IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Matthew L. Goins,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:12-cv-692

Carolyn W. Colvin,

Acting Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff, Matthew L. Goins, brings this action under 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications for

disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. 

This matter is before the court for consideration of plaintiff’s

June 21, 2013, Objections (Doc. 19) to the June 19, 2013, report

and recommendation of the magistrate judge (Doc. 18), recommending

that the court affirm the decision of the Commissioner. For the

reasons stated below, the court overrules plaintiff’s objections

and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

I. Standard of Review

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and

recommendation, the court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the

court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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The court’s review “is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by substantial evidence and

was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,

shall be conclusive.”). Put another way, a decision supported by

substantial evidence is not subject to reversal, even if the

reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v.

Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence

exists when ‘a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as

adequate to support a conclusion [and] . . . presupposes that there

is a zone of choice within which the decision-makers can go either

way, without interference by the courts.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citation

omitted). Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, “‘a

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the

[Commissioner] fails to follow its own regulations and where that

error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant

of a substantial right.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d

647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478

F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007).

II. Objections

Plaintiff objects to the finding of the magistrate judge that

there is substantial evidence supporting the decision of the

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denying benefits. Plaintiff is

seeking benefits for alleged disabling psychiatric illnesses. The

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ALJ aptly summarized the record as follows:

The evidence in this case paints two contrasting pictures

of the claimant. The first picture, which suspiciously

arises only in interactions with personnel evaluating the

claimant for purposes of disability, is of a man babbling

incoherent nonsense and functioning at a childlike

level.... The second picture is strikingly different. 

In this picture, which apparently emerges in interactions

with all others, the claimant’s incoherence and childlike

functioning mysteriously vanish, replaced by a man

described as alert and oriented, with normal speech and

memory and no barriers to learning.

Decision of November 23, 2010, PageID 67.

Plaintiff’s complaints of psychological impairments began at

the age of 34 in January of 2001, when he sought counseling at Six

County, Inc., for nervousness and anxiety. Sandra Untied, B.S.N.,

R.N., diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder, and prescriptions for

Seroquel and Risperdal were issued. On February 22, 2001, Rawji

Shiraz, M.D., diagnosed atypical psychosis. On March 22, 2001,

plaintiff reported that he had stopped taking Risperdal. At that

time, he was described as rational, relevant and coherent, and was

diagnosed with major recurrent depressive disorder. On July 18,

2001, plaintiff reported suffering from irritability and insomnia,

and constantly bounced his foot during the appointment. George

Moses, D.O. diagnosed bipolar I disorder. PageID 332-45.

On November 19, 2007, plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Lee

Roach, Ph.D., a psychologist, at the request of the Bureau of

Disability Determination following plaintiff’s October 3, 2007,

application for disability benefits. During the evaluation,

plaintiff did not answer any questions, and kept repeating one word

at a time. At one point, plaintiff took off his shoes and socks,

put himself in the corner, and repeatedly said “bad.” Plaintiff’s

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wife reported that plaintiff had outbursts, was childlike, and did

not leave the house. Dr. Roach was not able to assess plaintiff’s

memory and recall-attention span. Dr. Roach diagnosed low

functioning with dementia and undiagnosed and untreated

schizophrenia, disorganized type, panic disorder with agoraphobia,

expressive language disorder, borderline intellectual functioning,

schizotypical personality disorder eccentricities, and intermittent

explosive disorder. Dr. Roach noted that plaintiff had not seen a

doctor for years and had not sought psychiatric treatment of any

kind. Dr. Roach concluded that plaintiff was markedly impaired in

his abilities to understand and execute simple instructions, to

maintain appropriate attention and concentration, to relate to

fellow workers, supervisors, and the public, and to deal with dayto-day stress. PageID 305-316.

At the request of the Bureau of Disability Determination,

Floyd Sours, M.A., a psychologist, attempted to examine plaintiff

on March 25, 2010, prior to the hearing before the ALJ scheduled on

June 4, 2010. However, plaintiff refused to leave the van, and

plaintiff’s wife answered Mr. Sours’ questions. Mr. Sours

described plaintiff as being incoherent, rocking back and forth and

waving his arms in the air. Mr. Sours diagnosed plaintiff as being

schizophrenic. PageID 346-348.

On August 20, 2010, plaintiff’s wife requested an assessment

of plaintiff by Genesis Healthcare System. The counselor met with

plaintiff outside because he refused to come in the building. 

Plaintiff ran his hands over the table, shook his head, and stated

he hadn’t done anything wrong. The counselor recommended

behavioral health treatment. PageID 390.

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The ALJ also noted contact records prepared by personnel at

the Bureau of Disability Determination Field Office. See Decision,

PageID 72. On October 31, 2007, Kristy Brookins reported that

plaintiff’s speech was halting and that he only said one or two

words in answering questions. PageID 189. On June 25, 2008, C.

Harlan described plaintiff as looking “like a wild person that you

see in a movie.” Plaintiff was crying and saying “stop the voices”

and “don’t hurt me.” PageID 220-222.

On the other side of the ledger, the ALJ noted medical records

documenting seven emergency room visits by plaintiff from January

2002 to May 2007. PageID 263-304. The ALJ noted that these

records reflected that plaintiff had “no apparent or reported

difficulties in interacting with others.” PageID 68. In

particular, the ALJ observed that a report of a May 2007 emergency

room visit described plaintiff as being alert and oriented. PageID

73.

The record also includes the report of Dr. Irma Johnston,

Psy.D., a state agency reviewing psychologist, who completed a

psychiatric review technique of plaintiff. Dr. Johnston observed

that plaintiff was not currently receiving psychiatric treatment. 

She noted that plaintiff answered her questions appropriately and

adequately. Plaintiff stated that he was able to grocery shop and

perform other activities of daily living, and that he worked on

cars at his brother’s mechanic shop across the street. Dr.

Johnston concluded that plaintiff had mild restriction of

activities of daily living, and mild difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, concentration, and persistence or pace. She

noted that there were no episodes of decompensation. PageID 313-

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325. On July 28, 2008, Karla Voyten, Ph.D., reviewed the record

before Dr. Johnston and concurred in Dr. Johnson’s assessment. 

PageID 327.

The ALJ also considered a Cooperative Disability

Investigations Unit report prepared by Investigator Thomas

Lombardo. The report indicates that on February 14, 2008, Lombardo

went to plaintiff’s home under the guise of seeking information

about a missing person. He spoke with plaintiff at his brother’s

house across the street. Plaintiff answered all of Lombardo’s

questions and asked questions of his own, speaking in a clear and

concise voice. Plaintiff stated that he was capable of everyday

activities, including grocery shopping, attending appointments, and

working. His hands were dirty, as though he had been doing

mechanical work, and he stated that he worked on cars at his

brother’s house. Plaintiff showed no signs of physical or mental

impairment. PageID 209-212.

The ALJ observed that the symptoms plaintiff displayed in his

interactions with personnel evaluating him for purposes of

disability were not present in his interactions with others in

different contexts. PageID 73. The ALJ pointed to plaintiff’s

conversation with Lombardo in March of 2008, and the fact that

plaintiff was alert and oriented at a May 2007 emergency department

visit. PageID 73. The ALJ found that the record failed to

document sufficient objective medical evidence to substantiate the

severity and degree of plaintiff’s alleged functional limitations. 

PageID 73. The ALJ concluded that the evidence “reflecting the

claimant’s mental symptoms when he is interacting with persons not

evaluating him for disability purposes is entitled to great weight”

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and that “the evidence reflecting the claimant’s mental symptoms

when he is interacting the persons evaluating him for disability

purposes is entitled to very little weight.” PageID 71, 73.

The ALJ noted that the opinions and diagnoses of Dr. Roach and

Mr. Sours, who evaluated plaintiff at the request of the Bureau of

Disability Determination for disability purposes, were entitled to

very little weight, and concluded that the symptoms plaintiff

displayed at those consultative examinations were not genuine. 

PageID 71, 73. The ALJ observed that the evaluation of Mr. Sours,

in particular, was entitled to little weight because it was based

on a brief contact with plaintiff and information provided by

plaintiff’s wife. PageID 74.

The ALJ also observed that there was no evidence that

plaintiff had received any mental health treatment or counseling

since August, 2001, that he was currently taking psychotropic

medication, or that he had ever been hospitalized for mental health

treatment and counseling. The ALJ noted that this lack of

treatment and hospitalization “would not be expected if the

claimant actually experienced the symptoms he displayed at the

psychological consultative examinations, and casts further doubt on

the authenticity of the claimant’s allegations.” PageID 73.

Plaintiff did not testify at the hearing before the ALJ. His

counsel submitted an affidavit from plaintiff’s wife describing

plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments. The ALJ considered this

information but concluded that the evidence in the record did not

support the extent and frequency of symptoms alleged by plaintiff’s

wife, and that there were no current psychiatric treatment records

to corroborate her statements. He gave the statement of

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plaintiff’s wife little weight, noting that she would benefit if

plaintiff were awarded disability benefits, and therefore she had

a motive to exaggerate his symptoms. PageID 73-74.

The ALJ noted “other considerations that weigh heavily against

[plaintiff’s] overall credibility.” PageID 75. The ALJ concluded

that plaintiff’s periods of unemployment could be explained by his

extensive criminal history of arrests, convictions and imprisonment

for DUI, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia,

driving without a valid license, providing false information, child

abuse, and other traffic violations. The ALJ found plaintiff’s

conviction for providing false information to be “especially

troubling as it highlights and magnifies the claimant’s tendencies

for dissembling and exaggeration[.]” PageID 75. The ALJ also

cited evidence (the February 14, 2008, observations of the

investigator for the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit)

that plaintiff had worked as a car mechanic with his brother since

the alleged onset date of disability, November 19, 2007. The ALJ

concluded that “while the claimant has medically determinable

impairments that could reasonably cause some symptoms and

limitations, the above evidence shows that the allegations

regarding the extent of such symptoms and limitations are not fully

credible.” PageID 75. The ALJ considered the testimony of

vocational expert Michael A. Klein, Ph.D., and found that plaintiff

was capable of performing his past relevant work as a mason helper. 

PageID 75-76.

In his report and recommendation of June 91, 2013, the

magistrate judge summarized the findings of the ALJ as follows:

The administrative law judge relied on the medical notes

from seven emergency room visits from January 2002

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through May 2007. The hospital records did not reflect

that plaintiff had difficulty interacting with others. 

The investigator from the Cooperative Disability

Investigations Unit also reported that plaintiff was able

to interact appropriately with him. The administrative

law judge concluded that the opinions of the examining

psychologists were entitled to very little weight and

that plaintiff’s conduct during those examinations was

not genuine. (R. 22.) The administrative law judge

determined that when plaintiff was not “adopting a

childlike affect,” he was able to perform daily

activities, which included working with his [brother]. 

(R. 17.) The administrative law judge noted that the

record did not contain any evidence of episodes of

decompensation for an extended duration. The

administrative law judge concluded that the record did

not contain sufficient objective medical evidence to

substantiate the severity of symptoms alleged by

plaintiff. The administrative law judge specifically

relied on the fact that plaintiff’s demeanor with the

investigator, an individual unknown to him, was entirely

inconsistent with his allegations that he cannot work due

to his nerves, depression, and panic attacks. There are

no current psychiatric treatment records to corroborate

plaintiff’s allegations. Although plaintiff’s wife told

a Social Security employee that her husband could not get

treatment at Six Counties because he had not paid a bill

owed the agency, plaintiff offered no evidence that he

sought treatment from a publicly funded source and was

denied treatment because of his inability to pay. While

there is evidence that, if credited by the finder of

fact, would support an award of disability benefits,

there is substantial evidence supporting the

administrative law judge’s resolution of the disputed

facts. Since the Commissioner, and not the Court, has

the duty to make the findings of fact and those findings

are supported by substantial evidence, the decision

denying benefits must be affirmed. 

This court agrees with the analysis of the magistrate judge. 

“A reviewing court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is

based on substantial evidence, even if substantial evidence would

also have supported the opposite conclusion.” Gayheart v. Comm’r

of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2013)(citing Colvin

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v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007)). Because the ALJ’s

credibility assessment of plaintiff’s represented symptoms was

based on consideration of the entire record and supported by

substantial evidence, it is entitled to deference. See Sullenger

v. Comm'r of Social Security, 255 Fed.Appx. 988, 995 (6th Cir.

2007) (declining to disturb the ALJ's credibility determination,

stating that: “[w]e will not try the case anew, resolve conflicts

in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility” (citation

omitted)); Walters v. Comm'r of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531

(6th Cir. 1997) (“Discounting credibility to a certain degree is

appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical

reports, claimant's testimony, and other evidence.”). 

III. Conclusion

Having reviewed the record de novo, the court determines that

there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination

that plaintiff is not disabled, as defined in the Social Security

Act. Accordingly, the court overrules plaintiff’s objections (Doc.

19) and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

(Doc. 18). The Commissioner’s decision is affirmed, and this

action is dismissed. 

Pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the clerk shall

enter final judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner and

dismissing this action. 

It is so ordered.

Date: September 3, 2013 s/James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge 

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