J-A30044-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JIMMY AARON,

Appellant No. 664 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 16, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0008978-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2015

Appellant, Jimmy Aaron, appeals from his bench trial conviction of 

driving under the influence (general impairment), 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3802(a)(1).1 He challenges the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. 

We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance

(a) General impairment.--

(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a 

sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered 

incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical 

control of the movement of the vehicle. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
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On January 29, 2012, at approximately 1:32 a.m., Philadelphia Police 

Officer Christopher Ward pulled Appellant over on the 2700 block of 

Kensington Avenue for driving without headlights on. On approaching and 

talking with Appellant, the officer observed his slurred speech, bloodshot 

eyes and the odor of alcohol. Officer Ward arrested Appellant for driving 

under the influence of alcohol.2 

After a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of driving under the 

influence in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), but acquitted him of a 

violation of section 3802(b), operating a vehicle with a blood or breath 

alcohol level of at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours after 

the individual has driven or been in control of a vehicle. 

On January 16, 2014, the court imposed the guideline sentence for 

second offenders of a five day term of incarceration plus license suspension 

of twelve months, mandatory highway safety classes, and ignition interlock 

for one year, plus fines and costs. The court denied Appellant’s postsentence motion challenging the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence, 

on February 27, 2014. This timely appeal followed.3

____________________________________________

2

Later, after he consented to breathalyzer tests, Appellant’s blood alcohol 

content (BAC) tested at .116% at 3:40 a.m., and a minute later at .119%, 

at 3:41 a.m.

3 Appellant filed a statement of errors on April 29, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). The trial court filed its opinion on May 14, 2014, referencing its 

previous opinion dated March 31, 2014 and filed on April 16, 2014, stating 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant presents two questions for our review: 

I. Was the evidence presented at the trial of the 

Appellant legally sufficient to sustain his conviction of driving 

while under the influence of alcohol, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a) 

(1) [general impairment] where the Commonwealth failed to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had imbibed a 

quantity of alcohol that rendered him incapable of safely 

operating a vehicle?

II. Taking into consideration all of the evidence 

presented at trial was the Appellant’s conviction at trial for 

driving while under the influence of alcohol, under 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3802(a)(1) [general impairment] against the weight of the 

evidence?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 9).

In his first question, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence. He argues generally that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was incapable of safely operating a 

motor vehicle due to mental or physical impairment from consumption of 

alcohol. (See id. at 16). Specifically, he argues that expert testimony was 

required; he also claims that the mere odor of alcohol, or blood shot eyes, 

alone, or slurred speech, failed to prove his diminished capacity to drive. 

(See id. at 17-43). We disagree.

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims 

requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable 

to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

its reasons for denying Appellant’s motion to stay sentence under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1762(g). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty, and may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Significantly, we may not 

substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder; if the record 

contains support for the convictions they may not be disturbed. 

So long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective 

elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, his 

convictions will be upheld. Any doubt about the defendant’s 

guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 990 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 34 A.3d 828 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer 

in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not 

limited to, the following: the offender’s actions and behavior, 

including manner of driving and ability to pass field sobriety 

tests; demeanor, including toward the investigating officer; 

physical appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other 

physical signs of intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred 

speech. Blood alcohol level may be added to this list, although it 

is not necessary and the two hour time limit for measuring blood 

alcohol level does not apply. Blood alcohol level is admissible in 

a subsection 3801(a)(1) case only insofar as it is relevant to and 

probative of the accused’s ability to drive safely at the time he or 

she was driving. The weight to be assigned these various types 

of evidence presents a question for the fact-finder, who may rely 

on his or her experience, common sense, and/or expert 

testimony. Regardless of the type of evidence that the 

Commonwealth proffers to support its case, the focus of 

subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the individual 

to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol-not on a particular 

blood alcohol level.

Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa. 2009). 
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Thus, under our standard of review, and pertinent caselaw, it is 

beyond serious dispute that the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to support Appellant’s conviction. Appellant misconceives our 

standard of review under which we view the evidence presented in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. Assessment of the 

weight of the evidence was the province of the trial court as fact-finder. See

McKellick, supra at 990. Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.

Secondly, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 44). This claim is waived. Aside from an ill-conceived 

attempt to incorporate his sufficiency argument by reference, and a 

generalized invocation of due process supported by a single citation, 

Appellant fails to develop any argument in support of his claim.4(See id.). 

Mere blanket assertions fail to develop an argument, resulting in a waiver of 

the asserted claim. See Commonwealth v. McMullen, 745 A.2d 683, 

689 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 761 A.2d 549 (Pa. 2000). 

Moreover, under applicable legal principles, the claim would not merit 

relief. 

This Court has long recognized that a true weight of the 

evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to 

sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be 

believed. Where the trial court has ruled on a weight claim, an 

____________________________________________

4 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). We note that the 

United States Supreme Court overruled Palko in Benton v. Maryland, 395 

U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
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appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Rather, our review is limited to whether the trial court palpably 

abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

* * *

A new trial should be awarded when the jury’s 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative 

so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. 

In this regard, [t]he evidence must be so tenuous, vague 

and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the 

court.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 2014 WL 6948150, at *10 (Pa. Super. filed 

December 10, 2014) (citations, quotation marks, and internal punctuation 

omitted). 

Here, on independent review, the verdict does not shock the 

conscience of this Court, and we discern no palpable abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s ruling denying the weight claim.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2015