### Filed 7/30/19 by Clerk of Supreme Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2019 ND 206

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v. Bradley Joe Morales, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20180366

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Ju dicial District, the Honorable Douglas L. Mattson, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
Rozanna C. Larson, State’s Attorney, Minot, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
Bradley J. Morales, self-repres ented, Bismarck, N.D., defendant and appellant; submitted on brief.State v. Morales
No. 20180366

Tufte, Justice. [¶1] Bradley Joe Morales appeals a district court criminal judgm ent following a jury verdict finding him guilty of murdering his ex-girlfriend. Morales argues a motion hearing, evidentiary hearing, and parts of his trial wer e closed to the public without the pre-closure analysis required by Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), thus violating his right to a public trial guaranteed b y the Sixth Amendment. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
I [¶2] During an argument with his ex-girlfriend, Morales stabbed her in the neck. Morales was initially charged with Criminal Attempt - Murder. A fter the victim died from her injuries, the district court dismissed the Criminal Attempt charge on the State’s motion. The State then charged Morales with Murder. On appeal Morales argues his public trial right was violated by the district court’s closures of a motion hearing on March 27, 2018; an evidentiary hearing on April 16, 2018; and parts of the jury trial on May 17-24, 2018. He also argues he was denied his right to represent
himself at trial and the State’s decision to dismiss the initial charge and file new charges a week later was made in bad faith in an effort to have a new judge assigned
to the case. [¶3] These court proceedings attracted significant public intere st and media attention. Because of news media coverage, the trial judge expr essed concern about tainting the jury and impairing Morales’s right to a fair and i mpartial trial. In an attempt to mitigate the risk of tainting potential jurors, the court issued an expansive order on March 15, 2018, advising that “all participants, inclu ding potential witnesse[s], are to refrain from making or authorizing extrajud icial comments to the media and the public” encompassing all “out-of-court comments” and subject to “sanctions against the offending individual, including contempt of court.”

1[¶4] Morales argues the district court improperly closed the courtroom on eight separate occasions during the trial or pretrial hearings. Sevenof the closures were initiated by the court, and one was requested by Morales. Before several of the closures, the court failed to conduct any of the analysis requi red by Waller . For some,
the court discussed the Waller factors after the courtroom had already been closed. Before three of the closures, the court acknowledged the Waller factors but failed to articulate findings on all of the factors. In each of the eight closures, the public was excluded without the court giving consideration to whether the public could remain while the jury was excluded. [¶5] The district court closed two pretrial hearings to the publ ic. The first, a March 27, 2018, hearing on Morales’s pro se motion for new counsel, w as closed by a written order issued prior to the hearing. The closure notice p rovided no explanation. The amended notice of hearing simply stated “this hearing will be CLOSED TO THE
PUBLIC ” with “Per Judge” as the only explanation. No findings support ing the closure were made at the hearing. Neither party objected to theclosure. [¶6] The second closure was of an April 16, 2018, pretrial evide ntiary hearing relating to admissibility of evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). At the close of the March 27 motion hearing, the district court stated its intent t o close this hearing: I will have a new order clarifying on the pretrial being the fi rst part of the April 16th and then we w ill clear the press out and we willgo and deal with the 404(b). That will be a closed hearing for obvious reasons. Just before the court excluded the public from the courtroom, t he State objected to the
closure and reminded the court of the Waller requirements. Morales’s trial counsel then expressed concern that Morales’s right to a fair trial with an impartial jury would be diminished if the media reported on any inadmissible evidenc e that would be discussed in open court. The State suggested that by making thi s argument, Morales was waiving his right to a public trial. The State asked the co urt to make specific findings and adequately tailor the closure, reasserting that th e State did not join in the requested closure. When asked whether Morales concurred with th e requested closure, his attorney responded: “Mr. Morales and I are apparently takin g a different position,

2Judge. Mr. Morales will not waive his right to appeal on this i ssue should an appeal become necessary.” Faced with objections from both the State an d the defendant, the court then reflected on the level of media coverage: There [have] been reports, I don’t know if all the excessive de tails that have been reported are going to be admissible or not. And I do n’t want a jury to be needlessly tainted because somebody perceives that ’s the public’s absolute right to know. The public does have a right to know, and that. It’s just a question of balancing the matters of howsoon they have a right to know if we are going to be able to have a justi ce system that works. Both sides are entitled to a fair and impartial jury, and that’s what I want us to have here. After stating that “I will follow this up with an additional written order,” the court closed the courtroom without further pre-closure discussion of alternatives to closing the courtroom or whether the closure might be more narrowly tai lored to protect the interest in an untainted jury pool without unnecessarily burden ing the public trial right. [¶7] The first trial closure occurred just before the jury was g iven preliminary instructions. The bailiff gave the trial judge a note from a juror who wanted to alert the court he had family working at the hospital where the victi m was treated. The district court closed the proceedings, stating: “So if you are part of the public or the media I do ask that you leave temporarily. And just shut down y our recording equipment.” After closing the courtroom, the court found “no al ternatives to closing
the courtroom” and characterized the closure as “what we would normally call a conference at the bench.” The court then called in the juror wh o had written the note and questioned him in the presence of Morales and the State abo ut an incident in which people unrelated to the trial had initiated conversation with the juror about the case. The court was satisfied that the juror had complied with the court’s admonishment against talking to people about the case, and excu sed the juror back to the jury room. [¶8] The second closure occurred on the first day of trial after the jury had been
escorted out for a lunch recess. After a brief discussion with counsel about whether

3and in what form certain video clips would be played, the court closed the courtroom to the public. After the closure, the court reviewed graphic vi deo clips of the crime scene for analysis under N.D.R.Ev. 403. There was no objection to the closure by Morales or the State, and the court made no findings under Waller. [¶9] At the beginning of the second day of the trial, the court closed the trial for a
third time to have “a full and candid conversation with the att orneys” about a limiting
instruction. The court stated it did not “view that there is analternative to” the closure. During several closed sessions of court throughout the morning, the court discussed limiting instructions with Morales and the attorneys and also Morales’s dissatisfaction with his trial attorney and desire to represent himself. The courtroom was reopened to the public when the jury returned at 1:00 p.m. [¶10] The fourth closure was initiated by Morales when his trialattorney advised the court, “Mr. Morales wishes to make a record. Can we close the c ourt?” At the time, the court had just returned from recess and the jury had not ye t returned to the courtroom. Without making Waller findings or asking for a response from the State, the courtroom was closed to everyone other than Morales, the attorneys, and the court staff. After the courtroom was closed, Morales’s attorney expla ined to the court that Morales “wishes to make a record in regard to evidence that he wishes to offer that I am not going to.” Morales explained his intent to take the st and and the reasons he had for doing so. The court explained its requirements for maintaining decorum and discussed whether Morales would testify in narrative form or wo uld be questioned by his attorney. [¶11] Just before closing arguments, and before the jury was bro ught in, the district court closed the courtroom to the public for a fifth time to di scuss a report that two jurors might have seen Morales brought into the courthouse in s hackles. Again, there was no analysis or findings under the Waller factors. While the courtroom was closed to the public, the court and counsel discussed procedures for questioning the jurors to determine whether any juror had seen Morales in shackles and , if so, whether any

4impression made would affect the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial. The court discussed with counsel whether such questioning should be in op en court. [¶12] The courtroom was reopened to the public, and the jury pan el was questioned as a group. After one juror rai sed her hand to indicate she had seen Morales outside the courtroom, the court closed the courtroom to the public for a sixth time to question the juror. The court explained that questioning an individual j uror at this point into the trial would require “a lot of sensitivity.” [¶13] At oral argument, the State confirmed that there were memb ers of the public in attendance who were excluded from the courtroom during thesecourtroom closures.
II [¶14] Morales argues that each of these closures violated his co nstitutional right to a public trial and requires reversal. A de novo standard of rev iew applies to whether
facts rise to the level of a constitutional violation. State v. Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 3, 919 N.W.2d 193. “In criminal cases, errors not raised in the di strict court may fall into one of three categories: forfeited error, waived error, and str uctural error.” Id

. “Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right, while waiv er is the intentional relinquishment of a right.” State v. Watkins , 2017 ND 165, ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d 442. We review forfeited errors under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) for obvious e rror. Id . “A structural error is a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the tri al proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’” Rogers , at ¶ 4 (quoting Johnson v. United
States , 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)). Errors of this nature “necessarilyrender a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determi ning guilt or innocence.” Rogers , at ¶ 4 (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)). Because these errors affect the entire adjudicatory framework, they “defy ana lysis by
‘harmless-error’ standards.” Rogers , at ¶ 4 (quoting Puckett v. United States , 566 U.S. 129, 141 (2009)). With structural errors, it is not necessary t o “find[] [an] impact on
the trial’s outcome.” Rogers , at ¶ 4; United States v. Marcus , 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010). Inherent in the very nature of a structural error is th e “difficulty in ‘assessing

5the effect of the error.’” Id. “The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that sho uld define the framework of any criminal trial.” Weaver v. Massachusetts , 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017). [¶15] Violation of the right to a public trial is a structural e rror. Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 5, 919 N.W.2d 193. We have said that structural errors are constitutional errors “so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal” reg ardless of whether they
were forfeited or waived. Id . at ¶ 3 (reversing and remanding for new pretrial competency hearing); State v. Pittenger , 2019 ND 22, ¶ 8, 921 N.W.2d 439; State v.
Decker , 2018 ND 43, ¶ 8, 907 N.W.2d 378; State v. Watkins , 2017 ND 165, ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d 442; State v. White Bird , 2015 ND 41, ¶ 24, 858 N.W.2d 642.
A [¶16] To review a claimed violation of the constitutional right to a public trial, we must first consider whether there was a closure implicating the right. State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2015) (“[B]efore we can apply the Waller test to determine if a closure is justified, we must determine whether a closure even occurred.”). This
Court has said some courtroom clo sures may be “errors . . . ‘no t significant enough
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.’” State v. Decker , 2018 ND 43, ¶ 13, 907 N.W.2d 378 (quoting Carson v. Fischer , 421 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also
Decker , at ¶ 35 (Tufte, J., dissenting) (“Whether called ‘trivial’ or not, such partial or temporary restrictions on public access are not properly consid ered the sort of ‘closure’ within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment or N.D. Con st. art. I, § 12.”). Like the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment public trial right attaches from the beginning of adversarial proceedings through sentencing. Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶¶ 11-12, 919 N.W.2d 193. Closures of pretrial hearings implicate the public trial right, although they do not always require reversa l of a subsequent
conviction. Rogers , at ¶¶ 19-21. [¶17] Brief sidebars or bench conferences ordinarily will not im plicate the public trial right where they are conducted during trial to address ro utine evidentiary or administrative issues outside the hearing of the jury. For exam ple, arguments and

6rulings on objections and other routine evidentiary matters that must be held outside the jury’s hearing need not b e conducted so that the public canhear. State v. Smith , 334 P.3d 1049, 1054 (Wash. 2013) (concluding the public trial right was not implicated by sidebars to address speaking objections throughout trial); State v. Smith , 876 N.W.2d 310, 329 (Minn. 2016) (“[C]ourts have also treated r outine evidentiary rulings and matters traditionally addressed during private benc h conferences or conferences in chambers as routine administrative proceedings.” ). Courts have similarly rejected public trial claims in the context of closed hearings to consider a party’s offer of proof. E.g. , United States v. Vazquez-Botet , 532 F.3d 37, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2008) (“While we leave open the possibility that the publi c-trial right may apply to some offer-of-proof hearings, we decline to recognize such a right on facts as uncompelling as these.”). Where a bench conference is held in v iew of both the public and the jury, despite their inability to hear what is said, thepublic trial right is satisfied by prompt availability of a record of those proceedin gs. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , 448 U.S. 555, 598 n.23 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“when engaging in interchanges at the bench, the trial judge is not required to allow public or press intrusion upon the huddle”); United States v. Valenti , 987 F.2d 708, 713-14 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that closed benc h conferences do not require pre-closure findings supporting closure); Smith , 876 N.W.2d at 330 (“We have held that bench and chambers conferences may occur, so long as a record is made and the record is available to the press and the public.”). In cont rast, trial proceedings ordinarily may not be closed to the public where the jury is no t present. Compare People v. Harris , 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding public trial right violated by process of conducting peremptory challe nges in chambers to expedite jury selection and avoid jurors knowing which side exe rcised which challenges) with People v. Williams , 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 772-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (approving procedure where peremptory challenges and related motions were initially made at sidebar in view of the jury).

7[¶18] In Rovinsky v. McKaskle , the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when the trial c ourt conducted
in-chambers conferences to decide motions to limit the cross ex amination of two witnesses. 722 F.2d 197 (5th Cir .1984). Without pre-closure fin dings to review, the court explained it had no ability to evaluate the propriety of holding the conferences
behind closed doors. Id. at 201. “Any necessity that the motions be heard outside the jury’s presence did not require that they be heard behind close d doors. Prejudice could readily have been prevented without excluding the press and pub lic by, for example, sequestering the jury.” Id. [¶19] Ultimately, the district court must take “every reasonablemeasure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.” Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209, 215 (2010) (per curiam). We conclude a bench conference concern ing an evidentiary objection seeking to exclude evidence during trial is not a clo sure implicating the public trial right. In that situation, the public remains prese nt and is able to see and hear everything the jury is able t o see and hear. However, a co urt proceeding concerning a motion in limine or motion to suppress evidence th at is held either before trial or otherwise outside the presence of the jury is a proceeding that must be in open court unless pre-closure findings under Waller justify a closure.
B [¶20] The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a public trial : “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also N.D. Const. art. 1, § 12 (guaranteeing “the right to a speedy and public trial”). The defendant’s right to a fair tria l is not the sole test because, at times, an “unlawful closure might take place and ye t the trial still will be fundamentally fair from the defendant’s standpoint.” Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 6, 919 N.W.2d 193 (quoting Weaver , 137 S. Ct. at 1910). [¶21] “The right to a public trial ‘must give way in rare instan ces to other interests essential to the fair administration of justice.’” Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 14, 919 N.W.2d 193 (quoting State v. Garcia , 1997 ND 60, ¶ 20, 561 N.W.2d 599). An

8example of one such overriding interest is “the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Rogers , at ¶ 14 (quoting Presley , 558 U.S. at 213). Preserving a fair trial against the risk of a tainted jury pool was the trial judge’s stated concer n here. However, for the right to a public trial to yield to an overriding interest, the party seeking closure must assert an overriding interest to the court, and that interest m ust be the standard against which the court tailors any closure. The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overridi ng interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserv e higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The int erest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a revie wing court can determine whether the closure order was properly ente red.
State v. Klem , 438 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D. 1989) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California , 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). We review the district court’s application of the Waller factors “when evaluating claimed violations of the public trial right,” Rogers , at ¶ 15, and therefore “strictly requir[e] the trial court to make findings before closure.” Decker , 2018 ND 43, ¶ 9, 907 N.W.2d 378. This analysis consists of: 1. the claiming party must advance an overriding interest that i s likely to be prejudiced, 2. the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, 3. the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to clos ing the proceeding, and 4. it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Rogers , at ¶ 15 (quoting Waller , 467 U.S. at 48). If these requirements are satisfied, “the public trial right is not violated and the proceedings maybe closed.” Rogers , at ¶ 18. But if a closure during trial was not ordered consistent with Waller , the remedy
is a new trial. Id . at ¶ 3. [¶22] “Public trials are ‘for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the pres ence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.’” Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 8, 919 N.W.2d 193 (quoting

9Waller , 467 U.S. at 46); State v. Garcia , 1997 ND 60, ¶ 20, 561 N.W.2d 599 (“Although the guarantee of a public trial was created for the benefit of criminal defendants, the right is also shared with the public; the commo n concern is to assure fairness.” (internal citation omitted)). “Openness in co urt proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to c ome forward with relevant testimony, cause all trial participants to perform the ir duties more conscientiously, and generally give the public an opportunity t o observe the judicial system.” Rogers , at ¶ 8 (quoting Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale , 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979)); Garcia , at ¶ 20. “Without these basic protections, a criminal trial c annot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). Our cases reference four basic principles embodied in the public trial right: “(1) ensuring a fair trial; (2) reminding ‘ the prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functions’; (3) encouraging witnesses to testify; and (4) discouraging perj ury.” Rogers , at ¶ 9 (quoting Decker , 2018 ND 43, ¶ 14, 907 N.W.2d 378). [¶23] Waller requires that any closure be no broader than necessary. To com ply with
Waller , before closing a trial the district court must consider and m ake findings on reasonable alternatives to closure and must tailor any closure to be no broader than necessary to protect the interest asserted by the party request ing the closure. We have
held the Waller findings must be made before a closure. Decker , 2018 ND 43, ¶ 9, 907 N.W.2d 378. It is “an absolute requirement that before the trial court may exclude the public, it must articulate its reasons on the recor d and those reasons must be expressed in findings that enable a reviewing court to exerc ise its function.” State
v. Klem , 438 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D. 1989). Neither we nor the trial court can satisfy the constitutional command with post-closure rationale for why the closure would have been justified if the court had made the required findings

. Id. at 802.
III

10[¶24] The second closure of the trial was ordered by the court t o consider whether graphic video of the crime scen e was admissible under N.D.R.Ev. 403. Morales did not object, and the district court made no findings under Waller . Because Morales failed to preserve the issue with a timely objection, we reviewthis forfeited error only
for obvious error. State v. Pemberton , 2019 ND 157, ¶ 8; Watkins , 2017 ND 165, ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d 442. To establish obvious error, the defendantmust demonstrate (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) affected his substant ial rights. Pemberton , at ¶ 8. “To constitute obvious error, the error must be a clear de viation from an applicable legal rule under current law.” Id . If the defendant establishes obvious error, an appellate court has discretion whether to correct the error “and should correct it if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” State v. Olander , 1998 ND 50, ¶ 16, 575 N.W.2d 658. [¶25] Under Waller and this Court’s public trial decisions, the second trial closure without pre-closure findings was a clear deviation from an appl icable legal rule; thus it was an error that was plain. When the district court ordered the second closure, the jury was at its lunch recess and was not in the courtroom. Naturally, the court must consider whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by unfair prejudice without the jury observing the evidence or hearing the argument s. The court’s reason to exclude the public is less clear. We could speculate that th e court’s reason was the same as its reason for imposing the March 15 order restricting extrajudicial comments, but avoiding the need to speculate is precisely why Wallerrequires preclosure findings. The scenario presented in Waller is particularly instructive here. There, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s closure to th e public of a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. Like the suppression hearing in Waller , this closure involved hearing argument and discussing evidence which may or may not be admissible at trial. It is thus clear that more than a worry ab out jurors hearing prejudicial or inadmissible information is required to justify a closure. Considering a parallel concern asserted in support of closing jury selectio n, the Supreme Court has
said: “If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to overri de a defendant’s

11constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public from jury
selection almost as a matter of course.” Presley , 558 U.S. at 215. Assuming the circumstances here supported a conclusion that a risk of jury t aint was an overriding interest, it is clear from our cases and Waller that the court must also consider alternatives to closure and narrowly tailor any closure. Id. at 214 (concluding “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even wh en they are not offered by the parties”). [¶26] We now consider the third element of obvious error, whethe r the error “affects substantial rights.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The category of struc tural error is defined by the error’s effect on the “entire adjudicatory framework” wh ich “def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 4, 919 N.W.2d 193; Puckett
v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 141 (2009) (quoting Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309). Like its counterpart in the federal rules, Rule 52 distinguishe s between errors that affect substantial rights and those that do not. Those that do not affect substantial rights are defined as harmless errors that “must be disregarded .” If an error is immune to harmless error analysis, which is the definition of structur al error, it logically follows that the error affects substantial rights. United States v. Yamashiro , 788 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “a fi nding of structur al error satisfies the third prong of the Olano plain-error test”) (quoting United States v. Jimenez Recio , 371 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2004)); United States v. David , 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Rule 52 and concluding that because structural error can never be
harmless “it follows that such errors must affect substantial rights”); In re Taylor , 73 A.3d 85, 99 (D.C. 2013). Because the second trial closure was a structural error, it necessarily affects substantial rights for purposes of Rule 52(b). Accordingly, this trial
closure is an obvious error. [¶27] The third closure was initiated by the court to discuss a limiting instruction with counsel. Neither party objected to the closure. The jury w as not present when the court announced it would close the courtroom to the public so that it could have a “full and candid” conversation with counsel. Before closing thehearing, the

12court simply said, “I don’t view that there is an alternative t o that.” After closing the hearing, the court discussed proposed jury instructions limiting the jury’s consideration of prior bad acts evidence to uses consistent with N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). Because Morales did not object, the issue was forfeited and our review of the closure
is limited to obvious error. Pemberton , 2019 ND 157, ¶ 8; Watkins , 2017 ND 165, ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d 442. [¶28] Discussion of a limiting instruction must of course be hel d outside the presence of the jury. Yet closing the proceeding to the public without p re-closure findings is again an error that is plain under Waller . Adherence to the Waller requirements
focuses the district court’s attention on whether there is an o verriding interest requiring closure of the courtroom to the public and media that were observing the trial. Without findings articulated on the record, we are left to speculate whether the district court had an overriding interest in mind, considered any specific alternatives, or considered ways to limit the scope of any necessary closure. We have said that post-closure explanations are insufficient under Waller

. Klem , 438 N.W.2d at 802. The closed part of the trial, including several recesses, laste d from 8:39 a.m. to approximately 1:00 p.m. The transcript for this portion of the trial reveals no further discussion that would justify closing the proceedings. The failure to articulate preclosure findings is a clear deviation from the line of cases go ing back to Waller and
Klem . Because this public trial violation is a structural error imm une to harmless error analysis, we again conclude it necessarily affects substantial rights and thus was
obvious error. [¶29] The fourth closure was not simply forfeited by a failure t o object but instead was expressly requested by Morales. The transcript recounts the following exchange
before the courtroom was closed: MR. MOTTINGER: Your Honor, Mr. Morales wishes to make a record. Can we close the court? THE COURT: Is there anything else that we have in open court t o bring about? MR. MOTTINGER: No, Your Honor.

13THE COURT: So I am going to be closing the courtroom. Before the Defendant presents their case. Record reflect both counsel are present, the Defendant is present, the courtroom has been closed. The c ourt staff are present. It is my understanding that the Defendant w ants to say something in closed court. [¶30] The defendant’s direct request for the closure invited the error he now argues on appeal. The invited error doctrine ordinarily does not permi t a defendant to appeal
an invited error. White Bird , 2015 ND 41, ¶ 23, 858 N.W.2d 642 (“It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a r uling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.”); U.S. v. Solis , 299 F.3d 420, 452 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Under this doctrine, a defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors which
he invited or induced . . . . We ‘will not reverse . . . absent manifest injustice.’”); but see Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 9, 919 N.W.2d 193 (quoting Presley , 558 U.S. at 214 (“The public has a right to be present whether or not any partyhas asserted the right.”)); Press-Enterprise Co. , 464 U.S. at 503-05, 508, 513 (concluding public trial right was violated despite both parties having sought confident iality of transcript of
closed voir dire proceedings); Singer v. United States , 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965) (citing United States v. Kobli , 172 F.2d 919, 923-24 (3d. Cir. 1949) (concluding under
Sixth Amendment that “members of the general public should be a dmitted to every criminal trial even though it might appear that, in a case suchas the one before us, most of them come only out of morbid curiosity”)). Because we h ave concluded that the second and third trial closures were obvious error, we need not decide here
whether the district court’s failure to articulate Waller findings prior to closing proceedings at the specific request of the defendant is an erro r that may support reversal of a criminal judgment on appeal. [¶31] To guide the district court regarding issues that may recur on remand, we briefly address the other claimed public trial violations. The first closure was prompted by a note from an individual juror. The jury was not i n the courtroom at the
time. The district court stated that it saw no alternative and explained to the public attending the trial that they would have to leave for this “ben ch conference.” The

14court’s brief pre-closure statements did not satisfy the requir ements of Waller . In essence, the court reasoned that this was not a closure but a b ench conference that did not require Waller analysis. The fifth and sixth closures also involved midtrial questioning of jurors relating to potential prejudice arising f rom seeing the defendant in shackles outside the courtroom. We conclude that the public trial right is not implicated by the trial court’s private questioning of an indiv idual juror during a trial regarding potential misconduct. Should a similar situation occur on retrial, such questioning may be conducted in chambers or in a closed courtro om. United States v.
Edwards , 823 F.2d 111, 116-17 (5th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that “midtria l proceedings involving the questioning of jurors have traditionally been clo sed to the public”). [¶32] The district court’s two closures of pretrial hearings wer e also ordered without
Waller findings justifying the closures. This is also error, although improper closure of a pretrial hearing does not necessarily require a new trial. Rogers , 2018 ND 244, ¶ 21, 919 N.W.2d 193. Because there was no objection to the fir st pretrial closure, we review it as a forfeited error subject to obvious error review. In contrast, both Morales and the State objected to the second pretrial closure, preservi ng it for review on appeal. The district court’s March 15th order restricting all p articipants in the trial from making “extrajudicial comments” on penalty of contempt is clear indication of the court’s appropriate concern that Morales receive a fair tri al by an impartial jury not tainted by media coverage. That concern, to the extent it e xpressed the district court’s motivation in closing pretrial hearings in March and Ap ril, is not by itself sufficient. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed precisely this poi nt in Presley v. Georgia : There are no doubt circumstances where a judge could conclude that threats of improper communications with jurors or safety c oncerns are concrete enough to warrant closing voir dire . But in those cases, the particular interest, and threat to that interest, must “be arti culated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.”
558 U.S. at 215-16. Under Waller and Presley , the first pretrial closure is error that is plain and thus satisfies the first two requirements for obvi ous error. And as a

15structural error immune to harmless error analysis, we also con clude it affects substantial rights. Accordingly, the first closure was also obv ious error. [¶33] The second pretrial closure, which we review de novo, was also a violation of the public trial right. At the prior hearing the district court stated that at the pretrial evidentiary hearing it would “clear the press out . . . and dea l with the 404(b). That will be a closed hearing for obvious reasons.” On the record prior to closing the evidentiary hearing, the court stated, “I don’t know if all the excessive details that have been reported are going to be admissible or not.” Waller would permit a closure even over the objection of both parties, but the court must art iculate adequate findings supporting a closure. Compare Waller , which remanded for a new hearing on a motion to suppress, a hearing which necessarily includes discus sion of evidence that may not be admissible. Where there is a particularized risk of tainting the jury pool by public proceedings relating to potentially inadmissible evid ence, Waller tells us that the Sixth Amendment require s both tailoring any closure to be no broader than necessary to protect that interest and consideration of reasona ble alternatives to closure. Should similar pretrial hearings be held on remand, th e district court should make adequate findings under Waller before closing any hearing.
IV [¶34] We do not lightly reverse a criminal conviction in the abs ence of any apparent prejudice to the defendant flowing from erroneous trial closure s. It may appear that reversing a conviction for a public trial violation elevates fo rm over function. Further, we acknowledge the trial court’s motivation to preserve the def endant’s right to a fair trial by limiting distribution of case information that may not be admitted at trial. The second pretrial error was preserved by objection and would requ ire only a remand for a new pretrial hearing and a new trial contingent on the outcom e of that hearing. The other pretrial error and the two trial closures that we conclud e were forfeited obvious error are subject to corr ection at our discretion. Olander , 1998 ND 50, ¶ 16, 575 N.W.2d 658. Here, we conclude that the repeated exclusion of th e public without findings articulated on the record before the closures negative ly affects the fairness,

16integrity, and public reputation of our criminal justice system

. Id. at ¶ 28 (exercising discretion to notice obvious error and remanding for new trial because “an accused’s guilt or innocence is not the determinative factor; rather, thefairness and integrity of the proceeding is paramount”). We exercise our discretion and n otice these obvious errors. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. [¶35] We have considered Morales’s remaining issues and argument s and conclude they are either without merit or unnecessary to our decision. W e reverse the judgment
and remand for a new trial. [¶36] Jerod E. Tufte Daniel J. Crothers Jon J. Jensen Lisa Fair McEvers Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

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