MODERNIZING THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE

Observations on 

NNSA’s Options for 

Meeting Its Plutonium 

Research Needs

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate

September 2013

GAO-13-533

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-533, a report to the 

Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate

September 2013

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE

Observations on NNSA’s Options for Meeting Its 

Plutonium Research Needs

Why GAO Did This Study

Nuclear weapons are an essential part 

of the nation’s defense strategy. NNSA 

manages the nation’s nuclear weapons 

stockpile and carries out research to 

help extend the life of existing 

weapons. The core of a nuclear 

weapon requires plutonium—a manmade radioactive element—to create a 

nuclear explosion. NNSA’s LANL in 

New Mexico houses key plutonium 

facilities needed for research for 

nuclear weapons life extension 

programs and other missions. In 2005, 

NNSA approved construction of CMRR 

to replace the aging facility being used. 

In February 2012, NNSA announced it 

had decided to defer CMRR nuclear 

facility construction for at least 5 years, 

creating a potential gap in plutonium 

research capabilities from 2019 to the 

late-2020s. NNSA requested LANL to 

study options to address this gap. The 

study was completed in April 2012.

The Senate Armed Services 

Committee Report accompanying the 

2013 defense authorization directed 

GAO to review the study. GAO 

examined (1) the options identified in 

the study for meeting NNSA’s 

plutonium research needs, including 

costs and health risks, if any and (2) 

the potential impacts of those options 

on NNSA’s plutonium research for the 

nuclear weapons stockpile and other 

plutonium research missions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that NNSA 

continue efforts to assess how 

plutonium research and capability 

needs and stockpile requirements have 

changed, if at all since 2008, and 

develop a plan for both near- and 

longer-term needs. NNSA agreed with 

the recommendation.

What GAO Found

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Los Alamos National 

Laboratory’s (LANL) April 2012 study (1) identified general options for meeting 

the plutonium research needs of NNSA—a separately organized agency within 

the Department of Energy (DOE)—during the several-year gap created by the 

deferral of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) 

nuclear facility and (2) included limited information on costs and health risks. The 

study noted that the level of plutonium research necessary to support the nuclear 

weapons life extension programs is affected by the planned schedule of the life 

extension programs, the number of pits that will be needed under the programs, 

and the number of pits that will need to be manufactured versus re-used, all of 

which have uncertainties. According to the April 2012 study, one option for 

meeting NNSA’s plutonium research needs is to relocate analytical chemistry 

and materials characterization capabilities among facilities at LANL, which will 

require upgrades costing roughly $480 million to $820 million. A second option is 

to move capabilities to existing facilities at other sites. The study concluded that 

no single site could provide all the capabilities that might be needed, but that the 

facilities could be renovated to meet the needs. The study did not include costs 

for relocating capabilities to other sites. A third option is a combination of these 

two. The study also indicated some potential health risks to workers from 

increased plutonium handling if samples need to be transported to other sites. As 

of July 2013, NNSA officials stated that an option had not yet been selected for 

meeting plutonium research needs from 2019 through the late-2020s, and no 

decisions have been made on facilities to address longer-term plutonium 

research needs. To address its ongoing, longer-term plutonium research needs, 

NNSA stated it is now considering a modular facility.

The potential impacts of the options identified in LANL’s study on NNSA’s 

plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and other plutonium 

mission areas are uncertain. If NNSA uses space only at LANL, rather than 

relocating some capabilities to facilities at other sites, some LANL plutonium 

research missions could potentially be impacted because space may have to be 

reconfigured to accommodate nuclear weapons stockpile mission needs. NNSA 

has tasked LANL with assessing building space to see if it can be repurposed to 

better support plutonium research. In addition, the study noted that one potential 

impact of using facilities at other sites could be delays in completing needed 

analytical chemistry or materials characterization due to time needed to transport 

samples between sites. Using facilities at other sites will require time for NNSA to 

plan for and transport materials between LANL and other sites, which could 

increase the total time needed to complete the analyses for weapon pits. The 

study also noted that the shortage of trained staff in analytical chemistry could 

impact the ability to execute the options, which could affect NNSA’s ability to 

meet proposed schedules for the refurbishment of nuclear weapons. The study 

reported that the analytical chemistry staff at LANL has been reduced by 60 

percent in the span of a few years due to retirements and budget cuts. The 

contractor at LANL recommended that NNSA conduct a detailed risk analysis on 

staffing needs to better understand and plan for staffing limitations, according to 

the study.

View GAO-13-533. For more information, 

contact David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov
Page i GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

Letter 1 

Background 6

LANL’s Study Identified General Options for Meeting NNSA’s 

Plutonium Research Needs and Included Limited Information on 

Their Costs and Risks 10

The Potential Impacts of Options on NNSA’s Plutonium Research 

Missions Are Uncertain 16

Conclusions 17

Recommendation for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 20

Appendix II Comments from the National Nuclear Security 

Administration 22

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 24

Figure

Figure 1: Facilities and Sites Considered in LANL’s April 2012 

Study 14

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

Abbreviations

ARIES Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System

CMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

CMRR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

M&O management and operating

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

PF-4 Plutonium Facility 4

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Page 1 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 11, 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the national defense strategy. 

Plutonium—a man-made radioactive element produced by irradiating 

uranium in nuclear reactors—is vital to the nation’s nuclear weapons. 

Plutonium is used in “pits”—the central core of a nuclear weapon that is 

compressed with high explosives to create a nuclear explosion. During 

the Cold War, the United States manufactured thousands of pits each 

year to maintain its stockpile of nuclear weapons. With the end of the 

Cold War in the early 1990s, the nation began to shift from designing, 

testing, and producing new nuclear weapons to a strategy of maintaining 

the existing nuclear weapons stockpile through surveillance and life 

extension programs.1 Life extension programs are intended to lengthen 

the lives of existing nuclear weapons by 20 to 30 years by repairing or 

replacing nuclear weapons components as needed.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately 

organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible 

for the management of the nation’s nuclear weapons.2 This central 

mission is referred to as the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Specifically, 

under this program, NNSA annually assesses the stockpile and (1) 

determines which components, including the pit, will need refurbishment 

to extend each weapon’s life; (2) designs and produces the necessary 

 

1

The number of nuclear weapons in the nation’s stockpile has been decreasing since the 

end of the Cold War. The Department of Defense reported that in 1990, the nation had 

21,392 nuclear weapons and by 2009 the number decreased to 5,113. In addition, under 

the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, the United States agreed to further 

future reductions in the stockpile.

2

NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. 

L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate, semiautonomous agency within the Department of 

Energy, with responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval 

reactors programs.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

components; (3) installs the components in the weapons; and (4) certifies 

that the changes do not adversely affect the safety and reliability of the 

weapons. NNSA uses science-based activities, such as computer 

simulations and laboratory analyses, to carry out this mission. The life 

extension programs require a coordinated effort among NNSA’s three 

national weapons laboratories, four production facilities, and one support 

site—collectively known as the nation’s Nuclear Security Enterprise. Each 

of these facilities is managed and operated by contractors, called 

management and operating (M&O) contractors. Of these facilities, the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico houses most of the 

nation’s capabilities for plutonium research in support of the nuclear 

weapons mission. In addition, LANL’s scientists and technicians also 

perform research on plutonium to support other missions, such as 

conducting research on recycling plutonium for use as fuel in commercial 

nuclear reactors.

One of the key plutonium facilities at LANL is the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research facility (CMR). This facility has unique capabilities 

for performing analytical chemistry, material characterization, and 

research and development related to plutonium. 3 This includes activities 

that support the manufacturing, development, and surveillance of nuclear 

weapons pits; programs to extend the life of nuclear weapons in the 

stockpile; and nuclear weapon dismantlement efforts. Analytical chemistry 

in particular is needed to support the production of pits. The CMR was 

built in 1952 and is not sustainable in the long term because of its aging 

infrastructure and because it sits on a seismic fault line, raising concerns 

about the effect of earthquakes on the safety and security of plutonium 

used for research or stored at the facility.

4 To address these concerns, in 

2005 NNSA approved construction of a new facility at LANL called the 

 

3

For the purposes of this report, we are using the term plutonium research to include 

research and development, analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and other 

support capabilities for plutonium manufacturing operations.

4

LANL first assessed the currently known seismic risks in the late 1990s. At the time, DOE 

decided to continue operations at CMR using a safety analysis designed for nuclear 

facilities with limited operational lives. In order to keep operating under this safety 

analysis, LANL developed a strategy for minimizing risks at CMR, which included, among 

other things, closing several wings considered most at risk, improving safety controls, and 

reducing the amount of plutonium in the facility. DOE, then NNSA, has continued to 

operate CMR under this interim safety basis since 1998, but NNSA has committed to 

transferring all plutonium operations out of CMR by 2019 and then begin decommissioning 

activities.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) nuclear 

facility.5 The CMRR nuclear facility was to be built to current seismic 

standards and would modernize LANL’s plutonium support capabilities, 

including research. NNSA plans to continue operations in the CMR until 

about 2019, when it expected to complete the transfer of operations from 

the CMR to existing facilities, including the planned CMRR. In March 

2012, we reported that NNSA’s selected design for the CMRR nuclear 

facility, which at 22,500 square feet of laboratory space, was too small to 

meet all stockpile and other plutonium-related research needs.6

However, it is now unclear when or if the CMRR nuclear facility will be 

built, which may lead to insufficient capabilities to meet LANL’s plutonium 

research requirements. In February 2012, NNSA announced that it had 

decided to defer CMRR nuclear facility construction for at least 5 years. 

Since then, NNSA officials have announced that they are seeking 

alternatives to the CMRR nuclear facility that would provide the 

capabilities planned for the CMRR nuclear facility using existing 

infrastructure. NNSA officials have stated they are now reviewing 

concepts that could deliver incremental capability by the mid-2020s. One 

such concept is a modular facility that NNSA officials assert can be built 

in phases and will have the flexibility to support potential future changes 

in mission. The CMRR’s estimated costs had increased 6-fold from an 

estimated high of $975 million in 2005 to an estimated high of $5.8 billion 

in 2010.7 NNSA officials stated that their decision to defer construction of 

the CMRR nuclear facility was intended to free up funds for other higher 

priority projects, including a Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee. 

According to NNSA officials, with the 5-year delay, the CMRR nuclear 

facility may not be completed until the late-2020s at the earliest, 

 

5

The CMRR included both a radiological laboratory, which could manage only small 

amounts of plutonium, and a nuclear facility, where the bulk of plutonium-related research 

was to be performed. This report focuses primarily on the nuclear facility.

6

GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at 

Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs, GAO-12-337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 

2012).

7

Nominal dollars.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

potentially creating a gap in the nation’s plutonium research capabilities.8

In particular, the delay in establishing new plutonium research capabilities 

could affect LANL’s ability to manufacture pits for nuclear weapons. 

NNSA has estimated that it needs to be able to ramp up its capabilities to 

manufacture about 30 pits each year by 2021 to meet expected life 

extension program requirements.

In planning to avoid a potential insufficiency in plutonium research 

capabilities beginning in 2019 when the CMR is to cease operations, in 

February 2012, NNSA tasked the M&O contractor operating LANL with 

assessing the potential effects of deferring the construction of the CMRR 

nuclear facility. NNSA asked the M&O contractor to propose options for 

NNSA to maintain continuity in analytical chemistry and materials 

characterization capabilities using existing infrastructure. If the CMRR 

nuclear facility were to be built, it would not become operational until at 

least the late-2020s, assuming a 5-year delay. NNSA officials stated that 

if they built another facility as an alternative to the CMRR nuclear facility, 

it would likely take at least through the mid-2020s to plan and construct. 

On April 16, 2012, the contractor completed and issued LANL’s study,9

also called the 60-day study, which discusses potential capabilities at 

LANL and other sites that could be used to meet NNSA’s plutonium 

research needs. In accordance with the tasking letter from NNSA, the 

April 2012 study did not discuss longer-term options, such as the 

construction of the CMRR nuclear facility or other alternatives.

In light of concerns about maintaining the nation’s plutonium research 

capabilities for both its nuclear weapons stockpile and other plutonium 

research missions, the Senate Armed Services Committee Report, 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

 

8

We reported in March 2012 that the CMRR nuclear facility had initially been planned to 

be completed between 2013 and 2017, but that it was delayed until 2020 due to cost 

increases, reflecting a 3- to 7-year delay. See GAO-12-337. With the 5-year deferral, 

assuming no further delays, NNSA officials stated that the CMRR nuclear facility could be 

completed in approximately 2029, but some critics of NNSA we spoke to stated that, 

based on NNSA’s prior project management experience, the CMRR nuclear facility likely 

could not have been built within NNSA’s stated time frames and that further delays could 

be expected.

9

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos Initial Response for Maintaining 

Capabilities with Deferral of the CMRR Nuclear Facility Project, (Los Alamos, N.M.: Apr. 

16, 2012).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

2013, directed that we review LANL’s April 2012 study.

10 This report 

examines: (1) the options for meeting NNSA’s plutonium research needs 

identified in LANL’s April 2012 study, including their costs and health 

risks, if any, and (2) the potential impacts of those options on NNSA’s 

plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and other 

plutonium research missions.

To examine the options for meeting NNSA’s plutonium research needs 

identified in LANL’s April 2012 study, including costs and risks to health, 

we reviewed the April 2012 study as well as pertinent budget, planning, 

and analytical documents from NNSA and LANL. We interviewed NNSA 

officials and the M&O contractor to discuss the options and to better 

understand other facilities that could be used to meet plutonium research 

needs. We interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials to gain a 

better understanding of nuclear weapons stockpile requirements and 

DOD’s input into the options identified in LANL’s April 2012 study. We 

reviewed pertinent documents from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, a statutorily-created body that reviews safety issues for certain 

NNSA and DOE facilities, and we interviewed board officials to discuss 

potential safety issues with LANL’s plutonium facilities. To examine the 

potential impact of the options identified in LANL’s April 2012 study on 

NNSA’s plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and other 

mission areas, we reviewed pertinent documents from NNSA and LANL. 

We interviewed NNSA officials and the M&O contractor to discuss the 

impacts, if any, of using the facilities identified in LANL’s April 2012 study. 

We also interviewed former DOE officials and former LANL contractor 

officials to understand the history of the CMRR and reviewed documents 

and interviewed representatives from the JASON Program Office to 

gather other perspectives on NNSA and its plutonium science mission.11

Appendix I describes our objectives, scope, and methodology. We 

conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

 

10Senate Report 112-173 for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

directed GAO to report by January 31, 2013. Sen. Rep. No. 112-173 at 282 (2012). The 

Senate Report directed us to review NNSA’s proposed plutonium strategy, the options for 

which were initially outlined in the April 2012 study. On January 31, 2013, we reported our 

preliminary findings to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

11JASON is a scientific advisory group that provides consulting services to the U.S. 

government on matters of defense science and technology.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This background section discusses activities related to managing the 

stockpile and conducting plutonium related research, plutonium related 

research at LANL, and development of the CMRR.

Two key activities related to the management of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile are determining the size and composition of the stockpile and 

the schedule for life extension programs. The DOD and DOE each play 

an important role in nuclear weapons stockpile management, including 

participation in the Nuclear Weapons Council, which serves as the focal 

point for interagency activities to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons 

stockpile. The council is a joint DOD and DOE organization responsible 

for facilitating cooperation and coordination, reaching consensus, and 

establishing priorities between the two departments as they manage the 

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy, 

with input from the Nuclear Weapons Council, recommend a multiyear 

plan to the President on the size and composition of the stockpile, which if 

approved by the President, becomes the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Plan. Based on this plan, the Nuclear Weapons Council approves the 

schedule for nuclear weapons’ life extension activities. Because of limited 

production capacity, NNSA has conducted these life extension programs 

consecutively, rather than concurrently. Although their durations have 

varied, life extension programs can take nearly a decade or more from 

the start of the planning phases until refurbished weapons are delivered 

to DOD for reintroduction into the stockpile.

Plutonium research facilities and capabilities are needed to fulfill NNSA’s 

nuclear weapons stockpile plutonium research mission as well as its other 

plutonium research missions. Although the rate of deterioration for some 

components of nuclear weapons is relatively well-known, scientists are 

still learning about the effects of aging on pits, particularly on the 

plutonium housed inside. Scientists must perform research to determine if 

existing pits can be reused or if new pits need to be manufactured to 

Background 

Activities Related to 

Managing the Stockpile 

and Conducting 

Plutonium-Related 

Research
 

Page 7 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

extend the life of nuclear weapons.12 When manufacturing new pits, 

scientists perform about 20 different types of analyses to characterize and 

assess the chemical and material properties of plutonium. Analytical 

chemistry and materials characterization analyses are also used to 

assess plutonium’s structural attributes, such as the metal’s microscopic 

grain size and texture, to identify any potential defects.

While LANL houses most of the capabilities for plutonium research 

related to maintaining the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, it also has 

a broader plutonium-related research mission. For example, LANL 

conducts basic and applied research in the chemistry of plutonium and 

other radiological materials for the study of nuclear materials, including 

nuclear materials separation, processing, and recovery. As part of this 

capability, LANL has demonstrated the conversion of weapons-grade 

excess plutonium to mixed oxide fuel for electric power generation in 

commercial nuclear reactors.13 This core plutonium research capability 

also contributes to LANL’s role in understanding and minimizing the risks 

of proliferation and terrorism. Specifically, LANL conducts research to 

support safeguards in nuclear processing and storage facilities; arms 

control, denuclearization, and nuclear test treaty verification; and 

detection of nuclear materials in transit.

Currently, three main facilities at LANL are used for plutonium-related 

research:

 

12NNSA is studying the potential for reusing existing pits. Different studies have produced 

varying results on the life time of pits, and NNSA officials are not certain whether or for 

how long pits can be safely reused. NNSA and LANL officials told us, however, that 

although there are some generic analyses on pit reuse that can be done now, specific 

analyses must be tied to the weapon system being refurbished because each weapon has 

unique system requirements.

13The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System, or ARIES, demonstrated the 

technology for extracting plutonium from used pits and converting it into a plutonium oxide. 

The intent of making the plutonium oxide is to blend it with other materials to make a 

mixed oxide fuel that can be used as fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors. The 

technology was to be used at the planned Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, the future 

of which is uncertain because the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request proposes 

decreasing funding for the facility while NNSA assesses other plutonium disposition 

strategies. The mixed oxide fuel produced by ARIES was to have been eventually 

produced by the planned Plutonium Disposition and Conversion Facility, but NNSA 

terminated that facility because of budget conflicts.

Plutonium Related 

Research at LANL
 

Page 8 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

• CMR—The CMR became operational in 1952 and has unique 

capabilities for performing analytical chemistry, materials 

characterization, and research and development related to plutonium. 

NNSA plans to transfer operations out of CMR in about 2019.

• Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4)—PF-4 began operations in 1978 and is 

the nation’s only fully operational plutonium facility supporting pit 

manufacturing and the research of plutonium, including chemical and 

metallurgical processes to purify and convert plutonium into other 

chemical compounds. Space in PF-4 is also used to support the 

manufacture of plutonium heat sources and electric generators in 

spacecraft as well as the research into improved methods for 

reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The facility is capable of handling 

and storing plutonium and other special nuclear materials, although 

much of its storage space is already filled.

• Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building—The radiological 

laboratory, consisting of office-space, training areas, utilities, and 

laboratory space for research, was built to complement the proposed 

CMRR nuclear facility. According to NNSA officials, operations began 

in the radiological laboratory in 2013. The laboratory has the capacity 

to handle small plutonium samples for use in analytical chemistry 

research to support plutonium programs in PF-4.

DOE’s and NNSA’s plans for replacing the CMR have changed over the 

past several decades. In 1983, DOE first decided that the CMR was 

outdated and began making plans to replace it. Over the next nearly 2 

decades, several large replacement projects were proposed, but none 

progressed beyond conceptual stages. In developing a major construction 

project, like the CMRR, DOE and NNSA follow specific DOE orders, 

regulations, and guidance, which, as a whole, are intended to ensure that 

broadly stated mission needs can be transformed into well-defined 

requirements, ultimately resulting in operationally effective, suitable, and 

affordable facilities.14 NNSA has taken a number of steps to develop the 

CMRR nuclear facility or some facility to replace the CMR, but its plans 

have continued to change over time. Specifically:

 

14See DOE, DOE Order 413.3B: Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of 

Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2010).

History of the Proposed 

CMRR Nuclear Facility
 

Page 9 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

• In 2002, NNSA developed an initial design for the CMRR nuclear 

facility with 40,500 square feet of laboratory space to meet mission 

needs and to ensure ample contingency for program changes.

• In 2004, NNSA evaluated three different possible laboratory space 

sizes for the CMRR nuclear facility—22,500, 31,500, and 40,500 

square feet—and selected the smallest option, reporting that cost was 

the primary driver of the decision.15

• In 2006, an independent business case analysis validated the need 

for the CMRR nuclear facility, but it concluded that an additional 9,000 

square feet of laboratory space could allow for contingency in the 

event of changing requirements.

• In 2008, as part of a complex-wide review, NNSA issued a study that 

revalidated the need for the CMRR nuclear facility based on program 

requirements, the capabilities within the facility, and its size of 22,500 

square feet.

• In 2010, NNSA estimated that the CMRR nuclear facility would cost 

from $3.7 to $5.8 billion—a nearly 6-fold increase from the initial 

estimate—and that construction would be complete by 2020—a 3- to 

7-year delay.

• In February 2012, NNSA announced that construction of the CMRR 

nuclear facility would be delayed for at least 5 years.

• In March 2012, we reported that the CMRR nuclear facility design 

may not meet all plutonium-related research needs and 

recommended that NNSA conduct a comprehensive assessment of 

needed plutonium-related research.16,17

• In March 2013, the NNSA Administrator directed the agency to 

conduct an analysis to compare the planned CMRR nuclear facility 

 

15NNSA based its initial plans for the CMRR nuclear facility on the 22,500 square feet 

design and, in 2005, projected that the facility would cost from $745 million to $975 million 

and would be completed from 2013 to 2017.

16 GAO-12-337.

17By October 2012, NNSA had spent about $450 million designing the CMRR nuclear 

facility and $360 million designing, constructing, and equipping the radiological laboratory.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

with other options—including a modular facility concept that could be 

built in phases to meet additional capacity needs or new mission 

requirements—and to enlist the assistance of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

office in carrying out this analysis. According to NNSA officials, the 

results are expected in October 2013.

LANL’s April 2012 study identified general options for meeting NNSA’s 

plutonium research needs. The study included limited information on the 

potential costs and health risks associated with those options.

LANL’s April 2012 study identified general options for meeting NNSA’s 

plutonium research needs. Specifically, the April 2012 study outlined 

three options for analytical chemistry and materials characterization 

capabilities to support current and future pit production requirements and 

other plutonium research needs. These options include relocating 

analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities among 

facilities at LANL, moving some capabilities to facilities at other sites, or 

some combination of the two. Contractor representatives at LANL noted 

that the April 2012 study was intended primarily to identify options that 

needed to be addressed quickly to support decisions for the fiscal year 

2014 budget cycle, and that additional information and analysis would be 

required to develop a plan to meet NNSA’s ongoing—and much longerterm—plutonium research needs.

The April 2012 study stated that the level of plutonium research 

necessary to support nuclear weapons life extension programs would be 

affected by the planned schedule of the life extension programs, the 

number of pits that will be needed under the programs, and the number of 

pits that will need to be manufactured versus reused, all of which have 

uncertainties. The Nuclear Weapons Council is still evaluating 

specifications for nuclear weapons and their corresponding life extension 

program schedules, and it may take another year or two before final 

LANL’s Study 

Identified General 

Options for Meeting 

NNSA’s Plutonium 

Research Needs and 

Included Limited 

Information on Their 

Costs and Risks

Options Identified for 

Meeting NNSA’s Plutonium 

Research Needs
 

Page 11 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

decisions are made, according to NNSA officials. Since the schedule has 

not been finalized, the number of pits that will be needed is uncertain as 

well. The number of pits that need to be manufactured is an important 

consideration because the analytical chemistry capacity needed is largely 

proportional to the pit manufacturing capacity needed. Roughly speaking, 

the more pits that must be manufactured, the more analytical chemistry is 

required. On the other hand, according to the April 2012 study, reusing 

pits is less resource intensive because it requires less analytical 

chemistry. For planning purposes, NNSA is studying the possibility of 

manufacturing about 30 pits per year and the potential reuse of up to 

about 90 pits per year by 2021. According to NNSA officials, initial studies 

indicate it is likely that pits can be reused, but further detailed studies 

regarding pit specifications will need to be completed before NNSA can 

be certain which pits, if any, can be reused. According to the April 2012 

study, several independent, but key factors must be considered when 

making decisions about options to meet future analytical chemistry 

requirements. For example, any option should have the ability to increase 

the capacity of analytical chemistry to support increased pit 

manufacturing rates, should it be required. Also, the disposal of byproduct 

radiological material needs to be taken under consideration.

One option for meeting NNSA’s plutonium research needs identified in 

the April 2012 study was relocating analytical chemistry and materials 

characterization capabilities to other facilities at LANL. The study noted 

that LANL had demonstrated it could provide the analytical chemistry 

support for manufacturing 10 pits per year but that manufacturing the 30 

pits per year that are estimated would be needed by 2021 would require 

more analytical chemistry capacity than LANL can currently provide. The 

April 2012 study noted that any option for increasing the analytical 

chemistry capability to support the manufacture of more than 10 pits per 

year should involve more effective use of the radiological laboratory at 

LANL. According to NNSA officials and representatives of the M&O 

contractor at LANL, the radiological laboratory was designed to handle 

about 6 grams of weapons-grade plutonium at a single time, which, 

without additional capabilities, is not sufficient to support the manufacture 

of 30 pits per year. The April 2012 study suggested that the radiological 

laboratory could be outfitted with additional equipment that would allow 

for additional capability and capacity. The study also suggested that the 

amount of plutonium that can be handled in the radiological laboratory 

could be increased to enhance the analytical chemistry capability at 

LANL. The study stated that the amount of plutonium could be increased 

to 26 grams using revised material limits for radiological facilities—the 

current limit for the radiological laboratory under DOE’s hazard 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

categorization standard—or 1,750 grams by attempting to increase the 

hazard categorization level.18 The 26-gram level still requires additional 

analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities in other 

facilities to support the manufacture of 30 pits per year. The 1,750-gram 

level was considered not practical, considering the regulatory and cost 

challenges. To more effectively use space for analysis, the study also 

suggested that space in PF-4 could be reconfigured to prepare 

radiological samples that would then be analyzed in the radiological 

laboratory. Since the April 2012 study, an NNSA official has stated that, 

with the upgrade of the radiological laboratory to handle 26 grams of 

plutonium, and with repurposing available space in PF-4, NNSA now 

believes that LANL can support the manufacture of 30 pits per year, but 

the official stated that many uncertainties related to these possible 

improvements still exist.

In addition to more effective use of the radiological laboratory and PF-4 at 

LANL, the April 2012 study stated that facilities at other sites were 

available to provide for basic analytical chemistry. The LANL M&O 

contractor sent a survey to seven sites to gather information about 

additional capabilities available. The study concluded that no site can 

provide all the capabilities needed, but sites indicated that they could take 

steps to obtain additional capabilities such as renovating an existing 

facility or upgrading equipment. The April 2012 study noted that finding 

facilities with the capability to perform materials characterization, 

however, is more difficult than for analytical chemistry because most 

materials characterization analyses require larger amounts of plutonium. 

While multiple sites in the nation’s nuclear security enterprise have fairly 

broad analytical chemistry capabilities, materials characterization 

capabilities are mainly available at LANL and Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory in California. The April 2012 study also discussed 

moving some special nuclear material for staging at the Device Assembly 

Facility in Nevada to free up space in PF-4. Storage space in PF-4 for 

radioactive materials is already largely utilized and additional space is 

needed to store special nuclear material produced during plutonium-

 

18See DOE Standard: Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for 

Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, DOE-STD-1027-

92 (Washington, D.C.: September 1997) and NNSA Supplemental Guidance: Guidance 

on Using Release Fraction and Modern Dosimetric Information Consistently with DOE 

STD 1027.92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance 

with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Change Notice No. 1, NA-1 

SD G 1027 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2011). 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

related research and pit manufacturing.19 The study recommended that a 

base analytical capability could be established at the radiological 

laboratory and at PF-4 and as program requirements—including pit 

requirements—become more clear, additional options, such as using 

capabilities at other sites, could be explored. LANL officials told us that 

they are continuing to evaluate information about which facilities might be 

able to provide analytical chemistry and materials characterization. Figure 

1 shows the facilities and sites that LANL considered in its April 2012 

study.

 

19Special nuclear material comes from plutonium research and development programs 

and is not suitable for direct use in pit manufacturing. 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

Figure 1: Facilities and Sites Considered in LANL’s April 2012 Study
 

Page 15 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

As of July 2013, NNSA officials told us that they had not selected any 

options for meeting the plutonium research needs from 2019 through the 

late-2020s, although they were exploring improved work processes in 

analytical chemistry that could potentially enable LANL to support the 

manufacture of 30 pits per year. In addition, NNSA officials said that they 

had not made any decisions on facilities to address longer-term research 

needs, such as the phased, modular facility NNSA officials are 

considering. NNSA officials said planning must begin soon on some 

longer-term plutonium research facility if it were to be constructed and 

operational by the late-2020s.

The April 2012 study provided limited information on general options for 

meeting NNSA’s plutonium research needs and, given the time frames in 

which it was produced, was not expected to provide a meaningful 

assessment of the costs associated with any of the options. Specifically, 

the study reported that the cost of moving capabilities among facilities at 

LANL ranged from $480 million to $820 million. The study characterized 

these cost estimates as high-level and a rough order of magnitude and 

noted that the estimates should be viewed as preliminary and 

preconceptual that would not be useful for program definition or scoping. 

The April 2012 study did not include any estimated costs for the option of 

relocating some plutonium research capabilities to facilities at other sites, 

such as any actions that would be potentially necessary to conduct the 

needed research at those facilities, including capital improvements to 

develop analytical chemistry or materials characterization capabilities, or 

any operational costs related to the start-up or transportation. The 

information in the April 2012 study was not sufficient for a meaningful 

assessment of the costs associated with any of the options for meeting 

NNSA’s plutonium research needs identified in the study.

The April 2012 study also included some discussion of risks to workers. 

Although risks to workers and the public exist at PF-4 due to seismic 

hazards, some additional risks could be posed by the option to use 

facilities at other sites. Specifically, the study reported that using facilities 

at other sites for analytical chemistry research increases the handling and 

shipping of small samples of plutonium, thereby increasing the risk of 

contamination to workers. The study did not, however, quantify what the 

risk to workers might be. The April 2012 study also did not assess any 

risks to the public posed by transporting plutonium or other radiological 

materials. An NNSA official told us that transportation accidents or 

unintentional releases could pose risks to the public but that these risks 

Costs of the Options Are 

Uncertain

Some Potential Health 

Risks of the Options Have 

Been Identified
 

Page 16 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

generally are low given DOE’s history of successful shipments, existing 

transportation protocols, and the planned use of robust shipping 

containers.

The potential impacts of the options on NNSA’s plutonium research for 

the nuclear weapons stockpile and other plutonium mission areas are 

uncertain but could include reduced space to accommodate other 

plutonium research missions if NNSA relies only on facilities at LANL for 

nuclear weapons stockpile research, delays in completing needed 

analytical chemistry and materials characterization analyses if facilities at 

other sites were to be used, and challenges in meeting stockpile 

refurbishment schedules due to shortages in certain staff.

If NNSA uses space only at LANL, rather than moving some capabilities 

to facilities at other sites, some LANL plutonium research missions could 

potentially be impacted because space may have to be reconfigured to 

accommodate nuclear weapons stockpile mission needs. Currently, the 

bulk of the plutonium research activities for missions other than the 

nuclear weapons stockpile take place in PF-4. If NNSA decides to rely 

only on space at LANL, then PF-4 at LANL might have to absorb the 

additional plutonium research for the nuclear stockpile mission, which, in 

turn, could reduce the space available for other NNSA plutonium research 

missions. This impact, if it occurs, would not take place for several more 

years because, according to agency officials, NNSA plans to continue 

using the CMR until about 2019. The April 2012 study stated that the 

required number of activities in PF-4 would likely be too great to be 

supported in the facility but noted further that it was a rough guess given 

that no formal PF-4 space analysis has been performed. Following the 

study, NNSA tasked the M&O contractor for LANL with assessing the 

space inside PF-4 to see if it could be repurposed to better support 

plutonium research for the nuclear weapons program and other mission 

areas.

According to the April 2012 study, one potential impact of using facilities 

at other sites could be delays in completing needed analytical chemistry 

or materials characterization due to the time needed for transportation of 

samples between sites. Using facilities at other sites will require time for 

NNSA to plan for and then transport materials from LANL to facilities at 

other sites. This in turn could increase the total time needed to complete 

the analyses for weapon pits. Plans for transporting plutonium or other 

The Potential Impacts 

of Options on NNSA’s 

Plutonium Research 

Missions Are 

Uncertain 

Relying on LANL to 

Accommodate Nuclear 

Weapons Stockpile 

Mission Could Potentially 

Reduce Space for Other 

Plutonium Research 

Missions

Moving Capabilities to 

Facilities at Other Sites 

Could Result in Delays
 

Page 17 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

radioactive materials from LANL to facilities at other sites could also spur 

public opposition that may cause schedule delays or create other 

impediments to efficiently conduct analytical chemistry or materials 

characterization at other facilities in the nuclear security enterprise.

The April 2012 study stated that the shortage of trained staff in analytical 

chemistry could impact the ability to execute the options, which in turn 

could affect NNSA’s ability to meet proposed schedules for the 

refurbishment of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the study noted that the 

number of analytical chemistry researchers has decreased by 60 percent 

from 2005 to 2012 due to retirements and budget cuts. According to the 

April 2012 study, any of the options, including relocating capability and

capacity to an augmented radiological laboratory, reconfiguring 

capabilities in PF-4, or transferring capabilities to facilities at other sites, 

will strain existing staff resources and will require hiring additional staff. 

Staff shortages could adversely impact the ability of NNSA and LANL to 

meet proposed schedules for its nuclear weapons work. LANL’s M&O 

contractor representatives told us that it takes years of on-the-job training 

to develop core competencies for nuclear weapons work—about 10 years 

for scientists and about 3 to 4 years for technicians. NNSA and LANL 

officials told us that recruiting additional staff for plutonium-related 

research necessarily takes years of advance planning, but that the 

uncertainty of where the new capabilities will be located or what the level 

of capacity is needed has complicated planning efforts. The contractor at 

LANL recommended that NNSA conduct a detailed risk analysis on 

staffing needs to better understand and plan for staffing limitations, 

according to the April 2012 study.

NNSA’s mission to ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons is a 

critical, complex, and costly one. Key plutonium research facilities and 

capabilities are needed to assess the condition of existing nuclear 

weapons, implement life extension programs, and ensure that the nation’s 

nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable. Although NNSA has taken 

nearly a decade and spent millions of dollars designing a replacement for 

LANL’s aging CMR facility—an initiative that was approved in 2005 and 

revalidated in 2008—the construction of the CMRR nuclear facility has 

been delayed for at least 5 years. With the current CMR facility slated to 

transfer operations to some as yet undecided facility or facilities by 2019, 

this deferral may lead to insufficient plutonium research capabilities 

beginning in 2019. The timing of this potential gap in capabilities is critical 

given the number of pits NNSA is expecting to have to manufacture by 

Shortage of Trained Staff 

Could Impact Ability to 

Meet Nuclear Weapons 

Missions

Conclusions 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

2021 to support the life extension programs of our nuclear stockpile. The 

options identified in LANL’s April 2012 study were intended to help meet 

NNSA’s plutonium research needs, but NNSA has not clarified how these 

needs may have changed, if at all, since NNSA’s validation of its 

requirements for the CMRR nuclear facility in 2008—requirements we 

reported might not fully account for all of NNSA’s plutonium research 

needs. NNSA has also not selected one of the study’s options, or 

developed a plan for meeting these needs. Many aspects of the options 

identified in its April 2012 study, including which facilities will be used, 

what upgrades or changes to facilities will be needed, and the costs of 

carrying out the options are still uncertain as are the potential impacts of 

the various options being considered. NNSA is assessing possible 

concepts to meet NNSA’s longer-term plutonium research needs, 

including one that would call for constructing a facility at LANL in phases, 

as additional capacity is needed. A change in approach from constructing 

the CMRR nuclear facility, however, raises a number of questions. These 

include whether NNSA will make costly investments in short-term facilities 

that may ultimately not address its longer-term plutonium research needs. 

It is imperative that NNSA make prudent investments that right-size the 

solution with the actual and anticipated needs or it may continue to spend 

significant sums of money with little to show for it.

To ensure that NNSA’s investments in plutonium research facilities and 

capabilities result in an operationally effective and affordable solution, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Energy continue efforts to assess how 

plutonium research and other capability needs and stockpile requirements 

have changed, if at all, since the needs were revalidated in 2008, and 

develop a plan to appropriately meet the nation’s near-term and longerterm plutonium needs.

We provided DOE and NNSA with a draft of this report for review and 

comment. In its written response on behalf of DOE, NNSA stated that it 

agreed in principle with our recommendation. NNSA suggested changing 

the recommendation by broadening it to also reflect other plutonium 

activities or capabilities. We have modified the recommendation to 

incorporate NNSA’s suggested changes. In addition, NNSA noted that it 

has begun an evaluation of options for the plutonium strategy to inform 

the fiscal year 2015 budget request. Staff from LANL and DOD’s Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation office will be involved in this 

evaluation. NNSA added that it believes that the results of this effort will 

be responsive to our recommendation. Although we discussed this effort 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 19 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

in our report, it is still underway and we have not evaluated whether it will 

fully respond to our recommendation. 

NNSA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the 

report as appropriate. In particular, NNSA expressed concern that our use 

of the term plutonium research capabilities could be misleading to some 

readers. NNSA added that the principle role of the CMR, as well as its 

planned replacement, is to provide analytical chemistry and materials 

characterization capabilities to support plutonium manufacturing 

operations in other facilities at LANL. For consistency with our previous 

reports on this topic, we have continued to use the term plutonium 

research capabilities but have added language to the report to clarify our 

use of this term.

NNSA’s written comments are reproduced in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III.

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 20 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

To examine the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) April 2012 

study for meeting the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) 

plutonium research needs, including costs and risks to health, if any, we 

reviewed LANL’s April 2012 study and pertinent budget, planning, and 

analytical documents from NNSA and LANL. For example, we reviewed 

various technical documents on plans for research and production of pits. 

We interviewed senior NNSA officials at NNSA’s Washington, D.C. 

headquarters and interviewed several LANL program managers at LANL 

to better understand NNSA’s plutonium research needs and to the extent 

to which they analyzed cost estimates, and to determine what decisions 

still need to be made related to capacity requirements that may affect 

costs in the future. Separately, we interviewed Department of Defense 

(DOD) program officials to gain a better understanding of nuclear 

weapons stockpile requirements and DOD’s input into the options and 

related costs. To examine the risks the options pose to public health and 

safety, we reviewed numerous pertinent documents from NNSA, LANL, 

and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, focusing on issues 

related to seismic risks at LANL. In addition, we interviewed Defense 

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board officials to discuss the potential risks to 

public health and safety, if any, posed by the options.

To examine the potential impact of options in LANL’s April 2012 study on 

NNSA’s plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and other 

mission areas, we reviewed pertinent analytical documents from NNSA 

and LANL related to NNSA’s options for maintaining its capabilities for 

plutonium-related analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and 

storage, following the deferral of Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility. We also interviewed several NNSA 

and LANL program officials to better understand various facilities’ 

capabilities that might be used as part of the options and to identify major 

impacts, if any, of using these facilities. We also interviewed former 

Department of Energy (DOE) officials and former contractor officials to 

understand the history of the CMRR and reviewed documents and 

interviewed representatives from the JASON Program Office to gather 

other perspectives on NNSA and its plutonium science mission. We also 

reviewed documents and interviewed representatives from several 

nongovernmental organizations, including the Los Alamos Study Group, 

the Union of Concerned Scientists, Nuclear Watch of New Mexico, and 

Project on Government Oversight, to identify challenges to using facilities 

across the nuclear security enterprise and to gain their perspective on 

NNSA’s plan.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 21 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 22 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 23 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 24 GAO-13-533 Plutonium Research Options

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Janet E. Frisch (Assistant 

Director); John Delicath; Mehrzad Nadji; Timothy Persons; Cheryl 

Peterson; Steven Putansu; Danny Royer; Robert Sánchez; Kiki 

Theodoropoulos; and Rajneesh Verma made key contributions to this 

report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361450)
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