Acknowledgements

United States Department of Transportation

Secretary Federico F. Peña; Rodney E. Slater

Deputy Secretary Mortimer L. Downey

Federal Railroad Administration

Administrator Jolene M. Molitoris

Deputy Administrator Donald M. Itzkoff

Associate Administrator for Railroad Development James T. McQueen

Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad Development Arrigo P. Mongini

Study manager; general editor; principal writer Neil E. Moyer

System benefits; financing;

contract administration

Alice M. Alexander Magnetic levitation John T. Harding

James L. Milner

Transportation analysis Bruce Goldberg

Helen Ng

Chapter 1; liability; State

opportunities

Gareth W. Rosenau

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

Senior study advisor; Volpe Center project manager Ronald A. Mauri

Travel demand forecasting Simon P. Prensky

David M. Nienhaus

Sarah J. Lawrence*

Robert P. Brodesky*

System concept definition Michael N. Coltman

Leonore I. Katz-Rhoads

Model implementation:

projections of operating results

and investment needs

Todd C. Green*

David L. Skinner

Energy and emissions model

implementation

Howard M. Eichenbaum*

*

EG&G/Dynatrend

Argonne National Laboratories Charles River Associates

Energy and emissions model

development

Donald M. Rote

Zian Wang

Demand model development Dan Brand

Thomas E. Parody

Mark R. Kiefer

DeLeuw, Cather & Co. and Associated Firms

DeLeuw, Cather project manager Michael Holowaty

Operating expense model

development

Duncan W. Allen

Winn B. Frank

Eric C. MacDonald

Ancillary activities model

development

Steven A. LaRocco

Richard L. Tower (Wilbur

Smith)

Charles H. Banks (R.L.

Banks)

Public benefits model design and

implementation

Guillaume Shearin

Robert J. Zuelsdorf (Wilbur

Smith)

Anne G. Reyner (Wilbur

Smith)

Jeffrey B. Allen

Liability Charles A. Spitulnik

(Hopkins & Sutter)

Kenneth G. Sislak (Wilbur

Smith)

Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc.

Parsons, Brinckerhoff project manager John A. Harrison

System conceptual design and capital costing Kenneth B. Ullman

John F. Burckardt

Kenneth F. Briggs III

GIS model development Steven S. Line

Stephen R. Pritchard

(Applied Geographics)

Freight system analysis Paul H. Reistrup

Herbert T. Landow
Photo Credits

[All photos are used by permission. Photo use does not re0present endorsement by the U.S. Department of

Transportation of any particular design, product, or manufacturer.]

Report Cover

• RTL-2 Turboliner photo courtesy of the New York State Department of

Transportation.

• Maglev illustration courtesy of Florida Maglev Consortium, Inc.

• American Flyer illustration courtesy of Bombardier/GEC Alsthom Consortium, Inc.

• California Department of Transportation locomotive photo courtesy of ElectroMotive Division, General Motors.

Section on “HSGT Technologies” in Overview Report

• Metroliner photo courtesy of Amtrak, Washington, D.C.

• British Intercity 225 photo courtesy of Intercity East Coast Ltd., York, England.

• X-2000 tilt train photo courtesy of ABB Traction Inc., Elmira, New York.

• TGV photo courtesy of Societé Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français, Paris, France.

• Nozomi Shinkansen photo courtesy of Japan Railways Group, New York, New York.

• Intercity Express photo courtesy of Clay Moritz, Silver Spring, Maryland.

• Maglev photo courtesy of Thyssen Henschel.
Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND....................................................................................1-1

CHAPTER 2: HSGT IN ITS INTERMODAL CONTEXT.......................................2-1

 DEFINITION OF HSGT.....................................................................................2-1

 IMPETUS FOR HSGT .......................................................................................2-1

 Air Transportation...................................................................................2-2

 Highway Transportation..........................................................................2-6

 Summary: The Intermodal Context.........................................................2-9

CHAPTER 3: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK .........................................................3-1

 HSGT PROJECTION TYPES ............................................................................3-2

 ANALYTICAL COMPONENTS AND THEIR USES.....................................3-3

 System Requirements and Performance..................................................3-3

 Comparisons of Benefits and Costs ........................................................3-5

 PARTNERSHIP POTENTIAL DEFINED .........................................................3-7

 ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF PARTNERSHIP POTENTIAL.....................3-8

 Financial Measures..................................................................................3-9

 Benefit/Cost Measures............................................................................3-9

 CASES ................................................................................................................3-9

 Technologies...........................................................................................3-9

 Corridors ...............................................................................................3-13

 Matrix of Cases.....................................................................................3-15

CHAPTER 4: GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ...............................................................4-1

 FINANCIAL ASSUMPTIONS...........................................................................4-1

 NATIONAL TRENDS........................................................................................4-2

 THE TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT..................................................4-3

 Scope of Transportation .........................................................................4-3

 Trends in Other Modes............................................................................4-3

 HSGT System Concept Assumptions .....................................................4-6

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY—SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND

PERFORMANCE ..............................................................................................5-1

 CAPITAL INVESTMENTS ...............................................................................5-1

 Initial Investments...................................................................................5-1
 Continuing Investments.......................................................................... 5-6

 Areas of Uncertainty in Capital Cost Projections................................... 5-7

 TRAVEL DEMAND AND REVENUES........................................................... 5-7

 Overview................................................................................................. 5-7

 Step 1: Project Existing Modes Without HSGT..................................... 5-8

 Step 2: Apply Diversion Models........................................................... 5-10

 Step 3: Develop Induced Demand ........................................................ 5-11

 Steps 4 and 5: Total Demand and Transportation Revenue.................. 5-12

 OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSES ....................................... 5-13

 Maintenance of Way ............................................................................. 5-15

 Maintenance of Equipment................................................................... 5-15

 Transportation....................................................................................... 5-15

 Passenger Traffic and Services............................................................. 5-16

 General and Administrative Expenses.................................................. 5-17

 ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES............................................................................. 5-17

 Categories of Ancillary Activities......................................................... 5-18

 Analytical Treatment............................................................................. 5-18

CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY— COMPARISONS OF BENEFITS AND

COSTS ................................................................................................................ 6-1

 TYPES OF BENEFIT/COST COMPARISONS ................................................ 6-1

 “TOTAL BENEFITS” AND “OTHER IMPACTS”........................................... 6-3

 USERS’ CONSUMER SURPLUS..................................................................... 6-5

 BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE ....................................................... 6-6

 Airport Congestion Delay Savings.......................................................... 6-6

 Highway Congestion Delay Savings....................................................... 6-7

 Emissions Savings .................................................................................. 6-8

 OTHER IMPACTS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION.................................. 6-9

 Transportation Items............................................................................... 6-9

 Economic Development Items.............................................................. 6-11

 Environmental/Energy Items ................................................................ 6-12

CHAPTER 7: RESULTS .............................................................................................. 7-1

 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE..................................... 7-1

 Investment Requirements........................................................................ 7-1

 Demand and Revenues............................................................................ 7-3

 Operating and Maintenance Expenses.................................................. 7-12
 Synthesis: Investments and Operating Results......................................7-16

 BENEFIT/COST COMPARISONS..................................................................7-23

 Total Benefits Versus Total Costs.........................................................7-23

 Benefits to HSGT Users Versus Costs Borne by Users........................7-25

 Benefits to the Public at Large Versus Publicly-Borne Costs...............7-26

CHAPTER 8: SPECIALIZED ANALYSES ...............................................................8-1

 EXTENSIONS OF HSGT...................................................................................8-1

 Traffic Base.............................................................................................8-2

 Extensions of Existing Accelerail Service in the Northeast Corridor.....8-4

 New HSR and Maglev Systems..............................................................8-7

 “HYBRID” CORRIDORS ................................................................................8-11

 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES.............................................................................8-13

 Operating and Maintenance Expenses ..................................................8-13

 Low-Fare Air Service............................................................................8-16

 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................9-1

 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE.....................................9-1

 COMPARISON OF BENEFITS AND COSTS..................................................9-2

 IMPORTANCE OF PARTNERSHIPS AND STATE ROLES..........................9-4

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
List of Tables

Table 3–1: Analytical Components in Relation to Projection Types...........................................3-3

Table 3–2: The Accelerail Options.............................................................................................3-10

Table 3–3: Selected Inherent Advantages of HSGT Technological Options.............................3-13

Table 3–4: Cases Analyzed and Reported ..................................................................................3-16

Table 4–1: Underlying Population and Income Growth Rates from BEA...................................4-2

Table 4–2: Average Baseline Growth Projections for Existing Modes in CFS

Corridors.............................................................................................................4-5

Table 4–3: Comparison of Available FAA Forecasts With Air Baseline ....................................4-5

Table 4–4: Comparison of Available FHWA Forecasts With Auto Baseline .............................4-5

Table 4–5: Summary of Technologies..........................................................................................4-7

Table 4–6: Fare Setting for the HSGT Cases.............................................................................4-12

Table 5–1: Assumed Percent of Freight Locomotives Retrofitted with Cab Displays

by Railroad Size..................................................................................................5-3

Table 5–2: Assumed Treatment of Grade Crossings....................................................................5-4

Table 5–3: Induced Demand in Other Corridor Studies.............................................................5-12

Table 5–4: Assumptions on Induced Demand............................................................................5-12

Table 5–5: Example of O&M Model Output for a Typical Case...............................................5-14

Table 5–6: Equipment Maintenance Cycles for Steel-Wheel Options.......................................5-16

Table 5–7: Overview of Ancillary Activities .............................................................................5-19

Table 6–1: Total Benefits Versus Total Costs..............................................................................6-1

Table 6–2: Benefits to HSGT Users Versus Costs Borne by Users.............................................6-2

Table 6–3: Benefits to the Public at Large Versus Publicly-Borne Costs....................................6-2

Table 6–4: Development of Components of Total Benefits.........................................................6-4

Table 7–1: Initial Investment Cost Ranges for Illustrative Corridors ..........................................7-1

Table 7–2: Analysis of Difference in Unit Margins between New HSR and Maglev

in Selected Corridors........................................................................................7-19

Table 7–3: Surplus (Deficit) After Continuing Investments by Case.........................................7-21

Table 7–4: Initial Investment by Case ........................................................................................7-21

Table 7–5: Total Benefits Less Total Costs ...............................................................................7-24

Table 7–6: Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users...............................................7-25

Table 7–7: Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs......................................7-27

Table 8–1: Accelerail Projections for Northeast Corridor Extensions.........................................8-5

Table 8–2: Accelerail Performance Comparison: Northeast Corridor Extensions

Versus All Other Illustrative Corridors..............................................................8-6

Table 8–3: Ratios of Benefits to Costs for New HSR and Maglev Systems................................8-7

Table 8–4: Results for Integral Systems: Empire/Northeast and Southeast/Northeast ................8-8
Table 8–5: Comparative Results of Hybrid Option in California North/South

Corridor.............................................................................................................8-11

Table 8–6: Unit Operating Expenses for HSGT as Percent of Amtrak Long-Term

Avoidable Unit Expenses in 1993.....................................................................8-14

Table 8–7: Results of Sensitivity Analysis—Higher Operating Expense

Assumptions......................................................................................................8-15

Table 8–8: Illustrative HSGT Corridors: Low Fare Air Service in Major Air

Markets..............................................................................................................8-17

Table 8–9: Estimated Effect of Lower Air Fares on HSGT Traffic Volumes in Two

City-Pairs (New HSR Example—Florida Corridor).........................................8-20
List of Figures

Figure 2-1: Domestic Air Travel: Long-Term Trends in Revenue Passenger-Miles,

Population, and Income ......................................................................................2-2

Figure 2-2: Air Travel Comparisons — Average Annual Compounded Growth Rates

by Decade ...........................................................................................................2-3

Figure 2-3: Airports Predicted in 2003 To Have 20,000 Hours of Annual Aircraft

Delays.................................................................................................................2-4

Figure 2-4: Automobile Travel – Long-Term Trends in Vehicle-Miles Traveled,

Population, and Income ......................................................................................2-6

Figure 2-5: Automobile Travel Comparisons – Average Annual Compounded

Growth Rates by Decade ....................................................................................2-7

Figure 3-1: Flow of the Analysis..................................................................................................3-1

Figure 3-2: Definition of Partnership Potential ...........................................................................3-8

Figure 3-3: The Illustrative Corridors.........................................................................................3-13

Figure 4-1: Nonstop Elapsed Time by Technology Over a 50-Mile Straight Course ..................4-8

Figure 6-1: Users’ Consumer Surplus Concept ............................................................................6-5

Figure 6-2: Concept for Airport Congestion Delay Savings ........................................................6-7

Figure 7–1: Initial Investment per Route-Mile: Maglev Examples..............................................7-2

Figure 7–2: Line-Haul Running Times, Chicago—St. Louis.......................................................7-3

Figure 7–3: Initial Investment Per Hour Saved Over Amtrak 1993 Base Example:

Chicago—Detroit................................................................................................7-3

Figure 7–4: Composition of Each Mode’s Total Travel Time Example:

Chicago—Detroit City Pair ................................................................................7-4

Figure 7–5: Competitive Position of HSGT in Three Sample City Pairs

(Total Travel Time) ............................................................................................7-5

Figure 7–6: Fare Yields in the Chicago Hub Network .................................................................7-6

Figure 7–7: Fare Yield by Corridor, Year 2020 Example: New HSR..........................................7-7

Figure 7–8: Percent of Intercity Auto Traffic Diverted to HSGT by Corridor ............................7-8

Figure 7–9: Percent of Intercity Air Traffic Diverted to HSGT by Corridor...............................7-9

Figure 7–10: Passenger-Miles, Year 2020, by Corridor.............................................................7-10

Figure 7–11: California North/South Corridor— Composition of Traffic Base

by Option ..........................................................................................................7-11

Figure 7–12: System Revenues by Corridor and Technology Option........................................7-12

Figure 7–13: Operating and Maintenance Expenses Per Passenger-Mile ..................................7-13

Figure 7–14: Operating and Maintenance Unit Expenses Versus Average Trip

Lengths .............................................................................................................7-14

Figure 7–15: Maintenance-of-Way Expense Per Passenger-Mile..............................................7-14

Figure 7–16: Maintenance-of-Equipment Expense Per Passenger-Mile....................................7-15

Figure 7–17: Transportation Expense per Passenger-Mile.........................................................7-15
Figure 7–18: Passenger Traffic and Services Expense Per Passenger-Mile...............................7-16

Figure 7–19: General and Administrative Expense Per Passenger-Mile...................................7-16

Figure 7–20: Unit Margin for New HSR in Nine Illustrative Corridors.....................................7-17

Figure 7–21: Comparison of Unit Margin Components: New HSR in the Northeast and California

North/South Corridors ......................................................................................7-17

Figure 7–22: Unit Margins by Corridor......................................................................................7-18

Figure 7–23: Range of Annual Operating Surpluses by Corridor ..............................................7-20

Figure 7–24: Percent of Initial Investment Covered by Surplus After Continuing

Investments .......................................................................................................7-22

Figure 7–25: Ratios of Total Benefits to Total Costs.................................................................7-24

Figure 7–26: Ratios of Benefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users................................7-26

Figure 7–27: Ratio of Benefits to the Public at Large to Publicly-Borne Costs.........................7-27

Figure 8-1: Composition of Empire Corridor Traffic Base ..........................................................8-3

Figure 8-2: Composition of Southeast Corridor Traffic Base ......................................................8-3

Figure 8-3: Empire Corridor .........................................................................................................8-4

Figure 8-4: Southeast Corridor .....................................................................................................8-4

Figure 8-5: Annual Passenger-Miles (Million) Per Upgraded Accelerail 110 Route-Mile..........8-6

Figure 8-6: Annual Passenger-Miles (Million) Per Upgraded Accelerail 125 Route-Mile..........8-6

Figure 8-7: Annual Passenger-Miles Per Dollar of Initial Investment..........................................8-9

Figure 8-8: Passenger-Miles (in Millions) Attributed to Southeast Corridor Proper ................8-10

Figure 8-9: Average Trip Lengths for Traffic Attributed to Empire and Southeast

Corridors Proper................................................................................................8-10
Chapter 1 

BACKGROUND

This report examines the economics of bringing high-speed ground transportation

(HSGT) to well-populated groups of cities throughout the United States. The intention is to

draw nationwide—not corridor-specific—conclusions from projections of the likely

investment needs, operating performance, and benefits of HSGT in a set of illustrative

corridors in several regions. Although useful collectively, these case studies cannot

substitute for the more detailed, State- and privately-sponsored analyses of specific corridors

that would be prerequisite to HSGT implementation.

Congressional interest in HSGT dates back at least to 1965, with the passage of the

High Speed Ground Transportation Act. This legislation, initially authorized at $90 million,

started a Federal effort to develop, and demonstrate where possible, contemporary and

advanced HSGT technologies. Under the HSGT Act, the Office of High-Speed Ground

Transportation of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) introduced modern HSGT to

America in 1969 by deploying the self-propelled Metroliner cars and the Turbotrain in

Northeast Corridor revenue service. Simultaneously, the construction of new suburban rail

stations at Metropark (Iselin), New Jersey, and Capital Beltway (Lanham), Maryland

significantly improved access to the new HSGT service. Although catalyzed by the Federal

Government, these Washington—New York—Boston service improvements represented a

private/public partnership between the freight railroad companies, the equipment suppliers,

States, localities, and the FRA.1 The HSGT program also included a comprehensive

multimodal transportation planning effort focusing on long-term needs in the Northeast

Corridor “megalopolis,”2 as well as a pioneering research and development program in such

advanced technologies as tracked air-cushion vehicles, linear electric motors, and magnetic

levitation (Maglev) systems. 

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 led to the creation of the National Railroad

Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) in 1971 as a way of ensuring continued operation of an

intercity rail passenger network in the United States. On May 1, 1971, Amtrak took over

from the freight railroads the responsibility for operating intercity rail service in most of the

United States, including the Northeast Corridor.

The research, planning, development, and demonstration efforts under the HSGT Act

converged to recommend improved high-speed rail in the Northeast Corridor as the optimal

response to steadily increasing congestion and decreasing service quality in the other

 

1

 Walter Shapiro, “The Seven Secrets of the Metroliner’s Success,” The Washington Monthly, March 1973,

pp. 7 ff.

2

 So termed by Senator Claiborne Pell in his book Megalopolis Unbound.
[1-2]

intercity modes.3 While the Metroliners and Turbotrain had demonstrated the potential of

HSGT, the Boston-Washington route infrastructure was still suffering from decades of

deferred maintenance. Thus, when HSGT Act appropriations ended in 1975, the focus of

Congressional efforts shifted to upgrading the Northeast Corridor infrastructure with the

objective of enhancing reliability and allowing shorter trip times, particularly between New

York City and Washington, D.C. Pursuant to Title VII of the Railroad Revitalization and

Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,4 a total of $3.3 billion5 has been appropriated to date for

the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP), a massive engineering and

construction effort which has improved major sections of the main line by means of track

reconstruction, new signal and control systems, elimination of many highway/railroad grade

crossings, construction of maintenance-of-way bases and maintenance-of-equipment

facilities, improvements to stations, and bridge replacement and repair. In addition to

providing the foundation for a reliable HSGT intercity service in the Northeast, the NECIP

has also benefited commuter rail operators by effectively increasing the operating flexibility

of the Northeast Corridor. The marketplace success of HSGT in the Northeast endures as

the legacy of these early Federal HSGT efforts6 and has encouraged ongoing efforts to

achieve analogous service standards between Boston and New York City.

Federal HSGT emphasis in the 1980's shifted to studies of potential HSGT corridors.

 Among those efforts was a series of reports on “Emerging Corridors,” developed in

conjunction with Amtrak, which were issued in 1980 and 1981. In 1984, grants of $4

million were set aside for HSGT corridor studies on the State level under the Passenger

Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980.7 The law included authority for engineering and design

studies. This program funded about seven major HSGT analyses in various corridors. 

As Federal involvement in HSGT planning continued during the 1980's, State

involvement also increased. By 1986, at least six States had formed high-speed rail entities,

and ultimately Florida, Ohio, Texas, California, and Nevada awarded franchises to privatesector consortia to build and operate intercity high-speed rail or Maglev systems. For a

variety of reasons, none of these proposals has yet led to construction. Learning from such

challenges, the States have persisted in—and in some cases redoubled—their HSGT efforts.

Exemplifying this growing State interest in HSGT technologies is New York, which in the

1980's invested heavily in upgrading the New York City—Albany portion of the Empire

Corridor to 110 mph (with some Federal funding assistance) and which recently undertook

an intensive equipment demonstration program. Today, more than 15 States have passed

 

3

 U.S. Department of Transportation, Improved High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor, 1973.

4

45 U.S.C. 851 et seq.

5 Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor: Information on the Status and Cost of Needed Improvements, General

Accounting Office, Washington, DC, GAO/T-RECD-95-151BR, April 13, 1995, p. 24.

6

 Amtrak’s services carry 45% of the combined air-rail traffic in the New York-Washington city pair,

according to Amtrak’s 1994 Annual Report, p. 4.

7

Pub. L. 96-254
[1-3]

enabling legislation facilitating HSGT activities. Some States, moreover, are attempting to

implement HSGT, as exemplified by Florida’s recent selection of—and continuing

cooperation with—Florida Overland Express as its private partner in the Miami—Orlando—

Tampa corridor development.

In the late 1980’s, Congress sought further information on Maglev, requesting FRA

to assess the potential for Maglev technology and systems in the United States.8

Accordingly, FRA submitted a preliminary Maglev report to Congress9 in June 1990. In

1991, the National Maglev Initiative (NMI) was launched,10 with an initial appropriation of

$12 million. The NMI was a cooperative effort among the Department of Transportation,

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Energy, directed at system

concepts for Maglev development, market analysis, and safety issues.11

A key element of Congressional interest in HSGT has been to ensure the safety of

new technologies. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 198812 extended the statutory

definition of “railroad” in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1920 to include “all forms of

non-highway ground transportation that runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways,”

including “high-speed ground transportation systems that connect metropolitan areas,

without regard to whether they use new technologies not associated with traditional

railroads.” In response to this direction, FRA examined a variety of safety issues—including

collision avoidance and accident survivability, biological effects of Maglev magnetic field

exposures, and fire safety—to determine required regulatory activity with respect to HSGT

safety. Technical reports have been issued on these subjects.13 FRA has also entered into

several study agreements with other national governments to exchange information

concerning HSGT safety systems.

 

8As directed by the conference report accompanying the FY 1989 Department of Transportation and Related

Agencies Appropriations Act (H. R. Rept. No. 957, 100th Cong.(1988)).

9U.S. Department of Transportation, Assessment of the Potential for Magnetic Levitation Transportation

Systems in the United States, June 1990.

10Also in 1991, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a study of Maglev and tiltrotor technology,

entitled New Ways, which discussed funding issues and options.

11The NMI also received direction from a Transportation Research Board “Committee for the Critique of the

Federal Research Program on Magnetic Levitation Systems.” Cf. FRA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and

U.S. Department of Energy, Final Report on the National Maglev Initiative, September 1993.

1249 U.S.C. 20102

13 Among the reports covering HSGT safety are Safety of High Speed Guided Ground Transportation

Systems-Four Volumes, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, DOTVNTSC-FRA-93-2, March 1993; Safety of High Speed Magnetic Levitation Transportation Systems, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, DOT-VNTSC-FRA-93-10, September

1993; and An Assessment of High-Speed Rail Safety Issues and Research Needs, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, DOT/FRA/ORD-90/04, May 1990.
[1-4]

In 1991 the Senate passed a High-Speed Rail Transportation Act14 that would have

encouraged research, development, design, and implementation of Maglev and other HSGT

technologies in the United States and would have promoted domestic manufacturing efforts.

The bill also required a study of HSGT commercial feasibility, evaluation of potential

domestic Maglev designs which could be used in development of a full-scale prototype, and

adoption of a national high-speed rail policy. 

Key provisions of the proposed High-Speed Rail Transportation Act were ultimately

incorporated into the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),15

which mandated this study.16 Section 1036 of ISTEA17 authorized a National High-Speed

Ground Transportation Program at $800 million, including $725 million for development of

a U.S.-designed Maglev prototype, $50 million for demonstration of new HSGT

technologies, and $25 million for research and development. Funding for development of a

Maglev prototype has not been requested by the Executive Branch or appropriated by

Congress and remaining authorizations for the Maglev prototype have been rescinded.

Similarly, although ISTEA amended the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act

of 1976 to authorize up to $1 billion in government-guaranteed loans to help finance

construction of high-speed rail systems, no such loan program has received appropriations. 

Separately, section 1010 of ISTEA18 authorized the designation of five high-speed

rail corridors by the Secretary of Transportation, and provided $30 million for the

elimination of highway/rail grade crossings in these corridors.19 To date the funds have been

used on grade crossing projects in California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, North

Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. The Swift Rail Development Act,

which was enacted into law in November 1994 with Executive Branch support, authorized

$184 million for FY 1995 through FY 1997 for corridor planning and technology

improvements.20

 

14S.811

15P.L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914

1649 U.S.C. 309d

17105 Stat. 1978

18105 Stat. 1934

19 Further definition of these Section 1010 corridors appears in Chapter 3, where they are presented as

illustrative corridors in this study.

20 For FY 1995, $17.5 million was appropriated for technology improvements only; State planning funds

were not appropriated. For FYs 1996 and 1997, appropriations were as shown in the following table

(amounts are in millions of dollars):

Fiscal Year State Planning Technology Improvements Administration Total

1996 $1.25 $22.50 $0.38 $24.13

1997 $1.25 $24.45 $0.48 $26.18
[1-5]

This study may therefore be viewed as a continuation of many years of

Congressional, Executive Branch, State, local, and private interest in the development of

HSGT technologies and services. The study also lays the groundwork for HSGT policy and

may assist State and local governments, private firms, and others as they weigh further

efforts towards implementing HSGT in the United States.
Chapter 2 

HSGT IN ITS INTERMODAL CONTEXT

This chapter defines HSGT and explains why it merits consideration as a viable

passenger transport option in congested intercity corridors.

DEFINITION OF HSGT

HSGT is self-guided intercity passenger ground transportation—by steel-wheel

railroad or magnetic levitation (Maglev)—that is time-competitive with air and/or auto for

travel markets in the approximate range of 100 to 500 miles.1 A market is a city-pair—two

metropolitan areas, such as New York City and Washington, D.C.; a corridor is a natural

grouping of metropolitan areas and markets that, by their proximity and configuration, lend

themselves to efficient service by ground transportation.

This is a market-driven, performance-based definition of HSGT. It recognizes that

total trip time (including access to and from stations), rather than speed per se, influences

passengers' choices among transport options in a given market; and that travelers evaluate

each mode not in isolation, but in relation to the performance of the other available

choices.2 A specific technological option may constitute HSGT in a corridor 185 miles in

length, yet may fall far short of HSGT status in a 400-mile corridor. Conversely, another

option might suit a longer corridor admirably but represent an ineffective expenditure of

public funds in a much shorter corridor. Moreover, raising top speeds in a corridor may

provide only one of many ways to reduce trip times but may not be the most cost-effective

way.3

IMPETUS FOR HSGT

HSGT activity in the United States will only occur because of pressing

transportation needs. As travel demand grows, intercity transportation by air and auto

increasingly suffers from congestion and delay, particularly within metropolitan areas; at

and surrounding airports; and during weekend, holiday, and bad-weather periods. This

 

1

 A few examples of HSGT service around the world include the Shinkansen in Japan; the TGV in France; the

ICE and planned Berlin—Hamburg Maglev in Germany; and in the United States, Amtrak’s Metroliners

between New York and Washington. Important HSGT services exist in other countries as well.

2 Trip time represents but one of the many criteria used by travelers in choosing among modes, as described

in National Analysts, Inc. for FRA, The Needs and Desires of Travelers in the Northeast Corridor: A Survey

of the Dynamics of Mode Choice Decisions, NTIS publication PB 191 027, February 1970. Other criteria

defining the transportation product include fares (perceived costs for auto), frequency, and service quality. 

See the discussion of demand and diversions in Chapter 5.

3 Cf. Transportation Research Board, In Pursuit of Speed, pp. 89, 90, and 97.
[2-2]

 declining quality of service adversely affects intercity travelers, other transport system

users, carriers, and the general public, and provides the impetus for careful evaluation of

HSGT options.

The following sections explicate those needs by examining nationwide trends in the

air and highway modes.

Air Transportation

Domestic intercity air travel has grown much faster than population and income

since 1950, as demonstrated in Figure 2-1. The relatively high growth in air travel from

1950 to 1970 reflects in part the substitution of air travel for the formerly ubiquitous

intercity rail travel. In recent

decades, the discrepancies among

air passenger, population, and

income growth rates have

diminished (see Figure 2-2). This

trend stems from the maturation of

the air travel industry, the

acclimation of entire generations to

flight as an everyday occurrence,

and the decline in the price of air

travel in real terms from the 1970s

to today.5 The Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) has

projected domestic air carrier

revenue passenger miles (RPM)

and passenger enplanements to

increase at an average annual rate of 3.7 and 3.5 percent, respectively, between 1993 and

2005. 6 These increases assume higher load factors, greater seating capacity in aircraft, and

longer passenger trip lengths. Over the same period, RPM and passenger enplanements for

international air carriers are forecast to increase at an average annual rate of 6.3 and 6.5

 

4

 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, 114th ed., pp. 8, 451.

5 The revenue per passenger mile in constant 1993 dollars declined from an average of 21 cents in the years

1968 to 1971 to an average yield of 13 cents per mile in 1993. Contributing to this trend has been the

emergence of such low-cost regional carriers as Southwest Airlines. Federal Aviation Administration, FAA

Aviation Forecasts Fiscal Years 1994-2005, FAA-APO-94-1 (March 1994), p. III-25.

6

Ibid., pp. I-7.

Figure 2-1

Domestic Air Travel: Long-Term Trends

in Revenue Passenger-Miles (RPM),

Population, and Income4

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

_Index Value

 ___(1950 Base Year = 100)___ 

Total RPM

Per Capita RPM

Per Capita Income

Population
[2-3]

percent respectively. For regional/commuter airlines, RPM are expected to grow at 8.5 and

6.9 percent annually on average.7

Beyond 2005, increases in population and income are expected to result in longterm growth for air travel. Generally, however, air travel is forecast to increase faster over

the next ten years than in the longer term because the growth rates of population and

income are declining and are expected to continue to do so. For the period 2005 to 2020,

the FAA published a forecast that is more limited in scope than its short-term forecast and

that omits any prediction for domestic RPM. It does, however, predict that domestic air

carrier enplanements will increase at an annual average rate of 2.5 percent from 2005 to

2020,9lower than the 3.5 percent growth forecast for 1993 to 2005 (but still substantial in

view of existing capacity constraints). That assumption agrees with an assumed drop in the

growth rate for national income.

10

Over the past decades, the expansion of air traffic has far outpaced the growth in

airport capacity. As demonstrated in Figure 2-3, existing airport congestion has created

perceptible delays; the FAA now regards 23 airports, each exceeding a threshold of 20,000

airline flight delay-hours per year, as “delay problem” locations, and projects that 32

 

7

Ibid., p. I-8, 9.

8 U.S. Bureau of the Census, loc. cit.

9

 Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Long-Range Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years 2005-2020, FAAAPO-94-7, July 1994, p. 2.

10 Chapter 4 compares and contrasts the FAA forecasts with those for this report.

Figure 2-2

Air Travel Comparisons —

Average Annual Compounded Growth Rates by Decade8

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990

Years

Average Annual Compounded Growth Rate_____

Total RPM

Per Capita RPM

Per Capita Income

Population
[2-4]

airports will exceed the threshold by the year 2003 unless capacity is increased.11 However,

the FAA is investing significantly to improve airport capacity.

Aircraft delay creates significant cost penalties. The FAA has calculated the

average aircraft operating cost to be $1,587 per hour based on a range of $42 per hour for

small single-engine planes to $4,575 per hour for large aircraft. With this information the

FAA determined that an airport incurring 20,000 hours of annual delay will cause delay

costs of at least $32 million.13 Other costs include the environmental effects (e.g., noise

and emissions) of aircraft delays and the effects on passengers who suffer the consequences

of missing work, meetings, connections, and business opportunities. These costs—

affecting air carriers and passengers alike—significantly influence the benefit/cost analysis

(Chapter 6).

In the face of increasing air traffic, delays and costs, many states and localities 

must decide whether and how much to invest in airport expansion to reverse—or at least

alleviate—deterioration in the quality of air service. The FAA has identified and

recommended actions to prevent the projected growth in delays. The recommended

improvements include new technology to optimize existing airport capacity, terminal air

space procedures, and en route airspace capacity. The FAA considers that the largest

 

11Federal Aviation Administration, 1994 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan, Report No. DOT/FAA/ASC94-1, October 1994, p. 1-1.

12 Ibid., p. 1-17.

13 Ibid., p. 1-1.

Figure 2-3

Airports Predicted in 2003 To Have 20,000 Hours of Annual Aircraft Delays12

San Diego

Boston

Baltimore/Washington

Charlotte-Douglas

Washington National

DallasFort Worth

Detroit Newark

Houston

New York JFK

New York LaGuardia

Orlando

Miami

Ontario

Chicago

O’Hare

Philadelphia

Raleigh-Durham

Seattle-Tacoma

San Francisco

St. Louis

Atlanta Hartsfield

Nashville

Las Vegas

Memphis

Minneapolis-St. Paul

Phoenix

Pittsburgh

Salt Lake City

 Airport serving illustrative corridor

Airport not serving illustrative corridor

Key

Washington 

Dulles

LAX

Cincinnati
[2-5]

 capacity gains come from building new airports and new or extended runways at existing

airports. To increase capacity, 15 of the 23 delay-problem airports identified in 1993 are

planning or constructing new or extended runways; 24 of the 32 delay-problem airports

foreseen for 2003 have similar expansion programs as well. In total, at the Nation’s top 100

airports, the anticipated cost of adding planned and proposed runway capacity exceeds $9.0

billion.14

The FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems predicts that—if the

recommended improvements are effected—capacity at most of the 29 “large hub"

commercial service airports in the United States would adequately meet the forecast in

demand. 

 Weather conditions consistently account for over 50 percent of aircraft delays of 15

minutes or more (72 percent in 1993). The FAA therefore proposes technology

improvements for new electronic guidance and control equipment to allow for two or three

flight arrival streams instead of one or two during periods of poor visibility.15

At some problem airports, primarily the large metropolitan area airports on the East

and West Coasts, the FAA has determined that recommended improvements alone would

not adequately meet the projected growth in demand. The FAA does, however, point out

other potential solutions to the aviation system capacity problem. Characterized as

“marketplace solutions” because they rely on competitive free-market influences, these

solutions also depend on the interest and participation of aviation and transportation

industry groups and various governmental organizations. These marketplace solutions

could include16:

• expansion of smaller regional/commuter carriers;

• emergence of tiltrotor aircraft technology17;

• development of a next generation of aircraft with seating capacity of 500 to 800;

• enhancement of reliever and general aviation airport systems;

• advances in telecommunications;

• intermodalism; and

• development of HSGT. 

 

14 Ibid., p. 2-11.

15 Ibid., p. 1-13 and chapter 5.

16 Ibid., chapter 6.

17 Tiltrotor is the subject of a recent study: Civil Tiltrotor Development Advisory Committee, Report to

Congress in Accordance with PL 102-581, December 1995.
[2-6]

The FAA considers HSGT to be a potential means of relieving the pressure on

short-haul air traffic by diverting air trips of 500 miles or less.18 In addition, the FAA

points out that intercity HSGT systems can be designed for immediate access to airports,

with rail stations inside air passenger terminals, and that HSGT could provide connections

between multiple airports in large metropolitan areas. These intermodal concepts have

influenced the design and evaluation of the HSGT systems assumed for this study.19 For

example, Figure 2-3 demonstrates that the illustrative corridors in the study (identified in

Chapter 3) serve most of the metropolitan areas experiencing severe air traffic delays. 

Moreover, the HSGT corridors include station sites at airports wherever practicable. 

Highway Transportation

The growth in per capita

vehicle-miles traveled (VMT),

like that of RPM for air travel,

showed particular strength in the

1950’s and 60’s. These decades

saw the decline of U.S. rail

passenger service as well as

marked growth in automobile

ownership, per capita income,

and general living standards

(See Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5).

More recently, for the eight-year

period from 1983 to 1991, total

highway travel increased at an

annual rate of 3.5 percent,21

while population grew at

approximately only 1 percent.

22

 

18 Federal Aviation Administration, 1994 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan, p. 6-18

19 See Chapter 4 for particulars.

20 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, pp. 8, 451; Federal Highway

Administration, Highway Statistics: Summary to 1985, p. 225; U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of

Transportation Statistics, National Transportation Statistics: Historical Compendium, 1960-1992, September

1993, p. 20.

21 Report of the Secretary of Transportation to the U.S. Congress, The Status of the Nation’s Highways,

Bridges, and Transit Conditions and Performance, 1993, p 19.

22 U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., p. 8.

Figure 2-4

Automobile Travel: Long-Term Trends

in Vehicle-Miles Traveled (VMT),

Population, and Income20

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Index Value

_(1950 Base Year = 100)__

Total VMT

Per Capita VMT

Per Capita Income

Population
[2-7]

Growth in urban travel outpaced rural travel at 3.9 percent per year versus 2.9 percent.23

Overall vehicle travel increased by 32 percent between 1983 and 1991 measured by the

change in rural and urban VMT.24 This growth reflects increases in vehicle trip length,

population, and person-trips per capita, a reduction in vehicle occupancy, and mode shifts

to single occupant vehicles.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) forecasts that the average annual

rate of growth in overall highway travel will decline from historical levels. Traditionally,

highway travel growth has exceeded 3.0 percent annually since 1945. In a departure from

past trends, FHWA forecasts that for the 20-year period from 1992-2011, overall highway

travel will only grow at an average rate of 2.5 percent per year, for a total increase of about

65 percent. 26 This forecast is based on FHWA assumptions that mass transit usage will

increase at an aggressive rate in substitution for highways.27

 

23 Report of the Secretary of Transportation, loc. cit.

24 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

25 U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., pp. 8, 451; Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics:

Summary to 1985, p. 225; U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National

Transportation Statistics: Historical Compendium, 1960-1992, September 1993, p. 20.

26 Report of the Secretary of Transportation., p. 149.

27 Ibid., p. 155.

Figure 2-5

Automobile Travel Comparisons –

Average Annual Compounded Growth Rates by Decade25

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

3.5%

4.0%

4.5%

5.0%

1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990

Years

Average Annual Compounded Growth Rate _____

Total VMT

Per Capita VMT

Per Capita Income

Population
[2-8]

The FHWA’s analyses suggest that highway system performance will deteriorate

through 2011 in the Nation's 33 urbanized areas with population greater than one million,

as well as in some smaller urbanized areas. This reflects a comparison of current and

expected highway expenditures with amounts needed to fund the maintenance and

improvements required to accommodate projected demand.

28 Actual congestion statistics,

particularly for urban areas, illuminate the trend of deteriorating performance. For

example, on urban highways on the Interstate System, the percentage of peak-hour travel

that occurred under congested conditions exceeded 70 percent in 1991, compared to 55

percent in 1983. On other urban freeways and expressways, the percentage of congested

peak-hour travel rose from 49 percent in 1989 to over 61 percent in 1991. Of total urban

peak-hour congestion, 65 percent occurred in the 33 urban areas with populations of over

one million.29 Peak hour congestion more than doubled from 1983 to 1991 on rural

interstates, which are comparatively less prone to bottlenecks. Therefore, current and

anticipated demand will tax the highway system's ability to maintain existing levels of

mobility.

The costs of highway congestion include delay, increased travel time, increased fuel

consumption, increased vehicle emissions and reduced air quality, increased cost of goods

transported resulting in increased costs to the consumer, and increased aggravation to the

driver. A report by the Texas Transportation Institute states that in 1991, the total cost of

congestion for 50 urban areas studied was approximately $42.3 billion, with delay

accounting for approximately 89 percent of this amount, and excess fuel consumption for

the remainder.30

Some potential approaches to alleviating the rate of growth in highway congestion

include:

• construction of additional lane-miles and new highways;

• application of congestion pricing to highway use, perhaps through electronic

toll collection;

• implementation of intelligent vehicle-highway systems—also known as

intelligent transportation systems—now under development by the FHWA; and

• provision of intracity and intercity alternatives to the automobile that promise to

attract significant traffic.

 

28 Ibid., pp. 171 and 174.

29 Ibid., p. 85.

30 Texas Transportation Institute, Trends in Urban Roadway Congestion—1982 to 1991, Vol. 1: Annual

Report, Research Report 1131-6, Austin: September 1994, p. 32.
[2-9]

Summary: The Intermodal Context

America’s air and highway transportation systems are experiencing increasing

congestion. Preservation of service quality for those modes will entail significant

investment. Meanwhile, HSGT represents a family of transportation options that may be

found to offer social, economic, and environmental benefits in specific applications,

although the required public and private investment would be substantial. Thus, the

question before the States and localities ultimately reduces to this: Given the need to

preserve and improve travel mobility, and given the available options, what

combination of approaches would be most suitable, and how might each mode bring

its inherent advantages to bear in such a combination?

With respect to HSGT, this report will assist States, localities, and the general

public in answering that question.
Chapter 3 

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In assessing the economics of HSGT in the United States, the study consistently

applied a set of analytical components to a series of “cases”—specific technological options

in illustrative corridors—as shown in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1: Flow of the Analysis

Apply analytical components . . .

Example: New HSR modeled in Corridor B.

Technologies

Corridors Accelerail New HSR Maglev

Corridor A

Corridor B

Corridor C

A case consists of a specific technology modeled in a

corridor . . .

. . . to Cases

Life-cycle measures

 (All amounts are present values in the year 2000 of cash inflows/outflows over 40 years) 

Accelerail

90 110 125F 125E

Operations and Continuing Investment Needs

Revenues $536 $725 $807 $818

Less: Total O&M expenses $467 $513 $561 $622

 Contribution from operations $68 $211 $246 $196

Less: Continuing investments $136 $170 $167 $167

 Contribution after continuing investments ($67) $42 $79 $29

Initial investment requirements

Vehicles $116 $155 $155 $155

Infrastructure $314 $514 $919 $1,197

 Initial Investment, Total $430 $669 $1,074 $1,352

. . . yielding Projections

Compare projections with criteria . . .

.. . . to derive Nationwide Conclusions.

Benefits Costs

Capital

Costs

Operating

Expenses

Demand

Revenues

System Requirements

and Performance:

NPV 40 yrs

Ancillaries

General Assumptions

Partnership Potential

Private

• Full responsibility for continuing

 profitable operations

• Revenues exceed operating and 

 maintenance (O&M) expenses and 

 continuing investments

Public

• No responsibility beyond initial

 capital costs

• Total benefits equal or exceed

 total costs
[3-2]

The process depicted above yielded two interlinked types of projection data. This

chapter compares and contrasts these two data types, shows how they drew support from the

various analytical components, demonstrates how they were synthesized in the concept of

“partnership potential,” and introduces the illustrative cases that provided a basis for the

report’s results and conclusions. Subsequent chapters describe the assumptions

underpinning the work (Chapter 4) and the methodologies for each component (Chapters 5

and 6).

HSGT PROJECTION TYPES

This study characterizes HSGT corridor options in two ways:

• By their system requirements and performance—their initial

investments, travel demand levels, revenues, operating expenses, and

related operating and financial measures on a strictly commercial basis;

and

• More comprehensively, by a comparison of their benefits and costs.

Both types of information are indispensable to a full understanding of HSGT and its

potential role in American transportation. 

In effect, projections of system requirements and performance treat HSGT options

as analogous to private freight railroads—constructing and maintaining their own rights-ofway, providing their own equipment, and conducting their own transportation and ancillary

operations. Such projections depict each HSGT corridor as a largely self-contained business

enterprise.

Commercial projections alone may provide too narrow a perspective on the value of

HSGT, because intercity passenger transportation in the United States is a joint product of

public and private investments. Unlike America’s private freight railroads, each passenger

travel mode—air, highway, and rail—shows distinctly split responsibilities for such essential

functions as the provision, maintenance, and operation of rights-of-way, terminals, and

vehicles. Thus, every means of intercity passenger transport in this country represents an

implicit or explicit private/public partnership that—while incorporating user financing in

large measure—also demonstrates governmental support and involvement. 

Members of a private/public partnership will perceive a broader range of benefits and

costs than those pertaining to strictly private enterprises. Therefore, an accurate portrayal of

HSGT relies on a careful comparison of benefits and costs from a more comprehensive

economic and environmental perspective than that provided by analogy with private freight

railroads. While analysts may legitimately differ on the precise constituent elements and

calculations of “benefits” and “costs,” this more global viewpoint merits consideration
[3-3]

alongside strictly commercial projections for HSGT. With both types of projection data

available, private firms, governments, and the general public can better appreciate the full

implications of HSGT implementation.

ANALYTICAL COMPONENTS AND THEIR USES

As shown in Table 3-1, the comparisons of benefits and costs relied on the full

spectrum of analytical components, while the projections of system requirements and

performance made use of a more limited set of procedures.

The following sections describe the function of each of these tools in the two types of

analyses.

System Requirements and Performance

Commercial projections encompassed four main analytical components: capital

costs, travel demand and revenue forecasts, operating and maintenance expenses, and

ancillary activities. For each case, these projected cash outflows and inflows were

summarized in a discounted cash flow analysis.

Table 3-1: Analytical Components in Relation to Projection Types

Analytical component

Entered into projections of

System Requirements

and Performance?

Entered into comparisons of

Benefits and Costs?

Capital Investments YES YES

Travel Demand and

Revenues

YES

[As an element of System

Revenues]

YES

[As an element of Benefits to

HSGT Users; also measures

Costs Borne by Users]

Operating and Maintenance

Expenses

YES YES

Ancillary Activities YES

[As an element of System

Revenues]

YES

[As an element of Benefits to

HSGT Users; also measures

Costs Borne by Users]

Users’ Consumer Surplus NO YES

[As an element of Benefits to

HSGT Users]

Benefits To The Public At

Large

NO YES
[3-4]

Capital Costs

Cost estimates reflected the specific needs of each technology, appropriate Federal

Railroad Administration safety guidelines and regulations (for example, regarding

highway/railroad grade crossings), the characteristics of each corridor, and prevailing unit

costs. 

The initial investment would include upgraded or new track1; structures;

communications and train control systems; electrification (where applicable to the

technology); highway/railroad grade crossing safety enhancements; fencing and

environmental mitigation measures; right-of-way acquisitions and realignments; stations,

yards, and shops; locomotives, cars, and other vehicles; and an allowance for contingencies,

engineering, and program management.2

In addition to the initial investment, this study addressed continuing investments by

the HSGT operator—for instance, expansions and replacements of the vehicle fleet during

the 40-year planning period.

Travel Demand and Revenue Forecasts

For each case, the analysis first projected travel demand by mode in the absence of

HSGT. Fares for HSGT were then set to maximize net revenue given HSGT’s competitive

stance versus other modes in city-to-city markets. (The capital investments and consequent

total travel times powerfully influence that competitive stance.) A series of diversion

models projected the ridership that the new HSGT service would attract from air, auto,

existing intercity rail, and bus. Depending upon the market, up to 10 percent of diverted

traffic was added to reflect “induced demand,” trips that would not take place at all by any

mode without the introduction of HSGT. The ridership projections, multiplied by the fare

levels and summed over all city pairs, yielded revenues for each corridor.

Operating and Maintenance Expenses

The projections for each case included a build-up of operating and maintenance

(O&M) expenses in the functional areas of maintenance of way; maintenance of equipment;

transportation; passenger traffic and services; and general and administrative. In each

functional area, the O&M model identified all the required activities and calculated the

resources—personnel, materials, energy, and purchased services—needed to perform those

activities at the projected level of ridership and operations.

 

1

 “Guideway” in the case of Maglev.

2

 Ranging from approximately 30% of base costs for Accelerail to 41% for New HSR and Maglev.
[3-5]

Ancillary Activities

In addition to intercity passenger service, the HSGT operator could conduct ancillary

activities that conform with or support its main line of business. The analysis estimated, on

an activity-by-activity basis, the net revenues from mail and priority express service,

parking, station concessions, and certain on-board service amenities (e.g., telephones).

Varying in importance from case to case, these net ancillary revenues cumulatively amount

to between three and ten percent of system revenues.

Derivative Measures

The four analytical components yielded a variety of measures of system

requirements, performance, and efficiency. For example, the HSGT operator’s annual

“operating surplus” is the difference between system revenues (i.e., passenger transportation

revenue plus net revenue from ancillary activities) and O&M expenses. The “surplus after

continuing investments” is the present value of the future operating surpluses, less the

present value of continuing investments projected to be made by the HSGT operator in

future years. Chapter 7 describes these derivative measures in detail.

Comparisons of Benefits and Costs

To provide policy makers and the public with comprehensive information that would

support a wide variety of interpretive techniques, this analysis attempted to quantify the full

range of benefits and costs attributable to HSGT systems, as well as the parties on whom

such benefits and costs might fall. 

Total Benefits

As measured in this report, total benefits comprise the following elements:

• Benefits to HSGT users reflect the economic theory that travelers will

pay only for transportation whose worth to them is equal to or greater than

the applicable fare. Thus, the benefits to HSGT users consist of two

elements:

 Benefits for which users must pay: the product of the number of

riders and the fares.3 This equates to system revenues and was

estimated as part of the projections of system requirements and

performance.

 The users’ consumer surplus, which represents the difference

between the full value of HSGT transportation to passengers and

 

3

 Income from ancillary activities is also included on the same economic grounds.
[3-6]

the fares they would pay. The surplus arises because fare levels are

set to maximize net revenues rather than to exact payment from

each traveler for the full worth of the transportation provided.4

• Benefits to the public at large redound to the general public and to users

of modes other than HSGT. These benefits recognize the effects of

diverting significant passenger volumes from existing modes to HSGT,

and consist of savings from alleviated congestion and reduced emissions

in air and highway travel.

These elements can be included in total HSGT corridor benefits because they are

quantifiable in dollar terms and involve neither double counting nor transfers from one

region or type of project to another.5 On the other hand, total benefits do not include certain

items that—although quantifiable—either duplicate the included benefits or represent

“transfer effects” that might just as well accrue in other locations due to other major

investments. Examples include economic impacts from HSGT operations and construction;

capital savings on airports and highways; and energy savings. From the nationwide

viewpoint of this report, such duplicative or transfer impacts—while of interest to potential

partners in the development of specific corridors—could not appropriately enter into the

projected total benefits of each HSGT corridor. 

In addition, some impacts did not readily lend themselves to systematic

quantification (for example: benefits to the American HSGT equipment industry; impacts on

the automobile or aircraft industries) or required site-specific data exceeding the scope of

this national study (for instance, such environmental impacts as noise and water pollution). 

Such items may merit scrutiny in studies of specific corridor proposals at the State level.

Total Costs

Total costs consist of the following:

• The initial investment in HSGT infrastructure and vehicles;

• O&M expenses; and

 

4

 The models used to project revenues in studies of this type do not incorporate the oft-changing fares—keyed

to such factors as the precise date and time of travel, overnight stay requirements, amount of advance booking

time, and competing carriers’ prices—that characterize yield management in modern passenger transport

companies. To the extent that an actual HSGT operator exceeds this report’s projections by implementing

sophisticated yield management techniques that maximize net system revenues while forcing each rider to pay a

fare that approaches the full value of the transportation to him or her, then “users’ consumer surplus” will be

converted to “system revenues.”

5

 See Chapter 6 for the criteria for inclusion in total benefits.
[3-7]

• Continuing investments necessary (after initial system construction) to

assure capacity for future traffic growth. 

Viewed from the perspective of incidence, total costs fall into two fundamental

categories:

• Costs borne by users (this equates to system revenues); and

• Publicly-borne costs (total costs less system revenues).

PARTNERSHIP POTENTIAL DEFINED

Recognizing the current structure of the intercity passenger transport industry, this

report assesses HSGT cases for their partnership potential—their apparent capacity to

draw the private and public sectors together in planning, negotiations, and, conceivably,

project implementation. Partnership potential broadly gauges the attractiveness to State and

local governments of an HSGT project but does not address the project’s advisability,

equity, or worth from the public policy perspective, nor its practicability from the financial

viewpoint. Only detailed studies at the State level can fully treat the latter topics.

To exhibit partnership potential as defined in this report, the projections for an HSGT

technology in a particular corridor must satisfy at least the following two conditions (see

Figure 3-2), which respectively address system requirements and performance, and

comparisons of benefits and costs:

First, private enterprise must be able to run the corridor—once built and paid

for—as a completely self-sustaining entity. Thus, over the planning period, the HSGT

operator’s total revenues would need to cover not only the corridor’s operating and

maintenance expenses but also its continuing investment needs, such as for new vehicles to

replace and expand the fleet. This condition would assist in attracting a private operator and

would provide reasonable assurance to the public that its initial investment in HSGT is,

indeed, a one-time contribution, not a prelude to continuing operating or capital subsidies. 

By positing a system free of operating subsidies, this report clearly differentiates between

future HSGT corridor development and existing intercity passenger rail transportation.

Second, the total benefits of an HSGT corridor must equal or exceed its total

costs. 6,7 As described below, other approaches to measuring benefits and costs may be of

equal or greater interest to policy makers as they consider specific HSGT projects.

 

6

 Total benefits and total costs are expressed as present values, as of the year 2000, over the planning period

(2000—2040).

7 Chapter 5 describes in detail the methodology for projecting system requirements and performance, while

Chapter 6 does the same for the comparisons of benefits and costs.
[3-8]

This report uses “partnership potential” as an indicator of the aggregate

financial and economic impacts of HSGT alternatives in a set of illustrative corridors. 

Detailed State studies of individual corridors would benefit from site-specific

investigations and data as well as additional evaluation measures. Thus, while

“partnership potential” may offer useful insights in assessing the likelihood of HSGT

development by State and local governments and their private partners, it does not

constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal approval or funding. Any future

Federal consideration of specific HSGT project proposals could apply additional

criteria (e.g., comparisons of benefits to the public at large with publicly-borne costs)

that could differ from, and be much more stringent than, this report’s threshold

indicators for “partnership potential.”

Owing to locally perceived transportation conditions and business opportunities, 

States and private entities may still see partnership potential in options that lack it according

to this report. Clearly, as long as States can develop the requisite financing, they can choose

their own measurement techniques and thresholds to reflect local and regional public

priorities.

ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF PARTNERSHIP POTENTIAL

State studies will inevitably use additional measures to assess whether early

indications of partnership potential8 can withstand further, necessary scrutiny. Examples of

these additional measures include, but are not limited to, the following.

 

8

 Such as the findings of this report and of other preliminary investigations at the State level.

Figure 3-2

Definition of Partnership Potential

Partnership Potential

Private

• Full responsibility for continuing

 profitable operations

• Revenues exceed operating and 

 maintenance (O&M) expenses and 

 continuing investments

Public

• No responsibility beyond initial

 capital costs

• Total benefits equal or exceed

 total costs
[3-9]

Financial Measures

It is highly desirable that the private sector should be able to make a substantial

contribution, based on operating surpluses, toward the initial capital investment. Indeed, the

potential for private/public partnerships becomes larger the higher the percentage of initial

investment that can be covered by operating surpluses. 

Furthermore, the absolute size of the initial investment requirement will strongly

influence partnership potential, since different States and private consortia will have

different capacities for assembling the financing required for a proposed HSGT project.

Benefit/Cost Measures

In performing definitive feasibility studies of HSGT systems, policy makers and

the public may deem it essential to compare not just total benefits with total costs, but

also the benefits and costs accruing to users and the public at large respectively.

Comparisons of benefits to the public at large with publicly-borne costs, for instance, would

allow policy makers to determine the degree to which the public at large would obtain a

return on its investment in HSGT. 

CASES

To assess the economics and the partnership potential of HSGT, the study applied its

analytical components to cases, each of which paired a particular technology with a single

illustrative corridor.

Technologies

The family of available HSGT options includes three groups: accelerated rail service

(“Accelerail”), new high-speed rail systems (“New HSR”), and magnetic levitation

(“Maglev”), in order of increasing performance capabilities and initial cost. This section

pinpoints the salient characteristics of each of the HSGT technologies. Further

specifications appear in Chapter 4.

Accelerail constitutes upgraded intercity rail passenger service on existing railroad

rights-of-way, most of which belong to the freight railroads. The Accelerail options

considered in this report have top speeds ranging from 90 to 150 mph.9 At the lower

 

9

 The Accelerail 150 options generally assume a greater separation of passenger from freight service—see

Chapter 4.
[3-10]

speed levels, only non-electrified systems11

underwent scrutiny; the higher speed regimes

comprised both electrified12 and non-electrified

motive power. (See Table 3-2.) Typical Accelerailtype systems include today’s Metroliners between

New York City and Washington, as well as the X2000 in Sweden and the InterCity 225 service in the

United Kingdom.

Two fundamental means exist to accomplish

Accelerail13; these usually occur in combination,

based on projections of time savings, net revenue

impacts, and life-cycle costs:

• Improve the infrastructure (including, for example, track and structures) to allow

for higher top speeds, remove site-specific speed restrictions (e.g., in urban areas,

around curves, through switches), and offer higher line throughput capacity and

enhanced reliability; and/or

• Improve the fleet of locomotives and cars (sometimes permanently or semipermanently attached in larger units called “trainsets”) to provide better

acceleration, to achieve higher maximum speeds, and to alleviate the need to

slow down for curves by providing additional banking within the vehicle (“tilt”).

In addition to promising favorable operating results, efforts to upgrade existing

service to Accelerail levels must adhere to evolving safety standards, the stringency of which

generally increases with speed.

Costs to implement Accelerail solutions vary with two basic factors:

• The existing ownership, condition, freight and commuter traffic, and capacity of

the rail line to be improved; and

• The future institutional arrangements, standards of service, and projected levels

of traffic of all types.

 

10 Assumes successful development of non-electric locomotives capable of these speeds, with performance

substantially equivalent to existing electric high-speed locomotives.

11 That is, powered by on-train heat engines.

12 Powered by remote power plants with electrical power distributed to trains via a system of overhead wires.

13 The distinction is not hard and fast: certain system elements, such as train control and electrification, rely on

a perfectly coordinated set of vehicle, right-of-way, and other improvements. In addition, even in the absence

of line-haul trip-time savings, some reductions in total (door-to-door) travel times could conceivably occur—

for example, through station relocations, additions, and reconfigurations; through parking and other access

betterments; through higher train frequencies; and through streamlined ticketing and other processes.

Table 3-2

The Accelerail Options

Top

Speed

(mph)

Nonelectrified

options

Electrified

options

90 90 not analyzed

110 110 not analyzed

125 125F10 125E

150 150F10 150E
[3-11]

Making use of existing facilities, Accelerail ordinarily represents the least ambitious

and least expensive HSGT technology and may provide relatively high benefits in

comparison with the investment required. Nevertheless, Accelerail solutions require

concerted attention to the needs and operations of the freight railroads, which own most of

the rights-of-way and which already provide a transportation service that is of supreme

importance to the Nation’s commerce. Accelerail’s success thus depends on its ability to

secure the cooperation of the railroad companies.

New HSR represents advanced steel-wheel-on-rail passenger systems on almost

completely new rights-of-way. Through a combination of electrification and other advanced

components, expeditious alignments, and state-of-the-art rolling stock, New HSR can attain

maximum practical operating speeds on the order of 200 mph.14 On the other hand, because

it is compatible with existing railroads, New HSR can combine new lines in rural areas with

existing approaches to urban terminals, and can offer Accelerail-type services beyond the

confines of the New HSR lines per se.

The bulk of New HSR research and development has taken place after World War II

in Japan, France, and Germany. Japan introduced the world’s first New HSR—the

Shinkansen (or “bullet train”)—in 1964; France followed with its train à grande vitesse

(TGV), and Germany with its Intercity Express (ICE). Other countries have followed suit.

Although adhering to sometimes divergent design principles,15 New HSR systems have

uniformly succeeded in reducing journey times and capturing increased traffic among the

major cities served.

New HSR has the benefit of a technology that has seen many successful years of

revenue operation, that can compete on a door-to-door basis with air trip times, that has a

cost structure confirmed by experience, and that allows for smooth linkages with other rail

services. Unlike Accelerail, however, New HSR makes relatively sparing use of existing

facilities and thus must support the higher costs—as well as the environmental reviews and

mitigation requirements—associated with all new infrastructure projects.

Maglev is an advanced transport technology in which magnetic forces lift, propel,

and guide a vehicle over a special-purpose guideway. Utilizing state-of-the art electric

power and control systems, this configuration eliminates the need for wheels and many other

mechanical parts, thereby minimizing resistance and permitting excellent acceleration, with

cruising speeds on the order of 300 mph.16 This high performance would enable Maglev to

provide air-competitive trip times at longer trip distances than the other HSGT options.

 

14 The French National Railways (SNCF), for example, has successfully tested steel-wheel-on-rail systems at

speeds well in excess of 200 mph.

15 The French system was designed for passenger trains only, whereas the German New HSR lines initially

allowed for freight traffic as well.

16 Even higher speeds are possible.
[3-12]

There are two basic types of Maglev. One type is based on attraction forces:

electromagnets exert force on an iron rail on the guideway to effect levitation. The second

type is based on repulsion forces: superconducting magnets move across coils or aluminum

plates on the guideway to propel and levitate the vehicle. Typically, the attraction-force

Maglev has a gap of about one-half inch and can be levitated at zero speed. The repulsion

force Maglev has a gap of about four inches and must be in motion for levitation to occur. 

Germany has an attraction-force Maglev technology, Transrapid, ready for

commercial use and planned for implementation in the Berlin-Hamburg corridor. Japan has

a repulsion-force Maglev system under testing. The National Maglev Initiative (described in

Chapter 1) developed performance guidelines for a U.S. Maglev system, which would

improve on foreign systems in several respects17; those guidelines are incorporated in the

Maglev case studies in this report. However, prototype development for a domestic Maglev

design has not occurred.

In view of Maglev’s advanced performance capabilities, the guideway and related

propulsion, levitation, and guidance technology are more expensive than for New HSR:

Maglev initial infrastructure costs amount to about 20 to 50 million dollars per route-mile,

compared to about 10 to 45 million dollars per mile for some of the most advanced steelwheel-on-rail systems, and $1 to $10 million for the various Accelerail options.

Maglev can provide air-competitive trip times and top-quality service in the 100-500

mile range considered in this report, and thus can generate very high ridership, revenues, and

public benefits. Against that incomparable performance potential must be weighed 

Maglev’s relatively high initial cost, its need for environmental reviews and mitigating

measures appropriate for new construction, its lack of revenue service thus far, and its

inability to offer same-train services extending beyond the limits of the Maglev line.18

In summary, the HSGT technologies represent a diverse portfolio of inherent

capabilities and drawbacks. As demonstrated in Table 3-3, none of these technologies

constitutes an intrinsically “perfect” solution; were they cost-free, they would already exist

nationwide. Moreover, the relative benefits and costs of the HSGT options vary

significantly with the contexts in which they are modeled—with the topography,

demographics, economic characteristics, and transportation infrastructure and markets of the

individual corridors. It is to those corridors that this report now turns.

 

17 Final Report on the National Maglev Initiative, DOT/FRA/NMI-93/03 , September 1993.

18 The last two factors mentioned—lack of revenue service and incompatibility with existing technology—

characterized all new technological initiatives, from the railroads of the early 1800s to the automobile and

airplane at the turn of the century, to the compact disc of today. 
[3-13]

Table 3-3

Selected Inherent Advantages of HSGT Technological Options19

Selected Characteristics

Advantages of Technologies With Respect To Each Other

(+ means the technology has an apparent inherent advantage)

Accelerail New HSR Maglev

Trip-time and revenue performance + +

Initial cost +

Autonomy from existing railroads +

20 +

Through train potential over other railroads + +

Service-proven technology and cost structure + +

Corridors

The analytical components were consistently applied to a set of illustrative corridors

depicted in Figure 3-3.

Providing a broad spectrum of configurations, lengths, and travel densities, these

corridors represent:

 

19 These advantages are generic and do not address the relative performance of the options in specific corridors.

 For example, the “selected characteristics” may be weighted differently in one corridor than in another, and

other characteristics may be of prime importance in certain corridors.

20 New HSR would be autonomous over its dedicated rights-of-way, but would make limited use of existing

railroads in some urban areas.

Figure 3-3

The Illustrative Corridors

Florida

California

Chicago

Hub

Southeast

Corridor

Texas

Triangle

Pacific

Northwest

Northeast

Corridor

Empire

Corridor
[3-14]

• Existing corridors in which passenger trains regularly operate at speeds of 110 mph

and above—

 Northeast Corridor (Boston—New York City—Washington);

 Empire Corridor (New York City—Albany—Buffalo).21

• The five potential HSGT corridors designated by the Secretary of Transportation

for special grade crossing safety funds under Section 1010 of the ISTEA. To be so

designated, the ISTEA required that the corridor contain rail lines where railroad speeds

of 90 mph are occurring or can reasonably be expected to occur in the future, and that

other operational, financial, and institutional criteria be met.22 The Section 1010

corridors are:

 Pacific Northwest Corridor;

 California Corridor;

 Chicago Hub;

 Florida Corridor; and

 Southeast Corridor21; and

• The Texas Triangle, which presents a unique nonlinear configuration of heavily

populated metropolitan areas.

The study also derived, by truncation, additional illustrative corridors from the basic

eight. Specifically, the Chicago Hub underwent scrutiny as a unified network (with three

spokes—between Chicago and Detroit, St. Louis, and Milwaukee), while the Chicago—

Detroit and Chicago—St. Louis corridors also received separate attention. Similarly, the

study addressed both the California Corridor as a whole (San Francisco Bay Area—Los

Angeles—San Diego) and the segment between Los Angeles and San Diego.

Two of the illustrative corridors—the Empire and the Southeast—connect directly

with the existing high-speed Northeast Corridor, at New York City and Washington, D.C.,

respectively. Marketing considerations would dictate an operating plan that builds upon

these connections, by means of either through service (where possible technologically) or

 

21 For corridors connecting with (and treated as extensions of) the Northeast Corridor, this study included the

effects of the through traffic. For example, the Empire Corridor’s traffic levels included passengers between

Philadelphia and Albany, Wilmington and Albany, and similar city pairs. See chapter 8.

22 Specifically: “Projected rail ridership volumes in such corridor, the percentage of the corridor over which a

train will be capable of operating at its maximum cruise speed, projected benefits to nonriders such as

congestion relief on other modes of transportation, the amount of State and local financial support that can

reasonably be anticipated for the improvement of the line and related facilities, and the cooperation of the

owner of the right-of-way that can reasonably be expected in the operation of high speed rail passenger service .

. .”
[3-15]

carefully coordinated schedules. Therefore, this study treated the Empire Corridor and the

Southeast Corridor incrementally—as an addition to Northeast Corridor high-speed

service—rather than independently. Chapter 8 provides specifics on this treatment.

Although intended to be strictly illustrative, the study corridors still encompass

almost three-fifths of the Nation’s total metropolitan area population, 75 percent of the

people living in the 50 most heavily populated metropolitan areas, and 90 percent of the

inhabitants of the 17 metropolitan statistical areas with populations of 2.5 million or more.23

Matrix of Cases

A case is a specific technology projected in a specific corridor. The cells of the

matrix in Table 3-4 represent the universe of cases that could have been modeled; the

shaded cells are those that were modeled for this study. The rules for selecting cases for

projections were as follows:

• Cases representing levels of service that already exist in full, or will be in place

by the Year 2000, were omitted.24

• From an engineering perspective, the freight railroad right-of-way in certain

corridors25—by virtue of its curvature, existing freight traffic levels, or other

constraints—cannot provide a practical basis for the Accelerail 150 option,

which thus was not modeled.

• The Texas Corridor presents an analytical challenge since it can undergo

scrutiny in at least seven ways.26 This study completed projections for the 

entire triangle under all technologies.

• All other corridors received full scrutiny under all technological options.

 

23 Derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States—1995, table 43; 1990

census data.

24 E.g., all Accelerail options up to and including 150 in the Northeast Corridor.

25 I.e., the Northwest Corridor, San Diego—Los Angeles, Florida, and the Southeast Corridor.

26The three sides of the triangle together; the three sides individually; and three combinations of two sides each.

 Also, there are multiple routing possibilities for the Accelerail options.
[3-16]

 

27 For the Empire and Southeast Corridors, analysis was completed on Maglev, New HSR, and one sample

Accelerail case. See Chapter 8. Future, more detailed studies may yield more promising results for other

Accelerail options than those completed for this report.

Table 3-4

Cases Analyzed and Reported

LEGEND: Borders and shading indicate that the case—combining the technology

shown in the column with the illustrative corridor named in the row— was

modeled for this study and reported on herein.

Corridors Accelerail New Maglev

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E HSR

California North/South (San Diego—Los

Angeles—San Francisco Bay Area)

California South (San Diego—Los Angeles)

Chicago Hub Network (Chicago to Detroit,

St. Louis, and Milwaukee)

Chicago—Detroit

Chicago—St. Louis

Florida (Tampa—Orlando—Miami)

Northeast Corridor (NEC) (Boston—New

York—Washington)

Pacific Northwest (Eugene-Portland-SeattleVancouver, B.C.)

Texas Triangle (Fort Worth-Dallas-HoustonSan Antonio)

Empire Corridor: New York-Buffalo

(treated as an extension of the NEC)27

Southeast Corridor: WashingtonRichmond-Charlotte (treated as an extension

of the NEC)27
Chapter 4 

GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

The key assumptions affecting the results of this study fall into three categories:

financial, economic, and transportation-related. This chapter presents all three groups of

general assumptions.

FINANCIAL ASSUMPTIONS

In assessing the potential of HSGT, the study made a series of financial

assumptions consistent with Federal practices. While internal financial thresholds may

differ for each of the partners in any HSGT project, the following assumptions provide a

consistent means of comparing the various cases, technologies, and illustrative corridors:

• Planning period—This is the period from the year 20001 to 2040 in

which operations and continuing investments occur.

• Monetary values—Unless otherwise labeled, monetary values are 1993

constant dollars and are present values as of the beginning of the

assumed first year of operation in 2000.

• Discount rate—The study applied a ten percent discount rate (real) to

the revenues, operating expenses, and continuing investments projected

for the HSGT entity, which is presumed to be a private firm.2 Initial

investments, assumed to pertain to the public sector, incorporate the

Office of Management and Budget’s discount rate of seven percent

(real), as do the monetized values of all benefits except for those

measured by system revenues.

• Salvage value—No salvage value (residual value of the investment at

the end of 2040) was added to the cases’ present value.

• Construction period—This period consists of the three years prior to

2000 (two years for vehicles). Initial construction activities were

assumed to be evenly spread over the construction period, and the

reported investments are the present values as of the year 2000 of the

costs incurred in prior years (i.e., they are inflated at a rate of seven

percent from the year of incurrence).

 

1

 The year 2000 was used for analytical purposes only, in order to keep the cases comparable; achievable

startup dates would vary widely by technology and corridor.

2

 See also under “The HSGT Operating Entity,” page 4-12.
[4-2]

• Cash basis—The projections deal with cash inflows and outflows and

treat plant and equipment replacements as continuing investments in the

year incurred. This treatment recognizes phenomena of the type that

would have been addressed in an annual allowance for depreciation had

such an allowance been included in operating expenses.

• Taxes—The study assumed that the HSGT entity, as a member of a

private/public partnership, would not be liable for property taxes on

HSGT facilities and equipment, and would have no requirement for cash

payment of income taxes related to its HSGT operations during the

study period.

NATIONAL TRENDS

Population and income growth serve as the two key exogenous demographic

parameters shaping the demand for transportation. This study used forecasts from the

Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce on a

metropolitan-area-specific rather than a national-average basis to best reflect the

demographics of each corridor. Underlying these metropolitan-area forecasts, however, are

the BEA forecasts for nationwide annual compounded growth rates, as shown in Table 4-1.

 

3

 Population growth rate derived from: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA Regional Projections to 2045,

Diskette #61-95-40-201, July 1995; Bureau of the Census, Population Projections of the United States, by

Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1993-2050, November 1993, p. xii.

4

 Income growth rate derived using total personal income data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, op. cit.

Table 4-1

Underlying Population and Income Growth Rates from BEA

Time period

Population

growth rate3

Income

growth rate4

1993-2000 0.99% 2.27%

2000-2010 0.84% 1.92%

2010-2020 0.82% 1.60%

2020-2030 0.71% 1.54%

2030-2040 0.60% 1.47%
[4-3]

THE TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT

This section reviews the scope of intercity passenger transportation covered in the

study and characterizes the established non-HSGT modes as they are envisioned during the

planning period.

Scope of Transportation

In analyzing transportation by all modes in the illustrative corridors, this study

examined city-pair markets in which HSGT could compete with air and/or auto on door-todoor travel time. Hence, the study concentrated primarily on city-pairs approximately 100

to 500 miles in length. The data base for the study therefore omitted trips under 50 miles

as well as trips restricted to a single metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or consolidated

metropolitan statistical area (CMSA); such trips would have more in common with mass

transit than with intercity travel, or would be so heavily weighted toward access rather than

line-haul time as to dilute the time savings effected by HSGT. In short, this is an intercity,

not a transit study.

Trends in Other Modes

The projected shape of the transportation world in the absence of HSGT (a

condition termed “baseline”) profoundly affected the study results. This section

accordingly summarizes the assumed and derived trends in the intercity passenger transport

world.

Fuel Availability and Price

Petroleum-based fuels were assumed to be in constant supply over the projection

period: no repetition of the gasoline shortages of 1973 and 1979 was foreseen. Moreover,

real fuel prices were assumed to remain constant through 2040, although the Department of

Energy recently predicted increases in energy fuel prices5 due to shrinking resources,

capital investments in more efficient technology, and more stringent environmental

regulations. Any assumed increases in energy prices would have favorably affected the

projections for HSGT, both by raising the fare levels of competing, energy-intensive modes

and by giving most HSGT options a relative advantage in unit operating expenses for

energy. Instead of showing improved HSGT results on the basis of a world commodity

 

5

 Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 1994: With Projections to 2010, DOE/EIA0383(94), pp. 2 and 30-39. The crude oil prices are expected to have an average annual growth rate of 1

percent; natural gas prices are expected to rise at an annual rate of 3.3 percent; and coal prices increase at a

moderate annual rate of 1 percent. The electricity price is forecast to increase at an average annual rate of 0.3

 percent. 
[4-4]

market that has been unpredictable in the past,6 this study found it more judicious to

assume an unchanging energy environment.

Fares and Perceived Costs

Fares for all existing modes (perceived costs in the case of auto) were assumed to

remain constant, in real terms, over the planning period. Thus, the projections in this report

do not incorporate the effects of “fare wars”—characterized by marked fluctuations in

tariffs and predatory pricing—that might occur among modes upon the introduction of

HSGT service in a given corridor.7

Fares for public modes reflected a statistical analysis of actual 1993 traffic records,

which yielded typical fares for business and non-business trip purposes. For auto, the study

assigned a higher perceived cost to business travel ($0.16 per passenger-mile) than to nonbusiness travel ($0.08 per passenger-mile). The former reflected the full cost of auto

ownership (including depreciation and insurance), while the latter treated intercity travel as

an incremental “out-of-pocket” expense and omitted ownership costs.

Frequencies

Frequencies for existing modes were assumed to grow at the following rates per

decade:

Mode: Air Auto Conventional

rail

Bus

10-year rate of growth: Based on traffic

growth less any

diversions to HSGT

Not applicable

(infinite

frequency)

10% 10%

Travel Times

With the exception of the congestion and capacity effects described below, trip

times in the existing modes were assumed to remain constant over the planning period.

Growth in Demand

Table 4-2 shows the projected annual growth rates, by period, in baseline travel

demand for the existing modes. These are averages, across all the illustrative corridors, of

growth rates developed for this study. Comparing the baseline growth rates with available

 

6

 Forecasters failed to predict the oil crisis of the 1970s, for example.

7

 Chapter 8 contains a sensitivity analysis and other information on the extent of low-fare air service.
[4-5]

FAA and FHWA forecasts, Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 demonstrate that this analysis

incorporates much less growth in other modes than is foreseen nationwide by the relevant

agencies. For example, assumed air traffic growth to the year 2000 is about one third less

than FAA’s projection, and assumed auto growth is about one quarter less than FHWA’s.

Table 4-2

Average Baseline Growth Projections for Existing Modes in CFS Corridors

Projected Annual Growth Rates by Mode in Each “Decennial” Period

Period Air O/D Air Transfer Auto Rail Bus

1993-2000 2.36% 2.06% 1.85% 2.03% 1.79%

2000-2010 2.23% 2.23% 1.85% 1.96% 1.90%

2010-2020 1.83% 1.86% 1.56% 1.67% 1.58%

2020-2030 1.87% 1.90% 1.58% 1.72% 1.59%

2030-2040 1.87% 1.90% 1.58% 1.72% 1.59%

 

8

 This is the average growth in air origin/destination traffic within the illustrative corridors for this study.

9

 Derived from Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Aviation Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1994-2005, FAAAPO-94-1, March 1994, p. I-9; Office of Aviation Policy, Plans and Management Analysis, FAA Long-Range

Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years 2005-2020, FAA-APO-94-7, July 1994, p. 9.

10 This is the average growth in auto intercity traffic within the illustrative corridors for this study.

11 Forecast using total vehicle miles traveled. Data from: Report of the Secretary of Transportation to the

U.S. Congress, The Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions and Performance,

1993, p. 158.

Table 4-3

Comparison of Available FAA Forecasts

With Air Baseline

(Average Annual Growth Rates During Period)

Period

Air Baseline for

This Study8

FAA

Nationwide9

1993-2000 2.36% 3.5%

2000-2010 2.23% 2.9%

2010-2020 1.83% 2.3%

2020-2030 1.87% —

2030-2040 1.87% —

Table 4-4

Comparison of Available FHWA Forecasts

With Auto Baseline

(Average Annual Growth Rates During Period)

Period

Auto Baseline

for This Study10

FHWA

Nationwide11

1993-2000 1.85% 2.5%

2000-2010 1.85% —

2010-2020 1.56% —

2020-2030 1.58% —

2030-2040 1.58% —
[4-6]

Congestion and Capacity Effects

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the air and auto modes in recent decades have

exhibited inexorably growing demand, with which capacity has not kept pace. In

projecting conditions for air and auto, this study has assumed that, although some of the

capacity additions identified by the Department for other modes12 will come about,

discrepancies between travel volumes and infrastructure growth will continue to widen,

with some congestion-driven increases in automobile trip times, urban access times to

stations of all public modes (including HSGT itself), and air schedules. Delay estimates

were developed for each Metropolitan Statistical Area or Consolidated Metropolitan

Statistical Area on the basis of site-specific highway congestion13 and airport studies. In

addition to affecting somewhat the characteristics of the various modes for demand

estimation purposes,14 the projected increases in auto and air congestion provided a starting

point for estimating public benefits of HSGT (see Chapter 6). 

HSGT System Concept Assumptions

This section describes the technological, operational, fare-setting, and institutional

assumptions for the HSGT systems modeled in the study.

Technologies

Vehicles and Performance

Table 4-5 presents the assumed specifications for the eight technological options

already enumerated in Chapter 3. 

Three main categories of motive power were assumed: non-electrified,15

electrified,16 and linear electric (Maglev) propulsion. The study assumed that nonelectrified Accelerail technologies through 125F would use Diesel locomotives.

17

 

12 Federal Aviation Administration, 1994 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan, DOT/FAA/ASC-94-1,

October 1994, pp. 7-1 to 7-4; Report of the Secretary of Transportation to the U.S. Congress, The Status of

the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions and Performance, Chapters 3 and 4.

13 Texas Transportation Institute (TTI), Trends in Urban Roadway Congestion—1982 to 1991, Volume 1: 

Annual Report, Research Report 1131-6, College Station: TTI, September 1994.

14 While altering total trip times, the recognition of congestion effects over the planning period did not

significantly change the relative competitive positions of the modes in key city pairs.

15 That is, the prime energy source is on the train (rather than at an off-train electric generating station). 

Since the prime mover is an on-board fossil-fueled heat engine, these non-electrified options are designated as

“F” in speed regimes for which electrified (“E”) options are also studied.

16 That is, powered by a remote generating station.

17 In reality, Diesel locomotives ordinarily transfer their power to the axles by means of electricity (hence the

more accurate term “Diesel-electric”), and gas turbine engines can use a similar means of power transfer.
[4-7]

 

18 “1-4” means one locomotive (or power car) and 4 coaches.

19 In number of minutes from zero to top speed in miles per hour.

20 References to existing equipment are solely for the purpose of conveying to readers the generic type of

vehicles envisioned and do not imply endorsement of specific products or manufacturers. It is assumed that

all equipment actually operated over HSGT corridors will fully comply with all then-applicable Federal safety

regulations.

21 The choice between the 1-8-1 and the 1-6-1 consist was made on a corridor-specific basis reflecting

demand, load factors, and frequencies.

22 The choice between the 2-and 4-car consist was made on a corridor-specific basis reflecting demand, load

factors, and frequencies.

Table 4-5

Summary of Technologies

Technology (Top

Speed, Propulsion,

Horsepower (hp))

Consist18 Weight Seats Weight/seatHp/

ton

Acceleration19 Comments20

Accelerail

90 (Non-Electrified)

3500 hp

1-4 346 ton 1-4 trainset

(130 ton locomotive)

264 1.31 ton/seat 10.1 0-90

2.7 min.

Based on P-40

(AMD103) with X-2000

type Coaches

110 (Non-Electrified)

4000 hp (min.)

1-4 346 ton 1-4 trainset

(130 ton locomotive)

264 1.31 ton/seat 11.6 0-110

4.0 min.

Based on modified

Diesel with X-2000 type

Coaches

125F (NonElectrified)

5200 hp (min.)

1-4 326 ton 1-4 trainset

(110 ton locomotive)

264 1.23 ton/seat 16.0 0-125

3.88 min.

Based on advanced

Diesel (110t) with X2000 type coach

125E (Electrified)

7000 hp/locomotive

1-4 316 ton 1-4 trainset

(100 ton locomotive)

264 1.2 ton/seat 22.2 0-125

2.7 min.

Based on AEM-7 with

X-2000 type Coaches

150F (NonElectrified )

7000 hp/locomotive

1-4 316 ton 1-4 trainset

(100 ton locomotive)

264 1.2 ton/seat 22.2 0-150

4.1 min.

Based on Advanced

Turbo/Diesel Flywheel 

combination

150E (Electrified)

7200 hp/locomotive

1-4 306 ton 1-4 trainset

(90 ton locomotive)

264 1.16 ton/seat 23.5 0-150

2.9 min.

Based on improved

AEM-7 with X-2000

type Coaches

New HSR

200 (Electrified) 21

6000 hp/power car

1-8-1

(1-6-1)

460 ton 1-8-1

(1-6-1 390t)

(73 ton power car)

388

284

1.19 ton/seat

1.37 ton/seat

26.1

30.8

0-200

5.7 min.

Based on TGV-A 1-8-1

Maglev

300 (Maglev—

Linear electric) 22 

12000 hp/car

2 car

4 car

45 ton nose (65/85 seats)

45 ton middle (105

seats)

150

325

0.6 ton/seat (2)

0.5 ton/seat (4)

150

150

0-300

1.5 min.

Based on U.S. Maglev

with ride comfort limit

0.16g acceleration
[4-8]

Accelerail 150F was posited as a performance goal for technology development in

the Federal Railroad Administration’s Next-Generation High-Speed Rail Program, and as

such could make use of a variety of motive power innovations now under investigation.

New HSR and electrified Accelerail options would require the construction of catenaries

(overhead wires) and support systems to distribute power to the HSGT trains. Maglev

would operate via linear electric motors providing noncontacting propulsion and would

require its own guideway system.

Thus, the six Accelerail options, New HSR, and Maglev represent a gradual

performance progression from currently available Diesel and electric locomotives to

advanced prime mover and electric motive power, and to the 300 mph performance of

linear induction motors and frictionless magnetic suspension. Portraying this progression,

Figure 4-1 shows that Maglev completes a 50-mile simulated course (nonstop on straight

track) in one-third the trip time of Accelerail 90.

Figure 4-1

Nonstop Elapsed Time by Technology Over a 50-Mile Straight Course

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Accelerail 90

Accelerail 110

Accelerail

125F

Accelerail

125E

Accelerail

150F

Accelerail

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Nonstop Elapsed Time, Minutes
[4-9]

Alignments and Station Locations

To create as realistic a scenario as possible for HSGT service, the study made

general assumptions about alignments and station locations which allowed for evaluation

of HSGT from a national perspective.23

With respect to alignments:

• Accelerail options were assumed to follow existing Amtrak routes or, if

no direct Amtrak route presently exists, the most direct freight railroad

mainline.

• Except in major urban areas where upgraded freight or commuter

railroads could provide expeditious access to terminals, New HSR was

provided with new alignments that would be as direct as possible within

the constraints of cost-effectiveness. In the New York City area, with its

ever-burgeoning commuter demands over existing routes, completely

new alignments were posited.24

• Maglev was assumed to occupy new alignments that would be as direct

as possible within the constraints of cost-effectiveness.

Obviously, future detailed studies of individual corridors will address a wider

variety of potential alignments than this nationwide study, with its many cases, could treat.

From such advanced work, better alignment possibilities will doubtless emerge. With

respect to Accelerail, Amtrak’s existing route structure may not everywhere provide the

optimal available base for future passenger operations. Moreover, for each New HSR and

Maglev corridor, multiple analytical iterations—involving alternative routes, trip times,

demands, revenues, and costs—may be prerequisite to fully informed decisions on the

economics of railway location. 

With regard to station locations:

• Each major city was assumed to have a station in the city center, except

where alignment considerations dictated otherwise (e.g., Albany/

Rensselaer was retained in the Accelerail options for the Empire

Corridor).

 

23 Site-specific planning for HSGT systems will, of course, reflect detailed knowledge of regional, State, and

local facts, needs, and concerns that were beyond the scope of this report.

24 This, too, would be subject to very complex and expensive study at the local level.
[4-10]

• Additional “Beltway”-type stations were provided in major

metropolitan areas to reduce access times and expand HSGT’s market

reach to the suburbs. 

• For analytical purposes only, the study eliminated existing stations that

served fewer than 20,000 passengers per year. Certain other stations

were assumed to be consolidated with larger, nearby stations that could

provide adequate service. The ultimate decisions on station locations

will, of course, rest with the private/public HSGT partnerships. 

• In accordance with the intent of ISTEA to create a seamless

transportation network, the study actively sought to incorporate new

airport stations along corridors. New HSR and Maglev alignments were

specifically designed to serve important airports wherever HSGT triptime goals permitted; Accelerail cases also included airport stations

wherever existing rail alignments passed through or adjacent to airport

properties.25

Operating Assumptions

Line-haul trip times reflect the simulated performance of the technological

options, as specified in Table 4-5, over the applicable alignments for each illustrative

corridor. Trip times for origin-destination markets also reflect dwell time for stops at

intermediate points (adjusted for a likely service mix of non-stop or limited stop trains),

and a five percent pad commonly used in developing transportation schedules to

compensate for operational uncertainties, disruptions, and the like. Line-haul times for

HSGT were assumed to show no change over the planning period. 

Train frequencies resulted from iteration: they were specified as inputs to the

demand model, compared with ridership results throughout the planning period, and

adjusted to adhere to an assumed maximum 60 percent load factor26 for the busiest link in

each corridor. Under no circumstances, however, were departure frequencies allowed to

fall below six daily. 

Express service was assumed to be provided where warranted, particularly in the

highest-density markets. Thus, not all trains would stop at all stations.

 

25 In the Chicago Hub, O’Hare Airport would be such an important traffic generator that Accelerail service

was assumed to extend to it from both Detroit and St. Louis, through Union Station.

26 This 60 percent would be an average over the entire year and acknowledges that the busiest link will be

saturated at peak times.
[4-11]

Turnaround times. The minimum turnaround time at terminals for trainsets in

active service was assumed to be a half-hour.

Fare-Setting

HSGT fares were normally set to maximize net revenue to the HSGT operator. For

major city-pair markets in each corridor, the analysis identified HSGT’s prime competitor

mode (the potential source of most HSGT revenues), set HSGT fares as percentages of the

prime competitor’s fares (e.g., “75 percent of air”), developed demand results for a

spectrum of possible fare levels, and selected the fare that would provide the highest

operating surplus. Fares for smaller markets were derived from those for major markets.

In shorter rail corridors (under 150 miles) in which Amtrak currently provides

relatively high frequencies and generates significant rail traffic,27 conventional rail would

be the prime “competitor”; normal fare-setting procedures would have raised HSGT fares

to more than double the 1993 fare levels in real terms. While future revenues would have

been maximized, ridership would have fallen below the expected growth for conventional

Amtrak service. It is unlikely that State and local governments would consent to invest in

options that more than double fares and carry fewer riders than Amtrak does today. As a

result, in these few markets, this study capped HSGT fares at 180 percent of Amtrak’s

1993 fares.

Table 4-6 summarizes the basic fare-setting assumptions by corridor and

technology. As with the other modes, 28 HSGT fares were assumed to remain constant

throughout the planning period.

Institutional Assumptions

Some of the HSGT options—particularly those involving Accelerail-type

technologies—may entail ownership/operation structures with more than one participant. 

For the sake of simplicity, the study characterized the two main participants29 as an

independent HSGT entity and a generic, large (Class I) freight railroad. This section

characterizes the projected HSGT entity and describes the assumed relationships between

the owning/operating partners.

 

27 For example, San Diego-Los Angeles.

28 See under “Fares and Perceived Costs,” page 4-4.

29 This institutional categorization deals with the operating entities and omits the important relationships with

the public sponsors and other public and private partners in HSGT.
[4-12]

Table 4-6

Fare Setting for the HSGT Cases

Fares by Option Expressed as Percentages of Primary Competing Mode

(R = Rail, A = Air)

(Shading indicates that the case was not analyzed for inclusion in this report.)

Corridor Accelerail

90

Accelerail

110

Accelerail

125F

Accelerail

125E

Accelerail

150F

Accelerail

150E

New

HSR

Maglev

California North/South 85 (A) 85 (A) 85 (A) 85 (A) 85 (A) 85 (A) 90 (A) 110 (A)

California South 150 (R) 155 (R) 155 (R) 155 (R) 160 (R) 165 (R)

Chicago Hub Network same as spokes (shown below)

Chicago - Detroit 145 (R) 170 (R) 70 (A) 70 (A) 75 (A) 75 (A) 95 (A) 130 (A)

Chicago - St. Louis 125 (R) 140 (R) 80 (A) 80 (A) 80 (A) 80 (A) 95 (A) 125 (A)

Florida 130 (R) 140 (R) 70 (A) 70 (A) 85 (A) 105 (A)

Northeast Corridor 70 (A) 75 (A)

Pacific Northwest

Corridor

45 (A) 55 (A) 55 (A) 55 (A) 70 (A) 85 (A)

Texas Triangle 75 (A) 75 (A) 75 (A) 75 (A) 80 (A) 80 (A) 95 (A) 125 (A)

Empire Corridor 30 30 (A) 45 (A) 45 (A)

Southeast Corridor30 30 (A) 45 (A) 45 (A)

The HSGT Operating Entity

The entity that operates HSGT services was assumed to be a private, for-profit

concern specifically set up to efficiently and effectively manage a single corridor—or

group of related corridors31—with the focused management, marketing prowess,

operational responsiveness, efficient procedures, and customer-service orientation

characteristic of a very successful, entrepreneurial small business. In reality, such an entity

could be a highly independent, market-oriented, compact, aggressive subsidiary or business

unit of a larger private or mixed private/public company (such as Amtrak), or a State,

regional, or local government-sponsored authority.

 

30 Treated as an extension of the Northeast Corridor; see Chapter 8. Percentages shown are for trips wholly

within the extensions; trips involving Northeast Corridor service will carry higher percentages.

31 E.g., the Chicago Hub network as considered in this report.
[4-13]

Owner/Operator Paradigms

To best reflect the scope of the HSGT entity’s ownership and operating

responsibilities, the study developed—and applied to identifiable segments of each

corridor—three basic institutional paradigms32:

• “TENANT”—The entire segment is owned and maintained by the

freight railroad; the HSGT entity, as tenant, reimburses the landlord

railroad for the incremental expenses occasioned by the presence of

HSGT, plus a management fee.33 This is the most common paradigm

for the Accelerail options.

• “LANDLORD”—The HSGT entity owns and maintains the track in the

segment, charging the freight railroad (or a commuter rail service) for its

use. In this study, the “landlord” paradigm applies only where a route

segment currently belongs to an intercity railroad passenger operator.34

• “NEW RIGHT-OF-WAY”—The entire segment is owned and

maintained by HSGT for its exclusive use. This paradigm applies to

Maglev lines in their entirely, and to the bulk of New HSR route

mileage.35

Cooperation with Freight Railroads

Successful implementation of the “tenant” paradigm requires, and this report

assumes, the cooperation of the freight railroad landlord. The Department recognizes that

the freight railroads—in pursuing their self-evident business interests, which serve the

Nation’s critical freight transportation needs—have thus far adopted widely varying

policies toward HSGT development.36 However, the potential benefits of HSGT to freight

railroads in site-specific instances, and the current cooperation of the railroad companies in

development of the Southeast and Pacific Northwest corridors, offer both theoretical and

practical justification for assuming carrier cooperation in the Accelerail options.

 

32 The operating expense model applies these paradigms on a route segment basis. Thus, for example, the

Chicago-Detroit corridor, now partially owned by Amtrak, has both a “Tenant” and a “Landlord” segment.

33 See Chapter 5. The main incremental expenses are maintenance of way and dispatching. The management

fee is 20 percent on labor and 3 percent on materials.

34 For example, in the Chicago—Detroit corridor, the “landlord” paradigm applies to the segment currently

owned by Amtrak and the “tenant” paradigm applies elsewhere.

35 But see earlier in this chapter regarding assumptions for New HSR approaches to major cities.

36 See, for example, Daniel L. Roth, “Incremental High-Speed Rail Issues,” in Transportation Quarterly, Vol.

49, No. 2, Spring 1995, p. 66. These carrier views were expressed at a November 1994 FRA public meeting

on this study, as well as at subsequent conferences on freight railroads and HSGT sponsored by Railway Age.
[4-14]

Accordingly, the study includes the following assumptions affecting the

relationships between HSGT entities and freight railroads:

• Assumption: Liability. Currently, liability represents a challenge to be

met in HSGT development. An equitable assignment of responsibility

for HSGT liability claims will be a prerequisite to effecting the “tenant”-

type institutional paradigm. The study assumed that these liability

issues would be resolved and estimated the HSGT entity’s liability

expenses on a speed-adjusted passenger-mile basis reflecting the

experience of other passenger transport providers. It should be noted that

this is an extremely controversial issue with freight railroads and this assumption

may underestimate final costs.

• Assumption: Right-of-way. The analysis assumed that existing freight

railroad rights-of-way would remain the property of the current owners

and that access to these rights-of-way would be available for Accelerail

(and for New HSR where necessary).37

• Assumption: Investment programs. The HSGT entity and its nonrailroad partners would bear the entire capital costs of the requisite

improvements to the freight railroad.38 These improvements would

include sufficient capacity to accommodate reliably both freight traffic

(including a one-fifth increase in train frequencies) and the

superimposed HSGT traffic. 

In addition, as described in Chapter 5, the HSGT project would include

the capital cost of making an assumed proportion of the freight

railroad’s locomotive fleet compatible with the train control system. 

Any differences between the costs assumed herein for locomotive

compatibility, those identified by the railroad, and those which the other

HSGT partners would be willing to absorb, would fall under the rubric

of items left to negotiation (see below). 

• Assumption: Payments to the freight railroad. The payment for

incremental purchased services (described above under the “tenant”

 

37 Although a State may, in specific instances, wish to negotiate the purchase of Accelerail right-of-way from

a willing freight railroad, the case studies in this report did not incorporate such an eventuality.

38 This assumption prevails even though the freight railroad operation may also stand to gain from some

HSGT project elements. As noted below, any tangible benefits of Accelerail to the freight railroad would

inevitably enter into the latter’s partnership negotiations and financial arrangements with the public HSGT

sponsors and the HSGT entity.
[4-15]

paradigm) would be the only major operating expense due from the

HSGT entity to the freight railroad landlord.

• Items left to negotiation. This nationwide analysis relegated a number

of items to detailed negotiations between the railroads, the HSGT

entities, and other project partners. Examples of these items include:

 Valuation of the benefits to the railroad from construction of

HSGT improvements;

 Resolution of any differences over the responsibility for freight

locomotive fleet compatibility with HSGT;

 Any trackage rights payments (i.e., rentals and profits over and

above purchased services and management fees);

 Any line purchase or relocation costs resulting from detailed

studies and negotiations;

 Any incentive payments for on-time performance (in keeping

with Amtrak precedents);

 Resolution mechanisms for operating conflicts; and

 Valuation of fully allocated costs associated with increased

usage of freight infrastructure.
Chapter 5 

METHODOLOGY—SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

AND PERFORMANCE

This chapter presents the methodologies and specific assumptions for the analysis of

system requirements and performance of the HSGT cases. The four main analytical

components are capital investments, travel demand and revenues, operating and maintenance

(O&M) expenses, and ancillary activities.

CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

Building on the system design assumptions outlined in Chapter 4, the capital

investment requirements for an HSGT case fall into four broad categories:

1. Initial investment in fixed plant;

2. Initial investment in vehicles;

3. Continuing investment in vehicles; and

4. Continuing investment in fixed plant

Initial Investments

Initial investments include all fixed plant, rolling stock, and related equipment and

facilities necessary to operate and maintain the HSGT system at its inception.

Initial Fixed Plant Costs

Initial fixed plant requirements for Accelerail cases came primarily from a review of

track charts and other secondary sources.1 For New HSR and Maglev, the new rights-of-way

were superimposed on geographic information system maps. In both cases, the research led

to application of standard unit costs to the identified quantities and types of work.

Major components of initial fixed plant costs, together with key assumptions and

procedures governing the costing effort, are summarized below.

Right-of-way purchase and preparation costs figured into the estimates for New

HSR and Maglev because they involve new right-of-way. Such costs entered into Accelerail

estimates only for curve realignments outside the existing right-of-way.

 

1

 The scope of the capital costing effort did not allow for the illustrative corridors to undergo on-site inspection

especially for this study.
[5-2]

Realignments were treated as follows:

Technology: Accelerail 90 Accelerail 110, 125, 150 New HSR Maglev

Treatment: No realignments

outside right-ofway

Modest realignments, where

feasible and requiring no

extraordinary construction or

relocations

Does not apply—new rightsof-way2

Track capacity additions (applies to Accelerail only). New sidings, turnouts,

crossovers, double track sections, and reverse-signaling provisions were specified for

existing freight railroads, in order to accommodate—without adverse impact—freight train

frequencies one-fifth greater than those of today, along with projected HSGT trains.

New track construction (New HSR and Maglev). New HSR track was assumed to

be constructed to world-class (e.g., French, German, or Japanese) standards for 200 mph

permanent way. Maglev guideway reflected the system design concept for U.S. Maglev as

described in the report on the National Maglev Initiative (NMI), with some design

modifications based on subsequent research and made in consultation with such NMI

participants as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Both New HSR and Maglev were

assumed to be essentially double-tracked in the Northeast and California3 corridors, but

lower prospective traffic densities in most other corridors permitted the frequent use of

single track with long passing sidings.

Track structure improvements. Accelerail 150 options assumed a rebuilding of the

track to standards approaching those of New HSR, including concrete ties. The other

Accelerail options presupposed that—

• The freight railroads would be in a state of good repair at the inception of

HSGT projects—in particular, the existing rail would be suitable for the

higher speeds;

• The HSGT project would “line and surface” (bring to strict geometric

tolerances) all mainline track;

• Ties, other track materials, and ballast would be selectively renewed, at a

rate requisite to the speed level;

• Track undercutting, ballast cleaning, and drainage improvements would

occur for Accelerail 110 and 125; and

 

2

 Brief segments of New HSR, primarily in approaches to large cities, would make use of existing railroad

rights-of-way and were treated (in this and analogous design issues) similarly to higher-speed Accelerail

options.

3

 Los Angeles—Bay Area segment only.
[5-3]

• The condition of the track upon completion of the upgrading would be

consistently maintained thereafter. 4

Train control systems. New HSR and Maglev would have all-new, state-of-the-art

train control systems. The Accelerail options were estimated with train control systems

providing speed and authority enforcement.

The train control systems for Accelerail will necessitate that freight railroads’

locomotives be equipped with cab displays. These retrofits were estimated based on each

railroad’s fleet size and its route-mileage: the shorter the railroad, the higher the percentage

of locomotives assumed to require cab displays. (See Table 5-1.) As discussed in Chapter

4, any remaining differences over the extent and responsibility for locomotive modifications

would be left to negotiations between the railroad and other Accelerail partners.

Table 5-1

Assumed Percent of Freight Locomotives Retrofitted with Cab Displays by Railroad Size

Total Route-Miles

of the Freight Railroad

Percent of Freight Railroad’s

Locomotives Assumed To Be

Retrofitted

0—2,000 100%

2,001—5,000 75%

5,001—10,000 50%

10,001—15,000 25%

15,001 and above 15%

As added safety precautions for the mixed-use Accelerail environment, the estimates

also included shifted load detectors and additional electrically locked switches.

Electrification. New HSR and Maglev lines would be fully electrified. The

Accelerail 125 and 150 electrified cases were assumed to have modern, unobtrusive,

European-style electrification systems similar to that approved for installation between New

Haven and Boston.5 Electric propulsion was treated as an "overlay" for cost estimating

because the same alignments were used as in the nonelectrified cases. The overlay consists

of adding the required power supply system (substations) and delivery system (catenary) to

the candidate rail corridor, and providing the modifications to the signal systems and

clearances required to accommodate electrification.

 

4

 The costs of such a program were indeed charged against each case—see below under O&M expenses.

5

 Federal Railroad Administration, Record of Decision—Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report and

4(f) Statement—Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification—New Haven, Connecticut to Boston,

Massachusetts, May 1995.
[5-4]

Grade Crossings and Fencing. New HSR and Maglev would have no

highway/railroad grade crossings. Treatment of crossings on Accelerail lines adhered

strictly to the Department’s Action Plan for Highway-Rail Crossing Safety6 and assumed

improvements for public and private crossings that suit the planned operating speed over

each crossing, rather than the top speed of the technology. The distribution of crossings by

treatment at each operating speed level appears in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2

Assumed Treatment of Grade Crossings

Operating

speed over

crossing (mph)

Percentage of

crossings Percentage of crossings at each speed level improved by—

From To

retaining

existing

warning levels

Installing or

upgrading flashergate systems

Providing

positive barriers

against intrusion Separating Closing

PUBLIC CROSSINGS

0 79 65% 10% 25%

80 110 65% 10% 25%

111 125 50% 25% 25%

126 and up 75% 25%

PRIVATE CROSSINGS

0 79 75% 25%

80 110 60% 40%

111 125 30% 30% 40%

126 and up 60% 40%

The New HSR and Maglev options were assumed to be completely fenced, for

protection both of the railroad and of would-be trespassers. Fencing was installed in the

Accelerail cases at a coverage rate that was dependent on the maximum speed operated over

each segment.

Station treatments differed as between newly built and existing facilities:

• Each new station—built from scratch on New HSR or Maglev lines or

added to Accelerail systems—was sized, and its high-level platform and

track requirements were established, to accommodate its estimated

volume of traffic for the Year 2020 (midpoint of the planning period).

 

6

 Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan Support Proposals, June

13, 1994, pp. 28-30.
[5-5]

Costs were developed on a per-square-foot basis reflecting similar

construction.

• Existing Accelerail stations were assumed to be already adequately

sized. High-level platforms, however, were estimated and charged to

each case.

Other fixed facilities included:

• Maintenance-of-way bases (sited at regular intervals)7;

• Storage yards (based on fleet size in each case); and

• Equipment maintenance/repair and service/inspection facilities. Each

corridor (or group of corridors considered together) was assumed to have

one maintenance/repair shop. In addition, each corridor over 150 miles

in length was estimated to have a service/inspection facility at both

endpoints.8,9

Contingency and Program Management. The following percentage markups of

project cost provided an allowance for contingencies, design, and construction management:

Upgrading of Existing

Railroads (Mainly Accelerail)

New Construction (Mainly

Maglev and New HSR); also

Accelerail electrification

Contingencies 20% 25%

Design/construction management 10% 16%

Total allowance 30% 41%

Initial Vehicles

The required number of initial trainsets for a particular HSGT system10 was

determined to satisfy its estimated demand and service itineraries as of the year 2000, and

through the early years of corridor development. Several factors influenced the number of

trainsets required including forecast passenger demand, trip times, equipment turn times, and

 

7

 Lease costs for related movable equipment, both railborne (e.g. tamper) and highway (e.g. utility cranes, crew

cab trucks), are included in operating and maintenance expenses.

8

 Up-to-date Amtrak maintenance/repair/service/inspection shops already exist at Washington and Boston, and

non-Maglev corridors terminating in either of those two cities benefited from a consequent reduction in capital

costs.

9

 Corridors less than 150 miles long (of which this report contains only one example, California South) were

assumed to require only one service/inspection facility.

10 See Chapter 4 for trainset composition.
[5-6]

maintenance cycling. The cost of a locomotive varied with technology and was determined

based on recent procurements and estimates for development when necessary.

The cost of a passenger car depended largely on its interior configurations (e.g.,

coach, coach-café) and reflected recent procurements and the number of cars ordered.

Initial base costs ranged from $10 million per trainset for Accelerail 90 consists

($38,000 per seat) up to nearly $20 million per trainset for New HSR ($52,000 per seat).

The estimated base cost for Maglev vehicles was approximately $12 million per two-car

trainset ($80,000 per seat).

Continuing Investments

Continuing investments included all expenditures, other than annually recurring

O&M expenses, that would be incurred after the inception of HSGT service for fixed plant,

rolling stock, and related equipment and facilities. These ongoing investments would be

necessary to maintain the high degree of operational reliability and service quality that would

keep HSGT service marketable and commercially viable.

Continuing Vehicle Investments

Continuing investments in vehicles included the following items, for which the

analysis projected expenditures in the specific years of incurrence:

• Fleet expansion. The number of required trainsets would increase over

the study period (2000 —2040) with increases in demand. These

additional trains were assumed to be purchased in the middle of each

planning decade, or in some cases less frequently, in order to

accommodate growth. In general, fleet expansion equipment orders

would be for fewer units than the initial order.

• Fleet replacement. Assumed fleet life would be 20 years, at which time

vehicles would be replaced in kind.

• Fleet overhauls were assumed to occur on a mileage-driven basis that

would differ by technology, with work performed by outside contractors.

Equipment overhauls and equipment purchases, either to expand service or to replace

older equipment, were treated as continuing investments in the year in which they would

occur.
[5-7]

Continuing Fixed Facility Investments

For New HSR and any new construction under Accelerail options, the periodic

replacement of major track and electric traction components (“program” track maintenance)

was ascribed to particular years based on expected life cycles of the components.11

Continuing Investments for Maglev

For Maglev, continuing investments included fleet replacements and expansions

only; vehicle overhauls and fixed facility program maintenance were subsumed in operating

expenses.

Areas of Uncertainty in Capital Cost Projections

Beyond the requirement for intensive, site-specific engineering work as a prerequisite

to implementing any HSGT corridor, two areas of uncertainty characterize the capital cost

projections and emphasize the need for further detailed study of individual corridors.

Safety is a fundamental mission of the Department, and ongoing safety research and

experience periodically necessitate reexamination and augmentation of the FRA’s railroad

safety standards. To the extent that new safety regulations and guidelines impose costs not

addressed in this report, the initial investment requirements will increase over the levels

projected herein. On the other hand, the FRA’s Next Generation High-Speed Rail program

is actively pursuing opportunities for technological developments that would enhance safety,

lower capital and operating costs, and improve system performance. The net financial effect

of all these ongoing activities is not susceptible to estimation at this time, nor is it included

in the capital cost contingency factors.

TRAVEL DEMAND AND REVENUES

This section describes the methodology underlying the demand and revenue

projections for each case.

Overview

The broad outlines of the demand methodology, as applied to each case, are as

follows:

 

11 For Accelerail options in general, this study did not determine the installation dates of the freight railroads’

track components, and “program” maintenance was treated as a separate, annualized element of maintenanceof-way expense.
[5-8]

Step 1: In the absence of HSGT, project the likely traffic of the existing modes for all citypair markets in the forecast years.

• Air

• Auto

• Bus

• Conventional rail

Step 2: Apply diversion models to each existing mode to develop the likely traffic levels

contributed by that mode to an HSGT system.

Step 3: Based on the proportions of diversion from other modes, develop induced demands

for HSGT.

Step 4: HSGT demand is the total of diverted plus induced demand, summed across all city

pair markets served by the case.

Step 5: HSGT passenger transportation revenue is the product of the demand times the

assumed fares (separately calculated for business- and nonbusiness-purpose trips).

Step 1: Project Existing Modes Without HSGT

Air and auto projections made use of regression equations, while bus and rail

projections incorporated a simple annual percentage increase assumption from a 1993 base,

within the range established for auto and air.

Air Projections

A regression equation related air volumes in 1979, 1983, 1988, and 199312 to fares,

distances, population, and per capita income. On the basis of this equation, assumed fares,

 

12Taken from the 10 percent sample of actual tickets sold by large airlines as compiled by the Research and

Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the Department. Minor adjustments were made to account for

missing commuter airline trips and a small undercount. Base year traffic was extrapolated from the 10 percent

sample for that year. For comparison purposes, actual total commuter airline trips for a city pair were obtained

from RSPA. Given a situation when the extrapolated traffic for a city-pair appeared high/low in comparison

with the actual commuter trips, an adjustment was made to the base traffic. The effects of such adjustments

added 2.2 percent to total air traffic. All trip totals were then increased by 1.5 percent (3.7% -2.2%) to account
[5-9]

and applicable BEA population and income forecasts,13 the model then developed air

passenger growth factors for each city-pair market. Application of these growth factors to

1993 actual data yielded the presumed air traffic for the forecast years.

Auto Projections

No solid data base currently exists for auto traffic on a city-pair basis. Therefore, on

the basis of observations of auto trips in 55 markets from previous detailed corridor studies,

a model was developed to estimate existing and future auto traffic in 50- to 500-mile citypair markets. The model calculates auto trips for any year as a function of—

• the combined personal income of the two cities;

• the distance separating the cities;

• the potential of one of the cities, due to its recreational infrastructure, to

attract a high number of tourists; and

• whether or not competing, frequently operated rail service exists between

the cities.

Conventional Rail Projections

“Conventional rail” means passenger train service of the type and frequency operated

by Amtrak in the early 1990s. Amtrak city-pair ridership statistics were adjusted to remove

local traffic,14 then projected through the study period by applying the growth rates described

in Chapter 4.

Bus Projections

Since the bus companies do not publish their city-pair ridership, the study estimated

1993 bus traffic from bus route frequencies, an average seat capacity of 45, and an assumed

average load factor of 50 percent for corridor-type services.15 A gravity model then

estimated the number of bus passengers traveling to and from all city pairs (stops) within a

route,16 thus providing a base for forecasts.

 

for the remainder of the ticket sample’s shortage compared to Federal Aviation Administration enplanement

data.

13 See Chapter 4 for underlying assumptions and BEA forecasts.

14 I.e., within CMSAs or MSAs and less than 50 miles; see Chapter 4.

15 Thus a 45 seat bus is assumed to have 22.5 passengers, and this is multiplied by the bus frequency between

the route endpoints. The 50 percent average load factor is based on a conversation with a bus industry expert.

16 The gravity model calculates the number of intermediate stop passengers by using as explanatory variables

the population and income for the "stop" areas (cities) and the distance between the stops.
[5-10]

Step 2: Apply Diversion Models

A set of diversion models—one for each mode and trip purpose—estimated the

percentage of trips in each city-pair that HSGT would attract were it available. In this

discussion, the “donor mode” is one of the existing modes as projected for the future, and

the HSGT option is the recipient mode.

Each diversion model considers pairwise comparisons of the utility of HSGT versus

that of the existing mode, as seen by business and nonbusiness travelers. If the perceived

utilities are equal, then HSGT attracts 50 percent of the donor mode’s passengers.

The diversion model equations include, as independent variables, the fares, trip

times, and frequencies of the paired, competing modes. The coefficients used in these linear

combinations depend on the donor mode and trip purpose; represent the relative value that

travelers, who are using that mode for that purpose, attach to the attribute, e. g., “value of

time”; and reflect structured interviews in which travelers expressed preferences between

their habitual mode and alternatives characterized according to these attributes.

There are separate equations for business and nonbusiness trip purposes for each of

the following five donor modes, for a total of ten17 equations in all:

1. Local air trips within a corridor (“Air O/D”)—the actual trip

endpoints are both in the corridor

2. Transfer air trips (“Air Transfer”)—the trip within the corridor forms

part of a longer air trip

3. Auto

4. Conventional Rail18

5. Bus

For each donor mode and trip purpose, these equations calculate future market share

percentages for HSGT by city pair. These percentages, when applied to the base trips

projected by donor mode and trip purpose in the absence of HSGT, yield the ridership

diverted to HSGT. Total HSGT ridership in a corridor thus aggregates the diverted ridership

in all markets from all donor modes and trip purposes.

 

17 Actually, the air and auto modes are further disaggregated, making a total of 16 equations.

18 In markets where significant conventional rail service already exists, adjustments are made to account for

trips which have already diverted to the existing rail service.
[5-11]

Step 3: Develop Induced Demand

Induced demand, which is totally new demand for travel created by the introduction

of a new travel option, generates controversy owing to the paucity of corroborative historical

data, roadblocks to defining and quantifying such demand even where data exist, and

methodological difficulties.19

Probable cause exists, however, for allowing for a modicum of induced demand in

this analysis. Studies of the effects of introducing totally new transport capabilities (the jet

in transatlantic travel, major additions to highway networks) suggest that up to 70 to 80

percent of demand can be termed “induced.” More germane to HSGT, estimates of demand

induced by Shinkansen lines in Japan range from 6 to 28 percent of total travel; the French

National Railways claims that as of 1984, 16 percent of the traffic on the Paris-Lyon TGV

line was induced.20

When Southwest Airlines entered the Baltimore/Washington—Cleveland market, its

81 percent fare cut caused traffic between all three Washington area airports and Cleveland

to grow by 173 percent over the previous year’s traffic. Determining how much of that was

induced—trips that would never have occurred without the “new service”—exemplifies

the problems bedeviling all induced demand projections. First, there would have been

natural traffic growth due to improved national and local business conditions. Second,

traffic would have been diverted from other airports—conceivably, even from as far away as

Richmond, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and New York. Third, the new fare (averaging $31) can

be cheaper per mile than the perceived cost of driving assumed in this study, so that

considerable auto traffic might have been diverted between very large catchment areas

surrounding the two origins and destinations. 21 Only the residual, which cannot be readily

calculated based on available data and techniques, would truly constitute induced demand.

Table 5-3 shows the importance of induced demand in several HSGT corridor

studies. Following the precedent set by the more cautious of those studies as well as transit

 

19 As the World Bank’s railway advisor puts it:

Beware of induced demand. Logically, if an entirely new option is available, at least

some demand will occur that is entirely new and would only exist with the new mode.

Common sense (unlike some models) suggests that, if all else is held constant, little new

demand would actually result. Clearly, models that predict significant levels of induced

demand must bear the burden of proof.—Louis S. Thompson, “Trapped in the Forecast: An

Economic Field of Dreams,” Transportation Research News 165, March-April 1993.

20 Boon, Jones and Associates, Kingston, Ontario, Induced Demand: Case Histories, for National Maglev

Initiative.

21 To illustrate these last two factors: Baltimore-Washington International Airport—now a low-fare Mecca due

to the presence of Southwest Airlines—in 1995 registered a growth of 114 percent in passengers originating in

the District of Columbia, almost 90 percent from Virginia, and 80 percent from Southern Pennsylvania,

according to the Baltimore Metropolitan Council.
[5-12]

Table 5-3

Induced Demand in Other Corridor Studies22

L.A.—Las Vegas: 48% New York—Montreal: 17%

Florida: 40% Texas Triangle: 10%23

Pennsylvania: None Ohio: 6.8—7.6%

Detroit—Chicago: 10% National Maglev Initiative 10% (baseline option)

industry experience, 24 this analysis assumed that induced demand will equate to ten

percent or less of the diverted traffic, as detailed in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4

Assumptions on Induced Demand

Donor Mode Induced HSGT Traffic as a Percentage of Traffic Diverted from Donor Mode

Air O/D 10%

Air Transfer 25% of 10%, or 2.5 percent

Auto 10%

Conventional Rail At 50% diversion rates and above, a graduated scale of diversion starting at 0% and

reaching 10% at the 100% diversion level

Steps 4 and 5: Total Demand and Transportation Revenue

The total HSGT travel for each case in each forecast year equates to the sum, across

all city-pair markets in the corridor, of—

• Ridership diverted from each donor mode, by trip purpose, plus

• Induced ridership, expressed as a percentage markup over diverted traffic

by donor mode and trip purpose.

Likewise, the passenger transportation revenue for each case summarizes, across all

city-pairs—

• Diverted plus induced business-purpose trips, times the assumed HSGT

business fare, plus

 

22 Source: In Pursuit of Speed, Transportation Research Board, Washington: 1991, p. 105; Final Report on the

National Maglev Initiative, p. 3-4.

23This was for the initial Texas work. Subsequent efforts used a more complex method.

24 Retrospectives on urban transit ridership (derived from reported information on selected systems) before and

after the introduction of light or heavy rail to bus-only corridors show the following results, in terms of the

ratios of induced to diverted travel:

• BART Transbay (1975): 12%

• Euclid Line, San Diego Trolley (1987): 7%

• MARTA East-West Line (1980): 17%

• WMATA Van Ness Extension (1984): 13%
[5-13]

• Diverted plus induced nonbusiness trips, times the assumed HSGT

nonbusiness fare.

Passenger transportation revenue, plus income from ancillary activities, equals

system revenues for each case.

OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSES

The O&M expense model constituted a build-up costing approach. It analyzed the

entire HSGT operation into major functions (e.g., transportation), subfunctions (e.g., train

movement), and activities (e.g., train operators) so as to identify and estimate all the work

elements necessary to conduct and perpetuate passenger transportation service. The

objective was to develop a total O&M expense for each case by adding detailed estimates up

a complex hierarchy. Table 5-5 exemplifies the output of the model and shows the expense

hierarchy at its highest levels of aggregation.

To accomplish this, the model incorporated a series of linked spreadsheets,

comprising an ordered set of cost-estimating relationships (CERs), to project O&M expenses

for a broad spectrum of HSGT systems. This method resulted in a set of CERs with the

flexibility to estimate costs based on:

• the technology being modeled;

• the service operated—frequency, top speeds, and other characteristics;

• the physical characteristics of the infrastructure over which the service is

operated;

• the ownership and operational responsibility for the infrastructure; and

• the management philosophy applied to develop the HSGT organization.

Within that characterization, the expense estimates assumed the continuation of

existing rail passenger industry wage rates, ratios of supervisory and support personnel to

on-site primary workers, and spans of control. The expenses do, however, reflect the

efficiencies inherent in high-volume, high-frequency, high-speed operations with new

equipment, new or refurbished infrastructures, and enhanced customer service levels.

Maglev’s uniqueness necessitated careful consideration in the development of the

operating expense model. Not only does the technology depart from the steel-wheel-onsteel-rail norm of the other options, but no example of revenue intercity corridor service yet

exists anywhere in the world. Therefore, the Maglev O&M expense estimates incorporated

specialized CERs for such technology-specific functions as maintenance of equipment and

maintenance of way, while such other functions as stations and train crews received the same

treatment as for Accelerail and New HSR.
[5-14]

Table 5-5: Example of O&M Model Output for a Typical Case25

(Year 2020; Amounts in Dollars)

Account Labor Other Purchased Total

Number Description Costs Energy Materials Services O&M Expense

1000 MAINTENANCE OF WAY 606,855 0 44,449 5,410,681 6,061,985

1200 Permanent way maintenance - Inspection and

Repair

383,323 0 6,881 2,154,047 2,544,251

1300 Permanent way program maintenance 2,837 0 23,917 2,878,329 2,905,083

1400 Major structures maintenance 0 0 0 70,409 70,409

1600 Electric traction maintenance 0 0 0 0 0

1800 Signals and communications maintenance 117,138 0 9,725 306,121 432,985

1900 M-O-W facilities operating overhead and

maintenance

103,558 0 3,926 1,775 109,259

2000 MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT 4,587,429 7,149 782,296 4,297,848 9,674,722

2300 Short turnaround cleaning 0 3,805 94,182 937,114 1,035,101

2500 Service and inspection 40,371 3,344 253,183 2,725,370 3,022,267

2700 Maintenance and repair 4,223,812 0 418,993 0 4,642,806

2900 M-O-E buildings operating overhead and

maintenance

323,245 0 15,938 635,365 974,548

3000 TRANSPORTATION 11,833,937 4,250,808 11,050 1,791,560 17,887,354

3300 Superintendence and dispatching 335,454 0 11,050 1,791,560 2,138,064

3500 Train movement 10,513,055 4,215,619 0 0 14,728,674

3700 Yard operations 985,428 35,189 0 0 1,020,617

3900 Transportation facilities operating overhead

and maintenance

0 0 0 0 0

4000 PASSENGER TRAFFIC AND SERVICES 8,181,371 0 437,365 11,508,978 20,127,714

4200 Marketing, service design, and pricing 1,834,621 0 263,589 0 2,098,210

4300 Information, reservations, and ticketing 921,054 0 15,084 9,111,166 10,047,303

4500 Baggage services 65,557 0 280 0 65,837

4600 Station operations and maintenance 0 0 0 185,676 185,676

4800 On-board services 4,077,521 0 116,163 2,212,137 6,405,821

4900 Station overhead 1,282,617 0 42,250 0 1,324,867

5000 GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 6,343,603 0 690,569 11,540,683 18,574,855

5200 General and administrative management 3,582,502 0 145,392 0 3,727,894

5300 Personnel 590,146 0 17,940 0 608,086

5400 Procurement 667,122 0 21,450 0 688,572

5500 Financial management 1,038,717 0 38,476 425,608 1,502,801

5600 Security 280,708 0 461,189 4,552,157 5,294,054

5700 Insurance and liability 184,408 0 6,122 5,845,109 6,035,639

5800 Taxes 0 0 0 0 0

5900 G&A facility operating overheads and

maintenance

0 0 0 717,808 717,808

TOTAL 31,553,194 4,257,957 1,965,730 34,549,750 72,326,631

 

25 “Tenant” Paradigm. This table is provided for insight into the overall workings of the model rather than

for the sake of the individual numbers. A “zero” (or very small amount) in a cell does not necessarily mean

the item is missing from (or underestimated in) the calculation. For instance, many energy costs are included in

“purchased services” and certain overheads are dealt with elsewhere in the model than in the “overhead”

accounts (1900, 2900, etc.).
[5-15]

The following assumptions underlie the operating expenses for this study.

Maintenance of Way

Incremental costing. In Accelerail cases26 involving intercity passenger operations

over a freight railroad landlord, the expense model estimated the freight railroad’s track

maintenance expenses both “with” and “without” the superimposed passenger service and

assumed that the passenger operator would pay for the increment27 as a “purchased service.”

Since the scope of the study did not allow for detailed engineering inspection of the existing

routes, the model assumed a generic freight railroad based on typical conditions for principal

main lines in the U.S. and calculated the baseline expenses (“without” HSGT) accordingly.

The generic freight railroad was assumed always to be in good repair—i.e., with no deferred

maintenance at any time. The assumed standards for the improved railroad (“with” HSGT)

varied with the technological option and the assumed capital investments.

HSGT as Landlord. Where the HSGT operator would be the landlord, having

freight or commuter tenants, this study assumed that the HSGT landlord would recover, with

neither deficit, surplus, nor management fee, all incremental costs occasioned by the

presence of tenant services (e.g., for track maintenance due to the presence of freight).28 An

HSGT landlord situation only occurred where an intercity right-of-way currently belongs to

Amtrak—specifically, in the Northeast Corridor and in a portion of the Chicago—Detroit

corridor.

Maintenance of Equipment

The assumed nature and frequency of equipment maintenance tasks governed the

related O&M expenses. Table 5-6 summarizes these cycles for the Accelerail and New HSR

options.

Transportation

Incremental costing. Wherever intercity passenger operations would take place

over a line owned by a freight railroad, the expense model estimated, and charged to the

HSGT system, the incremental transportation superintendence and dispatching expenses to

be borne by the railroad landlord.

 

26 Also in New HSR cases to the extent that they rely on existing railroads for access to city centers.

27 Plus a 20 percent management fee on direct labor and three percent on materials.

28 To the extent the HSGT landlord can exact payment from its tenant(s) of a portion of its fixed overhead

costs, the landlord’s operating results will improve over those shown here. Conversely, to the extent the

tenant’s payment to the HSGT landlord falls short of full incremental costs, the HSGT operator’s results will

suffer.
[5-16]

Table 5-6

Equipment Maintenance Cycles for Steel-Wheel Options

Equipment Maintenance Task Assumed Frequency

Interior cleaning Each trip turnaround, in stations; daily at service/inspection

facility for more time-consuming work

Exterior cleaning Daily

Service and inspection Each trip turnaround, in stations; daily at service/inspection

facility for more time-consuming work

Periodic maintenance and repair 60-day and 6-month cycles, based on the nature of the

required work

Running repairs As needed

Overhauls Every 1.5 million miles of revenue service

Trainset crew sizing. Consistent with emerging arrangements at Amtrak stations,

ticket control was assumed to be by means of a farecard-type system at stations, all of which

would have high-level platforms allowing easy access to trains. Nevertheless, the study

assigned a three-person trainset crew—one operator (“engineer”), one conductor, and one

customer service representative29—to all trains of six cars or less. This is in addition to

personnel operating cafés (see under “On-Board Service,” below).

In the rare instances30 in which traffic densities called for trains with seven cars or

more, the model added a second customer service representative (for a total of four trainset

crew members) to assist the greater number of passengers.31

Passenger Traffic and Services

Information, reservations, and ticketing assumptions include:

• All trains will be space-controlled: while the HSGT operator will not

require advance reservations, it will sell tickets only up to the seating

capacity of each train.

• Twenty percent of passengers will arrive at the station without an

advance reservation.

• Of the advance-reserving passengers, about one-third will reserve and

purchase through travel agents at a ten percent commission, while two-

 

29 Customer service representatives are accounted for under “passenger traffic and services/on-board services.”

30 E.g., in the Northeast Corridor New HSR case.

31 This approximates the train crew-to-passenger ratios of the French National Railways for its TGV services.
[5-17]

thirds will reserve and purchase through the HSGT operator’s own

system.

Baggage service. In keeping with the precedent set by Amtrak’s Metroliners and

VIA’s Canadian corridor services, the HSGT system was assumed to offer no checked

baggage service. The relatively short distances involved, the availability of ample luggage

storage space on trains, and the high capital and operating costs of checked baggage service

called for this assumption. The model did allow for platform attendants to assist passengers

needing assistance with their hand luggage, and rental luggage carts would be available.

On-board services. The study assumed that food and soft-drink service would occur

at no direct cost32 to, and with no revenue production for, the HSGT operator. This could be

accomplished by developing a labor/management partnership to streamline Amtrak’s

existing staffing and commissary arrangements, by contracting out the cafés, by selectively

raising prices, or by other means.

General and Administrative Expenses

Insurance and liability. Expenses for insurance and liability reflected the

experience of airlines, commuter rail operators, and Amtrak on a per-passenger mile basis,

adjusted for both speed and the overall scale of the corridor operation.33

Taxes. As described in Chapter 4, the O&M expense projections do not include

property or income tax payments in view of the private/public partnership arrangement

underlying the HSGT project.34

ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES

Intercity passenger carriers typically engage in activities that are ancillary to the basic

movement of people, that enhance the quality of service, that are typically priced on a payas-you-go basis, and that often yield profits. This study modeled these ancillary activities

and included them in the system requirements and performance of the cases. Depending on

the case, the total income from ancillary activities amounted to between three and ten

percent of system revenues.

 

32 The HSGT operator would absorb the cost of the revenue transportation space lost due to provision of cafés.

33 The model typically returns costs of one to two cents per passenger-mile for this activity.

34 The precise tax arrangements and implications will, of course, require further study and negotiation during

the development of individual corridor partnerships.
[5-18]

Categories of Ancillary Activities

For purposes of this report ancillary activities fall into three categories: passenger-,

commerce-, and facility-dependent activities. These categories are defined as follows:

Passenger-dependent activities involve the purchase of optional goods and services

by passengers above and beyond the fares they pay for intercity transportation. These

revenues relate directly to the number of passengers carried. In addition to services and

conveniences for travelers, this category also includes revenues from advertising placed in

the HSGT system by other entities.

Commerce-dependent activities include use of HSGT for hauling commercial

freight, especially overnight and expedited freight and mail. These revenues are affected by

the volume of commerce between the cities along the right-of-way, and by competing modes

for moving this traffic. For some Accelerail and New HSR systems, the passenger

operator’s freedom to earn some types of freight revenue may depend on negotiations with

its freight railroad partners.

Facility-dependent revenues are the third component of ancillary activities. These

revenues can include lease of access to right-of-way, co-development of station properties,

and lease of facility space.

Analytical Treatment

The study applied four generic approaches to projecting the results of ancillary

activities:

(1) In situations in which the HSGT operator would—without incurring any

initial capital expenditure—receive an income stream (such as franchise

fees) from a concessionaire, the projection showed an "income only"

based on expected net receipts per passenger, per pound of package

shipments, and the like.

(2) If the HSGT operator would need to make an initial capital investment

prior to enjoying an income stream, as in the case of parking and station

concessions, the projection included both “income and capital cost” in

the years earned or expended. Initial investments were sized to meet year

2020 demand.

(3) If an ancillary activity's revenues would lend themselves to projection,

but the recipient of those revenues (or the party responsible for their

attendant expenses or capital costs) would be difficult to identify, then

the analysis developed those revenues for information only and omitted

them from the operating results.
[5-19]

(4) Facility-related activities were too site-specific for inclusion in the

operating projections and received “qualitative” treatment. Nevertheless,

they could theoretically provide a boost to HSGT implementation—for

example, if a commercial power industry highly covets access to a

specific right-of-way.

Table 5-7 summarizes the contents and treatment of each category.

Table 5-7

Overview of Ancillary Activities

Category Includes Treatment35

Passengerdependent

• Advertising revenue

• On-board alcoholic beverage service

revenue

• On-board phone, fax and entertainment

• Station parking revenue

• Station concessions revenue

• Income only

• Income only

• Income only

• Income and capital cost

• Income and capital cost

Commercedependent

• First-class mail; document and small

parcel express

• Package express

• Expedited LTL

• Income only

• Revenue only (for information

only; no income included)

• Revenue only (for information

only; no income included)

Facilitydependent

• Right-of-way access for pipelines,

power lines, fiber optics, air rights

• Co-development

• Station leases

• All qualitative

 

35 In the balance of this report, ancillary income is included in system revenues, of which the ancillary portion is

typically between three and ten percent. Ancillary capital costs are included in infrastructure investments.
Chapter 6 

METHODOLOGY—

COMPARISONS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS

Chapter 3 describes the rationale for going beyond purely commercial considerations to

compare the range of benefits and costs attributable to HSGT systems. The present chapter

describes the methodologies on which the benefit/cost comparisons are based.

TYPES OF BENEFIT/COST COMPARISONS

The analysis provides for three approaches to comparing benefits and costs:

(1) Total benefits versus total costs

(2) Benefits to HSGT users versus costs borne by users

(3) Benefits to the public at large versus publicly-borne costs

Regardless of the approach employed, the comparison of benefits with costs takes two

basic forms: a subtraction (benefits less costs) and a ratio (benefits divided by costs). 

The latter two approaches make use of subsets of “total benefits” and “total costs.” 

Tables 6-1 through 6-3 present the constituents of each of these three approaches. 

Table 6-1

Total Benefits Versus Total Costs

Types of Benefits and Costs Related Analytical Components

Total Benefits:

Benefits to HSGT Users:

Benefits for Which HSGT Users Pay Directly ....Equates to System Revenues (See

Chapter 5)

Benefits for Which HSGT Users Do Not Pay

Directly ...................................................................Equates to Users’ Consumer Surplus

(Described in This Chapter)

Benefits to the Public at Large:

Airport Congestion Delay Savings.......................Described in This Chapter

Highway Congestion Delay Savings.....................Described in This Chapter

Emissions Savings..................................................Described in This Chapter

Total Costs:

Initial Investment .............................................................See Chapter 5

Operating and Maintenance Expense.............................See Chapter 5

Continuing Investments...................................................See Chapter 5
[6-2]

Chapter 3 explains how the comparison of total benefits with total costs (Table 6-1)

enters into the “partnership potential” determination as formulated for this report. However,

further benefit/cost comparisons may be of interest to the public and its responsible officials.

Specifically, a comparison of the benefits to HSGT users with the costs borne by those users 

(Table 6-2) reveals the relative importance of the users’ consumer surplus, for which—by

definition—they pay nothing directly.1

Table 6-2

Benefits to HSGT Users Versus Costs Borne by Users

Types of Benefits and Costs Related Analytical Components

Benefits to HSGT Users:

Benefits for Which HSGT Users Pay Directly ....Equates to System Revenues (See Chapter 5)

Benefits for Which HSGT Users Do Not Pay

Directly ...................................................................Equates to Users’ Consumer Surplus (Described

in This Chapter)

Costs Borne by Users.....................................................Equates to System Revenues (See Chapter 5)

By the same token, a comparison of benefits to the public at large with publicly-borne

costs (Table 6-3) provides additional insights on the value of the public investment.

Table 6-3

Benefits to the Public at Large Versus Publicly-Borne Costs

Types of Benefits and Costs Related Analytical Components

Benefits to the Public at Large:

Airport Congestion Delay Savings......................Described in This Chapter

Highway Congestion Delay Savings....................Described in This Chapter

Emissions Savings.................................................Described in This Chapter

Publicly-Borne Costs.....................................................Equates to Total Costs Less Costs Borne by

Users (i.e., in practical terms, Total Costs Less

System Revenues)(See Chapter 5)

In most (but not all) illustrative cases, as detailed in Chapter 7, the comparison of benefits

to the public at large with publicly-borne costs tends to portray HSGT less favorably than does

the comparison of total benefits with total costs. This pattern essentially reflects the absence of

 

1

 In this comparison, HSGT users are treated as users only, and not as taxpayers. That is, the indirect payments that

users may make (in absorbing, via taxes, a portion of the public investment in HSGT) do not figure in the equation.
[6-3]

the users’ consumer surplus from the benefits to the public at large, and its inclusion in total

benefits. In economic terms, to the extent that the publicly-borne costs exceed the benefits to the

public at large in a given case, the consumer surplus may be regarded as a subsidy enjoyed by the

users.

“TOTAL BENEFITS” AND “OTHER IMPACTS”

The short-list of “total benefits” in Table 6-1 resulted from a process of elimination, in

which potentially includable benefits of HSGT had to satisfy all the following characteristics. 

Items lacking one or more of these characteristics fell under the rubric of “other impacts” and

did not influence the quantitative results of the study.

Immediately quantifiable in practical terms: Within the scope of a nationwide study,

data had to be available at a sufficient level of detail, and a straightforward methodology with

broadly acceptable assumptions had to be developed, to make the item susceptible to estimation

for this report. For example, many environmental/energy items (as well as benefits from

improvements to commuter service) would theoretically lend themselves to quantification, but

only in light of exhaustive, site-specific data gathered at the State and local level.

Monetizable: The item had to lend itself to expression in dollar terms, also in a

straightforward manner.

Not duplicative: The item could not duplicate any other element of total benefits. To

allow such duplication would result in a double counting of benefits, thereby skewing the results

of the study. For example, total benefits could not legitimately include both reductions in

congestion-driven airport delay costs to airlines and travelers and the value of deferred airport

expansions, since these are two ways of measuring the same effect.2

Not a transfer effect: The item could not represent a reallocation of infrastructure

investments and economic benefits from one geographic area or type of project to another. While

such transfers might be of interest to the recipients at the State or local level, they cannot

legitimately enter into total benefits from a national perspective. Typical transfers would include

the economic multiplier effects of HSGT construction, operations, and station area development.

These criteria pertain specifically to a nationwide study at the Federal level. States may

develop a different calculus of benefits because they will have access to much more detailed,

corridor-specific information, because their priorities will reflect regional concerns, and because

they may enjoy their own local financing sources.

Table 6-4 presents the results of this process of elimination. The following sections

present the methodologies for estimating the analytical components of total benefits that Chapter

 

2

 The same was true of highway delay cost reductions and deferred highway expansions.
[6-4]

Table 6-4

Development of Components of Total Benefits

Criteria for Inclusion in Total Benefits

(• means criterion was met. All criteria had to be met

for inclusion in Total Benefits.)

Components

Quantifiable Monetizable3

Not

duplicative

Not a

transfer

Total Benefits

System Revenues • • • •

Users’ Consumer Surplus • • • •

Benefits to the Public at Large:

Airport congestion delay savings • • • •

Highway congestion delay savings • • • •

Emissions savings • • • •

Other Impacts

Transportation Items:

Airport investment deferrals • • •

Highway investment deferrals • • •

Commuter rail travel efficiency

benefits

• •

Transportation safety improvements • •

Economic Development Items:

HSGT construction effects • • •

HSGT operations effects • • •

Station development effects • • •

Growth of American HSGT supply

industry

• •

Environmental/Energy Items:

Noise • •

Water quality • •

Land consumption • •

Community disruption • •

Endangered species habitat • •

Wetlands • •

Energy savings • • •

 

3

 If an item was not quantifiable, this table regards it as not monetizable.
[6-5]

5 does not treat: the users’ consumer surplus and the benefits to the public at large. Finally, the

chapter provides background information on “other impacts” that might be ascribed to HSGT.

USERS’ CONSUMER SURPLUS

HSGT fares in this study are set to

maximize net revenue in competition with

other modes,4 not to exact from travelers the

full value of each trip to them.5 The users’

consumer surplus, then, is the difference

between the amount an individual would be

willing to pay for HSGT service and the

amount demanded of her or him by the HSGT

entity. For example, a traveler might be willing

to pay $25 for using HSGT to go from City A

to City B, but the HSGT operator charges only

$20 because that fare yields the maximum net

revenue. The $5 difference is what economists

traditionally call “consumer surplus."6,7

For this study, the users’ consumer

surplus estimation procedure adopted the steps

demonstrated in Figure 6-1. Because the travel

demand model is highly sensitive to fare levels (note downward slope of the diagonal line

relating fares to ridership), increasing the fare from the base fare “A” to “D” and rerunning the

model results in lower ridership (“E”). The lower number of projected HSGT users represents the

number of people who would be willing to pay the extra fare for the HSGT benefits, and the

added fare times the number of travelers willing to pay it represents the first increment of users’

consumer surplus with respect to fare level “A.” Increasing the fare again to “G” will result in

 

4

 See Chapter 4 for this fundamental assumption.

5

 Exacting the full value at the farebox is, indeed, the purpose of yield management as practiced by Amtrak and the

airlines today. However, state-of-the-art demand projection techniques cannot yet deal with the multiplicity of everchanging fares characteristic of yield management. To the extent that an HSGT entity would be able to manipulate

its fares to exact the full value of travel from each passenger, revenues and operating surpluses would increase and

consumer surpluses would decrease from the levels projected herein.

6

 In economic terms, to the extent that the publicly-borne costs exceed the benefits to the public at large in a given

case, the consumer surplus may be regarded as a subsidy enjoyed by the users.

7

 See Robley Winfrey, Economic Analysis for Highways, 1969, and American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials, A Manual on User Benefit Analysis of Highway and Bus-Transit Improvements, 1977. OMB

Circular A-94 also addresses consumer surplus in the context of cost/benefit analysis.

Figure 6-1

Users’ Consumer Surplus Concept

I

D

A C

H E

F

G

Ridership B

Fares

Consumer

Surplus

Revenue

Consumer

Surplus
[6-6]

even lower ridership (“H”). The new ridership times the fare increase from level “D” represents

the next increment in users’ consumer surplus. At some maximum point, the fare level is

sufficiently high to discourage almost all riders and no additional increment of users’ consumer

surplus can be found. For purposes of this study, a maximum of three times the base HSGT fare

(“G” in the schematic) is used as the upper limit. By running the ridership model and increasing

fares from the base level “A” to the upper limit, then summing up the increments in users’

consumer surplus at each fare level, the users’ consumer surplus can be calculated for each

corridor and technology option.

BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC AT LARGE

For purposes of this analysis, benefits to the public at large consist of three items—

savings from congestion delay at airports and on highways, and emissions savings.

Airport Congestion Delay Savings

As explained in Chapter 2, congestion and delays experienced by aircraft and passengers

alike are reaching high levels, especially in California, the Chicago region, and the Northeast

Corridor. By diverting passengers from the air mode, HSGT would help to reduce the rate of

growth in airport congestion. Such savings would yield two sets of benefits:

(1) The change in operating costs, or the incremental savings, to remaining

aircraft when total takeoffs and landings are reduced and airport congestion

delay decreased. Various capacity studies at highly congested airports have

found significant savings are possible by reducing the hours of delay caused

by the capacity-straining growth in operations (takeoffs and landings). For

example, the Los Angeles International Airport Capacity Enhancement Plan,

September 1991, concluded that, in the year 2000, when total annual

operations are projected to exceed 711,000, the delay at Los Angeles

International due to each additional operation (plane landing or taking off)

would be 1.51 hours and add $3,360 to the operating costs of affected carriers.

(2) The value to remaining air passengers of the travel time saved. In addition

to increasing airlines' operating costs, congestion-related delays increase the

overall travel time of passengers. These delays may consist of deviations from

scheduled flight departure and arrival times and added time on the taxiway or

en route. Most available information pertains to wait time delays at an

originating or terminating airport.

Since each airport serves a multiplicity of city-pair markets, most of which will not have

HSGT service, the importance of HSGT’s effects on delay would vary with the relative
[6-7]

prominence of HSGT markets in the airport’s traffic base, and the airport’s ambient traffic,

capacity, and delay conditions. 

Figure 6-2 illustrates the conceptual basis for developing the airport congestion delay

savings. For each major airport in a corridor, the study projected traffic growth, assumed a

modicum of capacity additions, and developed average delay estimates per aircraft operation, all

in the absence of HSGT.8 Average delays were capped at 15 minutes per operation because such

crisis-level delays would likely be viewed as intolerable.

In the Year 2000, HSGT would begin to divert air traffic and palliate the rate of growth in

average airport delays. The “delay savings” pictured in Figure 6-2 would be the difference

between the delays without and with HSGT. Thus, over the planning period, the airport

congestion delay savings represent the sum of—

• The projected reduction of aircraft-hours of delay, multiplied by the average

cost to the airlines of each delay-hour; and

• The projected reduction in passenger-hours of delay for the remaining air

travelers, multiplied by the average value of air passenger wait times

($39.03/hour) included in the ridership model for this study. 9

Highway Congestion Delay Savings

Conceptually similar to airport delay savings, the value of reduced congestion and delay

on highways from diversion of auto travelers to HSGT would constitute a potential benefit of

HSGT. The benefit was estimated in terms of the value to remaining highway users of travel time

 

8

 These were the same general assumptions as affected the demand estimates; see Chapter 4.

9

 Charles River Associates, Market Share Models for Forecasting Ridership on New High-Speed Intercity

Transportation, 1994.

Figure 6-2: Concept for Airport Congestion Delay Savings

Delays per Air

Operation

Year

1993 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

15

Minutes

Delays Without HSGT

Delays With HSGT

Delay Savings
[6-8]

saved when traffic volumes on major highways in HSGT city-pair markets decrease (or grow at a

reduced rate) and travel speeds improve. As in the case of airports, the importance of HSGT’s

effects on highway delay would vary with the relative prominence of intercity travel in the road’s

traffic mix; the share of HSGT markets in that intercity travel; and the highway’s ambient traffic,

capacity, and delay conditions. 

Traffic removed from highways was based upon ridership model forecasts of diverted

auto passengers, converted to vehicles using a vehicle occupancy of 1.2. Highway conditions and

the effects of HSGT trip diversion were approximated by extrapolating from the traffic impacts

at selected corridor locations including:

• Each major metropolitan area HSGT terminus,

• Each intermediate major metropolitan area, and

• One intermediate rural/low density area between major metropolitan areas.

The decrease in traffic was assumed to have a measurable effect on auto travel speeds

only when facilities are significantly congested (i.e., operating at less than free flow speeds). For

rural areas, a level of service of "C" or worse, and in urban areas, a roadway congestion index of

1.0 or higher, were established as thresholds for significant congestion .10 Using relationships of

the volume-to-capacity for a roadway and associated travel speeds, the decrease in traffic due to

HSGT diversions was converted into a change in highway speeds. The change in speed was

converted to travel time savings for remaining auto users, whose in-vehicle travel time was

valued at $10.88 per hour.11,12

Emissions Savings

The diversion of travelers from auto and air transportation modes to HSGT will create the

potential for emissions savings. Regarding emissions, the differences among modes relate to the

nature of their respective fuel sources and to the specific power (i.e., per seat-mile and, by

extension, per passenger-mile) necessary to overcome inertia and to counteract three classes of

force:

 

10 Highway Capacity Manual, Special Report 209, Transportation Research Board, 1985 (revised), and Trends in

Urban Roadway Congestion - 1982 to 1991, Volume 1: Annual Report, Texas Transportation Institute, 1994.

11 This value of time is derived from studies undertaken by the Texas Transportation Institute for the National

Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board, and National Research Council. BenefitCost Evaluation of Highway Improvements, MicroBENCOST Program, Version 1.0, Texas Transportation Institute,

1993.

12 Just as this methodology projects congestion reduction benefits for HSGT in the realm of intercity transportation,

so has the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) found that metropolitan public transit reduces annual losses from

traffic congestion by about $15 billion annually. (FTA, National Transit Report—1996, p. 4.) Recent research for

FTA by the firm of Hickling-Lewis-Brod indicates that transit markedly improves the point-to-point speed of travel

for both transit riders and highway users in severely congested urban travel corridors.
[6-9]

• Air resistance (all modes);

• Gravity (air and Maglev); and

• Contact/rolling resistance (wheeled modes).

A method was developed to calculate emissions savings based on changes in energy use

with and without HSGT. The method accounted for the region of the country, the status of

compliance with air quality regulations of counties through which each route passes, and the

projection year. Access and egress modes were considered in addition to the line-haul portions

of trips. Emission factors from the EPA and manufacturers were compiled for representative air,

rail, and auto vehicles over the study period from 2000 to 2040. Based on assumptions about

intercity trip characteristics and ridership forecasts, emissions were projected with and without

HSGT options in place; the savings ascribed to HSGT represent the difference between the

emissions levels “with” and “without” the HSGT mode.

The valuation of emissions savings recognized the attainment status of the impacted

counties for all emissions except carbon dioxide (CO2) and sulfur oxides (SOx). CO2 was valued

at $15 per ton based on CO2's impact on the global green-house effect, while SOx was valued at

$600 per ton based on estimates for the value of emission allowances traded on the commodities

market. For other emissions, the value reflected control costs in non-attainment counties, with

no value assigned for emissions within attainment counties. As a result, the values associated

with emissions savings ranged from zero in attainment areas to a peak in Los Angeles of $18,900

per ton of reactive organic gases (ROG), $9,300 per ton of carbon monoxide (CO), $26,400 per

ton of nitrous oxides (NOx), and $5,700 per ton of particulate matter (PM10).13,14

OTHER IMPACTS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This section provides information on the items that did not qualify, in this study, for

inclusion in total benefits.

Transportation Items

The following impacts directly affect transportation system efficiency, costs, and safety.

 

13 Argonne National Laboratory, Methods of Valuing Air Pollution and Estimated Monetary Values of Air Pollutants

in Various U.S. Regions, U.S. Department of Energy, 1994.

14 Close linkage of HSGT with existing public transit systems in dense urban areas might enhance the emissions

benefits cited in this section. FTA has found that existing levels of transit use annually avoid about 125 million

pounds of hydrocarbons and over 150 million pounds of nitrous oxides that would otherwise be emitted by

automobiles. (FTA, loc. cit.)
[6-10]

Airport Investment Deferrals

Many commercial airports in proposed HSGT corridors face pressures to expand

significantly to accommodate future travel demand.15 HSGT could divert some traffic from air,

thereby mitigating the need for capacity-related improvements at increasingly congested

commercial airports. This study could not include these reduced or deferred capital expenditures

in total benefits, since they measure the same phenomena as the airport congestion delay savings.

Highway Infrastructure Savings

The diversion of automobile traffic to HSGT would mitigate or defer the need for

highway expansion, measured in terms of lane-miles that would otherwise be dedicated to

carrying the diverted trips. The costs saved or deferred by not having to expand roadways could

not be included in total benefits, since they measure the same phenomenon as the highway

congestion delay savings.

Commuter Rail Travel Efficiency Benefits

By enhancing the railroad passenger infrastructure in major metropolitan areas, HSGT

could theoretically lead to faster commuter schedules, with time savings for existing riders. The

better timings would also attract new riders, thus favorably impacting highway congestion. 

In the course of developing the capital program for the HSGT cases, this study calculated

the potential trip time savings on appropriate commuter routes. To quantify and monetize the

likely future benefits, however, would require detailed site-specific studies because—

• Commuter trains, with their frequent stops, cannot always take full advantage

of improved line-haul speeds16; and

• While producing secondary benefits in terms of highway congestion relief, the

additional commuter patronage could entail significant capital costs and

increased operating deficits.

Transportation Safety Improvements

To the extent that HSGT options in the United States actually establish sustained safety

records better than those of existing modes, 17 trip diversions to HSGT might ultimately reduce

 

15 Cf. Figure 2-3.

16 Between Baltimore and Washington, for example, the schedules for multi-stop commuter trains in 1995 were not

much better than before the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, although express schedules had shortened. In

such cases the benefits will depend on how many people use what types of trains—a fitting subject for intensive local

study.

17 The Federal Railroad Administration’s Next Generation High-Speed Rail Program and related research and

development efforts aim toward making the HSGT options at least as safe as their European counterparts.
[6-11]

the number of accidents and their attendant fatalities, injuries, property damage, and costs in both

human and monetary terms. Because significant methodological and data issues18 stand in the

way of a straightforward, broadly acceptable projection of the safety benefits of HSGT, this study

did not include, in total benefits, savings from that source.

 Economic Development Items

Since economic development impacts would ordinarily represent transfer effects (as

explained on page 6-3), they do not enter into “total benefits” in this report. However, the

following impacts could be of some interest at the State and local level:

Multiplier Effects—HSGT Construction and Operations

For one industry to function, its production process requires, as inputs, the goods or

services produced (output) by other industries. In addition, wages circulate in the economy as

part of household purchases. In this manner, each dollar of spending for transportation

stimulates additional spending, affecting other industries in the economy; this is known as a

"multiplier" effect. Therefore, expenditures to build and maintain infrastructure and operate

transportation services, such as HSGT, could influence a local or regional economy.

Station Development Effects

Development investment, including office, retail, hotel, and some housing, may gravitate

to the vicinity of HSGT stations from less attractive locations in the corridor because of HSGTinduced changes in spatial/temporal relationships, as well as the market potential represented by

HSGT riders. 

Growth of an American HSGT Supply Industry

Most rail passenger car manufacturers are now located outside the United States, although

there are local suppliers and assembly facilities to comply with the normal requirement of 50

percent United States content for Federally-funded acquisitions. To the extent that HSGT

ultimately expands in the United States to become a consistent and predictable market for

transportation equipment, the private sector may be willing to consider long-term investments

that would increase the American involvement in HSGT vehicle design and manufacture. 

 

18 Such a method would be based on projected passenger diversions among modes. Examples of the issues include:

whether to address nonpassenger as well as passenger fatalities; whether to include access/egress fatalities as well as

line-haul fatalities; how to treat Maglev, for which no revenue safety experience exists; and what base to use for

HSGT fatality rates, since Amtrak’s existing annual results— skewed by relatively low passenger-miles in the

denominator and marked year-to-year variations in fatalities in the numerator—do not represent the expected

performance of the HSGT options, while the safety rates for the various high-speed services overseas may not

necessarily apply equally to all American HSGT technologies.
[6-12]

Environmental/Energy Items

Environmental

With the prominent exception of emissions savings (discussed on page 6-8), the proper

estimation of most environmental costs and benefits of HSGT options requires detailed, sitespecific data and community participation that can only issue from a State-sponsored or regional

corridor study. These environmental factors include but are not limited to:

Noise. Noise effects relate directly to the percentages of highway and air passengers

diverted to rail, the percentage increase in rail volumes, and the relative exposure of residences to

the relevant highways, airports, and railroads. 

Water quality. Passenger diversions from highway and air to rail affect both the

volumes of polluting traffic and the likely expansion of impervious surfaces for highway and

airports. Because railroad ballast filters runoff very well, and because railroads make minimal

use of impervious surface, rail passenger facility and service expansions have insignificant direct

effects on water quality in comparison with the other transportation modes.

Land consumption. Because land consumption is directly determined by the expansion

of transportation facilities, the factors to be considered include percentages of highway and air

passengers diverted to rail, the relative degree of congestion on other modes’ facilities, and the

planned increase in rail right-of-way.19

Community disruption. Factors affecting the analysis of community disruption effects

include the change in train frequency, the degree of grade separation of rail and highway traffic

planned for each technology, the number and location (urban/rural) of grade crossings before

improvement, and the total change in delay at grade crossings, including that delay avoided by

elimination of grade crossings.

Endangered species habitat; wetlands. These two environmental areas are very similar

in treatment; the related impacts are determined by land consumption, incidence and quality of

habitat and wetlands, and type of expanding mode.

Energy

Energy savings may result from the diversion of travelers from auto and air transportation

modes (propelled by on-board fossil fuels) to HSGT (propelled either by on-board fossil fuels or

by a mix of energy sources).

 

19 Close integration of HSGT stations with existing transit systems, particularly in the urban core, could enhance

HSGT’s potential public benefits as they relate to community planning and development issues.
[6-13]

Although quantifiable and monetizable,20 the dollar value of energy savings could not

enter into total benefits because fuel and power costs already directly affect the operating

expenses of the HSGT options, the perceived cost of auto travel, and the economics of the airline

industry. It would be double counting to include, within total benefits, the dollar value of

reduced use of this ubiquitous material of transport production. Beyond the value of the energy

savings per se, lower petroleum consumption due to HSGT might help to wean the Nation from

its dependence on foreign oil sources. To translate the intangible concept of “energy

independence” into straightforward monetary values would, however, entail international trade

and other major policy issues that exceed the scope of this report.

 

20 Indeed, in the course of this study and in conjunction with the projections of emissions savings, a methodology

was developed to calculate differential energy usage with and without implementation of HSGT. The methodology

accounted for the region of the country, the mix of fuels for electricity generation in each, and the projection year. 

Access and egress modes were considered in addition to the line-haul portions of trips. Energy consumption factors

from manufacturers were compiled for representative air, rail, and auto vehicles for the 2000 to 2040 study period;

for the HSGT options, the vehicle performance assumptions were those of Chapter 4. Based on demand model

outputs for intercity trip characteristics and ridership forecasts, energy savings due to HSGT were projected.
Chapter 7 

RESULTS

This chapter synthesizes, by topic, the results of the projections.1 It covers not only

system requirements and performance but also benefits and costs, and treats all the

illustrative corridors except for the Empire and Southeast examples, which the analysis

regarded as Northeast Corridor extensions and which receive special treatment in Chapter 8.

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE

Investment Requirements

Initial investment

costs for HSGT vary widely

among corridors, and

particularly among

technological options. The

more ambitious options

show the widest variations

among corridors in absolute

terms, as Table 7–1 shows.3

The variations within

each technology reflect

several important factors:

Corridor length. Because each individual corridor was estimated as a separate

project, shorter corridors must absorb a greater share per route-mile of fixed support

facilities (e.g., equipment shops) than longer corridors. San Diego—Los Angeles has

relatively high costs for this among other reasons.

Traffic densities. As traffic densities increase (including ambient freight and

commuter volumes in Accelerail options), the need arises for more double track and passing

sidings.

 

1

 By their very nature, projections depend on the reasonableness of their underlying assumptions (described in

Chapter 4) and are subject to divergences between the assumptions and actual conditions. For these and other

reasons, the results of the systems described in this report may vary materially from the projections. This

further underscores the need for detailed studies prior to initiation of corridor development.

2

 I.e., including infrastructure and vehicles.

3

 See Table 7–4, page 7-21, for the projected initial investment by case.

Table 7–1

Initial Investment Cost Ranges

for Illustrative Corridors

Technology

Typical Range of Total2 Initial

Investment per Route-Mile

(Millions of Dollars)

Accelerail 90 $1 to $3.5

Accelerail 110 $2 to $5

Accelerail 125F $3 to $5.5

Accelerail 125E $5 to $7.5

Accelerail 150F $4.5 to $7

Accelerail 150E $6.5 to $9

New HSR $10 to $45

Maglev $20 to $50
[7-2]

Size of vehicle purchase. The initial vehicle purchase varies with route mileage,

HSGT ridership, and concomitant frequency. While amounting to between 20 and 40

percent of the initial cost of Accelerail 90 and 110 cases, vehicles comprise a small portion

of total costs for more intensive options. The importance of vehicles in the initial costs of

Accelerail 90 and 110 may enhance the commercial feasibility of those options, since

vehicles are a more fungible investment than fixed facilities and have traditionally attracted

lease financing.

Setting. Corridors that

entail difficult mountain

crossings, require major

tunneling, or traverse

continuously urbanized

landscapes naturally incur

relatively high initial costs.

Figure 7-1

summarizes the effects of

these factors on the

Northeast Corridor and

California, as compared

with some other potential

HSGT sites.4

Whatever the cost, the

different investment levels

share a single purpose: to reduce line-haul travel times, and—by extension—total travel

times.5 Yet the various technology options do not produce even gradations in their trip-time

effects. In fact, the typical pattern, shown in Figure 7-2 for Chicago—St. Louis, involves—

• A sharp decrease in existing Amtrak running times with the institution of tilttrain Accelerail 90 service;

 

4

 California’s initial investment costs call for a brief explanation in light of the complex alignment situation

caused by the topography and demographics of that State. In order to provide a broad range of initial costs in

the Los Angeles—Bay Area segment of the corridor, this study assumed the lowest possible cost solutions at

the Accelerail 90 and 110 level: via the existing Coast Line. Employing the somewhat more heavily populated

Valley route via Fresno and Stockton to Oakland, the Accelerail 125 and 150 options assumed a new right-ofway only between Los Angeles and Bakersfield across the Tehachapi Mountains. Finally, the New HSR and

Maglev cases were likewise assumed to cross the Tehachapis but to follow a new, more westerly alignment

from the Fresno vicinity to San Jose and downtown San Francisco. Due to the massive civil works assumed in

Accelerail 125 and above, the non-coastal California cases have a much higher cost per route-mile than the

ranges shown in Table 7–1.

5

 See below under “demand and revenues” for a discussion of total travel times.

Figure 7-1

Initial Investment per Route-Mile: Maglev Examples

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

$60

Northeast

Corridor

California

North/South

California

South

Chicago Hub

Network

Chicago -

Detroit

Texas

Triangle

Florida

Millions of Dollars
[7-3]

• A still marked trip

time improvement in

Accelerail 110;

• Slight improvements

in the 125 and 150

Accelerail range;

and

• Dramatic trip time

benefits from New

HSR and, especially,

Maglev.

Investment requirements

grow, sometimes disproportionately to trip time savings, as

the options become more

ambitious. These trends lead to the pattern typified by Figure 7-3, showing the dollars of

initial investment per

timetable-hour saved over

Amtrak’s 1993 performance

in the Chicago—Detroit

corridor. The cost per hour

saved grows noticeably,

although not steadily,

beyond the Accelerail 110

case. This escalating cost

of travel time savings raises

the question whether

demand and revenues grow

commensurately across the

options.

Demand and

Revenues

In response to an ever-improving product across the range of options, the cases

generate significant demand and revenues, in several cases surpassing the 1.3 billion

passenger-miles generated by Amtrak in the Northeast Corridor in 1993.

Figure 7-2

Line-Haul Running Times, Chicago—St. Louis

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

Amtrak 1993

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Hours

Accelerail

Figure 7-3

Initial Investment Per Hour Saved Over Amtrak 1993 Base

Example: Chicago—Detroit

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

$1,800

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Millionsof Dollars

Accelerail
[7-4]

The Product

The HSGT product has three salient characteristics, which work together to influence

ridership in the models for this study: travel times, fares, and frequencies.6

Travel Times

The ability to divert patrons from existing modes depends not on line-haul times

but on comparative total travel times, which also include access to, egress from, and time

spent in stations. The composition of those total travel times varies dramatically among

modes, as shown in Figure 7-4 for the Chicago—Detroit market. In any comparison of total

timings, auto has an inherent advantage in its door-to-door convenience (avoiding access and

terminal time), and air benefits from its superior cruising speeds.

Figure 7-5 compares the total travel times by mode in three sample city-pairs: San

Diego—Los Angeles (128 miles), Chicago—Detroit (280 miles), and Los Angeles—Bay

Area (425 miles). The examples indicate that an Accelerail trip, in total, can take longer than

the often cheaper auto in shorter city pair markets, but that Accelerail timings can better

those of auto in medium- and longer-distance corridors. Maglev can outperform air on total

travel times even in markets in the 400-mile range, whereas New HSR approaches but does

not achieve time comparability with air in such longer markets. The competitive situation

will, of course, differ from market to market depending on specific route length and

 

6

 Service quality factors are theoretically represented in the coefficients of the demand models. Obviously, a

transport entity that finds new ways to serve the public better can defy the limitations of mathematical models

and do better than the predictions, just as a failure to provide quality control after the project is built will

undermine operating and revenue performance.

Figure 7-4

Composition of Each Mode’s Total Travel Time

Example: Chicago—Detroit City Pair

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Air OD Auto Accel 110 Maglev 300

Terminal Time

Access\Egress

Line Haul

Accelerail 110
[7-5]

Figure 7-5: Competitive Position of HSGT in Three Sample City Pairs—

Total Travel Time in Minutes

San Diego - Los Angeles City Pair

0

50

100

150

200

250

Air OD

Existing Rail

Bus

Auto

Accelerail 90

Accelerail 110

Accelerail

125F

Accelerail

125E

New HSR 200

Maglev 300

Minutes

Auto

Benchmark

Chicago - Detroit City Pair

0

100

200

300

400

500

Air OD

Existing Rail

Bus

Auto

Accelerail 90

Accelerail 110

Accelerail 125F

Accelerail 125E

Accelerail 150F

Accelerail 150E

New HSR 200

Maglev 300

Minute

Air

Benchmark

Auto

Benchmark

Los Angeles - Bay Area City Pair

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Air OD

Existing Rail

Bus

Auto

Accelerail 90

Accelerail 110

Accelerail

125F

Accelerail

125E

Accelerail

150F

Accelerail

150E

New HSR 200

Maglev 300

Minutes

Air 

Benchmark

Auto 

Benchmark
[7-6]

alignment considerations and traffic congestion levels in major cities. The demand

projections for this study clearly reflect these competitive facts of life: the diversion rates to

HSGT from auto and air mirror very closely the decreases in HSGT trip times across

options.

Fares

Average fares, as measured by yield,7 vary dramatically from one corridor and option

to another, in response to the competitive situation and to the quality of the HSGT product. 

Generally, fares increase gradually as travel times improve across the options, since the

traffic will bear a higher price for an improved service. In keeping with the trip time trends

described above, the increases are particularly marked in the range of Accelerail 90 and 110,

and again for New HSR and Maglev. The Chicago Hub Network’s fares, depicted in Figure

7-6, typify the trends in the illustrative corridors.

Across all options, each corridor has a distinct niche on the array of fare levels, as

shown in Figure 7-7. What the traffic will bear in one corridor, in the presence of low-fare

air competition, will differ markedly from yields in corridors where airline operating costs

and prices are high. The California corridor illustrates this point: low-fare airline

competition over the prime Los Angeles—Bay Area market precludes the HSGT operator

from charging high fares. The only significant increase in fares over 16 cents per mile—in

Maglev, which betters total air travel time between Los Angeles and the Bay Area—remains

 

7The models for this study posit specific business and nonbusiness fares for each HSGT city-pair. The average

fare yield per passenger-mile in each corridor (passenger transportation revenues divided by passenger-miles)

indicates the relative prices charged to HSGT passengers and provides the basis for this section.

Figure 7-6

Fare Yields in the Chicago Hub Network (Year 2020)

$0.00

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

$0.30

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Dollars per Passenger-Mile

Accelerail
[7-7]

at 20 percent, because Maglev’s travel-time edge is not pronounced. By contrast, the

Northeast Corridor—with its high air fares and ideally-configured HSGT markets

(particularly New York to Washington, and New York to Boston)—allows for very high

New HSR and Maglev yields, more than half again as high as the current Amtrak estimated

average fares.

Frequencies

Frequencies—arrived at iteratively—vary significantly among corridors and cases in

response to, and as a contributing factor toward, demand. For the Accelerail options, most

corridors support between 10 and 20 round trip trains per day. The California corridors,

with their heavier traffic densities, justify more frequent service. New HSR and Maglev

both entail much higher train frequencies, as exemplified by the 100 daily round trips

projected in the Northeast Corridor between New York and Washington. These high

frequencies allow New HSR and Maglev to attract ridership despite their generally higher

fare levels.

The Outcome

This analysis suggests some limitations on the ability of HSGT to divert auto traffic

under current travel and land use patterns, conditions of energy availability and price, nearly

universal auto ownership, and the ready availability of the Interstate System. Should these

Figure 7-7

Fare Yield by Corridor, Year 2020

Example: New HSR

$0.00

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

$0.30

$0.35

California

North/South

California South

Chicago Hub

Network 

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St.

Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest 

Texas Triangle

 Dollars per Passenger-Mile --- 
[7-8]

underpinnings of America’s transportation structure shift in a fundamental way—

beyond the mere inconvenience of growing congestion, which affects all modes—

diversion levels from auto to HSGT would be higher. As projected in this study,

however, most cases divert between three and six percent of auto trips (Figure 7-8). The

travel time improvements in New HSR generally attract noticeably higher auto diversions,

despite fare increases of 20 to 40 percent over Accelerail levels. In California, where air

competition obviates such fare increases, the auto diversion rate grows by 50 percent from

Accelerail to New HSR.8

Corridors with short average trip lengths (under 150 miles) show the lowest

diversion rates, for price and time reasons described above. Auto diversion percentages for

New HSR and Maglev in the Northeast Corridor are relatively low because they are

incremental to those accomplished by Accelerail 150E, assumed to be in place by 2000, and

by its precursor Accelerail 125E, currently extant.

 

8

 Of course, the trip time improvement from Accelerail to New HSR is particularly strong in California due to

the routing changes explained in footnote 4.

Figure 7-8

Percent of Intercity Auto Traffic Diverted to HSGT by Corridor, Year 2020

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle

Accelerail
[7-9]

The auto diversion rates to Maglev show in stark relief the balancing act inherent in

HSGT pricing. With total trip times often better than for any other mode, Maglev can

support very high fares in airline-competitive markets. This policy will often maximize net

revenues to the HSGT entity, but discourage auto diversions. An actual Maglev operator

would have the flexibility to use yield management and variable pricing to maximize

revenue and still attract greater automobile-based traffic levels than those posited here.9

While varying widely due to local market conditions, air diversion percentages

respond generally to the degree of improvement in the HSGT product and, with New HSR

and Maglev, from one fifth to half the air traffic base diverts to HSGT. (See Figure 7-9.) 

Whatever the starting point, the diversions climb markedly to Accelerail 110, grow by

degrees through the other Accelerail options, and soar with New HSR and Maglev as HSGT

enters the range of time parity with air in major endpoint markets. The curve is steepest

where the improvements are proportionately greatest—in the long California corridor, with

 

9

 The greatest challenge HSGT faces in attracting automobile traffic is overcoming the inherent economic

advantage enjoyed by the automobile for two or more persons traveling together. Since the auto can carry

several people for the same cost as carrying one, its price advantage compared to public transportation

increases with group size.

Figure 7-9

Percent of Intercity Air Traffic Diverted to HSGT by Corridor, Year 2020

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle

Accelerail
[7-10]

the introduction of a new alignment between Los Angeles, the Central Valley, San Jose, and

downtown San Francisco in the New HSR and Maglev options. The Northeast Corridor air

diversion rates in Figure 7-9 are all the more noteworthy because they are incremental to

such diversions as have already taken place or are ascribed to Accelerail 150E.

These air and auto diversions, plus diversions from rail and bus where applicable,

combine to produce large quantities of transportation in many of the illustrative corridors.

Figure 7-10 summarizes the passenger-miles by case in the year 2020 and provides a useful

benchmark for size: Amtrak’s 1993 operation in the Northeast Corridor, the largest rail

passenger market in North America. The chart indicates that—

Figure 7-10

Passenger-Miles, Year 2020, by Corridor

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Millions of Passenger-Miles ___

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle

Amtrak Northeast Corridor 1993

BENCHMARK:

 Amtrak 

NEC, 1993

Accelerail
[7-11]

• Three corridors may exceed Amtrak’s existing Northeast Corridor

volumes by the year 2020: the California North/South corridor, the

Chicago Hub Network, and the Texas Triangle. California could generate

volumes four times as large as the Northeast Corridor did in 1993.

• The Northeast Corridor traffic could quadruple by the year 2020 with the

introduction of New HSR or Maglev.

• Commensurate with their size, several other corridors would also generate

sizable traffic levels, approaching half the benchmark Northeast Corridor

volumes.

These are significant volumes, and noteworthy findings. Despite profit-maximizing

fare levels and very modest diversions, particularly from auto, HSGT would generate

transportation production on a meaningful scale outside the Northeast Corridor,

although at a significant financial cost. While sheer size cannot assure partnership

potential, it underlines the importance that HSGT can achieve in intercity transport on a

nationwide scale.

The composition of the HSGT traffic base would reflect diversions from the source

modes. Figure 7-11 depicts the shifts, by option, in the sources of the traffic base in the

California North/South corridor. In particular, the chart shows how diversions from air

Figure 7-11

California North/South Corridor—

Composition of Traffic Base by Option, Year 2020

 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Induced

Diverted from bus

Diverted from conventional rail

Diverted from auto

Diverted from air
[7-12]

assume a predominant role in the New HSR and Maglev options, in keeping with their trip

time capabilities.

The combined effects of the pricing policies and passenger volumes appear in the

total system revenues, summarized in Figure 7-12. Here too, the California North/South,

Chicago Hub Network, and Texas corridors could exceed the Northeast Corridor 1993

benchmark. The huge volumes and higher fares in the Northeast Corridor for New HSR and

Maglev would, of course, produce revenue levels much higher than for other corridors.

Operating and Maintenance Expenses

For most illustrative corridors, this analysis projects HSGT to cost approximately 10

to 14 cents per passenger-mile to operate and maintain. (Figure 7-13.)

Figure 7-12

System Revenues by Corridor and Technology Option, Year 2020

$0

$200

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

$1,800

$2,000

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle

Millions of Dollars___

Maglev

New HSR

150E

150F

125E

125F

110

90

BENCHMARK: Amtrak NEC, 1993
[7-13]

For all cases taken together, the operating and maintenance expense model

produces unit expense results that respond predictably to system design and operating

efficiencies. Such factors as traffic volume, route length, passenger-miles per train-mile,

load factor, passenger-miles per gross ton-mile, passenger-miles per train-hour, and average

trip length strongly influence the cases’ expense levels. Figure 7-14, for example, shows a

discernible relationship between average trip lengths and operating and maintenance unit

expenses.

Differences in unit expense levels among corridors reflect in large measure the

above factors as predestined by each region’s geography and demographics. Exemplifying

this phenomenon are the Maglev cases in California and the Northeast Corridor; the former,

Figure 7-13

Operating and Maintenance Expenses Per Passenger-Mile, Year 2020

$0.00

$0.02

$0.04

$0.06

$0.08

$0.10

$0.12

$0.14

$0.16

$0.18

$0.20

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle

Accelerail
[7-14]

with its major city pair 400 miles in

length and average trip lengths of 316

miles, can reach load factors of 56

percent, or 14 percent higher than

those of the latter, with its major point

of attraction in the center (New

York), much shorter major markets on

either side, and a 192-mile average

trip. For these reasons among others,

Maglev in California would enjoy

unit operating expenses one-third less

than those of the Northeast.

Among options in each

corridor, expense levels respond to

the different technologies and

institutional assumptions. The unit

expense curves in Figure 7-13

summarize underlying (and

sometimes countervailing) trends in the major functional expense categories, as portrayed

below.

Among the Accelerail options,

maintenance-of-way expenses (Figure 7-15)

reflect, first and foremost, the presence or

absence of electrification. The Maglev and

New HSR options must invariably absorb the

full expense of fixed plant maintenance, but

their higher passenger volumes and (in the

case of Maglev) technology-based economies

help to moderate, and in some cases lower,

the unit expenses from Accelerail levels. 

Maintenance-of-equipment

expenses (Figure 7-16) include fixed

expenses for service, inspection, and repair

facilities, and thus benefit from volume

increases across options. The electrified

Accelerail options, omitting on-board power

generation, further reduce these expenses. 

New High-Speed Rail, with its two locomotives per trainset and lower-capacity cars,

occasions relatively high unit expenses; Maglev, with its revolutionary design, eliminates

Figure 7-14

Operating and Maintenance Unit Expenses

Versus Average Trip Lengths

(Year 2020—All Cases)

$0.00

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

$0.30

$0.35

0 100 200 300 400

Average Trip Length (Miles)

O&M Expense 

per Passenger-Mile

Figure 7-15

Maintenance-of-Way Expense Per Passenger-Mile

(Chicago Hub Network Example)

$0.000

$0.005

$0.010

$0.015

$0.020

$0.025

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Dollars per Passenger-Mile___

Accelerail
[7-15]

much of the mechanical wear and tear of the steel-wheel systems, and is projected to have

the lowest equipment maintenance unit expense.

Transportation expenses (Figure 7-17) embody the relative operating efficiencies

and passenger volumes of the options. Electrified Accelerail cases incur higher unit fuel

costs (based on the assumption of constant petroleum prices), which New HSR can

counteract with crew cost savings based on higher patronage and train speeds. In corridors

outside the heavily traveled California and Northeast corridors, Maglev was assumed to use

two-car trains and therefore has higher crew and energy expense levels than other options.10

Passenger Traffic and Services and General and Administrative expenses (Figure

7-18 and Figure 7-19) are rightfully independent of technology and generally decline as

passenger volumes increase. Marked declines for New High-Speed Rail and Maglev in

California and the Northeast Corridor show the beneficial effects of huge traffic increases on

these accounts.

 

10 Higher fares, justified in part by greater frequencies, yield revenues that more than offset these costs. With

regard to energy, Maglev has somewhat higher unit energy costs in all corridors. Yet despite its very high

speeds and use of energy for suspension as well as propulsion, Maglev’s energy costs are by no means orders of

magnitude higher than those for steel wheel options. Light in weight and unburdened by the structural

Figure 7-16

Maintenance-of-Equipment Expense

Per Passenger-Mile

(Texas Triangle Example)

$0.000

$0.002

$0.004

$0.006

$0.008

$0.010

$0.012

$0.014

$0.016

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Accelerail

Figure 7-17

Transportation Expense per Passenger-Mile

(Chicago—Detroit Example)

$0.000

$0.005

$0.010

$0.015

$0.020

$0.025

$0.030

$0.035

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Accelerail
[7-16]

 

Synthesis: Investments and Operating Results

In the most elemental terms, HSGT’s ability to perpetuate itself (by providing a

contribution over and above its continuing investment needs) depends on two things:

• The volume of traffic that it generates, measured in passenger-miles; and

• The difference, or unit margin, between the fare yield and operating

expense per passenger-mile.

In regard to margins, the comparative performance of the illustrative corridors 

(Figure 7-20) depends on two largely independent factors: the competitive situation versus

other modes, which limits allowable prices; and the inherent efficiencies of the cases, which

reflect many variables treated above. A very efficient operation can have low unit

margins, as exemplified in the California North/South corridor’s performance among the

New HSR cases.

The reasons for California North/South’s relatively poor unit margins become clear

in a comparison with the Northeast Corridor (Figure 7-21) for New HSR. California’s

comparatively low per-passenger-mile yield—caused by such differences in market

conditions as the importance of low-fare air carriers, the distance between the two largest

 

standards mandated in mixed freight/passenger railroad operations, Maglev generates very high passenger-toweight ratios, overcoming much of its energy disadvantage. 

Figure 7-18

Passenger Traffic and Services Expense

Per Passenger-Mile

(Chicago—St. Louis Example)

$0.000

$0.005

$0.010

$0.015

$0.020

$0.025

$0.030

$0.035

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Accelerail

Figure 7-19

General and Administrative Expense

Per Passenger-Mile

(California North/South Example)

$0.00

$0.01

$0.01

$0.02

$0.02

$0.03

$0.03

$0.04

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Accelerail

Maglev
[7-17]

Figure 7-20

Unit Margin for New HSR in Nine Illustrative Corridors

(Year 2020)

$0.00

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

Northeast

Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Florida

Chicago Hub

Network

Texas Triangle

Chicago - Detroit

California South

California

North/South

Chicago - St.

Louis

Operating Surplus per Passenger-Mile___

Figure 7-21

Comparison of Unit Margin Components:

New HSR in the Northeast and California North/South Corridors

$0.00

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

$0.30

$0.35

Revenue Operating Expense Margin

Dollars per Passenger-Mile___

Northeast Corridor

California North/South
[7-18]

metropolitan areas, and New HSR’s resulting inability to compete head-to-head with air on

total trip times—far overshadows the effect of better operating efficiencies and lower unit

expenses on the Bay Area—Los Angeles—San Diego route. 

Figure 7-22 indicates that the illustrative corridors, taken together, change similarly

from one option to another. The basic trends include:

• Improved margins in the lower-speed Accelerail ranges (90 to 110 to

125F) reflect unit cost reductions in virtually all corridors, and fare yield

improvements in some.

• Within the 125E to 150E range of Accelerail options, fare yields are

relatively constant and the changes in unit margin reflect operating

expense fluctuations.

• Fare yields generally rise, and O&M expenses decrease in most corridors,

between 150E and New HSR, thus causing a rise in unit margins.

Figure 7-22

Unit Margins by Corridor, Year 2020

$0.00

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

$0.30

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

Operating Surplus per Passenger-Mile___

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle

Accelera Accelerail
[7-19]

• Maglev shows markedly improved unit margins over New HSR, but the

reasons differ among corridors, as shown in Table 7–2. In the highestvolume Northeast Corridor and California North/South corridors,

Maglev’s heavy passenger volumes and assumed technological

efficiencies combine to produce dramatically reduced unit expenses

over New HSR. These economies do not appear, however, in lower

volume operations. In all corridors, Maglev—with its higher frequencies

and unmatched trip-time performance—commands much higher fares,

accounting for most of the margin improvement in lower-volume cases.

Table 7–2

Analysis of Difference in Unit Margins between New HSR and Maglev in Selected Corridors

Difference in unit

margin

Percent of difference

from revenue changes

Percent of difference

from O&M changes

California North/South $0.048 65% 35%

Chicago - Detroit $0.100 89% 11%

Chicago - St. Louis $0.082 87% 13%

Chicago Hub Network $0.079 99% 1%

Florida $0.065 97% 3%

Northeast Corridor $0.040 74% 26%

Texas $0.065 100% 0%

The annual operating surplus for each case can be regarded (for some analytical

purposes) as the product of the unit margin and the passenger-miles. Figure 7-23—arraying

the corridors in order of travel volumes—demonstrates not only the considerable variance in

operating surpluses within each corridor, but also the degree to which unit margins can

predominate over traffic levels in determining the outcome. The Northeast Corridor,

generating traffic volumes similar to (or less than) those of California, outshines the latter—

and all other corridors—in annual operating surplus for reasons analyzed above. Most other

corridors show surpluses in the $0 to $100 million range for Accelerail, and from $50 to

$200 million for New HSR and Maglev. California’s performance, of course, covers a wide

range because of the divergent products offered by the various options, a natural

consequence of the challenging routing and sheer size of that State.
[7-20]

The definition of partnership potential in Chapter 3 requires a case to do more than

simply cover its annual expenses out of annual revenues. The present value of the future

operating surpluses must cover at least the present value of the continuing investments.11

How do the illustrative corridors fare on this measure?

As shown in Table 7–3, all the illustrative cases—with one exception, Chicago–

Detroit at 90 mph—meet the “surplus less continuing investments” standard for partnership

potential. Virtually all the cases are projected to cover their operating and maintenance

expenses and continuing investment needs given the fare levels, unit costs, and partnerships

described herein.

 

11 The continuing investments range from approximately 5 to 18 percent of the initial investment for Accelerail

90 and 110, down to 2 to 8 percent of the higher-performance Accelerails, New HSR, and Maglev. These

amounts are present values of investments that occur throughout the 40-year planning period. 

Figure 7-23

Range of Annual Operating Surpluses by Corridor

(Year 2020: Corridors Are Arrayed in Order of Ascending Passenger-Miles for New HSR.)

for New HSR.)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

California South

Chicago - St. Louis

Pacific Northwest

Chicago - Detroit

Florida

Texas Triangle

Chicago Hub Network

California North/South

Northeast Corridor

Millions of Dollars___

Maglev

New HSR

150E

150F

125E

125F

110

90
[7-21]

Table 7–3

Surplus (Deficit) After Continuing Investments by Case

(Millions of Dollars, 40-Year Present Values) (Shaded Cases Were Not Analyzed)

Accelerail

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E

New

HSR Maglev

California North/South $276 $714 $870 $864 $1,151 $1,232 $2,489 $5,584

California South $206 $241 $252 $214 $176 $284

Chicago Hub Network $257 $560 $708 $584 $835 $690 $1,371 $2,974

Chicago - Detroit ($16) $114 $189 $82 $184 $115 $457 $1,160

Chicago - St. Louis $33 $111 $169 $131 $215 $154 $218 $618

Florida $152 $244 $270 $239 $915 $1,552

Northeast Corridor $8,277 $11,607

Pacific Northwest $181 $333 $359 $324 $521 $859

Texas $195 $456 $586 $486 $797 $646 $1,168 $2,453

These surplus amounts must come into comparison with the initial investments

required for each case (Table 7–4).

Table 7–4

Initial Investment by Case

(Millions of Dollars)

Accelerail

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E

New

HSR Maglev

California North/South $1,314 $2,914 $7,931 $8,948 $8,024 $9,203 $15,792 $23,430

California South $459 $657 $694 $969 $4,112 $5,006

Chicago Hub Network $1,062 $1,487 $2,438 $3,628 $3,708 $5,137 $12,285 $17,787

Chicago - Detroit $484 $688 $1,151 $1,748 $1,329 $1,945 $5,284 $7,044

Chicago - St. Louis $500 $657 $1,074 $1,516 $1,991 $2,617 $5,900 $9,291

Florida $1,235 $1,305 $1,494 $2,041 $4,316 $7,054

Northeast Corridor $19,127 $22,137

Pacific Northwest $598 $859 $1,233 $2,076 $7,819 $13,980

Texas $863 $1,714 $3,767 $4,613 $4,349 $5,780 $5,071 $10,127

As shown in Figure 7-24, surpluses could cover about half of the initial investment in

the Northeast Corridor; over one third of the initial investment in certain California South,

Chicago Hub Network, and Pacific Northwest cases; and up to one quarter of the initial

investment in California North/South and the Texas Triangle. 
[7-22]

Despite local differences, certain general trends emerge from Figure 7-24. Almost

universally, Accelerail 110 provides better coverage than Accelerail 90 because the former’s

revenue-producing potential outweighs its incremental investment. As investment needs

increase and performance improvements moderate in higher-level Accelerail cases, surpluses

cover a declining percentage of the investment (with some adjustments due to

electrification). This trend typically reverses itself with New HSR and particularly with

Maglev, due to their ability to generate higher unit and total margins.

Figure 7-24

Percent of Initial Investment Covered by Surplus After Continuing Investments

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago - Detroit

Chicago - St. Louis

Florida

Northeast Corridor

Pacific Northwest

Texas Triangle
[7-23]

Figure 7-24 epitomizes the purely commercial projections in that it gauges the

maximum proportion of each corridor’s initial investment that might be financed on the

basis of future operating surpluses, under all the assumptions governing this study. Many

cases—mainly lower-speed Accelerail technologies and new Northeast Corridor systems—

show promise of financing significant portions (one-fifth to one-half) of their initial capital

costs. While potentially encouraging the formation of private/public partnerships, the

projections displayed in Figure 7-24 do not meet the traditional private-sector criterion for

“commercial feasibility.”

Wherever possible, the study assumptions were intended to maximize the

percentages displayed in Figure 7-24. In particular, the fare-setting protocols12 tended to

maximize operating surpluses. This practice allowed the simulated cases to show optimal—

although not necessarily successful—results from a commercial perspective, in keeping with

the literal intent of Congress to explore HSGT’s “commercial feasibility.” However, this

fiscally cautious approach did not necessarily maximize all ratios of benefits to costs.

BENEFIT/COST COMPARISONS

As Chapter 3 explains, commercial feasibility is only one basis for calculating the

worth of HSGT. Other important comparisons are total benefits with total costs; benefits to

HSGT users with costs borne by users; and benefits to the public at large with publicly-borne

costs.

Total Benefits Versus Total Costs

Table 7–5 shows the amount by which total benefits are projected to exceed (or fall

short of) total costs. In most of the illustrative cases, HSGT’s total benefits exceed total

costs; the projected value of the excess is generally higher in the Accelerail than in the New

HSR and Maglev options.

 As shown in Figure 7-25, each HSGT technology would provide a favorable ratio of

total benefits to total costs in at least one corridor: New HSR, for example, is projected to

have ratios equal to or greater than 1.0 in four of the nine illustrative corridors covered in

this chapter, and Maglev in two of the nine. Likewise, each illustrative corridor would

provide favorable ratios of total benefits to total costs in one or more HSGT technologies.

The projections suggest that—subject to the assumptions and scope of this study—

the less expensive technologies, relying on upgraded existing rail lines and freight railroad

cooperation, could typically provide higher ratios of benefits to costs than the very highspeed options, which may offer higher benefits but would ordinarily cost much more.

 

12 See Chapter 4.
[7-24]

Table 7–5: Total Benefits Less Total Costs

(Millions of Dollars)

Accelerail

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

California North/South $3,228 $4,247 $93 $191 $1,383 $1,889 $3,670 $3,422

California South $1,329 $1,370 $1,384 $1,184 ($1,715) ($1,827)

Chicago Hub Network $3,194 $4,023 $3,280 $2,118 $2,466 $997 ($3,984) ($5,951)

Chicago-Detroit $979 $1,300 $902 $277 $735 $92 ($1,805) ($2,098)

Chicago-St. Louis $350 $632 $294 ($151) ($324) ($974) ($3,810) ($6,485)

Florida $195 $402 $335 ($173) $210 ($1,402)

Northeast Corridor $648 $2,128

Pacific Northwest $1,447 $1,434 $1,168 $333 ($4,622) ($10,028)

Texas Triangle $749 $1,122 ($441) ($1,318) ($520) ($2,015) $570 ($2,302)

Figure 7-25

Ratios of Total Benefits to Total Costs

 

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago-Detroit 

Chicago-St. Louis 

Florida 

Northeast Corridor 

Pacific Northwest 

Texas Triangle 

Accelerail
[7-25]

With the exception of Accelerail 90 in Chicago—Detroit, which generates an

operating deficit rather than a surplus, all the cases in Figure 7-25 with ratios of 1.0 or

greater fulfill this study’s threshold requirements for partnership potential.13

Benefits to HSGT Users Versus Costs Borne by Users

As displayed in Table 7–6 and Figure 7-26, HSGT users invariably enjoy an excess

of benefits over costs (i.e., the users’ consumer surplus described in Chapter 6). This excess

may be regarded as a subsidy enjoyed by HSGT users, to the extent that the publicly-borne

costs exceed the benefits to the public at large in a given case.

Table 7–6

Benefits to HSGT Users Less Costs Borne by Users

(Millions of Dollars)

Accelerail

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

California North/South $2,153 $3,055 $3,374 $3,745 $3,913 $4,396 $7,688 $10,324

California South $752 $807 $827 $843 $976 $1,249

Chicago Hub Network $1,888 $2,363 $2,392 $2,454 $2,594 $2,606 $3,478 $4,491

Chicago-Detroit $635 $811 $804 $837 $813 $820 $1,380 $1,721

Chicago-St. Louis $459 $642 $649 $662 $799 $805 $1,027 $1,225

Florida $681 $787 $847 $886 $2,435 $2,781

Northeast Corridor $7,861 $8,538

Pacific Northwest $1,216 $1,304 $1,363 $1,379 $1,899 $2,310

Texas Triangle $1,050 $1,814 $2,116 $2,146 $2,395 $2,412 $3,654 $4,543

 

13As defined in this report, “partnership potential” is the apparent capacity of an HSGT corridor to draw the

private and public sectors together in planning, negotiations, and, conceivably, project implementation. To

exhibit partnership potential, the projections for an HSGT technology in a particular corridor must satisfy at

least the following two conditions: First, private enterprise must be able to run the corridor—once built and

paid for—as a completely self-sustaining entity; in other words, the case must generate a projected surplus after

continuing investments. Second, the total benefits of an HSGT corridor must equal or exceed its total costs. 

This report uses “partnership potential” as an indicator of the aggregate financial and economic impacts of

HSGT alternatives in a set of illustrative corridors. Detailed State studies of individual corridors would benefit

from additional evaluation measures as well as site-specific investigations and data. Thus, while “partnership

potential” may offer useful insights in assessing the likelihood of HSGT development by State and local

governments and their private partners, it does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal

approval or funding. For further particulars on “partnership potential,” the reader is referred to Chapters 3 and

6.
[7-26]

The ratios in Figure 7-26 (minus one) equate to the ratio of consumer surplus to

system revenues. 14

Benefits to the Public at Large Versus Publicly-Borne Costs

For each illustrative case, Table 7–7 shows the excess (or shortfall) of benefits to the

public at large in comparison with publicly-borne costs, and Figure 7-27 depicts the

corresponding ratios.

As portrayed in Figure 7-27, benefits to the public at large exceed the publicly-borne

costs in only about one-quarter of the illustrative HSGT cases. These all occur in the

 

14 Cf. Chapter 6, which provides the equation for this ratio as:

(System Revenues plus Users’ Consumer Surplus)/ System Revenues

This is algebraically equivalent to:

(System Revenues/System Revenues), or one, plus (Users’ Consumer Surplus/System Revenues).

Figure 7-26

Ratios of Benefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago-Detroit 

Chicago-St. Louis 

Florida 

Northeast Corridor 

Pacific Northwest 

Texas Triangle 

Accelerail
[7-27]

Table 7–7

Benefits to the Public at Large Less Publicly-Borne Costs

(Millions of Dollars)

Accelerail

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

California North/South $1,075 $1,192 ($3,280) ($3,554) ($2,530) ($2,507) ($4,018) ($6,902)

California South $578 $563 $557 $341 ($2,691) ($3,076)

Chicago Hub Network $1,306 $1,660 $888 ($336) ($128) ($1,609) ($7,461) ($10,442)

Chicago-Detroit $344 $488 $98 ($560) ($79) ($729) ($3,184) ($3,819)

Chicago-St. Louis ($109) ($10) ($354) ($812) ($1,123) ($1,779) ($4,837) ($7,710)

Florida ($486) ($385) ($512) ($1,059) ($2,225) ($4,183)

Northeast Corridor ($7,213) ($6,410)

Pacific Northwest $231 $130 ($194) ($1,046) ($6,521) ($12,338)

Texas Triangle ($301) ($692) ($2,557) ($3,464) ($2,916) ($4,427) ($3,084) ($6,845)

Accelerail options. Benefits to the public at large do not exceed publicly-borne costs for any

Maglev, New HSR, or Accelerail 150 options. Such effects on users versus the public at

Figure 7-27

Ratio of Benefits to the Public at Large to Publicly-Borne Costs

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

90

110

125F

125E

150F

150E

New HSR

Maglev

California North/South

California South

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago-Detroit 

Chicago-St. Louis 

Florida 

Northeast Corridor 

Pacific Northwest 

Texas Triangle 

Accelerail
[7-28]

large merit further attention in State analyses of HSGT and in reaching decisions on public

funding of high-speed rail and Maglev.

When benefit-cost analysis of HSGT is approached in accordance with Figure 7-27,

lower-cost HSGT options appear to generate higher ratios of benefits to costs—a trend

analogous to that of Figure 7-25 for total benefits and costs. Along with this finding, public

benefit-cost analysis may yield valuable information necessary for fully apprising decision

makers and the public of the value of HSGT options. 

However, cases where public benefits do not exceed public costs need not be ruled

out for consideration by States or private concerns. In such cases, prospective transfer

effects, mobility concerns, and environmental factors may justify further consideration, even

though such impacts did not enter into the benefit/cost calculation for this analysis.15 The

state-specific localized benefits from HSGT corridors further illustrate why it is appropriate to focus on

State, local, or private financing rather than Federal financing for these projects.

Indeed, in contrast with a nationwide study such as this one, individual State studies

can more closely examine specific corridors, with greater sensitivity to the State’s underlying

reasons for considering HSGT. Such detailed examination may favor a non-HSGT solution,

Accelerail, New HSR, or Maglev. A State, for example, may wish to provide a highreliability, high-frequency HSGT option and may believe that only New HSR or Maglev can

offer a sufficient quality of service. Likewise, a State may place an extraordinarily high value

on environmental benefits, and would seek the HSGT option that maximizes those benefits. 

A State may regard the cooperation of its freight railroads as impossible to achieve, thereby

precluding Accelerail; or a State may perceive Accelerail as the ideal compromise between

its fiscal constraints and its desire for improved intercity transport. Financing issues,

moreover, would call for detailed scrutiny, since the absolute size of the required initial

investment (in conjunction with the available resources of the private and public

participants) will heavily influence the feasibility of HSGT proposals. Finally, the States and

localities, through their intermodal planning processes, are uniquely qualified to judge the

synergy between HSGT corridor development and the enhancement of regional public transit

services, highways, and airports. Taken together, these examples underscore the importance

of site-specific, State-sponsored studies to the definitive characterization of HSGT and other

intercity transport options.

 

15 See Chapter 6.
Chapter 8 

SPECIALIZED ANALYSES

This chapter presents the results of specialized analyses that offer further insights

into the economics and partnership potential of HSGT for America in the 21st century. 

Specifically, the following sections delve into these questions:

• What happens when an HSGT corridor is extended to a new terminus?

• What happens when “hybrid” HSGT cases, involving more than one

technology, are simulated?

• And finally—what happens when key assumptions are altered?

EXTENSIONS OF HSGT

All the illustrative cases described in Chapter 7 would constitute essentially new

services, either starting from scratch, substituting for conventional Amtrak operations, or

displacing older HSGT. Far different would be the case of an extension of HSGT service,

in which the ability to generate substantial traffic volumes over long distances might afford

special opportunities for partnership potential.

The Empire Corridor (New York to Albany, Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo) and

the Southeast Corridor (Washington, D.C. to Richmond, Raleigh, Greensboro, and

Charlotte) would be natural extensions of Northeast Corridor HSGT services. Through rail

passenger services from New York City via Washington to the Southeast developed over a

century ago and persisted as transportation evolved in the subsequent decades. While

historical factors traditionally impeded direct rail passenger service between the Northeast

and Empire corridors, the density of population in both corridors would encourage through

traffic there as well. 

Either of these extensions would increase the traffic levels on the Northeast Corridor

itself, because through passengers from south of Washington and north and west of New

York would need to use the Northeast Corridor to access major Northeastern cities.1 In this

manner, traffic densities on the Northeast Corridor would increase, thus creating synergistic

ridership, revenue, expense, and income effects that might redound to a single HSGT

operator’s profitability.

Recognizing the special opportunities posed by Southeast and Empire extensions of

HSGT in the Northeast Corridor, this study accorded them exceptional treatment based on

the following principles:

 

1

 In addition, but of lesser importance, any additional Northeast Corridor frequencies necessary to serve the

aforementioned through traffic could boost internal Northeast Corridor ridership.
[8-2]

• The study addressed two Northeast Corridor-related systems only2:

 Southeast Corridor plus Northeast Corridor; and

 Empire Corridor plus Northeast Corridor.

• For analytical convenience, each system was assumed to be operated by a

single HSGT entity: the Northeast Corridor operator.3

Technologies in the extensions were matched with technologies in the Northeast

Corridor as follows:

• Accelerail 110 (Southeast) and 125F (Empire) with Amtrak’s existing4

electrified Accelerail service in the Northeast Corridor.5

• New HSR in the extensions with a hypothetical future New HSR system

in the Northeast Corridor.

• Maglev in the extensions with a hypothetical future Maglev system in the

Northeast Corridor.

Traffic Base

All the options in the Northeast Corridor extensions draw much of their strength

from the synergies inherent in the underlying passenger flows. Specifically, for each

extension, the traffic base6 consists of three parts—(1), (2)(a), and (2)(b) below:

(1) Traffic internal to the extension—for example, between Buffalo and

Albany, or between Raleigh and Richmond;

 

2

 A combination of HSGT in all three corridors—Northeast, Empire, and Southeast—is conceivable but was

not modeled, nor were other potential Northeast Corridor HSGT extensions (e.g., Hartford/Springfield and

Harrisburg).

3

 This is a critical institutional assumption; others are conceivable but could yield far different results. 

Regardless of the institutional framework, issues would inevitably arise over the proper allocation of throughtraffic revenues and expenses between the Northeast Corridor and the extension. The treatment in this report

does not address those issues and institutional options, which the States, Amtrak, and others may someday wish

to explore in depth.

4

 The service capabilities over the Northeast Corridor in the Accelerail extension cases are assumed to be

substantially the same as those currently in effect, except that (a) electrification from New Haven to Boston is

assumed to be completed and (b) the new “American Flyer” trainsets are assumed to be in service for trips

strictly within the Northeast Corridor alone. Both of these exceptions are to be in place by the year 2000, and

neither of these exceptions would have a sizable impact on through traffic between the Northeast Corridor and

the extensions.

5

 Due to time and resource limitations, and the complexity and length of these incremental corridors, this study

addressed only one typical Accelerail option for each. The States may wish to address the full range of options

in any subsequent studies.

6

 The term “traffic base” refers to the 1993 traffic flows by existing modes (see Chapter 5). 
[8-3]

(2) Cross-traffic that makes use of both the extension itself and the

Northeast Corridor—for example, between Philadelphia and Albany,

or between Greensboro and New York City. This cross traffic

consists of two components:

(a) Passenger-miles accumulated on the extension itself; and

(b) Passenger-miles accumulated on the Northeast Corridor. 

 The “synergy bonus” consists of item (2)(b) above, since the benefits from increased

Northeast Corridor traffic come at relatively low cost. Both the Empire and Southeast

Corridors would, indeed, generate significant portions of their transportation production on

the Northeast Corridor, as shown in the base traffic data in Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2.

The variations in the traffic base between the Empire and Southeast Corridors reflect

their different spatial configurations (see Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4.) New York City is

supreme as a traffic generator; but the Empire Corridor accesses New York directly and is

not positioned to divert heavy traffic from New York State to New England via New York

City and the “North End” of the Northeast Corridor. Thus the prime opportunity for

Empire/Northeast Corridor through traffic is from upper New York State points to New

Jersey and Philadelphia, a relatively short distance (about 90 miles) on the Northeast

Corridor. By contrast, traffic from the Southeast Corridor to New York, New Jersey, and

Figure 8-1

Composition of Empire Corridor Traffic Base

Cross 

Traffic: 

Extension 

Portion

20%

Extension: 

Internal 

Traffic

58%

Cross 

Traffic: NEC 

Portion

22%

Figure 8-2

Composition of Southeast Corridor Traffic Base

Cross Traffic: 

Extension 

Portion

27%

Extension: 

Internal 

Traffic

43%

Cross Traffic: 

NEC Portion

30%
[8-4]

Philadelphia must traverse some 150-225 miles of Northeast Corridor trackage and generate

the consequent passenger-miles. Factors such as these would account for some of the

different traffic characteristics in the Empire versus the Southeast Corridor—for example, an

average trip length of 295 miles for Accelerail 110 in the Southeast Corridor, versus 237

miles for Accelerail 125F in the Empire Corridor.

Extensions of Existing Accelerail Service in the Northeast Corridor

Only the Accelerail options constitute “extensions” in the strict sense of that term,

since only they would “extend” a Northeast Corridor service that currently exists.8 The

Accelerail projections for the Empire and Southeast Corridors therefore address a

fundamental question—how would the addition of Southeast or Empire Corridor service to

Northeast Corridor service affect a single HSGT entity?—by effectively summing the

following:

• All investment requirements, revenues, expenses, and benefits pertaining

to the extension proper, plus

• Identifiable investment requirements, revenues, expenses, and benefits

arising on the Northeast Corridor proper as a direct result of through

traffic between the Northeast Corridor and the extension.

 

7

 Because of the extreme circuity involved, this study did not address city pair markets linking the Empire

Corridor with Northeast Corridor points north and east of the New York CMSA.

8

 Or will be in place by the year 2000; see footnote 4.

Figure 8-3

Empire Corridor7

Washington/

Baltimore

Wilmington

Philadelphia New York City

Albany

Rochester Syracuse

Buffalo

Figure 8-4

Southeast Corridor

Boston

Washington DC /

Baltimore

Philadelphia/

Wilmington

New York City

Richmond

Rocky Mount

Raleigh

Greensboro

Charlotte
[8-5]

Table 8-1 thus approximates the effects of adding Empire or Southeast Corridor

Accelerail service to a Northeast Corridor operation similar to that of today. 

Table 8-1

Accelerail Projections for Northeast Corridor Extensions

HSGT in 2020:

EMPIRE

CORRIDOR

Accelerail 125F

(Extension)

SOUTHEAST

CORRIDOR

Accelerail 110

(Extension)

Line-haul travel time, hours, New York-Buffalo 5.2

Line-haul travel time, hours, Charlotte-Washington 5.7

Trains per day in each direction, New York-Buffalo 50

Trains per day in each direction, Charlotte-Washington 27

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.192 0.176

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 9.4 5.7

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 2,229 1,689

Average trip length (miles) 237 295

Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in Millions for the

Period 2000-2040)

Surplus after continuing investments $1,473 $1,041

Total benefits $9,681 $6,519

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $3,591 $2,561

 Users' consumer surplus $4,374 $2,550

 Total benefits to HSGT users $7,965 $5,110

 Benefits to the public at large $1,716 $1,409

Total costs $4,050 $2,567

 Components of total costs:

 Initial investment $1,932 $1,047

 O&M expense $1,930 $1,389

 Continuing investments $188 $131

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $3,591 $2,561

 Publicly-borne costs $459 $7

Total benefits less total costs $5,631 $3,952

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by users $4,374 $2,550

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-borne costs $1,257 $1,403

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.39 2.54

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs borne by users 2.2 2.0

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to publicly-borne costs 3.7 9

Does this case meet the threshold tests for "partnership potential"? YES YES

Under this projection method, Accelerail in both extensions performs better, on a

purely commercial basis, than comparable options in the illustrative corridors described in

 

9

 Since the publicly-borne costs are projected to be nearly zero, this ratio would be inapplicable.
[8-6]

Chapter 7; furthermore, both extensions provide relatively high ratios of benefits to costs. 

Table 8-2 summarizes these comparatively favorable projections for Accelerail in the

Northeast Corridor extensions.

Table 8-2

Accelerail Performance Comparison:

Northeast Corridor Extensions Versus All Other Illustrative Corridors

Percentage of Initial Investment

Covered by Surplus After

Continuing Investments Ratio of Total Benefits to Total Costs

Accelerail 110 Accelerail 125F Accelerail 110 Accelerail 125F

Empire Corridor

(Extension)

76% 2.5

Southeast Corridor

(Extension)

99% 2.4

Range of All Other

Illustrative Corridors

10

Between 17%

and 39%

Between 11% and

36%

Between 1.1

and 2.5

Between 1.2

and 2.5

These results for the extensions clearly benefit from the “synergy bonus” described

above. Figure 5 and Figure 6, in showing the annual passenger-miles (Year 2020) per routemile of Accelerail infrastructure investment, clearly demonstrate how the cross-traffic

between the Northeast Corridor and its extensions enhances the potential of Accelerail in the

Empire and Southeast Corridors.

Figure 8-5: Annual Passenger-Miles (Million)

Per Upgraded Accelerail 125 Route-Mile

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

Pacific Northwest 

Chicago-St. Louis 

Texas Triangle 

Florida 

Chicago-Detroit 

Chicago Hub

Network

California South

California

North/South

Empire Corridor

Figure 8-6: Annual Passenger-Miles (Million)

Per Upgraded Accelerail 110 Route-Mile

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0

Pacific Northwest 

Chicago-St. Louis 

Texas Triangle 

Florida 

Chicago-Detroit 

Chicago Hub

Network

California South

California

North/South

Southeast Corridor
[8-7]

New HSR and Maglev Systems

Accelerail extensions in the Empire or Southeast Corridor were analyzed for their

impacts on the operator of a pre-existing Northeast Corridor Accelerail service. Such an

approach makes sense because the Northeast Corridor already enjoys Accelerail service. To

characterize New HSR and Maglev in the Empire and Southeast Corridors, however,

requires a more complex procedure since neither of these technologies exists in today’s

Northeast Corridor. Specifically, the study assumed that a single operator manages New

HSR or Maglev as a integral system in the Northeast and Empire Corridors

(“Empire/Northeast System”); or in the Northeast and Southeast Corridors

(“Southeast/Northeast System”). The study then projected the requirements and

performance, and the benefits and costs, of each integral system.

The results appear in Table 8-4. Both New HSR and Maglev have partnership

potential in the two systems, which are comparable in overall performance to the Northeast

Corridor taken alone, and to the California Corridor (as exemplified in Table 8-3):

Table 8-3

Ratios of Benefits to Costs for New HSR and Maglev Systems

Total Benefits to Total Costs Benefits to the Public at Large,

to Publicly-Borne Costs

New HSR Maglev New HSR Maglev

Empire/Northeast System 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.3

Southeast/Northeast

System

1.1 1.3 0.4 0.5

Northeast Corridor alone 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.4

California North/South 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.6

That these integral systems—each almost 900 miles in length—perform as well as

(and, in the case of the Southeast/Northeast System, even better than) the heavily trafficked

Northeast Corridor alone stems from two key factors. First, in both integral systems, the

traffic levels attributable to origins and/or destinations outside the Northeast Corridor proper

are approximately double those which might arise if Washington—Charlotte, or New

York—Albany—Buffalo, existed in a population vacuum. (See Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2.) 

So great is the “synergy bonus” that approximately 30 percent of the transportation

production of the Empire/Northeast System, and 35 to 45 percent of that of the

Southeast/Northeast System, services markets anchored in Upstate New York and in

Virginia and North Carolina, respectively. Second, the per-mile construction costs for New

 

10 See Chapter 7.
[8-8]

HSR and Maglev in Upstate New York and south of Washington are less than the equivalent

costs in the Northeast Corridor alone.

Table 8-4

Results for Integral Systems: Empire/Northeast and Southeast/Northeast

Empire/Northeast System Southeast/Northeast System

HSGT in 2020: New HSR Maglev New HSR Maglev

Route-miles 880 878 862 861

Line-haul travel time, hours, New York-Buffalo 3.3 2.4

Line-haul travel time, hours, Charlotte-Washington 3.0 2.1

Trains per day in each direction, New York-Buffalo 50 47

Trains per day in each direction, Charlotte-Washington 53 65

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.309 0.350 0.303 0.327

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 32.6 33.9 32.5 36.5

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 6,885 7,448 7,322 9,152

Average trip length (miles) 211 219 225 251

Percent of air traffic diverted 24.5% 31.8% 25.1% 38.8%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 3.2%

Projection Results (Dollar Amounts are Present Values in

Millions for the Period 2000-2040)

Surplus after continuing investments $10,530 $15,059 $11,576 $17,818

Total benefits: $35,643 $42,219 $37,665 $49,920

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $18,129 $22,133 $18,782 $25,205

 Users' consumer surplus $12,479 $14,352 $13,045 $17,236

 Total benefits to HSGT users $30,609 $36,485 $31,826 $42,441

 Benefits to the public at large: $5,034 $5,735 $5,839 $7,479

Total costs: $37,339 $40,443 $33,197 $39,836

 Components of total costs:

 Initial investment $29,739 $33,369 $25,991 $32,448

 O&M expense $6,832 $6,523 $6,531 $6,856

 Continuing investments $767 $552 $675 $531

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $18,129 $22,133 $18,782 $25,205

 Publicly-borne costs $19,210 $18,310 $14,415 $14,630

Total benefits less total costs ($1,696) $1,776 $4,468 $10,085

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by users $12,479 $14,352 $13,045 $17,236

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-borne costs ($14,175) ($12,576) ($8,576) ($7,151)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs borne by users 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to publicly-borne

costs

0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5

Does this case meet the threshold tests for "partnership

potential"?

YES YES YES YES
[8-9]

 In order to analyze the performance and requirements of the Empire/Northeast and

Southeast/Northeast Systems, it is essential to divide each of them into two portions: (1) the

Northeast Corridor “alone,” and (2) the Empire or Southeast Corridor “proper.” The latter

portion approximates the passenger-miles, revenue, expenses, investment requirements, and

other factors that can be fairly attributed to the Empire or Southeast Corridor as part of the

integral system with the Northeast Corridor. The attribution of values to the Empire or

Southeast Corridor proper, within the respective integral systems, is performed as follows

(using passenger-miles in the Empire Corridor for example):

Passenger-miles attributed to the “Empire Corridor proper” EQUALS:

Passenger-miles projected for the Empire/Northeast System

LESS: Passenger-miles projected for the Northeast Corridor alone (as per Chapter 7).

Other attribution methods are possible, and would need to be explored (see footnote

3).

Synthesizing the effects of the traffic synergies and construction cost differentials,

Figure 8-7 shows the annual passenger-miles per dollar of initial investment in the Northeast

Corridor alone versus the Empire and Southeast Corridors proper. For both New HSR and

Maglev, the Empire Corridor generates values only slightly below those of the Northeast

Corridor itself, while the Southeast Corridor generates much heavier traffic than the

Northeast Corridor per investment dollar.

Figure 8-7

Annual Passenger-Miles Per Dollar of Initial Investment

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

New HSR Maglev

Northeast Corridor alone Empire Corridor proper Southeast Corridor proper
[8-10]

The especially high traffic

payoff for New HSR and Maglev

in the Southeast Corridor echoes

the “California effect” apparent in

the traffic results for California

North/South; against the backdrop

of a very large, long-distance travel

demand (reflecting geographic

factors described on pages 8-3 ff.),

the trip-time performance of New

HSR and especially Maglev

competes very strongly with air

and diverts sizable numbers of

passengers for longer and more

profitable trips. (See Figure 8-8.) 

While the opportunities for

long-haul cross-traffic are more limited in the Empire than in the Southeast Corridor, the

average trip length in both corridors proper grows as travel time decreases (Figure 8-9). 

Figure 8-8

Passenger-Miles (in Millions)

Attributed to Southeast Corridor Proper

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

Accelerail

110

(Extension)

New HSR Maglev

Figure 8-9

Average Trip Lengths for Traffic Attributed to

Empire and Southeast Corridors Proper

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Empire

Corridor proper

Southeast

Corridor proper

Accelerail New HSR Maglev
[8-11]

“HYBRID” CORRIDORS

For the sake of simplicity and consistency, the study ordinarily assumed a single

technology for each case.11 (See Chapter 3, especially Table 3-3.) Since the suitability of a

technology modulates with traffic density, and since corridors frequently show patronage

levels that vary greatly by segment, a single-technology restriction could produce suboptimal

results in a detailed State study of a particular corridor. To demonstrate the potential effects

of mixing and matching technologies, the California North/South corridor was analyzed with

New HSR north, and Accelerail 125E south, of Los Angeles. (Because the two technologies

are fully compatible, no passenger or locomotive transfers at Los Angeles would be

necessary.)

The decline in performance at the southern end of the corridor manifests itself in

lower traffic, revenues, and operating surpluses for the hybrid versus New HSR:

Table 8-5

Comparative Results of Hybrid Option in California North/South Corridor

(Dollar Amounts are in Millions)

Annual Measures Accelerail

125E

Hybrid

[125E/200]

New HSR

[200 mph]

Maglev

[300 mph]

Trip-time, hours, Los Angeles-San Francisco12 5.3 3.6 3.2 2.1

Passenger-Miles, Million 2,116 4,314 4,743 5,888

Revenue $367 $723 $791 $1,167

Operating and maintenance expense $223 $386 $394 $389

Operating surplus $144 $337 $397 $778

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are Present Values, as

of the Year 2000, of cash inflows/outflows over 40 years)

Surplus after continuing investments $864 $2,055 $2,489 $5,584

Initial Investment, Total $8,948 $12,564 $15,792 $23,430

Percent of initial investment covered by surplus after

continuing investments

9.7% 16.4% 15.8% 23.8%

Ratio of Total Benefits to Total Costs 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1

Ratio of Benefits to HSGT Users, to Costs Borne by Users 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1

Ratio of Benefits to the Public at Large, to Publicly-Borne

Costs

0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6

 

11 The exceptions were the non-electric Accelerail options in the Southeast and Empire corridors, which were

matched with Accelerail 150E in the already-electrified Northeast Corridor.

12 Note that the California North/South corridor in this report extends the full distance from the San Francisco

Bay Area through Los Angeles to San Diego. The trip times reported in this table include a portion of trackage

in the Los Angeles region that, under the “hybrid” case, is upgraded to Accelerail 125E instead of New HSR.
[8-12]

However, over time, these traffic, revenue, and surplus impacts amount to little in

comparison with the significant saving in initial investment. Because a higher proportion of

benefits than of costs is retained in stepping down from a “pure” New HSR technology to

the hybrid, the latter offers somewhat better projections for both commercial and benefit/cost

measures. Thus, Table 8-5 clearly demonstrates that the more subtle approach—letting the

investment follow the revenue, rather than dictating a uniform service level throughout each

corridor—may enhance the outcome of the planning process.13

The California hybrid case demonstrates how States can fine-tune their corridor

studies to maximize the cost-effectiveness of HSGT investments. In addition to mixing and

matching technologies, State planners have many other opportunities, far beyond the scope

of the present report, for profitably diversifying corridor options. For example:

• Staging of options—the gradual implementation of more and more

ambitious HSGT solutions, over the 40-year planning period and possibly

beyond—merits intensive scrutiny. For example, opportunities may exist

for routes to be developed for Accelerail 90 or 110 service, then upgraded

to 125F, then purchased from the underlying railroad and converted to

150E, or even (with extensive realignment depending on the locale) to

New HSR. As a further hypothetical illustration of this principle: in the

Northeast Corridor of the 21st century, burgeoning Accelerail 150E and

commuter traffic, coupled with capacity constraints in the tunnels to

Manhattan and in Pennsylvania Station, may ultimately require a

partnership to build a parallel or significantly expanded route through

New York City for both local and intercity traffic. If designed with

vision, such a bypass or augmentation could ultimately become the kernel

for a New HSR route for the Northeast Corridor, which could, over the

course of many decades, gradually extend north and south from New

York to supplant portions of the existing alignment.

• Routing questions will likewise undergo serious scrutiny at the State and

local level, and rightfully so. The need to concentrate traffic on minimal

route-mileage—evidenced in the Chicago Hub Network,14 Texas, and the

Southeast Corridor15—dictates careful attention to the economic theory of

railway location. This may involve multi-State discussions of routing

alternatives and extension possibilities.

 

13 This has clearly been the approach overseas. In France, for example, a pre-existing electrified network

extended the market reach of the Paris—Lyons TGV and helped to make the initial project feasible.

14 Where the whole was much greater than the sum of its parts due to traffic synergy.

15 Where incremental traffic over the Northeast Corridor provided a basis for the favorable projections

described above.
[8-13]

For analytical convenience, this report adopted existing Amtrak routings

wherever possible. This assumption, however, yielded Accelerail routemileage almost twice as long as that of New HSR and Maglev in at least

one corridor (Texas) where other realistic opportunities may exist. 

California presents routing conundrums that only the State can resolve:

for example, the existing through passenger line (via the Coast) serves

completely different and less populous intermediate markets than the

Central Valley route, while the latter would require a new alignment over

the Tehachapi Mountains to achieve truly expeditious service. 

In selecting alignments that would demonstrate the full spectrum of

graded technological options, this study made no attempt to consider all

the theoretical possibilities.

• Combinations of the above. In many instances, a comprehensive

corridor analysis would need to address mixing and matching, staging,

and routing questions simultaneously.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSES

This section describes sensitivity excursions that assessed the effects of changes in

assumptions pertaining to two areas—operating and maintenance expenses, and airline fares

in competition with HSGT.

Operating and Maintenance Expenses

As incorporated in this report, HSGT operating expenses represent an improvement

over those experienced by Amtrak prior to its recent restructuring. For the Texas Triangle,

Florida, and California corridors, Table 8-6 shows the ratio of projected HSGT unit expenses

to 1993 Amtrak cost levels. In all three illustrations, unit expenses are on the order of 60

percent of Amtrak long-term avoidable costs (less for the high-volume California options).

Thus, the question naturally arises: how would adoption of expense levels more

akin16 to Amtrak’s affect the results of this study?

To answer this question, a set of alternate assumptions was applied to three test

cases, i.e.:

• Chicago—Detroit 125F;

 

16 It would be inappropriate to impose a cost structure identical to that of Amtrak on the HSGT cases in this

study. For these cases, the significant capital investment (in such support facilities as vehicle maintenance

shops), the modern equipment and infrastructure, the high volume of travel, and the frequent train service

would make for an operation—and a cost structure—fundamentally different from Amtrak’s.
[8-14]

• Chicago Hub 110; and

• California North/South, New HSR.

These assumptions reflected changes from the normative operating expenses, as

described in Chapter 5, in areas typified by the following:

• Less use of automated ticket dispensing;

• Restoration of on-train ticket control;

• Reintroduction of checked baggage service; and

• Recognition of food-service deficits.

With such changes in assumption, annual operating expenses for the test cases would

exceed the normative projections by approximately 25 percent. (See Table 8-7.) All the

cases would see a marked decrease in the ratio of operating surpluses to initial investment. 

The benefit/cost effect of these annual expense increases depends on the relative importance

of O&M in the total life-cycle costs of the case—largely a function of the technology. The

capital-intensive New HSR case in California, therefore, shows relatively little change in the

benefit/cost ratios as a result of the expense hikes. By contrast, the Chicago Hub Network

 

17 Operating expenses per passenger mile.

18 The ratio for each HSGT option is to Amtrak per-passenger-mile long-term avoidable costs as follows:

Expense per passenger-mile

(Based on Year 1993)

Source on Amtrak (1993 data) Applied as denominator in ratios for—

16.5 cents Combined Metroliner and Northeast Corridor

Boston—Washington conventional services

HSGT corridors with 900 million passengermiles or more

19 cents Chicago—Detroit;

New York—Albany—Buffalo

HSGT corridors with less than 900 million

passenger-miles, but with average trip

lengths over 100 miles

22 cents Los Angeles—San Diego HSGT options with less than 900 million

passenger-miles and average trip lengths less

than 100 miles

Table 8-6

Unit Operating Expenses17 for HSGT as Percent

of Amtrak Long-Term Avoidable Unit Expenses in 199318

90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New

HSR

Maglev

California North/South 79% 59% 62% 64% 57% 58% 50% 40%

Florida 71% 69% 66% 71% 79% 78%

Texas Triangle 63% 65% 60% 67% 60% 71% 65% 66%
[8-15]

Accelerail 110 case—in which operating expenses normatively make up 42 percent of the

total costs—shows a ten percent disimprovement in its total benefit/cost ratio, and a 24

percent reduction in its public benefit/cost ratio. 

In this sensitivity test, none of the sample cases loses its partnership potential. 

Operating surpluses persist, albeit in smaller quantities, and total benefits still exceed total

costs. Still, the projects are significantly less capable of financing themselves, the

benefit/cost ratios are diminished, and the partnership potential, in practical terms, suffers. 

For this reason, the attainment of operating economies, just as well as the maximization of

net revenues, will remain a guiding principle of HSGT planning and management.

Table 8-7

Results of Sensitivity Analysis—Higher Operating Expense Assumptions

Chicago-Detroit Chicago Hub Network California North/South

[125 mph fossil] [110 mph fossil] New HSR [200 mph]

[Dollar amounts are in millions except

where noted]

Norma

-tive

Sensi

-tivity

Sensitivity

higher

(lower)

than

Normative,

Percent19

Norma

-tive

Sensi

-tivity

Sensitivity

higher

(lower)

than

Normative,

Percent19

Norma

-tive

Sensi

-tivity

Sensitivity

higher

(lower)

than

Normative,

Percent19

Annual Measures, Year 2020

Passenger-Miles, Million 493.84 493.84 1,313.19 1,313.19 4,742.19 4,742.19

Revenue 87.7 87.7 227.0 227.0 791.3 791.3

Operating and maintenance

expense

56.7 71.2 26% 137.8 172.8 25% 394.4 486.7 23%

O&M expense per passenger-mile

(dollars)

0.115 0.144 26% 0.105 0.132 25% 0.083 0.103 23%

Amtrak unit expense20 (dollars) 0.19 0.19 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165

O&M expense per passenger-mile

as percent of Amtrak unit expense

60% 76% 26% 64% 80% 25% 50% 62% 23%

Operating surplus 31.1 16.5 (47%) 89.2 54.2 (39%) 396.9 304.6 (23%)

Operating surplus per passengermile (dollars)

0.063 0.033 (47%) 0.068 0.041 (39%) 0.084 0.064 (23%)

Life-Cycle Measures

(All amounts are Present Values, as of the Year 2000, of cash inflows/outflows over 40 years)

Surplus after continuing

investments 189.2 65.0 (66%) 559.9 264.2 (53%) 2,489.4 1,755.5 (29%)

Initial Investment, Total 1,150.6 1,150.5 1,486.8 1,486.5 15,792.0 15,792.0

Percent of Initial Investment

Covered by Surplus After

Continuing Investments 16% 6% (66%) 38% 18% (53%) 16% 11% (29%)

O&M Expense as Percent of Total

Costs 29% 36% 24% 42% 53% 26% 17% 21% 22%

Ratio of Total Benefits to Total

Costs 1.5 1.4 (6%) 2.5 2.2 (10%) 1.2 1.1 (4%)

Ratio of Benefits to the Public at

Large, to Publicly-Borne Costs 1.1 1.0 (11%) 2.8 2.1 (24%) 0.7 0.7 (5%)

 

19 Where ratios and percentages are concerned, this column shows a ratio of ratios rather than a percentagepoint spread. Slight discrepancies are due to rounding.

20 Long-term avoidable cost per passenger-mile, for comparable operations as discussed in Footnote 18.
[8-16]

Low-Fare Air Service

In markets not served by low-cost carriers in 1993, baseline air fares for this study

are probably higher than they would be if one or more low-cost carriers had been involved. 

Since low-cost carriers may expand to additional markets, it is possible that HSGT in some

corridors would face lower prices on the part of airlines than those characterized in the

normative analyses for this study. For this reason, the sensitivity of HSGT traffic projections

to the introduction of low-fare air services was examined. This section discusses the extent

of low-fare air service in the illustrative corridors and estimates the effect of lower air fares

in selected markets.

Extent of Low-Fare Air Service

Table 8-8 lists many of the major air markets21 in the HSGT corridors and identifies

those which had “low-fare air service” in 1993 (the year forming the basis for the analysis)

and in March 1996, when this portion of the analysis was completed. Only major markets

served with jet aircraft are shown. Markets served predominantly by regional carriers with

turboprop aircraft are not included since these markets are not prime candidates for the

successful introduction of low fares.

No specific definition of “low-fare” service exists. The fare yields for the highest

fare carriers in one market might, if offered in another market, be well below the existing

fare yields. Therefore, identifying which markets were served by “low-fare carriers”

involved both qualitative and quantitative factors. A list of low-cost carriers likely to offer

low fares was developed on the basis of news articles, advertisements, and limited data. 

Quantitative factors were then used to evaluate the presence of low-cost carriers and low fare

levels in specific markets, recognizing that low-cost carriers might not offer low fares in all

markets they serve, and that airlines with more traditional service, costs, and fares might

offer low fares in selected markets. The quantitative factors used in determining whether a

service is considered low-fare for this analysis are:

• At least five jet round trips daily by a single carrier (in the case of MiamiTampa a combination of two carriers was relied upon to reach that

threshold). This criterion avoids classifying a market as low-fare if the

low-cost airline has only a minimal presence in a market;

 

21 In some cases airport pairs rather than city pairs are shown.
[8-17]

Table 8-8

 Illustrative HSGT Corridors: Low-Fare Air Service in Major Air Markets22

 [See footnote 23 below for carrier designation codes.]

Corridor and Market 1993 1996

California North/South

Los Angeles-San Francisco UA

Los Angeles-Oakland WN WN/UA

Los Angeles-San Jose WN/QQ WN/QQ

San Diego-San Francisco WN WN\UA

San Diego-Oakland WN WN

Burbank-San Francisco QQ UA

Burbank-Oakland WN WN

Burbank-San Jose WN WN

San Jose -Orange County WN/QQ

Ontario-San Francisco UA

Ontario-San Jose WN WN

Ontario-Oakland WN WN

San Diego-San Jose QQ WN\QQ

California South

San Diego-Los Angeles

Chicago Hub Network

Chicago-Detroit WN WN

Chicago-St. Louis WN WN

Detroit-St. Louis WN WN

Detroit-Milwaukee

 

22 1993 schedules based on North American Edition, Official Airline Guide, December 1993;

1996 schedules based on North American Edition, Official Airline Guide, March 1996

23 Carrier designation codes are as follows:

CO Continental “Lite”

J7 Valujet Airlines

QQ Reno Air

TZ American Transair

UA Shuttle by United

WN Southwest Airlines

WV Air South

Note: America West is also a low-cost /low-fare carrier, at least is some markets, but did not offer service in

any of the markets listed in Table 8-8.

(Table 8-8 continues on the next page.)
[8-18]

Corridor and Market 1993 1996

Florida

Tampa-Miami WV/TZ

Fort Lauderdale-Tampa CO WN

Miami-Orlando

Northeast Corridor

New York-Boston

New York-Washington

New York-Baltimore CO

Boston-Baltimore

Boston-Philadelphia

Providence-New York

Providence-Washington

Pacific Northwest

Seattle-Portland

Vancouver-Seattle

Vancouver-Portland

Eugene-Seattle

Texas Triangle

Dallas-Houston WN WN

Houston-San Antonio WN WN

Dallas-San Antonio WN WN

Austin-Dallas WN WN

Austin-Houston WN WN

Empire Corridor

New York-Buffalo CO

New York-Rochester

New York-Syracuse

Southeast Corridor

New York-Raleigh

Philadelphia-Raleigh

Washington/Baltimore-Raleigh J7

New York-Greensboro CO CO

Philadelphia-Greensboro

Washington/Baltimore-Greensboro CO

New York-Charlotte

Philadelphia-Charlotte

Washington/Baltimore-Charlotte

(Table 8-8 continued . . .)
[8-19]

• Fares well below those in other similar stage length jet markets in the

same area of the country on a continuing basis (not just during “fare

wars”); and

• Generally one way, unrestricted (“walk-up”) fares are available at no

higher than half the round trip, advance purchase excursion fares offered

by the major non-discount carriers.

Table 8-8 shows each of the qualifying air markets. The primary discount carrier (or

carriers) is shown in each market for December 1993 and for March 1996. In most cases,

other carriers serving the market can be assumed to have matched, at least on a limited

availability basis, the offerings of the low-fare air carrier. If no carrier code is shown in a

box on the chart, there was no low-fare carrier operating in that market.

Table 8-8 shows that, as of 1993, low-fare air carriers had established a significant

presence in the California North/South, Chicago Hub Network, Chicago—Detroit,

Chicago—St. Louis, and Texas Triangle corridors, and had entered selected markets in the

Northeast, Empire, and Southeast Corridors. No low-fare service existed in the California

South, Florida, and Pacific Northwest corridors. Thus, the analytical base for this study

already includes extensive, although by no means ubiquitous, low-fare operations.

The situation as of March 1996 suggests that considerable fluidity exists in the entry

and exit of low-fare carriers in city-pair and airport-pair markets. Although some markets

enjoy recently added low-fare service (for example, additional airport pairs in the highvolume Bay Area—Los Angeles market), others—in the Northeast and Empire Corridors,

for instance—have seen low-fare service disappear.

Through the 1990s, the absence of low-fare service in the California South and

Pacific Northwest corridors, and its paucity in the Northeast Corridor, suggest that such sitespecific factors as relatively short average trip lengths and high operating costs may

discourage the introduction of low-fare air service, irrespective of the presence of HSGT. 

Many factors, however, enter into entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest in new aviation

services,24 and into established airlines’ pricing policies; thus, HSGT has no guaranteed

immunity from airline price competition.

Estimate of Effects of Lower Air Fares

Since Florida lacked significant intrastate service by discount airlines in 1993, it

provided a useful locale for a sensitivity analysis.25 The demand model was applied to two

 

24 For example, since the 1960s and 1970s, low-fare air service has come and gone in some important

Northeast Corridor markets and in San Diego—Los Angeles.

25 By no means does the selection of these city-pairs, for the purpose of this hypothetical sensitivity check,

imply that these markets will be consistently suitable for low-fare air service during the planning period

(2000—2040). The distances are relatively short and detailed studies of, and experience with, volume,
[8-20]

city-pairs: Miami—Orlando (189 air-miles) and Miami—Tampa (201 air-miles). Only one

change was made: air fares were lowered by 30 percent from their 1993 levels. All other

factors were held constant, including HSGT fares and the market sizes of auto and of the

hypothetical low-fare air service in the absence of HSGT.

The results, depicted in Table 8-9, suggest that a 30 percent reduction in air fares

would reduce diversion rates from air26 to HSGT by about 24 to 33 percent and total HSGT

traffic in these markets by about 10 to 24 percent.

Table 8-9

Estimated Effect of Lower Air Fares on HSGT Traffic Volumes in Two City-Pairs

(New HSR Example—Florida Corridor)

Market

Miami—Orlando Miami—Tampa

(1) Percent reduction in air fare 30% 30%

(2) Percent reduction in diversions from air26 to HSGT 24% 33%

(3) Net reduction in total HSGT traffic volumes 10% 24%

(4) Reduction in HSGT traffic volumes as percent of

reduction in diversions from air to HSGT [ = (3)/(2)]

42% 73%

The table reveals that for the two markets studied, and with all other factors held

constant, a 30 percent reduction in air fare results in a roughly equivalent drop in projected

diversions from air26 to HSGT. However, since HSGT attracts its traffic base from sources

other than air, total HSGT traffic volumes fall less markedly than air-sourced HSGT traffic

alone. The degree of mitigation varies between the two markets: whereas total HSGT traffic

declines by only ten percent in Miami—Orlando, it falls by 24 percent in Miami—Tampa. 

(See line (4) in Table 8-9.) Clearly, if the susceptibility of HSGT to airline price

competition can change so much from market to market in a single corridor, it can exhibit

even more variation among different corridors. In evaluating HSGT options on a sitespecific basis, therefore, States and HSGT entities may wish to conduct similar sensitivity

tests on key markets with careful attention to localized factors. Such detailed analysis would

 

capacity, and other important operating, marketing, and financing issues would be prerequisite to an airline’s

conduct of such service during that period.

26 That is, diversion from “origin/destination” air traffic only. This traffic consists of air trips the true endpoints

of which both lie within the HSGT corridor.
[8-21]

need to consider a number of additional phenomena that do not enter into Table 8-9. These

complicating factors include but are not limited to:

• Likelihood of actual entry of low-fare carriers into the corridor’s

constituent markets (i.e., their prospective investment requirements and

results of operations given, e.g., the operating performance and costs at

the specific airports involved);

• Long-term effects on the air traffic base in the constituent markets—this

involves such factors as induced demand and attracted traffic from

competing markets;

• Long-term effects of the presence of low-fare air carriers on the auto

traffic base and (where important) on conventional rail and bus ridership;

and

• The likely response of an HSGT operator to the entry of low-fare air

competition, in terms of pricing, service design, and other factors; and the

effects on air and auto diversion of that HSGT response.
Chapter 9 

CONCLUSIONS

The study results suggest that States should consider HSGT along with other options

for improving intercity passenger transportation.

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE

HSGT can cost from less than $2 million to $50 million per route-mile to build. The

less expensive options—upgraded existing railroads with 90-150 mph maximum speeds—

can, in some corridors, represent affordable travel improvements that would expand the

range of transportation choices. With top speeds up to 200-300 mph, the costlier options can

provide very fast, reliable, and comfortable transportation service, as in a Maglev timing of

just over an hour between midtown Manhattan and downtown Boston.

In the design and application of all HSGT technologies, the Department regards

safety as paramount. Evolving safety research and regulation could thus influence the

capital cost structure for Accelerail, New HSR, and Maglev. Similarly, research and

development in other facets of railroad and Maglev system design could reduce the

investment levels for HSGT technologies. As the effects of these regulatory advances and

technology development efforts become known, they will enter at the State level into the

conceptual and detailed design of specific HSGT infrastructure and equipment investments.

HSGT could develop appreciable ridership. For example, by the year 2020 in the

most heavily trafficked corridors (California North/South and the Northeast Corridor), New

HSR and Maglev could exceed by as much as a factor of four Amtrak’s current Northeast

Corridor travel volumes. Likewise, Accelerail in California, the Chicago Hub Network, and

Texas could approach or exceed existing Northeast Corridor patronage levels by 2020.

Because HSGT is capital-intensive, requiring a significant fixed investment to

connect specific city-pairs, its success calls for the highest possible concentration of traffic

and revenue over as few route-miles as possible, so as to raise travel volumes and lower unit

costs. The study results bear out this fundamental dictum of HSGT planning: the Chicago

Hub Network is greater than its parts, in sum or individually, due to more intensive and

efficient use of the route structure1; in Texas, New HSR performs much better than the lesscostly but twice-as-lengthy Accelerail 150; and the Southeast and Empire Corridor

 

1

 For example, the Chicago Hub Network is projected to generate traffic levels that are one third to one half

again as high as the sum of the individual corridors between Chicago and Detroit, Milwaukee, and St. Louis. 

Furthermore, the Chicago Hub Accelerail 110 case would cover about two-fifths of its initial investment

requirement from operating surpluses—double the coverage in the Detroit and St. Louis corridors considered

separately.
[9-2]

projections profit from more intensive use of the Northeast Corridor.2 Thus route alignment,

networking, and extension options merit careful consideration in detailed corridor studies.

In no corridor is HSGT projected to be commercially feasible, i.e., cover both its

capital and operating costs. However, in most of the illustrative cases, HSGT is projected to

function on a self-sustaining basis—independent of public subsidies—once the initial

investment is in place and paid for. This finding assumes the cooperation of the freight

railroads (for Accelerail cases primarily), and the HSGT entity’s ability to achieve a more

efficient operation than that which characterized Amtrak prior to its recent restructuring. 

Beyond covering future operating and maintenance expenses and continuing

investment needs, revenues in most of the illustrative cases could cover a portion of the

initial investment. For most corridors, the percentage of the investment that can be so

covered peaks with the Accelerail 110 option. Still, cases across the technological spectrum

show promise of financing, from operations, noticeable portions (one fifth to one half) of

their initial capital costs. In this regard, Accelerail 90 in California South, and New HighSpeed Rail and Maglev in the Northeast Corridor, show the best performance: their

surpluses are projected to cover, respectively, more than two-fifths, two-fifths, and one-half

of their initial investment costs at the normative discount rates applied in this report.3 Even

higher coverage rates characterize the projections for Accelerail in the Southeast and Empire

extensions of the Northeast Corridor, as described in Chapter 8. 

Although the projections of system performance do not meet the traditional privatesector criterion for “commercial feasibility,”4

 they may provide a basis for private/public

partnerships depending on the size of the initial investment required, detailed cash flow and

other analyses, the financing capacities of the prospective partners, and the impetus afforded

the partners by each project’s perceived benefits and costs.

COMPARISON OF BENEFITS AND COSTS

Commercial feasibility in the traditional sense may provide too narrow a perspective

on the worth of HSGT. Thus, in addition to demonstrating operating surpluses, an HSGT

case is deemed to have partnership potential only if its total benefits also exceed its total

costs. Moreover, in performing definitive feasibility studies of HSGT systems, policy

makers and the public may regard it as essential to compare not just total benefits with total

costs, but also the benefits and costs accruing to the public at large. The report, therefore,

 

2

 Further detailed studies would be necessary to confirm the applicability of this principle in specific locations.

3

 See Figure 7-24.

4

 The sole possible exception is Accelerail 110 in the Southeast Corridor, for reasons explained in Chapter 8. 

Much further examination would be required to verify preliminary suggestions that such an extension might be

self-financing when its effects on Northeast Corridor operating economics are fully recognized.
[9-3]

broadens the evaluation of HSGT by comparing total benefits with total costs, and benefits

to the public at large with publicly-borne costs.

HSGT’s total benefits exceed total costs in most of the illustrative cases. Each

HSGT technology would have one or more corridors that provide a favorable ratio of total

benefits to total costs: New HSR, for example, is projected to have partnership potential5 in

four of nine applicable illustrative corridors,6 and Maglev in two of nine. On the basis of

total costs and benefits, each illustrative corridor would have one or more HSGT

technologies that would meet the threshold conditions for partnership potential.7 The more

heavily traveled corridors would generally show partnership potential over a broader

spectrum of technologies.

HSGT’s projected benefits to the public at large are less than its publicly-borne costs

in some three-quarters of the illustrative cases. These shortfalls demonstrate the extent to

which HSGT may be regarded as providing, in effect, for the subsidization of HSGT system

users. Publicly-borne costs are projected to exceed benefits to the public at large in all

corridors for Maglev, New HSR, and Accelerail 150. Benefits to the public at large

consistently exceed costs only for Accelerail 90 and 110. However, cases in which public

benefits do not exceed public costs need not be ruled out for consideration by States or

private concerns. In such cases, prospective transfer effects, mobility concerns, and

environmental factors may justify further consideration, even though such impacts did not

enter into the benefit/cost calculation for this analysis.8

In a given corridor, the less expensive Accelerail technologies, relying on upgraded

existing rail lines and freight railroad cooperation, could typically provide higher ratios of

benefits to costs (both in total and for the public) than New HSR and Maglev. Accelerail’s

potential for HSGT at a modest initial investment cost validates the Department’s Next-

 

5

See Chapter 3.

6

 That is, corridors other than the extensions to the Northeast Corridor analyzed in Chapter 8.

7As defined in this report, “partnership potential” is the apparent capacity of an HSGT corridor to draw the

private and public sectors together in planning, negotiations, and, conceivably, project implementation. To

exhibit partnership potential, the projections for an HSGT technology in a particular corridor must satisfy at

least the following two conditions: First, private enterprise must be able to run the corridor—once built and

paid for—as a completely self-sustaining entity; in other words, the case must generate a projected surplus after

continuing investments. Second, the total benefits of an HSGT corridor must equal or exceed its total costs. 

This report uses “partnership potential” as an indicator of the aggregate financial and economic impacts of

HSGT alternatives in a set of illustrative corridors. Detailed State studies of individual corridors would benefit

from additional evaluation measures as well as site-specific investigations and data. Thus, while “partnership

potential” may offer useful insights in assessing the likelihood of HSGT development by State and local

governments and their private partners, it does not constitute an express or implied criterion for Federal

approval or funding. For further particulars on “partnership potential,” the reader is referred to Chapters 3 and

6.

8

 See Chapter 6.
[9-4]

Generation High-Speed Rail technology development program—which supports use of

existing railroads—and confirms several States’ decisions to implement Accelerail options.

IMPORTANCE OF PARTNERSHIPS AND STATE ROLES

Successful private/public partnerships are essential to the construction and

implementation of all HSGT systems. While necessarily varying among corridors and

technologies, the potential for such partnerships will be strongest where self-sustaining

operations can attract a private HSGT entity, where the benefits provide the State with a

convincing rationale for the public investment, and where a State regards HSGT as a

preferred approach to enhancing intercity travel mobility in an intermodal setting.

The States have specialized knowledge of local conditions and priorities, and the

very nature of corridor planning also calls for detailed consideration of a full range of

transport alternatives from a State and local perspective. Where public policy considerations

dictate, States may also wish to pursue an examination of the incidence of benefits and costs

in conjunction with their detailed corridor studies.
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED

TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

NOTE: These are general definitions applicable throughout the report. Special-purpose

definitions, or necessary specifics, appear ad locum.

Term or abbreviation Meaning

Air O/D Air traffic that has both of its true endpoints within a

single corridor. (I.e., both its origin and destination

cities lie within the same corridor.) Contrasts with “Air

Transfer.”

Air Transfer Air traffic that makes use of flights between endpoints

contained within the same corridor, but that has its

origin and/or destination outside that corridor.

Example: A traveler journeying from Chicago to

Portland, Oregon, switches in Seattle to a local flight to

Portland. The flight is within the Pacific Northwest

Corridor, but the passenger is categorized as air transfer

traffic.

ancillary activities Traditional by-product businesses of intercity passenger

transport companies—e.g., parking, concessions,

advertising, mail and express. (See Chapter 5.)

benefits to HSGT users The value of HSGT to its users, as measured by the

system revenues (the price users pay directly) plus the

users’ consumer surplus (for which they do not pay). 

(See Chapter 6.)

benefits to the public at

large

For this report’s purposes: the combined value of the

reductions in airport and highway congestion, and

emissions, projected for an HSGT case. (See Chapter 6.)

case A particular technological option (e.g., Accelerail 90,

Accelerail 125F, New HSR, Maglev) modeled in a

particular corridor (California North/South, Chicago Hub

Network, and so forth). (See Chapter 3.)

CMSA Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. This

represents a consolidation of data for its constituent

Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs). For

explanation, consult any recent edition of the Statistical

Abstract of the United States. See also MSA.
[Glossary: Page 2]

Term or abbreviation Meaning

continuing investments All capital additions, replacements, and overhauls

undertaken by the HSGT entity after the initiation of

corridor service. Contrasts with “initial investment,”

which occurs prior to the initiation of corridor service.

costs borne by users The portion of benefits to users for which they pay

directly (i.e., system revenues).

Department, the U.S. Department of Transportation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

FTA Federal Transit Administration

HSGT High-speed ground transportation

HSGT entity The private sector partner that would take full

responsibility for operating and maintaining a corridor

upon completion. The HSGT entity would also finance

all continuing investments needed to preserve and expand

the service after its initiation. (This is an assumption for

analytical purposes; the HSGT partners would ultimately

determine the nature of the HSGT entity, which could be

a public authority or mixed private/public concern.)

ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

Maglev Magnetic levitation

MSA Metropolitan Statistical Area. This is generally smaller

and/or less complex than a CMSA and does not contain

constituent PMSAs.

NEC Northeast Corridor

NECIP Northeast Corridor Improvement Project

NMI National Maglev Initiative

NTIS National Technical Information Service

O&M Operating and maintenance [expenses]
[Glossary: Page 3]

Term or abbreviation Meaning

offer The sum total of the marketing attributes presented by a

mode of transportation to the public: trip times, fares,

frequencies, and the many facets of service quality.

“operating expense(s)”;

“operating and

maintenance expense(s)”;

“O&M expense(s)”

In this report, all three terms mean the same thing. 

operating surplus System revenues less O&M expenses.

PMSA Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. A constituent part

of a consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA),

which see.

publicly-borne costs Total costs, less costs borne by users; in other words, total

costs, less system revenues. (See Chapter 6.)

RPM revenue passenger-miles

SEC Southeast Corridor (for this report’s purposes, defined as

the corridor between Charlotte, N.C., and the

Washington/Baltimore CMSA; and treated as an

extension of the Northeast Corridor)

System revenues Total revenues projected for an HSGT case; includes

passenger transportation revenue from fares, plus income

from ancillary activities.

tangent A straight portion of track

total benefits For this report’s purposes: The combined value of

benefits to the public at large, plus benefits to HSGT

users, projected for a case. (See Chapter 6.)

total costs Initial investment, plus O&M expenses, plus continuing

investments. (See Chapters 5 and 6.)

unit expense Operating expense per passenger-mile

unit margin Revenue per passenger-mile less operating expense per

passenger-mile (equates to operating surplus per

passenger-mile).

VMT vehicle-miles traveled
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT

Contents

Explanation i—vi

Corridor Data:

California North/South ............................ 1

California South....................................... 4

Chicago Hub Network ............................. 7

Chicago—Detroit..................................... 10

Chicago—St. Louis.................................. 13

Florida...................................................... 16

Northeast Corridor ................................... 19

Pacific Northwest..................................... 22

Texas Triangle ......................................... 25

Empire Corridor....................................... 28

Southeast Corridor ................................... 31

Explanation of Line Items

The following is a line-by-line explanation of the contents of the Statistical Supplement.

Line reference numbers appear only in this “Explanation” for purposes of specifying formulas

and do not appear in the body of the Statistical Supplement. In the “Line Reference Number”

column, the letter [h] means that the line is solely a heading and contains no amounts.

1 

Line

Reference

Number

Line Item Description

1[h] Physical, production, and traffic factors (traffic data is

for the year 2020)

Heading. Note that lines 4 through 53 relate to the year 2020,

the midpoint year in the planning period.

2 Route-miles This value can be expected to differ among Accelerail, New

HSR, and Maglev options, as routing differences are

common. Within the Accelerail range, values will differ in

California North/South because 90 and 110 use the coastal

alignment, while 125 and 150 use the Central Valley. In all

corridors, slight discrepancies among Accelerail options may

reflect differences in realignments.

3 Trip-time, hours, Los Angeles-San Francisco (example In most corridors, this is the trip time between the two most

 

1

 Line reference numbers 30, 54, and 76 are reserved and omitted from this listing.
[Statistical Supplement Explanation: Page ii]

Line

Reference

Number

Line Item Description

taken from California North/South) distant stations in the city-pair mentioned; i.e., from the most

northerly station in the San Francisco Consolidated

Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) to the most southerly

station in the Los Angeles CMSA. In the Northeast Corridor

only, specified trip times are from the vicinity of Penn

Station, New York, to the vicinity of South Station, Boston.

4 Average train speed (mph) = line 21 divided by line 27. Note: this is a system average

speed and has nothing to do with the trip times quoted in line

3.

5 Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) = line 33 divided by line 8. Note: this is passenger

transportation revenue (and not system revenue) divided by

passenger-miles.

6 Trains per day in each direction This is over the link specified in line 3.

7 Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) As is customary, “trips” are one-way trips. A traveler taking

a round trip (e.g., from Chicago to Detroit and return) counts

as two trips.

8 Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020)

9 Average trip length (miles) = line 8 divided by line 7.

10 Average trip length as % of route length = line 9 divided by line 2.

11 HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of

passenger-miles per route-mile)

= line 8 divided by line 2.

12 Percent of air traffic diverted For air trips with both origin and destination within the

corridor: the number of trips that would be diverted to HSGT

divided by the number of air trips that would occur in the

absence of HSGT.

13 Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted The number of trips that would be diverted to HSGT divided

by the number of auto trips that would occur in the absence of

HSGT.

14[h] Percent of HSGT traffic by source: Heading. The following lines indicate the composition of the

HSGT traffic in the year 2020. See Figure 7-11 for a graphic

representation of the following percentages (for California

North/South as an example). Percentages are based on

“passengers” (i.e., trips).

15 Diverted from air

16 Diverted from auto

17 Diverted from conventional rail

18 Diverted from bus

19 Induced Note: The induced traffic generally ranges from 7 to 9 percent

of total HSGT traffic.

20[h] Operating efficiency factors, 2020 Heading. The following are traditional statistics and

derivatives used in the analysis of transportation operations.

21 Train-miles. millions

22 Passenger-miles per train mile = line 8 divided by line 21

23 Seat-miles, millions

24 Load factor = line 8 divided by line 23
[Statistical Supplement Explanation: Page iii]

Line

Reference

Number

Line Item Description

25 Gross ton-miles, millions

26 Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile = line 8 divided by line 25

27 Train-hours, millions

28 Passenger-miles per train hour = line 8 divided by line 27

29 Operating ratio (O&M total expense/passenger

transportation revenue)

= line 43 divided by line 33. Note that this derivative

excludes ancillary activities and is intended as a measure of

passenger transportation operating performance only.

31[h] Operating results for 2020 Heading. Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise

stated.

32[h] Revenues: Heading.

33 Passenger transportation revenue This is the predominant revenue source.

34 Income from ancillary activities This is net of associated expenses. See the “Ancillary

Activities” section of Chapter 5.

35 System revenues = line 33 plus line 34.

36 Percent of system revenues from ancillary

______activities

= line 34 divided by line 35. Normally equates to 2 to 5

percent.

37[h] Operating and maintenance expenses: Heading. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the components

of O&M expense.

38 Maintenance of way

39 Maintenance of equipment

40 Transportation

41 Passenger traffic and services

42 General and administrative

43 Total O&M expense = sum of lines 38 through 42.

44[h] Per passenger-mile (dollars): Heading. Equals each of lines 38 through 43, divided by line

8.

45 Maintenance of way = line 38 divided by line 8.

46 Maintenance of equipment = line 39 divided by line 8.

47 Transportation = line 40 divided by line 8.

48 Passenger traffic and services = line 41 divided by line 8.

49 General and administrative = line 42 divided by line 8.

50 Total O&M expense = line 43 divided by line 8.

51 Operating surplus = line 35 minus line 43.

52 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) = line 51 divided by line 8.

53 Year showing first operating surplus Within the planning period 2000-2040, this is the first year in

which line 51 is greater than zero. Most cases show a

projected surplus in the first year.

55[h] Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present values, as

of the year 2000, of cash inflows/outflows between 2000

and 2040. )

Heading. All the following lines reflect present values

pertaining to the entire planning period. (For initial

investments, the outflows are actually assumed to occur in the

three years preceding 2000; see Chapter 4.) Dollar amounts

are in millions.

56[h] Revenues: Heading.
[Statistical Supplement Explanation: Page iv]

Line

Reference

Number

Line Item Description

57 Passenger Transportation Revenues Analogous to line 33.

58 Income from Ancillary Activities Analogous to line 34.

59 System Revenues = line 57 plus line 58.

60 Less: Total O&M expenses Analogous to line 43.

61 Operating surplus = line 59 minus line 60.

62 Less: Continuing investments As described in Chapter 5, the continuing investments are all

capital programs occurring after the inception of service.

63 Surplus after continuing investments = line 61 minus line 62.

64[h] Initial investment: Heading.

65 Initial vehicle investment

66 Initial infrastructure investment

67 Initial investment for ancillary activities

68 Initial investment, Total = sum of lines 65 through 67.

69[h] Percent of total initial investment pertaining to-- Heading. Equals each of lines 65 through 67, divided by line

68.

70 Vehicles = line 65 divided by line 68.

71 Infrastructure = line 66 divided by line 68.

72 Ancillary activities = line 67 divided by line 68.

73 Total initial investment per route-mile = line 68 divided by line 2. Note that this per-mile figure

includes vehicles and ancillary investments.

74 Portion of initial investment that is not covered by

surplus after continuing investments

= line 68 minus line 63. On the supposition that the present

value of all surpluses (i.e., line 63) accrues to the

governmental partners, this line represents the net public

investment in the project. To the degree that less than all

surpluses accrue to the governmental partners, the net public

investment would be so much the greater.

75 Percentage of initial investment covered by surplus after

continuing investments

= line 63 divided by line 68. This is a key commercial

measure since it approximates the maximum percentage of

the project that might be self-financed.

77[h] Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of

Partnership Potential

Heading.

78 Surplus after continuing investments This is line 63, repeated here. The existence of a surplus after

continuing investment is the first of two tests for partnership

potential (see Chapter 3 and line 107 below).

79[h] Total benefits: Heading.

80[h] Benefits to HSGT users: Heading. See Chapter 6.

81 System revenues These are the “benefits for which HSGT users pay directly.”

82 Users' consumer surplus These are the benefits for which HSGT users do not pay

directly.

83 Total benefits to HSGT users = line 81 plus line 82.

84[h] Benefits to the public at large: Heading.
[Statistical Supplement Explanation: Page v]

Line

Reference

Number

Line Item Description

85[h] Airport congestion delay savings Heading.

86 Operation delays These are the operational savings to airlines from the reduced

airport congestion projected to be occasioned by HSGT.

87 Passenger delays This is the value of air passengers’ time saved due to

projected reductions in airport congestion.

88 Total airport congestion delay

___________savings

= line 86 plus line 87.

89 Highway delay savings This is the value of reduced highway congestion projected to

result from HSGT.

90 Emission savings This is the value of reduced emissions projected to result

from HSGT.

91 Total benefits to the public at large = sum of lines 88 through 90.

92 Total benefits = line 83 plus line 91. That is: the total benefits to users and

the public at large.

93[h] Total costs: Heading. The following three lines show the constituents, by

type, of total costs:

94 Initial investment = line 68.

95 O&M expense = line 60.

96 Continuing investments = line 62.

97 Total costs = sum of lines 94 through 96.

98[h] Incidence of total costs: Heading. The following lines distribute the total costs among

the sources of funds: users at the farebox, versus the public at

large.

99 Costs borne by users This equals system revenues as shown in line 59. When total

costs are greater than revenues—as is true with the cases

projected in this report—then system revenues necessarily

represent the portion of those total costs for which users pay.

100 Publicly-borne costs = line 97 less line 99. That is, it is the total costs less the

costs borne by users. It also equals line 74, which is another

way of arriving at the same result.

101 Total benefits less total costs = line 92 less line 97.

102 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by users = line 83 less line 99.

103 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-borne

___costs

= line 91 less line 100.

104 Ratio of total benefits to total costs = line 92 divided by line 97. This ratio (calculated to one

decimal place) must equal or exceed 1.0 to meet the second of

two tests of partnership potential (see Chapter 3 and line 107

below).

105 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs borne by

____users = line 83 divided by line 99.

106 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to

___publicly-borne costs

= line 91 divided by line 100.
[Statistical Supplement Explanation: Page vi]

Line

Reference

Number

Line Item Description

107 Does this case meet the threshold tests for "partnership

potential"?

If line 78, the surplus after continuing investments, is greater

than zero; and if line104, the ratio of total benefits to total

costs, is 1.0 or more; then this report deems the case to have

“partnership potential” and a “YES” appears here.

Otherwise, no “partnership potential” is found and a “NO”

appears in the appropriate column.
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

California North/South 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 597 594 546 546 546 546 545 527

Trip-time, hours, Los Angeles-San Francisco 8.1 6.4 5.7 5.3 5.1 4.8 3.2 2.1

Average train speed (mph) 65 80 81 86 89 95 136 218

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.166 0.157 0.169 0.166 0.164 0.161 0.162 0.194

Trains per day in each direction 29 31 39 44 44 53 92 91

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 6.3 7.9 9.6 10.3 10.7 11.6 15.6 18.6

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 1,160 1,716 1,881 2,116 2,252 2,581 4,742 5,888

Average trip length (miles) 184 218 195 205 211 223 303 316

Average trip length as % of route length 31% 37% 36% 38% 39% 41% 56% 60%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 1.9 2.9 3.4 3.9 4.1 4.7 8.7 11.2

Percent of air traffic diverted 2.1% 4.6% 4.6% 5.8% 6.7% 8.6% 27.4% 36.9%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 2.8% 4.1% 3.6% 3.9% 4.0% 4.4% 6.3% 6.7%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 16% 23% 17% 19% 21% 24% 51% 56%

 Diverted from auto 24% 27% 36% 36% 35% 35% 19% 17%

 Diverted from conventional rail 43% 35% 31% 29% 28% 26% 17% 15%

 Diverted from bus 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 4% 3%

 Induced 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 12.7 13.5 15.2 17.0 17.3 20.1 33.1 32.4

Passenger-miles per train mile 92 127 124 125 130 128 143 182

Seat-miles, millions 3,343 3,559 4,007 4,480 4,568 5,317 9,387 10,520

Load factor 35% 48% 47% 47% 49% 49% 51% 56%

Gross ton-miles, millions 4,584 4,664 4,947 5,362 5,468 6,163 12,957 5,826

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.25 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.37 1.01

Train-hours, millions 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.15

Passenger-miles per train hour 5,947 10,207 10,070 10,749 11,543 12,155 19,514 39,571

Operating ratio 79% 62% 61% 64% 57% 59% 51% 34%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $192 $269 $317 $351 $370 $416 $770 $1,143

 Income from ancillary activities $8 $11 $16 $16 $17 $18 $21 $24

 System revenues $200 $280 $333 $367 $387 $434 $791 $1,167

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $7 $8 $12 $24 $9 $18 $41 $34

 Maintenance of equipment $22 $22 $25 $24 $29 $29 $65 $38

 Transportation $43 $43 $49 $59 $53 $67 $98 $118

 Passenger traffic and services $42 $48 $57 $61 $62 $68 $94 $109

 General and administrative $37 $46 $51 $55 $58 $64 $96 $90

 Total O&M expense $151 $168 $194 $223 $211 $246 $394 $389

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.006 $0.005 $0.006 $0.011 $0.004 $0.007 $0.009 $0.006

 Maintenance of equipment $0.019 $0.013 $0.014 $0.012 $0.013 $0.011 $0.014 $0.006

 Transportation $0.037 $0.025 $0.026 $0.028 $0.024 $0.026 $0.021 $0.020

 Passenger traffic and services $0.036 $0.028 $0.030 $0.029 $0.028 $0.026 $0.020 $0.018

 General and administrative $0.032 $0.027 $0.027 $0.026 $0.026 $0.025 $0.020 $0.015

 Total O&M expense $0.130 $0.098 $0.103 $0.105 $0.094 $0.095 $0.083 $0.066

Operating surplus $49 $112 $139 $144 $175 $188 $397 $778

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.042 $0.065 $0.074 $0.068 $0.078 $0.073 $0.084 $0.132

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 California North-South
California North/South 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $1,520 $2,122 $2,506 $2,773 $2,918 $3,286 $6,045 $8,975

 Income from Ancillary Activities $61 $89 $121 $128 $134 $143 $163 $187

 System Revenues $1,582 $2,210 $2,627 $2,902 $3,051 $3,429 $6,208 $9,162

Less: Total O&M expenses $1,222 $1,365 $1,611 $1,854 $1,724 $2,034 $3,318 $3,348

 Operating surplus $360 $846 $1,017 $1,048 $1,327 $1,394 $2,890 $5,814

Less: Continuing investments $84 $132 $146 $184 $176 $162 $401 $230

 Surplus after continuing investments $276 $714 $870 $864 $1,151 $1,232 $2,489 $5,584

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $372 $339 $466 $410 $438 $494 $1,043 $995

 Initial infrastructure investment $931 $2,561 $7,445 $8,517 $7,564 $8,684 $14,724 $22,406

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $11 $14 $20 $22 $22 $24 $25 $28

 Initial investment, Total $1,314 $2,914 $7,931 $8,948 $8,024 $9,203 $15,792 $23,430

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 28% 12% 6% 5% 5% 5% 7% 4%

 Infrastructure 71% 88% 94% 95% 94% 94% 93% 96%

 Ancillary activities 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $2.2 $4.9 $14.5 $16.4 $14.7 $16.9 $29.0 $44.5

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $1,038 $2,200 $7,060 $8,084 $6,873 $7,971 $13,303 $17,846

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 21% 24% 11% 10% 14% 13% 16% 24%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $276 $714 $870 $864 $1,151 $1,232 $2,489 $5,584

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $1,582 $2,210 $2,627 $2,902 $3,051 $3,429 $6,208 $9,162

 Users' consumer surplus $2,153 $3,055 $3,374 $3,745 $3,913 $4,396 $7,688 $10,324

 Total benefits to HSGT users $3,735 $5,265 $6,001 $6,647 $6,964 $7,824 $13,896 $19,486

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $514 $782 $722 $828 $895 $1,048 $2,272 $2,747

 Passenger delays $963 $1,478 $1,358 $1,563 $1,693 $1,988 $4,343 $5,239

 Total airport congestion delay savings $1,477 $2,261 $2,080 $2,390 $2,588 $3,036 $6,614 $7,986

 Highway delay savings $738 $1,080 $1,608 $1,773 $1,807 $1,985 $2,015 $2,222

 Emission savings ($102) $51 $92 $366 ($51) $444 $656 $736

 Total benefits to the public at large $2,113 $3,392 $3,780 $4,530 $4,343 $5,464 $9,285 $10,943

Total benefits $5,848 $8,657 $9,781 $11,176 $11,307 $13,288 $23,181 $30,429

Total costs:

 Initial investment $1,314 $2,914 $7,931 $8,948 $8,024 $9,203 $15,792 $23,430

 O&M expense $1,222 $1,365 $1,611 $1,854 $1,724 $2,034 $3,318 $3,348

 Continuing investments $84 $132 $146 $184 $176 $162 $401 $230

Total costs $2,619 $4,410 $9,688 $10,985 $9,925 $11,400 $19,511 $27,007

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $1,582 $2,210 $2,627 $2,902 $3,051 $3,429 $6,208 $9,162

 Publicly-borne costs $1,038 $2,200 $7,060 $8,084 $6,873 $7,971 $13,303 $17,846

Statistical Supplement Page 2 California North-South
California North/South 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $3,228 $4,247 $93 $191 $1,383 $1,889 $3,670 $3,422

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$2,153 $3,055 $3,374 $3,745 $3,913 $4,396 $7,688 $10,324

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs $1,075 $1,192 ($3,280) ($3,554) ($2,530) ($2,507) ($4,018) ($6,902)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.23 1.96 1.01 1.02 1.14 1.17 1.19 1.13

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.36 2.38 2.28 2.29 2.28 2.28 2.24 2.13

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 2.04 1.54 0.54 0.56 0.63 0.69 0.70 0.61

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES

Statistical Supplement Page 3 California North-South
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

California South 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 128 128 128 128 142 123

Trip-time, hours, San Diego-Los Angeles 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.3 0.7

Average train speed (mph) 63 70 71 73 108 167

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.276 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.244 0.312

Trains per day in each direction 25 26 26 27 26 55

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.6

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 276 283 287 289 365 330

Average trip length (miles) 94 94 94 94 113 92

Average trip length as % of route length 73% 73% 73% 73% 80% 74%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.7

Percent of air traffic diverted 17.8% 19.1% 19.5% 19.8% 21.5% 25.3%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 1.1% 1.7%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 12%

 Diverted from auto 4% 5% 5% 5% 7% 11%

 Diverted from conventional rail 74% 72% 71% 71% 68% 62%

 Diverted from bus 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 8%

 Induced 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 4.9

Passenger-miles per train mile 118 116 118 114 136 67

Seat-miles, millions 618 643 643 668 764 741

Load factor 45% 44% 45% 43% 48% 45%

Gross ton-miles, millions 848 843 794 799 1,054 445

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.74

Train-hours, millions 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03

Passenger-miles per train hour 7,390 8,085 8,391 8,371 14,719 11,132

Operating ratio 60% 59% 58% 63% 66% 60%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $76 $81 $82 $83 $89 $103

 Income from ancillary activities $3 $3 $3 $3 $4 $5

 System revenues $79 $84 $85 $86 $93 $107

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $2 $2 $2 $5 $9 $9

 Maintenance of equipment $6 $6 $6 $6 $8 $5

 Transportation $10 $10 $10 $11 $11 $15

 Passenger traffic and services $15 $16 $16 $16 $15 $17

 General and administrative $13 $13 $13 $13 $15 $15

 Total O&M expense $46 $47 $47 $52 $59 $61

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.009 $0.008 $0.009 $0.019 $0.025 $0.028

 Maintenance of equipment $0.022 $0.022 $0.022 $0.021 $0.023 $0.014

 Transportation $0.035 $0.036 $0.034 $0.040 $0.029 $0.046

 Passenger traffic and services $0.055 $0.055 $0.054 $0.054 $0.042 $0.052

 General and administrative $0.045 $0.046 $0.045 $0.046 $0.041 $0.045

 Total O&M expense $0.166 $0.168 $0.165 $0.179 $0.160 $0.186

Operating surplus $33 $37 $38 $34 $35 $46

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.121 $0.129 $0.133 $0.119 $0.095 $0.139

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 California South
California South 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $589 $627 $635 $641 $693 $812

 Income from Ancillary Activities $25 $25 $27 $27 $32 $35

 System Revenues $614 $652 $662 $668 $725 $848

Less: Total O&M expenses $380 $387 $386 $430 $498 $531

 Operating surplus $234 $265 $276 $238 $227 $317

Less: Continuing investments $28 $24 $24 $24 $51 $32

 Surplus after continuing investments $206 $241 $252 $214 $176 $284

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $128 $141 $141 $141 $209 $161

 Initial infrastructure investment $327 $512 $549 $824 $3,898 $4,841

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $4 $4 $4 $4 $5 $5

 Initial investment, Total $459 $657 $694 $969 $4,112 $5,006

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 28% 22% 20% 15% 5% 3%

 Infrastructure 71% 78% 79% 85% 95% 97%

 Ancillary activities 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $3.6 $5.1 $5.4 $7.6 $29.1 $40.7

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $253 $416 $442 $755 $3,936 $4,722

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 45% 37% 36% 22% 4% 6%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $206 $241 $252 $214 $176 $284

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $614 $652 $662 $668 $725 $848

 Users' consumer surplus $752 $807 $827 $843 $976 $1,249

 Total benefits to HSGT users $1,366 $1,459 $1,488 $1,511 $1,701 $2,096

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $230 $246 $251 $255 $275 $322

 Passenger delays $422 $451 $461 $468 $505 $590

 Total airport congestion delay savings $652 $697 $712 $723 $780 $912

 Highway delay savings $199 $250 $271 $289 $401 $643

 Emission savings ($20) $32 $17 $83 $65 $91

 Total benefits to the public at large $831 $979 $999 $1,096 $1,246 $1,646

Total benefits $2,197 $2,438 $2,487 $2,607 $2,946 $3,742

Total costs:

 Initial investment $459 $657 $694 $969 $4,112 $5,006

 O&M expense $380 $387 $386 $430 $498 $531

 Continuing investments $28 $24 $24 $24 $51 $32

Total costs $867 $1,068 $1,104 $1,423 $4,661 $5,569

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $614 $652 $662 $668 $725 $848

 Publicly-borne costs $253 $416 $442 $755 $3,936 $4,722

Statistical Supplement Page 2 California South
California South 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $1,329 $1,370 $1,384 $1,184 ($1,715) ($1,827)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$752 $807 $827 $843 $976 $1,249

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs $578 $563 $557 $341 ($2,691) ($3,076)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.53 2.28 2.25 1.83 0.63 0.67

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.22 2.24 2.25 2.26 2.35 2.47

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 3.28 2.35 2.26 1.45 0.32 0.35

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES YES YES NO NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 California South
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Chicago Hub Network 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 662 662 662 662 662 662 607 646

Trip-time, hours, Detroit-Milwaukee 5.3 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 3.4 2.1

Average train speed (mph) 70 80 84 86 89 88 116 177

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.145 0.166 0.181 0.181 0.188 0.188 0.230 0.309

Trains per day in each direction 12 13 13 14 14 14 13 46

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 5.9 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.9 8.1 9.4

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 1,142 1,313 1,305 1,329 1,375 1,380 1,680 1,900

Average trip length (miles) 193 197 198 198 200 200 207 203

Average trip length as % of route length 29% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 34% 31%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.9

Percent of air traffic diverted 12.7% 16.4% 16.9% 17.4% 18.5% 18.6% 28.1% 36.7%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 3.7% 4.2% 4.1% 4.1% 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 4.1%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 27% 30% 31% 31% 32% 32% 42% 49%

 Diverted from auto 41% 40% 39% 39% 38% 38% 33% 28%

 Diverted from conventional rail 24% 22% 22% 21% 21% 21% 18% 15%

 Diverted from bus 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%

 Induced 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 8.5 9.5 9.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.2 23.8

Passenger-miles per train mile 135 138 137 133 137 138 150 80

Seat-miles, millions 2,235 2,517 2,518 2,647 2,645 2,643 3,172 3,571

Load factor 51% 52% 52% 50% 52% 52% 53% 53%

Gross ton-miles, millions 3,065 3,299 3,110 3,168 3,166 3,064 4,378 2,143

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.38 0.89

Train-hours, millions 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13

Passenger-miles per train hour 9,457 11,033 11,491 11,374 12,218 12,129 17,487 14,141

Operating ratio 75% 63% 59% 65% 56% 62% 49% 37%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $166 $217 $236 $240 $258 $259 $386 $587

 Income from ancillary activities $8 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $11 $13

 System revenues $174 $227 $246 $250 $268 $269 $397 $599

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $11 $12 $14 $25 $15 $28 $30 $29

 Maintenance of equipment $16 $18 $18 $16 $18 $17 $25 $16

 Transportation $29 $32 $32 $37 $32 $37 $39 $63

 Passenger traffic and services $36 $40 $40 $41 $42 $42 $49 $60

 General and administrative $33 $36 $37 $37 $38 $38 $47 $47

 Total O&M expense $125 $138 $140 $157 $146 $161 $191 $215

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.009 $0.009 $0.011 $0.019 $0.011 $0.020 $0.018 $0.015

 Maintenance of equipment $0.014 $0.013 $0.013 $0.012 $0.013 $0.012 $0.015 $0.008

 Transportation $0.025 $0.025 $0.024 $0.028 $0.024 $0.027 $0.023 $0.033

 Passenger traffic and services $0.032 $0.031 $0.031 $0.031 $0.030 $0.030 $0.029 $0.032

 General and administrative $0.029 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.025

 Total O&M expense $0.109 $0.105 $0.107 $0.118 $0.106 $0.117 $0.114 $0.113

Operating surplus $50 $89 $106 $93 $123 $108 $206 $384

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.044 $0.068 $0.081 $0.070 $0.089 $0.078 $0.123 $0.202

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Chicago Hub Network
Chicago Hub Network 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $1,331 $1,754 $1,899 $1,935 $2,086 $2,093 $3,128 $4,859

 Income from Ancillary Activities $65 $76 $77 $79 $82 $82 $89 $103

 System Revenues $1,396 $1,831 $1,977 $2,013 $2,167 $2,175 $3,217 $4,962

Less: Total O&M expenses $1,041 $1,167 $1,179 $1,333 $1,237 $1,394 $1,663 $1,904

 Operating surplus $355 $664 $798 $680 $931 $781 $1,554 $3,058

Less: Continuing investments $98 $104 $90 $97 $95 $91 $182 $85

 Surplus after continuing investments $257 $560 $708 $584 $835 $690 $1,371 $2,974

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $360 $452 $424 $424 $424 $452 $730 $578

 Initial infrastructure investment $690 $1,020 $2,000 $3,190 $3,269 $4,670 $11,539 $17,192

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $13 $14 $14 $15 $15 $15 $15 $17

 Initial investment, Total $1,062 $1,487 $2,438 $3,628 $3,708 $5,137 $12,285 $17,787

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 34% 30% 17% 12% 11% 9% 6% 3%

 Infrastructure 65% 69% 82% 88% 88% 91% 94% 97%

 Ancillary activities 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $1.6 $2.2 $3.7 $5.5 $5.6 $7.8 $20.3 $27.5

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $805 $927 $1,730 $3,045 $2,872 $4,448 $10,913 $14,813

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 24% 38% 29% 16% 23% 13% 11% 17%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $257 $560 $708 $584 $835 $690 $1,371 $2,974

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $1,396 $1,831 $1,977 $2,013 $2,167 $2,175 $3,217 $4,962

 Users' consumer surplus $1,888 $2,363 $2,392 $2,454 $2,594 $2,606 $3,478 $4,491

 Total benefits to HSGT users $3,283 $4,194 $4,368 $4,468 $4,761 $4,781 $6,694 $9,453

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $511 $623 $642 $654 $691 $694 $907 $1,225

 Passenger delays $951 $1,158 $1,194 $1,217 $1,285 $1,290 $1,671 $2,254

 Total airport congestion delay savings $1,462 $1,780 $1,836 $1,871 $1,976 $1,984 $2,578 $3,480

 Highway delay savings $611 $692 $671 $686 $688 $690 $688 $717

 Emission savings $39 $115 $111 $152 $80 $165 $186 $175

 Total benefits to the public at large $2,111 $2,587 $2,618 $2,709 $2,745 $2,838 $3,452 $4,371

Total benefits $5,395 $6,781 $6,986 $7,176 $7,505 $7,619 $10,146 $13,824

Total costs:

 Initial investment $1,062 $1,487 $2,438 $3,628 $3,708 $5,137 $12,285 $17,787

 O&M expense $1,041 $1,167 $1,179 $1,333 $1,237 $1,394 $1,663 $1,904

 Continuing investments $98 $104 $90 $97 $95 $91 $182 $85

Total costs $2,201 $2,758 $3,706 $5,058 $5,039 $6,622 $14,130 $19,775

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $1,396 $1,831 $1,977 $2,013 $2,167 $2,175 $3,217 $4,962

 Publicly-borne costs $805 $927 $1,730 $3,045 $2,872 $4,448 $10,913 $14,813

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Chicago Hub Network
Chicago Hub Network 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $3,194 $4,023 $3,280 $2,118 $2,466 $997 ($3,984) ($5,951)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$1,888 $2,363 $2,392 $2,454 $2,594 $2,606 $3,478 $4,491

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs $1,306 $1,660 $888 ($336) ($128) ($1,609) ($7,461) ($10,442)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.45 2.46 1.88 1.42 1.49 1.15 0.72 0.70

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.35 2.29 2.21 2.22 2.20 2.20 2.08 1.90

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 2.62 2.79 1.51 0.89 0.96 0.64 0.32 0.30

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Chicago Hub Network
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Chicago-Detroit 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 296 296 296 296 296 296 285 285

Trip-time, hours, Chicago-Detroit 4.3 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 2.4 1.5

Average train speed (mph) 69 79 81 83 85 85 117 190

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.134 0.156 0.170 0.170 0.182 0.182 0.240 0.329

Trains per day in each direction 15 17 17 17 17 17 22 44

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 3.5 3.7

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 431 501 494 507 495 498 669 726

Average trip length (miles) 188 192 193 194 194 194 191 194

Average trip length as % of route length 63% 65% 65% 65% 66% 66% 67% 68%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.5

Percent of air traffic diverted 12.5% 16.8% 16.9% 17.6% 17.4% 17.6% 33.4% 41.3%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 2.7% 3.0% 2.9% 3.0% 2.8% 2.8% 3.2% 2.7%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 27% 31% 32% 32% 33% 33% 47% 56%

 Diverted from auto 42% 40% 39% 39% 38% 38% 30% 24%

 Diverted from conventional rail 23% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 15% 14%

 Diverted from bus 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0%

 Induced 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.6 9.2

Passenger-miles per train mile 133 136 134 138 135 135 146 79

Seat-miles, millions 857 971 971 971 971 971 1,303 1,376

Load factor 50% 52% 51% 52% 51% 51% 51% 53%

Gross ton-miles, millions 1,175 1,272 1,199 1,162 1,162 1,125 1,798 826

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.37 0.88

Train-hours, millions 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05

Passenger-miles per train hour 9,164 10,698 10,933 11,388 11,406 11,496 17,032 15,005

Operating ratio 94% 77% 68% 80% 69% 77% 57% 38%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $58 $78 $84 $86 $90 $90 $160 $239

 Income from ancillary activities $3 $4 $4 $4 $4 $4 $5 $6

 System revenues $61 $82 $88 $90 $94 $94 $166 $244

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $7 $7 $5 $15 $10 $16 $19 $14

 Maintenance of equipment $7 $8 $8 $7 $8 $7 $11 $7

 Transportation $11 $13 $13 $14 $12 $14 $17 $24

 Passenger traffic and services $14 $16 $16 $16 $16 $16 $21 $25

 General and administrative $15 $17 $16 $17 $17 $17 $23 $21

 Total O&M expense $54 $60 $57 $69 $62 $70 $91 $91

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.015 $0.014 $0.009 $0.029 $0.020 $0.032 $0.029 $0.019

 Maintenance of equipment $0.016 $0.015 $0.015 $0.013 $0.016 $0.014 $0.017 $0.009

 Transportation $0.026 $0.026 $0.026 $0.028 $0.025 $0.028 $0.025 $0.034

 Passenger traffic and services $0.033 $0.032 $0.032 $0.032 $0.032 $0.032 $0.032 $0.034

 General and administrative $0.035 $0.033 $0.032 $0.034 $0.034 $0.034 $0.034 $0.029

 Total O&M expense $0.125 $0.120 $0.115 $0.135 $0.126 $0.140 $0.136 $0.125

Operating surplus $7 $22 $31 $21 $31 $25 $74 $154

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.016 $0.044 $0.063 $0.042 $0.064 $0.050 $0.111 $0.212

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2002 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Chicago-Detroit
Chicago-Detroit 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $453 $620 $664 $684 $713 $718 $1,286 $1,951

 Income from Ancillary Activities $26 $31 $31 $32 $31 $31 $41 $45

 System Revenues $479 $652 $696 $715 $745 $749 $1,327 $1,996

Less: Total O&M expenses $449 $503 $472 $598 $531 $604 $798 $801

 Operating surplus $30 $148 $223 $117 $214 $145 $529 $1,195

Less: Continuing investments $45 $34 $34 $35 $30 $30 $72 $35

 Surplus after continuing investments ($16) $114 $189 $82 $184 $115 $457 $1,160

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $141 $184 $184 $184 $155 $155 $287 $241

 Initial infrastructure investment $338 $498 $961 $1,558 $1,168 $1,784 $4,989 $6,796

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $5 $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 $8 $8

 Initial investment, Total $484 $688 $1,151 $1,748 $1,329 $1,945 $5,284 $7,044

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 29% 27% 16% 11% 12% 8% 5% 3%

 Infrastructure 70% 72% 84% 89% 88% 92% 94% 96%

 Ancillary activities 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $1.6 $2.3 $3.9 $5.9 $4.5 $6.6 $18.5 $24.7

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $500 $573 $961 $1,666 $1,146 $1,831 $4,826 $5,885

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments (3%) 17% 16% 5% 14% 6% 9% 16%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments ($16) $114 $189 $82 $184 $115 $457 $1,160

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $479 $652 $696 $715 $745 $749 $1,327 $1,996

 Users' consumer surplus $635 $811 $804 $837 $813 $820 $1,380 $1,721

 Total benefits to HSGT users $1,113 $1,463 $1,500 $1,552 $1,558 $1,570 $2,707 $3,717

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $204 $260 $264 $273 $273 $275 $449 $615

 Passenger delays $385 $490 $498 $514 $515 $519 $829 $1,141

 Total airport congestion delay savings $589 $750 $762 $787 $788 $794 $1,278 $1,756

 Highway delay savings $250 $279 $267 $275 $260 $262 $296 $251

 Emission savings $5 $32 $31 $44 $19 $46 $68 $58

 Total benefits to the public at large $844 $1,061 $1,060 $1,106 $1,067 $1,102 $1,642 $2,066

Total benefits $1,958 $2,524 $2,559 $2,658 $2,625 $2,672 $4,349 $5,783

Total costs:

 Initial investment $484 $688 $1,151 $1,748 $1,329 $1,945 $5,284 $7,044

 O&M expense $449 $503 $472 $598 $531 $604 $798 $801

 Continuing investments $45 $34 $34 $35 $30 $30 $72 $35

Total costs $979 $1,225 $1,657 $2,381 $1,890 $2,580 $6,154 $7,881

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $479 $652 $696 $715 $745 $749 $1,327 $1,996

 Publicly-borne costs $500 $573 $961 $1,666 $1,146 $1,831 $4,826 $5,885

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Chicago-Detroit
Chicago-Detroit 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $979 $1,300 $902 $277 $735 $92 ($1,805) ($2,098)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$635 $811 $804 $837 $813 $820 $1,380 $1,721

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs $344 $488 $98 ($560) ($79) ($729) ($3,184) ($3,819)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.00 2.06 1.54 1.12 1.39 1.04 0.71 0.73

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.33 2.25 2.16 2.17 2.09 2.09 2.04 1.86

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 1.69 1.85 1.10 0.66 0.93 0.60 0.34 0.35

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

NO YES YES YES YES YES NO NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Chicago-Detroit
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Chicago-St. Louis 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 297 297 297 297 297 297 301 301

Trip-time, hours, Chicago-Saint Louis 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.2 1.5

Average train speed (mph) 73 83 90 90 98 98 138 203

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.147 0.167 0.188 0.188 0.187 0.187 0.218 0.290

Trains per day in each direction 10 13 12 12 14 14 16 32

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 291 362 355 360 414 417 499 531

Average trip length (miles) 209 211 213 214 217 217 227 229

Average trip length as % of route length 71% 71% 72% 72% 73% 73% 75% 76%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8

Percent of air traffic diverted 10.5% 16.4% 17.4% 17.8% 22.0% 22.2% 29.7% 35.5%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 4.0% 5.0% 4.5% 4.5% 5.2% 5.2% 5.5% 5.1%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 25% 31% 34% 34% 37% 37% 43% 48%

 Diverted from auto 36% 35% 33% 33% 33% 33% 30% 26%

 Diverted from conventional rail 28% 23% 24% 23% 21% 21% 18% 17%

 Diverted from bus 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0%

 Induced 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 2.2 2.8 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.5 7.0

Passenger-miles per train mile 131 128 136 138 136 137 141 76

Seat-miles, millions 588 746 689 689 803 803 1,006 1,055

Load factor 49% 48% 52% 52% 52% 52% 50% 50%

Gross ton-miles, millions 806 978 850 824 962 931 1,389 633

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.36 0.84

Train-hours, millions 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03

Passenger-miles per train hour 9,541 10,664 12,181 12,482 13,327 13,452 19,405 15,319

Operating ratio 83% 70% 61% 67% 60% 67% 65% 45%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $43 $60 $67 $68 $78 $78 $109 $154

 Income from ancillary activities $2 $2 $2 $2 $2 $3 $3 $3

 System revenues $44 $63 $69 $70 $80 $81 $112 $157

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $3 $3 $3 $7 $4 $9 $18 $14

 Maintenance of equipment $5 $6 $5 $5 $6 $6 $9 $5

 Transportation $8 $10 $9 $10 $10 $11 $12 $18

 Passenger traffic and services $10 $11 $11 $11 $12 $13 $14 $16

 General and administrative $11 $13 $12 $12 $14 $14 $18 $16

 Total O&M expense $35 $42 $41 $45 $46 $53 $70 $69

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.009 $0.008 $0.009 $0.019 $0.009 $0.022 $0.036 $0.026

 Maintenance of equipment $0.017 $0.016 $0.015 $0.014 $0.015 $0.014 $0.017 $0.010

 Transportation $0.026 $0.027 $0.024 $0.027 $0.024 $0.027 $0.024 $0.034

 Passenger traffic and services $0.033 $0.031 $0.031 $0.031 $0.030 $0.030 $0.028 $0.030

 General and administrative $0.037 $0.035 $0.035 $0.035 $0.034 $0.034 $0.035 $0.030

 Total O&M expense $0.122 $0.117 $0.115 $0.126 $0.112 $0.126 $0.141 $0.130

Operating surplus $9 $20 $28 $25 $34 $28 $41 $88

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.031 $0.056 $0.080 $0.068 $0.082 $0.068 $0.083 $0.165

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Chicago-St. Louis
Chicago-St. Louis 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $330 $477 $524 $532 $616 $620 $871 $1,262

 Income from Ancillary Activities $13 $17 $17 $18 $20 $20 $22 $24

 System Revenues $344 $494 $541 $550 $636 $640 $893 $1,286

Less: Total O&M expenses $291 $349 $346 $393 $388 $453 $616 $621

 Operating surplus $53 $145 $196 $157 $248 $186 $277 $664

Less: Continuing investments $20 $34 $26 $26 $32 $32 $59 $46

 Surplus after continuing investments $33 $111 $169 $131 $215 $154 $218 $618

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $116 $155 $155 $155 $155 $155 $235 $144

 Initial infrastructure investment $382 $498 $916 $1,358 $1,833 $2,458 $5,661 $9,143

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $3 $3 $3 $3 $3 $3 $4 $4

 Initial investment, Total $500 $657 $1,074 $1,516 $1,991 $2,617 $5,900 $9,291

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 23% 24% 14% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2%

 Infrastructure 76% 76% 85% 90% 92% 94% 96% 98%

 Ancillary activities 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $1.7 $2.2 $3.6 $5.1 $6.7 $8.8 $19.6 $30.9

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $468 $545 $905 $1,385 $1,776 $2,463 $5,682 $8,673

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 7% 17% 16% 9% 11% 6% 4% 7%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $33 $111 $169 $131 $215 $154 $218 $618

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $344 $494 $541 $550 $636 $640 $893 $1,286

 Users' consumer surplus $459 $642 $649 $662 $799 $805 $1,027 $1,225

 Total benefits to HSGT users $803 $1,136 $1,190 $1,211 $1,434 $1,445 $1,920 $2,511

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $111 $164 $171 $174 $206 $208 $263 $308

 Passenger delays $202 $295 $309 $314 $372 $375 $473 $554

 Total airport congestion delay savings $313 $459 $480 $489 $579 $583 $735 $861

 Highway delay savings $40 $50 $45 $46 $52 $53 $57 $53

 Emission savings $5 $27 $26 $39 $23 $47 $53 $48

 Total benefits to the public at large $359 $536 $551 $573 $654 $683 $845 $963

Total benefits $1,162 $1,672 $1,740 $1,785 $2,088 $2,128 $2,765 $3,474

Total costs:

 Initial investment $500 $657 $1,074 $1,516 $1,991 $2,617 $5,900 $9,291

 O&M expense $291 $349 $346 $393 $388 $453 $616 $621

 Continuing investments $20 $34 $26 $26 $32 $32 $59 $46

Total costs $811 $1,040 $1,446 $1,935 $2,412 $3,102 $6,575 $9,959

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $344 $494 $541 $550 $636 $640 $893 $1,286

 Publicly-borne costs $468 $545 $905 $1,385 $1,776 $2,463 $5,682 $8,673

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Chicago-St. Louis
Chicago-St. Louis 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $350 $632 $294 ($151) ($324) ($974) ($3,810) ($6,485)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$459 $642 $649 $662 $799 $805 $1,027 $1,225

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs ($109) ($10) ($354) ($812) ($1,123) ($1,779) ($4,837) ($7,710)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 1.43 1.61 1.20 0.92 0.87 0.69 0.42 0.35

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.34 2.30 2.20 2.20 2.26 2.26 2.15 1.95

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 0.77 0.98 0.61 0.41 0.37 0.28 0.15 0.11

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Chicago-St. Louis
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Florida 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 306 306 306 306 317 317

Trip-time, hours, Miami-Tampa 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 1.9

Average train speed (mph) 74 85 89 92 120 171

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.213 0.226 0.224 0.223 0.274 0.337

Trains per day in each direction 8 9 9 9 30 59

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.6 7.0 7.1

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 406 456 487 507 937 984

Average trip length (miles) 129 136 137 140 134 139

Average trip length as % of route length 42% 45% 45% 46% 42% 44%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 3.0 3.1

Percent of air traffic diverted 6.1% 7.7% 8.1% 8.5% 20.8% 25.1%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 1.9% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 4.0% 3.8%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 14% 17% 16% 17% 24% 28%

 Diverted from auto 71% 69% 69% 69% 65% 62%

 Diverted from conventional rail 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 2%

 Diverted from bus 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1%

 Induced 9% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 3.2 3.6 3.7 3.9 6.9 13.6

Passenger-miles per train mile 126 127 133 131 135 72

Seat-miles, millions 852 951 969 1,019 1,969 2,045

Load factor 48% 48% 50% 50% 48% 48%

Gross ton-miles, millions 1,168 1,247 1,196 1,220 2,717 1,227

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.80

Train-hours, millions 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08

Passenger-miles per train hour 9,354 10,778 11,753 12,051 16,245 12,316

Operating ratio 64% 58% 56% 61% 48% 38%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $87 $103 $109 $113 $256 $332

 Income from ancillary activities $4 $4 $4 $4 $9 $10

 System revenues $90 $107 $113 $117 $266 $342

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $3 $3 $3 $8 $18 $15

 Maintenance of equipment $7 $8 $8 $8 $16 $9

 Transportation $12 $14 $13 $16 $23 $35

 Passenger traffic and services $17 $18 $19 $19 $35 $38

 General and administrative $16 $17 $18 $18 $31 $29

 Total O&M expense $55 $60 $61 $68 $122 $127

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.006 $0.006 $0.006 $0.015 $0.019 $0.015

 Maintenance of equipment $0.018 $0.017 $0.017 $0.015 $0.017 $0.010

 Transportation $0.030 $0.030 $0.028 $0.031 $0.024 $0.035

 Passenger traffic and services $0.042 $0.040 $0.039 $0.038 $0.037 $0.039

 General and administrative $0.039 $0.037 $0.036 $0.036 $0.033 $0.029

 Total O&M expense $0.135 $0.131 $0.126 $0.135 $0.130 $0.129

Operating surplus $35 $48 $52 $49 $144 $215

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.087 $0.105 $0.107 $0.096 $0.153 $0.219

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Florida
Florida 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $636 $759 $802 $833 $1,986 $2,641

 Income from Ancillary Activities $28 $31 $32 $33 $73 $77

 System Revenues $663 $790 $834 $865 $2,060 $2,718

Less: Total O&M expenses $462 $482 $499 $562 $1,028 $1,091

 Operating surplus $201 $307 $334 $303 $1,032 $1,627

Less: Continuing investments $49 $64 $64 $65 $116 $75

 Surplus after continuing investments $152 $244 $270 $239 $915 $1,552

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $218 $198 $198 $198 $339 $241

 Initial infrastructure investment $1,011 $1,101 $1,290 $1,837 $3,961 $6,796

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $6 $6 $6 $6 $17 $17

 Initial investment, Total $1,235 $1,305 $1,494 $2,041 $4,316 $7,054

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 18% 15% 13% 10% 8% 3%

 Infrastructure 82% 84% 86% 90% 92% 96%

 Ancillary activities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $4.0 $4.3 $4.9 $6.7 $13.6 $22.3

Portion of initial investment that is not covered 

by surplus after continuing investments $1,082 $1,061 $1,224 $1,802 $3,401 $5,502

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 12% 19% 18% 12% 21% 22%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $152 $244 $270 $239 $915 $1,552

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $663 $790 $834 $865 $2,060 $2,718

 Users' consumer surplus $681 $787 $847 $886 $2,435 $2,781

 Total benefits to HSGT users $1,344 $1,577 $1,680 $1,752 $4,494 $5,499

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $73 $89 $95 $98 $193 $232

 Passenger delays $127 $157 $165 $173 $338 $405

 Total airport congestion delay savings $199 $247 $260 $271 $530 $637

 Highway delay savings $383 $398 $422 $430 $561 $608

 Emission savings $15 $31 $30 $43 $85 $74

 Total benefits to the public at large $597 $675 $712 $743 $1,176 $1,319

Total benefits $1,941 $2,252 $2,392 $2,495 $5,671 $6,818

Total costs:

 Initial investment $1,235 $1,305 $1,494 $2,041 $4,316 $7,054

 O&M expense $462 $482 $499 $562 $1,028 $1,091

 Continuing investments $49 $64 $64 $65 $116 $75

Total costs $1,746 $1,850 $2,057 $2,668 $5,461 $8,220

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $663 $790 $834 $865 $2,060 $2,718

 Publicly-borne costs $1,082 $1,061 $1,224 $1,802 $3,401 $5,502

Total benefits less total costs $195 $402 $335 ($173) $210 ($1,402)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$681 $787 $847 $886 $2,435 $2,781

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs ($486) ($385) ($512) ($1,059) ($2,225) ($4,183)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 1.11 1.22 1.16 0.94 1.04 0.83

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Florida
Florida 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.03 2.00 2.02 2.02 2.18 2.02

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 0.55 0.64 0.58 0.41 0.35 0.24

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES YES NO YES NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Florida
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Northeast Corridor New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors (traffic 

data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 441 441

Trip-time, hours, New York-Boston 1.7 1.1

Average train speed (mph) 110 163

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.332 0.379

Trains per day in each direction 181 166

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 24.8 25.8

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 4,773 5,094

Average trip length (miles) 193 198

Average trip length as % of route length 44% 45%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 10.8 11.5

Percent of air traffic diverted 27.0% 35.2%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 0.7% 0.7%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 22% 27%

 Diverted from auto 2% 2%

 Diverted from conventional rail 70% 66%

 Diverted from bus 0% 0%

 Induced 5% 5%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 39.4 36.7

Passenger-miles per train mile 121 139

Seat-miles, millions 11,203 11,932

Load factor 43% 43%

Gross ton-miles, millions 15,463 6,609

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.31 0.77

Train-hours, millions 0.36 0.23

Passenger-miles per train hour 13,306 22,612

Operating ratio 34% 26%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $1,587 $1,931

 Income from ancillary activities $43 $45

 System revenues $1,630 $1,976

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 3% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $43 $33

 Maintenance of equipment $88 $53

 Transportation $138 $154

 Passenger traffic and services $156 $160

 General and administrative $114 $95

 Total O&M expense $540 $494

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.009 $0.006

 Maintenance of equipment $0.018 $0.010

 Transportation $0.029 $0.030

 Passenger traffic and services $0.033 $0.031

 General and administrative $0.024 $0.019

 Total O&M expense $0.113 $0.097

Operating surplus $1,090 $1,482

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.228 $0.291

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Northeast Corridor
Northeast Corridor New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash inflows/outflows 

between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $13,089 $15,917

 Income from Ancillary Activities $353 $367

 System Revenues $13,442 $16,285

Less: Total O&M expenses $4,687 $4,328

 Operating surplus $8,755 $11,956

Less: Continuing investments $478 $349

 Surplus after continuing investments $8,277 $11,607

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $1,826 $1,541

 Initial infrastructure investment $17,232 $20,524

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $70 $73

 Initial investment, Total $19,127 $22,137

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 10% 7%

 Infrastructure 90% 93%

 Ancillary activities 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $43.4 $50.2

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $10,851 $10,530

Percentage of initial investment covered by surplus 

after continuing investments 43% 52%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $8,277 $11,607

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $13,442 $16,285

 Users' consumer surplus $7,861 $8,538

 Total benefits to HSGT users $21,303 $24,823

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $1,055 $1,256

 Passenger delays $1,792 $2,133

 Total airport congestion delay savings $2,847 $3,389

 Highway delay savings $639 $634

 Emission savings $152 $98

 Total benefits to the public at large $3,638 $4,121

Total benefits $24,941 $28,943

Total costs:

 Initial investment $19,127 $22,137

 O&M expense $4,687 $4,328

 Continuing investments $478 $349

Total costs $24,293 $26,815

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $13,442 $16,285

 Publicly-borne costs $10,851 $10,530

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Northeast Corridor
Northeast Corridor New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $648 $2,128

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$7,861 $8,538

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs ($7,213) ($6,410)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 1.03 1.08

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs borne 

___by users 1.58 1.52

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 0.34 0.39

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Northeast Corridor
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Pacific Northwest 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 470 469 469 469 451 454

Trip-time, hours, Eugene-Vancouver, BC 7.3 6.4 6.2 6.1 4.1 3.1

Average train speed (mph) 64 74 76 77 109 144

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.203 0.248 0.248 0.247 0.339 0.413

Trains per day in each direction 15 15 15 15 17 35

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.7

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 493 482 497 501 545 574

Average trip length (miles) 152 155 155 155 154 154

Average trip length as % of route length 32% 33% 33% 33% 34% 34%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3

Percent of air traffic diverted 29.0% 30.9% 31.7% 32.0% 45.7% 53.3%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 3.5% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.7% 3.6%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 24% 27% 27% 27% 34% 38%

 Diverted from auto 48% 47% 47% 47% 44% 41%

 Diverted from conventional rail 12% 12% 12% 12% 11% 10%

 Diverted from bus 7% 5% 6% 6% 4% 2%

 Induced 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.6 11.6

Passenger-miles per train mile 96 94 97 98 97 49

Seat-miles, millions 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,590 1,741

Load factor 36% 36% 37% 37% 34% 33%

Gross ton-miles, millions 1,859 1,777 1,674 1,623 2,194 1,045

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.25 0.55

Train-hours, millions 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08

Passenger-miles per train hour 6,146 6,903 7,347 7,502 10,621 7,137

Operating ratio 73% 61% 59% 60% 55% 47%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $100 $119 $123 $124 $184 $237

 Income from ancillary activities $4 $3 $4 $4 $4 $4

 System revenues $104 $123 $127 $128 $189 $241

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $6 $6 $6 $8 $24 $25

 Maintenance of equipment $10 $10 $10 $9 $13 $8

 Transportation $18 $18 $18 $19 $20 $30

 Passenger traffic and services $21 $20 $20 $20 $23 $26

 General and administrative $19 $19 $19 $19 $23 $23

 Total O&M expense $73 $72 $73 $75 $102 $112

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.011 $0.013 $0.013 $0.015 $0.044 $0.043

 Maintenance of equipment $0.020 $0.020 $0.020 $0.017 $0.023 $0.015

 Transportation $0.036 $0.037 $0.035 $0.039 $0.037 $0.053

 Passenger traffic and services $0.042 $0.042 $0.041 $0.041 $0.042 $0.045

 General and administrative $0.038 $0.039 $0.038 $0.037 $0.042 $0.040

 Total O&M expense $0.148 $0.150 $0.147 $0.149 $0.188 $0.196

Operating surplus $31 $51 $54 $53 $86 $129

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.062 $0.105 $0.108 $0.106 $0.158 $0.225

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Pacific Northwest
Pacific Northwest 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $783 $937 $967 $976 $1,460 $1,900

 Income from Ancillary Activities $27 $27 $29 $29 $33 $35

 System Revenues $810 $964 $996 $1,004 $1,492 $1,935

Less: Total O&M expenses $590 $589 $595 $620 $893 $985

 Operating surplus $220 $375 $401 $385 $599 $951

Less: Continuing investments $40 $42 $42 $61 $78 $92

 Surplus after continuing investments $181 $333 $359 $324 $521 $859

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $141 $155 $155 $155 $339 $241

 Initial infrastructure investment $452 $699 $1,073 $1,916 $7,475 $13,734

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $5 $4 $5 $5 $5 $5

 Initial investment, Total $598 $859 $1,233 $2,076 $7,819 $13,980

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 24% 18% 13% 7% 4% 2%

 Infrastructure 76% 81% 87% 92% 96% 98%

 Ancillary activities 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $1.3 $1.8 $2.6 $4.4 $17.3 $30.8

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $417 $526 $873 $1,752 $7,298 $13,121

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 30% 39% 29% 16% 7% 6%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $181 $333 $359 $324 $521 $859

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $810 $964 $996 $1,004 $1,492 $1,935

 Users' consumer surplus $1,216 $1,304 $1,363 $1,379 $1,899 $2,310

 Total benefits to HSGT users $2,027 $2,268 $2,359 $2,384 $3,391 $4,245

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $44 $48 $49 $50 $66 $73

 Passenger delays $67 $73 $75 $75 $100 $111

 Total airport congestion delay savings $112 $120 $124 $125 $166 $184

 Highway delay savings $510 $489 $508 $513 $531 $520

 Emission savings $26 $47 $47 $68 $80 $79

 Total benefits to the public at large $648 $657 $679 $706 $777 $783

Total benefits $2,675 $2,925 $3,038 $3,090 $4,168 $5,028

Total costs:

 Initial investment $598 $859 $1,233 $2,076 $7,819 $13,980

 O&M expense $590 $589 $595 $620 $893 $985

 Continuing investments $40 $42 $42 $61 $78 $92

Total costs $1,227 $1,490 $1,869 $2,757 $8,790 $15,057

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $810 $964 $996 $1,004 $1,492 $1,935

 Publicly-borne costs $417 $526 $873 $1,752 $7,298 $13,121

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Pacific Northwest
Pacific Northwest 90 110 125F 125E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $1,447 $1,434 $1,168 $333 ($4,622) ($10,028)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$1,216 $1,304 $1,363 $1,379 $1,899 $2,310

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs $231 $130 ($194) ($1,046) ($6,521) ($12,338)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.18 1.96 1.63 1.12 0.47 0.33

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.50 2.35 2.37 2.37 2.27 2.19

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 1.55 1.25 0.78 0.40 0.11 0.06

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES YES YES NO NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Pacific Northwest
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.)

Texas Triangle 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 792 783 783 783 783 783 436 436

Trip-time, hours, Dallas-San Antonio 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.6 1.7

Average train speed (mph) 74 88 94 95 103 104 123 179

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.177 0.178 0.177 0.177 0.188 0.188 0.217 0.284

Trains per day in each direction 10 15 16 17 18 18 22 47

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 3.2 4.7 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.6 7.5 8.1

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 653 982 1,111 1,124 1,208 1,215 1,650 1,840

Average trip length (miles) 205 210 212 213 215 215 220 226

Average trip length as % of route length 26% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 50% 52%

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions of 

passenger-miles per route-mile) 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.8 4.2

Percent of air traffic diverted 7.4% 13.3% 15.6% 15.9% 17.7% 17.9% 25.9% 31.4%

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted 3.3% 4.4% 4.8% 4.8% 5.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.1%

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air 35% 42% 44% 44% 47% 47% 57% 64%

 Diverted from auto 44% 40% 39% 39% 37% 37% 29% 25%

 Diverted from conventional rail 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%

 Diverted from bus 9% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 4% 3%

 Induced 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8%

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 5.0 7.3 8.0 8.2 8.9 8.9 11.5 24.6

Passenger-miles per train mile 131 134 139 137 136 137 144 75

Seat-miles, millions 1,312 1,937 2,110 2,171 2,344 2,343 3,252 3,686

Load factor 50% 51% 53% 52% 52% 52% 51% 50%

Gross ton-miles, millions 1,799 2,539 2,605 2,599 2,805 2,716 4,489 2,212

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.37 0.83

Train-hours, millions 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.14

Passenger-miles per train hour 9,732 11,751 13,073 12,975 14,078 14,224 17,774 13,438

Operating ratio 67% 60% 56% 62% 51% 59% 49% 38%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $115 $175 $197 $199 $228 $229 $359 $523

 Income from ancillary activities $4 $5 $6 $6 $6 $6 $9 $9

 System revenues $119 $180 $203 $205 $234 $235 $367 $533

 Percent of system revenues from ancillary activities 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $8 $9 $7 $16 $6 $17 $24 $23

 Maintenance of equipment $10 $14 $15 $13 $16 $15 $26 $17

 Transportation $18 $25 $26 $31 $27 $34 $38 $63

 Passenger traffic and services $21 $29 $31 $32 $33 $34 $45 $54

 General and administrative $21 $29 $31 $31 $33 $35 $44 $43

 Total O&M expense $78 $105 $110 $123 $117 $134 $176 $199

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.012 $0.009 $0.006 $0.015 $0.005 $0.014 $0.014 $0.012

 Maintenance of equipment $0.015 $0.014 $0.013 $0.012 $0.013 $0.012 $0.016 $0.009

 Transportation $0.027 $0.025 $0.023 $0.027 $0.023 $0.028 $0.023 $0.034

 Passenger traffic and services $0.033 $0.029 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.027 $0.029

 General and administrative $0.032 $0.029 $0.028 $0.028 $0.028 $0.029 $0.027 $0.024

 Total O&M expense $0.119 $0.107 $0.099 $0.110 $0.096 $0.110 $0.107 $0.108

Operating surplus $41 $75 $93 $82 $117 $101 $192 $333

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.063 $0.076 $0.084 $0.073 $0.097 $0.083 $0.116 $0.181

Year showing first operating surplus Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000 Year 2000

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Texas Triangle
Texas Triangle 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are present 

values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $868 $1,358 $1,540 $1,558 $1,788 $1,798 $2,840 $4,235

 Income from Ancillary Activities $27 $41 $46 $46 $49 $49 $69 $76

 System Revenues $894 $1,399 $1,586 $1,604 $1,837 $1,847 $2,909 $4,311

Less: Total O&M expenses $646 $871 $918 $1,046 $971 $1,134 $1,510 $1,735

 Operating surplus $248 $528 $668 $558 $866 $713 $1,399 $2,575

Less: Continuing investments $53 $72 $83 $73 $69 $67 $232 $122

 Surplus after continuing investments $195 $456 $586 $486 $797 $646 $1,168 $2,453

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $270 $353 $353 $353 $353 $353 $652 $626

 Initial infrastructure investment $590 $1,355 $3,408 $4,254 $3,990 $5,421 $4,408 $9,490

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $4 $5 $6 $6 $6 $6 $11 $11

 Initial investment, Total $863 $1,714 $3,767 $4,613 $4,349 $5,780 $5,071 $10,127

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 31% 21% 9% 8% 8% 6% 13% 6%

 Infrastructure 68% 79% 90% 92% 92% 94% 87% 94%

 Ancillary activities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $1.1 $2.2 $4.8 $5.9 $5.6 $7.4 $11.6 $23.2

Portion of initial investment that is not covered by 

surplus after continuing investments $668 $1,258 $3,182 $4,128 $3,552 $5,134 $3,903 $7,674

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments 23% 27% 16% 11% 18% 11% 23% 24%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $195 $456 $586 $486 $797 $646 $1,168 $2,453

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $894 $1,399 $1,586 $1,604 $1,837 $1,847 $2,909 $4,311

 Users' consumer surplus $1,050 $1,814 $2,116 $2,146 $2,395 $2,412 $3,654 $4,543

 Total benefits to HSGT users $1,944 $3,213 $3,702 $3,750 $4,232 $4,259 $6,563 $8,853

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $26 $47 $54 $55 $61 $62 $101 $121

 Passenger delays $36 $63 $74 $75 $83 $84 $143 $171

 Total airport congestion delay savings $63 $110 $128 $130 $144 $145 $244 $292

 Highway delay savings $302 $399 $430 $433 $446 $447 $418 $382

 Emission savings $3 $57 $66 $101 $46 $115 $157 $155

 Total benefits to the public at large $367 $566 $624 $664 $636 $707 $819 $829

Total benefits $2,311 $3,779 $4,326 $4,414 $4,868 $4,966 $7,382 $9,682

Total costs:

 Initial investment $863 $1,714 $3,767 $4,613 $4,349 $5,780 $5,071 $10,127

 O&M expense $646 $871 $918 $1,046 $971 $1,134 $1,510 $1,735

 Continuing investments $53 $72 $83 $73 $69 $67 $232 $122

Total costs $1,562 $2,657 $4,768 $5,732 $5,389 $6,981 $6,812 $11,984

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $894 $1,399 $1,586 $1,604 $1,837 $1,847 $2,909 $4,311

 Publicly-borne costs $668 $1,258 $3,182 $4,128 $3,552 $5,134 $3,903 $7,674

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Texas Triangle
Texas Triangle 90 110 125F 125E 150F 150E New HSR Maglev

Total benefits less total costs $749 $1,122 ($441) ($1,318) ($520) ($2,015) $570 ($2,302)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne by 

___users

$1,050 $1,814 $2,116 $2,146 $2,395 $2,412 $3,654 $4,543

 Benefits to the public at large less publicly-

___borne costs ($301) ($692) ($2,557) ($3,464) ($2,916) ($4,427) ($3,084) ($6,845)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 1.48 1.42 0.91 0.77 0.90 0.71 1.08 0.81

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs 

___borne by users 2.17 2.30 2.33 2.34 2.30 2.31 2.26 2.05

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs 0.55 0.45 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.11

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"?

YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Texas Triangle
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.) 

Empire Corridor Results ("N/Av" 

means "Not Available." "N/Ap" means "Not 

Applicable.") 

Accelerail 125F: 

Extension

New HSR: 

Empire/ 

Northeast 

System

New HSR: NEC 

Alone

New HSR: 

Empire 

Corridor 

Proper

Maglev: 

Empire/ 

Northeast 

System

Maglev: NEC 

Alone

Maglev: 

Empire 

Corridor 

Proper

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 467 880 441 438 878 441 437

Trip-time, hours, New York-Buffalo 5.2 3.3 N/Ap 3.3 2.4 N/Ap 2.4

Average train speed (mph) 86 114 110 120 166 163 170

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.192 0.309 0.332 0.255 0.350 0.379 0.289

Trains per day in each direction, New YorkBuffalo

50 50 N/Ap 50 47 N/Ap 47

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 9.4 32.6 24.8 7.8 33.9 25.8 8.2

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 2,229 6,885 4,773 2,112 7,448 5,094 2,355

Average trip length (miles) 237 211 193 271 219 198 287

Average trip length as % of route length N/Av 24% 44% N/Av 25% 45% N/Av

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions 

of passenger-miles per route-mile)

4.8 7.8 10.8 4.8 8.5 11.5 5.4

Percent of air traffic diverted N/Av 24.5% 27.0% N/Av 31.8% 35.2% N/Av

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted N/Av 2.6% 0.7% N/Av 2.6% 0.7% N/Av

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air N/Av 24% 22% N/Av 29% 27% N/Av

 Diverted from auto N/Av 11% 2% N/Av 11% 2% N/Av

 Diverted from conventional rail N/Av 58% 70% N/Av 55% 66% N/Av

 Diverted from bus N/Av 1% 0% N/Av 0% 0% N/Av

 Induced N/Av 6% 5% N/Av 6% 5% N/Av

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 19.6 64.2 39.4 24.8 60.1 36.7 23.4

Passenger-miles per train mile 114 107 121 85 124 139 101

Seat-miles, millions 5,393 18,241 11,203 7,039 19,545 11,932 7,613

Load factor 41% 38% 43% 30% 38% 43% 31%

Gross ton-miles, millions 6,563 25,178 15,463 9,715 10,825 6,609 4,216

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.22 0.69 0.77 0.56

Train-hours, millions 0.23 0.56 0.36 0.21 0.36 0.23 0.14

Passenger-miles per train hour 9,726 12,187 13,306 10,241 20,536 22,612 17,133

Operating ratio 51% 37% 34% 45% 28% 26% 36%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $427 $2,124 $1,587 $537 $2,610 $1,931 $679

 Income from ancillary activities $2 $61 $43 $18 $63 $45 $18

 System revenues $429 $2,185 $1,630 $555 $2,674 $1,976 $698

 Percent of system revenues from 

_____ ancillary activities 0.4% 2.8% 2.7% 3.2% 2.4% 2.3% 2.6%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $14 $57 $43 $14 $56 $33 $24

 Maintenance of equipment $32 $136 $88 $47 $81 $53 $29

 Transportation $64 $220 $138 $82 $247 $154 $93

 Passenger traffic and services $63 $212 $156 $56 $218 $160 $58

 General and administrative $47 $158 $114 $44 $135 $95 $40

 Total O&M expense $220 $783 $540 $244 $738 $494 $244

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.006 $0.008 $0.009 $0.006 $0.008 $0.006 $0.010

 Maintenance of equipment $0.014 $0.020 $0.018 $0.022 $0.011 $0.010 $0.012

 Transportation $0.029 $0.032 $0.029 $0.039 $0.033 $0.030 $0.040

 Passenger traffic and services $0.028 $0.031 $0.033 $0.027 $0.029 $0.031 $0.025

 General and administrative $0.021 $0.023 $0.024 $0.021 $0.018 $0.019 $0.017

 Total O&M expense $0.099 $0.114 $0.113 $0.115 $0.099 $0.097 $0.104

Operating surplus $209 $1,402 $1,090 $311 $1,935 $1,482 $453

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.094 $0.204 $0.228 $0.147 $0.260 $0.291 $0.193

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Empire Corridor
Empire Corridor Results ("N/Av" 

means "Not Available." "N/Ap" means "Not 

Applicable.") 

Accelerail 125F: 

Extension

New HSR: 

Empire/ 

Northeast 

System

New HSR: NEC 

Alone

New HSR: 

Empire 

Corridor 

Proper

Maglev: 

Empire/ 

Northeast 

System

Maglev: NEC 

Alone

Maglev: 

Empire 

Corridor 

Proper

Physical, production, and traffic factors Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are 

present values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $3,576 $17,633 $13,089 $4,544 $21,618 $15,917 $5,700

 Income from Ancillary Activities $15 $497 $353 $144 $515 $367 $148

 System Revenues $3,591 $18,129 $13,442 $4,687 $22,133 $16,285 $5,848

Less: Total O&M expenses $1,930 $6,832 $4,687 $2,145 $6,523 $4,328 $2,194

 Operating surplus $1,661 $11,297 $8,755 $2,542 $15,610 $11,956 $3,654

Less: Continuing investments $188 $767 $478 $289 $552 $349 $203

 Surplus after continuing investments $1,473 $10,530 $8,277 $2,253 $15,059 $11,607 $3,451

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $404 $2,739 $1,826 $913 $2,311 $1,541 $770

 Initial infrastructure investment $1,487 $26,908 $17,232 $9,676 $30,961 $20,524 $10,437

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $40 $93 $70 $23 $96 $73 $24

 Initial investment, Total $1,932 $29,739 $19,127 $10,612 $33,369 $22,137 $11,232

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 21% 9% 10% 9% 7% 7% 7%

 Infrastructure 77% 90% 90% 91% 93% 93% 93%

 Ancillary activities 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $4.1 $33.8 $43.4 $24.2 $38.0 $50.2 $25.7

Portion of initial investment that is not covered 

by surplus after continuing investments

$459 $19,210 $10,851 $8,359 $18,310 $10,530 $7,780

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments

76% 35% 43% 21% 45% 52% 31%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $1,473 $10,530 $8,277 $2,253 $15,059 $11,607 $3,451

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $3,591 $18,129 $13,442 $4,687 $22,133 $16,285 $5,848

 Users' consumer surplus $4,374 $12,479 $7,550 $4,929 $14,352 $8,642 $5,710

 Total benefits to HSGT users $7,965 $30,609 $20,993 $9,616 $36,485 $24,927 $11,558

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $343 $1,299 $1,011 $288 $1,496 $1,209 $287

 Passenger delays $609 $2,241 $1,717 $524 $2,580 $2,055 $525

 Total airport congestion delay savings $951 $3,541 $2,728 $812 $4,076 $3,264 $812

 Highway delay savings $652 $1,201 $521 $680 $1,416 $719 $697

 Emission savings $113 $293 $143 $150 $243 $101 $141

 Total benefits to the public at large $1,716 $5,034 $3,392 $1,643 $5,735 $4,084 $1,651

Total benefits $9,681 $35,643 $24,384 $11,259 $42,219 $29,011 $13,209

Total costs:

 Initial investment $1,932 $29,739 $19,127 $10,612 $33,369 $22,137 $11,232

 O&M expense $1,930 $6,832 $4,687 $2,145 $6,523 $4,328 $2,194

 Continuing investments $188 $767 $478 $289 $552 $349 $203

Total costs $4,050 $37,339 $24,293 $13,046 $40,443 $26,815 $13,629

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $3,591 $18,129 $13,442 $4,687 $22,133 $16,285 $5,848

 Publicly-borne costs $459 $19,210 $10,851 $8,359 $18,310 $10,530 $7,780

Total benefits less total costs $5,631 ($1,696) $91 ($1,787) $1,776 $2,196 ($420)

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne 

___by users

$4,374 $12,479 $7,550 $4,929 $14,352 $8,642 $5,710

 Benefits to the public at large less 

___publicly-borne costs

$1,257 ($14,175) ($7,459) ($6,716) ($12,576) ($6,446) ($6,130)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.39 0.95 1.00 0.86 1.04 1.08 0.97

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Empire Corridor
Empire Corridor Results ("N/Av" 

means "Not Available." "N/Ap" means "Not 

Applicable.") 

Accelerail 125F: 

Extension

New HSR: 

Empire/ 

Northeast 

System

New HSR: NEC 

Alone

New HSR: 

Empire 

Corridor 

Proper

Maglev: 

Empire/ 

Northeast 

System

Maglev: NEC 

Alone

Maglev: 

Empire 

Corridor 

Proper

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs Physical, production, and traffic factors 

___borne by users

2.22 1.69 1.56 2.05 1.65 1.53 1.98

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs

3.74 0.26 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.39 0.21

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"? YES YES YES NO YES YES YES

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Empire Corridor
System Requirements and Performance (Dollars are in millions except as noted.) 

Southeast Corridor Results 

("N/Av" means "Not Available." "N/Ap" means 

"Not Applicable.") 

Accelerail 110: 

Extension

New HSR: 

Southeast/ 

Northeast 

System

New HSR: NEC 

Alone

New HSR: 

Southeast 

Corridor 

Proper

Maglev: 

Southeast/ 

Northeast 

System

Maglev: NEC 

Alone

Maglev: 

Southeast 

Corridor 

Proper

Physical, production, and traffic factors 

(traffic data is for the year 2020)

Route-miles 477 862 441 421 861 441 420

Trip-time, hours, Charlotte-Washington 5.7 3.0 N/Ap 3.0 2.1 N/Ap 2.1

Average train speed (mph) 79 117 110 137 171 163 183

Average fare per passenger-mile (dollars) 0.176 0.303 0.332 0.248 0.327 0.379 0.261

Trains per day in each direction, CharlotteWashington

27 53 N/Ap 53 65 N/Ap 65

Passengers, Millions of Trips (2020) 5.7 32.5 24.8 7.7 36.5 25.8 10.8

Passenger-Miles, Millions (2020) 1,689 7,322 4,773 2,549 9,152 5,094 4,058

Average trip length (miles) 295 225 193 331 251 198 377

Average trip length as % of route length N/Av 26% 44% N/Av 29% 45% N/Av

HSGT traffic density per route-mile (millions 

of passenger-miles per route-mile)

3.5 8.5 10.8 6.1 10.6 11.5 9.7

Percent of air traffic diverted N/Av 25.1% 27.0% N/Av 38.8% 35.2% N/Av

Percent of intercity auto traffic diverted N/Av 2.5% 0.7% N/Av 3.2% 0.7% N/Av

Percent of HSGT traffic by source: 

 Diverted from air N/Av 29% 22% N/Av 36% 27% N/Av

 Diverted from auto N/Av 9% 2% N/Av 9% 2% N/Av

 Diverted from conventional rail N/Av 56% 70% N/Av 48% 66% N/Av

 Diverted from bus N/Av 0% 0% N/Av 0% 0% N/Av

 Induced N/Av 6% 5% N/Av 6% 5% N/Av

Operating efficiency factors, 2020

Train-miles. millions 13.3 57.5 39.4 18.1 63.5 36.7 26.8

Passenger-miles per train mile 127 127 121 141 144 139 151

Seat-miles, millions 4,565 16,333 11,203 5,130 20,644 11,932 8,712

Load factor 37% 45% 43% 50% 44% 43% 47%

Gross ton-miles, millions 5,238 22,544 15,463 7,081 11,434 6,609 4,825

Passenger-miles per gross ton-mile 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.80 0.77 0.84

Train-hours, millions 0.17 0.49 0.36 0.13 0.37 0.23 0.15

Passenger-miles per train hour 10,056 14,922 13,306 19,314 24,632 22,612 27,743

Operating ratio 53% 34% 34% 33% 26% 26% 27%

Operating results for 2020 

Revenues:

 Passenger transportation revenue $297 $2,219 $1,587 $633 $2,989 $1,931 $1,058

 Income from ancillary activities $13 $59 $43 $15 $65 $45 $20

 System revenues $311 $2,278 $1,630 $648 $3,054 $1,976 $1,078

 Percent of system revenues from 

_____ ancillaryactivities 4.3% 2.6% 2.7% 2.4% 2.1% 2.3% 1.8%

Operating and maintenance expenses:

 Maintenance of way $10 $67 $43 $24 $51 $33 $18

 Maintenance of equipment $25 $119 $88 $31 $82 $53 $29

 Transportation $45 $193 $138 $54 $256 $154 $102

 Passenger traffic and services $43 $213 $156 $57 $242 $160 $82

 General and administrative $34 $160 $114 $46 $150 $95 $55

 Total O&M expense $157 $751 $540 $212 $780 $494 $286

 Per passenger-mile (dollars):

 Maintenance of way $0.006 $0.009 $0.009 $0.009 $0.006 $0.006 $0.004

 Maintenance of equipment $0.015 $0.016 $0.018 $0.012 $0.009 $0.010 $0.007

 Transportation $0.027 $0.026 $0.029 $0.021 $0.028 $0.030 $0.025

 Passenger traffic and services $0.026 $0.029 $0.033 $0.022 $0.026 $0.031 $0.020

 General and administrative $0.020 $0.022 $0.024 $0.018 $0.016 $0.019 $0.013

 Total O&M expense $0.093 $0.103 $0.113 $0.083 $0.085 $0.097 $0.071

Operating surplus $154 $1,527 $1,090 $436 $2,273 $1,482 $791

 Operating surplus per passenger-mile (dollars) $0.091 $0.209 $0.228 $0.171 $0.248 $0.291 $0.195

Statistical Supplement Page 1 Southeast Corridor
Southeast Corridor Results 

("N/Av" means "Not Available." "N/Ap" means 

"Not Applicable.") 

Accelerail 110: 

Extension

New HSR: 

Southeast/ 

Northeast 

System

New HSR: NEC 

Alone

New HSR: 

Southeast 

Corridor 

Proper

Maglev: 

Southeast/ 

Northeast 

System

Maglev: NEC 

Alone

Maglev: 

Southeast 

Corridor 

Proper

Physical, production, and traffic factors Life-Cycle Measures (All amounts are 

present values, as of the year 2000, of cash 

inflows/outflows between 2000 and 2040. )

Revenues:

 Passenger Transportation Revenues $2,451 $18,306 $13,089 $5,217 $24,678 $15,917 $8,760

 Income from Ancillary Activities $110 $476 $353 $123 $528 $367 $161

 System Revenues $2,561 $18,782 $13,442 $5,340 $25,205 $16,285 $8,921

Less: Total O&M expenses $1,389 $6,531 $4,687 $1,844 $6,856 $4,328 $2,528

 Operating surplus $1,172 $12,251 $8,755 $3,496 $18,349 $11,956 $6,393

Less: Continuing investments $131 $675 $478 $196 $531 $349 $182

 Surplus after continuing investments $1,041 $11,576 $8,277 $3,299 $17,818 $11,607 $6,211

Initial investment:

 Initial vehicle investment $232 $2,373 $1,826 $548 $2,311 $1,541 $770

 Initial infrastructure investment $803 $23,529 $17,232 $6,297 $30,037 $20,524 $9,513

 Initial investment for ancillary activities $13 $88 $70 $19 $100 $73 $27

 Initial investment, Total $1,047 $25,991 $19,127 $6,864 $32,448 $22,137 $10,311

Percent of total initial investment pertaining to--

 Vehicles 22% 9% 10% 8% 7% 7% 7%

 Infrastructure 77% 91% 90% 92% 93% 93% 92%

 Ancillary activities 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Total initial investment per route-mile $2.2 $30.1 $43.4 $16.3 $37.7 $50.2 $24.6

Portion of initial investment that is not covered 

by surplus after continuing investments

$7 $14,415 $10,851 $3,565 $14,630 $10,530 $4,100

Percentage of initial investment covered by 

surplus after continuing investments

99% 45% 43% 48% 55% 52% 60%

Comparison of Benefits and Costs; Assessment of Partnership Potential

Surplus after continuing investments $1,041 $11,576 $8,277 $3,299 $17,818 $11,607 $6,211

Total benefits:

 Benefits to HSGT users:

 System revenues $2,561 $18,782 $13,442 $5,340 $25,205 $16,285 $8,921

 Users' consumer surplus $2,550 $13,045 $7,550 $5,494 $17,236 $8,642 $8,593

 Total benefits to HSGT users $5,110 $31,826 $20,993 $10,834 $42,441 $24,927 $17,514

 Benefits to the public at large:

 Airport congestion delay savings

 Operation delays $238 $1,255 $1,011 $244 $1,633 $1,209 $424

 Passenger delays $428 $2,166 $1,717 $448 $2,816 $2,055 $761

 Total airport congestion delay savings $666 $3,421 $2,728 $693 $4,449 $3,264 $1,185

 Highway delay savings $721 $2,079 $521 $1,559 $2,734 $719 $2,015

 Emission savings $22 $339 $143 $196 $297 $101 $196

 Total benefits to the public at large $1,409 $5,839 $3,392 $2,447 $7,479 $4,084 $3,395

Total benefits $6,519 $37,665 $24,384 $13,281 $49,920 $29,011 $20,909

Total costs:

 Initial investment $1,047 $25,991 $19,127 $6,864 $32,448 $22,137 $10,311

 O&M expense $1,389 $6,531 $4,687 $1,844 $6,856 $4,328 $2,528

 Continuing investments $131 $675 $478 $196 $531 $349 $182

Total costs $2,567 $33,197 $24,293 $8,904 $39,836 $26,815 $13,021

 Incidence of total costs:

 Costs borne by users $2,561 $18,782 $13,442 $5,340 $25,205 $16,285 $8,921

 Publicly-borne costs $7 $14,415 $10,851 $3,565 $14,630 $10,530 $4,100

Total benefits less total costs $3,952 $4,468 $91 $4,377 $10,085 $2,196 $7,889

 Benefits to HSGT users less costs borne 

___by users

$2,550 $13,045 $7,550 $5,494 $17,236 $8,642 $8,593

 Benefits to the public at large less 

___publicly-borne costs

$1,403 ($8,576) ($7,459) ($1,117) ($7,151) ($6,446) ($705)

Ratio of total benefits to total costs 2.54 1.13 1.00 1.49 1.25 1.08 1.61

Statistical Supplement Page 2 Southeast Corridor
Southeast Corridor Results 

("N/Av" means "Not Available." "N/Ap" means 

"Not Applicable.") 

Accelerail 110: 

Extension

New HSR: 

Southeast/ 

Northeast 

System

New HSR: NEC 

Alone

New HSR: 

Southeast 

Corridor 

Proper

Maglev: 

Southeast/ 

Northeast 

System

Maglev: NEC 

Alone

Maglev: 

Southeast 

Corridor 

Proper

 Ratio of benefits to HSGT users, to costs Physical, production, and traffic factors 

___borne by users

2.00 1.69 1.56 2.03 1.68 1.53 1.96

 Ratio of benefits to the public at large, to 

___publicly-borne costs

207.44 0.41 0.31 0.69 0.51 0.39 0.83

Does this case meet the threshold tests for 

"partnership potential"? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES

Statistical Supplement Page 3 Southeast Corridor