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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________

)

DAVID S. BRAUN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civ. Action No. 17-1050 (EGS)

)

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND )

BUDGET, )

)

Defendant. )

 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, David Steven Braun, alleges that defendant, 

Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), must be compelled to 

“process and settle” four claims that Mr. Braun has submitted to 

federal agencies requesting various forms of relief. Mr. Braun 

asserts that such an order would be proper under the Barring 

Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3702(a)(4), which he submits requires the 

federal government to settle all claims. 

Pending before the court are three motions. First, OMB 

moves to dismiss Mr. Braun’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 

12. Second, Mr. Braun asks that the Court order OMB to process 

one of his four claims “independently from the other three.” See

Pl.’s Mot. to Process Fourth Claim, ECF No. 15. Third, Mr. Braun 

requests that the Court schedule a Rule 16 conference so that 

the parties can move toward summary judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. for 
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a Rule 16(b)(1)(B) Conf., ECF No. 17. For the following reasons, 

the Court GRANTS OMB’s motion to dismiss, and DENIES Mr. Braun’s 

motion to process the fourth claim and motion for a Rule 16 

conference as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Mr. Braun asserts that the basis of this lawsuit are four 

claims that he has submitted to various agencies. See Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 1.1 Specifically, he points to the following four 

claims:

a. Claim Exhibit 1 shows the submission of a 

claim based on a [National Security Agency] 

record request denial. This falls under the 

Privacy Act.

b. Claim Exhibit 2 shows a claim submission 

based on a [Federal Communications 

Commission] record request denial. This 

claim is governed buy2 the Privacy Act. 

c. Claim Exhibit 3 shows a claim submission 

based on a [Federal Bureau of Investigation] 

 1 Mr. Braun does not number all of the paragraphs in his 

complaint, nor does his complaint contain page numbers. As such, 

for ease of reference, the Court refers to both the paragraph 

numbers (where available) and the page numbers designated by ECF 

when citing to the complaint. Likewise, because Mr. Braun does 

not include page numbers on the exhibits to his complaint or his 

motion papers, the Court refers to the page numbers designated 

by ECF when citing to these documents.

2 Mr. Braun's complaint and motion papers are riddled with 

significant spelling and grammatical errors. Accordingly, the 

Court does not include [sic] after each error when quoting Mr. 

Braun's complaint or motion papers.
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record request denial. This claim is 

Governed buy the Privacy Act.

d. Claim Exhibit 4 shows a claim that was 

based on add hock court cases and tort 

submissions as well as one privacy act case. 

This was small and intended to be processed 

easily and quickly. 

Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1 at 2.

Mr. Braun also attaches 33 pages of exhibits to his 

complaint. See ECF No. 1-1. Mr. Braun’s exhibits indicate that 

the first claim at issue in this lawsuit was created “when the 

[National Security Agency] FOIA/PA office denied [his] record 

request for result of investigation/contacts” that he had made 

to that agency. Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Mr. Braun states 

that he “did notify the agency that [he] believed [he] had a 

claim with a standard form 95 on 2/3/2014.” Id.3 Mr. Braun

acknowledges that a magistrate judge in a federal civil suit 

related to his records request to the National Security Agency

dismissed Mr. Braun’s case after finding that the records were 

properly withheld by the agency. Id.

Mr. Braun’s second claim was submitted to OMB as an

“official request to initiate a settlement/claim against the US 

government for correcting the liability that was created when 

 3 Standard Form 95 is a form developed by the Department of 

Justice to facilitate agency processing of claims under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act. Chung v. Chao, 518 F. Supp. 2d 270, 272 

n.2 (D.D.C. 2007).
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the [Federal Communications Commission] Denied [his] [FOIA] 

request’s for results off investigation from the consumer call 

Center and [Federal Communications Commission] Enforcement.” 

Compl. Ex. 2, ECF 1-1 at 2. Mr. Braun again acknowledges that a 

federal court upheld the agency’s denial of his record request. 

Id. Mr. Braun further asserts that, after the denial of his 

request, he submitted a claim on Standard Form 95 to the Federal 

Communications Commission in which he had requested $300,000 “a 

month for life in financial assistance.” Id.

Mr. Braun’s third claim was also submitted to OMB. This 

claim related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s denial of 

a “records request for all off the results for requested 

criminal investigations.” Compl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Mr. 

Braun again acknowledges that a federal court found that the 

records were properly withheld and again asserts that he 

submitted a Standard Form 95 requesting damages. See id., ECF 

No. 1-1 at 6, 10.

Finally, Mr. Braun’s fourth claim to OMB is based on a tort 

claim submitted to the Social Security Administration. See 

Compl. Ex. 4, ECF No. 1-1 at 11-13. This claim appears to stem 

from the Social Security Administration’s delay in approving Mr. 

Braun’s request for disability payments. Id. at 11. 

In this lawsuit, Mr. Braun asserts that, pursuant to 31 

U.S.C. § 3702(a)(4), "the Federal Government is required to 
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settle all claims." Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4. Accordingly, he asks 

that OMB "simply introduce an Attorney and process and Seattle 

the submitted claims as it would for any other US citizen." Id. 

at 5. Mr. Braun also requests that the Court “unbundle[]” the 

four claims and process the fourth claim on an expedited basis. 

See Pl.’s Mot. to Process the Fourth Claim, ECF No. 15. Finally, 

Mr. Braun requests a Rule 16 conference to “discuss facilitating 

settlement . . . or setting a scheduling order for say putting 

the 4 claims on the docket as a summary judgment and allowing 

the bench to process the claim as a Judgment.” See Pl.’s Mot.

for Rule 16(b)(1)(B) Conf., ECF No. 17. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A 

complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give 

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion 

to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
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on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially 

plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow the court 

to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged." Id. The standard does not amount to 

a "probability requirement," but it does require more than a 

"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss [pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint." Atherton v. 

D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court must 

give the plaintiff the "benefit of all inferences that can be 

derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 

F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A "pro se complaint is 

entitled to liberal construction." Washington v. Geren, 675 F. 

Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). Even so, 

"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements" are not sufficient to 

state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. ANALYSIS

Mr. Braun brings this lawsuit pursuant to the Barring Act, 

31 U.S.C. § 3702(a). In relevant part, that statute provides:
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(a) Except as provided in this chapter 

or another law, all claims of or against the 

United States Government shall be settled as 

follows:

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall 

settle--

(A) claims involving uniformed service 

members' pay, allowances, travel, 

transportation, payments for unused accrued 

leave, retired pay, and survivor benefits; 

and

(B) claims by transportation carriers 

involving amounts collected from them for 

loss or damage incurred to property incident 

to shipment at Government expense.

(2) The Director of the Office of 

Personnel Management shall settle claims 

involving Federal civilian employees' 

compensation and leave.

(3) The Administrator of General 

Services shall settle claims involving 

expenses incurred by Federal civilian 

employees for official travel and 

transportation, and for relocation expenses 

incident to transfers of official duty 

station.

(4) The Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget shall settle claims 

not otherwise provided for by this 

subsection or another provision of law.

Id. Mr. Braun points to this last provision which requires OMB 

to “settle claims not otherwise provided for” as support for his 

requested relief – i.e., an order compelling OMB to process the 

four outstanding claims previously submitted by Mr. Braun to 

various agencies.
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In its motion to dismiss, OMB asserts that Mr. Braun’s 

lawsuit must be dismissed because the four claims arise under 

other, specific statutes, thereby precluding recovering under 

the Barring Act. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12 at 5.

Specifically, because Mr. Braun’s claims arise under the Privacy 

Act and the Social Security Act, OMB argues that they are not 

subject to the catch-all provision of the Barring Act. Id. 

(citing West’s Fed. Admin. Prac. § 516).4

The Barring Act specifically directs OMB to settle claims 

“not otherwise provided for by this subsection or another 

provision of law.” 31 U.S.C. § 3702(a)(4). Here, three of Mr. 

Braun’s claims are governed by the Privacy Act, while the fourth 

is governed by the Social Security Act. See generally Compl. and 

Exs. 1-3, ECF Nos. 1 and 1-1. Mr. Braun’s only remedy for a 

denial of access to records under the Privacy Act is an order to 

the agency to provide the improperly withheld records. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(g)(3)(A). The Court may also order the agency to pay 

reasonable attorneys’ fees. Id. § 552(a)(g)(3)(B). Plaintiff is 

not entitled to any other damages. Because these provisions of 

the Privacy Act govern Mr. Braun’s first three claims, he cannot

 4 Although the treatise cited pertains to the Government 

Accountability Office – an agency that reports to Congress and 

is not part of the executive branch – the treatise explains that 

the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 1996 transferred 

claim settlement authority from the Government Accountability 

Office to OMB. See West’s Fed. Admin. Prac. § 516 n.1. 
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pursue these claims under the Barring Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 

3702(a) (explaining that the section applies “[e]xcept as 

provided in this chapter or another law”). Likewise, the Social 

Security Act sets forth the sole basis for challenging a denial 

of disability benefits, and damages are not available to Mr. 

Braun under that Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rattler v. Sec. of 

Health and Human Servs., No. 11-cv-729, 2011 WL 3841604 (D.D.C. 

2011). Accordingly, Mr. Braun may not pursue his fourth claim 

under the Barring Act either. Therefore, OMB’s motion to dismiss 

the complaint is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED. Moreover, 

in light of the dismissal of Mr. Braun’s claims, his motion to 

process the fourth claim independently is denied as moot, as is 

his motion for a scheduling conference. An appropriate Order 

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

March 20, 2018