AFGHANISTAN

Oversight and 

Accountability of U.S. 

Assistance

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and North Africa, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

GAO-14-680T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-680T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and North Africa, Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, House of Representatives

June 10, 2014

AFGHANISTAN

Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Assistance

Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. government has engaged in 

multiple efforts in Afghanistan since 

declaring a global war on terrorism that 

targeted al Qaeda, its affiliates, and 

other violent extremists, including 

certain elements of the Taliban. These 

efforts have focused on a whole-ofgovernment approach that calls for the 

use of all elements of U.S. national 

power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al Qaeda and its affiliates and prevent 

their return to Afghanistan. This 

approach, in addition to security 

assistance, provided billions toward 

governance and development, 

diplomatic operations, and 

humanitarian assistance. 

To assist Congress in its oversight, 

GAO has issued over 70 products 

since 2003 including key oversight 

issues related to U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan. This testimony 

summarizes the key findings from 

those products and discusses: (1) the 

challenges associated with operating in 

Afghanistan, (2) key oversight and 

accountability issues regarding U.S. 

efforts in Afghanistan, and (3) the need 

for contingency planning as the U.S. 

transitions to a civilian-led presence in 

Afghanistan. 

What GAO Recommends

While GAO is not making new 

recommendations it has made 

numerous recommendations in prior 

reports aimed at improving U.S. 

agencies’ oversight and accountability 

of U.S. funds in Afghanistan. U.S. 

agencies have generally concurred 

with these recommendations and have 

taken or plan to take steps to address 

them. 

What GAO Found

Since 2003, GAO has identified numerous challenges related to U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan. Among the various challenges that GAO and others have identified, 

are the following: the dangerous security environment, the prevalence of 

corruption, and the limited capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services 

and sustain donor-funded projects. As illustrated in the figure below, between 

fiscal years 2002 and 2013, U.S. agencies allocated nearly $100 billion toward 

U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 

Breakout of U.S. Allocations for Efforts in Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2002-2013 

Note: This figure does not include funding provided for U.S. military or other operations in 

Afghanistan. Percentages may not add up to 100 as a result of rounding.

The United States, along with the international community, has focused its efforts 

in areas such as building the capacity of Afghan ministries to govern and deliver 

services, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy, and developing 

and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. In multiple reviews of these 

efforts, GAO has identified numerous shortcomings and has made 

recommendations to the agencies to take corrective actions related to (1) 

mitigating the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan government, (2) 

oversight and accountability of U.S. development projects, and (3) estimating the 

future costs of sustaining Afghanistan’s security forces which the United States

and international community have pledged to support. 

In February 2013, GAO reported that while the circumstances, combat 

operations, and diplomatic efforts in Iraq differ from those in Afghanistan, 

potential lessons could be learned from the transition from a military- to a civilianled presence to avoid possible missteps and better utilize resources. As GAO

has reported, contingency planning is critical to a successful transition and to 

ensuring that there is sufficient oversight of the U.S. investment in Afghanistan. 

This is particularly vital given the uncertainties of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral 

Security Agreement and the ultimate size of the post-2014 U.S. presence in 

Afghanistan. 

View GAO-14-680T. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-14-680T 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss key issues relating to the oversight 

and accountability of U.S. government efforts in Afghanistan. Since 

declaring a global war on terrorism, the U.S. government has engaged in 

multiple efforts in Afghanistan. These efforts have focused on a whole-ofgovernment approach that calls for the use of all elements of U.S. 

national power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its 

affiliates, and other extremists, including certain elements of the Taliban, 

and prevent their return to Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002 through 2013, 

U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State (State) and Defense 

(DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have 

allocated close to $100 billion for efforts in Afghanistan. As shown in

figure 1, U.S. agencies allocated:

• $62.8 billion to support Afghanistan’s security in areas such as the 

development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and 

counternarcotics efforts.

• $23.1 billion to support governance and development efforts, such as 

the construction of roads, schools, and other infrastructure projects.

• $8.0 billion for diplomatic operations, such as diplomatic, consular and 

building operations.

• $2.1 billion for humanitarian assistance, including refugee, food, and 

disaster assistance.
 

Page 2 GAO-14-680T 

Figure 1: Breakout of U.S. Allocations for Efforts in Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2002-

2013

Note: Figure 1 does not include funding provided for U.S. military or other operations in Afghanistan. 

Percentages may not add up to 100 as a result of rounding.

Since 2003, GAO has issued over 70 products and participated in 

numerous congressional hearings and briefings on U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan. In the course of our work, we have made over 150 

recommendations to U.S. agencies on a range of actions that should be 

taken to improve program planning, implementation, management, and 

oversight. U.S. agencies have generally concurred and have taken steps 

to address many of our recommendations. In addition, we have identified 

several matters and key oversight issues for Congress. Our most recent 

key issues report prepared for the 113th Congress identified several 

oversight issues and is the basis for my testimony today.1

 

1

GAO, Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues, GAO-13-218SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 

2013).
 

Page 3 GAO-14-680T 

Among the key issues we have highlighted related to U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan:

• challenges faced by U.S. agencies operating in Afghanistan;

• the need to ensure oversight and accountability of U.S. efforts 

invested in Afghanistan; and

• the need to plan for contingencies as the U.S. transitions to a civilianled presence in Afghanistan.

This testimony and our 2013 key issues report summarizes some of the 

work we have reported on in over 70 issued products since 2003 related 

to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Detailed information on the scope and 

methodology for our prior work summarized in this testimony can be 

found in the reports cited. We conducted the work that this statement is 

based on in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits 

to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Our work has identified several challenges related to U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan. Among those we highlighted in our 2013 key issues report 

are a dangerous security environment, the prevalence of corruption, and 

the limited capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and 

sustain donor funded projects.

• Dangerous security environment. Afghanistan’s security environment 

continues to challenge the efforts of the Afghan government and 

international community. This is a key issue that we noted in 2007 

when we reported that deteriorating security was an obstacle to the 

U.S. government’s major areas of focus in Afghanistan.2

 

2

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight, 

In December 

2009, the U.S. and coalition partners deployed additional troops to 

disrupt and defeat extremists in Afghanistan. While the security 

situation in Afghanistan has improved, as measured by enemyGAO-07-801SP (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007). 

Challenges 

Associated with 

Operating in 

Afghanistan
 

Page 4 GAO-14-680T 

initiated attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, Afghan security forces, 

and non-combatants, including Afghan civilians, the number of daily 

enemy-initiated attacks remains relatively high compared to the 

number of such attacks before 2009. In 2012, attacks on ANSF 

surpassed attacks on U.S. and coalition forces (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: Average Daily Number of Enemy-Initiated Attacks on International Security Force Assistance (ISAF) and Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) Troops, by Month, December 2005—April 2014

Note: Enemy-initiated attacks do not include insider attacks. Some U.S. special forces in Afghanistan 

are not under ISAF command. Coalition forces include U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan but 

exclude ANSF and other Afghan security organizations.

• Prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan. Corruption in Afghanistan 

continues to undermine security and Afghan citizens’ belief in their 

government and has raised concerns about the effective and efficient 

use of U.S. funds. We noted in 2009 that according to the Afghan 

National Development Strategy pervasive corruption exacerbated the 

Afghan government’s capacity problems and that the sudden influx of 

donor money into a system already suffering from poor procurement 

practices had increased the risk of corruption and waste of 
 

Page 5 GAO-14-680T 

resources.3 According to Transparency International’s 2013 

Corruption Perception Index, Afghanistan is ranked at the bottom of 

countries worldwide.4 In February 2014, the Afghan President 

dissolved the Afghan Public Protection Force which was responsible 

for providing security intended to protect people, infrastructure, 

facilities, and construction projects. DOD had reported major 

corruption concerns within the Afghan Public Protection Force.

• Limited Afghan capacity. While we have reported that the Afghan 

government has increased its generation of revenue, it remains 

heavily reliant on the United States and other international donors to 

fund its public expenditures and continued reconstruction efforts.5 In 

2011, we reported that Afghanistan’s domestic revenues funded only 

about 10 percent of its estimated total public expenditures.6 We have 

repeatedly raised concerns about Afghanistan’s inability to sustain 

and maintain donor funded projects and programs, putting U.S. 

investments over the last decade at risk. DOD reported in November 

2013 that Afghanistan remains donor dependent.7

These persistent challenges are likely to play an even larger role in U.S. 

efforts within Afghanistan as combat forces continue to withdraw through 

the end of 2014.

The United States, along with the international community, has focused 

its efforts in areas such as building the capacity of Afghan ministries to 

govern and deliver services, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure and 

economy, and developing and sustaining ANSF. In multiple reviews of 

these efforts, we have identified numerous shortcomings and have made 

recommendations to the agencies to take corrective actions related to (1) 

mitigating against the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan 

 

3

GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-473SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009). 

4

Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. (Berlin, Germany: Dec. 

3, 2013). 

5

GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure V.

6

GAO. Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence. GAO-11-948R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 

2011). 

7

DOD. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. (Washington, 

D.C.: November 2013). 

Key Oversight and 

Accountability Issues 

Regarding U.S. 

Efforts in Afghanistan
 

Page 6 GAO-14-680T 

government, (2) oversight and accountability of U.S. development 

projects, and (3) estimating the future costs of ANSF.

In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its 

development aid directly through the Afghan government budget within 2 

years.8 This direct assistance was intended to help develop the capacity 

of Afghan government ministries to manage programs and funds. In the 

first year of the pledge, through bilateral agreements and multilateral trust 

funds, the United States more than tripled its direct assistance awards to 

Afghanistan, growing from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over 

$1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. For fiscal year 2013 USAID provided about 

$900 million of its Afghanistan mission funds in direct assistance. In 2011 

and 2013, we reported that while USAID had established and generally 

complied with various financial and other controls in its direct assistance 

agreements, it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct 

assistance before awarding funds.9 Although USAID has taken some 

steps in response to our recommendations to help ensure the 

accountability of direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan 

government, we have subsequently learned from a Special Inspector 

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report that USAID may 

have approved direct assistance to some Afghan ministries without 

mitigating all identified risks.10

Since 2002, U.S. agencies have allocated over $23 billion dollars towards

governance and development projects in Afghanistan through USAID, 

DOD, and State. The agencies have undertaken thousands of 

development activities in Afghanistan through multiple programs and 

funding accounts. We have previously reported on systemic weaknesses 

in the monitoring and evaluation of U.S. development projects as well as 

 

8

USAID has established a 5-year goal of providing 30 percent of mission funds worldwide 

for direct assistance by 2015. 

9

GAO, Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to 

Afghanistan Government, GAO-11-710 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2011); and 

GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure VI. 

10SIGAR, Direct Assistance: USAID Has Taken Positive Action to Assess Afghan 

Ministries’ Ability to Manage Donor Funds, but Concerns Remain, SIGAR-14-32-AR 

(Arlington, Va: Jan. 30, 2014). 

Mitigating the Risk of 

Providing Direct 

Assistance to the Afghan 

Government

Oversight and 

Accountability of U.S. 

Development Projects
 

Page 7 GAO-14-680T 

the need for a comprehensive shared database that would account for all 

U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan (see table 1).11

Table 1: Major U.S.-Administered Programs or Accounts Used to Fund Governance and Development Related Efforts in 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2002-2013

Economic Support 

Fund

Commander’s 

Emergency Response 

Program 

Task Force for 

Business and Stability 

Operations 

Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund 

Primary agency or 

agencies responsible 

U.S. Agency for 

International 

Development (USAID) 

Department of Defense 

(DOD)

DOD DOD and Department of 

State

Fiscal year in which 

funding for 

Afghanistan began

2002 2004 2009 2011 

Program or account 

description

Supports Afghan 

government in its efforts 

to promote economic 

growth, establish a 

democratic and capable 

state governed by the 

rule of law, and provide 

basic services for its 

people. 

Enables U.S. commanders 

in Afghanistan to carry out 

small-scale projects 

designed to meet urgent 

humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction needs in 

their areas of 

responsibility.

Supports projects to help 

reduce violence, enhance 

stability, and support 

economic normalcy 

through strategic

business and economic 

opportunities.

Supports high-priority, 

large-scale infrastructure 

projects that support the 

U.S. civilian-military effort 

in Afghanistan.

Total funding 

allocated since 

inception (millions)

$16,542 $2,921 $614 $1,125

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. │GAO-14-680T

Note: These four programs or accounts constitute most of the U.S. assistance for governance and 

development related efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Smaller amounts of assistance for 

development efforts have been provided by other U.S. agencies and through other accounts such as 

USAID Development Assistance. For the purposes of this report, we refer to the Economic Support 

Fund and Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund as accounts and to the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program and the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations as programs.

With respect to monitoring and evaluation, although USAID collected 

progress reports from implementing partners for agriculture and water 

projects, our past work found that it did not always analyze and interpret 

project performance data to inform future decisions. USAID has 

 

11GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance Management and 

Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID’s Agriculture Programs, GAO-10-368 

(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010); Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support 

Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination, 

GAO-11-138 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2010); and GAO, Opportunities to Reduce 

Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011). 
 

Page 8 GAO-14-680T 

undertaken some efforts in response to our recommendations to improve 

its monitoring and evaluation of the billions of dollars invested toward 

development projects in Afghanistan. We and other oversight agencies, 

however, have learned that USAID continued to apply performance 

management procedures inconsistently, fell short in maintaining 

institutional knowledge, and still needed to strengthen its oversight of 

contractors. For example, in February 2014, we reported that USAID 

identified improvements needed in its oversight and management of 

contractors in Afghanistan, including increasing the submission of 

contractor performance evaluations.12

We have also previously reported on several occasions on the need for a 

common database to avoid possible duplication and overlap of U.S. 

funded development efforts in Afghanistan. For example, in a review of 

U.S. funded road projects in Afghanistan, we reported in July 2008 that

despite guidance requiring DOD to provide their project information to a 

USAID-maintained database, DOD had not done so. As a result, a 

comprehensive database of all U.S.-funded road projects in Afghanistan 

did not exist. We recommended that information on DOD’s Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program-funded road projects be included in a 

USAID-maintained database, and DOD concurred.

We also found that USAID may 

have missed opportunities to leverage its institutional knowledge, and 

have recently recommended that USAID further assess its procedures 

and practices related to contingency contracting.

13

 

12GAO, Contingency Contracting: State and USAID Made Progress Assessing and 

Implementing Changes, but Further Actions Needed, 

Nearly 6 years later, 

we continue to report on the need for a comprehensive database. Despite 

the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan designating Afghan Info as the official 

database for U.S. foreign assistance efforts in Afghanistan, DOD has not 

taken steps to readily report its projects in Afghan Info or any other 

shared database. This raises concerns, as we have previously reported, 

about the potential duplication and overlap of U.S. development projects 

in Afghanistan. Furthermore, USAID officials have expressed concern 

about their lack of complete visibility into DOD funded development 

projects given the DOD’s 2014 transition plans. Because of the limited 

progress made by U.S. agencies in reaching agreement on a 

GAO-14-229 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 14, 2014).

13GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but 

Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are 

Needed, GAO-08-689 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008). 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-680T 

comprehensive database of U.S. development projects in Afghanistan in 

2012, we suggested that Congress consider requiring U.S. agencies to 

report information in a shared comprehensive database.14

Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from coalition nations, has 

worked to build, train, and equip ANSF so that the Afghan government 

could lead the security effort in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies have allocated 

over $62 billion to support Afghanistan’s security, including efforts to build 

and sustain ANSF, from fiscal years 2002 through 2013. This has been 

the largest portion of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan. The United States 

and the international community have pledged to continue to assist in 

financing the sustainment of ANSF beyond 2014. In April 2012, we 

reported concerns regarding the need to be transparent in disclosing the 

long-term cost of sustaining ANSF beyond 2014.15 DOD initially objected 

to such disclosure noting that ANSF cost estimates depend on a 

constantly changing operational environment and that it provided annual 

cost information to Congress through briefings and testimonies. Our 

analysis of DOD data estimates that the cost of continuing to support 

ANSF from 2014 through 2017 will be over $18 billion, raising concerns 

about ANSF’s sustainability. Furthermore, we reported that on the basis 

of projections of U.S. and other donor support for ANSF, that there will be 

an estimated gap each year of $600 million from 2015 through 2017 

between ANSF costs and donor pledges if additional contributions are not 

made. We previously noted in 2005 and 2008 that DOD should report to 

Congress about the estimated long-term cost to sustain ANSF.16

 

14GAO, Afghanistan Development: Agencies Could Benefit from a Shared and More 

Comprehensive Database on U.S. Efforts, 

In 2008, 

Congress mandated that DOD take such steps. In 2012, we once again 

GAO-13-34. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2012); 

and “Development Efforts in Afghanistan,” GAO’s Action Tracker (Washington, D.C.: last 

updated Mar. 6, 2014), accessed June 5, 2014,

http://www.gao.gov/duplication/action_tracker/Development_Efforts_in_Afghanistan/action

1. 

15GAO, Afghanistan Security: Estimated Costs to Support Afghan National Security 

Forces Underscore Concerns about Sustainability, GAO-12-438SU (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 26, 2012).

16GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, 

But Future Plans Need to be Better Defined, GAO-05-575 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 

2005); and Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure 

Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security 

Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).

Estimating Future Costs of 

Sustaining ANSF
 

Page 10 GAO-14-680T 

reported that DOD had not provided estimates of the long-term ANSF 

costs to Congress.17 Subsequently, in a November 2013 report to 

Congress on its efforts in Afghanistan, DOD included a section on the 

budget for ANSF and reported the expected size of ANSF to be 230,000 

with an estimated annual budget of $4.1 billion.

In February 2013, we reported that while the circumstances in Iraq differ 

from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be learned from the 

transition from a military to civilian-led presence to avoid possible 

missteps and better utilize resources. As we have reported, contingency 

planning is critical to a successful transition and to ensuring that there is 

sufficient oversight of the U.S. investment in Afghanistan.18 This is 

particularly vital given the uncertainties of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral 

Security Agreement and post-2014 presence.

While the circumstances, combat operations, and diplomatic efforts in 

Iraq differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons can be learned 

from the transition from a military to civilian-led presence in Iraq and 

applied to Afghanistan to avoid possible missteps and better utilize 

resources. In Iraq, State and DOD had to revise their plans for the U.S. 

presence from more than 16,000 personnel at 14 sites down to 11,500 

personnel at 11 sites after the transition had begun—in part because the 

United States did not obtain the Government of Iraq’s commitment to the 

planned U.S. presence. Given these reductions, we found that State was 

projected to have an unobligated balance of between about $1.7 billion 

and about $2.3 billion in its Iraq operations budget at the end of fiscal 

year 2013, which we brought to the attention of Congressional 

appropriators. As a result, $1.1 billion was rescinded from State’s 

Diplomatic and Consular Programs account. According to DOD officials, 

U.S. Forces-Iraq planning assumed that a follow-on U.S. military force 

would be approved by both governments. The decision not to have a 

follow-on force led to a reassessment of State and DOD’s plans and 

presence.

 

17GAO-12-438SU. 

18GAO-13-218SP, Enclosure IX.

Need for Contingency 

Planning as the U.S. 

Transitions to a 

Civilian-Led Presence 

in Afghanistan

Lessons Learned from 

Iraq
 

Page 11 GAO-14-680T 

In April 2014, we reported that State planned for the U.S. footprint in 

Afghanistan to consist of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, with additional 

representation at other locations as security and resources allow.19 In a 

review still under way, we are examining the status of U.S. civilian 

agencies’ plans for their presence in Afghanistan after the scheduled end 

of the U.S. combat mission on December 31, 2014, and how changes to 

the military presence will affect the post-2014 U.S. civilian presence. We 

have found that State plans to provide some critical support services to 

U.S. civilian personnel after the transition, but is planning to rely on DOD 

for certain other services. We plan to report in July 2014 on the 

anticipated size, locations, and cost of the post-2014 U.S. civilian 

presence, the planned division of critical support responsibilities between 

State and DOD, and how pending decisions regarding the post-2014 U.S. 

and coalition military presence will affect the U.S. civilian presence.

In closing, the President announced in May 2014 that the United States 

intends to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan through the end of 

2016, stationing about 10,000 military personnel in Afghanistan with two 

narrow missions: to continue supporting ANSF training efforts and to 

continue supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of 

al Qaeda. Simultaneously, the President announced that the embassy 

would be reduced to a “normal” presence. At the same time, the United 

States has made commitments to continue providing billions of dollars to 

Afghanistan over the next 2 years. These recently announced plans 

underscore the bottom line of my message today: continued oversight of 

U.S. agencies is required to ensure the challenges they face are properly 

mitigated in Afghanistan and that there is oversight and accountability of 

U.S. taxpayer funds.

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

 

19GAO, Afghanistan: Changes to Updated U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework Reflect 

Evolving U.S. Role, GAO-14-438R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2014).

Status of Transition to a 

Civilian-Led Presence in 

Afghanistan
 

Page 12 GAO-14-680T 

For further information on this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-

7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony 

include Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), David Dayton, Anne DeCecco, 

Mark Dowling, Brandon Hunt, Christopher J. Mulkins, Kendal Robinson, 

and Amie Steele.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments

(321028)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.