POSITIVE TRAIN 

CONTROL

Additional Authorities

Could Benefit 

Implementation

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate

August 2013

GAO-13-720

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-720, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation, U. S. Senate

August 2013

POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL 

Additional Authorities Could Benefit 

Implementation 

Why GAO Did This Study

In the wake of a 2008 commuter train 

collision that resulted in 25 fatalities, 

RSIA was enacted. It requires major 

freight railroads, Amtrak, and 

commuter railroads to install PTC on 

many major routes by the end of 2015. 

PTC implementation, overseen by 

FRA, is a complex endeavor that 

touches almost every aspect of train 

operations on major lines. According to 

FRA, 37 railroads are required to 

implement PTC. GAO was asked to 

examine the status of PTC 

implementation. This report discusses, 

among other things, railroads’ 

implementation of PTC to date and the 

challenges, if any, to meeting the 2015 

deadline. GAO interviewed

representatives from Amtrak, the four 

largest freight railroads, and seven 

commuter railroads, selected to 

represent a mix of locations, ridership 

levels, and PTC implementation status. 

GAO also interviewed PTC experts 

and suppliers, and reviewed FRA’s 

PTC regulatory impact analyses.

What GAO Recommends

Given the implementation challenges 

railroads face in meeting the deadline,

and to help FRA manage its limited 

resources, Congress should consider 

amending RSIA as FRA has

requested. Specifically, Congress 

should consider granting FRA the 

authority to extend the deadline on 

certain rail lines on a case-by-case 

basis, grant provisional certification of 

PTC systems, and approve the use of 

alternative safety technologies in lieu 

of PTC to improve safety. DOT 

reviewed a draft of this report and 

provided technical comments, which 

were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

To install positive train control (PTC)—a communications-based system 

designed to prevent certain types of train accidents caused by human factors—

almost all railroads are overlaying their existing infrastructure with PTC 

components; nonetheless, most railroads report they will miss the December 31, 

2015, implementation deadline. Both the Association of American Railroads 

(AAR) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have reported that most 

railroads will not have PTC fully implemented by the deadline. Of the four major 

freight railroads included in GAO’s review, only one expects to meet the 2015 

deadline. The other three freight railroads report that they expect to have PTC 

implemented by 2017 or later. Commuter railroads generally must wait until 

freight railroads and Amtrak equip the rail lines they operate on, and most of the 

seven commuter railroads included in this review reported that they do not expect

to meet the 2015 deadline. To implement PTC systems that meet the 

requirements of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), railroads are 

developing more than 20 major components that are currently in various stages 

of development, integrating them, and installing them across the rail network. 

AAR recently reported that by the end of 2012, railroads had spent $2.8 billion on 

PTC implementation. To implement PTC, AAR estimates that freight railroads will 

spend approximately $8 billion in total while the American Public Transportation 

Association (APTA) estimates that commuter railroads will spend a minimum of 

$2 billion. Much of the work to implement PTC remains to be done. For example, 

AAR reported that as of the end of 2012, about a third of wayside interface units, 

which are needed to communicate data, had been installed and that less than 1 

percent of locomotives needing upgrades had been fully equipped. 

Most railroads report they will not complete PTC implementation by the 2015 

deadline due to a number of complex and interrelated challenges. Many PTC 

components continue to be in various stages of development, and in order to 

ensure successful integration of these components, railroads must conduct 

multiple phases of testing before components are installed across the network. 

Also, some railroads raised concerns regarding FRA’s limited staff resources in 

two areas: verification of field tests and timely certification of PTC systems. 

Commuter railroads face additional challenges such as obtaining radio frequency 

spectrum, which is essential for PTC communications. By attempting to 

implement PTC by the 2015 deadline while key components are still in 

development, railroads could be introducing financial and operational risks. For 

example, officials from railroads and FRA said that without adequate testing, 

PTC systems might be more prone to reliability issues. To mitigate risks, provide 

flexibility in meeting the PTC deadline, and better manage limited resources, 

FRA has requested that Congress amend RSIA to provide additional authorities 

in implementing PTC. Specifically, FRA requested authority to extend the 

deadline on certain rail lines, grant provisional certification of PTC systems, and 

approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of PTC. Flexibility in 

extending the deadline for certain railroads acknowledges differences in 

railroads’ implementation schedules and may also help FRA better manage its 

limited resources by, for example, preventing a potential review backlog resulting 

from most of the railroads’ submitting final safety plans at the same time—a 

concern raised by both freight railroads and FRA.

View GAO-13-720. For more information, 

contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or 

flemings@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Letter 1 

Background 4

Almost All Railroads Are Installing PTC Overlay Systems but Face 

Challenges in Meeting the 2015 Implementation Deadline 13

FRA Found the Costs of Implementing PTC Outweigh the Safety 

Benefits, but Opportunities May Exist to Pursue Future Business 

Benefits 26

Conclusions 32

Matters for Congressional Consideration 33

Agency Comments 33

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix II Observations on the Quality of FRA’s Regulatory Impact 

Analyses Used in PTC Rulemaking 38

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: Positive Train Control’s Scale of Deployment—Number of 

Items Requiring Upgrade or Installation 16

Table 2: Comparison of the Federal Railroad Administration’s 

Positive Train Control Economic Analysis to OMB’s 

guidelines 39

Figures

Figure 1: Key Components of Current U.S. Railroad Operations 6

Figure 2: Basic Operation of a Positive Train Control (PTC) System 9

Figure 3: Positive Train Control’s Regulatory Timeline, 2008–2015 11

Figure 4: Basic Operation of the Interoperable Electronic Train 

Management System (I-ETMS) 15

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads 

ACSES Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System

APTA American Public Transportation Association 

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FRA Federal Railroad Administration 

GIS geographical information systems

GPS Global Positioning System 

I-ETMS Interoperable Electronic Train Management System 

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PTC positive train control

RSIA Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

August 16, 2013

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller

Chairman

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In September 2008, a commuter train collided with a freight train in the 

Chatsworth neighborhood of Los Angeles, California, resulting in 25 

deaths and over 100 injuries. In the wake of this accident, which was 

caused by the operator missing a red signal, the Rail Safety Improvement

Act of 2008 (RSIA) was enacted.1 RSIA mandated the implementation of 

positive train control (PTC) systems by December 31, 2015, on 

“mainlines” used to transport inter-city rail passengers, commuters, or any 

amount of certain toxic materials.2 PTC is a communications-based 

system designed to prevent certain types of rail accidents caused by 

human factors, including train-to-train collisions; trains entering 

established work zones, which could cause roadway worker casualties or 

equipment damage; and derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. 

PTC technology can automatically slow or stop a train that is not being 

operated safely due to some types of operator errors or a switch left in the 

wrong position.

PTC system implementation is a complex and costly endeavor that 

touches almost every part of major rail lines and almost every aspect of 

their train operations. Railroad representatives and experts have reported 

that PTC implementation is the biggest change in the railroad industry 

since it transitioned from steam to diesel locomotives in the mid-20th 

century. According to FRA, railroads required to implement PTC must do 

so on over 60,000 of approximately 160,000 miles of track nationwide. In 

addition, FRA has reported that railroads must design, produce, and 

install more than 20 major PTC components, such as data radios for 

 

1

Pub. L. No. 110-432, div. A, 122 Stat. 4848.

2

RSIA defines mainlines as those carrying 5 million or more gross tons of freight annually 

and grants FRA the authority to provide additional criteria for passenger routes. Toxic 

materials are referred to as either toxic-by-inhalation or poison-by-inhalation materials. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

locomotive communication, locomotive management computers, and 

back office servers as part of the PTC implementation.

We, along with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), have noted the 

challenges railroads face in implementing PTC by the 2015 deadline. In 

December 2010, we reported that much work remained for railroads to 

meet the 2015 implementation deadline.3 Likewise, in August 2012, FRA 

issued a report to Congress and concluded that, due to many obstacles, 

the majority of railroads will be unable to meet the deadline.4 Congress 

has considered, but has not passed, extensions to this deadline.5

FRA provides regulatory oversight of U.S. railroad safety and is 

responsible for overseeing PTC implementation. As part of its 

implementation of RSIA, FRA conducted three rulemakings and analyzed 

the economic impact of two final rules. FRA’s economic analyses of these 

rules calculated the costs of PTC implementation and discussed various 

benefits that railroads may attain by implementing PTC. Such benefits 

could include avoided property damage levels due to the avoidance of 

accidents and operational efficiencies from PTC that could result in cost 

savings to the railroad, known in the industry as “business benefits.”

6

Railroad industry representatives testified before Congress that PTC will 

not result in business benefits and that business benefits can be achieved 

through other means, such as technologies independent of PTC.7

To better understand the impact of RSIA and FRA’s associated 

rulemakings on railroads, you asked us to examine the status of PTC 

 

3

GAO, Rail Safety: Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the 

Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO-11-133 (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010).

4

FRA, Report to Congress, Positive Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and 

Impacts (August 2012). 

5

In the 112th Congress, bills to delay the deadline were considered in both houses of 

Congress, but were not enacted. See, H.R. 7, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 1813, 112th Cong. 

(2011). In the current Congress, a Senate bill was introduced to extend the deadline until 

December 31, 2020. See S. 1462, 113th Cong. (2013).

6

From this point on in this report, we refer to these operational efficiencies and cost 

savings as “business benefits.” 

7

Joint Statement of the Association of American Railroads and Norfolk Southern Railway 

before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, March 17, 2011.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

implementation and the costs and benefits of the PTC rule, including 

business benefits. This report discusses (1) how railroads are 

implementing PTC and the challenges, if any, to meeting the 2015 

implementation deadline, and (2) FRA’s estimates of the benefits and 

costs of PTC and the extent to which railroads might be able to leverage 

PTC technology to achieve business benefits.

To examine how railroads are implementing PTC, and any challenges 

they are facing, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from 

FRA and representatives from railroad associations including the 

Association of American Railroads and American Public Transportation 

Association. We interviewed representatives from the four largest freight 

railroads—BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Union Pacific, and Norfolk 

Southern. We interviewed representatives from seven commuter 

railroads, which we selected to represent a range of geographic locations, 

levels of ridership, PTC implementation status, and operations, including 

those operating on tracks owned by all four of the largest Class I railroads 

and the National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak). We also 

interviewed Amtrak representatives. We interviewed or received written 

responses to our interview questions from PTC suppliers and 

independent PTC experts that we selected based on involvement with 

PTC and recommendations from FRA, associations, and others.

To determine how FRA estimated the benefits and costs of PTC, we 

interviewed FRA officials and experts, among others, and evaluated 

proposed and final regulatory impact analyses for the 2010 and 2012 

PTC rules. We reviewed the regulatory analyses supporting the rules 

using standard economic principles and Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) economic guidance (Circular A-4) as criteria. See 

appendix I for more detailed information about our scope and 

methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to August 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

The U.S. railroad industry consists mostly of freight railroads but also 

serves passengers. Freight railroads are divided into classes based on 

revenue.8 Class I freight railroads earn the most revenue and generally 

provide long-haul freight service.9 Freight railroads operate over 

approximately 160,000 miles of track and own most of the track in the 

United States; a notable exception is the Northeast Corridor, between 

Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, which Amtrak 

predominantly owns. Amtrak provides intercity passenger rail service in 

46 states and the District of Columbia and operates on 21,000 miles of 

track. Commuter railroads serve passengers traveling within large 

metropolitan areas and most operate over track infrastructure owned by 

Amtrak or freight railroads for at least some portion of their operations.

Specifically, 9 commuter railroads operate over Amtrak-owned 

infrastructure. Sixteen commuter railroads operate over infrastructure 

owned by freight railroads.10,11

U.S. freight and passenger trains often share track, dispatchers, and 

signals that control train movement. Some railroads also use additional 

technologies to improve efficiency and achieve business benefits. 

Currently, dispatchers in centralized offices issue train movement 

authorities that allow trains to enter specific track segments, or blocks. 

These authorities are communicated to train operators through signals 

alongside the track, or in non-signaled territory through track warrants 

generally issued by verbal radio communication (see fig. 1).Railroads also 

use additional technologies to maximize operational efficiencies. These 

include:

 

8

Currently, there are seven Class I railroads operating in the United States. There are also 

over 500 smaller freight railroads in the United States, called short line and regional 

railroads, which earn less revenue and generally haul freight shorter distances. While we 

met with the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, we did not meet with 

individual short line or regional railroads. Short line and regional railroads that run on 

tracks equipped with PTC and travel over 20 miles are required to install PTC by 2020. 49 

C.F.R. § 236.1006(b)(4).

9

From this point on, we refer to Class I railroads as “freight railroads.” 

10GAO, Commuter Rail: Many Factors Influence Liability and Indemnity Provisions, and 

Options Exist to Facilitate Negotiations. GAO-09-282 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2009). 

11There are currently a total of 28 commuter railroads. 

Background 

Railroads and Supporting 

Infrastructure 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

• Computer-assisted dispatching so dispatchers can, among other 

things, optimally synchronize schedules, allowing trains on single 

track to “meet and pass” one another safely and efficiently, thereby 

minimizing delays and improving on-time performance.

• Energy management systems that analyze train location and track 

grade and curvature information to calculate the train’s most fuelefficient speed throughout the trip.

These technologies can lead to business benefits for the railroad as well 

as benefits for society at large. As we have reported in the past, diversion 

of freight traffic from highways to rail potentially increases highway safety 

and reduces highway congestion and energy consumption.12

 

12GAO, Intercity Passenger and Freight Rail: Better Data and Communication of 

Uncertainties Can Help Decision Makers Understand Benefits and Trade-offs of Programs 

and Policies, GAO-11-290 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2011). 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Figure 1: Key Components of Current U.S. Railroad Operations

Although train accidents have generally been on the decline in recent 

years, human factors such as train operators missing a red signal or 

exceeding allowable speeds, or train crews leaving a switch in the wrong 

Rail Safety
 

Page 7 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

position can lead to significant damage and loss of life.13 Overall, rail 

safety—measured by the train accident rate per million train miles—has 

improved markedly since 1980.14 According to FRA data, 2012 was the 

safest year in railroad history. Even with the significant reduction in 

accident rates, on average almost 300 people were reported injured and 

about 10 people were reported killed in train accidents each year, from 

2003 through 2012.15

PTC is a computer-based technology that uses a communications system 

to monitor and control train movements to minimize human factor errors.

Prior to the enactment of the RSIA in 2008, railroads developed and 

tested several PTC systems but deployed them on a limited basis.16 For 

example, in 1998, while Amtrak was upgrading the Northeast Corridor to 

enable operation of high-speed passenger trains—a service known today 

as Acela—FRA directed Amtrak to install a new train control system on 

some portions of the corridor as a safety measure. Amtrak worked with 

suppliers to develop a form of PTC—known as Advanced Civil Speed 

Enforcement System (ACSES)—and deployed this system on the 

Northeast Corridor.

In wake of the Chatsworth rail accident in September 2008 and other 

high-profile rail accidents, RSIA was enacted. RSIA, among other things, 

required railroads to install PTC by December 31, 2015, on mainlines 

used to transport inter-city rail passengers, commuters, or any amount of 

 

13In January 2005, a train accident in Graniteville South Carolina caused by a train crew 

leaving a switch in the wrong position resulted in 9 deaths and 554 people being taken to 

local hospitals. According to the National Transportation Safety Board, the total damages 

resulting from the accident were over $6.9 million.

14See GAO Rail Safety: Preliminary Observations on Federal Rail Safety Oversight and 

Implementation of Positive Train Control. GAO-13-679T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 

2013). 

15These figures do not include highway-railroad grade crossings or trespasser accidents. 

16BNSF’s predecessor, Burlington Northern, deployed Advanced Railroad Electronic 

System (ARES) on 250 miles of track in northern Minnesota and was operational from 

1987 to 1993. Although ARES tested successfully it was never deployed on a wide scale 

due to cost and lack of technical maturity. In 1994 BNSF and Union Pacific worked 

together to develop a system called Positive Train Separation. Again the cost and 

technical maturity prevented deployment. BNSF began development of another PTC 

system—Electronic Train Management System (ETMS)—in 2003 and FRA conditionally 

approved this system in 2006.

Railway Safety 

Improvement Act of 2008
 

Page 8 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

toxic-by-inhalation materials.

17 RSIA requires railroads to install PTC 

systems, which are designed to prevent train-to-train collisions and 

derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. PTC must also be

designed to protect rail workers by preventing trains from entering work 

zones as well as to prevent the movement of trains through switches left 

in the wrong position. PTC’s communications-based system links various 

components, namely locomotive computers, wayside units along the side 

of the track, and dispatch systems in centralized office locations (see fig. 

2). Through these components, PTC is able to communicate a train’s 

location, speed restrictions, and movement authorities, and can slow or 

stop a train that is not being operated safely. For example, a PTC system 

could have prevented the 2008 Chatsworth accident by first alerting the 

operator that the train was approaching a red signal and then stopping 

the train before passing the red signal. However, it should be noted that 

there are types of accidents, such as highway-railroad crossing accidents 

and trespasser deaths, that PTC technology is not designed to prevent. 

According to FRA, highway-railroad crossing and trespasser deaths 

account for 95 percent of all rail-related fatalities.

 

17Toxic-by-inhalation materials are gases or liquids such as chlorine and anhydrous 

ammonia that are especially hazardous if released into the atmosphere. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Figure 2: Basic Operation of a Positive Train Control (PTC) System

a

Train location information is determined through various methods depending on the specific PTC 

system, including through satellite-based positioning systems and sensors installed along the track.

b

Although the law does not require PTC systems to issue such warnings, the PTC systems that most 

railroads are implementing will do so.

RSIA does not require railroads to implement the same PTC system; 

however, the various PTC systems must meet the PTC system 

functionality requirements.18 There are two primary ways PTC can be 

implemented—as an overlay or as a standalone system. An overlay 

system involves installing PTC over existing track equipment to work in 

conjunction with the existing signal system and the train’s current method 

 

18Under RSIA, PTC must be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-speed 

derailments, incursions into work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a 

switch left in the wrong position. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

of operations. A standalone system involves taking information currently 

communicated through the signal system and putting it onboard the 

locomotive, effectively eliminating the need for the existing signal system. 

Whatever PTC system a railroad implements, RSIA requires that systems 

be interoperable, meaning they must be able to communicate with one 

another so trains can seamlessly move across track owned by different 

railroads with potentially different PTC systems. Interoperability is 

important given that, according to FRA, there are 37 freight, intercity 

passenger, and commuter railroads that are required to implement PTC.

To implement the requirements of RSIA, FRA has conducted three 

rulemakings that resulted in: (1) a 2010 final rule, (2) a 2012 final rule, 

and (3) a 2012 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which is 

currently not finalized (see fig. 3).19 In the original 2010 rule, FRA used 

facts and data known in 2008 to determine where PTC implementation 

should occur. Recognizing that traffic levels and routing could change 

between 2008 and the statutory deadline in 2015, the 2010 rule provided 

railroads with the option to request an amendment to not equip a track 

segment where the railroad was initially required to install PTC, but may 

no longer be required to do so. In order for certain rail segments to be 

excluded, the segments would need to pass two qualifying tests.20 After 

FRA finalized the 2010 rule, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) 

challenged the two qualifying tests in a lawsuit, and FRA and AAR 

entered into a settlement agreement in which FRA agreed to propose 

elimination of the tests.21 The two qualifying tests were eliminated in the 

2012 final rule; as a result, railroads do not have to implement PTC on rail 

segments that will not transport toxic-by-inhalation materials or 

passengers as of December 31, 2015. The FRA rulemaking that is 

 

1975 Fed. Reg. 2598 (Jan. 15, 2010); 77 Fed Reg. 28,285 (May 14, 2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 

73589 (Dec. 11, 2012). FRA also published amendments to the 2010 final rule. See 75 

Fed. Reg. 59108 (Sept. 27, 2010).

20These two qualifying tests were the alternative route analysis test and the residual risk 

analysis test. Under the alternative route analysis test, a railroad would have had to 

establish that rerouting toxic materials to one or more alternative track segments was 

justified. Under the residual risk analysis test, a railroad would have had to show that 

without a PTC system, the remaining risk on the track segment was less than the national 

average equivalent risk per route mile on track segments required to be equipped with 

PTC systems due to statutory reasons other than passenger traffic presence. 

21AAR is challenging FRA’s determination to use 2008 as the base year, arguing that it 

rests on a fundamental legal error and was arbitrary and capricious. As of our reporting 

date, the lawsuit is pending.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

currently under way addresses how railroads will handle en-route failures 

of PTC equipment, among other things.

Figure 3: Positive Train Control’s Regulatory Timeline, 2008–2015

In accordance with Executive Order 12866, FRA prepared economic 

analyses—also known as regulatory impact analyses—to assess the 

benefits and costs of PTC before promulgating regulations.22 Specifically, 

FRA issued two regulatory impact analyses evaluating final rules—one 

dated December 2009 evaluating the 2010 final rule and one dated 

January 2012 evaluating the 2012 final rule.23 Executive orders and OMB 

guidance direct agencies to assess the benefits and costs of regulatory 

alternatives. Agencies should generally select the regulatory approach 

that maximizes net benefits to society, unless a statute requires 

otherwise. OMB developed guidelines to encourage good regulatory 

impact analysis and to standardize the way that benefits and costs of 

federal regulations are measured and reported.24 OMB guidelines 

generally direct agencies, in analyzing the impacts of rules, to, among 

 

22See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).

23FRA also prepared a regulatory impact analysis for the 2012 Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking. 

24OMB. Circular A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003).
 

Page 12 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

other things: measure the potential social benefits and costs of regulatory 

alternatives incremental to a “baseline,” (i.e., the conditions that would 

exist in the absence of the proposed regulation); analyze a range of 

alternatives; identify and quantitatively analyze key uncertainties 

associated with the estimates of benefits and costs; and provide 

documentation that the analysis is based on the best reasonably 

obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information available. OMB 

guidelines further state that a good regulatory analysis includes 

identifying the regulatory alternative with the largest net benefits to 

society. It also states that such information is useful for decision makers 

and the public, even when economic efficiency is not the only or the 

overriding public policy objective.

As part of overseeing railroads’ progress with PTC implementation, FRA 

is also responsible for reviewing railroads’ PTC-related plans. Railroads 

must submit and FRA must review and approve three plans: a PTC 

development plan, a PTC implementation plan, and a PTC safety plan.

• The PTC development plan25 describes, among other things, the PTC 

system a railroad intends to implement to satisfy the PTC regulatory 

requirements. According to its August 2012 report, FRA’s approval of 

the development plans took nearly 18 months to complete.

• The PTC implementation plan describes a railroad’s plan for 

installation of its planned PTC system. RSIA required railroads to 

submit these plans within 18 months (by April 16, 2010), and FRA to 

review and approve or disapprove them within 90 days.

• The PTC safety plan26 includes a railroad’s plans for testing the 

system, as well as information about safety hazards and risks the 

system will address, among other things. By approving a safety plan, 

FRA certifies a railroad’s PTC system, a precondition for operating the 

PTC system in revenue service. Although FRA set no specific 

deadline for railroads to submit the safety plans, according to FRA, 

railroads must submit their safety plans with sufficient time for 

approval before the December 31, 2015, PTC implementation 

 

2549 C.F.R. §§ 236.1009, 236.1013. 

2649 C.F.R. §§ 236.1009, 236.1015.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

deadline. In its August 2012 report, FRA reported to need about 6 to 9 

months to review each safety plan.

Although there are two primary types of PTC systems—overlay and 

standalone— that functionally meet the PTC requirements in RSIA, 

almost all railroads required to install PTC are installing overlay systems. 

Railroad representatives told us they chose to install PTC as an overlay 

system because it was more feasible to meet the PTC implementation 

deadline than a standalone system. An overlay system allows railroads to 

install PTC components over existing rail infrastructure and operate the 

train in accordance with the existing signals and operations in the event of 

a PTC system failure.

Of the various PTC overlay systems that have been developed, all seven 

major freight railroads in the United States plan to implement 

Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS), which will 

account for most of the approximately 60,000 miles.27 Amtrak is 

implementing Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) on 

the Northeast Corridor.28 Although ACSES and I-ETMS are functionally 

similar, they differ technologically. To determine train location, ACSES 

relies on track-embedded transponders while I-ETMS uses Global 

Positioning System (GPS) information (see fig. 4). Since most commuter 

 

27Four railroads—BNSF Railway, CSX Corporation, Union Pacific, and Norfolk Southern—

are together developing the standards for I-ETMS. 

28Amtrak installed Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), another communicationbased overlay PTC System, on its Michigan line.

Almost All Railroads 

Are Installing PTC 

Overlay Systems but 

Face Challenges in 

Meeting the 2015 

Implementation 

Deadline 

Railroads Are Generally 

Implementing PTC as an 

Overlay System for 

Feasibility Reasons
 

Page 14 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

railroads run over tracks owned by freight railroads or Amtrak, they are 

largely implementing the same systems developed by the freight railroads 

or Amtrak. For example, eight commuter rail systems that operate over 

Amtrak infrastructure on the Northeast Corridor—including major 

commuter systems in the New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston 

areas—are installing ACSES.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Figure 4: Basic Operation of the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) 

FRA has reported that in order to implement PTC, railroads must design, 

produce, and install more than 20 major components such as data radios 

for locomotive communication, locomotive management computers, and 

back office servers. Once these components are developed and 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

integrated, PTC must then be installed on rail lines throughout the 

country, which involves upgrading and installing thousands of items, as 

well as replacing approximately 12,000 signals (see table 1). Adding to 

the complexity of PTC installation is the need to ensure that individual 

railroad systems are fully interoperable, which requires that the potential 

problems across railroads be identified, isolated, and corrected through 

testing in labs and in the field.

Table 1: Positive Train Control’s Scale of Deployment—Number of Items Requiring 

Upgrade or Installation

Type of equipment Total number 

Locomotives 18,000

Wayside interface units 38,000

Signal installation /replacement 12,000

Signal modifications 4,900

Back office and dispatch systems 30

Source: FRA.

Railroads have invested billions in PTC implementation to-date, but 

anticipate spending billions more.29 In May 2013, AAR reported that by 

the end of 2012, railroads had spent about $2.8 billion on PTC 

implementation.30 According to AAR, the total cost to freight railroads for 

PTC implementation is estimated to be approximately $8 billion.31 Despite 

the billions railroads have invested, much of the work to implement PTC 

remains to be done. For example, AAR reported that as of the end of 

2012, about a third of wayside interface units— which are needed to 

communicate data—had been installed. In addition, AAR reported that as 

 

29Freight railroads largely fund capital expenses with their own funds. According to AAR, 

U.S. freight railroads reinvest over $20 billion each year of their own revenues on their 

network.

30This includes cost information from the Alaska Railroad, BNSF, Canadian National, 

Canadian Pacific, CSX, Kansas City Southern, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific. See 

Association of American Railroads (AAR), PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry 

Cannot Install PTC on the Entire Network by the 2015 Deadline, May 2013 Update. 

31Testimony of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association 

of American Railroads, before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation, June 19, 2013. We did not independently verify these cost 

figures.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

of the end of 2012, less than 1 percent of locomotives needing upgrades 

had been fully equipped.32

Most railroads report they will not complete PTC implementation by the 

2015 deadline due to numerous interrelated challenges caused by the 

breadth and complexity of PTC. Both AAR and FRA have reported that 

most railroads will not have PTC fully implemented by the deadline. Of 

the four major freight railroads we included in our review, BNSF is the 

only railroad expecting to meet the 2015 deadline.33 According to BNSF 

representatives, it is on schedule to meet the 2015 deadline because of 

its extensive experience working on PTC prior to RSIA, its iterative build 

and test approach, and the concurrent development of its PTC 

dispatching and back office systems.34 Of the three remaining freight 

railroads we spoke to, representatives believe they will likely have PTC 

fully implemented by 2017 or later. In addition, while Amtrak officials 

report that they anticipate full PTC implementation on their Northeast 

Corridor and Michigan lines by the end of 2015, they noted it is unlikely 

they will have equipped the approximately 300 locomotives that will run 

on I-ETMS freight lines by the deadline. Commuter railroads generally 

must wait to equip their locomotives until freight railroads and Amtrak 

equip the rail lines that commuter railroads generally operate on. Four of 

the seven commuter railroads we included in our review reported that 

they will be unable to meet the 2015 PTC implementation deadline.35

Challenges to meeting the 2015 deadline are complex and interrelated. 

For instance, many of the PTC components had not been developed 

before RSIA was enacted, and some continue to be in various stages of 

development. In addition, all components, once developed must be 

 

32AAR, PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the Entire 

Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline, May 2013 Update.

33However, BNSF officials note that regulatory considerations such as the outcome of 

FRA’s current rulemaking could affect their ability to meet the deadline.

34A BNSF representative explained that they began working on ETMS, a predecessor to IETMS, in 2003. 

35Metrolink officials said they pledged to be the first commuter railroad with a fully 

operational PTC system and meet the existing FRA PTC requirements after their railroad’s 

2008 Chatsworth accident and are working closely with FRA, freight railroads, and PTC 

suppliers to meet the 2015 deadline. 

Most Railroads Report 

They Will Miss the 2015 

PTC Implementation 

Deadline Due to a Number 

of Challenges
 

Page 18 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

assembled and integrated to achieve the overall safety function of PTC. 

Likewise, the steps involved with implementing PTC are interrelated, with 

delays or problems with one component or process resulting in additional 

delays. Railroad representatives told us that once all the components 

have been assembled, integrated, and tested for reliability, rolling out and 

phasing in a PTC system into each railroad’s network will take a 

considerable amount of time. For example, Amtrak first conducted a 

demonstration test of its PTC system on its Michigan line in 1996, but it 

was 5 years later, in 2001, when the system was put into service.36

Finally, FRA’s resources and ability to help facilitate implementation by 

the 2015 PTC deadline are limited. Below is a discussion of these key 

interrelated challenges.

• Developing system components and PTC installation. Some PTC 

components are still in development, most notably the I-ETMS back 

office server. One or more of these servers will be installed in over a 

dozen railroads’ back offices and are needed to communicate vital 

information between the back office, locomotives, and waysides. 

According to AAR and the railroads, back office system delays are 

due to system complexity, interfaces to other systems, and lack of 

supplier resources.37 Nearly all of the freight railroads included in our 

review anticipate they will not have a final version of the back office 

system until 2014 and have identified it as one of the critical factors 

preventing them from meeting the deadline. In addition to component 

development, PTC installation is a time- and resource-consuming 

process. For example, railroads collectively will have to install 

approximately 38,000 wayside interface units. According to AAR and 

freight railroads, the volume and complexity of installing these signals 

is another significant reason most railroads cannot meet the 2015 

deadline. Railroads have also encountered unexpected delays while 

installing PTC. For example, the Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC) recently requested railroads halt their construction 

of radio antennae towers to allow FCC to consider how to implement 

oversight of the towers being installed for PTC. According to FRA and 

AAR officials, FCC requested that railroads halt construction on 

 

36This system is called ITCS and is currently in operation between Porter, Indiana, and 

Kalamazoo, Michigan. 

37In particular, AAR has reported that railroads rely on a small number of companies with 

limited capacity, partially due to the small number of professionals with knowledge of both 

technology and railroad operations. 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

antennae towers that have not gone through the environmental 

evaluation process, including tribal notice, while FCC considers ways 

to streamline the process.38 FRA officials told us they did not 

anticipate this issue. AAR and FRA officials report they are working 

together with FCC to find a solution that meets the goals behind the 

process while still allowing for timely PTC deployment. However, the 

impact of halting construction on the towers may result in additional 

delays in railroads’ time frames.

• System integration and field testing. Successful PTC implementation 

will require numerous components to work together, many of which 

are first-generation technologies being designed and developed for 

PTC. All components must properly function when integrated or the 

PTC system could fail. To ensure successful integration, railroads 

must conduct multiple phases of testing—first in a laboratory 

environment, then in the field—before installation across the network.

Representatives from all of the freight railroads we spoke with 

expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized the 

importance of field testing to ensure that the system performs the way 

it is intended and that potential defects are identified, corrected, and 

re-tested. One railroad representative we spoke with said that in some 

field tests, the PTC system components behaved differently than in 

the laboratory tests because labs do not reflect field conditions 

completely. Identifying the source of these types of problems is an 

iterative process; consequently, correcting the problems and retesting can be time-consuming and potentially further contribute to 

railroads not meeting the 2015 deadline.

• FRA resources. Although most railroads we spoke with said they have 

worked closely with FRA throughout the PTC implementation process, 

some railroads cited concerns with FRA’s limited staffing resources.

These concerns focused on two of FRA’s responsibilities. First, FRA 

officials must verify field testing of PTC. However, FRA reported that it 

lacks the staffing resources to embed a dedicated FRA inspector at 

 

38According to FRA, each PTC tower must go through an FCC approval process, which 

includes a review of compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 

other laws. For example, depending on the tower’s location, the FCC approval process 

may also include a review to ensure compliance with the National Historic Preservation 

Act. FCC notifies federally recognized tribes, Native Hawaiian Organizations, and State 

Historic Preservation Officers of proposed communications towers and allows these 

organizations to inform stakeholders about their concerns.
 

Page 20 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

each railroad for regular, detailed, and unfiltered reporting on 

railroads’ PTC progress.39 To address the lack of staff to verify fieldtesting, FRA has taken an audit approach to field testing, whereby 

railroads submit field test results for approval as part of their safety 

plans and FRA staff select plans to evaluate the accuracy of the 

results. Second, before a railroad can operate a PTC system in 

revenue service, it must be FRA certified, and FRA must approve the 

railroad’s final safety plan. FRA set no specific deadline for railroads 

to submit the safety plans, and according to FRA, to-date only one 

railroad has submitted a final safety plan, which FRA has approved.40

As it reported in its 2012 report to Congress, FRA’s PTC staff consists 

of 10 PTC specialists and 1 supervisor who are responsible for the 

review and approval of all PTC final safety plans.41 FRA also reported 

that this work covers the 37 railroads implementing PTC on over 

60,000 miles of track. FRA and railroads have expressed concern that 

railroads will submit their final safety plans to FRA at approximately 

the same time, resulting in a potential review backlog particularly 

since each plan is expected to consist of hundreds of pages of 

detailed technical information. FRA officials told us that they are 

dedicated to the timely approval of safety plans and that their 

oversight will not impede railroads from meeting the deadline.42

However, railroads report that their time frames are based on a quick 

turnaround in approvals from FRA. If approvals are delayed, it could 

be a further setback in railroads’ PTC implementation. 

Generally commuter railroads face these same PTC implementation 

challenges, as well as others. First, because commuter railroads are 

using the PTC systems developed by freight railroads and Amtrak, they 

are captive in many respects to the pace of developments of those 

entities and have few means to influence implementation schedules. 

Commuter railroads also face challenges in funding PTC implementation 

 

39FRA, Report to Congress, Positive Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and 

Impacts. August 2012. 

40 Select railroads told us they have submitted draft portions of their safety plans to FRA 

for preliminary review to expedite the process. This way FRA staff will be familiar with 

portions of the plan that are common across plans before the finalized plan is submitted.

41 According to FRA, 3 senior technical staff will also assist with the reviews.

42FRA must review safety plans within 180 days of the filing. If FRA is unable to meet this 

deadline, it must provide a statement of reasons and projected deadline for its review. See 

49 C.F.R. § 236.1009(j). 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

due to the overall lack of federal funding available to make investments in 

commuter rail and limited sources of revenue. Most commuter railroads 

are non-profit, public operations that are funded by passenger fares and 

contributions from federal, state, and local sources. Economic challenges 

such as the recession have eroded state and local revenue sources that 

traditionally supported capital expenses. In addition, according the 

American Public Transportation Association (APTA), commuter railroads 

face competing expenses such as state of good repair upgrades, leaving 

them with limited funding to implement PTC. According to APTA, 

collectively, PTC implementation will cost commuter railroads a minimum 

of $2 billion. Finally, commuter railroads report that obtaining radio 

frequency spectrum—essential for PTC communications—can be a 

lengthy and difficult process.43 FCC directed commuter railroads to secure 

spectrum on the secondary market.44 According to the FCC, spectrum is 

available in the secondary market to meet PTC needs.45 While freight 

railroads have secured most of the spectrum needed for PTC 

implementation, commuter railroads have reported difficulty acquiring 

spectrum in the 220 megahertz (MHz) band, which is required to operate 

the data radios that communicate information between PTC 

components.46 In particular, railroad representatives said that obtaining 

spectrum is a critical challenge in high-density urban areas. Without 

acquiring sufficient spectrum, railroads may be unable to adequately test 

 

43Radio frequency spectrum is the medium for wireless communications and supports a 

vast array of commercial and governmental services. Commercial entities use spectrum to 

provide a variety of wireless services, including mobile voice and data, paging, broadcast 

television and radio, and satellite services.

44Secondary Market policies and rules allow spectrum permit licensees to share their 

spectrum resource through spectrum lease arrangements. Users negotiate their own 

terms for sharing spectrum and FCC tracks these secondary market transactions. 

Spectrum Management: Incentives, Opportunities, and Testing Needed to Enhance 

Spectrum Sharing, GAO-13-7 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2012). 

45Presentation to the National Transportation Safety Board. “Positive Train Control: Is it on 

Track?” FCC, February 27, 2013.

46Seven freight railroads (Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific, BNSF, CSX Corporation, 

Canadian National, Canadian Pacific, and Kansas City Southern) together comprise PTC 

220 LLC, a company that owns spectrum licenses. According to a PTC 220 LLC 

representative, these seven freight railroads will lease spectrum from PTC 220 LLC and 

will lease spectrum to other railroads based on availability for a fee.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

their PTC systems, potentially causing further delays in meeting the 2015 

PTC deadline.47

By attempting to implement PTC by the 2015 deadline while key 

components are still in development, railroads may be making choices 

that could introduce financial and operational risks to PTC 

implementation. Representatives from freight railroads and FRA officials 

told us that railroads will not compromise the safety functions of the PTC 

system and will ensure that systems meet the functionality requirements 

in RSIA. However, freight railroad representatives told us that in order to 

work towards testing and installation, they compressed time frames and 

undertook processes in parallel rather than sequentially. For example, to 

begin installation while key components were being developed, railroads 

took a “double touch” approach to equipping locomotives, which involves 

taking locomotives out of service twice to begin installation while software 

was being developed.48 Railroad representatives told us this approach is 

more expensive than installing the equipment after the software is fully 

mature, as it involves more labor hours and more time that locomotives 

are out of service. Our prior work on weapon systems development has 

shown that technologies that were included in a product development 

program before they were mature later contributed to cost increases and 

schedule delays.49 This work showed that demonstrating a high level of 

maturity before new technologies are incorporated into a product 

development plan increases the chances for successful implementation. 

In 2010, we reported that railroads expected key PTC components to be 

available by 2012. Railroads have subsequently reported that PTC 

installation has involved many delays, particularly in component 

development and many of the essential components are still in 

development. Consequently, product maturity remains an issue for some 

PTC components and may result in additional cost and schedule 

overruns.

 

47Amtrak officials also report that securing spectrum has been a major challenge in PTC 

implementation and has led to implementation delays.

48In this case, “double touch” installation refers to partially installing groundwork equipment 

on thousands of locomotives, which will then later need to be taken out of service again to 

install the remaining equipment.

49GAO-11-133 and GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not 

Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time, GAO-10-382 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 

2010). 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

The development time frames involved in implementing PTC by the end 

of 2015 also potentially introduce operational risks. Representatives from 

all of the freight railroads we spoke with expressed concern regarding the 

reliability of PTC and noted that adequate field testing was important to 

identify and correct problems. These representatives noted that without 

adequate testing, PTC systems may not perform as planned and may be 

more prone to system reliability issues, possibly causing service 

disruptions. FRA officials also expressed concern that if pressured to 

meet the 2015 deadline, railroads might implement an unreliable PTC 

system that breaks down and leads to operational inefficiencies through 

slower trains or congestion.

In an August 2012 report to Congress, FRA identified three items for 

consideration in the event Congress amends RSIA. FRA officials told us 

that if Congress chooses to amend RSIA, additional authority to extend 

the deadline on certain rail lines, grant provisional certification of PTC 

systems and approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of 

PTC would help them to conduct oversight more effectively by providing 

FRA flexibility in overseeing PTC. Specifically FRA requested the 

authority to:

• Extend the deadline on certain rail lines to grant railroads incremental 

deadlines on a case-by-case basis. FRA officials told us they do not 

want a deadline extension applied to the whole railroad industry. 

Rather, FRA would like flexibility to create new deadlines based on an 

individual railroad’s circumstances, particularly a railroad’s due 

diligence to achieve the 2015 deadline and efforts to mitigate risks. 

FRA officials said currently they are unable to approve implementation 

plans that give completion dates beyond 2015. FRA officials said that 

such a change would require railroads to update their implementation 

plans.50

• Grant provisional certification of PTC systems under controlled 

conditions before final system completion to allow railroads to operate 

PTC in certain places while they are still developing it in other places. 

According to FRA, this would provide assurance that the PTC system 

was safe, so that a railroad could begin to use the PTC system while 

 

50Railroads submitted PTC implementation plans in 2010 that, according to FRA, were 

approved in the same year. 

FRA’s Request for 

Legislative Changes to 

Provide Additional 

Authority in Overseeing 

PTC’s Implementation 

Could Help Manage PTC 

Implementation 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

FRA reviewed the railroad’s full safety plan. FRA and railroads told us 

the benefit of this authority is that it would allow railroads and the 

public to experience the safety benefits of PTC sooner. FRA officials 

said they believed this would provide railroads with additional time to 

address issues and would lead to the implementation of a more 

reliable system.

• Approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of PTC to 

allow railroads to improve safety and meet many of the functions of 

PTC through other means. FRA officials told us that they would 

anticipate using this authority only for commuter and some smaller 

railroads and would consider technologies in combination with 

operating rules that railroads demonstrate would enhance safety.

Although some freight railroad representatives we spoke with supported 

providing FRA with additional authority, others voiced concerns about 

how the authorities would be administered.51 For example, details such as 

how FRA will identify and apply criteria to determine which railroads 

should receive extensions would need to be addressed. In addition, one 

freight railroad representative raised concerns over timeliness of FRA’s 

determinations of deadline extensions. Furthermore, representatives from 

another railroad suggested that granting deadline extensions to some 

railroads unfairly penalizes those railroads that may meet the PTC 

deadline. FRA could not provide us with specific information detailing how 

these authorities would be applied. However, if Congress were to amend 

RSIA in order to provide FRA additional authorities in implementing PTC, 

the Secretary of Transportation would need to direct FRA to develop new 

regulations or orders, in order to carry out its duties. 

At a June 2013 hearing on rail safety, AAR and APTA stated their support 

for FRA’s request for additional authority and extending the PTC 

implementation deadline to December 31, 2018, for all railroads.52,53 In

addition, FRA recommended the Secretary of Transportation be given the 

 

51We spoke to the four freight railroads included in our study and Amtrak about FRA’s 

requested authorities. However, due to time and resource constraints we did not speak 

with the seven commuter railroads in our study about these requested authorities. 

52Edward R. Hamberger, AAR, and Kathryn Waters, APTA, testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, June 19, 2013. 

53Following the June 2013 hearing on rail safety, a Senate bill to extend the deadline for 

PTC implementation to December 31, 2020, was introduced. S. 1462, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

authority to grant railroads extensions beyond a December 2018 

deadline. In particular, AAR stated its support for FRA’s request for 

flexibility to extend the deadline and previously noted that FRA’s request 

to provide provisional certification of PTC systems could reduce delays.

According to AAR, these authorities could provide some relief to railroads 

experiencing challenges meeting the deadline. APTA, representing 

commuter railroads, also supported FRA’s request for additional authority 

and specifically stated its support that FRA be allowed to consider 

alternative technologies in lieu of a PTC system on specified line 

segments. According to APTA’s testimony statement, some commuter 

railroads already have collision avoidance systems in place that protect 

against train-to-train collisions. According to APTA, allowing FRA to 

examine the feasibility of alternative technologies to PTC for some of the 

smaller railroads on a line-by-line basis could provide opportunities to free 

up PTC components for other railroads to expedite their PTC 

implementation.

While an extension of the PTC implementation deadline may provide 

railroads with additional time to implement PTC, it is not clear that all 

railroads would be able to meet a revised December 31, 2018 deadline 

proposed by AAR and APTA. For example, AAR’s May 2013 report 

predicts that, while PTC could be in operation on most mandated PTC 

routes by December 31, 2018, the date PTC will be in operation on all 

routes would vary by railroad. One freight railroad we spoke to anticipated 

it would not be able to fully implement PTC until 2020. In addition, given 

that many commuter railroads are waiting for freight railroads to develop 

and implement PTC, many commuter railroads will likely have PTC fully 

installed after the freight railroads. Furthermore, in a hearing statement, 

AAR recommended flexibility beyond December 2018 due to the 

unprecedented nature of PTC and the uncertainties — both known and 

unknown—of implementation.

Given the uncertainties in implementing PTC and the unexpected delays 

already encountered, additional challenges could prevent railroads from 

meeting a new deadline. However, FRA’s request for additional authority 

could provide railroads the flexibility to implement PTC on individual, 

case-by-case deadlines, either instead of or in addition to an overall 

deadline extension. Additional authority could also assist FRA in 

managing its limited staff resources and help railroads mitigate risks and 

ensure PTC is implemented in a safe and reliable manner. For example, 

although at the June 2013 rail safety hearing concerns were raised that 

providing railroads deadline extensions on a case-by-case basis would be 

resource-intensive and could provide additional challenges and delays, 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

we found that railroads were at various stages in their implementation. 

Flexibility in extending the deadline for certain railroads acknowledges 

these differences and also may help FRA better manage limited 

resources by, for example, preventing a potential review backlog resulting 

from final safety plans being submitted at the same time—a concern 

raised by freight railroads and FRA. In addition, according to FRA, 

allowing provisional certification of PTC systems not only helps to 

manage limited resources, it also reflects good engineering practice in 

implementing wide-ranging, complex systems and is a well documented 

risk mitigation strategy. Finally, as outlined in APTA’s testimony at the 

June 2013 hearing on rail safety, allowing some railroads to use 

alternative technologies on certain lines could provide relief to other 

railroads struggling to procure certain PTC components.

FRA Found the Costs 

of Implementing PTC 

Outweigh the Safety 

Benefits, but 

Opportunities May 

Exist to Pursue 

Future Business 

Benefits 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

FRA’s final regulatory impact analysis for the 2010 final rule estimated 

that the costs of PTC installation far outweigh the safety benefits.54 FRA’s 

regulatory impact analysis presents an analysis of the costs and benefits 

associated with implementing a PTC system on qualifying rail segments. 

FRA estimated the total costs of implementing PTC to be about $13.2 

billion and the total safety benefits to be about $674 million.55 Costs FRA 

anticipated to accrue to railroads through the implementation of PTC 

included:

• development of implementation plans and administrative functions 

related to the implementation and operation of PTC systems, 

including the information technology and communication systems that 

make up the central office;

• hardware costs for onboard locomotive-system components, including 

installation;

• hardware costs for wayside system components, including installation; 

and

• maintenance costs for all system components.

FRA expects that PTC implementation will generate safety benefits from 

the reduction in the risk of certain types of accidents and the number and 

severity of casualties caused by train accidents on lines equipped with 

PTC systems. FRA also estimated benefits related to accident 

preventions that are anticipated to accrue, such as reductions in property 

damage, equipment cleanup, environmental damage, train delays 

resulting from track closures, road closures, emergency response, and 

evacuations. In addition to these safety benefits, FRA’s regulatory impact 

analysis stated that after PTC systems are refined, business benefits 

 

54 FRA also issued a final regulatory impact analysis for the 2012 PTC final rule. The 2012 

analysis found that the benefits of the final rule, which were the costs saved by installing 

PTC on fewer rail lines, outweighed the costs, which represent the increased risk for train 

incidents as a result of PTC no longer being required along an estimated 10,000 miles of 

track. The cost saving attributable to the 2012 final rule are not significant enough to affect 

FRA’s conclusion in its previous analysis that the estimated costs of PTC far outweigh the 

safety benefits.

55Dollar amounts are expressed in 2009 dollars and based on a 3-percent discount rate 

over a 20-year analysis period. OMB guidance recommends that future costs and benefits 

be discounted using both a 3 percent and 7 percent discount rate. Using a 7 percent 

discount rate for implementation of PTC, FRA estimated total costs of about $9.55 billion 

and total benefits of $440 million. Under both discount rates, net benefits are negative, 

indicating that the rule is not cost beneficial (e.g., economic efficiency would be lower 

under the rule). 

FRA Estimated That the 

Costs of PTC 

Implementation Far 

Outweigh the Safety 

Benefits 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

resulting from more efficient railroad operations could be forthcoming.

FRA did not, however, include business benefits in its impact analysis 

estimates because of significant uncertainties regarding whether and 

when such benefits would be achieved.

We found that FRA generally followed OMB guidance in assessing the 

benefits and costs of implementing PTC, and although we generally 

agree with FRA’s estimation that costs likely outweigh benefits, we are 

not confident in the precision of the specific estimates of costs and 

benefits. Specifically, we compared FRA’s regulatory impact analyses 

with key elements of OMB guidelines, including establishing a baseline, 

considering alternatives, analyzing uncertainty and quantifying key 

categories of costs and benefits.56 We identified some limitations in the 

analyses, for example, analyses are not comprehensive in some respects 

and the source and quality of some of the underlying data is unclear.

According to FRA officials, the limitations in its analysis and data do not 

affect the primary outcome of the analysis— that total costs are expected 

to exceed total safety benefits (i.e., that there are negative net societal 

benefits). Based on our review, we also believe the limitations we 

identified were not significant enough to affect FRA’s general 

determination that PTC’s implementation costs outweigh benefits. (See 

app. II for more detail on our assessment of FRA’s regulatory impact 

analyses and findings.)

The PTC mandate limited the flexibility and time available to FRA to 

develop a rule and analyze its economic impacts; nonetheless, more 

thorough analyses and better quality data could have made the benefit 

cost analysis more useful in discussions of PTC implementation. FRA’s 

PTC rulemaking was initiated to implement PTC, as required by RSIA. 

Specifically, RSIA mandated the installation of a PTC system, which can 

achieve certain safety benefits, and specified the system’s functional 

requirements and the 2015 implementation deadline. FRA had little 

latitude to implement other, non-PTC alternatives that may have been 

less costly to achieve the same safety benefits. In addition, FRA officials 

told us that because the PTC rulemaking process was expedited, they 

had to use the information that was available to them at the time to 

 

56OMB guidelines are intended to inform decision-makers, stakeholders and the public on 

the benefits and costs of potential regulatory alternatives. 

FRA Generally Followed 

OMB Guidance in 

Assessing the Benefits and 

Costs of PTC 

Implementation 
 

Page 29 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

conduct their analysis. However, we found that some information was up 

to 10 years old and the quality of some of the underlying data was 

unclear. Finally, FRA excluded business benefits from its estimates, 

instead opting to include a discussion of potential business benefits in an 

appendix to its analysis. FRA officials said that they excluded business 

benefits from their analysis due to uncertainty about whether and when 

business benefits could be achieved. While we found this decision was 

appropriate, we found limitations to the discussion of business benefits. 

For example, FRA assumed that railroads would achieve business 

benefits associated with a standalone PTC system, but did not include 

supporting evidence that railroads would likely install such a system.57

Although an overlay PTC system alone is not expected to generate 

business benefits, over time and with additional investments, there may 

be opportunities for railroads to achieve some business benefits.58 PTC 

implementation involves upgrades that railroads could integrate with 

existing technologies to provide operational enhancements. As previously 

discussed, railroads are making substantial investments in their rail 

network infrastructure to implement PTC. These investments include (1)

upgrading existing wayside and office subsystem components; (2) 

installing a new communication infrastructure to facilitate the 

communication of train speed, train location, work zone and switch 

information; (3) and developing detailed geographical information 

systems (GIS) mappings of an entire rail network. The first two 

investments can help to generate information that can be shared with 

other applications, such as train dispatching software and energy 

management systems to potentially produce business benefits while the 

detailed GIS mapping can be used to support a railroad’s state of good 

repair.

 

57See FRA Office of Safety Analysis, Positive Train Control Systems Regulatory Impact 

Analysis, Dec. 8, 2009. In addition, FRA officials told us that the appendix in the 2009 

regulatory impact analysis only showed business benefits possible through a PTC 

standalone system because business benefits are not achievable through an overlay 

system. In the analysis, FRA stated it believed railroads would add a productivity system 

to PTC that would enable them to achieve these benefits. 

58As previously mentioned, most railroads are implementing an overlay PTC system. 

However, additional investment in a standalone PTC system may also provide 

opportunities for railroads to achieve business benefits by allowing for the elimination of 

signal systems found in the overlay system. 

PTC Alone Is Unlikely to 

Generate Business 

Benefits, but Opportunities 

Might Exist to Pursue 

Business Benefits over 

Time and with Additional 

Investment
 

Page 30 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

More specific train location and speed data for use in other applications 

such as precision dispatching could help to improve train dispatching, 

potentially increasing network capacity. 59 The PTC overlay systems 

railroads are installing require changes to most dispatching systems to 

account for more precise train location information. For example, 

according to AAR and FRA, most railroad dispatching systems, which 

currently require location information within one-tenth of a mile, are being 

upgraded as part of PTC to require location information of up to a tenthousandth of a mile. According to a freight railroad representative we 

spoke to, using the more detailed train location information from PTC 

could help dispatchers better prioritize train movements based on a train’s 

delivery schedule and better manage “meet and pass” operations (when 

two trains approach each other on a single track). PTC, however, is not a 

prerequisite for precision dispatching. For example, one freight railroad 

representative told us that their railroad is already using alternative 

means independent of PTC to enable real-time train position reporting to 

improve dispatching. Nonetheless, the PTC system that is being installed 

is also expected to provide this information. In addition, according to a 

supplier we included in our review, PTC could enable development of 

additional features, such as precision dispatching. Representatives from 

another supplier we spoke with said they anticipate that railroads will use 

PTC-generated train location information for improved dispatching in the 

future after the initial rollout of PTC.

PTC-generated information and data also could help railroads achieve 

greater fuel savings than they are currently achieving with their energy 

management systems. An energy management system is an on-board 

technology that uses a variety of information, including train location and 

track elevation and curvature, to calculate a train’s most fuel efficient run 

and make throttle and braking recommendations to the operator to 

minimize a train’s consumption of fuel.60,61 PTC can generate information 

 

59Precision or optimized dispatching is the use of complex computer algorithms to analyze 

and account for a number of conditions to determine optimal scheduling that can lead to 

increased capacity, reduced transit times, and fuel savings resulting from reduced train 

idle times. 

60Fuel efficient runs optimize train mechanics by using less braking when possible and 

utilizing a train’s potential energy to coast to reduce the amount of fuel a train uses while 

traveling from origin to destination. Energy management systems determine the most fuel 

efficient run by running a number of simulations of a train’s potential route then picking the 

best scenario that conserves the most energy and fuel. 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

that could assist energy management systems in two ways. First, PTC 

systems are being designed to enforce compliance with safety 

parameters, such as speed restrictions, that trains encounter when 

traveling from origin to destination. According to an energy management 

system supplier and freight railroad representatives we spoke with, these 

parameters could be used to make train movement calculations based on 

the PTC safety parameters governing the route, which is information 

currently unavailable to such systems.62 Second, railroads are developing 

more detailed mapping of their rail networks, including its critical features 

such as signals and switches and putting this information into a track 

database as part of PTC implementation. According to an energy 

management system supplier we spoke with, this more precise 

information, which is needed for the PTC system to calculate train safety 

stopping distances could enhance railroads’ existing fuel-management 

systems’ performance through more accurate information on track 

features.

Representatives from all of the freight railroads we spoke with reported 

already achieving fuel savings through energy management systems but 

noted that there may be potential for additional savings by integrating 

these systems with these PTC components. For example, one freight 

railroad representative reported that the railroad’s energy management 

system currently provides annual fuel savings of 4 to 6 percent, but that 

integrating the system with PTC could lead to an additional 1 to 2 percent 

in fuel savings.

Freight railroad officials we spoke with generally expressed interest in 

pursuing PTC-related business benefits, but noted they are currently 

focused on installing PTC and are devoting their time and resources to 

that effort.63 For example, one freight railroad representative told us the 

railroad has not had time to fully think through how to achieve business 

benefits using the PTC system since all resources are currently focused 

on implementing PTC and noted that these benefits were incremental and 

 

61Freight railroads are currently using two energy management systems. LEADER is 

manufactured by New York Air Brake, and Trip Optimizer is manufactured by General 

Electric. 

62According to one freight railroad, energy management systems currently take speed 

restrictions into account. 

63By contrast, only one of the seven commuter railroads we spoke to expressed interest in 

pursuing business benefits through PTC. Several commuter railroad representatives told 

us their systems are already designed to allow optimal rush hour capacity.
 

Page 32 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

could likely be achieved outside of PTC. However, railroad 

representatives from the four freight railroads we spoke with said they 

would explore ways to leverage the safety investment they are making in 

PTC to obtain additional business benefits once the PTC system is fully 

implemented and operating. These railroads emphasized that pursuing 

business benefits will involve additional investments beyond their current 

investments in PTC installation.

Nevertheless, railroad representatives also identified a number of 

concerns about attempting to achieve business benefits through PTC 

systems. First, some business benefits are already being achieved 

through existing technologies. Second, the potential for significant PTC 

business benefits is still not clear. For example, according to one railroad 

representative, despite his railroad’s long history with PTC, it is still 

unsure of the potential for PTC to achieve business benefits. PTC is a 

new technology, and system components are still being developed. After 

the safety functionalities of the system have been tested and deployed, 

representatives will be able to determine what additional functionality 

(e.g., operational efficiencies) can be achieved through PTC 

implementation. In addition, additional functionalities to achieve PTC 

business benefits must be done in a way that would not compromise the 

system’s underlying safety functions. FRA officials told us that when 

integrating PTC with other systems to achieve business benefits, 

railroads must be careful not to compromise the integrity of PTC system’s 

underlying safety functions. According to a PTC supplier, delaying the 

introduction of any business benefit features to the PTC system may help 

railroads avoid complicating the initial deployment of PTC. 

Representatives from one freight railroad we spoke with anticipated that 

railroads would, with additional investment, begin to achieve business 

benefits through PTC over the next two decades as PTC is fully installed 

and operational.

In the wake of the 2008 Chatsworth commuter rail accident that resulted 

in 25 deaths and over 100 injuries, RSIA was enacted, marking a public 

policy decision that rail safety warranted mandatory and accelerated PTC 

system installation. PTC implementation is a massive, complex, and 

expensive undertaking. Amid numerous implementation challenges, it 

appears that most railroads will not fully implement PTC by the December 

31, 2015, deadline. Given the state of PTC technology and the myriad of 

PTC components that must seamlessly work together, the potential risks 

railroads may be taking in attempting to meet the deadline should be 

considered. Accordingly, FRA has requested additional authorities which 

Conclusions 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

could allow FRA to better manage its limited resources and give railroads 

the flexibility to take a more measured approach to PTC implementation, 

potentially mitigating some implementation risks. AAR and others have 

proposed extending the PTC implementation deadline to December 31, 

2018, and agree that providing FRA with additional authorities could 

increase flexibility in managing PTC implementation. Given all the 

uncertainties in implementing PTC technology, it is not clear 2018 will be 

sufficient time for railroads to fully implement PTC. Consequently, 

Congress, the railroads, and FRA may end up in the same position they 

are currently in, with an impending deadline and not enough flexibility to 

ensure that all railroads fully implement PTC both reliably and 

expediently. Regardless of whether the deadline is extended for the 

industry as a whole or FRA is given the flexibility to grant extensions to 

railroads on a case-by-case basis—upon consideration of railroads’ due 

diligence in implementing PTC—action is needed to help FRA better 

manage its limited resources and address the reality of PTC 

implementation, which is that different railroads are at different stages.

To help ensure that the Federal Railroad Administration manages its 

limited resources and provides flexibility to railroads in implementing PTC, 

Congress should consider amending RSIA as requested in the FRA’s 

August 2012 PTC Implementation Status Report to Congress, including 

granting FRA the authority to:

• extend the deadline on individual rail lines—when the need to do so 

can be demonstrated by the railroad and verified by FRA—to grant 

railroads incremental deadlines based on a case-by-case basis;

• grant provisional certification of PTC systems under controlled 

conditions before final system completion; and

• approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of PTC to 

allow railroads to improve safety and meet many of the functions of 

PTC through other means.

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Transportation for 

review and comment. DOT provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments
 

Page 34 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Transportation and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4431 or flemingS@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Susan A. Fleming

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

This report discusses (1) how railroads are implementing positive train 

control (PTC) and the challenges, if any, to meeting the PTC 

implementation deadline; and (2) FRA’s estimates of the benefits and 

costs of PTC and the extent to which railroads might be able to leverage 

PTC technology to achieve business benefits.

To obtain information about how railroads are implementing PTC and the 

challenges to meeting the PTC implementation deadline, we interviewed 

representatives from the four largest Class I freight railroads—BNSF 

Railway, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific—and 

Amtrak. We also interviewed representatives from seven commuter 

railroads:1

• Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Boston, Massachusetts)

• Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) Long Island Railroad 

(New York, New York)

• MTA Metro-North Railroad (New York, New York)

• Southern California Regional Rail Authority, also known as Metrolink 

(Los Angeles, California)

• Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) 

(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania),

• Utah Transit Authority (Salt Lake City, Utah)

• Virginia Railway Express (Washington, D.C.)

We selected the commuter railroads to represent a range of geographic 

locations, levels of ridership, and PTC implementation status, while 

selecting railroads that had a mix of operations, including those operating 

on tracks owned by all four of the largest Class I railroads and Amtrak. 

We also interviewed or received written responses from representatives 

from selected rail supply companies (New York Air Brake, Wabtec, 

MeteorComm, and Parsons); railroad industry associations (the 

Association of American Railroads (AAR), the American Short Line and 

Regional Railroad Association, and American Public Transportation 

Association (APTA)); the Chlorine Institute; six experts; and FRA. We 

selected the railroad supply companies based on the types of products 

and services provided, railroad clients, and recommendations from FRA, 

associations, and experts. We selected experts based on their experience 

 

1

We spoke to the four freight railroads included in our study and Amtrak about FRA’s 

requested authorities. However, due to time and resource constraints we did not speak 

with the seven commuter railroads in our study about these requested authorities. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

working on PTC, independence from current PTC work, and 

recommendations from associations and other experts. We also reviewed 

PTC development and implementation requirements in the Rail Safety 

Improvement Act of 2008 and FRA regulations; FRA’s 2012 report to 

Congress on Positive Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and 

Impacts; and prior GAO reports. We attended the Railway Age 

International Conference on Communications-Based Train Control in 

Washington, D.C., and the National Transportation Safety Board Forum 

on Positive Train Control Implementation. We visited and met with 

officials at Southern California Regional Rail Authority, in Los Angeles, 

California, and Amtrak officials in Wilmington, Delaware, to witness 

computer simulations of PTC and view PTC track side components. In 

addition, we visited and met with officials at SEPTA in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania.

To understand how FRA estimated the benefits and costs of PTC in its 

rulemakings we reviewed the 2010 and 2012 PTC rules and the 

supporting proposed and final regulatory impact analyses, and 

interviewed representatives from the FRA. To review the quality of the 

regulatory impact analyses, we used key elements in the OMB economic 

guidelines (Circular A-4) as criteria, including: use of appropriate baseline 

from which to estimate benefits and costs; assessment of a range of 

alternatives; inclusion of all key categories of benefits and costs; use of 

best available information in analyzing benefits and costs; and analysis of 

uncertainty. In addition, to better understand the potential economic effect 

of the rules, and the changes that FRA made in response to comments, 

we reviewed public comments submitted to FRA in response to the 

rulemakings, and we interviewed FRA officials, stakeholder groups (AAR, 

the Chlorine Institute), PTC technology and railroad industry experts, 

economists, and railway supply companies. We did not independently 

analyze the benefits and costs of FRA’s PTC regulations. Since the 

rulemaking is in response to a mandate, we focused on the information 

contained in the benefit cost analyses and did not comment on the overall 

rule.

To determine the extent to which railroads might be able to leverage PTC 

technology to achieve business benefits we interviewed representatives 

from the previously mentioned Class I freight railroads, Amtrak, 7 

commuter railroads, association officials, experts, railroad supply 

companies, and FRA to learn about plans to leverage PTC to achieve 

business benefits as well as existing technologies that could potentially 

be used to achieve business benefits. We reviewed documentation from 

an array of sources, including FRA, AAR, the Chlorine Institute, and PTC 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

experts to determine the types of technology that could potentially be 

used to achieve PTC business benefits and the extent railroads can 

leverage PTC technology to achieve business benefits.
Appendix II: Observations on the Quality of

FRA’s Regulatory Impact Analyses Used in 

PTC Rulemaking

Page 38 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

FRA issued regulatory impact analyses that examined the economic 

impact of the implementation of RSIA and generally found that the costs 

far outweighed the benefits of PTC installation.1 Specifically, the 

December 2009 final regulatory impact analysis concluded that the costs 

to comply with the regulation far exceeded the safety benefits of PTC. 

The January 2012 final regulatory impact analysis evaluated the costs 

and benefits of the final rule (i.e., to eliminate the two risk-based tests for 

exempting certain rail segments from the PTC requirement) and found 

that the benefits, which were the costs saved by installing PTC on fewer 

rail lines, outweigh the costs, which were the increased risk for train 

incidents as a result of PTC no longer being required along 10,000 miles 

of track. However, this final rule did not alter the conclusions of the 

December 2009 analysis conclusion that the costs of PTC far outweighed 

the safety benefits.

We reviewed FRA’s 2009 and 2012 regulatory impact analyses using 

OMB guidance for developing regulatory impact analyses and found that 

although FRA generally followed OMB guidance in assessing the costs 

and benefits of implementing PTC, the quality of some of the underlying 

data suggests some limitations in the analyses. Specifically, we found:

• Although FRA established a baseline and considered one alternative, 

an analysis of other alternatives in the implementation of PTC may 

have been useful.

• FRA analyzed uncertainty associated with cost estimates, but not with 

safety benefit estimates.

• FRA included key costs in its analysis, but excluded the cost of 

implementation to the government.

• Data and computations underlying the analysis were not clearly 

sourced and explained, and for some data, the quality was unclear 

resulting in a lack of transparency.

See Table 2 for a discussion of these findings, including the OMB 

guidance, what FRA did in the December 2009 analysis, what FRA did in 

the January 2012 analysis, and our analysis.

 

1

FRA determined that the 2010 PTC rule and 2012 PTC final rule were significant and as 

directed by Executive Order 12866, analyzed the regulatory impacts. 

Appendix II: Observations on the Quality of 

FRA’s Regulatory Impact Analyses Used in 

PTC Rulemaking
Appendix II: Observations on the Quality of 

FRA’s Regulatory Impact Analyses Used in 

PTC Rulemaking

Page 39 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Table 2: Comparison of the Federal Railroad Administration’s Positive Train Control Economic Analysis to OMB’s guidelines

OMB Guideline

What FRA

did in 2009 analysis

What FRA

did in 2012 analysis GAO’s analysis

FRA considered one alternative against a baseline, though analysis of other alternatives could have been useful

Measure the potential 

benefits and costs of 

regulatory alternatives 

incremental to a “baseline” 

(or the conditions that 

would exist in the absence 

of the proposed 

regulation).

Used a baseline that reflected 

the policy conditions of the time 

of RSIA to estimate the effects of 

the PTC rule.

Analyzed one alternative that 

used:

- traffic levels from base year 

2008. FRA officials said this was 

the best approach because it 

used actual 2008 traffic data 

rather than projected 2015 data 

for railroads’ implementation 

plans.

- the RSIA-mandated December 

31, 2015 implementation 

deadline.

Used the 2010 rule as the 

baseline.

Used projected traffic 

levels from 2015, which 

reduced the PTC 

implementation cost and 

the safety benefit 

estimates.

FRA established a baseline as required 

but could have analyzed other alternatives 

in the first analysis to better inform 

decision making, such as:

- analyze other years for base years of 

traffic. For example, if FRA had used an 

estimate of 2015 traffic levels in the 2009 

analysis, it would have likely shown lower 

costs. Railroads, for example, could 

reduce PTC compliance costs by 

consolidating some traffic by the 2015 

deadline. FRA indicated it did not receive 

the railroads’ projections of 2015 traffic 

levels until 2011, after FRA completed its 

2009 analysis. However, FRA could have 

developed an estimate of expected traffic 

in 2015 to assess how benefits and costs 

would vary under alternative base-year 

traffic levels.

- longer implementation time frames, 

which could have shown lower costs. FRA 

discussed the potential for a longer time 

period to lower costs. FRA officials noted 

and we agree that FRA was under time 

constraints and that a longer 

implementation deadline was not feasible 

since PTC was mandated. However, the 

mandate did not prohibit FRA from 

analyzing alternatives.

FRA quantified safety benefits and most key categories of costs

Assess the social benefits 

and costs of each 

alternative, including those 

that can be quantified and 

providing a qualitative 

discussion of benefits and 

costs that cannot be 

quantified.

Quantified safety benefits and 

most key categories of costs, 

specifically the safety benefits 

and compliance costs associated 

with PTC installation.

Did not include government 

administrative costs, which OMB 

directs agencies to include if they 

are significant.

Excluded business benefits from 

its primary analysis and instead 

presented estimates of business 

benefits in an appendix. FRA 

presented the benefits of a 

standalone PTC system and 

stated it believed railroads would 

add a productivity system to PTC 

Quantified benefits (cost 

savings associated with 

not having to install PTC 

on certain segments), and 

costs (damages 

associated with increased 

risk of accidents).

FRA did not analyze the 

effect of the final rule on 

business benefits. The 

agency acknowledged that 

there are limitations in the 

analysis underlying the 

business benefit estimates 

in the 2009 regulatory 

impact analysis, stating 

Estimates of government costs would 

have been useful. However, FRA officials 

said they didn’t include government 

administrative costs because they viewed 

the activities as part of their safety 

mandate, they do not typically include 

these costs in such analyses, the costs 

were relatively small, and they did not 

think including these costs would have 

affected PTC decision making. We believe 

the inclusion of these costs could have 

better informed decision making.

Although it was reasonable for FRA to 

consider whether the 2010 PTC regulation 

might generate business benefits, FRA’s 

business benefits estimates are of 

questionable usefulness and reliability. 
Appendix II: Observations on the Quality of 

FRA’s Regulatory Impact Analyses Used in 

PTC Rulemaking

Page 40 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

OMB Guideline

What FRA

did in 2009 analysis

What FRA

did in 2012 analysis GAO’s analysis

that would enable them to 

achieve these benefits.

According to FRA, it included 

these benefits because at the 

time there was a possibility that 

railroads would adopt a PTC 

system capable of generating 

business benefits.

that many of these 

benefits were speculative 

or achievable through 

other means, and that 

existing PTC systems lack 

some of the features used 

to justify assumptions in 

the 2004 report’s analysis. 

FRA stated that it had no 

reason to believe that 

railroads were investing in 

PTC-related equipment 

likely to generate business 

benefits. According to 

FRA, the railroads’ PTC 

implementation plans 

submitted to FRA after the 

2010 rule had no plans for 

implementing PTC 

systems that would 

generate business 

benefits in the 20-year 

analysis period.

FRA based its analysis on a 2004 study 

that FRA acknowledged used 

controversial assumptions to determine 

whether PTC would generate business 

benefits. This report was of questionable 

validity (see below) but FRA noted it did 

not have time to formally update the study. 

Furthermore, the agency did not consider 

business benefits in its 2012 final rule, 

stating that many of these benefits were 

achievable through other means and that 

FRA had no reason to believe that 

railroads would achieve business benefits 

through PTC.

The 2009 discussion also presented the 

benefits of a standalone system but did 

not provide evidence that railroads would 

install such a system. The analysis could 

have been enhanced if it had taken into 

account the potential business benefits of 

an overlay system.

FRA analyzed uncertainty associated with costs but not safety benefits

Uncertainty should be 

analyzed and presented in 

terms of both a central 

“best estimate,” which 

reflects the expected 

value of the benefits and 

costs of the rule, as well 

as a description of the 

ranges of plausible values 

for benefits, costs, and net 

benefits, which informs 

decision-makers and the 

public of the degree of 

uncertainty associated

with the regulatory 

decision.

Analyzed the uncertainty 

associated with each of the three 

main categories of cost (central 

office, locomotive, and wayside), 

and discount rate.

Did not analyze the uncertainty 

associated with PTC safety 

benefits. FRA did not analyze the 

uncertainty associated with 

benefits because, according to 

officials, the gap between the 

expected costs and benefits was 

significant enough that 

uncertainty in the benefits could 

not have affected the results.

Analyzed uncertainty 

associated with miles of 

rail segments receiving 

exemption, and discount 

rate.

FRA’s approach to analyzing the 

uncertainty of costs was generally 

consistent with OMB guidance (only 

partially addressed). FRA also generally 

followed OMB guidelines in discounting 

future benefits and costs using OMBrecommended discount rates.

A discussion of uncertainties of PTC 

safety benefits could have been useful. 

For example, PTC might work better or 

worse than expected in terms of accident 

prevention. Such a discussion may have 

been useful given that there is no existing 

fully functional PTC system for safety 

purposes to use to analyze its 

effectiveness in preventing accidents and 

that agency judgment was the primary 

source of safety information.
Appendix II: Observations on the Quality of 

FRA’s Regulatory Impact Analyses Used in 

PTC Rulemaking

Page 41 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

OMB Guideline

What FRA

did in 2009 analysis

What FRA

did in 2012 analysis GAO’s analysis

Quality of some FRA data sources is unclear

Regulatory analysis 

should be transparent and 

the results must be 

reproducible. A regulatory 

analysis should document 

that results are based on 

the best reasonably 

obtainable scientific, 

technical, and economic 

information available.

Relied mostly on a 1999 Railroad 

Safety Advisory Committee 

(RSAC) report for cost and 

benefits information

a

Business benefits discussion 

relied on a 2004 report that FRA 

and others have called into 

question and that FRA 

acknowledged was controversial.

Relied on same 1999 

report for cost and benefit 

information.

FRA acknowledged 

limitations in the business 

benefits estimates it 

included in the 2009 

regulatory analysis.

FRA’s analysis provides little information 

about the origin of its data sources. We 

could not reproduce certain computations 

in order to determine reasonableness of 

the estimates, as OMB guidelines 

recommend. This raises questions 

regarding the quality of the data, 

particularly since FRA’s analysis was 

based on data from a 1999 report that was 

approximately 10 years old at the time 

FRA used its estimates.

FRA officials noted that they did not 

receive objections to their estimates in the 

public comment phase of the 2010 

rulemaking.

b

c

FRA said it relied on the 2004 analysis for 

its 2009 business benefits appendix 

because it was the only information 

available at the time.

However, it is not clear 

whether there was enough information in 

the rulemaking to be able to comment on 

the quality of the data.

Source: GAO.

a

OMB guidelines also direct agencies to comply with their own information quality guidelines. The 

Department of Transportation issued guidelines in 2002

b

The 1999 report defined PTC as a system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, enforce speed 

restrictions, and provide protection for roadway workers. FRA’s 2010 PTC rule includes an additional 

requirement, to prevent movement through a switch in the wrong position.

c

Because the 2012 rulemaking relied on essentially the same data, the same data limitations apply.
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-13-720 Positive Train Control

Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-2834 or Flemings@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Sharon Silas, Assistant Director; 

Richard Bulman; Tim Guinane; Delwen Jones; Emily Larson; Sara Ann 

Moessbauer; Josh Ormond; Madhav Panwar and Crystal Wesco made 

key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(541101)
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