OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Summary of Report: SIGIR 11-003 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

The Department of Defense (DoD) is 

responsible for managing the program to assist 

the Government of Iraq (GOI) develop police 

forces capable of maintaining internal security. 

The Iraq Training and Advisory Mission 

(ITAM), under U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), is 

responsible for managing the program for DoD. 

On October 1, 2011, management responsibility 

for the program is to transfer to the Department 

of State’s (DoS) Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). 

DynCorp International, under a contract with 

INL, provides police advisors who assist with 

the training. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) 

oversees the Iraqi police forces in 15 of Iraq’s 

18 provinces with the Kurdistan Regional 

Government responsible for the remaining three 

provinces. Because of the program’s 

significance in terms of U.S. investment and 

Iraqi security, the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) examined program 

outcomes, DoD’s management and oversight, 

status of the transfer, and issues facing GOI that 

impact the capability and effectiveness of the 

police forces. 

What SIGIR Recommends 

SIGIR has a number of recommendations for the 

Commanding General USF-I that pertain to 

improving oversight and management of police 

advisors and working with the GOI to assess the 

capabilities of the Iraqi police. 

Management Comments and Audit 

Response 

USF-I and the Department of the Army Office 

of the Provost Marshal General concurred with 

the report recommendations. USF-I and INL 

provided technical comments that we have 

addressed as appropriate 

October 25, 2010 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: POLICE TRAINING PROGRAM 

DEVELOPED SIZEABLE FORCE, BUT CAPABILITIES ARE UNKNOWN 

What SIGIR Found 

Since 2003, the United States has spent about $7.3 billion on a program to 

help the GOI train, staff, and equip Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic 

order and deny terrorists a safe haven in Iraq. The program was 

unprecedented in its magnitude and conducted in a hostile environment with 

ongoing combat operations. In addition, the existing Iraqi police forces in 

2003 were in very poor condition, and a new Iraqi government was in 

development. Despite these impediments, DoD reports that over 400,000 

Iraqi police have received training and are on the force. However, the 

capabilities of these forces are unknown because no assessments of total 

force capabilities were made.

There were weaknesses in program management in (1) program planning 

and assessments, (2) communications and coordination between 

organizations performing the training, and (3) oversight of contract police 

advisors. The impact of these weaknesses on the program is difficult to 

quantify but undoubtedly led to inefficiencies and waste. For example, there 

was no comprehensive plan to guide the program to desired results or 

assessments to determine if the program was on track. Because of the 

frequent rotations by military personnel, a comprehensive plan would have 

provided a foundation for program continuity as military units rotated in and 

out of Iraq. Also, police advisors, who were critical to the training program, 

were not always effectively monitored and utilized. 

DoD is in the process of establishing Stability Transition Teams (STT) to 

advise and assist MOI and its forces over the next year. The STTs will be 

responsible for day-to-day management of the police advisors while ITAM 

will be responsible for tracking them. This split in responsibilities was not 

well coordinated in the past and needs to be effectively managed in the 

future. Moreover, since DynCorp will be self reporting on the utilization of 

police advisors, these reports need monitoring to check the validity of the 

information and to ensure police advisors are productively employed. 

A significant challenge ahead will be effectively and efficiently transitioning 

the police training assistance program from DoD to DoS in 2011. To their 

credit, the two Departments are working collaboratively on the transfer. 

However, DoS will be assuming responsibility for the program to advise and 

assist the police forces when the capabilities of those forces have not been 

assessed in any comprehensive way. 

The long-term success of the Iraqi police training program is dependent on 

sustainment by the GOI and its ability to mitigate force structure, corruption, 

land ownership disputes, and other issues adversely impacting the force. 

DoD and DoS need to continue to work with GOI officials to help them 

address these problems. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

October 25, 2010 

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, but 

Capabilities Are Unknown (SIGIR 11-003) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. It discusses the U. S. Department of 

Defense program to help train Iraqi police. We performed this audit in accordance with our 

statutory responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates 

the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. This 

law provides for independent and objective audits of programs and operations funded with 

amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for reconstruction of Iraq, and for 

recommendations on related policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR Project 9028. 

U.S. Forces-Iraq and the Department of the Army Office of the Provost Marshal General 

provided written comments on a draft of this report, and the comments are included in 

Appendix D. We also obtained technical comments and addressed them in the report as 

appropriate. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Glenn Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), 

(703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jason Venner, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 607-1346/ jason.venner@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Commanding General, U.S. Central Command 

S i l I t G l f I R t ti
i 

Table of Contents 

Table of Contents i

Introduction 1

Background 1

Iraq Ministry of Interior Oversees Most Police Forces 3

U.S. Funds Provided through Multiple Appropriations 3

Ministry of Interior Reported Expenditures Exceeded $14 Billion 6

Objectives 7

Iraqi Police Training Program Developed a Sizeable Force, but Total 

Capabilities of That Force Are Unknown 9

Major Difficulties Adversely Impacted Program Beginning 9

Iraq Police Training Program Has Built a Sizeable Force Which Now Emphasizes 

Specialized Training and Manages Training Facilities 11

Capabilities of the Iraqi Police Force Are Unknown 18

MOI Officials Expressed Satisfaction with the Training Assistance Program 21

Weak Program Management and Oversight 22

Program Lacked a Comprehensive Plan with Goals and Objectives and Metrics to 

Measure Progress 22

Poor Communications and Coordination Resulted in Inefficiencies 24

Program in Transition from DoD to DoS in Planning Phase 28

Transition Planning Underway by DoD and DoS 28

Issues Facing the Government of Iraq 30

Force Structure and Corruption Issues Remain 30

Sustainment Issues Need To Be Addressed 31

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned 33

Conclusions 33

Recommendations 33
ii 

Lessons Learned 34

Management Comments and Audit Response 35

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 36

Appendix B—Acronyms 39

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 40

Appendix D—Management Comments 41

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 46
1 

Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program 

Developed Sizeable Force, but Capabilities Are Unknown 

SIGIR 11-003 October 25, 2010

Introduction 

Since 2003, the United States has spent about $7.3 billion to support a program to help train, 

staff, and equip Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order and deny terrorists a safe haven in 

Iraq. The program has been managed by Department of Defense (DoD) military organizations in 

Iraq, but management is scheduled to transfer to the Department of State (DoS) on October 1, 

2011. The Government of Iraq (GOI) is responsible for training and equipping the police, and 

DoD continues to advise and assist the GOI with the training. The Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) performed this audit because of the program’s significance in terms 

of U.S. investment and Iraqi security and the pending transfer of the program from DoD to DoS. 

Background 

DoS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is responsible for 

developing policies and managing programs to strengthen law enforcement and other rule of law 

institutional capabilities outside the United States.1

 The Bureau was initially assigned 

responsibility for the Iraqi police training program and was assisted in that effort by the 

Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program 

(ICITAP). However, responsibility for that program was transferred to DoD in 2004 due to the 

security situation, the scale of the task, and to ensure unity of command. On May 11, 2004, 

National Security Presidential Directive 362 assigned the mission of organizing, training, and 

equipping Iraq’s security forces, including the police, to the U.S. Central Command until the 

Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that DoS should take on that responsibility. In 

accordance with the Presidential Directive, on October 1, 2011, DoS is scheduled to assume 

responsibility for the program from DoD. 

The U.S. Central Command designated the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

under the overall direction of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, manager of this effort. The MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq created the Civilian Police Assistance Training 

Team to train and equip Iraqi police and other civilian security forces. In June 2009, the Civilian 

Police Assistance Training Team transitioned to the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission 

(ITAM). In January 2010, the Multi-National Force-Iraq transitioned to the U.S. Force-Iraq 

(USF-I) and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq transitioned to the Deputy 

 

1

 Presidential Decision Directive 71, February 24, 2000, directed DoS to strengthen criminal justice systems in 

support of U.S. peace operations and other complex contingencies. The Secretary of State designated INL as the 

primary focal point for rule of law matters. 

2

 United States Government Operations in Iraq, 5/11/2004. 
2 

Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG–A&T). Figure 1 shows DoD’s 

management structure and the organizational transitions. 

Figure 1—DoD’s Management Structure and Organizational Transitions 

Source: SIGIR prepared from DoD documents 8/2010. 

Although our audit covers periods during which the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, 

the Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq were 

in existence, we use ITAM, USF-I, and DCG-A&T throughout the report to refer to them and 

their predecessor organizations. 

ITAM was responsible for providing the Iraqi police with academic training whereas USF-I 

utilized U.S. military units to provide on-the-job training of the police at the local level. Both 

ITAM and the military units utilized police advisors to assist with the training. Although 

advisors were provided by a number of U.S. government organizations (including the 

Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice), other nations (including Italy 

and the United Kingdom), and U.S. contractors (including DynCorp International), our reference 

to police advisors refers only to the DynCorp advisors. We focused on the DynCorp advisors 

because they were the largest group of advisors working for the U.S. government.3

 ITAM was 

responsible for providing the guidance and oversight for DynCorp police advisors. Personnel 

from the military units and their police advisors were organized into police training teams.

By December 2006, the GOI had assumed responsibility for most of the academic training, but 

ITAM continued to advise and assist at the police training centers, and the police training teams 

advised at the police stations, districts, and provinces. By December 2008, the GOI had assumed 

responsibility for all academic training and most of the advanced training courses. U.S. military 

and police advisors continued to assist by providing advice and quality control. Other U.S. 

federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and international 

 

3

 The DynCorp advisors are provided under a contract with INL. DoD transferred funds to DoS for the contractor 

support, and INL managed the contract that provided U.S. police advisors and logistical support for those advisors. 

DynCorp continues to provide advisors under the INL contract. SIGIR last reported on INL’s management of the 

DynCorp contract in January 2010: Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp 

Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program, SIGIR 10-008, 1/25/2010. 
3 

contributors, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, also provide the Iraqis with police training 

assistance. 

Iraq Ministry of Interior Oversees Most Police Forces 

The Iraq Ministry of Interior (MOI) oversees Iraqi police forces in 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces.4 

The major police forces it oversees include: 

 Iraqi Police Service: composed of patrol and station police, as well as specialists such as 

forensic specialists, assigned throughout 15 of Iraq’s provinces. Its mission is to enforce 

the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The Iraqi 

Police Service comprises police officers, who conduct investigations and make arrests, 

and “shurtas,”5

 who perform functions such as traffic management and crowd control. 

 Federal Police: a bridging force between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army, 

which allows MOI to project police capabilities across provinces. It could be used to 

counter large-scale disobediences and for national emergencies. 

 Border Police:6 staff border forts and ports of entry to protect Iraq’s borders from 

unlawful entry. 

 Oil Police: provides security for Iraq’s oil infrastructure. 

 Facilities Protection Services: protects Iraqi government buildings. 

U.S. Funds Provided through Multiple Appropriations 

DoD has spent about $7.3 billion from three U.S. funds appropriated for the total program. The 

three funds are the Iraq Security Forces Fund ($5.7 billion), Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

($1.6 billion), and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program ($2.8 million). DOD tracks 

funds for the total police program and does not separately track funds for the components of that 

program such as training, equipment, facilities, and related support services. 

Figure 2 shows the reported funds spent from the Iraq Security Forces Fund to support the police 

training program. The expenditures totaled about $5.7 billion. Funds were primarily used to 

provide equipment; supplies; services; training; and facilities repair, renovation, and 

construction. 

 

4

 The Iraq MOI does not oversee the police forces in the Kurdistan region. Those forces are overseen by the 

Kurdistan MOI. Future references to the MOI will be limited to the Iraqi MOI, unless noted. 5

 The literal translation of “shurta” is “police” in Arabic. However, USF-I and Iraqi officials refer to Iraqi police 

who are not officers as “shurtas.” 

6

 Officially known as the Directorate of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate. 
4 

Figure 2—Reported Iraq Security Forces Fund Expenditures by Fiscal Year 

Appropriation and Activity, as of June 31, 2010 ($ in millions) 

Notes:

Training and Operations: Police training, institutional development, instructor support, medical and office equipment, training aids, aircraft 

support, and information technology equipment and services. 

Equipment and Transportation: Equipment and transportation of police, contracted security, force protection (including vehicle modifications), 

vehicles, organizational clothing, office furniture, and communications equipment. 

Infrastructure: Facilities for police units, training academies, and headquarters expenses. 

Sustainment: Weapons, ammunition, and contracted activities such as logistics support, maintenance, and other services. 

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer. 

Figure 3 shows the reported funds spent from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund to support 

the police training program. The expenditures totaled about $1.6 billion. 
5 

Figure 3—Reported Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Expenditures by Project 

from Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriations, as of April 2010 ($ in millions) 

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System.

Figure 4 shows the reported funds spent from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

to support the police training program. The expenditures totaled about $2.8 million. The funds 

were used primarily for construction of police stations and border forts. 

Figure 4—Reported Commander’s Emergency Response Program Expenditures 

by Fiscal Year Appropriation and Types of Facilities, as of March 2010 

Note: 

SIGIR has pointed out in numerous reports that the Iraq Reconstruction Management System database suffers from inconsistencies in data 

quality, accuracy, and overall usefulness. 

Source: Iraq Reconstruction Management System database. 

DoD also provides U.S. military personnel, life support, and security that benefit the program at 

costs that are significant but that are not readily available. In addition, other U.S. government 
6 

agencies, national governments, and international organizations have contributed personnel and 

funding to the Iraqi police training program. 

For example, the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives all provide various forms of specialized training as needed or requested. 

MOI has requested assistance from the FBI to develop an FBI academy. The Department of 

Homeland Security has been involved in Iraq since 2005 to train Iraqi personnel on a variety of 

skills including: physical security; port operations; threat assessments; document analysis and 

search techniques; and how to develop border, customs, and immigration courses. The Bureau 

of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has had a continuous presence in Iraq since 2003 

and has provided support to the Iraq police training program in an advisory capacity at crime 

scenes; in training development/delivery; and as subject matter experts in firearms, explosives, 

and other areas as requested. 

Other countries and international organizations have also provided support to the Iraqi police 

training program. For example, the United Kingdom spent approximately $229 million for such 

assistance as sponsoring forensics programs, providing forensic laboratories, and providing 

specialized training on leadership and management, criminal investigations, community policing, 

and curriculum development. Australia spent about $21 million in areas such as developing a 

curriculum tailored to the Iraqi policing environment and forensic training. The European Union 

spent about $54 million to provide MOI training in such areas as confidence building, mutual 

respect, and operational cooperation between the different branches of the Iraqi criminal justice 

system. 

Ministry of Interior Reported Expenditures Exceeded $14 Billion 

According to ITAM, MOI spent about $14 billion from 2005 through 2009 on salaries, 

equipment, facilities, goods, and services, with most of MOI’s expenditures for the Iraqi police. 

Figure 5 shows MOI’s reported expenditures for 2005 through 2009 by type of expenditure. 
7 

Figure 5—MOI Reported Expenditures 2005-2009, as of March 20, 2010 

($ in millions) 

Source: ITAM. 

As the figure shows, the reported expenditures have increased every year since 2005 with the last 

two years accounting for about 63% of the 5-year total. Over 80% of total expenditures are for 

salaries. The table does not include Kurdistan expenditures because the Kurdistan Regional 

Government receives its funds from the Ministry of Finance. We requested the Kurdistan 

expenditure data but did not receive that information. 

With ITAM’s assistance and support, MOI developed its first 3-year budget and completed its 

2010 budget, which includes over $5.8 billion for MOI. 

Objectives 

This report examines police training program outcomes, DoD management and oversight of the 

program, status of the program’s transfer from DoD to DoS, and issues facing the GOI that 

impact the capability and effectiveness of the police forces. Our audit was adversely impacted 

by incomplete files and the lack of historical knowledge of the program by U.S. military 

personnel. Frequent turnover of personnel and poor records management have often been cited 

by SIGIR in past audits as program management weaknesses. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For a list of acronyms, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see 
8 

Appendix C. For a copy of management comments, see Appendix D. For the SIGIR mission 

and contact information, see Appendix E 
9 

Iraqi Police Training Program Developed a Sizeable 

Force, but Total Capabilities of That Force Are 

Unknown 

The situation faced in Iraq by individuals tasked with establishing a police training program was 

considerably worse than originally envisioned in terms of the operating environment, the 

condition of the existing police force, and the size of the training force that would be available. 

That situation forced a significant change in program goals and objectives. 

Starting with a police force that was in extremely poor condition, U.S. forces and coalition 

partners have helped MOI build a sizeable force and transition this force to the control of the 

GOI. According to DoD, over 400,000 Iraqi police have received training and are on the force. 

Initially, U.S. trainers had responsibility for training recruits; however over time, the U.S. 

transferred full responsibility to MOI for developing and maintaining the police training program 

including operating its training centers and colleges. At the time of our audit, MOI was 

operating all training centers and police colleges located in 15 provinces in Iraq. The U.S. and 

international partners were providing police advisors who mentored the trainers and advised Iraqi 

police leadership. The training program had shifted to more advanced training such as criminal 

investigations and forensics. 

The capabilities of the Iraqi police are unknown. Since June 2009, Iraqi security forces have 

been responsible for the internal security of the country as U.S. military forces were repositioned 

to military installations in Iraq. The Iraqi police forces in June 2009 were reportedly more 

capable than the police forces the coalition members began training in 2003. However, the 

extent of those capabilities then and at the time we completed our field work in July 2010 were 

unknown because no assessments of total force capabilities were made. 

Almost all senior Iraqi police training officials we spoke with in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basrah 

expressed satisfaction with the program and U.S. assistance. Also, according to USF-I, just 

under 60% of the Iraqi public believes the Iraqi police is controlling crime. 

Major Difficulties Adversely Impacted Program Beginning 

After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, an international police team assigned to the Coalition 

Provisional Authority assessed the state of the Iraqi police and reported7 that the Iraqi police had 

suffered years of neglect, coupled with a “repressive command structure that prohibited training, 

proactivity, initiative and stifled attempts toward modernization of the police. Unless redesigned 

and redeveloped, the Iraqi Police will not constitute a suitable, viable, supportable or sustainable 

police service for a free Iraq.” The report described the Iraqi police as the only institution that 

remained intact following the conflict, but in the opinion of many citizens, the police were 

“inextricably linked with a cruel and repressive regime” and were “corrupt, unprofessional and 

untrustworthy.” The report further stated that the Iraqi police displayed “the results of poor 

 

7 Iraq Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future, Coalition Provisional AuthorityInterior Ministry, 5/30/2003. 
10 

standards, inadequate expectations of performance, absence of an understanding/appreciation for 

human rights, poor management and insufficient or inadequate training.” 

This assessment illustrates the institutional and psychological challenges that DoD had to 

overcome to change the mindset of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi communities’ perception of the 

police because the police need community support and consent to conduct civilian policing. 

Adding to these challenges was the 2004 to 2006 peak of insurgency, which adversely impacted 

training operations. Police training centers, stations, and personnel were often the targets of 

attacks. 

According to U.S. government officials involved in international police training assistance 

programs, including the early years of the Iraq program, the challenges faced in Iraq far 

surpassed those faced in other assistance programs such as Panama, Bosnia, and Haiti. Those 

challenges included a gross underestimation of program complexity and the number of 

individuals needed for the tasks ahead; a large population with no law enforcement on the street; 

a hostile security environment; and the remnants of a poorly trained and brutal police force under 

Saddam Hussein. The following examples illustrate the conditions encountered: 

 The assessment conducted in early 2003 for the Coalition Provisional Authority 

estimated that a force of over 6,600 international police advisors would be needed to 

properly train, mentor, and advise the Iraqis. According to ICITAP officials, this was the 

same number of advisors used in Kosovo for a population half the size of Iraq. However, 

unlike Kosovo, the coalition members did not provide the trainers needed because they 

were unwilling to send advisors to Iraq due to the dangerous environment and lack of 

logistical support. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace report8

, only 50 police advisors 

had arrived in Iraq during the first six months following the invasion and 375 a year later. 

 A July 2005 joint report by the DoS and DoD Inspectors General stated9, “The initial 

assumption was that the Iraqi police training programs would be conducted in a postconflict environment. Contrary to these expectations, the IPS [Iraqi Police Service] is 

evolving in an environment of high-level violence and terrorism intermingled with a 

problematic insurgency movement.” 

 SIGIR reported10 in Hard Lessons that by the time the Coalition Provisional Authority 

assessment team of experts arrived in May 2003, “looters had destroyed most of the 

Ministry of Interior, as well as many police stations across the country, leaving the police 

force infrastructure in tatters. Gerald Burke, a member of the six-person team assigned to 

assess the police, said their conclusions could be summed up in one sentence: The police 

need everything.” 

According to the U.S. government officials, the situation in Iraq in 2004 forced a significant 

change in program goals and objectives. The focus shifted from long-term organizational 

development to training large numbers of police in a short period of time for counterinsurgency 

operations. Organizational development would have entailed building a police force that was 

 

8 Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence, U.S. Institute of Peace, 6/2006. 9 Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72 and Department 

of Defense Report No. 1E-2005-002, 7/15/2005. 10Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 2/2/2009. 
11 

fully integrated into a functioning justice system, developing standard policies and procedures, 

and incorporating policing concept of a free society. 

The situation also required a change in training curriculum in 2004. According to the same joint 

report by the DoS and DoD Inspectors General, 

The curriculum used was a revised ICITAP course originally developed for 

training in Kosovo. From the beginning Coalition planners intended the eightweek basic course to serve as a starting point and not as the ultimate training 

solution. A field training and mentoring program was to have supplemented the 

rudimentary basic training course. Given the April 2004 rise in the insurgency, it 

became apparent that the field training envisioned in the original concept could 

not be executed. Yet the coalition was reluctant to increase the length of basic 

training because of the urgent need to build IPS [Iraqi Police Service] capacity 

and get policemen on the streets. As the IP [Iraqi Police] increasingly became 

targets of the insurgency, MNF-I [Multi-National Force-Iraq] recognized the need 

to change the direction and emphasis of the training. The basic recruit curriculum 

was changed to focus on officer survival skills in an insurgency. 

Because of the hostile situation in Iraq and the need to train large numbers of police in a short 

period of time, the Coalition Provisional Authority arranged with the Government of Jordan for 

the U.S. to build an academy there to train Iraqi police. From November 2003 through February 

2007, as part of a bilateral agreement with the Government of Jordan, the U.S. and international 

partners operated the Jordan International Police Training Center. U.S. military and Justice 

Department officials, contractors, and coalition partners trained Iraqi police at the Center. At the 

request of the GOI and ITAM, the basic police training program at the Center ended in February 

2007 and the police training effort shifted to the training centers in Iraq that were also being used 

in conjunction with the Center in Jordan to train Iraqi police. During its period of operation, 

over 54,000 Iraqi police graduated from the Center. 

The Training Center was constructed under a contract between INL and DynCorp. The amount 

expended for the construction totaled $70.4 million. An additional $53.3 million was expended 

for operating and maintaining the facility. That facility has since been turned over to the 

Jordanian government. 

Iraq Police Training Program Has Built a Sizeable Force Which 

Now Emphasizes Specialized Training and Manages Training 

Facilities 

The Iraqi police training program has built a sizeable force since 2003. According to the May 

2003 assessment of the Iraqi police force conducted for the Coalition Provisional Authority, the 

Iraqi police force under Saddam Hussein numbered about 58,000. DoD reported that as of May 
12 

31, 2010, there were 412,000 police in the force.11 SIGIR has reported on the problems in 

obtaining the true number of assigned and trained police.12 

Whereas under Saddam the police were poorly trained and had no appreciation for human rights, 

a senior MOI official told us that all police in the current force had, at a minimum, completed 

eight weeks of basic police training on a modern, democratically based curriculum. Although 

coalition forces initially managed and conducted the training program, MOI now manages the 

program, and the Iraqi police conduct all of the basic training and most of the advanced training. 

Police advisors from the U.S. and other countries provide advice, assistance, and specialized 

training. 

Numbers of Police Increased To Include Women Police Officers 

According to the joint audit report by the DoD and DoS Inspectors General, coalition planners 

reviewed the per capita police-to-population ratios in neighboring Islamic countries to arrive at a 

proposed personnel level of 135,000 for the Iraqi police. Over the years, the GOI has increased 

the number and types of forces to be trained. As of May 31, 2010, DoD reported that 297,000 

provincial police forces and 115,000 federal forces were assigned to MOI. According to ITAM, 

all police had, as a minimum, received basic recruit training. 

ITAM and MOI have promoted the inclusion of women in the Iraqi Police Service. This resulted 

in the first class of 50 women officer graduates from the Baghdad Police College in December 

2009. Although these women were segregated 

from the men during the training program, the 

curriculum was the same, and they graduated 

with the same rank, lieutenants, as the male 

graduates. Their inclusion in the force is 

significant even though Iraqi women comprise 

less than one-half a percent of the total officer 

corps (approximately 50 of 18,000). MOI has 

demonstrated that including women was not an 

isolated occurrence by training a second class 

of 85 female officers. Figure 6 shows a SIGIR 

auditor with Iraqi women police trainees at the 

Baghdad Police College, and Figure 7 shows 

the college. We have blurred the faces of the 

police trainees to protect their identities. 

 

 

11 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Department of Defense Report to Congress in accordance with the 

Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, 6/2010. 12 Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq, SIGIR 08-015, 4/25/2008; and Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on 

Iraqi Security Forces Continue, SIGIR 09-002, 10/21/2008. 

Figure 6—SIGIR Auditor with Iraqi 

Women Police Trainees 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during visit to Baghdad Police 

College, 4/26/2010. 
13 

Figure 7—Baghdad Police College 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during visit to Baghdad Police College, 4/26/2010. 

Training Emphasis Has Shifted from Numbers Trained to Specialized Training 

As stated earlier, during the program’s initial years, the emphasis was on the number of persons 

receiving training and basic survival skills. Over time, the program shifted to emphasize more 

specialized skills, including advanced policing techniques and policing in a free society, 

however, the number of persons receiving training remained a key metric of the program’s 

progress. 

All shurtas (Iraqi police who are not officers) are required to receive two months of training that 

includes courses on human rights, firearms, and basic policing skills. The length of the required 

officer program depends upon the individual’s prior education. Officer candidates who are 

college graduates have a 1-year program and those with no college degree have a 3-year 

program. The officer programs include courses on leadership, law, investigations, evidence 

collection, and human rights. Figures 8 and 9 show police trainees in various training scenarios, 

and Figure 10 shows a SIGIR auditor with an Iraqi canine police trainee. 

 
14 

Figure 8—Counterinsurgency Training for Police Service Forces 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during training center visits, 4/13/2010. 

Figure 9—Riot Control Training for Police Service Forces 

 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during training center visits, 4/24/2010. 
15 

ITAM provided guidance to MOI officials through the 

creation and final approval of the MOI police training 

curriculum. MOI has 92 approved curriculum courses 

including specialized courses for all police services. This 

curriculum is the only approved police training instructional 

material recognized by MOI. The MOI approved curriculum 

helps ensure police training in the 15 MOI controlled 

provinces is standardized.13 Table 1 provides examples of 

these courses and their length. 

Table 1—Examples of MOI Specialized Training Courses 

MOI Courses Length (in weeks)

Specialized Policing Skills 

 Advanced Criminal Investigation 2

 Intelligence Analyst Course 6

 Violent Crime Investigation 1

 Community Policing Varies

Leadership 

 Administration and Leadership 2

 Civil Disorder Management 2

Police Management 

 First Line Supervisor 2

 Sergeant Commissioner Course 12

Instructor Development 

 Field Training Officer Course 2

 Provincial Training Officer Course 5

Source: ITAM. 

 

13 According to ITAM officials, the curriculum in the Kurdistan controlled provinces is almost identical to the MOI 

curriculum. 

Figure 10—SIGIR Auditor 

with Canine Police Trainee 

for Police Service Force 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during 

training center visit, 4/26/2010. 
16 

Even though MOI does not oversee Kurdistan police, ITAM has encouraged MOI to include the 

Kurdistan police in joint training. For example, the Kurdistan police are included in classes at 

the Baghdad Police College. 

To meet the needs for more specialized training, the curriculum now includes advanced training 

in areas such as crime scene analysis, evidence collection, forensic evidence, white-collar fraud, 

gang task forces, and DNA testing. U.S. military officers stated that the proper collection of 

crime scene evidence is a priority training area because it has possibly the most dramatic impact 

in helping to strengthen the link between police arrests and criminal prosecution. To address this 

need, ITAM constructed five forensic laboratories to train students on how to compare and 

analyze evidence. Preserving evidence for analyses is critical to effective prosecutions. 

Moreover, proper evidence collection and analysis should help reduce the Iraqi judicial system’s 

heavy reliance on confessions to achieve convictions, which has led to charges of human rights 

violations and high acquittal rates. Figures 11 and 12 show police trainees in training on the 

collection and analysis of forensic evidence. 

Figures 11 and 12—Training Sessions on the Collection and Analysis of Forensic 

Evidence 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during training course, 4/24/2010.
17 

Source: SIGIR photo taken during training course, 4/21/2010.

MOI Manages Police Training Program and Training Facilities 

MOI is now responsible for police training. Although coalition forces initially managed and 

conducted the police training, in 2006 they transitioned the management for all police training 

centers, colleges, and stations to MOI. MOI currently funds, staffs, and manages training 

centers, colleges, and police stations in 15 of 18 provinces in Iraq. Iraqi police instructors lead 

classroom instruction, and Iraqi deans manage all college programs. At the time of our audit, the 

Iraq MOI operated 3 police colleges and 28 training centers, and the Kurdistan MOI operated 2 

police colleges and 6 training centers. Figure 13 shows the location of these training centers and 

colleges. 
18 

Figure 13—Police Training Centers and Colleges 

Notes: 

IPS = Iraqi Police Service 

TC = Training Centers 

DBE = Directorate of Border Enforcement 

Source: ITAM, 12/2009. 

The Iraqi police now conduct all of the basic training and most advanced training utilizing Iraqi 

police trainers and instructors. U.S. and other countries’ trainers continue to teach highly 

specialized training courses. According to ITAM, MOI had about 5,500 trainers and instructors 

as of March 2010. ITAM assists MOI to develop target numbers of police trainers and 

instructors needed in each police service for MOI to sustain its police forces. 

Capabilities of the Iraqi Police Force Are Unknown 

On June 30, 2009, the Iraqi military and police forces assumed responsibility for the security of 

Iraqi cities, villages, and localities. At that time, U.S. military forces were repositioned to 

military installations in Iraq. Although the Iraqi police forces in June 2009 were reportedly more 

capable than the forces the coalition members began training in 2003, the extent of those 

capabilities was unknown. The capabilities were not known because ITAM’s assessments were 
19 

focused on quantitative (such as numbers trained) rather than qualitative factors (such as skill 

levels) and the assessments did not include the total force. The information available in July 

2010 was more limited than that available in 2009 because USF-I had stopped using its 

capabilities assessment instrument for the Iraqi Police Service and, according to ITAM officials, 

the assessment function had been turned over to the three U.S. military divisions—North, Center, 

and South—to decide how they will assess the Iraqi Police Service. 

We obtained a classified assessment of the Border Police that was conducted in 2010. The 

assessment is based on numerous border stations that had limited or no coverage. We could not 

determine how or whether similar assessments are performed for the other police services. 

To a limited extent, USF-I used Operational Readiness Assessments to assess the capabilities of 

the Iraqi police. For the Iraqi Police Service, the Assessments were compiled from Police 

Station Monthly Reports (PSMR) which were focused on quantitative factors such as numbers of 

trained personnel and equipment on hand. U.S forces began using PSMRs in mid-2006 to 

measure capacity of the Iraqi Police Service at the station, district, and provincial levels. 

Military leaders of police training teams and their police advisors were required to complete the 

PSMRs. Using the PSMR information, objective Operational Readiness Assessment levels were 

derived. In addition, the military leaders were to provide subjective Operational Readiness 

Assessment levels of their stations. There were four Operational Readiness Assessment levels. 

The best was level 1 (police station capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent 

law enforcement operations), and the worst was level 4 (police station forming or incapable of 

planning, executing, and sustaining law enforcement operations). 

PSMR evaluations and Operational Readiness Assessments were to be summarized into district 

level evaluations, and the district level evaluations were to be summarized into provincial level 

evaluations. Because of criticism by users that the PSMR evaluation had too many questions to 

complete, USF-I streamlined it in 2009. The revised PSMR was focused on seven critical 

performance measures required to establish a “Rule of Law” police agency. The performance 

measures were based on international democratic policing standards. The seven international 

policing critical performance measures are: leadership, administration, operations, logistics, 

investigations, facilities, and training. 

Based on available information, the revised PSMR was used for only a few months after 

September 2009. According to an ITAM contract employee, neither the PSMR nor the 

Operational Readiness Assessments are now used because the police training teams no longer 

provide assistance at the police station level but concentrate their assistance at the district and 

provincial levels. Although ITAM plans to have a common assessment instrument at some 

undetermined point in the future, the responsibility for assessing Iraqi Police Service capabilities 

has been turned over to the U.S. military divisions. The divisions will decide how capabilities 

will be assessed and police advisors will complete the assessments. 

We found a number of reasons the PSMRs and Operational Readiness Assessments did not 

provide meaningful assessments of the Police Service’s capabilities. First, PSMRs were not 

available for most police stations. For example, although all military units were required to 

prepare PSMRs, we found for September 2009 that military units completed only 466 of 1,935 
20 

required PSMRs, or 24%, throughout Iraq. Second, Operational Readiness Assessments for 

some provinces were based on a limited number of PSMRs. For example, one province received 

an Operational Readiness Assessment of 1 (the highest rating) based on only 1 assessment of 28 

police reporting units in the province. Third, we were told by an ITAM contract employee that 

some military units did not use the PSMR but used their own assessment tools. For example, the 

Marine Corps units in Al Anbar Province used “Valuation Assessments Reports” to assess police 

capabilities. 

ITAM also conducted other assessments, but they also have limited usefulness in evaluating the 

capabilities of the Iraqi police services. For example, USF-I required that ITAM complete 

assessments of the police forces on a quarterly basis. The assessments were to be used for 

informed, timely decision making. We asked ITAM officials for all assessments completed 

since 2003, and they provided a total of three—two for 2009 and one for 2010. The evaluations 

assessed the current status of measures of effectiveness and performance of certain tasks.14 

According to an ITAM official, these are subjective evaluations. Under the task, “Advise and 

assist the MOI in establishing professional and capable Police forces,” there are nine measures of 

performance. ITAM evaluated eight of the nine in 2010 and all eight received the lowest 

capability rating. Table 2 shows ITAM’s latest assessment for six of the eight rated measures of 

performance.15

Table 2—ITAM Assessment of Measures of Performance for Iraq Police Forces 

(February 2010) 

Description Status 

Iraqi Police Service have minimum essential 

capability in protecting the population and fighting 

crime 

Capability in fewer than 3 provinces 

Iraqi Police Service have minimum essential 

capability in investigations and crime scene 

management 

Capability in fewer than 3 provinces 

Iraqi Police Service have minimum essential 

capability in counter explosives 

Capability in fewer than 3 provinces 

Oil Police, Facilities Protection Service, and Electric 

Police capable of protecting critical infrastructure 

Capability in fewer than 3 provinces 

Federal Police capable of providing federal 

reinforcement to Iraqi Police Service in 

counterinsurgency, special event security, and 

major crimes as required 

Federal Police brigades in fewer than 3 

provinces 

Border Police capable of securing borders with 

reinforcement of Iraqi Army 

2 or fewer regions capable 

Source: ITAM, 2/25/2010. 

 

14 Measures of effectiveness assess progress of operations toward achieving objectives. Measures of performance 

assess changes in capability as a result of tasks performed. 

15 The other two measures of performance relate to the capabilities of internal affairs/inspector general and first 

responders. 
21 

According to ITAM, over the past two years, ITAM and an MOI Joint Assessment Team have 

collaboratively developed and implemented a comprehensive Iraqi Police Service training center 

performance and operational capabilities assessment process. On June 1, 2010, the MOI 

finalized and began to implement the assessment process. In late September 2010, the MOI Joint 

Assessment Team was to perform its first independent assessment of an Iraqi Police Service 

training facility. ITAM stated that an objective of the assessment process is for the Joint 

Assessment Team to identify training centers that need additional support, are under-utilized by 

the provincial Iraqi Police Service, and that are not performing to expectations. Once these are 

identified, the Joint Assessment Team can provide direction and guidance to the centers’ 

leadership and staff to encourage improvements. Follow up assessments will be performed to 

determine if performance or operational capabilities have improved, and, if not, 

recommendations will be made to the MOI for further corrective actions or for closing the 

centers. SIGIR did not have the opportunity to review this assessment process prior to issuing 

this report. 

MOI Officials Expressed Satisfaction with the Training Assistance 

Program 

Many MOI officials, police trainers, and police with whom we spoke expressed satisfaction with 

the training assistance program and the U.S. contribution to the program. A top official at 

Baghdad’s Training and Qualification Institute stated that Iraq is very grateful to the U.S. 

government and military for their full backing of the police training program. He emphasized, 

“If the U.S. was not there to help us every step of the way, we could not have done it alone.” He 

also said the U.S. is providing expert mentoring and support in all aspects of the program. An 

Iraqi trainer described the students as enthusiastic and eager to learn. The Provincial Deputy 

Chief of Police in Kirkuk and the Dean of the Kirkuk Training Center each described U.S. 

advisors as “family.” 

According to USF-I data, almost 60% of Iraqis believe the Iraqi police is controlling crime and 

45% of Iraqis said they would go to the Iraqi police first to report a serious crime.16

 

16 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Department of Defense Report to Congress in accordance with the 

Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, 6/2010. 
22 

Weak Program Management and Oversight 

DoD’s controls over the training program were weak. SIGIR could find no comprehensive plan 

for the police training program and believes the absence of such a plan was a key factor that led 

to weaknesses in program management and oversight. A comprehensive plan would have 

provided a foundation for program continuity as military units rotated in and out of Iraq. SIGIR 

believes that such a plan should have clearly articulated USF-I’s specific goals for the program, a 

timeframe for accomplishing its goals, how it would accomplish those goals, how much it would 

cost, what resources would be required, and how it would measure its progress. Instead, what we 

found were elements of plans and programs that changed from one year to the next with no 

explanations for the changes. As a result, the numbers of persons trained and amount of 

equipment distributed became the primary measures of program progress and success. 

Although USF-I should have ensured that academic and local training efforts were coordinated 

to improve overall program effectiveness and efficiency, this was not done. As a result, (1) local 

training conducted by military units did not always support the curriculum taught at the training 

centers or was not well coordinated with training at the centers, (2) police advisors were not 

always effectively monitored and utilized, and (3) police training teams were not always 

effectively organized. Changes were made to correct these problems, but new problems could 

occur under recent organizational changes. 

Program Lacked a Comprehensive Plan with Goals and Objectives 

and Metrics to Measure Progress 

According to individuals associated with the program during the early years, a comprehensive 

plan for the program was not developed. Moreover, SIGIR found no evidence that such a plan 

was ever developed. According to a military official who worked on the program when it first 

began and more recently, the annual changes of commands created significant disconnects as 

each new command had its own agenda. Moreover, the official described the program as six 

one-year programs over six years with no continuity. Another official stated that the reporting 

on program progress tended to change frequently because of personal preferences. Our ability to 

document these changes was adversely impacted by incomplete files and the lack of historical 

knowledge of the program by U.S. military personnel who were in Iraq during our audit. 

Frequent turnover of personnel and poor records management have often been cited by SIGIR in 

past audits as program management weaknesses. 

Early Years of the Program (2003–2005) 

According to a senior police advisor who was associated with the program during its early years, 

there were several unsuccessful attempts to develop a comprehensive plan. Program goals, 

objectives, timelines for numbers of police to be trained, and other program information were 

presented in briefing slides. Similarly, DoD’s program performance measures concentrated on 

outputs (numbers of Iraqis provided training) rather than program outcomes (capabilities of the 

force). The individual stated that outcomes are far more difficult to measure because the desired 

results need to be identified and appropriately assessed to measure progress towards those 
23 

desired results. SIGIR was unable to find documents related to these planning attempts or 

briefing slides. 

Planning Initiatives (2006–2007) 

The Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG-A&T) established 2006 as 

the “Year of the Police.” Briefing slides identified that ITAM was to “provide the Ministry of 

Interior and its forces the capability to establish civil security in Iraq based on Rule of Law and 

respect for human rights,” and three objectives: build ministerial capacity; man, train, and equip 

the civil security force; and develop and institute a professional development system for MOI 

forces. The briefing slides relevant to the police was heavily focused on numbers (e.g., number 

of or percent of forces provided training/to be provided training and equipment; training teams; 

and facilities constructed). Although DCG-A&T’s focus was to be on building a civil security 

capability based on Rule of Law and human rights, there was no discussion of how that would be 

accomplished, what resources would be required, or how DCG-A&T would measure progress. 

DCG-A&T’s 2007 Campaign Action Plan was titled “The Year of Logistics and Leaders.” 

According to the plan, the desired end state was: 

Iraq at peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that respects the 

human rights of all Iraqis. Security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and 

deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists. Conditions set for the Government of Iraq 

(GOI) to transform its ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] to provide for the full spectrum of 

security missions. Iraq politically, economically, and militarily partnered with the 

Coalition in the War on Terror and cooperatively engaged with the U.S. and 

Coalition on security issues in Iraq and the region. 

The 2007 Campaign Action Plan had two “Lines of Operation,” or major efforts, directed at the 

Iraqi Security Forces. The first was “Generate a Capable ISF – and then transition to – Assist the 

ISF with Force Development” and the second was “Develop a Professional ISF.” The Plan’s 

Annex A describes DCG-A&T’s implementation plan and includes six lines of operation for 

ITAM. Under each line are key tasks for 2007. For example, a line of operation for ITAM is to 

“Complete Generation of Capable CSF” [Civil Security Forces]. A key task under that line of 

operation is to “Enable the CSF in enhancing its operational capability.” Lead responsibility for 

this task was to be determined. Another line of operation for ITAM is “Improve National Police 

Capability.” A key task under that line of operation is “Complete basing of the National Police 

in support of Year of the Police Completion.” Lead responsibility for this task was to be 

determined. Although the DCG-A&T’s plan has more specificity than previous documents we 

were able to locate, it still lacked key elements such as how DCG-A&T would accomplish its 

goals, how much it would cost, what resources would be required, and how it would measure its 

progress. 

Planning Shifts to Supporting MOI’s Program (2008–2009) 

USF-I’s Operation Order 08-01 described the “commander’s intent” for the police forces as 

assisting the Iraqi MOI in generating forces to meet immediate requirements while 

simultaneously growing their capacity to generate forces on their own and perform the 

institutional functions necessary to support and operate those forces. The desired end state was 
24 

that MOI would be able to function independently with little or no assistance in the most critical 

aspects of force management, acquisition, training, sustainment, development, resources, and 

leadership. However, USF-I did not include a date when that end state would be achieved. The 

order identified four conditions and supporting program objectives. The conditions that the 

program planned to achieve were: force generation on track, improved capability of the force to 

operate independently, improved institutional performance, and strengthened professionalism 

and reduced sectarian behavior. The objectives were primarily focused on tasks to be 

accomplished by the end of 2008. For some objectives, specific numbers were identified. For 

example, the force generation objectives provided numbers of police to be trained and equipped 

by the end of 2008. Specifically, the goal was for MOI to generate a total police force of 

420,000 and 4,580 new police officers by the end of 2008. For other objectives, the goals were 

unspecified degrees of improved capability. For example, the condition to improve the 

capability of the force to operate independently included an objective to improve the police 

capabilities in border security, ports of entry, forensics, explosive ordinance disposal, and 

intelligence, but it did not include indicators of success. The order continued to lack the 

necessary details of a compressive plan such as how goals would be accomplished, how much it 

would cost, what resources would be required, and how progress would be measured.

USF-I’s Operation Order 09-01 describes the desired end state for the Iraqi police as achieving 

sustainable police primacy with minimal assistance in seven police performance measures: 

leadership, administration, operations, training, investigations, logistics, and facilities. Only two 

of the measures—training and leadership—were the same as those identified in the operation 

order for the previous year. We found no explanation for the change in measures. The order 

identified four conditions and supporting objectives for the police training program. The 

conditions were: ministerial capacity enhanced, force capacity enhanced, force 

professionalization/specialization, and rule of law. Again, we found no explanation for the 

change in conditions from the previous year. Each condition had objectives, effects, and finally 

tasks. We found the objectives, effects, and tasks limited to a single year context rather than an 

overall program plan. 

Plans Change Again in 2010 

USF-I’s Operation Order 10-01 provided the overall guidance for the program starting in 2010. 

The order identified “objectives” rather than “conditions.” The two objectives that affected 

ITAM were focused on internal security and security transition and had four sub-objectives: 

(1) transition of MOI and police training and advising mission to INL to be completed no later 

than October 2011, (2) set the conditions for police primacy, (3) facilitate the development of 

self‐reliant ministries with enduring systems and leadership that enable the programming, 

budgeting, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining of security forces, and (4) police forces 

trained, manned, and equipped to maintain internal security with Iraqi Army reinforcement as 

necessary. In early 2010, ITAM developed tasks to accomplish each of the sub-objectives. 

Poor Communications and Coordination Resulted in Inefficiencies 

Because academic training assistance was ITAM’s responsibility and local training assistance 

was the responsibility of military teams, communications and coordination among the 

organizations was key to program unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness. However, the 

efforts were not well coordinated, resulting in police training teams that were not always 
25 

effectively organized, academic training and local training that was not well-coordinated, and 

police advisors that were not always fully utilized. Changes have been made over time to correct 

these problems. However, new organizational changes and organizational responsibilities have 

recently occurred that reinforce the need for good communications and coordination among 

organizations.

Police Training Teams Were Not Always Effectively Organized 

According to ITAM officials, there was no standard structure for the ITAM-led teams working 

with the training centers and colleges. In some instances, the teams consisted only of police 

advisors. This was possible when the facilities were collocated with the advisors’ home units or 

in low-threat environments, such as the Kurdish region, where protection was not required. 

Otherwise, advisors would be accompanied by a military escort. The advisors working with 

training centers and colleges reported directly to ITAM personnel. 

At the local level, police advisors worked on police training teams led by military personnel. 

During most of our fieldwork, the military team members were from the 49th Military Police 

(MP) Brigade. The teams were embedded with U.S. combat units and relied on those units for 

their protection. The police training teams were responsible for reinforcing police skills by 

accompanying the Iraqi police during operations and by assisting and advising the local police 

and provincial chiefs of police. 

According to senior leaders with the 49th MP Brigade, the unit was in Iraq in the 2005/2006 

period and returned in 2009. During its tours in Iraq, the Brigade was responsible for managing 

the police training teams in most provinces. When the Brigade left Iraq in 2006, military 

commands in the field were made responsible for staffing the police training teams with military 

members and managing the teams operating in their areas of responsibility. According to a 49th

MP Brigade senior leader, the composition of the police training teams suffered during the 

period the Brigade was not in Iraq and responsibility for police training was dispersed to military 

commands in the field. The Brigade senior leader stated that some field commanders did not 

view the police training mission as a priority or really understand the roles of the police advisors. 

Although the military field commanders sometimes had MPs that could have been assigned to 

the police training teams, the commanders assigned them to other priority missions and assigned 

personnel with no policing experience, such as infantry or artillery specialists, to the police 

training teams. We were told this created a chaotic environment for the affected teams. 

In July 2010, the 49th MP Brigade left Iraq, and the police training teams were converted to 

stability transition teams (STT). The STTs will be assigned to Advise and Assist Brigades. The 

STTs were to continue to comprise police advisors and members of military units deploying to 

Iraq; however, the military members would not be from one unit, such as the 49th MP Brigade. 

In addition, the advisors assigned to work at the training centers and colleges were incorporated 

into the Advise and Assist Brigades. According to ITAM officials, all advisors will be tracked 

by ITAM, but local military commanders will have responsibility for overseeing the advisors and 

providing them with transportation and protection. 

Because of the recent organizational changes and prior problems with the management and 

oversight of police advisors, we requested from ITAM copies of instructions and guidance issued 
26 

to Advise and Assist Brigades on the utilization of advisors. ITAM did not provide the requested 

documents. 

Academic Training and Local Training Were Not Well Coordinated 

Because ITAM was responsible for providing policing advice at academic training centers, and 

military units were responsible for providing advice and assistance at the local level, effective 

coordination and communications were essential to ensure local mentoring was aligned with 

classroom training. According to police trainers, local police advisors and academic advisors 

can enhance training quality through effective coordination and communications. For example, 

when police training team advisors at the local police stations inform the police advisors at the 

training centers about deficiencies in academic training, the centers can make changes to 

improve their academic programs. We were told by representatives of the 49th MP Brigade that 

no formal feedback communication mechanisms existed but there were informal 

communications between advisors. Police training advisors we spoke with indicated that 

communications were informal or did not occur. 

We found the resulting lack of communication and coordination impaired the delivery of 

feedback on performance and requirements from the street to the training centers and impaired 

the execution of a consistent mentoring process. Poor communications sometimes led to local 

training that was not supportive of MOI training center curriculum. For example, some police 

training teams provided ad hoc police training at the local police stations. Such training could be 

on any topic requested by the local chiefs of police but might not be formalized in the MOI 

curriculum. Therefore, even though police training teams provided certificates of completion, 

MOI would not approve the training, and the recruits received no recognition for their efforts. 

Officials with ITAM and the 49th MP Brigade became aware of the coordination challenges and 

took action in 2009. We were told that the unit made an effort to check the MOI curriculum 

prior to conducting any field training. If the requested training was not part of the approved 

curriculum, the local chief of police was given the option to approve the non-certificate training. 

Also, in April 2010, a conference was held to coordinate and plan the way ahead for the training 

program in the context of the U.S. military drawdown. Police advisors and representatives of 

ITAM and U.S. military units from all over Iraq participated in the conference.17 The conference 

provided a chance for ITAM leadership to engage U.S. military units who are responsible for 

supporting training throughout Iraq. 

Police Advisors in Police Training Teams Were Not Always Fully Utilized 

According to senior leaders with the 49th MP Brigade, upon the Brigade’s return in September 

2009, the Brigade personnel found that neither ITAM nor USF-I knew where the police advisors 

were located nor what they were doing. For example, a senior Brigade leader noted there were 

12 police advisors in the Dhi-Qar province that neither ITAM nor USF-I knew were there. 

Another Brigade senior leader stated that he learned that a police advisor had been assigned to 

his headquarters three months earlier even though he had not seen the individual during that 

time. According to the senior leader, the advisor told him he had been working in his trailer 

 

17 SIGIR representatives attended the conference. 
27 

when in reality he had not been assigned to any job. One senior Brigade leader attributed this 

loss of control to a lack of coordination among USF-I, ITAM, INL, and DynCorp. 

To improve its accountability of police advisors assigned to the Brigade, the Brigade initiated 

daily tracking reports in March 2010. The tracking reports are compiled by a DynCorp 

employee from daily activity reports submitted by police advisors. According to a Brigade 

senior leader, DynCorp had required police advisors to prepare daily activity reports, but the 

reports were previously not available to military units because DynCorp considered them 

proprietary. The Brigade discussed the matter with DynCorp officials who agreed to provide the 

Brigade with detailed information from the activity reports such as employee name, assigned 

location, current location, military contact, days engaged with Iraqis, and reasons if not engaged. 

To help ensure that the information submitted on the activity reports is accurate, the Brigade also 

required that the police training teams’ military leaders sign the reports. 

The tracking report process should help identify the magnitude of another problem raised by 

Brigade senior leaders and others with whom we spoke: that in some instances police advisors 

could not travel to perform their missions. According to senior leaders with the 49th MP 

Brigade, U.S. military commanders responsible for the forward operating locations where police 

training teams were assigned decided whether those teams could perform their missions. We 

were told of instances where the commanders diverted maneuver units to other priorities rather 

than providing security and support to the police training teams. Without maneuver units, the 

teams could not travel to their assigned stations/districts/provinces. For example, a police 

advisor we spoke with in Kirkuk stated that his training team could not perform their mission 

when the U.S. military brigades were focused on supporting the Iraqi national election in March 

2010. The advisor stated the lack of movement impaired the police training’s progress in the 

area. It also prevented the advisors from doing their jobs. However, because of the weaknesses 

in the processes for tracking police advisor activities, it is uncertain to what extent this occurred 

over time or to what extent training funds may have been wasted. 

Copies of the tracking reports were to be submitted to both ITAM and to the Brigade prior to the 

Brigade’s departure from Iraq in July 2010. ITAM, which is responsible for tracking all police 

advisors, is to continue to receive the tracking reports. DynCorp is to continue to maintain the 

daily activity reports, but we were told by a Brigade senior leader that copies of reports can be 

requested, if needed.
28 

Program in Transition from DoD to DoS in Planning 

Phase 

ITAM plans to transfer the police training assistance program to INL on October 1, 2011. In 

preparation for that transfer and in coordination with USF-I’s drawdown, ITAM plans to reduce 

the number and locations of police advisors over time and concentrate its assistance on helping 

the Iraqi police develop managerial, administrative, and specialized policing skills. By October 

2011, INL plans to be operational from three locations and to concentrate its assistance at 

training academies and provincial headquarters levels. Although INL is planning for a 

downsized assistance program, its total requested start-up and operational costs are about 

$812 million for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 combined.18 A large part of that cost will be for 

security and logistics support.

Transition Planning Underway by DoD and DoS 

ITAM and INL representatives brief the USF-I Commanding General monthly on the October 1, 

2011, transition status. The briefings identify various transition tasks with associated risks and 

planned action. Both organizations expressed satisfaction with the coordination process. To 

improve coordination, INL has added two INL directors to ITAM’s police training headquarters 

and ITAM has added a military planning officer at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. 

During the period leading up to the transfer, DoD plans to draw down its more extensive 

program to meet INL’s planned program level. At the time we completed our field work in July 

2010, USF-I was consolidating its police advisors into STTs. By September 2010, it planned to 

have all STTs consolidated at six regional training centers supported by Advise and Assist 

Brigades. According to an ITAM official, the Advise and Assist Brigades will have day-to-day 

operational authority over the police advisors but ITAM will be providing overall guidance and 

will monitor their location and utilization. ITAM, in conjunction with the U.S. military 

divisions, is to determine the specialized skills required of police advisors and how many 

advisors each brigade will need to complete its mission. 

An ITAM official stated that each Advise and Assist Brigade will have a military police unit. 

The brigades will be responsible for providing the police advisors with protection, movement, 

and logistical support. That organizational structure is to transition again from the six regional 

centers to three locations in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil by October 1, 2011. At the transition, 

INL will be responsible for providing protection, transportation, and logistical support. At this 

point, INL plans to use DoS-contracted security and logistics personnel. 

INL has developed a hub-and-spoke concept of operation. Police advisors are to be located at 

the three central (hub) locations and would travel out to provinces and Iraqi training academies 

(spoke sites) from the hubs. Training and assistance is to include higher-order training such as 

forensics, investigative skills, use of information technology in policing, and program 

 

18 According to an INL official, the fiscal year 2011 estimate is only for the 4th quarter, July 1 through September 

30, 1011. 
29 

management. The hub-and-spoke concept is designed to allow INL to scope the size of the 

program up or down depending on available funds and Iraqi needs. 

By October 2011, INL plans to have about 200 police advisors distributed among the hub 

locations, a reduction of 150 advisors from INL’s original plan of 350 advisors. According to an 

INL official, the reduction in advisors is due to budget constraints. The INL plan would 

represent a substantial reduction in advisors from 2009 when there were about 500 advisors 

distributed among multiple locations. 

INL has outlined specific criteria for the selection of police advisors, and INL will continue to 

shift the training focus away from basic training to advanced training in various specialties and 

to personnel management. In addition, INL will move from training at the local station level to 

advising and institution-building at the provincial and national levels. Consistent with this 

strategy, INL will not renew the contracts of some police advisors. According to an INL official, 

INL plans to retain advisors that can provide the training envisioned and that have established 

good rapport with the Iraqis. It plans to supplement those advisors with new hires who have the 

requisite experience and subject-matter expertise. 

According to an INL official, it is working to develop metrics to assess the output and outcomes 

of its training assistance program. According to the same official, DoD’s focus has been on 

measuring outputs. Moreover, INL developed its plan to best facilitate the transfer of full 

responsibility of the police development mission to the Iraqi government over a 3- to 5-year 

period. Program length will be determined by available funds and the progress of MOI police 

forces. 

USF-I and INL have identified resource requirements for the transition and submitted budgets 

for congressional approval. INL estimated it would require about $517 million for fiscal year 

2010 and $294 million for the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2011 for startup and operation costs 

relating to the transition of the police program. These funds are to cover the necessary base 

camp and aviation facility upgrades, security infrastructure, the procurement of aircraft for 

transportation between program hubs and field locations, and initial funding for the recruitment 

and training of key personnel, including security, contract management, and oversight personnel. 

As part of the supplemental appropriation request, INL requested $517.4 million for startup costs 

for fiscal year 2010 and $294 for operational costs for fiscal year 2011. It received $450 million 

or $67.4 million less than requested for fiscal year 2010 and $200 million or $94 million less 

than requested for fiscal year 2011.19 According to an INL official, INL is adjusting its plans 

based on the congressional reduction. The official stated that the reduction for fiscal year 2010 

will likely result in INL purchasing fewer helicopters to transport advisors to the spoke locations. 

INL expects other countries and international organizations to continue to provide various levels 

of international police assistance, including assistance from the United Kingdom, France, 

Denmark, Italy, the European Commission, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, and 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

 

19 Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2010, Public Law 111-212, 7/29/2010. 
30 

Issues Facing the Government of Iraq 

Based on comments by U.S. military personnel and senior MOI officials, issues such as 

corruption, infiltration by ex-militia members, and “ghost” employees continue to impact the 

capability and effectiveness of the Iraqi police forces. The extent of these problems is unknown 

but represents issues that U.S. and GOI officials must address as they continue to engage in 

discussions concerning police force development. Additionally, the ultimate success of the Iraqi 

police training program is also very dependent on the GOI’s sustainment of existing forces, 

capabilities, and infrastructure. We identified issues that could adversely impact those 

sustainment efforts, if not addressed. Those issues pertain to an MOI hiring freeze, land 

ownership conflicts between MOI and the Ministry of Defense, and uneven support from 

provincial police chiefs. 

Force Structure and Corruption Issues Remain 

According to U.S. military officials and MOI police training leadership, there are significant 

force structure and corruption issues facing the police force and the police training program, 

despite efforts to limit them. These issues involve ex-militia members within the police force, 

“ghost” employees, and bribes. The extent of these problems is unknown. 

Some Ex-militia Members in the Police Force 

Three senior MOI officials expressed concern about the high number of ex-militia members 

employed by the police. One official indicated as many as 3,760 police officers are ex-militia 

members who are more loyal to the militias than to their police chain of command. The officials 

also noted that the ex-militia officers are placed in high positions in the police when they are not 

qualified, resulting in poor management. The official further added that high ranking GOI 

officials directed the MOI to integrate the ex-militia members into the police force. U.S. military 

officials are aware of this issue and have contacted MOI officials to express their concerns. 

Salary Sharing and Ghost Employees in the Iraqi Police Services 

A senior MOI official acknowledged that some Iraqis receive pay despite not reporting for work. 

This is allowed to occur by supervisors who demand payment from the absent employees and is 

known as “salary sharing.” The absent employee can then work at a second job to supplement 

his MOI salary. An MOI official stated that the MOI cannot resolve this problem since 

technically the person is on the payroll, and there is no way to find out how much of his salary he 

is sharing with his supervisor. 

Another official commented on instances where police officers are hired by MOI and receive a 

salary but are told they do not need to report to work. He told SIGIR that his colleague was 

recently hired at the Facilities Protection Services at MOI and was assigned four bodyguards. 

When he reported to work and inquired about his assignment, his superior told him he would get 

paid but did not have to report to work. The official emphasized there is extensive waste and 

abuse at the Ministerial level. 
31 

Another major issue at MOI and certain police centers, provinces, and directorates has been nonexistent or “ghost” police on their force and the salaries they collect. An MOI official indicated 

that the problem mainly occurs in the Federal Police and Border Police directorates and is 

primarily attributable to their large size and semi-independent nature. The MOI Inspector 

General stated that his office is working to rectify this problem by requiring that every employee 

get a finger stamped to validate receipt of salary. The Inspector General stated that last year his 

office recovered almost $17 million in “ghost” employee salaries. 

The March 2010 DoD report to Congress20 also referred to the MOI Inspector General’s effort in 

combating this issue. The report stated, "The MoI conducted a comprehensive audit process in 

2009 to validate employee rolls and to identify and remove ‘ghost’ employees from its personnel 

system. Additional audits at the provincial level continue to identify deserters, no-shows, and 

additional inefficiencies within the personnel reporting system." 

Some Police Demand Bribes 

Representatives of the U.S. Central Command stated that bribery occurs within the Iraqi police 

despite efforts to eliminate this practice. Senior Iraqi officials stated bribery is common and that 

there is corruption at all levels. In a June 2009 letter to the Washington Post21, Minister of the 

Interior Bolani defended his ministry’s actions to combat bribery and wrote, “My ministry alone 

has fired more than 60,000 employees on corruption charges and concerns. This month we 

announced that more than 40 police officers would face charges after an investigation into prison 

abuse found that inmates had been incarcerated without warrants and the rights of other inmates 

had been violated.” 

In an interview with the BBC in September 2009, General Odierno, the commander of U.S. 

troops in Iraq is reported to have said, “The endemic corruption within the Iraqi system—not 

only the security forces, but the system—is still probably the biggest problem facing Iraq.” 

Sustainment Issues Need To Be Addressed 

The success of the Iraqi police training program is also dependent on GOI sustainment. We 

identified three issues that could impact that sustainment: an MOI hiring freeze, land ownership 

conflicts between MOI and the Ministry of Defense, and uneven support from provincial police 

chiefs. 

MOI Hiring Freeze Limits Replacement of Personnel 

MOI is currently enforcing a hiring freeze to address budget concerns. The freeze will likely 

remain in place until Iraq forms a new government resulting from the March national election. 

The hiring freeze limits MOI’s ability to replace police officers who leave the program. In 

addition, assassins continue to target Iraqi police and the death toll is heavy. A senior Iraqi 

official at the Training and Qualification Institute stated that some of the explosive ordinance 

disposal specialists have been lost due to targeted attacks against them. ITAM and MOI reported 

that between March 2009 and March 2010 there have been 12,726 policemen killed and 10,573 

deserters. Police advisors emphasize the importance of hiring Iraqi officers in key management 

 

20 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, DoD Report to Congress, 3/2010. 21 Interior Minister Bolani: Mission Not Yet Accomplished in Iraq, Washington Post, 6/30/2009. 
32 

positions with specific skills and qualification. However, given the freeze, MOI is required to 

promote from within the police force which can lead to less qualified personnel in key 

management positions. 

Ministry of Defense Holds Deeds to Land Supporting Police Training Centers 

ITAM and Iraqi police officials stated some police training centers are located on land owned or 

controlled primarily by the Ministry of Defense.22 As a result, MOI is reluctant to invest funds 

to improve infrastructure, including new construction and improvements to water and electrical 

utilities, fearing the Ministry of Defense may reclaim the facilities in the future for its own use. 

Senior Iraqi officials and DynCorp advisors at police training centers in Kirkuk and Basrah 

stated the land ownership issue adversely impacts the growth and sustainment of the program, 

although training continues. The Dean of the Kirkuk Training Center stated his facility will 

continue to persevere and train under adverse conditions, but he expressed frustration stating that 

the situation could be resolved by a mere transfer of ownership, something his office has been 

trying to obtain for two years. 

Senior U.S. police training officials stated they are aware of this issue and that part of the 

problem is the historic tension between the Ministry of Defense and MOI in providing internal 

security. Over time, the role of the Iraqi police has expanded, and the quality of the police has 

improved. However, the Ministry of Defense has been reluctant to surrender primacy over 

internal security as evidenced by the land conflicts. 

Uneven Support by Provincial Police Chiefs 

A senior police advisor in Basrah stated a major impediment to the success of the police training 

program is that MOI provides funds to the provincial police chiefs who allocate the resources. 

While this approach supports decentralization of management, the police advisor stated that if a 

particular chief does not support police training in the province, the training center and the 

program will suffer from the lack of necessary funds. Conversely, in the Kurdish region, the 

Kurdistan MOI funds the Kurdistan police colleges directly, allowing each school to operate with 

its own budget. According to the police advisor, the predictable funding stream to the Kurdish 

police colleges and training centers allows the schools to operate much more efficiently. 

U.S. military officials and police trainers stated cultural issues exacerbate this problem. 

According to police trainers, Iraqi leaders at training centers will often tell them of items they 

need from the provincial chief, but will refuse to make those requests to the chief because in Iraq 

such requests are considered a sign of weakness and an indication that the training center dean 

has failed because he cannot make do with what he has. 

 

22 In 2008, SIGIR reported on a similar issue concerning MOI’s difficulties in securing deeds to properties where the 

U.S. government planned to construct police stations: Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraqi Security 

Forces Infrastructure Development, but Substantial U.S. Support Remains, SIGIR 08-022, 7/26/2008.
33 

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned 

Conclusions 

Since 2003, the United States has spent about $7.3 billion on a program to help the GOI train, 

staff, and equip Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order and deny terrorists a safe haven in 

Iraq. The program was unprecedented in its magnitude and conducted in a hostile environment 

with ongoing combat operations. In addition, the existing Iraqi police forces in 2003 were in 

very poor condition, and a new Iraqi government was in development. Despite these 

impediments, DoD reports that over 400,000 Iraqi police have received training and are on the 

force. However, the capabilities of these forces are unknown because no assessments of total 

force capabilities were made. 

There were weaknesses in program management in (1) program planning and assessments, 

(2) communications and coordination between organizations performing the training, and 

(3) oversight of contract police advisors. The impact of these weaknesses on the program is 

difficult to quantify but undoubtedly led to inefficiencies and waste. For example, there was no 

comprehensive plan to guide the program to desired results or assessments to determine if the 

program was on track. Because of the frequent rotations by military personnel, a comprehensive 

plan would have provided a foundation for program continuity as military units rotated in and 

out of Iraq. Also, police advisors, who were critical to the training program, were not always 

effectively monitored and utilized. 

DoD is in the process of establishing STTs to advise and assist MOI and its forces over the next 

year. The STTs will be responsible for day-to-day management of the police advisors while 

ITAM will be responsible for tracking them. This split in responsibilities was not well 

coordinated in the past and needs to be effectively managed in the future. Moreover, since 

DynCorp will be self reporting on the utilization of police advisors, these reports need 

monitoring to check the validity of the information and to ensure police advisors are productively 

employed. 

A significant challenge ahead will be effectively and efficiently transitioning the police training 

assistance program from DoD to DoS in 2011. To their credit, the two Departments are working 

collaboratively on the transfer. However, DoS will be assuming responsibility for the program to 

advise and assist the police forces when the capabilities of those forces have not been assessed in 

any comprehensive way. 

The long-term success of the Iraqi police training program is dependent on sustainment by the 

GOI and its ability to mitigate force structure, corruption, land ownership disputes, and other 

issues adversely impacting the force. DoD and DoS need to continue to work with GOI officials 

to help them address these problems. 

Recommendations 

Because DoS is to assume responsibility for the Iraqi police training program, and a 

comprehensive assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi forces should be a key input for that 
34 

continuing effort, SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq in 

consultation with the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, take the following action: 

1. Work with the Ministry of Interior to help assess the capabilities of the Iraqi police forces 

and provide that assessment to INL. 

Because DoD will continue to manage the program for the next year under a new management 

structure for police advisors, and because of prior problems with the management and oversight 

of advisors, SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq direct the Iraq 

Training and Advisory Mission to take the following actions: 

2. Provide guidance to the STTs on their roles and responsibilities regarding police advisors. 

3. Develop and implement procedures to periodically check the validity of the information 

received from DynCorp by comparing daily activity reports to summary information from 

those reports. 

4. Monitor the activity reports to ensure that police advisors are productively employed and, if 

advisors are underemployed, seek corrective actions. 

Lessons Learned 

DoD’s experiences in the Iraqi police training program provide invaluable lessons learned that 

should be captured and applied in other contingencies, such as Afghanistan. Specifically, it 

needs to consider the adequacy of (1) its planning for and assessments of the training program, 

(2) guidance to organizations implementing the program, and (3) management and oversight of 

police advisors. 

 
35 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

USF-I and the Department of the Army Office of the Provost Marshal General provided SIGIR 

with written comments. Both concurred with SIGIR’s recommendations. In addition, USF-I and 

INL provided technical comments that SIGIR addressed where appropriate. 
36 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In September 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated 

Project 9028 to assess the program to train Iraq’s police forces. This report examines the police 

training program outcomes, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) management and oversight of 

the program, status of the program’s transfer from DoD to the Department of State (DoS), and 

issues facing the Government of Iraq (GOI) that impact the capability and effectiveness of the 

police forces. SIGIR performed this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as 

amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the 

Inspector General Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work from September 2009 through August 

2010 in Baghdad and other locations in Iraq and the Washington, D.C. area. 

Our audit was adversely impacted by incomplete files and the lack of historical knowledge of the 

program by U.S. military personnel. Frequent turnover of personnel and poor records 

management have often been cited by SIGIR in past audits as program management weaknesses. 

To determine the outcomes of the police training program, SIGIR requested from military 

organizations in Iraq evidence of program outcomes. We obtained briefing slides and other 

documents which showed such information as numbers and types of police trained and number 

and type of training facilities. We interviewed program officials at the Iraq Training and 

Advisory Mission (ITAM), the 49th Military Police Brigade, and Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). We also interviewed officials with DynCorp and 

the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). We visited training centers and colleges in Baghdad, 

Basrah, and Kirkuk. At the centers, we observed classroom instructions, training exercises, 

exams, graduations, and assembly formations. We interviewed police training team members, 

including U.S. Military Police and police advisors. We interviewed Iraqis at the training centers, 

provincial headquarters, and police stations. 

To evaluate DoD’s management and oversight of the program, SIGIR requested from U.S. 

Central Command and military organizations in Iraq the information they had on plans relating 

to the police training program. We interviewed ITAM and 49th Military Police Brigade officials 

to discuss available planning documents. We reviewed available documentation of plans and 

assessments that were used throughout the history of the program. We also attended the police 

training team conference on April 1 and 2, 2010. 

To determine coordination and communication among program management elements, SIGIR 

requested copies of instructions and guidance issued to performing organizations. We reviewed 

documents provided to organizations and individuals participating in the program. We also 

interviewed ITAM and 49th Military Police Brigade officials to discuss roles, responsibilities, 

and coordination between the organizations. We also discussed actions to correct problems with 

coordination and communications. 
37 

To determine program transition status, we discussed with ITAM and INL officials efforts 

underway to plan for the transfer from DoD to DoS. We obtained and analyzed documents 

describing those efforts. 

In performing our work, we were told of issues facing the Government of Iraq. We reviewed 

available reports concerning those issues. 

We conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

The computer processed data we obtained was not critical to our findings, conclusions, or 

recommendations. Therefore, we did not test the accuracy of the data because it was used for 

background purposes only. 

Internal Controls 

We reviewed the specific controls used by DoD organizations to manage the program. The 

report identifies weaknesses in those controls. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office, 

Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors’ Office of Inspector General, and 

Department of Defense’s Office of the Inspector General. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support 

of the Iraqi Police Training Program, SIGIR 10-008, 1/25/2010. 

The U.S. Has Reduced Its Funding for the Iraqi Security Forces, but Continued Support Will 

Likely Be Necessary, SIGIR 09-012, 1/26/2009. 

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue, 

SIGIR 09-002, 10/21/2008.

Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraqi Security Forces Infrastructure Development, but 

Substantial U.S. Support Remains, SIGIR 08-022, 7/26/2008. 

Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense 

Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, SIGIR 08-015, 4/25/2008. 

Progress on Recommended Improvements to Contract Administration for the Iraqi Police 

Training Program, SIGIR 08-014, 4/22/2008.
38 

Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police 

Training Program, SIGIR 07-016, 10/23/2007. 

Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 

0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support, SIGIR 06-029, 1/30/2007. 

Government Accountability Office 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not 

Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed, GAO-08-143R, 11/30/2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issue for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-

308SP, 1/2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T, 9/11/2006. 

U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector 

General and U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General 

Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72 

and Department of Defense Report No. IE-2005-002, 7/15/2005. 
39 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

DCG-A&T Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GOI Government of Iraq 

ICITAP International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program 

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

ITAM Iraq Training and Advisory Mission 

MOI Ministry of Interior 

MP Military Police 

PSMR Police Station Monthly Reports 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

STT Stability Transition Team 

USF-I U.S. Forces-Iraq 
40 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Meredith P. Baumeister 

Michael A. Bianco 

Art Granger 

W. Dan Haigler, Jr. 

Nancee K. Needham 

Robert L. Pelletier 

Nadia Shamari 

William E. Shimp 
41 

Appendix D—Management Comments 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html

 Phone: 703-602-4063

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil