COMBATING 

TERRORISM

State Department Can 

Improve Management 

of East Africa 

Program

Report to the Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate

June 2014

GAO-14-502

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-502, a report to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

June 2014

COMBATING TERRORISM

State Department Can Improve Management of East 

Africa Program

Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorism in East Africa has 

remained a concern of the United 

States since 1998, when al Qaeda 

bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania. As part of its efforts to 

address this threat, State launched 

PREACT in 2009 as a program for 

long-term engagement and capacity 

building in East Africa. PREACT—

which focuses on countering terrorist 

threats, including al Shabaab, an al 

Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia—is 

managed by State’s Bureau of 

African Affairs and provides 

assistance in a region composed of

12 partner countries.

GAO was asked to examine 

PREACT, including (1) the role it 

plays in U.S. counterterrorism 

assistance to East Africa, (2) the 

extent to which funds allocated for 

PREACT since 2009 have been 

disbursed, and (3) the extent to 

which State considers key factors in 

managing PREACT. GAO reviewed 

agency documents and interviewed 

U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., 

and in Germany, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 

and Uganda.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of State improve the management of 

the PREACT initiative by taking 

steps to improve the documentation 

of key factors considered and by 

routinely collecting activity and 

funding information. State agreed 

with all three recommendations and 

stated that it is taking steps to 

address them.

What GAO Found

State Department’s (State) Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts in East Africa. PREACT’s five 

goals focus on improving partner nations’ military capacity, rule of law, border 

security, ability to counter violent extremism, and ability to counter terrorist 

financing. PREACT has funded activities such as providing training for terrorist 

investigation techniques for Somali police, new communications equipment for 

the Ethiopian military, and computer literacy to teachers working with at-risk 

youth in Kenya. PREACT assistance is in addition to other U.S. counterterrorism 

assistance to East Africa and peacekeeping and stability efforts in Somalia. 

As of November 1, 2013, State reported disbursing $42.3 million of the $104 

million allocated for PREACT from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Since 2009, 

State allocated PREACT assistance to countries near Somalia, as shown below.

PREACT Allocations by Country, Fiscal Years 2009-2013 

State considers key factors in managing PREACT but lacks comprehensive

documentation of factors considered when selecting activities and does not 

routinely maintain information on the status of PREACT activities or funding. 

Presidential Policy Directive 23 highlights key factors—partner country needs, 

absorptive capacity, sustainment capacity, U.S. efforts, and other donor efforts—

as critical to building partner capacity and focusing limited resources. State 

reported considering these key factors when selecting PREACT activities.

However, State did not consistently document its consideration of the five factors. 

In addition, State’s Foreign Affairs Manual calls for managers to collect program 

information to inform decision making and reporting. However, State does not

routinely collect PREACT activity and financial information from implementing 

partners to enable it to have complete information needed to inform program 

management and accurately report on PREACT. For example, GAO discovered 

that State mistakenly allocated PREACT funds to Mauritius, which is not a 

PREACT partner, and the managing bureau was unaware of $3 million in 

unobligated balances in Antiterrorism Assistance that are no longer available for 

obligation. Routinely collecting such information, as the Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government calls for, could enhance PREACT managers’ 

ability to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources.

View GAO-14-502. For more information, contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 202-512-7331, 

JohnsonCM@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Letter 1 

Background 3

PREACT Supports Broader U.S. Government Counterterrorism 

Efforts in East Africa 9

State Has Disbursed $42.3 Million of the Nearly $104 Million 

Allocated for PREACT 18

State Considers Key Factors in Managing PREACT Initiative, but 

Lacks Comprehensive Documentation and Information 

Collection Efforts 23

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix II Status of Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

Funds 38

Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 42

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46

Related GAO Products 47

Tables

Table 1: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for 

Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) 

Activities, Fiscal Years 2009-2013, as of November 2013 21

Table 2: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for 

Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) 

Activities by Account, Fiscal Years 2009-2013, as of 

November 2013 22

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Table 3: Economic Support Fund (ESF) Funding Allocated and 

Disbursed, by Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward 

Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, as of November 

2013 38

Table 4: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Funding Allocated and 

Disbursed, by Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward 

Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, as of November 

2013 39

Table 5: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

Affairs (INCLE) Funding Allocated and Disbursed, by 

Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities in 

Partner Countries, as of November 2013 40

Table 6: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs (NADR) Funding for Antiterrorism Assistance 

(ATA) Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal Year 

Appropriated, toward Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities in Partner 

Countries, as of November 2013 41

Table 7: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs (NADR) Funding for Terrorist Interdiction 

Program (TIP) Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal Year 

Appropriated, toward Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities in Partner 

Countries, as of November 2013 41

Figures

Figure 1: Reported Terrorist Attacks by al Qaeda and al Shabaab 

in Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Countries, 1998-2012 4

Figure 2: Organization of the Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT) 8

Figure 3: Illustrations of Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities Supporting Military 

Capacity Building in Partner Countries 11

Figure 4: Antiterrorism Cyber Forensics Training in Tanzania 12

Figure 5: Antiterrorism Maritime Border Security Training in 

Tanzania 13
Page iii GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 6: Examples of Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities Aimed at Reducing 

the Appeal of Violent Extremism in Partner Countries 14

Figure 7: Funds Allocated for U.S. Assistance to Combat 

Terrorism in East Africa, Fiscal Years 2009-2013 16

Figure 8: Percentages of U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for 

Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), Fiscal 

Years 2009-2013, as of November 2013 19

Figure 9: U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for Regional East 

Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), by Country, Fiscal 

Years 2009-2013, as of November 2013 20

Figure 10: State’s Reported Consideration and Documentation of 

Key Factors when Selecting Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities 26
Page iv GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Abbreviations

AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

EARSI East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative

ESF Economic Support Fund

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

 Affairs

NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

 Programs

PKO Peacekeeping Operations

PREACT Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

TIP Terrorist Interdiction Program

TSCTP Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

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Page 1 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 17, 2014

The Honorable Robert Menendez

Chairman

The Honorable Bob Corker

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

In 1998, al Qaeda operatives detonated truck bombs outside two U.S. 

embassies in East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania). Several of the terrorists 

that participated in that attack found refuge in Somalia. Since then, 

officials report that the primary source of instability in East Africa 

emanates from al Shabaab, the al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization 

in Somalia. Al Shabaab conducted its first major international assault in 

2010, bombing two restaurants in Kampala, Uganda, during the World 

Cup soccer tournament. More recently, in September 2013, al Shabaab 

claimed credit for attacking the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, where 

nearly 200 people were injured—including Americans—and more than 60 

people were killed.

To enhance its efforts to combat violent extremists, such as al Qaeda and 

al Shabaab, the United States launched the Partnership for Regional East 

Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) in 2009 as the U.S. government 

initiative for counterterrorism capacity building in East Africa. PREACT is 

managed by the Department of State (State) to provide law enforcement, 

military, development, and public diplomacy assistance in 12 partner 

countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 

Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.1 State 

has allocated a total of about $104 million for PREACT activities since 

2009.

You asked us to review several issues related to PREACT. This report 

reviews (1) the role PREACT plays in U.S. counterterrorism assistance to 

 

1

GAO has also reviewed a similar program focused on West Africa, the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The report is expected to be published in late 

June 2014. For GAO’s previous report on TSCTP, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: 

Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership, GAO-08-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008).
 

Page 2 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

East Africa, (2) the extent to which funds allocated for PREACT since 

2009 have been disbursed, and (3) the extent to which PREACT 

decision-making processes consider key factors and other information to 

inform program management.

To support our work for all three objectives, we reviewed agency

documents from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, the 

Treasury, and Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). We interviewed U.S. officials from those agencies 

in Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Germany; 

and at U.S. missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda. We also met with 

officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. To 

examine the role PREACT plays in U.S. counterterrorism assistance to 

East Africa, we reviewed national, agency, and program strategic plans; 

information on activities implemented; and other relevant information. To 

determine the extent to which funds allocated for PREACT have been 

disbursed, we collected data from State on funds allocated, obligated, 

and disbursed for PREACT activities for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. 

We also collected allocation data from State for other counterterrorism 

assistance.2 To assess the reliability of all data provided, we reviewed 

information from State regarding the underlying data systems and the 

checks, controls, and reviews used to generate the data and ensure their 

accuracy and reliability. We found the data sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. To determine the extent to which State uses key information to 

manage PREACT, we reviewed agency guidance, country assessments, 

activity proposals, and interagency agreements. (For further details of our 

objectives, scope, and methodology, see app. I.)

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

2

For the purposes of this report, “other counterterrorism assistance” includes those 

activities funded by the U.S. government that support PREACT’s goals, but that were not 

funded using PREACT-designated money. U.S. military operations, law enforcement 

investigations, and intelligence activities are not included.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

The greatest terrorist threat in East Africa currently emanates from

Somalia.3 This country, which has lacked a stable government since 

1991, created the environment that provided a safe haven for al Qaeda 

and led to the rise of al Shabaab. Between 1998 and 2012, when the 

latest data were available, there were 334 terrorist attacks by either al 

Qaeda or al Shabaab in East Africa, with the vast majority occurring in 

Somalia, as illustrated in figure 1. The United States designated al Qaeda 

as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1999 and designated al 

Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2008.4 Other 

violent organizations, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, are also active 

in East Africa but have not been designated as Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations by State.5

 

3

GAO reported on U.S. assistance to Somalia in 2008. See GAO, Somalia: Several 

Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development 

Efforts, GAO-08-351 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2008).

4

To be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by State, an organization must meet 

the following criteria: (1) be a foreign organization; (2) engage in terrorist activity or 

terrorism (as defined by U.S. law) or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist 

activity or terrorism; and (3) the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten 

the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, 

or the economic interests) of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1189.

5

Although the Lord’s Resistance Army has not been designated as a Foreign Terrorist 

Organization, this group has been designated on State’s Terrorist Exclusion List, a 

separate designation for immigration purposes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 for Terrorist 

Exclusion List designation authority.

Background

The Terrorist Threat in 

East Africa
 

Page 4 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: Reported Terrorist Attacks by al Qaeda and al Shabaab in Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Countries, 1998-2012

Notes: Terrorist events conducted by al Qaeda and al Shabaab are included in the graphic. This 

graphic only includes events that the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism identified as events (1) aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 

(2) occurring where there was evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message 

beyond the immediate victims; (3) falling outside legitimate warfare activities and the parameters of 

international humanitarian law; and, (4) that are not ambiguous as to their nature as terrorist 

incidents. Successful and unsuccessful attacks are included. Terrorist event information is drawn 

entirely from publicly available materials and reflects what is reported in those sources. (National 

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). (2012). Global Terrorism 

Database, Incidents Over Time. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd on May 6, 2014.)
 

Page 5 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

According to many experts, the unstable situation in Somalia is a 

particularly important factor fueling the spread of violent radicalism in 

eastern Africa today and poses a great risk to U.S. national security. We 

reported in June 2011 that Somalia ranked third, behind Yemen and 

Pakistan, as one of the countries that pose the greatest risk to U.S. 

national security.6 In 1991, armed opposition groups overthrew the 

existing Somali government, resulting in turmoil, factional fighting, and 

anarchy. Until recently, Somalia lacked a functioning central government. 

This tumultuous environment provided a safe haven for al Qaeda after the 

1998 attacks and led to the rise of al Shabaab. Since then, there have 

been at least 15 attempts to establish a federal government. Somalia had 

operated without a permanent national government or a national legal 

system from 1991 through 2012. However, recent gains in stability led the 

United States to formally recognize the government of Somalia in January 

2013.

Al Qaeda’s involvement in East Africa goes back more than 20 years. In 

1989, a militant government seized power in Sudan and established 

contact with al Qaeda leadership, who subsequently moved people and 

financial assets into the country. In the early 1990s, al Qaeda began 

building cells in other East African nations, such as Kenya and Somalia. 

In 1998, it conducted simultaneous terrorist attacks against the U.S. 

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility 

for other attacks in East Africa, including the 2002 coordinated attacks in 

Mombassa, Kenya; Al Qaeda bombed a hotel—killing 15 people and 

injuring another 35—and unsuccessfully fired missiles at a passenger 

airplane departing from the airport. Some experts argue that al Qaeda 

has decreased its direct operations in East Africa and instead provides 

ideological direction to other militant groups located in the region.

Al Shabaab is an al Qaeda affiliate.7 It began as the militant wing of the 

former Somali Islamic Courts Union that took control of most of southern 

 

6

See GAO, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on 

Terrorist Safe Havens, GAO-11-561 (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011). GAO spoke with 

13 subject matter experts with knowledge related to terrorist safe havens and asked them 

to determine which five terrorist safe havens identified in State’s August 2010 Country 

Reports on Terrorism posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security.

7

Al Shabaab declared its ties to al Qaeda in February 2012.
 

Page 6 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Somalia in 2006.8 Since then, al Shabaab has led an insurgency against 

the transitional government and international peacekeepers in Somalia. 

At various times, the group has controlled strategic locations in southern 

and central Somalia. Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for bombings 

and shootings throughout Somalia as well as assassinations of 

government officials, journalists, and peace activists. The group also 

claimed responsibility for the July 2010 suicide bomb attacks in Kampala, 

Uganda, which killed more than 70 people. More recently, it claimed 

responsibility for the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which 

killed more than 60 people.

The U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism (the National Strategy), 

approved in 2011, articulates the government’s approach to countering 

terrorism and focuses on disrupting, degrading, dismantling, and 

defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates.9 The National Strategy lists East 

Africa as one of nine global priority regions.10 The National Strategy’s 

section on East Africa states that the goal for that region is to dismantle al 

Qaeda elements—including elements embedded within al Shabaab—

while building the capacity of countries and local administrations to 

counter the terrorist threat. To achieve these goals, the United States 

uses an array of tools implemented by several agencies, including those 

that require direct action by the United States. For example, Department 

of Defense (DOD) officials stated that they have the authority through a 

presidential order to conduct direct military operations that can be specific 

to designated members of al Qaeda and its affiliates. The Department of 

the Treasury (Treasury) addresses money laundering and terrorist 

 

8

State reports that al Shabaab has roots in the al-Ittihad al-Islami terrorist organization, 

which rose to prominence in the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s.

9

The National Strategy’s eight overarching goals are to (1) protect the American people, 

homeland, and American interests; (2) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda 

and its affiliates and adherents; (3) prevent terrorist development, acquisition, and use of 

weapons of mass destruction; (4) eliminate safe havens; (5) build enduring 

counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities; (6) degrade links between al Qaeda and its 

affiliates and adherents; (7) counter al Qaeda ideology and its resonance and diminish the 

specific drivers of violence that al Qaeda exploits; and, (8) deprive terrorists of their 

enabling means.

10The National Strategy’s nine priority regions are (in order): the homeland, South Asia, 

Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Europe, Iraq, the Maghreb and Sahel, South-East Asia, 

and Central Asia. The National Strategy also has one other area of focus that is not 

geographical: information and ideas (al Qaeda ideology, messaging, and resonance).

U.S. Approach to 

Terrorism in East Africa
 

Page 7 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

financing threats, and administers and enforces counterterrorism 

sanctions.11 The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes 

terrorists. The National Strategy also emphasizes the need to build 

foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen U.S. resilience. Many 

U.S. agencies also have programs that work with partner nations to 

increase the capacity of their military, legal, and financial systems.

The United States also partners with other countries and multilateral 

institutions to achieve its counterterrorism goals. In particular, the United 

States has supported the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a 

peacekeeping mission first authorized by the United Nations Security 

Council in 2007. AMISOM has a military component staffed with troops 

from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone.12

PREACT was designed to be the U.S. government initiative for long-term 

engagement and capacity building to combat evolving terrorist threats in 

East Africa.13 State created a guiding strategy for PREACT in 2009, which 

it updated in 2013 in consultation with the Departments of Defense, 

Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury, and with USAID.14 The 

PREACT program is managed by State’s regional Bureau of African 

Affairs, but draws on the expertise of several other bureaus and U.S. 

agencies to implement its activities, as depicted in figure 2.

 

11According to Treasury Officials, the functions of the Office of Terrorism and Financial 

Intelligence include providing policy, strategic, and operational direction to the Treasury on 

issues relating to: terrorist financing; financial crimes, including money laundering, 

counterfeiting and other offenses threatening the integrity of the financial system; United 

States economic sanctions programs; implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act, as 

amended, other enforcement matters; certain intelligence analysis and coordination 

functions; and certain security functions and programs of the Treasury.

12Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia are PREACT countries. Sierra Leone is 

not.

13PREACT was formerly known as the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative.

14State also reported that it has established an annual strategic planning process 

involving U.S. embassies to validate PREACT’s priorities and evaluate its overall 

progress.
 

Page 8 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 2: Organization of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT)

Note: In addition to the agencies listed above, State has involved other U.S. government agencies in 

creating PREACT’s strategy, such as the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland 

Security. While these agencies could partner with State to implement PREACT activities, they have 

not received any PREACT funding to date.

PREACT activities are funded by four State-managed U.S. foreign 

assistance accounts:

• Economic Support Fund (ESF) authorizes the President to assist 

various countries and organizations in order to promote economic or 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

political stability, and has also been specifically appropriated for 

programs to counter extremism in East Africa.

• International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 

authorizes the President to assist foreign countries and international 

organizations in controlling narcotics and other controlled substances, 

or for other anticrime purposes. For example, INCLE funds have been 

used to develop and implement policies and programs that maintain 

the rule of law and strengthen institutional law enforcement and 

judicial capabilities, including combating transnational crime.

• Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

(NADR) authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance, 

nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance to 

foreign countries for various purposes. PREACT is funded specifically 

through two NADR programs: Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), which 

is used to furnish assistance to foreign countries in order to enhance 

the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter, detect, and 

respond to terrorist attacks, and the Terrorist Interdiction Program 

(TIP), which assists in building immigration capacity in foreign 

countries to identify the attempted travel of known or suspected 

terrorists. 

• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) authorizes the President to furnish 

assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for 

peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in 

furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. 

PKO funds are used, in part, to train and equip military units tasked 

with monitoring and controlling border areas and territory exploited by 

terrorist elements.

PREACT is a regional program that serves as one part of the overall U.S. 

counterterrorism assistance to East Africa, providing counterterrorism 

capacity-building assistance to 12 East African countries. Officials from 

State and other U.S. agencies view PREACT as a valuable component of 

U.S. counterterrorism assistance in East Africa.

PREACT Supports 

Broader U.S. 

Government 

Counterterrorism 

Efforts in East Africa
 

Page 10 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

PREACT’s five goals focus on improving partner nations’ military 

counterterrorism capacity, rule-of-law framework, border security, ability 

to counter violent extremism, and ability to counter terrorist financing. 

State has funded activities to support four of PREACT’s five goals; 

PREACT funds have not been used to counter terrorist financing. The 

following are examples of activities implemented to help achieve 

PREACT goals:15

• Improve the institutional and operational capacity of militaries to 

participate in regional counterterrorism operations. To achieve this 

goal, State’s Bureau of African Affairs generally implements activities 

through DOD’s AFRICOM, using PKO funding. For example, 

AFRICOM has implemented or planned activities such as providing 

the Navy of Djibouti with small boats to assist with counterterrorism 

and force protection; providing intermediate-level aviation 

maintenance training and spare parts for the Kenya Army fleet of 

helicopters, and organizing a regional best practices forum regarding 

military logistics for several PREACT countries. In one case, however, 

State directly funded a contractor to implement an activity. 

Specifically, State provided the Ethiopian military with 

communications equipment, training, and a dedicated 

communications adviser. Figure 3 illustrates a few PREACT activities 

aimed at improving the counterterrorism capabilities of partner 

countries’ militaries.

 

15Activities identified are meant to serve as examples of PREACT-funded U.S. 

counterterrorism capacity-building efforts, not to provide an exhaustive list of all U.S. 

activities to address counterterrorism capacity building in East Africa.

PREACT Is a Regional 

Program That Provides 

Capacity Building 

Assistance to Partner 

Nations
 

Page 11 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 3: Illustrations of Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Activities Supporting Military Capacity Building in Partner Countries

• Develop a rule-of-law framework for countering terrorism and building 

law enforcement and justice sector capacity. To achieve the goal of 

detecting, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorist activities, State’s 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Bureau of African Affairs generally implements activities through other 

State bureaus such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs (INL), which manages the INCLE account, or Diplomatic 

Security’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, which implements 

activities using the NADR/ATA funding account. According to State 

officials, INL activities focus on the institutional reform and 

foundational skill sets of the criminal justice sector, while ATA 

activities focus on specialized counterterrorism law enforcement 

training. INL has implemented projects such as enhancing a police 

forensics laboratory to help the Tanzanian Police Force fight and 

deter crime, including terrorism. The Office of Antiterrorism Assistance 

has provided numerous trainings on topics such as investigating 

terrorist incidents in Djibouti and Somalia, fraudulent documents 

recognition in Burundi, and cyber forensics in Tanzania, as shown in 

figure 4.

Figure 4: Antiterrorism Cyber Forensics Training in Tanzania

• Enhance border security to restrain terrorist movement. To achieve 

this goal, State’s Bureau of African Affairs generally implements 

activities through DOD’s AFRICOM and through State’s Bureaus of 
 

Page 13 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Counterterrorism and Diplomatic Security. AFRICOM has equipped 

and trained a technical platoon in Kenya that supports 

counterterrorism and border security operations in the northern part of 

Kenya. In addition, the Bureau of Counterterrorism manages TIP, 

which provides partner countries with training and equipment for 

screening at 38 port-of-entry locations in five PREACT countries.16

State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has also implemented trainings 

on border security (see fig. 5).

Figure 5: Antiterrorism Maritime Border Security Training in Tanzania

• Reduce the appeal of violent extremism. To achieve this goal, State’s 

Bureau of African Affairs generally implements activities using ESF 

assistance by partnering with USAID or public affairs sections at U.S. 

missions. USAID has used funds designated for PREACT programs in 

both Kenya and Somalia to counter al Shabaab’s efforts to reach 

disenfranchised youth and to promote democratic governance and 

political participation by using social media, radio, theater, and music; 

rehabilitating community centers; and supporting local groups. As 

shown in figure 6, State has directly funded projects such as computer 

training to teachers working with at-risk youth in Kenya and Uganda.

 

16 In 2011, GAO reported on TIP and other U.S. government efforts to build partner 

countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel. See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Additional 

Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners’ Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel, 

GAO-11-637 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011).
 

Page 14 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 6: Examples of Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Activities Aimed at Reducing the Appeal of Violent Extremism in Partner 

Countries
 

Page 15 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

• Countering the financing of terrorism. State’s Bureau of African Affairs 

has not used funds designated for PREACT to achieve this goal, in 

part because, according to State officials, the financial systems in 

many of the partner nations are currently not sophisticated enough to 

absorb such specialized assistance. However, using non-PREACT 

funds from the NADR account, State does support activities to 

enhance some PREACT countries’ ability to investigate financial 

crimes. For example, State funds Treasury’s efforts to help Kenya and 

Tanzania improve their Financial Intelligence Units.

PREACT is one part of overall U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in East 

Africa, and officials report that it is a valuable complement to other 

counterterrorism activities. From 2009 through 2013, PREACT has 

accounted for about 11 percent (about $104 million) of overall U.S. 

assistance to combat terrorism in East Africa (about $967 million). In 

addition to PREACT, the United States has provided about $348 million in 

other U.S. counterterrorism assistance for East Africa, including activities 

funded by, for example, State’s bilateral counterterrorism capacitybuilding efforts, DOD’s global security sector assistance programs, or 

USAID’s programs to counter violent extremism.17 In addition, since fiscal 

year 2009, State has provided about $516 million to fund efforts in 

Somalia, as shown in figure 7.18 U.S. assistance to Somalia has provided, 

in part, training and equipment for troops deploying to AMISOM and to 

support logistics, training, equipment, and other support to the Somalia 

National Security Forces. While this assistance is not explicitly labeled as 

counterterrorism assistance, officials reported that U.S. efforts to stabilize 

Somalia support PREACT’s counterterrorism goals because Somalia is 

the safe haven for al Shabaab.

 

17For the purposes of this report, “other counterterrorism assistance” includes those 

activities funded by the U.S. government that support PREACT’s goals, but that were not 

funded using PREACT-designated money. U.S. military operations, law enforcement 

investigations, and intelligence activities are not included.

18The amount provided to Somalia does not include the United States’ assessed 

contributions to the United Nations’ Support Office for AMISOM.

U.S. Officials View 

PREACT as a Valuable 

Part of Overall U.S. 

Counterterrorism 

Assistance to East Africa
 

Page 16 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 7: Funds Allocated for U.S. Assistance to Combat Terrorism in East Africa, 

Fiscal Years 2009-2013

Officials from State and DOD report that PREACT funding is a valuable 

complement to other counterterrorism assistance for several reasons:

• Funds for PREACT programs are dedicated to counterterrorism 

assistance in East Africa, whereas other counterterrorism assistance 

may be used more broadly around the globe. Officials from AFRICOM 

stated that the targeted nature of PREACT funds helps them plan 

their programming in East Africa. For example, they can anticipate 

receiving about $10 million annually for East Africa from the PKO 

account for PREACT, whereas the availability of funds from other 

sources may vary widely from year to year depending on shifting 

global priorities. 

• PREACT provides multi-year funds, which give implementing entities 

more time to plan and implement a program. The accounts funding 

PREACT programs, except for PKO, are generally available for 

obligation for more than 1 fiscal year in appropriations laws. For 

example, appropriations for NADR, ESF, and INCLE are generally 

available for obligation for 2 fiscal years, giving implementing entities 

more time to plan and implement a program. Officials from AFRICOM 
 

Page 17 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

reported that the flexible nature of PKO funds they receive through 

PREACT allows them to better implement an activity.19 Officials report 

that DOD’s process for assigning military personnel and troops can be 

lengthy and that sometimes DOD cannot get its units into place fast 

enough to carry out a project within the 1-year timeframe required by 

some other programs. PREACT-designated funds allow them more 

flexibility.

• As financing for a regional program, PREACT funds do not need to be 

allocated for a specific country in advance and can be reprogrammed 

from one PREACT country to another to address implementation 

challenges or emerging needs. For example, State planned to fund a 

Resident Legal Advisor position in Burundi using PREACT funds. 

However, State had difficulty coming to an agreement with the 

Burundian government on the exact parameters of the program and 

could not get the program started. PREACT was able to reprogram 

that money to be used to fund a Resident Legal Advisor position in 

Uganda. Officials reported that, had the money for the position been 

programmed bilaterally to Burundi, it would have taken longer to shift 

it from one country to another.

• The nature of PREACT also encourages implementing entities to view 

counterterrorism from a regional perspective, rather than country by 

country. For example, officials from State’s Bureau of 

Counterterrorism report that TIP has focused its resources on 

countries surrounding Somalia to address East Africa’s primary 

terrorist threat, al Shabaab. Officials from DOD report that PREACT 

allows them to provide regional training in a centralized location or 

similar training, maintenance, and equipment to several countries 

bilaterally. With PREACT money, AFRICOM has been able to 

introduce a standardized set of 10 courses focused on developing 

intelligence corps in several PREACT countries to better enable the 

countries to share intelligence.

 

19The funds officials referred to were PKO funds, which are generally available for 

obligation for 1 year. However, under certain authority generally granted in the State, 

Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations acts, if these funds are obligated within 

the period of availability, they may be deobligated and remain available for obligation for 

an additional 4 years. These funds remain available for expenditure for an additional 5

years after the period of availability for obligation. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7011, 

Jan. 17, 2014.
 

Page 18 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

For fiscal years 2009 through 2013, State allocated about $104 million for 

PREACT, of which it had disbursed $42.3 million by November 2013. 

State allocated funds for PREACT activities from four foreign assistance 

accounts to 7 of the 12 PREACT countries.20

For fiscal years 2009 through 2013, State allocated nearly $104 million for 

PREACT from four foreign assistance accounts: ESF, INCLE, NADR, and 

PKO.21 As shown in figure 8, State allocated the majority of resources for 

PREACT from PKO (about $45 million) and NADR (about $45 million), 

and allocated about $8 million from ESF and $6 million from INCLE.

 

20At the time of reporting, the most recent data available on funding for PREACT were as 

of November 2013.

21In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Congress mandated that not less than 

$24,735,000 shall be made available from certain accounts for the East Africa Regional 

Strategic Initiative (EARSI), the predecessor of PREACT. However, State allocated only 

$24,628,000 for EARSI/PREACT from this appropriation (Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 

7070(b)(1), Dec. 16, 2009). In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Congress 

mandated that not less than $21,300,000 from that appropriation should be made 

available for PREACT, and State allocated $23,322,000 for PREACT from this 

appropriation (Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7043(b), Dec. 23, 2011).

State Has Disbursed 

$42.3 Million of the 

Nearly $104 Million 

Allocated for 

PREACT

State Allocated About 

$104 Million for PREACT 

from Fiscal Years 2009 

through 2013
 

Page 19 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 8: Percentages of U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for Regional East 

Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), Fiscal Years 2009-2013, as of November 2013

State allocated funds for PREACT activities for 7 of the 12 PREACT 

partner countries. The largest amounts of funds for PREACT activities 

were allocated for Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, which border Somalia 

(see fig. 9). In addition, 13 percent of funding for PREACT activities was 

allocated for regional activities that benefited multiple PREACT countries.
 

Page 20 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Figure 9: U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), by Country, Fiscal Years 

2009-2013, as of November 2013 

Note: State also allocated approximately $1 million of the funds for PREACT for program 

management for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. In addition, State allocated $300,000 of funds for 

PREACT for Mauritius, which is not a PREACT partner.

As of November 2013, State reported disbursing $42.3 million of the 

nearly $104 million allocated for PREACT from fiscal years 2009 through 

2013, as shown in table 1. An additional $45 million has been obligated 

for PREACT activities but not disbursed. As of November 2013, State had 

an unobligated balance of $16.7 million. The majority (81 percent, or 

$13.6 million) of the unobligated balance was appropriated in fiscal year 

State Has Disbursed 

$42.3 Million in PREACT 

Funding from Fiscal Years 

2009 through 2013
 

Page 21 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

2013 and remains available for obligation, and State is in the process of 

obligating these funds. The remaining unobligated balance of $3.1 million 

is from NADR/ATA funds appropriated in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, 

and according to State officials, the period of availability to incur new 

obligations has expired. These unobligated balances remain available for 

an additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations 

properly chargeable to the appropriations period of availability. For 

example, these funds may remain available for contract modifications 

properly within the scope of the original contract.

Table 1: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities, Fiscal

Years 2009-2013, as of November 2013

Dollars in thousands

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Allocated 11,481 24,648 20,947 23,322 23,598 103,995

Unobligated balance 829a 881a 532a 871a 13,598b 16,711

Unliquidated obligations 2,891 8,813 9,136 14,174 9,986 45,000

Disbursed 7,761 14,954 11,280 8,277 14 42,286

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

Notes: The amounts above reflect totals from ESF, INCLE, PKO, and NADR funds dedicated for 

PREACT activities appropriated by fiscal year. For the status of each account’s unobligated balance 

by fiscal year, see app. II.

a

This unobligated balance is from NADR/ATA and, according to State officials, the period of 

availability to incur new obligations has expired. These unobligated balances remain available for an 

additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations properly chargeable to the 

appropriation’s period of availability. For example, these funds may remain available for contract 

modifications properly within the scope of the original contract.

b

This unobligated balance is from ESF, INCLE, NADR/ATA, and NADR/TIP and reflects fiscal year 

2013 appropriations that remain available for obligation and State is in the process of obligating these 

funds.

As shown in table 2, NADR (both ATA and TIP) accounted for the 

majority of funds disbursed between fiscal years 2009 and 2013 for 

PREACT. (See app. II for greater detail on the status of U.S. funds 

allocated for PREACT, by account and fiscal year.)
 

Page 22 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Table 2: Status of U.S. Funds Allocated for Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities by 

Account, Fiscal Years 2009-2013, as of November 2013

Dollars in thousands

Account Allocated

Unobligated 

balance

Unliquidated 

obligations Disbursed

ESF 8,439 1,900a 1,777 4,762 

INCLE 6,000 2,000a 3,318 682 

NADR/ATA 34,316 11,650b 2,917 19,750 

NADR/TIP 10,281 1,161a 0 9,120 

PKO 44,960 0 36,988 7,972 

PREACT Total 103,995 16,711 45,000 42,286 

ESF Economic Support Fund

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance

TIP Terrorist Interdiction Program

PKO Peacekeeping Operations

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

a

Unobligated balances for ESF, INCLE, and NADR/TIP reflect fiscal year 2013 appropriations that are 

still available for obligation and that State is in the process of obligating these funds. 

b

The majority (73 percent, or $8.5 million) of the unobligated balance for NADR/ATA is from fiscal 

year 2013 appropriations that are still available for obligation and that State is in the process of 

obligating. The remaining unobligated balance of $3.1 million is from NADR/ATA and, according to 

State officials, the period of availability to incur new obligations has expired. These unobligated 

balances remain available for an additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations 

properly chargeable to the appropriation’s period of availability. For example, these funds may remain 

available for contract modifications properly within the scope of the original contract.
 

Page 23 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

State’s Bureau of African Affairs considers key factors and information to 

manage PREACT using separate processes for each funding stream. 

However, weaknesses exist in the bureau’s and State’s documentation of 

critical factors considered when selecting activities and State’s collection 

of PREACT activities and financial information. The presidential policy 

directive on security sector assistance asserts that U.S. agencies should 

consider several key factors when implementing security sector 

assistance, including partner country needs, absorptive capacity, 

sustainment capacity, other U.S. efforts, and other donor efforts.22 State 

officials said that they consider those factors when selecting PREACT 

activities; however, we found that State did not consistently document its 

consideration. Moreover, while the Bureau of African Affairs undertakes 

several efforts to manage PREACT, it does not routinely collect 

comprehensive, PREACT-specific activity and financial information, which 

would be consistent with internal controls and State’s Foreign Affairs 

Manual.

23 Effective internal control activities help program managers cope 

with shifting environments and evolving demands through effective 

stewardship of public resources.24

Since PREACT derives its funding from different foreign assistance 

accounts that have different authorities and broader goals beyond 

PREACT, State’s Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with other 

State bureaus, uses a separate process for each account when 

determining, designing, and selecting the types of PREACT activities to 

fund.

• ESF: The Bureau of African Affairs selects PREACT activities funded 

from ESF in coordination with the Bureau of Counterterrorism and 

USAID. The Bureau of African Affairs uses a proposal template to 

solicit proposals from U.S. missions in East Africa. Although a USAID 

official stressed the importance of the interagency review of 

 

22The White House, Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance

(Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2013).

23State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 2 FAM 022.12, 4 FAM 013 a.1, and 4 FAM 013 b.9; and 

also GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, (Washington, D.C.: November, 1999), 19.

24According to the Foreign Affairs Manual and the Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government, “management control” and “internal control” are synonymous.

State Considers Key 

Factors in Managing 

PREACT Initiative, 

but Lacks 

Comprehensive 

Documentation and 

Information Collection 

Efforts

State Selects PREACT 

Activities Using Different 

Processes for Each 

Funding Stream
 

Page 24 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

proposals, a State official noted that bureau officials make the final 

decision on which PREACT activities to fund through the ESF 

account.

• PKO: The Bureau of African Affairs, along with State’s Bureau of 

Political-Military Affairs and DOD’s AFRICOM, uses a proposal 

process to select programs to implement activities with PKO funds. 

AFRICOM requests and collects proposals for counterterrorism 

assistance from its components and units at U.S. missions. State and 

DOD officials review the proposals and determine which activities will 

be funded through different funding streams. State officials make the 

final decision on which PREACT activities to fund through the PKO 

account.

• INCLE: INL determines which PREACT partner countries receive 

INCLE funds through PREACT, in consultation with the Bureaus of 

African Affairs and Counterterrorism, according to State officials. INL 

officials said they generally focus on partner countries that have an 

existing INL program.25 According to INL officials, INL works with 

country mission teams to identify and develop PREACT activities. INL 

typically conducts in-country visits to identify needs and gaps that an 

INL program could address.

• NADR: The Bureau of African Affairs works with the Bureau of 

Counterterrorism to determine which countries will receive NADR 

assistance through ATA and TIP.

• ATA: The Bureau of Counterterrorism provides policy guidance 

and sets programming priorities for ATA for each partner country 

in consultation with the Bureau of African Affairs. The Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security leads in-country assessments to measure law 

enforcement technical capabilities in the partner country and to 

follow up on previous training and equipment investments. 

According to State officials, on the basis of resources allocated for

each country by the Bureaus of Counterterrorism and African 

Affairs, Diplomatic Security’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance 

either selects ATA training from a set of developed training 

activities or develops tailored consultations to address the 

capability gaps identified in the assessment.

 

25INL has programmed PREACT activities in Burundi, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda.
 

Page 25 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

• TIP: The Bureau of Counterterrorism determines if a country 

meets certain prerequisites and will work with the Bureau of 

African Affairs to allocate TIP resources designated for PREACT 

to those partner countries. TIP officials look for three factors when 

selecting a partner country: (1) evidence of terrorist activity, (2) the 

need for a screening system, and (3) a willingness to work with 

the United States.

The presidential policy directive on security sector assistance states that 

U.S. agencies should target security sector assistance where it can be 

effective.26 To accomplish this, the directive calls for assessments that (1) 

identify partner country needs, (2) highlight absorptive capacity, (3) 

highlight sustainment capacity as necessary to sustain U.S. investments, 

(4) note the importance of unity of effort across the U.S. government, and 

(5) consider coordination with other donors. State uses different 

mechanisms to collect information on those five key factors.27 In addition, 

the Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government states 

internal control activities aimed at ensuring effective use of resources 

should be clearly documented.28

State officials engaged in managing the various PREACT funding 

accounts reported considering the key factors of country needs, 

absorptive capacity, sustainment capacity, other U.S. efforts, and other 

donor efforts for all the funding accounts. U.S. officials provided various 

examples of how State considered the key factors. For example, State 

and DOD officials reported that officials at U.S. missions and AFRICOM 

components identify partner country needs by talking with partner country 

officials. INL officials said that during in-country visits, INL personnel 

gather information about the partner country’s absorptive capacity. 

According to TIP officials, they require partner countries to sustain 

information technology systems. U.S. officials in Ethiopia told us that they 

 

26Presidential Policy Directive 23 was signed by the President on April 5, 2013.

27According to Presidential Policy Directive 23, security sector assistance includes areas 

related to PREACT, such as counterterrorism, law enforcement, border security, financial 

crimes, rule of law, and responding to violent extremism, among other areas.

28Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that internal control 

activities, which help government program managers achieve desired results through 

effective stewardship of public resources (p. 4), need to be clearly documented, and the 

documentation should be readily available for examination (p. 15). GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

State Reported 

Considering Key Factors, 

but Documentation Was 

Inconsistent
 

Page 26 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

have a Security Sector Working Group that monitors all security-related 

assistance to coordinate U.S. efforts. U.S. officials in Djibouti reported 

that the embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation, which manages U.S. 

security assistance for Djibouti, meets with other donors, such as Japan, 

France, and the European Union, on a monthly basis to discuss security 

assistance and identify complementary efforts.

As figure 10 illustrates, State reported considering the key factors. 

However, State’s documentation of this consideration varied among the 

accounts. State documented all five key factors for two accounts 

(NADR/ATA and PKO), one or more of the key factors for two accounts 

(ESF and NADR/TIP), and none of the key factors for one account 

(INCLE). Therefore, State did not completely document its consideration 

of these factors as called for by internal control standards and its own 

policy manual.

Figure 10: State’s Reported Consideration and Documentation of Key Factors when 

Selecting Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) 

Activities
 

Page 27 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

• State documented all five key factors for NADR/ATA and PKO 

activities. For NADR/ATA, State uses a standardized, formal process 

to conduct in-country assessments for each country that documented 

its consideration of all the key factors we reviewed. These 

assessments describe and assess partner countries’ needs, 

absorptive capacity, and sustainment capacity. For example, in 

Uganda, the written ATA assessment identified border security, 

investigations, and critical incident management as areas that could 

benefit from additional ATA assistance. Likewise, a 2012 assessment 

documented that Tanzanian officials had demonstrated their 

absorptive capacity by incorporating the ATA curriculum at their 

academies. The most recent round of assessment reports also 

included standard annexes on other U.S. efforts and other donor 

efforts. For PKO, State selects activities from among AFRICOM 

proposals that provide information on, and documented consideration 

of, all the key factors we reviewed. AFRICOM has a formal process 

for developing proposals, with formal guidelines, a two-stage proposal 

form, and two interagency reviews. The proposal form template 

requests information on all five key factors. For example, in a proposal 

to provide Burundi with small unmanned aircraft systems, the 

proposal described Burundi’s need for this equipment to conduct 

intelligence and reconnaissance operations. It also noted Burundi’s 

lack of trained operators, addressing Burundi’s absorptive capacity. 

The form specifically requests information on how the proposed 

assistance will be sustained by the recipient country or the United 

States. The proposal form also provides information on other U.S. and 

other donor efforts by collecting information on whether the proposed 

activity complements other ongoing initiatives in the country or region.

• State documented three of the five key factors for activities selected 

for ESF funding. The Bureau of African Affairs’ proposal form for ESF 

activities documented consideration of partner country needs, other 

related U.S. efforts, and other donor efforts, but the bureau did not 

document its consideration of the two other key factors. The proposal 

form includes a section requesting information on coordination with 

U.S. government efforts and other donor efforts. In addition, 

completed proposals we reviewed included information on partner 

country needs. However, the proposal form does not include sections 

on absorptive capacity or sustainment capacity. Therefore, we were 

unable to verify whether Bureau of African Affairs officials had 

documented information about the other two key factors as they made 

decisions. Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Kampala reported that a 

PREACT-funded ESF project on social media had to be modified 

because the target audience did not have access to the Internet. This 
 

Page 28 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

absorptive capacity issue may have been anticipated if State 

consistently documented relevant information.

• State documented one of the five key factors for activities funded 

through NADR/TIP. Officials from State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism 

said the bureau decides which PREACT partners would receive 

PREACT assistance using uniform criteria. State documented its 

consideration of partner country needs when selecting PREACT 

activities through memorandums of intent and operational readiness 

reviews. For example, operational readiness reviews identified 

locations in partner countries that needed upgraded systems. 

However, State had no documentation of its consideration of the other 

four key factors.

• State had no documentation regarding the key factors for activities 

funded through INCLE. While INL reported considering the key factors 

through in-country visits to develop PREACT activities funded through 

INCLE, INL did not document these visits. According to State, INL has 

encountered implementation issues in trying to establish a legal 

adviser in Burundi because of the partner country’s inability to absorb 

INCLE assistance. Without documentation of the in-country visits, it is 

unclear whether State considered Burundi’s absorptive capacity 

before initiating this PREACT activity. As a result, State has decided 

to move the legal adviser to Uganda instead. This issue may have 

been anticipated if State consistently documented information on 

absorptive capacity.

As stated earlier, State’s Bureau of African Affairs is responsible for 

managing PREACT and works with other bureaus and agencies to 

implement PREACT activities. However, the bureau does not routinely 

collect complete operational and financial information on PREACT that 

would inform decision making and ensure the effective use of resources. 

The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government

recommends that program managers need both operational and financial 

data to determine whether they are meeting their agencies’ plans and 

goals for effective and efficient use of resources.29 While bureau officials 

use several methods to collect information about U.S. counterterrorismrelated activities, the bureau does not have a comprehensive list of 

 

29GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, 19.

State Does Not Routinely 

Collect and Lacks 

Comprehensive 

Information on PREACT 

Activities and Funding
 

Page 29 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

PREACT-specific activities and has presented some information 

inaccurately in the bureau’s Performance Plans and Reports. Similarly, 

the bureau uses some financial information to manage PREACT, but also 

does not routinely collect important financial information that could inform 

decision making. As a result, the bureau’s reports on PREACT contained 

inaccuracies and may have missed opportunities to ensure PREACT 

funds were used to support PREACT partners.

The Bureau of African Affairs uses several methods to collect information 

about U.S. counterterrorism-related activities in East Africa. However, the 

bureau lacks a comprehensive list of PREACT-specific activities and has 

presented information regarding PREACT inaccurately in reports to senior 

policy officials. The Foreign Affairs Manual states that managers are 

responsible for maintaining and monitoring systems of internal controls in 

their areas to provide reasonable assurance that activities are carried out 

to further management objectives.30 Further, the Standards for Internal 

Controls in the Federal Government states that program managers need 

operational data to determine if they are meeting agency goals regarding 

the effective use of resources.31

The Bureau of African Affairs has some tools in place to monitor PREACT 

activities. One way the bureau manages PREACT activities is by 

convening a routine working group with relevant State bureaus and U.S. 

agencies. State officials reported that the working group is a useful tool to 

determine what activities are being implemented and to identify any 

issues that need to be addressed. In addition, officials from implementing 

units also reported providing status updates on activities through frequent 

e-mail or telephone contact. AFRICOM also provides the bureau with a 

regular update on its PREACT activities.

The Bureau of African Affairs reports tracking counterterrorism efforts in 

East Africa; however, the bureau does not track separately or identify 

which activities included in its report were funded through PREACT and 

which activities were funded with other counterterrorism assistance. 

Because of this, the Bureau of African Affairs, which manages PREACT, 

did not have a distinct list of PREACT activities. As a result, it is unclear 

whether the Bureau of African Affairs has the ability to monitor all 

 

30State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 2 FAM 022.12.

31GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, 19.

Information Regarding 

PREACT Activities Is 

Incomplete and Reported 

Inaccurately in Its Annual 

Performance Plan and Report
 

Page 30 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

PREACT-funded activities. For example, State data indicated that ATA 

funds designated for PREACT were used for activities in Mauritius, which 

is not a PREACT partner country.32 State officials said the allocation of 

funds to Mauritius was an oversight. Officials from the Bureau of African 

Affairs stated that each of the implementing partners (such as other State 

bureaus, USAID, or DOD) tracks activity information separately. However, 

in our attempt to obtain or compile lists of PREACT activities during the 

course of our 11-month review from those partners and State’s Bureau of 

African Affairs, neither we nor State could produce a comprehensive list 

of activities. State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security was able to provide 

only a list of PREACT-funded ATA activities for 2013.

During the course of our review, we identified inaccuracies in how the 

Bureau of African Affairs reported on PREACT in its annual Performance 

Plan and Report for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, which State officials said 

were provided to senior U.S. policy officials and were used to inform State 

in reporting to Congress. In its fiscal year 2011 report, the bureau listed 

accounts supporting PREACT activities, but omitted ESF despite 

allocating funds for activities that year. For fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 

the bureau reported that PREACT supported counterterrorism-financing 

efforts in Kenya and Tanzania through NADR/Countering Terrorist 

Financing funds. However, information provided by State, State’s 

Congressional Budget Justifications for fiscal year 2012, and spend plans 

submitted to Congress do not record NADR/Countering Terrorist 

Financing as an account funding PREACT activities.33 Furthermore, in the 

Performance Plan and Report for fiscal year 2012, the Bureau of African 

Affairs reported that ATA had implemented PREACT activities in Kenya 

using NADR funds. However, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

stated that it implemented ATA trainings in Kenya bilaterally and not 

through PREACT.34 Other information provided by State also indicated 

that Kenya did not receive any PREACT-designated funds for ATA 

training in fiscal year 2012. We believe several of these mistakes were 

 

32In fiscal year 2010, State provided ATA funding designated for PREACT for cyber 

forensics training and equipment for security forces in Mauritius, according to an official.

33Officials from State, Treasury, and the Department of Justice reported that their 

countering terrorist financing activities in the region were not formally part of PREACT, 

though these activities did further PREACT goals.

34According to State officials, Kenya may have benefitted from some PREACT regional 

activities supported by NADR/ATA funds. However, the Performance Plan and Report

does not reference any regional activities.
 

Page 31 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

the result of not routinely collecting data specifically on PREACT 

activities.

While the Bureau of African Affairs tracks allocations, it does not collect or 

have complete and ready access to information on the status of funds for 

PREACT activities that could inform decision making, including 

information on any unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and 

disbursements that could help inform future funding and program 

decisions. State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and the Standards for Internal 

Controls in the Federal Government, call for financial reporting to help 

inform program decision making. The Foreign Affairs Manual section on 

Financial Management Policy states financial information is required for 

internal management regarding planning, programming, budgeting, 

performance evaluation, and reporting, and calls for the development of 

accurate and useful reports for internal and external use.35 Further, the 

Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government states that 

financial information is required on a day-to-day basis to make operating 

decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources.36

The Bureau of African Affairs and State’s Office of Foreign Assistance 

Resources track allocations of funds for PREACT, while implementing 

bureaus and agencies, such as the Bureau for Counterterrorism, USAID, 

or DOD, track the status of funds. State officials reported that U.S. 

missions in East Africa also track the status of funds. Officials from 

implementing units reported providing status updates through frequent email or telephone contact and through the PREACT working group. 

However, the Bureau of African Affairs does not consistently collect 

information on the status of funds, such as unobligated balances, 

unliquidated obligations, and disbursements. Therefore, we found that the 

bureau was unaware of unobligated balances and unliquidated 

obligations for some accounts. For example, the Bureau of African Affairs, 

in response to our data request, originally reported that all PREACT 

allocations from fiscal years 2009 to 2012 were obligated. However, after 

reviewing data from the implementing agencies, the bureau identified 

unobligated balances from the funds allocated for PREACT from 

NADR/ATA in prior years. State officials from the Bureaus of African 

Affairs and Counterterrorism stated that they had not been aware of 

 

35State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 4 FAM 013 a.1 and 4 FAM 013 b.9.

36GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, 19.

State Lacks PREACT-Specific 

Financial Information to Inform 

Decision Making
 

Page 32 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

unobligated balances in the NADR/ATA account designated for PREACT. 

The Bureau of African Affairs, in consultation with the Bureau for 

Counterterrorism and the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, has 

requested higher amounts of ATA for PREACT each year since fiscal 

year 2011, even though there were unobligated balances from prior fiscal 

years totaling more than $3 million.37 As a result, the Bureau of African 

Affairs made resource allocation decisions without full information on the 

fiscal status of available funds. Having complete and ready access to 

financial information, as called for by State’s own Foreign Affairs Manual

and the Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government, may 

have prevented the inaccuracies in bureau reporting described earlier.

The U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights East Africa as 

a region of particular concern for terrorism because of al Shabaab and 

the al Qaeda-affiliated network’s growing threat to U.S. interests that has 

been emanating from safe havens in the region. In addition, the President 

has highlighted the U.S. government’s increased focus on building 

partner countries’ capacity to combat terrorism and share the costs of 

common security challenges. State, in concert with other agencies, such 

as DOD and USAID, implements PREACT as an additional tool to further 

U.S. strategic objectives by allocating over $100 million since 2009 for 

PREACT activities to enhance partner countries’ counterterrorism 

capabilities in East Africa.

While the PREACT initiative has funded counterterrorism assistance to 

foreign partners, State’s Bureau of African Affairs could improve its 

management of the PREACT program in three areas. First, while the 

bureau considers partner country needs, absorptive capacity, 

sustainment capacity, other U.S. efforts, and other donor efforts when it 

selects PREACT activities, State does not fully document its 

consideration of these factors. Fully documenting its consideration and 

evaluation of these factors could enhance the transparency of the 

decision-making process, assist future program managers and decision 

makers, and provide additional assurance that resources are being 

efficiently allocated. Second, despite the bureau’s efforts to track U.S. 

counterterrorism assistance in East Africa, it lacks a comprehensive list of 

 

37These funds were requested in fiscal years 2009 through 2012 and are no longer 

available for new obligations.

Conclusions
 

Page 33 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

specific PREACT activities. Improving the collection and reporting of 

information on PREACT activities could strengthen PREACT’s whole-ofgovernment approach to counterterrorism by ensuring all agencies have a 

common understanding of the activities that are being implemented. In 

addition, a comprehensive list of PREACT activities could help State 

program managers accurately assess whether the program is taking 

steps to achieve its goals and may help ensure there is no unnecessary 

duplication, overlap, or fragmentation. Third, the Bureau of African Affairs, 

which manages PREACT, lacks full insight into the status of the funds for

PREACT activities it oversees. Collecting such information could help 

PREACT managers make more informed decisions about future 

opportunities to direct resources where they can be most effectively used, 

as well as improve the accuracy of its reporting. Given the ongoing threat 

of terrorism in East Africa, improving PREACT program management to 

help guide PREACT activities and target PREACT resources is essential 

to strengthening the partnership and making effective use of U.S. 

assistance in the region.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take the following three 

actions to improve the management of PREACT:

1. take steps to improve documentation of consideration of key factors 

when selecting PREACT activities for each funding account, such as 

country needs, absorptive capacity, sustainment capacity, other U.S. 

efforts, and other donor efforts;

2. routinely collect information on and maintain a comprehensive list of 

PREACT activities; and

3. routinely collect and maintain information that will better enable State 

to more efficiently determine and report on the status of funds 

allocated for PREACT.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Defense, 

Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury; to USAID; and to the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence for their review and 

comment. State provided written comments, which we have reproduced 

in appendix III. State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of

the Director of National Intelligence also provided technical comments, 

which we have incorporated as appropriate. The Departments of 

Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, and USAID did not provide 

comments. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 34 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

In its written comments, State concurred with all three of our 

recommendations to improve the management of PREACT and stated 

that it is taking actions to address them. More specifically, to improve its 

documentation of key factors considered when selecting PREACT 

activities, State reported that the Bureau of African Affairs is creating a 

streamlined reporting mechanism in line with our recommendation to 

improve documentation of its consideration of key factors. To collect 

information about and maintain a comprehensive list of PREACT 

activities, State is taking actions to institutionalize a working document 

used by the Bureau of African Affairs that currently does not differentiate 

between PREACT and other counterterrorism activities. Lastly, to collect 

and maintain information on the status of funds allocated for PREACT, 

State is seeking to identify better mechanisms and processes regarding 

financial data on PREACT activities.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and 

the Treasury; the Attorney General of the United States; the Administrator 

of USAID; the Director of National Intelligence; and other interested 

parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

For this review of the Partnership for Regional East Africa 

Counterterrorism (PREACT), our objectives were to examine (1) the role 

PREACT plays in U.S. counterterrorism assistance to East Africa, (2) the 

extent to which funds allocated for PREACT since 2009 have been 

disbursed, and (3) the extent to which PREACT decision-making 

processes consider key factors and other information to inform program 

management.

To support our work for all three objectives, we reviewed agency 

documents from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), 

Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). We interviewed U.S. officials from 

those agencies in Washington, D.C.; at the U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) in Germany; and at U.S. missions (via video-teleconference) 

in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda. We selected these countries because 

they were among the top four recipients of PREACT funding, and 

collectively they implemented activities funded by all four accounts used 

for PREACT. We also met with officials from the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence. 

To examine the role PREACT plays in U.S. counterterrorism assistance 

to East Africa, we reviewed national, agency, and program strategic 

plans, including the 2011 and 2013 versions of the PREACT strategy. We 

examined information regarding PREACT activities from implementing 

entities including AFRICOM; USAID; and State’s Bureaus of 

Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, and Political-Military Affairs, and compared them 

against PREACT goals. We interviewed agency officials from State; DOD; 

USAID; and the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland 

Security regarding what role PREACT plays in the overall U.S. 

counterterrorism assistance to East Africa, including efforts in Somalia. 

To calculate the amount allocated for other counterterrorism assistance in 

East Africa, we collected allocation data from State, DOD, and USAID 

and reviewed State’s Congressional Budget Justifications.1

 

1

For the purposes of this report, “other counterterrorism assistance” includes those 

activities funded by the U.S. government that support PREACT’s goals, but were not 

funded using PREACT-designated money. U.S. military operations, law enforcement 

investigations, and intelligence activities are not included. State provided data on 

assistance provided to Somalia that support PREACT’s counterterrorism goals.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

To determine the extent to which funds allocated for PREACT have been 

disbursed and the amounts of unobligated balances and unliquidated 

obligations, we collected data from State on the status of funds used for 

PREACT activities for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. To assess the 

reliability of the data provided, we reviewed information from agency 

officials regarding the underlying financial data systems and the checks, 

controls, and reviews used to generate the data and ensure their 

accuracy and reliability. We found the data sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. We reviewed agency documents from State, DOD, and USAID 

to corroborate financial data. For example, we reviewed interagency 

agreements and associated amendments between State and DOD 

regarding the implementation of Peacekeeping Operations funds for fiscal 

years 2010 through 2013. We also used State’s Congressional Budget 

Justifications to corroborate State information. We analyzed data 

provided by State and other agencies to identify trends related to the 

fiscal status of PREACT funds.

To assess the extent to which PREACT decision-making processes 

consider key factors and other information to inform program 

management, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency 

officials. We reviewed the presidential policy directive on security sector 

assistance, which identified five key factors to be considered for 

assistance programs like PREACT because they are critical to building 

partner counterterrorism capacity and to focusing limited resources: 

country needs, absorptive capacity, sustainment capacity, other U.S. 

efforts, and other donor efforts. To determine the extent to which State 

considered and documented those factors when selecting activities to 

implement with PREACT funds, we reviewed agency guidance, country 

assessments, proposal forms, and implementation agreements. For 

example, we analyzed assessments conducted by the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s Antiterrorism Assistance program of Burundi, 

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda from 2010 

through 2012. We traveled to Germany to meet with AFRICOM officials 

and gather information about AFRICOM’s role in collecting and sharing 

information with State on the key factors. We also interviewed U.S. 

officials from State’s Bureaus of African Affairs, Counterterrorism, 

Diplomatic Security, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 

and Political-Military Affairs; DOD; and USAID in Washington, D.C., and 

officials at AFRICOM and U.S. missions in East Africa to obtain their 

perspectives on how they considered key factors when selecting 

PREACT activities.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 37 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

To understand what information was used to manage the implementation 

of PREACT activities, we compared activity and financial information, 

when available, regarding PREACT activities provided by State’s Bureau 

of African Affairs—which manages PREACT—with information provided 

by the implementing entities including AFRICOM; USAID; and State’s 

Bureaus of Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, and Political-Military 

Affairs. We also reviewed how the Bureau of African Affairs reported on 

PREACT activities in its annual Performance Plan and Report for fiscal 

years 2009-2012. In addition, we interviewed U.S. officials from State’s 

Bureaus of African Affairs, Counterterrorism, International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, and Political-Military Affairs and USAID in 

Washington, D.C., and officials at AFRICOM and U.S. missions in East 

Africa to gather information about implementation of PREACT activities in 

partner countries and the extent to which U.S. officials in the field gather 

information on the key factors, status of implementation, and status of 

funding and provide that information to decision makers in Washington.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Status of Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism Funds

Page 38 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

The information below describes, by account, the status of funds 

allocated for the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT), as of November 2013. The tables show unobligated 

balances—which are the portions of allocations that have not yet been 

obligated—and unliquidated obligations—which are the amounts of 

obligations incurred for which payment has not yet been made.

State allocates funding for PREACT activities through the following four 

accounts: Economic Support Fund (ESF); Peacekeeping Operations 

(PKO); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); 

and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs 

(NADR). State’s Bureau of African Affairs manages the PREACT program 

overall; however other State bureaus lead the design and selection of 

PREACT activities funded from the various accounts.

State’s Bureau of African Affairs leads the design and selection of 

PREACT activities funded by ESF. As table 3 shows, for fiscal years 2009 

through 2013, State allocated about $8.4 million for ESF. It allocated the 

largest amounts of its ESF funds for PREACT activities in Kenya to 

promote democratic participation and in Somalia to engage Somali 

populations. As of November 2013, State had obligated all ESF funds 

appropriated for fiscal year 2012 and earlier. State officials explained that 

the agency had not yet obligated funds that Congress appropriated for 

fiscal year 2013 for implementation in specific countries or activities, and 

these funds remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014. 

State had disbursed about half of the approximately $8.4 million of ESF 

funding for PREACT activities as of November 2013.

Table 3: Economic Support Fund (ESF) Funding Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward Partnership 

for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, as of November 2013 

Dollars in thousands

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Allocated - 2,500 2,039 2,000 1,900 8,439

Unobligated balance - 0 0 0 1,900a 1,900

Unliquidated obligations - 334 250 1,193 0 1,777

Disbursed - 2,166 1,789 807 0 4,762

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

Notes: The amounts above reflect funds dedicated for PREACT activities appropriated by fiscal year.

a

This unobligated balance reflects fiscal year 2013 appropriations that remain available for obligation

until September 30, 2014, and State is in the process of obligating these funds.

Appendix II: Status of Partnership for 

Regional East Africa Counterterrorism Funds

Status of ESF Account 

Funds Allocated for 

PREACT Activities
Appendix II: Status of Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism Funds

Page 39 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs leads the design and selection 

of PREACT activities funded by PKO. As table 4 shows, for fiscal years 

2009 through 2013, State allocated about $45 million for PKO. State had 

obligated all PKO funds to support activities in partner countries as of 

November 2013. While State had disbursed about $8 million (or 18 

percent) of PKO funds as of November 2013, unliquidated obligations 

account for more than half of the PKO allocations every fiscal year since 

2009. However, after the period of availability for obligation has ended, 

U.S. agencies have an additional 5 years to disburse those funds. 

Therefore, no PKO funds allocated for PREACT activities had expired as 

of November 2013.

Table 4: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Funding Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward Partnership 

for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, as of November 2013 

Dollars in thousands

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Allocated 5,000 10,000 9,960 10,000 10,000 44,960

Unobligated balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Unliquidated obligations 2,827 6,371 8,497 9,307 9,986 36,988

Disbursed 2,173 3,629 1,463 693 14 7,972

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

Note: The amounts above reflect funds dedicated for PREACT activities appropriated by fiscal year.

State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

leads the design and selection of PREACT activities funded by INCLE. As 

table 5 shows, State allocated a total of $6 million in INCLE funds under 

PREACT in fiscal years 2010, 2012, and 2013. State had allocated these 

funds for Burundi, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and regional activities. As 

of November 2013, State had obligated all INCLE funds appropriated for 

fiscal year 2012 and earlier. State officials explained that the agency had 

not yet obligated funds that Congress appropriated for fiscal year 2013 for 

implementation in specific countries or activities, and these funds remain 

available for obligation until September 30, 2014. State had disbursed 

$682,000 (or 11 percent) of INCLE funds allocated, as of November 

2013. In addition, State officials reported that they had encountered 

challenges implementing the INCLE program in Burundi and amended 

the program to be based in Uganda.

Status of PKO Account 

Funds Allocated for 

PREACT Activities

Status of INCLE Account 

Funds Allocated for 

PREACT Activities
Appendix II: Status of Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism Funds

Page 40 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Table 5: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE) Funding Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal 

Year Appropriated, toward Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, 

as of November 2013 

Dollars in thousands

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Allocated - 2,000 - 2,000 2,000 6,000

Unobligated balance - 0 - 0 2,000a 2,000

Unliquidated obligations - 1,634 - 1,684 0 3,318

Disbursed - 366 - 316 0 682

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

Notes: The amounts above reflect funds dedicated for PREACT activities appropriated by fiscal year.

a

This unobligated balance reflects fiscal year 2013 appropriations that remain available for obligation

until September 30, 2014, and State is in the process of obligating these funds.

State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism leads the design and selection of 

PREACT activities funded by NADR. For fiscal years 2009 through 2013, 

State allocated a total of about $44.6 million in NADR funds to support 

PREACT activities in East African countries. State split this assistance 

between the Antiterrorism Assistance program (ATA) and the Terrorist 

Interdiction Program (TIP).

As shown in table 6, about $34.3 million had been allocated for 

NADR/ATA activities. State had disbursed about $19.8 million (or 58 

percent) of the NADR/ATA allocated funds as of November 2013. State 

carried an unobligated balance for each fiscal year as of November 2013. 

The majority of the unobligated balance ($8.5 million, or 73 percent) is 

from fiscal year 2013 because State is in the process of obligating those 

funds, which remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014. For 

funds allocated in fiscal year 2012 and earlier, State has about $3.1 

million in unobligated balances. State has either 1 or 2 years to obligate 

NADR funds, depending on the purpose for which the NADR funds are 

appropriated. Therefore, the authority to incur new obligations for any 

funds appropriated in fiscal year 2012 and earlier that were not obligated 

has expired. These unobligated balances remain available for an 

additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations properly 

chargeable to the appropriation’s period of availability. For example, 

these funds may remain available for contract modifications properly 

within the scope of the original contract. Officials from State’s Bureaus of 

Diplomatic Security and Counterterrorism acknowledged that about $3.1 

million in NADR/ATA funds remains unobligated and is no longer 

available for new obligations. Despite having unobligated balances from 

Status of NADR Account 

Funds Allocated for 

PREACT Activities
Appendix II: Status of Partnership for Regional 

East Africa Counterterrorism Funds

Page 41 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

prior fiscal years, State has requested higher amounts of ATA for 

PREACT each year since fiscal year 2011, requesting more than $9 

million for fiscal year 2014.

Table 6: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) Funding for Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 

Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, as of November 2013

Dollars in thousands

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Allocated 3,781 7,578 6,948 7,472 8,537 34,316

Unobligated balance 829a 881a 532a 871a 8,537b 11,650

Unliquidated obligations 64 474 389 1,990 0 2,917

Disbursed 2,888 6,223 6,028 4,611 0 19,750

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

Notes: The amounts above reflect funds dedicated for PREACT activities appropriated by fiscal year.

a

According to State officials, the period of availability to incur new obligations has expired for these 

unobligated balances. These unobligated balances remain available for an additional 5 fiscal years 

for recording and adjusting obligations properly chargeable to the appropriation’s period of availability.

For example, these funds may remain available for contract modifications properly within the scope of 

the original contract.

b

This unobligated balance reflects fiscal year 2013 appropriations that remain available for obligation

until September 30, 2014, and State is in the process of obligating these funds.

As shown in table 7, State had allocated a total of about $10.3 million for 

NADR/TIP activities for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. As of November 

2013, State had obligated and disbursed all funds allocated for TIP 

activities from fiscal years 2009 through 2012.

Table 7: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) Funding for Terrorist Interdiction Program 

(TIP) Allocated and Disbursed, by Fiscal Year Appropriated, toward Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism 

(PREACT) Activities in Partner Countries, as of November 2013

Dollars in thousands

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Allocated 2,700 2,570 2,000 1,850 1,161 10,281

Unobligated balance 0 0 0 0 1,161a 1,161

Unliquidated obligations 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Disbursed 2,700 2,570 2,000 1,850 0 9,120

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. | GAO-14-502

Note: The amounts above reflect funds dedicated for PREACT activities appropriated by fiscal year.

a

This unobligated balance reflects fiscal year 2013 appropriations that remain available for obligation

until September 30, 2014, and State is in the process of obligating these funds.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 42 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of State

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 43 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 44 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 45 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated June 2, 2014.

1. In GAO’s Highlights of this report, we note the amount of funding 

allocated for regional activities.

2. While interagency collaboration was not the focus of our review, we 

note on page 29 that the Bureau of African Affairs convenes a 

PREACT working group and uses email to monitor PREACT activities. 

We have also incorporated some information regarding State’s 

recently-developed PREACT strategic plan and strategic planning 

process.

GAO Comments
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 46 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jason L. Bair (Assistant Director), 

Miriam Carroll Fenton, and Brandon L. Hunt made key contributions to 

this report. Ashley Alley, Martin de Alteriis, Karen Deans, and Etana 

Finkler provided technical assistance.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
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Page 47 GAO-14-502 Combating Terrorism

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(320987)
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