MANAGING 

CRITICAL ISOTOPES

Stewardship of 

Lithium-7 Is Needed to 

Ensure a Stable 

Supply

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology, 

House of Representatives

September 2013

GAO-13-716

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-716, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 

Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, House of Representatives

September 2013

MANAGING CRITICAL ISOTOPES

Stewardship of Lithium-7 Is Needed to Ensure a 

Stable Supply

Why GAO Did This Study

About 13 percent of our nation’s 

electricity is produced by pressurized 

water reactors that rely on lithium-7, an 

isotope of lithium produced and 

exported solely by China and Russia, 

for their safe operation. Lithium-7 is 

added to the water that cools the 

reactor core to prevent the cooling 

water from becoming acidic. Without 

the lithium-7, the cooling water’s acidity 

would increase the rate of corrosion of 

pipes and other infrastructure—

possibly causing them to fail. Utilities 

that operate the pressurized water 

reactors have experienced little 

difficulty obtaining lithium-7, but they 

may not be aware of all the risks of 

relying on two producers. 

GAO was asked to review the supply 

and domestic demand for lithium-7 and 

how risks are being managed. This 

report examines (1) what is known 

about the supply and demand of 

lithium-7, (2) what federal agencies are 

responsible for managing supply risks, 

and (3) alternative options to mitigate a 

potential shortage. GAO reviewed 

documents and interviewed officials 

from DOE, NNSA, and NRC, in 

addition to industry representatives.

This report is an unclassified version of 

a classified report also issued in 

September 2013.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Energy ensure a stable future supply 

of lithium-7 by directing the Isotope 

Program to take on a stewardship role 

for lithium-7 by taking steps, including

fully assessing risks and accurately 

determining domestic demand. DOE 

concurred with the recommendation.

What GAO Found

Little is known about lithium-7 production in China and Russia and 

whether their supplies can meet future domestic demand. According to 

industry representatives, China and Russia produce enough lithium-7 to 

meet demand from U.S. pressurized water reactors, a type of commercial 

nuclear power reactor that requires lithium-7 for safe operation. However, 

China’s continued supply may be reduced by its own growing demand, 

according to an expert that is familiar with China’s plans. Specifically, 

China is building several pressurized water reactors and developing a 

new type of reactor that will require 1,000s of kilograms of lithium-7 to 

operate, rather than the 300 kilograms needed annually for all 65 U.S. 

pressurized water reactors. Relying on two producers of lithium-7 leaves 

U.S. pressurized water reactors vulnerable to lithium-7 supply disruptions.

No federal entity has taken stewardship responsibility for assessing and 

managing risks to the lithium-7 supply, but DOE is taking some steps. 

Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks, 

communication of risks to stakeholders, and then taking steps to manage 

the risks, according to federal standards for internal control. Officials at 

DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) told GAO they view lithium-7 as a 

commercial commodity for which industry is responsible. Industry 

representatives told GAO that they had no concerns about the lithium-7 

supply, as they have experienced no problems in obtaining it. But GAO 

learned that industry representatives may not be familiar with all the 

supply risks. Notwithstanding, DOE plans to set aside 200 kilograms of 

lithium-7 and is funding research on lithium-7 production methods. DOE 

also studied lithium-7 supply and demand and concluded that no further 

action is needed. However, GAO found several shortcomings in its study, 

including that DOE underestimated the amount of lithium-7 used 

domestically. Industry estimates show that about 300 kilograms of lithium7 are used annually in the United States, whereas DOE estimated that 

200 kilograms are used annually. This and other shortcomings make it 

unclear if DOE’s conclusion is correct that no additional action is needed.

Based on information from agency officials and industry representatives, 

GAO identified three options to mitigate a potential lithium-7 shortage: (1) 

building a domestic reserve is a low-cost option that could help in the 

short-term; (2) building a domestic production capability is a longer-term 

solution that could eliminate lithium-7 imports, but take about 5 years and 

cost $10-12 million, according to NNSA; and (3) reducing pressurized 

water reactors’ reliance on lithium-7 is another longer-term solution, but 

may require years of research and changes in how reactors are operated.

View GAO-13-716. For more information, 

contact David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov or Dr. Timothy M. Persons, 

(202) 512-6412 or personst@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

Letter 1

Scope and Methodology 4

Background 5

Little Is Known about Lithium-7 Production, Creating Uncertainty 

about the Reliability of the Future Supply 7

No Entity Has Taken Stewardship Responsibility for Assessing and 

Managing Risks to the Lithium-7 Supply, but DOE Is Taking 

Some Actions 10

Additional Options Exist to Mitigate a Potential Lithium-7 Shortage 17

Conclusions 19

Recommendation for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Energy 23

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 26

Figure

Figure 1: Pressurized Water Reactor and Where Lithium-7 is

Incorporated Into the Cooling Water 7

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

Abbreviations

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

Isotope Program Isotope Development and Production for 

 Research and Applications program

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 19, 2013

The Honorable Dan Maffei

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Oversight

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Maffei:

About 13 percent of our nation’s electricity is produced by 65 nuclear 

power reactors that rely on enriched lithium hydroxide—a chemical that is 

produced and exported only by China and Russia. Of the 100 commercial 

nuclear power reactors in the United States, these 65 are pressurized 

water reactors, a type of reactor that requires lithium hydroxide to be 

added to the water that cools it. The lithium hydroxide is used in 

pressurized water reactors to prevent the cooling water from becoming 

acidic due to the addition of other chemicals that are critical to managing 

the nuclear reaction. Without the lithium hydroxide, the cooling water’s 

acidity would increase the rate of corrosion of pipes and other 

infrastructure in the reactor—possibly causing them to fail. Lithium 

hydroxide is made using lithium-7, an isotope of lithium that does not 

interfere with the nuclear reaction within a reactor core.1 Lithium-7 is also 

used in special purifiers called demineralizers that extract radioactive 

material and contaminants from the cooling water.2

 1

Isotopes are varieties of a given chemical element with the same number of protons but 

different numbers of neutrons. For example, the helium-3 isotope, which is used in 

research and to detect neutrons in radiation detection equipment, has one less neutron

than the helium-4 isotope, which is the helium isotope commonly used in party balloons. 

Low enriched lithium7 was produced in the United States by the Y-12 National Security 

Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, from 1955 to 1963 as a byproduct of producing lithium-6, which is used in the nuclear weapons 

program. DOE has not needed to produce additional lithium-6 since that 

time and, according to Y-12 officials, the department sold the resulting 

supply of low-enriched lithium-7 on the open market, except for a limited 

2

For the purposes of this report, we use the term lithium-7 when we describe the supply 

and demand for lithium-7 and/or lithium hydroxide that is made with lithium-7. Additionally, 

all quantities are expressed in terms of the weight of lithium-7 and not the weight of the 

lithium hydroxide that it is found in. 
Page 2 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

quantity.3

Lithium-7 has not been produced in the United States since 1963, but a 

portion of the low-enriched lithium-7 was further enriched and is stored by 

the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),

Today, industry relies on China and Russia for its supply of 

lithium-7. According to industry representatives, utilities that operate 

pressurized water reactors have experienced little to no problems 

obtaining lithium-7 when they have needed it.

4 a semiautonomous 

agency within DOE. Specifically, about 1,300 kilograms of lithium-7 

(about 2,860 pounds), in the form of lithium hydroxide, was enriched to 

99.99 percent—the level needed for use in pressurized water reactors—

and stored at Y-12. However, according to Y-12 documentation, this 

supply has become contaminated during storage and would need to be 

purified before it is usable in a pressurized water reactor.5 NNSA makes 

this supply available to DOE’s Isotope Development and Production for 

Research and Applications program (Isotope Program) to sell for 

research and other purposes.6 Similarly, NNSA makes other isotopes 

available to the Isotope Program to sell, including helium-3, on which we 

previously reported.7

 3

The by-product of producing lithium-6 was slightly enriched lithium-7, according to DOE, 

which was sold on the open market. Y-12 later enriched some of the low-enriched lithium7 to a level that could be used in pressurized water reactors.

According to DOE, the Isotope Program’s threepronged mission is to: (1) produce or distribute isotopes in short supply, 

their associated by-products and surplus materials, and deliver isotoperelated services; (2) maintain the infrastructure required to produce and 

supply isotopes and related services; and (3) investigate and develop 

4

Congress created NNSA as a semiautonomous agency within DOE. NNSA is responsible 

for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and 

naval reactors programs. 

5

In addition to the approximately 1,300 kilograms of lithium hydroxide, NNSA has about 

400 kilograms of lithium-7 (about 882 pounds) that is enriched to 99.99 percent lithium-7, 

but is in a different chemical form and would need to be purified and converted to lithium 

hydroxide before it can be used in a pressurized water reactor. Approximately 8,600

kilograms of lithium-7 (about 18,900 pounds) are not enriched to 99.99 percent lithium-7, 

making it unusable in a pressurized water reactor. 

6

The Isotope Program provides over 300 different isotopes for sale, including lithium-7, for 

commercial and research applications. 

7

GAO, Managing Critical Isotopes: Weaknesses in DOE’s Management of Helium-3 

Delayed the Federal Response to a Critical Supply Shortage, GAO-11-472 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 12, 2011). 
Page 3 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

new or improved isotope production and processing techniques that can 

make new isotopes available for research and other applications.

The 65 pressurized water reactors that rely on lithium hydroxide are 

owned and operated by utility companies and provide electricity to the 

electrical grid. For the purposes of this report, these utilities, as well as 

trade organizations, such as the Electric Power Research Institute 

(EPRI),8

In light of the risk of relying on two suppliers for a critical component used 

in most of the nation’s commercial nuclear power reactors, you asked us 

to review lithium-7 supply and demand in the United States. This report 

examines (1) what is known about the supply and domestic demand for 

lithium-7; (2) the responsibilities of DOE, NRC, and other entities in 

assessing risks to the lithium-7 supply, and what, if anything, has been 

done to mitigate a potential supply disruption of lithium-7; and (3) 

additional options, if any, identified by government officials and industry 

representatives for mitigating a potential lithium-7 shortage. In September 

2013, we reported to you on the results of our work in a classified report; 

this is an unclassified version of that report.

make up the nuclear power industry that relies on lithium-7. All 

commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States, including the 65 

pressurized water reactors, are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) through licensing, inspection, and enforcement of its 

requirements. NRC’s regulations govern certain aspects of the cooling 

water, according to NRC officials, but not the specific chemicals used in 

the cooling water, including lithium-7. Utilities that operate pressurized

water reactors purchase their lithium hydroxide from lithium-7 brokers. 

According to industry representatives and lithium-7 brokers, there are 

three brokers that purchase lithium hydroxide directly from China or 

Russia and then sell it to U.S. companies for use in pressurized water 

reactors and in the manufacture of demineralizers. While some utilities 

and demineralizer manufacturers may purchase lithium-hydroxide directly 

from China or Russia, according to a lithium-7 broker, most lithium 

hydroxide used in the United States is purchased through the three 

brokers.

 8

The Electric Power Research Institute conducts research, development, and 

demonstration relating to the generation, delivery, and use of electricity for the benefit of 

the public. Its work spans nearly every area of electricity generation, including commercial 

nuclear power.
Page 4 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

To determine what is known about the supply and domestic demand for 

lithium-7, we analyzed data provided by industry representatives, 

reviewed agency and industry documents, and interviewed agency 

officials and industry representatives. Specifically, to understand the 

supply and domestic demand of lithium-7, we reviewed data from the 

three brokers that purchase lithium hydroxide from China and Russia and 

sell it to utilities and other companies in the United States. To assess the 

reliability of the data, we interviewed lithium-7 brokers about the data and 

found the data to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. We 

also obtained information on China’s supply and demand for lithium-7 

from an expert on nuclear reactors at the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology that was identified by DOE and Y-12 officials. Additionally, 

this expert has been working with DOE in its meetings with scientists from 

the Chinese Academy of Sciences regarding China’s research on new 

reactor designs. We also reviewed documents provided by DOE, Y-12, 

and two utilities that operate pressurized water reactors—Tennessee 

Valley Authority (TVA) and Exelon. We also interviewed representatives 

of companies that buy, sell, and/or handle lithium hydroxide, including 

Ceradyne, Inc., Isoflex, Nukem Isotopes, and Sigma Aldrich and officials 

from DOE, NNSA, and Y-12.

To examine the responsibilities of DOE, NRC, and other entities in 

assessing risks to the lithium-7 supply, and what, if anything, has been 

done to mitigate a potential supply disruption of lithium-7, we reviewed 

documents from DOE, Y-12, and NRC. We also interviewed officials from 

DOE’s Isotope Program and the Office of Nuclear Energy; NNSA’s Office 

of Nuclear Materials Integration, Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and 

International Security, and Y-12; and NRC. We also interviewed 

representatives from Exelon, TVA, EPRI, North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation, Nuclear Energy Institute, Pressurized Water 

Reactors Owners Group, Ceradyne, Inc., and Isoflex. In addition, we 

compared actions DOE is taking to manage and communicate lithium-7 

supply risks with federal standards for internal control.9

To identify additional options, if any, for mitigating a potential lithium-7 

shortage, we reviewed technical articles and documents from industry 

and academia, DOE, Y-12, and NRC. We also interviewed officials from 

 9

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(“Green Book”) (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Scope and 

Methodology
Page 5 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

DOE’s Isotope Program, Office of Nuclear Energy, and Idaho National 

Laboratory; Y-12; and representatives from Exelon, TVA, and EPRI.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to September 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Lithium-7 was produced in the United States as a by-product of enriching 

lithium-6 for the United States’ nuclear weapons program. Lithium-7 and 

lithium-6 are derived from natural lithium, which contains about 92.5 

percent lithium-7 and about 7.5 percent lithium-6. Lithium-6 was enriched 

in the United States by separating it from lithium-7 using a column 

exchange process, called COLEX, that required very large quantities of 

mercury, which can harm human health and the environment. Y-12 built a 

COLEX facility and began operations in 1955 and used it through 1963 to 

enrich lithium-6 and lithium-7.10

Lithium-7 is used in two functions of a pressurized water reactor—to 

produce lithium hydroxide that is added to the cooling water to reduce the 

acidity, and lithium-7 is added to demineralizers to filter contaminants out 

of the cooling water. The cooling water becomes acidic due to the 

addition of boric acid, which contains boron-10, an isotope of boron that is 

used to manage the nuclear reaction in the core—the use of both boron10 and lithium hydroxide is based on reactor core design requirements 

and water pH requirements for corrosion control. Lithium hydroxide, made 

with lithium-7 rather than lithium-6, is added to the cooling water to 

Y-12 experienced several problems with 

the COLEX process, including equipment failures, worker exposure to 

mercury, and mercury contamination of the environment. Y-12 shut the 

COLEX facility down in 1963 and has not operated it since then. While 

the United States still has a stockpile of lithium-6, DOE sold the lithium-7 

by-product to commercial companies, though some was enriched and still 

remains stored at Y-12.

 10The COLEX process separated the two lithium isotopes by using natural lithium 

dissolved in mercury and other chemicals. Lithium-6 is more attracted to the mercury than 

lithium-7, which is more attracted to the other chemicals, thus separating the two isotopes. 

Background
Page 6 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

reduce the acidity of the water and boric acid. Lithium-7 is used rather 

than lithium-6 or natural lithium, which contains lithium-6, because lithium6 would react with nuclear material in the reactor core to produce tritium, 

a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. According to industry representatives, 

lithium hydroxide is added directly to the cooling water, via a chemical 

feed tank, when a pressurized water reactor is started up after being shut 

down, such as after refueling. Lithium-7 is also used in special water 

purifiers—called demineralizers—that remove radioactive material and 

impurities from the cooling water. Figure 1 shows the flow of water 

through a typical pressurized water reactor, though some variations 

among reactors may exist. As the cooling water circulates in the primary 

cooling loop, as shown in figure 1, some of the water flows through pipes 

to the demineralizers and the chemical feed tank where the lithium 

hydroxide is added.
Page 7 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

Figure 1: Pressurized Water Reactor Showing Where Lithium-7 is Incorporated Into the Cooling Water

a

Lithium-7, in the form of lithium hydroxide, is added to the cooling water using the chemical 

feed tank.

There is no domestic production of lithium-7, and little is known about the 

lithium-7 production capabilities of China and Russia and whether they 

will be able to provide future supplies. China and Russia produce lithium7 as a by-product of enriching lithium-6 for their nuclear weapons 

programs, according to a DOE official, much like the United States 

previously did. Because of the secrecy of their weapons programs, China 

and Russia’s lithium-7 production capabilities are not fully known, 

according to lithium-7 brokers. According to industry representatives, 

lithium-7 brokers, and NNSA documents, China and Russia have 

produced enough lithium-7 to meet the current U.S. demand, which is not 

expected to increase a significant amount in the near future, based on 

Little Is Known about 

Lithium-7 Production, 

Creating Uncertainty 

about the Reliability 

of the Future Supply
Page 8 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

DOE’s information that shows five new pressurized water reactors 

scheduled to begin operating by 2018. Additionally, during the course of 

our review, utilities announced that four pressurized water reactors would 

be decommissioned, eliminating their demand for lithium-7.

China’s continued supply of lithium-7 may be reduced by its own growing 

demand created by the construction of new reactors and the development 

of new reactor designs. China’s demand is expected to increase because, 

according to information from DOE, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency,11 and an expert on nuclear reactors who has met with Chinese 

scientists on this topic, China is constructing over 25 pressurized water 

reactors that are scheduled to begin operating by 2015. Additionally, 

China is planning to build a new type of nuclear power reactor—a molten 

salt reactor—that will require dramatically larger amounts of lithium-7 to 

operate.12 China is pursuing the development of two different types of 

molten salt reactors, according to the expert, each of which will result in a 

reactor that requires 1,000s of kilograms of lithium-7 to operate, rather 

than the approximate 300 kilograms (about 660 pounds) annually needed 

for all 65 U.S. pressurized water reactors combined, according to lithium7 brokers. China’s first molten salt reactor is expected to be finished by 

2017, and the second reactor by 2020, according to the reactor expert.13

 11The International Atomic Energy Agency is an autonomous international organization 

affiliated with the United Nations, established in Vienna, Austria, in 1957. The agency has 

the dual role of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by transferring nuclear 

science and technology through its nuclear science and applications and technical 

cooperation programs and verifying, through its safeguards program, that nuclear material 

subject to safeguards is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. 

Furthermore, molten salt reactors require a more pure form of lithium-7—

99.995 percent, or higher—than what is currently produced by China and 

Russia, according to the reactor expert and a lithium-7 broker. To obtain 

the higher enriched lithium-7, according to the reactor expert who is 

familiar with China’s research, China built a small facility that will feed in 

lower-enriched lithium-7 and enrich it to the higher level of purity that is 

needed. An Isotope Program official suggested to us that China’s new 

12Molten salt reactors, unlike pressurized water reactors, do not use water to cool the 

reactor core; instead, a type of salt is liquefied and circulated through the core. The molten 

salt consists of lithium-7, in addition to other chemicals. 

13According to the expert, China’s first reactor, a fluoride salt-cooled, high-temperature 

reactor, referred to as an FHR, is being built first, followed by the molten salt reactor; both 

reactor designs use 1,000s of kilograms of lithium-7. 
Page 9 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

facility could increase the available supply of lithium-7 for pressurized 

water reactors. However, according to the reactor expert, this new facility 

may reduce the supply of lithium-7 available for export since it uses 

lithium-7 as feedstock. This expert said that China has obtained lithium-7 

from its own supplies and has purchased additional lithium-7 from Russia 

to enrich in its own facility, possibly making China a net importer of 

lithium-7. It is unknown, however, whether China has enough lithium-7 for 

its increased nuclear fleet and molten salt reactors, or if it will need to 

import additional quantities, which could reduce the available supply of 

lithium-7. For example, one lithium-7 broker told us in June of this year 

that China had no lithium-7 that it could sell to this broker.

Russia’s supply of lithium-7, on the other hand, may be largely available 

for export because Russia is believed to have very little domestic demand 

for lithium-7. Russia’s fleet of pressurized water reactors does not use 

lithium hydroxide because they were specifically designed to use 

potassium hydroxide to lower the cooling water’s acidity. However, 

because Russia’s production capacity of lithium-7 is not known, U.S. 

utilities cannot be assured that Russia will continue to meet their demand 

for lithium-7 as China’s demand increases. For example, one lithium-7 

broker told us in June 2013 that he is having difficulty getting lithium-7 

from Russia, though he is unsure if it is because Russia is unable to meet 

demand or for some other reason.

The risk of relying on so few producers of lithium-7 leaves the 65 

pressurized water reactors in the United States vulnerable to supply 

disruptions. In 2010, for example, we reported on the challenges faced by 

the Department of Defense when it experienced supply disruptions in rare 

earth elements—17 elements with unique magnetic properties that are 

produced almost exclusively in China.14

 14GAO, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply Chain, 

Specifically, we reported that a 

Department of Defense program was delayed due to a shortage of rare 

earth elements. Controlling most of the market on rare earth materials 

production, China caused a shortage when it decreased its exports of 

rare earth materials. At the time of our report, the Department of Defense 

and other federal agencies were taking steps to mitigate a shortage to 

prevent future supply disruptions. In the case of lithium-7, according to 

representatives of two utilities, if not mitigated, a lithium-7 shortage could 

GAO-10-617R (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 14, 2010). 
Page 10 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

possibly lead to the shutdown of one or more pressurized water reactors. 

Pressurized water reactors are temporarily shut down to refuel about 

every 18 months, after which time lithium-7, in the form of lithium 

hydroxide, is added to the cooling water, according to industry 

representatives. TVA representatives explained that nuclear reactors are 

scheduled for refueling during times when there is low demand for 

electricity, such as the spring or fall, when there is less need for heating 

or air-conditioning of homes and businesses. During peak times of 

electricity use, such as the summer months, commercial nuclear reactors 

are critical for maintaining the stability of the electrical grid, according to 

industry representatives. Without lithium hydroxide or some alternative, 

industry representatives told us that they would not be able to restart the 

pressurized water reactors after refueling. According to NRC officials, 

operating a pressurized water reactor without lithium-7 could be done, but 

it would significantly increase the corrosion of pipes and other 

infrastructure.

No federal entity has taken stewardship responsibility for assessing risks 

to the lithium-7 supply for the commercial nuclear power industry. 

However, DOE has taken some steps in this area. Specifically, DOE 

studied lithium-7 supply and demand and concluded that no further action 

is needed, but our review found shortcomings in DOE’s study.

No federal entity has taken stewardship responsibility for assessing and 

managing risks to the supply of lithium-7 for commercial use. Federal 

stakeholders—DOE, NRC, and NNSA—told us they view lithium-7 as a 

commercial commodity for which industry is responsible. Officials in 

DOE’s Isotope Program told us that because lithium-7 is a material 

bought and sold through commercial channels and used by industry, 

industry is responsible for monitoring the supply risks and managing 

those risks as it would do for any other commercial commodity. The 

Isotope Program produces isotopes that are in short supply and not those 

that are produced commercially and not in short supply. Notwithstanding, 

Isotope Program officials told us that the program’s mission includes 

No Entity Has Taken 

Stewardship 

Responsibility for 

Assessing and 

Managing Risks to the 

Lithium-7 Supply, but 

DOE Is Taking Some 

Actions

No Entity Has Taken 

Stewardship Responsibility 

for Lithium-7 Risk 

Assessment
Page 11 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

isotopes that have the potential for being in short supply and that they see 

the Isotope Program’s role as being the lead office within DOE on issues 

related to lithium-7. Additionally, an Isotope Program official told us that 

the program must be careful not to address lithium-7 risks too 

aggressively because that may signal to industry stakeholders that DOE 

is taking responsibility for mitigating these risks—risks that DOE views as 

the responsibility of industry to manage.

NRC officials also told us that they believe industry is better suited to 

address any problems with the lithium-7 supply because the utilities are 

more likely to be aware of and have more information related to supply 

constraints than NRC or other federal government agencies. Similarly, 

officials in DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy said that, in their view, industry 

is responsible for addressing lithium-7 risks, and their office’s role is to 

serve as liaison between DOE and industry. One DOE official said that 

industry probably would be aware of a shortage before any government 

agency would be. An official in NNSA’s Office of Nuclear Materials 

Integration noted that NNSA is responsible for ensuring there is a 

sufficient supply of lithium-7 for federal demand but not for industry’s 

demand. Furthermore, this official said that utilities are in the electricity 

business and should, therefore, assume the responsibility of assessing 

and managing risks. This official also stated that, in his view, given the 

importance of lithium-7 to the nuclear power industry, the commercial 

market would respond by increasing production to bring supply and 

demand into balance. However, our review found no other countries with 

the capability to enrich lithium-7 and, as described above, it is unclear if 

Russia and China will be able to meet increased demand.

We reported in May 2011 on the importance of stewardship responsibility 

for critical isotopes. Specifically, our review found that a delayed 

response to the shortage of helium-3 in 2008 occurred because, among 

other things, there was no agency with stewardship responsibility to 

monitor the risks to helium-3 supply and demand.15

 15

The shortage was 

addressed when an interagency committee took on a stewardship role by 

researching alternatives and allocating the limited supply, among other 

things. In that report, we recommended the Secretary of Energy clarify 

which entity has a stewardship role for 17 isotopes that are sold by the 

Isotope Program. In its comments on that report, NNSA stated that it 

GAO-11-472. 
Page 12 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

could implement our recommendation, but to date, DOE and NNSA have 

not determined which entity or entities should serve as steward for 

lithium-7, and no federal entity has assumed such responsibility.

The nuclear power industry may not be concerned about lithium-7 supply 

disruptions because it may not be aware of all the risks. Industry 

representatives we spoke with said that they have no concerns over the 

lithium-7 supply because they have not experienced any supply 

problems. For example, representatives from one utility said they have 

never had a problem obtaining lithium-7 so they did not see a need to 

consider actions to mitigate future supply disruptions. Similarly, 

representatives from EPRI said that they are not doing any work related 

to lithium-7 because there is no demonstrated need. However, EPRI 

representatives said they were surprised to recently learn from DOE that 

China is researching the development of molten salt reactors. These 

representatives said that such a development is important for EPRI’s 

considerations of the lithium-7 issue. EPRI representatives told us they 

need to learn about all the factors relating to the current and future supply 

and demand of lithium-7 so those factors can be incorporated into EPRI’s 

decision-making process and long-term planning. We discussed this point 

with DOE officials, and they were surprised to hear that industry was 

previously uninformed about China’s development of molten salt reactors. 

An official from DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy told us the risks to the 

lithium-7 supply had been discussed with industry representatives in 

October 2012, including China’s increased domestic demand for new 

reactors and for research on molten salt reactors, all of which could 

impact the lithium-7 supply.

In addition to the longer term supply challenges created by increased 

Chinese domestic demand for lithium-7, there are also the recent 

examples of brokers facing supply disruptions. As previously discussed, 

two of the lithium-7 brokers told us they are having difficulty obtaining 

lithium-7 from China and Russia. Given the recent nature of this 

information, the uncertainty over whether these are isolated difficulties or 

indicative of a trend, and that the impact has not yet been felt by utilities, 

could also contribute to industry’s current assessment that the risks of a 

possible lithium-7 supply disruption are low. Some industry 

representatives stated that, if there is a shortage, the federal government 
Page 13 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

should be involved to ensure the reliability of the electrical grid.16

Under risk assessment, one of the federal standards for internal control, 

agencies are to identify and analyze relevant risks, including estimating 

the risk’s significance and likelihood of occurrence, and then decide what 

actions should be taken to manage the risks.

For 

example, EPRI representatives said that, in the event of shortage, EPRI’s 

role would be to research options for replacing lithium-7, but also said that 

government involvement is needed to ensure the reliability of the 

electrical grid.

17 In the case of lithium-7, 

the steward would, for example, need to ensure risks to the lithium-7 

supply are identified, analyzed, communicated to stakeholders, and 

managed appropriately. The steward would also need to determine and 

assign proper roles and responsibilities to stakeholders and ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of data and information for decision making. 

Such a steward does not necessarily have to be a federal entity or be 

responsible for all actions; a steward could be an entity from industry, or 

even a committee of federal and industry stakeholders, each responsible 

for specific tasks. Another federal standard for internal control states that 

information should be recorded and communicated to management and 

others within an entity in a form and within a time frame that enables them 

to carry out their responsibilities.18

 16There is a federal agency with responsibility for regulating the reliability of the electrical 

grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is an independent agency responsible 

for the regulation of interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. The agency 

assigns implementation of these activities to the North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation, a nonprofit entity whose mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power 

system in North America. 

While these standards may not apply 

to nonfederal entities, they can provide guidance as to the sorts of 

internal controls that may be appropriate for stewardship of Lithium-7. 

Relevant, reliable, and timely communications related to internal, as well 

as external events, are important for an agency to achieve all its 

objectives and especially important for managing risks, which involve 

developing knowledge of the situation to inform decision making on the 

methods employed to adequately mitigate the risks. In the case of lithium7, a steward would, for example, need to have adequate information to 

identify the supply risks and manage them appropriately. Industry does 

17GAO/AIMD-00 -21.3.1. 

18 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Page 14 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

not have access to all the sources of information that are available to 

DOE.

DOE studied the supply and demand of lithium-7 and concluded that no 

further action is needed to mitigate a potential lithium-7 shortage, but our 

review found shortcomings in its assessment of domestic demand and 

the mitigation measures it identifies for industry to consider implementing. 

In conducting this study, Isotope Program officials collaborated with 

officials in DOE’s Offices of Nuclear Energy and Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence and NNSA’s Office of Nuclear Materials Integration 

and had discussions with EPRI and other industry representatives.

DOE’s study, which was completed in May 2013, identifies some risks to 

the lithium-7 supply, describes several actions that industry could take to 

help mitigate a shortage, and lists the steps that DOE’s Isotope Program 

is taking, or plans to take. According to DOE’s study, there are several 

risks to the lithium-7 supply that could result in a shortage in a matter of 

years. Specifically, DOE’s study points out that increasing demand for 

lithium-7 from construction of additional pressurized water reactors and 

the development of molten salt reactors are risks to the lithium-7 supply 

because demand could exceed the supply in a matter of years, if 

production does not increase. The study also points out the risks of 

relying on two foreign suppliers for lithium-7 and notes that a supply 

shortage is a low probability risk, but it is one with high consequence. 

DOE’s study also describes several actions that industry could take to 

help mitigate a lithium-7 shortage. In its discussions with industry 

representatives, representatives identified the following four actions that 

the nuclear power industry could take should a shortage of lithium-7 

occur:

• recycling lithium-7 from the demineralizers;

• increasing the burnable poisons in the reactor fuel;19

 19Burnable poisons are isotopes in the nuclear fuel that help control the nuclear reaction 

in the core. Burnable poisons can be added to reactor fuel to provide additional control 

over the reaction in a reactor core early in its operating cycle, thus reducing the amount of 

boric acid and lithium hydroxide needed in the cooling water. 

DOE Studied Lithium-7 

Supply and Demand and 

Concluded That No 

Further Action Is Needed, 

but Its Study Has 

Shortcomings
Page 15 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

• reducing the acidity of the cooling water to reduce the amount of 

lithium-7 needed by using boric acid that is enriched with boron-10, 

which would reduce the amount of boric acid added to the cooling 

water, thus reducing the acidity; and

• developing alternative sources of lithium-7, including building a 

domestic lithium-7 production capability.

DOE’s study of lithium-7 also lists two steps the Isotope Program is taking 

and concludes that no further action is needed. First, the study states that 

the Isotope Program will work with NNSA to prevent its inventory of 

contaminated lithium-7 at Y-12 from being disposed of or distributed 

without approval from DOE and will request that NNSA retain 200 

kilograms (441 pounds) of this inventory to be purified and then sold to 

the nuclear power industry in the event of a supply disruption.20

Nevertheless, our review found several shortcomings in DOE’s study 

regarding its assessment of domestic demand for lithium-7 and the 

feasibility of the actions it says industry can take to mitigate the risks of a 

supply disruption. First, our review found that DOE’s Isotope Program, as 

well as Y-12, underestimated domestic demand for lithium-7. While 

studying lithium-7 supply and demand, DOE’s Isotope Program and Y-12 

both estimated annual domestic demand for lithium-7 to be about 200 

kilograms per year, whereas the lithium-7 brokers estimated domestic 

demand to be over 300 kilograms (662 pounds) per year, on average, 

from 2008 through 2012. Isotope Program and Y-12 officials told us that 

their estimate of 200 kilograms per year includes lithium-7 used in cooling 

water, but it does not include lithium-7 used in demineralizers, which the 

Second, 

according to Isotope Program officials, as part of its mission to support 

isotope production research and development, the program is also 

funding research on enriching lithium-7 without employing the mercuryintensive COLEX method that was previously used. The study concludes 

that the listed steps serve as an acceptable short-term strategy for 

mitigating the risks of a lithium-7 shortage and concludes that no 

additional action is needed.

 20The study says that 200 kilograms of the contaminated lithium-7 will be set aside rather 

than purified now because if a supply disruption occurs, there will be sufficient time to 

purify it before it is actually needed by the utilities. According to DOE, it will take about 7 

months to purify 200 kilograms of lithium-7 and cost about $600,000, which the Isotope 

Program has agreed to pay for if the reserve is needed. 
Page 16 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

lithium-7 brokers did account for. Second, DOE’s study concludes that 

there is enough lithium-7 in inventory held on-site at reactors to keep the 

reactors operating during the approximately 7 months required to purify 

Y-12’s lithium-7. However, DOE officials involved in the study said they 

did not collect any data from utilities to determine what quantities they 

held in inventory, and industry representatives told us that they are not 

aware of any entity that keeps records of the amount of lithium-7 

inventory held at utilities across the industry. Some industry 

representatives also said that there is no standard practice for when to 

purchase lithium-7 or how much inventory to have on hand and that they 

believe inventory practices vary from utility to utility.

Regarding the measures the study indicates industry can take to mitigate 

a potential lithium-7 supply shortage, our review found that DOE’s study 

provides more optimistic assessments than industry’s view about the 

challenges involved in implementing these actions. For example, DOE’s 

study characterizes the process for recycling lithium-7 from 

demineralizers to be straightforward and of low technical risk, and it 

states that recycling can be implemented within a year. However, 

according to representatives of a utility with whom we spoke, there is no 

existing method to retrieve and recycle the lithium-7 from the 

demineralizers. According to EPRI representatives who provided 

information for DOE’s study, the process is challenging because 

extracting lithium-7 from the demineralizers may require a special process 

to separate it from the other materials in the demineralizers, some of 

which pose radiation risks. In addition, there are also application 

challenges to recovering the lithium-7, such as modifying the plants to 

implement the process. EPRI representatives estimated it would take 

more than a year to develop the technology, and potentially many years 

to address the application challenges before this process could be 

implemented. Another mitigation option that DOE’s study identifies is 

increasing burnable poisons—isotopes added to the nuclear fuel to help 

control the nuclear reaction—that would decrease the amount of boron 

required in the cooling water, in turn reducing the amount of lithium-7 

needed to decrease acidity. The study states that doing so should not 

take a long time to implement, based on the premise that the modified 

fuel could be changed when plants refuel, which is about every 18 

months. EPRI representatives, however, said this would be a longer 

process because any given fuel assembly is typically in the reactor for 

three operating cycles of 18 months each, which means a fuel assembly 

would be in the reactor for a total of about 41⁄2 years before being 

replaced. Also, according to NRC officials, a change in the fuel would 

require extensive modeling, testing, and regulatory reviews, which could 
Page 17 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

take considerably longer than 41⁄2 years. As a result of the shortcomings 

in DOE’s study, combined with the recent supply problems reported by 

brokers, as we previously discussed, it is unclear if its conclusion is 

correct that no additional actions need to be taken.

Based on information from government officials and industry 

representatives, we identified three options for mitigating a potential 

lithium-7 shortage in the near and long term, which could be implemented 

by government, industry, or even a committee of federal and industry 

stakeholders. The three near- and long-term options are: building a 

domestic reserve of lithium-7, building domestic capability to produce 

lithium-7, and reducing pressurized water reactors’ reliance on lithium-7.

The first option—building a domestic reserve of lithium-7—is a relatively 

low-cost option and would provide a fixed quantity of lithium-7 that, in the 

event of a shortage, could be used until a long-term solution is 

implemented. Establishing a domestic reserve would involve building up a 

stockpile of lithium-7 by importing an additional quantity above what is 

needed each year, purifying all or a portion of the existing supply of 

lithium-7 at Y-12 to make it suitable for use in pressurized water reactors, 

or a combination of these two. Stockpiling could be accomplished by 

individual utilities or, for example, by a steward that could maintain the 

supply for all utilities. Increasing imports to establish a domestic reserve 

could be initiated immediately, and the cost would be based on the 

market price of lithium-7, which is currently less than $10,000 per 

kilogram (about 2.2 lbs). However, stockpiling lithium-7 would have to be 

carefully managed to avoid a negative impact on the market—stockpiling 

lithium-7 too aggressively could cause the price to increase or otherwise 

disrupt the available supply. A second way to help build up a reserve is 

the purification of all or a portion of the 1,300 kilograms of lithium-7 at Y12. DOE has plans to set aside 200 kilograms of the 1,300 kilograms of 

lithium-7 at Y-12, which could be purified and sold to utilities. DOE 

estimates it would take about 7 months to purify 200 kilograms and cost 

about $3,000 per kilogram for a total cost of about $600,000; purifying the 

remainder of the 1,300 kilograms would likely incur additional costs.

The second option—building a domestic lithium-7 production capability—

is a longer-term solution that would reduce or eliminate the need for 

importing supplies, but it would take several years to develop the 

technology and construct a production facility. While lithium separation 

was done in the United States until 1963 using the COLEX process, DOE 

and Y-12 officials told us that the COLEX separation method will not be 

Additional Options 

Exist to Mitigate a 

Potential Lithium-7 

Shortage
Page 18 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

used for a new production facility because of the large quantities of 

mercury it requires. Officials from DOE and Y-12, as well as industry 

representatives, identified several other potential separation techniques 

that do not use mercury, such as solvent extraction, a process in which 

the components to be separated are preferentially dissolved by a solvent 

and are thus separated, and electromagnetic separation, a process that 

uses electric and magnetic fields to separate isotopes by their relative 

weights. While these techniques have been developed and used to 

separate other materials—for example, electromagnetic separation was 

used to separate isotopes of uranium—further development of the 

techniques specifically for use with lithium-7 would be needed, according 

to DOE documentation. In particular, DOE’s Isotope Program is funding a 

proposal from scientists at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Y-12 to 

conduct research on lithium separation techniques using solvent 

extraction processes, which have been used in the pharmaceutical 

industry. If successful, according to Y-12, its proposed research would 

provide the basis for an industrial process to produce lithium-7. According 

to Y-12 officials, the entire research and development process, and the 

construction of a pilot facility capable of producing 200 kilograms of 

lithium-7 per year, would take about 5 years and cost $10 to $12 million.

The third option—reducing pressurized water reactors’ reliance on 

lithium-7–is also a longer-term option that would generally require 

changes in how reactors are operated and may produce only modest 

reductions in the use of lithium-7. Four possible changes that could be 

made to reactors include the following:

• Lithium-7 can be recycled from used demineralizers. According to 

industry representatives, the chemistry required for the recycling 

process would be challenging, would require plant modifications, and 

may pose risks to workers due to the presence of radioactive 

materials. This option would reduce the amount of lithium-7 needed 

for demineralizers but not reduce the amount of lithium-7 needed for 

the cooling water.

• Potassium hydroxide can be used in lieu of lithium hydroxide in the 

cooling water. According to nuclear power industry representatives, 

making such a change would require about 10 years of research to

test the resulting changes in the rate of corrosion of pipes and other 

infrastructure in the reactor.

• Using enriched boric acid in the cooling water in place of natural boric 

acid would require less boric acid to be used, which would reduce the 
Page 19 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

acidity of the water and result in less lithium-7 being needed. 

According to industry representatives, however, enriched boric acid is 

expensive, and this change may require plant modifications and would 

only modestly reduce the amount of lithium-7 needed.

• The nuclear fuel used in pressurized water reactors could be modified 

to reduce the need for boric acid and thus also reduce the amount of 

lithium-7 needed. According to industry representatives, however, this 

would be expensive and require long-term planning because utilities 

typically plan their fuel purchases for refueling 11⁄2 to 41⁄2 years in 

advance. According to one utility, changing the fuel could also have 

widespread impacts on operations and costs that are difficult to 

quantify.

Industry representatives characterized all four possible changes to 

pressurized water reactors for reducing the demand for lithium-7 as 

requiring significant modifications to reactor operations at all 65 

pressurized water reactors. Furthermore, these possible changes would 

need to be studied in more detail to determine the associated cost, time, 

and safety requirements before implementation and, if necessary, 

approved by NRC, all of which may take several years.

DOE studied the lithium-7 supply and demand situation, including 

identifying some supply risks, and is undertaking some actions to help 

mitigate a potential shortage, such as setting aside 200 kilograms of 

lithium-7 as a reserve. However, relying on two foreign producers to 

supply a chemical that is critical to the safe operation of most of the 

commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States places their 

ability to continue to provide electricity at some risk. Furthermore, the 

recent problems some brokers reported in obtaining lithium-7 from Russia 

and China, combined with China’s increasing demand for lithium-7 

suggest that the potential for a supply problem occurring may be 

increasing. DOE has not taken on stewardship responsibility, in part 

because lithium-7 it is not in short supply, at which time it could fall under 

the Isotope Program’s mission. However, waiting for a critical isotope with 

increasing supply risks to become short in supply before taking action 

does not appear consistent with the mission of the Isotope Program. 

Because no entity has assumed stewardship responsibility for lithium-7, 

supply risks may not have been effectively communicated to industry, 

which could then weigh the risks and respond appropriately. Furthermore, 

there is no assurance that the risks have been fully analyzed and 

mitigated, as outlined in federal standards for internal control. Similarly, a 

Conclusions
Page 20 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

shortage of helium-3 occurred in 2008 because, among other things, 

there was no agency with stewardship responsibility to monitor the risks 

to helium-3 supply and demand. The shortage was addressed when an 

interagency committee took on a stewardship role by researching 

alternatives and allocating the limited supply, among other things. Some 

DOE officials have described lithium-7 as a commercial commodity used 

by industry and, therefore, they assert that industry is responsible for 

addressing any supply problems, despite its importance to the electrical 

grid; NNSA and NRC concur that industry is responsible. Yet, industry is 

not in a position like DOE to be aware of all the risks. DOE has studied 

lithium-7 supply and demand to guide its decisions related to lithium-7. 

However, its study contains shortcomings, including underestimating the 

domestic demand, and may be underestimating the technological 

challenges industry will face in trying to adjust to a supply disruption. 

These shortcomings bring into question DOE’s conclusion that no 

additional actions are needed to mitigate a potential lithium-7 shortage. In 

the end, without a full awareness of supply risks and an accurate 

assessment of domestic demand, utilities may not be prepared for a 

shortage of lithium-7. This leaves the reactors that depend on lithium-7 

vulnerable to supply disruptions that, if not addressed, could lead to their 

shutdown.

To ensure a stable future supply of lithium-7, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Energy direct the Isotope Program, consistent with the 

program’s mission to manage isotopes in short supply, to take on the 

stewardship role by fully assessing supply risks; communicating risks, as 

needed, to stakeholders; ensuring risks are appropriately managed; and 

fully and accurately determining domestic demand.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NRC for review and 

comment. In written comments, DOE’s Office of Science’s Acting 

Director, responding on behalf of DOE, wrote that DOE concurred with 

our recommendation. DOE’s written comments on our draft report are 

included in appendix I. In an e-mail received August 15, 2013, NRC’s 

Audit Liaison in the Office of the Executive Director for Operations stated 

that NRC generally agreed with the report’s content and recommendation. 

DOE and NRC provided technical comments that we incorporated as 

appropriate.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 21 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

In its comment letter, DOE concurred with our recommendation and 

stated that, in its view, ongoing efforts by DOE’s Isotope Program satisfy 

the recommendation. Specifically, DOE’s letter states that to further 

address lithium-7 utilization, demand, and inventory management, the 

Isotope Program has initiated the development of a more in-depth survey 

coordinated directly with the power industry through the Electric Power 

Research Institute—a new undertaking that we learned about after 

providing a draft of our report to DOE for comment. We believe that this 

undertaking is especially important since we found that few people in 

industry were aware of the lithium-7 supply risks. 

In its written comments, DOE also states that the report includes several 

inaccurate descriptions of the federal role with respect to the response to 

lithium-7 availability and demand. Specifically, DOE does not agree with 

our characterization that there is a lack of federal stewardship for 

assessing and managing risks to the lithium-7 supply. DOE states that it 

has been active in assessing and managing supply risks, including 

engaging with stakeholders, forming an internal working group, and 

identifying actions to be taken to mitigate a shortage. 

We disagree and believe that DOE’s comment letter overstates both the 

department’s level of awareness of lithium-7 supply risks and its 

involvement in mitigating these risks. At no time during our review did any 

DOE official characterize DOE as a steward of lithium-7 or state that the 

agency will manage supply risks. Notably, during our review, the Director 

of the Facilities and Project Management Division, who manages the 

Isotope Program, told us that the Isotope Program is not the steward of 

lithium-7, nor should it be. Regarding engagement with stakeholders, we 

found that Isotope Program officials were aware of only two of the three 

key brokers of lithium-7 until we informed them of the third broker during a 

meeting in June 2013—over a year after the program became aware of a 

potential lithium-7 supply problem. Moreover, at this same meeting, 

program officials were not yet aware of recent lithium-7 supply problems 

experienced by two of the three lithium-7 brokers. Regarding mitigation 

actions, while DOE states in its comment letter that industry stakeholders 

identified actions for consideration should a shortage of lithium-7 occur, 

industry stakeholders told us that they were not aware that their input was 

being used for a DOE study and would not characterize the actions as 

DOE did in its study.

We also disagree with DOE’s comment letter suggesting that the 

shortcomings identified in our report regarding the department’s demand 

estimates for lithium-7 were simply due to differences between our 
Page 22 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

estimates and the DOE internal working group’s estimates as a result of 

the demand quantities identified being for specific and different 

applications. To identify the actions needed to mitigate a lithium-7 

shortage, all the uses of lithium-7 must be considered. By not accounting 

for the lithium-7 used in demineralizers, DOE left out an important use of 

lithium-7 that may represent about one-third of the total demand for 

pressurized water reactors. As DOE engages collaboratively with industry 

for ensuring a stable supply of lithium-7, accurately accounting for lithium7 demand will be essential.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees, Secretary of Energy, Executive Director for 

Operations of NRC, and other interested parties. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov or 

Dr. Timothy M. Persons at (202) 512-6412 or personst@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Timothy M. Persons, Ph.D., Chief Scientist

Director, Center for Science, Technology, and Engineering
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Energy

Page 23 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Energy
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Energy

Page 24 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Energy

Page 25 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 26 GAO-13-716 Managing Critical Isotopes 

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

Dr. Timothy M. Persons, (202) 512-6412 or personst@gao.gov

In addition to the individuals named above, Ned H. Woodward, Assistant 

Director; R. Scott Fletcher; Wyatt R. Hundrup; and Franklyn Yao made 

key contributions to this report. Kevin Bray, Cindy Gilbert, Karen Howard, 

Mehrzad Nadji, and Alison O’Neill also made important contributions.

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361425)
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