CIVIL SUPPORT

Actions Are Needed to 

Improve DOD’s 

Planning for a 

Complex Catastrophe

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2013

GAO-13-763

United States Government Accountability Office
 

United States Government Accountability Office

 

Highlights of GAO-13-763, a report to 

Congressional Requesters

September 2013

CIVIL SUPPORT

Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD's Planning for a 

Complex Catastrophe

Why GAO Did This Study

The United States continues to face an 

uncertain and complicated security 

environment, as major disasters and 

emergencies, such as the Boston 

Marathon bombings and Hurricane 

Sandy illustrate. DOD supports civil 

authorities’ response to domestic

incidents through an array of activities 

collectively termed civil support. In July 

2012, DOD began to plan for federal 

military support during a complex 

catastrophe—such as a large 

earthquake that causes extraordinary 

levels of casualties or damage, and 

cascading failures of critical 

infrastructure. GAO was asked to 

assess DOD’s planning and 

capabilities for a complex catastrophe. 

This report assesses the extent to 

which DOD has (1) planned for and 

identified capabilities to respond to 

complex catastrophes, and (2) 

established a command and control 

construct for complex catastrophes 

and other multistate incidents. To do 

so, GAO analyzed civil support plans, 

guidance, and other documents, and 

interviewed DOD and FEMA officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that combatant 

commands (1) work through the 

defense coordinating officers to 

develop an interim set of specific DOD 

capabilities that could be provided to 

prepare for and respond to complex 

catastrophes, as FEMA completes its 

five-year regional planning cycle; and 

(2) develop, clearly define, 

communicate, and implement a 

construct for the command and control 

of federal military forces during 

multistate civil support incidents such 

as complex catastrophes. DOD 

concurred with both recommendations.

What GAO Found

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) 

are updating their existing civil support plans to include a complex catastrophe

scenario, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. However, 

the commands are delaying the identification of capabilities that could be 

provided to execute the plans until the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), the lead federal response agency, completes its regional planning 

efforts in 2018. NORTHCOM officials told us that the command’s civil support 

plan would describe some general force requirements, such as types of military 

units, but that it will not identify specific capabilities that could be provided to civil 

authorities during a complex catastrophe. Similarly, according to PACOM 

officials, PACOM’s plan also will not identify such capabilities. Still, defense 

coordinating officers—senior military officers who work closely with federal, state, 

and local officials in FEMA’s regional offices—have taken some initial steps to 

coordinate with FEMA during its regional planning process to identify capabilities 

that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be required to provide in some 

regions. For example, a defense coordinating officer has helped one of the 

FEMA regions that has completed its regional plan to develop bundled mission 

assignments that pre-identify a group of capabilities that region will require during 

a complex catastrophe. DOD doctrine states that the department should interact 

with non-DOD agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response 

capabilities and limitations.

DOD has established a command and control framework for a federal military 

civil support response; however, the command and control structure for federal 

military forces during complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD has not 

developed a construct prescribing the roles, responsibilities, and relationships 

among command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents

across multiple states. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by 

recent events such as National Level Exercise 2011—which examined DOD’s 

response to a complex catastrophe—and the federal military response to 

Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For example, officials from NORTHCOM’s Army 

component told us that the exercise revealed that the absence of an operationallevel command element created challenges for NORTHCOM in managing the 

operations of federal military forces during a large-scale, multistate incident. 

Similarly, DOD after action reports on Hurricane Sandy found that the command 

and control structure for federal military forces was not clearly defined, resulting 

in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution 

of missions without proper approval. DOD doctrine states that operational plans 

should identify the command structure expected to exist during their 

implementation. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command relationships 

during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes, DOD will be better 

positioned to manage and allocate resources across a multistate area and 

ensure effective and organized response operations.

By working through the defense coordinating officers 

to identify an interim set of specific capabilities for a complex catastrophe—

instead of waiting for FEMA to complete its five-year regional planning process—

NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their preparedness and mitigate the risk 

of an unexpected capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes 

its regional plans in 2018. 

View GAO-13-763. For more information, 

contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Letter 1 

Background 5

NORTHCOM and PACOM Are Including a Complex Catastrophe in 

Their Civil Support Plans but Are Delaying Identification of 

Capability Requirements 10

A Gap Exists in DOD’s Command and Control Framework for 

Complex Catastrophes and Other Multistate Incidents 14

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 25

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements 31

Related GAO Products 32

Tables

Table 1: Select Command and Control Observations Related to the 

Federal Military Response to Hurricane Sandy 21

Table 2: DOD and Department of Homeland Security Organizations 

Contacted 26

Figures

Figure 1: Map of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Regions 9

Figure 2: Functional Component Command and Control Structure 

for Land-based Federal Military Operations in the 

NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility 16

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Figure 3: Dual-status Command and Control Structure for SingleState Land-based Operations in the NORTHCOM Area of 

Responsibility 17

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command

PACOM U.S. Pacific Command

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Page 1 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 30, 2013

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

United States Senate

The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated 

security environment with the potential for major disasters and 

emergencies,1 as incidents such as the Boston Marathon bombings, 

Hurricane Sandy, and recent wildfires illustrate. DOD supports civil 

authorities’ response to domestic incidents through an array of activities 

collectively termed civil support.2 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) in October 2002 to, among other things, 

provide for and manage DOD’s civil support mission. DOD generally does 

not acquire capabilities specifically for civil support, but it possesses a 

broad array of resources developed for its warfighting mission that could 

be brought to bear when civilian response capabilities are overwhelmed 

 

1 42 U.S.C. § 5122 defines major disasters and emergencies. A major disaster is any 

natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven 

water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, 

or drought), or regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United 

States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity 

and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance to supplement the efforts and 

available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 

alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. An emergency is an 

occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is 

needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect 

property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in 

any part of the United States.

2 For the purposes of this report, civil support refers to defense support of civil authorities, 

which is DOD’s mission to provide support through the federal military force, National 

Guard, and other resources in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for 

special events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other 

domestic activities.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

or exhausted—or in instances where DOD offers unique capabilities. For 

example, DOD has been called upon to mitigate the effects of major 

disasters and emergencies by providing fuel and medical care, and 

certain military units within DOD may be tasked to provide specialized 

life-saving and decontamination capabilities in response to a radiological 

incident. The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support3

recognizes that, although DOD is always in a support role to civilian 

authorities for disaster response, the capacity, capabilities, and training of 

the military mean that DOD often is expected to play a prominent 

supporting role in response efforts. The strategy also notes that public 

expectations for a rapid federal response have grown in the wake of 

major disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.

In July 2012,4 the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing 

the department to plan for a complex catastrophe—that is, an incident 

that results in cascading failures of critical infrastructure and causes 

extraordinary levels of casualties or damage. DOD has defined a complex 

catastrophe as a natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace 

attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading 

failures of multiple interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure 

sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or 

disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, 

public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government 

functions. A domestic incident of this scale is likely to affect multiple 

states even though DOD’s definition of a complex catastrophe does not 

specifically include multiple states. An example of a complex catastrophe 

is the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor meltdown that struck 

Japan in 2011 and caused extensive loss of life and suffering. DOD said 

that the scope, scale and duration of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which 

affected several states on the East Coast of the United States, fell short 

of the threshold for a complex catastrophe. According to Office of the 

Secretary of Defense officials, the department’s increased focus on 

complex catastrophes is largely the result of lessons learned from a 2011 

national-level planning exercise. This exercise tested the government’s 

response to a large earthquake scenario that involved numerous 

 

3 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Feb. 25, 

2013).

4 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Actions to Improve Defense Support in Complex 

Catastrophes (July 20, 2012). 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

casualties, and caused widespread property damage and critical 

infrastructure degradation across eight states. A complex catastrophe has 

not yet occurred in the United States; however, if it does occur it would 

produce qualitative and quantitative effects that exceed those 

experienced in major disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 

creating unprecedented demand for response capabilities at all levels of 

government.

In his July 2012 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense delineated nine 

major tasks (and 28 related sub-tasks) requiring departmental entities to: 

(1) define a complex catastrophe; (2) expedite access to reserve 

components; (3) better leverage immediate response authority;5 (4) 

enable effective access to and use of all defense capabilities; (5) update 

DOD planning documents to include preparedness for complex 

catastrophes; (6) integrate and synchronize DOD planning with federal, 

regional, and state partners; (7) enable fastest identification of DOD 

capabilities for complex catastrophe response; (8) strengthen shared 

situational awareness, and (9) strengthen DOD preparedness through 

improvements to doctrine, exercises, training, and education. Most of the 

tasks and subtasks have a scheduled completion date, ranging from 

August 2012 to September 2014.

To date, we have published several reports on the progress DOD has 

made to address civil support issues. Among other things, these reports 

have focused on coordination between NORTHCOM and the states, the 

National Guard Bureau, and other federal agencies for civil support 

planning and response; capabilities requirements for civil support; 

National Guard requirements for responding to large-scale civil support 

incidents; DOD’s planning, resourcing, and training for domestic 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; NORTHCOM’s 

civil support exercise program; and NORTHCOM’s civil support guidance 

development and planning efforts. We recommended that DOD update its 

civil support strategy, doctrine, and DOD directives related to civil support 

and clarify roles and responsibilities for civil support personnel. The 

department generally concurred with these recommendations. These 

reports are listed in the Related GAO Products section at the end of this 

 

5 Immediate response authority allows DOD to provide immediate response to save lives, 

prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious 

conditions in response to a request from civil authorities when time does not permit 

approval from higher DOD headquarters.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

report. You asked us to assess DOD’s planning and capabilities for a 

complex catastrophe. This report examines the extent to which DOD has 

(1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex 

catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for 

complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents.

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for and identified 

capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, we assessed DOD civil 

support planning documents, guidance, and after action reports from civil 

support incidents and exercises that have occurred since 2011; and we 

met with Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, 

military service, defense agency, and Reserve officials. We also met with 

several defense coordinating officers and Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) officials to determine what planning was 

being conducted at the regional level. We also met with officials at 

NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to determine how the 

commands are incorporating a complex catastrophe scenario into civil 

support plans by the September 2013 and 2014 deadlines. We assessed 

planning guidance issued by the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense and 

DOD joint doctrine against interviews with DOD and combatant command 

officials to determine how DOD was incorporating a complex catastrophe 

into civil support plans. To determine the extent to which DOD has 

established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes 

and other multistate incidents, we analyzed DOD doctrine and plans 

related to operational planning and command and control. We also 

reviewed laws and national-level policy pertaining to disaster response 

coordination and planning, and met with officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, the military 

services, and the National Guard Bureau to determine DOD’s existing 

command and control structure. In addition, we reviewed relevant 

documentation—including briefings, analyses, and after action reports 

related to Hurricane Sandy and National Level Exercise 2011—and met 

with Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, 

military service, and National Guard officials to determine the extent to 

which DOD had identified and analyzed multistate command and control 

issues. We also assessed DOD and interagency guidance and other 

documents including NORTHCOM’s civil support plan, DOD’s civil 

support joint publication and Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of 

Effort, and DOD after action reports from Hurricane Sandy to determine 

how the existing command and control construct addressed complex 

catastrophes and other multistate incidents.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More detailed information 

on our objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I of 

this report.

The federal government’s response to major disasters and emergencies 

in the United States is guided by the Department of Homeland Security’s 

National Response Framework.

6 The framework is based on a tiered, 

graduated response; that is, incidents are managed at the lowest 

jurisdictional level and supported by additional higher-tiered response 

capabilities as needed. Overall coordination of federal incidentmanagement activities is generally the responsibility of the Department of 

Homeland Security. Within the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA 

is responsible for coordinating and integrating the preparedness of 

federal, state, local, and nongovernmental entities. In this capacity, FEMA 

engages in a range of planning efforts to prepare for and mitigate the 

effects of major disasters and emergencies. For example, FEMA is 

currently developing regional all-hazards and incident-specific plans 

intended to cover the full spectrum of hazards, including those that are 

more likely to occur in each region. FEMA expects to complete its current 

regional planning cycle by 2018.

Local and county governments respond to emergencies daily using their 

own capabilities and rely on mutual aid and other types of assistance 

agreements with neighboring governments when they need additional 

resources. For example, county and local authorities are likely to have the 

capabilities needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such 

as a local factory explosion, and therefore would not request additional 

 

6 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework 2nd ed. (Washington, 

D.C.: May 2013).

Background 

Framework for Disaster 

Response 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

resources. For larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed, 

local and county governments will request assistance from the state. 

States have resources, such as the National Guard of each state,7

that 

they can marshal to help communities respond and recover. If additional 

capabilities are required, states may request assistance from one another 

through interstate mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact,8 or the governors can seek federal 

assistance.

Various federal agencies play lead or supporting roles in responding to 

major disasters and emergencies, based on their authorities and 

capabilities, and the nature of the incident when federal assistance is 

required. For example, the Department of Energy is the lead federal 

agency for the reestablishment of damaged energy systems and 

components, and may provide technical expertise during an incident 

involving radiological and nuclear materials. DOD supports the lead 

federal agency in responding to major disasters and emergencies when 

(1) state, local, and other federal capabilities are overwhelmed, or unique 

defense capabilities are required; (2) it is directed to do so by the 

President or the Secretary of Defense; or (3) assistance is requested by 

the lead federal agency. When deciding whether to commit defense 

resources to a request for assistance by the lead federal agency, DOD 

evaluates the request against six criteria: legality, lethality, risk, cost, 

readiness, and appropriateness of the circumstances.9

 

7

 The Army and Air National Guard of the United States perform federal missions under 

the command of the President and the National Guard of each state performs state 

missions under the command of the state’s governor. The National Guard can use 

available capabilities provided by DOD––such as transportation, engineering, medical, 

and communications—to respond to domestic emergencies while operating under the 

command of the governors. 

8 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid agreement among 

member states and is administered by the National Emergency Management Association. 

States affected by major disasters and emergencies have increasingly relied on the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact as a means to access resources from 

other states, including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. 

9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Jul. 31, 2013). 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

A number of DOD organizations have roles in planning for and 

responding to major disasters and emergencies.

• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs serves as the 

principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on civil support 

issues. 

• The Joint Staff: The Joint Staff coordinates with NORTHCOM and 

PACOM to ensure that civil support planning efforts are compatible 

with the department’s war planning and advises the military services 

on the department’s policy, training, and joint exercise development.

• Combatant commands: NORTHCOM and PACOM are responsible 

for carrying out the department’s civil support mission, and have 

command and control authority depending on the location. The 

NORTHCOM area of responsibility for civil support is comprised of the 

contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. Outside of 

this area, NORTHCOM may also support civil authorities’ major 

disaster and emergency response operations in the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. PACOM has these 

responsibilities for the Hawaiian Islands and U.S. territories in the 

Pacific.

• Other Defense Organizations: Other DOD organizations, such as 

the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency, and the Defense Logistics Agency, support FEMA during 

major disasters and emergencies by providing power generation 

capabilities, fuel, and logistics support as lead of several emergency 

support functions cited in the National Response Framework. The 

Army Corps of Engineers in particular serves as the lead for 

Emergency Support Function 3, Public Works and Engineering.

• National Guard Bureau: The National Guard Bureau serves as the 

channel of communications on all matters relating to the National 

Guard between DOD and the States.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM assigned a defense 

coordinating officer with associated support staff (known as a defense 

DOD Organizations and 

Offices Involved in Major 

Disaster and Emergency 

Response 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

coordinating element) in each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices.10 Defense 

coordinating officers are senior-level military officers with joint service 

experience, and training on the National Response Framework and the 

Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident Management 

System.

11 Defense coordinating officers work closely with federal, state, 

and local officials to determine DOD’s understanding of what additional or 

unique capabilities DOD can provide to mitigate the effects of a major 

disaster or emergency. Figure 1 shows the 10 FEMA regions.

 

10 NORTHCOM has designated 10 defense coordinating officers, one in each of the 10 

FEMA regions. Because FEMA Region IX is located in both NORTHCOM’s and PACOM’s 

areas of responsibility, PACOM has established two defense coordinating officers of its 

own, one for Hawaii and American Samoa, and one for Guam and the Northern Marianas.

11 The National Incident Management System provides a systematic, proactive approach 

to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental 

organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, 

respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, 

location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the 

environment. The National Incident Management System works hand in hand with the 

National Response Framework. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Figure 1: Map of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions

According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders—active duty military 

or National Guard officers who coordinate state and federal responses to 

civil support incidents and events—have been used for select planned 

and special events since 2004, and more recently for civil support 

incidents. The dual-status commander construct provides the 

intermediate link between the federal and the state chains of command 

and is intended to promote unity of effort between federal and state forces 

to facilitate a rapid response to save lives, prevent human suffering, and 

protect property during major disasters and emergencies. The Secretary 

of Defense must authorize, and the Governor must consent to,

The Dual-Status 

Commander Construct
 

Page 10 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

designation of an officer to serve as a dual-status commander. During 

Hurricane Sandy, dual-status commanders served in New York, New 

Jersey, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 201212 provided 

that a dual-status commander should be the usual and customary 

command and control arrangement in situations when the armed forces 

and National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil 

authorities, including major disasters and emergencies. When serving in a 

title 32 or state active duty status, the National Guard of a state is under 

the command and control of the state’s governor. DOD and National 

Guard personnel serving on federal active duty, sometimes referred to as 

being in Title 10 status, are under the command and control of the 

President and the Secretary of Defense. Dual-status commanders 

operate in both statuses simultaneously and report to both chains of 

command. Command and control refers to the exercise of authority and 

direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in 

the accomplishment of the mission.

NORTHCOM and PACOM are updating their existing civil support plans 

to include a complex catastrophe, as directed, but the plans will not 

identify capabilities needed to execute their plans that could be provided 

to execute the plans, as required, until FEMA completes its regional 

planning efforts in 2018. In the interim, combatant command officials have 

not determined how they will incorporate into their civil support plans 

regional capability information from those FEMA regions that have 

completed their plans.

 

12 Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 515 (2011).

NORTHCOM and 

PACOM Are Including 

a Complex 

Catastrophe in Their 

Civil Support Plans 

but Are Delaying 

Identification of 

Capability 

Requirements 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

NORTHCOM and PACOM are updating their civil support plans to include 

a complex catastrophe. However, the commands are delaying the 

identification of capabilities needed to execute the plans, as required by 

the Joint Staff, until FEMA completes its regional planning efforts. The 

Secretary of Defense’s July 2012 memorandum directed NORTHCOM 

and PACOM to update their civil support plans—to include preparing for a 

complex catastrophe—by September 2013 and September 2014, 

respectively. In September 2012, the Joint Staff issued more specific 

guidance to the commands; directing them to, among other things, 

identify within the civil support plans required DOD forces and capabilities 

for responding to a complex catastrophe by the September 2013 and 

September 2014 deadlines.13 NORTHCOM officials told us that they 

expect the command to update its civil support plan by September 2014, 

and that the plan would describe some general strategic-level complex 

catastrophe scenarios and identify general force requirements, such as 

the types of military units that would be needed to respond to a complex 

catastrophe. However, according to NORTHCOM officials, the command 

will not identify DOD capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities 

during a complex catastrophe until FEMA completes its plans.

According to PACOM officials, PACOM also expects to update its civil 

support plan by September 2014. These officials told us that PACOM’s 

plan will describe a complex catastrophe scenario that begins with an 

infectious disease, followed by a typhoon that leads to an earthquake that 

triggers a tsunami. PACOM also plans to identify critical infrastructure 

likely to be impacted by this scenario. However, officials stated that 

PACOM’s civil support plan will not identify capability needed to execute 

the plan, despite the requirement specified in the Joint Staff’s planning 

guidance. Rather, NORTHCOM and PACOM plan to continue to work 

with FEMA to identify those DOD’s capabilities that could be provided to 

respond to a complex catastrophe and include them in subsequent 

versions of the civil support plans once FEMA has completed its plans for 

each of the 10 FEMA regions during the next few years.

According to FEMA officials, DOD’s civil support concept plans are 

intended to be coordinated with FEMA’s regional all-hazards and incidentspecific plans but these plans are not scheduled to be completed until 

 

13 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support to Civil Authorities Planning 

Order (September 25, 2012). 

NORTHCOM and PACOM 

Are Updating Civil Support 

Plans to Address a 

Complex Catastrophe; But 

Are Not Identifying 

Capability Requirements 

Until FEMA’s Regional 

Planning is Complete
 

Page 12 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

2018. FEMA is currently working with each of its regions to update both 

all-hazards and incident-specific plans, which are updated every 5 years. 

FEMA’s all-hazards plans are intended to cover the spectrum of hazards, 

including accidents; natural disasters; terrorist attacks; and chemical, 

biological, nuclear, and radiological events. Incident-specific plans are 

intended to address those specific hazards that are believed to have a 

greater probability of occurring in a region when compared to other types 

of hazards and have unique response requirements. Each FEMA region 

has a collaborative team that is responsible for developing a regional allhazards plan that details capabilities required at the regional level for 

supporting emergency response.

While FEMA’s current efforts to develop regional plans are not scheduled 

to be completed until 2018, FEMA officials told us that their process to 

develop and update incident-specific plans is ongoing as needs arise in 

the regions. As of August 2013, half of the 10 FEMA regions had 

completed updating their all-hazards plan, and none of the 10 FEMA 

regions had completed updating their incident-specific plans. According to 

NORTHCOM officials, these FEMA regional plans are intended to, among 

other things, inform DOD of the local and state-level capabilities available 

for responding to a complex catastrophe in each FEMA region, as well as 

any capability gaps that might ultimately have to be filled by DOD or 

another federal agency.

DOD’s defense coordinating officers have taken some initial steps to 

coordinate with FEMA; however, NORTHCOM, which is responsible for a 

majority of the civil support mission for DOD, has not determined how it 

will incorporate information produced by these efforts into its civil support 

plan. DOD has defense coordinating officers in each of FEMA’s 10 

regions who work closely with federal, state, and local officials to 

determine what specific capabilities DOD can provide to mitigate the 

effects of major disasters and emergencies when FEMA requests 

assistance. Defense coordinating officers are senior-level military officers 

with joint service experience, and training on the National Response 

Framework and the Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident 

Management System. Currently they are coordinating with FEMA and 

other federal, state, and local agencies to determine regional and state 

capability requirements for a complex catastrophe in each of the regions. 

For example, the defense coordinating officer in FEMA Region IX, one of 

the regions that has completed its all-hazards plan, has helped the region 

develop bundled mission assignments for its regional plan that preidentify a group of capabilities the region will require from DOD for a 

DOD Officials Have Taken 

Some Initial Steps to 

Coordinate with FEMA to 

Develop Regional 

Capability Information; 

However, the Combatant 

Commands Have Not 

Determined How They Will 

Use This Information
 

Page 13 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

complex catastrophe to fill an identified capability gap, such as aircraft, 

communications, medical, and mortuary for responding to an earthquake 

in southern California. The bundled mission assignments are specific to 

the region’s plans and are intended to expedite the process of preparing a 

request for assistance so that DOD can deliver the required capabilities 

more quickly. Similarly, within FEMA Region IV, which has also 

completed its all-hazards plan, the defense coordinating officer has 

helped to develop a list of specific response capabilities that DOD can 

plan to provide to civil authorities when needed. FEMA and the defense 

coordinating officers are exploring the possibility of developing bundled 

mission assignments for complex catastrophes for all of the FEMA 

regions. However, NORTHCOM and PACOM have not determined how 

this regional capability information will be incorporated into their civil 

support plans.

According to DOD doctrine, an effective whole of government approach is 

only possible when every agency understands the competencies and 

capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals. 

This doctrine further states that DOD should interact with non-DOD 

agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities 

and limitations.14 By working through the defense coordinating officers to 

identify an interim set of specific capabilities that DOD could provide in 

response to a complex catastrophe—instead of waiting for FEMA to 

complete its five-year regional planning processes and then updating civil

support plans—NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their 

preparedness and more effectively mitigate the risk of an unexpected 

capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its 

regional plans in 2018.

 

14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint 

Operations. (June 24, 2011).
 

Page 14 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

DOD has established an overall command and control framework for a 

federal military civil support response. However, the command and 

control structure for federal military forces during incidents affecting 

multiple states such as complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD 

has not yet prescribed the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of 

command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents.

DOD guidance and NORTHCOM civil support plans establish a 

framework for the command and control of federal military civil support, 

identifying a range of command elements and structures that may be 

employed depending on the type, location, magnitude, and severity of an 

incident, and the scope and complexity of DOD assistance. This 

framework addresses command and control for federal military forces 

operating independently or in parallel with state National Guard forces, 

and it also provides a model for the integrated command and control of 

federal military and state National Guard civil support.

Joint Doctrine15 and NORTHCOM’s civil support concept plans 

collectively prescribe specific federal military command and control 

procedures and relationships for certain types of civil support incidents—

such as radiological emergencies—and also identify potential command 

and control arrangements for incidents of varying scale. For example, for 

small-scale civil support responses, NORTHCOM’s 2008 civil support 

concept plan16 provides that a defense coordinating officer may be used 

to command and control federal military forces so long as the response 

force does not exceed the officer’s command and control capability. 

Should an event exceed that threshold, a task force may be needed to 

command and control medium-scale military activities. Such a task force 

could be composed of personnel from a single military service; or, if the 

 

15 Joint Doctrine includes Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities, (July 31, 2013); Joint Pub. 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land 

Operations, (June 29, 2010); and Joint Pub. 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, (July

30, 2012). 

16 U.S. Northern Command, Concept Plan 3501-08, Defense Support of Civil Authorities

(Aug. 2008).

A Gap Exists in DOD’s 

Command and 

Control Framework 

for Complex 

Catastrophes and 

Other Multistate 

Incidents 

DOD Has Established a 

Command and Control 

Framework for 

Responding to Federal 

Military Civil Support 

Incidents 

DOD Has Established a 

Command and Control 

Structure for a Federal Military 

Civil Support Response
 

Page 15 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

scope, complexity, or other factors of an incident require capabilities of at 

least two military departments, a joint task force may be established. The 

size, composition, and capabilities of a joint task force can vary 

considerably depending on the mission and factors related to the 

operational environment, including geography of the area, nature of the 

crisis, and the time available to accomplish the mission. For large-scale 

civil support responses, per the civil support concept plan, NORTHCOM 

can establish or expand an existing joint task force with multiple 

subordinate joint task forces, or appoint one or more of its land, air, or 

maritime functional component commanders to oversee federal forces. 

U.S. Army North, located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is NORTHCOM’s 

joint force land component commander. Air Force North, located at 

Tyndall Air Force Base near Panama City, Florida, is NORTHCOM’s joint 

force air component commander. U.S. Fleet Forces Command, located in 

Norfolk, Virginia, is NORTHCOM’s joint force maritime component 

commander.

According to NORTHCOM’s civil support concept plan, command and 

control of federal military forces providing civil support is generally 

accomplished using the functional component command structure. Within 

this structure, NORTHCOM transfers operational control17 of federal 

military forces to a designated functional component commander. This 

commander may then deploy a subordinate task force or multiple task 

forces to execute command and control. For example, for land-based 

incidents, NORTHCOM would transfer operational control of federal 

forces to U.S. Army North, which could then deploy one or more of its 

subordinate command and control task forces. Figure 2 depicts a 

functional component command and control structure for a land-based 

federal military response to a major disaster or emergency in the 

NORTHCOM area of responsibility.

 

17 Operational control is command authority over subordinate forces involving organizing 

and employing forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving direction 

necessary to accomplish a mission. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Figure 2: Functional Component Command and Control Structure for Land-based 

Federal Military Operations in the NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility

In certain cases, such as large-scale civil support responses, federal 

military and state National Guard forces may operate simultaneously in 

support of civil authorities. In such instances, a dual-status commander—

with authority over both federal military forces and state National Guard 

forces—should be the usual and customary command arrangement. 

Federal military forces allocated to the dual-status commander through 

the request for assistance process are to be under that commander’s 

control. For events or incidents that affect multiple states, a dual-status 

commander may be established in individual states. Dual status 

commanders do not have command and control over state National 

Guard forces in states that have not designated that commander as a 

dual status commander.

According to NORTHCOM’s civil support concept plan, dual-status 

commanders provide the advantage of a single commander who is 

authorized to make decisions regarding issues that affect both federal 

and state forces under their command, thereby enhancing unity of effort. 

For example, dual-status authority allows the commander to coordinate 

and de-conflict federal and state military efforts while maintaining 

separate and distinct chains of command. Unlike some federal military 

DOD Has Established a 

Structure for Integrated 

Federal and State Military 

Command and Control
 

Page 17 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

task forces, dual-status commanders, when employed, are under the 

direct operational control of NORTHCOM, operating outside of the 

functional component command structure. Dual-status commanders also 

fall under a state chain-of-command that extends up through the state 

Adjutant General and Governor. Figure 3 depicts a command and control 

structure for a land-based, single-state federal military response to a 

major disaster or emergency in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility 

when a dual status commander is employed.

Figure 3: Dual-status Command and Control Structure for Single-State Land-based 

Operations in the NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility
 

Page 18 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

The Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort18 emphasizes the 

importance of properly configured command and control arrangements, 

and DOD doctrine19 states that operational plans should identify the 

command structure expected to exist during their implementation. The 

Joint Action Plan also states that there is a likelihood that the United 

States will face a catastrophic incident affecting multiple states, and that 

past multistate emergencies demonstrated a coordinated and expeditious 

state-federal response is crucial in order to save and sustain lives. 

However, the command and control structure for federal military forces 

during multistate incidents is unclear because DOD has not yet 

prescribed the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among some of 

the command elements that may be involved in responding to such 

incidents. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent 

events such as National Level Exercise 2011—which examined DOD’s 

response to a complex catastrophe in the New Madrid Seismic Zone—

and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy led by NORTHCOM 

in 2012. Citing this gap, officials we spoke with from across the 

department—including NORTHCOM, U.S. Army North, the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, and two of the defense coordinating 

elements—told us that the lack of a multistate command and control 

structure has created uncertainty regarding the roles and responsibilities 

of command elements that could be involved in response efforts.

National Level Exercise 2011 helped to identify a gap in DOD’s federal 

military command and control structure for multistate incidents. The 

exercise highlighted uncertainty regarding the roles and relationships 

among federal military command elements—and between such command 

elements and responding forces. For example, officials from U.S. Army 

North told us that the exercise revealed that not having a level of 

command between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM did 

not work well for such a large-scale, multistate incident, in part, because 

NORTHCOM, in the absence of an operational-level command element, 

faced challenges in managing the operations of federal military forces 

across a widespread area. According to DOD doctrine, operational-level 

commands, such as a functional component commander like the joint 

 

18 Department of Defense, Council of Governors, Department of Homeland Security, Joint 

Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort (Washington, D.C.: 2011).

19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug. 2011).

DOD Has Not Developed a 

Construct for the 

Command and Control of 

Federal Military Forces 

During Complex 

Catastrophes and Other 

Multistate Civil Support 

Incidents 

National Level Exercise 2011

National Level Exercise 2011 simulated a 

major earthquake in the central United States 

region of the New Madrid Seismic Zone that 

caused widespread casualties and damage to 

critical infrastructure across eight states. The 

exercise took place in May 2011 and focused 

on integrated multi-jurisdictional catastrophic 

response and recovery activities between 

over 10,000 federal, regional, state, local, and 

private sector participants at more than 135 

sites across the country.

Source: FEMA. 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

force land component commander, can directly link operations to strategic 

objectives. To address this gap, two task forces were employed to 

operate between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM. While 

the task forces improved the overall command structure, according to 

Army officials, there was confusion regarding the role of the task forces in 

relation to the dual-status commanders, as well as federal military forces 

in states without a dual-status commander—which some of the state 

governors involved in this exercise chose not to appoint.

National Level Exercise 2011 illustrated other potential challenges 

associated with the lack of a multistate command and control structure. 

For example, according to NORTHCOM’s publication on dual status 

commander standard operating procedures, NORTHCOM is responsible 

for coordinating the allocation of federal military forces among multiple 

states or areas—that is, determining where and how to employ federal 

military forces, particularly when there are similar requests for assistance. 

NORTHCOM officials told us that the command, looking at the totality of 

requests for assistance, would normally make such force employment 

determinations based on FEMA’s prioritization of requests. However, in 

the absence of a multistate command and control structure to provide the 

necessary situational awareness over forces already engaged or 

available, NORTHCOM may be impaired in its ability to make additional 

informed decisions regarding the appropriate allocation of federal military 

resources. For example, at the outset of a complex catastrophe, DOD 

should expect to receive hundreds of requests with possibly redundant 

requirements and no prioritization. Similarly, a preliminary NORTHCOM 

analysis found that the current request for assistance process is unlikely 

to handle the timely demands that a complex catastrophe would incur, 

and that the prioritization of these requests would be unclear in the initial 

hours and days of the incident. Army officials told us that without an 

intermediate command entity to collate operational data and inform force 

allocation decisions, it was unclear how DOD would prioritize requests for 

federal military resources when there are multiple requests for the same 

or similar capabilities. Officials from the Joint Staff, and defense 

coordinating elements echoed these concerns, noting that it is unclear 

how DOD would prioritize the allocation of federal military forces across 

an affected multistate area when two or more dual-status commanders 

are in place.
 

Page 20 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Challenges associated with the lack of a multistate command and control 

construct were evident in the federal military response to Hurricane 

Sandy, which marked the first occasion in which multiple dual-status 

commanders were employed. For example, NORTHCOM officials told us 

that the command recognized the need for a command and control 

element between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM and, in 

early November 2012, employed a joint coordinating element—a concept 

without definition or doctrinal basis. According to DOD after action reports 

for Hurricane Sandy, the purpose of the joint coordinating element, 

employed as an extension of the joint force land component commander, 

was to aid in the coordination, integration, and synchronization of federal 

military forces. However, officials we spoke with from across the 

department told us that the joint coordinating element’s role was neither 

well-defined nor well-communicated, rendering it largely ineffective. For 

example, officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs told us that 

uncertainty regarding the role of the joint coordinating element contributed 

to confusion during DOD’s response to Hurricane Sandy.

Additionally, officials from one of the defense coordinating elements 

involved in the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy told us that 

the roles and responsibilities of the dual-status commander, joint 

coordinating element, and defense coordinating officer were unclear. 

According to these officials, such uncertainty hampered unity of command 

across state boundaries and created confusion regarding command and 

control relationships and force allocation across the affected multistate 

area. Officials from U.S. Army North and the Joint Staff similarly told us 

that there were challenges in allocating federal military forces during the 

response to Hurricane Sandy, in part, because of the command and 

control structure that was employed. Joint Staff officials noted that DOD’s 

joint coordinating element had limited visibility and control over federal 

military forces.

DOD after action reports covering the federal military response to 

Hurricane Sandy also found that the command and control structure for 

federal military forces operating in the affected area was not clearly 

defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of 

effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. For 

example, a U.S. Army North after action review concluded that while the 

joint coordinating element initially had a positive effect on situational 

awareness, inconsistencies in its purpose and task caused numerous 

problems. Table 1 shows select Hurricane Sandy after action report 

observations pertaining to command and control.

Civil Support Operations during Hurricane 

Sandy 

DOD’s activities during and after Hurricane 

Sandy in October and November 2012 

represented its largest civil support response 

since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. DOD 

received an unprecedented number of 

requests for assistance, specifically in the 

areas of power restoration and gasoline 

distribution. According to DOD, the cascading 

effects of the failures of critical infrastructure 

in New York and New Jersey—including mass 

power outages, major transportation 

disturbances, and disruption of the fuel 

distribution system—resembled those of a 

complex catastrophe.

Source: DOD
 

Page 21 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Table 1: Select Command and Control Observations Related to the Federal Military Response to Hurricane Sandy 

After Action Report Observation

NORTHCOM 2012 Hurricane Season After 

Action Report /Improvement Plan

- The command and control structure for dual-status commanders, the joint 

coordinating element, and higher headquarters was unclear to federal military 

personnel.

- Command relationships were not initially clear to all personnel, and some missions 

were executed without the approval/awareness of the dual-status commander.

- Authority of command with regard to the movement of forces was confusing.

- The task and purpose of the joint coordinating element was not clearly identified.

- There was not a well-defined chain of command or process to manage coordination of 

efforts of forces not assigned to a task force or dual-status commander.

U.S. Army North Hurricane Sandy After 

Action Report

- There was no defined structure between the defense coordinating element/officer, 

dual-status commander, and joint coordinating element; no one understood the role of 

the dual-status commander; and there was conflicting information received from the 

joint force land component command and the joint coordinating element.

- The command and control structure needs to be clearly identified prior to forces 

arriving in the operating area.

- Multiple defense coordinating officers were deployed to FEMA Region II, but no 

command relationships were established. This resulted in the degradation of DOD’s 

situational awareness and unity of effort with FEMA.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

According to NORTHCOM officials, the command has recognized the 

need for a multistate command and control construct, is analyzing this 

issue, and plans to incorporate the results of its analysis into the 

command’s updated civil support concept plan by October 2013. 

NORTHCOM previously produced an analysis in March 2012 that 

identified a command and control gap for multistate incidents along with 

potential mitigation options, but this analysis was never approved. Also, 

we recommended in 2012 that DOD develop implementation guidance for 

the dual-status commanders that may partially address these challenges 

by covering, among other things, criteria for determining when and how to 

use dual-status commanders during civil support incidents affecting 

multiple states.20 DOD agreed with this recommendation, and officials 

from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs told us that they are in the 

process of drafting such guidance. DOD has established a command and 

control framework for single-state civil support responses; but, until it 

 

20 GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support Guidance. GAO-13-128 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2012). 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

develops, clearly defines, communicates, and implements a multistate 

command and control construct, federal military forces responding to a 

multistate event will likely face a range of operational ambiguities that 

could heighten the prospects for poorly synchronized response to major 

disasters and emergencies. For example, uncertainty regarding command 

structure may negatively affect the flow of information and prevent 

commanders from having adequate situational awareness over DOD’s 

response, leading to reduced operational effectiveness and ineffective

use of DOD forces. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command 

relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes, 

DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate forces across a 

multistate area, and ensure effective and organized response operations.

DOD acknowledged in its 2013 strategy for homeland defense and civil 

support that the department is expected to respond rapidly and effectively 

to civil support incidents, including complex catastrophes—incidents that 

would cause extraordinary levels of mass casualties and severely affect 

life-sustaining infrastructure. The effects of such an incident would 

exceed those caused by any previous domestic incident. NORTHCOM 

and PACOM, the combatant commands responsible for carrying out the 

department’s civil support mission, cannot effectively plan for complex 

catastrophes in the absence of clearly defined capability requirements 

and any associated capability gaps. Consequently, DOD’s decision to 

delay identifying capabilities that could be requested by civil authorities 

during a complex catastrophe until FEMA completes its five-year regional 

planning efforts may lead to a delayed response from DOD and 

ineffective intergovernmental coordination should a catastrophic event 

occur before 2018. An interim set of specific capabilities that DOD could 

refine as FEMA completes its regional planning process should help to 

mitigate the risk of a potential capability gap during a complex 

catastrophe. Further, developing, clearly defining, communicating, and 

implementing a command and control construct for federal military 

response to multistate civil support incidents would also likely enhance 

the effectiveness of DOD’s response. National Level Exercise 11 and 

Hurricane Sandy highlighted this critical gap in command and control. 

Without a multistate command and control construct, DOD’s response to 

a multistate incident, such as a complex catastrophe, may be delayed, 

uncoordinated, and could result in diminished efficacy.

Conclusions 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two 

actions:

(1) To reduce the department’s risk in planning for a complex catastrophe 

and enhance the department’s ability to respond to a complex 

catastrophe through at least 2018, direct the Commanders of 

NORTHCOM and PACOM to work through the defense coordinating 

officers to identify an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be 

provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes while FEMA 

completes its five-year regional planning cycle.

(2) To facilitate effective and organized civil support response operations, 

direct the Commander of NORTHCOM—in consultation with the Joint 

Staff and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs—to develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement 

a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during 

multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes—to 

include the roles, responsibilities, and command relationships among 

potential command elements.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 

concurred with both recommendations and cited ongoing activities to 

address our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their 

entirety in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, 

which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to identify an interim set of 

specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare and respond to 

complex catastrophes. DOD stated that it recognizes the need for 

detailed planning to ensure the department can provide the needed 

capabilities, and is planning to work with defense coordinating officers 

and emergency support function leads to develop a set of capabilities. 

DOD also concurred with our recommendation to develop, clearly define, 

communicate, and implement a construct for command and control of 

federal military forces during multistate civil support incidents such as 

complex catastrophes. DOD stated that it recognizes the need for this 

and will ensure, as part of its contingency planning, that a range of 

command and control options are available for NORTHCOM and PACOM 

during multistate incidents. We believe that these actions will better 

position DOD to effectively and efficiently provide support during a 

complex catastrophe.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 24 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

We also provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. 

DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report

until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will distribute this 

report to the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary of Homeland 

Security and other relevant officials. We are also sending copies of this 

report to interested congressional committees. The report is also 

available on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

Appendix III. 

Brian J. Lepore

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 25 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

planned for and identified capabilities to respond to a complex 

catastrophe, we assessed current DOD civil support planning documents, 

guidance, and after action reports from civil support incidents and 

exercises since 2011, and met with Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint 

Staff, combatant command, military service, defense agency, and 

Reserve officials. We assessed planning guidance issued by the Joint

Staff and Secretary of Defense and DOD joint doctrine against interviews 

with DOD and combatant command officials to determine how DOD was 

incorporating a complex catastrophe into civil support plans. We also met 

with several defense coordinating officers and Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) officials to determine what planning was 

being conducted at the regional level. We met with defense coordinating 

officers from regions that were impacted by Hurricane Sandy, participated 

in National Level Exercise 11, and completed their regional plans to gain 

an understanding of issues across a number of FEMA regions.

NORTHCOM’s deadline for completion of a complex catastrophe plan is 

September 2013 and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM’s) deadline is 

September 2014, which coincides with the commands’ planning cycles. 

To determine NORTHCOM’s and PACOM’s planning requirements, we 

reviewed the July 2012 Secretary of Defense memorandum on complex 

catastrophes that requires NORTHCOM and PACOM to incorporate 

complex catastrophe scenarios into the commands’ civil support plans 

and the Joint Staff planning order related to complex catastrophes. We 

compared planning requirements directed by the July 2012 Secretary of

Defense memorandum on complex catastrophes and other applicable 

guidance to the federal and regional-level planning efforts to identify 

capabilities for a complex catastrophe. We met with officials at 

NORTHCOM and PACOM to determine how the commands are 

incorporating a complex catastrophe scenario into civil support plans by 

the September 2013 and September 2014 deadlines. Further, we 

reviewed recent GAO reports describing long-standing problems in 

planning and identifying civil support capabilities and gaps.

To determine the extent to which DOD has established a command and 

control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents, 

we analyzed DOD doctrine and plans related to operational planning and 

command and control. Specifically, we assessed DOD and interagency 

guidance including NORTHCOM’s civil support plan, DOD’s civil support 

joint publication, and Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort and 

DOD after action reports from Hurricane Sandy to determine how the 

existing command and control construct addressed complex catastrophes 

and other multistate incidents. We also reviewed laws relevant to disaster 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

response and domestic employment of federal military forces, including 

the Stafford Act and certain provisions of Title 10 of the United States 

Code, as well as national-level policy pertaining to response coordination 

and planning, including the National Response Framework1 and National 

Incident Management System. In addition, we reviewed relevant 

documentation—including briefings, analyses, and after action reports 

related to Hurricane Sandy—and met with Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, military service, and National 

Guard officials to determine the extent to which DOD had analyzed 

multistate command and control issues.

In addressing both of our audit objectives, we met with officials from the 

DOD and the Department of Homeland Security organizations identified 

in table 2. 

Table 2: DOD and Department of Homeland Security Organizations Contacted

Name of Department Organization

Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Directorate Antiterrorism/ Homeland Defense (J-34)

Joint Directorate for Joint Force Development (J-7)

Joint Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

The National Guard Bureau

U.S. Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado

U.S. Army North, San Antonio, Texas

Defense coordinating officers and staff Region II, New York City, New York

Defense coordinating officers and staff Region III, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Defense coordinating officers and staff Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia

Defense coordinating officers and staff Region IX, Oakland, California

U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii

Defense Logistics Agency

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

U.S. Army Reserve Command

 

1 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework 2nd ed (Washington, 

D.C.: May 2013). 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Name of Department Organization

Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response Directorate

Source: GAO. 

Note: Unless otherwise indicated, these organizations are located within the Washington, D.C. 

metropolitan area.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-13-763 Civil Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 30 GAO-13-763 Civil Support
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgements

Page 31 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Brian Lepore, Director, (202) 512-4523, leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above Marc Schwartz, Assistant 

Director; Tracy Burney; Ryan D’Amore; Susan Ditto; Gina Flacco; Michael 

Silver; Amie Steele; and Michael Willems made key contributions to this 

report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgements 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 32 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support Guidance. GAO-13-128. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 

2012.

Homeland Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management 

of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations. GAO-12-311. Washington, D.C.: 

January 31, 2012.

Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps 

Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life Saving 

Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.

Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 

Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 2011.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, 

Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness. 

GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency 

Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions. 

GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to 

Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington, 

D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge 

DOD’s Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

and High-Yield Explosive Incidents. GAO 10-123. Washington, D.C.: 

October 7, 2009.

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise 

Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be 

Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 

Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. 

GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 33 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to 

Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process. 

GAO-08-768. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 

Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, 

but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 

Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other 

Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities 

during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. GAO-08-105. Washington, D.C.: 

November 19, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to Address 

Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 

GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2007.

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts 

Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 

Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 

GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-903. 

Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support 

Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Related GAO Products

Page 34 GAO-13-763 Civil Support

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 8, 2006.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 23, 2006.

GAO’S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 1, 2006.

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington,

D.C.: July 11, 2005.

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005.

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