[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Engel, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2988.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2988

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ENGEL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Engel, Slip Opinion No. 

2018-Ohio-2988.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Twoyear license suspension with 18 months of the suspension stayed.

(No. 2017-1087—Submitted December 6, 2017—Decided July 31, 2018.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2016-030. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Andrew Mahlon Engel, of Centerville, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0047371, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1990. 

{¶ 2} On November 21, 2001, we publicly reprimanded Engel for 

neglecting a legal matter and attempting to handle it without adequate preparation. 

Dayton Bar Assn. v. Engel, 93 Ohio St.3d 623, 758 N.E.2d 178 (2001). And on 
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2

December 22, 2004, we suspended him from the practice of law for two years with 

six months of the suspension stayed on conditions for intentionally failing to seek 

the lawful objectives of a client, intentionally failing to carry out a contract of 

employment, engaging in conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice 

law, and failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. Dayton Bar 

Assn. v. Engel, 105 Ohio St.3d 49, 2004-Ohio-6900, 822 N.E.2d 346. 

{¶ 3} In an August 3, 2016 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged 

that Engel neglected a single client matter, failed to keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of her legal matter and to comply with her reasonable 

requests for information, failed to promptly refund the unearned portion of his fee, 

and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation. The parties 

submitted joint stipulations in which Engel admitted the charged misconduct and 

agreed that three aggravating factors and four mitigating factors are present. 

{¶ 4} A panel of the Board of Professional Conduct conducted a hearing at 

which it heard testimony from Engel and three character references and viewed the 

video deposition of Engel’s treating psychologist. 

{¶ 5} The panel adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended that 

Engel be suspended from the practice of law for two years with 18 months of the 

suspension stayed provided that he meet certain conditions before reinstatement 

and that once reinstated to the practice of law, he serve a two-year period of 

monitored probation. The board adopted the panel’s report and recommendation, 

with an additional requirement that on seeking reinstatement, Engel must provide 

an opinion from a qualified healthcare professional that he is able to return to the 

competent and ethical professional practice of law. Engel objects to the panel’s 

denial of his motion to supplement his posthearing brief and to the board’s 

recommended sanction. For the reasons that follow, we overrule Engel’s 

objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and 

mitigating factors, and suspend Engel from the practice of law for two years with 
January Term, 2018 

3

18 months of the suspension stayed, and we place the recommended conditions on 

his reinstatement. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 6} In April 2015, Dianne Shelton hired Engel to represent her in a 

consumer- debt action. Engel sent letters to counsel for Shelton’s creditor on April 

27 and June 22, 2015, but Engel did not respond to Shelton’s multiple efforts to 

reach him or take any other action to settle her debt before she filed a grievance 

with relator in August 2015. 

{¶ 7} Engel responded to relator’s original letter of inquiry in October 2015 

and promised, during a November 19, 2015 telephone conversation with relator, 

that he would contact Shelton. But he had no contact with Shelton or relator until 

mid-February 2016. After informing relator that Shelton had agreed to continue 

his representation and exchanging a few e-mails with Shelton, Engel had no further 

contact with her until early March—when Shelton told him that she had settled the 

matter herself. Engel did not respond to relator’s letters requesting that he submit 

proof that he had honored his promise to refund the balance of Shelton’s retainer 

until relator served him with a subpoena for his deposition at the end of May. But 

even then, he did not provide a copy of the correspondence he had sent to Shelton. 

The parties stipulated that Engel refunded $50 of Shelton’s $500 retainer on May 

24, 2016, followed by the remaining $450 on July 11, 2016. 

{¶ 8} Therefore, the parties stipulated and the board found that Engel 

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 

representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as 

soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 

1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s 

withdrawal from employment), and 8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G) (both requiring 

a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation). 
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{¶ 9} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 

Recommended Sanction 

{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 

imposed in similar cases. 

{¶ 11} Here, the board considered Engel’s misconduct and adopted the 

parties’ stipulated aggravating factors, which include two instances of prior 

discipline, the commission of multiple offenses, and Engel’s failure to cooperate in 

the investigative stage of the disciplinary process. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), 

(4), and (5). The board also adopted the parties’ stipulations regarding the 

applicable mitigating factors, including the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, 

Engel’s eventual full and free disclosure to the board and cooperative attitude 

toward the disciplinary proceeding, evidence of his good character and reputation, 

and two qualifying mental disorders—anxiety and depression. See Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(C)(2), (4), (5), and (7).1

 

{¶ 12} At the disciplinary hearing and in his posthearing brief, Engel agreed 

that he should be suspended from the practice of law for two years but argued that 

the entire suspension should be stayed with a requirement that he serve a period of 

monitored probation. In contrast, relator argued that a two-year suspension with 18 

months stayed is the appropriate sanction. 

{¶ 13} The board found that there is no case law to support the imposition 

of a fully stayed suspension under the facts of this case. On the contrary, it 

recognized that the presumptive sanction for neglect of client matters coupled with 

 

1

 For a disorder to qualify as a mitigating factor pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), there must be 

(a) a diagnosis by a qualified healthcare professional, (b) a causal relationship between the disorder 

and the misconduct, (c) a sustained period of successful treatment, and (d) a prognosis from a 

qualified healthcare professional that the attorney will be able to return to the competent, and ethical 

professional practice of law. 
January Term, 2018 

5

the failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation is an indefinite 

suspension from the practice of law. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 133 

Ohio St.3d 105, 2012-Ohio-3915, 976 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 24; Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. 

v. DiMartino, 147 Ohio St.3d 345, 2016-Ohio-5665, 65 N.E.3d 737, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 14} But the board also found that we have imposed partially stayed term 

suspensions on attorneys—both with and without prior discipline—who engaged 

in conduct comparable to Engel’s. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Bancsi, 

141 Ohio St.3d 457, 2014-Ohio-5255, 25 N.E.3d 1018 (imposing a two-year 

suspension with 18 months stayed on the license of an attorney with prior 

suspensions who neglected a client’s legal matter resulting in its dismissal and 

failed to reasonably communicate with the affected client); Columbus Bar Assn. v. 

Reed, 145 Ohio St.3d 464, 2016-Ohio-834, 50 N.E.3d 516 (imposing a two-year 

suspension with 18 months stayed on a previously disciplined attorney who had 

neglected client matters, failed to reasonably communicate with the affected clients, 

and also failed to cooperate in a fee-dispute arbitration and the ensuing disciplinary 

investigations); and Disciplinary Counsel v. Hallquist, 128 Ohio St.3d 480, 2011-

Ohio-1819, 946 N.E.2d 224 (imposing a two-year suspension with six months 

stayed on an attorney with no prior discipline who had neglected two client matters 

and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation). 

{¶ 15} The board determined that the facts of this case most closely aligned 

with those of Columbus Bar Assn. v. DiAlbert, 120 Ohio St.3d 37, 2008-Ohio-5218, 

896 N.E.2d 137. Like Engel, DiAlbert had neglected a single client’s legal matter, 

failed to fully cooperate in the disciplinary process, and had a diagnosed mental 

disorder that contributed to his misconduct. He also had two prior instances of 

misconduct—one for leading a client to believe that he had filed a motion for 

judicial release when he had not done so and the other for failing to comply with 

continuing-legal-education requirements. Id. at ¶ 1, 8. We suspended DiAlbert’s 

license for two years with 18 months of the suspension stayed on conditions, 
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6

including compliance with an Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) 

contract and completion of a two-year period of monitored probation. Id. at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 16} Noting that Engel has twice been disciplined for the same type of 

misconduct that he has been found to have committed in this case, and that unlike 

DiAlbert, he failed to fully cooperate in the disciplinary process, the board 

recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years with 18 

months of the suspension stayed. On his application for reinstatement, the board 

would also require him to submit proof that (1) he has continued to receive 

counseling from a qualified healthcare professional, (2) he is adhering to the 

recommendations of his primary care physician, (3) he is in compliance with his 

March 7, 2017 OLAP contract and any extension of it, and (4) a qualified healthcare 

professional has determined that he is able to return to the competent and ethical 

professional practice of law. Following his reinstatement to the practice of law, the 

board further recommended that Engel be required to comply with the 

recommendations of his healthcare professionals while serving a two-year period 

of monitored probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(21). 

Objections 

{¶ 17} Engel’s primary objections relate to the board’s recommendation 

that he serve a two-year suspension from the practice of law with just 18 months of 

that suspension stayed on conditions. But he also objects to the panel’s denial of 

his motion to supplement his posthearing brief. In the interest of clarity, we address 

Engel’s objections in reverse order. 

Denial of Motion to Supplement 

{¶ 18} In Engel’s third objection, he argues that the panel erred in denying 

his August 1, 2017 motion to supplement his posthearing brief following a dispute 

with his counsel that allegedly deprived him of the opportunity to highlight certain 

mitigating factors and cite additional precedent favoring a lesser sanction. 
January Term, 2018 

7

{¶ 19} Engel’s motion was not timely, as it was filed more than five weeks 

after the deadline that the panel had set for filing posthearing briefs and just six 

days before the full board filed its report and recommendation with this court. The 

facts that he sought to bring to the panel’s attention were already a part of the 

record, and the board was not limited to the consideration of the precedent cited in 

the briefs. Moreover, Engel has availed himself of the opportunity to present his 

proposed supplemental authority in his objections to this court. For these reasons, 

we find that the board did not abuse its discretion by overruling his motion to 

supplement his posthearing brief, and we overrule Engel’s third objection. 

Weight Attributed to Mitigating Evidence 

{¶ 20} In his second objection, Engel contends that the board should have 

afforded greater mitigating weight to his mental disorders and should have 

considered evidence of additional mitigating factors—including his OLAP 

contract, his mentoring relationship, his service to economically disadvantaged 

clients in consumer-protection and foreclosure-defense cases, and changes that he 

made to his office procedures and staffing to prevent future misconduct. He also 

urges us to find that his anxiety and depression “contributed significantly” to his 

misconduct and that, when combined with other mitigating evidence, they warrant 

the imposition of a fully stayed suspension. 

{¶ 21} The board made extensive findings regarding the parties’ stipulated 

mitigating factors and Engel’s supporting evidence. It acknowledged that Engel 

admitted that he had not been attentive to Shelton’s case and that he attributed his 

inattention to her case to its not being in active litigation. The board also credited 

Engel’s testimony that he did not realize he was suffering from anxiety and 

depression or that his conditions were adversely affecting his practice. The board 

acknowledged that Engel was incredibly ashamed of and embarrassed by his 

conduct and that he has taken steps to ensure that it will not recur. For example, it 

credited Engel’s testimony that his health and mood had improved since he started 
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8

taking a prescribed antidepressant and that in addition to being committed to his 

course of psychotherapy, he had also entered into and complied with a three-year 

OLAP contract. And in furtherance of his professional obligations, Engel hired an 

associate to facilitate communication with his clients and began to confide in a 

mentor, attorney Jonathan Hollingsworth. Hollingsworth confirmed that the 

mentoring relationship commenced in July 2016 and that he had met with Engel on 

three occasions to discuss Engel’s personal life, his office arrangement, and his 

working to maintain a calendar that would allow Engel to meet his clients’ needs. 

{¶ 22} The board also credited Engel for eight character letters that 

identified him as a very competent, well-respected attorney of some renown in his 

area of practice. It noted that three of the attorneys who wrote letters on Engel’s 

behalf also testified to his good character, legal skills, and respect for and 

commitment to his clients and the legal system. And despite their knowledge of 

Engel’s three disciplinary proceedings, all stated that they would not hesitate to 

refer clients to him. 

{¶ 23} The board also considered the written report and video deposition 

testimony of Engel’s treating psychologist, Marsha K. Weston, Psy.D. The 

testimony revealed that Dr. Weston began treating Engel for depression and anxiety 

in August 2016 and had seen him twice a week through April 2017 for 55 to 60 

sessions. Dr. Weston observed that Engel has tended to avoid conflict, isolate 

himself, and shut down emotionally. The board accepted Dr. Weston’s testimony 

that those conditions had been present for many years and that they contributed 

significantly to Engel’s delay in contacting his client, taking action on his client’s 

behalf, and responding to disciplinary counsel. Yet we note that on crossexamination, Dr. Weston was unable to explain why Engel’s mental disorders 

caused him to neglect only a single client matter. 

{¶ 24} Ultimately, the board recognized Engel’s progress in psychotherapy, 

his positive response to a prescription antidepressant, and his belief that meetings 
January Term, 2018 

9

with his professional mentor are helpful. Furthermore, the board accepted Dr. 

Weston’s testimony that she was satisfied with Engel’s progress—which she 

estimated to be a 75 to 80 percent improvement—and acknowledged her opinion 

that Engel can safely and competently practice law provided he continues his 

medication, participate in therapy, and meet with his mentor. 

{¶ 25} Although the board did not expressly state whether Engel’s 

diagnosed mental conditions were solely, principally, or substantially responsible 

for his misconduct as Engel now suggests it should have, the board’s findings 

clearly demonstrate that it attributed significant effect to Engel’s mitigating 

evidence. Indeed, those mitigating factors led the board to reduce the 

recommended sanction from a presumptive indefinite suspension to a two-year 

suspension with all but six months stayed—even though Engel has already been 

sanctioned twice for engaging in similar misconduct, has committed multiple 

offenses, and initially failed to cooperate in relator’s investigation. Having 

independently reviewed the record, we are confident that the panel properly 

considered and weighed all mitigating evidence. We therefore overrule Engel’s 

second objection. 

Precedent for Sanction 

{¶ 26} In Engel’s first objection, he asserts that our precedent (including 

that cited by the board) supports the imposition of a fully stayed suspension under 

the facts of this case. In support, he identifies four cases in which we have imposed 

fully stayed suspensions on attorneys who had prior records of disciplinary 

offenses, all readily distinguishable from the facts presently before us. 

{¶ 27} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Turner, 140 Ohio St.3d 109, 2014-Ohio3158, 15 N.E.3d 851, we imposed a two-year stayed suspension on an attorney who 

deposited personal funds into his client trust account, used the account to pay his 

personal and business expenses, and initially failed to cooperate in the ensuing 

disciplinary investigation. But Turner’s conduct did not affect any clients, and 
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10 

there was no allegation that his client-trust account contained any client funds. And 

although Turner had five prior suspensions, none of them were for similar 

misconduct. In contrast to Engel, four of Turner’s prior suspensions related to 

noncompliance with attorney registration or CLE requirements, with just one 

suspension arising from his neglect and other client related matters. 

{¶ 28} In Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hanni, 145 Ohio St.3d 492, 2016-

Ohio-1174, 50 N.E.3d 542, we imposed a one-year fully stayed suspension with 

CLE and monitored-probation requirements for an attorney’s neglect and failure to 

communicate with a single client. We had previously suspended Hanni for six 

months, with the entire suspension stayed, for neglecting another client’s matter 

and making unsubstantiated claims of ethical misconduct against a county 

prosecutor. Id. at ¶ 1. Similarly, in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Berk, 132 Ohio 

St.3d 82, 2012-Ohio-2167, 969 N.E.2d 256, we imposed an 18-month stayed 

suspension with two years of monitored probation for misconduct that included a 

pattern of missed court deadlines and appearances in several client matters that 

echoed Berk’s prior disciplinary offenses. But neither Hanni nor Berk failed to 

cooperate in their respective disciplinary investigations as Engel has. Hanni at 

¶ 11; Berk at ¶ 19; see also Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hanni, 127 Ohio St.3d 367, 

2010-Ohio-5771, 939 N.E.2d 1226, ¶ 24; Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Berk, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 478, 2007-Ohio-4264, 873 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 29} We also imposed a two-year stayed suspension in Ashtabula Cty. 

Bar Assn. v. Brown, 151 Ohio St.3d 63, 2017-Ohio-5698, 86 N.E.3d 269, based on 

the respondent’s use of then sitting Justice William O’Neill’s name on his office 

sign and business card approximately 18 years after they had last practiced together. 

Although several aggravating factors were present, including Brown’s prior 

discipline, selfish motive, and failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 

conduct, Brown’s misconduct differed from Engel’s in that it did not mimic his 
January Term, 2018 

11 

prior offenses or affect any clients and because he cooperated in the disciplinary 

process. 

{¶ 30} Based upon the foregoing, we are not persuaded that our precedent 

supports the imposition of a fully stayed suspension in this case. Nor do we find 

Engel’s argument that his case is sufficiently distinguishable from the cases cited 

by the board to warrant the imposition of a lesser sanction here. Rather, given the 

unique facts and circumstances of this case, we find that a brief actual suspension 

from the practice of law followed by a longer stayed suspension with monitoring 

will best protect the public from harm and preserve the public’s trust in the legal 

profession. Therefore, we overrule Engel’s first objection and adopt the board’s 

recommended sanction. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 31} Having overruled Engel’s objections, we adopt the board’s findings 

of fact, misconduct, aggravating and mitigating factors, and recommended 

sanction. Accordingly, we suspend Andrew Mahlon Engel from the practice of law 

in Ohio for two years, with 18 months of the suspension stayed on the condition 

that he engage in no further misconduct. If he fails to comply with the condition of 

the stay, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve the entire two-year suspension. 

{¶ 32} On his application for reinstatement, Engel shall submit proof that 

he has continued counseling with Dr. Weston or another qualified healthcare 

professional, is adhering to the recommendations of his primary-care physician, and 

remains in compliance with his March 7, 2017 contract with OLAP, along with any 

extensions recommended by his treating professionals or OLAP. He shall also 

submit proof that a qualified healthcare professional has determined that he is able 

to return to the competent and ethical professional practice of law. 

{¶ 33} On reinstatement to the practice of law, Engel shall serve a two-year 

period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), during which 

time he shall comply with the recommendations of his treating healthcare 
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professionals, maintain compliance with any OLAP terms that may be in effect, 

and continue to work with a monitoring attorney approved by relator. Costs are 

taxed to Engel. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, LASTER MAYS, FISCHER, and

DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

O’Neill, J. 

_________________ 

 KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶ 34} I concur with the majority’s decision to suspend Andrew Mahlon 

Engel from the practice of law in Ohio for two years, with 18 months of the 

suspension stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. I also 

agree that on his application for reinstatement, Engel shall submit proof that he has 

continued counseling with Dr. Weston or another qualified healthcare professional, 

is adhering to the recommendations of his primary-care physician, and remains in 

compliance with his March 7, 2017 contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 

Program (“OLAP”), along with any extensions recommended by his treating 

professionals or OLAP. I disagree, however, with the majority’s reinstatement 

requirement for Engel to submit proof that a qualified healthcare professional has 

determined that he is able to return to the competent and ethical professional 

practice of law. 

{¶ 35} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider the 

mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Pickrel, 

151 Ohio St.3d 466, 2017-Ohio-6872, 90 N.E.3d 853, ¶ 10. Relevant currently is 

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), which permits a mental disorder or chemical dependency 

to be considered mitigating upon all of the following: 
January Term, 2018 

13 

 (a) A diagnosis of a disorder by a qualified health care 

professional or qualified chemical dependency professional; 

 (b) A determination that the disorder contributed to cause the 

misconduct; 

 (c) In the case of mental disorder, a sustained period of 

successful treatment or in the case of substance use disorder or 

nonsubstance-related disorder, a certification of successful 

completion of an approved treatment program; 

 (d) A prognosis from a qualified health care professional or 

qualified chemical dependency professional that the attorney 

will be able to return to competent, ethical professional practice 

under specified conditions. 

If any one of the factors is not established, the mental disorder or qualified chemical 

dependency may not be considered as mitigation. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel 

v. Joltin, 147 Ohio St.3d 490, 2016-Ohio-8168, 67 N.E.3d 780, ¶ 22 (board did not 

consider attorney’s mental-health issues to be mitigating factors, as there was no 

proof that they caused his misconduct). 

{¶ 36} In this matter, the board adopted the parties’ stipulation that Engel’s 

mental disorders of depression and anxiety may be considered as mitigation. They 

agreed that Engel had established all the factors recited in Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), 

including “a prognosis from a qualified health care professional that respondent is 

able to return to the competent, ethical practice of law now and in the future so long 

as he continues to follow the professional advice of his mental health provider and 

his family doctor.” As Engel has already established that he is currently able to 

return to the competent and ethical professional practice of law now and in the 
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future, I would not require him to submit this proof with his application for 

reinstatement. 

{¶ 37} Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 

_________________ 

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsel, and Jennifer A. Bondurant, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, 

for relator. 

Pyper and Nordstrom, L.L.C., and Thomas H. Pyper, for respondent. 

_________________