table 4.3 presents the projected effectiveness (E) for critical combat tasks performed by the several duty positions of Armor (Tank Platoon).

Successive parts of Table 4.3 present projected values of E for tasks performed by the Tank Platoon Leader (TK PL), Tank Commander (TK CD1),

Tank Gunner (TK G1) and Tank Loader (TK LDR). Values of E are tabled

for each of the three types of defensive platoon actions (1, 2, and 3) and for

the average across the three types (Platoon Actions 1, 2, 3). In each case

values are given for the (last hour of) first, second, third, fourth and fifth

day of (ontinuous combat oper'ations.

Here, as for Mechanized Infantry, the pattern of projected values

is most characterized by variability of effectiveness across tasks and

platoon actions. Again, some tasks degrade only nominally over' five days

(120 hours) of continuous operations, while others, become very quickly

degraded to unacceptable levels. Examples of tasks degraded only nominally are Task No. 48 (loading machine guns) and Task No. 54 (operating

the breech mechanism). Both of these tasks are normally performed by

the TK LD. On the other hand, Task No. 3 (selecting firing position for

tanks), Task No. 4 (selecting observation posts), Task No. 5 (selecting

routes), and Task No. 6 (selecting alternate positions) are all examples of

tasks that are projected to degrade very substantially. All are tasks

normally performed by the TK PL.

Table 4. 4 presents a descriptive summary of the impacts of debilitating factors on the critical abilities of the personnel of TK PL relevant to the performance of their critical tasks. The table heading shows

the abilities (see taxonomy in Chapter 1) needed for task performance and

the debilitating factors (see Chapter 1) impacting on these abilities. Only

the impacts are recorded in the body of the table. That means that the

absence of an entry may be due to the fact that: (a) the task in question is

not critical on the given platoon action, (b) the ability in question is not

c ritical for the given task, or (c) the ability in question is not depressed in

this task and platoon action. Where there is an entry in the table a "T'

2 :i2

t 7 - ~ , '-- "! - _ __
"C . r CC4G'T Q CD DC, C, C rC

r-~~ C ~ ~ ~ :zl -r ' CH c I C1 ur L

'H c1- C) C C -) C)C C C) cr - r

fl_ V'4 -4 c CDC)C)QQQ C) C 3C) C)0CCr ,

U) -A CO C -4--4- DC)c )C)C -4o- ,C

0 0 0C)C)C C - -LC 00C) )nC J0Na oc

o C000 C) ) C C)C) D C C 0C) C3 D C C )C

U) 0 00 ON 0000 r 0 00CDCC)0 C4C0000 0 \mm00c 0C 

-4 -4- oC - -. 0 C -D C) CO CO , O 4 4 -I.- -A 'H CO

00 ~-r~ -, CN C c,4o 400 00 r o )0 10c

r- -4\ff) 14 - 000 L)_T -10, C f IC14 c-4c yz ~cn

H ~-4_4-4-4 1 -4

1- 14-4 .0a -47 -- 4 -4C -4 ,3 C iC r ) -- oc

C-,- L)c)C -i c -L)L I , \0 1-r r - I l 1

-4 _4 -4 -- 4 -4 -4 4

0 000 0000 0

-4 --- 4 4 -4 -- 4 41--44-HC\

41 '- e CI C 41 ') ( 4

.)- (L) .- 40 C

233
r

C)~ --3 (0D0 C)_D Lf )C) DC C C)C)C 0 C 00 -)C

r-~ ~ 00 ~ -- ~~ C1 . -4t C-A C-C4)CDC -r -3 -) )Nm

\- :T00-- C4 L C -) (D 0 0 ( - -4 -, 0 C)C - ,4r '4M

I 0000 r 0 0)C)0 0C 0 C C C C 00000 rcoc

C: )C)C 0 D C)0 DC 0 00 C' 0000 C 000CDa(DC

C)r

000 0 Cooo C)C 0000 )o)C D )( C ooo(D DC -. 7 DC 0 3C) C 0000 DC Q3 C0 ODOO (DC-0000 C )C)C

0DC o0C )QC ) 0C )C ( 3C )C 2l ooD Cooo (Doc o OpC ) )C 3 D C ( DC oo)C C

2c ~ -A- U~ -A H ' .- '- i ~ 4 -,-4 -- 4 -- A -A -

;-4C dT 0C )C )C 3C D 3C )C,(3 C DC 3C

0- OpC00 3C00C)0000 0C 0000)CDCD ( C)0C0030

Hr 4f - 4 -- 4- '-4 _q -4 - - - ,4 -- 1-A .- -4 -4

_fl -- A 4 .- -4 _ 4 .- '-4 4 .- - - -- ---1.4 -4 - - I 

0o C )C DC D 0000 00 )C )C 00 )C 0 0 0 CD V4 -4 .- - -- 4 -4 '-4 -4 ' 4H -4- .- 4 .- 4' -4 --1 4 .- f

0D0:)0)0 000030 (DC ) l C 00 )CDC)0 000300 c

~ A A 14 -' -4 'H .- -4 -- 4A A A ' - -'

0000 00000 00c 00 0 0- 0 0 0000 0000 0000 ,- -,, 4' q 4' 4 .~' 41 'H4 ,-4 H - 4H.1 -

V) -40P -

234
1- Ln -n UNr ' )( Z - ) C C ( ) )C ) I

C14 r--Lr)cn Cq ) C (D - 1 r- - ,-. C4 -1) in -I -

0l -Czj L co~~ - C'0C'J ~ r 0 -- t - Z) %4.0 c-4 zc

e'J -T O 4c)c CC'~ r' ) : l 1 0-Lro U tr',4 J-.4oo

C14 ko "T- C) 0 0 0I- 0 C:) 0 I-) -,I NI ~c 4 COr C4 ~4- - -4 ,-4

E,4 '-4 .A -4 - -

4 4 .-4 -4 -.4 -4 -41 - -4 1-

OD tc-4- o C1 00 4000 00C)C0CD00 DIic .-4 %DrnCq -4.. 0000 00 0 corr-'D C)C)c'C)o 0 -,, f)

14 -TLr) () -4 C4-C)-4 -4 -4 l -,4 m- ,-. -4,I

0 0 0 0 0 00 -4-' .- 4 4- " .,- cd -- ' 41 -- q Cd 41 rd -4 ~ -4 0

235

4t P
LID )(D00000 C 0000 C) -a' '0C'j

-4 -4 -4 -A -- 1 -4 -- 4 - -

C3 0000 C)C ) 00C0C)C C 0 000 0 000C0C C C

z z -1 -4-- -4 -- -4 - -- 4 -4-4 -4 " -4

Cfl 1-4 0 0 04 -4 -4 -OA 0 0 -4- 0 0 

Mi C) 0000)0 Cf)L~- 0000 C)C O C4 GC 'CA S-ON tn

-li 0000 D )0 0000 ) ) )0 co ru' lIT '-r, - ON 0co~ r- r-- 4 -4 -- -4 -4 -.4 -- '-4

mi cf. 00 00 00z 00

0- 0 0 0 ...~0 4 -4 -4 -1 p .

236
co U-)f' n 0 CDC 0 - 0 0 )C 0 0 l r f -i

a CY) c - r- 10 C)C) 000 D(DC3 0 )C 0 C %a Cc %00 cO .-- 4 -4 4- - -A -4 - '-'

cli -C'-4- C00000C c 0 7

co --- 'ONC'j 0000 0C0000 DC C D G- r r') OD 00000CD(3(DC C 0 ) 7C 0C0IN0 0 -

r- -,T ~ 00 --q L.4 ~ -0. -I C, C'C--CDC -D C 4Z -L) I

-- 1 -4 -4 -- -- - -- - -

-4-4 4 -4 - - -

-4 Lo \O~ C1 0 -4 '0c* , 00000 ) )( D D c r , - Cl ~)E - (D~ OD - r)-n TC0 CC)CD r-22n

6 l 0r ot ) 0C0 DC DC 0 )C 00

cii cii r-LlC'J.14-4 Co00000)C 0 0C000D D G- c

-4 -- -4- -4. 1 

E-4 co-4 -A000 0 0000 C4 CDC 0000mC C 0 00000.DF-C

-4 CD -C4-4 4--3 (n4-- CD C) -4 -4- C-. (D4- C- -D DCDC )C

- -4-1 " -4 " -1 1-1 .4 44-4 --4 4 - 14

ON ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . 0 ~ 4t ~ 4- ~ a%-44C1 ~ '- DC 4--T )aC) Ci- , -

00. Ocr- r-' a,000 00IT .% OC30 C 00 N 0 - ---

00 C T O -4 L 0000 CJIC 000003C r) -T N C30'in- C14 0* 0r-'r- %o 0D000 0C) %000r 0 O 0c 0

t-~-4-- 3 -4 ) -T C *-0 C -4-4aC ) ,-4 1 O C4 - %. C% oor 0 C3 ') ) C)C) ) 0 1% ON 3 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

cd c + - Cd4-cii4- 1-I U -40 U -(

P, <4 P-4 -:

237

-- "
.sia i, all ( i, o> . 'thti 2t)'U.) d"ha'l-ioi o: "il( abili*.\ in

Pi| t O -, Iloll 1 , a 611 i 1tot h it e o C 1 'r Platoo A- ,I tion 2, ala, a -, ,t)l,. .: . 111l~a oon A , .io '

3.

.As 11,,Srp a a cr e-j 11i)1i\- v U1 m a IV f0 advLiSt Lv aft c l i11 A

ahiliti-.s in t.livical tasks, Tabl- 4. 4 selves as a cross index. The folbo. il illfolil latioll c'all be obtained fI om lhl, cl'oss-i ld(,x:

a. (''iti. at tasks perforncd b\ various duty positions

b. Soum.,(s) of adverse impacts oi ciiticaL abilities

Adversly affectod (dpressed) litical abilities

in , 'itikal tasks

d. Advetsel, affected tasks in platoon act ions

. Combinations of the above

As butor',, tile cross-index can be used to answer various questions,

suh as:

* Who performs a given task?

S Which critical abilities are depr-essed in which

task and which platoon action?

o Which conditions (debilitating factors) dutei'mine

decri ents in which c ritical ability(i, s) ?

" Which tasks experience parallel patterns of degradation?

Underlying Table 4.4 is the premise that a set of relations governs

the depressive effect of the debilitating factors on the various critical

abilities. Only some debilitating factors affect some abilities. The relation

between debilitating factors and the critical abilities on which they act w as

summarized in Table 3.5 (in the preceding chapter).

Digest of Critical Tasks and Their Performance

Succeeding portions of this chapter present a detailed description of

what is known about how the conditions associated with continuops operations

affect the performance of each of the 58 cr-itical tasks of the TK PLT. The

derivation of task criticality is fully described in a companion report, Background Data, Vol. Ill Human Performance in Continuous Operations Guidelines.

Here, the purformance of each task is reviewed in terms of its behavioral

requirements. For example, the TK PL Task No. 4, "selecting observation

posts, " rcquires the critical abilities Reasoning and Orientation, which are

affcted by Fatigue, Diurnal Rhythms, Stress, and Darkness.

238

,l2 p ,-_ .. . . -,_-_ .. . .. .. . . __- _.. . . .. .
Table 4. 4

Armor. ioary of Significant Depressions of Critical Abilities

D IUPNAL

TASK FATIGUE aEYN L:Gir LEVEL STRESS

PLATOON 1 3 3

LEADER 2 3 3 3

3 123 1 3 i2 13

4 1 i

5 1 3 3 1 1

6 123 1 3 12 1.3 6 123 1 3 123

3

9

10

11

12 1 1 Z

13 1 1 1 1- 2 12 1 12 12 12 12

16 1 1 1 1

17 12 12

IN - 1 12

19

20

I- 2 31 27.;. 1 3i1 3 i 3

23 3 13 23 3

1 1 3 1 3 33 13 13 23 23 23

25 1 3 1 3 33

26

TANK 27

COMMANDER 28 23

29 1 3

30 1

31

32 12 2'

33 1 1 1

3433 1. 1 12" * 12 2 36 L

36

37

38 1

39 1 3 1 3 L 3 13 .3

0 1 3 13 1 3

41

G4ME 2 3 3 3

43 3 3 3 3

44

45

46 3

LOADER 47

*9

50

51

53

54

55

56

37

58

239

jo~ ______ _________________ _____
HI I

t-h ationships bettcuen a t ritical ability and onei of thl uniquet

st SsOl'S Oi cOntiflUOUs O)€'atIOUS arVe presented in the previous chapIe"

on Ithe \1e.haniz d Infant 'y.

Each task shows onl index which lists the cI'itical pe IformanceL abilities rejuircd. Unless otherwise noted, the degradation effects for the

tasks listed in this chapter are the same as for the tasks for which involved

critical abilities are discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter i1). Th,

interpretations and implications ar'e also tile same. Table 4. 5 identifies

wihere a discussion appears on how debilitating factors degrade the abilities

of the pL;rsonnel of TK PLTs to per'form their tasks. This table is also 1-eltvant to [IST, Artillery and Mechanized Infantry personnel where tasks demand common abilities.

The task digests Ahich follow provide a compendium of information

pertaining to each of the identified criti al tasks. Each digest provides the

basiL identifying information: Task No. , Duty Position which norinally

carries out this task, and the Task Title. Then the defensive (platoon)

action in which this task is highly critical is indicated. Next, the critical

abilities required for task performance are listed together with the adverse

debilitating factors impacting on and depressing the abilities. Also, listed

auie Task Nos. under which the impacts of debilitating factors on abilities

are discussed. Note that these Task Nos. refer to the tasks of the Mechanized Infantry (see Chapter I1).

240

"IF " .. .... r. r - , ,
'able 4. 5

Al 1111- Index of' ist ulssi i ot isf

of' D)biitaling u'ators oni ('rii, aL Abititi,s

Debilitating Critical Discussed Under Mechanized

Factor Ability Infantry Task No. (Ch. Il1)

Vision i, 30, 33

Hearing 19, 33 Fatigue Numerical Facility 57, 66, 68

Reasoning 57, 66, 68, 74

Perceptual Speed 29, 30, 57

Orientation 7, 29, 33

Diurnal Numerical Facility 11, 57, 61

Rhythm Reasoning 11, 57, 61

Vision 9, 26, 44, 72 Light Hearing 22, 33

Level Dynamic Precision 18, 20

Orientation 7

Memory 56, 69

Reasoning 45, 53, 54, 74

Stress Perceptual Speed 2, 6

Communication 48

NOTES: I. Task Nos. in body of table refer to task digests

appearing in Chapter III.

2. Discussion in task digests are relevant to Armor,

Artillery and FIST where common abilities are required.

241

At- -,-- .I- __ _ IL
CRITICAL TASK 1

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Coo'dinate with 81mm FO (Fire Planning)

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

242

St 7 w i:- - - ----- - - "- . ....... -... - . _ ....
CRITICAL TASK 2

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Coordinate with Artillery FO (Fire Planning)

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Light Level/ Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

2.

243

4 __ ,t P *
CRITICAL TASK 3

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Select Firing Position for Tanks

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

244
CRITICAL TASK 4

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Select Observation Posts

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

245

or .......
CRITICAL TASK 5

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Select Routes

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

246

A 7
CRITICAL TASK 6

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Select Alternate Positions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

247
CRITICAL TASK 7

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Select Supplementary Positions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

248

l ,p . . - r ". . .T "- . . .. . -
CRITICAL TASK 8

Position: TaInk Platoon Leade-r

Task: (Comnuni'cat, Positioning of 'Fanks to the Tank ('M)t.1

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Coinrnunication Stress 48

249

- -, -n-I I i I I
CRITICAL TASK b

Position Tan'k ilP1 ()IOU1 .

Task: O1)r. 1it, i I,'t 1t1/ 1*-'dllo

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with T-k No.

,ar'ing None

Comninuniwation None
CRITICAL TASK 10

Position: Tank Platoon L., ad.'

Task: Supei'vist, D ,f rlsive lrvpurati ons

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory st-as56, 6(j

251

). -____ . -..-.
CRITICAL TASK 11

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Inspect for Readiness

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication None

Perceptual Speed None

Reasoning None

252

2 ____ __
CRITICAL TASK 12

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Approve Tank Commander's Firing Data

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

253 .4 Wi _ _ _ _--- - _ _ _ -- i 
CRITICAL TASK 13

Position: Tank Platoon Leadr

Task: Approve FOs F're Plan

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

254
CRITICAL TASK 14

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Prepare PLT Fire Plan

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

255

'r-7 ... " '"-- ' "..... . . . . . . _ _ _ __/-r 
CRITICAL TASK 15

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Acquire Targets

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

256

-/ - T• I
CRITICAL TASK 16

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Determine When To Commence Engagement

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

257 f ._,_ _ _ _ __.... _-_ _ __- _ _ _...

I , l ili 
CRITICAL TASK 17

Position: Tank Platoon L(-ader

Task: Order FOs To Adjust Vires

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 57, 61

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57 61

Communication Stress 48

258 j
CRITICAL TASK 18

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Control Employment Of Coordinated PLT Tank Fires

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 3:3

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Communication Stress 48

259 B _ __
CRITICAL TASK 19

Position: Tank P'latoon Leader

Task: Ope rate Laser Lange Finder

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

260

"- --7 .--.. -....,, .. .I.. -... T ~ . - .. ... ... ...... ... . .
CRITICAL TASK 20

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Override Gunner's Traverse

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Perceptual Speed None

Reasoning None

261

4 . __ II II
CRITICAL TASK "1

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: 1ire .50 Cal 'MG

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision [atigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

262

i i. - ___ .. .. -- - . -r , -- '- -"-. .. . .. . . . .. . .. .. ... .
CRITICAL TASK

Position: Tank Platoon Ioad ,r

Task: De, idt Whn (if) to Relocate

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

1I-asonin- Fatigue 57, 66, G8, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, -4

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

263

L __. .li i I I i l I
CRITICAL TASK 23

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Control Formations On The Move

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

264

• • y- -,--V
CRITICAL TASK 24

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Adjust Indirect Fires

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Communication Stress 48

265

S " .-. .
CRITICAL TASK 25

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Issue Fragmenlary Orders

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3 5

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with TaskNo.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

266

,t,-7 .. . ..- ,___j- - ..
CRITICAL TASK 26

Position: Tank Platoon Leader

Task: Issue Spot Reports

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

267

p . . -''wV ." -
CRITICAL TASK 27

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Coordinate With Gunner

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

268

A .. -t . . I . -. .r + - .. ! - -
CRITICAL TASK 28

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Coordinate With Driver

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

269
CRITICAL TASK 29

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Occupy Firing Position

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

270

' . -. . .,r=, -r .. . . .-- -- .,,--- -. _ __ _ __ __ . .... .. -..2___ 
CRITICAL TASK 30

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Plan Fire Control Measures

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, dl

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

271 2w ___ _ _ ____ I;
CRITICAL TASK 31

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Escort PL or TM CDR During Inspection

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication None

Hearing None

Memory None

272

= . . .? 'i -r --- - -- l -r- .. .. .
CRITICAL TASK 32

Position: Tank Commander

Task: R{eport Enemy Sightings

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 2 9, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

273

4? _ I. t _ _ _ _II_ - I- II I I I
CRITICAL TASK 33

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Acquire Targets

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Light Level/Visibility 22, 33

274
CRITICAL TASK 34

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Engage Targets on Order

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

275

t 'p - ---- -- Y; - -- _I_ __
CRITICAL TASK 35

Position: Tank Conmander

Task: Adjust Indirect Fires

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 32

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

276

-7 !---
CRITICAL TASK 36

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Operate Laser Range 'ind "r

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

277

2I . .. .... _ _-_ _-_ _-_ _--- _ __.. 
CRITICAL TASK 37

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Issue Crew Fire Commands

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

278

i1 p . . ., - " - -' ". . . 4 _ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ ___ _
CRITICAL TASK 38

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Fire .50 Cal MG

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requi-es abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

279
CRITICAL TASK 39

Position: Tank 'omrnmander

Task: Decide When (or if) to Relocate

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

280
CRITICAL TASK 40

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Control Driver Actions When Moving

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Communication Stress 48

I 281 ) I__ _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 41

Position: Tank Commander

Task: Transmit Spot Reports to Tank Platoon Leader

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

2e2

t7 - - _ .. .. 

_ _ _ _ _ _i _ _ "
CRITICAL TASK 42

Position: Tank Gunner

Task: Acquire Targets

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Communication Stress 48

283

__ _ __ _ ___ _ _

II ___•_____m IIII
CRITICAL TASK 43

Position: Tank Gunner

Task: Track Targets

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Communication Stress 48

284

-' . .. . ... . . . - 'P____- r . . . ..
CRITICAL TASK 44

Position: Tank Gunn ,'

Task: R''ivi I'i o Cuiniands firom TK CI-H

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication None

Hlearing None

S 285 _ I . - 7
CRITICAL TASK 45

Position: Tank (iuMI(nI

Task: Fire Main GuU

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Perceptual Speed None

286
CRITICAL TASK 4(

Position: Tank Gunner

Task: Fire COX MG

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

287

r - , -r -------- --- .. . .. . .... ... . . . . ..- . . .
CRITICAL TASK 47

Position: Tai'c I oadt'l,

Task: Loatd ('OAX AT;

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

D)y nainic P 1

.,:ision None

288 " i

4 __
CRITICAL TASK 4,;

Position: 'Tank Loader

Task: load 50 CAL )WG

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

I)ynanic 1Pi'ecisloli None

289
CRITICAL TASK 49

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Handle Main Gun Rounds

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Dynamic Precision None

Memory None

290 £

-. .. - - - - - -
CRITICAL TASK 50

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Load Selected Hounds

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Dynamic Precision None

Memory None

291

A• -- "' ' - - --
CRITICAL TASK 51

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Conduct WPN Safety Checks

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Perc eptual Speed None

Memory None

' -, __ _-2_ _ ... . .
r|

CRITICAL TASK 52

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Conduct Communication Operation Checks

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors a&sociated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing None

Communication None

Memory None

293

r 7 -- r--, - II-
CRITICAL TASK 53

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Set Head Space and Timing on .50 Cal MG

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Dynamic Precision None

Vision None

294

--._ _ _...._ _ _ 7
CRITICAL TASK 54

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Operate Breech Mechanism

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Dynamic Precision None

Perceptual Speed None

295

07

_ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 55

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Operate Fire/Safety Switch

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing None

Memory None

296
CRITICAL. TASK 56

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Advise Gunner When COA-X and M,\ain Gun Can Fii'e

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

297
CRITICAL TASK 57

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Conduct Immediate Action to Correct COAX Malfunction

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

298
CRITICAL TASK 58

Position: Tank Loader

Task: Unload Non-Operational Main Gun Rounds

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

N REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Dynamic Precision None

Memory None

tI

299 4. __ ____ _ - _ ____

.a v ,-
Fa w.III FA= BLAwL - Ncr n"A.%w D

CHAP TFR V

FIRE SUP'PORT TEAM (FIST) PERFOI .1ANCf

Projected performance degradation in Fire Support

Teams (FIST) for duty positions, platoon, and company level teams are summarized. Detailed projections by tasks

and defensive (platoon) actions are tabulated. Digests of

adverse factors' impacts on 59 critical tasks are provided.

Summary of Consequences for Performance of Continuous Operations

Of the four debilitating factors, fatigue (sleep loss over five days),

light level (darkness), stress and disruption of diurnal rhvthms, again, fatigue (expressed as i.ission days) is experted to produce the greatest decrement in the performance of the FIST personnel. Htowever, all tasks performed

by the FIST are not affected in the same way. While tasks that are externally

(situationally) paced, or have a heavy cognitive or vicilance component can be

expected to degrade in proportion to the amount of sleep lost, self-paced acLt.Vities that are well practiced or routine are likely to show orderly and appropriate reactions with only small performance difficulties as time wears on. Intellective and perceptual tasks, typically performed by the FIST Chief and

FO, most severely affected by sleep loss are those involving logical reasoning

and requiring accurate perception as well as concentration. Resistanc- to

degradation over time will vary directly with task complexity. For example,

"redirecting FO calls for fire" (Task Nos. 18, 58) can be expected to show

little deterioration with sleep loss because it requires little mental manipulation of information. On the other hand, performance of target acquisition

(Task No. 40) and selection of observation posts (Task Nos. 5, 35) can be expected to exhibit considerable degradation. Even acutely sleep deprived FS

NCO's and RTO's probably will adequately perform most of their critical tasks.

However, the acutely sleep deprived FIST Chief and FO's may show considerable deterioration in their performance of specific critical tasks as the time

of the continuous operation becomes extended in duration. A summary of the

projected effectiveness of various FIST duty positions over five days of continuous combat operations, assuming little or no organized sleep, is shown as

Figure 5. 1. The duty positions shown to degrade most rapidly include the

FIST Chief and the FO. Persons in these two duty positions are required to

perform many tasks with a heavy cognitive and perceptual loading. In contrast, the tasks peculiar to the FS NCO and the RTO tend to be of a well

practiced or routine type.

301

r ; -w_-_-_
100

90-

70

60-

50

EFCTIV ENIES FIST PERSONNEL

(El 40-

10

624 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 5.1. Performance degradation in FIST duty positions.

(FC FIST Chief, FS Fire Sul-port NCO,

FO -. Forward Observer, RTO -Radio Telephone Operator)

.302

r x
F'igure 5. 2 present" nr ojec'ted perfo'rmance e'civlye s a fn,

of mission duiration for the F'ISF at company and ,lat oon levels. lhe a':

illustrates that the platoon level dearade.a more ra:,idly lan the o t ij 1 t\.[.

Figure 5. 31 contrasts J.'ISI effectiveness over miss ion ia.v- :'or ' bestand "worst" prevailing conditions of itmacting' debilit ttiry 1'actors. Ine t'arx

illustrates that, as before, the influence of the imoacting fac totrs (lioilt level,

stre.-;s, and diurnal rhythms) is less than the influence ,f fa:iaue (sice a los>

over, five days) in degrading perfortmance effectiveness. HIowever, the fe's,

of these other stressors on performance strould not be minimized in 'he thinking of the military planner. lrojected effectiveness s a ilso influenced bv 'he

number o)f individuals in the I" iST. At the platoon level, t"IS I' nornmallv consists of the 1'() and the P TO. \t the company level, I-'IS" normally consis

of three platoon level teams, tIhe FIST Cihief, and the .S NCO. Ht owever, a

somewhat degraded condition of only two olat oon level teams was assu ned fol.

calculation of the effectiveness values shown in Tables 5. 1 and 5. 2. Since the

scenario (Chapter II) assumred G to 1 odds, this seemed to be a realisic )remise. Table 5. 1 presents the projected effectiveness of each l"IST duty pnosition and the team at two or anizational levels for the different platoon actionrs

as well as an average ac.:-sS the three tynes of platoon action and mission days

(sleep loss). The projections indicate that wide va'iations in perfot'man :e (ffectivetress can be expected for the different posit.ions and :alatoon actions.

Best and worst performanc-c can rarge between veryv effective, e. . , 100 and

grossly ineffective, e.g., 21.

Table 5. 1

Effectiveness (E) of PIST: Duty Positions, Platoon and Company

Level Teams in Different Platoon Actions and Over Mlission Days

Duty Position Team

Day FC FO FS RTO Platoon Company

Platoon 1 74 73 100 100 85 88

Action 3 41 38 100 100 62 69

1 5 22 20 100 100 45 53

Platoon 1 82 78 100 92 85 91

Action 3 55 48 100 78 61 76

2 5 37 30 100 65 44 63

Platoon 1 73 69 92 92 80 85

Action 3 38 33 78 78 51 60

3 5 20 15 65 65 31 42

Platoon 1 76 73 97 94 83 88

Action 3 44 39 92 84 57 68

1,2,3 5 25 21 87 75 40 52

303

41 _ ____ ____ ____ ___ ___ ___
100

90F

60

50

EFFECTIVENESS

(E) 140

SL ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL

COMPANY

20 PLATOON

10

Figure 5. 2. FIST :Progressive degradation of (-ffectiveness-- -platoon and

company levels with all adverse factors present.

304
100

90 F

80 i

70

60

50.

EFFECTIVENESS FIST CONDITIONS

(E) 40

BEST:-.

3 WORST: _ ___

20

I0

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 5. 3. FIST: Effectiveness of teams under best and worst conditions.

305 -t i)-'

d. . .- _ _ ~
-fable 5. 2

Effectiveness (E) of FIST': l)uty POsitiotl, 1liatonm and

Company Level Teams Under All Combinations of Adverse ('oiditions

Impacting Duty Position

Debilitating Factors FIST FIST

F L S D Chief FSNCO FO RTO Platoon Company

24 0 0 0 93 100 92 100 96 97

24 0 0 1 90 100 88 100 94 96

24 0 1 0 85 97 84 94 89 92

24 1 0 0 87 100 85 100 92 94

24 0 1 1 82 97 80 94 87 91

24 1 0 1 84 100 81 100 90 93

24 1 1 0 79 97 77 94 85 89

24 1 1 1 76 97 73 94 83 88

48 0 0 0 69 97 67 94 79 84

'48 0 0 1 67 97 64 94 78 83

48 0 1 0 64 95 62 89 74 81

48 1 0 0 65 97 62 94 76 82

48 0 1 1 62 95 59 89 72 80

48 1 0 1 63 97 60 94 75 81

48 1 1 0 60 95 57 89 71 79

48 1 1 1 58 95 54 89 69 77

72 0 0 0 54 95 50 89 67 75

72 0 0 1 52 95 47 89 65 74

72 0 1 0 49 92 45 84 61 71

72 1 0 0 50 95 46 89 64 73

72 0 1 1 48 92 43 84 60 70

72 1 0 1 49 95 44 89 63 72

72 1 1 0 46 92 41 84 59 69

72 1 1 1 44 92 39 84 57 68

96 0 0 0 39 92 36 84 55 65

96 0 0 1 39 92 34 84 53 64

96 0 1 0 37 89 33 80 51 62

96 1 0 0 38 92 33 84 53 64

96 0 1 1 36 89 32 80 51 61

96 1 0 1 37 92 32 84 52 63

96 1 1 0 34 89 30 80 49 60

96 1 1 1 33 89 29 80 48 59

120 0 0 0 31 89 27 80 46 58

120 0 0 1 30 89 25 80 45 57

120 0 1 0 28 87 24 75 42 54

120 1 0 0 29 89 25 80 45 56

120 0 1 1 27 87 23 75 42 54

120 1 0 1 28 89 23 80 43 55

120 1 1 0 26 87 22 75 41 53

120 1 1 1 2) 87 21 75 40 52

306

f ._ -- - . . . . . . . . .. _ _.. _ __j-r . ... .. . .
Table 5. 2 presents the effectiveness of FIST D)t Position, 'lato)on

level team and Company level team as a function of all combinations of i1-

paCting adverse factors over five days of continuous operations. In the l'abie

5.2, the impacting debilitating facto's are coded as follows:

F Fatigue level in days (1 -5)

1. Light level: 1 = dark and 0 = light

S Stress: I = stress oresent and 0 =str'ess absent

I) Diurnal rhythm: 1 = rhythm out of phase and

0 = rhythm in phase.

As before, the values of F (the effectiveness index) in Table 5. 2 'epre -

sent all possible degrees -)r combinations in the impact of the debilitating ia, -

tors on performance. The least degr'adation occur's with the 24, 0, 0, 0 combination of debilitating factor's, and the greatest degr'adation with 120, 1, 1, 1

combination. Intermediate conditions lie between these exteme s. [he E values shown in Table 5. 2 represent tle indicated 1ou', i. e., the last hour of

the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth days of continuous combat one rations.

'Fable 5. 3 presents the projected effectiveness (E) for critical c( bat

tasks characteristically performed by the several duty positions in -ISI's.

Successive parts of 'Fable 5. 3 present pcojected values of E for tasks per'fornmed

by the FIST Chief, FO, FS NCO, and lRT0. Values of E are tabled for eaci of

the three types of defensive platoon actions (Platoon :\ctions 1, 2, 3) here considered and for the average across the three types. In each case Values ar'e

given for the (last hour of) fi'st, second, third, fourth, and fifth day of continuous combat operations.

Once again, the variability of effectiveness across tasks and platoon

actions represents a dominant data characteristic. This makes general statements about overall performance effectiveness quite tenuous. While the performance of some tasks is anticipated to be degraded only nominally over five

days (120 hours) of continuous operations, performance of other tasks will become very quickly degraded to unacceptable levels. Examples of tasks anticipated to be only nominal are: Task No. 58 "redirecting FO calls for fire,"

and Task No. 59 "operating the field telephone." The FS NCO and RTO respectively normally perform these tasks. Examples of tasks forecast to degrade

to an unacceptable level include Task No. 10 "adjusting corrective fires," Tasks

Nos. 26, 54 "adjusting multiple missions," and Tasks Nos. 11, 42 "engaging

targets of opportunity." These perceptually and cognitively loaded tasks are

performed by either the FIST Chief or the FO.

Table 5. 4 summarizes the impacts of debilitating factors on critical

abilities of FIST personnel relevant to the performance of their critical tasks.

307

41 _ _____ I
CD 0~44 C C -- C C -)C

-C7 O D"~Q 

0- 0 CDC)LQ0C0-CDQT

-.1 c,4 -)C C C) r) cl - C 1P ) T c- C) C) If, - uDC:

.- cC) C - 11 -, 0 r.rq . 0 -. I C)C DILC -InI)r-C

-4

0n u.rCmd) t-n0C- U" , f ~N -f r)j u0 n (j m

Uj 0D ot r- 0 Mo--~ In - fn ;T-0

Cd Lr )1)L e nc4 - C

41-

-'r 0 C4 0 00 L (1 Cr c'. D - N C 0 L)cJ-C

0

cno

CD 0000>C)0 00 -10 -CN 0 0 ,O r " C)C)C3C 0000 c o -- I -4 r-10-Tc)I 0 - d

\.O C)C)C)0 :) 00 r 0CI C 00 D )C 0 0 00 'r- r

ra)

a) C) n c4 cf4 0(T 00 0 r 00L) c00 0 I-4 tr -, -iC-Ir-.

00' u~t- , 000)' ) )C ) )C )CD0 00 MC Or-~0C~u 

cN l) O . u 0000 D CDC 0 ) C>C DCDC a 0 0r -1 -4--1

C14 00r,\. L T C)0 00C0 0 0 r- '0Lfn a\oo r0.o I

C1 zT~r- L 00 )0C)0 0 4T0 r--- 0 Or) 1 C N.

Cd c) -. Lr)-u -IC4c) IL) -40 n T L, - N M :

0 0 00 Co0 0.0-c

CIS -d Cd4

-

~04

308
m 00000z 00000 -0001 00 -7 00000c4 1 o r

C'4 C7 co 4- r- -4C' -4 -, r- .4 -4l c r- r- o N -L r- r- 1-

04- - t'C 0 0 0 0

r- -T ,T D O C4 c 4 C- CD - -= CD00 D 0C4T--C

C-4 C4 ) l C)-00 (4 000) < C) -. 000-) C:

-t -0 1 n 000 - tr,0c 000) -C4M00 01-C - 0

0r C14 0000 c)-tlC-- 0000 n M C3

-<1 C) CDC,0

aC'4 0a CDC)C) 0 " 0000 Mc40C) 3 - D 0r-00Ln

.,- -4 -o~ -4- D CD4 - C-4 - -4 0 D -4 r4 )L)C4 I 0O

C44 t. -4. 0. 00000 r C 00 000I --. r r

C'4 "~-~4 0000C)C)C0 0000 C) C) CDC) t

0D t" -4 Lr) C4 r-Tr-' - C14 C) r)(N 0 l r

CA4 -T C,4 -40 0 L) C4 -40 D -0 ( - D ITC4C ) 0

a% 00C )00 0 00C l0 0 0 M O CDO zT4T-

- 4 .- 4 - -4 -- -

00 0000C)C0 0 0C)0 0 0 0 4 r) - r C4 1%r.

00 C- 0 DC) C 0000 D DC o rr- .O000 % mO 

C -4 In IT4 L-) C- -4 L-4- n 1C 1

clc

0 0 0 0 0 0 0DO.C

309
-t C 0 0 0 0(7)CD 0C

-4~ DC Q 'CDC CD -c' -j ) D C .'(

0-C)C

- ~'ZD r- C 1 - ~ - - CD( o - r ) j)

C) iC) r n -t ' 4 i)C )(

r-o -, C*) C1 11.U(. (1D 4 CD(

0 ")-T 'fl n r CD D DC .I C - 0 I--Tx r- \DI r 1 f DLC'J cm( CD0CD C)0( DC Or-0 0 0-M I

-n CDC 0J C 0rc~)c r- cr-) -4 -\CTD D -

C( --T c- -4' - r'- .11 C)(14 o - - '-,I c N.-

H C:) CD 0C C) 0C)C')C) CD CD -C) C)C, C <

-1 OCCCD C 0DD0DCDD C C--C C CC C) C) C C) Mf - - - - - - - -- - - - - -4 - - - - -

c, I ~ n N ')t i)CD CD CD C C D C C:)DD l -

c- C ')r- D I '~lT 0C _ Dc CD C : C00a0 CN c 0 -

-1 ~ -. CO-)(4 ~ ~ - - 0 - u)0 ,--4 -- r q' D -L'

0D c~lIT 0-4 f) 0 0C 0 ))0'T0 ~~-4 0 L') rcl O -1C ~~LI cn~~ ~ r . -7 )C -. : -- %cor - 7 0o o

0a0 c0 r

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

- - 4- -.4 -4- +

-u C) .. U -

310[
-'10 4N-ITD 'J 000nc-100 0 00-4 T00 0L) C T0 f

t- -- ~- ) -- )C -r D --- DC )C a or 0-

ol -. J C.t CD-0 cn -O C)4C c -0 CD 0 cl)-CD 0 CD

-r 0c CD r'- C40)00 cr- C4 n00 0 r- C1 On00 D - -- n00

10 ) D0 c'4 C ~ CD 0C)0 -,T C '4 CDC):TC- -4

a) *C r -- N- -- )C nc - -4 - C30 -C4C

02

It -orC4 - 1- 0 -0c >c-c-c - - fL, n"c

00 r-C )U 4r ,tr T r 1 Lf 1 0c nc

$-T c)C4 U IT C4- )C - 0 C : )C , c S 10 1 c - 0 10 44 0C4 0 1 N 0

0, r 1 DL)C4 C : 0 P A0L)C4 C DC4n0

0~ r_ 0000 0 C4 a ~~J 0 ccc

0- t0L 0 00 0 r.010 0 0~

., -4 4 41'1

311
C

C.;

0

i 4 0000 C-4 -4~f -4U~ ~ o~tL

Ln 0 0 C or- aom00 o~r m c 0-

C")

an-rt 4e r 4m w

C)-

~ 14

-31
Table 5. 4

FIST: Summary of Significant Depressions of Critical Abilities

TASK FATIGUE R.YWL :;H :.VEL _____________

FIST CHIEF I.

3 :3 L

5 3 3 3 23 3

'3 '3 13

3 1 2 123 123

9 . 3 :23

i3 1Z3 123 123 123 123 :23 I 3 :23

11 123 : 3 1 3 :23 123 1 3 .23

I2 123 123

13 1 1 12

14 122 123 123 123 13 23 1 3 i23

15 13 13 13 13 13 13

16 13 13 13 13 12 12 13 17

18

19 3 3 3

20 123 123 123 123 123 123 1 3 123 i-.

21 1 1 1 -

22 123 123 123 123 123 1 3 :23 :..

23 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

24 2 2 2

25 123 123 123 123 123

26 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 :23 123 123 i2

27 1 1 i

28

29

FORWARD 30 1 3

OBSERVER 31 123

32

33 123

34

35 1 3 123 1 3 123 123

36 23 23 23

37 1 3 123 123

38 123 1 3 1 3 123

39 1 3 1 3 1 3 123 123 123

40 123 123 123

41 123 123 123

4 123 1 3 1 3 12 123 1 3 123

43 123 123

44 23 23 23 23

45 123 123 123 123 123 123 1 3 123 1

46 3 3 3 3 3 3

47 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 1

48 123 123 123 123 123 123 1 3 123 12.

49 13 13 13 13 13 1

50 123 122 123 123 123 1 3 123 12.

51 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

52 2 2 2 1

53 123 123 123 123 123 12-

54 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 12

55 1 1 1 *56 .2-

FIRE SU'PPORT 37 3

NCO 58

RnIO 39 23

OPERATOR

313

L i -. am| | ___ 
[he table heading shows the abilities (see Taxonomy in Chapter I) needed for

task performance and the debilitating factors (see Chapter 1) impacting on

these abilities. Only the impacts are recorded in the body of the table. That

is, the absence of an entry may be due to the fact that (a) the task in question

is not critical in the given platoon action, (b) the ability in question is not

critical for the given task, or (c) the ability in question is not depressed in

this task and platoon action. Where there is an entry in the body of the table,

a "i" denotes a significant (greater than 20'1/) depression of the ability in

Platoon Action 1, a ''' denotes the same for Platoon Action 2, and a '3'for

Platoon Action 3.

As well as a descriptive summary of adversely affected critical abilities in critical tasks, Table 5. 4 serves as a cross index to yield information

such as:

a. critical tasks performed by various duty

positions

b. source(s) of adverse impacts on critical

abilities

c. adversely affected (depressed) critical

abilities in critical tasks

d. adversely affected tasks in platoon actions

e. combinations of the above.

Note that Table 5.4 is derived from findings which indicated that all

debilitating factors do not affect all abilities. The relationship between debilitating factors and the critical abilities on which they act was summarized

in Table 3. 5 (in Chapter III).

Digest of Critical Tasks and Their Performance

As for the prior sections of this volume, succeeding sections of this

chapter present a task by task summary of the variables which affect FIST

task performance during continuous operations. The compendium attempts

to summarize for each duty position, and critical FIST task within position,

the critical ability or abilities necessary for successful task performance

and to state which debilitating factor(s) will affect performance of the task.

For example, the FIST Chief's Task No. 15, "adjusting counterfire mission,"

requires the critical abilities of Vision, Numerical Facility, Reasoning, Perceptual Speed, and Communication, which are affected by Fatigue, Light Level

(Darkness, etc.) Diurnal Rhythms, and Stress.

The relationships between a critical ability and one of the unique conditions of continuous operation are presented in Chapter III on the Mechanized

Infantry. The Chapter III implications apply equally to the case of the FIST.

The interpretations and implications are also the same.

314

I-
Table 5.5

F.-IST: IOdex of I)i cuiSSons of EffeCts

of I)ebititating Factors on C uitical Abi[itiesDebilitating Critical Discussed Under Mechanized

Factor Ability Infantry Task No. (Ch. III)

Vision 1, 30, 33

Hearing 19, 33

Fatigue Numerical Facility 57, 66, 68

Reasoning 57, 66, 68, 74

Perceptual Speed 29, 30, 57

Orientation 7, 29, 33

Diurnal Numerical Facility 11, 57, 61

Rhythm Reasoning 11, 57, 61

Vision 9, 26, 44, 72

Light Hearing 22, 33

Level Dynamic Precision 18, 20

Orientation 7

Memory 56, 69

Reasoning 45, 53, 54, 74

Stress Perceptual Speed 2, 6

Communication 48

NOTES: 1. Task Nos. in body of table refer to task digests

appearing in Chapter III.

2. Discussion in task digests are relevant to Armor,

Artillery and FIST where common abilities are

required.

315

43 --- -.- ! I
CRITICAL TASK

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Receive Orders and Plans from TM CDR

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory Stress 56, 69

316
CRITICAL TASK

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Coordinate with TM CDR

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

317

- --
CRITICAL TASK 3

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Coordinate with PLs

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Communication Stress 48

318

1 . .*B -- r -. . .T -.. .... ... .... . . . .. ..
CRITICAL TASK 4

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Coordinate with FSO

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Communication Stress 48

S10319

-o ; 

_ __
CRITICAL TASK 5

Position: ISF Chief

Task: Select Observation Posts

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, (8, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

320
CRITICAL TASK 6

Position : FIST Chief

Task: Plan WPN SYS RuUnd, FUZE, MOE & MOC for Each T'arget

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverst

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 6 8, 74

Diurnal Rhythm ii, 57, 61

321

!--
CRITICAL TASK 7

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Operate Laser Locator-Designator

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

322

It F. :- - - - - -... - - - .T ". - . . .. . . . .... ------- . . . . . . . . . . .
CRITICAL TASK 8

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Orient for Direction

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2,

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

323

tr I' -- r ! '". . . . . . .. . .
CRITICAL TASK 9

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Determine Fxa(.t Position on the Ground

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

324

- - - 7 - - ;--- .--- .-----
CRITICAL TASK 10

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Corrective Fires

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

325

SA- -. ...
CRITICAL TASK 11

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Engage Targets of Opportunity

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

326

_ .7
CRITICAL TASK 12

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust CLGP (Laser)

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

327

2 _ - - ___-_
CRITICAL TASK 13

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Determine When to Request End of Mission

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

328

: £
CRITICAL TASK 14

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust ICM Mission

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

Tue performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, G

Communication Stress 48

329

br-
CRITICAL TASK 15

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Counterfire Mission

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: i, 3

I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, i6, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, f;

Communication Stress 48

330
CRITICAL TASK 16

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Immediate Suppression

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

I REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

331

, i
CRITICAL TASK 17

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Approve FO Calls for Fire

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reazioning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Conminunication Stress 48

332 2 ____ _____

I' - -- -- - ----
CRITICAL TASK 18

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Redirect FO Calls for Fire

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Cornnmunication Stress 48

333

p.

SJ_72 2
CRITICAL TASK 19

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Request FSO Provide GS Artillery Support

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

fi:ctors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

334

4 ' . .- n. - , -r -. . . _ _.. 
CRITICAL TASK 20

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust TACAIR

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: i, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

335 4:t I _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 21

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust High Burst

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

336

" . ,"p .,. . - "--- ~- .. .. ____

-' -

__.....
CRITICAL TASK 22

Position: FIS' Chief

Task: Adjust Attack Helicopters

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

337

'p

I___.......

p i II
CRITICAL TASK 23

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Mortars

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 2b, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed St:,ess 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

338

_ _ _ i
CRITICAL TASK 24

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Communication

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

339

t. , W r Y - - -i-- 
CRITICAL TASK 25

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Danger Close

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1. 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 6C, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

4'__ 340

_
CRITICAL TASK 26

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Adjust Multiple Missions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Reasoning Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

341
CRITICAL TASK 27

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Report Target Engagement Results

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

342
CRITICAL TASK 28

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Order Relocation of FIST

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication None

Numerical Facility None

Orientation None

Reasoning None

343

U P P:
CRITICAL TASK 29

Position: FIST Chief

Task: Relay Calls for Fire

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

344

- . . . . --------
CRITICAL TASK 30

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Receive Plans and Orders from FISI' Chief

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory Stress 56, 69

345

p1

" 7 - r " . . , ... 2 .. ..... . .. . .. .. wi: .. . ..

- ,, " ___I
CRITICAL TASK 31

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Receive I'lans and Orders from PL,

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory Stress 56, 69

346
CRITICAL TASK 32

Position 1 Forward Observer

Task: Coordinate with }fIST Chief

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are aftected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Cormmunication Stress 48

347

__-

Lt
CRITICAL TASK 33

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Coordinate with PL

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

348

.- - - -"--, J -
CRITICAL TASK :34

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Coordinate with FDC

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussedwith Task No.

Communication None

Hearing None

Memory None

Numerical Facility None

Orientation None

Reasoning None

Vision None

349 '1'4
CRITICAL TASK 35

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Select Observation Posts

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

350 rt--___ 1
CRITICAL TASK 36

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Operate Laser Locator-Designator

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

351

Sm
CRITICAL TASK 37

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Orient for Directions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

352

Ii ___
CRITICAL TASK 38

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Determine Exact Location on the Ground

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

353
CRITICAL TASK 39

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Acquire Targets

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1. 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue I, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

354

pi -- i
CRITICAL TASK 40

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Determine Range of Target

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

355

A _ _ _ _ . i _ _ _ _ __. _ _ l _ _ 

"
CRITICAL TASK 41

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Determine Direction of Target

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

356
CRITICAL TASK 42

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Engage Targets of Opportunity

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

357
CRITICAL TASK 43

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust CLGtI

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

'actors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities -,dverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

358
CRITICAL TASK 44

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Determine When to Request End of Mission

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

359

.... , i', : 7 - r .- - . . -- ....... . . ...... .. . . ..........
CRITICAL TASK 45

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust ICM Missions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITiES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 37, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, G

Communication Stress 48

360
CRITICAL TASK 46

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Counterfire Mission

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 6j6, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

361

7 ft ___

__ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ "__ 

" . I . .r - t -r - -- -.- r - - .... ..
CRITICAL TASK 47

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Immediate Suppressive Fires

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

362
CRITICAL TASK 48

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust TACAIR

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

363

" -'-'-- " .. . . - ' - 7 .r - -
CRITICAL TASK 49

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust High Burst Missions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

364
CRITICAL TASK 50

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Attack Helicopters

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

365
CRITICAL TASK 51

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Mortars

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

366
CRITICAL TASK 52

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Illumination

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

367 1
CRITICAL TASK 53

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Danger Close

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: I, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

368

--17 ........ raw,[:, .I- __2- 
CRITICAL TASK 54

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Adjust Multiple Missions

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Perceptual Speed Fatigue 29, 30, 57

Stress 2, 6

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Reasoning Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Memory Stress 56, 69

Communication Stress 48

361)

_i_ , , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 55

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Report Target Engagement Results

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

Communication Stress 48

370

_ _-. . ._ _ _A
CRITICAL TASK 56

Position: Forward Observer

Task: Relay Calls for Fire

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 1, 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operat'rns.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

371

,!

-" .r .. ..... .", ' - .. .. . ... . . . . . . . .. .. .. . ... .. ..
CRITICAL TASK 57

Position: Fire Support NCO

Task: Receive Plans and Orders from FIST Chief

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory Stress 56, 69

372

Mj-
CRITICAL TASK 58

Position: Fire Support NCO

Task: Redirect FO Calls for Fire

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

373

A _ .__ 
CRITICAL TASK 59

Position: Radio Telephone Operator (lTO)

Task: Operate Field Telephone

Highly Critical in Platoon Actions: 2, 3

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory Stress 56, 69

374
CHAPTE1 VI

ARTILLERY BATTERY PERFOR'MANCE

Projected performance degradation of 155mm artillery

batteries for duty positions, gun crews, and batteries are

summarized. Detailed projections by tasks over three levels

of intensity of demand are tabulated. Digests of adverse

factors' impacts on 48 critical tasks are provided.

Summary of Consequences for

Performance of Continuous Operations

As repeatedly noted before, fatigue (loss of sleep over 120 hours)

will progressively dominate over and ultimately dwarf the effects of adverse visibility, stress, and disrupted diurnal rhythms. In fact, the

adverse effects of the disrupted diurnal rhythms may be diminishing

after, perhaps, 72 hours, but this will be so masked by fatigue as to be

undetectable. While all personnel, regardless of rank or personal characteristics, are affected in substantially the same way, all tasks performed by these persons are not affected equally.

Tasks making a heavy demand on intellectual (cognitive) abilities

or demanding attention or vigilance tend to become most degraded by fatigue.

Also, tasks whose pace is set by the surrounding conditions, as opposed

to self-initiated and paced tasks tend to suffer greater deterioration. Howevei-, "mechanical" tasks, i. e., motor tasks that are very highly practiced, remains surprisingly proof against the deterioration otherwise produced by loss of sleep.

Cognitive and perceptual tasks play an important part in the functioning of the Battery Executive Officer, Howitzer Section Chief, and Gunner. Accordingly, sleep loss is expected to begin degrading tasks that involve logical reasoning and require accurate perception as well as concentration even after the first day (24 hours) without sleep. However,

many of the routine tasks performed by the crew members are extremely

resistant to sleep loss. Even accutely sleep deprived crew members are

likely to perform most of their critical tasks effectively for extended periods

without organized sleep. A summary of projected effectiveness of various

positions of artillery personnel over five days (120 hours) of continuous

operations, assuming little or no organized sleep, is presented as Figure

6. 1. The duty positions in which performance can be anticipated to degrade

most rapidly are: Battery Executive Officer, Howitzer Section Chief, and

375

:. I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
100

90

s0

70

60

50

EFFECTIVENESS 155mm ARTILLERY

(E 1 40

30 SC:

GR:

20 CM:

I0

I I I I I

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 6.1. Artillery: Progressive degradation ot effectiveness--

duty positions.

(XO = Executive Officer, SC = Howitzer Section Chief,

GR = 155 mm Gunner, CM = 155 Crew Member)

376

-r -
anid Gu line i. Pel'solns ill tiese til'te duty posi1ions atrt '.uii lo P i Iform critical tasks which p)oSSS heavy &'oC ritivt and p,- ic,)T ual Loucinlt.

In contrast, the crew me mbers prtfitOll many physita lasks that ult

usually well pr'acticed, routili, and lot it elhecti\elv involvitig. A, --

coI'dingl, theil' PecfoimanIe xill be deg'iad'd only nominally. V.'iu'.

6. 2 depicts projected overall p)rfoimOalht efi' t'i\ vn Us a funcltioll o

mission duriation for an individual 155mm S1) Aritillery cce. aid f'r a

Batter'N. The gr'aph illustil'aes that tht twvo degrade at about the samt,

'atc. Figur-e 6.3 contrasts Bauttr" Cffec'tiveness over' mission days foa'

the best! and tile "worst" conditions of impactini d,,bilituatin factol's.

Projected effectiveness is also infhten'ed by the, nunmb,-r o: individuals and the number of 155mm SP piees available. Whih a 15,5mm

Artillery Battery normally consists of six howitze is, a considr'l'ably deia-aded condition of only three howit,.:ers was assumed fo' calt ulation of

the effectiveness values shown in Trables 6. 1 and 6. 2. tinc, tht, scenario

(Chapter 11) assumed 6 to 1 odds, this seemed to be a realistic premise.

However, each piece %%as assumed to have a complete crew c-onsistin. of

a Section Chief, a Gunner, and three c ilex members.

Table (.1

Fffectiveness (E) of Artillery: Duty Positions, Individual Crew,

and Battery with Different Demand Levels and Over Mission Days

Position Artillery

DEMAND DAYS XO SC GR CM Howitzer Battery

1 96 93 92 100 95 97

LO 3 88 82 79 100 87 92

5 81 71 68 100 79 87

1 76 82 78 95 86 85

MED 3 44 55 47 86 63 61

5 25 37 29 77 47 44

1 69 78 77 94 84 81

HI 3 33 47 46 82 59 53

5 16 28 28 72 42 35

1 80 84 82 96 88 88

AVERAGE 3 50 60 56 89 69 67

L,M,H 5 32 42 38 82 53 51

377

'4 _ _ "_" " _

...-- - 'i: - _ __ _ _ - __ _ _ ~ . .....
io

90

so

70

60

50

EFFECTIVEDIESS

(E) 40V 155 mm ARTILLERY

30 PIECE

BATTERY A20O

10

_ I II I 1 I

0 24 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 6.2. Artillery: Progressivc degradation of effectiveness--

pieces and batteries with all adverse factors present.

378
100

90-

80

70

60!

50

EFIFECTIVENESS ARTILLERY CONDITIONS

(E) 40FBET

30 - WORST: ~

20

10

024 48 72 96 120

MISSION HOURS

Figure 6. 3. Artillery: Effectiveness of batteries

under best and worst conditions.

379
Table G. 2

E'ffect ivf ncs (E) of Artillciv: Duty Positions, P3ic'ces, atid

Batteries Under All Combinations of Adv.rse- Conditions

Impacting

Debilitating Factors Duty Position Artillery

F L S D Xo Sc GR CM Piece Battery

24 0 0 0 94 97 93 99 97 96

24 0 0 1 92 94 91 99 95 95

24 0 1 0 88 93 92 98 95 93

24 1 0 0 88 90 85 98 91 92

24 0 1 1 86 91 90 98 93 92

24 1 0 1 86 87 83 98 90 91

24 1 1 0 82 86 84 96 89 89

24 1 1 1 80 84 82 96 88 38

48 0 0 0 75 81 76 95 35 84

48 0 0 1 73 79 75 95 84 83

48 0 1 0 70 78 76 94 84 81

48 1 0 0 70 75 70 94 80 81

48 0 1 1 68 76 74 94 82 80

48 1 0 1 68 73 69 94 79 79

48 1 1 0 65 73 70 93 79 78

48 1 1 1 63 71 68 93 78 76

72 0 0 0 59 68 63 92 75 73

72 0 0 1 58 67 62 92 74 72

72 0 1 0 55 66 63 91 74 71

72 1 0 0 55 64 58 91 71 70

72 0 1 1 54 65 61 91 73 70

72 1 0 1 54 64 57 91 71 69

72 1 1 0 51 62 57 89 70 67

72 1 1 1 50 60 56 89 69 67

96 0 0 0 47 57 52 88 66 64

96 0 0 1 46 56 48 88 64 63

96 0 1 0 44 55 52 87 65 62

96 1 0 0 44 53 48 87 63 61

96 0 1 1 43 54 50 87 64 61

96 1 0 1 43 52 47 87 62 61

96 1 1 0 41 51 47 86 61 59

96 1 1 1 40 50 46 86 61 58

120 0 0 0 38 48 43 85 58 56

120 0 0 1 37 47 42 85 58 56

120 0 1 0 35 46 42 84 57 54

120 1 0 0 35 44 39 84 55 54

120 0 i 1 34 45 42 84 57 53

120 1 0 1 34 43 38 84 54 53

120 1 1 0 33 43 39 82 54 52

120 1 1 1 32 42 38 82 53 51

380
Tabl 6I . 1 pr -c.e s lh pioje;ci t , ffI''ivs.- s t' e :\i tilII.v

duty position, all ilidividual 1o\\ itil' ( .\\ , and tht h Batte iv fo i differ inw

levels of cd Inumid and lission davss. The d.munds 'onsici,d in the table

ale to,,, mediu m and hi1h hev elS of Battk' Iv acliv-itV, \\id, vauiatioll in

pe rfoi'mant .-. ffct:tivelncss e ( all be texpt ctetd for diffe-l't.nt leve[Ls of dt'I nalid,

mission da\s, dAlud dul y positions. Best anld \%or"st pe u'forlan , is fortc ast

to rangf bt. wee-n v e 'v effeitive (i. e. , 100) and grossly inI effectiv. (i. '.

16) as a funtionl of differ'ent conditions.

Table 6. 2 presents the forecast effectiveness by A'till.ly Duty

Position, individual Hlowitzer crew, and Battery as a function of all colnbinations of impacting adverse factors over five ciays (120 hours) of continuous oper'ations. In Table 6. 2, impacting factors are coded as follows:

' = Fatigue level in days (1-5); L = Light level: 1 = dark and 0 = light;

S = Stress: 1 =str-ess present and 0 = stress absent; ) = Diurnal Phythm:

1 = rhythm out of phase and 0 = r'hythm in phase. For the 155amm Artillery,

rather than by platoon actions, differentiation is in ter-ms of the level of

demand on the firing Battery: Low = Battery firing in support of a unit pre -

paring a defensive position; Medium = Battery firing in support of a unit

under attack; Heavy = Battery and supported unit are under attack (counter'

battery fire). The projections suggest that here, as for other types of

units, fatigue (sleep loss over mission days) is more important in degrading

performance over five days than any of the other factors.

Here, again, values of E (the effectiveness index) in Table 6. 2

represent all possible degrees or combinations in the impact of the debilitating factors on performance. The least degradation occurs with the

24, 0, 0, 0 combination of debilitating factors, a:.d the greatest degradation with 120, 1, 1, 1. Intermediate conditions lie between these extremes. The E values shown in Table 6. 2 represent the indicated hour,

i. e., the last hour of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth days of

continuous combat operations.

Table 6. 3 presents the projected effectiveness (E) for critical

combat tasks characteristically performed by the several duty positions

in a firing 155mm Battery. Successive parts of Table 6. 3 present projected values of E for tasks per'ormed by the Battery Executive Officer

(XO), Howitzer Section Chief (How SC), 155mm Gunner (GR), and 155mm

Crew Member (CM). Values of E are tabled for three degrees of demand:

(1) the Battery is firing in support of a unit under attack (Medium), (2)

the Battery is firing in support of a unit preparing a defensive position

(Low), and (3) the Battery as well as supporting the unit being under attack, the

Battery is forced to displace to avoid the effects of counter battery fire

(Heavy). Also, the average across the three levels of demand is shown.

In each case, values are given for the (last hour of) first, second, third,

fourth and fifth day of continuous combat operations.

) 381

I __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- w : - -a~~-
Cd 00 b .

.0 0 ~.~~C

00

C) 4

r- r

.0 C 0 

Cd 0 ~ 0Cd M

Cd 4 £ Ci] .

0i C) C) CpC 4 D Lnd D' -C) " nD - C)' C 

Cd C) 0 0 C)0 0rrl 00 r,.-&f 'D. 'nO t) m 00 r- r- C), £

-44 CJ~- 00'~ .4:T Ln r- 't r4 -T 0

0 000 f 0 ~-0~ rn-a u)~n- C)--C 00 0 00 rn '0C 0 r'.4f -

di C . *.-.Ci2

-. C)aC 00r--~ r- I T r I 1 nC 0.'0(1--* I'-)DLf

0 )i Cd ~ ~ 4zC]a~.-'C ~ ~ L' ~ f 44~~' ~ ~ c 01~ 

0 .T
r- 0000 D :)0 ~c n :co CD .-- T NC11 G U

--rfl t C 0C14 C r- tf) 0CDrn r-Lf 0C)c' C "Ar- r- ON 00 r, Ln Lf , ,Tr)C4 nC'- r cn cq4

-r) .0 cc "- or~o ' - o o C - 00 1-1) -c- -4 r--o-, r-r-) r co cN* C1 r--um 1 )ZCn C

0. -4

F- C ) D )C) CDC 00)C0000 -- r-0

* C4 C)l Ln Mo o l 0qc 00 00 cc-) r- 'j0:)C)-( 0000 L T r 00000 nc ~:(4 ' G-4cr----\ , O'a'c cc

N 0 -'r 00 0 r - 0 n- 0 e'4 -. tcO. 11 0 ) M z'4,t- Hr 0' 0 r o o 00000C4- ) .C~c "-r U r- ,IrnC'4

-4-4 -4 -

C) C-u-r- C) 4 a )C)0C .C 1 - 0 r r c N

Q)

c383
rC) Le) l CIA CJ ) Lr fn! () co 00 C) 0 C n n 00 00 C3 0 - GN L'I r

(1 C c 14 C) f C~Cl) o (C0 ()Cl) 00 00 C r- M r r--

o O r- o-- Lr j -L) CA(I -L nOiC i r r -

0') 00 000r - 0 LlL) T 0 O ,L 0 LrO)f c-J 00r L Tr

M 0 4 -0 l-4 -4 -r t r f C4 r n c 1 -4 r ) :-c

'ci 00000m C C C 0 -O- 0 0 r-c~' LC4C'JN 0 , -4C'.J

o o C14- 00 00 r 0 r-' - - 7N 0 ' crm c e' c ~ 'D 0 r0 C1 (1cor t- \ -- 0 T n0 - -:C)ci c 0L) c

-' C)C DC Dzr- MC 1 )C4 CN01- %

0 / C, ~ - -1u) L O r-o M 0 r- a -)0 o .o oll Dr .r-'. 0 "\ o t )C-'4 r- '.o IT(11cla 00 o Ll .7 n

00 O-4 Lrl c 0- 00r- o 0 - 00 r-o M l o 00

LO C14 ton 00 for- -tCl!) cq fl I T mC4 00toV) -

C14 C 4 -4C -4 Lr o -0 -a 0 0r 0I o0

0' 0000 C DCDC 0r- )I r, ' L('Ir 71 0 10

C). - 00 i C 0 - - r DC cAr r-.~ C)C:)m 0'J-O Z , C rn

m- 'o r- r-'.1 ,0 LfjC14.4 T D :Tc'jCN J r TmC

md 0 C) -t C)r' C)C ~? n nC4M ' r f v D C) rtf"c 

---4 i

00 C' ~ - ~ 0edC' ~ - 1 -f C4C4r -O 002 0r Y

CY o r- r-% -02MCN - -L n " - -% Z

384
-. ) DClC CD0O Co I-4 0P-V\ cn O 1 -IT 14 OCr L' NQ- r

r- C 0000 )C )C)0 Cor)r r Nl~ -,:T CYCo0T "

4O 0 C000C 0 3 000 N00 0 0,00 00 O l

- D 0000C C C 0 )0 0 0 r- r o 0,0,O c ca-o

-- 4 4-.4 ~ -4 - 4 - - 4-4 -- 44- -

-. T C) 0000 CD C) C) 0 - r T 0 \. n.r O 0 n

-j 00000 C ) N-T0 -~~f4- Ln c T0 r N: )L

-4 -4 -4 -

C'J C 000 C C CDo041C 4 J-,T 0.0 - .trL)CN 0r, l C- C 000C) 0 O CDr-hD'fl C mor- r- (7%m C 01\00r- ---A 4 -A - -4 -

-Z 0000 cC c 0000 -- ' ,t 0 OLDrt~ r D nI a 0 C D

-. -4 -- 4-4 -4 - - 14 ----

--- -4-4 0 0 4- 0 A - -- -- 4~r- 1-4. c~o- f -

-4 -4 4-4 -4 -4 -4 -4 "A 4- 4 -4 -4 -- 4 -4 -4--1

en C 0000 0000C C D )0 0 0 C00 0CD0DC00DC ~-4 -4 .4 -4 -4 1-4 'A 4 -4 '-4 -4 -t -4 - -4-4 _-4

-d 4 -- -,t -4-. 4 (n L4.4 44-- C4c)Iu -4 -4 l-z4-4

~O 00 00 0 000 0000 0000

CO 00 00 0 000 0000 0000

0 a)

385
Here, as for other types of units, the variabilit v of effectiveness

degradation across tasks and level of demand is noted. While some tasks

ar projected to be degraded only nominally over five days (120 hours) of

continuous operations, others are forecast to be very quickly degraded to

unacceptable levels. Examples of tasks degraded only nominally include

Task No. 35 "laying communications wire to ['DC, " Task No. 38 "ernplain,

rkcovering aiming posts, " and Task No. 44 "fuzing the projectile. " Any one

of the three CMs can perform these tasks. Examples of tasks projected to

degrade to an unacceptable level of performance include Task No. 9 "laying

the weapon, and Task No. 16 "determining piece to crest range. " These

perceptually and cognitively loaded tasks are no rmally performed bY the

flow SC.

Table 6. 4 summarizes the impacts of the debilitating factors on

the critical abilities of 155mm Artillery personnel relevant to the performance of their critical tasks. The table heading shows the abilities

(see taxonomy in Chapter 1) needed for task performance and the debilitating factors (see Chapter 1) impacting on these abilities. The body of

the table shows the impact. That is, the absence of an entry may be due

to the fact that: (a) the task in question is not critical with the given level

of demand, (b) the ability in question is not critical for the given task, or

(c) the ability in question is not depressed in this task at the given level

of demand. Where there is an entry on the table "L" denotes a significant

(greater than 20%) depression of the ability with "Low" demand, "M" denotes the same for "Medium" demand, and "H" for "Heavy" demand.

As well as a descriptive summary of adversely affected critical

abilities in critical tasks Table 6. 4 serves as a cross index. The following information can be obtained from the cross index:

a. critical tasks performed by various duty positions

b. source(s) of adverse impacts on critical abilities

c. adversely affected (depressed) critical abilities

in critical tasks

d. adversely affected tasks at each demand level

e. combinations of the above

386

41.__ __
Table 6. 4

Artillery: Summary of Significant Depressions of Critical Abilities

D IUR1NAL FATIGUE RYT124 LIGHT LEVEL STRESS

TASK

,to__. V H 1F R PS 0 N K V _ P 3 5 . PS

1 L'IH H 2 SI MR LIR SI SI H

3 MlR h'il H

4 114H KH M H 11H SIR .IH 11H 5 H MH

6 H n H H

7 H

8 MH

9 !, MI Mn S LMH

10 H .IR LMII L.R I

1 MR H LIMR

12 H

13 H

14 H 15 LL.RM LIR 4I

16 .1H LMH SI LM M R MR

17 mR H HR MR

Is MH MH MH LR

19 .MH SIR

20 HH MH MH LI

21 SI MH

22 LuRH IRH

23 LMIH MH SI

24 LI SIR

25 SI LKHR

26 \fiR MR SIR

2 7 SMI MIR

28 MIR LKH SI

29 H SH

30 S S LMH LMUi

31 LSIR LMH

32 MR LSIR LR SI

33 SI L2I LR MH

34 MR MR MR L'R MR

35

36

37

38

39

40 SH SI1

41 H

42 MR 43 HH Sk

44

43 H

46

47 MR

48 SI R MR

387
Digest of Critical Task and Their Performance

Suc cc(ding po rtions of this c1hap)lk'e pe ,ls ;t Ui. detaied sUPoinmail' o

how.x tIe( conditions associated \%ith continuous oprations ave, all' tipat,,d

io aff et the pceifoitnance Of eatch Of the 48 critical tasks of the 1355mm

SP Batt,,iy personnel. An example of one deviation of task ci'itic-alit v is

full, dcse .ibd in an car'iu report, eltitled, Background a)ta, Vol. 11I

Human Pe ifo'man,(! in Continuous Operations (;uidelines. Lie c' he pci -

formance of each critical task is e-valuatcd in ter'ms of the. abilities 'c -

quired for task p-rformance. lo ' C-xamplc, the: Battery Ix..utiv, Offic.,r"s

Task No. 1 layin, the Battery wlen it ocupic.s a fiing position, i ',! ilI'.s

Vision, Memory, Orientation and Numi'ical t'actiliY. The citical abilities

are affected by I-'atiauc, Diur-nal Idhythl, Darkness, and Strss.

The relationships among critical abilities and the. stricssol's 01 contilluous operations are presented in Clhapter Ill On the \Iehani/,d lnfantiv.

The various discussions of the effects of stressors on )erf,orml1lance, [)'esented in Chaptei' III apply equally to the Artillery.

The task digests which follow provide a c ompendium of information

pertaining to each of the identified critical tasks. Each digest provides the

basic- identifying information: Task No. , the Duty Position which normally

carries out this task, and the task title. Next, the critic-al abilities required

for task performance are listed together with the adverse debilitating factors

impacting upon and depressing the abilities. Also, listed are Task Nos.

under which impacts of debilitating factors on abilities are discussed. These

Task Nos. refet to the tasks of the Mechanized Infantry (see Chapter 111).

388
Table 6.5

Artillery: index of Discussions of Effects

of Debilitating t.'actocs or. C(riti .a Abiti;i,-.

Debilitating Critical Discussed Under Mechanized

Factor Ability Infantry Task No. (Ch. 111)

Vision 1, 30, 33

Hearing 19, 33

Fatigue Numerical Facility 57, 66, 68

Reasoning 57, 66, 68, 74

Perceptual Speed 29, 30, 57

Orientation 7. 29, 33

Diurnal Numerical Facility 11, 57, 61

Rhythm Reasoning 1i, 57, 61

Vision 9, 26, 44, 72

Light Hearing 22, 33

Level Dynamic Precision 18, 20

Orientation 7

Memory 56, 69

Reasoning 45, 53, 54, 74

Stress Perceptual Speed 2, 6

Communication 48

NOTES: 1. Task Nos. in body of table refer to task digests

appearing in Chapter III.

2. Discussion in task digests are relevant to Armor,

Artillery and FIST where common abilities are required.

389

4rr---t-~.---~------____
CRITICAL TASK 1

Position: Battery Executive Officer

Task: Super vise Battery \Vhen it Occupies a Firing Plosition

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Communication Stress 48

390

2 At_
CRITICAL TASK 2

Position: Battery Executive Officer

Task: Lay the Battery When it Occupies a Firing Position

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, ;6, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

391

7 . -
CRITICAL TASK 3

Position: Battery Executive Officer

Task: Measure and Renort Directions

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

I.ighL I.evel/Visibility 7

Communication 'tress 48

392 1
CRITICAL TASK 4

Position: Battery Executive Officer

Task: Control Fires of the Battery

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, (it

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Communication Stress 48

393

4t - :
CRITICAL TASK 5

Position: Battery Executive Officer

Task: Insure Sections Store, Segregate and Protect Ammunition

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibilitv 9, 26, 44, 72 1

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

394 1
CRITICAL TASK 6

Position: Battery Executive Officer

Task: Insure Ammunition is Distributed in Accordance with Anticipated

Needs of FDC

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Memory Stress 56, 69

395
CRITICAL TASK 7

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Insure Weapon is Properly Emplaced

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

396
CRITICAL TASK 8

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Insure Weapon is Ready for Action

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Reasoning Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

397

r I
CRITICAL TASK 9

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Lay the Weapon

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 6 6, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

light leve I/Visibility 7

398

-7 -p ... ...-- w 4 - --- ---.- ...... . . .. ..... - ... .. ....----- 
CRITICAL TASK 10

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Select Aiming Points .or Gunner

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Vision light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

399

a J
CRITICAL TASK 11

Position -Howvitzer .Section Chief

Task: i,"o th C'.

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision I -, iL',e 1, 30, 3

IiLht Ievel/ %Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Nurnerical 'acilitY l)iu,'nILl Phythml 11, 57, 6

400

-} -
CRITICAL TASK 12

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Order When to Boresiglit

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor (s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Stress 45, 5:, 5~4, -i4

401
CRITICAL TASK 13

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Order Azimuths MaIrked

REQUIRED ABILITIES

T!e performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

402

: i.
CRITICAL TASK 14

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Order the Prefire Checks Performed

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Communication Stress 48

403

: i

"4? ._ _ _r_.. _ __t _._ _ . ..... .
CRITICAL TASK 15

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Measure and Report Site to the Crest

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Communication Stress 48

404

• . . . r ... ,Jw ' 2-- - .

.+ T,,,i/, ' . . .- +. . .
CRITICAL TASK ,

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Determine Piece to Crest Range

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, :30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Nurnerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

405
CRITICAL TASK 17

Position: Howitzer Section Chief

Task: Supervise Section during Firing

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 66, 68, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/ Visibility 7

Communication Stress 48

406

4? __ __ __._ _ _.
CRITICAL TASK 18

Position: Gunner

Task: Lay Cannon on Initial Direction of Fire with Aiming Circle

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critica! Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

407
CRITICAL TASK 19

Position: Gunner,

Task: Lay Cannon on Initial Direction of Fire with Compass

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

408

" p "J - ." " -
CRITICAL TASK 20

Position: Gunner

Task: Lay Cannon in Initial Direction of Fire with Distant Aiming P1oint

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Lev-1/Visibility 9, 2 6, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

409

.r. ' ..
CRITICAL TASK 21

Position: Gunner

Task: Lay Cannon on Initial Direction of Fire by Reciprocal Lay of Another

Cannon

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

4V

410

* _ _ d
CRITICAL TASK 22

Position: Gunner

Task: Verify Direction of Fire with Reciprocal Check as Control Piece

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

411

11 ~ 4 ' .. . ...
CRITICAL TASK 23

Position: Gunne r

Task: Verify Direction of Fire with Reciprocal Check as Ad jacen, I iee

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Vision Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

412

or------~
CRITICAL TASK 24

Position: ( unner'

Task: Verify Direction of Fire with Reciprocal Check Using Lighting Device

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

tactors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

413
CRITICAL TASK 25

Position: Gunner

Task: Boresight the Pano arnic Telescone with the IAO Aliginrent l)e\Ace

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

t'actors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/ Visibility 7

414
CRITICAL TASK 21i

Position: Gunner

Task: Boresight the Panoramic Teleseo)e with a Distant Aiming Point

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light Level/Visibility 7

415
CRITICAL TASK 27

Position: Gunner

Task: Boresight the Panoramic Telescope with the Collimat'

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

,ight Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

416
CRITICAL TASK 28

Position: Gunner

Task: Boresight the lannr ia inic Telescope Us.in th, "'e . ino 1' ,

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Orientation Light I.evel/Visibility 7

417

_______________I
CRITICAL TASK 29

Position: Gunner

Task: Set/Lay Cannon for Deflection

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

A 418
CRITICAL TASK 30

Position: Gunner

Task: Refer the Piece

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Fatigue 1, 30, 33

Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

419
CRITICAL TASK :31

Position: Gunner

Task: Orient with a Compass

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light ILevel/Visibility 7

420
CRITICAL TASK 32

Position: Gunner

Task: Orient a Map by Terrain Association

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

421 41 _ _ _

-t - .. -. , _ -;w -, _. -- i. - _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ _
CRITICAL TASK 33

Position: Gunner

Task: Determine Present Location by Terrain Association

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/ Visibility 7

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Memory Stress 56, 69

422
CRITICAL TASK 34

Position: Gunner

Task: Locate a Point on a Map Using the Military Grid Reference System

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are af..eted by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Numerical Facility Fatigue 57, 66, 68

Diurnal Rhythm 11, 57, 61

Orientation Fatigue 7, 29, 33

Light Level/Visibility 7

Memory Stress 56, 69

423

r ' - - - _
CRITICAL TASK 35

Position: Crew Merber

Task: L.ay Communication Wire to FDC

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memorv Non,

Orientation None

1'casoning None

Vision None

424

A
CRITICAL TASK 36

Position: Crew Member

Task: Connect Wire to Telepost Terminal on Vehicle

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous comnat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory None

425
CRITICAL TASK 37

Position: Crew Member

Task: Emplace/Recover Collimator

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation None

Reasoning None

426
CRITICAL TASK :38

Position: Crew Member

Task: Emiplace/Recover Aiming Posts

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Orientation None

Reasoning None

427

__ __._____
CRITICAL TASK :39

Position: Crew Meinber

Task: tore AmrnLinition at a Cannon Position

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Perceptual Spe)d Non"

Numerical Facility Nonie

428

p . . . .,tl: Z - -
CRITICAL TASK 40

Position: Crew \lember

Task: Monitor and Relav Fire Commands

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Hearing Fatigue 19, 33

Communication Stress 48

429
CRITICAL TASK 41

Position: Crew \Member

Task: Plrepare Ammunition fol. Firing

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

430

-. - q - -r -.......... _ -.-.-- ___ _ ',--.___ 
CRITICAL TASK 42

Position: (Crw \lemhe i

Task: tR(cngtlizfP .\!I-flunition 'ypes by Color Coding

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The perf'ormance of' this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 26, 44, 72

J431
CRITICAL TASK 43

Position: Crew Metnber

Task: Identify Fi.zes and FLuze \Vrenches by Type

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

Perceptual Speed Stress 2, 6

432 .4f _______________________
CRITICAL TASK 44

Position: Crew Member

Task: Fuze the Projectile

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Mei-nory None

Numerical Facility None

Perceptual Speed None

Vision None

4 M 3

i" ,- "-"- - -
CRITICAL TASK 45

Position: Crew Member

Task: Set the Fuze Using the P)roper Fuze Setter

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

434
CRITICAL TASK 46

Position: Crew Member

Task: Prepare Propellant Charge

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Memory None

Numerical Facility None

• 435

a p -
CRITICAL TASK 47

Position: Crew Member

Task: Set/Lay Cannon for Quadrant with the Range Quadrant

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Vision Light Level/Visibility 9, 26, 44, 72

436
CRITICAL TASK 48

Position: Crew Member

Task: Operate MIOPAl Howitzer Under Unusual Conditions

REQUIRED ABILITIES

The performance of this task requires abilities which are affected by adverse

factors associated with continuous combat operations.

Critical Abilities Adverse Factor(s) Discussed with Task No.

Reasoning Fatigue 57, 6 6, 68, 74

Stress 45, 53, 54, 74

Memory Stress 56, 6 9

t 437
4M~GDMG PG BLAW. - uor F1 IAD~

(HAI\'TER VII

RHSTRUC TURING OF t EStPONSIBILITIF-1S

The potential of restructured task responsibilities

for counteracting performance degradation is explored. Projected effects of task reallocations, task sharing, and redundant (parallel) task performance are presented. Reallocation is found to be least promising and parallel task performance to be most promising.

One of the potential means for counte racting the cumulative and 'ggregate (ffe( ts of debilitating factors on a military urit during continuous operations is to consider a restructuring of tresponsibilities. Such a restructuring

does not mean a reorganization of lines of responsibility as specified by TOE.

Rather, it refers to a rearrangement--a partial er full reallocation of certain

critical task responsibilities so as potentially to improve overall performance

effectiveness - -pe rhaps only after extreme performance deterioration has

begun. Restructuring can involve any one or all of these possiblities:

1. Interchanging or delegating. A critical task

normally performed by an individual in duty

position A is shifted to or delegated to another individual in duty position B.

2. Paralleling. All of the component activities

of certain critical tasks normally performed

by an individual in duty position A alone are also

performed by another individual in duty position B.

3. Sharing. Some of the component activities of

some critical task that is normally performed

by an individual in duty position A alone are

shifted or delegated to another individual in

duty position B.

Assumption

Before considering the potential benefits of a restructuring of responsibilities, some restrictions must be placed on the realistic alternatives. First,

it was assumed that tasks and component task activities will not be reallocated

across organizational boundaries. To some extent, these boundaries will be

determined by the duty position in question. For example, one FO within a

FIST team may exchange tasks with another FO of the same FIST team, but not

439

A . ----
with an ['0 of another FIST team. Similarly, a SL. of an infantry pltooi 1nv

interchange tasks with another SL in the same Platoon. However, the P1.

might interchange tasks with another PLI (of a different Platoon) in the same

Company (though not of a different Company), and so forth.

A second assumed restriction was that tasks and component task activities may be reallocated either to a coordinate position or a subordinate

position, but not to a supraordinate position. That is, a SL tasks might he

shifted to another SL or, for example, to some MFTM of his Platoon.

A third assumed set of restrictions on realistic possibilities for task

reallocation derives from several considerations. Certain line -of-command

responsibilities--especially those related to decision making--cannot be delegated. Certain items of equipment (e.g., a .50 Cal MG) are specifically "vested" in a duty position and have multiple uses. Thus, for example, the

G1 CTL cannot relinquish use of the . 50 cal MG to someone else while still

performing other tasks that also require the use of the MG. A given duty position may carry with it some unique knowledge and/or skill with irespect to

some task. Some tasks may be of a type that involves very rapid processing

of incoming information so as to react promptly, or the information must be

rapidly related to a complex of other information items which is maintained

"within a single head."

Method

All identified critical tasks were reviewed by an experienced military

advisor and rated as to their potential for interchanging, paralleling, and for

sharing according to the above outline criteria. In arriving at these judgments

every effort was made to set aside all other preconceptions about the possibilities of potential reallocations.

Approaches to Estimating Effects of Restructuring

In order to evaluate the effects of any sort of restructuring of task

responsibilities, it is necessary to have some effectiveness indicator. Such

an indicator exists in the form of the effectiveness index E and the E-scale.

An average value of E, (E), expresses the remaining performance capability

or effectiveness of (the incumbent of) the duty position under the worst expected

conditions at approximately the forty-eighth hour of continuous operations. To

assess the effects (benefits or impairment) of a reallocation, the consequent

change in the value of E was examined.

Within such an approach, no increase or decrease in the overall amount

of work done is involved. The total number of tasks that is expected to be performed by a given (incumbent of) duty position in--say--a 24 hour period remains constant. Only a redistribution of types of tasks is involved. If the redistribution increases the proportion of tasks that are highly vulnerable to

440
degradation or the sum total of task vulnerability1 F will deccease; in the

reverse redistribution E will increase. It is the net shift in task vulnerability that counts.

Task Interchange/Reallocations

Tables 7. 1 througlh 7. 4 i)resent the projected changes in perfrormance

effectiveness that would occur if selected tasks or groups of tasks were reallocated. The reference value of E that is shown in each case is the average

across platoon actions for the indicated cuty nosition. Projected comparison

values are also averages across platoon actions.

Mechanized Infantry

Four types of duty positions are considered. They are respectively

G/CTI. (Tasks 1-17), MTM (Tasks 18- 32), SL (Tasks 33-49), and PL (Tasks

50- 76). These duty positions, which are synonymous with their task sets,

are presented below successively. In each case various realistic reallocation

possibilities in seemingly meaningful combinations are examined.

Tank Platoon

Though five types of dL.,y positions were identified, only four entered

into consideration here: TK PL (Tasks 1 - 26), TK CDR (Tasks 27-41), T

GR (Tasks 42 - 46), TK LDR (Tasks 47 - 58). The Tank Driver is not considered here, because no critical tasks were identified for that duty position. Again, various realistic reallocation possibilities in some seemingly coherent

groupings are presented. None were projected for rK GR and TK LDR, because: (a) for both the initial task set is quite small, and (b) values of E for

the tasks they perform are uniformly high with little chance of improvement.

FIST

Four types of duty positions are considered: FIST Chief (Tasks 1 - 29),

FO (Tasks 30- 56), FS NCO (Tasks 57 and 58), and PTO (Task 59). The paucity

of critical tasks for the FS NCO and the RTO must be interpreted in the light of

their funtioning as Assistant Chief and Assistant FO respectively. When they

function as Chief and FO, their effectiveness will be essentially that shown for

these positions.

Artillery

The type of artillery unit under consideration here is a battery, and,

more specifically, a 155mm SP gun crew. Four types of duty positions are

considered: BTRY XO - Battery Executive Officer (Tasks 1 - 6), How SC -

Howitzer Section Chief (Tasks 7-17), GR -Gunner (Tasks 18- 34), and--

without detailed distinction- -CM -Crew Member (Tasks 35 - 48).

441
Table 7. 1

\Iek:hanized Infantry: Effectiveness (F) with Fask Reallnuat iol.j

Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (1-17) .62

Eliminations

Four Most Vulnerable Tasks (1, 6, 11, 14) .72

Firing Tasks (1, 3, 14, 16) .65

Overwatching Tasks (2, 4) .62

Knowledge of Squad's Location (7) .62

Detecting Enemy (9) .63

Disengagement Tasks (13, 15) .61

All Combinations (1-4, 7, 9, 13-16) .64

Additions

Observing Terrain (33) .63

Preparing Range Cards (36) .61

Establishing Routes to Subsequent Position (37) .62

Supervising Obstacle/Camouflage Construction (38) .64

Adjusting Firing as Necessary (39) .57

Making New Range Cards as Needed (42) .61

ALL (33, 36-39, 42) .57

Carrier/Maneuver Team Member

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (18-32) .74

Eliminations

Three Most Vulnerable Tasks (19, 20, 25) .79

Weapons Condition Task (18) .74

Target Acquisition Task (19) .76

Firing Tasks (20, 26, 30, 32) .76

Orienting/Locating/Moving-Spatial Reference (21-25, 29, 31) .72

ALL-except Task 27 1.00

Additions

Firing from Bounding Vehicle (1) .72

Overwatching Bounding Vehicle (2) .73

Firing to Protect Bounding Vehicle (3) .74

Overwatching Dismount (4) .75

Firing CAL 50 MG at Areas (5) .76

Detecting Enemy Movement (9) .73

Covering Disengaging Squads (14) .73

Firing to Protect Regrouping (16) .74

ALL (1-5, 9, 14, 16) .72

442

'r. -r . . ... ..
Table 7. 1 (Cont.

Squad Leader

E

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (33-49) .44

Eliminations

Three Most Vulnerable Tasks (39, 41, 44) .59

Observe Terrain/Establish Communications (33, 34) .41

Additions

Knowledge of Squad Location (7) .45

Repositioning to Allow Other SWs to Fire (13) .45

Maintaining Concealed Disengagement (15) .46

Conducting Reconnaissance (50) .45

Checking Accuracy of Terrain Maps (51) .45

Deciding to Engage Unexpected Fire or Not (53) .45

Directing Mounted Defense (54) .43

Communicating with OPs (55) .46

Requesting Possible Support Fire Requirements (56) .43

Selecting Positions (57) .44

Communicating with Company, etc. (65) .46

Directing Protective Fire for Move to Assembly (71) .45

Calling Indirect Fire Required for Disengagement (75) .46

ALL (7, 13, 15, 50, 51, 53-55, 57, 65, 71, 75)

Platoon Leader

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (50-76) .61

Eliminations

Five Most Vulnerable Tasks (54, 56, 57, 68, 69) .71

Checking Accuracy of Terrain Maps (51) .61

Communication Tasks (55, 62, 65) .58

Fire Direction/Support Tasks (56, 71, 75) .62

ALL (51, 55, 56, 62, 71, 75) .67

Additions

None

443 t -- .P -~-.----~ - ---- _____
Tank Platoon LeaCer

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (1-26)

Eliminations

Two Most Vulnerable Tasks (14, 24) .

Fire Planning & Control Tasks (1, 2, 12-21, 24) .75

Locating/Positioning Tasks (3-6, 22) .77

Command Supervision Tasks (10, 11, 23, 25, 26) .72

Additions

None

Tank Commander

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (27-41) .83

Eliminations

Two Most Vulnerable Tasks (35, 39) .87

Coordinating & Reporting Tasks (27, 28, 31, 32, 41) .79

Fire Planning & Control fasks (29, 30, 35, 36, 37) .82

Fire MG Task (38) .82

Additions

None

Tank Gunner

.E:;Cl;: Original Task Set (42-46) .93

inatt n

Tank Loader

Tisk Se- (47-58) .99
l'jtbl. 7. 2

ti%: ti - t - (I-) ;' * ii i' . k I '-j Ilo ( . o I,) .

FIST Chief

E

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (1-29) .56

Eliminations

Four Most Vulnerable Tasks (10, 14, 20, 26) .68

Orienting/Locating Tasks (5, 8, 9) .57

Coordination, etc. (1-4, 27, 29) .52

Command & Control (6, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 28) .53

Adjust Fire Tasks (10, 12, 14-16, 20-26) .79

Additions

None

Forward Observer

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (30-56) .54

Eliminations

Four Most Vulnerable Tasks (45, 48, 50, 54) .63

Coordination/Communications Tasks (30-34, 56) .47

Orienting & Locating Tasks (35, 37-41) .53

Evaluation Tasks (42, 44, 55) .53

Adjust Fires Tasks (43, 45-54) .67

Additions

None

Fire Support NCO

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (57, 58) .95

Eliminations

None

Additions

Adjust Fire Tasks (10, 12, 14-16, 20-26) .43

Coordination, etc. (1-4, 27, 29) .88

Radio Telephone Operator

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (59) .89

Eliminations

None

Additions

Coordination/Communications Tasks (30-34, 56) .87

Evaluption Tasks (42, 44, 55) .68

Adjust Fires Tasks (43, 45, 46-54) .41

445

LW
Tabh' 7. 4

Aitev -t) It i 1rl, Ph l~iu, ati~ a,

Battery Executive Officer

E

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (1-6) .63

Eliminations

Most Vulnerable Task (4) .75

Battery Emplacement Tasks (1-3) .5b

All Combinations (1-4) .81

Additions

None

Howitzer Section Chief

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (7-17) .71

Eliminations

Two Most Vulnerable Tasks (9, 16) .76

Laying, etc., Tasks (9-13) .71

Safety (14-16) .73

All Combinations (9-16) .78

Additions

Battery Emplacement Tasks (1-3) .71

Orienting/Locating Tasks (31-34) .68

Laying/Referring Tasks (18-21, 30) .70

ALL (1, 2, 3, 18-21, 30-34) .68

155mm Gunner

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (18-34) .68

Eliminations

Five Most Vulnerable Tasks (20, 30, 32-34) .66

Laying/Referring Tasks (18, 21, 29, 30) .67

Verifying Tasks (22-24) .67

Boresighting Tasks (25-28) .66

Orienting Tasks (31-34) .70

Additions

Laying, Etc. Tasks (9-13, 47) .69

Safety (14-16) .68

ALL (9-16, 47) .69

-- l-7 ---- - - - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _--
'rable 7.4 (('otn.

155mm Crew Member

REFERENCE: Original Task Set (35-48) .93

Eliminations

Three Most Vulnerable Tasks (40, 43, 48) .98

Use Range Quadrant (47) .93

Ammunition Preparation (41-46) .92

Additions

Laying/Referring Tasks (18-21, 29, 30) .85

Verifying Tasks (22-24) .88

Boresighting Tasks (25-28) .87

Orienting Tasks (31-34) .84

ALL (18-34) .78

447 L i_ ~:-J _ _ _______A
l)iscussion

The prece ring results suggest that a 1cVtisttrib ation Of ( it itic a) tasks

or a partial recon.stitution of duty positions does not provide a xt)Ir!iculau'lv

effective managetment option for Lounte tact ing the debilitaUtive effecTs of oitinuous onerations. The improvements to he obtained in this way, if an.%,

appear quite small.

With respect to Mechanized Infantry, the changes in the overall F

for each duty position that can be induced tend to be in the range of + 5. This

holds within the strict interpretation of realistic reallocation. For examiple,

the value of E for MTMs could be raised as much as 26, but only by confining

activities to a single critical task. Similarly, in the cases o)f the SI. -and PT,

substantial improvements would require extravagant task reallocations.

'[his situation is even more pronounced with respect to Armor. Here,

the physical restrictions imposed by space and location in the tank already _

reduce the number of even remotely possible task reallocations. [he calculated effects for the remaining possibilities were trivial.

In the case of FIST a pronounced improvement (A +21) was indicated,

if the FIST Chief were to be relieved of all obligations to adjust fires. A large

improvement (A F = +13) would occur, also, if the FO were relieved of these

responsibilities. On the other hand, if performance of these tasks was allocated

to the FS NCO or RTO, very substantial decrements were calculated to occur

( A E = -52 and A E = -48 respectively). Accordingly, there appears to be no

net advantage in the potential reshuffle.

With respect to the 155mm gun crew, it is again doubtful whether any

significant advange might be gained through task reallocation. While elimination of the fire control responsibilities from the BTRY XO duties was indicated

to raise his effectiveness ( A E = +12), these responsibilities are also at the

core of the XO's function.

Despite these unpromising projections, task reallocations should be

considered when rested individuals are potentially available for assignment.

Paralleling Task Performance

Table 7. 5 below presents the anticipated changes in E consequent to

paralleling the task performance. Task numbers, as before, correspond to

critical task titles listed in Tables 1.2- 1.5. The first column in each case

lists the original value of E (average across the three types of platoon actions),

the second column lists the expected value (E), and the last column (A +) indicates the amount of incremental change in E as a consequence of the paralleling.

448
Table 7. 5

Parallet Tasik P , 'foi ma ftiy e 'ft.*..

1. Mechanized Infantry

Task Task

No. A+ +Ep No. E +

G/CTL 1 52 77 25 SL 33 72 92 20

2 56 81 25 34 85 98 13

3 76 94 18 35 76 94 18

4 85 98 13 36 45 70 25

7 64 87 23 37 49 74 25

9 53 78 25 38 90 99 9

13 62 86 24 39 13 24 11

14 38 62 24 42 46 71 25

15 81 96 15 - - -

16 67 89 22 PL 50 59 83 24 - - - - 51 73 93 20

MTM 18 77 95 18 53 68 90 22

19 55 80 25 54 28 48 20

20 61 85 24 55 95 100 5

21 68 90 22 56 31 52 21

22 77 95 18 57 45 70 25

23 90 99 9 62 89 99 10

24 77 95 18 65 94 100 6

25 55 80 25 71 69 90 21

26 73 93 20 75 85 98 13

27 100 100 0 - - -

28 82 97 15 - - -

29 81 96 15 - - -

30 69 90 21 - - -

31 90 99 9 - - -

32 72 92 20 - - -

2. Tank Platoon

TK PL 3 60 84 24 - - -

4 64 87 23 - - -

5 68 90 22 - - -

6 60 84 24 - - -

7 68 90 22 - - -

12 bO 96 16 - - -

13 80 96 16 - - -

14 46 71 25 - - -

18 68 90 22 - - - -

24 37 60 23 - - - -

449

] - - - ,___,_,--_____ _
Table 7.5 (Con.)

Task - Task

No. E Ep No. E _p _

TK CDR 30 84 97 13 -. .

33 80 96 16 -. .

35 61 85 24 -. .

40 65 88 23 -. .

TK GR 42 89 99 10 - - -

TK LDR 47 100 100 0 -. .

48 100 100 0 -. .

49 100 100 0 -. .

50 100 100 0 -. .

57 95 100 5 -. .

58 100 100 0 -. .

3. FIST

CHIEF 5 71 92 21 46 69 90 21

6 89 99 10 47 36 59 23

8 65 88 23 48 23 41 18

9 75 94 19 49 53 78 25

10 25 44 19 50 29 50 21

12 73 93 20 51 60 84 24

14 25 44 19 52 76 94 18

15 47 72 25 53 37 60 23

16 41 65 24 54 10 19 9

20 23 41 18 55 82 97 15

21 69 90 21 56 84 97 13

22 31 52 21 - - -

23 60 84 24 - - -

24 76 94 18 - - -

25 37 60 23 - - -

26 10 19 9 - - -

27 82 97 15 - - -

29 85 98 13 - - -

FO 35 48 73 25 - - -

37 65 88 23 - - - -

38 58 82 24 - - -

39 44 69 25 - - -

40 61 85 24 - - -

41 61 85 24 - - -

42 37 60 23 - - -

43 73 93 20 - - -

45 25 44 19 - - -

4501
Table 7.5 (Cont.

4. 155mm Artillery Battery

Task -* Task

No. E mp_+ No. R E___+

XO 1 80 96 16 CM 37 100 100 0

2 61 85 24 38 100 100 0

3 76 94 18 39 100 100 0

5 85 98 13 40 81 96 15

6 76 94 18 41 95 100 5

42 89 99 10

HOW SC 9 49 74 25 43 81 96 1

10 56 81 25 44 100 100 0

11 72 92 20 45 95 100 5

15 56 81 25 46 100 100 0

16 52 77 25 47 89 99 10

48 72 92 20

GR 18 61 85 24 - - - -

19 81 96 15 - - - -

20 55 80 25 - - - -

21 81 96 15 - - - -

22 68 90 22 - - - -

23 68 90 22 - - - -

24 75 94 19 - - - -

25 68 90 22 -. .

26 72 92 20 -. .

27 79 96 17 -. .

28 68 90 22 -. .

29 84 97 13 -. .

30 58 82 24 -. .

31 71 92 21 -. .

32 59 83 24 -. .

33 59 83 24 -.. .

34 55 80 25 -.. .

451

V '-
The Mechanized Infantry duty positions considered wecre G/CI'I., %I IM,

SL, and PL. For Armor, or the TK PILT, the duty positions were l'K ItII,

I'K CDH, TK GR, and "IK LDR. For FIST, there was only the 1.IS1 Chief

and FO. For oreviously stated reasons, the 'S NCO and HT() were not considered. Finally, for Artillery the duty positions under consider'ation were BI'hY

XO, How SC, 155mm GR, and 155mm CM.

Discussion

Not unexpectedly, the predicted benefits of paralleling task performance

proved to be substandtially greater than those for- task reallocation. The meaning of i or E in this case is the effectiveness with which the task will be perf.)rmed. Predicted results agree with the common sense inference that two

neople nerforming the same task, even when exhausted, are more likely to

bring it to a satisfactory conclusion than a single person.

Predicted changes, if any, are uniformly positive (incremental). In

some cases, the increase is as high as 25 o:- one quarter of tihe extent of the

E-scale. The cases in which no improvement is predicted are uniformly those

in which there is no room for improvement, i.e., baseline performance is

100. The maximum of incremental performance is obtained over the midrange of deterioration. With very extreme deterioration the expected improvement appears slignt. The practical feasibility of committing two persons

to a single task, of course, requires a management evaluation.

Sharing Task Performance

Whereas in parallel task performance the given task is performed independently by two people (performance duplication), in task sharing some steps

are carried out by either of two people. Lacking specific information about who

does what, it can be assumed that for any component step of performance there

is a 50/50 chance of rectification or compensation for performance inadequacy.

Table 7. 6 presents the projected effects of shared task performance in

the same tasks considered previously. As before, the first column following

the task number lists the original value of E, the second column the expcted E*

value (Es), and the last column indicates the amount of incremental change

A+) in E as a consequence of shared performance.

Table 7. 6 indicates that sharing the execution of a task also provides

considerable benefit. However, the benefit is less than that for performing the

task in parallel. As before, the improvement tended to be most substantial

over the mid-range of deterioration. Ceiling effects (i.e., little room for imDrovement) restricted benefits at the upper extreme. At the lower extreme,

these benefits may be too insubstantial for practical purposes. Hence, paralleling rather than sharing performance may be advisable.

452

I r
TbLO 7.G

Sha Li tI' a sk s I YIu Inlk ~~ S

1. Mechanized Infantry

Task _ - Task

No. E A+ No. E Es AG/CTL 1 52 67 15 SL 33 72 85 13

2 56 71 15 34 85 94 9

3 76 88 12 35 76 88 12

4 85 94 9 36 45 59 14

7 64 78 14 37 49 64 15

9 53 68 15 38 90 97 7

13 62 77 15 39 13 19 6

14 38 51 13 42 46 60 14

15 81 92 11 - - - -

16 67 81 14 PL 50 59 74 15

51 73 86 13 MTM 18 77 89 12 53 68 82 14

19 55 70 15 54 28 39 11

20 61 76 15 55 95 99 4

21 68 82 14 56 31 43 12

22 77 89 12 57 45 59 14

23 90 97 7 62 89 96 7

24 77 89 14 65 94 99 5

25 55 70 15 71 69 83 14

26 73 86 13 75 85 94 9

27 100 100 0 - - - -

28 82 92 10 - - - - 29 81 92 11 - - - -

30 69 83 14 - - - -

31 90 97 7 - - -

32 72 85 13 - - - -

2. Tank Platoon

TK PL 3 60 75 15 TK CDR 30 84 94 10 4 64 78 14 33 80 91 11

5 68 82 14 35 61 76 15

6 60 75 15 40 65 79 14

7 68 82 14 - - - - 12 80 91 11 TK GR 42 89 96 7

13 80 91 11 - - -

14 46 60 14 TK CDR 47 100 100 0

18 68 82 14 48 100 100 0

24 37 50 13 49 100 100 0

- - - - 50 100 100 0

- 57 95 99 4

- 58 100 100 0

453
Table 7.6 (Cont.)

3. FIST

Task Task

No. E _s__ No. E 

S

CHIEF 5 71 84 13 41 61 76 15

6 89 96 7 42 37 50 13

8 65 79 14 43 73 86 13

9 75 88 13 45 25 35 10

10 25 35 10 46 69 b3 14

12 73 86 13 47 36 49 13

14 25 35 10 48 23 32 

9

15 47 61 14 49 53 61 15

16 41 55 14 50 29 4 11

20 23 32 9 51 60 73 15

21 69 83 14 52 76 88 12

22 31 43 12 53 37 50 13

23 60 75 15 54 10 15 

5

24 76 88 12 55 82 92 10

25 37 50 13 56 84 94 10

26 10 15 5 

-

-

-

-

27 82 92 10 

-

-

-

-

29 85 94 9 

-

-

-

-

FO 35 48 63 15 

-

-

-

-

37 65 79 14 

-

-

-

-

38 58 73 15 

-

-

-

-

39 44 58 14 

-

-

-

-

40 61 76 15 

-

-

-

-

4. 155mm Artillery Battery

XO 1 80 91 11 30 58 73 15

2 61 76 15 31 71 84 13

3 76 88 12 32 59 74 15

5. 85 94 9 33 59 74 15

6 76 88 12 34 55 70 15

HOW SC 9 49 64 15 CM 37 100 100 

0

10 56 71 15 38 100 100 

0

11 72 85 13 39 100 100 

0

15 56 71 15 40 81 92 11

16 52 67 15 '41 95 99 

4

42 89 96 

7

GR 18 61 76 15 43 81 92 11

19 81 92 11 44 100 100 

0

20 55 70 15 45 95 99 

4

21 81 92 11 46 100 100 

0

22 61 82 14 47 89 96 

7

23 68 82 14 48 72 85 13

24 75 88 13 

-

-

-

-

25 68 82 14 

-

-

-

-

26 72 85 13 

-

-

-

-

27 79 90 11 

-

-

-

28 68 82 14 

-

-

-

-

29 84 94 10 

-

-

-

-

454

,L i "-'--- -'r _ _ _ _ __ 
Summary

When the three possibilities of restructuring cluty responsibilities

were compared, it was quite evident that parLAlleling of task performance

should provide the most effective method of restructuring. The improvements, which are thus attainable, demand that a price (duplication of effort) be paid. This price is attenuated, as are benefits, when performance

is merely shared by two persons. Redistribution of responsibilities (task

reallocation) seemed to offer the least promise so long as all duty positions

in question are equally debilitated. If some duty positions were manned withl

rested (undeteriorated) personnel a more substantial benefit would be noted.

However, the relative magnitudes of improvements obtainable via the three

approaches would remain as before.

4

t 455
RMiEM~D1G PG &AM~1 N £C r niV&D1

(t1I "Ftt, VIII

THAINING OPEiRATIONS AND CONDITIONS

This chapter deals with training operations, conditions

and patterns designed to create a performance capability that

is maximally resistant to degradation. Five general training

principles particularly applicable to this purpose are outlined. Specific recommendations are listed and related to

specific critical tasks. Cross training considerations and

recommended priorities are suggested.

Training is perhaps the most effctive of all means for counteracting prospe'tive delgradation of performanct resulting fr'om V continuous operations. Of course, the reuli.:ation of ,he ( ount e,ac' iv- pot eItial is dependent on a preparatory period in adv.a'nce of actual combat

operations. Training is an anticipating :neans Iot coping with pei'o'mance degradation rather than a concurrent manaaement technique. As

well as requiring time, the realization of full training benefits also requires propel trainingy operations cariied out in the pl'ope surounding

onditions.

Overtraining

Overtraining refers to the process of practicing the performance

of a task for beyond its basic mastery until its execution becomes:

(1) rapid

(2) highly reliable

(3) automatic.

The "over" in ovei'training does not imply excessive or unnecessary

f'aining. It implies practice beyond the point of initial mastery.

To appreciate the importance of overtraining or continued practice,

consider the task of operating an automobile. In starting the cat', the

novice must successively think about depressing the clutch, placing the

gear shift lever into neutral, depressing the gas pedal (and how far), engaging the starter, and so forth. By contrast the experienced driver performs all of these operations smoothly in an integral pattern, and without

any cluar or specific awareness of each. Especiatly when tired, tense, or

distracted, the novice will forget one or the other component operation,

or he will perform them in the wrong order.

457
I ia i I I n, It Wd to a iaxi I I In of r:i Ii -1,VIn r-- it) :o nUril'', riji-hteI :v e Utioll, ant(I autonial I, 1\ 0:1) !: loi:Tll T'1- a, :iiev

'lr~a ll 10111 Wr)iithiL factors Q" g, ,1 mng 1 w iI,- in

surrouningi~ situationl.

P~atten illS OPr~actic

Mo re p>!~j' itiori of tau-ik pelfo11i uIe 1.7 10', Ill1 ll lt a g a

that Woi desie beit-f its of ovoitlaiiiing %kxill be obtaineo. I a.k K 1:110:0-

alle iies. heP lid ied unlder all condlitionls under %%hi. ih :h, *,k ni, m

to be peifolIlil. 101r xaiiple, unt~it -iaixvleo IIIo Ii ~ s

imaishy) I :avliiL -10k ptace onl a rifle lnge. Thesr Ondl jul- dir ra......

cilv , rom Thosten iouliteled it, onilbai. Obsixrei 1: naun ,1 w r-n 

bat otid1cit ions :ell fari short of' levels oh orved on thi i ifi, i~i~ an-. Toi -

fH t , ha ng, s ini Ina r ks mnanship t 'iiiing pio.,k' I :i %% '' '' 111r;i1 LiU! :

Ade(]uate perforiumnee by individual soidie !s inislbultiOO due, ni

gualaritue adequate peiiormaricc of a taam assemibLed from O1s" run>,i

sold irs, 6Miiaily, no amnount o! piatice of a task i i soAuloll assU oz,

it's smooth peitorml'c inl too coirnxi of Priecedinlg, paratllel, and Su ed: 0

tasks.

sum"l dlqii* of ot g lll v' ill Lj: e(.4 4,N- a tusk as d to a Ill Ii

de:ee 011 tilcilty. FOI sapl, flily Sports5 aid 1a Isial iristi1 elnts de maill ontiitua p Iactu a. At the same time, Mvieni' prt ti a

Shou Id ( oil(enitiate onl thoc, tasks or aspee (ts ot* lasi, perlol mnal;- Ilham ilax

rot Net been bte-1 d or lealied soffu(-iirtlV.

lsuminnavy:

" Piaete i itical tasks tind er all i ditioil5 ulnde I

%%hili they nay have to be poiformled.

* Practice iiit iral tasks in all of their (on exts.

" D~evote aIpiopiate prop)ortion~s of' available

tuine (oi dit e rent frequencies) to the practih C

ui more aiid less well mastered tasks and /orcomfbinlations of tasks.

S)ifl I sr-fu Triaining Ptlileiptes and Techniques

in -orldu( ting trin ing operations intended to forustall or attemum

[wifol,) man( degrad ation in cont inuous combat operations, the point s

outilliied .I low shoul d be kept in Mid. These i 011 neida tim.)ns 0 ) u)t

rollst itrlte ani exhauistive 11-1 of' trIaining principle s and techniiques5. at

hev to rist itui,-d a [is ting o )l ose consid oei to be most i eerant for I.-

ing to 0111! i act the debilita.ioli a( ompanying continluous oOrfl :.

45
0 Practice In All 1.)cgradtd V'ibihulit\ (Oihr iT j11

The amount and the or garnization (patt ,.isr) of visual inr'Oin aion1

available to the ra'nc witl d iffei' Vith d lffet'n4 ILsual 0nld V 10 1. isi -

bility conditions include not oity light l'Vcls (da Irkr t -S , lki1 "), but also

fog, smoke, rain, snow, elaite, ext ye lre contaa , and n tie like. Th l',.

is less information obtained about a given 1errain, for exaape, durin, a

dark night than during a sunny day. Not only call feiower landimarks b,-

detected, but these landmarks themselves will look dife ent aund the ov,.rall visual pattern (i. e. , hich landmark is Mhere and in relation to what)

will be different. To maintain good orientations, trainees must become

highly proficient at relating maximum (clear daytight) visual infor mat ion

to reduced visual information and vice versa.

The effect of bright lights such as, flar.s, searchlights, wkeapons'

flashes, etc. on dark adapted vision also requircs consider-alion. Training

should aim for two objectives:

(1) avoiding flash exposure or minimiZ.:ing it

(2) coping with the transient effects of flash on vision.

0 G radually Increase Severity Of Conditions And Difficulty Of Tasks

Before basic mastery of a critical task has been achieved, the

trainee should be exposed to none, or as few as possible of the adverse,

debilitating factors. After that basic mastery has been achieved, these

factors should be gradually introduced into task practice.

Just as there should be a gradual, progressive introduction of

debilitating factors so should there be a gradual, progressive increase

in the difficulty (i. e., complexity, precision, rate of situation change, etc.)

of each critical combat task. For example, Mechanized Infantry Task No. 6

requires the G/CTL to coordinate his fire with that of other vehicles and

dismounted elements. The "easy" version of this task might involve one or

two coordinating elements, only one or two targets, and these targets might

be unmistakable enemy targets. The "difficult" version might involve five

coordinating elements, 10 target possibilities, a 50/50 mix of friendly/enemy,

rapid changes, and so forth.

1 Maximize Practice Of Vulnerable Tasks

Other things equal, the greater the frequency with which a task is

practiced, or the greater the cumulative amount of time devoted to practice,

the more thoroughly it will be learned, i. e., the greater the automaticity,

reliabilit ' , and rapidity of its performance. The practical question is how

a lot of p -. ctice in vulnerable (subject to extreme degradation) tasks can

be achieved under the worst expected conditions. For example, Task

No. 39 "Adjust fire as necessary" of an infantry SL is of this type. In the

459

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
worst case, this task is practiced after the trainee has suffered extreme

sleep loss, disrupted diurnal rhythiis, is perforn'mi- in darkness, and

under stress (noise, confusion, etc.

Training should provide planned opportunt.i(s for practice of

specific tasks rather than depending on the chan-e occurrence of conditions

in a developing exe rcise. Once the trainee is in the exhausted, confused,

and stressful situation, preplanned repetitive practice cal be provided.

For the example above (Mechanized Infantry Task No. 39), the SL can be

asked to adjust fire again and again, e. g. , \\ith different preplanned "1enemv" attack patterns, if the actual situation cannot be so manipulated,

some degree of simulation may be possible.

t Simulate Critical .eatures For Practice

An adeouate simulation is easiest %khen task perfornmance is

primarily dependent on reasoning, tnumnerical manipulation, decision

making, communication, and similar cognitive (intellectual) effots.

When abstr-act information (e. g. , target locations, types, numbe rs, etc.

is received over, perhaps, radio telephone, evaluated, a decision reached

and communicated (perhaps again via radio telephone), very lok fidelity

of physical simulation is sufficient. It may even suffice to provide a

series of preprinted problems to which a response must be formulated

and recorded with pencil. It will be recalled that cognitive aspects of task

performance: are the most vulnerable ones.

High physical fidelity of simulation is called for only when the task

in question is primarily of a sensory- perceptual - motor type. Fot'

example, acquiring a target, aiming and firing with a CAL 50 MG call for

something very closely resembling a CAL 50 MG in size, configuration

mass, dynamics, and so foi th. The best simulation will be the CAL 50 MG

itself. As for the target, a "cardboard cutout" will do so long as it visually

approximates the simulated object. Recall, also, that tasks of this type

are very resistant to degradation (though vigilance in detecting randomly

appearing targets is not).

O Provide Ample Reinforcement (Reward) During Practice

The technical term "reinforcement" does not refer to a strengthening of performance itself, but to increasing the likelihood that some item

of performance will reoccur in proper form on subsequent occasions.

Reinforcement, a concept similar to reward, is considered a fundamental

requirement for effective learning. For present purposes, reinforcement

can be considered in terms of a very few practical possibilities.

460

1<
Table 8. 1

Specific Training Recommendations

Applies to:

Training/Practice

Recommendations: Mechanized

Infantry Armor FIST Artillery

Task No. Task No. Task No. Task No.

Practice task when

trainee is in a state of extreme ALL ALL ALL ALL

exhaustion from 36+

hours of sleep loss

Practice trials 1, 3, 16, 20, 19, 36, 43, 7, 12, 36, 18-30

should be of extend- 26, 28, 30, 46 43

ed duration so as to 32

induce fatigue due

to task activity

Schedule task prac- 10-13, 35, 36, 1, 2, 6, 7, 3, 4, 6, 9, 2, 3, 9, 11,

tice between 0200- 39, 41, 42, 44, 12-14, 16, 10, 13-16, 20.15, 16, 18-34,

0600 51, 53, 54, 60, 18, 22, 24, 26, 28, 34, 45, 47

66, 71-74 35, 39 38, 40, 41,

44-54

Provide for some 1, 18, 20, 26, 47, 48, 53, 15, 16, 18-

practice in low tem- 28, 30, 32 54, 57 29, 44, 45

peratures (-10oC to

+50 C); require moderately prolonged

exposure of hands

to cold

Practice task in full 1-7, 9, 11-16, 3-7, 15, 16, 5, 7-16, 20- 2, 3, 9-11,

daylight, twilight, 19-33, 35-37, 18-21, 23, 27, 35-55 15, 16, 18-34

darkness, rain, fog, 39-44, 47, 49- 24, 33, 35,

with smoke present, 51, 54, 57, 36, 38, 40,

etc. 59-61, 63, 64, 42, 43

66, 68, 69,

71-74. 76

Provide a high fre- 3, 6, 14, 16, 15, 18, 20, 11, 39, 42

quency of target pos- 19, 26, 30, 32, 21, 33, 38,

sibilities of which 41, 44, 46, 61, 42, 43

a high percentage 71-73

are actual targets

Present a constantly 1, 3, 6, 9, 14, 15, 18, 20, 11, 39, 42

changing mix of 16, 19, 20, 26, 21, 33, 38,

friendly/enemy target 30, 32, 39, 41, 42, 43

possibilities with 44, 46, 61, 71-

constantly changing 73

ratios (at times 7-

10 target choices)

Provide for varying 1-4, 6, 9, 16, 15, 19, 33, 10-12, 14, 20,

contrast ratios of 19, 26, 28, 30, 34, 36, 38, 22, 23, 25-

targets/backgrounds 32, 33, 44, 54, 42, 43 27, 36, 39,

71, 73 43, 45, 48-

50, 51, 53,55

461

24__
Table 8. 1 (Cont.

Applies to:

Training/Practice

Recommendations: Mechanized

Infantry Armor FIST Artillery

Task No. Task No. Task No. Task No.

Provide for firing 1, 6, 16, 20, 19, 21, 36, 7, 36

from moving vehicle 26, 28, 30, 32 38, 43, 46

at moving target(s)

Assure that some 2, 4, 9, 19, 15, 33, 42, 11, 39, 42

target movements are 33 43

over very short

distances

Require trainee to 1-4, 9, 14, 21, 38, 43,

use only one eye as 16, 19, 20, 26, 46

well as both eyes 30. 32, 33

Arrange exposure to 1-4, 6, 14, 16, 15, 19, 21, 7, 36

sudden bright light 19, 20, 26, 28, 33, 36, 38,

so as to induce 30, 32, 33 42, 43, 46

flash blindness

Require landmarks 7, 11, 12, 24, 1-7, 23, 24, 3-5, 8-10, 2, 3, 11

established in day- 29, 31, 35, 35 12, 14-16,

light recon to be 36, 37, 40, 20-26, 33-35,

used at night and 42, 43, 47, 37, 38, 45-

vice versa 49-51, 57, 60, 54

69, 76

Induce stress by any 1-4, 6-10, 12- 1-8, 10, 16, 2-6, 10-28, 1, 4, 8, i7,

one or all of these 14, 22, 24, 25, 18, 22-28, 32-35, 42- 18-24, 31-34,

means: 35, 39-41, 43- 30, 32, 35, 55, 58 42-48

1. loud unpredictable 49, 52-76 39, 41

noises

2. supervisory pressure

3. deliberate distractions

4. requirements for

rapid task execution

Maximize the quantity 6, 11, 36, 42, 1, 2, 12-14 2-4, 26, 32- 41, 45, 46

of numerical data 60, 63, 69 34, 54 48

to be processed in

this task

Progressively 1, 2 4, 17, 26, 27,4, 17, 40-47

increase: 32-34, 54, 55

1. number of missions

2. number of changes

3. types of changes

4. countermands

462

* . .. ' WA. r . . . .. . . .
Table 8. 1 (Cont.

Applies to:

Training/Practice

Recommendations: Mechanized

Infantry Armor FIST Artillery

Task No. Task No. Task No. Task No.

Progressively intro- 11, 24, 35, 12-15, 18, 2-4, 11, 17- 4, 17-29, 40

duce incomplete and 50, 51, 60 32, 33, 42, 19, 30-34,

inaccurate data that 43 39

are at variance (incompatible with)

prior or other concurrent information;

also, make corrections to given data

Precede terrain 11, 35, 37, 4-7 5, 8, 9, 35, 2, 3, 11, 15,

practice with pre- 42, 43, 60, 37, 38 16, 31-34

orientation brief- 69, 76

ings supported by

maps

Protract practice 7, 12, 29, 40, 23 8, 9, 37, 38 31-34

over an extended 43, 49, 76

sequence of locations, and introduce major elements

of confusion (shifts

in direction, backtracking)

Progressively in- 11, 24, 35-37, 1-7, 13, 14, 2-5, 8-12, 31-34

crease complexity of 50, 51, 60, 24, 35 14-16, 20-

map/chart data as 69, 75 26, 32-35,

their reliability 37-43, 45-

decreases 54

s'nultaneously I

Provide trainees 11, 35-37, 50, 1-7, 13, 14, 2-5, 8-12, 31-34

with some obsolete 51, 60, 69, 75 24, 35 14-16, 20-26,

terrain maps that 32-35, 37-43,

contain inaccuracies 45-54

and discrepancies

Present trainee with 6, 10, 13, 39- 16, 18, 22, 2-4, 6, 11, 4, 17, 39,

rapidly and com- 41, 43-47, 53, 23, 39, 40 13, 17-19, 41, 48

plexly changing 54, 57, 63, 64, 32-34, 42

requirements 71-74

Progressively intro- 12, 15, 23, 29 5, 23, 40

duce complex con- 31, 37, 40, 43

straints on possible 47, 49, 64, 76

movement patterns

Progressively intro- 10, 53, 66 3-7, 16, 22, 5, 13, 19, 6

duce increasingly 25, 39 28, 35, 44

complex decision

factors

4 ,i
Table 8. 1 (Cont.

Applies to:

Training/Practice

Recommendations: Mechanized

Infantry Armor FIST Artillery

Task No. Task No. Task No. Task No.

Progressively in- 6, 55, 62, 65, 1, 2, 8, 9 1-4, 30-34 40

crease: 76

1. kinds of information sources,

and

2. rate and synchrony of message

arrival

Provide progres- 6, 10, 41, 43, 3-7, 11, 16, 5, 6, 11, 13, 6

sively more complex 44, 47, 49, 22, 25, 37, 28, 35, 42,

and ambiguous de- 53, 54, 61, 39 44

cision data 63, 64, 66,

68, 70-74, 76

Progressively in- 6, 39, 44, 46, 1, 2, 12, 13 6, 10-12,

crease the quantity 56, 61, 63, 14, 17, 18, 14-16, 20-

and complexity of 71-75 24, 35 26, 42, 43,

target data 45-54

Increasingly deny 52, 56, 62, 75 1, 2, 18 18, 19, 29,

requests so as to 56, 58

force search for

alternate solutions

to problems

Progressively de- 1-4, 14, 16, 15. 20, 21, 11, 42

crease the time 20, 26, 28, 33, 37, 38,

available to react 30, 32, 39, 42, 43, 46

appropriately (e.g , 41, 44, 53,

distance and sud- 54, 71-73

denness of target

appearance)

Progressively re- 13, 17, 29, 8, 10, 11,

duce the permissible 38, 42, 50, 25, 26, 29,

time for task 51 34, 41, 45, ALL

completion 47-50, 53-

55, 57, 58

Provide for suf- 6, 8, 48, 55, 1, 2, 8, 9 1-4, 10-12, 22-24, 40

ficient noise in 56, 58, 62, 23-28, 32, 14-34, 42,

communication chan- 65 41 43, 45-59

nel (e.g., radio

telephone) to impair communication

Provide for various 6, 17, 22, 39- 10 1, 2, 9, 11-

combinations of dis- 41, 43, 44, 15, 17-21,

tance and mutual 46, 47, 49 25-30, 40,

visibility of com- 47, 48

municants and vary

the noise level

464

~~t 7 - w i- - w-'--w---------------------------------- ~
Table 8. 1 (Cont.)

Applies to:

Training/Practice

Recommendations: Mechanized

Infantry Armor FIST Artillery

Task No. Task No. Task No. Task No.

Progressively in- 6, 8, 22, 40, 1, 2, 8, 27, 1-4, 30-34,

crease the complex- 46, 48, 55, 28 57

ity, diversity 56, 62, 65,

and ambiguity of 69, 76

issues to be coordinated

Arrange for in- 6, 8, 48, 55, 8, 17, 32 27, 55

creasing complexity 56, 62, 65

of matters to be

expressed in communication ..

Present targets and 1, 3, 6, 14, 15, 18, 20, 11, 39, 42

target mixes that 16, 19, 20, 21, 33, 38,

approach as well as 26, 30, 32, 42, 43

retreat from 39, 41, 44,

trainee's position 46, 61, 71-73

at varying speeds

465 :1 __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Vulnerability And Cross Training Priorities

In the ideal military organization, every incumbent of evcry duty

position would be competent to perform ea h and everi- duty (task) of each

and every other duty position. This would help to assure that no matter

what the emergency, there would be someone available to perform some

crii'al task or to help in its peiforrmance. Clearly, the ideal is not

possible, but it provides a goal. The degree to which the ideal can be

approximated is constrained by factors such as available tim,, .ompeting

r'equirements, etc. Within these constraints, what should be the order of

priotities for cross training?

For the military organization preparing itself to meet the demands

of continuous c-ombat operations, these priorities should be determined

most heavily by specific task vulnerabilities to degradation. I'o, example,

the effectiveness o' performance (E) in certain tasks declines not at all

or only nominally (e.g. , Mechaniz ed Infantry Task No. 27, Artillery Task

No. 36), while othere promise to decline very severly (e. g., Mechanized

Infantry T-tsk No. 44, FIST Task No. 26). The complement of E, I-E,

expresses the magnitude of the decline or the degree of vulnerability to

degradation. While E is inversely related to degradation, 1-E expresses

it dif-ectly.

The absolute degree of vulnerability of each task and the 'elative

degree within a duty position or type of unit (Infantry, FIST, etc.) would

seem to be the prime indicator of necessity and urgency for- cioss training.

The absolute, as well as relative degree, of task vulnerabilities are shown

in Figures 8. 1 through 8.4. Within these tables, tasks are categorized by

type of unit and duty position. The scale of vulnerability appears on the

left. Next to each scale interval, the task numbers of critical tasks falling

in that interval are given.

Mechanized Infantry Task Vulner ability

For Mechanized Infantry units, the calculated vulner'ability is

highest for Task Nos. 39, 44, and 41 which fall within the responsibility

domain of the Squad Leader's (SL) duty position. These are fire direction

tasks requiring primarily complex evaluation and rapid decision making.

By contrast, Tasks Nos. 5 and 27, which involve firing at areas, are

minimally vulnerable. The absolute, as well as relative, vulnerability

of other tasks, which fall between these extremes, are readily apparent

in Figure 8. 1.

466
00 TASK NOS t00 TASK NOS

so 90 _44

39,41

so GUNNER'ICARRIER so SQUAD

TEAM LEADER LEADER

70 I 70

,- 1o 443

6 36

a:Z;5 a 50 3742 1,9,12 z - 45,47

Z - _J __

> 40 > 40 .69

7,13 _49

"o 16 30

__t0 33

20 __ 3 20 46

4,8,15 34,48

0 10 38

175o_ 7 o_ __38__________

0 5 0

100 TASK NOS 1 00 TASK NOS

90 90

so MANEUVER TEAM s0 PLATOON

MEMBER 69 LEADER

70 7o _ 54

56

>_ 6 60 68

Z2 __ -J 5760

,5o _ 32

:19,2- 61,73,76 -I

> 40 > 4 40 50,63,64

20

3o _21 21 71

-45,2632 159, , 66,2 ,74

2D 181 22,24 20 -- 58

to 23, 31 o 62

o+ 27 OT

Figure 8.1. Vulnerabilities to degradation-Mechanized Infantry

467

I- i ... .,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,_,_ _ _ __-_ _ - ... . ..

" r I I
00 TASK NOS 00 TASK NOS

so 90

so TANK PLATOON so TANK

LEADER GUNNER

70 70

>- 22,24 _j ._j

c 50 14 50s

> 40 ,6 40

4,25

30 5,7, 18 30

15, 23

20 12, 13, 16,17 20

1, 2

10 21, 26 jo - -42, 43, 46 _ 8, 10, t9_

o 91I 20 o , 44 45

o0o - TASK NOS 0 - TASK NOS

90 90

so TANK 80 TANK

COMMANDER LOADER

70 70

)- 60 60

- -

50 . 0 _

> 40 _ 39 > 40

35, 40

30 ,30

20 _32,33

Z9, 30

_ 28, 8 34, 38 0

2? 36~ 37 41 56, 57

0 '31 0 T 47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55.58

Figure 8.2. Vulnerabllities to degradation -Armor (Tank Platoon)

468

I, !r~~__ _ _
100 TASK NOS 100 TASK NOS

SO 26 90

SO FIST so FIRE SUPPORT

10,1 4,20 CHIEF NCO

70 70

22

t- 60 _ II, 25 s o -

< 16

X" -- -

_j w - - b J --

> 40 23 > 40

8

30 _ _21 30

- 5,7, 9, 12, 13

20 __ 19,24 20

2, 27,29

0 _1,3,4,6 7 0 80 

57,58

o 28 0 1

TASK NOS TASK NOS I00 1 00 _

90 _ _54 90

8o FORWARD 8o RADIO

48 OBSERVER TELEPHONE .... OPERATOR

7o __ 50 70

60 4__2, 47, 53 60

=2 __ 39_ _

39a -

S5o __ 35 <, 50

z- 49 - "- 

j z > 40 -38, 51 D 40

37, 40,41, 44

_46 30

- 33.6 4,4

20 20

31, 55, 56

,0 30,32 10 59

o 34 0

Figure 8.3. Vulnerabilities to degradation- FIST

469

43,
TASK NOS TASK NOS o0 100 .

so 90..

80BATTERY 80155mm 80 EXECUTIVE so

OFFICERGUNNER

70- 70

h 60- 60

Li -

z -20,34

> 40 > 40 30, 32, 33

2 18

30 __22, 23, 25, 28

24, 26, 31

o0 3,4,6 2o 27

5 19,21,29

0 10

00 TASK NOS 100 TASK NOS

90 90

s0 HOWITZER 8o 155mm SECTION

CHIEF CREW MEMBER

70 70

> 60 >- 60

F- -- t ,1

-15z j --

> 40 5 40

17

30 30

II 48

20 20

8 40 43

42, 47

7,12,13,14, 41, 45

, o0 35,36,37, 38,39,44.46

Figure 8.4. Vulnerabilities to degradation --Artillery

470

PS4 -?--- -.
Armor Task Vulnerabilit.y

The pattern of vulnurabihlties Ior tank platoon personnel (tl'Fiure 8. 2)

reflects the somewhat higher values of ' co ipard to infanti v dut% poSi.n011S,

As might bt expected, the highest cal ulated vulnurabillities appear for thf.

Tank Platoon Leader (TK PL) %. hose overall patt(u n 1 nol xe v1' diffferclil

from his infintry counterpart. On the other hand, Tank Comm ndce's (TK ('1)

are for le.s xuInerable overall than SLs. The ruclatively lox vullerabilv.ie.s

of tasks performed by the Tank Gunner (TK (;.E) and the Tank Loade r (TN LI)H)

are probably clue to a lack of cognitive or vigilatice demand.

FIST Task Vulnerability

F.or FIST, the hlihest c alculated vulnerabilities occur ( "iiu c 8. 3)

for the adjusting of Multiple Missions %hether 1hat task is pe1'formud b

the FIST Chief (No. 26) or the lorwarcd Observer (No. 54). To the exten

to %% hich identical tasks (e. Y., adjust fires) are involved, the patlerns fothese two duty positions are also identical. To the extent to which the

Fire Support NCO acts as deputy or assistant to the [IST Chief -- pefoorms

the same tasks -- his task vulnerabilities xx ould coincide with those of the

FIST Chief. The pattern shown for this duty position is t-onfined to those

tasks peculiar to it. This is true, simularlv, for the Radio Telepho!,ne

Operator and his role as assistant [O.

Artillery Task Vulnerability

Taken as a group, artillery tasks (i. e. , 155mm Htowitier Operator)

appear less vulnerable (Figure 8. 4) to degradation than those of the preceding

types of unit. To some extent, this result reflects the highly proceduralized

and practiced character of artillery tasks. Possibly, however, the calculated

pattern of vulnerabilities is somewhat attenuated b- the background scenario

against which the tasks are assessed. Presumably, the most difficult circumstances for the execution of these tasks would occur when multiple missions

are being fired, interrupted, redirected, again interrupted and redirected,

and so forth. At the same time, it must be noted that extensive cross training

of gun crews is already a standard policy.

Other Determiners

Though the absolute and relative vulnerabilities of tasks should be a

principal determiner of priority for cross training, it should not be the only

one. Consideration must be given; also, to the degree of importance or

criticality of each task (see Tables 1.2 - 1.5).

A final consideration derives from economies of the type implied by

higher and lower levels of the same MOS. Assume that individuals B and C

are both candidates for cross training with A. If C's tasks are very similar

to A's, he may deserve priority over B (tasks less similar), because he is

likely to master A's task in less time and with less effort than B.

471
IR MCr~D1MG PM BI-l.J~ N0 r MAK~LD

PT IX -II' 

SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERF OI{MANCE SUPPOkT

The possibilities offered by system (re)design and by

performance supports in countering human performance degradation are examined. The alternatives or combinations of

relief of demand and support for critical abilities are described. Examples are given. Needs related to required

critical abilities are listed together with potential means

for satisfying these needs.

The requirements foi hu mat performance ale jointly delet2jv m11(ind b.

existing conditions and by the established system (organizaton) Nx ithin whII h

each person functions. Two additional categories of counteraction can be

considered for counteracting the adverse effects of coutinuous oper ations:

1. reduce system demand

2. support critical abilities.

In the first approach, the requirements for sensing, information

processing, or motor ability o re diminished so as to reduce the requir'ed cffort. In the second approach, the perceptual and/or motor capabilities of

the personnel are amplified by equipment, and the information processing

load is shifted in part to devices extraneous to the person.

The distinction between these two approaches exists more for ease

of discussion than in reality. Also, the counteractive measures discussed

in this chapter must not be considered as independent from those presented

in previous chapters. Rather, counteractive provisions need to be planned

and implemented in an integrated fashion. Performance supports must be

considered while restructuring responsitilities (or vice versa), performance

supports also affect training operations, system design or redesign inleracts

with both, and so forth. For example, a simulator incorporating vehicle

motions and vibration, and perhaps, electronic targets and scoring might

support only training of the CAL 50 gunner. However , the acquired ability

to compensate for erratic vehicle motion strengthens the critical ability

"Dynamic Precision" in actual combat operations.

The possibilities for effective system (re)design and for performance

supports are extensive. Often, the desirable change or support may be

seemingly very minor. Yet the effects may be substantial. Such minor

"fixes" will occur to the inventive, interested person familiar with his oxxn

tasks and their: performance. Such inventiveness and initiative should be

encouraged locally and translated into practice, although with subsequent

evaluation of practicality and effectiveness.

473

-t2 ~ :-y--.....
.System nI), Pc g

A. vse..-item is the Iltkeglal of tile Itulils, inilt' iatlOll, actioll and

orgalll.Xi Con r Uil'ed to acIieve' SOM 61)(k lld OutLCOM . III. ll lllital' v L 0 11-

bat, obycti art e','s the ic'd' pio'llellt of tOte' , iedistibt t l of ntla' lar l,

'ulocation, ett . 'The comtnandtf' s specifi(.ationi of xx ho is to 1o0V lu 1 v. h

with %%hat 1'soulc'u's, for what purpose, for how% long, and so Oil call bt cOllnmunlcalcd at the time of desired execution, or it can be pet'planned. "h,-n,

at til tillle of desired execution, tile communiucation rcol' ellt lc t is 'icdL, eni

to "execute man..iuver X. " All this is not nexxt, but does constiutel an cx, ,llcnr

example of system design. The comnmunicatiun demands on the m(ssage

originator (commander) as well as those on the recipient(s) ar'e sharply reduced.

In anticipation of the exhaustion and degradation of human performance capabilities, the development of SOPs assumes critical importance.

However, the possibilities for system design are by no means fulic achieved.

['or example, SOPs need to be coded, and the codes must be we.ll learned.

Also, at critical times they must be communicated. The following example

of efficient code development, therefore, is pertinent for the critical abilities

"Memory" and "Communication. " The example is taken from a Soviet manual

"Military Human Factors Engineering. "

Let us assume that we must remember an arbitrary (ode number A

2-12-85. Memorization of the series A/ 2/1/2!/8,5 requires storage of 21.5

bits of information (the bit is a measure of information amount). Memorization

in the form of A/2/12/85 reduces this very slightly to 21.3 bits. If the A is

replaced by the number "I" and digits are grouped by threes, thus, 121/ 285,

the information storage requirement drops to 19. 6 bits. But, a further redesign of the code to 'twice twelve" or (2)12/85 achieves a maximum reduction

to 16.3 bits.

For, some situations, SOPs will not have been developed and verbal

messages must be formulated. The demands on the communication ability

of, both, message originator and recipient will be reduced, if messages are

composed from a limited, standard vocabulary. The smaller the set of possible message elements (words), the easier is formulation and comprehension

of the message.

While the examples given here were drawn from the context of communication and memory, this should not be thought to represent all of system

design. All facets of systems can be improved to reduce demands on critical

abilities. Nor should a single round of improvements be thought to exhaust

the virtually infinite number of possibilities. System improvement should be

a continuing process of "chipping away" at error sources.

474
11'I ilorialie SUIIpolts

If system (i'eOdesign is analogous to ireduc(in, thu ei~i 1j o ari obije( t

per~tfO r mneM. csuppoLit is ztnaLogous to pr-oviding a Ic r.iitho 7h- hfu manl

capability is amplified by a device, oi- the demand is adva nta'; r.ouslv dli lc

betvw cen tire per'son and thre b~.ppoi-tilg device. FIl CI eaimpie, e'ven M~khun a

highl-; efficient (ode has been developed, a code lisi. ot- a note' p~al V'. il1 v

the memor-y ulemand on the per-son.

Pefforrnance suppor-ts already exist. For- example, binio ulalis and

night vision devices (NVDs) ar-e in widespr-ead use. Cer-tain pei-foimankt

supports are av&.ilable f-rm standard Ar'my stock through its s;upply' sy.stm.

Other-s may recquirec special pr~ocu-rments. Still other,.- ran be speCifif-d

functionally, but r-ealizations r-emain to be developed.

Relief! Support for Cr-itical AbilitiesBecause thre circumstances gener-ated by and inher-en in koiitiiiUOU.S

oper-ations sei-ve to diminish or- depr-ess abilities imrportant to the etot.i

of critical combat tasks, it becomnes especially iM poitant to scippoil' these;(

abilities. System design and per~for-mance supporAt possibilities are( outtlned

and exemplified below. These suggestions have been categomiiucl bY pr-incipal

supported ability, but many schemes and 0 2vice s cut across theSe categorie.

The list is not exhaustive. Rather-, it is intendedi to stimulate the cetv

initiative of those most intimately familiar- %kith Mi at is needed.

Definitions given her-eafter- for' thle various abilities ale thre sameu as

those given in Chapter- 1. They ar-e r-epeated for convenient reteience.

475
Communication--the ability to transfer required and/or

relevant information in proper depth and scope at the

the proper time.

Need Potential Realization

1. Prompts for the (likely) message 1. Check lists of standard message

elements in their appropriate elements, i. e., prompts.

order(s).

2. All nonredundant or variable 2. Standard messages in standard

message elements need to be formats requiring only variables

recorded and repeated. (blanks) to be filled in.

3. Method for separating and coding 3. Precede message transmission with

message categories as to clearly and easily identifiable marker

importance, type, urgency, etc. signal (e. g., beeps of distinctive

pitch).

4. Minimum, adequate standard

vocabulary.

5. Nonverbal communication 5. Visual signals; also, electro-cutaneous

channels. ("touch") communication Jevice.

476
Dynamic Precision--the ability to maintain body

balance and make accurate aiming movements while

the body is in motion

Need Potential Realization

1. Stabilization and damping of 1. Rapid, electronic/hydraulic dampers

motions in the platform on which (shock absorbers) for shooting

the person stands, platforms in vehicles.

2. Stabilization and damping of 2. Rigid frame work to brace person

weapon used by a person, and/or plastic air bag for use as rifle rest.

3. Practice under dynamic conditions 3. Simulator incorporating vehicle

dynamics to allow training in

accurate fire when vehicle is

tilting or vibrating.

477
Hearing--the ability to detect and identify significant sounds

amid competing sounds

Need Potential Realization

1. Attenuate noise and especially 1. Rubber ear canal plugs or sound

masking noises, reducing over-the-ear protection/

head phones.

2. Amplify faint sounds and/or 2. On-ear or in-ear hearing aids

portions of the audible spectrum. incorporating filters adjustable to

sound signatures of threat forces

equipment.

3. Clip peaks of electronically 3. Clipping and hi-lo filters.

transmitted vocal signals and/or

reduce high and low frequency

components.

4. Assure clarity of transmitted 4. Midrange sensitive, directionally

verbal signals. shielded microphones.

5. Method for providing redundant 5. Hand signals, light signals,

information through other sense cutaneous (touch) signals.

modalities.

6. Means for accurate classification 6. Hand held spectrum analyzer

on basis of auditory information.

478
Memory--the ability to remember (recognize and/or recall)

information such as words, pictures, and procedures

Need Potential Realization

1. Encode information to be 1. Develop efficient codes, message

remembered (recognized or schemes, vocabularies, etc. and or

recalled) efficiently. overtrain (overlearn) SOPs, message

schemes, etc.

2. Maximize recognition and 2. Provide quick look check lists,

minimize active recall require- reference manuals, pictures, or

ments. charts.

3. Means external to the person for 3. Note pad, (micro)-cassette

information storage and retrieval, recorder, printing terminal to

receive and print incoming

information.

4. Means for regenerating 4. Nomographs, slide rules, curves.

information, instead of storing

it.

.479

7 ..
Numerical Facility--the ability to add, subtract, multiply,

and divide numbers (including when they are part of other

questions such as finding percentages or cosines)

Need Potential Realization

1. Need to minimize or eliminate 1. Hand held calculators; sets of

requirements for "mental" "rules of thumb" for checking

arithmetic, calculations.

2. Need to reduce requirement for 2. Calculator preprogrammed for

correctly ordering problem standard numeric problem types.

solution steps.

480

-|
Orientation--the ability to orient and find one's way about

in three dimensional space as well as assessing the location

of objects in that space

Need Potential Realization

1. Means for abstracting and 1. Maps and charts, plexiglass slate,

recording the position of critical grease pencils, and wiping rag.

points.

2. Means for determining distance 2. Compass, pedometer.

and direction of movement.

3. Represeutation of surrounding 3. CRT or similar terrain display with

space, objects in it and the blip marking present position

orienting person's momentary (e. g., driven by on-board computer

position. in APC, task, etc.)

4. Practice in maintaining orientat- 4. Proving ground or simulated battle

ion. field for training in orientation

maintenance.

481
Perceptual Speed--the ability to compare letters, numbers

objects, pictures, situations or patterns, present or

remembered, both quickly and accurately.

Need Potential Realization

1. Facilitate mainly visual compar- 1. Provide line dr-wings and/or

isons of actual and remembered silhouettes of enemy equipment

objects (targets). with distinctive features

emphasized; provide pictorial

representation of similar appearing friendly and enemy equipment

(BMD, tanks, aircraft) overlaid

or overlayable on each other;

also, from various angles of view.

2. Means for detecting change and 2. Computer driven status display

amount of change for defined showing (at option) only changing

situations. elements plus duration or distance

of change.

482
Reasoning--the ability to apply rules to problems and to

d, rive answers or decisions, or to combine units of

information to form a rule or to produce a set or rules

necessary to arrange things or actions in order.

Need Potential Eealization

1. Solution aids for various classes, 1. Steps leading to solution - in

(kinds) of problems encountered their proper order - outlineu

in combat operations, on paper (booklet, cards, etc.);

prompts associated with each

step and which call for users to

furnish the required data (numbers,

observations, quantities, etc. );

decision trees in printed form--

user needs only to choose correct

branch at each decision point.

2. Decision aids to calculate utility 2. On-board micro-computer (in

(i. e., comparative desirability) APC, tank, etc.) preprogrammed

of competing courses of action, for most standard combat decision

or of probability of class member- problems; user specifies problem

ship of observed object (e. g., type and furnishes input data.

friendly vs enemy target).

3. Practice in realistic problems. 3. War gaming boards for use at

unit level

483

'-- .. . .- ,- , -, t -- '""_ . .. . . . . . -

- •~ - - ,
Vision--the ability to detect visually objects and relations

among objects such as movement or relative distances

Need Potential Rtealization

1. Amplify distance vision 1. Binoculars; miniature ('hand

held") radars

2. Enhance target contrast 2. Polarizing and similar types of

optical filters

3. Shift or alter colors 3. Red, green yellow, blue optical

filters

4. Amplify night or dark vision 4. Night vision devices; miniature

("hand held") radars

5. Amplify evident movement 5. Opticl lenses which distort and,

therefore,, enhance angular displacement of moving objects

6. Reference frame for field of

vision 6. Standard grid or transparent

medium at standard distance

from eyes to aid in judging

vertical and lateral distances

and angles

484

7-i
C(II.-\ Il1"'V 1 ' N

\\Otl\ IiLS'17 SLEEP ,1N\ I\lN''L

The effects of progressive sleep deprivation on hiuman

performance are summarized. Types of tasks most affected,

duty schedules, recovery requirements, and similar matters

are discussed as well as listed in tabular form. Recoin--

mendations for rest and sleep discipline are presented.

Tht i-of Aleep I o.ss vii pc01 foiman1clkt ',I val's.- V, il' (xi .-- il

no ef~w ti ahiniosi completek hio'a kdo.',lit i I''livtien III Lt! I' A ,ay

Tit, Ilfl Its., ali(, aI 1,i1t e ioil 01* mlal'~ Ca( ~oi-', Iill ui l.iih! l iti ii 1 :li Kla 'Ni[tt'i: i -,11

in, jit. slc'.'p loss, thIe t ime ( phase) inl ihoe diu rnal 1 4,, ' lhitA a iiv P1101 10

and du!I iili the Stec!a loss 5 t' iOlA, Ihe ph livI' maill t, v' t~lm vi

aN i to hle inidividu-al, and the naturn of vih- wv i-k hein Iicvii

'Vank hiti is st and (ioiplexitv

%Vithin broad Limits, lihe ke'icial variiabtt' inl pi'cdctinii he l( itent1 10

%Il i( It, sleep loss \%ill affect pci for'mane c is the l aLetvi0: lil e e tIlie inlfa, t

o;s,'c lvss5 is mlore priviouneced whenthe tik asks inivolved kcase tv evoke

Ili geiiei'aL, pet -fo tmanek t onl m-11otoous tasks m vinvcn i'elat ive Lx

un 1pie. skills dec iiate" maurked lv as a re-sult of atute stIeep los s icuaterI

thlani 24 -hvn is- durtation. Thlis tends to be less tine( as the tas-ks he O 1i,0h1hY

,ant Ol;A'liC Nionot onlol- s-asks leui riol~' for examiple, detect ionl of' fainit vi,

I[o%%I e s i~nal s (,, . , tarIgets o n a iadari scope) over' s evera ia ours Cti'jUk tlt Lv

.s inn'.' lie? ifori'i a e decrieenits greatem' than 50 pin' (c in of initial tcapahilit1Y,

Ink rdeLI sing task ivitnpiexitv t o the extent that it mayv se rve 'Lo inl ci'ea.se in t lest

Xi itlhivo I ZIa 111101 (Iiffitt toL too highl a 1oe c may oft en re!sult in Iless so kve

feip lossef. s

Siiply inces i lug task cmlithow eve i', (stit- as h:,- iplomi ng

ilt elrtalntv) %%ititoti. a concurr[lent inci-lease inii ite ic st will resl in1 u'i 'ati

p~ tormat cdcc cic nt afteri sleep loss. At the same tinit', lilt (e lest Ili,, tasks

such'i as gamet-s ov chialleitting tasks inl which- thie pa rticipant know\s how% vex el e

is doing1( and %%Ilih involve comon0e'ce1111011lvh~ skills, appe(al les isilti

o tile e-ffects of, sleep) loss f'or periods of' as inu h at. 60) ous

I.' o out itit. of' this chapter is adapted from a irepor't pi epai'ed h,-1 D. P. \'ivodxt aid

(Offic e of, Naval. Hesoal til) and Captain P1. 1). Nels on (Naval M(dicaul kesc-;a k Ii

!)'xi'flopuneutt1 ('otnrnaualit) for The, Tichlnial ('ooptemaliou igin(ni 'la

( uada , 17'K, US).

485

r~ P
Difficult tasks, those defined as involving high% work toad, kk ill be

more sensitive than easy tasks to the effec'ts of slcep loss. One must b(' awayIof interaction effects here, since a difficult but interesting task probably will

be less affected than an easy but monotonous task.

Type of Task

The type of task in which the individual is engaged is a significant

cktot in judging sleep toss effect. Conditions, such as extended pe.riods of

time spent on the task without rest or change of pace, are another significanw

factor. Tasks that tend to be repetitive, less immediately rewarding and less

interesting, are also most tikel\ to show performance dec cement as lime oil

task increases and rest periods or breaks in routine are decreased or not

permitted at all.

It is not advisable to ask individuals to learn new things, e. g. , facts

of a discrlete nature, until they have fully recovered from sleep loss of 24

hours or mol'e. Experimental data clearly show impairment in acquisition

and immediate recall of newly learned material. At the same time, a 24-hour

sleep toss appeals to have little effect on the recall of' material which was

learned previously. The fact that skills w\hich have achieved the status of

being almost automatic or "second nature" suffer less from the effects of

sleep loss than do newly learned skills suggests, of course, thatthe individual

be very'v well trained in the execution of whatever tasks he will be expected to

perform if the sleep loss effects are to be minimized.

in one stud", after four days and nights without sleep, subjects \.ete

unable to read completely a sentence of more than 30 words; they would lapse

before finishing it. A consistent finding in studies involving sleep loss is the

occurrence in perceptual performance of brief intermittent lapses that increase

in both frequency and duration as sleep loss progresses. A lapse is defined as

a pause that is more than twice as long as the average or typical time taken to

respond.

The specific effect of lapses on performance varies with the properties of the task and with the task environment. In self-paced tasks (i. e. , those

in which the worker sets the pace of responding) speed of response seems to be

critical: the person tends to slow down while maintaining high accuracy. In

work-paced tasks, errors appear to be the critical measure. In such situations,

errors tend to be of omission or missed signals.

As sleep loss continues, errors appear progressively earlier in the

task and the benefits of breaks become increasingly short-lived. Extensive

data from laboratory and simulated work sessions have recently been further

supported by data involving real highway driving tasks; after sleep loss, the

same sorts of effects are founC in that more road signs are missed, normally

detected and avoided obstacles (such as tires in the roadway) arte struck more

often, and weaving (or inadvertent lane changing) increases.

-86
Steep loss has a differential effect on various aspects of the -olimurnication tasks that have come to play an increasingly importatl ro e in most

systems. In giving instructions, the time required for sending informal ioll

increases with sleep loss; the number of errors made also 11Wrease.s significantly, although these errl'ors typically a re ceorrecled. On the other' hand, in

re('-iving instructions, errors of omission increase significatlv with sle,..i

loss.

Mission Duration

How long it is possible to continue working before perforimance dec rement sets in? As with most questions of this sort, there is probably no single

answer' that will apply to everyone under all conditions and work situalions.

There is, however, an adequate body of data which indicates that durring period :

of 36 to 48 hours of continuous work, with no sleep, and a work period beginning

between 0800 and 1200, rmajor performance, decrlements first appear after

approximately 18 hours. This coincides with the low segment -' the lypical

diurnal cycle which occurs at about 0200-0600 hours.

It is important to note the specificity of the starting time and the

condition of (ontinuous work. Measures of sleep-loss duration are based on

reports of the hours of prior v akefuhness and 16 or 18 hours of wakefulness

ale daily experiences for many of us. Continuous work, however, is probably

less frequently encountered. Different starting times will result in different

times of decrement appearance, most likely determined in part by the phasing

of the diurnal rhythm. Experimental data from studies involving periods of

36 to 38 hours of continuous work with no steel) suggest that performance is

particularly sensitive to the fluctuation of diurnal rhythm.

Performance during continuous work generally appears to show

irncreasing impairment as the number of hours spent awake increases, but

the impairment is subject to a superimposed variation from the influerce of

diurrnal rhythms. Again, individual differences are great, as is the influence

of the type of task. Individual curves will quite often show rather sharp performancc decrements at various points, following sleep loss of 24 hours or

more. However, these points are not consistent. A useful guideline may

well be to expect fairly steady performar -'e decrement as the number of hours

awake increases, with worst performance most frequently found between 0200-

0600 hours.

In a simulated work situation involving a number of different tasks,

it was found that average performance de( rements as great as 40 per cent

below baseline levels can be expected toward the end of a 48-hour period of

continuous work with no sleep, breaks, or catnaps. Typically, the poorest

per-formance can be expected during the early morning hours (0200-0600); the

pe , formance will be especially poor if the end of a 48-hour sleep loss period

487

41 _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ I _
o,kL'uis du rinog t ese 1111-1oiing hours. i should bt, no1 ed that the do, 1'mn,

is i'cfe ' ie in d to baseline pelifoi'malce, vhic h its I may 101 ntinrc s leh best

p}z- sile ptitfotman t . Thus, in tit is of' absolute pe)ifort'maih e chan/,, (e.

,oral nuimbel of taig s not dcet eted, i'atht thati the numb i' below ave i age)

'lit, dl ieilent ( ould be much - 'eate '. Noe should be taken that valuo's of The

.'tiv-.ness ildexe (E) tlthohout lhes c (;ud dine s ref ct v p'er is el sU.h a

ci . line ftoin has elile ( touiew, not' maL) peIformanC rat her than an ideal of

bes pus sible" e etm'aine.

A i i-lical factor Uff(c-tinl,( e cfortO na~1' 0 aftel' p lp'iods of sleep loss is

1he. umll nerlupted 1-ntth of' time that the same task stimuli occur and the same

,,stoilse is eqtuired. In a sense, this observation is consistent with the

above, obserations uegardint task duration and inhuront interest, in that tasks

involving the same stimuli and r'esponses ate more likely to be repetitive and

bor'ill

The performance impairment associated with sleep loss is accentual d as a function of time on task durin(g the continuous operation of a single

task. Thete is an ilt elact ion bet%, con task duration and sleep loss in that the

effects of acute sleep loss are generally greater for longer duration tasks.

Expeiimental data indicate that following one night of sleep toss, performance

wLl! tend to "bottom out" after about 30 minutes time on task, and %%ill sho\

relatively little addi+ional impairment during the next 30 minutes.

Ther'c are data which indicate that lapses similar to those resulting

fr'om steel) loss also occur under fatigue resulting from extended periods of

time on a given task without rest or change of pace. This may be, in part,

a function of the type of task and/or the variation or lack thereof in the task.

B caks in a task appear to delay the occurrence of sleep loss induced performaice lapses until the later stages of the work period. Such breaks apparently

hell) to return performance lapses until the later stages of the work period.

Such b-eaks apparently hell) to return performance to the initial level. Performance shortly after the break, however', again shows a decrement.

In general, lapses resulting from steel) loss are strongly affected by

stimulus monotony in that the more monotonous tasKs seem to be related to

more frequent lapeses. At present, it is not clear if this sort of lapse has

the same underilying dynamic characteristics as those found with more varied

stimulation.

As sleep loss increases, performance becomes more uneven, with

periodic lapses in efficiency being more characteristic than a continuous depression of performance. This follows from the basic idea that if a lapse were to

occur at the time a target was to be detected, the target \%ould be missed.

488

.. . . r---- " - I __ _ - - __. .... ..... .... . ..
I, eactioln time1 ttlet to the- irftetral be .cclilt uP:h apera IIUl , 0OlS0ttle

sii at for action (c. ot. , pettro ~' act ad lite Inv1tation o1 ation01

ap optia'itr to that sianal. SIee) loss ptsistnt[v p dut Is n tit'e'iSe ill

'eak .ion time that is jefle( 14 d ill pro or5 es-ivel v i 'eit I I (Iv thi I I Is . 0 t t I 0' m -

atice, and in an inc tease in thlt va tiabilit , of t he Ftlac ion1-time dis t;iibut ioni.

ilnr eases il traction timile are st ionwlv i'o alld ' i rt-'A,, ill hours

of sleep loss: after 78 hours %ithout sleep, av' 'ai01 ion 1tat time is %%Dp as

long as that ioted on the day immediatel'v I)io" to iit start ot iThe'hemision. 

word "averaoe" is emphasized for a iCson: whe tl b1C ict11011 int,

responses ale examined, it seems clear that these, in c,.ase only slihlv o\r "

baselim, while the pootrest performance b(,comte konsisIten'l " ose. Pherefore, when all the reaction times aie evaluated, the ave ag(, t(-tids to iriteast

or become longer.

Many work situations will involve mote than one task. Mhen this

happens, one of the tasks is usuaLly conside ted primar'y either' by thle inv,stigatoi or by the subject. If the work is such that it is at ot 'at te pl frmtat'

load capabilily of the operatot, then petfornance ott additional, or sk ondarv,

tasks will be especially susceptible to the delet erious effects of faligu,, and slep

loss. The operator will altetupt to maintain his levt of performance oil the

primar task at the expense of poorer petfoi-mance on secondaity tasks. Th tc

are data, however, which suggest that when all tasks are weighted equally in

impottan ce, then performance decriements on all tasks \will be about the sa inc.

As roted above, there aie wide individual differences in the kind and

degree of performance degradation resulting from sleep loss. The relation

of these differences and of tile effects to intelligence and personality has been

repeatedly investigated. No relationship has been found. Intelligence, education, background do nothing to diminish the adverse effects. Sleep-loss also

seems to have a negative effect on mood or disposition, as evidenced by selfreports of increased feelings of hostility, irritability and depression. However,

this may be as much the result of the individual's attitude toware the situation

as of the sleep-loss as such.

A summary of this information appears in Tables 10, 1 and 10. 2.

Amount of Sleep-Loss Required to Degrade Performance

How soon can the effects enumerated in Table 10. 2 be expected to

manifest themselves? How much sleep can men go without before performance

is degraded? Table 10.3 summarizes the available information pertinent to

these questions.

489 it ! iK
Table 10. 1

Tasks Most Vulnerable to Sleep-Loss Eff.cts

6 Uninteresting and monoonous ta.-ks

* Tasks that a re new or rcquire learning on the job

* Work-paced tasks (as opposed to self-paced tasks)

* High-workload tasks that 'equire time-sharing with

other primary and secondary tasks

• Tasks that require continuous attention and steady

performance

* Tasks in which the worker has little feedback on his

perfor mance 3 a Tasks with heavy cognitive components (reasoning,

problem solving, decision making, evaluating information

Table 10.2

Types of Performance Degradation Most

Likely from Sleep Loss

* Slower reaction time, increased time to perform known

tasks

* Short-term memory decrement, impairment in speed

of learning

* Impairment in reasoning and complex decision chain

* Errors of omission, lapses of attention

* Increased feelings of fatigue, irritability depression

* Erratic per'formarre or increased variabilitNy in

profictien y

490

4ti .-
Table 10.3

Amount of Sleep Loss Required

to Degrade Performance

* 24 hours on routine and monotonous tasks or new

skills

0 36-48 hours on most tasks involving -ognitive and

perceptual skills

* 50 per cent/24 hours cumulative reduction of normal

sleep time over one week

* 4-6 hours if working 0200-0600 watch after day of

continuous work

0 24 hours if sleep loss is imposed on one week of "4

on - 2 off" work-rest schedule

* 24 hours if sleep loss is imposed on two weeks of

"4 on - 4 off" work-rest schedule

491
Work-Rest Schedules and Performance

As previously noted, one of the factors that influences the effects

of sleep loss on performance is the work-rest schedule followed before and

after a period of acute sleep loss. A few selected comments ale appropriate.

Work-rest schedules are presented, typically, in the format "4 on - 4 off,"

"2 on - 6 off, " etc. This should be read in the first instance as "four hours

on duty followed by four hours off duty" and in the second instance as "two

hours on duty followed by six hours off duty. " The majority of workers,

military or civilian, probably work an "8 on - 16 off" schedule or some reasonable approximation thereof under normal circumstances.

The possible similarity of off-duty and on-duty activity should also

be noted. It should be equally clear that the nature of the work activity during

an on-duty period is an important variable and should be considered in establishing a work-rest schedule. Further consideration would include the extent

to which the work allows for' breaks, i. e. , brief nonwork periods, and whether

the tasks to be performed are self-paced, or if the person must perform in

accordance with the demands of the task.

For periods of up to five days, work -rest schedules of "2 on - 2 off,

"4 on - 2 off, " "4 on - 4 off, " "6 on - 2 off, " "6 on - 6 off, " "8 on - 4 off, "

and "8 on - 8 off, " can be maintained equally well in terms of performance

decrement.

Work-rest schedules of "4 on - 4 off" and "16 on - 8 off" can be

maintained equally well in terms of performance effectiveness for a period

of up to two weeks so long as no period of acute sleep loss is experienced, and

none of the typical "housekeeping" extracurricular tasks have to be performed.

For periods greater than two weeks and up to 30 days, a "4 on - 4 off"

schedule is superior to a "4 on - 2 off" schedule in terims of performance effectiveness. Under normal conditions, performance differences may not be great.

Under stressful conditions, however, "4 on - 2 off" and "6 on - 2 off" schedules

tend to result in poorer performance than do those which allo for longer offduty periods. There are also data which suggest that fur, \iork p t'iods over

two weeks long, the "4 on - 2 off" schedule results in lengihiemig of 'he 24-hour

diurnal rhythm and a corresponding change, with about a 2-hour la. in performance effectiveness.

When a period of acute sleep loss greater than 24 hou.- i. .xprienced

under continuous work-rest schedules of "4 on - 2 off" or ",i , - 8 off, " the

"4 on - 2 off" worker is most vulnerable, in terms of mainltaliditiL bai .line performance, and slowest to recover, while the "16 on - 8 off" % t, k. is least

vulnerable and quickest to recover.

492

-w :, &-----w ---- ---- ------- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-- --- - -
Adaptation in biological rhythms to atypical work-rest schedules

generally reqciires a three- to four-wveek time period. Adaptation may be

enhanced, however, if the individual can synchronize his sleep with the

sleep phase of the atypical schedule as quickly as possible. It is obviously

easier for a person to work when he is tired than it is for him to sleep Nkhen

he is alert and rested; therefore, adaptation will be enhanced if he (an start

on the new sleep cycle as soon as possible. Probably the best way to maximize the likelihood of this happening is to have the person stay awake sufficiently long to ensure his being in a low-alertness condition when the sleep

period of his new schedule comes around. This relatively simple solution

to problems of adaptation to new schedules seems to work fairly well, especially in the case of transmeridian shifts such as are experienced in eastbound flights. A period of three to five days typically is required for initial

adaptation; a complete phase shift takes three to four weeks on average.

Duty Schedules Most Vulnerable to Performance Degradation

Under what types of duty schedules is performance degradation

most likely to occur ? These schedules may also affect performance dc]ine

in subsequent continuous duty. A summary of this information appears in

Table 10.4.

Table 10.4

Duty Sciedules Most Vulnerable

to Performance Degradation

* Continuous, uninterrupted time on task for several

hours duration

* Work period between 0200-0600 hours (unless person

is specially prepared)

* Night-shift work with person having had less than three

to five days on the night shift

" Day and night shifts rotated on consecutive days

• Work periods of around the clock with 2-hour intervals

* First postsleep work period immediately following

continuous duty

Recovery from Sleep-Loss Effects

Given that sleep loss occurs, how long does it take to get over the

effects and what conditions enhance recovery? The problem of recovery from

sleep loss has not been explored nearly as extensively as have questions relating to sleep-loss effects or work-rest schedules. Correspondingly, the

49:1

Ai_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
suggestions which follow will tend to have a smaller number of scientific

studies to support them. Most notable for their absence are studies on the

degree of performance recovery that can be expected when only a fraction

of the total sleep-rest time required for recovery can be granted (e. g. , cat

naps). Such information, while of extreme importancc to sleep management

in continuous operations, does not exist at present.

Clearly, the most direct way to avoid the performance degradation

that results from sleep loss is to provide adequate sleep. One way of implementing this obvious fact is to arrange appropriate work-rest schedules

which provide sufficient off-duty time in large enough blocks to permit

adequate sleep. Frequently, in scheduling certain operations, it is possible

to anticipate that a prolonged-work or sleep-loss period will occur. If this

is the case, then it is recommended that the 12-hour period preceding such a

prolonged-work or sleep-loss period be kept free of duties. Ideally, this time

should be spent in sleep to build up performance reserves and thereby minimize the performance decrements during the later sleep-loss period. Operational requirements may preclude executing this recommendation, but it should

should be followed to the extent it is possible to do so.

If a period of acute sleep loss is experiended, the question naturally

arises as to what should be done to return the per'sonnel to what is essentially

a presleep-loss condition. An estimate must be made on how mu(h sleep is

necessary to provide recovery from the effects of sleep loss. Once again,

factors such as individual differen'cs, diurnal rhythm and duration of sleep

loss, must be taken into consideration.

A few generalizations, derived from laboratory and synthetic-task

investigations, appear to be valid. Less than six hours of sleep is usually

inadequate for full performance recover'y following a pci iod of 36 to 48 hours

of continuous work with no sleep. In fact, for a large number of subjects in

one study, eight hours of sleep was not adequate for full performance recovery.

The recovery of performance from acute sleep loss of up to 48 hour s

is generally complete after 12 hours of rest, although subjective fatigue is

reported until after the third full night of sleep. Sleep loss of mole than 48

hours (i. e., on the order of 72 or 96 hours of sleep loss) probably will require more than one full night of sleep before performance recovery is complete, and most certainly will require more than one night for the diurnal

rhythm to return to "normal."

If a period of 36 to 48 hours of continuous \\or'k is imposed on a

normal load of eight hours per day, e. g. , a 4/4/4' 12 or 8/ 16 work-rest

schedule, 12 hours of rest appears sufficient for recovery to %% ithin five

percent of baseline performance. However if the same load is imposed on

a %%ork load of 12 to 16 hours per day (as in a 4/4 or 4,2 k ork-ic.t schedule)

it takes about 24 hours of rest for rctoverv, to within five p:r, e nt of baseline

per-formance.

494
On the basis of these data, it appears ihai per fo'tlah , I',. o V.

after acute sleep loss will not be achieved b\ mos individuals unl,. < '11v

have at least eight hours of sleep. It is extreinely im)o taf', refrt',

that if men have endured a stressful period of sleep loss, th,'ri 2ol,' Io slc.Ip,

they should not be awakened for duty unt.L they have obiamed ad equate sh.,,'p

unless one is prepared to accept vely lowN perfomare e effik,,In ,v ill ,hell

work.

A summary of this information appears in Table 10. 5.

Table 10.5

Time Required for Recovery from Sic.p Loss

and for Adjustment

* 12 hours sleep-rest before prolonged work periotr

• 12 hours sleep-rest after 36-48 hour's acute sleep

loss (subjective fatigue may Linger for thrte days)

24 hours sleep-rest after 36048 hours sleep loss

with high work load (12-16 hours per day)

* Two to three days time off aftec 72 hours or more

acute sleep loss

* Three to five days to initiate biological adaptation

and return to normal day/ night c.ycle from night

shift work

0 Three to four weeks for full adaptation of biological

rhythms to atypical work-rest schedules (as in night

shift work)

A graphic summary is given in Figure 10. 1. in Figure 10. 1,

slashed lines suggest the range of variability in required/ recommended recovery time.

Methods for Counteracting Sleep-Loss Effects

The chief practical problem with the performance Iecremenl resuiting from Loss of sleep and with its management is that the only truly

effective cure is sleep itself. At one time, it was thought that (e rtain stages

of sleep, especially those classed as deep sleep, had greater recuperatiwe

effects than the less deep stages. Recent data, however', sugg.est that it is

the absolute amount of sleep, rather than the amount of time in any particular'

stage of sleep, that is c ritit il for per'formance recovelr\.

495

'7-.
0

,L

a (4 :"6 > c

Cc o o

0 :C LL

Oo( 00

o o

CC

too

3 C3

%00 a. '-

% CDC 0

a- P 0 o

0 0 w 0 U * - 0 cc - Ci0 0 -c

tt

, , . ao ")

C.,, .n 0 ~

0 a

w >.

~> U " 0 >1 t U)

0 0 t1 S " 0 (0 0

o". o u1

C) ~.-.

T9 m t

o4 E

496

|l *,
Considerable publicity has been given to the possible use of

meditative procedures and learned techniques for controlling physiological

processes within the body as %ays of overcoming the performance degradation

resulting from various stressors, including acute sleep loss. The data from

controled investigations of the meditative tochniques are, as yet, equivocal.

Subjects report feeling better, more rested, etc. , but the performance data

do not reflect any beneficial effects.

Hotation of tasks among cross trained crew members is one technique

that has been used to prevent fatigue and performance deterioration during

work. The benefits to be derived from task rotation are influenced by the

type of task involved, time on task, extent of sleep loss, and level of training

of the various crew member s. In general, performances on tasks that are

relatively routine, boring, and not too demanding intellectually seem to benefit

most from task rotation. This also seems to be true for work situations that

normally involve extended periods of time on a task. In both instances, the

benefits may be simply a result of a changed stimulus, and in that sense somewhat analogous to the effect of breaks on reducing the effect of lapses as discussed above.

Rotation of tasks among cross trained crew members during a given

workshift is least beneficial, and may even be detrimental, if the tasks

involved are of a complex cognitive nature involving decision making. This

is not necessarily true when the crew members are well practiced and expert at shifting functions, as would be the case with an artillery Fire Direction

Center (FDC), for example.

Performance effectiveness during continuous work perious of 36 to 48

hours, with no sleep, may be facilitated by task rotation among cross trained

crew members, especially if such rotation results in a lowker overall work

load for the person. There is, however-, some questions as to hox\ lasting

the effect would be, as well as whether or not it would be effective %k ith longer

periods of sleep loss.

As a general rule, the use of stimulant drugs may obviate some of

the drops in performance associated with sleep loss. D-amphetamine is

probably the most powerful stimulant drug used to any extent. While there

is little question that stimulants have an arousing effect and are generally

beneficial in terms of improved performance, there are serious drawbacks

to their use. For example, response to a stimulant is highly individual and

dose dependent. Really effective use would require knowledge of the individual's

reaction to a given dose under given conditions. Such information is rarely

available in operational situations. Were the appropriate information availab[c,

however, stimulant drugs might well be an effective %%ay to mainim alertness

over periods of as long as 36 hours of continuous work without .lcp. Mass

administration of stimulants, or prolonged or frequently repeat,,d isage, .annot be recommended, however.

497

-~ ~ i:~; - '------ ---- -- --- -. _-___ _I

_________________________________________ I _;.>'
It has often been obse!rved during studies of sleep deprivation that

good way to revive a flagging subject is to take him for a walk or other-

%ise exercise him physically. The extrcise should be of a relatively mild

nature since rigorous or demanding physical activity is more likely to result in inc reasing the effects of sleep toss and possibly further depleting

pirformance reserves.

%Ve might reasonably expect that adding another stressor to an already stressful situation would lead to greater performnance degradation.

Although all the data oil combined stressor effects on performance are

equivocal, there does seem to be sufficient data to indicate that the effects

of multiple stressors are not simply additive. Laboratory studies have

dcmonstrated that continuous or intermittent very loud noise tends to increase

the error rate and variability in the rate at which work is completed on a

variety of tasks. Acute sleep loss tends to have the same effect. Ilovkever,

combining the stressors kill not necessarily result in a total number of errors

.qual to the sum of their individual effects.

Thetre are sone data which suggest that noise, as described above,

may even counteract to some extent the effects on performance of up to 24

hours of sleep loss. It is doubtful that this would hold true for as much as

48 hours of sleep loss. This observation may not be pertinent if the operational situation is already rather noisy as when individuals are( running

various pieces of motorized equipment, rifle firing, and the like. In otherwise quiet situations, such as are found occasionally in monitoring tasks, it

may have some validity.

Procedures for Reducing Performance Degradation in Continuous Operations

How can the risks of incurring degraded performance due to sleep

loss be minimized? What means, apart from sleep (or cat naps) itself, are

there for counteracting fatigue? A summary of this information appears in

Table 10.6.

Finally, it cannot be stressed sufficiently that those most in need of

sleep are persons--regardless of rank or background--who must make decisions

or plans. The survival of any military unit and of its individual members depends on "clearheaded" reasoning. Therefore, the maximum of sleep-rest

that can possibly be spared should be allocated to such persons.

498

- ---}-------.- ---- --- - i i
b 1, -~ I U. 1;

I~y((~r~,fo i ig - Dtrformki~tror

111 ('olntlilU-I S 01M," lor)IS

* P'eriod ic breaks in tusk and imid phlv si A exo r.i- o:

Irer at lonl

* 63-8 IbooI ( Ot11001U S oil d UtV 1;lt- pti 2-1 hour ptcriou

* Ta.;k rotation amfong ro,-; T in d ( t 'A oi ve ltixiv

routine jobs

* Task rotation[ amon1011'1 Oil k 0r11p x tasks only % htti

members art: ily., t'iirwd t') Ahift fonllkt UIoS

* Selection of p sor. o pitift-r and ar ( abiti -o aJ pt

to diffe runt v% ork scherjuit

& Trxaining oil] tornpex ta,-ks to a high dug ret orfx~

learIning"

* System design to compensatu for typus of i lors most

likely to occur

0 Plan for and provide naps where 1-ossible

499
m=LaN.DZG p~c BLia -c r1' i

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF MILITARY ABBREVIATIONS

USED IN SCENARIO AND TASK LISTS

5

501

41 i
L1G PGE BLANK - r Fli"kDI

Abbreviation Definition

AD Air Defense

AMMO Ammunition

APC Armored Personnel Carrier

ARTY Artillery

ASACO Army Security Agency Company

AT Anti-Tank

ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile

BMP Threat Infantry Combat Vehicle

BP Battle Position

Br/BDE Brigade

Btry/BTRY Battery

CBR Chemical/Biological/Radiological

CBT Combat

CEOI Communications/Electronics Operating Instructor

CFA Covering Force Area

CLGP Cannon Launched Guided Projectile

CO Commanding Officer

COAX MG Coaxial Machine Gun

COMEX Communication Exchange

CP Command Post

Div Division

DR Driver

DS Direct Support

Engr Engineers

FA Field Artillery

FDC Fire Direction Center

FEBA Forward Edge of Battle Area

FIST Fire Support Team

FO Forward Observer

FPF Final Protection Fire

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

FS NCO Fire Support Sergeant

FSO Fire Support Officer

GR Gunner

GS General Support

GSR Ground Surveillance Radar

HAW Heavy Anti-Tank Weapon

HE High Explosive Ammunition

HVY SEC Heavy Tank Section (3 tanks)

1CM Improved Conventional Munitions

INF Infantry

LAW Light Anti-Tank Weapon

LT SEC Light Tank Section (2 tanks)

MAW Medium Anti-Tank Weapon

MBA Main Battle Area

MECH Mechanized

MG Machine Gun

MICV Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle

503 .l
MOC Method of Control

MOE Method of Engagement

NCS Net Control Station

NIR Night Infrared Device

NOD Night Observation Device

NVD Night Vision Device

OP Observation Post

PL Platoon Leader

PLT Platoon

Plat Platoon

RATELLO or RTO Radio/Telephone Operator

SL Squad Leader

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SP Self-Propelled

SW Squad Weapon

TACAIR Tactical Close Air Support

TF Task Force

TF CDR Task Force Commander

TGP Target Group

TK Tank

TM Team

TM CDR Team Commander

TM LDR Team Leader

TOW Tube-Launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-Guided ATGM

TRP Target Reference Point

V Vulcan

VT Variable Time Fuze

XO Executive Officer

81mm 81mm Mortar (Company)

4.2" 107mm Mortar (Battalion)

155mm SP 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer

1SG First Sergeant

Unit Abbreviation Format Examples

(-) Understrength

2/A/78 Second Platoon, A Company, TF 4-78

A Btry (-) (3-454) (U) A Battery, Understrength, third of the 454th,

(AD) (DS) Vulcan, Air Defense, Direct Support

A/4-78(-) A Company, TF 4-78, Understrength

TF 9-50 FA (155,SP) Task Force 9-50, Field Artillery (155 Howitzer

equipped, Self-Propelled)

504 1
APPENDIX II

CRITICAL TASKS AND ABILITIES DEGRAD'CD BY

EACH DEBILITATING FACTOR FOR EACH UNIT,)L7FY POSITION

Mechanized Infantry

Platoon Leader

Squad Leader

Maneuver Team Member

Gunner/Carrier Team Leader

Tank Crew

Platoon Leader

Commander

Gunner

Loader

FIST Personnel

FIST Chief

Forward Observer

Fire Support NCO

RATELLO (RTO)

Artillery Battery

Platoon Leader

Commander

Gunner

Loader

505
_. h ... ... ...

MECHANIZED INFANTRY-PLATOON LEADER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 60, 71, 73

H 54, 68, 71, 73

NF 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64,

6S, 69, 76

R 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64,

66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76

PS 54, 57, 60, 69, 73

0 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 64, 69, 74, 75, 76

Diurnal Rhythm NF 50, 54, 56, 60, 61, 63, *3, 69, 72

R 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64,

66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76

Light Level/Visibility V 50, 51, 54, 57, 63, 68, 72, 74

H 54, 63, 68, 72, 74

DP

O 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 69, 71,

74, 75, 76

Stress M 54, 56, 60, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73

R 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64,

66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76

PS 51, 54, 60, 69

C 54, 55, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67,

68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76

507

r .. .. _ _ __ _ _ _ _
MECHANIZED INFANTRY-SQUAD LEADER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44

H 33, 39, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48

NF 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45,

46, 47, 49

R 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44,

45, 46, 47, 49

PS 33, 39, 44

O 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 49

Diurnal Rhythm NF 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44

R 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,

46, 47, 49

Light Level/Visibility V 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48

H 33, 39, 41, 44, 47, 48

DP

0 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 49

Stress M 39, 40, 43, 44, 49

R 34, 36, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46,

47, 49

PS 33, 39, 44

C 34, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49

508
MECHANIZED INFANTRY-MANEUVER TEAM MEMBER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 19, 20, 26, 28, 30, 32

H 19, 22, 26, 30, 32

NF 21, 25

R 21, 25

PS 19, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32

0 22, 23, 24

Diurnal Rhythm NF 21, 25

R 21, 25

ight Level/Visibility V 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32 H 19, 22

DP 18, 20, 22, 23, 30

0 24, 29, 31

Stress M 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32

R 18, 21, 25

PS 19, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32

C 22

509

7:
MECHANIZED INFANTRY-GUNNER/CTL

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 16

H 1, 6, 9, 14

NF 10, 11, 12, 14, 16

R 10, 11, 12, 14, 16

PS 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14

0 6, 7, 11, 13, 15

Diurnal Rhythm NF 11, 13, 14, 16

R 11, 12, 13, 14, 16

Light Level/Visibility V 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16

H 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12

DP 6

0 2, 7, 11, 13, 15

Stress M 6, 7, 11, 12, 15

R 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

PS 1, 3, 6, 11, 14

C 8, 12, 13

I
TANK PLATOON-PLATOON LEADER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 15, 21

H

NF 14, 24 R 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18,

22, 25

PS 15, 16, 22, 23, 24

O 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 18, 23, 24

Diurnal Rhythm NF 14, 24

R 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16,

17, 18, 22, 25

Light Level/Visibility V 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24

H

DP

O 1, 2, 4, 14, 15, 23, 24

Stress 1 10, 14, 26

R 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 1,

22, 25

PS 15, 24

C 1, 2, 8, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26

51

511
TANK PLATOON-TANK COMMANDER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 33, 35, 38, 40

H 33

NF

R 30, 39

PS 35, 39, 40

0 29, 32, 35

Diurnal Rhythm NF

R 30, 39

Light Level/Visibility V 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40

H 33

DP

O 29, 32, 35

Stress M 34

R 30, 39

PS 35

C 27, 28, 32, 35, 37, 40, 41

512
TANK PATOON-GUNNER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 42, 43, 46

H

NF

R

PS 42, 43

0

Diurnal Rhythm NF

R

Light Level/Visibility V 42, 43, 46

H

DP

0

Stress M

R

PS

C 42, 43

.
TANK PLATOON-LOADER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V

H

NF

R

PS

0

Diurnal Rhythm NF

R

Light Level/Visibility V

H

DP

0

Stress M

R 57

PS

C 56

514
FIST-FIST CHIEF

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 10, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 26

H

NF 10, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,

25, 26

R 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 19, 25

PS 26

O 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 20, 21. 23,

24, 26

Diurnal Rhythm NF 10, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,

25, 26 R 5, 6, 11, 13, 19, 25, 26

Light Level/Visibility V 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20,

21, 22, 23, 26, 27

H

DP

0 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22,

23, 24, 26

Stress M 1, 26, 27

R 2, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20,

22, 23, 25, 26

PS 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26,

27

C 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29

515

_ M.,o 
FIST-FORWARD OBSERVER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 39, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54

H

NF 38, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,

51, 52, 53, 54

R 35, 42, 44, 53

PS 39, 54

O 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 47, 48,

50, 51, 52, 54

Diurnal Rhythm NF 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,

49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54

R 35, 42, 44, 53, 54

Light Level/Visibility V 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,

47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55

H

DP

O 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48,

50, 51, 52, 54

Stress M 30, 31, 54, 55

R 32, 33, 35, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50,

51, 53, 54

PS 39, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54,

55

C 32, 33, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,

53, 54, 55, 56

516
FIST-FIRE SUPPORT NCO

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V

H

NF

R

PS

0

Diurnal Rhythm NF

R

Light Level/Visibility V

H

DP

0

Stress M 57

R

PS

C 58

517
FIST-RADIO TELEPHONE OPERATOR

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V

H

NF

R

PS

0

Diurnal Rhythm NF

R

Light Level/Visibility V

H

DP

0

Stress M 59

R

PS

c

I
ARTILLERY BATTERY-EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V

H

NF 2, 4, 6

R 6,

PS

0 2, 3, 4

Diurnal Rhythm NF 2, 4

R

Light Level/Visibility V 1, 2, 4, 5

H

DP

0 2, 3, 4

Stress M 2, 4, 6

R 4, 5, 6

PS

C 1, 3, 4

519
ARTILLERY BATTERY-SECTION CHIEF

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 9, 11, 16

H

NF 9, 15, 16

R 10, 17

PS

O 9, 10

Diurnal Rhythm NF 9, 11, 15, 16

R

Light Level/Visibility V 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17

H

DP

0 9, 10, 16, 17

Stress M

R 8, 10, 12, 17

PS

C 13, 14, 15, 17

J

' - 520

-
ARTILLERY BATTERY-GUNNER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30

H

NF 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30, 34

R

PS

0 20, 31, 32, 33, 34

Diurnal Rhythm NF 18, 22, 23, 24, 30, 34

R

Light Level/Visibility V 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28,

29, 30, 32, 33 H

DP

0 20, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34

Stress M 32, 33, 34

R

PS

C

521
ARTILLERY BATTERY-CREW MEMBER

DEBILITATING FACTOR ABILITY TASKS

Fatigue V

H 40

NF

R 48

PS

0

Diurnal Rhythm NF

RI

Light Level/Visibility V 41, 42, 43, 45, 47

H

DP

0

Stress M 48

R 48

PS 43

C 40

522