The Honorable Paul A. Crotty, of the United States District Court for the Southern *

District of New York, sitting by designation. 

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09-1343-cv

Taylor v. United Technologies Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to summary orders

filed after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by this court’s Local Rule 32.1 and

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. In a brief or other paper in which a litigant cites a

summary order, in each paragraph in which a citation appears, at least one citation must either

be to the Federal Appendix or be accompanied by the notation: “(summary order).” A party

citing a summary order must serve a copy of that summary order together with the paper in

which the summary order is cited on any party not represented by counsel unless the summary

order is available in an electronic database which is publicly accessible without payment of fee

(such as the database available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ ). If no copy is served by

reason of the availability of the order on such a database, the citation must include reference to

that database and the docket number of the case in which the order was entered. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,

on the 1 of December, two thousand and nine.

st

PRESENT:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

ROBERT D. SACK,

Circuit Judges,

PAUL A. CROTTY,

District Judge.*

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DAVID S. TAYLOR, JIM CONLIN, and KARL TODD, individually,

and as representatives of all those similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 -v.- No. 09-1343-cv

 

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, UNITED

TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION PENSION & INVESTMENT

COMMITTEE, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 

PENSION AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE,

Defendants-Appellees.

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FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Schlichter

Bogard & Denton LLP, St. Louis,

MO (Jerome J. Schlichter, Jason P.

Kelly, Sean E. Soyars, Schlichter

Bogard & Denton LLP, St. Louis,

MO, on the brief, Stuart B. Katz,

Cohen and Wolf PC, Bridgeport,

CT, of counsel).

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: JEFFREY G. HUVELLE (Thomas L.

Cubbage III, Peter A. Swanson, on

the brief) Covington & Burling,

Washington, D.C.

Appeal from a March 3, 2009 order of the United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut (Warren W. Eginton, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED.

Plaintiffs-appellants David Taylor, Jim Conlin, and Karl Todd, individually, and as

representatives of those similarly situated (collectively, “plaintiffs”), appeal from an order of the District

Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees United Technologies Corporation,

United Technologies Corporation Pension & Investment Committee, and United Technologies

Corporation Pension and Administration Committee (jointly, “defendants”), in plaintiffs’ action under

the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that

defendants breached their fiduciary duties pursuant to ERISA with respect to an employee benefit plan. 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

Plaintiffs allege that the District Court erred in concluding that there was no evidence on which

plaintiffs could obtain a judgment in their favor. Specifically, plaintiffs maintain that their evidence

showed that (1) defendants chose retail mutual funds as investment options for employees without

considering the deficiencies of mutual funds for large retirement plans, as compared to alternatives more

suited to large retirement plans; (2) defendants’ mutual funds deducted from participant investments

unreasonably high sub-transfer-agent fees for more than the amount due under contract; (3) defendants

did not disclose full information about those sub-transfer-agent fees and failed to investigate or

otherwise account for the allegedly excessive amount being paid; and (4) defendants operated the

employee-stock fund imprudently, causing significant underperformance.

We review de novo the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment and, in the course of

that review, we resolve ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008); Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v.

Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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We have considered each of plaintiff’s arguments on appeal and, substantially for the reasons

stated in the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned memorandum of decision dated March 3,

2009, Taylor v. United Technologies Corp., No. 06-cv-1494, 2009 WL 535779 (D. Conn. 2009), we find them

to be without merit.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

FOR THE COURT,

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

By _______________________________