IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TIMERA QUINN, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v.

JULIO CARDENAS, Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0398 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2018-007278 

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Bradley & Associates, Goodyear 

By Percival R. Bradley 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee 

Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix 

By John T. Masterson, Michele Molinario, Justin M. Ackerman, 

Derek R. Graffious 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

FILED 8-1-2023
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

OPINION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 Following a minor traffic accident, Timera Quinn (“Quinn”) 

and Julio Cardenas (“Cardenas”) got into an altercation. What made this 

conflict different is that, unbeknownst to Quinn, Cardenas was an off-duty 

City of Phoenix Police Officer. The altercation quickly escalated until 

Cardenas pulled his service weapon, revealed his status as a police officer, 

and detained Quinn while on-duty officers arrived. 

¶2 Quinn brought four claims against Cardenas in superior 

court: a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for excessive force), and three 

state law claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction 

of emotional distress. After Cardenas removed the case to federal court, 

that court granted summary judgment for Cardenas on the § 1983 claim. 

The federal district court remanded the three state-law claims to state court. 

¶3 The primary issue we answer is whether, on remand, a federal 

court’s final judgment binds the superior court in any way. And if so, 

whether a final judgment is binding under preclusion principles (issue and 

claim preclusion) or, instead, the law of the case principles. 

¶4 We hold that a federal court’s final judgment is, upon remand, 

binding on the superior court under preclusion principles. We also 

conclude the federal court’s final judgment granting Cardenas qualified 

immunity is, under the issue preclusion doctrine, fatal to her state law 

claims for assault and false imprisonment. We, therefore, affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶5 Quinn and Cardenas were involved in a traffic accident on the 

evening of May 14, 2017. The record is unclear how the accident came about 

or who caused it, but those matters are immaterial. What we do know is 

that Cardenas, who was off-duty, pulled off the interstate. Quinn, who was 

accompanied by two male passengers, drove behind him. At some point, 

their vehicles collided. 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

¶6 Cardenas then drove to a nearby gas station; Quinn followed. 

There, Quinn’s male passengers exited the vehicle and one of them 

discussed the collision with Cardenas. Quinn’s passengers returned to the 

vehicle, and Quinn began driving away before the parties exchanged 

identification or insurance information. Cardenas began running after 

Quinn’s vehicle, causing Quinn to turn around and park. Quinn exited her 

vehicle and confronted Cardenas about who caused the accident and who 

failed to remain at the scene. At some point during the discussion, Quinn’s 

two male passengers also exited. 

¶7 Cardenas then utilized an “impact push” against Quinn. 

Using his two hands against her upper chest, Cardenas pushed Quinn 

while taking a step back. Quinn still did not know Cardenas was a police 

officer. So Quinn responded, pushing Cardenas. Cardenas then revealed 

his occupation; he drew his service weapon, announced he was a police 

officer, and ordered Quinn to return to her vehicle. Quinn complied. 

Eventually, on-duty police arrived and took control. 

¶8 Quinn sued Cardenas in the superior court under § 1983 for 

allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive 

force. Quinn also asserted state law tort claims for assault, false 

imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cardenas 

removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, where it was assigned to the Hon. Michael T. Liburdi. The parties 

completed fact and expert discovery, after which Cardenas moved for 

summary judgment on all claims. The federal court granted Cardenas’ 

motion concerning Quinn’s § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds. 

Having disposed of the lone federal claim, the court remanded Quinn’s 

state law claims back to the superior court. Quinn did not appeal the 

federal court’s order and judgment. 

¶9 On remand, Cardenas moved for summary judgment on the 

remaining tort claims, arguing in part that the federal judgment precluded 

re-litigation of the federal court’s qualified immunity decision. The court 

granted the motion on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 

based on evidentiary shortcomings, but it otherwise denied the motion.1 

¶10 A different superior court judge rotated onto the case. Shortly 

before trial, the parties filed a joint pretrial statement, with Cardenas again 

raising issue preclusion arguments. But this time, Cardenas’ arguments 

1 Quinn did not appeal this ruling, so the only claims at issue are her 

assault and false imprisonment claims. 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

4 

focused on the federal court’s factual findings and how they might impact 

jury instructions. The court ordered Quinn to address Cardenas’ preclusion 

arguments. After oral argument, the court concluded that because there 

was a final federal judgment involving the same parties and the same 

issues, issue preclusion prohibited Quinn from moving forward with her 

assault and false imprisonment claims. 

¶11 Quinn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Summary Judgment Timing 

¶12 Before addressing the meat of the appeal, we address two 

preliminaries. First, Quinn asserts that the superior court’s ruling stemmed 

from an untimely renewed motion for summary judgment tucked into 

Cardenas’ joint pretrial statement. Cardenas responds that the court raised 

the summary judgment issue on its own under Rule 56(f). We review 

whether the superior court properly heard a motion, even an untimely one, 

for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Vincent, 147 Ariz. 6, 9 (App. 1985). 

¶13 Under Rule 56(f)(3), “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable 

time to respond, the court may: . . . consider summary judgment on its own 

after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in 

dispute.” After unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment on two of 

Quinn’s claims, Cardenas, in the joint pretrial statement, again addressed 

the federal court’s order and judgment and their impact on the surviving 

claims. The superior court held a status conference where this issue was 

discussed, and the court allowed Quinn to file a brief explaining why the 

surviving claims should be tried. While Quinn’s brief is not part of the 

record because Quinn emailed it directly to opposing counsel and the court 

without ever filing it, Quinn concedes she complied with the court’s order 

by providing a brief.2 The court then held oral argument and ultimately 

concluded that the federal judgment precluded the state tort claims. 

Because the parties were given notice and an opportunity to respond, the 

superior court’s judgment was procedurally permitted under Rule 56(f). 

¶14 Additionally, trial courts serve an important function as 

gatekeepers to ensure only meritorious claims and defenses reach a jury. 

2 To aid appellate review, counsel should ensure that any briefs 

submitted directly to the superior court through email are also filed on the 

court’s docket. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a). 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

See, e.g., Booth v. State, 207 Ariz. 61, 68 ¶ 20 (App. 2004); Sign Here Petitions 

LLC v. Chavez, 243 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 1 (App. 2017). Indeed, a superior court 

has the authority to “eliminate nonmeritorious claims or defenses” at a 

scheduling conference. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(d)(9). And courts must also 

“manage a civil action” with the objectives to (1) manage the court’s 

calendar to eliminate unnecessary trial settings; (2) adhere to “applicable 

standards for timely resolution of civil actions”; and (3) conserve the 

parties’ resources. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(A); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 1. The court 

did not abuse its discretion in disposing of claims it thought were nonmeritorious in lieu of conducting an unnecessary jury trial. 

II. Horizontal Appeal 

¶15 Second, Quinn contends Cardenas asked Judge Astrowsky 

for an impermissible “horizontal appeal” of Judge McCoy’s earlier decision 

denying summary judgment. “We review the superior court’s 

reconsideration of an earlier ruling for an abuse of discretion.” Humphrey 

v. State, 249 Ariz. 57, 67 ¶ 36 (App. 2020). 

¶16 We refer to a request for “a second trial judge to reconsider 

the decision of the first trial judge in the same matter, even though no new 

circumstances have arisen in the interim and no other reason justifies 

reconsideration” as a “horizontal appeal.” Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Mont. 

Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275, 278–79 (App. 1993). A court cannot 

turn away a horizontal appeal simply to “justify [its] refusal to reconsider a 

ruling when an error in the first decision renders it manifestly erroneous or 

unjust[.]” Id. at 279. In such circumstances, “a second judge does not abuse 

his discretion by agreeing to reconsider an earlier decision.” Id.; Humphrey, 

249 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 39. 

¶17 Cardenas argues the superior court did not violate the 

horizontal appeal doctrine because Judge Astrowsky was permitted to 

revisit a prior ruling if it was “palpably erroneous.” Because summary 

judgment should have been granted earlier based on issue preclusion, he 

argues, any decision holding otherwise was erroneous. 

¶18 We agree that Quinn’s horizontal appeal argument ultimately 

turns on the correctness of Judge Astrowsky’s final preclusion ruling. As 

an appellate court, we primarily review the content of final judgments. The 

horizontal appeal argument does not really get Quinn anything her 

challenges to the final judgment would not already get her—once final 

judgment is entered, the horizontal appeal argument largely collapses into 

the merits of the appeal. Think about it—if Judge Astrowsky correctly 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

6 

decided the preclusion issue (reflected in the final judgment), Quinn’s 

horizontal appeal argument (along with the rest of her appeal) fails. If he 

incorrectly decided the preclusion issue, we would reverse the final 

judgment on that basis, even if a prior ruling by the superior court once got 

the merits right. To the extent Quinn argues Judge Astrowsky might have 

been right in the end but the ruling he reversed was also not “palpably 

erroneous,” we reject the argument as slicing the onion a bit too thin. 

III. The Merits of the Superior Court’s Preclusion Decision 

¶19 Turning to the merits, Quinn argues the superior court 

erroneously granted summary judgment by concluding the federal order 

and judgment precluded her assault and false imprisonment claims. We 

review the superior court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming 

if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Williamson 

v. PVOrbit, Inc., 228 Ariz. 69, 71 ¶ 11 (App. 2011). We may affirm the grant 

of summary judgment on any grounds raised in the superior court. See Zuck 

v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 42 (App. 1988). 

A. Preclusion vs. Law of the Case 

¶20 Quinn first questions whether a federal court judgment has 

preclusive effect when state law claims return after removal. Quinn argues 

that a federal court judgment should not have preclusive effect on remand 

because the state court action is the same as the action removed. With the 

mere continuation of an already-existing case, there is no second action in 

which to apply preclusion. Although Quinn’s argument makes some sense, 

we conclude that preclusion, rather than law of the case, principles apply 

when litigation is removed to federal court, a final federal court judgment 

issues, and the case then completes the round trip back to state court for 

resolution of pendant state law claims. 

¶21 Ordinarily, claim preclusion (once referred to as res judicata) 

“bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could 

have been raised in the prior action” resulting in a final judgment. Clem v. 

Pinal County, 251 Ariz. 349, 353 ¶ 8 (App. 2021) (emphasis added). 

Similarly, issue preclusion (once referred to as collateral estoppel) prohibits 

the re-litigation of an issue actually litigated and decided in a final 

judgment. See Brown v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 199 Ariz. 521, 524 ¶ 11 (App. 

2001). Litigants ordinarily invoke issue preclusion when, in a subsequent 

action, a party tries to litigate an issue decided after final judgment in a 

prior lawsuit. 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

7 

¶22 To enforce rulings made in the same case, the best a party can 

usually do is invoke the law of the case doctrine. That doctrine reflects the 

“judicial policy of refusing to reopen questions previously decided in the 

same case by the same court or a higher appellate court.” Powell-Cerkoney, 

176 Ariz. at 278 (emphasis added). 

¶23 The situation here does not fit perfectly within preclusion 

principles or the law of the case doctrine. On the one hand, the federal 

judgment is not a judgment from a prior action—it is a judgment on the 

federal claims in this action before remand. The superior court case number 

pre-remand is the same post-remand. So applying preclusion is a bit 

awkward. On the other hand, a federal district court is neither the same as 

the superior court nor a court maintaining appellate jurisdiction over the 

superior court. So applying the law of the case doctrine is likewise 

awkward. 

¶24 This quandary has split other state courts—some have 

applied preclusion principles after remand from federal court, and others 

have used the law of the case doctrine. Compare Stewart v. City of Hammond,

322 So. 3d 1253, 1257 (La. Ct. App. 2021) (applying preclusion principles); 

Massad v. Greaves, 977 A.2d 662, 668 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (same), with

Cordova v. Larsen, 94 P.3d 830, 834 ¶ 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the 

law of the case doctrine); Hess v. Wojcik-Hess, 86 A.D.3d 847, 848 (N.Y. App. 

Div. 2011) (same). 

¶25 We think applying preclusion principles is the better path. 

Under the U.S. Constitution, “both the Federal Government and the States 

wield sovereign powers, and that is why our system of government is said 

to be one of ‘dual sovereignty.’” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 

138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018). The federal courts are part and parcel of that 

dual sovereignty. Treating a final judgment from a federal court under 

preclusion principles is most consistent with that system, particularly when 

(as explained below) we apply federal law to determine the preclusive 

effect of a federal judgment. See Clem, 251 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 7. Using preclusion 

principles “helps maintain the integrity of federal judicial power and the 

coherence of the federalist judicial system.” Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & 

Drainage Dist. v. Robertson, 211 Ariz. 485, 491 ¶ 38 (2005). 

¶26 Ordinarily, when a party seeks to re-litigate a claim or issue 

rejected by a federal court resulting in a final judgment issued in a different 

action, preclusion principles apply. See id. at 491–92 ¶¶ 39–43 (applying 

issue preclusion principle to a prior federal judgment). Moreover, 

preclusion can apply in the same action when a trial court certifies a 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

8 

judgment as final under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See 

Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525 

(9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that “a 54(b) ruling in fact has res judicata

ramifications, which are potentially very important”). We see no 

compelling reason—and Quinn offers none—why preclusion should not 

also apply when a party seeks to re-litigate a claim or issue decided in a 

final judgment issued in the same case after removal but prior to remand. 

¶27 Applying the law of the case doctrine instead of preclusion is 

less consistent with dual sovereignty. Treating a final judgment from a 

federal court the same as a ruling issued in the same case by the superior 

court or a higher appellate court, ignores that federal and state courts 

operate within separate and sovereign judicial systems—a “federalist 

judicial system.” Id. at 491 ¶ 38. 

¶28 Moreover, it is doubtful that applying preclusion principles 

instead of law of the case will make it easier for federal judgments to have a 

binding effect. Rather, in most circumstances, applying preclusion 

principles will make it more difficult to cut off state court litigation. 

Compare Clem, 251 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 18 (discussing federal issue preclusion 

standard), with Powell-Cerkoney, 176 Ariz. at 279 (discussing Arizona law of 

the case doctrine). Using preclusion principles, thus, strikes the proper 

balance between respecting federalism, by showing respect for federal 

court judgments, and not prematurely cutting off additional state court 

litigation. 

¶29 The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that a federal 

court’s decision before remand may have issue preclusive effects. See 

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (“If a federal court 

dismisses a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction, that 

determination may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same 

personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”). This Court’s only prior opinion 

dealing with the issue has, without discussion, implicitly followed that path 

by applying preclusion principles. See S. Leasing Corp. v. Tufts, 167 Ariz. 133 

(App. 1991). We now hold that the preclusive effect of a federal court 

judgment travels back with it to the superior court after remand, even in 

the same case. 

B. Issue Preclusion Applies 

¶30 We determine the preclusive effect of a prior judgment de 

novo. Clem, 251 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 7. When a federal court entered the prior 

judgment at issue, we apply federal law to determine whether the judgment 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

9 

precludes later state court litigation. Id. In any event, Arizona courts apply 

the same issue preclusion test as federal courts. Compare Oyeniran v. Holder, 

672 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012), with Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 

Ariz. 571, 573 (1986). 

¶31 As explained, there are two types of preclusion—claim and 

issue. Claim preclusion “treats a judgment, once rendered as the full 

measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same 

‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’” Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Issue preclusion, similarly based on the issuance of a prior final 

judgment, “prevents relitigation of all ‘issues of fact or law that were 

actually litigated and necessarily decided’ in a prior proceeding.’” Id. at 322 

(citation omitted). An issue may be precluded from re-litigation “even if 

the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 

U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Because Quinn’s § 1983 claim differs from her statelaw assault and false imprisonment claims, issue preclusion is the only 

potentially applicable preclusion doctrine. 

¶32 A party asserting issue preclusion must prove: “(1) the issue 

at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually 

litigated and decided in the prior proceeding; (3) there was a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide 

the merits.” Oyeniran, 672 F.3d at 806. We conclude the federal court’s final 

judgment satisfies each requirement. 

1. Identical Issues 

¶33 Quinn argues the federal judgment cannot preclude her tort 

claims because those claims are not governed by federal qualified immunity 

standards, and thus the issues are not identical. To determine whether 

issues are identical, federal courts apply the following four factors from the 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments: 

(1) [I]s there a substantial overlap between the evidence or 

argument to be advanced in the second proceeding and that 

advanced in the first? (2) does the new evidence or argument 

involve the application of the same rule of law as that 

involved in the prior proceeding? (3) could pretrial 

preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in 

the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced the 

matter sought to be presented in the second? (4) how closely 

related are the claims involved in the two proceedings? 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

10 

Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017); accord Clem, 

251 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 20. We are not required to apply the factors mechanically 

but should instead use them as a helpful guide in assessing whether issues 

are identical. See Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041–44 (holding that the issues were 

identical after finding only the first restatement factor was “illuminating”). 

a. Substantial Overlap of Evidence 

¶34 In the federal litigation, Cardenas maintained that his actions 

were constitutional but also asserted qualified immunity as a defense to 

Quinn’s § 1983 claim. Quinn points out that resolving a federal qualified 

immunity defense does not address her assault or false imprisonment 

claims. That is correct so far as it goes. But Quinn’s argument misses at 

least two points. First, the evidence and arguments underlying her assault 

and false imprisonment claims overlap substantially with the evidence and 

arguments supporting her § 1983 claim based on excessive force. In fact, 

the evidence underlying each of those claims is identical. Second, while 

Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment claims may not have identical 

elements as her § 1983 claim, Quinn does not dispute that, when the 

applicable elements are satisfied, state-law qualified immunity can apply to 

assault and false imprisonment claims, just as federal qualified immunity 

applied to her § 1983 claim.3 The issues underlying those defenses are 

substantially overlapping and thus governed by nearly identical 

arguments. 

¶35 Federal qualified immunity bars recovery of monetary 

damages “unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official 

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly 

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Federal qualified immunity is said to combat “the risk 

that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly 

inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 638 (1987). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[i]n excessive 

3 Because Quinn does not argue that state-law qualified immunity is 

wholly inapplicable to an assault or a false imprisonment claim, we assume 

for purposes of our analysis that qualified immunity can apply to those 

claims (and not just negligence claims). But see Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 

Ariz. 551, 558 (1986) (applying state-law qualified immunity to a 

defamation claim); McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 13 P.3d 631, 641 (Wash. App. 

2000) (“Having found that the officers’ use of force was reasonable, we find 

that they are entitled to state law qualified immunity for the assault and 

battery claims.”). 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

11 

force cases, the inquiry remains whether, under the circumstances, a 

reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the force employed was 

unlawful, and whether any mistake to the contrary would have been 

unreasonable.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(cleaned up). 

¶36 Similarly, in Arizona, “qualified immunity generally 

provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from 

liability when ‘performing an act that inherently requires judgment or 

discretion.’” Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119, 123 ¶ 9 (App. 2018). 

“The doctrine thus gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting 

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 

Id. (quotation marks omitted). If an officer is performing a discretionary act 

within the scope of his public duties, he can only be liable if he “knew or 

should have known that he was acting in violation of established law or 

acted in reckless disregard of whether his activities would deprive another 

person of their rights.” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 558. “If immunity applies, 

an officer is shielded from liability unless the conduct rises to gross 

negligence or recklessness.” Jennings v. Agne in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 254 

Ariz. 174, __ ¶ 15 (App. 2022). 

¶37 Both federal and state qualified immunity require an analysis 

of whether Cardenas violated established law or unreasonably disregarded 

the unlawful nature of his conduct. Because the evidence and arguments 

required to resolve either qualified immunity defense are nearly the same 

(at least in the context of excessive force), we conclude there is a substantial 

overlap between the issues. 

b. Remaining Identical Issue Factors 

¶38 Additionally, the parties completed discovery and summary 

judgment briefing on all issues in federal court before remand. No 

additional discovery was later conducted back in state court. Indeed, in the 

order remanding, the federal court “anticipate[d] that the parties could 

refile the same or substantially similar summary judgment briefing on the 

state law claims in state court with limited additional effort.” Quinn v. 

Cardenas, 2020 WL 2512787, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2020). And that is exactly 

what transpired. This factor supports Cardenas. 

¶39 Both the second and fourth restatement factors also support 

that the issues are identical. See Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041–44. As explained, 

although Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment claims do not share 

elements with her § 1983 claim, Cardenas’ federal and state qualified 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

12 

immunity defenses are substantially similar because both involve a similar 

standard. In other words, both require the application of a similar rule of 

law—whether Cardenas, under the circumstances, unreasonably violated 

established law. Consequently, we hold that the issues are identical for the 

purposes of issue preclusion. 

2. Remaining Issue Preclusion Factors 

¶40 The remaining issue preclusion factors are also satisfied. The 

parties actually litigated, and the federal court decided, whether Cardenas 

acted reasonably under the circumstances. Resolution of that issue was 

necessary to determine the merits of the federal qualified immunity 

defense. Finally, there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 

The parties completed discovery and full summary judgment briefing in 

federal court, and Quinn does not argue that she was deprived in federal 

court of the opportunity to fully develop any evidence necessary to 

overcome Cardenas’ qualified immunity defense. Consequently, on 

remand, the federal court’s resolution of issues was binding on the parties. 

C. Effect of Issue Preclusion 

¶41 The superior court correctly concluded that, applying issue 

preclusion principles, the federal court’s resolution of federal qualified 

immunity is fatal to Quinn’s state law claims. The federal court recognized 

that the altercation between Quinn and Cardenas resulted in three events 

that could “give rise to liability under § 1983”: (1) Cardenas’ impact push 

against Quinn; (2) Cardenas pulling his weapon when he announced he 

was a police officer; and (3) Cardenas ordering Quinn to remain in her car 

until police arrived. Quinn, 2020 WL 2512787 at *3. These three 

circumstances provide the underlying factual basis for Quinn’s assault and 

false imprisonment claims. The federal court held that under each set of 

facts, Quinn failed to meet her burden to show clearly established law 

prohibited Cardenas’ actions, holding instead that Cardenas was justified 

and acted as a reasonable officer would at each turn. Id. at *3–4. 

¶42 First, the federal court recognized that for liability to arise 

under § 1983, Cardenas had to have been acting under color of law during 

the events in question. Id. at *3 n.5. The federal court found that “[t]he 

parties agree that Officer Cardenas was acting under color of law during 

his interaction with Ms. Quinn.” Id. The federal court then analyzed each 

of the three events. Regarding the impact push, the federal court found as 

follows: 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

13 

Here, Ms. Quinn has failed to satisfy her burden that clearly 

established law would have prohibited Officer Cardenas’ impact 

push under the presented circumstances. Officer Cardenas 

utilized the impact push to create distance between himself, 

on the one hand, and Ms. Quinn and her two male passengers, 

on the other. Officer Cardenas and Ms. Quinn were engaged 

in a shouting match at close proximity. From the perspective of 

a reasonable officer, the situation could have deteriorated to a much 

more serious altercation where Officer Cardenas would be 

outnumbered three to one and without knowledge of whether any of 

the individuals were armed.

Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 

¶43 Regarding Cardenas pulling his weapon and announcing he 

was a police officer, the federal court likewise found the following: 

Ms. Quinn has similarly failed to show that established law would 

have prohibited Officer Cardenas’ use of his service weapon under 

the circumstances presented . . . . [Officer Cardenas] used [his 

weapon] with the objective of calming a heated verbal 

altercation, that could very well have led to a physical 

exchange, while waiting for on-duty law enforcement to 

arrive . . . . Ms. Quinn’s interaction with Officer Cardenas 

cannot be described as peaceful. She engaged in a verbal 

argument with him and, at one point, shoved him hard 

enough that he was pushed back from where he stood . . . . 

Officer Cardenas thought that Ms. Quinn was attempting to 

leave the scene in her car . . . . Officer Cardenas was 

outnumbered by Ms. Quinn and her two friends . . . . And 

Officer Cardenas was not aware of whether any of the three 

had a weapon that he did not know about. Under these facts, a 

reasonable officer would be concerned for his or her safety and the 

use of Officer Cardenas’ weapon was therefore justified for the 

purposes of the qualified immunity analysis. 

Id. at *3–4 (emphasis added). 

¶44 Finally, the federal court concluded, “Ms. Quinn has not 

identified any established law that prohibited Officer Cardenas from 

holding Ms. Quinn, with his weapon in hand, while waiting for on-duty 

officers to arrive.” Id. at *4. Based on these findings, the federal court 

granted Cardenas’ request for qualified immunity. Id. at *5. 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

14 

¶45 The federal court’s resolution of the issues underlying federal 

qualified immunity, unchallenged by Quinn, doom her state-law assault 

claim. The federal court concluded Cardenas acted in his official capacity 

during each of the underlying incidents. Id. at *3 n.5. The federal court then 

found that Cardenas acted as a reasonable officer would; Cardenas was 

justified in employing an impact push against Quinn and then pulling his 

weapon and announcing himself as a police officer. Id. at *3–4. Those same 

conclusions—that Cardenas acted as a reasonable officer would and did not 

violate clearly established law—preclude the opposite finding in state court 

(i.e., a finding that Cardenas violated established law and was grossly 

negligent or reckless in doing so). The federal court’s findings entitle 

Cardenas to state qualified immunity from that claim. See Chamberlain, 151 

Ariz. at 558. 

¶46 Turning to Quinn’s false imprisonment claim, the federal 

court resolved qualified immunity against Quinn by finding that “Cardenas 

thought that Ms. Quinn was attempting to leave the scene in her car.” 

Quinn, 2020 WL 2512787 at *4. A “driver of a vehicle involved in an 

accident” must give the other person certain information including their 

name and address. A.R.S. § 28-663(A). Failure to do so can be a 

misdemeanor offense. A.R.S. § 28-663(C). A police officer may arrest an 

individual without a warrant “if the officer has probable cause to 

believe . . . [a] misdemeanor has been committed in the officer’s presence 

and probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the 

offense.” A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). And an officer cannot be liable for false 

imprisonment if he “act[ed] in good faith in the lawful performance of his 

duty.” A.R.S. § 13-1303(B)(1). 

¶47 Both parties agree they had not exchanged information after 

the accident when Quinn started to leave the scene, and Quinn is precluded 

from re-litigating the federal court’s finding that Cardenas was acting in his 

official capacity and reasonably believed Quinn was attempting to leave 

before providing required information. Thus, Cardenas was lawfully 

allowed to detain Quinn, who Cardenas reasonably believed had violated 

the law. See A.R.S. § 28-663(A); A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). Based on the federal 

court’s findings, the superior court correctly concluded Quinn cannot 

succeed on her false imprisonment claim as a matter of law. 

¶48 Because, for Quinn to prevail on her assault and false 

imprisonment claims, a jury would have to reach conclusions contrary to 

those the federal court reached, we hold the superior court properly 

precluded further litigation of Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment 

claims. 
QUINN v. CARDENAS 

Opinion of the Court 

15 

CONCLUSION 

¶49 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.