[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-16511

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cv-80643-RLR

STEPHEN HOLZMAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MALCOLM S. GERALD & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

LVNV FUNDING, LLC,

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(April 5, 2019)

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Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and KAPLAN,* District

Judge.

JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiff asserts claims under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Florida Consumer Collection 

Practices Act (“Florida Act”), Florida Statute § 559.55 et seq., arising from an 

attempt by Defendants to collect on Plaintiff’s time-barred consumer debt. As to 

his federal claims, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that (1) a collection letter he 

received from Defendants in connection with the debt was “false, deceptive, or 

misleading” in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA and (2) the general practice of 

attempting to collect on time-barred consumer debts is “unfair or unconscionable”

in violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA. As to the claim under Florida law, Plaintiff 

contends that by sending the collection letter, Defendants violated the Florida 

Act’s prohibition against asserting a legal right that is known not to exist. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims pursuant to 

Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, agreeing with 

Defendants that their collection efforts did not violate either § 1692e or § 1692f of 

that statute. Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the court declined to 

exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Florida Act claims. After a careful review of 

 *

 Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of 

New York, sitting by designation. 

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the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we REVERSE the district 

court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claim under § 1692e of the FDCPA, but

AFFIRM the court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claim under § 1692f of that same 

statute. Given our ruling on Plaintiff’s § 1692e FDCPA claim, we reinstate 

Plaintiff’s Florida Act claim and REMAND the case to the district court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

Defendant LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) is a debt collector that 

purchases and attempts to collect on time-barred debts. In 2015, LVNV purchased 

such a debt, which had been incurred by Plaintiff on a personal credit card years 

prior and had subsequently been charged off by the original creditor in 2007. 

LVNV retained Defendant Malcolm Gerald & Associates (“Malcolm”) to collect 

the debt on LVNV’s behalf. Like LVNV, Malcolm is a debt collector for purposes 

of the federal and state statutes at issue in this litigation. 

In connection with its collection efforts, Malcolm sent Plaintiff a collection 

letter that reads, in relevant part: 

Original Creditor: HSBC BANK NEVADA, N.A.

BALANCE DUE: $869.51

Charge Off Date: 07/31/2007

Balance Itemization

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Principal Balance: $615.41

Interest Balance: $254.10

Please be advised that LVNV FUNDING LLC, the Current 

Creditor-Debt Purchaser has purchased the account referenced 

above. LVNV FUNDING LLC has placed your account with us 

for collection.

Malcolm S. Gerald and Associates wants to help you resolve 

your delinquent account with LVNV FUNDING LLC. We 

would like to offer you a balance reduction to 30% of the balance 

due listed above. We will be able to accept $260.85 as a reduced 

payment in full on your account. To take advantage of this offer, 

the reduced amount listed must be received in our office no later 

than 05/31/2015. We are not obligated to renew this offer.

This communication is from a debt collector. This is an attempt 

to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for this 

purpose.

Make check payable to: Malcolm S. Gerald and Associates, Inc. 

If you would like to pay online, you may do so at 

https://msgpayments.com

After receiving this collection letter, Plaintiff filed a putative class action 

complaint against Defendants asserting federal claims under the FDCPA, 15 

U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and its state corollary, the Florida Consumer Collection 

Practices Act, Florida Statute § 559.55 et seq. In support of his FDCPA claims, 

Plaintiff alleged that (1) the letter was “false, deceptive, or misleading” in violation 

of § 1692e of the FDCPA because it could lead a consumer to believe that there 

were legal consequences to not making the requested payment when, in fact, the 

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statute of limitations barred legal enforcement of the debt and (2) attempting to 

collect on Plaintiff’s time-barred debt via the letter constituted an “unfair or 

unconscionable” practice in violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA. Plaintiff further 

alleged that the letter violated the Florida Act because it falsely asserted a legal 

right that Defendants knew did not exist. 

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

12(b)(6). In an oral ruling and following a hearing on the motion, the district court

dismissed Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims with prejudice. In support of its ruling, the 

court cited Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., 248 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 

2001), Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management, 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011), and

Ehrich v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2015 WL 6470453 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 

2015) for the legal principle that: “the FDCPA permits debt collector[s] to see[k]

voluntary repayment of . . . time-barred debt so long as the debt collector does not 

initiate or threaten legal action in connection with its debt collection efforts.” The 

court determined that the letter Plaintiff received did not contain any language that 

could be interpreted as initiating or threatening legal action. Thus, accepting the 

legal principle announced in Freyermuth, Huertas, and Ehrich, the court concluded

that Plaintiff’s allegations did not assert a plausible violation of the FDCPA. 

In so ruling, the district court distinguished Daugherty v. Convergent 

Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2016), Buchanan v. Northland Group., 

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Inc., 776 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2015), and McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 

F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014), in which the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, 

respectively, held that a collection letter offering to “settle” a time-barred debt, but 

not threatening litigation, could nonetheless serve as the basis for an FDCPA 

claim. The district court noted that the collection letter Plaintiff received offered to 

“resolve” his time-barred debt, not “settle” it. According to the court, the “settle” 

language used in the letters at issue in Daugherty, Buchanan, and McMahon was 

more akin to a threat of legal action than the “resolve” language used in the letter 

Plaintiff received. Consequently, the court determined that Plaintiff could not state 

a viable FDCPA claim under the rationale of Daugherty, Buchanan, or McMahon. 

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims, the district court declined to 

exercise pendant jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Florida Act claim. The court thus 

dismissed this claim without prejudice. 

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his FDCPA and Florida Act claims. As 

noted, Plaintiff argues that he has presented a plausible claim that the collection 

letter he received from Defendants was “false, deceptive, or misleading” in 

violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA, given that the debt referenced in the letter was 

legally unenforceable. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the general practice of 

attempting to collect time-barred consumer debts is per se “unfair or 

unconscionable” in violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA. Assuming his federal 

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claims are revived pursuant to either argument, Plaintiff asserts that his state claim

should be reinstated and addressed on the merits. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review the decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See West v. 

Warden, Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 869 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017). In 

conducting our review, we accept the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true 

and we construe the facts in the light most favorable to his claims. See id. 

Viewing the complaint in that manner, the relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiff has 

stated a “plausible claim for relief” under the FDCPA. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 679 (2009). If he has, then the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s 

FDCPA claims must be reversed and the Florida Act claim must be reinstated. See

id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (granting district courts supplemental jurisdiction over all

claims that are “so related to claims in the action within [the] original jurisdiction

[of the court] that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 

III”). 

II. Plaintiff’s FDCPA Claims

The FDCPA protects consumers from abusive debt collection practices by 

regulating the conduct of debt collectors. See Crawford v. LVNV Funding LLC,

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758 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that “Congress passed the FDCPA in 

1977 to stop the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by 

many debt collectors” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To enforce its 

provisions, the FDCPA provides consumers with a private right of action against 

debt collectors who violate the Act. See id. at 1258. Assuming Plaintiff’s 

allegations are true, Defendants qualify as debt collectors for purposes of the 

FDCPA and are thus subject to the Act’s regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 

(defining “debt collector” to include “any person who . . . regularly collects or 

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed 

or due another”). 

As noted, Plaintiff alleges (1) that the collection letter he received from 

Defendants was “false, deceptive, or misleading” in violation of § 1692e of the 

FDCPA and (2) that attempting to collect on Plaintiff’s time-barred debt via the 

letter constituted an “unfair or unconscionable” debt collection practice in violation 

of § 1692f the FDCPA. The relevant inquiry at this stage of the litigation is 

whether Plaintiff has alleged a plausible violation of either provision. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. To determine whether that is so, we apply the “least-sophisticated 

consumer” standard. See LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193, 

1201 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the least-sophisticated consumer standard 

applies to determine whether a debt collector has violated §§ 1692e or 1692f of the 

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FDCPA). Under that standard, a debt collector violates § 1692e by making a 

representation in a collection letter that would be deceptive or misleading to the 

“least sophisticated” recipient of the letter. See id. at 1193–95. Likewise, a 

collection practice violates § 1692f if it would be unfair or unconscionable as 

applied to the “least sophisticated” debtor subjected to the practice. See id. at 

1201. 

The least-sophisticated consumer standard is intended to protect “all 

consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.” Id. at 1194 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). As such, the “least-sophisticated consumer” is presumed to have 

only a “rudimentary amount of information about the world.” Id. Nevertheless, it 

is assumed that the least-sophisticated consumer will be “willing[] to read a 

collection notice with some care.” LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Moreover, the least-sophisticated consumer standard “has an 

objective component in that while protecting naive consumers, the standard also 

prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by 

preserving a quotient of reasonableness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, whether a representation made in a collection letter would be deceptive or 

misleading to the least-sophisticated consumer, or a collection practice would be 

unfair or unconscionable when applied to the least-sophisticated consumer,

generally is a question of fact to be decided by a jury. See id. at 1195, 1201. 

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A. The collection letter Plaintiff received plausibly could be 

misleading or deceptive to the “least sophisticated consumer” in 

violation of § 1692e.

Section 1692e of the FDCPA states that: “A debt collector may not use any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. It then provides a non-exhaustive list 

of specific conduct that is prohibited, including: (1) falsely representing “the 

character, amount, or legal status of any debt” and (2) threatening “any action that 

cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” Id. § 1692e(2)(A), (5). 

There is no question that these provisions prohibit a debt collector from suing or 

threatening to sue on a time-barred debt, and federal courts have uniformly so held. 

See Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259 (collecting cases). The question presented by this 

case asks more specifically: to what extent does the above prohibition extend 

beyond a threat to sue on a time-barred debt and encompass a potentially—albeit 

more subtly—misleading offer to “resolve” such a debt when there is no 

accompanying disclosure that the debt is time-barred.

This Court has not ruled on the above issue, and the appellate courts that 

have done so have taken different approaches. In a case factually similar to this 

one, the Third Circuit suggested that a threat of litigation is necessary to state a 

claim under § 1692e. See Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33. The plaintiff in Huertas had 

received a collection letter notifying him that his defaulted debt had been 

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reassigned and requesting him to call the debt collector to “resolve this issue.” See 

id. Although the letter did not make any overtly false representations, the plaintiff 

argued that it was misleading as to the legal enforceability of the referenced debt, 

thus violating § 1692e of the FDCPA. See id. at 32–33. The Huertas Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1692e claim, noting that the FDCPA generally permits a 

debt collector to seek voluntary repayment of a time-barred debt so long as it does 

not threaten legal action and concluding that “[e]ven the least sophisticated 

consumer would not understand” the letter to “threaten litigation.” Id. at 33. The 

Eighth Circuit similarly has indicated that a threat to sue is necessary to establish a 

violation of § 1692e in this scenario. See Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 771 (“[I]n the 

absence of a threat of litigation or actual litigation, no violation of the FDCPA has 

occurred when a debt collector attempts to collect on a potentially time-barred debt 

that is otherwise valid.”). 

In contrast to Huertas and Freyermuth, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits 

disagree that a collection letter referencing a time-barred debt cannot violate the 

FDCPA absent an express threat of litigation. See Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 509; 

Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 399–400; McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020. In each of these 

cases, a debt collector sent a letter offering to “settle” the debtor’s account for a 

percentage of the total balance. Although technically accurate in every other 

respect, each of these collection letters failed to disclose that the referenced debt 

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was, in fact, time-barred and thus legally unenforceable. Contrary to the result 

reached in Huertas and Freyermuth, the appellate courts in Daugherty, Buchanan, 

and McMahon held that the debtors had stated a claim under § 1692e of the 

FDCPA because an offer to “settle” a time-barred debt, without an accompanying 

disclosure that the debt is judicially unenforceable, plausibly could mislead an 

unsophisticated consumer as to the legal unenforceability of the debt. See 

Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 511; Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 398–400; McMahon, 744 F.3d 

at 1020–21.

In reaching this conclusion, the courts in Daugherty, Buchanan, and

McMahon recognized that, as a general matter, a creditor can seek voluntary 

payment of a time-barred debt. See Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 509 (observing that “it 

is not automatically unlawful for a debt collector to seek payment of a time-barred 

debt”); Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 397 (“There . . . is nothing wrong with informing 

debtors that a debt remains unpaid or . . . allowing them to satisfy the debt at a 

discount.”); McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020 (“[S]ome people might consider full debt 

re-payment a moral obligation, even though the legal remedy for the debt has been 

extinguished.”). Nevertheless, a right to seek repayment does not confer a right to 

mislead. And each of these courts held that a collection letter offering to “settle” a

time-barred debt could give rise to a claim under § 1692e of the FDCPA, even in 

the absence of an express threat of litigation. See Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 511; 

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Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 399–400; McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020. Their reasoning is 

summed up by the Fifth Circuit’s statement in Daugherty that:

While it is not automatically unlawful for a debt collector to seek 

payment of a time-barred debt, a collection letter violates the FDCPA 

when its statements could mislead an unsophisticated consumer to 

believe that her time-barred debt is legally enforceable, regardless of 

whether litigation is threatened.

Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 509.

Further, notwithstanding its prior decision in Huertas, the Third Circuit 

recently has adopted the rationale of Daugherty, Buchanan, and McMahon. See 

Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 428–30 (3d Cir. 2018). The plaintiff 

in Tatis asserted a claim under § 1692e of the FDCPA based on a letter she 

received from a debt collector offering to settle a time-barred consumer debt, but 

failing to disclose that the debt was legally unenforceable. See id. at 425. Relying 

primarily on Huertas, the district court dismissed the claim pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) because the letter did not include a threat of legal action. See id. at 426. 

Reversing and ruling based on the reasoning set forth in Daugherty, Buchanan, and 

McMahon, the Third Circuit held that a collection letter “may run afoul of the 

FDCPA by misleading or deceiving debtors into believing they have a legal 

obligation to repay time-barred debts even when the letters do not threaten legal 

action.” Id. at 428. Explaining its implicit disavowal of Huertas, the Tatis court 

stated:

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Huertas stands for the proposition that debt collectors do not violate 

[the specific prohibition found in] 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) when they 

seek voluntary repayment of stale debts, so long as they do not threaten 

or take legal action. But the FDCPA sweeps far more broadly than the 

specific provision found in § 1692e(2)(A). It prohibits “any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation” associated with debtcollection practices.

Id. (emphasis in original). As to the FDCPA’s general prohibition of any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation, Tatis held that the plaintiff had established

a plausible violation by pleading that she had received a collection letter offering to 

settle her debt but failing to disclose that this time-barred debt was legally 

unenforceable. Tatis, 882 F.3d at 430. 

We are persuaded by the reasoning of Daugherty, Buchanan, and

McMahon—and, most recently, Tatis. We likewise conclude that with regard to a 

collection letter seeking payment on a time-barred debt, an express threat of 

litigation is not required to state a claim for relief under § 1692e so long as one can 

reasonably infer an implicit threat. This holding finds support both in the plain 

language of § 1692e and in a common-sense application of the least-sophisticated 

consumer standard in the Rule 12(b)(6) context. See Tatis, 882 F.3d at 429 

(observing that “[c]ommon sense, our case law, and traditional tools of statutory 

interpretation foreclose” a construction of the FDCPA to “require a threat of legal 

action” under these circumstances). As quoted above, § 1692e specifically 

prohibits a debt collector not only from threatening to take any action “that cannot 

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legally be taken” (i.e., threatening litigation on a time-barred debt) but also from 

misrepresenting the “legal status” of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), (5). More 

broadly, § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from making “any false, deceptive, or 

misleading representation” in a collection letter. Id. § 1692e (emphasis added).

In their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants argue that, as a 

matter of law, the particular representation at issue in the collection letter would 

not mislead or deceive an unsophisticated consumer as to the legal status of, or the 

legal ramifications of non-payment on, a time-barred debt. In examining this 

argument in a motion to dismiss context, the question is whether it is plausible that 

a reasonable jury could find that this representation would so mislead an 

unsophisticated consumer. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“To survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1195–97 (a court may decide this question as a 

matter of law only if there is no basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that a

consumer would be deceived or misled). The language of the present collection 

letter contains an offer to “resolve” a time-barred debt, combined with a deadline 

to accept the reduced-payment offer and a warning that the offer might not be 

renewed if payment is not timely made. We conclude that this language, taken in 

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its entirety, could plausibly deceive or mislead an unsophisticated consumer as to 

the legal status of the debt, even in the absence of an express threat of litigation. 

Further, we are not persuaded that this case is materially distinguishable 

from Daugherty, Buchanan, and McMahon merely because the letter Plaintiff 

received offers to “resolve” the referenced time-barred debt rather than “settle” it. 

Despite the slight semantic difference, it still is plausible that the letter Plaintiff 

received would leave an unsophisticated consumer with the same general—and 

inaccurate—impression as did the letters at issue in Daugherty, McMahon, and 

Buchanan. That is, by urging the debtor to “take advantage” of the offer, the letter 

might have caused an unsophisticated consumer to mistakenly believe that the debt 

was legally enforceable and that he had something to gain by accepting the offer, 

or to lose by declining it. In fact, the letter reinforces this impression by 

announcing a deadline, thus creating some urgency for the debtor to accept the 

offered terms by making payment. In this regard, the letter states that payment 

“must be received in our office no later than 5/31/2015” and that Defendants are 

“not obligated to renew” the offer. As Plaintiff points out, an unsophisticated 

reader might conclude from this language that he is being presented with an 

ultimatum, and that failure to make payment within the required time frame would 

result in negative consequences, such as legal action. 

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Finally, we disagree that our holding in this case will require debt collectors 

to give legal advice to debtors, as Defendants argue. Essentially, Defendants argue 

that by permitting Plaintiff’s case to go beyond the pleading stage, we put debt 

collectors in the untenable position of having to analyze and advise debtors as to 

the merits of any potential statute of limitations defense. Whether or not that 

concern might be valid in some situations, the suggestion that Defendants would 

have had to conduct any legal analysis to determine whether the debt in this case 

was time-barred seems a bit disingenuous. After all, Defendants were aware of the 

status of Plaintiff’s debt when they purchased it, presumably at a heavily 

discounted price that accounted for the fact that its legal enforcement is barred by 

the statute of limitations. But in any event, the court in Buchanan specifically and 

adequately addressed the concern raised by Defendants, explaining that: 

[I]f a debt collector is unsure about the applicable statute of limitations, 

it would be easy to include general language about that possibility, 

correcting any possible misimpression by unsophisticated consumers 

without venturing into the realm of legal advice.

Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 400 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And in 

fact, Defendant LVNV has, subsequent to the letter it sent to Plaintiff in this case,

incorporated such language into its collection letters. See Shields v. J.C. 

Christensen & Assoc., Inc., 2017 WL 1106085, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2017) 

(quoting the following language from a recent LVNV collection letter: “The law 

limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, 

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LVNV Funding LLC will not sue you for it, and LVNV Funding LLC will not 

report it to any credit reporting agency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In short, it is at least plausible that the collection letter Defendants sent to 

Plaintiff would have been “false, deceptive, or misleading” to the “least 

sophisticated” recipient of the letter, in violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA. As 

Plaintiff has thus stated a claim for relief under § 1692e of the FDCPA, the district 

court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s § 1692e claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is 

REVERSED. 

B. Attempting to collect on time-barred debt is not a per se unfair or 

unconscionable practice that automatically violates § 1692f of the 

FDCPA.

Although we find that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that Defendants’ 

collection letter was misleading under § 1692e, we reject Plaintiff’s claim that the 

general practice of attempting to collect on time-barred debt is per se unfair or 

unconscionable in violation of 1692f of the FDCPA. The only legal support 

Plaintiff offers for this argument is the Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Pantoja 

v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 852 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2017). In 

Pantoja, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its decision in McMahon that an 

unsophisticated consumer could potentially be misled by a letter seeking collection 

on a time-barred debt. See id. Then, thinking out loud, the court briefly expressed 

some thoughts about the practice of collecting on time-barred debt, observing that: 

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[T]he opportunities for mischief and deception, particularly when 

sophisticated parties aim carefully crafted messages at unsophisticated 

consumers, may well be so great that the better approach is simply to 

find that any such efforts violate the FDCPA’s prohibitions on 

deceptive or misleading means to collect debts, § 1692e, and on “unfair 

or unconscionable means” to attempt to collect debts, § 1692f.

 

Id. Ultimately, however, the Pantoja Court never articulated such a general 

prohibition, noting that: (1) the plaintiff had not argued for it and (2) the case 

could be decided on narrower grounds. Id. 

The Seventh Circuit’s observations in Pantoja notwithstanding, courts 

generally have recognized that the FDCPA does not impose a bright-line rule 

prohibiting debt collectors from attempting to collect on time-barred debt. See 

Daugherty, 836 F.3d at 509 (noting that “it is not automatically unlawful for a debt 

collector to seek payment of a time-barred debt”); Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 397 

(“Legal defenses are not moral defenses, however. And a creditor remains free, in 

the absence of a bankruptcy order or something comparable preventing it from 

trying to collect the debt, to let the debtor know what the debt is and to ask her to 

pay it.”). Pantoja does not offer adequate justification for upending that general 

rule, nor does Plaintiff suggest any alternative ground for finding that Defendants 

engaged in an “unfair or unconscionable” debt collection practice in violation of 

§ 1692f of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the Court affirms the district court’s 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under § 1692f. 

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III. Plaintiff’s Florida Act Claim

The district court did not dismiss Plaintiff’s Florida claim on substantive 

grounds, but rather declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over it after 

dismissing Plaintiff’s federal FDCPA claims. In light of the Court’s reversal of the 

ruling as to Plaintiff’s claim under § 1692e of the FDCPA, Plaintiff’s Florida claim 

should be reinstated for consideration on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) 

(“[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 

that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 

Constitution.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the 

district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) and declining to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Florida Act claim. 

The case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

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