No. 88-45:! 

IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

PAUL R. EASTMAN, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-VSATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, Employer, 

CefenZant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FRON: The Corkers' Compensation Court, The Ilonorahle Timothy 

Reardon, zudge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Paul R. Eastman, pro se, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Andrew 2. IJtick; [Jtick & Grosfield, Helena, Montana 

Suhmitted on Briefs: March 9, 1989 

i - Decided: May.10, 1989 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weher delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The claimant, Paul Eastman, appeals from a final decision of the Workers' Compensation Court denying him benefits 

under the Workers' Compensation Act and affirming a compensation award of $10,000 under the Occupational Disease Act. Me 

affirm. 

Mr. Eastman appears pro se and requests this Court to 

review the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court in two 

respects. First, we are asked to determine the constitutionality of the Occupational Disease Act, and then to review the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the lower court's 

determination. We phrase the issues as follows: 

1. Does the treatment of employees suffering 

work-related diseases under the Occupational Disease Act 

violate equal protection or deny a claimant's right to full 

legal redress? 

2. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in determining that Mr. Eastman is ent-itled to benefits under the Occupational Disease Act rather than the Workers' Compensation 

Act? 

3. Is claimant entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees and a 20% penalty? 

Pa-ul Eastman began working for Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) at its Columbia Fa1l.s Aluminum plant in June 19?7. 

He was employed! as a welder, and continued i.n that position 

until he was laid off on April 26, 1985, following the closure of the Columbia Falls plant. Two weeks prior to the lay 

off, Mr. Eastman was exposed to an unusually large and concentrated dose of fumes while welding at the plant. He was 

working with a heavy metal pot in which aluminum ore is 

refined, when the welding debris dripped onto plastic and tar 

belcv, 1-he area and ignited those materials. The smoke and 
fumes from the burning materials were much more j-ntense and 

concentrated than normal. 

Following the incident, Mr. Eastman left work and drove 

himself to t.he emergency room at Kal-ispel: Regional Hospitz! 

for treatment. He was hospitalized for three days, during 

which time he was given large doses of: steroids. Followj-ng 

hospitalization, Mr. Eastman returned to work urrtil he was 

laid off two weeks Later. 

bir. Eastman had a history of asthma prior to the incident of April 8, 1985. He first began to experience short-- 

ness 05 breath in 1973 during periods of heavy exercise. Re 

continued. to experience shortness of breath during exertion 

while empl-oyed with ARC0 between 1978 and 1980, during whj-ch 

time he al.so experienced recurring bouts of bronchitis. Ry 

1983, Mr. Eastman's condition had developed into full-blown, 

severe asthma, which was mefiically diagnosed as Chronic 

ObstructFve Pulmonary Cisease. He was first treated with 

antibiotics and steroid medication in April, 1983, under the 

care of Dr. Rosetto. The steroid treatments have continued 

on and off since that time. Dr. Rosetto described Mr. East.-. 

man as "steroid dependent," meaning that the claimant is 

unable to go off the medication without his ast-hma flaring to 

the point where he either couldn't do anything or would end 

up in the hospit.al. Dr. Rosetto testified that the claim-- 

ant's steroid dependency had existed prior to the incident 

which occurred in April, 1985. The medication he must take 

to control his asthma has severe physical and emotional side 

effects, which the claimant. testified affects his ability to 

find and perform work. 

Since his layoff in April, 1985, Mr. Eastman has conducted an extensive job search through the Montana Department 

of Social and Rehabi.l.itative Services. Despi.te applying for 

2C t-c 30 jobs, Mr. Rastman has failed t.o find steady 
employment. He worked as a retail clerk in 1986, but had tc 

quit after one day because the job required him to lift and 

carry 10 pound boxes which exacerbated his breathing problems 

and precipitated an asthma attack. A vocational counselor 

.for the Career Exploration and Development Center t-estified. 

that Mr. Eastman has the work habits, grooming, and aptitudes 

of competitive employment and has many transferable skills. 

Kith the exception of one clay of employment, the cl-aimant did 

not work at all between April 1985 and June 1987. 

I. Eastman filed a claim for compensation with the 

Division of Workers1 Compensation on May 1, 1985. The 

Division designated the claim as one for benefits under the 

Occupational Disease Act, although the claimant later filed a. 

petition alleging that he was entitled to benefits under the 

Workers' Compensation Act because of his April 8, 1985 "injury." The determination of "injury" was consolidated with the 

claimant's appeal from the Division's final decision regarding compensation under the Occupational Disease Act. In that 

order, the Division determined that Mr. Eastman suffered from 

a nondisabling occupational disease and was awarded the 

maximum statutory allowance of $10,000 pursuant tc 5 

39-72-405 (2), MCA. 

The Workers1 Compensation Court affirmed the decision of 

the Division that the claimant's occupational disease was 

nondisabling. The court also addressed the "injury" issue, 

noting that the claimant did not elect to pursue either form 

of ccmpensation, but instead presented both theories of 

recovery for determination. The court held that the unexpected occurrence of abn~rmally dense fumes at work on April 

8, 1985, caused an aggravation of the claimant's preexisting 

asthma condition, and therefore qualified as an "linjur.;." 

?Towever, the court then concluded that, 
. . . the mezical evidence from claimant's treating 

physician Dr. Rosetto clearly indicates that the 

claimant's medication during his three days of 

hospitalization returned him to his 

pre-exacerbation state. The claimant was then 

released from the hospital to return to his fulltime work which he continued until he was laid off 

some two weeks later. A1 though the claimant's 

incident is technically an "injury, " his asthma 

condition returned to its pre-injury state with no 

loss of wages or impairment being established. 

Having satisfied the statutory criteria for an 

injury, the Court's function has not encied. The 

overwhelming medical evidence is that claimant's 

April 8, 1985 exposure was disabling only for a few 

days and upon receiving medication he was essentia!ly restored to his pre-April 8, 1985 condition. 

That condition, as well as his health after the 

three-day hospital stay, was a product of an occupational disease exposure as found by the Division. 

Although the court determined that Mr. Eastman suffered 

an injury on April 8, 1985, it concluded that the injury was 

noncompensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. The 

court also concluded that the claimant was not entitled tc a 

2C% increase in award pursuant to S 39-71-2907, MCA, nor was 

he entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees under 5 

39-71-61.?, NCA. It j.s from this jud-gment that Kr. Eastman 

appeals. 

Does the 0cc.upational Cisease Act violate equal protection or deny a claimant's right to full legal redress? 

The employer argues that this Court should not address 

the claimant's constj.tuti.onal arguments because he failed to 

present them before the lower court. It is a general ru1.e 

that new issues may not be raised for the first time or! 

appeal. Bauer v. Kar Products, Inc. (~ont. 19881, 749 P.2d. 

1385, 1318, 45 St.Rep. 322, 326. However, this Court "reserves to itself the power to examine constitutional issues 

that. involve broad public concerns," and even if raised for 
the 5rst time on appeal, this Court can hear the issue if 

the alleged error affects the substantial. right of a litigant. Cot-trill v. Cottrill Sodding Service (Mont. 1987), 744 

P.2d 895, 896, 44 St.Rep. 1762, 1763. Claimant has not 

briefed his constitutional contentions in detail. Nonetheless, considering the nature of such ccntentions as well as 

his pro se status, we will consider his constitutional 

challenges. 

----- EQUAL PROTECTION 

Mr. Eastman first challenges the State's classification 

of diseasecl workers under the Occr~pational Disease Act as 

arbitrary and discriminate and in violation of the Equal 

Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Montana Constitutions. In 

determining what level of scrutiny is to be applied to this 

legislation under an equal protection analysis, it is neces-- 

sary to determi-ne what rights are involved and whether the 

legislation infringes ,upon the rights of any suspect cl-ass. 

Cottrill, 744 P.2d at 897. -- 

We have held that the right to receive b?srkers1 Cornpen-.- 

sation benefits is not a fundamental right. --- Cottrill, ?44 

P.2d at 897, citing Shapiro v. Thompson (19691, 394 U.S. 618, 

89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 T,.Ed.2d 600. This same rule applies to 

benefits under the Occupational Disease Act, which are also a 

form of disability benefits, so that no fundamental right is 

at stake here. The classification dces not affect the rights 

of a suspect class, which woul-d. i.ncl.ude race, nationality, 

alienage and wealth. Cottrill, 744 P.2d at 897. We conclude 

that the Act is not subject to strict scrutiny. As a result. 

ARC0 nee$. not show a compelling state interest. We conclude 

that the Act should be analyzed under the rational basis 

test. That test requires a legitimate governmental objective 

whi ch bears some identifiabl e rational relationship tc: the 

c!asstfication in question. --- Cottrill, - -- - 744 P.2d at 897. 
Mr. Eastman argues that there is no rational basis upon 

which to distinguish an employee who suffers from an occupational disease from an employee who suffers an injury. F7e 

disagree. A historical inquiry into the subject reveal-s a 

legislative purpose for this differentiation. 

Historically workers' conpensation was enacted to compensate vFctims of industrial. accidents and injuries. It was 

not set up to respond to workers suffering occupational 

c',is~ase. That distinction was partial-ly explained by the 

common law historical background which had allowed tort suits 

fcr i.njuries but generally had shown that the negligence of 

an employer was not a basFs for a common law action. As 

state6 in 1 F Iarson, I4Torkmen's Cornpensat<-on T,aw , Section 

41.20 (1987) : 

To the extent that compensation acts were thought 

of as substituting nonfault liability for the kind 

of in-juries that were potential subjects of fault 

liahil-ity, there was thought to he no place for 

occupational diseases, which (in the sense of a 

disease due to the "normal" conditions of t-he 

industry as distinguished from the negligence of 

the employer) had consistently been hel-d incapable 

of supporting a common-law act!-on. 

As the incidence of devastating diseases of the work place 

increased, legislatures concluded that some system of compensation was needed. Gradually the law was expanded to provide 

henefits for the victims of occupational disease, notably 

silicosis and ashest-osis. 32 Labor Law Journal (1981), 313, 

By 1978, every state had enacted statutes making occupational di.seases compensable. 1B Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 41.00. Larson points out that this lag in 

coverage can be attributed to the heavy incidence of siliccs_is a~d asbestosis in certain j.ndustries, for whi-ch full 
coverage under workers' compensation would have created a 

difficult burden. 1R Larson, supra, Section 41.10. 

Kontana creat.ed a statutory remedy for work-related 

eiseases in 1959 by the enactment of t.he Occupational Disease 

Act, S 92-1301 RCM (19471 et seq., now SS 39-72-101 to 716, 

MCA. In the workers' compensation field, this Court upheld 

the power cf the legislature to enact workers' compensation 

which replaced common law remedies. Shea v. North-Butte 

Plining Co. (1919), 55 Mont. 522, 534, 179 P.2d 499, 503. We 

conclude that the same rationale properly can be applied to 

the Occupational Disease Act. We concl-ude there is a rational basis for the enactment of the Occupational Disease Act. by 

the legislature. 

Claimsnt argues that the benefits payable under both 

workers' compensation and the Occupational Disease Act shou.15 

be the same. We recognize the fairness of Fin argument for 

equal compensation for similar disabilities. However, the 

equal protection clause does not require that all aspects of 

occupational disease and occupational injury be dealt with in 

the same manner. As stated. bl7 the Unite? States Supreme 

Court in Iqilliamson v. Lee Optical Co. (19551, 348 1T.S. 483, 

99 L.Ed. 563, 75 S.Ct. 461: 

The problem of legislative classification is a 

perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire defini-- 

tion. Evils in the same field may be of different 

dimensions and proportions, requiring different 

remedies. Or so the legislature may think. (case 

cited) Or the reform may take one step at a time, 

addressing itself to the phase of the problem which 

seems most acute to the legislative mind. (case 

cited) The legislature may select one phase of one 

field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the 

others. (case cited) 
We conclude that the claimant has failed to show that 

the legislature is required to award the same or comparable 

benefits under the Gccupational Eisease Act as compare6 to 

the Workers' Compensation Act. We hold that there is a 

rational basis for the benefits awarded under the Occupational Disease Act and that the claimant has failed to establish 

a viclation under the equal protection clauses of the Montana 

Consti-tution and of the Constj.tution of the United St-ates. 

While we find that claimant has failed to show a constitutional violation of the equal protection clauses, our 

review of the Occupational Disease Act has shown there are 

serious questions which should be addressed by the legislature. In this instance Mr. Eastman has proved permanent 

partial disabiLity which would entitle him to extensive 

benefits i f he came under the Workers' Compensation Act. 

However, under the Occupational Disease Act, because he is 

not totally disabled, his award is limited to $10,000. We 

suggest that a review of the benefjts under this Act is 

certainly Cue cn the part of the leaislature. 

FUIdL LEGAL REDRESS 

. Eastrnan next argues that he was denied full legal 

redress under the Occupational Disease Act because of the 

requirement that a worker be disabled for more than five days 

t.o receive compensation. He argues that had he remained off 

the joh For more than five days, he would have received full 

compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, but because 

he missed only two days of work, the statutory requirement 

arbitrarily denies him his right to full legal redress. We 

p~int out that the five day requirement appears under 9 

39-71-736, MCA (1985), of the Wor1;ers' Compensation Act, and 

no similar requirement is contained in the Occupational 

Disease Act as Mr. Eastmarl asserts. Plhile the lower court 

concluded that the claimant suffered an injury nnder the 
Workers ' Compensation Act, it further concluded that the 

injury was only temporary an2 did not continue to be disabling. Based on that evidence, the court held that claimant's injury was noncompensahle and affirmed the Division's 

award under the Occupational Disease Act. 

Even if claimant had proved an injury which resulted in 

e Zisahility of more than five days, under the medical evidence of this case he would nut be entitled to compensation 

unler the klorkers' Compensation Act. The court found that 

the medical evidence established that his condition returned 

to its pre-exacerbation state following medical. treatment 

which extended over just a few days. We therefore hold that 

claimant has "ailed to establish a denial of his right to 

full legal redress because he ha-s not been denied any compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. 

I1 

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in determining 

that Mr. Eastman was entitled to benefits under the Occupational Disease Act rather than the Workers' Compensation Act? 

The Workers' Compensation Court found that the claimant's asthma was a preexisting condition which was aggravated 

by his 8 years of enployment as a welder with ARCO. This 

Court has he12 that a preexisting condition of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, which includes asthma, is compensable under the FJorkers' Compensation Act if a claimant 

can identify an unexpected tangible happening on a specific 

date which aggravate6 the condition. Flhittington v. Ramsey 

Construction and Fabrication (Mont. 1987), 744 P.2d 1251, 44 

St.P.ep. 1823. Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co. 11983), 204 

Mont. 473, 665 P.2d 783. Fhere the claimant was unable to 

show that his asthma was significantly aggravated by an 

unexpected incident. rather than a deteriorating condition 

over time, t-hjs Ccurt has upheld the lower court's conclusion 
that the claimant suffered from an occupational disease 

rather than an injury compensable under the Workers ' Compensation Act. -- Whittington, 744 P.2d at 1257. 

In this case, the court determined that the unexpected 

occurrence of abnormal.2.y dense fumes at work on April 8, 1985 

caused an aggravation of claimant's preexisting asthma, and 

that the incident was unexpected and time definite enough to 

qualify as an "injury" under the Workers' Compensation Act. 

g 39-71-119, MCA (1985). Fowever, the court went on to 

conclude that the injury was noncompensable under the Workers' Compensc;t::'.on Act based on the medical evidence which 

established that the injury did not continue to be disabling. 

Following hospitalization and medication, the court found 

that Mr. Eastman was returned to his pre-exacerbation state 

and failed to prove any loss of wages or additional physical 

Impairment. The court concluded that his pre-April 8, 1985 

condit.i.on, as well as his health following the three day 

hospital stay, was a product of an occupational disease and 

affirmed the Division's award under the Cccupati.onal Disease 

Act. . 

It is not the function of this Court to reweigh the 

evidence. We will uphold the findings and conclusions of the 

Workers' Compensation Court if they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Snyder v. San Francisco Feed and Grain (Mont. 1987), 748 P.2d 924, 929, 44 St.Rep. 

2216, 2221. 

The testimony which led the lower court to conclude that 

Mr. Eastman's injury did not continue to be disabling and was 

therefore noncompensable under the Workers' Compensation Act 

was given hy several medical experts. The claimant's own 

treating physician, Dr. Rosetto, testified that Mr. Eastman's 

asthma condition would not change in the f.uture, that his 

disease was not: caused by any single eve~t, ancl tha-t any 
"incident" which occurred during the progression of his 

6isease would not change the status of his condition as it 

was at the time of trial. Dr. Rosetto also testified that 

having worked at ARC0 for 8 years as a we]-der, the worsening 

of claimant's disease could have heen expected, and that the 

incident of breathing toxic fumes did not cause any permanent 

significant additional impairment. 

Another physician, Dr. Schimke, testified that the 

fluctuations in claimant's condition over 8 years showed a 

norseni-ng trend, and that his employment as a welder was the 

cause of the dFsease becoming disabling. 

Dr. Power examined Mr. Eastman at the request of the 

claims division to determine whether claimant suffered an 

occupationaL disease. The examination consisted of a general 

physical, chest X-rays, and a pulmonary function test, which 

took place in November 1985, seven months after the April 8 

incident. Dr. Power testified that any aggravation caused b:- 

the incident was only temporary and that claimant's asthma 

had stabilized to its pre-April 8 condition. 

The conclusion of the lower court that claimant's condi-- 

tion had returned to his conditjon prior to the April 8, 1985 

injury does not suggest that he had returned to good health. 

The evidence shoo~s that he had disability from the disease 

prier to April 8, 1985 and that such disability continued and 

grew worse thereafter. Our examination of the record demonstrates there is substantial medical evidence which show^ 

that claimant experienced no additional physical impairment 

as a result of the injury of April 8, 1985. The record also 

contains substantial evizence to support the conclusion that 

his condition was the result of an occupational disease. Ve 

hold that it was not error For the lower court to conclude 

that r. Eastman's injury was not compensahle under the 

Florkers' Compensation Act. 
Is claimant entitled to reasonable costs ancl attorney 

fees and/or a 20% penalty? 

The provi-sions for costs and attorney fees and a 20% 

penalty are found in the Workers' Compensation Act, 5s 

33-71-61? and 39-72-2907, MCA (1985). Since this Court 

affFrms the determination by the lower court that Mr. Eastman 

i.s not entitled to benefits und.er the Workers' Compensation 

Act, those provisions do not apply in this case. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: A 

Chief Justice 

-- -- - - - - -- Justices 
Mr. ~ustice ~illiam E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting: 

I dissent. From the beginning, Eastman has been forced 

to surmount hurdles that would challenge even the greatest 

trial tactician. He appears before this Court pro se because 

his attorney, after collecting his fee, merged his law firm 

with the firm representing ARCO. Added to this burden, is 

the fact that Steven J. Shapiro, chief legal counsel for the 

Workers' Compensation Division--the same division that 

actively opposed Eastman every step of the way--was appointed 

the first hearing examiner. The facts found by Shapiro and 

adopted by Robert J. Robinson, administrator for the 

division, are the facts Eastman has had to struggle with 

throughout this legal and medical morass. The wonder here is 

not that Eastman was denied his rights as an injured Montana 

worker. The wonder is that he got anything at all. 

The majority holds that Eastman's April 8, 1985, injury 

did not significantly aggravate his preexisting disease. 

Eastman's medical history, however, tells a different story. 

Prior to the April 8, 1985, injury, Eastman's breathing 

difficulties forced him to seek treatment at Kalispell 

Regional Hospital on only two occasions. In July, 1983, he 

consulted with the hospital emergency room. In June, 1984, 

he was hospitalized. Within the four months following the 

accident, however, his visits to the hospital became much 

more frequent. He visited the hospital emergency room 

twice--once on May 20, 1985, and again on July 31, 1985. On 

August 20, 1985, he was hospitalized for four days with 

severe asthma. 

In addition, Eastman's need to consult with his treating 

physician had subsided in the months preceding the injury. 

In 1983, he called or visited Dr. Rossetto almost monthly. 
In 1984, however, he saw Dr. Rossetto twice--once in June and 

once in July. He called the doctor three times. His last 

flare up of asthma prior to April 8, 1985, occurred in 

December, 1984. After the April accident, however, his 

asthma repeatedly flared. He consulted Dr. Rossetto at least 

once a month thereafter. 

In ide en our v. Equity Supply Co. (1983), 204 Mont. 473, 

665 P.2d 783, a claimant's preexisting Chronic Obstructive 

Pulmonary ise ease (COPD) was aggravated by a high 

concentration of grain dust. We awarded the claimant 

permanent total disability benefits under the Workers' 

Compensation Act. Yet in this case, where the facts are 

almost identical, we award claimant a mere $10,000 under the 

Occupational Disease Act and send him on his way. 

In Ridenour, the claimant was injured on December 18, 

1978. He was unable to perform his usual job from that date, 

though he did attempt less strenuous work. A little over 

five months after the accident, his breathing difficulties 

became so severe that he was forced to cease employment. 

Unlike the claimant in ide en our, Eastman returned to his 

normal job for two weeks after the accident. He was able to 

do so, however, only because he was heavily medicated with 

steroids. He returned to work rather than remaining on sick 

leave because he knew ARC0 was planning a large reduction in 

force and he wanted to work as much as possible before being 

laid off. 

Had Eastman not been laid off as part of ARCO's general 

reduction in force, his breathing problems would have soon 

forced him to quit, just as the claimant in Ridenour 

eventually ceased working. Slightly over two months after 

the accident, on June 11, 1985, Dr. Rossetto wrote a letter 

to Job Service in which he sta.ted that Eastman's condition 

had progressively worsened and he would be unable to work in 
the foreseeable future. On September 9, 1985, Dr. Rossetto 

noted on the medical record that Eastman should not return to 

work because of recent extensive asthma attacks. Eastman 

himself testified that, due to his physical condition, he had 

not been able to return to work since the lay off even though 

ARC0 had called him back two or three times. 

The medical record amply demonstrates that the April 8, 

1985, injury aggravated Eastman's disease. Nevertheless, the 

majority refuses to acknowledge this objective evidence. 

Instead, the majority relies on the deposition testimony of 

three doctors--even though one of the doctors, Dr. Power, did 

not have access to Eastman's medical record. Dr. Power's 

testimony indicates that he was unaware of Eastman's complete 

medical history. 

Furthermore, the testimony of the remaining doctors does 

not unequivocally support the majority's holding. Dr. 

Rossetto testified that the injury was unlikely to change 

Eastman's medical status as of the time of the deposition. 

He acknowledged that since the accident, Eastman continued to 

have periods of severe exacerbations. He also stated that 

Eastman had been on steriods almost continuously since that 

time and was steroid dependent. 

Dr. ~chimke's testimony is more telling. Dr. Schimke 

testified that the ~pril 8, 1985, incident was not the single 

underlying cause of Eastman's disease. However, he could not 

state with medical certainty that Eastman's status returned 

to his preexacerbated condition following the accident. He 

stated: 

I view the ~pril, 1985, incident as but one in a 

long series of similar incidents. And I believe I 

stated if the incident caused hospitalization--and 

I believe that one did--it could have had some 

long-term lasting effect. And it is medical 

speculation, I think, to tell you how much or how 

little. 
We have previously recognized that "'cautious medical 

testimony' should, whenever possible, be interpreted in favor 

of the claimant.'' Wheeler v. Carlson Transport (1985), 217 

Mont. 254, 262, 704 P.2d 49, 54. Indeed, in Ridenour, we 

granted disability benefits based on testimony very similar 

to that given by the doctors in this case--testimony that the 

claimant's accident "may have resulted in more asthma and 

more bronchitis, which could flare up more readily in the 

ensuing months and years." (Emphasis added.) Ridenour, 204 

Mont. at 475-76, 665 P.2d at 785. The majority in this case, 

however, ignores the precedent set in Ridenour and unfairly 

denies Eastman disability under the Workers' Compensation 

Act. 

The majority also asserts that there is a rational basis 

for paying benefits to claimants under the Occupational 

Disease Act at a lower rate than those paid to claimants 

under the Workers' Compensation Act. I wish somebody would 

tell me exactly what that rational basis is. I certainly 

cannot find it in this opinion. n 

I would reverse the Workers' 

We join Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., in his 

dissent to the majority opinion. /