Thi s opi ni on i s su bj ec tt o r ev i si on be f or e f i nal pub l i cat i on in t he Pa ci f i c R epor t er

2014 UT 46

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

M ER RI LL C OO K , P AUL B RUGGER , and M AR A B RE NENS TALL , Appellants , v

. L T

. G O V ERNO R G R EG B ELL and S ALT L AKE C O UN TY C LERK ’ S O F F I CE , Appe lle es

.
No. 20120748 Filed Octo ber 24, 2014

Th ird D is tric t, S al t La ke The Honorable Randall N. Skanc hy

No. 120904608

Att or neys: Mer rill Coo k, Paul Brugger , Mar a Brenenstall,

appellants pro se
Sean D . Reyes, At t’y Gen., Th om D. Robert s, As s t. A tt’y G en ., Mel an ie F. Mi tc he ll , S al t La ke C ity,

fo r ap pe ll ees
J UST I CE D U R H A M authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT , A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG ,

and J UST I CE P A R R I S H c onc ur. J UST I CE L EE fi le d a n op inion c onc urri ng i n th e j ud gm ent.
J UST I CE D UR HAM , op inion of the Cou rt:
INTRODUCTION ¶1 D uri ng t he 20 11 le gis la tive s es s ion, th e Uta h l egi s la tu re pa s s ed S en ate Bi ll16 5 ( S .B . 1 65 ), al teri ng t he requir ements fo r pl ac in g an initi ati ve on the bal lot. After an un s uc c es s fu l attempt to pl ac e aloc aliniti ati ve on the ba ll ot, th e s pon s ors of the initi ati ve challen ged s ever al prov isions of S.B. 165, contending t he

am en dm ents viol ate the right to i ni tia tive an d unif ormope rati on o f laws prov isions of the Utah Constitution and the F ree Speech Claus e of the federal Co nstitution. The district court found that the amendments did not vio late any of these constitutional pro visions. We affirm.C OO K v . B ELL Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

2 BACKGROUND ¶2 Appellants Mara Br enenstall, Pau l Brugge r, and Me r r ill Coo k (collectively, initiat ive pr oponents) a re sponsors of an initiative petition entitled “Lawfu l Employment Or dinanc e,” whic h would r e q ui r e Salt Lake County employer s to comply with an “Ever ify ” r e q uirement aimed at preser ving jobs in Utah for leg al

res id ents . After u ns uc c es s fu l a ttempts by the initi ati ve p ropon ents to s ec ure the ne c es s ary su pp ort fromthe le gis la tu re, he s ou ghtto pl ac e th e ord in anc e on the 20 12gen era l e le c tion ba ll ot in S al t La ke Cou nty

. The ini tia tive prop one nts fi le d a n i ni tia tive ap pl ic ati on
w ith the S al t La k e County Cl erk’s Offi c e i n J un e 2 01 1, an d u s ed volu nte ers t o c oll ec t s ign atu res thro ugh A pri l 2 01 2. Th e c ou nty

c le rk, h ow ever, det ermin ed tha t th ere w ere n ot en ou gh s ign atu res to place the Lawful Employment O rdinance on the 2012 gener al el ec tion ba ll ot. ¶3 Several mont hs b efore t he initiative propo nents filed the application for petit ion, the state legislature mo d i fied the requirements f or placin g a local initiativ e on the ballot . Alleging t hat the s e a me nd me nts res ul ted in hi s in ab il ity to get en ou gh s ign atu res to place the Law ful Employment Ordinanc e on the 2012 ballot, t he initi ati ve p ropon ents fi le d a l aw s ui t aga in s t Li eu ten ant G overn or Gre g Be llan d S al t La ke Cou nty Cl erk She rrie Sw en s on ( c oll ec tive ly, the S tate ), s eek in g a d ec la rati on t ha t tw o of the s e a me nd ed prov isions w ere unconstitutional. ¶4 The initiative pro ponents’ first challenge was to t he

nu mb er of

s ignature s req ui red to pl ac e th e i ni tia tive on t he ba ll ot. U tah Cod e s ec tion

20 A- 7- 50 1( 1) (a ) w as mo di fi ed to requi re i ni tia tive sponsors to g ather “signat ures equal to . . . 10% of all the v ote s cas t in the county, city, o r t own for all candid ates for Pre sident of the Un ite d S tate s at th e l as t el ec tion at w hi c h aP res id ent of the Un ite d States was elec ted,” r ather t han an equal percentage of vo tes cast in Uta h’ s mo s t rec ent gubernatori alel ec tion as pre viou s ite rati ons of the la w req ui red

. 20 11 Uta h La w s 21 5. Th e initiat iv e propon ents claim ed that the 2011 amendment unc onstitutio nally increased the

nu mb er of

req ui red s ign atu res in S al t La ke C ou ntyfro m approx imately twenty-thr ee thousand t o approx imately thir ty-nine thousand. ¶5 S ec ond , the initi ati ve p ropon ents c ha ll en ged the am en de d provi s ion

req ui rin g initi ati ve s pon s or s to c ons ign the c om pl ete d initiative packet and suffic ient signatures to the county clerk ’s offic e by “the so o ne r o f

. . . (A) 316 days after the day o n whi ch the ap pl ic ati on is fi le d; or (B ) the Ap ril 15 imme di ate ly b ef ore th e n extCite as: 2014 UT 46 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

3 reg ular gener al election immediately after t he application is filed.” U T A H C ODE § 20A- 7- 50 6( 1) (a ). P rior to the 20 11 am en dm ent, propo nents of statew i d e initiatives had one ye ar after filing an ap pl ic ati on to g at he r the req ui red s ign atu res , w hi le prop one nts of loc aliniti ativ es had an unli mi ted am ou nt o f t im e to ga the r signatures so long as t hey were subm itted t o the county clerk’s office byAp ril15 of the yea r in w hi c h the initi ati ve w as to go on the ba ll ot. U T A H C ODE §§ 20A-7-202(4) (a), 2 0 A-7-506(1) (2010). T he 2011

am en dm ents s tan da rdi ze d th es e d ive rs e ti me tab le s , re qu iri ng b oth

s tate w id e a nd lo cal initi ati ve s pon s ors to gat he r the req ui red numb er o f signatu r e s by the sooner o f (a) 316 days after filing an application or (b) the Apr il 15 imm ediately befor e the next reg ular gener al election. U T A H C ODE §§ 20A-7-206(1) (a), 20A-7- 506(1)( a). ¶6 On c ros s -motio nsfo r s umma r y judg men t , t he dis t r ict cou rt denied the initiative pr oponents’ declarat or y r elief clai ms. T he initi ati ve p ropon ents ap pe al ed , c ha ll en gin g th e c ons titu tion al ity o f the 2011 amendments to the local initiativ e require ments.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 “B ec au s e th e i s s ue of c ons titu tion al ity p res ents a que s tion of la w , w e revi ewthe tria l c ou rt’s rul in g fo r c orrec tne s s an d a c c ord it no par ticular defe r e nc e.” Rya n v. Go ld C ro ss S erv s. , I nc. , 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (internal quotatio n marks omitte d).
AN AL YSI S ¶8 Th e i ni tia tive prop one nts as s ert th at th e 2 01 1 a me nd me nts to th e loca l i ni tia tive req ui rem ents are unc ons titu tion alon t hre e separate gro unds : first, the c hallenged prov isions violat e t he fu nd am entalright to i ni tia tive granted un de r arti c le VI , s ec tion 1 of the Uta h C ons titu tion

; s ec ond , th e p rovis ion s viol ate the uni fo rm oper ation of laws under art icle I, sec tion 24 o f the Utah Co nstitution; and fin ally, the pr ov isions u nconst i tu ti ona l l y infringe upon the r ight to fr ee speech u nder the F irst Amendment to the U.S. Constitutio n. We disagree with these assertions.

I. THE RIGHT T O INI TIATIVE ¶9 Art icle VI, sec tion 1 o f th e Ut a h C ons ti tu ti on

e s tab lishes the rightof vo ter s to legislate v ia local initiatives: The leg al vot ers of any county, city , or town, in the numb ers , un der t he conditions, in the manner, and within the time prov ided by statute, may

. . . initiate any desired legi slation and cau se it to be submitted to t he people of the county , city, or to wn f or adoptio n upon aC OO K v . B ELL Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

4 majority vo t e of those v otingon the leg islation, as prov ided by statute . . . .
U T A H C O NST . a rt. V I, § 1( 2) (b ). Wh il e w e rec ogn i z e tha t th e “ res erved rightand power of initiativ e is a fu ndamental right,” Gallivan v. W a lker , 2002 UT 89, ¶ 24, 54 P.3d 1069, it “is not unfe t t e r e d , but

come s wi th a built-in l imitation,” Uta h Sa fe to Lea rn- Sa

fe toW o rsh ip Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 28, 94 P.3d 217. Th e co ns t i t utional prov ision establis hing the rig ht to initiative also qualifies that rig ht by gr anting the leg islature power t o r egulate “t he numbers, . . . the

c ond iti ons , . . . the ma nn er, an d .

. . t he t ime ” by wh ic h i ni tia tive s may be placed on the ballot. U T A H C O NST . art . VI, § 1(2)(b ). ¶10 Thus , although the leg islatur e is precluded fro m pass ing la w s tha t “u nd ul y bu rde n or di mi ni s h the pe opl e’s right to i ni tia te legislation,” Gallivan , 2002 UT 89, ¶ 28, “[t]his does not mean . . . that the le gis la tu r e may neve r pa s s regu la tion s tha t ha ve th e ef fe c t of making it mor e diffic ult to e nact legislat i o n by initiative,” Safe to Lea rn , 2 00 4 UT32 , ¶ 2 9. S tatu tory regu la tion s of the right to i ni tia tive

a re u n c on s ti tu ti on a l onl y i f th e y a re u n d u l y b u rd e n s ome. Id . 34– 5. ¶11 The initiative pro ponents po i nt to the language in the district court’ s opinion that re cognizes “t here is a pointat which the rat cheting up of required signatures and rat cheting down of time in whic h to g a t he r t hose signatures reaches a point where few or no citize n’s gr ou p c ou l d m e e t t h e c ri te ri a

. ” In c onn e c ti on

w i th thi s la ngu age , th e i ni tia tive prop one nts argu e f or an interp reta tion of “u nd ul y b urd en s om e” tha t trig gers a c ons titu tion alviol ati on
w he ne ver ala wha s the effe c t of ac tu al ly pr ev en t ing a pa rty from reaching the ballot with a specifi c initiative. They further note t hat while the lower co ur t has f ound each provision of the 2011

a me ndments to be constitutional, individually permiss ible restr ictions can

become un duly burd e nsome wh en consid ering t heir

c ombi ne d e ffec t. ¶12 As not ed ab ove, the right to initi ati ve in Uta h i s a qua li fi ed right , sub

ject to leg islative re gulation. Thus, w hile residents o f Utah may not be stat utor ily depriv ed o f the rig ht to initiative, t he le gis la tu re d oes pos s es s the pow er to d efin e th e b ou nd ari es surrounding its practice, whic h may have the effect of render ing the ballot-initiative pr ocess m or e diffic ult. However , increasingly

s trin gent requi rem ents ma y, in di vid ua ll y or in the aggre gate , ris e to

an unc ons titu tion alle vel if the y u nd ul y b urd en

the right of

Uta h’ s citizens to initiate legislatio n. SeeGa lli va n, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 27. To avo id thi s da nge r, c ou rts w ei gh t he bu rde ns place d on i ni tia tive propo nents against the legislature’s purpose i n enacting theCite as: 2014 UT 46 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

5 reg ulations to det ermine whether an enactment undul y burdens the rightto initiat ive. As we stated in Sa fe to Lea rn : In making this deter mination, a court should ass ess whether the enactment is reasonable, whether it has a le gitimate leg islative purpose, and whether the

en act ment rea s ona bl y ten ds to furt he r tha t le gis la tive p ur pose. In evaluating t he reasonableness of the

c ha ll en ged en ac tm ent an d its rel ati on to the le gis la tive purpos e , co ur ts should w eigh the ex tent t o which the right of initi ati ve is bu rde ne d a gai ns t th e i mp ortanc e of the le gis la tive pu rpos e. 2004 UT 32, ¶ 35.
A. Rea so na bl ene ss ¶13 Wh en

c ons id eri ng t he rea s ona bl en es s of a s tatu tory prov ision, we as sess both t he t y pe and the magnitude of the

res tric tion

in bu rde ni ng t he ri ght to i ni tia tive . T he Uta h C ons titu tion explicitly permits the legisl ature to impose four types of reg ulations on the r ight t o initiati v e , namely , reg ulations that deter mine “the

nu mb ers , . . . the c ond iti ons , . . . thema nn er, an d .

. . the tim e” whe r eby legi s la tion

ma y b e i ni tia ted bydi rec t vote of the pe opl e. U T A H C O NST . art . VI, § 1(2)(b). Reasonable reg ulations falli ng within the abov e four categ or ies have gener al l y been uph eld as constitutional. ¶14 For exa mp le , as tatu te d efini ng t he numb er of s ign atu res req ui red w as up he ld by thi s c ou rt w he re s pon s ors w ere req ui red to gath er te n p erc ent of the nu mb er of votes ca s t in tw enty- s ix of

Uta h’ s senatorial distr icts in the m ost recent gubernato rial election. Safe to Lea rn , 2004 UT 32, ¶ 43. ¶15 S im il arl y, p rovis ions regu la tin g th e ma nner of obtaining

s ign atu res ha ve b een

up he ld as rea s ona bl e wh ere p eti tion s pon s ors were limited to utilizing state r es i d e ntsto c ol l e c t s i gna tu res, Initiative & Re ferend um I

nst . v . J a eg er , 241 F.3 d 6 14 , 6 17

(8 th C ir. 20 01 ), w he re
s pon s ors w ere p rohibi ted fro m p ayi ng c irc ul ators a c om mi s s ion fo r each s ignature o btained, id. at 61 8, w he re c irc ul ators w ere re qu ire d to be of legal vo ting ag e, Am

. Co nstit ut io na l La w Fo und.
, In c. v. Meyer , 12 0 F. 3d 10 92 , 1 10 1 ( 10 th Ci r . 1 99 7) , a nd w he re c irc ul ators w ere required t o sign affidavits of compliance prior to circulating, id. at 1106. ¶1 6 St atutory c o ndi ti o ns found to permissibl y r egulate t he right to initiat ive include requiring a quantity o f signature s from an establish ed numb er o f elective re gions within a s tate , Sa fe to Lea rn ,C OO K v . B ELL Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

6 20 04 UT32 , ¶ 4 3, es tab li s hi ng aproc es s w he reb y initi ati ve s ign ers may remov e their name and support fro m the initiative, id. ¶ ¶ 44, 49, limiting each initiativ e to a single su bjec t, PE ST Com m. v. Mill er , 626 F.3d 1097, 1107– 08 (9th Cir. 2010), requiring a desc riptio n of the effect of t he initiative t o appear o n the initiative , id. , and requiring the subj ect of the initiativ e to appear in its title, Ca mpb ell v. Buck ley, 203 F.3d 738, 746–747 ( 10th Cir. 2000). ¶17 This court has upheld a s tatut e pro viding a one-ye ar allotment o f ti me within w hich signatures mus t be gat hered, not ing that pr ior initiat ive sponsors have qualifi ed for the ballot within six weeks to five mo nths. Sa fe to Lea rn , 2004 UT 32, ¶¶ 51–52. ¶18 Much of the jurisp rudence in this area has proceeded o n a
c as e- by -c as e c ate goric alan al ys is of w he the r a s pe c ific type of

r es tric tion

is un du ly b urd en s om e. Bu t an y res tric tion

ma y on its

ow n, or in

c onn ec tion

w ith o t he r r equi rem ents , ri s e to th e l evelof being an und ue burden if legislative r equirements v i s-à-vis the

nu mb er, ma nn er, c ond iti on, or tim e a re u nre as ona bl y res tric tive . In contemplating the quantitat ive lev el at whic h r estrictions cross the threshold fro m cons titutio nal regulatio n to an unconstitutional abrog ation o f the fundam ental right to initiative, cour ts consider the qualitative net effect of a l l t he relev ant statuto ry restr ictions. Whereas in isolat i o n a pr ov ision may not rise to the leve l of being undu ly burdensome, the combined effect of multiple, ot herwise permissib le, prov isions m ay cro ss that threshold. ¶19 This case presents a series of statutes that require l ocal initiative pr oponents to collect signatures equal to te n percent of the

vo tes cast in the most recent presidential election by Apr il 15 of the

e lection year or within 316 days, w hich ever occurs first. These prov isions es tablish the nu mber of signatures required and the t ime frame within w hich they mus t be gather ed, both of which are within the enum era ted res tric tion s the s tate le gis la tu re m ay i mp os e u pon the rig ht to initiative. U T A H C O NST . art . VI, § 1(2)(b ). ¶20 As to t he numb ers requir ement of the amended local initiative stat ute, it retained the ten-percent-of-vot es-c ast threshold but chan ged the r eferenced of fi ce from the prev ious gubernator ial election to the previous presidential election. In or der t o a sses s
w he the r the am en de d s tatu te u nre as ona bl y inc rea s es the nu mb er of signatures required, we ther efore would n eed to e valuate histor ical

e v i d e nc e of the number of vo tes cast for each of these offices in prev ious elections. Bu t the initiat ive pr oponents do no t ci te any

rec ord e vid enc e of

the nu mb er of

votes c ast in prior el ec tion s , n or ha ve w e u nc overe d s uc h e vid enc e from ou r in de pe nd ent revi ewofCite as: 2014 UT 46 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

7 the rec ord. In

its rul in g on

the c ros s -m otio ns fo r s umm ary j ud gm ent, the district court noted t hat the initiat i ve pr oponents claimed that the am en de d s tatu te inc rea s ed the nu mb er of s ign atu r es requ ire d fro m a ppro x ima t el y t wen ty -t hr ee t ho usan d t o approx imate ly thirtyni n e t h o u s a n d

. A b s e n ta ny r e c o r d e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , w e c annot evaluate t his c laim. Nor can we determine whether any v ariance in the number of signatures required was entirely due t o the fact that Utah had recently held its first special gubernator ial election outside of the pre sidenti a l election cycle, wh ich m ight have led to an art ific ially low numb er o f vot es cas t in the pre vious gubernato rial

rac e. ¶21 Without any e v idence of the practical effect of the amendment, we are left with only the language o f the statute. And on i ts fa c e, w e c annots ay t hat r eq ui rin g s ign atu res eq ua l to t en pe rc ent of

the votes c as t in

the pre viou s pre s id entia l e le c tion rath er tha n te n p erc ent of

the votes c as t in

the pri or gu be rna toria l e le c tion

amo unt s to a p er s e u nre as ona bl e res tric tion on t he right to initi ati ve. ¶22 We next e xamine whether the short ened time requirement im p os e d b y t h e a m e n d e d s ta tu te u nre a s on a b l y b u rd e n s c i ti z e ns
s eek in g to p la c e a n i ni tiati ve on the ba ll ot. A lth ou gh t he am en de d prov isions requir e circulators to collect the requir ed signatures in fort y-nine few er day s t ha n we found to be appr opriat e in Safe to Lea rn , there is no evidence that the t ime restrictio n amounts t o an undu e burden. The T enth Circuit, in ruling on a restriction limiting the duratio n of initiative pet ition driv es to six months, held that

w hi le “s om e m ea s ure s mi g ht far e bette r un de r a l ong er or in de term in ate pe r io d, the c urre nt d ea dl in e [ of s ix m ont hs ] i s nota
s ignific ant b urd en

on t he ab il ity of org an iz ed prop one ntsto pl ac e a
measu re o n t he ballot.” Am. Constitutional Law Found. , 120 F.3d at 1099. Furt her, ther e is no evidence that the initiat ive pr oponents’ failure t o acquire sufficient signatures via an uns ponsored and volu nte er- dri ven

pe titi on ci rc ul ati on s ignifie s tha t no un s pon s ored and vo lunteer-driv en petitio n would be able to succ eed. Rather , it is pos s ib le tha t the Le gal Empl oym ent Ordi na nc e s impl y di d n ot en j oy
mu c h p opu la r s up port. Aga in, th e rec ord c ont ai ns no evi de nce on thi s s ub j ec t. ¶23 The initiative propo nents fu rt her ar gue that t he statute has the effect of forcing initiativ e circulators to ga ther mo st of their signature s during the o ppressive winter months, especiall y at t he

en d of the dri ve w he re the mo me ntu m s hou ld be the g r ea tes t. How ever, a c are fu lr e a d i n g o f th e s t a t u t e de mo ns trate s tha t initi ati veC OO K v . B ELL Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

8 s pon s ors ma y s el ec t any 31 6- da y pe riod w ith in the tw o yea rs pri or to t he April 15 preceding t he election. SeeU T A H C ODE § 20A-7- 50 6( 1) (a ). Thus , a n i ni tia tive s pon s or m ay fil e a n a ppl ic ati on o n Ja nu ary 1 , re c ei ve th e a pp rovalan d p ac kets in F eb rua ry, a nd ha ve the warm weather o f April thro ugh Oc to b e r t o collect signatures and gather momentum. ¶24 We hold, t he r e fore, t hat the burdens imposed b y the amendments to U tah’s initiative process—either individually or in the a g g r e g a t e
— a r e n o t u nr e a s o n a b l e r e s t r i c t i o n s u n d e r a r t i c l e V I, section 1 of the Utah Co nstitution.

B. Leg it ima teLeg isl a ti vePur po se ¶25 We now consid er whether a n i mp ro p e r l e gi s l ative purpose in pa s s in g the 20 11 am en dm ents ma y void the chall en ged prov isions. G enerally, “[t]he author ity o f the leg i sl a t ur e . . . . is limited . . . to t he role o f prov idi ng fo r t he or derly and r easonable

use of the initiativ e p ower.” Sevier Power Co. v. Bd. o

f Sevi er Cn ty. Co mm’ rs , 2 00 8 UT72 , ¶ 1 0, 19 6 P.3d 58 3. Le giti ma te l egi s la tive purposes inc lude “deterr ing fra ud , ensuring the effic iency of the process, [and ] ensu ring a modicum of numerical support for an initiative.” G a llivan , 20 02UT89 , ¶ 5 3. “T he le gis la tu re m ay n ot, however , i mp ose disc riminator y r estrictions on the initiat ive r ight

. . . s impl y f or th e s ake of ma kin g it h ard er to [ pl ac e a n i ni tia tive on the ballot] and restr icting the initiativ e power.” Id. ¶26 No s howing of suc h an illegitimate legislative purpose has been made here

. A s t he State not es in its b riefing, Ut ah had held a speci al int e r i m e lection to replace Gover nor Huntsman, w ho had recently been appointe d as Unit ed States Ambass ador t o China. The S tate c la im s tha t as a re s ult o f t hi s irre gu la r oc c urre nc e, an d u nd er the prio r ite rat ion of se ct i o n 20A of the Ut ah Code, a signific antly red uc ed nu mb er of signa tu res w ou ld ha ve bee n re qu ire d i n 2 01 1 f or
an initi ati ve to re ac h th e b al lot t ha n i n p rior ye ars . It i s rea s ona bl e to conclu de that t he legislature, inter ested in prov iding for t he order ly and reasonable us e of the initiati v e power, acted t o maintain a

c om pa rab le s tan da rd of nu me ric als up port by w hi c h i ni tia tive s mi ghtrea c h th e b al lot d uri ng t his pe riod . T hi s is a l egi tim ate le gis la tive pu rpos e. ¶27 I n w e i ghi n g

th e r e a s o n ab l e ne s s o f t he bu rde ns pl ac ed up on the initiativ e rig ht against the legislative purpose for the re strictions,

w e co nclude tha t th e c ha ll en ged provi s ion s are rea s ona bl e, bo th in di vid ua ll y an d in the aggre gate , and are s up porte d b y a l egi tim ate legislative purpo se. Thes e pro visions reasonably serve to maintain

a c ons i s t e ntthr e s h o l d o f mi ni m a l s up port re qu ire d b ef ore l egi s la tionCite as: 2014 UT 46 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

9 may be placed on the ballot via ini tiativ e, pro moting an efficient and orde rly i ni tia tive proc es s . W e th erefore h old tha t th e c ha ll en ged provi s ion s do n ot u nd ul y b urd en theright to i ni tia tive

. II. UNI FOR M OPERATIO N OF LAWS ¶28 The initiative pro po ne nt s argue thatlegislation re duci ng the number of days to gather signatures and (allegedly) inc reasing the nu mb er of

s ign atu res req ui red di s ad vantage s volu nte er c iti ze n grou ps . T he y as s ert th at the s e regul ati ons fa vor w el l- fu nd ed initi ati ve ef

fo rts , w hi c h c an

hi re s ign atu re ga the rers , ove r unfu nd ed initiatives, which

rely exclusively on vo lunteer signature gather ers. The initiat ive propo nents cont end t his disparate impac t violat es the unif or m operat ion of laws provision of the Ut ah Constitution. ¶29 Arti c le I, s ec tion 24 of the Uta h C ons titu tion gu ara nte es that “[a]ll laws of a g e neral nature shall have uniform oper ation.” U T A H C O NST . a rt. I, § 24. Un de r thi s la ngu age , “a s tatu tory p rovis ion may be unc onstitutio nal if it creat e s a clas sifi cation that is disc riminator y; thatis, if it crea t e s a clas sifi cation that t reat s the members of the class or sub clas ses di sparately.” Uta h Sa fe to Lea rnSafe to Wo rship Coal., Inc. v. S tate , 2004 UT 32, ¶ 31, 94 P.3d 217 (in t e r nal quotatio n marks omitte d). Further , under the Ut ah Constitutio n, a statute may be held u nconstitutional both on its face

a nd for any de facto disparate effects on similarly situated par ties. Leev. Ga ufin , 867 P.2d 572, 5 7 7(Utah 1993) (“For a law to be constitutional u nder [ a]rticle I, s ection 24, it is not eno ugh that it be

unif orm on its fa c e. Wh at is c riti c alis tha t th e operation of the law be unif or m. A law does not o perat e uniformly if persons si milarly

s itu at e d a r e n o t t r e a t e d s i m i l a r l y

. . . . ” ( i nt e r n a l q u o t a t i o nma rks omitte d)). ¶30 Violations o f the uniform oper ation o f laws claus e may t r i g g e r v ary ing degr ees of sc rutiny. Sa fe to Lea rn , 2004 UT 32, ¶ 31. Th e l evelof

s c rut iny ap pl ie d tu rns on whe t he r “ale gis la tive

en ac tm ent impl ic ate s a fun da me nta l or cri tic alright or c rea tes clas sifi cations wh ich are consid ered impermissib le or sus pect in the abstract.” Ga lli va n v. W a lker , 2002 UT 89, ¶ 40, 54 P.3d 1069 (i nternal quo ta ti on m a rk s om i tt e d )

. W h e re a s ta tu to ry p ro vi s i on c re a tes an impermiss ible cl assi fication, heightened scrutiny is appropriate

. See id

. ¶31 We decline to recog nize the inability to e mploy paid

c irc ul ators as de fi ni ng a con s titu tion al ly s ignific ant c la s s ific ati on. In Sa fe to Lea rn , a pp el la nts c ha ll en ged a sta tu te re qu iri ng a llba ll ot initi ati ves to rec ei ve te n p erc ent of v o t es cast i n th e p rior gubernato ri a le l e c ti on

in twenty-six of Utah’s twenty -nine s enator ialC OO K v . B ELL Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

10 districts within one year o f fili ng an application. 200 4 UT 32, ¶ 4. Al tho ugh th e c ont es ted req ui rem ents ne c es s ita ted an incre as ed

am ou nt o f o rganiz ati on, la bo r, a nd mo ne y to ga the r s igna tu res across the entire stat e, we concl uded that nei t her the senato rial district requir ement, nor t he one-year requirement, cr eated any clas sifi cations, “bu t appl[ied] equal ly to all Utah citizens.” Id. ¶ 33. A simil ar logi c ap pl ie s he re. Al tho ugh the s tric tu res of the s tatu tory prov isions m ay r ender the initiat ive pr ocess m or e acces sibl e to those with great er r esources, they apply uniformly to all citizens a nd do not v iolate ar ticle I, section 24 of the Ut ah Constitution.

III. FRE ED OM OF S P EE CH ¶32 Th e i ni tia t iv e prop one nts argu e th at th e c ha ll en ged prov isions vio late their rightto “cor e political expr ession” as prote c ted by the Firs t Am en dm ent’s gu ara nte e of fre e s peech . In

es s enc e, the initi ati ve p ropon ents as s ert th at U tah’s initi at ive reg ulations impro perly hinder their ability to expr ess their political

me s s age byme an s of

a b al lot i ni tia tive . W e d is agre e. ¶33 Numerous cas es adju dicated by this court and federal courts have r epeatedly distingui shed b etween reg ulation of the initiative pr ocess an d disc ourag ing or prev enting speech regar ding the sub ject o f t he initiative. See, e.g ., Uta h Sa fe toLea rn- Sa

fe to W o rsh ip Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶¶ 56–57, 94 P .3d 217 (dis tinguishing

s ta t u t e s t h a tv i o l a t e t h e F i r s tA m e n d m e n tb y l i m i t i n gs p e e c hfrom statutes that constitutionally lim it the suc cess of initiative pet itions via pro cedural restricti o ns); In it ia ti ve& Re ferend um I

nst . v . W a lker , 450 F.3 d 1 0 8 2 , 1099 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T] he First A mendment prote c ts pol iti c als pe ec h inc id ent to an initi ati ve c ampa ign,” bu t no t “the rig ht to make law[] by initiative .”); S ave Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T ]he right to free speech

. . . [ is ] n ot impl ic ate d b y th e s tate ’s c rea tion of an initiat ive procedure, but o nly by t he state’s att empts to r egulate speech associ ated with an initiative pr ocedure . . . .”); Sk rzyp cz a k v. Ka uge r

, 92F.3 d 1 05 0, 10 53 (1 0th Ci r. 1 99 6) (i ni tia tive prop one nt’ s de s ire to place an initiativ e on the ball o t no t pro tected by t he First Am en dm ent b ec au s e r e m o v i n g th e i ni t i a t ive fro m t he ba ll ot di d “ not prev ent[] [the propone nt] fro m s p e a kin g o n

a n y s ubj ect”); Republi can Pa rt y o f N. C. v . M

a rt in , 980 F

. 2 d 9 4 3 , 9 6 0 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The First Amendment guarantees the r ight t o part icipate in the political process. It does notguarante e political suc cess .”). ¶34 In Sa

fe to Lea rn , an initiative pr oponent r a i sed a First Amendment clai m similar to the claim in this cas e

. Th e r e , the initiative pr oponent ar gued that t he legislature’s limits on the rig htCite as: 2014 UT 46 J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in the judgment

11 to initiat ive “impose[d] s ever e restr ictions up on rig hts of free speech and political expression, and thus [were] subject to str ict sc rutiny under federal free speec h analysis.” 2004 UT 32, ¶ 53 (i nt e r nal quotat ion marks omitt ed). Thi s court held that
the provi s ion s of

the initiat iv e s tatu te d [i d] not hi ng t o restr ict sp eech. Initiative pr oponents [were] free, and

even enc ou rage d, to di s s em in ate the ir m es s age thro ughou t th e s tate . N oth in g in t he ini tia tive s tatu te

s erve[ d] to li mi t th e numbe r of me s s en gers ava il ab le to engage in t hi s sort o f political expression. While the reg ulations may arguably [have made] it more diffi cult to place an initiative on the ballot, nothing . . . suggest[s] that t here is a prot ected rig ht t o have a par ticular initi ati ve on

the ba ll ot. Id. ¶ 57 (fi ft h a nd s ixth al tera tion s in

origi na l) (i nte rna l quo tati on marks omitt ed). W e affirm our ruling in Sa fe to Lea rn , holding that

c ore p oli tic alexp res s ion, a s prote c ted bythe F irst A me nd me nt, distinguis hes political expression from political activity

. S e e id. ¶¶ 5 6– 57 . Un de r the 20 11 am en dments , th e i nitiati ve p ropon ents were free t o printposter s, hold rallie s, d emonstrat e, disc uss , canvass , campai gn, and r aise awareness for an E-ver ify requirement initiative befor e, during, and after t he s ta tu tor y 316-day per iod. Fir st Am en dm ent j ur i s p r u d e nc e i n thi s c as e d oes notgu ara nte e u nl im ite d pa rtic ip ati on i n p oli tic alac tivi ty, n or doe s it e s tab li s h a r ig ht to political suc cess . Rather , it pro tects individualsfro m re gu l a ti ons th at directly discourage o r pr ohibit political expr ession. ¶35 We ther efore find no Fir st Am e nd me nt vio lation in the Mar ch 2011 am endments c hallenged by the initiativ e pro ponents.
CONC LUSION ¶36 We hold that t he chall enged a me ndments c ontained in S.B. 165 do not vio late the U tah Constit ut i o n’ s g uarantees of the right of the pe opl e to i ni tia te l egi s la tion or of the unif ormope rati on of the law. Furt her, t he p r o v isions d o notviolat e the federal F irst Am en dm ent. T hu s , w e a ffirm the j ud gm ent of

the di s tric t c ou rt.

____________ J UST I CE L EE , c onc urri ng i n th e j ud gm ent: ¶37 I concur in the court’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of the ballot initiat ive amendment s adopted in Senate Bill 165. Bu t I disagr e e wi th the standard set for th in theC OO K v . B ELL J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in the judgment

12 majority opinion and write s eparat ely to art icul ate t he standard that I w ou ld ap pl y. ¶38 Th e co ntro lling constitutional pro vision at issue here is unusual. It prescribes bot ha ri ghtto an

initi ati ve a nda l e gis la tive power t o r egulate t he exer cis e of that r igh t

. Th us , under art icle VI

s ec tion 1 of the Uta h C ons titu tion , ou r c iti zens ha ve aright to “i ni tia te any des ire d legi s la tion ,” bu t the le gis la tu re als o pos s es s es the expr ess au thor ity t o r egulate t he “num bers,” “conditio ns,” “m anne r,” an d “ tim e” fo r pl ac ement o f in iti ati ves on t he ba ll ot. U T A H C O NST

. art . VI, § 1(2)(b ). We mus t honor bo t h prov isions. T o do so, in my view, we mus t (1) vigo ro usly prote ct the individual rightto “initiat e any desired legislation,” by upholding ballot access fo r any initi ati ves pl au s ib ly wi thi n the le gis la tive pow er as d efin ed in Carter v. Lehi C ity, 2012 UT 2, 269 P.3d 141; and also (2) defer t o the le gis la tu re’s exe rc is e of its de leg at ed au tho rity t o regu la te a s to

nu mb ers , c ond iti ons , m anne r, a nd tim e. ¶39 To reconcile t he se t wo mandates, I would defer t o the legislature’s re gulation o f the initiative p r o ce ss exceptin circum stances where suc h regulatio n forecloses any meaningfu l possib ility for the people t o ex ercise the power r eserve d to t hem in art icle VI, sec tio n 1

. In ot her wor ds, in m y v iew we s hould yield bro ad de fe renc e to the leg is la tu re to dete rmine howbe s t to regu la te the initiativ e process (as to numbers, conditions, manner, and time). Bu t tha t de fe renc e s hou ld yie ld to th e ri ghtof the pe opl e to i ni tia te de s ire d l egi s la tion

in c irc um s tanc es w he re th e l egi s la tu re’s reg ulati o n fo recloses any meaningfu l channels f or the actual vin di c ati on o f t he pe opl e’s res erved pow er. ¶40 This standard seems to me to fol l o w fr om the twofo ld structure o f a rt icle VI, sec tion 1. By g enerally defer ring t o the le gislat ure , w e res pe c t th e c ons titu tion’s exp res s res erva tion of legislative power. And by withholding deference in cas es wh ere t he legislature’s re gulation blocks the people’ s acc ess to me a ning ful chann els for exer cis ing their r eserve d power, we also respect the

c ons titu tion alres erva tion of thi s right. ¶41 The standard applied b y the major ity se e ms to me t o be inc om pa tib le w ith

the text a nd s tru c tu r e o f ar t ic le VI , s ec tion 1. In light of t he expre ss reservat ion of th e le gis la ture ’s pre rogati ve of regu la tin g th e initia ti vepro ces s , I cannot see how the courts c an as s ert the au tho rity t o ( a) as s e s s the exte nt o f a ny “ un du e b urd en ” i mp os ed bythe le gis la tu re’s regu la tion of the initi ati ve p roc es s , (b) eva lu ate

w he the r any le gis la tive regu la tion is “re as ona bl e” or “re as ona bl y” advances a leg islative purpose, or (c) “weigh the ext ent to whic h theCite as: 2014 UT 46 J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in the judgment

See Nordli nger v. Hahn , 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (stating that “t he 1 Equa l Protec tion

Cl au s e requi res onl y th at th e classifi c ati on rat ionally further a legitimate stat e intere st”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa . v . Ca sey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (adopting an “undue burden” standard for due pro cess analysis u nder which “[o]nly

w he re s tate regu la tion

impos es an un du e bu rde n

. . . doe s the pow er of the State r each into the heart of the libert y prot ected by the Due Process Clau se”); Mountain Fuel Suppl y Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988) (under our state equal pro tection analysis, a statute is constitutional if it s classification is “a r easonable one and be ars a re as ona bl e rel ati ons hi p to t he ac hi eveme nt o f ale giti ma te legislative purpo se”).
Nor is ther e a basis for t he co urt’s standard in the F irst 2 Am en dm ent. E s tablis he d free s pe ec h j uri s pru de nc e p res c rib es he ighten ed s c rut iny on ly f or la w s regu la tin g political s p e e c h by initiative proponents ; the Fir st Amendment has no application to laws regu la tin g th e i ni tia tive la wm a k ing pr oc ess itself. “Th e distinction is be tw een la w s tha t regu la te or res tric t the c om mu ni c ati ve c ond uc t of persons advocating a position in a refer endum, whic h warrant str ict

s c rut iny, and la ws tha t de term in e th e p roc es s byw hi c h l egi s la tion (continued...)

13 rightof initiative is bu rdened against the importance of the legislative purpo se.” Supra ¶¶ 10, 12, 13—24 (applying and ext ending the s tandard set for th in Uta h Sa fe to Lea rn- Sa

fe to W o rsh ip Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, 94 P.3d 217) . As a gener al rule, these

are qu es tion s fo r the le gislat ur e. Un de r a c ons titu tion alprovi s ion recog nizin glegislative autho rity to r egulate t he ter ms an d conditions of the exer cis e of the initiativ e power, the courts are in no position to second- guess the legislature’s judgmentsas to the weight of co mp e ting consideratio ns, or the r easonablenes s of the legislature’s judgments. ¶42 Aga in, d ef erenc e to the leg is la tu re s hou ld notbe ab s olu te. Bu t in li ghtof the text a nd s tru c tu re of t he co nst itu tion , w e c annot prop erl y as s es s the le gis la tu re’s j ud gm ents de novo . We sh ou ld s tep in onl y in the rare c irc um s tanc e i n w hi c h th e l egi s la tu re’s atte mp ts to regu la te pro ces s e ff e ct i v ely abro gate the re served r ight o f the people to initiate desired legislatio n. ¶43 The maj or ity’ s standard—articulated in Sa fe to Lea rn and ext ended today —appears to have b een importe d from st a t e a nd feder a l e q ua lp r o t e ct i o n a nd d ue p r o ce ss p r e ce d e nt

. B utthere are no 1 equal prot ection or due pr o ce ss i ssues bef or e us today. This case 2C OO K v . B ELL J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in the judgment

(...continued) 2 is enacted, whic h do not.” In it ia ti ve & Re ferend um I

nst . v . W a lker , 450 F.3d 1082, 1099– 100 (10th Cir. 2006); seea lso Save Palisade Frui tlands v. Todd, 2 79 F.3 d 1 20 4, 12 11 (1 0th Ci r. 2 00 2) (“ [T] he right to free
s pe ec h a nd the right to vote are not impl ic ate d by the s tate ’s c rea tion of an initi ati ve p roc ed ure , bu t on ly b y th e s tate ’s atte mp ts to reg ulate speech as sociated with an initiativ e p r ocedure . . . .”); Biddulph v. Mortham , 8 9 F. 3d 14 91 , 14 97 (1 1th Ci r. 19 96 ) ( “T he c as es do s ay tha t he ighten ed Firs t Am en dm ent s c rut iny s hou ld be ap pl ie d to cer tain state reg ulations o f ballot initiatives, but they distinguish be tw een regu la tion

of the c irc ul ati on o f p eti tion s —which is ‘c ore political speech’—and a state’s gener al initiative reg ulations .

. . .”).

14 arises exclus iv e l y under the I nitiative Clause of the Utah Constitutio n. And t ha t claus e, as noted abov e, pro tects both the pe opl e’s initi ati ve p ow er an d the le gis la tu re’s au tho rity t o regu la te the initiativ e pro cess

. ¶44 I w ou ld ap pl y th is s tan da rd to ou r eva lu ati on of thi s c as e. An d I w ou ld affi rm o n t he grou nd tha t pl ai nti ff s ha ve f ai le d to pre s ent any evi de nc e that the res tric tion s impos ed by the le gis la tu re i n th e e xe rc i s e of i ts c on s ti tu ti on a l p re ro ga ti ve to re gu l ate t he numb ers, conditions, manner, or t ime for the bal l ot initiative pr ocess effe c tive ly p rec lu de d th em fro m g etti ng t he ir i ni tia tive on t he ba ll ot. Seesup ra¶ 21 (noting t hat plaintiffs have notpresent e d “any evidence of the practical effect” of the legislation in question).