UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

PATEL FAMILY TRUST, et al., 

Plaintiffs, Case No. 2:11-cv-1003

JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

v. Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King

AMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the “Joint Motion for Bifurcation” filed by Plaintiff

Patel Family Trust (“Patel”) and Defendant AMCO Insurance Company (“AMCO”). (ECF No.

29.) The Motion asks this Court to enter an order bifurcating the insurance breach-of-contract

claims from the bad faith and punitive damages claims in this action. Intervening Plaintiff Belfor

USA Group, Inc. is not a party to the Joint Motion.

It should go without saying that this action is pending in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio. Yet, the Joint Motion does not cite to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b),

which provides for bifurcated trials for reasons of “convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite

and economize.” Rather, the Joint Motion asks for bifurcation based on a slew of Ohio appellate

cases standing for the proposition that bifurcation of the breach-of-contract and bad faith aspects

of the case are proper and “routine.” (Joint Mot. 3-4, ECF No. 29.) The Joint Motion also

invokes Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.21(B), which provides for mandatory bifurcation of the punitive

damages portion of the case from the compensatory damages portion. In essence, the parties to

the Joint Motion ask this Court to bifurcate the proceedings in this case into separate breach-ofcontract and bad faith/punitive damages phases based on Ohio law. 

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Ohio law does not, however, govern the question of whether bifurcation of proceedings is

proper in a given case. As the undersigned judge ruled two years ago when addressing the

supposed duty to bifurcate under Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.21(B), the question of whether

bifurcation is appropriate is governed by federal law under the teachings of Erie R.R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) and its progeny (particularly Hanna

v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965)). See Wolkosky v. 21st

Century Centennial Ins. Co., No. 2:10-cv-439, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79643, at *3-*8 (S.D. Ohio

July 14, 2012). Bifurcation is a procedural matter addressed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) and, thus,

Rule 42(b) is the controlling authority for assessing whether a federal court will grant a motion to

bifurcate. See id. at *7; accord Valley Ford Truck, Inc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-2170,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29210, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2011) (rejecting Ohio Rev. Code §

2315.21(B) as “entirely irrelevant” to the issue of bifurcation because bifurcation is a procedural

matter governed by federal law). 

The Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision in Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 131 Ohio St. 3d

235, 963 N.E.2d 1270, 2012-Ohio-552, does not change this Court’s opinion regarding the

procedural nature of bifurcation. In Havel, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld Ohio Rev. Code §

2315.21(B) against an argument that the statute violated the Ohio Constitution by usurping the

judiciary’s power to make rules controlling the procedure in Ohio’s courts. See id. at ¶¶ 1-2. 

Specifically, the issue raised was whether Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.21(B) improperly conflicted

with Ohio Civil Rule 42(B), which, like Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), provides for bifurcation of

proceedings in the trial court. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code §

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2315.21(B) was “substantive” under Ohio law because it provided a party with a mandatory right

to bifurcate punitive damages proceedings from the remainder of the case. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 35-36. 

Just because the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted Ohio Rev. Code § 2315.21(B) to

provide a “substantive” right to bifurcation does not mean that a federal court is bound by the

characterization. A state’s characterization of its own rule as “substantive” instead of

“procedural” must “yield to the strong presumptive validity of the properly promulgated federal

procedural rule, which will be upheld as controlling the procedure in the federal court.” Rosales

v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259, 262. Accordingly, numerous federal courts have found that

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) controls the issue of bifurcation in federal diversity cases despite the

existence of a state law or rule purporting to substantively govern bifurcation. See, e.g., id. at

261-62 (concluding under Hanna that Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) controlled over a Texas substantive

law prohibiting bifurcation); Moss v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 25-27 (6th Cir. 1965)

(holding that Rule 42(b) preempts Tennessee law guaranteeing right to try all facts at the same

time before one jury); see also Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 14-15

(2d Cir. 1988) (finding that district court did not have to bifurcate liability and punitive damage

issues despite state law requiring bifurcation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Sellers v.

Baisier, 792 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 may be applied in

diversity cases to bifurcate issues of liability and damages despite a state law prohibiting

bifurcated trials). This Court will therefore rule upon the Joint Motion utilizing Fed. R. Civ. P.

42(b) as the relevant authority underlying the analysis.

A decision to bifurcate an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) should be grounded in the

facts and circumstances of each case. See Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg, Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir.

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1996). The ultimate decision to grant or deny bifurcation is left to the sound discretion of the trial

court. Id. In determining whether separate trials are appropriate, the court should consider

several facts, including “the potential prejudice to the parties, the possible confusion of the jurors,

and the resulting convenience and economy.” Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir.

2007) (quoting Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1311 (6th Cir. 1997)). Bifurcation is,

however, considered an exception to the general rule that favors resolving federal-court disputes

in a single proceeding. Wolkosky at *8. 

Presumably because Patel and AMCO rely solely on Ohio law and the fact of their

agreement as the bases for bifurcation, their Joint Motion does not speak to any of the above Fed.

R. Civ. P. 42(b) factors specifically. Accordingly, the Court has before it no facts that would

support a decision to grant bifurcation. While the Court is cognizant of the fact that the Joint

Motion is agreed upon (at least as to Patel and AMCO) and that the parties have contemplated

(and perhaps assumed) there would be bifurcation of the breach-of-contract and bad faith issues in

this case, the Court is hesitant to bifurcate the proceedings without facts demonstrating the

propriety of bifurcation. The Court requires such facts before it will disturb the general rule that

disputes in federal court should be resolved in a single proceeding. 

The Joint Motion to Bifurcate (ECF No. 29) is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gregory L. Frost 

GREGORY L. FROST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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