Filed 3/24/15 

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

KEN WATTS et al.,

 Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants,

v.

OAK SHORES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,

 Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent;

ROBERT C. BURLISON, JR.,

 Cross-defendant and Appellant.

2d Civil No. B240337

(Super. Ct. No. CV060326)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Here we hold, among other things, that homeowners associations may 

adopt reasonable rules and impose fees on its members relating to short term rentals 

of condominium units.

Two owners of one lot in a common interest development and one of 

two owners of another lot brought an action challenging regulations and fees 

adopted by the homeowners association. The association cross-complained against 

all owners of both lots for fees and declaratory relief. The association prevailed on 

the complaint and cross-complaint. The trial court also awarded the association 

statutory attorney fees and costs on the complaint and cross-complaint. As we 

 

*Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for partial publication. The portions of this opinion to be deleted from 

publication are identified as those portions between double brackets, e.g., [[/]].
2

explain in the unpublished portion of this opinion, the judgment must be clarified so 

that the attorney fees awarded on the complaint are against plaintiffs only, and not 

against the cross-defendant who was not a plaintiff. In all other respects, we affirm.

FACTS

Oak Shores is a single-family residential common interest 

development. It is governed by the Oak Shores Community Association 

(Association). The Association is governed by a board of directors (Board). All 

property owners in the development are members of the Association.

The Association's governing documents include its Covenants, 

Conditions and Restrictions (CC&R's) and its bylaws. The Board "may adopt, 

amend, or repeal Rules for the use, occupancy and maintenance of the Project; for 

the general health, welfare, comfort, and safety of Members; and to interpret and 

implement these CC&R's, and establish penalties for violation of such Rules."

(CC&R's, art. 6.2.) "In the event the Association undertakes to provide materials or 

services that benefit a particular Member, such Member in accepting the materials 

or services agrees to reimburse the Association for the costs incurred by the 

Association, which shall become a Special Assessment against the Member." (Id., 

art. 3.8.)

Oak Shores consists of 851 parcels of land. Six hundred sixty parcels 

are developed with single-family homes. Only about 20 percent, 125 to 150, of the 

homes are occupied by full-time residents. Approximately 66 absentee 

homeowners rent their homes to short-term vacation renters.

Ken and Joyce Watts and Lynda Burlison (collectively "Watts") are 

absentee owners who rent their homes to short-term vacation renters. Watts filed a 

complaint against Oak Shores challenging fees charged and rules and regulations 

enacted by the Association. The challenge included: a rule stating the minimum 

rental period is seven days; an annual fee of $325 imposed on owners who rent their 

homes; a rule limiting the number of automobiles, boats and other watercraft that 
3

renters are allowed to bring into Oak Shores; a mandatory garbage collection fee; 

boat and watercraft fees; building permit fees; and property transfer fees.

[[The Association cross-complained against Watts and Robert 

Burlison, Jr., for unpaid fees and fines and for injunctive relief to require crossdefendants to comply with Association rules and regulations. At the time of filing, 

the Burlisons owed $2,355.06 in unpaid assessments and the Wattses owed 

$4,888.47. The Burlisons paid the assessment under protest. At the time of trial, 

the Wattses owed $10,264.]]

Short-term Renters

The Association has a rule stating that the minimum rental period is 

seven days. The Association's general manager testified that, based on his 

discussion with Board members, staff and code enforcement officers, as well as his 

review of gate and patrol logs, short-term renters cause more problems than owners 

or their guests. The problems include parking, lack of awareness of the rules, noise 

and use, and abuse of the facilities. Expert James Smith testified that, unlike guests 

who are typically present with the owners, short-term renters are never present with 

the owner. Guests tend to be less destructive and less burdensome. Short-term

renters require greater supervision and increase administrative expenses.

A $325 fee is charged to all owners who rent their homes. A 2007

study calculated each rental cost the Association $898.59 per year.

Watercraft

All short-term renters and guests who bring watercraft into Oak 

Shores pay a fee of $25 per day or $125 per week. Short-term renters and guests 

are limited to one boat or two personal watercraft. Owners and long-term renters do 

not pay such special fees and are not limited in the number of watercraft they can 

bring into Oak Shores.

Boats have a negative impact on the Association's roads. There are 

also costs of maintaining the docks and parking lot used by the renters and 

increased costs for code enforcement.
4

Expert Smith testified that renters comprise only 8 percent of the 

people entering the gate, but renters bring in 37 percent of the boats.

Parking Restrictions

Association rules restrict parking in the lower marina lot to owners on 

weekends and holidays during the summer months. A lot not much further away is 

available to all.

Construction Permits

The Association charges a plan-check fee of $100 and a road impact 

fee of $1,600 for new construction. Expert Smith testified that heavy equipment 

used to construct homes places more wear on the roads and results in greater usage. 

It is appropriate to consider the need for reserves in determining the amount of the 

fee. The Board president testified that road resurfacing and repair are the basis for 

the fee.

Trash Collection Fees

The Association contracts with a trash collector. It passes the fees 

pro rata onto all owners of developed lots. The Association does not distinguish 

between full-time and part-time residences because it is too difficult to make that 

determination. It does not charge the owners of undeveloped lots because they do 

not produce trash.

Former Civil Code Section 1366.11

Former section 1366.1 (repealed by Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 1 and

reinstated with nonsubstantive changes as § 5600, subd. (b)) provided, "An 

association shall not impose or collect an assessment or fee that exceeds the amount 

necessary to defray the costs for which it is levied."

David Levy and Travis Hickey are certified public accountants. Levy 

testified that the expenses generated by owners who rent short term far exceed the 

income generated from those owners. He analyzed fees and costs contained in the 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless noted otherwise.
5

Association's financial statements and reserve studies. He concluded the fees 

charged were reasonable and complied with the law. Levy also consulted with the 

Association's former auditors. Levy and Hickey concluded that the fees were 

reasonable and did not violate former section 1366.1. Levy also testified the fees 

charged by comparable associations for similar activities were higher or equivalent 

to fees charged by Oak Shores.

Hickey testified that he is the Association's former auditor. He 

studied the fees and consulted with another former auditor. He concluded the fees 

were fair, reasonable, and in compliance with the law. They do not exceed the costs 

for which they are levied. No association conducts a formal study to set fees. Nor 

does any association conduct time and motion studies. In fact, time and motion 

accounting is not possible.

Homeowners association expert Karen Conlon testified the 

Association met the standard of care for giving members notice of rule and fee 

changes. Fee increases can be enacted by adopting a budget for the year.

Swimming Pool

The Association paid a pool contractor $35,000 to repair a swimming 

pool. The contractor absconded with the money without repairing the pool. A 

former director testified that a former Board president wrote a check to the 

contractor without Board approval. Expert Smith testified it is not typical, nor 

within the standard of care, for an association to purchase a performance bond.

Release and Unclean Hands

[[Lynda Burlison filed a previous lawsuit against the Association. 

Her complaint included an attack on the Association's CC&R's, rules and 

regulations restricting the use of her property for rental purposes. She settled the 

suit for $3,000 and the Association's agreement to accept her suggestions for 

changes in the rental policies, rules and regulations. As part of the settlement, she 

executed a release of all claims "known or unknown" arising out of the complaint.]]
6

Ken Watts has never obtained a business license to rent his home, nor 

has he paid transient occupancy taxes since at least 2000. He owes at least $5,000 

in back taxes. Watts has repeatedly mischaracterized his renters as guests in order 

to avoid applicable rental rules and regulations. Portions of his testimony at trial 

were "demonstrably false." Throughout his tenure at Oak Shores, he has adopted a 

"rancorous, accusatory and obstructionist" style of interaction with Board members 

and staff. He has occasionally intimidated staff with bizarre and threatening 

behavior.

Judgment

The trial court found for the Association on the complaint. [[The 

court found Lynda Burlison had no standing because she had previously released 

her claims against the Association. The court found that the Wattses are denied 

relief under the doctrine of unclean hands. The court determined that, although all 

the inequitable conduct was committed by Ken Watts, Joyce Watts's claims are 

inextricably tied to those of her husband. Therefore, Joyce Watts is also denied 

relief.]] The court found that the Association's rules and regulations are reasonable 

and comply with the Association's governing documents and the law, and that the 

fees charged comply with former section 1366.1.

The trial court also found for the Association on the cross-complaint. 

It granted the Association an injunction ordering the cross-defendants to abide by 

the rules and regulations. [[It also granted the Association a money judgment 

against Ken and Joyce Watts in the amount of $10,264 plus interest for unpaid 

assessments.

The Association moved for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 

former section 1354, subdivision (c). "In an action to enforce the governing 

documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and 

costs." (Ibid., repealed by Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 1, and reenacted without 

substantive changes as § 5975, subd. (c).) The trial court found the Association was 

the prevailing party in its efforts to enforce the governing documents, both as to the 
7

complaint and cross-complaint. The trial court awarded $1,180,646.50 for 

defending the complaint and $27,730 on the cross-complaint.]]

DISCUSSION

[[I.

On appeal, Watts does not challenge the trial court's findings that 

Lynda Burlison must be denied relief because she had previously released the 

Association from liability and that Ken and Joyce Watts are denied relief under the 

doctrine of unclean hands. Watts's failure to raise the issues in his opening brief 

waives the issues on appeal. (Tisher v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 

Cal.App.3d 349, 361.) Because Lynda Burlison and the Wattses are the only 

plaintiffs, we must affirm the trial court's judgment denying any relief under their 

complaint. We discuss the issues raised on appeal only as they relate to the crosscomplaint and the award of attorney fees.]]

II.

Watts contends that the judgment is based on incorrect legal grounds.

Watts claims that the rule applying judicial deference to association 

decisions applies only to ordinary maintenance decisions. But in Lamden v. La 

Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249, our 

Supreme Court stated, "'Generally, courts will uphold decisions made by the 

governing board of an owners association so long as they represent good faith 

efforts to further the purposes of the common interest development, are consistent 

with the development's governing documents, and comply with the public policy.'" 

(Id., at p. 265, quoting Nahrstadt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn., Inc. 

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 74.) It is true the facts in Lamden involve the association 

board's decision to treat termites locally rather than fumigate. But nothing in 

Lamden limits judicial deference to maintenance decisions. Common interest 

developments are best operated by the board of directors, not the courts.

Watts's reliance on Affan v. Portofino Cove Homeowners Assn.

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 930, is misplaced. There, an owner sued the association for 
8

failing to properly maintain the sewer lines. In applying judicial deference, the 

court stated that the Lamden rule gives "deference to the reasoned decisionmaking

of homeowners association boards concerning ordinary maintenance." (Affan, at 

p. 940.) But there is no reason to read Lamden so narrowly. In fact, courts have 

given deference to board decisions that do not concern ordinary maintenance. Thus, 

for example, in Dolan-King v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 965, 

979, the court gave deference to an association board's decision denying an owner's 

application for a room addition on aesthetic grounds.

Article 3.8 of the CC&R's gives the Board broad powers to adopt 

rules for Oak Shores. Nothing in the article or elsewhere prohibits the Board from 

adopting rules governing short-term rentals, including fees to help defray the costs 

such rentals impose on all owners. The Board may reasonably decide that all 

owners should not be required to subsidize Watts's vacation rental business.

That short-term renters cost the Association more than long-term 

renters or permanent residents is not only supported by the evidence but experience 

and common sense places the matter beyond debate. Short-term renters use the 

common facilities more intensely; they take more staff time in giving directions and 

information and enforcing the rules; and they are less careful in using the common 

facilities because they are not concerned with the long-term consequences of abuse.

In arguing the cost of short-term rentals must be borne by all

members, Watts cites California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2792.16(a). 

That regulation provides, "Regular assessments to defray expenses attributable to 

the ownership, operation and furnishing of common interests by the Association 

shall ordinarily be levied against each owner according to the ratio of the number of 

subdivision interests owned by the owner assessed to the total number of interests 

subject to assessments." Watts's reliance on the regulation is misplaced for a 

number of reasons. First, the regulation applies to subdivision developers. Watts 

cites no authority that it also applies to continuing operations of a common interest 

development. Second, the regulation is qualified by the word "ordinarily." (Ibid.) 
9

It clearly does not state an immutable rule. Third, the regulation applies to 

"[r]egular assessments." (Ibid.) Watts cites no authority that it applies to the type 

of use fees at issue here.

Watts's reliance on the Association's Articles of Incorporation, Article 

II, paragraph (d), is also misplaced. The paragraph under the heading "General 

Purposes" states in part: "To fix and establish the fees, dues and assessments that 

each member of this corporation shall pay to this corporation for the purpose of 

providing funds to carry out the community purposes and objects of this 

corporation, and to receive and collect such fees, dues and assessments[.]" Nothing 

in the paragraph provides that each member shall pay the same amount regardless 

of his or her activities on the premises. It does confirm, however, the power of the 

Association to impose fees as well as assessments. Thus, it confirms the power of 

the Association to impose the type of fees at issue here.

Watts's reliance on Laguna Royale Owners Assn. v. Darger (1981) 

119 Cal.App.3d 670, 685 ("Laguna Royale") is misplaced. There, a common 

interest development was built on a 99-year ground lease. Defendants purchased a 

unit in the development. Later, defendants transferred undivided interests to three 

other families. No more than one family would use the unit at a time and each of 

the four families agreed to 13-week periods of exclusive use. The ground lease 

contained a provision prohibiting transfer of the unit without the development 

association's approval. The association refused to approve the transfer on the 

ground, among others, that use by the four families would place an undue burden on 

the other owners in their use and enjoyment of their units so as to be inconsistent 

with their quiet enjoyment and maintenance of security. The trial court invalidated 

the assignments. The Court of Appeal reversed.

In reversing, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the association had the 

authority to enact reasonable regulations on the use and alienation of the 

condominiums. (Laguna Royale, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 682.) The court also 

determined that the reason given for refusing consent to the transfer is rationally 
10

related to the proper operation of the property and purposes of the association. (Id., 

at p. 686.) The court concluded, however, there was no evidence that consecutive 

use of the unit by the four families one at a time would be so disruptive as to 

interfere substantially with the other owners' use and enjoyment or the maintenance 

of security. (Id., at p. 687.) The court pointed out that the association's bylaws 

allowed leasing of a unit for 90 days or more, a use more intense than the 13 weeks 

excusive use agreed to by each of the four families. (Ibid.)

If anything, Laguna Royale is favorable to the Association. It 

confirms the authority of the Association to enact reasonable regulations governing 

transfers so as to preserve the owner's quiet enjoyment of the premises and the 

maintenance of security. There was simply no evidence in Laguna Royale that four 

13-week periods of occupation by a single family would have a significant impact 

on the enjoyment of the premises by other owners or on security. Here there is 

more than ample evidence that short-term rentals have such significant impacts.

[[III.

Watts contends the judgment is not based on the evidence.

Watts's statement of facts cites the evidence in a light most favorable 

to himself. But that is not how we view the evidence.

In viewing the evidence, we look only to the evidence supporting the 

prevailing party. (GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 

856, 872.) We discard evidence unfavorable to the prevailing party as not having 

sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. (Ibid.) Where the trial court or 

jury has drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence, we have no power to draw 

different inferences, even though different inferences may also be reasonable. (9 

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 376, pp. 434-435.) The trier of fact 

is not required to believe even uncontradicted testimony. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc.

(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1028.) Watts's failure to state the evidence favorable 

to the judgment waives the contention on appeal. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. 

Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.)
11

In any event, Watts's only argument is that the uncontroverted 

evidence proved the Association's true purpose in enacting its rules and regulations 

is to keep Oak Shores private by making it expensive to rent. But Watts confuses 

uncontroverted evidence with credible evidence. The trier of fact may reject even 

uncontradicted evidence as lacking sufficient verity. (Sprague v. Equifax, supra, 

166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1028.)]]

IV.

Watts contends the trial court erred in adopting the proportionality test 

in determining the reasonableness of the fees.

Former section 1366.1 prohibits an association from imposing or 

collecting "an assessment or fee that exceeds the amount necessary to defray the 

costs for which it is levied."

At trial, Watts argued the Association was required to conduct time 

and motion studies to determine the correct amount of the fees. The trial court 

rejected Watts's argument. In its statement of decision, the court stated the issue is 

whether "rough proportionality" between the fees and costs is sufficient to comply 

with the statute. The court found that the evidence established a "reasonably close" 

relationship between each contested fee and the cost it is intended to offset. The 

court concluded that relationship satisfied former section 1366.1.

Nothing in the language of former section 1366.1 requires the exact 

correlation between the fee assessed and the costs for which it is levied that Watts 

appears to demand. In some instances, such an exact correlation may be impossible 

to obtain. In other instances, the costs of studies necessary to obtain an exact 

correlation may be prohibitive, requiring the Association to add the costs to the 

fees. The "golden rule" for statutory interpretation is that where several alternative 

interpretations exist, the one that appears the most reasonable prevails. (Stewart v. 

Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 171, 179.) The most 

reasonable interpretation of former section 1366.1 is that it requires nothing more 

than a reasonable good faith estimate of the amount of the fee necessary to defray 
12

the cost for which it is levied. Whether the court uses the term "roughly 

proportional" or "reasonably close," the test has been met here.

In Foothills Townhome Assn. v. Christiansen (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 

688, a homeowners association imposed a special assessment of $1,300 against 

each owner. The assessment was to replenish the association's reserve fund, which 

had been depleted paying for storm damage. The reserve fund could be used for 

purposes other than storm damage. An owner challenged the assessment as 

violating former section 1366.1. The court upheld the amount of the assessment on 

the ground that there was no showing that the usual reserve balance was excessive 

or that the amount of the assessment pushed the fund above its usual balance. 

(Foothills, at p. 694.) The court did not require a precise correlation between the 

amount of the assessment and the cost for which it was levied.

Watts argues that the Association should be bound by its admissions 

made during discovery that no studies to determine costs associated with the fees 

were conducted. The discovery to which Watts refers were interrogatories 

answered in February 2007. Trial began in April 2011. At trial, the Association 

produced evidence of studies that supported the fees. Watts points to no place in 

the record where the Association's witnesses were asked to explain the apparent 

discrepancy between the interrogatory responses and their testimony. Nor does 

Watts cite any authority in support of his argument requiring the trial court to reject 

the Association's evidence at trial. Watts has failed to carry his burden of 

showing error on appeal. (See In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 

Cal.App.3d 272, 278 [judgment presumed correct, error must be affirmatively

shown].)

Watts claims that the garbage fees were initiated January 1, 2001, 

without ever being adopted by the Association as required by former section

1357.100, subdivision (a) (repealed by Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 1, now § 4340). But 

that statute simply defines "'operating rule.'" (Ibid.) It does not set forth any 

particular procedure for adopting any rule. Moreover, it defines operating rule as a 
13

"regulation." (Ibid.) The garbage fee is not a regulation. It is simply a cost the 

Association passes through to the owners of the developed lots.

Watts claims the Board adopted or increased fees and fines by simply 

including them in the budget. But he cites no authority prohibiting the Board from 

adopting or increasing fees and fines in that manner.

In any event, Watts's entire contention is based on a view of the 

evidence most favorable to himself. Watts fails to cite the evidence most favorable 

to the judgment. That evidence includes the testimony of Karen Conlon, an expert 

on homeowners associations. She testified the Association met the standard of care 

on notice of rules and fee charges. Board members also testified that Board 

meetings agenda and minutes were posted on the Association's website. Watts has 

waived the contention on appeal. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 

Cal.3d at p. 881.)

[[V.

Watts contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying its 

motions in limine.

(a)

Watts argues the trial court should not have permitted the testimony 

of six "persons most qualified" ("PMQs") who were not designated during 

discovery.

During discovery, the Association designated Robert Lever as its 

PMQ for purposes of a deposition. Bandy Smith, an Association manager, verified 

responses to written discovery. Watts made a motion in limine to exclude Board 

member witnesses who were not designated as a PMQ.

In opposing the motion, the Association pointed out that the discovery 

designating its PMQ was made years prior to the trial. Lever is no longer on the 

Board and is not an agent or employee of the Association. In written discovery 

responses, the Association identified others with knowledge of the issues. It even 
14

provided Watts with a historical list of Board members, officers and employees. 

The trial court denied the motion.

Watts cites no authority to support his argument that the trial court 

abused its discretion. Moreover, preclusion discovery sanctions are generally not 

imposed unless a party fails to obey a discovery order or engages in repeated and 

willful refusal to permit discovery. (See Maldonado v. Superior Court (2002) 94 

Cal.App.4th 1390, 1398-1399.) Watts points to none of those factors here.

(b)

Watts argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting the 

Association's motion in limine. The Association moved to exclude evidence that it 

breached its fiduciary duty by incurring $300,000 in attorney fees to pursue its 

cross-complaint. The cross-complaint was to recover the fees owing. Watts points 

out that the amount was within the jurisdiction of the small claims court.

Watts does not contest that the Association has the right and duty to 

collect all properly imposed fees and assessments. He cites no authority prohibiting

the Association from retaining an attorney to enforce its rights. This case does not 

involve a simple question whether Watts had paid the fees. Instead, the case 

involves the more complex question whether the Association has the power to 

impose the fees. If enforcing the Association's rights to the fees cost $300,000, it is 

not because the Association breached a fiduciary duty; it is because Watts resisted 

paying lawfully imposed fees. Watts simply had no viable claim for a breach of 

fiduciary duty.

VI.

Watts contends the award of fees and costs was excessive. The trial 

court awarded the Association $1,180,646.50 on the complaint and $27,730 on the 

cross-complaint.

Former section 1354, subdivision (c) provided, "In an action to 

enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable 

attorney fees and costs." Watts argues the action did not involve a challenge to the 
15

validity of the governing documents. It may be true that Watts did not challenge the 

validity of the governing documents. But the statute applies to actions to "enforce

the governing documents." (Ibid.) Watts's action challenged the right of the 

Association to enforce the governing documents by enacting and attempting to 

collect fees and assessments pursuant to those documents. The action clearly comes 

within that statute. Thus an award of fees was appropriate.

Watts makes no challenge to any specific item of attorney fees and 

costs. Instead, he states that the award was punitive. He argues the court rewarded 

the Association for vigorously litigating the case in order to make a statement and 

precedence for future litigation.

Watts ignores that he initiated the action and vigorously litigated in 

order to make a statement and create precedence. Watts could have avoided all 

attorney fees and costs simply by declining to bring the instant unmeritorious 

action and by paying the Association the few thousand dollars it was properly 

demanding.

Watts claims the trial court found the cross-complaint should not 

have been brought. The trial court only stated it would have made "better sense" 

to obtain a tolling agreement, or file and stay the collection matter. But the 

Association had every right to bring the cross-complaint on which it unequivocally 

prevailed. The court did find the $250,000 the Association was requesting on the 

cross-complaint was excessive and awarded only $27,730. Robert C. Burlison, Jr., 

argues he was not a party to the complaint and thus fees on the complaint cannot be 

awarded against him. The trial court's ruling states that fees are awarded to Oak 

Shores. The trial court's ruling also states, "No request has been made to apportion 

this award." Nevertheless, the Association does not contest Burlison's point on 

appeal. The attorney fee portion of the judgment against Robert C. Burlison, Jr., 

must be modified to reflect that it is only on the cross-complaint.]]

The attorney fee portion of the judgment is ordered modified as 

discussed in the unpublished portion of the opinion. In all other respects, the 
16

judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent and against all 

appellants.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
Charles S. Crandall, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Burlison Law Group and Robert C. Burlison, Jr., for Plaintiffs, Crossdefendants and Appellants and for Cross-defendant and Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Roy G. Weatherup, Michael 

B. Wilk, Caroline E. Chan, Ryan D. Harvey; Adams Kessler PLC, Adrian J. 

Adams, Gary S. Kessler, Paul S. Ablon, Aide C. Ontiveros, Tina Chu for 

Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.