Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EX-377 | July 13, 2023 Page 1 of 16

APPELLANT PRO SE

Z.C.

Simpsonville, South Caroline

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Z.C.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Review Board of the Indiana 

Department of Workforce 

Development,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 13, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-EX-377

Appeal from the Review Board of 

the Indiana Department of 

Workforce Development

Gabriel Paul, Chairman

Lawrence A. Dailey, Member

Heather D. Cummings, Member

No. 23-R-283

Opinion by Judge Bradford

Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EX-377 | July 13, 2023 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary

[1] Z.C. received unemployment benefits from the Indiana Department of 

Workforce Development (“the Department”); however, Z.C. had 

underreported his wages to the Department resulting in the overpayment of 

benefits. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and the Review Board of the 

Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“the Review Board”) 

determined that Z.C. was required to repay the overpayments. Z.C. requested a 

waiver of repayment, which the Department denied. Z.C. appealed to ALJ E. 

Page Prentice, who affirmed the Department’s decision. Z.C. appealed ALJ 

Prentice’s decision to the Review Board, which affirmed the decision. Now, 

Z.C. argues that the Review Board erred in affirming ALJ Prentice’s decision 

that he is ineligible for a waiver under the repayment-waiver statute; he is 

entitled to waiver on equitable estoppel grounds, he qualifies for 

accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”); he 

qualifies for a waiver under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 

Security Act (“the CARES Act”); the Department was negligent in performing 

its work, and the Department’s exchange of exhibits was untimely. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] During 2020 and 2021, Z.C. intermittently taught online courses for multiple 

universities. Z.C. taught courses for eight or fifteen weeks and was paid for 

each course. Beginning in February of 2020, Z.C. began collecting 

unemployment insurance (“UI”) benefits after having been laid off by his full-
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time employer in 2019. (Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 3) By November of 2020, 

Z.C. had exhausted his UI benefits, at which point he transitioned to receiving 

pandemic emergency unemployment compensation (“PEUC”), federal 

pandemic unemployment compensation (“FPUC”), and lost wages assistance 

(“LWA”) benefits. 

[3] For each week Z.C. sought benefits, he completed claim forms. On those 

forms, he verified that he had “report[ed] the work and the gross amount of the 

earnings [he] ha[s] or will receive at some future date for that work” on the 

voucher for the week that he had performed the work, regardless of when he 

would be paid. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 3. Z.C. also verified that he had read 

the Claimant’s Handbook, which “advises claimants that they must report their 

earnings from wages on the voucher(s) for the week in which the work was 

performed and the wages were earned.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 3. Further, 

Z.C. called the Department on multiple occasions “to seek guidance on how to 

report his wages from the online courses,” and he claims that he had “received 

different guidance from different representatives.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 3. 

[4] Throughout 2020 and 2021, when Z.C. reported his wages, he “treat[ed] the 

wages from the course(s) as though they were the only course(s) he would teach 

for the year” and “divided his wages by fifty-two weeks” instead of reporting 

the specific weeks that he had worked under one or more of his contracts. 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 3. Consequently, in July of 2022, the Department 

notified Z.C. that he had not properly reported his earnings on multiple weeks 

in 2020 and 2021; therefore, the Department had determined that Z.C. had 
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been overpaid benefits. In August of 2022, Z.C. appealed the Department’s 

determination that he had been overpaid. After an evidentiary hearing that 

same month, ALJ Tracey Buzzard determined that Z.C. had, in fact, been 

overpaid after misreporting his earnings. Z.C. appealed that decision to the 

Review Board, which affirmed ALJ Buzzard’s decision. On September 25, 

2022, after Z.C. had decided not to appeal that decision to this court, the 

Review Board’s decision became a final judgment. Altogether, Z.C. had 

received $39,046.00 in overpayments. 

[5] Also in July of 2022, Z.C. requested a waiver of his obligation to repay the 

overpayments. In October of 2022, the Department denied Z.C.’s request, 

explaining that he did not meet the statutory criteria to receive a waiver. 

Namely, the Department determined that Z.C. had not been “without fault for 

the overpayment” of PEUC, FPUC, and LWA benefits, and that he was 

ineligible for waiver of his UI benefits because his employers had elected “to 

make payments in lieu of contributions[.]” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 54. Z.C. 

appealed that decision to ALJ Prentice who affirmed the Department’s denial 

of Z.C.’s waiver. In doing so, ALJ Prentice found that Z.C.’s reporting method 

had failed to adhere to the instructions about disclosing part-time work and, to 

the extent that Z.C. had received contrary guidance during his calls with the 

Department, that guidance had been mistaken and did not relieve Z.C. of his 

responsibility to repay because he had had access to the correct information for 

reporting part-time work. ALJ Prentice concluded that Z.C. was ineligible for a 

waiver because (1) two of Z.C.’s employers had elected “to make payments in 
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lieu of contributions” to the State-monitored unemployment insurance fund 

and (2) Z.C. was at fault for the overpayments. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 8.

[6] On January 31, 2023, Z.C. appealed ALJ Prentice’s decision. The following 

month, the Review Board adopted ALJ Prentice’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions and affirmed the decision to deny Z.C.’s request for a waiver.

Discussion and Decision1

[7] When reviewing a decision of the Review Board, our standard of review is 

threefold: “(1) findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) 

findings of mixed questions of law and fact [...] are reviewed for 

reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed for correctness.” Recker 

v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011)

(citing McClain v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 

(Ind. 1998)). Further, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility 

of witnesses; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the 

Review Board’s findings.” J.M. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 975 

N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012) (citing McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1318)). We will 

reverse the Review Board’s decision “only if there is no substantial evidence to 

1 As an initial matter, we note that Z.C. has failed to include in his brief the appropriate standard of review in 

violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b); however, our “discretionary authority over the appellate 

rules allows us to achieve our preference for decid[ing] cases on their merits rather than dismissing them on 

procedural grounds.” In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 579 (Ind. 2017) (internal citation 

and quotations omitted).
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support the Review Board’s findings.” Id. Additionally, we note that Z.C. does 

not challenge any of ALJ Prentice’s factual findings in the order denying his 

waiver request. We accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See Moriarty v. 

Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Henderson v. 

Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)), trans. denied. 

I. Indiana Code 22-4-13-1(i): Repayment Waiver

[8] Z.C. argues that he qualifies for an overpayment waiver based on Indiana Code 

section 22-4-13-1(i). That section provides that:

(i) Liability for the repayment of benefits paid to an individual (other 

than an individual employed by an employer electing to make payments 

in lieu of contributions [to the State unemployment insurance benefit 

fund]) for any week may be waived [...] if:

(1) the benefits were received by the individual without fault of 

the individual; 

(2) the benefits were the result of payments made: [...]

(B) because of an error by the employer or the department; 

and

(3) repayment would cause economic hardship to the individual.

Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1(i). 

[9] We agree with the Review Board’s determination that Z.C. is not entitled to a 

repayment waiver under Indiana Code section 22-4-13-1(i). To start, Z.C. was 

ineligible for a waiver for his UI benefits overpayment because two of his 

previous employers had elected “to make payments in lieu of contributions” to 
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the State unemployment insurance benefit fund, i.e., they are “reimbursable 

employer[s].” Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1(i); Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 8. 

Specifically, Regent University, Liberty University, and Taylor University had 

employed Z.C. during the periods in which he made claims and “Liberty 

University and Taylor University are reimbursable employers.” Appellee’s 

App. Vol. II p. 9. The unchallenged facts establish that Liberty and Taylor 

Universities are categorized as “reimbursable employers” which made 

“payments in lieu of contributions” and are therefore not waiver-eligible 

employers under Indiana Code section 22-4-13-1(i). Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 

8; Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1(i). Consequently, and because Indiana Code section 

22-4-13-1(i) is written in the conjunctive, Z.C. does not qualify for a waiver of 

repayment for the excess UI benefits he received. See Baker v. Town of 

Middlebury, 753 N.E.2d 67, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that a statute 

written in the conjunctive means that a claimant must meet each element to be 

successful under the statute), trans. denied. 

[10] Additionally, we agree with the Review Board’s conclusion that Z.C. is not 

eligible for a repayment waiver of his PEUC, FPUC, and LWA benefits. This 

is a mixed question of law and fact which we review for reasonableness. J.M., 

975 N.E.2d at 1288. The Review Board’s decision here was reasonable. For 

instance, Indiana Code section 22-4-13-1(i)(1) provides that an individual 

cannot be eligible for a waiver if he is at fault for the overpayment. Further, 

each federal-benefit program enables the Department to consider whether to 

grant a waiver if a claimant meets certain requirements. The federal statutes 
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governing PEUC, FPUC, and LWA all enable the Department to waive 

repayment if it determines that “the payment of [PEUC benefits] was without 

fault on the part of [the claimant]”; “the payment of [FPUC benefits] or Mixed 

Earner Unemployment Compensation was without fault on the part of [the 

claimant]”; and “the payment of [LWA benefits] was without fault on the part 

of [the claimant.]” 15 U.S.C. §§ 9025(e)(2), 9023(f)(2), and 9021(d)(4).

[11] Here, the unchallenged findings establish that Z.C. reported his wages 

incorrectly despite his having access to the correct information. When 

reporting his wages, Z.C. divided his contract wages by fifty-two weeks instead 

of by the number of weeks that he had worked under each contract, leading to 

his “underreport[ing] his wages on the vouchers for multiple weeks.” 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 8. Moreover, in accordance with the benefits 

application, Z.C. had to read and sign a Benefit Rights Agreement, which had 

included the requirement to report his wages and that he read the Claimant’s 

Handbook, which contained another advisement regarding wage reporting. 

Despite these advisements, Z.C. incorrectly reported his wages. ALJ Prentice 

found, and the Review Board agreed, that Z.C.’s “failure to follow the 

instructions provided to him during the claim application process and in the 

Claimant Handbook and the resulting under-reporting of wages [...] constituted 

‘fault’ for the overpayment of benefits.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 9. 

[12] Because Z.C. had access to the correct information, and had, in fact, “read the 

Benefit Rights Agreements and added his initials to each advisement[,]” and 

“read the Claimant Handbook[,]” the Review Board reasonably concluded that 
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he had been at fault for misreporting his wages. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 8. 

There is substantial evidence to support the Review Board’s decision and any 

argument to the contrary is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence, 

which we will not do. J.M., 975 N.E.2d at 1286.

II. Non-Waiver Statute Arguments

A. Estoppel

[13] Z.C. “claims equitable estoppel against [the Department] based on [its] Call 

Center’s fiduciary failure[,]” or “misguidance and misinterpretations” of its 

handbook. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Specifically, he argues that our holding in 

DenniStarr Environmental v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 741 

N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, does not necessarily mean that 

courts are prohibited from applying estoppel against the government, only that 

they are reluctant to do so. Consequently, Z.C. argues that the Department 

should be estopped from denying his waiver because representatives of the 

Department misinformed him about the wage-reporting process during his 

multiple phone calls with the Department. Again, we disagree. 

[14] In DenniStarr, we denied the application of estoppel when a plaintiff alleged that 

a state agency employee assured it that reimbursement for a remediation would 

be available but ultimately was not. Id. at 1289. In rejecting the plaintiff’s 

estoppel claim, we noted that “[c]ourts are reluctant to apply estoppel against 

the government where a party claiming to have been ignorant of the facts had 

access to the correct information.” Id. at 1290 (citing U.S. Outdoor Advert. Co. v. 
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Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 714 N.E.2d 1244, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied). 

Further, we concluded that “misinformation provided by a government 

employee is not a basis for estoppel because the government could be precluded 

from functioning if it were bound by its employees’ unauthorized 

representations.” Id. at 1289–90 (citing Nat’l Salvage & Serv. Corp. v. Comm’r of 

Ind. Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt., 571 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. 

denied). To conclude otherwise, we reasoned, “would grant incentive to entities 

to ignore the legal obligations provided by statute and rely on misinformation 

received from governmental employees.” Id. at 1290.

[15] Here, ALJ Prentice and the Review Board properly relied on DenniStarr in 

denying Z.C.’s request for a waiver, despite any alleged misinformation 

provided by the Department’s call center representatives. Like the plaintiff in 

DenniStarr, Z.C. had access to the correct information. In fact, Z.C. 

acknowledged that he had read the Claimant’s Handbook and the Benefit 

Rights Agreements, which advised him of the process for reporting his wages 

multiple times. As a result, ALJ Prentice and the Review Board reasonably 

concluded that Z.C. was at fault for the overpayment, and we are likewise 

reluctant to apply estoppel when Z.C. had access to the correct reporting 

information. Z.C.’s argument to the contrary is essentially a request that we 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. J.M., 975 N.E.2d at 1286. 
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B. ADA Accommodation

[16] The ADA requires that government agencies not exclude any individual with a 

disability from participating in, or receiving benefits from, a public entity’s 

service program or activity because of that individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 

12131–12165; see also Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 843 (Ind. 2012). Z.C. 

argues that he has been diagnosed “by a licensed physician and clinician as 

suffering from two clinical disorders.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Therefore, he 

argues, it “stands to reason, based on [the Department]’s Theme and Goals [...] 

that the [Department] would have eagerly sought to provide confidently 

accurate information when Z.C. disclosed his mental infirmities.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 13. However, this issue is waived for failure to make a cogent argument 

or include citations to the record.

[17] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) provides that a party’s argument must be 

“supported by cogent reasoning” and must include “citations to the authorities, 

statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]” 

Z.C.’s argument on this point is devoid of any reference to the record. While 

Z.C. is acting pro se, our case law is clear: “pro se litigants are held to the same 

standards as licensed attorneys, and thus they are required to follow the 

procedural rules.” Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

(citing Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied) 

(emphasis added). Consequently, a pro se litigant “must be prepared to accept 

the consequences of his or her action.” Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of 

Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Mullis v. 
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Martin, 615 N.E.2d 498, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). Put simply, neither ALJ 

Prentice nor the Review Board found that Z.C. had a disability, and Z.C. does 

not point to anything in the record indicating that he had argued the issue 

below. Therefore, the issue is waived.

C. The CARES Act

[18] In arguing that he is eligible for a repayment waiver under the CARES Act, 

Z.C. relies on letter issued by the U.S. Department of Labor addressing certain 

scenarios in which states may apply waivers of repayment obligations. 

Specifically, Z.C. argues that he “‘submitted required proof of earnings used to 

calculate Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Weekly Benefit Amount and 

the State incorrectly processed the calculation resulting in a higher weekly 

benefit amount under the PUA program.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 14 (quoting U.S. 

Dep’t of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 20-21 (May 5, 

2021), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/advisories/unemploymentinsuranceprogram-letter-no-20-21). Thus, Z.C. argues that “[he] qualifies.” Id.

[19] We, however, disagree. Again, we note that Z.C. has failed to make an 

argument “supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, 

statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[,]”

thereby waiving this issue for appellate review. Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). We 

will not address arguments which are not developed and will not develop 

arguments for a party to an appeal. Hay v. Hay, 885 N.E.2d 21, 24 n.2 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008) (citing Ind. App. R. 46); Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d 957, 963 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2023). Z.C.’s bald assertion that “[he] qualifies[,]” without more, results 

in waiver. Appellant’s Br. p. 14.

D. The Department’s Alleged Negligence and 

Mismanagement

[20] Z.C. claims that he should be eligible for a waiver due to the Department’s 

“negligence, mismanagement, disorganization, [and] irresponsibility[.]” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 16. Specifically, Z.C. argues that (1) the Department failed to 

review quarterly employment reports quickly enough that it could have 

discovered Z.C.’s misreporting sooner; (2) the Department never provided him 

with records of his telephone calls with Department representatives, and “based 

on several contradictory statements [...] it is impossible to know whether the 

[Department] had or has access to [those] call records [...] from early 2020”; 

and (3) that “Indianapolis news stations [...] have comprehensively and 

consistently investigated the [Department] based on complaints received by 

Hoosiers concerning its negligence, mismanagement, disorganization, and 

irresponsibility.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 11, 15–16.

[21] To start, Z.C. contends that, at his hearing, a representative of the Department 

had explained that “employment verification [...] occurs quarterly.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 11. Z.C. claims that had the Department followed its own 

policy, it would have discovered that Z.C. was misreporting his wages and 

could have deemed him ineligible for benefits after merely twelve weeks—not 

eighty-five—and his overpayment balance would be nearly $33,000.00 less. 

According to Z.C., the Department’s failure to follow its own “policy and 
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procedure led to this predicament.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. We, however, 

disagree.

[22] Contrary to Z.C.’s argument, the Department discovered the overpayment and 

sought repayment within the statutory timeframe. Indiana Code section 22-4-

13-1(a)(1) provides that “the [D]epartment has four (4) years from the date of 

[its] discovery of the overpayment to send notification to the individual of 

possible overpayment[.]” Here, Z.C. began receiving benefits in February of 

2020 and the Department Z.C. notified Z.C. that he had been overpaid in July 

of 2022. Therefore, the Department was clearly within the statutory timeframe 

during which it could notify Z.C. of the overpayment and begin seeking 

repayment. 

[23] Moreover, Z.C.’s argument that he received no records of his telephone calls 

with representatives of the Department is unavailing. Z.C. explains that “each 

time [he] called” the Department and the representatives gave him “quick, but 

confident reassurance for how [he] was completing weekly wages earned[.]” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 15. Z.C. claims that some of the Department’s call center 

representatives informed him that the Department purged phone records after 

two years and others informed him that some records from early 2020 may be 

accessible. Again, Z.C. fails to support his argument with citations to the 

record or to relevant authorities; therefore, the issue is waived. See Ind. R. App. 

46(A)(8); Ramsey, 789 N.E.2d at 490. Waiver aside, we have already 

determined that ALJ Prentice and the Review Board reasonably concluded that 

Z.C. was at fault because he had access to, and acknowledged that he had read, 
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the correct wage-reporting procedures in the Claimant Handbook and the 

Benefit Rights Agreements. 

[24] Further, Z.C. lists a series of news stories relating to “complaints by Hoosiers 

concerning [the Department’s] negligence, mismanagement, disorganization, 

and irresponsibility.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16. Without arguing how the 

Department’s alleged negligence affected him specifically, Z.C. asks us to 

“consider the [news stories] as supporting evidence of [the Department’s] recent 

history of negligence, mismanagement, disorganization and irresponsibility.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 16. Z.C. has also waived his argument on this point for 

failing to develop it. See Hay, 885 N.E.2d at 24.

E. Timely Exchange of Exhibits

[25] Lastly, Z.C. argues that the Department failed to provide him with an exhibit 

list before the waiver hearing scheduled for January 3, 2023, which was later 

rescheduled for January 11, 2023. Z.C.’s argument on this issue lacks any 

citations to facts in the record supporting this contention; therefore, he has 

waived this issue for appellate review. Price v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce 

Dev., 2 N.E.3d 13, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Ultimately, Z.C. asks us to reweigh 

the evidence, which we will not do. J.M., 975 N.E.2d at 1286. Reviewing all 

evidence most favorably to the Review Board’s conclusion, we cannot say that 

its decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. 

[26] The judgment of the Review Board is affirmed.
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Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.