Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A05-1710-CR-2271 | May 7, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Justin Bowling,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 7, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

15A05-1710-CR-2271

Appeal from the Dearborn 

Superior Court

The Honorable Sally A. 

McLaughlin, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

15D02-1703-F6-81

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A05-1710-CR-2271 | May 7, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Following a guilty plea, Justin Bowling was convicted of domestic battery and 

intimidation, both Level 6 felonies. The trial court sentenced Bowling to an 

aggregate term of four years in the Indiana Department of Correction. He now 

appeals, raising for our review the sole issue of whether his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of his character and the nature of his offense. Concluding 

his sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 18, 2017, an intoxicated Bowling returned home and began arguing 

with his girlfriend, Rhonda Hoffman. The argument soon turned physical 

when Bowling grabbed Hoffman by the throat and threw her to the ground. 

While on the ground, Bowling used his elbow to strike Hoffman in her face and 

body. Bowling then stood up and kicked Hoffman in her stomach. Hoffman’s 

six-year-old son watched as Bowling kicked Hoffman. Hoffman was then able 

to stand up and run to a neighbor’s house for help, but her neighbors did not 

answer their door. As she tried to call 911, Bowling grabbed her cell phone and 

stated, “I’ll f****** kill you!” Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 16. 

Eventually, Hoffman was able to reach law enforcement. Hoffman suffered 

multiple nasal bone fractures, an abdominal muscle strain, and contusions and 

abrasions on her head and face.
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[3] The State charged Bowling with battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a 

Level 6 felony; domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than 

sixteen years of age, a Level 6 felony; domestic battery, a Level 6 felony; 

intimidation, a Level 6 felony; interference with the reporting of a crime, a 

Class A misdemeanor; and domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On 

August 16, 2017, Bowling pleaded guilty to domestic battery and intimidation, 

both Level 6 felonies. The trial court sentenced Bowling to two years in the 

Department of Correction on each conviction with the sentences to be served 

consecutively. Bowling now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[4] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits this court to “revise a sentence authorized 

by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender.” In reviewing a sentence, we defer to the trial court’s 

decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant’s sentence is 

inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. 

Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Bowling, as the appellant, 

bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. 

State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
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II. Inappropriate Sentence

[5] The trial court sentenced Bowling to an aggregate sentence of four years for his 

two convictions. It further appears the trial court concluded Bowling’s crimes 

constituted an “episode of criminal conduct” thus limiting the court’s 

sentencing discretion to a total of four years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b); Ind.

Code § 35-50-1-2(d) (stating consecutive terms may not exceed four years if the 

most serious crime for which a defendant is convicted is a Level 6 felony). 

Thus, Bowling has been given the maximum sentence permitted under this 

statute. Bowling contends his sentence is inappropriate because maximum 

sentences are “reserved for the very worst offenses and offenders.” Amended 

Appellant’s Brief at 10.

[6] In Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, with 

respect to the argument the maximum sentence is reserved for the worst 

offenders, this court stated,

There is a danger in applying this principle [because] [i]f we were 

to take this language literally, we would reserve the maximum 

punishment for only the single most heinous offense. In order to 

determine whether an offense fits that description, we would be 

required to compare the facts of the case before us with either 

those of other cases that have been previously decided, or—more 

problematically—with hypothetical facts calculated to provide a 

“worst-case scenario” template against which the instant facts 

can be measured. If the latter were done, one could always 

envision a way in which the instant facts could be worse. In such 

case, the worst manifestation of any offense would be 

hypothetical, not real, and the maximum sentence would never 

be justified.
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This leads us to conclude the following with respect to deciding 

whether a case is among the very worst offenses and a defendant 

among the very worst offenders, thus justifying the maximum 

sentence: We should concentrate less on comparing the facts of 

this case to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on 

focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for 

which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about 

the defendant’s character.

[7] Regarding the nature of the offense, Bowling returned home intoxicated and 

battered his girlfriend in the presence of her son. Bowling’s actions caused 

serious injury to Hoffman including nasal bone fractures, a muscle strain, and 

abrasions and contusions on her head and face. When she attempted to find 

help, Bowling took her phone so she could not do so and threatened her life. 

The nature of Bowling’s offenses are violent and despicable, and justify his fouryear sentence.

[8] Regarding his character, Bowling has around forty prior misdemeanors and 

felonies in Ohio and Indiana beginning in 1997, including prior convictions for 

intimidation, battery, and domestic violence. See Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 

867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the significance of a criminal history in 

assessing a defendant’s character and an appropriate sentence varies based on 

the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current 

offense.). Additionally, a high number of Bowling’s offenses relate to the use of 

alcohol such as possession of an open flask, public intoxication, and driving 

under the influence. Bowling’s twenty years of criminal behavior, and failure to 

remedy that behavior, does not reflect well on his character and we are not 

persuaded his four-year sentence is inappropriate. 
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Conclusion

[9] Bowling’s four-year sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm his 

sentence.

[10] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.