POLAR WEATHER 

SATELLITES

NOAA Identified Ways 

to Mitigate Data Gaps, 

but Contingency Plans 

and Schedules Require 

Further Attention

Report to the Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, House of 

Representatives

September 2013

GAO-13-676

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-676, a report to the

Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, House of Representatives

September 2013

POLAR WEATHER SATELLITES

NOAA Identified Ways to Mitigate Data Gaps, but 

Contingency Plans and Schedules Require Further 

Attention 

Why GAO Did This Study

NOAA established the JPSS program

in 2010 to replace aging polar satellites 

and provide critical environmental data 

used in forecasting weather and 

measuring variations in climate. 

However, program officials anticipate a 

gap in satellite data between the time 

that the S-NPP satellite reaches the 

end of its life and the JPSS-1 satellite 

becomes operational (see graphic). 

Given the criticality of satellite data to 

weather forecasts, the likelihood of a 

significant satellite data gap, and the 

potential impact of a gap on the health 

and safety of the U.S. population and 

economy, GAO added this issue to its

High Risk List in 2013.

GAO was asked to review the JPSS 

program because of the importance of 

polar satellite data. GAO’s objectives 

were to (1) evaluate NOAA's progress 

in sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s 

polar-orbiting satellite system through 

S-NPP and JPSS satellites; (2) 

evaluate the quality of NOAA's 

program schedule; and (3) assess 

NOAA’s plans to address potential 

gaps in polar satellite data. To do so, 

GAO analyzed program management

status reports, milestone reviews, and 

schedule data; examined polar gap 

contingency plans; and interviewed 

agency and contractor officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending NOAA develop 

a mechanism to track the usage of its 

satellite products, establish a complete

integrated master schedule, address 

weaknesses in component schedules, 

and address shortfalls in polar satellite 

gap contingency plans. NOAA 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations and identified steps 

it is taking to implement them.

What GAO Found

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has made

noteworthy progress on the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program by 

delivering data from its first satellite—the Suomi National Polar-orbiting 

Partnership (S-NPP)—to weather forecasters, completing significant instrument 

development for the next satellite (called JPSS-1), and reducing the program’s 

life cycle cost estimate from $12.9 billion to $11.3 billion by refocusing on 

weather products. However, key challenges remain. Specifically, S-NPP has not 

yet achieved full operational capability because the program is behind schedule 

in validating the readiness of satellite products. Also, the program does not track

whether key users are using its products or if the products meet the users’ 

needs. In addition, issues with the JPSS ground system schedules have delayed 

the delivery of key system capabilities. Until the program addresses these 

challenges, it may continue to experience delays in delivering actionable S-NPP 

data to system users and in meeting JPSS-1 development schedules.

A program’s success depends in part on having an integrated master schedule 

that defines when and how long work will occur and how activities are related to 

each other; however, the JPSS program office does not yet have a complete 

integrated master schedule and weaknesses exist in component schedules. 

Specifically, the program established an integrated master schedule in June 

2013 and is reporting a 70 percent confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date. 

However, about one-third of the program schedule is missing information needed 

to establish the sequence in which activities occur. In addition, selected 

component schedules supporting the JPSS-1 satellite have weaknesses 

including schedule constraints that have not been justified. Until the program 

completes its integrated schedule and addresses weaknesses in component 

schedules, it will lack the information needed to effectively monitor development 

progress and have less assurance of meeting the planned JPSS-1 launch date. 

While NOAA developed a mitigation plan to address a potential 14 to 18 month 

gap in afternoon polar satellite data in October 2012 and subsequently identified

additional alternatives for addressing potential gaps, it has not yet established a 

comprehensive contingency plan. Specifically, NOAA has not yet revised its 

mitigation plan to include the new alternatives, and the plan lacks several key 

elements, such as triggers for when to take key actions and detailed procedures 

for implementing them. Until NOAA establishes a comprehensive plan, it may not 

be sufficiently prepared to mitigate anticipated gaps in polar satellite coverage.

Figure: Timeline for a Potential Gap in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon Orbit

View GAO-13-676. For more information, 

contact Dave Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Letter 1

Background 3

NOAA Has Made Progress on JPSS Development, but Continues to 

Face Challenges in Completing S-NPP Products, Revising the 

Program’s Scope, and Meeting Schedules 15

JPSS Schedules Demonstrate Multiple Best Scheduling Practices, 

but Integration Problems and Other Weaknesses Reduce 

Confidence in the JPSS-1 Launch Date 25

NOAA Has Analyzed Alternatives for Addressing Gaps in Satellite 

Data, but Lacks a Comprehensive Contingency Plan 34

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40

Agency Comments 40

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 42

Appendix II NOAA Plans to Transfer Selected JPSS Program Components to 

the Polar Free Flyer Program 45

Appendix III Assessment of JPSS Component Schedules Implementation of 

Best Practices in Scheduling 46

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Commerce 52

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 55

Tables

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002 7

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and JPSS, at Different Points in 

Time 11

Table 3: Estimated Completion Dates for S-NPP Products, as of 

July 2013 18

Table 4: JPSS Projects and Components 20

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 5: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting 

the JPSS-1 Satellite, as of July 2013 21

Table 6: Reported Cost Reductions Associated with JPSS Changes 24

Table 7: The Four Characteristics and Ten Best Practices of a HighQuality and Reliable Schedule 27

Table 8: Assessment of JPSS-1 Component Schedule Quality 29

Table 9: Summary of NOAA’s Polar Satellite Gap Mitigation Plan 35

Table 10: Guidelines for Developing a Sound Contingency Plan 37

Table 11: Assessment of NOAA’s Gap Mitigation Plan for its Polar 

Environmental Satellites 38

Table 12: Detailed Assessment of Ground System Schedule Quality 46

Table 13: Detailed Assessment of Spacecraft Schedule Quality 48

Table 14: Detailed Assessment of VIIRS Schedule Quality 50

Figures

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites 4

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing 5

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products 6

Figure 4: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon 

Orbit 14
Page iii GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Abbreviations

A-DCS Advanced Data Collection System 

ATMS Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder

CERES Cloud and Earth’s Radiant Energy System

CrIS Cross-Track Infrared Sounder

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DOD Department of Defense

IDPS Interface Data Processing Segment

JCL Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level

JPSS Joint Polar Satellite System

MetOp Meteorological Operational (satellite)

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NESDIS National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information 

Service

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System

S-NPP Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership 

OMPS Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite

POES Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites

TSIS Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor

VIIRS Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 11, 2013

The Honorable Lamar Smith

Chairman

The Honorable Ralph Hall

Chairman Emeritus

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

Ranking Member

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environmentmonitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-orbiting 

environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the Department of 

Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the program was 

considered critical to the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data 

required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through 

the year 2026.

However, in the 8 years after the development contract was awarded in 

2002, the NPOESS cost estimate had more than doubled—to about $15 

billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant 

functionality had been removed from the program, and the program’s triagency management structure had proven to be ineffective. Importantly, 

delays in launching the satellites put the program’s mission at risk. To 

address these challenges, a task force led by the White House’s Office of 

Science and Technology Policy reviewed the management and 

governance of the NPOESS program. In February 2010, the Director of 

the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced a decision to 

disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, have NOAA and DOD 

undertake separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for satellites in 

the afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites in the early morning 

orbit. After that decision, NOAA began developing plans for the Joint 

Polar Satellite System (JPSS). In October 2011, the JPSS program 

successfully launched the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership 

(S-NPP) demonstration satellite, the first in a series of satellites to be 

launched as part of NOAA’s JPSS program.
Page 2 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Given your interest in the progress NOAA has made on the JPSS 

program, our objectives were to (1) evaluate NOAA's progress in meeting 

program objectives of sustaining the continuity of the polar-orbiting 

satellite system through the S-NPP and JPSS satellites, (2) evaluate the 

quality of the JPSS program schedule, and (3) assess NOAA’s plans to 

address potential gaps in polar satellite data.

To evaluate NOAA's progress in meeting its program objectives, we 

analyzed plans and reports on the satellites’ system development efforts 

and on the maturity of S-NPP products. We compared current 

requirements to prior iterations to assess how recent changes in 

capabilities have impacted program goals and objectives. We also 

interviewed JPSS program officials to discuss S-NPP product 

development, JPSS system development, and changes in requirements 

for JPSS satellites. To evaluate the quality of NOAA's program schedule, 

we used an exposure draft of GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide1 to 

assess component contractor schedules as well as the program’s 

schedule risk analysis and interviewed cognizant JPSS program office 

and contractor officials. To assess NOAA’s plans to address potential

gaps in polar satellite data, we compared NOAA’s gap mitigation plan and 

contracted alternatives study against risk mitigation and contingency best 

practices from GAO and advocated by leading organizations,2 determined 

planning shortfalls and key remaining activities for NOAA to accomplish, 

and interviewed NOAA headquarters and JPSS program officials about 

their plans.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 through 

September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Additional details on our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided 

in appendix I.

 1 GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO-12-120G

(exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).

2 See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning, 

GAO/AIMD-10.1.19 (Washington, D.C.: August 1998); National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, NIST 800-34

(May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 1.3

(Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010).
Page 3 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate 

operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is 

managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.3 These satellites obtain 

environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather 

images and specialized weather products. These satellite data are also 

the predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which are 

a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including 

forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products 

and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so 

that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and

mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor 

environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought 

conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a variety 

of studies such as climate monitoring.

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to 

the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost 

north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the 

weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the 

earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface 

twice a day. Currently, there is one operational POES satellite and two 

operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they cross the 

equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In 

addition, the government relies on a European satellite, called the 

Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite, for satellite observations in 

the midmorning orbit.4 In addition to the operational satellites, NOAA, the 

Air Force, and a European weather satellite organization maintain older 

satellites that still collect some data and are available to provide limited 

backup to the operational satellites should they degrade or fail. The last 

POES satellite was launched in February 2009. The Air Force plans to 

 3 NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP satellites after they 

are in orbit.

4 The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites’ MetOp 

program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. 

MetOp satellites are planned to be flown sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 

satellites was launched in 2006, the second was launched in 2012, and the final satellite in 

the series is expected to launch in 2017.

Background
Page 4 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

launch its two remaining DMSP satellites as needed. Figure 1 illustrates 

the current operational polar satellite constellation. 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites

Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a 

variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation 

wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining 

information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the 

space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw 

data. To make them usable, processing centers format the data so that 

they are time-sequenced and include earth-location and calibration 

information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The 

centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data 

sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These 

data records are then used to derive weather and climate products called 

environmental data records. These environmental data records include a 

wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage, 

temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface products 

showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting 

sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and 

Polar Satellite Data and 

Products
Page 5 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

characterizations of the space environment. Combinations of these data 

records (raw, sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are 

also used to derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from

numerical weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is 

a simplified depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing, 

and figure 3 depicts examples of two different weather products.

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing
Page 6 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products

Note: The figure on the left is a POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 2005; the figure on the right is an 

analysis of ozone concentration produced from POES satellite data.

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs 

would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 

Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 

two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable 

of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.5 The converged 

program, NPOESS, was considered critical to the nation’s ability to 

maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global 

climate monitoring. NPOESS satellites were expected to replace the 

POES and DMSP satellites in the morning, midmorning, and afternoon 

orbits when they neared the end of their expected life spans.

To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency 

Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program 

management for the converged system and for satellite operations, the 

Air Force responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for facilitating 

 5 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.

The NPOESS Program: 

Inception, Challenges, and 

Divergence
Page 7 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

the development and incorporation of new technologies into the 

converged system. 

When the primary NPOESS contract was awarded in August 2002, the 

program was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2018. The 

program was to include the procurement and launch of 6 satellites over 

the life of the program, with each satellite hosting a subset of 13 

instruments. The planned instruments included 11 environmental 

sensors, and two systems supporting specific user services (see table 1). 

To reduce the risk involved in developing new technologies and to 

maintain climate data continuity, the program planned to launch the 

demonstration satellite in May 2006.6 This satellite was intended to 

demonstrate the functionality of selected instruments that would later be 

included on the NPOESS satellites. The first NPOESS satellite was to be 

available for launch in March 2008.

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002

Instrument

Instrument 

type Description

Advanced technology 

microwave sounder 

(ATMS)

Environmental 

sensor

Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the atmosphere; to be used in 

combination with the cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric 

temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.

Aerosol polarimetry 

sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Retrieves specific aerosol (liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, 

such as sea spray, smog, and smoke) and cloud measurements.

Conical microwave 

imager/sounder

Environmental 

sensor

Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain rate, ocean surface wind 

speed and direction, amount of water in the clouds, and soil moisture, as well as 

temperature and humidity at different atmospheric levels.

Cross-track infrared 

sounder (CrIS)

Environmental 

sensor

Collects measurements of the infrared radiation emitted and scattered by the Earth and 

atmosphere to determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and pressure 

in the atmosphere.

Data collection system System 

providing 

services to 

users

Collects environmental data from platforms around the world and delivers them to users 

worldwide.

Earth radiation budget 

sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave radiation released by the Earth back 

into space on a worldwide scale to enhance long-term climate studies.

 6 Originally called the NPOESS Preparatory Project, in January 2012, the satellite’s name 

was changed to the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership satellite.
Page 8 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Instrument

Instrument 

type Description

Global positioning 

system occultation 

sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Measures the refraction of radio wave signals from the Global Positioning System and 

Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System to characterize the ionosphere and 

information related to the vertical distribution of temperature and moisture of the 

atmosphere.

Ozone mapper/ profiler 

suite (OMPS)

Environmental 

sensor

Collects data needed to measure the amount and distribution of ozone in the Earth’s 

atmosphere. Consists of two components (nadir and limb) that can be provided 

separately.

Radar altimeter Environmental 

sensor

Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and ocean surface roughness, 

which are used to determine sea surface height, significant wave height, and ocean 

surface wind speed and to provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate 

prediction models.

Search and rescue 

satellite-aided tracking 

system

System 

providing 

services to 

users

A subsystem that detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based users in 

distress.

Space environmental 

sensor suite

Environmental 

sensor

Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects of space weather on technological 

systems, including satellites and radio links.

Total and spectral solar 

irradiance sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance data.

Visible/infrared imager 

radiometer suite (VIIRS)

Environmental 

sensor

Collects images and radiometric data used to provide information on the Earth’s clouds, 

atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces.

Source: GAO analysis of data from the former NPOESS Integrated Program Office.

In the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS encountered 

significant technical challenges in sensor development, program cost 

growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we estimated that the 

program’s cost had grown to $10 billion, and the schedule for the first 

launch was delayed by almost 2 years.7 These issues led to a 2006 

decision to restructure the program, which reduced the program’s 

functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites from 6 to 4, 

and the number of instruments from 13 to 9. As part of the decision, 

officials decided to reduce the number of orbits from three (early morning, 

midmorning, and afternoon) to two (early morning and afternoon) and to 

rely solely on the European satellites for midmorning orbit data.

Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to

encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant tri-

 7 GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost 

Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, 

GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005).
Page 9 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

agency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost 

increases. Because the schedule delays could lead to satellite data gaps, 

in March 2009 agency executives decided to use S-NPP as an 

operational satellite.8 Later, in August 2009, faced with costs that were 

expected to reach about $15 billion and launch schedules that were 

delayed by over 5 years, the Executive Office of the President formed a 

task force, led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, to 

investigate the management and acquisition options that would improve 

the NPOESS program. As a result of this review, in February 2010, the 

Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced that 

NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite 

system; instead each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite 

system.9 Specifically, NOAA would be responsible for the afternoon orbit 

and the observations planned for the first and third satellites. DOD would 

be responsible for the early morning orbit and the observations planned 

for the second and fourth satellites. The partnership with the European 

satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit was to continue as planned. 

When this decision was announced, NOAA and NASA immediately began 

planning for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit called JPSS. 

DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the morning orbit, 

called the Defense Weather Satellite System, but later decided to 

terminate the program and reassess its requirements, as directed by 

Congress.

After the decision was made to disband the NPOESS program in 2010, 

NOAA began the JPSS satellite program. Key plans included:

• relying on NASA for system acquisition, engineering, and integration;

• completing, launching, and supporting S-NPP;

• acquiring and launching two satellites for the afternoon orbit, called 

JPSS-1 and JPSS-2;

• developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites;

• finding alternative host satellites for selected instruments that would 

not be accommodated on the JPSS satellites; and

 8 Using S-NPP as an operational satellite means that the satellite’s data will be used to

provide climate and weather products.

9 The announcement accompanied the release of the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget 

request.

Overview of Initial NOAA 

Plans for the JPSS

Program
Page 10 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

• providing ground system support for S-NPP, JPSS, and the Defense 

Weather Satellite System; data communications for MetOp and 

DMSP; and data processing for NOAA’s use of microwave data from 

an international satellite.

In 2010, NOAA estimated that the life cycle costs of the JPSS program 

would be approximately $11.9 billion for a program lasting through fiscal 

year 2024, which included $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent on NPOESS 

through fiscal year 2010.10 Subsequently, the agency undertook a cost 

estimating exercise where it validated that the cost of the full set of JPSS 

functions from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2028 would be $11.3 

billion. After adding the agency’s sunk costs, which had increased to $3.3 

billion through fiscal year 2011, the program’s life cycle cost estimate 

totaled $14.6 billion.11 This amount was $2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 

billion estimate for JPSS when NPOESS was disbanded in 2010. 

In working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish the 

president’s fiscal year 2013 budget request, NOAA officials stated that 

they agreed to cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion through 2028, 

to fund JPSS at roughly $900 million per year through 2017, and to merge 

funding for two climate sensors into the JPSS budget. Because this cap 

was $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6 billion life cycle cost of the full 

program, NOAA decided to remove selected elements from the satellite 

program. Table 2 compares the planned cost, schedule, and scope of 

NOAA’s satellite programs at different points in time.

 10 This figure does not include approximately $2.9 billion in sunk costs that DOD spent on 

NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.

11 NOAA’s $3.3 billion sunk costs included $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2010 and about 

$400 million in fiscal year 2011.
Page 11 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and JPSS, at Different Points in Time

Key area

NPOESS program 

before it was 

restructured (as of 

May 2006)

NPOESS program after it 

was restructured (as of 

June 2006)

NPOESS program prior to 

being disbanded (as of 

February 2010)

JPSS program (as of May 

2010)

JPSS program (as of 

June 2012)

Life cycle 

range

1995-2020 1995-2026 1995-2026 1995-2024 1995-2028

Estimated

life cycle 

cost

$8.4 billion $12.5 billion $13.95+ billion $11.9 billion (which includes 

about $2.9 billion spent 

through fiscal year 2010 on 

NPOESS)

a $12.9 billion (which 

includes about $3.3 

billion spent through 

fiscal year 2011 on 

NPOESS and JPSS)

Number 

of 

satellites

6 (in addition to 

S-NPP)

4 (in addition to S-NPP) 4 (in addition to S-NPP) 2 (in addition to S-NPP) 2 (in addition to S-NPP)

Number 

of orbits

3 (early morning, 

midmorning, 

afternoon)

2 (early morning and 

afternoon; would rely on 

European satellites for 

midmorning orbit data)

2 (early morning and 

afternoon; would rely on 

European satellites for 

midmorning orbit data)

1 (afternoon orbit)

(DOD and European 

satellites would provide early 

and midmorning orbits, 

respectively)

1 (afternoon orbit)

(DOD and European 

satellites would provide 

early and midmorning 

orbits, respectively)

Launch 

schedule

S-NPP by October 

2006

First NPOESS (C1) 

by November 2009

Second NPOESS 

(C2) by June 2011

S-NPP by January 2010

C1 by January 2013

C2 by January 2016

C3 by January 2018

C4 by January 2020

S-NPP no earlier than 

September 2011

C1 by March 2014

C2 by May 2016

C3 by January 2018

C4 by January 2020

S-NPP—no earlier than 

September 2011

JPSS-1 available in 2015

JPSS-2 available in 2018

S-NPP—successfully 

launched in October 

2011

JPSS-1 by March 2017 

JPSS-2 by December 

2022

Number 

of 

sensors

11 sensors and 2 

user services 

systems

S-NPP: 4 sensors

C1: 6 sensors

C2: 2 sensors

C3: 6 sensors

C4: 2 sensors

S-NPP: 5 sensors

C1: 7 sensors

C2: 2 sensors

b

C3: 6 sensors

C4: 2 sensors

S-NPP: 5 sensors

JPSS-1: 5 sensors

JPSS-2: 5 sensors

c

S-NPP: 5 sensors

JPSS-1: 5 sensors

JPSS-2: 5 sensors

c

Free flyer-1: 3 sensors

Free flyer-2: 3 sensors

d

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA, DOD, and task force data.

a

Although the program baseline was $13.95 billion in February 2010, we estimated in June 2009 that 

this cost could grow by about $1 billion. In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the President 

stated that they reviewed life cycle cost estimates from DOD and the NPOESS program office of 

$15.1 billion and $16.45 billion, respectively.

b

In May 2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee approved an additional sensor—the Total and 

Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor—for the C1 satellite.

c

The five sensors are ATMS, the Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES), CrIS, 

OMPS, and VIIRS. NOAA also committed to finding an alternative spacecraft and launch 

accommodation for the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor, the Advanced Data Collection 

System, and the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system.

d

NOAA planned to launch two stand-alone satellites, called free flyer satellites, to accommodate the 

Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor, Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system, and 

an Advanced Data Collection System.
Page 12 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS and JPSS programs

highlighting technical issues, cost growth, and key management 

challenges affecting the tri-agency program structure.12 In June 2012, we 

reported that while NOAA officials communicated publicly and often about 

the risk of a polar satellite data gap, the agency had not established plans 

to mitigate the gap.

13 At the time, NOAA officials stated that the agency 

would continue to use existing satellites as long as they provide data and 

that there were no viable alternatives to the JPSS program. However, our 

report noted that a more comprehensive mitigation plan was essential 

since it is possible that other governmental, commercial, or foreign 

satellites could supplement the polar satellite data. Because it could take 

time to adapt ground systems to receive, process, and disseminate an 

alternative satellite’s data, we noted that any delays in establishing 

mitigation plans could leave the agency little time to leverage its 

alternatives. We recommended that NOAA establish mitigation plans for 

risks associated with pending satellite gaps in the afternoon orbit as well 

as potential gaps in the early morning and midmorning orbits. NOAA 

agreed with the report’s recommendation and noted that the National 

Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service—a NOAA 

component agency—had performed analyses on how to mitigate potential 

gaps in satellite data and planned to provide a report by August 2012.

More recently, in February 2013, we added the potential gap in weather 

satellite data to our biennial High-Risk list.14 In that report, we noted that 

satellite data gaps in the morning or afternoon polar orbits would lead to 

less accurate and timely weather forecasting; as a result, advanced 

warning of extreme events would be affected. Such extreme events could 

include hurricanes, storm surges, and floods. For example, the National 

 12 See, for example, GAO, Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in 

Weather and Climate Data Coverage, GAO-11-945T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2011); 

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That 

Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data, GAO-10-558 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 27, 2010); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data 

Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-Agency Decision Making, GAO-09-772T

(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009); and Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With 

Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-Agency 

Decision Making, GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).

13 GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, 

Technical Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention, GAO-12-604

(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012).

14 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: February 2013).

Prior GAO Work 

Recommended Actions to 

Address the Risk of Gaps 

in Polar Satellite Data
Page 13 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Weather Service performed case studies to demonstrate how its 

forecasts would have been affected if there were no polar satellite data in 

the afternoon orbit, and noted that its forecasts for the “Snowmaggedon” 

winter storm that hit the Mid-Atlantic coast in February 2010 would have 

predicted a less intense storm further east, with about half of the

precipitation at 3, 4, and 5 days before the event. Specifically, the models 

would have under-forecasted the amount of snow by at least 10 inches. 

Similarly, a European weather organization15 recently reported that 

NOAA’s forecasts of Hurricane Sandy’s track could have been hundreds 

of miles off without polar-orbiting satellites—rather than identifying the 

New Jersey landfall within 30 miles 4 days before landfall, the models 

would have shown the storm remaining at sea. Such degradation in 

forecasts and warnings would place lives, property, and our nation’s 

critical infrastructure in danger.

We reported that the length of an afternoon polar satellite data gap could 

span from 17 months to 3 years or more. In one scenario, S-NPP would 

last its full expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 would 

launch as soon as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit 

checkout for a year (until March 2018). In that case, the data gap would 

extend 17 months. In another scenario, S-NPP would last only 3 years as 

noted by NASA managers concerned with the workmanship of selected 

S-NPP sensors. Assuming that the JPSS-1 launch occurred in March 

2017 and the satellite data were certified for official use by March 2018, 

this gap would extend for 41 months. Of course, any problems with JPSS1 development could delay the launch date and extend the gap period. 

Figure 4 depicts four possible gap scenarios.

 15 The European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts is an independent, 

intergovernmental organization supported by 34 European nations, providing global 

medium-to-extended range forecasts.
Page 14 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 4: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon Orbit

We also noted that NOAA had recently established a mitigation plan for a 

potential 14- to 18-month gap in the afternoon orbit, which identified and 

prioritized options for obtaining critical observations, including alternative 

satellite data sources and improvements to data assimilation in models 

and listed technical, programmatic, and management steps needed to 

implement these options. However, these plans were only a beginning. 

We suggested that NOAA must make difficult decisions on which steps it 
Page 15 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

would implement to ensure that its mitigation plans are viable when 

needed, including how these plans would be integrated with the agency’s 

broader end-to-end plans for sustaining weather forecasting capabilities. 

NOAA has made progress towards JPSS program objectives of 

sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite capabilities 

through the S-NPP, JPSS-1, and JPSS-2 satellites by (1) delivering 

S-NPP data to weather forecasters and (2) by completing significant 

instrument and spacecraft development for the JPSS-1 satellite. 

However, the program is behind schedule in validating the readiness of 

S-NPP products and has experienced delays on the ground system 

schedules for the JPSS-1 satellite. Moreover, the program is moving to 

revise its scope and objectives to reduce costs and prioritize NOAA’s 

weather mission. Until it addresses challenges in product and ground 

system development, the program office may continue to experience 

delays in delivering actionable S-NPP data to users and in meeting 

program development schedules.

In order to sustain polar-orbiting earth observation capabilities through the 

S-NPP satellite, over the past 18 months the JPSS program had planned 

to complete activation and commissioning of the S-NPP satellite, 

transition the satellite from interim to routine operations, and deliver 76 

data products that were precise enough for use in operational weather 

observations and forecasts. To develop the precise data products, NOAA 

established a process for calibrating and validating its products. Under 

this process, most products (which are primarily sensor data records and 

environmental data records) proceed through three different levels of 

algorithm maturity—the beta, provisional, and validated levels.16 NOAA 

had originally planned to complete efforts to validate S-NPP products by 

October 2013, which was 2 years after the S-NPP satellite was launched. 

It is not enough, however, to simply deliver validated products. Both the 

Software Engineering Institute and GAO recommend tracking whether 

customers are receiving the expected value from products once they are 

 16 According to NOAA and NASA officials, the products go through a beta stage (in which 

products have been minimally validated, but are available to users so that they can begin 

working with the data); a provisional stage (in which products are not optimal, but are 

ready for operational evaluation by users); and a validated stage (in which products are 

ready for operational use).

NOAA Has Made 

Progress on JPSS 

Development, but 

Continues to Face 

Challenges in 

Completing S-NPP 

Products, Revising the 

Program’s Scope, and 

Meeting Schedules

Weather Forecasters Are

Using Selected S-NPP 

Products, but the JPSS 

Program Is Behind 

Schedule in Validating

Products and Unaware of

the Full Extent to Which 

They Are Being Used
Page 16 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

deployed, and whether corrective actions are needed.17 Moreover, in April 

2013 the Executive Office of the President’s National Science and 

Technology Council released a national strategy for civil earth 

observations that called for agencies to, among other things, track the 

extent to which earth observation data are actually being used, track 

whether the data had an impact, and provide data users a mechanism to 

provide feedback regarding ease of use, suspected quality issues, and 

other aspects of the data.

18

The JPSS program has made progress on S-NPP since launching the 

satellite in October 2011. Specifically, the program completed satellite 

activation and commissioning in March 2012, and transitioned from 

interim operations under NASA to routine operations under NOAA in 

February 2013. The program also made key upgrades to the ground 

system supporting S-NPP. For example, in November 2012 the office 

completed an interim backup command and control facility that could 

protect the health and safety of the satellite if unexpected issues occurred 

at the primary mission operations facility. In addition, the JPSS program 

office has been working to calibrate and validate S-NPP products in order 

to make them precise enough for use in weather-related operations. 

While the program office plans to have 18 products validated for 

operational use by September 2013, it is behind schedule for the other 

products. Specifically, the program expects to complete validating 35 

S-NPP products by the end of September 2014 and 1 other product by 

the end of September 2015, almost 1 and 2 years later than originally 

planned. In addition, the program office reported that 15 products do not 

need to be validated, one product’s validation date has not been 

established, and 6 products do not have estimated validation dates 

because the program plans to remove them from its requirements. The 

program categorized its products by their priority, ranging from priority-1 

for the highest priority products, to priority-4 for the lowest priority 

products. According to NOAA and NASA officials, the S-NPP products’ 

validation has been delayed in part because of issues initially identified on 

 17 Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: 

November 2010) and GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A 

Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, Version 1.1, GAO-04-394G

(Washington, D.C.: March 2004).

18 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council, National 

Strategy for Civil Earth Observations (Washington, D.C.: April 2013).
Page 17 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

VIIRS that had to be corrected and additional time needed to validate 

environmental data record products that require observations of seasonal 

weather phenomena. Further, program officials stated that they 

rebaselined the planned product validation timelines in November 2011 

and have been generally meeting the target dates of this revised plan. 

Table 3 illustrates program-reported data on the number of products in 

each priority level, examples of products, and the estimated validation 

date for the last product at each level.
Page 18 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 3: Estimated Completion Dates for S-NPP Products, as of July 2013 

Number of 

products

Priority level (number of 

products)

Examples of products Validated by

18 Priority 1 or 2: 4 ATMS land surface emissivity

Advanced Microwave Scanning 

Radiometer-2 sensor data record

VIIRS polar winds

VIIRS vegetation fraction

End of September 2013

Priority 3 or 4: 14 ATMS rainfall rate

OMPS-nadir profile ozone

OMPS-nadir ozone total column

Advanced Microwave Scanning 

Radiometer-2 cloud liquid water

35 Priority 1 or 2: 5 ATMS sensor data record

CrIS sensor data record

VIIRS sensor data record

VIIRS imagery

End of September 2014

Priority 3 or 4: 29 OMPS-nadir sensor data record

VIIRS active fires

VIIRS cloud optical thickness

CrIS infrared ozone profile

No priority: 1 VIIRS ocean color/chlorophyll

1 Priority 3 or 4: 1 VIIRS vegetation health index suite End of September 2015

15 Priority not assigned Application packets and raw data records Not applicable

1

a

Priority 1 or 2: 1 Advanced Microwave Scanning 

Radiometer-2 temperature data record

Date is still to be determined

6 Priority 1 or 2: 0 Not applicable Planned to be removed from 

requirements Priority 3 or 4: 5 b

CERES sensor data record

No priority: 1 OMPS-limb profiler sensor data record

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA documents.

Notes:

a

Program officials stated that selected products, including raw data records and application packets, 

do not undergo validation.

b

Program officials expect that these requirements will be removed once the transfer of instruments is 

approved through the fiscal year 2014 budget process.

Even though S-NPP products are not at the validated stage in which 

products are ready for operational use, the National Weather Service 

(NWS) has accepted certain products for use in its operational systems. 

For example, the JPSS program office reported that NWS is using ATMS 

temperature data records in its operational forecasts, and that the Alaska 
Page 19 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Weather Forecast Offices are using VIIRS imagery in its forecasts. In 

addition, NWS’s National Centers for Environmental Prediction is 

evaluating CrIS sensor data records for use in numerical weather 

prediction, but has not yet used the data operationally because it is in the 

midst of a computer upgrade. Officials also stated that the program 

obtains information on the operational use of S-NPP data from other 

NOAA offices, including the National Ocean Service and the National 

Marine and Fisheries Service.

While NOAA is aware of these uses, it does not track the extent to which 

key satellite data users—including users from the Air Force, Navy, Forest 

Service, European weather offices, and academic institutions—have 

incorporated S-NPP data into their operations or if corrective actions are 

needed to make the products more accurate or more effective for the 

specific users. Program officials noted that they are not required to tailor 

products to meet non-NOAA user requirements, and that they do not 

have a tracking mechanism that would allow them to identify which 

entities are using the data. They noted, however, that the program 

obtains informal reports from customer representatives through various 

working groups and forums, such as the Low-earth Orbiting 

Requirements Working Group and the JPSS Customer Forum. While 

these efforts obtain information from known customer groups, they do not 

meet best practices for actively tracking whether customers are using the 

products, receiving the expected value, or in need of product corrections. 

Until the program office tracks the use of S-NPP and future JPSS 

products, it will not have full knowledge of the extent to which products 

are being used to assess the value they provide to end users and 

whether corrective actions are needed. More significantly, without 

information on who is using S-NPP data, NOAA will be unable to ensure 

that the significant investment made on this satellite is not wasted.

In order to sustain polar-orbiting earth observation capabilities, the 

program is working to complete development of the JPSS-1 systems in 

preparation for a March 2017 launch date. To manage this initiative, the 

program office organized its responsibilities into two separate projects: (1) 

the flight project, which includes sensors, spacecraft, and launch vehicles 

and (2) the ground project, which includes ground-based data processing 

and command and control systems. Table 4 shows the JPSS projects and 

their key components.

Development of JPSS 

Flight Project Is on Track, 

but Scheduling Issues on 

the Ground System Have 

Caused Delays 
Page 20 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 4: JPSS Projects and Components

Project Key components and responsibilities

Flight Sensors: ATMS, CERES, CrIS, OMPS, VIIRS 

Spacecraft

Launch vehicle

Ground Satellite command, control, and communications

Interface data processing segment

Source: NOAA’s JPSS program office.

JPSS projects and components are at various stages of system 

development. The flight project has nearly completed instrument

hardware development for the JPSS-1 satellite and has begun testing 

certain instruments. Also, the flight project completed a major design 

review for the JPSS-1 satellite’s spacecraft. While the flight project’s 

development is on track, the ground project experienced delays in its 

planned schedule that could further delay major program milestones, 

including key reviews required to establish the program’s cost and 

schedule baseline.

The flight project is generally on track with respect to planned JPSS-1 

instrument and spacecraft development efforts. According to program 

reports of instrument development, the instruments for the JPSS-1 

satellite are nearly complete. Specifically, as of July 2013, the instrument 

hardware ranged from 80 to 100 percent complete. Also, all of the 

instruments have completed or are scheduled to complete environmental 

testing reviews in 2013 and are to be delivered to the spacecraft by 2014. 

The spacecraft completed its critical design review—which evaluates 

whether the design is appropriately mature to continue with the final 

design and fabrication—in January 2013. 

While individual instruments have experienced delays, the key testing 

milestones and delivery dates for the instruments and spacecraft have 

generally held constant since the last key decision point in July 2012. 

CERES experienced a 10-month slip in its delivery date due to a technical 

issue with the instrument’s internal calibration monitor, and ATMS 

experienced an 8-month slip to its pre-environmental review due to an 

issue in one of the sensor’s channels, but even accounting for these slips, 

the instruments have a schedule reserve of 14 and 10 months, 

respectively. VIIRS is expected to be the last instrument to be delivered to 

the spacecraft and has a schedule reserve of 6 months. Also, between 

July 2012 and December 2012 instrument contractors’ estimated costs at 

Flight Project: JPSS-1 

Instrument and Spacecraft 

Development Is On Track 
Page 21 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

completion increased by $29 million for ATMS, CrIS, and OMPS, while 

the cost for VIIRS decreased by $46 million. In addition, based on 

program reports of technical performance, the instruments and the 

spacecraft are generally meeting expected technical performance. Table 

5 describes the current status of the components of the JPSS-1 flight 

project.

Table 5: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting the JPSS-1 Satellite, as of July 2013

Component Status

Instrument

ATMS The instrument completed its hardware development and is in environmental testing. The instrument experienced a 

technical issue beginning in November 2012 in which science counts in one of the channels were lower than 

expected. The program replaced channel components with spares and performed additional regression testing. This 

issue delayed the planned pre-environmental review by 6 months from November 2012 to May 2013. ATMS is 

expected to be delivered for integration on the spacecraft in March 2014.

CERES The instrument completed its hardware development and is in environmental testing. The instrument’s internal 

calibration monitor exhibited unstable performance during calibration, which delayed its delivery by 13 months. The 

cause of this issue is still unknown. CERES underwent pre-environmental review in February 2012. The program 

office plans to perform additional calibration testing, vacuum performance testing, and regression testing prior to its 

delivery in October 2013. 

CrIS The instrument completed 80 percent of its hardware development and is in subsystem integration. The 

instrument’s electronic components have been experiencing a power-up issue, possibly due to a timing issue with 

the digital power supply. The program office replaced the power supply with a spare and is working on resolving the 

issue and completing acceptance testing. Additional work remaining on the instrument includes completing the 

subsystems, integrating the complete instrument, conducting the pre-environmental review in September 2013, and 

completing its environmental test program. The expected delivery date for the instrument is August 2014.

OMPS-Nadir The instrument completed its hardware development and is in environmental testing. The instrument’s diffuser 

experienced degradation during calibration and the adhesive was deemed the root cause. There was no 

performance impact but the instrument’s delivery date slipped 3 months. The program office planned to complete 

cleaning, regression testing, and preparation of the nadir unit for testing. The instrument completed a preenvironmental review in April 2013, is conducting environmental testing, and is expected to be delivered in August

2014.

VIIRS The instrument completed 80 percent of its hardware development and is in subsystem integration. Several sensor 

components have been delivered, installed, and integrated. VIIRS is expected to undergo pre-environmental review 

in October 2013 with an expected delivery in October 2014.

Spacecraft The spacecraft completed its critical design review in December 2012; hardware development is ongoing. The 

spacecraft has an expected delivery in October 2014.

Launch vehicle NASA awarded a contract for launch services in July 2012. Previously accepted risks for the launch program on 

S-NPP are being reviewed for applicability and potential mitigation.

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office data.

The JPSS ground project has made progress in developing the ground 

system components, but scheduling issues have caused delays in the 

deployment of system upgrades. Specifically, between August 2012 and 

February 2013, the program office defined the ground system’s technical 

performance baseline, ordered and received the first increment of 

Ground Project: Progress 

Made, but Facility Scheduling 

Problems Have Caused Delays
Page 22 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

hardware for the next major software release, and transitioned S-NPP 

operational management from the JPSS program to NOAA’s office 

responsible for satellite operations.

However, the program has delayed the delivery of key ground system 

upgrades needed to support JPSS-1 because the facilities needed for 

hardware installation, software development, and testing activities were 

not available when needed. The ground system upgrades, called block 

1.5 and 2.0, were originally scheduled to be delivered in January and 

December 2015, respectively. To address the problem in scheduling the 

facilities, NOAA delayed the delivery of block 1.5 and merged it with block 

2.0. The program is now expecting to deliver both upgrades in December 

2015. We have previously reported that compressing system 

development schedules introduces program risk because it implies the 

need to accomplish a larger number of activities in parallel and on time 

before the next major event can occur as planned.19 As a result, any 

complications in the merged ground system upgrades could affect the 

system’s readiness to support the JPSS-1 launch date.

While NOAA is moving forward to complete product development on the 

S-NPP satellite and system development on the JPSS-1 satellite, the 

agency recently made major revisions to the program’s scope and 

planned capabilities and is moving to implement other scope changes as 

it finalizes its plans pending congressional approval. We previously 

reported that, as part of its fiscal year 2013 budget process, NOAA was 

considering removing selected elements of the program in order to 

reduce total program costs from $14.6 billion to $12.9 billion.20 By October 

2012, NOAA made the following changes in the program’s scope: 

• develop two (instead of three) TSIS instruments as well as two freeflyer spacecraft and launch vehicles to accommodate the instruments;

• reduce the previously planned network of fifteen ground-based 

receptor stations to two receptor sites at the north pole and two sites 

at the south pole; 

 19 See GAO-12-120G (exposure draft).

20 GAO-12-604.

NOAA Revised Program 

Scope to Focus on 

Weather Priorities and 

Reduce Costs 
Page 23 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

• increase the time it takes to obtain satellite data and deliver it to the 

end user from 30 minutes to 80 minutes on the JPSS-2 satellite;21

• not install an interface data processing segment at the two Navy 

locations or at the Air Force Weather Agency; and

• withdraw future support for ground operations for DOD’s Defense 

Weather Satellite System, which was subsequently cancelled.

More recently, as proposed by the administration, NOAA began 

implementing additional changes in the program’s scope and objectives in 

order to meet the agency’s highest-priority needs for weather forecasting 

and reduce program costs from $12.9 billion to $11.3 billion. Specifically, 

NOAA has begun to:

• Transfer requirements for building the OMPS-limb and CERES followon climate sensors for the JPSS-2 satellite to NASA. 

• Transfer the first free-flyer mission from the JPSS program to a 

separate NOAA program, called the Polar Free Flyer program, and 

cancel the second free-flyer mission. More information on the Polar 

Free Flyer program is provided in appendix II. 

• Eliminate requirements for a legacy type of broadcast transmitter, 

which, according to NOAA officials, is in a spectrum range being 

crowded out by terrestrial users and is consistent with its European 

partners’ plans.

• Reduce science and algorithm requirements for lower-priority data 

products.

• Reduce operations and sustainment costs based on increased 

efficiencies through moving from customized components to more offthe-shelf solutions.

• Reduce the mission life cycle by 3 years from 2028 to 2025.

While we were unable to precisely itemize the reductions in costs 

associated with various program changes, program officials provided 

rough estimates. The following table summarizes the reported cost 

reductions associated with key changes to the JPSS program. 

 21 In January 2013, program officials revised this delay to 96 minutes to more precisely 

reflect the time it takes to send products from the ground system to the end users.
Page 24 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 6: Reported Cost Reductions Associated with JPSS Changes

Timing of revisions Program reported cost 

reductions Major scope changes and other revisions

June 2012 $1.7 billion through 2028

(from the $14.6 billion to $12.9 

billion life cycle cost estimates)

Restructured free flyer missions ($800M)

Revised operations and sustainment concept ($700M)

Reduced reserve estimates ($200M)

April 2013 $1.6 billion through 2025

(from the $12.9 billion to $11.3 

billion life cycle cost estimates)

Transferred first free flyer mission to Polar Free Flyer program and 

transferred a TSIS, CERES, and OMPS-Limb instrument to NASA 

($750M)

Reduced program lifetime by 3 years, from 2028 to 2025 ($390M)

Eliminated second free-flyer mission and one type of communication 

downlink ($240M)

Lowered expected costs for the JPSS-1 launch vehicle and launch 

services ($9M)

Saved in other areas, including costs saved by acquiring VIIRS spare 

parts from the Air Force and eliminating enhanced data processing of 

data obtained from the Global Change Observation Mission-Water 

satellite ($211M)

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program data. 

While there are a number of reasons for individual changes in the 

program, the key reason for the June 2012 changes was to meet the 

program’s $12.9 billion cost cap. The reasons for the more recent 

changes were to reduce mission costs and complexity, focus JPSS 

priorities on NOAA’s weather forecasting mission, and identify 

opportunities to reduce potential gaps between JPSS satellites, all of 

which an independent study on NOAA’s satellite program recommended 

in July 2012. 

While these are worthy goals, the changes NOAA implemented over the 

last 2 years will have an impact on those who rely on polar satellite data. 

Specifically, satellite data products will be delivered more slowly than 

anticipated because of the reduction in the number of ground stations, 

and military users may not obtain the variety of products once anticipated 

at the rates anticipated because of the removal of their ground-based 

processing subsystems. Further, while not as obvious, the impact of other 

changes, including the removal of the communications downlink and the 

reduction of requirements for certain algorithms, could also affect specific 

groups of satellite data users. As NOAA moves to implement these 

program changes, it will be important to assess and understand the 

impact the changes will have on satellite data users.
Page 25 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

The JPSS program office has established a preliminary integrated master 

schedule and implemented multiple scheduling best practices, but the 

integrated master schedule is not complete and weaknesses in 

component schedules significantly reduce the program’s schedule quality 

as well as management’s ability to monitor, manage, and forecast satellite 

launch dates. The incomplete integrated master schedule and shortfalls in 

component schedules are due in part to the program’s plans to further 

refine the schedule as well as schedule management and reporting 

requirements that varied among contractors. Further, while the program is 

reporting a 70 percent confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date, its 

analysis is likely to be overly optimistic because it was not conducted with 

an integrated schedule and included a component schedule with 

weaknesses. Until the program office completes its integrated master 

schedule and addresses weaknesses in component schedules, it will lack 

the information it needs to effectively monitor development progress, 

manage dependencies between schedules, and forecast the JPSS-1 

satellite’s completion and launch.

According to our guidance on best practices in scheduling,22 the success 

of a program depends in part on having an integrated and reliable master 

schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how each 

activity is related to the others. The program schedule provides not only a 

road map for systematic project execution but also the means by which to 

gauge progress, identify and resolve potential problems, and promote 

accountability at all levels of the program. An integrated master schedule 

constitutes a program schedule as a network of logically linked 

sequences of activities that includes the entire required scope of effort, 

including the effort necessary from the government, contractors, and 

other key parties for a program’s successful execution from start to finish. 

Although the integrated master schedule includes all government, 

contractor, and external effort, the government program management 

office is ultimately responsible for its development and maintenance. 

The JPSS program office provided a preliminary integrated master 

schedule in June 2013, but this schedule is incomplete. The program’s 

June 2013 schedule is its first attempt to document a programwide 

integrated master schedule since it began in October 2010. The schedule 

 22 GAO-12-120G (exposure draft).

JPSS Schedules 

Demonstrate Multiple 

Best Scheduling

Practices, but 

Integration Problems 

and Other 

Weaknesses Reduce 

Confidence in the 

JPSS-1 Launch Date

The JPSS Program Has Not 

Yet Established a 

Complete Integrated 

Master Schedule
Page 26 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

contains the scope of work for key program components, such as the 

JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 satellites and the ground system, and cites linkages 

to more detailed component schedules. However, significant weaknesses 

exist in the program’s schedule. Specifically, about one-third of the 

schedule is missing logical relationships called dependencies that are 

needed to depict the sequence in which activities occur. Because a logic 

relationship dictates the effect of an on-time, delayed, or accelerated 

activity on subsequent activities, any missing or incorrect logic 

relationship is potentially damaging to the entire network. Complete 

network logic between all activities is essential if the schedule is to 

correctly forecast the start and end dates of activities within the plan. 

Program documentation acknowledges that this schedule is not yet 

complete and the program office plans to refine it over time. Until the 

program office completes its integrated schedule and includes logically 

linked sequences of activities, it will lack the information it needs to 

effectively monitor development progress, manage dependencies, and 

forecast the JPSS-1 satellite’s completion and launch.

Our scheduling guidance identifies ten best practices that support four 

characteristics of a high-quality, reliable schedule—comprehensive, wellconstructed, credible, and controlled.23 A comprehensive schedule 

includes all government and contractor activities, reflects resources 

(labor, materials, and overhead) needed to do the work, and realistically 

reflects how long each activity will take. A well-constructed schedule 

includes activities that are sequenced with the most straightforward logic 

possible, a critical path24 that represents a true model of the activities that 

drive the project’s earliest completion date, and total float that accurately 

depicts schedule flexibility. A credible schedule reflects the order of 

events necessary to achieve aggregated products or outcomes 

(horizontal traceability) and maps varying levels of the schedule to one 

another (vertical traceability). Also, a credible schedule includes data 

about risks and opportunities that are used to predict a level of confidence 

in meeting the project’s completion date. A controlled schedule is updated 

periodically by trained schedulers using actual progress and logic to 

 23 GAO-12-120G (exposure draft).

24 The critical path is generally defined as the longest continuous sequence of activities in 

a schedule. As such, it defines the program’s earliest completion date or minimum 

duration.

The Quality of JPSS-1 

Component Schedules Is 

Inconsistent 
Page 27 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

realistically forecast dates for program activities and is compared against 

a designated baseline schedule to measure, monitor, and report the 

project’s progress. The JPSS program office is applying NASA’s schedule 

management handbook guidance to manage its schedules, which is 

largely consistent with our guidance on scheduling best practices. Table 7 

provides more detail on the best practices and key characteristics of a 

reliable schedule.

Table 7: The Four Characteristics and Ten Best Practices of a High-Quality and Reliable Schedule

Characteristic Best practice Description

Comprehensive Capturing all activities The schedule should reflect all activities as defined in the project’s work breakdown 

structure, which defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a project’s

objectives, including activities both the owner and contractors are to perform.

Assigning resources to all 

activities

The schedule should reflect the resources (labor, materials, overhead) needed to do the 

work, whether they will be available when needed, and any funding or time constraints.

Establishing the duration of 

all activities

The schedule should realistically reflect how long each activity will take. When the 

duration of each activity is determined, the same rationale, historical data, and 

assumptions used for cost estimating should be used. Durations should be reasonably 

short and meaningful and allow for discrete progress measurement. Schedules that 

contain planning and summary planning packages as activities will normally reflect 

longer durations until broken into work packages or specific activities.

WellconstructedSequencing all activities The schedule should be planned so that critical project dates can be met. To do this, 

activities need to be logically sequenced—that is, listed in the order in which they are to 

be carried out. In particular, activities that must be completed before other activities can 

begin (predecessor activities), as well as activities that cannot begin until other activities 

are completed (successor activities), should be identified. Date constraints and lags 

should be minimized and justified. This helps ensure that the interdependence of 

activities that collectively lead to the completion of events or milestones can be 

established and used to guide work and measure progress.

Confirming that the critical 

path is valid

The schedule should identify the program critical path—the path of longest duration 

through the sequence of activities. Establishing a valid critical path is necessary for 

examining the effects of any activity’s slipping along this path. The program critical path 

determines the program’s earliest completion date and focuses the team’s energy and 

management’s attention on the activities that will lead to the project’s success.

Ensuring reasonable total 

float

The schedule should identify reasonable float (or slack)—the amount of time by which a 

predecessor activity can slip before the delay affects the program’s estimated finish 

date—so that the schedule’s flexibility can be determined. Large total float on an activity 

or path indicates that the activity or path can be delayed without jeopardizing the finish 

date. The length of delay that can be accommodated without the finish date’s slipping 

depends on a variety of factors, including the number of date constraints within the 

schedule and the amount of uncertainty in the duration estimates, but the activity’s total 

float provides a reasonable estimate of this value. As a general rule, activities along the 

critical path have the least float.
Page 28 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Characteristic Best practice Description

Credible Verifying that the schedule 

can be traced horizontally 

and vertically

The detailed schedule should be horizontally traceable, meaning that it should link 

products and outcomes associated with other sequenced activities. These links are 

commonly referred to as “handoffs” and serve to verify that activities are arranged in the 

right order for achieving aggregated products or outcomes. The integrated master 

schedule should also be vertically traceable—that is, varying levels of activities and 

supporting subactivities can be traced. Such mapping or alignment of levels enables 

different groups to work to the same master schedule.

Conducting a schedule risk 

analysis

A schedule risk analysis uses a good critical path method schedule and data about 

project schedule risks and opportunities as well as statistical simulation to predict the 

level of confidence in meeting a program’s completion date, determine the time 

contingency needed for a level of confidence, and identify high-priority risks and 

opportunities. As a result, the baseline schedule should include a buffer or reserve of 

extra time.

Controlled Updating the schedule 

using actual progress and 

logic

Progress updates and logic provide a realistic forecast of start and completion dates for 

program activities. Maintaining the integrity of the schedule logic at regular intervals is 

necessary to reflect the true status of the program. To ensure that the schedule is 

properly updated, people responsible for the updating should be trained in critical path 

method scheduling.

Maintaining a baseline 

schedule

A baseline schedule is the basis for managing the project scope, the time period for 

accomplishing it, and the required resources. The baseline schedule is designated the 

target schedule, subject to a configuration management control process, against which 

project performance can be measured, monitored, and reported. The schedule should 

be continually monitored so as to reveal when forecasted completion dates differ from 

planned dates and whether schedule variances will affect downstream work. A 

corresponding baseline document explains the overall approach to the project, defines 

custom fields in the schedule file, details ground rules and assumptions used in 

developing the schedule, and justifies constraints, lags, long activity durations, and any 

other unique features of the schedule.

Source: GAO Schedule Assessment Guide, GAO-12-120G (exposure draft).

The quality of three selected component schedules supporting the JPSS1 mission—VIIRS, the spacecraft, and the ground system—was 

inconsistent with respect to implementing the characteristics of a highquality, reliable schedule.25 Each schedule had strengths and 

weaknesses with respect to sound scheduling practices, but VIIRS was a 

stronger schedule with fewer weaknesses compared to the ground 

system and spacecraft schedules. Since the reliability of an integrated 

schedule depends in part on the reliability of its subordinate schedules, 

schedule quality weaknesses in these schedules could transfer to an IMS 

derived from them. Table 8 identifies the quality of each of the selected 

JPSS-1 component schedules based on the extent to which they met ten 

 25 These three component schedules represent the critical path for the flight project and 

the entire ground system schedule.
Page 29 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

best practices of high-quality and reliable schedules; the discussion that 

follows highlights observed strengths and weaknesses from each 

schedule. In addition, appendix III includes a more detailed assessment of 

each schedule against the ten best practices.

Table 8: Assessment of JPSS-1 Component Schedule Quality

Schedule characteristic or best practice Ground system Spacecraft VIIRS

Comprehensive

Capturing all activities ◕ ◑ ◕

Assigning resources to all activities ◕ ◕ ◕

Establishing the duration of all activities ◕ ◑ ●

Well-constructed

Sequencing all activities ◕ ◑ ◕

Confirming that the critical path is valid ◔ ◑ ◕

Ensuring reasonable total float ◑ ◑ ◕

Credible

Verifying that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically ◑ ◑ ◕

Conducting a schedule risk analysis ◔ ◑ ◑

Controlled

Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic ◕ ◕ ●

Maintaining a baseline schedule ◕ ◑ ◕

Source: GAO analysis of detailed schedules and related documentation for the VIIRS instrument, spacecraft, and ground system.

●=Met: The program office or contractor provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.

◕=Substantially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a large 

portion of the criterion.

◑=Partially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies about half of the 

criterion.

◔=Minimally met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a small portion 

of the criterion.

○=Not met: The program office or contractor provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion.

Of the ten best practices, the ground system schedule minimally met two 

best practices, partially met two best practices, and substantially met six 

best practices. There were strengths in the ground schedule in that the 

contractor established a clear process for integrated information between 

the schedule and its resource management software and the contractor 

has performed resource leveling on the schedule. In addition, the 

contractor stated that people responsible for the activities estimated 

activity durations. Also, the contractor stated that it performs wellness 

Ground Schedule 
Page 30 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

checks on the quality of the schedule after each update to identify issues 

associated with missing logic or date constraints and provides a monthly 

status briefing to the JPSS program office that addresses the status of 

external schedule handoffs.

However, there were also weaknesses in the ground schedule. For 

example, activities on the critical path with date constraints are preventing 

accurate calculations of the schedule’s total float, or flexibility. In order for 

the critical path to be valid, the activities on the critical path must also 

have reasonable total float. Without a critical path that accurately 

calculates schedule flexibility, the program office will not be able to 

provide reliable timeline estimates or identify when problems or changes 

may occur and their effect on downstream work. Moreover, while the 

contractor conducted a schedule risk analysis on the schedule, that 

analysis was for select near-term milestones rather than the readiness of 

the ground system for the launch of JPSS-1 and it did not include the 

risks most likely to delay the project. A schedule risk analysis should be 

conducted through the finish milestone and should include risk data to 

determine activities that most often end up on the critical path.

Of the ten best practices, the spacecraft schedule partially met eight best 

practices, and substantially met two best practices. There were strengths 

in the spacecraft schedule in that it was horizontally and vertically 

traceable; the contractor provided evidence of monthly progress updates 

to management, including status reporting of key milestones, handoffs, 

explanations of date changes, and an analysis of the critical and nearcritical paths; the contractor conducted a schedule risk analysis; and the 

schedule included baseline dates of activities for comparisons of actual 

performance to date.

However, there were also weaknesses in the spacecraft schedule. For 

example, the schedule had a low level of detail and included one-third of 

remaining activities with durations greater than 44 days, even after 

accounting for undefined and procurement-related activities. When 

establishing the durations of activities, they should be reasonably short 

and meaningful and allow for discrete progress measurement. Durations 

longer than 2 months do not facilitate objective measurement of 

accomplished effort and the milestone to detail activity ratio does not 

allow for effective progress measurement and reporting. As another 

example of a quality shortfall, the schedule was overly flexible with high 

float values that were not justified in schedule documentation. 

Specifically, 70 percent of remaining activities had about 5 business 

weeks of float, including 67 activities that had over 1,000 days of float, 

Spacecraft Schedule 
Page 31 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

meaning that these activities could slip approximately 3.5 years without 

affecting the project’s completion date. In order to establish reasonable 

total float, there should be documented justification for high float values in 

the schedule. Without this, it is unclear whether float values are high due 

to factors accepted by management and which are due to incomplete 

logic or other issues.

The VIIRS schedule partially met one best practice, substantially met 

seven best practices, and fully met two best practices. There were 

strengths in the VIIRS schedule in that the contractor established a clear 

process for integrating information between the schedule and resource 

management software, stated that durations were estimated by the 

people responsible for the activities based on work to be done, and 

justified in its schedule documentation activities with durations longer than 

44 days. In addition, the contractor justified in schedule documentation 

the use of all date constraints, identified a valid driving path of activities

for managing the program, and identified reasonable float values or 

justified them to the JPSS program office. Further, the contractor provided 

a schedule narrative accompanying each status update, which describes 

the status of key milestone dates (including the program finish date);

explanations for changes in key dates; and a description of critical paths. 

However, there were also weaknesses in the VIIRS schedule. For 

example, the schedule had milestones that represented handoffs 

between contractor integrated product teams, but it did not include 

handoffs to the JPSS program office. In order to verify a schedule’s 

horizontal traceability, handoffs should link products and outcomes 

associated with other sequenced activities. Without this, there could be 

different expectations between management and activity owners. As 

another example, the contractor conducted a schedule risk analysis with 

a good schedule network and obtained three different duration estimates 

from subject matter experts. However, the duration estimates did not 

reflect risks from the project’s risk register and the analysis was focused 

only on activities on the critical path. This approach is flawed because 

activities that are not currently on the critical path could become critical as 

risks occur.

VIIRS Schedule
Page 32 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

The inconsistency in quality among the three schedules has multiple 

causes. Program and contractor officials explained that certain 

weaknesses have been corrected with updated schedules. In other 

cases, the weaknesses lacked documented explanation in part because 

the JPSS program office did not require contractors to provide such 

documentation. Based on program schedule documentation, the schedule 

management and reporting requirements varied across contractors 

without documented justification for tailored approaches, which may 

partially explain the inconsistency in practices among the schedules. 

Since the reliability of an integrated schedule depends in part on the 

reliability of its subordinate schedules, schedule quality weaknesses in 

these schedules will transfer to an integrated master schedule derived 

from them. Consequently, the extent to which there are quality 

weaknesses in JPSS-1 support schedules further constrains the 

program’s ability to monitor progress, manage key dependencies, and 

forecast completion dates. Until the program office addresses the 

scheduling shortfalls in its component schedules, the JPSS schedule will 

have lower quality and reduced reliability as a management tool for 

monitoring and forecasting satellite launch dates. 

According to our guidance on best practices in scheduling,26 a schedule 

risk analysis uses statistical techniques to predict a level of confidence in 

meeting a program’s completion date. This analysis focuses on key risks 

and how they affect the schedule’s activities. The analysis does not focus 

solely on the critical path because, with risk considered, any activity may 

potentially affect the program’s completion date. By relying on statistical 

simulations to randomly vary activity durations according to the probability 

of occurrence for certain durations and risks, the analysis seeks to 

develop a probability distribution of possible completion dates that reflect 

the program plan and enable an organization to match a date to its 

degree of risk tolerance.

The JPSS program office has conducted a schedule risk analysis on the 

JPSS-1 mission schedule (and launch date) through NASA’s joint cost 

 26 GAO-12-120G (exposure draft).

Program Has Confidence 

in the JPSS-1 Schedule, but 

Its Assumptions Do Not 

Reflect Weaknesses in the 

Underlying Data
Page 33 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

and schedule confidence level (JCL) process.27 The JCL implemented by 

the JPSS program office represents a best practice in schedule 

management for establishing a credible schedule and reflects a robust 

schedule risk analysis conducted on key JPSS-1 schedule components. 

For example, the analysis assessed the impacts of key risks from the risk 

register and how multiple duration estimates for activities, based on 

documented uncertainty distributions, could affect the schedule. Based on 

the results of the JCL, the program office reports that its level of 

confidence in the JPSS-1 schedule is 70 percent and that it has sufficient 

schedule reserve to maintain a launch date of no later than March 2017. 

However, the program office’s level of confidence in the JPSS-1 schedule 

may be overly optimistic for two key reasons. First, the model that the 

program office used was based on flight project activities rather than an 

integrated schedule consisting of flight, ground, program office, and other 

activities relevant to the development and launch of JPSS-1. As a result, 

the JPSS program office’s confidence level projections do not factor in the 

ongoing scheduling issues that are impacting the ground project. Had 

those issues been considered, the JPSS-1 confidence level would have 

been lower. Second, there are concerns regarding the spacecraft 

schedule’s quality as discussed in the previous section. Factoring in these 

concerns, the confidence of the JPSS-1 satellite’s schedule and projected 

launch date would be lower. We have previously reported that when using 

the JCL, NASA projects did not always include relevant cost and risk 

inputs.28

While program officials noted that they included key ground system risks 

in their calculations, they did not include ground system scope in the JCL 

because it was too difficult to allocate ground system components to 

individual missions. Moreover, officials stated that they do not plan to 

include ground project or program office activities in future JCL updates. 

While it may have been difficult to include ground system scope in the 

JCL, without this, the program’s schedule risk analysis and JCL do not 

reflect the full amount of work to be performed leading to JPSS-1 launch. 

 27 The JCL is a probabilistic analysis that includes, among other things, all cost and 

schedule elements, incorporates and quantifies potential risks, assesses the impacts of 

cost and schedule to date, and addresses available annual resources to arrive at 

development cost and schedule estimates associated with various confidence levels.

28 GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, GAO-12-207SP

(Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2012).
Page 34 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Until the program office conducts a schedule risk analysis on an 

integrated schedule that includes the entire scope of effort and addresses 

quality shortfalls of relevant component schedules, it will have less 

assurance of meeting the planned March 2017 launch date for JPSS-1.

While NOAA has identified multiple ways to help mitigate expected gaps 

in polar satellite data, it has not yet developed and implemented a 

comprehensive contingency plan. In October 2012, NOAA established a 

plan to address the impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon satellite 

data and contracted for a technical assessment that generated additional 

alternatives for the agency to consider. However, NOAA’s mitigation plan 

has shortfalls when compared to government and industry best practices. 

Moreover, NOAA intends to update its plan by fall 2013 by integrating 

alternatives generated from the contractor’s technical assessment. Until 

NOAA establishes a comprehensive contingency plan that addresses key 

shortfalls, it may not be positioned to effectively mitigate anticipated gaps 

in polar satellite coverage.

Polar satellites are essential to NOAA’s mission to understand and predict 

changes in climate, weather, oceans, and coasts. Satellite data gaps in 

the morning or afternoon polar orbits would lead to less accurate and 

timely weather forecasting; as a result, advanced warning of extreme 

events would be affected. In June 2012, we reported that while NOAA 

officials communicated publicly and often about the risk of a polar satellite 

data gap, the agency had not established plans to mitigate the gap.29 We 

recommended that NOAA establish mitigation plans for pending satellite 

gaps in the afternoon orbit as well as potential gaps in the early morning 

and midmorning orbits and NOAA agreed with the report’s 

recommendation.

In October 2012, NOAA established a mitigation plan to address the 

impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon satellite data. This plan 

identifies alternatives for mitigating the risk of a 14- to 18-month gap in 

the afternoon orbit beginning in March 2016, between the current polar 

satellite and the JPSS-1 satellite. Key alternatives include utilizing 

different satellites as data sources and improving data assimilation in 

models. The plan also lists technical, programmatic, and management 

 29 GAO-12-604.

NOAA Has Analyzed 

Alternatives for 

Addressing Gaps in 

Satellite Data, but 

Lacks a 

Comprehensive 

Contingency Plan 

NOAA Identified Multiple 

Ways to Mitigate Polar 

Satellite Data Gaps
Page 35 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

actions needed to implement these options. Table 9 provides an overview 

of NOAA’s polar satellite gap mitigation plan. 

Table 9: Summary of NOAA’s Polar Satellite Gap Mitigation Plan 

Key assumptions Alternatives Key actions 

Implementation 

status

There would be a polar afternoon 

gap of 14 to 18 months between 

March 2016 and October 2017 

(the date that JPSS-1 is to 

become operational)

Mission critical data from 

S-NPP’s ATMS, CrIS, and VIIRS 

instruments would be lost 

DOD and European satellites 

would continue providing data in 

the early morning and 

midmorning orbits, respectively

Use similar data from available 

sources, such as existing DOD, 

NOAA, and NASA polar satellites

Improve NOAA data assimilation

Rely on foreign data, including 

radio occultation data or future 

polar satellites from other nations 

such as Russia or China

Use non-satellite sources, such as 

aircraft observations

Use commercial solutions (although 

none were identified)

Technical:

• Conduct data denial experiments 

eliminating afternoon polar-orbiting 

sounder data from forecast models

• Calculate, obtain, and distribute the 

estimated end-of-life of all sounder 

and imagery satellite assets

Programmatic:

• Monitor and report monthly on the 

health of instruments on existing 

polar satellites

• Augment NOAA research and 

development computing capability 

as soon as possible to run data 

impact experiments

Management:

• Commit to augmenting NOAA 

operational computing capability

• Maintain international relationships 

that can result in partnerships for 

satellite data 

Actions were not 

implemented or 

funded.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

However, NOAA did not implement the actions identified in its mitigation 

plan and decided to identify additional alternatives. In October 2012, at 

the direction of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and 

Atmosphere (who is also the NOAA Administrator), NOAA contracted for 

a detailed technical assessment of alternatives to mitigate the 

degradation of products caused by a gap in satellite data in the afternoon 

polar orbit. This assessment solicited input from experts within and 

outside of NOAA and resulted in the following alternatives:

• rely on DOD’s DMSP satellite; 

• expand the use of radio occultation data, including funding the ground 

segment for a follow-on United States/Taiwan radio occultation 

mission;

• use atmospheric motion vectors (observed wind data); 
Page 36 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

• utilize future geostationary advanced imagery data;

• expand the use of aircraft observations;

• expand the use of targeted observations for high-impact events;

• implement a 4-dimensional hybrid data assimilation system (by adding 

a time dimension) ;

• improve data assimilation of cloud-impacted radiances;

• implement blends of global models, such as European and Canadian 

models;

• accelerate global model research to operations;

• sustain the use of high-latitude direct readout imagery; and

• rely on China’s future Feng Yun-3 satellite.

Moving forward, NOAA officials stated that they are currently considering 

the additional alternatives and that the agency intends to integrate a final 

set of alternatives into its existing mitigation plan by the fall of 2013.

Government and industry best practices call for the development of 

contingency plans to maintain an organization’s essential functions in the 

case of an adverse event.30 As a complement to risk mitigation, 

contingency planning includes strategies that attempt to reduce or control 

the impact of risks should they occur. These practices identified by, for 

example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the 

Software Engineering Institute, include key elements such as defining 

failure scenarios, identifying and selecting strategies to address failure 

scenarios, developing procedures and actions to implement the selected 

strategies, testing the plans, and involving affected stakeholders. These 

elements can be grouped into categories, including (1) identifying failure 

scenarios and impacts, (2) developing contingency plans, and (3) 

validating and implementing contingency plans (see table 10).

 30 See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency 

Planning, GAO/AIMD-10.1.19 (Washington, D.C.: August 1998); National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, 

NIST 800-34 (May 2010); Software Engineering Institute, CMMI® for Acquisition, Version 

1.3 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2010).

NOAA Does Not Yet Have 

a Comprehensive 

Contingency Plan
Page 37 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 10: Guidelines for Developing a Sound Contingency Plan 

Category Description

Identifying failure 

scenarios and impacts 

This category includes activities such as defining failure scenarios; conducting impact analyses that show 

the impact of failure scenarios; defining minimum acceptable levels of outputs and recovery time 

objectives; and establishing resumption priorities.

Developing contingency 

plans 

This category includes activities such as identifying alternative solutions to address failure scenarios; 

selecting contingency strategies from among alternatives based on costs, benefits, and impacts; defining 

actions, roles and responsibilities, triggers, and timelines for implementing contingency plans; developing 

“zero-day” procedures; ensuring that steps reflect priorities for resumption of products and recovery 

objectives; and obtaining review and approval of the contingency plan from designated officials.

Validating and 

implementing 

contingency plans

This category includes activities such as identifying steps for testing contingency plans and conducting 

training exercises; preparing for and executing tests; validating test results for consistency against 

minimum performance levels; executing applicable actions for implementation of contingency strategies; 

communicating and coordinating with stakeholders to ensure that contingency strategies remain optimal for 

reducing potential impacts; and updating and maintaining contingency plans as warranted.

Source: GAO analysis of guidance documents from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Software Engineering Institute, 

and GAO.

By documenting its mitigation plan and conducting a study on additional 

alternatives, NOAA has taken positive steps towards establishing a 

contingency plan for handling the potential impact of satellite data gaps in 

the afternoon polar orbit. However, NOAA does not yet have a 

comprehensive contingency plan because it has not yet selected the 

strategies to be implemented, or established procedures and actions to 

implement the selected strategies. In addition, there are shortfalls in the 

agency’s current plans as compared to government and industry best 

practices, such as not always identifying specific actions with defined 

roles and responsibilities, timelines, and triggers. Moreover, multiple 

steps remain in testing, validating, and implementing the contingency 

plan. The following table provides an assessment of the extent to which 

NOAA’s mitigation plan met contingency planning practices in three 

general categories.
Page 38 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 11: Assessment of NOAA’s Gap Mitigation Plan for its Polar Environmental Satellites

Contingency 

planning 

category

GAO 

assessment Description

Identifying 

failure 

scenarios and 

impacts

Partially met • The plan identifies key scenarios, such as an earlier than expected loss of data from the S-NPP 

satellite, a slip in the JPSS-1 launch date, a failure of JPSS-1 on launch, and a longer than 

expected calibration and validation period for JPSS-1. 

• The plan includes analyses of the impact to users from losing key weather products from ATMS, 

CrIS, and VIIRS. The plan also identifies minimum performance outputs for key weather data and 

reflects the top priorities identified in JPSS program requirements.

• However, the plan does not address other scenarios, including the possibility of a loss of data 

from Department of Defense and European partner satellites in morning orbits or a partner 

mission in the afternoon orbit. 

• Further, the plan does not include recovery time objectives for key data products. 

Developing 

contingency 

plans

Partially met • The plan describes the impact of potential gaps in polar afternoon satellite data, identifies 

alternative strategies for mitigating the gap, and lists technical, programmatic, and management 

actions needed to implement gap mitigation strategies. 

• However, the plan has not yet been integrated with the other alternatives that were subsequently 

identified.

• NOAA has not yet assessed its alternative strategies based on costs, benefits, and potential 

impacts.

• The plan does not identify options for preventing gaps from occurring. 

• The plan does not identify opportunities for accelerating the calibration and validation phase—the 

time between launch and availability of operational products—on JPSS-1. 

• The plan does not identify specific actions for executing two of the five alternatives; identify roles

and responsibilities for three alternatives; identify timelines for any of the alternatives; or identify 

triggers to signal when steps should be taken on any of the alternatives.

Validating and 

implementing 

contingency 

plans

Not met • NOAA has not yet initiated efforts to validate or implement its gap mitigation plan.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

NOAA officials stated that the agency is continuing to work on 

refinements to its gap mitigation plan, and that they anticipate issuing an 

updated plan in fall 2013 that will reflect additional alternatives. While 

NOAA expects to update its plan, the agency does not yet have a 

schedule for adding key elements—such as specific actions, roles and 

responsibilities, timelines, and triggers—for each alternative. Until NOAA 

establishes a comprehensive contingency plan that integrates its 

strategies and addresses the elements identified above to improve its 

plans, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate potential gaps in 

polar satellite coverage.
Page 39 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

While NOAA has made noteworthy progress over the past year in utilizing 

S-NPP data in weather forecasts and developing instrument and 

spacecraft components of the JPSS-1 satellite, the agency is facing 

challenges in its efforts to ensure sustained satellite observations. 

Specifically, NOAA does not expect to validate key S-NPP products until 

September 2014—nearly 3 years after the satellite’s launch. Also, the 

agency does not track the usage of its satellite products or obtain 

feedback on them, which limits the program’s ability to ensure that 

satellite products are useful. Further, the program experienced scheduling 

problems on its ground systems, which led to a delay in planned system 

upgrades. Until NOAA establishes a way to track which agencies are 

using its products and to obtain feedback on those products, the program 

office may continue to experience delays in delivering actionable S-NPP 

data to users.

Almost 3 years after the JPSS program was established, it lacks a 

complete integrated master schedule. While program officials recently 

established a preliminary integrated master schedule, the schedule lacks 

proper linkage among dependent activities, which limits its ability to 

calculate dates and predict changes in the future. Further, the quality of 

component schedules varied for certain practices. These issues raise 

questions about the program’s 70 percent joint cost and schedule 

confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date. Until the program office 

develops a complete integrated schedule and addresses weaknesses in 

component schedules, it will lack the information needed to effectively 

monitor development progress and ensure the planned JPSS-1 launch 

date. 

NOAA has taken steps to mitigate an anticipated gap in polar afternoon 

satellite data, but its efforts are incomplete. Specifically, the agency has 

not yet established a comprehensive contingency plan that identifies 

specific actions with defined roles and responsibilities, timelines, and 

triggers for contingency strategies. Moreover, the agency’s recent 

assessment of a larger set of alternatives has not yet been integrated with 

its mitigation plans. As a result, the agency faces important decisions as 

to whether and how the various alternatives should be carried out. While 

NOAA plans to add alternatives to its mitigation plan by fall 2013, it does 

not yet have plans to add the other key components. Until NOAA 

establishes a comprehensive contingency plan that addresses these 

shortfalls, its plan for mitigating potential gaps in the polar orbit may not 

be effective in avoiding significant impacts to NOAA’s weather mission.

Conclusions
Page 40 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Given the importance of having reliable schedules for managing JPSS 

satellite launch dates and the significance of polar-orbiting satellite data to 

weather forecasts, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct 

the Administrator of NOAA to 

• track the extent to which key groups of satellite data users are using 

S-NPP and JPSS products, and obtain feedback on these products; 

• establish a complete JPSS program integrated master schedule that 

includes a logically linked sequence of activities;

• address the shortfalls in the ground system and spacecraft 

component schedules outlined in this report;

• after completing the integrated master schedule and addressing 

shortfalls in component schedules, update the joint cost and schedule 

confidence level for JPSS-1, if warranted and justified;

• establish a comprehensive contingency plan for potential satellite data 

gaps in the polar orbit that is consistent with contingency planning 

best practices identified in this report. The plan should include, for 

example, specific contingency actions with defined roles and 

responsibilities, timelines, and triggers; analysis of the impact of lost 

data from the morning orbits; and identification of opportunities to 

accelerate the calibration and validation phase of JPSS-1.

We sought comments on a draft of our report from the Department of 

Commerce and NASA. We received written comments from Commerce 

transmitting NOAA’s comments. NOAA concurred with all five of our 

recommendations and identified steps that it is taking to implement them. 

It also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into our 

report, as appropriate. NOAA’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV. 

NASA did not provide comments on the report’s findings or 

recommendations, but noted that it would provide any input it might have 

to NOAA for inclusion in NOAA’s comments.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 

of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other 

interested parties. In addition, this report will be available on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Page 41 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

David A. Powner

Director, Information Technology

 Management Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) progress in meeting the Joint Polar 

Satellite System (JPSS) program’s objectives of sustaining the continuity 

of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite system through the Suomi National 

Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP) and JPSS satellites, (2) evaluate the 

quality of the JPSS program schedule, and (3) assess NOAA's plans to 

address potential gaps in polar satellite data.

To evaluate NOAA's progress in meeting JPSS program objectives, we 

assessed (1) the status of activities supporting the operational S-NPP 

satellite, (2) progress on efforts to develop the JPSS-1 satellite, and (3) 

recent changes in JPSS program scope. A more detailed description of 

our activities in each of these areas follows.

• S-NPP progress: We reviewed monthly program reports to identify 

the status of key upgrades to the ground system supporting S-NPP 

and the efforts to transition operational control of the satellite to 

NOAA. In addition, we compared the program’s current estimated 

completion dates for S-NPP products to original program estimates for 

when the products would be available for operational use. We 

compared program office information on the extent to which S-NPP 

products were being used to best practices in evaluating the use of 

completed products. We also interviewed program officials about 

algorithm maturity and the extent to which users are using S-NPP 

products.

• JPSS-1 progress: We analyzed plans and reports on system 

development efforts for the JPSS-1 satellite. Specifically, we reviewed 

the JPSS-1 mission preliminary design review package to assess 

completion of work on the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system 

as well as cost, schedule, and technical performance for the JPSS-1 

satellite. We also examined JPSS program office monthly status 

reports on system development progress to identify variances and 

corrective actions being taken to address the most critical issues and 

risks to the program. We interviewed JPSS program officials to 

discuss system development status. We assessed the reliability of 

reported milestone dates for top-level milestones by examining 

multiple project status reports at different points in time for consistent 

reporting of dates or explanations of any changes and compared 

reported dates to source schedule data. We determined that the 

milestone data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes.

• Changes in JPSS program scope: We compared the program’s 

requirements as of September 2011 to the program’s updated plans 

and requirements as of May 2013 to identify key changes and to 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

assess whether changes in capabilities have impacted program goals 

and objectives. We interviewed program officials about changes in the 

JPSS program’s scope. We assessed the reliability of the program’s 

estimated savings from program scope changes by comparing them 

to program documentation on prior and current cost estimates and 

found that the estimates were sufficient for our purposes. 

To evaluate the quality of NOAA's program schedule, we used an 

exposure draft of GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide1 to assess 

schedule management practices and characteristics of selected 

contractor schedules. We selected and analyzed three component 

contractor schedules—the ground system, the spacecraft, and the 

Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite instrument—because these 

schedules represented the critical path for flight and the entire ground 

system development schedule that was either already or likely to be 

driving the JPSS-1 satellite launch date. We also analyzed schedule 

metrics as a part of that analysis to highlight potential areas of strengths 

and weakness in, among other things, schedule logic, use of resources, 

task duration, float, and task completion. In order to assess each 

schedule against the ten best practices, we traced and verified underlying 

support and determined whether the program office or contractor 

provided a small portion, about half, a large portion, or complete evidence 

that satisfied the criterion and assigned a score depicting that the 

practices were met, minimally met, partially met, substantially met, or fully 

met. By examining the schedules against our guidance, we conducted a 

reliability assessment on each of the schedules and incorporated our 

findings on reliability limitations in the analysis of each component 

schedule. We reviewed documentation on a schedule risk assessment 

the JPSS program office conducted on JPSS-1 flight project schedules to 

identify assumptions and results of its analysis and to assess the 

reliability of the reported JPSS joint cost and schedule confidence level. 

We interviewed government and contractor officials to discuss reasons for 

observed shortfalls in schedule management practices. We determined 

that the schedules were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes

and our report notes the instances where reliability concerns affect the 

quality of the schedules as well as the program’s schedule risk 

assessment. 

 1 GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO-12-120G

(exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

To assess plans to address potential gaps in polar satellite data, we 

reviewed NOAA’s October 2012 polar satellite gap mitigation plan and a 

subsequent technical assessment as well as NOAA’s plans for 

implementing recommendations from the assessment. We compared 

elements of the plan and assessment against best practices developed 

from leading government and industry sources such as the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology, the Software Engineering 

Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration, and our prior report. 

Based on that analysis, we identified shortfalls in NOAA’s current plans 

as well as key remaining activities for the agency to accomplish. We 

interviewed NOAA headquarters staff and JPSS program officials about 

the technical assessment and their plans.

We performed our work at NASA and NOAA offices in the Washington, 

D.C. area. We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 

through September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: NOAA Plans to Transfer Selected 

JPSS Program Components to the Polar Free 

Flyer Program

Page 45 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

In order to reduce Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program costs and 

increase the program’s focus on its weather mission, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to transfer key 

program components to a separate program, called the Polar Free Flyer 

program. After establishing JPSS in 2010, NOAA committed to 

developing three units of the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor 

(TSIS) and to finding a spacecraft and launch accommodation for three 

instruments that would not be on the JPSS satellite: TSIS, the Advanced 

Data Collection System (A-DCS), and the Search and Rescue SatelliteAided Tracking (SARSAT) system. As of June 2012, the JPSS program 

planned to launch two stand-alone satellites (called free flyers) to 

accommodate two suites of these instruments. However, NOAA recently 

made several decisions that affect these commitments, and expects to 

finalize these plans by the end of September 2013:

• NOAA plans to transfer responsibility for developing TSIS and 

accommodating the launch of the three instruments out of the JPSS 

program and into a newly established Polar Free Flyer program. 

According to JPSS program officials, a transition plan for the new 

program is under review and selected staff positions have been filled.

• The Polar Free Flyer program will deliver a single free flyer mission 

instead of the two missions planned under the JPSS program.

• NOAA will transfer the responsibility for developing the second TSIS 

instrument to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), rely on an Air Force Global Positioning System mission to 

continue SARSAT coverage, and find a launch vehicle to 

accommodate an additional A-DCS instrument.

• NOAA plans to use the JPSS ground system to support the Polar 

Free Flyer Program. 

The JPSS program plans to award a contract in fiscal year 2014 for a 

spacecraft that is to accommodate the TSIS, A-DCS, and SARSAT 

instruments. The three instruments are in development and testing, and 

are expected to be delivered to the satellite by 2015. The planned launch 

readiness date for the free-flyer mission was originally July 2016, but that 

date may change pending the outcome of the spacecraft contract award. 

Also, the program is looking to share a launch vehicle with some other 

mission to reduce launch costs. However, the program office is not aware 

of any ride-sharing opportunities that could accommodate the mission’s 

planned launch readiness date.

Appendix II: NOAA Plans to Transfer 

Selected JPSS Program Components to the 

Polar Free Flyer Program
Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component 

Schedules Implementation of Best Practices in 

Scheduling

Page 46 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

The following tables identify detailed assessments of the extent to which 

three component schedules supporting the JPSS-1 schedule met the ten 

best practices and four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable schedule. 

Table 12 provides an assessment of the ground system contractor’s 

schedule, which integrates activities from seven components of the 

ground system; table 13 provides an assessment of the spacecraft 

contractor’s detailed schedule; and table 14 provides an assessment of 

the VIIRS contractor’s detailed schedule.

The following information describes the key that we used in tables 12

through 14 to convey the results of our assessment of the schedules’ 

consistency with an exposure draft of GAO best practices for schedule 

management.1

● Met: The program office or contractor provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.

◕ Substantially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a large portion 

of the criterion.

◑ Partially met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies about half of the 

criterion.

◔ Minimally met: The program office or contractor provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of 

the criterion.

○ Not met: The program office or contractor provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion.

Table 12: Detailed Assessment of Ground System Schedule Quality

Schedule characteristic or 

best practice

GAO 

assessment Examples of strengths and weaknesses 

Comprehensive

Capturing all activities ◕ The schedule largely reflects the statement of work. However, the schedule only partially 

reflects the work breakdown structure and includes 40 activities that are marked as both 

summary activities and milestones.

Assigning resources to all 

activities

◕ The contractor has established a clear process for integrating information between the 

schedule and the resource management software. However, resource leveling has been 

performed outside of the schedule, which limits the effectiveness of the process.

Establishing the duration of 

all activities

◕ According to the contractor, durations were estimated by the people responsible for the 

activities based on work to be done. Additionally, calendars were used to specify valid 

working times for all activities. However, over 35 percent of the activities in the schedule 

were of long duration, and only half of these were justified in schedule documentation.

 1 GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO-12-120G

(exposure draft) (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).

Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS 

Component Schedules Implementation of 

Best Practices in Scheduling
Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component 

Schedules Implementation of Best Practices in 

Scheduling

Page 47 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Schedule characteristic or 

best practice

GAO 

assessment Examples of strengths and weaknesses 

Well-constructed

Sequencing all activities ◕ A majority of the activities in the schedule had dependencies, and the schedule’s 

relationships were largely finish-to-start. However, program officials did not justify in 

schedule documentation the small number of activities with missing dependencies, date 

constraints, and lags.

Confirming that the critical 

path is valid

◔ The critical path and driving path are not fully valid because they are not free of long 

activities, constraints, and lags. Moreover, considering the schedule as a whole, the 

schedule software may not be calculating the true critical path of the project because the 

use of more than 800 constraints. These may result in float values that present an 

unrealistic view of the critical path.

Ensuring reasonable total 

float

◑ According to contractor officials, float values have been assessed as part of regularly 

scheduled health checks and they have determined that for certain cases float values 

are necessarily high. However, not all float values calculated by the schedule are 

reasonable and many values do not accurately reflect true schedule flexibility. 

Additionally, the JPSS program office did not provide a documented assessment of total 

float values that appear to be excessive to show that the team agrees with the logic and 

that the float is consistent with the plan.

Credible

Verifying that the schedule 

can be traced horizontally 

and vertically

◑ The schedule is vertically traceable in all but one of the milestones that we reviewed, 

meaning that it allows activity owners to trace activities to higher-level milestones with 

intermediate and summary schedules. However, the schedule is not fully horizontally 

traceable—that is, although the schedule includes giver/receiver milestones that are 

defined in the schedule documentation, the schedule was not always affected by 

activities whose durations were extended by hundreds of days. 

Conducting a schedule risk 

analysis

◔ The contractor conducted a schedule risk analysis with a schedule network that partially 

meets the characteristics associated with a good schedule network, as well three point 

duration estimates that were captured from control account managers. However, the 

analysis was conducted for select near-term milestones—not to the readiness of the 

ground system for the launch of JPSS-1. Additionally, the analysis did not include risks 

most likely to delay the project, the paths or activities that are most likely to delay the 

project, and the activities that most often ended up on the critical path.

Controlled

Updating the schedule using 

actual progress and logic

◕ Responsibility for changing the schedule has been assigned to someone who has the 

proper training and experience in critical path method scheduling and the schedule is 

free of clearly erroneous progress information. However, although the contractor 

provides a monthly program management briefing that addresses the status of external 

giver/receiver activities, it does not address the status of key milestone dates, changes 

in network logic, or critical paths.

Maintaining a baseline 

schedule

◕ A baseline schedule exists and is compared to the current schedule to track variances

from the plan. According to contractor officials, a formal change control process is used 

to make changes to the baseline. However, the contractor’s rolling wave reports do not 

satisfy all elements of a baseline schedule document. A baseline schedule document is 

a single document that describes, among other things, the organization of the IMS; the 

logic of the network; the basic approach to managing resources; the schedule’s unique 

features; and justification for lags, date constraints, and long activity durations.

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office and contractor schedule data. 
Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component 

Schedules Implementation of Best Practices in 

Scheduling

Page 48 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 13: Detailed Assessment of Spacecraft Schedule Quality

Schedule characteristic or 

best practice

GAO 

assessment Examples of strengths and weaknesses 

Comprehensive

Capturing all activities ◑ The schedule reflects the work necessary to build the spacecraft, and schedule activities 

are mapped to the contract data requirements list and contractor work breakdown 

structure numbers. The schedule contains a low level of detail, which reflects the 

contractor’s role as integrator for multiple vendors in a fixed-price environment. 

However, with a nearly 1:1 ratio of detail activities to milestones, the schedule would 

benefit from increased detail into work activities.

Assigning resources to all 

activities

◕ The contractor has established a clear process for integrating information between the 

schedule and the resource management software. However, resource leveling has been 

performed outside of the schedule, which limits the effectiveness of the process.

Establishing the duration of 

all activities

◑ The contractor has experience in developing spacecraft similar to JPSS-1, including 

S-NPP. Contractor officials stated that they obtained duration estimates for activities 

from engineers that were responsible for them while other engineers conducted peer 

reviews on those estimates. However, durations in general appear too long to facilitate 

objective measurement of accomplished effort. Even accounting for procurement-related 

activities and level-of-effort type recurring meeting activities, one-third of all remaining 

activities are longer than 2 business months.

Well-constructed

Sequencing all activities ◑ The schedule was partially logically sequenced. Approximately 20 percent of all 

remaining activities and milestones were missing predecessor links, successor links or 

both. Officials stated that many of these activities were related to contract data 

requirements list deliveries and internal or external handoffs (called givers/receivers).

We found other areas of questionable sequencing logic. For instance, there are about 10 

percent of remaining activities in the schedule that have lags and leads, including some 

instances of leads with start-to-finish logic—a particularly abnormal logical relationship.

We also found date constraints pervasive throughout the schedule: 140 activities have 

soft constraints and 17 have hard constraints. Hard constraints are useful for calculating 

the amount of float available in the schedule and, therefore, the realism of the required 

project finish date and available resources during schedule development. However, they 

may be abused if they force activities to occur on specific dates that are determined offline without much regard for the realism of the assumptions necessary to achieve them.

Confirming that the critical 

path is valid

◑ The schedule defines activities with zero total float as critical. However, partly because 

of logic issues, the critical path as calculated by the scheduling software was convoluted 

and most likely unreliable. The path includes lags, leads, long-duration activities, and 

activities with hard constraints, which by definition will appear as critical. Officials stated 

they agreed that software-calculated critical paths cannot be relied upon in a complex 

schedule, and said they report the longest (or driving path) to management. Ideally, the 

critical path and the longest path should be the same, but our analysis found the longest 

path to be somewhat different than the default critical path; it does not include several 

activities that appeared on the critical path because of their date constraints. In addition, 

the longest path also includes several near-term, nonprocurement-related activities with 

long durations, spanning between 84 and 365 days.
Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component 

Schedules Implementation of Best Practices in 

Scheduling

Page 49 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Schedule characteristic or 

best practice

GAO 

assessment Examples of strengths and weaknesses 

Ensuring reasonable total 

float

◑ Officials stated that the total float values calculated by the schedule accurately reflect 

true schedule flexibility. However, we found that the schedule appears overly flexible 

due to high amounts of total float. 70 percent of remaining activities and milestones have 

greater than 30 days (about 5 business weeks) of total float. This includes 67 activities 

(8 percent of remaining) with over 1,000 days of float, meaning these activities can slip 

more than 3.5 business years before impacting the planned finish date of the project. 

Without documented justification for high float values in the schedule, it is not clear 

which are explained by milestones without successors, which are due to schedule 

maintenance, and which are due to incomplete logic.

Credible

Verifying that the schedule 

can be traced horizontally 

and vertically

◑ The schedule is vertically traceable, with dates in the detail schedule mapping to higherlevel management briefing charts. The schedule is generally horizontally traceable. The 

schedule clearly identifies givers and receivers and negative total float calculations 

respond appropriately when significant delays are introduced into the network. However, 

negative float is calculated because key milestones are constrained. While the negative

float may be an accurate assessment of potential delay, management may not be aware 

of potential delays when constrained dates are reported in summary-level schedules.

Conducting a schedule risk 

analysis

◑ Officials stated that they follow an internal process to perform schedule risk analyses on 

the schedule. Officials also stated that three-point durations are applied to activities, 

correlation is accounted for, and a Monte Carlo analysis is run on the schedule to derive 

probabilities for forecasted dates. Although the contractor has no contractual 

requirement to share schedule risk analysis results with the JPSS program office, it 

provided a summary of its risk assessment report and instructions. However, this 

summary information did not include supporting details such as risk data inputs and data 

normalization techniques and the contractor did not incorporate correlation or perform 

the schedule risk analysis on a logically sound (well-constructed) schedule.

Controlled

Updating the schedule using 

actual progress and logic

◕ Schedule progress is updated monthly and the schedule is delivered to the JPSS 

program office in accordance with contractual requirements. While a formal schedule 

narrative does not accompany the schedule delivery to the government, much of the 

narrative information—such as the status of key milestones and handoffs, explanations 

for changes in key dates, and an overview of critical and near-critical paths—is 

conveyed in monthly management meetings. However, 26 activities had start or finish 

dates in the past. Of these, 12 activities could be explained by obsolete scope of work. 

We also found 12 out-of-sequence activities, representing 13 percent of in-progress 

activities.

Maintaining a baseline 

schedule

◑ Contractor officials stated that they maintain schedule baseline information in the default 

baseline fields in the schedule and we found that baseline dates were set in the 

schedule. However, a schedule baseline document was not created for the schedule 

baseline. We found 104 activities in the schedule without baseline dates, 72 of which are 

complete or are planned to start by 2014. The majority of start variances appear 

reasonable, but we did find start variances ranging from -221 days (221 days ahead of 

schedule) to 237 days (237 days delayed). Despite the significant variances noted, it is 

commendable that the schedule includes baseline information that allows for analysis 

and monitoring of dates’ variances.

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office and contractor schedule data. 
Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component 

Schedules Implementation of Best Practices in 

Scheduling

Page 50 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 14: Detailed Assessment of VIIRS Schedule Quality

Schedule characteristic or 

best practice

GAO 

assessment Examples of strengths and weaknesses 

Comprehensive

Capturing all activities ◕ The schedule largely reflects the work breakdown structure and statement of work. 

However, the schedule does not reflect work to be performed by a subcontractor and 

includes 10 activities that are marked as both summary activities and milestones. 

Assigning resources to all 

activities

◕ The contractor has established a clear process for integrating information between the 

schedule and the resource management software. However, resource leveling has been 

performed outside of the schedule, which limits the effectiveness of the process.

Establishing the duration of 

all activities

● According to the contractor, durations were estimated by the people responsible for the 

activities based on work to be done, realistic assumptions about available resources, 

productivity, normal interferences and distractions, and reliance on others. Further, the

contractor justified in its schedule documentation virtually all activities with durations 

longer than 44 days.

Well-constructed

Sequencing all activities ◕ All but one activity in the schedule has at least one predecessor and one successor, and 

that activity was justified in the schedule documentation. Additionally, every schedule 

date constraint was justified in schedule documentation. However, the schedule has a 

very small number of activities with dangling logic. Further, although explanations were 

provided for most of the small number of lags, the explanations did not justify their use.

Confirming that the critical 

path is valid

◕ Program office and contractor officials use the driving path to manage the program, 

which is preferred because it represents the activities that are driving the sequence of 

start dates directly affecting the estimated finish date. However, the driving path and the 

critical path to key milestones should be the same, and they are not. Also, the critical 

path is not valid because it contains level of effort activities.

Ensuring reasonable total 

float

◕ The program office has defined reasonable float values, and the values associated with 

the schedule largely fit that definition. For those float values that were not reasonable, 

the program office provided a documented assessment of those values to show that the 

team agrees with the logic and that the float is consistent with the plan. However, the 

schedule has a small number of activities that have unrealistic float values.

Credible

Verifying that the schedule 

can be traced horizontally 

and vertically

◕ The schedule is largely horizontally traceable. In particular, the schedule is affected by 

activities whose durations are extended by hundreds of days, and it includes 

giver/receiver milestones that represent handoffs between contractor integrated project 

teams. However, the schedule does not include all givers/receivers between the 

contractor and the program office. Additionally, the schedule is vertically traceable. 

Specifically, it allows activity owners to trace activities to higher-level milestones with 

intermediate and summary schedules.

Conducting a schedule risk 

analysis

◑ A schedule risk analysis was conducted with a good schedule network, and three point 

duration estimates that were captured from subject matter experts. However, the 

duration estimates did not reflect risks from the project’s risk register and the analysis 

was focused on only the deterministic critical path and near-critical path.
Appendix III: Assessment of JPSS Component 

Schedules Implementation of Best Practices in 

Scheduling

Page 51 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Schedule characteristic or 

best practice

GAO 

assessment Examples of strengths and weaknesses 

Controlled

Updating the schedule using 

actual progress and logic

● Responsibility for changing or updating the schedule has been assigned to someone 

who has the proper training and experience in critical path method scheduling. 

Additionally, the schedule is free of clearly erroneous progress information. Further, the 

contractor provides a schedule narrative accompanying each status update, which 

describes the status of key milestone dates (including the program finish date); 

explanations for changes in key dates; and a description of the critical paths. 

Maintaining a baseline 

schedule

◕ A baseline schedule exists and is compared to the current schedule to track variances. 

However, the contractor did not have a baseline schedule document. A baseline 

schedule document is a single document that describes, among other things, the 

organization of the IMS; the logic of the network; the basic approach to managing 

resources; the schedule’s unique features; and justification for lags, date constraints, 

and long activity durations.

Source: GAO analysis of JPSS program office and contractor schedule data. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce

Page 52 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Commerce
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce

Page 53 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce

Page 54 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 55 GAO-13-676 Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites

David A. Powner (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips (Assistant

Director), Paula Moore (Assistant Director), Shaun Byrnes, Juaná 

Collymore, Lynn Espedido, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, 

Kaelin Kuhn, Jason Lee, Joshua Leiling, and Maria Stattel made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(311278)
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