MARITIME SECURITY

Progress and Challenges in 

Key DHS Programs to 

Secure the Maritime 

Borders

Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Border 

and Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

GAO-14-196T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-196T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

November 19, 2013

MARITIME SECURITY

Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to 

Secure the Maritime Borders 

Why GAO Did This Study

Maritime borders are gateways to our 

nation’s maritime transportation system 

of ports, waterways, and vessels—

which handle billions of dollars of cargo 

annually. An attack on this system 

could have dire consequences and 

affect the global economy. In addition, 

criminals could use small vessels to 

smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other 

contraband across U.S. maritime 

borders. Within DHS, the Coast Guard 

is responsible for many homeland 

security efforts in the maritime domain, 

including conducting port facility and 

commercial vessel inspections and 

coordinating maritime informationsharing efforts, among other things. In 

addition, CBP is responsible for 

screening incoming vessels’ crews and 

cargo to facilitate the flow of legitimate 

trade and passengers. 

This testimony identifies key factors 

important to secure the maritime 

borders, and discusses progress and 

challenges in related DHS programs.

This statement is based on products 

GAO issued from July 2003 through 

October 2013. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations to 

DHS in prior reports to strengthen its 

maritime security programs. DHS 

generally concurred with these 

recommendations and has taken 

actions, or has actions under way, to 

address them. 

What GAO Found

GAO’s prior work has identified several key factors important to secure the maritime 

borders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components have 

made progress (e.g., coordinating with partners), and in some cases also

experienced challenges with their related maritime security programs. 

• Maintaining robust maritime domain awareness. It is critical that federal 

agencies maintain maritime domain awareness—the understanding of anything 

associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the 

security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. The U.S. Coast 

Guard has developed systems—including information-sharing and vesseltracking systems—to enhance maritime domain awareness. GAO’s prior work 

has found that the Coast Guard has made progress in developing its systems, 

but that it also experienced some challenges. For example, in July 2011, GAO 

reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a system intended 

to enable the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft.

GAO recommended that the agency take actions to address this challenge. DHS 

concurred and stated it planned to take actions.

• Assessing risks coming from foreign ports. The security of maritime borders 

also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargo bound for the United 

States originates. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Coast Guard 

have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports, foreign vessels 

entering U.S. ports, and the cargo carried by these vessels from these ports. In 

September 2013, GAO found that CBP has taken steps to enhance the security

of U.S.-bound cargo, but CBP does not periodically assess the supply chain

security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States. GAO 

recommended that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from 

these ports. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendation and reported that it 

planned to take actions to address it.

• Conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations.

Along the coasts and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operations 

are conducted to ensure the security of the maritime borders. For example, 

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine is to provide maritime surveillance and interdiction 

capabilities. In March 2012, GAO found that the office did not meet its national 

performance goal and did not provide higher rates of support in locations

designated as high priority. GAO made recommendations to help ensure that the 

office’s assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission 

needs and address threats, among other things. DHS concurred and reported 

that it planned to take action to address the recommendations by the end of 

March 2014. 

• Measuring performance. In securing our maritime borders, DHS and its 

component agencies have faced challenges in developing meaningful 

performance measures. For example, GAO’s prior work found that they have 

experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data; among 

other things. In January 2011, GAO reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard 

tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but the 

records of these incidents varied considerably between the two component 

agencies and between the agencies’ field and headquarters units. GAO made a 

recommendation to improve the accuracy of DHS data, and DHS concurred and 

has made progress in addressing the recommendation. 

View GAO-14-196T. For more information, 

contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 

or caldwells@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-14-196T 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss key aspects of a secure maritime 

border. Maritime borders are gateways to our nation’s maritime 

transportation system of ports, waterways, and vessels, which handle 

billions of dollars of cargo annually. Accordingly, maritime borders are 

critical to our national security. For instance, an attack on this system 

could have a widespread affect on global shipping, international trade, 

and the global economy, and an attack on a domestic port could have 

dire consequences because of the size of ports and their general 

proximity to metropolitan areas. Further, criminals could use small 

vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other contraband across U.S. 

maritime borders. Balancing maritime security concerns with the need to 

facilitate the free flow of people and commerce remains an ongoing 

challenge for the public and private sectors alike.

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast 

Guard has much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and security 

of U.S. maritime interests and leading homeland security efforts in the 

maritime domain. In this capacity, the Coast Guard conducts port facility 

and commercial vessel inspections, coordinates maritime informationsharing efforts, and promotes maritime domain awareness, among other 

things.1 Also within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is 

responsible for screening incoming vessels’ crews and cargoes for the 

presence of contraband, such as weapons of mass destruction, illicit 

drugs, or explosives, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and 

passengers. Several other DHS components, such as the Transportation 

Security Administration, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the 

 

1

Maritime domain awareness is the understanding by stakeholders involved in maritime 

security of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely 

affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-196T 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, also have roles in securing our 

maritime borders.2

My statement today identifies key factors that are important to secure the 

maritime borders and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS 

programs. Specifically, I will address the following factors: (1) maritime 

domain awareness; (2) risks from foreign ports; (3) international 

partnerships in global supply chain security; (4) maritime surveillance, 

interdiction, and security operations; (5) partnerships and coordination 

along the coasts and in ports; and (6) measuring performance.

My statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from July 

2003 through October 2013 related to maritime, port, vessel, and cargo 

security and other related aspects of maritime border security. To perform 

the work for our previous reports and testimonies, we visited domestic 

and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security 

plans, and other documents; and interviewed officials from the federal, 

state, local, private, and international sectors, among other things. The 

officials we met with represented a wide variety of stakeholders including 

the Coast Guard, CBP, port authorities, terminal operators, vessel 

operators, foreign governments, and international trade organizations. 

Further details on the scope and methodology for the previously issued 

reports and testimonies are available within each of the published 

products. We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

2

The Transportation Security Administration has responsibility for managing the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential program, which is designed to control the 

access of maritime workers to regulated maritime facilities in the United States. The 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for acquiring and supporting the 

deployment of radiation detection equipment, including radiation portal monitors at 

domestic seaports to support the scanning of cargo containers before they enter U.S. 

commerce. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is responsible for administering 

grants intended to improve the security of the nation’s highest-risk port areas. 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-196T 

Our prior work has identified several key factors important to securing the 

maritime borders, which include (1) maintaining robust maritime domain 

awareness, (2) assessing risks coming from foreign ports, (3) leveraging 

international partnerships, (4) conducting maritime surveillance, 

interdiction, and security operations, (5) coordinating with partners along 

the coast and in ports, and (6) measuring performance. Our prior work 

has also shown that DHS and its components have made progress, and 

in some cases experienced challenges, with their programs to address 

these factors.

To ensure the security of our maritime borders, it is critical that federal 

agencies maintain robust maritime domain awareness. According to the 

National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the maritime 

domain provides an expansive pathway around the world that terrorist 

organizations could exploit for moving equipment and personnel, as well 

as a means for launching attacks. Timely awareness of the maritime 

domain and knowledge of threats helps the Coast Guard to detect, deter, 

interdict, and defeat adversaries. For example, according to the Coast 

Guard, maritime domain awareness played a key role in allowing it to 

interdict narcotics, intercept thousands of alien migrants, detain hundreds 

of suspected smugglers, board foreign vessels to suppress illegal fishing, 

and rescue thousands of people.

To enhance maritime domain awareness, the Coast Guard works with its 

maritime partners to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of a wide 

array of information and intelligence to better secure the nation’s maritime 

transportation system against potential threats. The Coast Guard has 

made progress in developing its maritime domain awareness systems—

including its Common Operational Picture—by increasing user access 

and adding data sources.3 The Coast Guard also has related systems 

that can be used to provide enhanced maritime domain information to 

Coast Guard units and port partners. However, as we previously reported, 

the Coast Guard experienced challenges in developing and implementing 

these systems. For example, in July 2011, we reported that the Coast 

Guard had not met its goal of building a single, fully interoperable 

 

3

The Common Operational Picture is an interactive, map-based information system that 

can be shared among Coast Guard commands. 

Several Factors Are 

Important to Secure 

Maritime Borders and 

DHS Has Made 

Progress to Address 

Them, but Challenges 

Remain 

Maintaining Robust 

Maritime Domain 

Awareness
 

Page 4 GAO-14-196T 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program system intended to enable 

the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft.4 In 

addition, in February 2012, we reported that the intended informationsharing capabilities of the Coast Guard’s WatchKeeper software—which 

was designed to gather data to help port partner agencies collaborate in 

the conduct of operations and share information, among other things—

met few port partner agency needs. This is, in part, because the Coast 

Guard did not determine these needs when developing the system.5

Further, in April 2013, we reported that, among other things, the Coast 

Guard had not followed its own information technology development 

guidance when developing one of its new maritime domain awareness 

systems, known as Coast Guard One View.6 We recommended, and the 

Coast Guard concurred, that it take actions to address these challenges. 

DHS stated that it planned to take actions to address these 

recommendations, such as developing necessary acquisition 

documentation.

In addition to its own systems, the Coast Guard also relies on systems 

operated by other entities to help it track vessels and enhance maritime 

domain awareness. For example, to track vessels at sea, the Coast 

Guard uses a long-range identification and tracking system and an 

automatic identification system that broadcasts information on the vessels 

and their locations. To track vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland 

waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based automatic 

identification system and also obtains information from radar and 

cameras in some ports. In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of 

tracking small vessels using available technologies.7 For example, we 

reported that although the Coast Guard and other agencies may have 

technology systems that can track small vessels within some ports, these 

 

4

GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains 

Unachievable, GAO-11-743 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011).

5

GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management of 

Interagency Operations Centers, GAO-12-202 (Washington, D.C: Feb. 13, 2012).

6

GAO, Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common Operational 

Picture Development Would Strengthen Program, GAO-13-321 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

25, 2013).

7

GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need 

for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO-09-337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009).
 

Page 5 GAO-14-196T 

did not always work in bad weather or at night. In September 2012, we 

reported that the expansion of vessel tracking technology to all small 

vessels may be of limited utility because of, among other things, the large 

number of small vessels, the difficulty in identifying threatening actions, 

and the challenges associated with getting resources on scene in time to 

prevent an attack once it has been identified.8 DHS and its components—

such as the Coast Guard and CBP—have started or completed initiatives 

to improve maritime domain awareness in order to address small vessel 

security risks, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels 

arriving from foreign locations and another initiative to assist the Coast 

Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites.

The security of maritime borders also depends, in part, upon security at 

foreign ports where cargo and vessels bound for the United States may 

originate. CBP and the Coast Guard have developed models to assess 

the risks of cargo carried by these vessels, foreign ports, and foreign 

vessels entering U.S. ports. In particular, CBP developed the Container 

Security Initiative (CSI) program that places officials at select foreign 

ports to use intelligence and risk assessment information to determine 

whether U.S.-bound cargo container shipments from those ports are at 

risk of containing weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist 

contraband.9 CBP’s selection of the initial 23 CSI ports in 2002 was 

primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but beginning in 

2003, CBP considered more threat information when it expanded the 

number of CSI ports.10 In our September 2013 report, we reported that 

CBP had not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to 

the United States since 2005.11 In 2009, CBP developed a model that 

ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis 

of risk, but it was not implemented because of budget cuts. We found in 

 

8

GAO, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, GAO-12-1009T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2012).

9

As of July 2013, there were 58 CSI ports in 32 countries that, collectively, accounted for 

over 80 percent of the container shipments imported into the United States.

10We reported in September 2013 that CBP subsequently added 35 ports to the CSI 

program from 2003 through 2007 on the basis of additional criteria, such as strategic 

threat factors and diplomatic or political considerations.

11GAO, Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically 

Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO-13-764 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2013).

Assessing Risks Coming 

from Foreign Ports
 

Page 6 GAO-14-196T 

September 2013 that by applying CBP’s risk model to fiscal year 2012 

cargo shipment data, CSI did not have a presence at about half of the 

ports CBP considered high risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI 

ports were at lower risk locations. As a result, we recommended that CBP 

periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that 

ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future 

expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to 

existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported 

that by December 2014 it plans to develop a process for conducting 

periodic assessments of the supply chain security risks from all ports that 

ship cargo to the United States and use information from the 

assessments to determine if future expansion or adjustments to CSI 

locations are appropriate.

While CBP is focused on the security of the cargo shipped to the United 

States from foreign ports, the Coast Guard is focused on the security of 

ports and the vessels arriving in the United States. Under the 

International Port Security program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign 

ports to evaluate their antiterrorism security measures against established 

international standards. We reported in October 2007 that the Coast 

Guard had found that most of the over 100 countries it visited had 

substantially implemented international standards.12 More recently, the 

Coast Guard reported in November 2013 that it had visited over 150 

countries. In September 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard had 

made progress with implementing its International Port Security program 

despite a number of challenges.13 For example, we reported that the 

Coast Guard was able to alleviate sovereignty concerns of some 

countries by including a reciprocal visit feature in which the Coast Guard 

hosts foreign delegations to visit U.S. ports. Further, as we reported in 

September 2013, the Coast Guard developed a risk-informed model—

that it updates annually—as part of its International Port Security program 

to regularly assess the potential threat foreign ports pose to the maritime 

supply chain and make operational decisions.14 According to the Coast 

Guard International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012, the 

Coast Guard uses the model to make informed decisions on how to 

 

12GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year 

Later, GAO-08-126T, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).

13GAO-12-1009T. 

14GAO-13-764. 
 

Page 7 GAO-14-196T 

engage each country with the International Port Security program, 

including (1) how often to visit ports, (2) how many staff to assign to a 

particular visit, and (3) whether the country requires assistance.15

In addition to assessing the security of foreign ports, the Coast Guard 

also uses the results of the International Port Security program to help 

determine which arriving foreign vessels to board and inspect through its 

Port State Control program. In particular, according to the Coast Guard’s 

International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012, the Coast 

Guard is to use risk-based criteria to identify which foreign vessels 

entering U.S. ports and waterways it considers to be at risk of 

noncompliance with international or domestic regulations, and perform 

compliance examinations of these vessels. The risk-based criteria used to 

make these decisions include the vessel’s management, the flag state 

under which the vessel is registered, and the vessel’s security compliance 

history resulting from previous examinations.

International partnerships based on international standards are another 

key aspect of secure maritime borders. For example, the International 

Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was developed after the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to establish measures to enhance 

the security of ships and port facilities with a standardized and consistent 

security framework. The ISPS Code requires facilities to conduct an 

assessment to identify threats and vulnerabilities and then develop 

security plans based on the assessment. The requirements of this code 

are performance based; therefore, compliance can be achieved through a 

variety of security measures. Additionally, in collaboration with 11 other 

members of the World Customs Organization, CBP developed the 

Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE 

Framework), which is based, in part, on the core concepts of CBP 

programs and provides standards for collaboration among customs 

administrations and entities participating in the supply chain.

16 The SAFE 

Framework was adopted by the 173 World Customs Organization 

 

15 U.S. Coast Guard, International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2012).

16The World Customs Organization is an intergovernmental organization representing the 

customs administrations of 173 countries that aims to enhance the effectiveness and 

efficiency of customs administrations. 

Leveraging International 

Partnerships in Global 

Supply Chain Security
 

Page 8 GAO-14-196T 

member customs administrations in June 2005; and as of our last report 

on this topic in July 2008, 154 had signed letters of intent to implement 

the standards.

CBP and the Coast Guard also leverage relationships with private 

industry stakeholders and foreign partners to promote the security of 

maritime borders, given that protecting domestic ports begins outside the 

United States where inbound shipments enter the supply chain. For 

example, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 

program is a voluntary program that enables CBP officials to work in 

partnership with private companies to review and approve the security of 

their international supply chains.17 Companies that join the C-TPAT 

program commit to improving the security of their supply chains and 

agree to provide CBP with information on their specific security 

measures. In addition, the companies agree to allow CBP to verify, 

among other things, that their security measures meet or exceed CBP’s 

minimum security requirements. This allows CBP to ensure that the 

security measures outlined in a member’s security profile are in place and 

effective.18 In April 2008, we reported that the C-TPAT program holds 

promise as part of CBP’s multifaceted maritime security strategy.19 We 

also reported that the program allows CBP to develop partnerships with 

the trade community, which is a challenge given the international nature 

of the industry and resulting limits on CBP’s jurisdiction and activities, and 

provides CBP with a level of information sharing that would otherwise not 

be available. However, our reports raised concerns about the overall 

management of the program and challenges in verifying that C-TPAT 

members meet security criteria. We recommended that CBP strengthen 

program management by developing planning documents and 

 

17In November 2001, CBP announced the C-TPAT program as part of its efforts toward 

facilitating the free flow of goods while ensuring that the containers do not pose a threat to 

homeland security. In October 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 

2006 established a statutory framework for the C-TPAT program, codified its existing 

membership processes, and added new components—such as time frames for certifying, 

validating, and revalidating members’ security practices. 6 U.S.C. §§ 961-973. 

18In return for their participation in the program, C-TPAT members are entitled a reduced 

likelihood of scrutiny of their cargo. CBP has awarded initial C-TPAT certification—or 

acceptance of the company’s agreement to voluntarily participate in the program—to over 

10,000 companies, as of February 2012.

19GAO, Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its 

Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security 

Practices, GAO-08-240 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2008).
 

Page 9 GAO-14-196T 

performance measures, and by improving the process for validating 

security practices of C-TPAT members. CBP agreed with these 

recommendations and has addressed them.

Additionally, through mutual recognition arrangements with foreign 

partners, the security-related practices and programs established by the 

customs or maritime security administration of one partner are recognized 

and accepted by the administration of another.20 Both CBP and the Coast 

Guard have entered into such arrangements. For example, CBP can 

expand the reach of its supply chain security programs (such as C-TPAT) 

through mutual recognition arrangements. According to the World 

Customs Organization, mutual recognition arrangements allow customs 

administrations to target high-risk shipments more effectively and 

expedite low-risk shipments by, for example, reducing redundant 

examinations. As we reported in September 2013, mutual recognition 

arrangements may allow the Coast Guard to allocate resources more 

efficiently and reduce risks.21 For example, we further reported that the 

Coast Guard signed a memorandum of understanding with the European 

Union that establishes a process for mutually recognizing security 

inspections of each other’s ports.22 According to DHS documents and 

Coast Guard officials in Europe, by signing this memorandum of 

understanding, the Coast Guard plans to reassign some International Port 

Security officials from Europe to Africa, where certain countries are 

having more difficulties than others in implementing effective antiterrorism 

measures in their ports. Further, we reported that one trade-off of signing 

the memorandum of understanding is that Coast Guard’s International 

Port Security officials will not have the same opportunities to have faceto-face interactions and share port security information and practices 

directly with their European Union counterparts as in the past. Despite 

 

20Mutual recognition arrangements can be entered into with other countries as well as 

other governing bodies, such as the European Union. For the purposes of this testimony, 

the countries and governing bodies that enter into mutual recognition arrangements with 

the United States are considered partners. 

21GAO-13-764. 

22According to DHS officials, the European Union characterizes its port visits as 

“inspections.” Under the memorandum of understanding procedures, the Coast Guard 

recognizes a successful European Union inspection of its member states’ ports in the 

same manner as it would recognize a successful country visit by Coast Guard inspectors. 

Coast Guard officials stated that they have collaborated with their European counterparts 

to develop standard operating procedures for these port inspections.
 

Page 10 GAO-14-196T 

this trade-off, Coast Guard officials stated that entering into such 

arrangements increases efficiencies and noted that they intend to 

negotiate additional memorandums of understanding with other foreign 

governments that have strong port inspection programs.

Along the coast and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and 

security operations are conducted to ensure the security of maritime 

borders. For example, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine provides maritime 

surveillance and interdiction capabilities. Its strategic assumptions include 

the ability to provide a 24-hour, 7-day a week response to border 

penetrations anywhere along the U.S. border, with a 1-hour response 

time for areas designated as high priority.23 We reported in March 2012 

that as of May 2011, the Office of Air and Marine had placed about half of 

its air assets on the southwest border region and the remainder in the 

northern and southeast regions, while marine resources were distributed 

fairly evenly across the northern, southwest, and southeast regions.24

Further, our analysis of the Office of Air and Marine’s fiscal year 2010 

performance results indicate that they did not meet its national 

performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air 

support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations 

designated as high priority based on threats. We made recommendations 

to help ensure that the Office of Air and Marine’s assets and personnel 

are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address 

threats, and to help DHS better leverage existing resources, eliminate 

unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. DHS concurred with 

these recommendations, and described actions it was taking, or planned 

to take to address them, including making strategic and technological 

changes in its assessment of the mix and placement of its resources by 

the end of March 2014.

 

23CBP’s Office of Air and Marine resources are divided among 70 air and marine locations 

across three regions (southeast, southwest, and northern); the National Capital area; and 

National Air Security Operations Centers throughout the continental United States, Puerto 

Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In deciding how resources should be allocated, 

considerations include historical location, congressional direction, and differences in 

geography and relative need for air and marine support to address threats. 

24The Office of Air and Marine has 23 branches and 6 National Air Security Operations 

Centers across these regions, and within the branches, the office may have one or more 

air or marine units. See GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More 

Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 

2012).

Conducting Maritime 

Surveillance, Interdiction, 

and Security Operations 

along the Coast and in 

Ports 
 

Page 11 GAO-14-196T 

In addition to CBP’s Office of Air and Marine interdiction and response

activities, the Coast Guard conducts a number of activities to deter 

potential threats to the United States’ maritime borders. For example, the 

Coast Guard escorts a certain percentage of high-capacity passenger 

vessels—cruise ships, ferries, and excursion vessels—and energy 

commodity tankers to protect against an external threat, such as a 

waterborne improvised explosive device. The Coast Guard also provides 

additional security response capabilities through its Maritime Safety and 

Security Teams and Maritime Security Response Teams. Created by the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Maritime Safety and 

Security Teams constitute a maritime security antiterrorism force.25 The 

teams are managed as assets that may be deployed nationwide, and are 

responsible for safeguarding the public and protecting vessels, harbors, 

ports, facilities, and cargo in U.S. territorial waters. The teams are to 

maintain readiness to deploy to events such as terrorist threats or 

incidents and storm recovery operations, and routinely deploy to national 

special security events such as Super Bowls and presidential 

inaugurations. They are also to enforce security zones around highinterest vessels in transit and at other times when additional levels of 

security are needed within the nation’s ports and waterways. The Coast 

Guard’s Maritime Security Response Team complements the Maritime 

Security and Safety Team, and is charged with maintaining a high 

readiness posture 365 days a year. The Maritime Security Response 

Team is the Coast Guard’s advanced interdiction force for 

counterterrorism and law enforcement operations of a high-risk nature. 

The team provides a variety of advanced capabilities or skills, including 

addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and vertically 

deploying from helicopters to engage potentially hostile personnel.

Along the coast and in ports, partnerships and coordination among 

various stakeholders contribute to the security of the maritime borders. To 

target the threat of transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the 

coastal borders, the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, established 

in 2011, directs CBP, the Coast Guard, and U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations to utilize the 

fusion of their intelligence, planning, and operations capabilities through 

 

25See 46 U.S.C. § 70106. 

Coordinating with Partners 

along the Coast and in 

Ports 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-196T 

the formation of Regional Coordinating Mechanisms.26 The Coast Guard 

serves as the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating 

among components. We reported in September 2013 that, according to 

the Coast Guard, there were 32 Regional Coordinating Mechanisms as of 

June 2013 that aligned with Coast Guard sectors’ geographic areas of 

responsibility.27 In addition to the lead agencies, other stakeholders 

include the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement 

Administration; the U.S. Attorney’s Office; state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies; and foreign law enforcement agencies.

In ports, Area Maritime Security Committees consist of key stakeholders 

who (1) may be affected by security policies and (2) share information 

and develop port security plans. These committees, which are required by 

Coast Guard regulations that implement the Maritime Transportation 

Security Act of 2002, also identify critical port infrastructure and risks to 

the port, develop mitigation strategies for these risks, and communicate 

appropriate security information to port stakeholders.28 Recommended 

committee members include a diverse array of port stakeholders, 

including federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private sector 

entities such as terminal operators, yacht clubs, shipyards, marine 

exchanges, commercial fishermen, trucking and railroad companies, 

organized labor, and trade associations. Area Maritime Security 

Committees also are to serve as forums for developing Area Maritime 

Security Plans. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 required 

the Coast Guard to develop Area Maritime Security Plans—to be updated 

every 5 years—for ports throughout the nation.29 The Coast Guard 

develops these plans for each of the 43 geographically defined port areas 

with input from applicable governmental and private entities, and the 

plans are to serve as the primary means to identify and coordinate Coast 

 

26The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan was signed by the Director of Homeland 

Security Investigations, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard. 

27GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over 

Collaborative Field Mechanisms, GAO-13-734 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2013). 

2833 C.F.R. §§ 103.300-.310.

2946 U.S.C. § 70103(b)(2)(G). In 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 

of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) added a requirement that AMSPs include recovery issues by 

identifying salvage equipment able to restore operational trade capacity. 46 U.S.C. § 

70103(b)(2)(G). 
 

Page 13 GAO-14-196T 

Guard procedures related to prevention, protection, and security. In 

March 2007, we reported that there was a wide variance in ports’ natural 

disaster planning efforts and that Area Maritime Security Plans—limited to 

security incidents—could benefit from unified planning to include an allhazards approach. We recommended that DHS encourage port 

stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards planning.30

DHS concurred with our recommendation and implemented it through the 

fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program supplemental program, 

which was designed, in part, to facilitate the development of a Port-Wide 

Risk Management/Mitigation and Business Continuity/Resumption of 

Trade Plan.31

Another important aspect of a secure border is measuring maritime 

security. In the DHS component agencies’ implementation of the various 

maritime security related programs I have described today, and as we 

have previously reported, one of the challenges that DHS and its 

component agencies have faced has been the lack of adequate 

performance measures. The following are some of the performance 

measurement challenges we have reported on:

• Lack of reliable and accurate data: DHS and its component agencies 

have experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and 

reliable data. For example, in January 2011, we reported that both 

CBP and the Coast Guard tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer 

incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied 

considerably between the two component agencies and between the 

agencies’ field and headquarters units.32 As a result, the data DHS 

 

3046 U.S.C. § 70103(b). GAO, Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance 

Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 28, 2007). 

31Fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program supplemental program funding supports 

the development of a plan that emphasizes port-wide partnerships, regional management 

of risk, and business continuity/resumption of trade. The central plan focuses on security 

across the port area and articulates a strategy for ensuring business continuity and 

resumption of trade within the port in the event of an emergency. 

32Illegal seafarers include both absconders (seafarers CBP has ordered detained onboard a vessel in port, but who depart a vessel without permission) and deserters 

(seafarers CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who do not return when required). 

GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Risks Posed 

by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-11-195 (Washington D.C.: Jan. 14, 

2011). 

Measuring Maritime 

Security 
 

Page 14 GAO-14-196T 

used to inform its strategic and tactical plans were of undetermined 

reliability. We recommended that CBP and the Coast Guard 

determine why their data varied and jointly establish a process for 

sharing and reconciling records of illegal seafarer entries at U.S. 

seaports. DHS concurred and has made progress in addressing the 

recommendation.

• Not using data to manage programs: DHS and its component 

agencies have not always had or used performance information to 

manage their missions. For example, we reported in February 2008 

that Coast Guard officials used their Maritime Information for Safety & 

Law Enforcement database—the Coast Guard’s primary data system 

for documenting facility inspections and other activities—to review the 

results of inspectors’ data entries for individual maritime facilities, but 

the officials did not use the data to evaluate the facility inspection 

program overall.33 We found that a more thorough evaluation of the 

facility compliance program could provide information on, for example, 

the variations we identified between Coast Guard units in oversight 

approaches, the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, 

and whether some approaches work better than others. We 

recommended that the Coast Guard assess its Maritime Information 

for Safety & Law Enforcement compliance data, including the 

completeness and consistency of the data and data field problems, 

and make any changes needed to more effectively utilize the data. 

The Coast Guard agreed and has reported taking actions to address 

the recommendation. These actions include hiring a full-time 

management and program analyst to consistently review the data for 

trends and gaps, and developing training resources, help desks, and 

conferences, among other things, to help field personnel track 

changes to Maritime Information for Safety & Law Enforcement and to 

improve data entry time and consistency.

• Lack of outcome-based performance measures: DHS and its 

component agencies have also experienced difficulties developing 

and using performance measures that focus on outcomes. Outcomebased performance measures describe the intended result of carrying 

out a program or activity. For example, although CBP had 

performance measures in place for its C-TPAT program, these 

 

33GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility 

Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data, 

GAO-08-12 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008).
 

Page 15 GAO-14-196T 

measures focused on program participation and facilitating trade and 

travel and not on improving supply chain security, which is the 

program’s purpose. We made separate but related recommendations 

in July 2003, March 2005, and April 2008 that CBP develop outcomebased performance measures for this program.34 CBP concurred, 

and, in response to our recommendations, identified measures to 

quantify actions required and to gauge C-TPAT’s impact on supply 

chain security. The Coast Guard has faced similar issues with 

developing and using outcome-based performance measures. For 

example, we reported in November 2011 that the Coast Guard 

developed a measure to report its performance in reducing maritime 

risk, but faced challenges using this measure to inform decisions.35

The Coast Guard reported it has improved the measure to make it 

more valid and reliable and stated it believes it is a useful proxy 

measure of performance, but notes that developing outcome-based 

performance measures is challenging because of limited historical 

data on maritime terrorist attacks.

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

 

34See GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 

Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 

2003); Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with 

Limited Assurance of Improved Security, GAO-05-404 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2005); 

and Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its 

Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security 

Practices, GAO-08-240 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2008). 

35GAO, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training Could 

Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations, GAO-12-14 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 17, 2011). 
 

Page 16 GAO-14-196T 

For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at 

(202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Christopher Conrad (Assistant Director), Christine Hanson 

(Analyst-in-Charge), Tracey Cross, and Jeff Jensen.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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