If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

HASSAN AHMED SAAD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

January 18, 2024

v No. 362247

Wayne Circuit Court

AMERICAN SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY 

and SABER MOHAMED YAFFAI,

LC No. 20-010266-NI

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this first-party no-fault action, plaintiff Hassan Ahmed Saad appeals as of right the trial 

court’s order granting summary disposition of his claim for benefits in favor of defendant

American Select Insurance Company (ASIC) based on the lack of standing under MCR 

2.116(C)(5) and (C)(10). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Saad initiated this action alleging, as relevant to the issues on appeal, that ASIC had 

unreasonably and unlawfully refused to pay personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits to which 

he was entitled under the no-fault act and his insurance policy arising out of an October 11, 2019 

motor vehicle accident involving Saad and defendant Saber Mohamed Yaffai. Specifically, Saad 

sought to recover for unpaid medical expenses for treatment that he had received at the following 

five medical providers: 4 Transport, 411 Help, Gravity Imaging, SHP Services, and Spine & 

Health. Saad had executed a series of assignments transferring his right to collect or pursue PIP 

benefits for services he received from these medical providers. Despite the assignments, Saad 

filed suit against ASIC in August 2020, seeking PIP benefits for unpaid medical bills from these 

providers.

ASIC sought summary disposition on the ground that Saad lacked standing to pursue these 

claims as a result of the assignments. Saad responded by asserting that the issue was moot because 

he had subsequently obtained revocations of the assignments to the above medical providers. Saad 

attached the purported revocations from all of the above entities except SHP Services. Of the 
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attached revocations, only the revocation from Spine & Health included a date; that revocation 

was dated January 24, 2022.

ASIC argued in reply that Saad could only regain standing as of the date of the revocations. 

Further, ASIC argued that, pursuant to MCL 500.3145,1even if it were assumed that all of the 

revocations were executed on January 24, 2022, Saad could only seek recovery for any allegedly 

unpaid medical expenses incurred on or after January 24, 2021. Because the bills at issue were for 

expenses incurred before January 24, 2021, ASIC maintained that Saad’s claims were time barred 

and should be dismissed on summary disposition because she never regained standing to assert 

pursue those claims.

At the hearing on ASIC’s summary disposition motion, ASIC reiterated that to the extent 

Saad’s assignments to the medical providers may have been revoked, Saad’s claims were 

nonetheless barred by the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145 and Saad was not the real party in 

interest—as a result of the assignments—during the time frame in which the allegedly unpaid 

medical expenses at issue could have been pursued. Saad argued in response that the revocations 

rendered the assignments void ab initio. Saad also argued for the first time that the one-year period 

remained tolled because ASIC never provided him a formal denial of benefits. 

The trial court granted ASIC’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the action. 

Saad moved for reconsideration and submitted new revocations that were notarized and dated May 

11, 2022. The court denied Saad’s motion and Saad filed a claim of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

 

1 MCL 500.3145 provides in relevant part as follows:

(1) An action for recovery of [PIP] benefits payable under this chapter for an 

accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of 

the accident that caused the injury unless written notice of injury as provided in 

subsection (4) has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless 

the insurer has previously made a payment of [PIP] benefits for the injury.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), if the notice has been given or a payment has been 

made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent 

allowable expense, work loss, or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the 

claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 

year before the date on which the action was commenced.

(3) A period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the commencement 

of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim 

for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim. This 

subsection does not apply if the person claiming the benefits fails to pursue the 

claim with reasonable diligence.
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Saad challenges the dismissal of his claims, contending the revocations restored his 

standing retroactively to the date that he filed the lawsuit and the one-year-back period remained 

tolled because ASIC never provided a written claim denial.

We review de novo a lower court’s resolution of a summary disposition motion and review 

for an abuse of discretion a court’s denial of a reconsideration motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 

Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Woods v SLB Prop Mgmt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 629; 

750 NW2d 228 (2008). Questions involving the interpretation and application of statutes are 

reviewed de novo. Linden v Citizens Ins Co of America, 308 Mich App 89, 91; 862 NW2d 438 

(2014).

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) is based on the ground that the “party 

asserting the claim lacks the legal capacity to sue,” while MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for 

summary disposition if “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” 

Under both subrules, a court must consider the pleadings and documentary evidence submitted by 

the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Wortelboer v Benzie County, 212 Mich App 208, 213; 537 NW2d 

603 (1995); Maiden, 461 Mich at 120. When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the 

evidence must be evaluated “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” and if 

“the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden, 461 Mich at 120.

Here, there is no indication that any of the medical expenses for which Saad sought recover 

were incurred any later than April 1, 2020. Saad filed this lawsuit on August 12, 2020. Generally, 

and subject to certain conditions not put in issue by the parties’ arguments, an action for PIP 

benefits “may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, 

work loss, or survivor’s loss has been incurred.” MCL 500.3145(1). However, the one-year-back 

rule in MCL 500.3145(2) provides that “the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of 

the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.” “The 

one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits recoverable under the no-fault act 

to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought.” Joseph v Auto Club 

Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 203; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). 

Although it would ordinarily appear that Saad timely filed his lawsuit, he had previously

executed assignments of his rights to pursue his claims for the medical expenses at issue to his 

medical providers. “When an assignment occurs, the assignee of a cause of action becomes the 

real party in interest with respect to that cause of action, inasmuch as the assignment vests in the 

assignee all rights previously held by the assignor.” Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for 

Regional Transp, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 360537); slip op 

at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As this Court has explained,

A real party in interest is the one who is vested with the right of action on a given 

claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another. The real-party-in-interest 

doctrine recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party having an 

interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy and protects a defendant 

from multiple lawsuits for the same cause of action. [Id. at ___; slip op at 3-4

(quotation marks and citations omitted).]
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During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, Saad obtained revocations of these 

assignments from at least four of the medical providers executed, at the earliest, on January 24, 

2022.

This Court was presented with a virtually identical factual scenario in Wallace. In that 

case, the plaintiff

received medical treatment from various medical providers and executed 

assignments of rights in exchange for the treatment. Plaintiff filed suit within one 

year of the accident, but the medical providers did not. During the lower court 

proceedings[, almost two years after suit was commenced], the medical providers 

revoked the assignments in an apparent effort to save their claims from application 

of the “one-year-back rule,” MCL 500.3145, by transferring those claims back to 

plaintiff. [Id. at ___; slip op at 2.]

The defendant argued on appeal in this Court that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the 

one-year-back rule because the plaintiff’s assignments to her medical providers “divested plaintiff 

the right to pursue those PIP benefits” and the medical providers’ claims under the assignments 

were already barred by the one-year-back rule by the time they executed the revocations of the 

assignments. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. Thus, the defendant argued that the plaintiff “was also barred 

by the one-year-back rule from pursuing those claims.” Id.

This Court concluded that the trial court had erred by denying the defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This Court reasoned:

In this case, the majority of benefits at issue were assigned to the medical 

providers before plaintiff filed her complaint. Plaintiff executed assignments to CSpine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation 

between October 2019 and January 2020. Thus, upon execution of these 

assignments, these providers became the real parties in interest to the claims for 

benefits, and only the providers could bring an action to recover said benefits. . . . 

After executing the assignments and during the litigation, plaintiff obtained 

revocations for the assignments from C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select 

Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation in January 2022, after she filed her 

complaint.

While the revocations of the assignments reassigned the providers’ claims 

for benefits back to plaintiff, the revocations occurred more than a year after [the 

defendant] denied the medical providers’ claims for benefits. Plaintiff and the 

providers executed the revocations in January 2022, and these revocations 

transferred the providers’ interests to the claims for benefits back to plaintiff. 

However, by the time plaintiff obtained these revocations, the providers no longer 

had valid claims for benefits by operation of the one-year-back rule. . . . [The 

defendant] denied Sierra Surgical’s claims on January 24, 2020, Select Specialists’ 

claims on February 11, 2020, Baz Eagle Transportation’s claims on February 28, 

2020, and C-Spine Ortho’s claims on April 8, 2020. As such, the providers needed 
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to bring an action against [the defendant] within one year of its formal denial, which 

they failed to do.

* * *

. . . when the transfer of the beneficial interest from the medical providers 

to plaintiff occurred in this case, the medical providers did not transfer an interest 

in a claim to which liability attached. When the medical providers revoked their 

assignments for the benefit of plaintiff to pursue her claims after the litigation 

began, the medical providers could no longer recover their claims by operation of 

the one-year-back rule. See MCL 500.3145. . . .

* * *

By January 2022, when plaintiff obtained the revocations, each provider’s 

right to collect on these claims for benefits had already been extinguished by the 

one-year-back rule. Thus, there remained no actionable causes of action to give 

back to plaintiff. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying in part [the defendant’s] 

motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims as it relates to the benefits 

plaintiff assigned to C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists, and Baz 

Eagle Transportation before she filed her complaint. [Id. at ___; slip op at 5-6.]

Our reasoning in Wallace applies with equal force to this case and is dispositive in 

resolving this appeal. When Saad assigned his rights to collect benefits and pursue payment to his 

medical providers, the medical providers became the real parties in interest with respect to those 

benefits and they were the only parties who could bring an action to recover those PIP benefits. 

Id. at ___; slip op at 5. By the time Saad secured assignment revocations from the medical 

providers on January 24, 2022, the medical providers were already barred by the one-year-back 

rule in MCL 500.3145 from bringing their own claims to recover those benefits because there is 

no claim on this record for PIP benefits related to any medical expenses occurred after April 1, 

2020, which is well more than one year before January 24, 2022. Accordingly, at the time of the 

revocations, the medical providers did not have any viable claims to assign back to Saad. Id. at 

___; slip op at 5-6.

Saad additionally asserts in his appellate brief that “the one year back rule was not 

implemented in this case because a denial was never received.” Saad apparently relies on MCL 

500.3145(3), which provides that a “period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the 

commencement of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim 

for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim.” (Emphasis added.)

Saad fails to further elaborate regarding how he believes the record supports this assertion. 

At the motion hearing, Saad’s counsel stated: “I just this morning reviewed my records and have 

no form am [sic] denial from American as to these claims.” Based on Saad’s failure to cogently 

develop this argument, we deem it abandoned. “It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce 

a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis 

for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either 
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to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Moreover, to the extent Saad appears to contend that he never received written denial, “a 

formal denial [for purposes of the tolling provision in MCL 500.3145(3)] need not be in writing.” 

Encompass Healthcare, PLLC v Citizens Ins Co, 344 Mich App 248, 261; ___ NW2d ___ (2022). 

The denial must merely be “sufficiently direct.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

test is whether the denial “unequivocally impresse[s] upon the insured that the extraordinary step 

of pursuing relief in court must be taken.” Id. at 260 (quotation marks and citation omitted; 

alteration in original).

Here, Saad never claimed he believed ASIC was still considering his claim for PIP benefits. 

Indeed, Saad filed suit based on ASIC’s lack of payment, making it difficult to imagine that it had 

not been “unequivocally impresse[d]” upon him “that the extraordinary step of pursuing relief in 

court must be taken.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Saad has not demonstrated that 

he was entitled to the benefit of the tolling provision in MCL 500.3145(3) under these 

circumstances.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting ASIC’s motion for summary disposition 

or denying Saad’s motion for reconsideration.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro