IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL R. DIEMER, 

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-610

Judge Frost

Magistrate Judge King 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Background

This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income. This matter is now before 

the Court on Plaintiff Michael R. Diemer’s Statement of Specific 

Errors (“Statement of Errors”), Doc. No. 9, Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Statement of Specific Errors 

(“Commissioner’s Response”), Doc. No. 10, and Plaintiff Michael R. 

Diemer’s Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition (“Plaintiff’s 

Reply”), Doc. No. 11.

Plaintiff Michael R. Diemer filed his current application for

disability insurance benefits on January 29, 2009, and his current 

application for supplemental security income on February 2, 2009, 

alleging that he has been disabled since November 19, 1985. PAGEID 

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134, 138.1 The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration, 

and plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law 

judge. 

An administrative hearing was held on November 17, 2010, at which 

plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did 

Hermona C. Robinson, who testified as a vocational expert, and Lisa 

Diss, who testified as a witness about “the severity of otherwise 

already established diagnoses.” PAGEID 45, 74. In a decision dated 

November 30, 2010, the administrative law judge concluded that 

plaintiff was not disabled from December 30, 2004, through the date of 

the administrative decision. PAGEID 39. That decision became the 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals 

Council declined review on May 14, 2012. PAGEID 19. 

Plaintiff was 27 years of age on the date of the administrative 

law judge’s decision. See PAGEID 39, 134. Plaintiff has a marginal 

education, is able to communicate in English, and has past relevant 

work as a laborer, lawn and garden clerk, and crew member. PAGEID 38. 

Plaintiff was last insured for disability insurance purposes on

September 30, 2010. PAGEID 30. He has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since his alleged date of onset. Id. 

II. Medical Evidence

Dennis A. Marikis, Ph.D., evaluated plaintiff on February 17, 

2009, for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility. PAGEID 301-

05. On the WAIS-III, plaintiff’s scores were indicative of a person 

of average intelligence with no significant and profound deficits but 

 

1 Plaintiff’s prior applications were denied on December 30, 2004 and have not 

been reopened. PAGEID 28. 

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with some problematic aspects in social awareness and social 

connection. PAGEID 302. The MMPI-2 included an elevated F-score and 

reflected a “grossly over-stated and focused emphasis on pathology 

presenting himself in an unfavorable light.” Id. According to Dr. 

Marikis, plaintiff “is inclined to have more of a chronic dysthymic 

attitude, which is more of a ‘poor me’ perspective.” Id. Dr. Marikis 

also observed “levels of anti-social traits [that] suggest some 

difficulties at any kind of emotional depth.” Id. In terms of 

interpersonal functioning, plaintiff “has very strong anti-social 

functioning. He is defined as extremely odd and peculiar with really 

eccentric aspects to his personality and poor social skills.” Id. 

Dr. Marikis also noted boundary issues. Id. 

On Axis I, Dr. Marikis diagnosed “[h]igh level malingering with 

fictitious disorder primarily psychological. He does show some 

patterns as consistent with attention difficulties and delusional 

disorder. He also has a chronic dysthymic disorder.” PAGEID 303. On 

Axis II, Dr. Marikis diagnosed borderline personality disorder. Dr. 

Marikis assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 

45. Id. Dr. Marikis opined that “malingering is a factor in 

[plaintiff’s] perception of self” but that plaintiff “does not have 

the social capacity and interpersonal ability to manage the world of 

work. However, there very well may be aspects in which he could be 

affectively trained in the future to do.” Id. 

Dr. Marikis assessed plaintiff’s mental residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”), in which he concluded that plaintiff was moderately 

limited in his ability to (1) perform activities within a schedule, 

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maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary 

tolerances, (2) sustain an ordinary routine without special 

supervision, (3) complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a 

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 

periods, (4) interact appropriately with the general public, (5) 

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors, (6) maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere 

to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, (7) respond 

appropriately to changes in the work setting, (8) travel in unfamiliar 

places or use public transportation, and (9) set realistic goals or 

make plans independently of others. PAGEID 304. Plaintiff was 

markedly limited in his ability to get along with coworkers or peers 

without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. Id.

On April 7, 2009, John S. Reece, Psy.D., consultatively examined 

plaintiff for purposes of state disability benefits. PAGEID 306-11. 

Plaintiff reported that his inability to focus and to accomplish 

repetitive tasks kept him from working. PAGEID 307. He reported no 

difficulties following instructions at work or getting along with coworkers or supervisors. Id. He had not worked for more than a year 

because of transportation problems, because of a move and because he 

had been fired for “eating a biscuit on the job.” Id. Dr. Reece 

characterized plaintiff’s concentration and persistence as 

satisfactory, and noted that plaintiff worked at an average pace and 

had no difficulty understanding or following instructions. PAGEID 

308. 

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Dr. Reece diagnosed Asperger’s disorder, attention deficit 

disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and inability to focus, and

assigned a GAF score of 60. PAGEID 309. According to Dr. Reece, 

plaintiff was of average intelligence, would be able to live 

independently, and could make decisions on a daily basis. Id. Dr. 

Reece could not make an Axis II diagnosis. Id.

Dr. Reece opined that plaintiff was mildly impaired in his 

ability to (1) relate to others, including co-workers and supervisors, 

(2) maintain attention, concentration, persistence and pace to perform 

simple repetitive tasks, (3) withstand the stress and pressures 

associated with daily work activity, and (4) manage his funds, but he 

would likely not need assistance managing his money. PAGEID 310. 

Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember and follow instructions 

was satisfactory and not impaired. Id.

Karla Voyten, Ph.D., reviewed the medical record in May 2009 on 

behalf of the state agency and completed a Psychiatric Review 

Technique form. PAGEID 312-25. According to Dr. Voyten, plaintiff 

had a mild limitation in maintaining social functioning and 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and no limitation in 

his activities of daily living. PAGEID 322. Plaintiff was not 

severely impaired by a mental illness. PAGEID 325. In making this 

determination, Dr. Voyten found that plaintiff’s allegations of 

functioning were partially credible, at best, and likely not credible. 

Id. She noted that plaintiff “is functional, goes to the library, 

uses the internet, chats online, and essentially follows his interests 

freely.” Id. 

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Tonnie Hoyle, Psy.D., reviewed the medical record on July 24, 

2009 on behalf of the state agency and affirmed Dr. Voyten’s 

assessment. PAGEID 326.

From January through October 2009, plaintiff underwent 

approximately 15 treatments at Moundbuilders Guidance Center by social 

workers Scott Allen Gatton, M.Div., LSW., and Carol Crane, QMHS. 

PAGEID 275-99, 413-35. He cancelled or missed approximately 6 

treatment sessions. See PAGEID 275-77, 280, 419, 429. In January 

2009, Mr. Gatton diagnosed R/O obsessive compulsive disorder, bipolar 

I, mania, and a reported history of Asperger’s disorder. PAGEID 298. 

Suseela Nalluri, M.D., treated plaintiff on August 1 and 4, 2010. 

PAGEID 327-33. Dr. Nalluri found that plaintiff’s thought process was 

logical, his mood was euphoric, he was non-aggressive and had a full 

affect, his behavior was impulsive and hyperactive, and he 

demonstrated poor judgment. PAGEID 329-30. Dr. Nalluri assigned a 

GAF score of 50 and diagnosed “r/o ADHA,” “r/o pervasive developmental 

disorder not otherwise specified,” “r/o BPAD” and “r/o MR.” PAGEID 

330. On October 30, 2010, Dr. Nalluri completed a mental RFC 

questionnaire, in which she opined that plaintiff had marked 

limitations in 16 of 16 areas of social interaction, sustained 

concentration and persistence, and adaptation. PAGEID 401-404.2

 Dr. 

Nalluri further opined that plaintiff’s condition would likely 

deteriorate if he were under stress. The doctor also concluded that 

plaintiff could not manage his own funds and would have marked 

 

2 Dr. Nalluri defined a “marked limitation” as an impairment that seriously 

affects one’s ability to function in a work setting. PAGEID 401. 

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limitations in social interaction even where only minimal contact or 

interaction with others was required. PAGEID 401-03.

Plaintiff underwent treatment on eight occasions between August 

16, 2010 and October 19, 2010, by Jessica Wade, M.A., PC-CR, at MidOhio Psychological Services. PAGEID 368-73. The administrative 

record does not include treatment notes for the eight sessions, but it 

does include a goal and objective for each session. Ms. Wade 

diagnosed Asperger’s disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder, predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type, and personality 

disorder, NOS, with antisocial features. PAGEID 368. Ms. Wade 

assigned a GAF score of 48. Id. 

Claire Robitaille, Ph.D., and Ms. Wade completed a mental RFC 

questionnaire on November 1, 2010. PAGEID 409-12. They opined that 

plaintiff had mild, moderate and marked limitations in areas of social 

functioning, but fewer limitations if only minimal contact or 

interaction with others were required, because plaintiff “demonstrates 

capability to focus and maintain attention on tasks when absent 

opportunities to socialize.” PAGEID 409-10. Plaintiff also had mild, 

moderate and marked limitations in areas of sustained concentration,

pace and adaptation. PAGEID 410-11. Dr. Robitaille and Ms. Wade 

further opined that plaintiff was unable to manage his own funds and 

that his condition would likely deteriorate if he were subjected to 

stress. PAGEID 411.

A Conners’ Continuous Performance Test II was administered on 

September 13, 2010, PAGEID 374-83, and again on October 12, 2010, 

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related deficit. PAGEID 382. The record does not indicate who 

administered the tests, nor is there any indication that the tests 

were reviewed by a medical professional. 

III. Administrative Decision

The administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s severe 

impairments consist of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 

Asperger’s syndrome, borderline personality disorder with antisocial 

features, bipolar I mania, chronic dysthymic disorder also diagnosed 

as depression, and obsessive compulsive disorder. PAGEID 30. The 

administrative law judge also found that plaintiff’s impairments 

neither meet nor equal a listed impairment and leave plaintiff with 

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for medium work, 

except that he can only frequently use ramps and stairs; 

occasionally use ladders, ropes and scaffolds; frequently 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; must 

avoid concentrated exposure to moving machinery and 

unprotected heights; he is limited to positions that 

require only the ability to understand, remember and carry 

out simple instructions, with only occasional and 

superficial interaction with the general public and coworkers.

PAGEID 31-33. Although this RFC precluded plaintiff’s past relevant 

work, the administrative law judge relied on the testimony of the 

vocational expert to find that plaintiff is able to perform a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy, including such 

jobs as maintenance laborer, hand packager, and janitor. PAGEID 38-

39. Accordingly, the administrative law judge concluded that 

plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act from December 30, 2004, through the date of the administrative law 

judge’s decision. PAGEID 39.

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IV. Discussion

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings 

of the administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence 

and employed the proper legal standards. Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389 (1971); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 

(6th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of 

evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

See Buxton v. Haler, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001); Kirk v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981). This 

Court does not try the case de novo, nor does it resolve conflicts in 

the evidence or questions of credibility. See Brainard v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. 

Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).

In determining the existence of substantial evidence, this 

Court must examine the administrative record as a whole. Kirk, 667 

F.2d at 536. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if this Court would 

decide the matter differently, see Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 

1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also 

supports the opposite conclusion. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595.

In his Statement of Errors, plaintiff contends that the 

administrative law judge improperly evaluated the medical evidence of 

record. Plaintiff specifically argues that the administrative law 

judge erred by failing to follow the treating physician rule when 

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evaluating the opinions of Dr. Nalluri and Ms. Wade, by failing to 

articulate the weight given to the opinions of the state agency 

reviewers, Dr. Voyten and Dr. Hoyle, by rejecting a portion of Dr. 

Marikis’s opinion, and by assigning considerable weight to Dr. Reece’s 

opinion. 

A. Dr. Nalluri and Ms. Wade

Plaintiff maintains that the administrative law judge erred in 

evaluating the opinions of Dr. Nalluri and Ms. Wade because he did not 

follow the treating physician rule. Statement of Errors, pp. 10-13. 

The opinion of a treating provider must be given controlling weight if 

that opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not inconsistent with the 

other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The opinions of only treating sources 

are entitled to controlling weight; a treating source is a “medical 

source who provides you, or has provided you, with medical treatment 

or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment 

relationship with you.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902. Generally, 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has declined 

to find that an ongoing treatment relationship exists after just two 

or three examinations. See, e.g., Yamin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 67 F. 

App’x 883, 885 (6th Cir. 2003) (“These two examinations did not give 

[the physician] a long term overview of [the claimant’s] condition.”); 

Boucher v. Apfel, No. 99-1906, 2000 WL 1769520, at *9 (6th Cir. Nov. 

15, 2000) (finding that a doctor did not qualify as a treating source 

and did not have an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant 

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even though the doctor had examined claimant three times over a twoyear period). See also Helm v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-5025, 2011 

WL 13918, at *3 n.3 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (noting that “it is 

questionable whether a physician who examines a patient only three 

times over a four-month period is a treating source – as opposed to a 

nontreating (but examining) source”). 

Even if the opinion of a treating provider is not entitled to 

controlling weight, an administrative law judge is nevertheless 

required to determine how much weight the opinion is entitled to by 

considering such factors as the length, nature and extent of the 

treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, the medical 

specialty of the treating physician, the extent to which the opinion 

is supported by the evidence, and the consistency of the opinion with 

the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 

416.927(c)(2)–(6); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 

(6th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th 

Cir. 2004). Moreover, an administrative law judge must provide “good 

reasons” for discounting the opinion of a treating provider, i.e., 

reasons that are “‘sufficiently specific to make clear to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating 

source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Rogers v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting SSR 

96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (July 2, 1996)). This special treatment 

afforded to the opinions of treating providers recognizes that

“these sources are likely to be the medical professionals 

most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of 

[the claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a 

unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be 

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obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from 

reports of individual examinations, such as consultative 

examinations or brief hospitalizations.”

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Dr. Nalluri treated plaintiff twice in August 2010 and opined in 

October 2010 that plaintiff had marked limitations in 16 of 16 areas 

of social interaction, sustained concentration and persistence, and 

adaptation. PAGEID 327-33, 401-04. Ms. Wade treated plaintiff eight 

times between August 16, 2010 and October 19, 2010, at Mid-Ohio 

Psychological Services. PAGEID 368-73. Ms. Wade and Dr. Robitaille 

completed a mental RFC questionnaire on November 1, 2010, PAGEID 409-

12, and opined that plaintiff had mild, moderate and marked 

limitations in areas of social function, sustained concentration and 

pace and adaptation. PAGEID 409-11. They also noted that plaintiff 

would have fewer limitations if only minimal contact or interaction 

with others were required because plaintiff “demonstrates capability 

to focus and maintain attention on tasks when absent opportunities to 

socialize.” PAGEID 409-10. 

The administrative law judge accorded “little weight” to the 

opinions of Dr. Nalluri and Ms. Wade “because they make[] 

conclusion[s] without identifying what their conclusions are based 

upon, are inconsistent with each other, and produce results that are 

contrary to the weight of the medical evidence, specifically the in 

depth and detailed assessments by” Dr. Reece and Dr. Marikis. PAGEID

37. 

The administrative law judge did not err in failing to apply the 

treating physician rule when evaluating Dr. Nalluri’s opinion because 

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Dr. Nalluri does not qualify as a treating provider. Dr. Nalluri 

treated plaintiff on only two occasions; as discussed supra, such 

limited treatment is insufficient to establish an ongoing treatment 

relationship. See Yamin, 67 F. App’x at 885. Moreover, the 

administrative law judge’s reasons for discounting Dr. Nalluri’s 

opinion are supported by substantial evidence. Notably, Dr. Nalluri’s 

opinion does not provide support for her conclusion that plaintiff has 

marked limitations in all areas of functioning; that conclusion is 

inconsistent with her actual treatment notes. See PAGEID 327-33.

Similarly, the administrative law judge did not err in failing 

to apply the treating physician rule when evaluating Ms. Wade’s 

opinion because, as a psychological therapist, Ms. Wade is not a

treating source under the regulations. See Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 12-3553, 2013 WL 896255, at *12 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2013) 

(citing SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4 (Aug. 9, 2006)); 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1513, 416.913. Moreover, the administrative law judge’s 

reasons for discounting Ms. Wade’s opinion are supported by 

substantial evidence. The mental residual functional capacity 

questionnaire completed by Ms. Wade does not contain a narrative 

statement explaining her conclusions and the record does not contain

treatment notes for any of Ms. Wade’s appointments with plaintiff. 

See PAGEID 368-73, 409-12.

B. Dr. Voyten and Dr. Hoyle

Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge failed to 

comply with Social Security Ruling 96-6p:

1. Findings of fact made by State agency medical and 

psychological consultants and other program physicians and 

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psychologists regarding the nature and severity of an 

individual's impairment(s) must be treated as expert 

opinion evidence of nonexamining sources at the 

administrative law judge and Appeals Council levels of 

administrative review.

2. Administrative law judges and the Appeals Council may 

not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given 

to these opinions in their decisions.

SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 (July 2, 1996). Plaintiff specifically 

argues that the administrative law judge failed to explain the weight 

accorded the opinions of state agency reviewers Voyten and Hoyle in 

accordance with the ruling. Statement of Errors, pp. 14-15.

The administrative law judge evaluated the opinions of Drs. 

Voyten and Hoyle, see PAGEID 36-37, and found that the opinions 

reinforced Dr. Marikis’s and Dr. Reece’s determinations that plaintiff 

has mild to moderate limitations in social function and in maintaining 

focus and attention. PAGEID 38. The administrative law judge further 

found that their “opinions represent the great weight of the medical 

evidence and strongly support the limitations as identified in the 

RFC.” Id. It is apparent that the administrative law judge considered 

these experts’ conclusions and that he accorded them substantial 

weight because they “represent the great weight of the medical 

evidence and strongly support the limitations as identified in the 

RFC.” Although brief and unspecific, that explanation satisfies the 

requirements of SSR 96-6p. See Thacker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F. 

App’x 661, 664 (6th Cir. 2004).

C. Dr. Marikis

Plaintiff also argues that the administrative law judge erred 

in evaluating Dr. Marikis’ opinion. Dr. Marikis evaluated plaintiff 

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on February 17, 2009, for purposes of determining Medicaid 

eligibility. PAGEID 301-05. Dr. Marikis made an Axis I diagnosis of 

“[h]igh level malingering with fictitious disorder primarily 

psychological. He does show some patterns as consistent with 

attentional difficulties and delusional disorder. He also has a 

chronic dysthymic disorder.” PAGEID 303. Dr. Marikis made an Axis II 

diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and assigned a GAF score 

of 45. Id. Dr. Marikis concluded that plaintiff’s eligibility for 

Medicaid benefits is difficult to discern because “malingering is a 

factor in [plaintiff’s] perception of self.” Id. Nevertheless, he 

concluded that plaintiff “does not have the social capacity and 

interpersonal ability to manage the world of work. However, there 

very well may be aspects in which he could be affectively trained in 

the future to do.” Id. 

The administrative law judge gave “considerable weight” to Dr. 

Marikis’ clinical examination because “it represents one of the only 

objective diagnostic assessments of claimant’s condition in the 

medical record, is completed by an expert, and makes conclusions that 

are generally consistent with the weight of the objective medical 

evidence.” PAGEID 35. “[L]ittle weight” was given, however, to Dr. 

Marikis’ “conclusion regarding claimant’s ability to work” because 

that conclusion is “contrary to the vast majority of the evidence 

which consistently notes only mild impairments and never mentions 

claimant[’]s lack of ability to work.” PAGEID 35-36. 

Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge erred by 

“purporting to give ‘considerable weight’ to the ‘results of Dr. 

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Marikis’s examination’ yet rejecting the conclusions drawn by Dr. 

Marikis in favor of the ALJ’s own conclusions.” Statement of Errors, 

p. 15. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the administrative law 

judge “impermissibly played doctor” by rejecting Dr. Marikis’ opinion 

that it was “very evident that Mr. Diemer does not have the social 

capacity and interpersonal ability to manage the world of work.’” Id. 

at pp. 15-16. According to plaintiff, it was improper for the

administrative law judge to reject this “conclusion” and yet rely on

Dr. Marikis’ “data” in determining plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff’s 

Reply, p. 5. Plaintiff also argues that the administrative law judge 

failed to consider the mental RFC assessment completed by Dr. Marikis. 

Statement of Errors, p. 17. Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. 

First, Dr. Marikis’ “opinion that plaintiff was unable to work is 

tantamount to a disability opinion, a matter reserved to the 

Commissioner for determination.” See Sims v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 406 

F. App’x 977, 980 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011). See also Payne v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 402 F. App’x 109, 112 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The applicable 

regulations provide that a statement by a medical source that the 

claimant is ‘unable to work’ is not a ‘medical opinion[;] rather, it 

is an opinion on an ‘issue[] reserved to the Commissioner because [it 

is an] administrative finding[] that [is] dispositive of a case, i.e., 

that would direct the determination or decision of disability.’”) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1)). Accordingly, Dr. Marikis’ 

opinion that plaintiff could not “manage the world of work” is, “as a 

matter of law, ‘not given[n] any special significance.’” Payne, 402 

F. App’x at 112.

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Second, the administrative law judge did not reject Dr. Marikis’ 

“conclusion” and rely solely on the “data” to determine plaintiff’s 

RFC. The administrative law judge rejected Dr. Marikis’ vocational 

“conclusion regarding claimant’s ability to work,” but he also 

expressly adopted Dr. Marikis’ medical conclusion that plaintiff 

“suffers from mild to moderate difficulties in social function and 

maintaining focus and attention.” See PAGEID 36, 38. This is simply 

not a case in which the administrative law judge interpreted raw 

medical records without the assistance of medical opinions regarding a 

claimant's abilities. See Deskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 605 

F.Supp.2d 908 (N.D. Ohio 2008). Further, the RFC determination is an 

administrative finding of fact reserved to the Commissioner, see 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (3), 416.927(d)(2), (3); Edwards v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 97 F. App’x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2004), and the 

administrative law judge, in formulating a claimant’s RFC, is not 

required to parrot medical opinions verbatim. Rather, an 

administrative law judge may adopt portions of a medical opinion and 

reject others in making an RFC determination. See Neace v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 5:11-cv-00202-KKC, 2012 WL 4433284, at *8 (E.D. Ky. 

Sept. 25, 2012); Deaton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-00461, 

2011 WL 4064028, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2011); Carroll v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., No. 1:09cv2910, 2011 WL 3648128, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 

18, 2011). 

Third, the administrative law judge’s finding that Dr. Marikis’ 

“conclusion regarding claimant’s ability to work” is “contrary to the 

vast majority of the evidence which consistently notes only mild 

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impairments and never mentions [plaintiff’s] lack of ability to work” 

is itself supported by substantial evidence. As noted by the 

administrative law judge, see PAGEID 35, Dr. Reece and Dr. Voyten both 

opined that plaintiff suffered only minor impairments. See PAGEID

309, 312-25. Dr. Reece further found that plaintiff was of average 

intelligence, could live independently and could make decisions on a 

daily basis; on the day he was examined, plaintiff’s mental ability to 

understand, remember and follow instructions was satisfactory and not 

impaired. PAGEID 309. Dr. Voyten noted that plaintiff “is 

functional, goes to the library, uses the internet, chats online, and 

essentially follows his interests freely.” PAGEID 325. 

Dr. Marikis’ opinion is also internally inconsistent: after 

concluding that plaintiff could not work, Dr. Marikis went on to 

suggest plaintiff “could be affectively trained in the future to” 

work. See PAGEID 303. 

Finally, plaintiff’s argument that the administrative law judge 

improperly failed to consider Dr. Marikis’ mental RFC assessment is 

without merit. The administrative law judge noted that Dr. Marikis 

“independently evaluated claimant’s mental conditions and determined 

that claimant suffers from mild to moderate difficulties in social 

function and maintaining focus and attention.” PAGEID 38. Dr. 

Marikis’ narrative evaluation, which was extensively reviewed by the 

administrative law judge, was attached to his mental RFC assessment 

and was incorporated into that assessment as his explanation of the 

“observations and/or medical evidence [that] led to [the] findings” in 

the assessment. See PAGEID 305. It is clear that the administrative 

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law judge considered the limitations suggested by Dr. Marikis; he was 

not required to expressly address the proposed limitations 

individually. See Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 413 F. App’x 853, 

855 (6th Cir. 2011).

D. Dr. Reece

Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge erred by 

assigning considerable weight to Dr. Reece’s opinion because Dr. Reece 

opined that plaintiff had no severe psychological impairments. 

Statement of Errors, pp. 13-14. Plaintiff has not cited, and the 

Court has not found, authority for the proposition that an 

administrative law judge who determines that a claimant suffers severe 

impairments cannot also assign considerable weight to the findings of 

a medical professional who found no severe impairments. In the case 

presently before the Court, the administrative law judge was 

sufficiently specific as to the weight given to Dr. Reece’s opinion 

and the reasons for assigning that weight. See PAGEID 36 (assigning 

“considerable weight” to Dr. Reece’s opinion because he was a 

“licensed psychologist, the results are consistent with the weight of 

the objective medical evidence, and are consistent with the evidence 

in the rest of the file.”).

Plaintiff also challenges the administrative law judge’s

assigning “no weight” to two Conners’ Continuous Performance Test II

tests in the record. Statement of Errors, pp. 11-13. The 

administrative law judge explained that he assigned no weight to these

tests because they “are not signed by a medical professional of any 

type, contain no evidence of who administered the test and under what 

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conditions, and lacks an[] interpretive guidance as to the results.” 

PAGEID 37. This determination enjoys substantial support in the 

record. See PAGEID 384-90. 

In short, the Court concludes that the decision of the 

Commissioner applied all appropriate standards and is supported by 

substantial evidence. That decision must, therefore, be affirmed.

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner 

be AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report 

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file 

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, 

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part 

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections 

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy 

thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to 

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

June 19, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King

 United States Magistrate Judge

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