# FILED

July 10, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JOHN ROBERTSON, ) ) Plaintiff/Appell

ant, )

) Marshall Circuit VS. ) No. 12591 ) TENNESSEE WALKIN

G HORSE ) Appeal No. BREEDERS’ AND EXHIB ITORS’ ) 01A01-9610-CV-00456 ASSOCIATION, ) ) Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUI T COURT FOR MARSHALL COUNTY AT LEWISBURG, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE LEE RUSSELL, JUDGE

For Plaintiff/Ap

pellant : For Defendant/Appellee : Donald E. Paris

h Marc O. Dedman Ivey, Parish & Johns Julie-Karel Elk in Huntingdon, Tennessee Spicer, Flynn & R udstrom Nashville, Tennessee Diane Segroves Bobo, Hunt & Bobo Shelbyville, Tennessee



## AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE-2- 

## O P I N I O N

This appeal arises from a breeder’s expulsion from t he T ennessee Walking HorseBreeders’ and Exhibitors’ Association. The Association revoked the breeder’s membership

and permanently s

us pended his horse regis tration privileges f

or registering

afalse pedigree fo

r two horses. The

breeder sued the

Association in the Circuit Court for Marshall County alle

ging wrongful expulsion

and defamation and seeking reinstatement. A fter con sideri ng the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court gra nted the Association ’s motion and dismissed the case . On this appeal, the bre

eder asserts that t

he Association fail

ed to follow

its ow n bylaws and thereby deprived him of a valuable property ri ght w ithout adequate notice. We have determined that the Associat ion substantially compl ied with its bylaws and rules and provided the breeder with f air notice and an opportuni

ty to be hea rd. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the Associat ion’ s summary judgment m otion.

I.

John Robertson breeds an d exhibits Spotted Tobiano walking horses. He has bred walking horses on his farm near Camden, T ennessee since 1957.Before his expulsio n, he was a member o f the Tennessee W

alking Horse Bree

ders’ and Exhibitors’ Association, a nonp rofit corporation whose purpose is to protect t he industry by maintaining a registry of the pedigrees of Tenness ee walking horses. As
a member of the Ass ociation, Mr. Rob ertson had the

pri vilege of register

ing his walking horses ’ ped igrees which substa ntially increased th

eir sale prices a

nd stud fees.

In 1985, the Associati on began a new progra

m requiring blood typing for each
s tallion foal and stallion used

for production befor

e an owner could re

gist er thei r offspring. Five year s later, t he Association began requiring that stall

ion foals be checked or qualified to

their sire, whic

h means that each co

lt’s blood type

would be checked against

its sire’s blood type. The As sociation broadened t he rule in 1993 to require verifica tion of th e sire and dame of each foa l before it could be reg istered.-3- Th e A ssociation first became concerned abou t Mr. Robertson’s r

egistration practices when the purchaser of one of his horses,

a horse na

med Rock N Roll Parader, attempted to register one of Rock N Roll

Parader’s foals . When blood tests revealed th at Rock N Roll Par ader could not be the f

oal’s sire, the Associatio n compared a photograph of Rock N Roll Parade r submitted with his original registration

documents with a photo

graphof the foal’s sire

and determined that the photographs were of two different horses.

In order to rule out the

possibility of a mistak

e, the Asso ciati on tested Mr. Robertson’s only other spott ed stallion, a horse named Paint Me Delight

. The results of these blood tests w

ere identical to

the tests of another horse named Romeo’s Jet. Even though the registration of Romeo’s Jet listed Delight’s Romeo as the sire, the blood testing ruled out the po ssibility that Deligh t ’s Romeo could be the

sire of Romeo’s Jet. The

Association also disc

overed that the photogr

aphs attached to

the registration

papers for

both Rock N Roll Par

ader and Paint Me D

elight depicted the same horse, althou

gh one of the photographs had been altered sl

ightly.

This information prompte d the Association to

suspect that Mr. Robertson had provided false blood samples, false information, and false photographs to the Association

when registering Rock N Roll Parader and Paint Me Delight.Since this falseregistration affected not only Ro ck N Rol l Parader and Pai nt Me Delight but also their offspring

and other breeders , the Association i nformed Mr. Robe

rtson by letter dated May 12, 1994,

th at disciplinary proc

eedings had been comm

enced and that he had been charged with possible fraudu lent registration of

Rock N Roll Parader and Paint Me Delight. This letter also informed Mr. Robe

rtson that there wo

uld be a hearing and that he

had a right to be

represented by counsel and to call witne sses. Itexplained to him the po ss ible penalties that could be imposed i f he was found to have violated the As sociation’s registr ation rules.

The Association wrote

Mr. Robertson anot

her letter on June 1,

1994 informing h imof the date, time,

and location of the he

aring and again advisi

ng him of his procedural rights. The Assoc iation’s executive d

irector wrote a third le tter to Mr. Robertson

on June 17, 1 994, reminding him of the allegations agai

nst him and enclosing a copy of the Associat ion’s rules and by laws. At the June 27, 1994 hearing, Mr. Robertson

chose to appear without counsel and declined the Association’s offer-4-

to continue the proceedings. On June 28, 1994, the Association informed Mr. Robertson

that his membership had been revoked for v iolation of the As sociat ion’s registration rules and that he could no longe r register horses w

ith the Association.

On May 8, 1995, Mr. R

obertson sued the Association

in the Circuit Court

for Marshall County seeking reinstatement and damages for defamation. Mr. Robertson
move d for a par tial summary judgmen t on his reinstatemen

t claim, and the Association responded with its own summar y judgment motion seekin g dismissal of all cla

ims. The tr ial court granted the Association’s summa

ry judgment motion, a

nd Mr

. Robertson

has appealed. Whi

le he does not contest t

he dismissal of his def

amation claim, he takes issue

with the dismissal of

his claim for

reinstatement as a

member of the Association.

II.

An order granting a motion for summary judgment en joys n o presumption of correctness

on appeal. See City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County , 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn. 1997); McClung v. Delta Square Lt d. Partnership , 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 ( Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, re

viewing courts must m

ake a fresh deter

mination c oncerning whet her the requirements of Ten n. R. Civ. P. 56 have been sat isfied. See Hunt er v . Brown , 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton , 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997). Summary ju dgment s are appropriate

only when there ar

e no genuine factual disputes with regard to the c laim or defense em

bodied in the motion and

when the moving party is en titled to a judgmen t as a matter of law. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Bain v. Wells , 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995).

When reviewing

an order granting a sum

mary judgment motion,

an appellate courtmust

view the evidence in the light m

ost favorable to the nonmoving party and must als o dra w all reasonable inferen ces in the nonmovi ng party’s favor. See Robinson v. Omer , 95 2 S.W.2d 423, 426 ( Tenn. 1997); Mike v. Po Group, Inc. , 937 S. W .2d790, 792 (Tenn. 1996 ). Thus, a summa

ry judgment should be gr anted only when the undisputed facts r easonably support only

one conclusion – that the moving party is entitled to a jud gment as a matter of law. See McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) ; Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d at 26. A party mayobtain a-5-

summary judg ment by de monstrating that the n onmoving party will be

unable to prove
an essential element of its case, see Byrd v. Hall , 847 S.W.2d 208, 21 2- 13 (Tenn. 1 993), because this defect n ecessarily renders al l other facts immateria l. Se e Alexander

v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n , 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. 1993); Strauss v. Wyatt, Tarrant , Combs, Gilbert & Milom , 911 S.W.2d 727, 729 ( Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

III.

The courts are gen eral ly reluctant to inter fere in the interna

l affairs of priva

te organizationsand clubs. See Original Lawrence County Farm Org., Inc. v. Tennessee FarmBureau Fed’n , 907 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tenn. Ct. App . 1995); Moran v. Vincent , 588 S.W.2d 867, 870 (

Tenn. Ct. App.1979). It i s only when a case inv olves fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or

an invasion of proper

ty rights that the

courts will

intervene in
a dispute between an associa tion and one of its members

. See Tennessee Sec ondary School Athletic Ass’n v

. Cox , 221 Tenn. 164, 174 , 425 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1968). When
a member has been ex

pelled, suspended,

or exclu ded from membership for cau se, a courtshould look no further t ha n ne cessary to establish that the procedure involved
was fair and reasonable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-56-302 (1995); Original Lawrence County F

arm Org., Inc. v. Tennessee Farm Bureau Fed’n , 907 S.W.2d at 422.

Mr. Robe rtson argues that the Association failed to follow its own Rule 1 9 which provides, in part:

19.03 A complaint m ay be filed by any mem ber of the Association

with the Executive

Secretary as fo

llows: A. In writing. B. Contain

a reasonably clea

r description of

the offense and cite the Rule(s ) allegedly violated

. C. Be signed by the member. D. State the full name and address of the r

espondent. E. Be accompanied by a dep osit of $25 wh ich wi ll be refunded only if the c

omplaint is sustained. 19.04 The Executive

Secretary shall

immediately notify t

he respondent

of the c ompla int and send a copy, se t a hearing date, notify the parties of the date. 19.05 The hearing shall be conducted w ithin 40 days of the receipt of the com

plaint. 19.06 The h earin g shall allow each party to fairly and adequately present their case.-6- 19.07 The decision shall be made on the date o f th e conclusion

of the hearing. The deliberations shall be in private and the par

ties notified by mail. He asserts that the As sociation’s failure to provide him with a written complaint signed by an Association

member and the Ass ociation’s failure to identify the person who lodged the complaint undermined the fairness of the proceeding. He a

lso asserts that the Association’s failure to inform him of the identity of the person who lodged the complaint or to state

precisely how the t

wo regist ra tions were fraudulent misled himinto believing that the proceeding was not g

overned by the discipli

nary rules and confused him abou t the need to retain co unsel.

The Association’s inve stigatio n was not commenced because of a member’s complaint

but rather becaus e of r egistration discrepancies the Associa tion itself discovered while processing the registration of a ho

rse thought to be

the foal of Rock N Roll Parader. W

e do not read Rule 19 a s the exclusive meth

od by which th e Association

may discipline its mem bers. Rather, it provide s a procedure for processingcomplaints made by one Association membe

r again st another. The rul e does not preclude the

Association itself

from investigating a

nd filing charges aga

inst one of its members bas ed on information i t has discovered on its own.

Mr. Robertson had adequa te notice of the

charges against him, the hearing date, the possible penalties,

and the procedure provided b y the rules. The Assoc

iation sent himthree le tt ers informing him tha t he had been charge

d with possible fraud

ulent registration

of Rock N Roll Par

ader and Paint Me D

elight, and that he had the right to be repr e sented by counsel and to question witnesses a

t the hearing. He

was also provided with notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing, anexplanation of the possi ble penalties that could be imposed, and a copy of the Association’s rules and bylaws.

Mr. Robertson attended t he hearingwithout counsel and specifically declined
an offer of postponement. At that hearing, it was established that Mr. Robertson had sold Paint Me Delight to

another Associatio

n member

and that he had later

agreed to take the horse back when it did not qualify to its n amed sire. Mr. Robertson replaced Paint Me Delight with Ro

ck N Roll Parader. After

Rock N Roll Parad

er produced four foals, retesting reveale

d that he was not the s ame horse that had be en orig in ally registered as Rock N Roll Parader. At this point, Mr. Robertson permitted Paint Me-7-

Delight to be blood typed, and this test revealed that the animal was actually Romeo’s Jet. These facts, to

gether with the

statement

in the Association’s correspondence that th e “Enforcement C

ommittee . . . ha

s lodged a complaint c

oncerning the possi

bl e fraudulent

registration” of P

aint Me Delight and Ro ck N Roll Parader put Mr. Robertson

on fair notice of the

charges against him. Accordingly, like the trial court,
we have determined tha

t the Association

substantially complied with its disciplinary rules and that Mr. Rober

tson was give

n fair notice of the charg

es against him and a fair opportunity to be

heard before the A

ssociation revoked his

membership.

IV.

We affirm the summa

ry judgment dismissing M r. Robertson’s cla

ims against the Asso ciation and remand the case for whatever fur

ther proceedings ma

y be required. We tax the

costs of this appeal to John Robertson and his surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

______________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

_______________________________ SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

_______________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE