IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2023 WY 99

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

 October 18, 2023

SHANNON EDWARD STEVENSON,

Appellant 

(Defendant), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 

(Plaintiff).

S-23-0123 

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County 

The Honorable Suzannah G. Robinson, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Shannon E. Stevenson, pro se. 

Representing Appellee:

Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; 

Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Before FOX, C.J., KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ. 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Shannon E. Stevenson, representing himself, appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He asserts he is entitled to credit towards his 

prison sentence for time spent on supervised probation, inclusive of inpatient substance 

abuse treatment and participation in Treatment Court. We affirm the district court’s 

decision.

ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. Stevenson presents a single issue, which we restate as whether the district court 

properly denied Mr. Stevenson’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.

FACTS

[¶3] On August 23, 2019, the State charged Mr. Stevenson with driving under the 

influence more than three times within ten years, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-

233(b)(i) and (e) (2023). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Stevenson entered a guilty 

plea, and the district court sentenced him to five to seven years in prison, suspended for 

three years of probation. One of the conditions of his probation was to attend inpatient 

treatment for substance abuse. Another condition was to attend and successfully complete 

Sweetwater County Treatment Court.

[¶4] Mr. Stevenson attended inpatient treatment and then participated in Treatment 

Court. In 2021, Mr. Stevenson relapsed by using methamphetamine, and the Treatment 

Court sanctioned him with an order to return to inpatient treatment. Mr. Stevenson 

completed approximately six months of additional inpatient treatment, was released to a 

sober living residential program, got a job at a local restaurant, and returned to the 

Treatment Court program. In late February 2022, Mr. Stevenson relapsed, again using

methamphetamine. As a result, the Treatment Court terminated Mr. Stevenson’s 

participation in its program on March 9, 2022. On the same date, the State petitioned to 

revoke Mr. Stevenson’s probation, alleging improper contact with a felon and the use of 

methamphetamine in violation of his probation conditions.

[¶5] Mr. Stevenson admitted to the State’s allegations. The district court revoked Mr. 

Stevenson’s probation and reinstated his sentence but reduced that sentence to only four to 

seven years in prison, with credit for 209 days of presentence confinement—195 days 

served prior to the change of plea in the original proceedings and 14 days served prior to 

the probation revocation hearing.

[¶6] Eight months later, in November 2022, Mr. Stevenson moved to reduce his 

sentence, noting his positive personal development, work in the prison’s kitchens, and 

completion of education classes while incarcerated. He attached a letter to his motion 
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describing his struggles with addiction, his substance abuse treatment efforts, a relapse that 

led to his incarceration, and his efforts to take accountability for his actions. Mr. Stevenson 

presented similar information about his history of substance abuse, treatment, and relapse 

at his initial sentencing hearing and at the probation revocation hearing. On December 13, 

2022, the district court denied the request for a sentence reduction, noting that it already 

reduced Mr. Stevenson’s sentence from five to seven years to four to seven years during

the probation revocation hearing.

[¶7] On December 22, 2022, Mr. Stevenson asked the district court, by letter, to reduce 

his sentence further to reflect credit for his two years of probation which included periods 

of inpatient treatment and participation in Treatment Court. That letter did not cite either 

W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) (for correction of an illegal sentence) or W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) (for sentence 

reduction). The trial court treated the letter as a motion to correct an illegal sentence 

pursuant to Rule 35(a) and denied the motion on January 17, 2023, noting that credit for 

presentence confinement generally does not apply to time spent on probation or in 

treatment: 

Credit for time served is only awarded for time a person serves 

while in “official detention” and “does not include supervision 

on probation” or time spent receiving treatment unless the 

person is a resident in a facility which subjects them to a charge 

of escape from detention. See W.S. § 6-5-201(a)(ii) and White 

v. State, 934 P.2d 745, 747 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶8] A few days later, on January 20, 2023, Mr. Stevenson filed a second motion to 

correct an illegal sentence, again asserting that his time on probation should be credited 

against his sentence, for a total credit of 730 days. He also filed a letter asking the district 

court for the judge’s opinion and “an interpretive ruling” of certain Wyoming statutes 

related to sentencing credits. On the same day, January 20, 2023, the district court denied 

the motion to correct an illegal sentence, citing its prior decision on the same issue. The 

district court also denied the request for an interpretive opinion and cited the rule that courts 

may not issue advisory opinions.

[¶9] Less than one week later, on January 26, 2023, Mr. Stevenson moved a third time 

to correct an illegal sentence, asserting his sentence was illegal because it did not include 

credit for his time on probation. On January 30, 2023, the district court denied the motion, 

explaining it already ruled on the same issue twice through Mr. Stevenson’s previous 

filings and his third motion was therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

[¶10] Mr. Stevenson timely appealed the January 17, 2023 order that denied his first 

request to correct an illegal sentence. He did not appeal the district court’s January 20, 

2023 order denying his second motion to correct an illegal sentence and the request for an 
3 

advisory opinion or the January 30, 2023 order denying his third motion to correct an illegal 

sentence. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

[¶11] We review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. Greene v. State, 2023 WY 72, ¶ 5, 532 P.3d 1061, 1062 (Wyo. 2023) (citation 

omitted). However, whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law we review de novo. 

Hiltner v. State, 2023 WY 82, ¶ 10, 534 P.3d 452, 454 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Hicks v. State, 

2018 WY 15, ¶ 10, 409 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 2018)); Best v. State, 2022 WY 25, ¶ 5, 

503 P.3 641, 643 (Wyo. 2022). 

DISCUSSION 

[¶12] Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) allows a court to correct an illegal 

sentence at any time. A sentence that does not include proper credit for presentence

confinement is an illegal sentence. Hiltner, 2023 WY 82, ¶ 10, 534 P.3d at 454 (quoting

Dax v. State, 2012 WY 40, ¶ 7, 272 P.3d 319, 320 (Wyo. 2012)); Cruzen v. State, 2023 

WY 5, ¶ 11, 523 P.3d 301, 304 (Wyo. 2023). 

[¶13] A defendant is entitled to credit for “presentence confinement” pursuant to 

W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E)–(F). “Presentence confinement” is defined as “incarceration for 

inability and failure to post bond on the offense for which the sentence is entered[.]” Sweets 

v. State, 2001 WY 126, ¶ 5, 36 P.3d 1130, 1131 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Renfro v. State, 785 

P.2d 491, 498 n.8 (Wyo. 1990)); see also Candelario v. State, 2016 WY 75, ¶ 6, 375 P.3d 

1117, 1118 (Wyo. 2016). This rule is designed to avoid violating principles of 

constitutional equal protection when pre-sentence confinement occurs due to indigency. 

Asch v. State, 784 P.2d 235, 236–37 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted).

[¶14] The law is well-settled that time spent on probation—or in treatment as a condition 

of probation—is not presentence confinement, unless the defendant, “as a probation 

condition, is placed in an environment from which a charge of escape would lie” under 

Wyoming’s several escape from detention statutes. E.g., Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 

363–64 (Wyo. 1992) (discussing the crimes of escape from detention codified at Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 7-18-112 and § 6-5-206). Under those circumstances, the defendant would be 

entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he spent in that environment. Yearout v.

State, 2013 WY 133, ¶ 8, 311 P.3d 180, 182 (Wyo. 2013); Blouir v. State, 950 P.2d 53, 55 

(Wyo. 1997); Kupec, 835 P.2d at 363; Prejean v. State, 794 P.2d 877, 878–79 (Wyo. 1990). 

We recognized this exception most recently in Hiltner in relation to inpatient treatment—

if an order to participate in a substance abuse treatment program includes language that the 

defendant was considered in official detention while at the treatment facility, then he may 
4

be entitled to credit against his sentence. 2023 WY 82, ¶ 12, 534 P.3d at 454 (discussing 

Hutton v. State, 2018 WY 88, ¶ 16, 422 P.3d 967, 971 (Wyo. 2018)).

[¶15] Mr. Stevenson asserts that certain probation conditions (residential treatment and 

Treatment Court) place a probationer under such supervision and authority of the State that 

the probation is also “custody” pursuant to various statutes which entitles him to credit for 

presentence confinement.1

 After reviewing the record and the terms of Mr. Stevenson’s 

probation, we find no indication that his probation, or his time in treatment or in Treatment 

Court as conditions of that probation, would subject him to a charge of escape from 

detention if he left either program. His time on probation and in treatment therefore cannot 

be considered presentence confinement.

[¶16] Mr. Stevenson also asserts the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for 

Criminal Justice require an award of credit towards his sentence for time spent on 

probation. That is not what the ABA Standards provide. Standard 18-7.3 addresses the 

authority of a sentencing court to resentence an offender, previously sentenced to a 

compliance program, after that offender violates that sentence. In his initial sentencing, 

Mr. Stevenson was required to complete a compliance program inclusive of inpatient 

treatment and Treatment Court, and he admitted he violated those requirements. The ABA 

Standard recommends that for resentencing, the trial court:

determine explicitly the extent to which an offender’s 

substantial compliance with the requirements or conditions of 

the initial sentence is to be credited toward the requirements or 

conditions of a resentence. In determining the severity of a 

resentence, a sentencing court should take into account an 

offender’s substantial compliance with the initial sentence that 

cannot be credited toward a resentence.

ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-7.3(d)(iii) (3d ed. 1994). The trial court did so 

in this case—at the probation revocation hearing, the trial court acknowledged Mr. 

Stevenson’s history of treatment during probation and then reduced his sentence by one 

year.

CONCLUSION

[¶17] The district court correctly concluded Mr. Stevenson was not entitled to credit for 

time he spent on probation when he was resentenced in a probation revocation proceeding. 

We affirm. 

1 Mr. Stevenson relies, in part, on the statutes for credit to parolees. A parolee is a prisoner or an inmate of 

an institution who has been granted parole. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(viii). Mr. Stevenson was not a 

parolee at the time of sentencing.