NO. 5-00-0524

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)  Appeal from the

							)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,				)  Madison County.

							)  

v.							)  No. 99-CF-1650

							)

MARK MAGUIRE,				)  Honorable

							)  James Hackett,

     Defendant-Appellant.				)  Judge, presiding.  

________________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

	After a jury trial in the circuit court of Madison County, Mark Maguire (defendant)

was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1)

(West 1998)).  Thereafter, the trial court found defendant to be a habitual criminal pursuant

to section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/33B-1 (West

1998)) and sentenced defendant to life in prison.  On appeal, defendant contends that (1) his

conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove that he was the person who

committed the crime, (2) the trial court deprived him of his rights to compulsory process and

due process by preventing him from compelling the testimony of the child victim at the

reliability hearing, and (3) section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code, under which he was found

to be a habitual criminal, violates a defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a trial

by jury as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).  We affirm.

	FACTS

	The victim was four years old when she alleged that defendant molested her by placing his penis in her mouth.  Defendant and his family lived in the same trailer park as

the victim and her family.  Prior to the trial, the State notified defendant that pursuant to

section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10

(West 1998)), it intended to introduce statements allegedly made by the victim to Susan

Redmon, Sergeant Larry Coles, Kris J., M.J., S.J., and Lieutenant Jack Stalcup.  The trial

court then set the matter for a reliability hearing to determine whether the hearsay testimony

was sufficiently reliable.  Defendant subpoenaed the victim to testify at the reliability

hearing.  The State moved to quash the subpoena.  The trial court granted the State's motion

to quash.

	The six witnesses listed by the State in its notice of intention to admit hearsay

statements testified at the reliability hearing.  Sergeant Larry Coles testified that on July 25,

1999, he was dispatched to the home of Kris J., the victim's mother, where he spoke with

both Kris and the victim.  Sergeant Coles asked the victim to tell him what happens when

she goes to defendant's house to play.  The victim initially hesitated, but after being

reassured by her mother, she told Coles that defendant pulls down his pants in the living

room when his son, J.D., goes outside to play.  Defendant then gets under some covers with

the victim and puts his "wiener" in her mouth.  The victim said that this happened a lot.  It

occurs  when Diane, defendant's wife, is at work.  

	Upon completing the interview with the victim, Sergeant Coles telephoned his

supervisor, Lieutenant Stalcup.  Stalcup told Coles to ask the victim and her mother to come

to headquarters so he could speak to them.  Stalcup and Coles then interviewed the victim

together at the police station.  The victim's mother was also present.  Coles asked the victim

to tell Lieutenant Stalcup what happens when she plays at defendant's house.  The victim

said that defendant tells his son, J.D., to go outside and play.  She and defendant then lie on

the couch under the covers.  Defendant then pulls down his pants and puts his "wiener" in her mouth.  Defendant tells her not to tell anyone.  He also gives her candy and lets her play

with his kittens afterwards.  Sergeant Coles specifically asked the victim whether she saw

defendant's underwear.  The victim said that she did not because defendant does not wear

underwear.  The victim said she is afraid of defendant.  The victim said that she keeps her

clothes on under the covers and denied that defendant ever touched her anywhere else.

	Lieutenant Stalcup observed Sergeant Coles interview the victim at police

headquarters while the victim's mother was in the room.  Stalcup reiterated Coles' testimony

about the interview.  Stalcup also testified that later that day he and Coles went to

defendant's house and placed defendant under arrest.  The next day, Stalcup interviewed

M.J., one of the victim's brothers.  M.J. told him that the week before defendant's arrest,

defendant babysat for him, his two brothers, and the victim and spanked all of them because

they were fighting.  According to Stalcup, M.J. did not seem mad about being spanked.  M.J.

also told Stalcup that he had walked over to defendant's trailer looking for the victim.  When

he entered, he saw the victim's head pop out from underneath covers on the couch. 

Defendant was also on the couch.  

	Susan Redmon, a Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employee,

went to the South Roxana police department at Lieutenant Stalcup's request for assistance

with the instant case.  Redmon met with the victim and her mother in a small room at police

headquarters.  Redmon stated that the mother was present but did not interfere with 

Redmon's interview of the victim.  According to Redmon, the victim could distinguish her

"fake" stuffed duck from her "real dog," could count, and knew her colors.  Redmon testified

that the victim used the words "butt" and "pee-pee" and "wiener" for the parts of

anatomically correct dolls.  Redmon recalled that without being specifically asked, the

victim started talking about her neighbor J.D. and his father and mother.  The victim told

Redmon that defendant did a bad thing to her.  She said that defendant did something bad while J.D. was outside playing and defendant's wife, Diane, was at work.  She said that she

and defendant would be under the blankets on the couch and that defendant would have his

pants down around his feet.  The victim said she did not remove any of her clothes.  The

victim told Redmon that after they were under the covers, defendant would put his "wiener"

in her mouth and that his "wiener" would go in and out of her mouth.  The victim said that

her brothers were outside, except on one occasion when her brother M.J. saw her with her

head under the covers.

	The victim told M.J. what defendant did to her.  According to Redmon, the victim

then said that M.J. "told on her" to her mother.  Redmon specifically asked the victim about

his underwear, and the victim replied that defendant does not wear underwear.  The victim

also said that sometimes when defendant put his "wiener" in her mouth it would make her

cough.  Redmon testified that the victim's concept of time was not good, but the victim did

tell her that it was warm out when it occurred and that it happened more than once.

	Kris J. testified that she lives with her boyfriend and four children, including the

victim, in a trailer park.  Her trailer and defendant's trailer are separated only by a vacant lot. 

Defendant's son, J.D., is approximately 11⁄2 years older than the victim.  The two children

often played together, and the victim spent time at defendant's trailer.  Defendant and his

family got along well with the victim's family.  On occasion, Kris saw the victim and

defendant lying together underneath a blanket on defendant's couch.  Kris's sons were not

allowed in defendant's trailer.  When Kris questioned defendant about this unequal

treatment, defendant explained that he treated the victim differently because she was like his

daughter that he never gets to see. 

	At the end of July 1999, Kris first learned of the alleged assault when one of the

victim's brothers, age nine, informed her that the victim told him defendant "had stuck his

wiener in [the victim's] mouth."  Kris immediately approached her daughter and asked  her whether the allegations made by her brother were true.  The victim told Kris that it was true

and that it had occurred more than once.  Kris asked a friend for advice.  The friend talked

to the victim, and the victim told the same story about defendant.  Kris then contacted the

police.

	Between the time Kris learned about the alleged assault and the time she called the

police, defendant became aware that the victim made accusations against him.  Defendant

asked Kris whether he could speak with the victim.  Kris allowed defendant to speak with

the victim while Kris was present.  Defendant asked the victim whether she told anyone that

he stuck his "wiener" in her mouth.  The victim denied making such an allegation.  Kris

stated, "I could tell [the victim] was a little scared *** [b]y the look on her face."  Kris

described what defendant said then, while in the victim's presence: "[Defendant stated] that

he didn't really need to have this kind of thing getting around, because if it did, if one word

of this got out, that [sic] he would go back to prison."  Sometime after the victim and Kris talked to defendant, Kris asked her daughter whether, when defendant pulled his pants

down, he also pulled his underwear down, and the victim said, "No, mommy, he doesn't

wear underwear."

	The victim's brother M.J., age 12, testified that on one occasion, he saw defendant

and the victim on defendant's couch underneath some blankets.  According to M.J., the

victim liked to play with defendant's son, but she did not like going over to defendant's

house.  M.J. said that the victim told him "that when she went over there, she had to suck

[defendant's] wienie."  M.J. did not immediately tell his mother what the victim told him. 

M.J. admitted that sometimes he got in trouble when he was playing at defendant's house. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked M.J. whether, a few days before defendant's

arrest, defendant had paddled him, and M.J. responded: "Yeah.  But he like tapped us.  He

tapped me."     

	The victim's brother S.J., age nine, also testified that he saw the victim and defendant

under the covers on defendant's couch.  According to S.J., the victim later told him "that

once when she was laying [sic] under the covers, [defendant] told her to suck his private."  S.J. said that the victim used the term "pee-pee" rather than "private."  S.J. said that the

victim had a "sad face" and was crying when she told him about the incident and that she

had never made this type of allegation before.  S.J. told his mother what the victim told him

about defendant.  S.J. further testified that defendant would occasionally babysit for him and

his siblings and that sometimes he would get in trouble at defendant's house.  Defendant

paddled S.J. and his siblings while he was babysitting for them right before he went to jail.

	After the State presented its witnesses, the prosecutor declared that the State would

not be using Lieutenant Stalcup at the trial as a witness to the victim's hearsay statements. 

The trial court found that the time, contents, and circumstances of the victim's statements to

S.J., M.J., Kris J., Susan Redmon, and Sergeant Coles were sufficiently reliable to allow

those witnesses to testify at the trial about the victim's hearsay statements.  The trial court

noted defendant's continuing objection to the hearsay statements.

	At the trial, Sergeant Coles, M.J., S.J., Kris J., and Susan Redmon testified

consistently with their testimony at the reliability hearing.  The victim, age five at the time

of the trial, testified that she had completed preschool and would be starting kindergarten. 

She identified J.D. as a boy who lived next door.  She said that she liked to play with J.D.

and that they played both inside and outside.  She said that J.D.'s dad's name is Mark and his

mom's name is Diane.  She said that Mark told her to keep a secret and that, in exchange for

her keeping the secret, Mark gave her gum and let her play with his kittens.  She said that

the secret happened when she and Mark were on the couch and Diane was at work.  Using

anatomically correct dolls, she testified that Mark would take off his clothes and put his

penis in her mouth.  The victim ultimately told her brothers the secret, and her brothers told her mother.

	Lieutenant Stalcup, an investigator with the South Roxana police department who has

special training to deal with sexual assaults, testified that he interviewed both the victim and

defendant.  He recalled that the victim was scared but did not have trouble relaying what had

happened.  He also stated that while the victim's mother was present during the interview,

the mother did nothing that concerned him.  As to the interview of defendant, he recalled

that defendant was read his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)), signed a waiver of his rights, and proceeded to talk to

Stalcup.  Stalcup told defendant he was being investigated due to sexual assault allegations

made by the victim.  Stalcup asked defendant for his version of events.  Defendant said,

"[T]he situation come [sic] up, and the mother called the little girl over, and I was supposed to have done something."  Stalcup asked him what he was supposed to have done, and

defendant replied that one of the victim's brother's said he stuck his "wienie" in the victim's

mouth.  Defendant said that when he was talking to the victim and her mother, the victim

specifically denied that this happened.  Stalcup asked defendant if there was ever an

opportunity for this to occur and whether he was ever alone with the victim.  According to

Stalcup, defendant responded: "Just when she got a drink of water or lemonade.  But my

son, J.D., was always there."  Stalcup asked defendant whether he had any gum or candy,

and defendant told him he had some "Chiclets" gum that his wife's father gave her. 

Defendant admitted that he had been under the covers on the couch with the victim, but he

said that J.D. was also under the covers with them each time.  Defendant said he had no idea

why someone would make up such allegations.  Defendant volunteered that he babysat for

the children and had recently "whipped their butts for fighting."  He said he had permission

from their mother to do so.  

	Stalcup also asked defendant whether he had any kittens, and defendant stated that he did.  Stalcup asked defendant whether he wore any underwear.  According to Stalcup,

defendant replied that when he went to work he wore underwear but that he did not wear any

underwear around the house.  Stalcup searched defendant's trailer and found gum under the

couch and kittens in a bedroom.  He also retrieved a brown and black blanket from the

couch.  The parties stipulated that if Kris J. was recalled, she would testify that the blanket

retrieved by Stalcup was the blanket she had seen on defendant's couch near the time in

question.  

	After the State finished presenting its evidence, defendant moved for a directed

verdict, arguing that insufficient evidence had been presented to convict defendant beyond

a reasonable doubt.  The trial court denied defendant's motion.  Defendant did not present

any evidence.  Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.  

	At the sentencing, it was disclosed that defendant had seven prior felony convictions,

including convictions for Class X felonies.  For example, in January 1978 defendant was

convicted of armed robbery and burglary.  Defendant was sentenced to 41⁄2 years in the

Department of Corrections on the armed robbery conviction and 1 to 3 years' imprisonment

on the burglary.  In June 1980 defendant was convicted of home invasion and rape and was

sentenced to 15 years in the Department of Corrections.  In October 1989 defendant was

convicted of residential burglary and was sentenced to four years in the Department of

Corrections.  In 1995, defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated criminal sexual

assault and one count of kidnaping against an adult female.  A memo dated July 27, 1999,

from a sex therapist with the Department of Corrections was also introduced.  The memo

stated, inter alia:

		"[Defendant's] progress in treatment has been minimal at best.  Client has been

resistant and has consistently tried to undermine the group therapy process with his

hostile and passive[-]aggressive tendencies.  He does not accept responsibilities [sic] for any of his offending behavior[] but[,] rather, views himself as a victim of

circumstance.

		***

		Given the fact that client is so criminally versatile[,] it is this therapist [sic] opinion that he be considered a high risk to re[]offend[,] both sexually and

criminally.  Recent allegations involving [the] new sex offense charge would seem

to confirm this prediction.  Client is not amenable to treatment and would better be

[sic] served if placed in a more restrictive environment."

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that defendant qualified as a habitual

criminal, and the court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment pursuant to section 33B-1

of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/33B-1 (West 1998)).  Defendant now appeals.

	ANALYSIS

	I.  Identification of Defendant

	Defendant first contends that his conviction must be reversed because the State failed

to prove that he is the person who committed the crime.  Defendant insists that none of the

witnesses identified him as the person who committed the crime.  The State points out that

defendant's identity was never at issue in this case and that defendant waived this issue by

failing to raise it at the trial or in his posttrial motion.  Additionally, the State asserts that the

victim's mother identified defendant in open court.

	Generally, both an objection at the trial and a written posttrial motion are required to

preserve an error for review.  People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988).  Because defendant failed to raise the issue complained of here, either at the trial or

in his posttrial motion, the issue is waived.  Even assuming, arguendo, that the issue was not waived, we find it to be without merit. 

	A review of the record supports the State's assertion that defendant's identity was never at issue in this case.  The victim identified "Mark" as the person who sexually

assaulted her.  "Mark" lived next door to her and has a son named J.D.  The victim's mother,

Kris J., and the victim's siblings all testified about "Mark" and his family and about the fact

that defendant was their neighbor.  Furthermore, the record shows that Kris was specifically

asked whether she saw defendant in the courtroom.  Kris replied that she did and pointed out

that defendant was "wearing a white shirt" and "[h]as a reddish[-]white beard."  The

prosecutor asked that the record reflect that Kris identified defendant.  The trial court

replied, "The witness is pointing to Mr. Maguire."  Under these circumstances, we cannot

agree with defendant that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he was the

person who committed the crime charged.

	II.  Reliability Hearing

	Defendant next contends that the trial court deprived him of his rights to compulsory

process and due process by preventing him from compelling the testimony of the victim at

the reliability hearing and that, in light of these constitutional deprivations, his conviction

must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new reliability hearing and a new trial. 

Defendant insists that by quashing the subpoena for the victim, the trial court deprived him

of a key method of testing the reliability and admissibility of the victim's hearsay statements. 

We disagree.

	Section 115-10(a)(2) of the Code provides that for any prosecution of a sexual

offense committed on a child under the age of 13, testimony of the child's out-of-court

statements which describe any complaint of such an act or matter or detail pertaining to any

act which is an element of the charged offense is admissible as an exception to the hearsay

rule.  725 ILCS 5/115-10(a)(2) (West 1998).  The admission of such testimony is subject to

the requirements of section 115-10(b) of the Code, which provides:

	"(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:

		(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that

the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards

of reliability; and

		(2) The child *** either:

			(A) testifies at the proceeding; or

			(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of

the act which is the subject of the statement."  725 ILCS 5/115-10(b) (West

1998).

The hearsay exception found in section 115-10 of the Code was a legislative response to the

difficulty associated with convicting a person accused of sexually assaulting a child.  It is

well accepted that at a trial a child witness, especially one who is extremely young, might

lack the cognitive or language skills to effectively communicate about the abuse or might

be impeded psychologically in his or her effort to do so.  People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 115,  699 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1998).

	The requirement that the court find that the "time, content, and circumstances" of the

statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability has been held to secure compliance

with the defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him

(U.S. Const., amend. VI).  People v. Rocha, 191 Ill. App. 3d 529, 541, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1343 (1989).  However, the actual testimony of the child at the reliability hearing is not

necessary to enable the judge to evaluate whether there were sufficient safeguards of

reliability when the statements were made.  People v. Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d 44, 54, 605 N.E.2d 689, 696 (1992).  In Back, the trial court allowed certain witnesses to testify regarding statements made to each of them by the child victim in a sexual assault, even

though the child victim did not testify at the reliability hearing.  Back, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 51- 52, 605 N.E.2d at 695.  The Back court held that the term "proceeding," as used in section 115-10 of the Code, "refers to trial proceedings, not the reliability hearing."  239 Ill. App.

3d at 53, 605 N.E.2d at 696.  This decision was based on the statute's direction that the focus

of the reliability hearing be on the time, content, and circumstances surrounding the child

victim's statements.  The Back court specifically stated, "The child's testimony at the reliability hearing is not necessary to enable the trial judge to evaluate whether there were

sufficient safeguards of reliability when the statements were made."  239 Ill. App. 3d at 54,

605 N.E.2d at 696.  We recently adopted and followed the reasoning of Back.  People v. Murphy, 322 Ill. App. 3d 271, 752 N.E.2d 19 (2001); see also People v. Wilson, 246 Ill. App. 3d 311, 615 N.E.2d 1283 (1993) (following and adopting the reasoning in Back).

	Notwithstanding these decisions, defendant insists that it was unfair to impair

defendant's chosen method for testing the reliability of the out-of-court statements, which

in this case was to call the child victim.  Defendant insists that quashing the subpoena

harmed his interests and lightened the State's load.  However, upon a close examination, it

is clear that defendant is not challenging the trial court's findings that the time, content, and

circumstances of the victim's statements about the events in question ensure their reliability. 

	Section 115-10(b)(2)(A) of the Code refers to only one "proceeding" at which the

child victim must testify.  725 ILCS 5/115-10(b)(2)(A) (West 1998).  The logical argument

is that the "proceeding" means the trial rather than the reliability hearing, because such an

interpretation protects a defendant's confrontation rights at a trial.  Murphy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 280, 752 N.E.2d at 26-27.  In making such a determination, the Murphy court relied on People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 699 N.E.2d 577 (1998).  In Bowen, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the testimony of the child is essential at the trial, not at the reliability

hearing, and the court specifically stated, "[U]nless a finding of unavailability is made,

statements admitted under section 115-10 can never serve as substitutes for trial testimony,

because section 115-10 makes the introduction of the statements expressly contingent upon the child's production for direct and cross-examination at trial."  Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d at 114- 15, 699 N.E.2d at 584.  In the instant case, the victim testified at the trial.

	In determining the reliability of the child victim's hearsay statement, relevant factors

include the following:  (1) the spontaneity and consistent repetition of the statement, (2) the

mental state of the child victim giving the statement, (3) the use of terminology not expected

in a child of comparable age, and (4) the lack of a motive to fabricate.  Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d at 120, 699 N.E.2d at 586.  In the instant case, the victim's first allegation occurred

spontaneously when she told her brother that "Mark" told her to suck his "pee-pee."  The

language evoked by the victim in describing the assault was consistent with the language

one would expect a young child to use.  The victim's brother said that the victim was crying

when she made this statement and that the victim had never made this type of allegation

before.  The victim made essentially the same allegations to police and a DCFS caseworker

each time she was asked to repeat what had occurred.  When the mother questioned the

victim about the alleged assault, the victim gave her virtually the same details she had given

her brother.  	Moreover, some of the victim's details about the alleged assault indicate that her statements were reliable.  For example, when she was asked about defendant's

underwear, the victim replied that defendant did not wear underwear.  When questioned by

the police, defendant admitted that he did not wear underwear around the house.  The victim

said that defendant gave her gum and let her play with his kittens after the assault occurred. 

When the police interviewed defendant at his home and searched his house, they found a

container full of gum and a litter of kittens in a back bedroom.  

	The victim's mother recalled that her family got along well with defendant's family. 

The victim often played with defendant's son.  The only evidence of any motive to fabricate

was that defendant recently had disciplined the children while they were in his care.  There

is no question that the State presented sufficient evidence at the reliability hearing to show that the statements were reliable.

	Because there is no statutory requirement that the child victim testify at the reliability

hearing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in quashing the subpoena,

especially in light of the fact that the victim testified at the trial and defense counsel was

given the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the victim.  Nevertheless, we are not

insensitive to defendant's concerns.  We caution trial courts in the future to make certain that

a defendant has a reasonable opportunity to test the reliability of the hearsay statements in

a  reasonable manner.  However, we find that remanding the instant cause for a new

reliability hearing would serve no purpose.  Defendant failed to show that the statements

were unreliable.  For all these reasons, we find that the trial court did not deprive defendant

of his constitutional rights to compulsory process or due process when it prevented him from

compelling the testimony of the child victim at the reliability hearing.

	III.  Apprendi Concerns 

	Defendant's final contention on appeal is that the life sentence imposed by the trial

court pursuant to section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code must be vacated because it was

imposed in violation of the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).  In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury[ ] and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  530 U.S. at 490, 147

L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.

	In People v. Pickens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 429, 752 N.E.2d 1195 (2001), this court rejected the same arguments raised by defendant herein.  We specifically stated, "Since the

increase in the defendant's penalty beyond the sentencing range otherwise provided was

based on prior convictions, it was constitutionally permissible for the trial judge to impose life imprisonment."  Pickens, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 435, 752 N.E.2d at 1200.  The holding and rationale in Pickens are equally applicable to the case at bar.  As in Pickens, here, defendant's prior convictions are not an element of the crimes that he committed. 

Defendant's convictions are a part of his past, a criminal history obtained through

proceedings that provided procedural safeguards.  See Pickens, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 752 N.E.2d at 1199.  Because section 33B-1 of the Criminal Code requires punishment

enhancement based upon the existence of prior convictions, it does not run afoul of

Apprendi.  Pickens, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 752 N.E.2d at 1199.  Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention that his sentence must be vacated.  Considering defendant's criminal

propensity, the life sentence imposed by the trial court is warranted. 

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is

hereby affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	KUEHN and CHAPMAN, Melissa, JJ., concur.

                                     	NO. 5-00-0524

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)  Appeal from the

							)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,				)  Madison County.

							)  

v.							)  No. 99-CF-1650

							)

MARK MAGUIRE,				)  Honorable

							)  James Hackett,

     Defendant-Appellant.				)  Judge, presiding.  

___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:	May 156, 2002	

___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices:	Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

	Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J., and 

	Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,

	Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, John H. Gleason, Assistant Defender, Office

for	of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Route 15 East, P.O. Box

Appellant	2430, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864-0047

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Hon. William Haine, State's Attorney, Madison County, 157 North Main,

for	Edwardsville, IL 62025; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy

Appellee	Director, Sharon Shanahan, Contract Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys

	Appellate Prosecutor, Route 15 Eatst, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________