IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Buddy R. Allen,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:12-cv-619

Carolyn W. Colvin,

Acting Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff, Buddy R. Allen, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for

supplemental security income benefits. This matter is before the

court for consideration of plaintiff’s July 8, 2013, objections to

the June 24, 2013, report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge, recommending that the court affirm the decision of the

Commissioner.

I. Standard of Review

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and

recommendation, the court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the

court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The court’s review “is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by substantial evidence and

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was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,

shall be conclusive.”). Put another way, a decision supported by

substantial evidence is not subject to reversal, even if the

reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v.

Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence

exists when ‘a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as

adequate to support a conclusion [and] . . . presupposes that there

is a zone of choice within which the decision-makers can go either

way, without interference by the courts.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citation

omitted). Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, “‘a

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the

[Commissioner] fails to follow its own regulations and where that

error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant

of a substantial right.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d

647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478

F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007).

II. Administrative Record

In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge

accurately summarized the evidence in the administrative record,

and the court adopts the magistrate judge’s description of the

administrative record. The ALJ concluded in his decision of

October 28, 2010, that plaintiff had the following severe

impairments: obesity, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar

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spine, residuals of tendon transfer and carpal tunnel repair on the

right hand, and depression. Doc. 8-2, PageID 45. Plaintiff and

Jerry A. Olsheski, a vocational expert, offered testimony at a

video hearing held on October 27, 2010. The record also includes

the treatment records of Dr. Olson, who began treating plaintiff as

his primary care physician on May 30, 2007. These records include

a diagnosis form dated April 28, 2009, which was completed by Eric

Chilton, PA-C, Dr. Olson’s physician’s assistant, and a physical

capacity evaluation form completed by Dr. Olson on July 27, 2010. 

In regard to plaintiff’s physical condition, the medical

evidence also includes the records of: Dr. Arthur Neil Cole, M.D.,

a neurosurgeon, who performed back disc surgery on plaintiff on

January 17, 2008; Dr. James Weiss, an orthopedic specialist who saw

plaintiff on September 22, 2008, following back surgery; Dr. Gary

L. Rea, an orthopedic specialist at the OSU Comprehensive Spine

Center who saw plaintiff on August 6, 2010, for complaints of hip

problems; Dr. Thomas Kovack, D.O., an orthopedic surgeon who saw

plaintiff in 2007 for problems with his right hand and wrist; Dr.

James Cassandra, D.O., an orthopedic surgeon who performed carpal

tunnel surgery on plaintiff’s right hand on March 20, 2008, surgery

on plaintiff’s left shoulder in February, 2010, and arthroscopic

surgery on plaintiff’s right shoulder on September 7, 2010.; Dr. J.

Mark Hatheway, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon who performed

arthroscopic surgery on plaintiff’s left knee on September 28,

2007; and a physical residual functional capacity assessment based

upon the review of plaintiff’s medical records by state agency

physicians Dr. Gerald Klyop on December 17, 2008, and Dr. Diane

Manos on June 30, 2009.

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In regard to plaintiff’s mental condition, the record reveals

that plaintiff did not have a treating mental health specialist. 

The mental health evidence consists of the reports of: Dr. Jeremy

D. Kaufman, Psy.D, a psychologist who examined plaintiff on March

14, 2008, at the request of the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family

Services; the October 27, 2008, opinion of Allan Rain, M.A., a

psychologist who examined plaintiff on behalf of the Bureau of

Disability Determination; and the opinions of psychologists Dr.

Irma Johnston, Psy.D, dated November 19, 2008, and Carl Tishler,

Ph.D, dated April 4, 2009, based on their review of plaintiff’s

records for a state agency. 

III. Plaintiff’s Objections

A. Discussion of Opinion of Treating Physician

Plaintiff objects to the findings of the magistrate judge

regarding the adequacy of the analysis of the administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) concerning whether the opinion of treating physician

Dr. Kevin Olson, D.O., was entitled to controlling weight. 

Plaintiff also argues that the magistrate judge and the ALJ did not

adequately explain why the opinions of the nontreating experts were

entitled to more weight than Dr. Olson’s opinion.

The Commissioner has implemented regulations concerning how

medical opinions, including those of a treating physician, are to

be weighed. The Commissioner has also issued a policy statement,

Social Security Ruling 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July

2, 1996), to guide an ALJ’s assessment of a treating-source

opinion. An opinion from a medical source who has examined a

claimant is generally given more weight than one from a source who

has not performed an examination. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1502,

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404.1527(c)(1). An opinion from a medical source who regularly

treats the claimant is afforded more weight than one from a source

who has examined the claimant but does not have an ongoing

treatment relationship. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2).

Treating-source opinions must be given “controlling weight”

if: (1) the opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”; and (2) the opinion

“is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]

case record.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). The term “substantial

evidence” denotes a quality of evidence amounting to “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion that is contrary to the conclusion expressed in the

medical opinion.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *3. 

The conflicting substantial evidence “must consist of more than the

medical opinions of nontreating and nonexamining doctors.” 

Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 377 (6th Cir. 2013)

Even if the opinion of the treating doctor does not meet these

“controlling weight” criteria, this does not mean that the opinion

must be rejected; rather, it “may still be entitled to deference

and be adopted by the adjudicator.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996

WL 374188 at *1. If the Commissioner does not give a treatingsource opinion controlling weight, then the opinion is weighed

based on factors such as the length, frequency, nature, and extent

of the treatment relationship, the treating source’s area of

specialty, and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with

the record as a whole and is supported by relevant evidence. 20 

C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2)-(6); Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. An opinion

which does not warrant controlling weight “still must be weighed as

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the regulations prescribe, with no greater scrutiny being applied

to [the treating physician’s] opinions than to those of the

nontreating and nonexamining sources.” Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 380.

The Commissioner is required to provide “good reasons” for

discounting the weight given to a treating source opinion. 

§404.1527(c)(2). These reasons must be “supported by the evidence

in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear

to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the

treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” 

Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *5; Rogers v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007). This procedural

requirement “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician

rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the

rule.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir.

2004). The Sixth Circuit has stated that it will not hesitate to

remand when the Commissioner has not provided good reasons for the

weight given to a treating physician’s opinion. Gayheart, 710 F.3d

at 380.

In his opinion, the ALJ noted that “little weight is given to

the opinion of Dr. Olson, who the claimant testified has been his

primary physician for four or five years.” Doc. 8-2, PageID 51. 

The ALJ stated:

Dr. Olson completed a form on July 27, 2010 indicating

that the claimant can stand two hours, walk two hours,

sit two hours, lift up to ten pounds occasionally, but

can use feet for operating foot controls, can reach above

shoulder level, can bend and can climb steps occasionally

but cannot perform [any] grasping pushing or pulling or

fine manipulation, and cannot squat, crawl, or climb

ladders (Exhibit 20F). Dr. Olson further remarked that

the claimant is unable to sit or stand without breaks,

that his knees and back “give” with stress, that the

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claimant’s pain level decreases concentration and focus,

that numerous breaks are needed, that his condition will

worsen with age and physical activity, and that

rehabilitation has failed and surgery is pending’

diagnoses included lumbar strain sprain, spinal stenosis,

and glenoid tear of the left shoulder (Exhibit 20 F p 3). 

A form completed and signed by a physician’s assistant in

Dr. Olson’s office on April 28, 2009 shows that the

claimant was first seen in that office on May 30, 2007[,]

that [the] diagnoses were “HNP L5-S1 L3-4, chronic” and

“morbid obesity,” that the claimant is not a surgical

candidate because he smokes a pack of cigarettes daily

and has a body mass index of 43, that the claimant’s only

prescribed therapy was medication not prescribed from

that office, and that the claimant may do sedentary work

(Exhibits 16F and 17F). That form also referenced notes

that were not attached.

Doc. 8-2, PageID 51. The only other reference to Dr. Olson in the

ALJ’s decision was the notation that the “claimant’s primary

treating physician, Dr. Olson, did not list a knee problem as an

impairment resulting in limitations[.]” Doc. 8-2, PageID 46.

Although the ALJ recognized Dr. Olson as a treating physician

and obviously did not give his opinion controlling weight, he did

not indicate why he concluded that Dr. Olson’s opinion was not

supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic evidence, or why the opinion was inconsistent with other

substantial evidence in the record, as required under 20 C.F.R.

§404.1527(c)(2). Although he discussed other medical records

concerning plaintiff’s various surgeries, he did not state whether

or how any of this evidence was inconsistent with Dr. Olson’s

assessment of plaintiff’s physical capacities. The cursory

statements of the ALJ are insufficient to permit a meaningful

review of whether the ALJ properly applied the controlling weight

test.

Having obviously concluded that Dr. Olson’s opinion was not

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entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ also did not apply the

factors in §404.1527(c) in determining what other weight to give

his opinion. Although a formulaic recitation of the factors listed

in 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(c)(2)-(6) and 416.927(c)(2)-(6) is not

required, see Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551

(6th Cir. 2010), any “good reasons” for discounting the weight

given to a treating-source opinion must be “supported by the

evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to

make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator

gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for

that weight.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242. The ALJ’s discussion of

plaintiff’s treatment relationship with Dr. Olson was cursory at

best. Although he referred to the fact that Dr. Olson was

plaintiff’s primary care physician and had treated plaintiff since

May of 2007, he engaged in no analysis of how this information and

other relevant factors, such as the frequency of examination or

whether Dr. Olson’s opinion was inconsistent with the record as a

whole or was not supported by relevant evidence, contributed to his

decision to give Dr. Olson’s opinion “little weight.”

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred in failing to

adequately explain the weight being assigned to other medical

opinions. The only other medical opinions regarding plaintiff’s

physical condition specifically referred to by the ALJ are those of

Dr. Klyop and Dr. Manos, who were non-treating and non-examining

sources. Although the ALJ was not required to engage in the

detailed analysis required by the §404.1527(c) factors in

evaluating the opinions of Drs. Klyop and Manos, see Ealy, 594 F.3d

at 514; Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.

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2007), relevant policy does require ALJs to consider opinions by

state agency physicians and consultants and to “explain the weight

given to these opinions in their decisions.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No.

96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *1 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996).

Unless a treating source’s opinion is given controlling

weight, the administrative law judge must explain in the

decision the weight given to the opinions of a State

agency medical or psychological consultant or other

program physician, psychologist, or other medical

specialist, as the administrative law judge must do for

any opinions from treating sources, nontreating sources,

and other nonexamining sources who do not work for us. 

20 C.F.R. §416.927(e)(2)(ii).

The ALJ stated that he was giving great weight to the opinions

of Drs. Klyop and Manos that plaintiff was able to lift fifty

pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently, could stand

or walk for six hours in an eight-hour work day, had unlimited use

of his left upper extremity, and could frequently perform handling

and fingering with the upper right extremity. Doc. 8-2, PageID 51. 

However, the only reason he gave for doing so was that “[a]t the

time of the hearing, the claimant was not taking the morphine he

testified had previously been prescribed, and did not appear to be

in significant pain.” This statement alone was not sufficient to

comply with Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-6p.1

In addition, when Drs. Klyop and Manos rendered their opinions

on December 17, 2008, and June 30, 2009, respectively, they did not

1 The court rejects any argument that the ALJ was automatically required

to assign greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Olson, a treating physician, than

to the opinions of Dr. Klyop and Dr. Manos, who were non-treating sources. “In

appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and psychological

consultants ... may be entitled to greater weight that the opinions of treating

or examining sources.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *3; see also

Lyons v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 19 F. App’x 294, 302 (6th Cir. 2001). On remand, the

ALJ will have the opportunity to explain whether and why the opinions of Dr.

Klyop and Manos are entitled to greater weight.

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have the complete record before them. While this circumstance

would not automatically preclude the ALJ from assigning those

opinions greater weight than the opinion of a treating physician,

in such a case, the Sixth Circuit requires some indication that the

ALJ at least considered these new records before giving greater

weight to an opinion that was not based on a review of a complete

case record. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 409. Here, the ALJ did

summarize later treatment records in another portion of his

decision, including the 2009-2010 treatment records of Dr.

Cassandra, who performed surgery on plaintiff’s shoulders and

continued to monitor plaintiff’s progress following carpal tunnel

surgery, and the 2010 records of Dr. Rea, who saw plaintiff for hip

pain. See Doc. 8-2, PageID 47, 50-51. The ALJ also summarized

plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing on October 27, 2010. Doc. 8-

2, Page ID 49-50. However, the ALJ did not discuss what impact, if

any, these later records had on his evaluation of the weight to be

given the opinions of Drs. Klyop and Manos. The ALJ will have the

opportunity to address this issue on remand. 

B. Discussion of Mental Health Evidence

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s decision did not

adequately state his reasons for giving various weights to the

opinions of the examining and non-examining opinions concerning

plaintiff’s mental health. Because all of the mental health

sources were non-treating physicians, the ALJ was required to

“explain the weight given to these opinions” in his decision. Soc.

Sec. Rul. No. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *1.

In commenting on the opinion of Dr. Kaufman, an examining

source, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Kaufman’s assessment that

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plaintiff was unemployable from a psychological perspective,

correctly noting, Doc. 8-2, PageID 51, that the ultimate issue of

whether plaintiff is employable was reserved to the Commissioner. 

Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security, 375 F.3d 387, 391 (6th Cir.

2004). The AlJ gave little weight to Dr. Kaufman’s opinion that

plaintiff had marked impairments in some areas, including the

ability to perform activities with a schedule, to work in

coordination or proximity with others, to interact appropriately

with the general public and co-workers, to accept instructions from

supervisors, to maintain socially appropriate behavior, and to

adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. Doc. 8-2,

PageID 52. The ALJ gave some weight to Dr. Kaufman’s opinion that

plaintiff a had moderate impairment of ability to maintain a

routine without special supervision, sustain a routine without

special supervision, make work-related decisions, request

assistance, respond appropriately to changes, be aware of normal

hazards and take appropriate precautions, and set realistic goals

or make plans independently of others. The ALJ gave great weight

to Dr. Kaufman’s opinion that plaintiff had a moderate impairment

of ability to understand, remember and to carry out detailed

instructions, to maintain concentration for extended periods, but

no impairment of ability to remember locations and work-like

procedures, and to understand, remember and carry out very short

and simple instructions. However, the ALJ did not explain why he

was assigning these various weights to different aspects of Dr.

Kaufman’s decision.2

 Thus, remand for compliance with Soc. Sec.

2

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should not have “cherry-picked” the

opinion of Dr. Kaufman by assigning little weight, some weight, and great weight

to different parts of Dr. Kaufman’s opinion. This argument can cut both ways. 

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Rul. No. 96-6p is appropriate.

The ALJ stated that he was giving the opinion of Mr. Rain, an

examining source, little weight. The ALJ notes that during his

evaluation with Mr. Rain, plaintiff “reported no history of alcohol

or drug involvement” and “exhibited sad and withdrawn features.” 

Doc. 8-2, PageID 52. This was in contrast to plaintiff’s

testimony, as summarized by the ALJ, during which plaintiff

acknowledged that he had taken prescription pain medication,

including morphine and Percocet, that he “had a problem with use of

alcohol in his younger days” and still drinks two or three beers on

the weekends, and that he had previously used marijuana. Doc. 8-2,

PageID 49. In commenting on Mr. Rain’s report, the ALJ noted that

plaintiff “provided an inaccurate history.” Doc. 8-2, PageID 52. 

The ALJ further noted that Mr. Rain assessed a global functioning

score of 50, but then stated that “from a functional perspective he

appears to rate a GAF of 75 because he seems to have developed

maintenance levels of function with his condition and reports he

can lead an independent lifestyle.” Doc. 8-2, PageID 52. The ALJ

commented that “Mr. Rain’s conclusion as to degree of impairment

was not consistent with his findings.” Doc. 8-2, PageID 52. The

court concludes that these reasons are sufficient to comply with

Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-6p. However, the ALJ will have the

opportunity to provide further elaboration of these reasons on

remand.

The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of the non-examining

White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 285 (6th Cir. 2009). There is no per

se rule which would preclude an ALJ from according different weights to different

conclusions in an expert’s opinion, so long as the ALJ explains his reasons for

doing so in a manner which permits adequate review of that decision. 

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state agency psychologists, Dr. Johnston and Dr. Tishler, who

issued opinions based on a review of plaintiff’s records.3 These

experts concluded that plaintiff has an affective disorder,

dysthymic disorder, with mild restriction of activities of daily

living, moderate difficulties in social function, moderate

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace,

with no episodes of decompensation. They also concluded that

plaintiff’s mental impairment would not prevent him from

understanding, recalling, and performing simple repetitive tasks on

a routine basis or from adapting to a relatively static work-like

setting where there are no strict production quotas and where the

required interactions with others are minimal. Doc. 8-2, PageID

52. The ALJ noted that “[t]his opinion is more consistent with the

evidence as a whole, including the claimant’s testimony.” Doc. 8-

2, PageID 52. However, the ALJ did not elaborate on this

conclusory statement. Although the ALJ summarized plaintiff’s

testimony concerning his activities in another portion of the

decision, the ALJ did not explain why he concluded that those

activities were consistent with the opinions of Drs. Johnston and

Tishler. Remand for further explanation pursuant to Rule 96-6p is

warranted.

3 Although more weight is generally given to the medical opinion of a

source who has examined the claimant than to the opinion of a source who has not,

see 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(1), this “is not a bright-line rule.” Dragon v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 470 F. App’x 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2012). “A non-examining

physician’s opinion may be accepted over that of an examining physician when the

non-examining physician clearly states the reasons that his opinions differ from

those of the examining physicians.” Lyons, 19 F. App’x at 302. Dr. Johnston

discussed the reports of Mr. Rain and Dr. Kaufman in her report and stated why

she disagreed with their findings. Therefore, it was not error per se for the

ALJ to give her opinion more weight. 

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III. Conclusion

In conclusion, the court finds that the ALJ did not adequately

address the factors in §404.1527(c)(2)-(6) in determining what

weight to give Dr. Olson’s opinion as a treating physician, nor did

he explain the weight being accorded other non-treating sources

pursuant to Rule 96-6p. In the report and recommendation, the

magistrate judge did a thorough analysis of the administrative

record and noted evidence which supported the weight being assigned

by the ALJ to the opinions of the various experts. However, it is

the ALJ as the “adjudicator” who must decide whether the treating

source’s medical opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R.

§404.1527(c)(2); Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *2. 

Whether a medical opinion “is not inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence in [the] case record” is “a judgment that

adjudicators must make in each case.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2);

Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *3. “Administrative

law judges ... must explain the weight given to [the opinions of

state agency consultants] in their decisions.” Soc. Sec. Rul. No.

96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *1.

The purpose of the remand is to permit the ALJ to further

explain his reasons for according different weights to the various

treating and non-treating sources, as required by the

Commissioner’s policies and regulations. The court makes no

findings and expresses no opinion as to whether the administrative

record supports the determinations made by the ALJ in his decision

of October 28, 2010, concerning the weight to be given the expert

opinions and other evidence. The court also does not reach the

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issue of whether there is substantial evidence to support the

Commissioner’s nondisability determination. On remand, the ALJ

might reach the same conclusions he expressed in his previous

decision with regard to the weight to be assigned the opinions of

the various experts and the other evidence of record, or he might

decide to assign a particular opinion a different weight. Those

decisions are matters for the ALJ. The ALJ may also decide, at his

discretion, to revisit the ultimate issue of whether plaintiff

should be awarded disability benefits based upon the weight the ALJ

assigns to the various source opinions and other evidence on

remand. However, nothing in this opinion shall be construed as

suggesting or requiring that the ALJ decide that ultimate issue one

way or the other.

For the reasons stated above, the court adopts the summary of

the record outlined in the report and recommendation (Doc. 14) but

declines to adopt the magistrate judge’s recommendations concerning

the sufficiency of the ALJ’s discussion of the weight being given

the treating and nontreating sources. The court remands this case

to the Commissioner under Sentence Four of § 405(g). On remand,

the administrative law judge shall apply the treating physician

analysis to Dr. Olson’s opinion and explain the weight being given

to his opinion. The administrative law judge shall also explain

the weight being given to the other medical and psychological

opinions in the case.

It is so ordered.

Date: September 18, 2013 s/James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge

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