1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

SHANDA MATHIS, et al., 

 Case No. 2:11-cv-395 

 Plaintiff, JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King 

v. 

 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the following filings: 

1. Defendant National Youth Advocate Program’s (“NYAP”)1 motion for judgment on 

the pleadings and/or summary judgment (ECF No. 47); 

2. Plaintiff Shanda Mathis’s combined opposition to NYAP’s motion for summary 

judgment and motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem for minor Plaintiffs 

(ECF No. 52); and 

3. NYAP’s combined reply in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings 

and/or summary judgment and opposition to Mathis’s motion for appointment of a 

guardian ad litem (ECF No. 53); 

4. NYAP’s motion to strike or exclude Plaintiff Mathis’s expert witness from testifying 

at trial for failure to comply with the Court’s pretrial order (ECF No. 48) and motion 

to quash subpoenas and/or to exclude certain exhibits listed by Plaintiff Mathis from 

use at trial (ECF No. 51); 

 

1

 Plaintiff named the Ohio Youth Advocate Program (“OYAP”) as a defendant in this action. OYAP is now known 

as NYAP. Accordingly, this Court will refer to the Defendant as NYAP. 

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5. Plaintiffs’ combined reply in support the motion for appointment of a guardian ad 

litem and opposition to NYAP’s motions to strike and to quash (ECF No. 54); and 

6. NYAP’s combined reply in support of its motions to strike and to quash (ECF No. 

55). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant NYAP’s motion for 

summary judgment, DENIES Plaintiff Mathis’s motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, 

and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims of the minor children. The Court also 

TERMINATES AS MOOT the motion to strike or exclude Plaintiff’s expert (ECF No. 48) and 

the motion to quash subpoenas and/or exclude certain exhibits (ECF No. 51). 

I. 

Plaintiff Mathis, purportedly on behalf of herself and her five minor children (identified 

as “M.C.,” “M.C.,” “D.C.,” “D.C.,” and “A.C.”), filed this action alleging violation of their 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as violations of the Racketeering Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The gist of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that the Columbus 

Police Department wrongfully seized Mathis’s minor children in July 2007, leading to the 

children being adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary custody of Franklin County 

Children’s Services (“FCCS”).2

 

Neither the Plaintiffs’ Complaint nor the opposition to Defendant NYAP’s motion for 

summary judgment is a model of clarity with regard to the events that give rise to the lawsuit 

filed in this Court. It appears from the record that the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals 

 

2 Plaintiff also alleges that NYAP “committed agaravate [sic] sexual abuse of minors [sic] Plaintiffs 

where they were aware of Sexual violator/offender orders to stay away from minors.” (Compl., ECF No. 

3 at PageID# 11.) In her opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff mentions “gross sexual imposition” 

as a basis of her claims. But apart from these fleeting references, Plaintiff Mathis makes no reference to 

this theory of liability, much less present any evidence concerning what sexual abuse or “gross sexual 

imposition” allegedly occurred. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff bases any claims upon purported 

sexual abuse, the Court deems the claim(s) abandoned. 

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affirmed the adjudication of Plaintiff Mathis’s minor children as neglected and dependent, as 

well as the award of temporary custody of the children to FCCS. In the Matter of M.C., 10th 

Dist. Nos. 08AP-327, 08AP-328 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009) (slip opinion). The state court of 

appeals’ opinion summarizes the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ claims as follows: 

By separate complaints, a case worker from the Ohio Youth Advocate 

Program (“OYAP”) alleged that [Mathis’s] children were neglected and 

dependent children pursuant to [Ohio] R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) and 2151.04(C), 

respectively. According to the complainant, on July 6, 2007, police officers found 

[Mathis’s] children in a car n [sic] a parking lot in downtown Columbus, Ohio. 

When police officers found appellant’s children, the five younger children were in 

the care of their older half-sibling, who was about 12 years old at the time. 

[Mathis] and one of her sisters purportedly had left the children for approximately 

one and one-half hours while they looked for assistance because [Mathis’s] car 

had become disabled. When [Mathis] and her sister returned, [Mathis] was 

allegedly uncooperative with police officers who were concerned about the 

children’s welfare. 

The complainant also alleged that on July 9, 2007, while investigating a 

call, police officers found [Mathis], her sister, and all six children asleep in a car 

in a parking lot during the early predawn hours. When questioned by police, 

[Mathis] purportedly stated they had been waiting for a friend who had agreed to 

allow them to stay with her. However, [Mathis] allegedly was unable to provide 

police officers with the name or address of this friend. Because there was 

insufficient safety restraints in the car to permit [Mathis] and all the other 

occupants to drive away safely, police took the children to FCCS where [Mathis] 

allegedly became uncooperative. At some point, [Mathis] allegedly informed an 

FCCS worker that she was being “stalked” by a woman in Toledo, Ohio, who 

purportedly sabotaged efforts by other people to assist her. The complainant 

further alleged that [Mathis] lacked stable housing, failed to complete a requested 

psychological evaluation, and failed to attend a case review meeting. 

Finding sufficient information to proceed and that FCCS had made 

reasonable efforts to prevent the continued removal of the children from their 

home, the juvenile court, through a magistrate, placed the children in the 

temporary custody of FCCS and ordered [Mathis] to submit to a psychological 

evaluation. The juvenile court also appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. 

[Mathis] thereafter moved to dismiss the action, which the juvenile court, through 

a magistrate, later denied. 

After the juvenile court, through a magistrate, held an adjudicatory hearing 

. . . , the magistrate found all six children to be neglected and dependent children. 

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Id. at 3-4. 

 Plaintiff Mathis filed the complaint in this action on May 9, 2011, nearly four years after 

the events giving rise to her claims. The Complaint alleges (1) violation of Plaintiffs’ rights 

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution based on the 

purportedly unlawful seizure of the minor children and (2) a federal RICO claim based upon a 

purported theory that Defendants “kidnapped” her minor children through racketeering activity. 

(Compl., ECF No. 3 at PageID# 10-11.) Plaintiff Mathis purported to bring the Complaint on 

behalf of herself and her minor children. (Id.at PageID # 10.) Plaintiffs’ Complaint named the 

Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”), FCCS, and the NYAP as Defendants. 

(Id.) This Court previously dismissed all claims against ODJFS and FCCS in this action, leaving 

NYAP as the only remaining Defendant. (ECF No. 25.) The matter is now before the Court on 

NYAP’s dispositive motion, which the Court granted leave for NYAP to file. (ECF No. 41.) 

II. 

Defendant NYAP has styled its motion one for “judgment on the pleadings and/or 

summary judgment.” (ECF No. 47.) The Court will treat this motion as a motion for summary 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial 

burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the court must draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air 

Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). 

When the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant can escape summary 

judgment by designating specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Kimble v. 

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Wasylyshyn, 439 Fed. Appx. 492, 2011 WL 4469612, at *3 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party 

maintaining that a fact is genuinely disputed to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the 

record”); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another 

party’s assertion of fact” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the 

motion”). “The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Lee v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 

432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011). The nonmoving party must direct the court to evidence 

upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find in her favor. Id. “When a motion for summary 

judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a 

showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is 

appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). 

III. 

A. Minor Children as Plaintiffs 

The Complaint in this case lists Shanda Mathis and her five minor children as Plaintiffs 

in this case. Mathis purports to bring this action on behalf of herself and the minor children. 

(Compl. , ECF No. 3, at PageID# 10.) In its motion for summary judgment, NYAP urges that 

the children’s claims must be dismissed because Mathis is a non-attorney and, therefore, cannot 

bring claims “pro se” on behalf of her children. The Court agrees with NYAP. 

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1654 provides that parties “may plead and conduct their own cases 

personally or by counsel,” the statute does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se on behalf of 

interests other than their own. Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 

Curtis v. Hamby, No. 5:12-cv-13, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131832, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 

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2013); Mitchell v. Taylor, No. 3:13-cv-569, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93304, at *2-3 (M.D. Tenn. 

July 3, 2013). “Consequently, in a civil rights action, ‘parents cannot appear pro se on behalf on 

their minor children because a minor’s personal cause of action is her own and does not belong 

to her parent or representative.’” Id. (quoting Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970). 

Plaintiff Mathis, as the mother of the minor children, is not entitled to bring this action on 

behalf of her children without legal representation by counsel. It is therefore appropriate to 

dismiss the minor children’s claims without prejudice. Id. See also Bender v. Metro Nashville 

Bd. of Edn., No. 3:13-cv-470, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100545, at *7-8 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 

2013) (dismissing without prejudice claims brought by parents on son’s behalf); Bethel v. 

Middletown City School Dist., No. 1:11-cv-206, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54179, at *5-6 (S.D. 

Ohio Apr. 21, 2011) (dismissing without prejudice claims brought by parents on behalf of minor 

children). 

To avert dismissal of her children’s claims, Mathis asks this Court to appoint a guardian 

ad litem. (ECF No. 52.) But this request is a nonsequitur to the issue actually before the Court. 

Even if this Court were inclined to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the minor children’s 

interests, that would not solve the problem at hand. Whether it is Mathis or the guardian ad litem 

who is representing the interests of the minor children, the children cannot bring their claims in 

this action without the assistance of counsel. There is no reason to delay the disposition of this 

case to appoint a guardian ad litem; the obstacle to Mathis’s ability to bring her children’s claims 

is not the necessity of a guardian ad litem but, rather, the necessity of counsel. The Court will 

not delay the disposition of this case in order to undertake the unnecessary action of appointing a 

guardian ad litem. 

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For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims of the 

minor Plaintiffs in this action and DENIES Plaintiff Mathis’s motion for appointment of a 

guardian ad litem. 

B. Section 1983 

Having dismissed without prejudice the claims asserted on behalf of the minor children, 

the Court proceeds to address the propriety of summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff 

Mathis’s claims brought on her own behalf. Mathis purports to bring a civil rights claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result 

of the incidents leading to the “illegal seizure” of her minor children in 2007. See, e.g., Vinson v. 

Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 200-01 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding a cognizable § 

1983 claim based on deprivation of a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right “in the custody of 

her children”). 

1. NYAP as a “Conspirator” with a State Actor 

To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) conduct by an individual 

acting under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprives the plaintiff of a right secured 

under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 

155 (1978). NYAP argues that it cannot be held liable under § 1983 because it is a private nonprofit corporation. NYAP argues that it is a strictly private organization that contracts with 

FCCS to provide care to assist troubled youth and their families, “with the goal of strengthening 

and reunifying families.” (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 47 at PageID# 246; Timmerman Aff. ¶ 2, ECF 

No. 47-1 at PageID# 386-87.) NYAP provides services including foster care placement, mental 

health counseling, drug and alcohol treatment, housekeeping assistance, and other services to 

assist families. (Timmerman Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 47-1 at PageID# 387.) 

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In opposing NYAP’s motion for summary judgment, Mathis attempts to establish the 

“state action” component of her § 1983 claim through the theory that NYAP was a “coconspirator” of FCCS in the actions of which she complains. Where a plaintiff claims 

cooperation or concerted action between state and private actors, the private actor may qualify as 

a state actor and therefore be subject to liability under § 1983. Memphis, Tenn. Area Local, Am. 

Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 905 (6th Cir. 2004). In 

order to hold a private person liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the private actor 

willfully participated in joint action with those acting under color of law. Id. A plaintiff must 

prove a § 1983 conspiracy by showing that (1) a single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a 

general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and (3) an overt 

act was committed. Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007). Rarely in a 

conspiracy case will there be direct evidence of an express agreement among public and private 

actors to violate a person’s constitutional rights; thus, “circumstantial evidence may provide 

adequate proof of conspiracy.” Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 528 (6th Cir. 2000). But in 

order to overcome summary judgment, Mathis has the burden to come forward with some 

evidence from which to infer that the defendants acted in concert in their unlawful acts. Jackim 

v. Sam’s East, Inc., 378 F. App’x 556, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2010) 

The problem with Mathis’s claim is that she has failed to come forward with evidence to 

support the inference of a “conspiracy” to deprive her of her constitutional rights. Mathis’s 

opposition to summary judgment complains of the conduct of the Columbus Police Department 

in the allegedly unlawful traffic stop that started the series of events that eventually led to FCCS 

obtaining temporary custody of Mathis’s minor children. (Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 52 at PageID# 

616.) Mathis further complains that FCCS “forcibly separated” her from her children and 

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committed “fraud upon the court” in bringing the neglect and dependency action in the Ohio 

juvenile court. (Id. at PageID# 617-18.) Mathis asks the Court to infer a “conspiracy” from the 

“fraudulent” neglect and dependency complaint. 

Mere allegations of conspiracy are not enough to establish that NYAP acted under color 

of state law. In response to NYAP’s motion for summary judgment, Mathis came forward with 

no evidence to support her claim of conspiracy. When opposing summary judgment, the 

nonmoving party must support her assertions of a genuinely disputed fact “citing to particular 

parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored 

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or 

other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Mathis attaches a number of documents to her 

opposition (some authenticated, some not), but none of them helps her theory that there was a 

vast conspiracy involving NYAP to seize her children. 

Notably, Plaintiff’s response to NYAP’s summary judgment is largely devoid of any 

allegations specific to NYAP’s involvement. It appears that Mathis’s sole basis for alleging 

NYAP to be a “coconspirator” is the fact that it was an NYAP caseworker who filed the original 

complaint of neglect and dependency with the state juvenile court. But there is simply no 

evidence of Mathis’s theory that NYAP conspired with FCCS and the Columbus Police to 

deprive her of custody of her children. Without more, Mathis has failed to set forth the requisite 

material facts from which a reasonable trier of fact can infer a “conspiracy.” To paraphrase the 

Sixth Circuit, the logical path from Mathis’s allegations to a conclusion that NYAP acted in 

concert with a state actor to deprive her of her rights relies not on evidence or even a reasonable 

inference, but on pure fantasy. Jackim, 378 F. App’x at 565. 

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For these reasons alone, Mathis’s claim under § 1983 cannot withstand summary 

judgment. 

2. Statute of Limitations 

Even assuming that Mathis’s § 1983 claim were supported by evidence, she faces another 

problem. NYAP argues that the § 1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court 

agrees. 

In § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the statute of limitations from the state’s general 

personal injury statute. See Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 

2003). In this case, Plaintiff Mathis argues that Defendants conspired to violate her rights 

beginning on July 9, 2007, at the latest, when she “was forcibly separated from” her children. 

(Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 52, at PageID# 616.) Mathis filed this action, however, on May 9, 2011, 

well more than two years after the events giving rise to her claim. On its face, Mathis’s claim is 

therefore time-barred. 

In response to the statute-of-limitation argument, Mathis claims that the statute of 

limitations was tolled under Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.16 until May 6, 2009, when Mathis alleges 

she was found to be of sound mind. (Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 52, at PageID# 627.) “When the 

statute of limitations is borrowed from state law, so too are the state’s tolling provisions, except 

when they are ‘inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under 

consideration.’” Bishop v. Children’s Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 537 

(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980)). Here, NYAP 

does not argue that applying Ohio’s tolling provision for periods of “unsound mind” would be 

inconsistent with the federal policy underlying § 1983. Rather, NYAP argues simply that Mathis 

has not presented evidence to support her argument for tolling. 

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On this point, NYAP is correct. Mathis vaguely asserts that “Defendants did not 

adjudicate Plaintiff to be of sound mind until May 6, 2009.” (ECF No. 52, at PageID# 627.) 

Here, Mathis is referring to the fact that she could not regain custody over her children unless she 

“submitted to psychological evaluation where there was [sic] issues of mental disability or 

mental history or threat of harm or injury of minor Plaintiffs.” (Id. at PageID# 632.) But this 

circumstance does not entitle Mathis to toll the statute of limitations. 

None of the Defendants is a court of law, leaving it a mystery as to how any of them 

could adjudicate anything, much less Mathis’s mental capacity between July 2007 and May 

2009. And Mathis does not offer any evidence in opposition to summary judgment to 

demonstrate her argument for tolling (i.e., evidence suggesting she was of unsound mind). 

Indeed, Mathis does just the opposite: she adamantly contends that she was not of unsound mind, 

even arguing that the doctor who evaluated her found no need for mental health services to be 

provided. (Id.) If anything, Mathis’s arguments suggest the absence of tolling, not the 

applicability of it. 

Absent evidence from which it could be inferred as a factual matter that Mathis was of 

unsound mind until May 6, 2009, Mathis cannot establish the applicability of tolling under Ohio 

Rev. Code § 2305.16. Summary judgment in NYAP’s favor on Mathis’s § 1983 claim is 

therefore appropriate on statute-of-limitations grounds. 

C. RICO 

Plaintiff Mathis also alleges in her Complaint a claim under RICO. RICO provides that 

it “shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or 

the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly 

or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity” 

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or to conspire to engage in such activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). An “enterprise” includes 

any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group 

of individuals associated in fact, although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “Racketeering 

activity” includes any act that is indictable as a violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes. 18 U 

.S.C. § 1961(1). “A ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ is defined as requiring at least two acts of 

racketeering activity,” as predicate offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The predicate offenses must 

be ones “indictable under” a number of federal criminal statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); see also 

BAC Home Loans Servicing LP v. Fall Oaks Farm LLC, 848 F. Supp. 818, 828 (S.D. Ohio 

2012). 

Private parties who have been injured by a violation of § 1962 of the RICO statute may 

bring a civil suit in federal court to collect damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also Beck v. 

Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000). A civil RICO claim has four elements: “‘(1) conduct (2) of an 

enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 

465 F.3d 719, 723 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 

(1985)). 

NYAP argues that Mathis cannot show there was an “enterprise.” To satisfy the 

“enterprise” element, Mathis contends that “any informal group” constitutes an “enterprise” for 

purposes of RICO. (ECF No. 52, at PageID# 628.) To show such an enterprise, however, 

Mathis needs to show evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, that functions as 

a continuing unit. “From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise 

must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with 

the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s 

purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009); see also United States v. Turkette, 

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452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (describing an association-in-fact enterprise as “a group of persons 

associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct”). Mathis’s 

opposition to summary judgment provides no evidence in support of any of these features. Her 

theory seems to be simply that NYAP acted in concert with FCCS, ODJFS, and/or the Columbus 

Police Department to commit “fraud upon the court” and remove Mathis’s minor children from 

her custody (which Mathis characterizes as a “kidnapping”). Absent any evidence from which to 

infer an “enterprise” to conduct racketeering activity, Mathis cannot establish a RICO claim. 

Moreover, Mathis’s ability to show an “enterprise” is further undermined by this Court’s 

prior ruling that the other Defendants originally named in this case—FCCS and ODJFS—cannot 

be held liable under RICO as a matter of law because these entities cannot form the requisite 

intent necessary to establish a RICO claim as a matter of law. (Opinion and Order, ECF No. 25 

at PageID# 139-40.) Accordingly, this Court has found that FCCS and ODJFS cannot, as a 

matter of law, be part of a RICO “enterprise.” Without these parties, NYAP is left as the only 

RICO defendant. NYAP, by itself, cannot be an “enterprise.” 

Mathis’s RICO is also deficient for the absence of sufficient evidence to support a theory 

that NYAP participated in any “predicate acts” of racketeering activity. Mathis relies on three 

alleged predicate acts—“kidnapping,” “extortion,” and “obstruction of justice.” (ECF No. 52 at 

PageID# 635.) But Mathis has no evidence to support her fantastical theory that NYAP and the 

other Defendants engaged in a grand scheme to concoct a neglect and dependency action and 

fraudulently induce the juvenile court to grant temporary custody of Mathis’s children to FCCS. 

The summary judgment evidence before the Court shows: 

 FCCS initiated an action of neglect and dependency when Columbus police alerted 

them about concerns over the well-being of Mathis’s children; 

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 after the juvenile court found that Mathis’s children were neglected and dependent, 

FCCS referred the children to NYAP for placement in foster homes; 

 NYAP placed the children in foster homes to provide for their basic needs; and 

 when Mathis fulfilled the requirements of a reunification plan set forth by the juvenile 

court, the children were returned to her. 

(Timmerman Aff. ¶¶ 4-6, ECF No. 47-1 at PageID# 387-88.) 

Mathis’s contention that the juvenile court proceedings were somehow tainted by fraud 

and obstruction of justice are nothing more than conclusory assertions unsupported by evidence. 

There is simply no evidence of any predicate act upon which Mathis can base a RICO claim. 

D. Nonexistent State Law Claims 

NYAP’s motion for summary judgment also addresses Plaintiff Mathis’s state-law 

claims, if any. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 47 at PageID# 259.) Though NYAP does not believe that 

the Complaint alleges state-law claims, NYAP asks the Court to decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over them in the event that the Court grants summary judgment on the federal claims 

in this action. (Id.) For her part, Mathis says that she has pleaded state-law claims under Ohio 

Rev. Code 2151.419, 2151.422(E), and 2907.05. (Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 52 at PageID# 614.) 

There is no need for the Court to formally dismiss state-law claims because none are 

pleaded in this action. Though Plaintiff Mathis’ pro se Complaint is far from a model of clarity, 

it expressly pleads only federal claims based upon (1) the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution and (2) the federal RICO statute. (ECF No. 3 at PageID# 10.) 

The Complaint does not give any semblance of notice to Defendants that there are claims 

brought based on state substantive law. 

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IV. 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court— 

1. DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims of the Plaintiff minor 

children M.C., M.C., D.C., D.C., and A.C.; 

2. GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of Defendant NYAP (ECF No. 

47), granting summary judgment in Defendant NYAP’s favor on the claims of 

Plaintiff Shanda Mathis; 

3. DENIES Plaintiff Mathis’s motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem. 

(ECF No. 52); and 

4. TERMINATES AS MOOT NYAP’s motions to strike or exclude Plaintiff 

Mathis’s expert witness for failure to comply with pretrial order (ECF No. 48) 

and to quash subpoenas and/or to exclude certain exhibits listed by Plaintiff 

(ECF No. 51). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

 GREGORY L. FROST 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case: 2:11-cv-00395-GLF-NMK Doc #: 56 Filed: 10/29/13 Page: 15 of 15 PAGEID #: <pageID>