Chapter Name a Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Systemic Safety Project

Selection Tool
Notice

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Cover Photos

Left: Scott Davis, Thurston County Public Works, Washington

Top Right: North Dakota Department of Transportation

Bottom Right: www.pedbikeimages.org / Andy Hamilton
1. Report No. 

FHWA-SA-13-019

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient’s Catalog No.

4. Title and Subtitle

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

5. Report Date

July 2013

6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)

Howard Preston, Richard Storm, Jacqueline Dowds Bennett, Beth Wemple

8. Performing Organization Report No.

No

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

CH2M HILL, Inc.

1295 Northland Drive, Suite 200

Mendota Heights, MN 55120

and

Cambridge Systematics, Inc.

555 12th Street, Suite 1600

Oakland, CA 94607

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

DTFH61-05-D-00026

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

Department of Transportation

Federal Highway Administration 

Office of Safety

400 Seventh Street S.W.

Washington, DC 20590

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

Covered Technical Manual

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

FHWA COTM: Karen Scurry, Office of Safety

Technical working group members: David Brand (Madison County, OH), Tom Bruff (SEMCOG), Aaron Butters (WSDOT), 

Matthew Enders (WSDOT), Brad Estochen (MnDOT), Terry Hopkins (NCDOT), Keith Knapp (IA LTAP), Kevin Lacy (NCDOT), 

Rob Limoges (NYSDOT), Tracy Lovell (KYTC), Stephen Lowry (NCDOT), Ken Mammen (NVDOT), Mike Manthey (AZDOT), 

Ken Mayhew (NCDOT), John Miller (MoDOT), Sue Miller (Freeborn County, MN), Don Petersen (FHWA WA), Joey Riddle 

(SCDOT), Will Stein (FHWA MN), Christine Thorkildsen (FHWA NY), Marc Thornsberry (FHWA MO), Marie Walsh (LA LTAP)

16. Abstract

The Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool presents a process for incorporating systemic safety planning into traditional 

safety management processes. The Systemic Tool provides a step-by-step process for conducting systemic safety analysis; 

considerations for determining a reasonable distribution between the implementation of spot safety improvements and 

systemic safety improvements; and a mechanism for quantifying the benefits of safety improvements implemented through 

a systemic approach. The tool is intended for use by transportation safety practitioners in state, county, and local government agencies to plan, implement, and evaluate systemic safety improvement programs and projects that best meet their 

capabilities and needs. 

17. Key Words

Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), Strategic Highway Safety Plan 

(SHSP), safety management process, systemic safety, risk factor, problem identification, countermeasure identification, project prioritization, Crash Modification 

Factors (CMF), evaluation

18. Distribution Statement

No restrictions.

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

Unclassified

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Unclassified

21. No. of Pages

100

22. Price

N/A

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of complete pages authorized.

Technical Report Documentation Page

Foreword

The Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool builds upon current safety management 

practices for identifying roadway safety problems and implementing highway 

safety improvement projects. The tool expands a transportation agency’s analytical 

techniques and models beyond current site-specific analysis to a systemic safety 

analysis approach by helping an agency perform a systemwide evaluation for 

roadway attributes that are common to locations with a crash history. This process 

enables the agency to proactively address highway safety concerns. 

The systemic analysis outlined in this tool can be used across the board by state 

agencies, transportation planning organizations, and county and local government 

agencies to plan, implement, and evaluate systemic safety programs and projects 

that best meet their capabilities and needs. The tool provides a step-by-step process 

for conducting systemic safety analysis; considerations for determining a reasonable 

distribution between implementing site-specific safety improvements and systemic 

safety improvements; and a mechanism for quantifying the benefits of safety 

improvements implemented through a systemic approach.

A comprehensive safety management program, including both site analysis and 

systemic approaches, will reduce the occurrence of, and the potential for, fatalities 

and serious injuries on our nation’s roadways. For additional information, please visit 

the Systemic Approach to Safety: Using Risk to Drive Action website. 

Tony Furst 

Associate Administrator 

Office of Safety 

Preface

The “Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act” continues the Highway 

Safety Improvement Program as a core Federal-aid highway program based in 

strategic planning and resulting in data-driven decisions that reduce the occurrence 

of fatalities and serious injuries on our nation’s roadways. This act emphasizes the 

eligibility of systemic safety improvements and projects to reduce the potential 

for traffic-related fatalities and serious injuries on all public roads. The Systemic 

Safety Project Selection Tool (Systemic Tool) provides supporting information for 

state transportation departments and local government agencies to incorporate 

a systemic planning component into their existing safety management programs. 

The Systemic Tool provides an overview of the role of systemic planning in the 

safety management process and outlines the process to select systemic safety 

improvements and projects. The Systemic Tool provides a framework for determining 

a reasonable funding distribution between spot safety and systemic safety improvements, and discusses the evaluation of systemic safety programs. The Systemic Tool 

is a valuable reference for state and local transportation safety practitioners working 

to advance the planning and implementation of systemic safety improvements. 

Hyperlinks in this document connect the user to valuable resources to assist with 

their decision-making processes.

Based on the latest research and state and local practices pertaining to systemic 

safety planning efforts, the Systemic Tool was developed with input from a technical 

oversight working group and revised based on feedback from several volunteer pilot 

agencies. The primary role of the technical oversight working group was to provide 

initial input into the scope and direction of the project and review major deliverables. 

Four volunteer pilot agencies then applied the systemic process documented in the 

Systemic Tool to their systems. The objective of this pilot effort was to assess the flexibility 

of the Systemic Tool by applying it to a variety of roadway systems, jurisdictions, and 

geographies. The  feedback from these agencies and lessons learned during the pilot 

were incorporated into the final version of the Systemic Tool presented here. The pilot 

results are also incorporated via examples that are integrated throughout the Systemic 

Tool to illustrate its application across multiple systems. 

The agencies that participated in the pilot effort are the Thurston County, Washington, 

Department of Public Works; the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet; the Missouri 

Department of Transportation; and the New York State Department of Transportation. 

In addition, the Minnesota Department of Transportation and the Rutgers Center for 

Advanced Infrastructure and Transportation provided information on their application 

of the systemic approach to safety. The gracious contributions and expertise of the 

technical oversight working group and pilot agencies will support the advancement 

of systemic safety planning and reduce the occurrence of and potential for fatalities 

and serious injuries on our nation’s roadways.
Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic 

and Traditional Safety Investments

Introduction to Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments.................59

Decision Support Framework.......................................................................................59

Review of Past Funding Practices.......................................................................60

A Funding Determination Framework................................................................61

Programmatic Assessment of the Benefit to be Gained 

through Systemic Investment .............................................................................63

Summary .......................................................................................................................66

Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program

Introduction to Systemic Safety Program Evaluation.................................................69

Systemic Safety Performance Measures.....................................................................70

Systemic Safety Program Output .......................................................................71

Observed Trends in Crash Frequency or Severity..............................................72

Countermeasure Performance..........................................................................74

Where to Go for More Information.....................................................................76

Summary .......................................................................................................................77

References

References.....................................................................................................................81

Appendix

Applying Existing Tools and Resources in a Systemic Safety Program.....................85

Strategic Highway Safety Plan............................................................................85

Roadway Departure and Intersection Safety Implementation Plans ..............85

Fatality Analysis Reporting System .....................................................................86

Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse ......................................................86

NCHRP Report 500 and FHWA’s Nine Proven Safety Countermeasures ...........86

The Highway Safety Manual...............................................................................87

Safety Analyst and Interactive Highway Safety Design Model.........................87

United States Road Assessment Program..........................................................87

Contents

Introduction

Introduction to the Systemic Safety Project 

Selection Tool ..................................................................................................................3

Systemic Approach to Safety ...............................................................................3

Attributes of a Systemic Safety Program..............................................................4

Overview of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool ......................................5

Organization of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool................................6

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Overview of the Systemic Safety Planning Process......................................................9

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors ..............................................................10

Task 1: Select Focus Crash Types........................................................................11

Task 2: Select Focus Facilities .............................................................................16

Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors..........................................................18

Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations................................................................25

Task 1: Identify Network Elements to Analyze ....................................................25

Task 2: Conduct Risk Assessment.......................................................................26

Task 3: Prioritize Focus Facility Elements.............................................................26

Select Countermeasures..............................................................................................30

Task 1: Assemble Comprehensive List of Countermeasures.............................30

Task 2: Evaluate and Screen Countermeasures ...............................................31

Task 3: Select Countermeasures for Deployment..............................................32

Prioritize Projects ...........................................................................................................34

Task 1: Create a Decision Process for Countermeasure Selection...................34

Task 2: Develop Safety Projects...........................................................................35

Task 3: Prioritize Safety Project Implementation.................................................35

Case Study: Minnesota Department of Transportation’s Application 

of the Systemic Safety Planning Process ....................................................................37

Summary .......................................................................................................................56
Figures

1. Highway Safety Improvement Program Process....................................................4

2. Framework for the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool ....................................5

3. Systemic Safety Planning Process...........................................................................9

4. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks to Identify 

Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors .....................................................................11

5. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks to Screen and Prioritize 

Candidate Locations .............................................................................................25

6. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks to Select Countermeasures ...............30

7. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks to Prioritize Projects.............................34

8. Characteristics to Consider in Balancing the Distribution 

of Safety Investments .............................................................................................61

9. Benefit-Cost Analysis Spreadsheet ..................................................................64-65

10. Program Results for Addressing Lane Departure 

and Speeding-Related Fatalities...........................................................................72

11. Illinois Department of Transportation Illustration of Cable Median Barrier 

Program Results for Treated Locations..................................................................73

Tables

1. Potential Risk Factors for Example Focus Crash Types ........................................20

2. Example Historical HSIP Funding Review..............................................................60

Examples

1. New York State Department of Transportation Data Analysis 

to Select Focus Crash Type....................................................................................13

2. Thurston County Public Works Data Analysis to Select Focus Facilities.............15

3. New York State Department of Transportation Crash Tree Diagram 

to Select Focus Facility...........................................................................................17

4. Summation of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Research Process 

to Identify Potential Risk Factors............................................................................19

5. New York State Department of Transportation Evaluation of Curve Radii 

as a Potential Risk Factor ......................................................................................21

6. Thurston County Public Works Evaluation of Roadway Functional Class 

as a Potential Risk Factor ......................................................................................23

7. Thurston County Public Works Risk Factor Prioritization ......................................27

8. Thurston County Public Works Results of Segment Prioritization 

for Focus Facility Type Based on Risk Factor Scoring..........................................29

9. Rutgers Center for Advanced Infrastructure and Transportation 

Benefit Cost Analysis to Evaluate and Screen Countermeasures......................33

10. Minnesota Department of Transportation 

Application of Funding Determination Framework.............................................62 

11. Missouri Department of Transportation Evaluation 

Using Empirical Bayes Methodology....................................................................75 
Acronyms

3R Resurfacing, Restoration, and Rehabilitation

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

ADT Average Daily Traffic

AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic 

CAIT Rutgers Center for Advanced Infrastructure and Transportation 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CMF Crash Modification Factor

DOT Department of Transportation

EB Empirical Bayes

FARS Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FDE Fundamental Data Elements

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

GIS Geographic Information System

HEAT Highway Enforcement of Aggressive Traffic

HSIP Highway Safety Improvement Program

HSM Highway Safety Manual

HTCM High-Tension Cable Median

IHSDM Interactive Highways Safety Design Model

KYTC Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act

MIRE Model Inventory of Roadway Elements

MIRE FDE Model Inventory of Roadway Elements Fundamental Data Elements

MnDOT Minnesota Department of Transportation

MoDOT Missouri Department of Transportation

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NYSDOT New York State Department of Transportation

PIE Post Implementation Evaluation 

SHSP Strategic Highway Safety Plan

SIMS Safety Information Management System 

SRI Smooth Roads Initiative

Systemic Tool Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

U.S.C. United States Code

usRAP United States Road Assessment Program
Introduction

Introduction to the Systemic Safety Project

Selection Tool

Crashes on rural roads often account for a high percentage of all severe crashes, 

but the density of crashes associated with rural roadways or particular crash types is 

typically low. A low density of crashes typically does not lead to identifying crash issues 

or locations of concern within the traditional site-specific analysis process. Instead, 

this low-density distribution of crashes poses a challenge to addressing safety issues 

and concerns because a high percentage of severe crashes are not being identified 

for improvement projects. A further challenge to the low-density issue is that these 

crashes frequently occur on roadways that are part of the local system that might not 

have robust data to assist with identifying the locations of concern. This low-density 

crash situation is often viewed as a rural issue, but similar situations can exist in 

urban areas, such as crashes involving motorized vehicles and vulnerable road users 

(e.g., pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists). 

Many traditional network screening techniques for identifying sites for potential 

safety improvement base investment decisions on the site analysis approach. Such 

techniques focus primarily on specific locations with a history of severe crashes (often 

referred to as hot spots or black spots). However, compelling evidence indicates that 

severe crashes actually are widely distributed across state and local highway systems, 

and very few individual locations in rural areas and on local systems experience 

a high number or sustained occurrence of severe crashes. As a result, states will 

have trouble meeting their safety performance goals by only investing in high-crash 

locations; some systemic deployment will be needed. Thus, some agencies added 

a systemic approach to their safety management efforts. 

The “Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act” (MAP-21) continues the 

Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) as a core Federal-aid highway program 

and emphasizes reducing fatal and serious injury crashes on all public roads. The 

legislation acknowledges that a State’s HSIP should identify projects to improve 

safety not only on the basis of crash history, but also on crash potential. MAP-21 

places a significant emphasis on systemic safety improvements as part of the safety 

management process. MAP-21 clarifies that systemic safety improvements are eligible 

highway safety improvement projects. In addition, MAP-21 encourages each state to 

consider systemic safety improvements as they update their strategic highway safety 

plan (SHSP).

Systemic Approach to Safety 

As part of the HSIP, the requirement to address the potential for crashes to 

occur suggests the need to include a systemic approach to safety in the safety 

management process. The systemic approach to safety involves widely implemented 

improvements based on high-risk roadway features correlated with specific severe 

crash types. The approach provides a more comprehensive method for safety 

planning and implementation that supplements and complements traditional site 

analysis. The approach also helps agencies broaden their traffic safety efforts and 

consider risk as well as crash history when identifying where to make low-cost safety 

improvements.

Introduction

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 3 Introduction

Introduction
FIGURE 1. Highway Safety Improvement Program Process

The systemic approach to safety is a data-driven process that involves analytical 

techniques to identify sites for potential safety improvement and suggests projects for 

safety investment not typically identified through the traditional site analysis approach. 

The intent of this complementary approach is to supplement traditional site analysis 

and provide a more comprehensive and proactive approach to preventing the 

most severe crashes on our nation’s roadways. Figure 1 illustrates that the systemic 

and site analysis approaches include the same basic planning elements (problem 

identification, countermeasure identification, and project prioritization) as reflected in 

most common safety management processes, including the HSIP. Systemic analysis, 

however, addresses the crash types that result in a significant number of fatal and 

serious injury crashes spread across the network rather than focusing only on specific 

sites experiencing a history of severe crashes (traditional site analysis). The systemic 

approach to safety does not replace traditional site analysis; high crash locations 

must still be addressed. Rather, both the site analysis and systemic approaches are 

necessary to advance a comprehensive safety management program.

Attributes of a Systemic Safety Program

Systemic safety planning is the process of evaluating an entire system using a defined 

set of criteria to identify candidate locations for safety investments to reduce the 

occurrence of and the potential for severe crashes. The systemic approach to safety 

is a complementary analytical technique intended to supplement the traditional 

site analysis approach and results in a more comprehensive safety management 

program. 

The systemic approach to safety:

z Identifies a “problem” based on systemwide data, such as rural lane departure 

crashes, urban pedestrian crashes, or rural unsignalized intersection crashes. 

These crashes are often spread across the network with few or no locations 

experiencing a “cluster” of crashes during a typical 3- to 5-year analysis period. 

z Looks for characteristics (e.g., geometry, volume, or location) frequently present 

in severe crashes. These characteristics, also known as risk factors1, can be used 

to identify and prioritize locations with few or no crashes that could be potential 

candidates for safety investments. 

z Focuses on deploying one or more low-cost countermeasures to address 

the underlying circumstances contributing to crashes on a majority of roads. 

Addressing crash types experiencing low densities (crashes per intersection or 

mile) but high aggregate numbers steers the decision toward low-cost solutions 

widely deployed across the system in order to affect a large number of locations. 

1 For purposes of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool, the term “risk factor” refers to a 

common characteristic of the locations where severe crashes occurred; therefore, the presence 

of a risk factor at other locations is an indicator of the potential for a future severe crash.

z Identifies and prioritizes locations across the roadway network for implementation. 

The prioritization process might take on different forms such as implementing lowcost countermeasures as part of resurfacing, restoration, and rehabilitation (3R) 

projects or stand-alone safety projects. In either case, the systemic approach to 

safety represents one of several mechanisms to implement a state SHSP or other 

local safety plan.

Introduction 4 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Introduction
The key to the systemic planning process is the concept of evaluating an entire 

system using a defined set of criteria that will vary depending on the available data. 

The result is an inferred prioritization, indicating that some elements of the system are 

better candidates than others for safety investment. A key question this process sets 

out to answer is Do all systems and crash types present equal opportunities for crash 

reduction, or do specific parts of the system and certain crash types offer a greater 

opportunity for crash reduction?

Overview of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

The Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool (Systemic Tool) builds upon current practices 

for identifying roadway safety problems and developing highway safety improvement 

projects. The Systemic Tool fills the current void of analytical techniques and models 

useful for conducting the systemic approach to roadway safety (current techniques 

and models focus on site-specific analysis).

Specifically, the Systemic Tool provides the following:

z A step-by-step process for conducting systemic safety planning

z Considerations for determining a reasonable distribution between the 

implementation of spot safety improvements and systemic safety improvements

z A mechanism for quantifying the benefits of safety improvements implemented 

through a systemic approach

The Systemic Tool outlines a process that agencies can integrate into existing safety 

management practices and safety analysis tools. The process guides agencies as 

they conduct systemic safety planning, determine funding levels for implementation 

of systemic safety improvement projects, and evaluate the effectiveness of systemic 

safety programs. The cyclical process illustrated in Figure 2 reflects the three elements 

of the Systemic Tool as presented in this manual: 

z Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process (blue in Figure 2) helps safety 

analysts identify priority crash types and associated risk factors; evaluate proven, 

low-cost safety countermeasures; and prioritize alternative candidate locations for 

systemic safety investment. 

z Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety 

Investments (green in Figure 2) provides a framework for setting funding goals 

between systemic and site analysis programs. Finally, 

z Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program (purple in Figure 2) provides 

high-level direction for evaluating the effectiveness of systemic safety programs.

FIGURE 2. Framework for the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 

The Systemic Tool is designed to be flexible and easy to use, resulting in easy-tounderstand output. The data requirements for the Systemic Tool are flexible and 

assist with identifying potential risk factors. The following describes each of these 

characteristics of the Systemic Tool:

z Flexible—The tool is applicable to a variety of systems, in a variety of locations, 

and with a variety of crash types.

z Easy to use—The processes are meant to be relatively straight-forward, requiring 

minimal training and technical assistance.

z Easy-to-understand output—The output is understandable by both program 

managers and project development engineers who might have no training in 

traffic safety analysis techniques.

z Flexible data requirements—The data requirements can be matched to what 

individual agencies can deliver.

z Risk factors—Where possible, the tool helps identify characteristics in addition to 

crash experience to support the identification of potential risk factors. 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 5 Introduction

Introduction
Organization of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

This Systemic Tool is organized into five sections and an appendix. This section 

(Introduction) provides an overview of systemic safety planning and the Systemic 

Tool. The next three sections are devoted to the three elements of the Systemic Tool, 

and each of these sections contains examples that illustrate the systemic planning 

concepts explained in the text. Element 1 describes the four-step systemic safety 

planning process and concludes with a case study from the Minnesota Department 

of Transportation (MnDOT). Element 2 provides a framework for determining a 

reasonable distribution between the implementation of spot safety improvements and 

systemic safety improvements. Element 3 contains an overview and considerations 

for evaluating a systemic safety program based on approaches demonstrated to be 

useful. The final section (References) lists the works cited throughout the document 

and includes hyperlinks to access reports and websites. The appendix presents several 

national resources available to practitioners, along with guidance about how the 

resources can be used to support a systemic safety program. 

While using the Systemic Tool, agencies should understand that the process 

presented needs to be tailored to fit the available data. This might mean that some 

agencies will have one or two risk factors to consider when prioritizing locations, and 

others agencies might be able to evaluate numerous characteristics as risk factors. 

Additionally, the examples and case study simply represent how some agencies have 

approached a systemic safety analysis process. In the application of the Systemic 

Tool, it is entirely appropriate for agencies to make changes to adapt to their own 

data systems.

Introduction 6 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Introduction
Element 1:

The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Overview of the Systemic Safety 

Planning Process

The systemic safety planning process (Element 1 of the Systemic Safety Project 

Selection Tool) consists of the four steps shown in Figure 3. Each step can be scaled 

based on the availability of technical resources and the quality or quantity of data 

available to support different analytical approaches. The systemic safety planning 

process is similar to most common safety management processes. The systemic 

safety planning process involves identifying the problem, screening and prioritizing 

candidate locations, selecting countermeasures, and prioritizing projects. 

The premise that makes systemic safety planning different from traditional network 

screening techniques is that it looks for similar issues across the roadway system rather 

than focusing on select locations with high crash histories or densities. The systemic 

safety planning process begins by looking at systemwide data to analyze and 

identify focus crash types (those representing the greatest number of severe crashes) 

and potential risk factors. As the downward arrows indicate, the approach then 

moves to a micro-level risk assessment of locations across the network, which then 

leads to selecting relevant mitigating countermeasures most appropriate for broad 

FIGURE 3. Systemic Safety Planning Process

implementation across those locations, and prioritizing projects for implementation. 

The upward arrows indicate that the results of one step might suggest the need to 

return to a previous step and make adjustments before continuing the process.

The following chapters (Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors, Screen and 

Prioritize Candidate Locations, Select Countermeasures, and Prioritize Projects) further 

describe the four steps of the systemic safety planning process. Each chapter includes 

a discussion of the objective, data needs, tasks, and outcomes, along with examples 

illustrating the fundamental process for each step.

Data Needs

The systemic safety planning process 

builds on the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) guidance to 

develop SHSPs and structure an HSIP 

using data-driven processes. The fourstep process uses basic types of crash, 

roadway, and traffic volume data that 

are recommended by the FHWA for use 

in safety analysis efforts. Several agencies 

actively applying the systemic approach 

to safety and conducting research 

relative to systemic safety improvement also use these types of data. The 

following chapters describe in detail 

the specific types of data associated with each step in the systemic safety planning 

process. These data are recommended for each step because they represent 

elements that can impact safety performance of a facility. Although agencies might 

not currently maintain all these data elements, more detailed data provide the 

opportunity to more specifically identify facility types and risk factors.

Element 1:

The Systemic Safety Planning Process

The systemic approach 

emphasizes a data-driven 

decision-making process. 

However, the Tool is intended to 

be flexible to support varying 

degrees of data availability.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 9 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Systemic Safety

Overview of the

Planning Process
The basic objective of the systemic safety planning process is to identify candidates 

for safety investment. Candidate identification results from comparing the actual 

conditions of segments, curves, and intersections with a set of observed characteristics 

associated with the locations where the focus crash types actually occurred. The datadriven process identifies the observed characteristics (risk factors) associated with the 

focus crash type. The systemic safety planning process uses selected risk factors to 

differentiate one segment from another, one curve from another, and one intersection 

from another in order to prioritize these facilities and give higher priority to locations 

where there is greater potential for future severe focus crashes. The data suggested to 

support the systemic approach are not intended to be prescriptive; some agencies 

currently use these types of data to successfully advance a systemic approach to 

safety. The systemic safety planning process can be adapted to meet agency-specific 

needs or crash reduction goals, consistent with the data available. The systemic 

planning process produces results with minimal levels of data; greater levels of data, 

however, support a more refined prioritization. 

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors

Objective

The objective of the first step in the systemic safety planning process is to identify 

risk factors commonly associated with each focus crash type experienced across 

a system. This step involves reviewing systemwide (i.e., macro-level) crash data and 

identifying potential risk factors for further analysis. Identification of potential risk factors 

does not necessarily imply the observed characteristics “caused” the crashes; rather, 

the characteristics are useful to identify the situations in which the crashes occurred, 

so that similar “looking” locations can be identified and prioritized.

Data Needs

The identification of focus crash types and risk factors results from using a range of 

data elements. Following are the minimum recommended crash data elements:

z System type

z Crash type

z Facility type

z Crash location type

z Location characteristics

The FHWA’s Model Inventory of Roadway Elements Fundamental Data Elements 

(MIRE FDE) identified for the HSIP is a good starting point for determining which 

roadway data to collect for a systemic analysis because it includes many of the 

roadway and traffic volume data elements recommended for use in this first step 

(FHWA, 2012). However, other road characteristics, such as shoulder width and type or 

roadway curvature, should be investigated when possible. The road and intersection 

data inventory is typically available in a geographic information system (GIS) or 

database, which should be linked with the crash records system. Ideally, the various 

data sets would incorporate the same time period. When volume data are from an 

earlier time period than crash data, first consider if changes have occurred that make 

the volumes no longer relevant (i.e., economic growth). If little change has occurred, 

Data for Identifying Target Crash Types 

and Location Characteristics

Recommended Minimum Data

z System type (e.g., state, local)

z Crash type (e.g., road departure, right angle, head-on, rear end, turning)

z Facility type (e.g., freeway, expressway, arterial, or collector)

z Crash location type (e.g., urban vs. rural, intersection vs. segment, tangent vs. curve)

z Location characteristics (e.g., topography, intersection elements, segment elements)

Additional Data for Identifying Risk Factors

z Traffic volumes for segments and intersections

z Roadway features (e.g., number of lanes, shoulder type and width, road edge 

features and quality, number and type of access, radius and superelevation of 

horizontal curves, density of horizontal curves, speed limit, speed differential between 

curves and tangents, medians, pavement condition and friction)

z Intersection features (e.g., number of approaches, skew, proximity to horizontal 

and vertical curves, number of approach lanes, signal timing, proximity to railroad 

crossing, traffic control devices, presence of street lighting, presence of commercial 

development)

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 10 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Identify

Focus Crash Types

and Risk Factors
Task 1: Select Focus Crash Types 

Task 1 in the step to identify focus crash types and risk factors involves conducting a 

systemwide analysis of crash types to select those representing the greatest potential 

to reduce fatalities and severe injuries. This effort typically results in identifying the crash 

types that represent the greatest number of severe crashes across the system being 

analyzed.

A good starting point for identifying 

focus crash types is a state or regional 

SHSP, which documents emphasis areas 

(i.e., focus crash types) for the state or 

region’s safety program. These emphasis 

areas were likely identified through a 

data-driven process, which is a primary 

principle of the systemic safety planning 

process. State agencies with completed 

Roadway Departure and Intersection 

Safety Implementation Plans can identify 

these as focus crash types for their 

systemic safety programs. As such, the 

analysis summaries contained in the 

plans are useful for the subsequent 

tasks that identify focus facilities and risk 

factors. Agencies can also refer to safety 

plans in which emphasis areas specific 

to their jurisdiction have been identified 

through a similar data-driven approach. 

If the state or regional SHSP does not 

cover the roadway type or region of 

interest, then referencing the emphasis 

areas identified in the American 

Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials (AASHTO) SHSP is 

useful to determine what types of crashes 

require further investigation. Depending 

upon their needs, an agency can 

add additional emphasis areas to the list of 22 emphasis areas in the AASHTO SHSP 

(AASHTO, 2005). Some common additions include winter weather crashes, animal 

crashes, and driveway/access crashes. If a state SHSP added emphasis areas to 

AASHTO’s list, then, at a minimum, those same emphasis areas should be included in 

this task. In addition to a systemwide assignment of crashes into the emphasis areas, 

The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 

developed a Roadway Departure 

Safety Implementation Plan in 2010 

to detail the key steps and actions 

necessary to implement the broad 

initiatives outlined in the roadway 

departure emphasis area of the 

state’s SHSP. The agency chose their 

focus facility and crash type for the 

pilot effort based on this plan. The 

data analysis had already been 

performed as part of the planning 

efforts for the SHSP and Roadway 

Departure Safety Implementation 

Plan, so the agency was able to 

begin the systemic analysis process 

at Task 3 of Step 1.

agencies can consider using older traffic volumes. To compensate for greater 

change, agencies can estimate current traffic volumes by applying a growth factor 

appropriate for the region or jurisdiction.

The systemic safety planning process focuses on severe crashes (defined as fatal plus 

serious injury crashes) to be consistent with national safety programs. Furthermore, 

focusing on severe crashes reduces the scale of the effort and resources required to 

gather supplemental data if needed.

The data-gathering effort is an iterative process; as such, all data do not need to 

be collected at the beginning of the process. For example, the focus facility types 

selected will determine the necessary roadway and volume data to be collected to 

identify potential risk factors.

Process

The first step of the systemic safety planning process—identifying and understanding 

the risk factors commonly associated with the focus crash types—includes a series of 

analyses involving three tasks (Figure 4). The first task refines the problem identification 

from all crashes to a few focus crash types for an entire system or subregion. Further 

investigation through additional analyses attains a more comprehensive understanding of the facility type and risk factors (i.e., roadway characteristics) commonly 

linked with the severe focus crash types.

FIGURE 4. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks 

to Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 11 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Select

Focus Crash Types
subregional and jurisdictional analyses are an important consideration. The systemwide analysis can mask important localized issues—for example, differences between 

rural and urban locations or between state and local highway systems. Following are 

some typical sublevel summaries for severe crashes by emphasis area:

z State-maintained highways compared with local agency roads

z Jurisdictional subdivisions (e.g., county, city)

z Rural areas or districts compared to urban/suburban areas or districts

z Areas with unique geography, such as mountainous areas

z Areas with strong seasonal travel 

patterns, such as tourist destinations

Since the systemwide analysis identifies 

crash types for an aggregate crash 

data set, the results are not as sensitive 

to specific locations as are the results 

of a subregion analysis in which the 

crash data set is more focused on a 

specific geographical area. Comparing 

the results of the systemwide analysis 

to subregion analyses highlights those 

crash types and contributing factors that 

may be substantial only in a localized 

area. For example, intersection crashes could be the top crash type in all districts 

within the state, while pedestrian and bicycle crashes represent a sizable portion of 

severe crashes only in the urbanized district. In this case, the safety program manager 

will not identify pedestrian and bicycle crashes as a top emphasis for the state; 

however, the crash data justifies encouraging the urban district manager to develop 

a pedestrian and bicycle safety program.

Example 1 illustrates the data-driven selection of focus crash types by the New York 

State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT). Using crash data from the state’s Safety 

Information Management System (SIMS) database, NYSDOT identified focus crash 

types by disaggregating the crash data by emphasis area and facility type. This 

example highlights how roadway systems in different jurisdictions or subregions require 

different priorities.

Thurston County disaggregated data 

according to attributes recorded on 

crash reports (e.g., crash type, road 

geometry, lighting, and contributing 

circumstances), to identify their 

focus crash type.

AASHTO’s 22 Emphasis Areas

Part 4: Highways

z Reducing vehicle-train crashes

z Keeping vehicles on the roadway

z Minimizing the consequences of 

leaving the road

z Improving the design and operation of 

highway intersections

z Reducing head-on and across-median 

crashes

z Designing safer work zones

Part 5: Emergency Medical 

Services

z Enhancing emergency medical 

capabilities to increase survivability

Part 6: Management

z Improving information and decision 

support systems

z Creating more effective processes and 

safety management systems

Part 1: Drivers

z Instituting graduated licensing for 

young drivers

z Ensuring drivers are fully licensed and 

competent

z Sustaining proficiency in older drivers

z Curbing aggressive driving

z Reducing impaired driving

z Keeping drivers alert

z Increasing driver safety awareness

Part 2: Special Users

z Making walking and street crossing 

safer

z Ensuring safer bicycle travel

Part 3: Vehicles

z Improving motorcycle safety and 

increasing motorcycle awareness

z Making truck travel safer

z Increasing safety enhancements in 

vehicles

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 12 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Select

Focus Crash Types
Fatal and Severe Injury Crashes from Safety Information Management System (2007-2011)

Percent by Jurisdiction

Emphasis Area

Statewide 

Total

114,592 mi

Statewide

Percentage

State (01)

15,486 miles

County (02)

19,938 miles

City, Township, Village

(03, 04, 12, 13)

76,735 miles

Parkway (05)

511 miles

Interstate 

(06, 07, 11)

575 miles

Other

1,347 miles

Total Fatal/Serious Injury 63,443 31% 19,819 10% 6,572 45% 28,597 1% 407 2% 1,540 10% 6.508

Young drivers (under 21) 9,686 15% 17% 3,394 22% 1,441 13% 3,747 12% 48 13% 201 13% 855

Older drivers (over 64) 8,805 14% 17% 3,405 15% 978 11% 3,270 8% 34 10% 149 15% 969

Aggressive driving and 

speeding-related

15,378 24% 30% 5,905 33% 2,152 17% 4,979 45% 182 56% 866 20% 1,294

Drug and alcoholrelated6,175 10% 11% 2,227 16% 1,039 9% 2,581 9% 35 10% 147 9% 599

Inattentive, distracted, 

asleep drivers

13,258 21% 23% 4,631 20% 1,291 20% 5,598 15% 63 20% 302 21% 1,373

Pedestrian crashes 11,786 19% 9% 1,860 6% 421 28% 8,122 5% 19 4% 54 20% 1,310

Bicycle crashes 3,390 5% 3% 518 3% 187 8% 2,414 0% 2 0% 1 4% 268

Motorcycle crashes 852 1% 2% 360 2% 141 1% 283 1% 4 1% 20 1% 44

Heavy vehicle crashes 3,123 5% 6% 1,266 4% 234 4% 1,051 1% 6 19% 288 4% 278

Train-vehicle crashes 17 0% 0% 0 0% 6 0% 7 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4

Road departure crashes 16,668 26% 30% 5,985 44% 2,892 18% 5,128 44% 179 47% 722 27% 1,762

Intersection crashes 25,791 41% 25% 5,033 30% 1,957 64% 18,270 16% 65 4% 64 6% 402

Head-on and sideswipe 

crashes

3,071 5% 7% 1,439 7% 490 3% 887 2% 7 2% 37 3% 211

Workzone crashes 214 0% 1% 104 0% 16 0% 32 0% 1 2% 37 0% 24

NYSDOT identified focus crash types by disaggregating the crash data by emphasis 

area and facility type. The emphasis areas are from the 2010 New York State 

Strategic Highway Safety Plan. As the bold text highlights, intersection crashes are 

the most frequent severe crash type statewide (41 percent), followed by roadway 

departure crashes (26 percent). Since roadway departure crashes are the 

most predominant crash type on the state-owned system (30 percent), NYSDOT 

chose to focus their systemic planning efforts on this severe crash type. The data 

disaggregation also shows that the most predominant crash type on the county 

roadway system is road departure and is intersection-related for the city street 

systems.

EXAMPLE 1. New York State Department of Transportation Data Analysis to Select Focus Crash Type

Source: New York State Department of Transportation Office of Traffic Safety and Mobility

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 13 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Select

Focus Crash Types
How many crash types should I select?

How you disaggregate crash data depends on the data 

type, system capabilities, and agency past practices. 

Disaggregating crash data is about identifying 

statewide and regional trends regarding a focus for 

subsequent analytical efforts. Screening those trends to 

a manageable list of target crash types is very important 

because if the list is too long, then the associated level of 

effort could be a burden. If the systemic safety program 

is new, you might consider limiting your analysis to one 

or two crash types, which limits the scope while the 

methodology is developed and refined.

Should crashes be assigned to a single 

category or is double counting acceptable? 

When completing the analysis, a single crash could 

involve more than one emphasis area. For example, a 

fatal intersection crash involving a drinking teen-driver 

covers three AASHTO emphasis areas. One approach is to 

identify the leading contributing factor, thereby assigning 

each crash to only one emphasis area. Another approach 

is to include the crash in each related emphasis area to 

determine the total number of crashes in each category. 

Regardless of the decision made, the process needs 

to be documented so that consistency is maintained 

across regional analyses and jurisdictions, and when the 

analysis is updated.

What criteria do I use to identify crashes 

in each emphasis area? 

Crash record systems vary greatly by jurisdiction, so there 

are no guidelines or criteria that can be used to identify 

crashes in each emphasis area. Instead, the process 

to analyze crash data when developing the state SHSP 

might provide an answer or general guidance for local 

agency crash record systems. Also, FHWA and National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) provide 

guidance on how Fatality Analysis Reporting System 

(FARS) data can be used to identify various crash types, 

such as road departure or speeding-related crashes 

(NHTSA). These resources might provide insights on 

how local crash record systems can be used to identify 

crashes within each emphasis area.

As a local jurisdiction, can I select 

focus crash types different from statewide 

focus areas?

A Department of Transportation (DOT) district, county, 

or city should consider crash types that represent 

the greatest potential for crash reduction in their 

jurisdiction. For example, an urban DOT district might 

select pedestrian crashes for a district program because 

they represent a sizeable problem locally, even though 

pedestrian safety may not be a priority focus area 

statewide. Focus crash types for local jurisdictions should 

ideally be selected in consultation with the state DOT, 

particularly if the state agency establishes priorities for 

allocating funding.

Should the focus be on infrastructure-related 

crash types only or also include other 

factors, such as driver behavior? 

Highway agencies should not be reluctant to select crash 

types that are related to driver behavior, such as unbelted 

vehicle occupants, speeding, or alcohol-related. Selecting 

these crash types as the focus of systemic safety 

planning efforts creates opportunities for coordinating 

with enforcement and driver education programs.

Helpful Hints and Other Considerations

Depending on the focus crash type, further data disaggregation may be necessary to more 

specifically define a systemic safety problem. For example, Thurston County began their systemic 

planning effort with a focus on lane departure crashes that had been formulated from previous 

safety-related studies. Example 2 illustrates the disaggregation of the County’s lane departure 

crash data into various data elements available from the crash reports.

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 14 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Select

Focus Crash Types
Fatal and Serious Crashes

2006 - 2010 Collision History

Thurston County 

Percentage

All Counties 

Percentage

Statewide 

Percentage

Overall Numbers Total number of collisions 3 4 2

By Collision Type Hit fixed object 48 41 27

Overturn 10 14 11

Angle (left turn) 9 13 16

Head on 7 5 5

By Light Condition Daylight 52 54 58

Dark – no street lights 33 29 16

By Junction Relationship Intersection-related 19 22 33

Driveway-related 5 6 7

Non-Intersection 77 72 60

Hit Fixed Object Crashes Only − 

By Fixed Object Hit

Tree/stump (stationary) 14 10 5

Roadway ditch 7 6 3

Utility pole 7 5 3

By Roadway Curvature Straight and level 42 42 54

Horizontal curve (all) 45 39 26

By Speed Limit 

(Number of Drivers)

35 mph 28 48 35

50 mph 69 33 16

By Contributing Circumstance 

(Number of Drivers)

Exceeding safe/stated speed 48 41 31

Under influence of alcohol/drugs 42 31 25

Over centerline 16 12 10

Inattention/distraction 11 13 13

By Driver Age Group Ages 16-20 26 26 20

Ages 41-50 28 23 26

By Seat Belt/Car Seat Use 

(Number of Occupants)

No restraint 33 35 25

Between 2006 and 2010, 177 fatal 

and serious injury crashes occurred 

in Thurston County, Washington. A 

spreadsheet program was used to 

disaggregate the lane departure 

crash data into various data 

elements available from crash 

reports. This dataset shows that 

the horizontal curve crashes are 

overrepresented in the County. Also, 

the proportion of roadway departure 

crashes in horizontal curves is greater 

in Thurston County than for either the 

combined County roadway system 

in Washington or the statewide 

roadway system. As a result, Thurston 

County selected lane departure 

crashes on horizontal curves as their 

focus crash type.

EXAMPLE 2. Thurston County Public Works Data Analysis to Select Focus Facilities

Source: Thurston County, Washington, Department of Public Works

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 15 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Select

Focus Crash Types
Task 2: Select Focus Facilities

After selecting the focus crash types, Task 2 answers the question Where are the 

crashes occurring? A “crash tree” diagram is the recommended approach to answer 

this question. The crash tree can have a number of different formats, depending on 

agency capabilities and data availability. One such example is to begin the crash tree 

with the total number of severe crashes at the highest level. Each subsequent level 

separates the severe crashes by facility type. 

At a minimum, the crash tree analysis should include separation by urban and rural, 

ownership (state and local), segment and intersection, segment type, and intersection 

control type. This minimum level of detail allows for the refinement of facility types, 

which is useful to focus the identification of risk factors (i.e., characteristics associated 

with the locations where the focus crash types are occurring) and select relevant 

countermeasures. 

Depending on the data set and the scope of the analysis, examples of potential 

combinations include the following:

z Segment versus intersection

z Segment type, including freeway, multilane, two-lane, and one-way 

(typical segment divisions)

z Intersection control type, including signalized, unsignalized, 

and uncontrolled (typical intersection divisions)

z On tangent versus on curve

z High-speed versus low-speed

z Presence of street lighting

z District or region

Examining the crash tree leads to the 

identification and selection of the facility 

types where the focus crash types 

most frequently occur. States with a 

Roadway Departure or Intersection Safety 

Implementation Plan may already have 

crash trees and could use these plans 

to identify focus facility types for either 

their roadway departure or intersection 

crashes. Example 3 shows a crash tree 

diagram for the New York state roadway 

system. 

How many levels will my crash tree include?

That will depend on the data and your starting point. For example, you might choose 

to begin the crash tree with only data for your jurisdiction or subregion instead of 

statewide, thereby eliminating one or more levels from the diagram.

Typically, most information used at this step will be reported by the officer on the 

crash report. Therefore, use whatever data are considered reliable and relevant for 

the focus crash type, but be careful not to create too many levels or the number of 

crashes will become small and the patterns difficult to identify.

Does the crash tree include all severe crashes or just severe 

crashes for one focus crash type? 

Either option is considered acceptable. If there are relatively few severe crashes, 

then it might be best to begin the crash tree with all crash types. However, if there 

are instead many severe crashes for a particular crash type, the crash tree might 

focus on just the one.

How many facility types should I select? 

Selecting fewer facility types is generally advised because it will streamline the 

process of identifying candidates for investment, reduce effort to conduct follow-up 

evaluations, and simplify the identification process if changes in crash numbers are 

a direct result of the projects implemented. However, the selection does not have to 

be a single type of facility for each focus crash type: an intersection systemic safety 

program might choose both urban signalized and rural thru-stop intersections. 

There is no set rule on exactly how many or what proportion of the severe crashes 

must occur at the facility type to be selected. An important consideration is 

selecting facilities that have crash histories that permit the identification of patterns 

and risk factors.

Helpful Hints and Other Considerations

Systemic approach: 

Deploy countermeasures at 

locations with greatest risk. 

Systematic approach:

Deploy countermeasures at 

all locations.

If data or resources are not available to complete the remaining tasks and steps of 

the four-step systemic safety planning process, then an agency can still move forward 

with selecting and implementing countermeasures to address the focus crash types 

on the focus facility type. After identifying the focus crash type and facility type, a 

systematic deployment (deploy everywhere), instead of systemic (deploy at locations 

with greatest risk), of cost-effective countermeasures is a possibility. While a systematic 

deployment requires no further analysis to prioritize locations, the approach requires 

more funding since all locations are improved.

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 16 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Select

Focus Facilities
After selecting lane departure as 

their focus crash type based on 

an analysis of crash data for the 

years 2007 through 2011, NYSDOT 

created a crash tree diagram for 

the state roadway system to identify 

the focus facility type for their 

systemic planning effort. The first 

level separates the severe roadway 

departure crashes into rural, urban, 

and New York City areas. Separating 

the data into three more levels 

(divided versus undivided, number 

of lanes, and speed limit) identifies 

the appropriate focus facility as 

those that are rural, undivided, and 

two lanes with a posted speed limit 

of 55 miles per hour (represented 

by the highlighted boxes in the 

diagram).

EXAMPLE 3. New York State Department of Transportation Crash Tree Diagram to Select Focus Facility

Source: New York State Department of Transportation Office of Traffic Safety and Mobility

State System

6,030 crashes

Divided

798

4 Lanes

170

5-6 Lanes

7

3 Lanes

28

40-50 mph

363

55+ mph

336

30-35 mph

195

< = 25 mph

2

Unknown

1

Rural

2,512 crashes

Divided

375

3 Lanes

35

4 Lanes

39

1 Lane

1

40-50 mph

281

55+ mph

1,637

30-35 mph

163

< = 25 mph

7

Unknown

2

NYC

1,618 crashes

Divided

1,159

3 Lanes

26

4 Lanes

64

1 Lane

1

40-50 mph

185

55+ mph

50

30-35 mph

120

< = 25 mph

2

5-6 Lanes

11

Undivided

2,165

2 Lanes

2,090

Undivided

1,102

2 Lanes

897

Urban

1,900 crashes

Undivided

459

2 Lanes

357

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 17 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Select

Focus Facilities
Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors

Task 3 further defines the facility types selected in the previous task by documenting 

the most common characteristics of the locations where crashes occurred. For 

example, if the previous tasks suggested a focus on road departure crashes on 

rural two-lane segments, then this task might indicate that these crashes were overrepresented on roads with poor edges, curvilinear alignment, and volume within 

a specific Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) range. Tasks 1 and 2 relied on data 

typically available in the crash records system. Task 3 is the first point where road 

and intersection inventories are likely needed to provide additional levels of detail to 

support the data analysis. 

The first decision to be made for this task is determining which characteristics will be 

evaluated—in other words, the potential risk factors for the systemic network screening. 

The initial characteristics are further evaluated before selecting the final characteristics 

that represent the risk factors. Selecting characteristics for evaluation might be based 

on several considerations, but it is important that they can indicate greater potential 

for severe focus crashes to occur. For example, the shoulder surface type might be a 

risk factor for roadway departure crashes in a curve but not for right angle crashes at 

intersections. If not certain whether a characteristic might be a suitable risk factor, then 

first reference safety research before evaluating that risk factor for a specific jurisdiction. Example 4 summarizes the research process the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 

(KYTC) conducted to identify potential risk factors.

Additionally, the availability of the data element in existing databases, the ability to 

quickly gather data if not already available, and the applicability to the focus crash 

type and facility type (e.g., intersection characteristics do not need to be investigated 

for a systemic lane departure program) influence the selection of characteristics to 

review as potential risk factors. For data elements in an existing database, concerns 

about quality or the amount of time since the last update also may influence the 

decision of whether to evaluate that data element as a potential risk factor. Data that 

do not reflect current conditions could lead to implementing a countermeasure that is 

no longer appropriate or the best choice for addressing the focus crash type.

The list of potential risk factors suggests characteristics to be examined for curves, 

segments, and intersections. These characteristics are based on a review of published 

research and professional experience, many of which are inputs used by the predictive methods in the AASHTO Highway Safety Manual (HSM), and the degree to which 

many of these attributes might affect crash frequency is available within the HSM 

(AASHTO, 2010). The FHWA’s Crash Modification Factor (CMF) Clearinghouse is another 

Potential Risk Factors

Roadway and Intersection Features

z Number of lanes

z Lane width

z Shoulder surface width and type

z Median width and type

z Horizontal curvature, superelevation, 

delineation, or advance warning 

devices

z Horizontal curve density

z Horizontal curve and tangent speed 

differential

z Presence of a visual trap at a curve 

or combinations of vertical grade and 

horizontal curvature

z Roadway gradient 

z Pavement condition and friction

z Roadside or edge hazard rating 

(potentially including sideslope 

design)

z Driveway presence, design, and density

z Presence of shoulder or centerline 

rumble strips

z Presence of lighting

z Presence of on-street parking

z Intersection skew angle

z Intersection traffic control device

z Number of signal heads vs. number of 

lanes

z Presence of backplates

z Presence of advanced warning signs

z Intersection located in or near 

horizontal curve

z Presence of left-turn or right-turn lanes

z Left-turn phasing

z Allowance of right-turn-on-red

z Overhead versus pedestal-mounted 

signal heads

z Pedestrian crosswalk presence, 

crossing distance, signal head type

Traffic Volume

z Average daily traffic volumes

z Average daily entering vehicles

z Proportion of commercial vehicles 

in traffic stream

Other Features

z Posted speed limit or operating speed

z Presence of nearby railroad crossing

z Presence of automated enforcement

z Adjacent land use type (e.g., schools, 

commercial, or alcohol-sales 

establishments)

z Location and presence of bus stops

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 18 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
Risk Factors

(Highway Safety Manual)

Compatible Highway Performance 

Monitoring System Attributes Data Available

HSM – SPF Base Condition 

for Rural 2-Lane Road

From HSM Chapter 6 (run-off-road)

Inadequate Lane Width* Item 34 – lane width Yes 12 feet

Slippery Pavement 16 attributes that are “pavement-related” 

Item 61 – climate zone

No NA

Inadequate median width Items 35, 36 – median type, median width Yes NA

Inadequate Maintenance Item 54 – year roadway was last improved No NA

Inadequate Roadway Shoulders* Items 37, 38, 39 – shoulder type and width Yes 6 feet, paved

Poor Delineation (pavement 

markings, RPMs, chevron signs, 

object markers, PMDs)

None No Centerline Rumble Strips – 

None

Poor Visibility None No Lighting – None

Excessive Speed* None No Automated Speed 

Enforcement – None

From HSM Chapter 6 (vehicle rollover)

Roadside Design 

(e.g. non-traversable side 

slopes, pavement edge dropoff)

None Yes Roadside Hazard Rating 

(RHR) = 3

Pavement Design 16 attributes that are “pavement-related” No NA

From HSM Chapter 6 (fixed object)

Obstruction In or Near Roadway None Yes Roadside Hazard Rating 

(RHR) = 3

Inadequate Lighting None No Lighting – None

Inadequate Roadway Geometry* Item 43 – curves 

Item 45 – grades 

Item 46 – percent passing sight distance

Yes

(Curves)

Horizontal curvature – None 

Vertical curvature – None

Passing Lanes – None

From HSM Chapter 13

Roadway Signs (a CMF) None Yes

The four risk factors selected by KYTC for the systemic risk assessment are: Horizontal curve density, lane width, shoulder type, 

and speed limit. These are denoted by an asterisk (*) in the table. 

The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 

(KYTC) consulted a variety of 

references to assist with identifying 

potential risk factors. A list of potential 

risk factors for the focus crash 

type (lane departure crashes on 

2-lane rural roads) was generated 

based on risk factors presented in 

Chapters 6 and 13 of the Highway 

Safety Manual. The table shows the 

potential risk factors, of which four 

were selected for the systemic risk 

assessment. 

The Highway Pavement 

Management System (HPMS) was 

then reviewed to determine if their 

database contained an attribute 

related to each risk factor. The 

table summarizes those potential 

risk factors for which data were 

either available or collected for this 

systemic planning effort. 

Availability of data or the ability to 

collect data should be part of the 

decision process for selecting a 

risk factor so candidate locations 

can be identified based on their 

characteristics. KYTC also included 

the base conditions for the focus 

facility type from the Highway 

Safety Manual as another source of 

information to assist with evaluating 

and selecting risk factors.

EXAMPLE 4. Summation of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Research Process to Identify Potential Risk Factors

Source: Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 19 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Risk Factors with Potential Applicability for Run-Off-Road and/or On-Curve Crash Type

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
source for information on the relationship between location characteristics and their 

potential to contribute to a severe focus crash type (refer to the Appendix for more 

information about the CMF Clearinghouse). Table 1 shows examples of potential risk 

factors based on focus crash types.

After potential risk factors have been identified, they are evaluated to determine 

whether the characteristics exhibit a relationship to future crash potential. Only 

those that positively demonstrate a relationship should be selected as risk factors. 

Two approaches to evaluate these relationships are using descriptive statistics and 

reviewing characteristics using CMFs from published research.

Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are used to compare the proportion of 

locations where the location characteristics exist with the percentage of severe 

crashes. For example, consider a scenario where an analysis of an intersection 

database identifies only 10 percent of rural unsignalized intersections are skewed, yet 

more than 40 percent of the severe rural unsignalized crashes occurred at skewed 

intersections. This indicates skew is overrepresented at rural unsignalized locations 

experiencing a severe crash. By extension, skew would be a good choice for one risk 

factor when prioritizing locations. Another option is to compare the crash density of 

locations exhibiting the characteristic with locations without the characteristic. Where 

the crash density differs between locations with and without the characteristic, then 

that characteristic could be used to differentiate between locations for prioritization. 

Reviewing characteristics using CMFs from published research. The safety 

effectiveness of design features and traffic characteristics can be used instead 

of descriptive statistics to select risk factors. For example, intersection skew has 

been shown to increase crash frequency (CMF greater than 1.0) while intersection 

lighting has been proven to reduce crashes (CMF less than 1.0). By applying CMFs 

documented in safety research results, an agency could select intersection skew 

and the absence of intersection lighting as risk factors in lieu of local crash analysis. 

Furthermore, combining the findings and CMFs from research with the results of the 

local descriptive statistics might increase confidence in the final selection of risk 

factors. For example, if a county agency has a relatively small data set to evaluate 

risk factors for severe intersection crashes, then the descriptive statistics might not be 

conclusive for skew and lighting. However, CMFs for skew and lighting might reinforce 

or confirm the patterns seen in the local descriptive statistics, providing greater 

confidence that these characteristics are risk factors for a future severe crash.

Example 5 depicts the descriptive statistics application used by NYSDOT to identify 

curve radii as a risk factor. 

Example Focus Crash Type Potential Risk Factors

Rural Crashes

Road Departure •	Road edge condition

•	Access density

•	Curve density

•	Traffic volume

Road Departure in Horizontal 

Curve

•	Curve radius

•	Speed differential (from tangent approach)

•	Visual trap

•	Intersection in the curve

•	Traffic volume

Intersection •	Skewed approach

•	Proximity to horizontal and/or vertical curve

•	Presence of commercial development

•	Proximity to at-grade railroad crossing

•	Traffic volume

•	Distance from previous controlled 

intersection 

Urban Crashes

Pedestrian •	Intersection control type

•	Major road characteristics (e.g., number 

of lanes, divided or undivided)

•	Traffic volume

•	Traffic speed

•	Presence or proximity of pedestrian 

generator

•	Presence or proximity of transit stop

•	Presence of sidewalk

Intersection •	Left or right turn lanes

•	Left-turn signal phasing

•	Right-turn-on-red

•	Red-light enforcement

•	Intersection control

•	Number of lanes on major approach

•	Divided or undivided

•	Lighting

•	Traffic volume

•	Speed

TABLE 1. Potential Risk Factors for Example Focus Crash Types

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 20 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
NYSDOT chose curve radii as a 

potential risk factor because of 

the typical geometry of their focus 

facility — rural, undivided, two-lane 

roadways. When compared with 

all curves along the focus facility 

type, those segments with curve 

radii between 100 and 500 feet are 

overrepresented when compared 

with the proportion these curves 

represent of the focus facility 

segments. NYSDOT selected a curve 

radius less than 300 feet as a risk 

factor because the data show 

that 12 percent of severe crashes 

occurred in curves with radii less 

than 300 feet, while only 7 percent 

of all reviewed curves have radii less 

than 300 feet. 

EXAMPLE 5. New York State Department of Transportation Evaluation of Curve Radii as a Potential Risk Factor

Source: New York State Department of Transportation Office of Traffic Safety and Mobility

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 21 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
How can I test a characteristic even if it is 

not part of an existing data set or if my data 

set cannot be merged with the crash data?

You could either review published CMFs or consider 

sampling locations for evaluation. Instead of a 

systemwide comparison, sample locations that have 

severe crashes and compare them with sampled 

locations without severe crashes. Video logs, online aerial 

imagery, or windshield surveys can be used to costeffectively collect information on the characteristics. This 

also allows you to understand the magnitude of effort 

needed to collect the information for an entire system 

before choosing the characteristic as a risk factor. Does 

the crash tree include all severe crashes or just severe 

crashes for one focus crash type? 

Either option is considered acceptable. If there are 

relatively few severe crashes, then it might be best to 

begin the crash tree with all crash types. However, if there 

are instead many severe crashes for a particular crash 

type, the crash tree might focus on just the one.

Helpful Hints and Other Considerations

How many risk factors should I select? 

There is no rule on how many risk factors must be 

selected. At a minimum, you would need two to three 

risk factors to differentiate between sites. Of these, the 

presence of one or more fatal or serious injury crashes 

can be viewed as a risk factor. Selecting more—up 

to seven to ten—requires more time to perform the 

screening but also helps to determine the likelihood of 

future crashes.

Should potential risk factors be combined 

during the evaluation process? 

There might be occasions in which individual risk 

factors do not appear to be overrepresented in the 

crash data set. In these cases, you can perform the 

descriptive statistics analysis for combinations of risk 

factors to determine whether the related crashes are 

overrepresented. For example, one agency’s crash data 

indicated that neither shoulder width nor shoulder 

surface type were risk factors for road departure 

crashes in horizontal curves. Engineering judgment 

suggested further analysis was required. Combining 

the data associated with these two risk factors revealed 

that severe crashes were found to be overrepresented 

in curves that had either narrow gravel shoulders or 

wide paved shoulders (which were also high volume 

corridors).

Can you still identify risk factors if you do 

not have local Average Annual Daily Traffic 

(AADT) information? 

Unless the range of volumes across the network being 

evaluated is very narrow, it is generally desirable to 

consider AADT as a risk factor. Since higher volume 

may not always relate to higher risk, agencies should 

conduct a descriptive statistics analysis to identify the 

range of volumes with the highest risk for potential 

crashes. If traffic volume data are not available to perform 

a descriptive statistics analysis for AADT, then agencies 

are strongly encouraged to do a qualitative assessment 

(e.g., categorizing AADT as high, medium, or low to 

evaluate if AADT is indeed an important risk factor).

As illustrated in Example 6, Thurston County also used descriptive statistics to 

compare the proportion of severe curve-related roadway departure crashes on 

various functional classifications of roadways to the proportion of those functional 

classifications represented on the entire county roadway system.

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 22 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
Thurston County compared the 

proportion of severe curve-related 

roadway departure crashes on 

various functional classifications of 

roadways to the proportion those 

functional classifications represent 

of the entire County roadway system. 

The data show that the focus crash 

type occurs on roadways with a 

Rural Major Collector functional 

classification in a greater proportion 

than this roadway type represents 

for the County system. Based on this 

descriptive statistics analysis, Thurston 

County chose Rural Major Collector 

functional classification as a risk 

factor.

EXAMPLE 6. Thurston County Public Works Evaluation of Roadway Functional Class as a Potential Risk Factor

Source: Thurston County, Washington, Department of Public Works

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 23 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
Outcome

Completing the first step of the systemic safety planning process provides an 

understanding of the focus crash types, focus facilities, and risk factors that represent 

the core of the developing systemic safety program. This information informs the risk 

assessment process in the next step of the systemic safety planning process. 

Q: Is there a minimum number of crashes on a system that is 

considered necessary to provide credible results?

A: That will depend on the data and your starting point. For example, you might 

choose to begin the crash tree with only data for your jurisdiction or subregion 

instead of statewide, thereby eliminating one or more levels from the diagram.

Typically, most information used at this step will be reported by the officer on 

the crash report. Therefore, use whatever data are considered reliable and 

relevant for the focus crash type, but be careful not to create too many levels or 

the number of crashes will become small and the patterns difficult to identify.

Q: What if my data system cannot provide the ideal level 

of data?

A: The process can be modified to work with the data that are available, but the 

analysis outcomes might not be as detailed as desired. If existing road and 

intersection data are limited, then video logs, aerial imagery, or field visits 

might supply useful information. However, these data collection efforts would 

require additional investment to synthesize the data into a usable format.

Q: What if my jurisdiction has developing areas for which land 

use patterns are changing and traffic volumes are growing?

A: The process ideally relies on the most recent crash, volume, and roadway 

data available. If these data do not reflect current conditions, then the process 

might still be applicable, depending upon the crash type and countermeasure 

selection. For example, if traffic volumes are increasing on a facility but 

access is not changing, then the risk rating and the countermeasure 

selection might still be appropriate. A possible exception is when the type 

of countermeasure assigned for very low-volume facilities is different than 

moderate- and high-volume facilities. In this case, you should consider the 

countermeasures identified for moderate- and high-volume areas based on the 

volume growth rate. On the other hand, if the growth in the area is resulting in 

modified land use patterns, access density, and roadway cross-section, then 

the countermeasures derived from the process might not be as useful for 

preventing crashes given the current volumes and roadway configurations. In 

these situations, you should critically review the analysis to determine whether 

the risk rating and selected countermeasure will apply to conditions in the 

near future.

Answering Some Common Concerns

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 24 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Identify and

Evaluate Risk Factors
Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations

Objective

The objective of the second step in the systemic safety planning process is to develop 

a prioritized list of potential locations on the roadway system (e.g., segments, curves, 

intersections) that could benefit from systemic safety improvement projects. The results 

of this step answers the question Are all elements of my system equally at risk for the 

focus crash types or are some more at risk than others?

The process to screen and prioritize candidate locations evaluates specific sites 

(i.e., individual segments, curves, and intersections) at the micro-level. The tasks in this 

step involve reviewing all elements from the focus facility types and assigning a level 

of risk to each element. Risk is inferred from the presence of crashes and risk factors, 

which are roadway and traffic features commonly associated with the locations where 

the focus crash types occur.

Data Needs

The screening and prioritization process requires two primary types of data. The first 

type is site-specific crash information, including severity, type, and any contributing 

factors relevant to the focus crash types and facility types. The second data type is the 

basic features of the road system, especially geometric or traffic elements selected as 

risk factors in the previous step of the systemic safety planning process. This information 

is available in from variety of sources, including electronic databases of roadway 

features and traffic characteristics, archives of as-built plans, aerial photography and 

street views, video logs, traffic control device inventories, and traffic flow maps.

Process

As Figure 5 illustrates, screening and prioritizing candidate locations involves three 

tasks: selecting the locations or elements of the roadway system to review, verifying 

selected crash risk factors, and prioritizing these elements based on the presence of 

the risk factors at each location. In this process, the more risk factors present infers 

a higher priority as a candidate for safety investment.

FIGURE 5. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks 

to Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations

Task 1: Identify Network Elements to Analyze 

Task 1 identifies the elements from the focus facility types, which represent the 

locations where the focus crash types tend to occur. For spot-based applications 

such as curves and intersections, all relevant locations are identified first. For segment 

applications, corridors are split into elements with consistent design (i.e., cross-section) 

to establish homogeneous segments. Additionally, the segment elements should have 

uniform traffic and design characteristics whenever possible, especially with respect to 

the selected risk factors. Homogeneous segments allow for consistent application of 

risk assessment and the same countermeasure to be selected for the entire element. 

For example, a rural two-lane corridor might be divided into segments extending 

from the limits of one small rural community to the limits of the next community. The 

Highway Safety Improvement Program Manual provides additional guidance for 

identifying network elements (FHWA, 2010). 

After identifying the network elements to analyze, assemble the information in a 

format useful for conducting the risk assessment and documenting the results. Refer 

to the Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study for an illustration of how to 

document identified network elements. 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 25 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Screen and Prioritize 

Candidate Locations/

Identify Network

Elements to Analyze
What other data should I collect when reviewing locations 

for risk factors?

When examining specific locations, in addition to collecting information about the 

risk factors, you should also collect information that might impact countermeasure 

selection. For example, if the focus crash type is lane departure on rural two-lane 

highways, data related to shoulder width, shoulder surface type, and lane width can 

help select countermeasures, such as shoulder rumble strips, edgeline rumble strips, 

or enhanced edgeline markings. 

You might not be able to gather every possible piece of data that impacts the project 

type selection, especially the first time going through a systemic analysis. However, 

the point is to think this through to prevent (or at least minimize) having to scan the 

part of the system selected for treatment a second time.

Helpful Hints and Other Considerations

Task 2: Conduct Risk Assessment

In Task 2, agencies assess the risk of the systems and specific locations selected 

for analysis. The purpose of this assessment is to identify and document roadway 

and traffic characteristics pertaining to the selected risk factors, as well as total 

crash history, if applicable, for each location. For purposes of the Systemic Tool, the 

term “risk assessment” means the effort to collect the roadway/traffic data and to 

characterize the potential for a severe focus crash to occur at a given location or 

along a given segment of roadway based on certain characteristics present at these 

network elements. 

The roadway and traffic characteristics could be available in a database format or 

can be collected as part of a field review of the road system. Roadway and traffic 

characteristics might also be collected in a virtual environment with field confirmation, 

as appropriate. Agencies with experience developing systemic approaches have 

found that roadway features can be documented in the office using video logs, aerial 

photography, and traffic volume data bases. Also, local agencies can provide some 

basic information about design features and traffic control devices. 

The process to document the presence of a risk factor at a given network element 

involves recording if the risk factor is present or not. Presence can be indicated with 

a “1” or an asterisk or some other identifier that can be tabulated. Summing the 

number of risk factors present provides the ability to compare and prioritize network 

elements. The MnDOT Case Study at the end of this section provides an example of 

the documentation produced for a risk assessment.

After identifying and documenting the network elements for the prioritization process, 

consider if the selected risk factors are feasible for a systemwide analysis. A risk factor 

is not useful to prioritize locations if it is present at every location on the focus facility. 

For example, speed limit may need to be removed as a risk factor if it is the same for 

all roadway segments identified for the screening process. Also, curve radii may not 

be an appropriate risk factor if every curve on the focus facility type has the same 

radius. After considering, remove or add risk factors if necessary. This revision may be 

necessary if risk factors were selected using CMFs or a sample of locations on the 

focus facility. The MnDOT Case Study contains an example of the determination of risk 

factor feasibility.

Task 3: Prioritize Focus Facility Elements 

Task 3 generates the prioritized lists of segments, horizontal curves, and intersections 

based on the presence of the selected risk factors—the more risk factors present, 

the greater the potential for the focus crash type and the higher the priority as a 

candidate for safety investment. Systemic analysis approaches might weigh risk 

factors equally, which simply means the more risk factors present, the higher the 

location’s priority. However, risk factors also can be given relative weights. In this case, 

particular risk factors—if found to have a stronger association with locations where 

severe focus crashes occurred—can be given larger weights. The values for relative 

weights may be high/medium/low or based on integers that infer a higher level of 

confidence in the weights. Example 7 illustrates how Thurston County weighted their 

selected risk factors based on their level of confidence in the data representing that 

risk factor. 

Agencies can adjust the thresholds (the number of risk factors present or a weighted 

value) used to identify high-priority candidates based on the level of funding 

anticipated for implementation. To set the threshold, agencies should identify more 

candidate locations than can be implemented in a given year. There are two reasons 

for this. First, the effort creates a backlog or shelf life for the analysis so that it does 

not have to be completed annually. Second, locations might drop off the list as a 

result of field conditions or where additional time or funding is needed to implement 

the selected countermeasure. Having identified more candidates than can be 

implemented in one year provides flexibility to ensure all available funding can be 

allocated to priority projects. The MnDOT Case Study contains an example illustration 

of how risk assessment results are useful to establish a threshold for candidate 

locations.

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 26 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Conduct

Risk Assessment/

Prioritize Focus

Facility Elements
ID Risk Factor 1 Point Range 1⁄2 Point Range

01 Federal/Functional Classification Major Rural Collector Urban Minor Arterial 

02 Intersection Yes —

03 Vertical Curves — Yes

04 Visual Trap — Yes

05 Edge Risk Assessment Rating = 3 Yes —

06 Paved Shoulder Width > 4 feet —

07 Average Daily Traffic 3,000 -7,500 0 -1,500

08 Speed Differential (native shoulders) 0 to 5 mph

Width < 4 feet at 25 mph

09 Speed Differential (paved shoulders) 20 mph

10 Type of Advance Warning Sign W1-5

In a systemic review of road departure crashes on horizontal 

curves, Thurston County prioritized their selected risk factors by 

weighting them based on their level of confidence in the data 

representing that risk factor. Using the results of the descriptive 

statistics analysis performed on the potential risk factors, those 

factors present in at least 30 percent of the severe crashes 

and overrepresented by at least 10 percentage points (when 

comparing the proportion of all locations with the proportion 

of severe crash locations) were considered to have a high 

confidence and were assigned a weighted value of one point in 

the risk assessment process. Of the risk factors that were selected 

but did not meet these criteria, Thurston County had a lower 

confidence in them and each was assigned a relative weight of 

one-half point. The Risk Factor Weights table summarizes these 

criteria. This prioritization was used as a guideline, not a strict 

standard, for assigning weights to risk factors. The Risk Factor 

Prioritization Results table summarizes the results of the weighting 

process for the ten risk factors selected by Thurston County.

Category Higher Confidence Lower Confidence

Crash Over-representation > 10% ≤10%

Crash Total ≥ 30% < 30%

Weight 1 point 0.5 point

1 Served as a guide, not a standard.

Risk Factor Weights1

Risk Factor Prioritization Results

EXAMPLE 7. Thurston County Public Works Risk Factor Prioritization

Source: Thurston County, Washington, Department of Public Works

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 27 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Prioritize Focus

Facility Elements
The final result of Task 3 is a prioritized list of focus facility elements that represents the 

locations with the greatest potential for the focus crash type to occur. At a minimum, 

the list includes information about the element location and the risk assessment 

score. Example 8 shows the eight horizontal curves on the Thurston County Rural 

Major Collector system that have the highest risk scores and, therefore, represent the 

highest priority locations for systemic safety improvements. This list shows the value of 

systemic safety planning—more than half of these locations with risk factors present 

do not have a documented severe crash. However, the risk assessment indicates these 

locations have common characteristics with locations where severe crashes have 

occurred and, therefore, have the potential for a future severe crash.

Outcome

The outcome of this step is a risk assessment and ranking of the focus facility elements. 

The elements of the focus facilities carried forward to the next phase represent the 

locations with greatest potential for safety improvement. 

Q: What if I do not have enough data to either document 

the characteristics of locations with crashes or to conduct 

the risk assessment of focus facilities?

A: The key objective of this step is to determine whether one part of a system 

is more at risk than another, which might require only one or two risk factors 

which could be based on data readily available, such as number of lanes or 

roadway curvature.

Q: How do I know if the characteristics I select really 

represent an increased level of risk?

A: Three keys to improve the success of your program include (1) be evidence 

driven [descriptive statistics and CMFs] in your selection of risk factors and 

consistent in their application, (2) exercise your judgment and conduct 

annual follow-up evaluations to see how the process is working, and (3) make 

adjustments if and when necessary.

Q: How many locations should I select in my initial 

prioritized list?

A: You can determine exactly how many locations to select for your initial 

prioritized list using factors such as anticipated funding amount and 

implementation goals. If your initial threshold identifies too few locations, then 

add locations in their established priority order until the target funding level 

is reached.

Answering Some Common Concerns

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 28 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Prioritize Focus

Facility Elements
Curve ID Road Name Scoring

5-year 

Crash 

Rate

Fatal or 

Serious 

Crash

182 Hawks Prairie Road NE 6.5 1.2 Yes 

194 Boston Harbor Road NE 6.0 1.1 No 

143 Delphi Road NW 6.0 0.9 No 

203 Johnson Point Road NE 5.5 0.4 No 

202 South Bay Road NE 5.5 0.2 No 

136 Waddell Creek Road SW 5.5 10.3 Yes 

238 Morris Road SE 5.5 2.6 Yes 

58 Bald Hill Road SE 5.5 7.2 No 

These eight horizontal curves on the Thurston County Rural Major Collector system 

have the highest risk scores and, therefore, represent the highest priority locations 

for systemic safety improvements. This list shows the value of systemic safety 

planning — more than half of these locations with risk factors present do not have 

a documented severe crash. 

EXAMPLE 8. Thurston County Public Works Results of Segment Prioritization for Focus Facility Type Based on Risk Factor Scoring

Source: Thurston County, Washington, Department of Public Works

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 29 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Prioritize Focus

Facility Elements
FIGURE 6. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks 

to Select Countermeasures

Select Countermeasures

Objective

The objective of the third step in the systemic safety planning process is to assemble 

a small number of low-cost, highly effective countermeasures to be considered for 

project development at candidate locations. The countermeasures are selected 

based on research related to the systemwide data analysis results from the first step 

(Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors), and specific jurisdictional experience, 

policies, and practices regarding potential countermeasures.

Data Needs

The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 500 

series is a suggested source of information for assembling the initial list of safety 

countermeasures (TRB, Various). These 24 volumes provide an extensive list of 

countermeasures for each of AASHTO’s safety emphasis areas plus they provide insight 

about implementation costs. Recent countermeasure effectiveness information is 

available in the HSM and the CMF Clearinghouse. The National Highway Safety Traffic 

Administration’s (NHTSA’s) Countermeasures That Work report provides effectiveness 

information about behavioral countermeasures (NHTSA, 2013). These resources 

provide information about the expected effectiveness of the countermeasures, and 

documentation of implementation and maintenance costs. Other information needed 

to support countermeasure selection is gathered from the crash, roadway, and traffic 

data assembled in the previous two steps. 

The information documented for the countermeasures might indicate whether the 

countermeasure is proven or tried, the expected safety effectiveness of the countermeasure, estimated implementation and maintenance costs, and consistency with 

agency policies and practices. In addition to assisting with countermeasure selection, 

this information is useful to the safety planning process because it provides:

z Documentation of proven, effective, or tried countermeasures which support 

a level of confidence about forecasted crash reductions.

z Effectiveness measures which assist in computing an expected crash reduction 

associated with deployment across a system.

z Implementation costs which are critical in the safety investment decision-making 

process. 

z A final check of deployment feasibility in relation to agency policies and 

practices.

Process

Countermeasure selection involves assembling a comprehensive list of potential 

countermeasures and evaluating each countermeasure to determine a select few 

most appropriate for systemic deployment. Figure 6 shows the three primary tasks 

conducted to define the safety countermeasures for implementation at the candidate 

locations. 

Task 1: Assemble Comprehensive List 

of Countermeasures

Task 1 involves assembling a comprehensive list of the safety countermeasures 

associated with each focus crash type. The list is assembled after reviewing the latest 

research and other available information (e.g., agency experience or engineering 

judgment) to identify those countermeasures with the greatest potential to address 

the focus crash types. As previously mentioned, the NCHRP Report 500 series, HSM, and 

CMF Clearinghouse are suggested starting points for the research effort. A state SHSP 

or other local safety plans also might include countermeasures already defined for 

particular focus crash types. Other resources, such as FHWA’s illustrated guide sheets 

for 77 intersection countermeasures, may be used for developing the initial list of 

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 30 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Select

Countermeasures/

Assemble Comprehensive 

List of Countermeasures
countermeasures (FHWA, Office of Safety). An agency’s existing maintenance program 

could also be a source for identifying potential countermeasures. For example, a 

countermeasure could be to replace missing or damaged traffic signs with signs that 

meet current retroreflectivity standards. The MnDOT Case Study provides an illustration 

of the process to assemble a comprehensive list of countermeasures.

Task 2: Evaluate and Screen Countermeasures 

The second task in the countermeasure selection process is to evaluate and screen 

the initial list of countermeasures based on documented safety effectiveness 

at reducing the focus crashes, implementation and maintenance costs, and 

consistency with the agency’s policies, practices, and experiences. Implementing 

countermeasures that are proven to be effective at reducing crashes provides 

agencies the highest possible level of confidence that their investment will have a 

positive outcome—a reduction in the focus crashes. The HSM and the CMF Clearinghouse provide the most current information about countermeasure effectiveness. 

Evaluation results from previous countermeasure implementation efforts (discussed 

in Element 3 of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool) offer additional critical 

information for evaluating and selecting future countermeasures. The key is to follow 

the evidence and select the countermeasures with the greatest potential to address 

the focus crash type not just at a single location, but across the prioritized focus 

facility elements.

Should I seek input from others when screening countermeasures?

To generate awareness of the systemic safety planning process and support among 

safety partners, you may conduct safety workshops during this task. Agency staff 

representing Engineering, Enforcement, Emergency Medical Services, and Driver 

Education could participate in a day-long workshop focused on sharing information 

about the process to select target crash types, and then discussing and prioritizing 

safety countermeasures. Also, within the engineering group, experts beyond just traffic 

and safety (e.g., construction, maintenance, public affairs representatives) should be 

involved.

Is safety effectiveness the only issue to consider 

when evaluating countermeasures? 

An equally important consideration in the process of screening the countermeasures 

is the implementation and maintenance cost. The systemic approach is focused on 

mitigating types of crashes that are widely scattered across a roadway system. The key 

to addressing low crash densities is implementing low-cost countermeasures, so that 

resources are adequate to widely deploy them across a system. Furthermore, policies 

and practices might limit the ability to use some countermeasures such as automated 

enforcement. The practical ability to implement a countermeasure equally influences the 

screening process.

Helpful Hints and Other Considerations

Is there an optimum number of countermeasures for my agency’s 

short list? 

Not really—too few countermeasures can limit flexibility to address the various conditions 

and constraints that are typical across a roadway system. Too many countermeasures 

can make project development more challenging and follow-up evaluations more difficult 

(too few samples of any one countermeasure to provide statistical reliability).

Why would I want to remove countermeasures from the list?

In many cases, there are simply too many potential countermeasures to discuss in any 

meaningful way at a stakeholder meeting or workshop. There are going to be some 

countermeasures that are just not consistent with an agency’s practices and should be 

removed before investing time and energy to discuss further.

Are the CMFs developed for specific high-crash locations 

applicable to a systemic implementation?

While CMFs in the CMF Clearinghouse present the best information available to date, 

it is important to recognize that most CMFs were developed from before-after studies 

conducted when the countermeasure was implemented at a high-crash location. 

However, it is unknown whether the same results will be achieved when implementing 

these countermeasures on a systemic basis. Because systemic countermeasures are 

deployed at some locations with no crash history, it is possible that a systemic application 

of a countermeasure may not achieve as high of an average percentage reduction in 

crashes as a high-crash location. Therefore, you are encouraged to conduct follow-up 

evaluations as described in Element 3 to determine the true effect of implementing 

safety countermeasures.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 31 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Evaluate and Screen 

Countermeasures
The screening process should consider maintenance requirements for the countermeasures because a countermeasure cannot perpetually provide the potential for 

crash reduction if it is not maintained or replaced when necessary. Thus, agencies 

should consider their ability to perform and fund routine maintenance of countermeasures implemented through a systemic deployment program. A countermeasure 

is likely not going to be a viable improvement and should be removed during the 

screening process if it will not be maintained. The MnDOT Case Study provides an 

illustration of how to evaluate and screen countermeasures.

Agencies can also screen potential countermeasures by performing a benefit-cost 

analysis of various countermeasures applicable for a typical section that represents 

the focus facility type. A spreadsheet tool is useful to automate the benefit-cost ratio 

calculations. Example 9 illustrates the benefit-cost analysis used to identify countermeasures for roadway departure crashes on bridges in Salem County, New Jersey. 

When performed in this manner, a benefit-cost analysis can help to determine the 

most cost-effective way to spend the funding allocated to systemic improvements. 

Task 3: Select Countermeasures for Deployment

The result of the countermeasure screening process is the selection of one or more 

countermeasures for each focus crash type. This short list would include primarily 

low-cost countermeasures, along with a few higher-cost countermeasures. Agencies 

use this list of countermeasures to develop safety projects at specific locations 

across their roadway system. Although an agency might choose to deploy one 

particular countermeasure, there might also be locations where that countermeasure 

is not an ideal choice. As a result, having alternatives to choose from provides 

flexibility and acknowledges that all candidate locations in a system are not the 

same. Additionally, including alternative countermeasures offers an opportunity 

to incorporate a few higher-cost countermeasures proven to significantly reduce 

crashes. Agencies should use these higher-cost countermeasures in a limited number 

of circumstances and only in situations that might not be effectively addressed by 

the low-cost countermeasures in the short list. The high-priority locations identified in 

the second step (Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations) also might influence 

the final countermeasure selection, which is why it is important to identify a range of 

countermeasures appropriate for the range of high-priority sites selected for project 

development. The final selection represents the highest-priority countermeasures that 

agencies will maintain for safety investment, based on expected crash reductions and 

estimated implementation costs. The MnDOT Case Study provides an illustration of 

how to select countermeasures for deployment.

Outcomes 

An outcome of this step is documentation of the countermeasures, which will be used 

in future program evaluation. The primary outcome of this step is a short list composed 

mainly of effective, low-cost countermeasures and a few higher-cost countermeasures 

for each focus crash type. These countermeasures then become the focus of the 

safety project development efforts that are described in the next step of the systemic 

safety planning process. 

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 32 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Select

Countermeasures

for Deployment
Category

Benefit

(Net Present Value) Cost

Benefit/

Cost Ratio

Guiderail $1,685.55 $4,200 0.401

Rumble Strips $619.41 $126 4.915

Rumble Stripes $0.00 $268 0.0000

Pavement Markings $813.67 $284 2.865

Pavement Resurfacing $162.22 $3,675 0.044

High-Friction Surfacing $1,171.71 $1,386 1.278

Service Life: 3 years Year (Years in Service Life)/

Annual Average Daily Traffic

Step

2012 (0)/

1,400

2013 (1)/

1,428

2014 (2)/

1,457

2015 (3)/

1,486

Total Number

of Crashes 

Total

Benefit

Step 1 WITHOUT Countermeasure

Number of Crashes 

(Expected Before)

Total 0.0090 0.0092 0.0094 0.0097 0.0283

Fatal and Injury 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0031 0.0091

Property Damage Only 0.0061 0.0063 0.0064 0.0066 0.0092

Step 2 WITH Countermeasure

Number of Crashes 

(Expected After)

Total 0.0073 0.0075 0.0076 0.0224

Fatal and Injury 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0048

Property Damage Only 0.0063 0.0064 0.0066 0.0192

Step 3 Change in Number 

of Crashes (Expected)

Total 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020 0.0059

Fatal and Injury 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0043

Property Damage Only 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Step 4 Benefit and Maintenance 

Calculations

Change in Number

of Crashes (Fatal and 

Injury)

0.001391 0.0 0.0

Fatal and Injury Crash 

Cost

$158,200 $158,200 $158,200

Annual Maintenance 

Cost (Fatal and Injury)

$220 $220 $230

Change in Number

of Crashes (Property 

Damage Only)

0.0 0.0 0.0

Property Damage Only 

Crash Cost

$7,400 $7,400 $7,400

Annual Maintenance 

Cost (Property Damage 

Only)

$0 $0 $0

Annual Maintenance 

Cost (Total)

$220 $220 $230

Step 5 Present Value Calculation Present Value $212 $203 $204 $619

Cost/Benefit Ratio

The Rutgers Center for Advanced 

Infrastructure and Transportation 

(CAIT) Transportation Safety Resource 

Center performed a systemic 

safety analysis for Salem County, 

New Jersey, to develop a prioritized 

list of HSIP-eligible projects. CAIT 

conducted a cost-benefit analysis of 

potential countermeasures selected 

based on identified risk factors. 

CAIT used safety performance 

functions (from the HSM predictive 

method procedures) and crash 

modification factors (from the CMF 

Clearinghouse) to estimate the 

difference between the expected 

number of crashes with and without 

the countermeasure (the benefit of 

implementing the countermeasure). 

After calculating the net present 

value of the implementation and 

maintenance costs, the automated 

process estimated the benefit-cost 

ratio of each countermeasure. 

The resultant prioritization of the 

countermeasures was used to create 

safety projects for sites with particular 

combinations of lane width and 

traffic volume.

EXAMPLE 9. Rutgers Center for Advanced Infrastructure and Transportation Benefit Cost Analysis to Evaluate and Screen Countermeasures

Source: Rutgers CAIT Transportation Safety Resource Center

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 33 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Countermeasure 2: Rumble Strips

Select

Countermeasures

for Deployment
Prioritize Projects

Objective

The objective of the fourth and final step in the systemic safety planning process 

is to identify and develop a list of high-priority safety improvement projects for 

implementation. This process considers the prioritized at-risk locations identified 

in the second step (Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations) and applies the 

most appropriate countermeasures from the list developed in the third step (Select 

Countermeasures) to develop a list of high-priority safety improvement projects. 

For the purposes of the Systemic Tool, the term projects includes dedicated safety 

projects as well as safety improvements implemented as one component of 

a traditional construction or maintenance project (e.g., resurfacing) or as part of 

routine maintenance efforts.

Data Needs

The information needed to support the project prioritization process includes a 

basic understanding of an agency’s priorities, practices, and policies as they relate 

to project and program development. This understanding is especially important to 

ensure the countermeasures identified in this step are only included in projects for 

areas where they fit with local practices for installation and maintenance. In addition, 

defining specific safety projects requires current information about countermeasure 

implementation costs and estimated effectiveness. 

Process

Prioritizing projects involves developing a decision process so that selected 

countermeasures can be consistently assigned to projects for the prioritized focus 

facility elements identified in the second step. This fourth and final step results in a 

prioritized implementation order for safety projects. Figure 7 shows the three basic 

tasks conducted to prioritize systemic safety projects. 

Task 1: Create Decision Process for Countermeasure 

Selection 

Creating a decision process for each focus crash type provides a means to 

consistently assign countermeasures to focus facility locations. A decision process is 

simply a set of criteria that considers issues such as volume, environment, adjacent 

land use, or cross-section, and uses them to identify the appropriate countermeasure 

for high-priority locations. An important distinction of the systemic safety planning 

process is that the decision-making process does not just identify the most 

appropriate countermeasure for each location (like when addressing hot spots), 

it also considers multiple locations with similar crash and risk characteristics to select 

preferred one or more countermeasures suitable and affordable for widespread 

implementation. Alternative countermeasures, and the criteria for deploying each 

countermeasure, might consider typical variations in site conditions.

FIGURE 7. Systemic Safety Planning Process: Tasks to Prioritize Projects 

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 34 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Prioritize Projects/

Create Decision Process

for Countermeasure 

Selection
Shoulder rumble strips may be the preferred countermeasure for addressing rural 

road departure crashes that happen due to driver inattention. Factors that might 

influence the actual decision to implement shoulder rumble strips at any given 

location include the shoulder surface type and width, lane width, and the presence 

of adjacent residential development. These factors could point to selecting an 

alternative countermeasure, such as edge-line rumble strips (also known as 

rumble stripes), if there is no paved shoulder and no noise concerns. An enhanced 

edgeline using a wider edgeline or wet-reflective material might be considered in 

the case of either really low-volume, narrow lanes with no paved shoulder or due to 

noise concerns in areas with residential development.

Criteria should also consider when any higher-cost alternatives are selected. 

In this same scenario, a higher-cost alternative could be paving shoulders with 

adding rumble strips. Criteria might suggest this as the preferred project if the 

gravel shoulder is sufficiently wide and the countermeasure is appropriate for the 

site conditions and agency practices. Other criteria for choosing a higher-cost 

countermeasure could include high volumes, a relative high frequency of severe 

road departure crashes, or a curvilinear alignment where recovery area outside the 

edgeline is viewed as important.

A Quick Illustration: Addressing Road Departure Crashes 

on Rural Two-Lane Highways

For example, urban intersection and rural road departure systemic safety programs 

address uniquely different problems. Therefore, each program needs countermeasures 

specific to the problem and different decision processes for selecting the final 

countermeasure. Additionally, programs addressing similar issues on different facility 

types (e.g., road departure on rural divided expressways versus two-lane highways) 

might have some of the same countermeasures, but the criteria and thresholds for 

selecting the countermeasures might be completely different. An agency can develop 

a process recognizing that no single countermeasure is likely to be best for every 

location due to the variety of features and characteristics that are encountered along 

a roadway system. The MnDOT Case Study illustrates a decision tree created to select 

countermeasures.

Task 2: Develop Safety Projects 

The next task in the project prioritization process is to apply the decision process 

to identify one or more specific countermeasure for each candidate locations 

selected for safety investment. Safety projects are developed by providing a 

detailed site description (e.g., route number, mile point, intersecting roadway, and 

segment termini), identifying the specific countermeasure selected, estimating the 

implementation cost, and summarizing how the site scored with the risk factors. After 

the countermeasures for safety investments are selected, agencies can then decide 

how to most efficiently bundle projects into a design package for contract letting. 

The MnDOT Case Study shows an example of the documentation produced during 

the process to develop a safety project. 

Task 3: Prioritize Safety Project Implementation 

Lastly, projects are prioritized for implementation by considering factors such as 

funding, other programmed projects, time to develop project plans, expected 

crash reduction, amount of public outreach needed, and environmental and rightof-way constraints. The prioritized list of locations infers a particular order based on 

the number of risk factors present at a given location. However, other factors often 

influence the ability to let a specific project. For example, a project might need to 

be included in an established capital improvement program or coordinated with 

other projects/programs. The next chapter presents a case study that illustrates how 

MnDOT applied the systemic safety planning process to develop prioritized projects 

for deployment on the county roadway network throughout the state. 

Outcome

The outcome for this step is development of a safety project for each identified at-risk 

candidate location along a roadway system. The roll-up of the prioritized projects 

produces the systemic safety program for the city, county, district, region, or state. This 

final step completes the systemic safety planning process, which is Element 1 of the 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool. 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 35 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Develop

Safety Projects/

Prioritize Safety Project 

Implementation
Q: I have selected a preferred countermeasure to mitigate the focus 

crash type and now I find that I cannot implement this countermeasure at a particular location (e.g., due to a lack of support 

by maintenance crews, complaints by residents, lack of support 

by local politicians, geometric constraints). What do I do?

A: You should have multiple countermeasures identified, which will provide flexibility 

to adapt to the many constraints and/or features that are typical across roadway 

systems. The decision process should account for such issues by providing 

alternative countermeasures. 

Q: If I have a list of suggested safety projects in my possession 

and I choose not to implement some, either immediately or ever, 

am I at risk from a tort liability perspective?

A: This question comes up regularly in conversations with local agencies. Agencies 

should have clear documentation of the process used to identify and prioritize 

safety investments. Tort law in a number of states provides agencies with 

discretionary immunity related to decisions about the allocation of resources. In 

addition, federal law (23 U.S.C. 409) and a U.S. Supreme Court case (Pierce County, 

Washington v. Guillen) protects agencies participating in statewide safety planning 

efforts that support the HSIP by shielding the outcomes of those efforts from 

plaintiff’s attorneys; the information generated (e.g., data, lists of at-risk facilities, 

lists of suggested projects) is not discoverable and cannot be used against an 

agency in tort cases. Agencies should seek legal counsel to determine the extent 

of protection provided by these Federal statutes.

Answering Some Common Concerns

Q: The process has identified more projects 

than there are funds available—is this a problem?

A: No, systemic safety planning is not expected to be fiscally constrained. It is 

desirable to identify more projects than could be implemented in a single year 

because funding agencies will have a multiyear backlog of high-priority projects 

(and will not need to perform annual analysis updates). A good target would be 

to assume a of 3- to 5-year shelf life for the results of the analytical process, after 

which the process would be updated.

Q: Can I use HSIP funds to supplement regular funding sources 

for reconstruction?

A: Federal regulation (23 CFR 924.5) states that improvements to safety features 

that are routinely provided as part of a broader federal-aid project should be 

funded from the same source as the broader project. States should address 

the full scope of their safety needs and opportunities on all roadway categories 

by using all available funding sources. For example, if an improvement project 

identified through the HSIP planning and programming process encompasses 

an area identified through the systemic planning process a location for safety 

improvements, it makes logical sense to combine the two efforts to reduce the 

cost of two projects (less administration, only one mobilization cost, etc.). 

Q: My high-priority segments, curves, and intersections are listed 

in a very specific rank order. Do the suggested safety projects 

need to be implemented in that exact order?

A: No, the prioritization process results in a rank ordering of the system based on 

a comparison to the adopted risk factors. However, a variety of factors (i.e. cost 

effectiveness) likely will enter into an agency’s decision as to how projects will fit 

into their capital improvement program. Agencies would benefit from a systemic 

prioritization process that considers these other factors to the extent feasible.

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 36 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Prioritize

Safety Project

Implementation
Case Study: Minnesota Department of 

Transportation’s Application of the Systemic 

Safety Planning Process 

The following case study illustrates how the Minnesota DOT applied the systemic safety 

planning process as part of a statewide effort to develop county road safety plans for 

each of their 87 counties. The focus crash types were severe lane departure crashes 

on rural segments and curves, severe right-angle crashes at rural thru-stop and urban 

signalized intersections, and severe pedestrian crashes in urban areas. The FHWA’s 

HSIP Noteworthy Practice Series provides information about this effort (FHWA, Office of 

Safety). The FHWA’s Developing Safety Plans: A Manual for Local Rural Road Owners

provides guidance for developing local road safety plans (FHWA, 2012). The case 

study provides illustrations of each successive task of the systemic safety planning 

process, using the same data set throughout. Each illustration describes the purpose, 

provides a description, and typically shows example data and analysis results.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 37 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Statewide

Emphasis Area

Statewide

Percentage State System County System

City, Township,

& Other System

Total Fatal and Serious Injury Crashes 8,300 2,998 3,379 1,923

Drivers Young drivers (under 21) 24% 21% 638 25% 839 28% 539

Unlicensed drivers 8% 8% 251 7% 237 9% 164

Older drivers (over 64) 14% 18% 527 13% 429 11% 206

Aggressive driving and 

speeding-related

20% 20% 606 20% 661 22% 432

Drug and alcohol-related 26% 23% 680 26% 949 26% 497

Inattentive, distracted, asleep 

drivers

20% 23% 693 19% 638 16% 300

Occupants Unbelted vehicle occupants 25% 26% 782 26% 872 21% 400

Special Users Pedestrian crashes 8% 6% 180 7% 222 15% 291

Bicycle crashes 4% 2% 54 3% 113 8% 157

Vehicles Motorcycle crashes 16% 14% 416 17% 591 15% 293

Heavy vehicle crashes 10% 15% 456 7% 249 6% 114

Highways Train-vehicle crashes 0% 0% 1 0% 7 1% 17

Road departure crashes 28% 27% 807 32% 1,090 22% 420

Intersection crashes 42% 40% 1,212 42% 1,422 45% 871

Head-on and Sideswipe 

(opposite) crashes

15% 17% 51 14% 489 14% 263

Work zone crashes 2% 2% 69 1% 38 1% 20

KEY: 

Top 5 Emphasis Areas by Jurisdiction

Note: Numbers are not additive, as one crash may involve a young driver at an intersection.

The numbers represent severe crashes (Fatal and A-type Injury crashes).

Source: Department of Public Safety Crash Data Records, 2006 to 2010

15%

Purpose

Identify the high-priority emphasis 

area — categories of severe crashes 

that represent the greatest opportunities for reduction.

Description

•	Demonstrates disaggregation 

of Minnesota’s statewide crash 

data into AASHTO’s designated 

emphasis areas.

•	In this case, the data suggests 

Minnesota’s high-priority emphasis 

areas (focus crash types) include:

•	 Drivers

— Seatbelt usage

— Impaired driving

— Young drivers

•	 Highways

— Intersections

— Road departure

•	The data also supports the 

importance of actively including 

the county highway system in 

statewide safety planning efforts.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 1: Select Focus Crash Types | Crash Data for All Public Roads

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 38 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Identify where crash types most 

frequently occur.

Description

•	This is a crash tree analysis 

focusing on the county highway 

system in Minnesota.

•	Analysis shows there are more 

severe crashes on the county 

system than the state system, 

and the majority of these crashes 

are rural, involve road departure, 

and occur on curves more than 

50 percent of the time.

•	Rural intersection crashes primarily 

occur at thru-stop controlled 

intersections. The most common 

crash type is a right-angle crash.

•	Urban intersection crashes 

primarily occur at signalized 

intersections. The most common 

crash type is a right-angle crash. 

•	This chart provided a reasonable 

preview of the likely outcome of the 

safety analysis — the safety focus 

of Minnesota’s County Roadway 

Safety Plans has been rural, road 

departure, curves, and angle 

crashes at intersections.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 2: Select Focus Facilities | Crash Tree for All Public Roads

Example

All (xx%)

Severe (xx%)

KEY:

Severe is fatal and serious 

injury crashes (K+A)

Source: MnDOT Crash 

Mapping Analysis Tool 

Crash Data, 2005-2009

Run Off Road

3,564 (16%)

153 (27%) 

Head On

1,567 (7%)

104 (19%)

Rear End

7,082 (33%)

86 (15%)

“Other”

1,981 (9%)

84 (15%)

Head On

1,052 (4%)

37 (9%)

Run Off Road

8,819 (66%)

743 (64%)

Head On

319 (3%)

23 (11%)

On Curve

3,686 (42%)

380 (51%)

Head On,

SS Opp

867 (6%)

151 (13%)

Thru-Stop

3,395 (51%)

296 (55%)

On Curve

292 (34%)

51 (34%)

Right Angle

1,187 (35%)

161 (54%) 

“Other”

608 (18%)

50 (17%)

Run Off Road

429 (13%)

27 (9%)

Head On

175 (5%)

15 (5%)

All-Way Stop

223 (3%)

18 (3%)

Signalized

293 (4%)

5 (1%)

Other/Unknown

2,690 (41%)

217 (40%)

Run Off Road

1,084 (40%)

100 (46%) 

“Other”

279 (10%)

22 (10%)

Head On

119 (4%)

22 (10%)

Right Angle

183 (7%)

20 (9%)

Right Angle 

7,761 (28%)

192 (47%) 

Rear End

9,460 (35%)

57 (14%)

Left Turn

3,935 (14%)

54 (13%)

Left Turn

1,074 (10%)

24 (11%)

Right Angle

4,715 (44%)

133 (63%)

“Other”

762 (7%)

31 (15%)

Other/Unknown

8,371 (17%)

188 (21%)

Thru-Stop

10,771 (22%)

261 (30%)

All-Way Stop

1,889 (4%)

31 (3%)

Signalized

27,321 (57%)

408 (46%)

Not Inters-Related

13,344 (62%)

1,153 (66%)

Inters-Related

6,604 (31%)

536 (30%)

Other/Unknown

1,587 (7%)

67 (4%)

Not Animal

21,539 (83%)

1,756 (96%)

Animal

4,546 (17%)

69 (4%)

Rural

26,091 (24%)

1,825 (54%)

Inters-Related

48,360 (59%)

888 (57%)

Not Inters-Related

21,758 (27%)

562 (36%)

Other/Unknown

1,587 (7%)

67 (4%)

Urban

81,680 (76%)

1,562 (46%)

State System

157,528 (41%)

2,985 (36%)

City, Twnshp, Other

116,239 (30%)

1,918 (23%)

Unmappable

1,250 (<1%)

17 (<1%)

5-Year Crashes

382,830

8,311

County System

107,813 (28%)

3,391 (41%)

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 39 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Purpose

Identify roadway characteristics to 

use as an initial set of potential risk 

factors to be further evaluated for 

use in systemic network screening.

Description

•	MnDOT reviewed published 

research to identify roadway 

features strongly related to crash 

experience. MnDOT compared 

these findings to available data 

and identified potential crash risk 

factors to apply to:

•	 Two-lane rural county 

highways

•	 Rural horizontal curves

•	 Rural thru-stop intersections

•	 Urban signalized intersections 

— focus on angle and 

pedestrian crashes

•	The potential risk factors for each 

facility type selected by MnDOT are 

shown in the bottom table.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors | Risk Factor Identification

Road Features

Shoulder Width/Type

Horizontal Curvature

Access Density

Roadside Rating

Intersection Skew

Traffic Volume

Average Daily Traffic 

(ADT)

Other Features

Presence of Commercial Development

Proximity to Rail Crossing

Distance from Previous Stop

Operating Speed

Facility Potential Risk Factors

Rural Segments ADT, curve density, access density, edge rating

Rural Curves ADT, radius, intersection, visual trap

Rural Intersections ADT, geometry, RR crossing, commercial development, 

distance from previous stop

Urban Signals Speed, geometry, commercial development

Data screened by:

— Agency Experience

— Availability

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 40 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Use descriptive statistics to evaluate 

Average Daily Traffic (ADT) as a 

potential risk factor.

Description

600 - 1,200 ADT was selected as a risk 

factor because severe crashes were 

overrepresented on roadways with 

ADTs in this range.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors | Evaluation of Segment Traffic Volume as a Potential Risk Factor

Road Departure Crashes

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 41 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Purpose

Evaluate access density as a 

potential risk factor.

Description

•	Illustrates macro analysis showing 

that as access density increases, 

crash rates increase.

•	Shows significant relationship 

between density and crash rate 

— risk factor selected for systemic 

network screening.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors | Evaluation of Access Density as a Potential Risk Factor

Crash Rate for Minnesota State Highways

Based on Access Density

Crash Rate for Rural Minnesota County Roadways 

Based on Access Density

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 42 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors | Evaluation of Edge Risk Assessment as a Potential Risk Factor

1 – Good Shoulder, Good Clear Zone 2 – Good Shoulder, No Clear Zone

2 – No Shoulder, Good Clear Zone 3 – No Shoulder, No Clear Zone

Edge Risk Assessment Categories

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 43 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Purpose

Use descriptive statistics to evaluate 

edge risk assessment as a potential 

risk factor.

Description

•	Severe road departure density is 

the number of crashes per mile per 

year, which illustrates the frequency 

of these crashes.

•	The crash rate is the number of 

crashes normalized by vehicle 

miles traveled, indicating the 

relative risk based on exposure.

•	Shows that a roadside condition 

of no usable shoulder and the 

presence of fixed objects (Risk 

Rating = 3) generates a higher 

severe road departure rate.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Identify Focus Crash Types and Risk Factors | Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Risk Factors | Evaluation of Edge Risk Assessment as a Potential Risk Factor

Edge Risk Assessment

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 44 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Corridor

Route

Type

Route 

Number Start End

Length 

(miles)

Average

Daily Traffic

144.01 CNTY 89 CSAH-30 CSAH-30 1.4 480

40.04 CSAH 40 New London Corp Limit CSAH-2 5.9 450

131.01 CNTY 89 CSAH-30 MNTH-23 0.7 145

9.02 CSAH 9 CR-90, Willmar Corp Limit CSAH-10 5.6 940

5.06 CSAH 5 150th Ave NW, CSAH-29 CSAH-1 10.1 628

31.02 CSAH 31 New London Corp Limit MNTH-23 1.6 920

8.01 CSAH 8 Renville County Line Lake Lillian Corp Limit 3.6 750

4.01 CSAH 4 CSAH-8 CSAH-20 6.7 320

2.05 CSAH 2 CSAH-10 MNTH-23 9.8 385

4.04 CSAH 4 CR-98 CSAH-40 2.4 290

38.01 CSAH 38 CSAH-40 CSAH-48 2.1 130

132.01 CNTY 89 CSAH-8 CSAH-8 2.2 190

42.01 CSAH 42 CSAH-7 County Line 0.5 120

9.03 CSAH 9 CSAH-10 CSAH-40, Redwood Street 4.9 1,800

25.01 CSAH 25 CSAH-5 USTH-71 3.2 1,315

1.03 CSAH 1 MNTH-23 Pennock Corp Limit 7.0 333

116.02 CNTY 89 CSAH-3 MNTH-40 7.0 98

2.04 CSAH 2 Atwater Corp Limit CSAH-10 6.7 1,018

28.02 CSAH 28 CSAH-2 County Line 2.0 315

KEY: CSAH = County State Aid Highway CNTY = County Road MNTH = Minnesota Trunk Highway

This table represents 19 of the 77 segments.

Purpose

Identify the network elements 

from the focus facility types which 

represent the locations where the 

focus crash types tend to occur. 

The elements are for use in network 

screening.

Description

•	For the application of the Systemic 

Safety Planning Process on 

corridors, the Minnesota process 

split corridors into segments 

with consistent design features 

(e.g., cross section or volume) to 

minimize the variation of risk factors 

within a corridor and so that the 

same countermeasure could be 

applied to the entire segment. 

•	The end points of the segments 

also considered practical issues 

about how projects could be 

deployed. Segments typically 

ended at the edge of cities since 

the preferred countermeasure, 

shoulder and edgeline rumble 

strips, could not be deployed 

within cities. 

•	The table on this page illustrates 

the results of segmentation of 

Minnesota 2-lane county roads.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations | Task 1: Identify Network Elements to Analyze

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 45 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Purpose

Evaluate the risk factors of the 

systems and locations selected for 

analysis using roadway and traffic 

characteristics in order to rank/

prioritize at-risk locations.

Description

•	Risk factors are not weighted. 

•	A star () indicates the 

corresponding risk factor is present.

•	More s identify locations as 

higher priority candidate for safety 

investment.

Rank Corridor ADT Range

Road 

Departure 

Density

Access

Density

Curve 

Critical Radius 

Density

Edge

Risk Totals

1 144.01      

2 40.04      

3 131.01     

4 9.02     

5 5.06     

6 31.02     

7 8.01    

8 4.01    

9 2.05    

10 4.04    

11 38.01    

12 132.01    

13 42.01    

14 9.03    

15 25.01    

74 1.03

75 116.02

76 2.04

77 28.02

This table represents 19 of the 77 segments.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations | Task 2: Conduct Risk Assessment 

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 46 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Assess selected risk factors to 

determine their feasibility for 

differentiating between elements 

(curves, segments, and intersections) 

on the focus facility type.

Description

•	The line representing the percent 

of focus facility locations with the 

risk factor present indicates that 

the risk factors generally appear 

in 20 to 30 percent of focus facility 

type segments. 

•	MnDOT concluded these 

percentages are high enough to 

distinguish between segments, 

but not so high that most or all 

segments had the risk factor 

present (making it difficult to 

distinguish between segments for 

prioritization purposes.) 

•	Additionally, the bars representing 

segments with the risk factors 

present show a higher severe 

lane departure crash density than 

segments without the risk factor.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations | Task 2: Conduct Risk Assessment | Determine Feasibility of Selected Risk Factors

Greater Minnesota Segment Risk Factors

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 47 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Purpose

Summarize the locations based on 

the number of risk factors present to 

establish a threshold for selecting 

candidate locations.

Description

The bars indicate the percent of the 

system that has the number of risk 

factors present (i.e., stars received). 

Additionally the chart shows that the 

severe crash density and severe lane 

departure crash density increases 

as more risk factors are present. 

MnDOT used this chart to determine 

that those locations with three or 

more stars present, approximately 

30 percent of the focus facility type, 

would be candidate locations for 

systemic safety projects.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Screen and Prioritize Candidate Locations | Task 3: Prioritize Focus Facility Elements | Threshold for Selecting Candidate Locations

Greater Minnesota Segment Star Summary

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 48 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Review NCHRP 500 Reports, Highway 

Safety Manual, CMF Clearinghouse, 

FHWA Office of Safety website, and 

state Strategic Highway Safety Plans 

to identify a comprehensive list of 

potential countermeasures for each 

focus crash type.

Description

•	The key is to review the latest 

research and other available 

information to identify those 

countermeasures with the greatest 

potential to address the focus 

crash types.

•	The countermeasures will be 

screened using:

•	 Crash data,

•	 Effectiveness,

•	 Cost, and

•	 Agency policies, procedures, 

and experience.

•	The end result will comprise a 

short list of countermeasures for 

each focus crash type to use in 

development projects.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Select Countermeasures

Seat Belts

4 Countermeasures

Engineering

Countermeasures

Enforcement

Countermeasures

Speeding

2 Countermeasures

Intersections

77 Countermeasures

Young Drivers

2 Countermeasures

Alcohol/Drugs

15 Countermeasures

EMS

Countermeasures

Education

Countermeasures

Countermeasures for Deployment

Road Departures

13 Countermeasures

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 49 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Objectives Countermeasures

Relative Cost

to Implement 

and Operate Effectiveness

Typical 

Timeframe for 

Implementation

15.1 A: 

Keep vehicles from 

encroaching on the 

roadside

15.1A1: Install shoulder rumble strips Low Tried Short

15.1 A2: Install edgelines “profile marking”, 

edgeline rumble strips or modified 

shoulder rumble strips on section 

with narrow or no paved shoulders

Low Experimental Short

15.1 A3: Install midlane rumble strips Low Experimental Short

15.1 A4: Provide enhanced shoulder or 

delineation and marking for sharp 

curves

Low Tried/Proven/

Experimental

Short

15.1 A5: Provide improved highway 

geometry for horizontal curves

High Proven Long

15.1 A6: Provide enhanced pavement 

markings

Low Tried Short

15.1 A7: Provide skid-resistance pavement 

surfaces

Moderate Proven Medium

15.1 A8: Apply shoulder treatments

— Eliminate shoulder drop-offs

— Shoulder edge

— Widen and/or pave shoulders

Low

Experimental

Experimental

Proven

Medium

15.1 B: 

Minimize the likelihood of 

crashing into an object or 

overturning if the vehicle 

travels off the shoulder

15.1 B1: Design safer slopes and ditches to 

prevent rollovers

Moderate Proven Medium

15.1 B2: Remove/relocate objects in 

hazardous locations

Moderate to 

High

Proven Medium

15.1 B3: Delineate trees or utility poles with 

retroreflective tape

Low Experimental Short

15.1 C: 

Reduce the severity of the 

crash

15.1 C1: Improve design of roadside 

hardware

Moderate to 

High

Tried Medium

15.1 C2: Improve design and application 

of barrier and attenuation systems

Moderate to 

High

Tried Medium

KEY:

Short: (<1 year)

Medium: (1-2 years)

Long: (>2 years)

Source: NCHRP 500 Volume 6 (2003)

Purpose

Assemble an initial comprehensive 

list of countermeasures associated 

with focus crash type.

Description

Initial list of countermeasures MnDOT 

identified to reduce road departure 

crashes using the NCHRP 500 

Volume 6 report.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Select Countermeasures | Task 1: Assemble Comprehensive List of Countermeasures | List of Potential Countermeasures

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 50 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Evaluate and screen the initial 

list of countermeasures based 

on documented effectiveness of 

reducing the focus crash types 

and consistency with the agency’s 

policies, practices, and experiences.

Description

MnDOT used the NCHRP 500 reports 

to determine an initial estimate of 

effectiveness with their classification 

of each countermeasure as Proven 

(effective), Tried, or Experimental 

to narrow down the initial list of 

countermeasures.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Select Countermeasures | Task 2: Evaluate/Screen Countermeasures | Countermeasure Effectiveness

Proven

Graduated drivers licensing

Safety belt enforcement campaigns

DWI checkpoints

Street lights at rural intersections

Access management

Roadside safety initiatives

Pave/widen shoulders 

Roundabouts

Exclusive left turn signal phasing

Shoulder rumble strips

Improved roadway alignment

Cable median barrier

Removing unwarranted traffic 

signals

Removing trees in hazardous 

locations

Pedestrian crosswalks, sidewalk, 

and refuge islands

Left turn lanes on urban arterials

Tried

Rumble strips (on the approach to 

intersections)

Neighborhood traffic control 

(traffic calming)

Overhead red/yellow flashers

Increased levels of intersection 

traffic control

Indirect left turn treatments

Restricting turning maneuvers

Pedestrian signals

Improve traffic control devices on 

minor intersection approaches

Experimental

Turn and bypass lanes at rural 

intersections

Dynamic warning devices at 

horizontal curves

Static/dynamic gap assistance 

devices

Delineating trees in hazardous 

locations

Marked pedestrian crosswalks at 

unsignalized intersections

Source: NCHRP 500 Reports

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 51 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Objectives Countermeasures

Relative Cost 

to Implement 

and Operate Effectiveness

Typical 

Timeframe for 

Implementation

15.1 A: 

Keep vehicles from 

encroaching on the 

roadside

15.1A1: Install shoulder rumble strips Low Proven* Short

15.1 A2: Install enhanced pavement 

markings, edgeline rumble strips or 

modified shoulder rumble strips on 

section with narrow or no paved 

shoulders

Low Experimental/

Tried

Short

15.1 A3: Install centerline rumble strips Low Proven* Short

15.1 A4: Provide enhanced shoulder or 

delineation and marking for sharp 

curves

Low Tried/Proven Short

15.1 A5: Provide improved highway 

geometry for horizontal curves

High Proven Long

15.1 A8: Apply shoulder treatments

— Eliminate shoulder drop-offs

— Shoulder edge

— Widen and/or pave shoulders

Moderate*

Experimental

Experimental

Proven

—

15.1 B: 

Minimize the likelihood of 

crashing into an object or 

overturning if the vehicle 

travels off the shoulder

15.1 B1: Design safer slopes and ditches to 

prevent rollovers

Moderate to 

High*

Proven Medium

15.1 B2: Remove/relocate objects in 

hazardous locations

Moderate to 

High*

Proven Medium

Short: (<1 year)

Medium: (1-2 years)

Long: (>2 years)

* Low: (<$10,000/mile)

* Moderate: ($10,000-$100,000/mile)

* High: (>$100,000/mile)

Source: NCHRP 500 Volume 6 (2003) information updated by CH2M HILL (*)

Purpose

Identify and select a few 

countermeasures for each focus 

crash type based on the evaluation 

of the countermeasures and 

consideration of agency priorities, 

practices, and policies.

Description

MnDOT paired down the list of 

countermeasures identified in Task 1 

to address road departure crashes 

based on the evaluation. These 

countermeasures were selected to 

develop safety projects.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Select Countermeasures | Task 3: Select Countermeasures for Deployment | Countermeasures Selected for Deployment

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 52 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Develop a decision process to 

facilitate consistency in the selection 

of countermeasures.

Description

•	Adapted from Minnesota County 

Road Safety Plan Project to 

represent a typical decision 

process for selecting roadway 

departure countermeasures on 

county roads.

•	Utilizes Average Daily Traffic (ADT), 

lane width, and shoulder surface 

type to determine project type for 

rural 2-lane segments.

Key Point

Provides county engineer with 

opportunity to identify treatment 

preferences while selecting projects 

that MnDOT is comfortable funding.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Prioritize Projects | Task 1: Create a Decision Process for Countermeasure Selection | Decision Tree

Rumble Strips Allowed?

(i.e., noise, sensitive area?)

Existing Shoulder 

Surface Type

County Treatment 

Preference

Project

• Edgeline 

rumble strip

≥ 12 feet

Project

Existing Lane Width

• 2-ft shoulder paving 

with safety edge

• Edgeline 

rumble strip

< 12 feet

Project

• Shoulder 

rumble strip

Paved Upaved

Project

• Edgeline 

rumble strip

≥ 12 feet

Project

Existing Lane Width

• 2-ft shoulder paving 

with safety edge

• Edgeline 

rumble strip

< 12 feet

Edgeline

Rumble Strip

Shoulder

Rumble Strip

Project

• 6-in latex edgeline 

> 200

Project

Existing Average 

Daily Traffic

• 6-in epoxy wet reflective 

in longitudinal groove

≤ 200

Yes No

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 53 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Purpose

Apply decision process to develop specific safety projects for each candidate site 

selected for safety investment.

Description

•	County Highway 26 Segment Project Form (left), provides information on: 

•	 Roadway Data — Average Daily Traffic (ADT), length, lane width, shoulder 

width/type

•	 Crash Data — total and road departure crashes, density, rate

•	 Deficiencies — risk ranking

•	 Countermeasures Considered

•	 Selected Countermeasure

•	 Project Cost

•	The table on this page provides regional summaries of the projects identified using 

the systemic process.

Region

2-ft Shoulder 

Pave, Rumble 

Strips, and 

Safety Edge

(miles)

Shoulder 

Rumble 

Strips

(miles)

Edgeline 

Rumble 

Strips

(miles)

6-inch 

Edgelines

(miles)

Ground 

in WetReflective 

Markings

(miles)

Total

Project 

Value

1 180 373 673 50 636 $16,106,107

2 151 147 560 210 180 $10,095,868

3 153 91 332 46 306 $10,196,428

4 106 139 758 200 85 $8,158,210

Total 591 749 2,323 505 1,207 $44,556,613

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Prioritize Projects | Task 2: Develop Safety Projects | Safety Projects Selected for Development

County Highway 26 from State Highway 23 to County Highway 15

Roadway Data

Type:

Number:

Start:

End:

City/Rural:

County:

District:

ADT:

Facility Type:

Lane Width:

Shoulder Width:

Shoulder Type:

Length (miles):

Rumble Installed:

County Highway

6

State Highway 23

State Highway 15

Rural

4

888

2-Lane

12

2

Gravel

8.0

None

5-Year Crash Data (2005-2009 MnCMAT Crash Data)

Type Road Dept K+A

Crashes 15 11 1

Density (per mile per year) 0.38 0.28 0.03

Rate (per million vehicle miles of travel) 1.52 1.19 0.11

Ranking Criteria

Value Critical Risk Ranking

ADT Range 634 600 to 1,200 

Road Departures Density 0.28 0.08 

Access Density 8.88 4.30 

Curve Critical Radius Density 0.75 0.59 

Edge Risk 2 2 or 3 



Short List of Countermeasures Considered

Type Cost Per Mile Mileage Cost

2-ft Shoulder Pave + RS + Safety Edge Proactive $40,000 0.0 $0

Rumble Strip Proactive $3,000 0.0 $0

Rumble StripE Proactive $3,500 6.0 $21,000

6-in Edgelines Proactive $650 0.0 $0

Ground in Wet-Reflective Markings Proactive $8,500 2.0 $17,000

Note: Noise sensitive area adjacent to Big Lake

Implementation Cost

Federal Funds $34,200

Local Match (10% of total project cost) $3,800

Total Project Cost $38,000

Rank:

Segment ID:

Date:

1

26.01

2/12/2011

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 54 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Case Study
Purpose

Identify the order in which projects 

will be implemented.

Description

Prioritizing the projects for 

implementation will start with the 

number of risk factors present at a 

given location. Several other factors 

may play a role in the selection 

process, such as funding availability, 

other programmed projects, time 

to develop project plans amount 

of public outreach needed, etc. For 

example, a lower priority project 

may be selected over a higher 

priority project if the location is in 

an established capital improvement 

program.

Minnesota Department of Transportation Case Study

Prioritize Projects | Task 3: Prioritize Safety Project Implementation | Project Prioritization Process

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 55 Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process

Case Study
Summary

Element 1 of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool presents a general process for 

conducting systemic safety planning efforts, which is intended to complement an 

agency’s site-specific analysis process—not replace it. This systemic safety planning 

process involves four steps:

1. Identifying the problem by looking at systemwide data; 

2. Screening and prioritizing candidate locations across the network; 

3. Selecting relevant mitigating countermeasures most appropriate for 

broad implementation across those locations; and 

4. Prioritizing projects for implementation. 

The systemic safety planning process is a data-driven process that identifies the types 

of crashes which represent the greatest opportunity for substantially reducing the 

number of severe crashes, the locations that have the greatest potential for severe 

crashes but do not have a high crash history, and a short list of highly effective 

countermeasures. The systemic safety planning process is flexible. Any agency can 

adapt the tool to fit their needs, and this flexibility allows agencies to develop a 

process that leads to implementation within the constraints of their data availability, 

program requirements, staff capabilities, and funding. While there can be variation in 

the detail and time invested or specific actions conducted for each task, the ultimate 

goal is to direct low-cost, effective countermeasures where the greatest opportunities 

exist to prevent severe crashes and improve safety.

Element 1: The Systemic Safety Planning Process 56 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Summary
Element 2:

A Framework for Balancing Systemic and

 Traditional Safety Investments

Introduction to Balancing Systemic 

and Traditional Safety Investments

Agencies interested in adding a systemic component to their highway safety program 

quickly realize their next decision involves determining how to distribute their safety 

investments among projects identified through the traditional site analysis approach 

and projects identified through the systemic approach. Element 2 of the Systemic 

Safety Project Selection Tool provides a framework determining an appropriate 

balance of safety investments between the site analysis and systemic approaches. The 

framework supports a program manager’s decisions about the general distribution of 

the safety investments given particular crash and roadway system characteristics. A 

framework is more appropriate than a prescriptive process because each agency has 

unique considerations.

Decision Support Framework

The decision support framework begins with a review of historical safety investments 

and crash history to gain an understanding of past agency decisions. Looking back 

is often instructive when considering a new path to move forward. The path forward is 

then based on a combination of understanding the effectiveness of historical safety 

investments, understanding how an agency’s goals, priorities, and crash and roadway 

characteristics lend themselves to a systemic approach, and assessing the potential 

benefit to be gained with systemic investment.

Element 2:

A Framework for Balancing Systemic and

 Traditional Safety Investments

Consideration of an agency’s goals, priorities, and crash and roadway characteristics 

provides a safety program manager with useful clues for making decisions about 

adding a systemic component to their safety program and allocating funding in 

support of identified projects. Following are some examples of these considerations:

z Adopting a goal to reduce severe crashes suggests a need to include a systemic 

component to safety management efforts because severe crashes tend to 

be scattered across a roadway system, making it difficult to isolate high-crash 

locations.

z Adopting cross-median head-on crashes as a priority suggests a need to include 

a systemic component because these types of crashes rarely occur at the same 

location, but supporting data may show that these crashes occur in similar locations (e.g., overrepresented in the vicinity of interchanges).

z Adopting deployment of center-line rumble strips as a priority safety countermeasure suggests the need to include a systemic component because it is rare 

for multiple severe head-on crashes to occur at the same location.

z Adopting a goal to address safety on the rural secondary system as a priority 

suggests the need to include a systemic component because, although these 

road systems often account for a high percentage of severe crashes, they 

typically have very low crash densities. 

Thus, the decision to invest funding in systemic improvements is influenced by program 

goals rather than justified solely through analysis of the benefits to be gained from 

implementation and maintenance costs expended. 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 59 Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments

Balancing Systemic 

Investments/Decision 

and Traditional Safety 

Support Framework
Review of Past Funding Practices

Reviewing past funding practices helps answer the following questions about an 

agency’s historical investment in safety improvement projects: 

z Which countermeasures were implemented?

z Where were countermeasures implemented (i.e., what roadway systems)? 

z Which crash types were these countermeasures addressing?

z Were these crash types and countermeasures identified as a priority in the SHSP?

z What was the outcome (i.e., countermeasure influence on focus crashes)?

Answers to these questions provide insight for safety program managers. If the 

review determines that the historical safety investments were consistent with SHSP 

priorities, the investments effectively reduced focus crashes, the results of the historical 

investments were satisfactory, and the same crash types and roadway facilities are 

expected to be a priority going forward, only a small portion of an agency’s safety 

investments would likely need to be diverted to supporting projects identified through 

a new systemic approach. However, if the review determines that these criteria 

were not achieved, then safety program managers might conclude that it may be 

necessary to redirect safety investments. This new direction might include allocating 

safety funds to a systemic safety program aimed at proactively deploying low-cost 

countermeasures systemwide.

Table 2 illustrates an example of one agency’s efforts to review their historical 

highway safety investments. This state’s HSIP records were searched, and the 

investments were disaggregated by project type within three basic categories: 

Intersection Improvements, Lane Departure Improvements, and Other Improvements. 

The safety program managers concluded that the Intersection Improvements and 

Lane Departure Improvements categories were consistent with their SHSP priorities, 

but several of the specific project types were not. Specifically, the proportion of 

funding for all safety improvement projects related to traffic signal installation and 

revisions substantially exceeded the proportion of severe crashes occurring at 

signalized intersections. In addition, the program managers concluded that within 

the Lane Departure Improvements category, they had underinvested in road edge 

enhancements and overinvested in median barriers. This determination was based on 

crash characteristics that indicated more than seven times as many road departure 

crashes on two-lane rural roads than cross-median crashes on divided roadways. 

It is important to understand that the funding distribution was a byproduct of the 

site analysis approach used to focus on locations with multiple severe crashes. This 

approach resulted in costly investments at relatively few locations that addressed 

a small percentage of the total severe crashes. Finally, the safety program managers 

noted that all of these safety investments were directed toward projects deployed 

along the state’s highway system, but over 40 percent of their severe crashes occurred 

on the local system. Based on this review, the safety program managers intend to 

modify their HSIP investments; going forward, a greater portion of their HSIP funds will 

be directed toward proactive, low-cost road edge improvement projects developed 

using the systemic safety planning process and located along two-lane roads on both 

the state and local highway systems.

TABLE 2. Example Historical Highway Safety Improvement Program 

Funding Review

Funding Category Project Description Level of HSIP Funding

Intersections Turn lanes $20,000,000

Turn lanes and signal revisions $8,000,000

Install traffic signals $4,000,000

Traffic signal revisions $12,000,000

Roundabout $1,000,000

Intersections Total $45,000,000

Lane Departure Cable barrier $27,000,000

Concrete barrier $16,000,000

Centerline rumble strips $1,000,000

Edgeline rumble strips $1,000,000

Guardrail $16,000,000

Shoulders $9,000,000

Lane Departure Total $70,000,000

Other Other Total $39,000,000

Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments 60 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Past Funding

Practices
Funding Determination Framework

A funding determination framework assumes two key points. First, there is no 

suggestion or expectation that any roadway agency’s safety program will be 

100 percent oriented toward deployment of systemic projects. This framework suggests, 

however, that in every agency there will be some balance between projects derived 

from the site analysis approach and projects derived from the systemic approach. 

The systemic safety planning process to identify candidates for safety investment 

complements an agency’s site analysis approach rather than replaces it. Secondly, 

there is no suggestion or expectation that one particular portion of the safety 

investments would apply uniformly across an agency’s entire safety program. The 

balance between projects implemented through each approach is likely different in 

different regions of a state (e.g., urban versus rural), on different components of the 

roadway system (e.g., state versus local), and for different focus crash types (e.g., rear 

end versus road departure crashes).

Agencies should consider a variety of crash and roadway characteristics to determine the balance of safety investments between site analysis and systemic projects. 

Such considerations suggest a general balance along a safety funding continuum, 

with one end representing all site analysis projects and the other end representing all 

systemic projects. Agencies can develop a continuum with characteristics appropriate 

for their system. Figure 8 illustrates a continuum using the following recommended 

characteristics for the funding determination framework:

z Are there many or few high-crash locations in a system? Many high-crash 

locations suggest directing more HSIP funds toward site analysis projects; few 

high-crash locations suggest directing more HSIP funds toward systemic projects.

z Is an agency’s safety performance measure total crashes or severe crashes?

A performance measure based on total crashes suggests a site analysis safety 

program; a performance measure based on severe crashes suggests a more 

systemic safety program.

z Are crashes (or specific focus crash types) overrepresented in urban or rural 

areas? An overrepresentation of crashes in urban areas suggests a site analysis 

safety program; an overrepresentation of rural crashes suggests a more systemic 

safety program might be appropriate.

z What are the identified focus crash types? A safety program focused on all crash 

types suggests a site analysis program; a focus on specific crash types suggests 

a more systemic program.

FIGURE 8. Characteristics to Consider in Balancing the Distribution 

of Safety Investments 

z What are the identified priority locations? A focus on signalized intersections 

suggests a site analysis program; a focus on unsignalized intersections and 

horizontal curves suggests a more systemic focus.

Example 10 illustrates the application of this funding determination framework by 

Minnesota DOT, which is now directing a considerable portion of their safety investments to systemic projects. In the two years since adopting this plan, MnDOT has 

found that their safety investments are consistent with their safety investment goals, 

and spending on systemic projects is actually slightly above the minimum goals set 

for both rural and urban areas.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 61 Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments

Funding

Determination

Framework
The MnDOT safety program managers shared information they used to support their funds 

distribution decisions. The following key facts about MnDOT’s organization, priorities, and 

roadway and crash characteristics are relevant to their funding determination process:

•	MnDOT is decentralized, with seven districts in rural areas of the state and one in a 

major metropolitan area.

•	Minnesota has almost 140,000 total miles of roadways; the state system consists of 

approximately 12,000 miles, and the local secondary system consists of 45,000 miles 

(which is administered by counties and is virtually all rural).

•	MnDOT’s adopted safety performance measure is severe crashes, which are almost 

equally distributed between the state and local secondary system.

•	Almost 70 percent of fatal crashes and 60 percent of serious injury crashes occur 

outside of Minnesota’s one major metropolitan area.

•	Focus crash types include road departure and angle crashes at unsignalized 

intersections in rural areas, and angle and pedestrian crashes at signalized 

intersections in urban areas.

•	An additional priority location was determined to be horizontal curves along rural 

two-lane roadways. Almost 30 percent of all severe road departure crashes on 

MnDOT’s system are in horizontal curves, and more than 50 percent of the severe road 

departure crashes on the local secondary system are in horizontal curves (by mileage, 

curves make up less than 10 percent of each of these systems).

To determine a division of their safety investments, MnDOT reviewed historical funding 

practices and determined that, although severe crashes were almost equally distributed 

between state and local systems, more than 90 percent of safety investments were 

directed toward projects on the state system. MnDOT also determined that they did 

not select projects consistently with priorities indicated by their crash data. Rather, a 

disproportionate amount of funding had been directed to projects in Minnesota’s major 

urban area, and a disproportionate amount of that funded the traffic signal installation 

and revision projects. As a result of this review and a commitment in their SHSP to address 

severe crashes on all roads in the state, MnDOT adopted an entirely new approach 

to distributing their HSIP funds. The following framework shows the crash and roadway 

characteristics the safety program managers considered.

Using this information, MnDOT’s safety program managers decided their overall safety 

investments needed to be more systemic than site-specific. To accomplish this, the safety 

program managers:

•	Redistributed their safety funds by district based on the distribution of severe crashes. 

This resulted in directing 70 percent of their safety funds to the seven districts outside of 

the metropolitan area, which is the opposite of their historical practice. 

•	Divided the safety funds within each district between the state and the local secondary 

systems based on the distribution of severe crashes. Statewide, this approach resulted 

in more than 50 percent of the safety investments being directed toward projects on 

the local secondary system. 

•	Analyzed crash characteristics resulting in two conclusions: 1) there were no high 

crash locations on the local secondary system, and 2) crash densities on the local 

secondary system were a fraction of those on the state system. The analysis also 

showed that more than 80 percent of severe crashes were on rural roads; focus crash 

types were road departure (especially in curves) and angle crashes at through/STOP 

intersections. 

•	Directed 100 percent of the safety funds dedicated to local roads to low-cost proactive 

projects with a focus on dealing with rural road edges, enhanced curve delineation, 

and STOP-controlled intersections, as a result of the analysis of the crash characteristics. 

•	Noted that virtually no high crash locations were in their rural districts, and set a goal 

to direct at least 70 percent of their safety investment to systemic projects on the state 

system. In the urban district, where some high crash locations did exist, they set a goal 

to direct at least 30 percent of their safety investment toward systemic projects. 

Characteristics Considered by MnDOT for

MnDOT applied the Funding Determination Framework to assess their decisions Balancing the Distribution of Safety Investments related to balancing safety investments between site analysis and systemic projects.

EXAMPLE 10. Minnesota Department of Transportation Application of Funding Determination Framework

Source: Minnesota Department of Transportation

Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments 62 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Funding

Determination

Framework
Programmatic Assessment of the Benefit to be Gained 

through Systemic Investment 

Safety program managers can perform a programmatic evaluation of their systemic 

safety planning process to help determine how much funding to invest in systemic 

improvements. One purpose for the programmatic evaluation is to gain an understanding of the expected crash reduction based on different levels of investment in 

the systemic countermeasures. To assist with gaining this understanding, several states 

have developed spreadsheet tools (similar to the one shown in Figure 9) that estimate 

the potential crash reduction expected for a systemic program. 

These spreadsheet tools use the number of severe crashes or fatalities and serious 

injuries that occurred across the focus facility type and the size of focus facility type 

(i.e., number of intersections, curves or miles of roads) (columns with light green 

shading in Figure 9) to estimate the average annual crash densities (column with dark 

green shading). With the typical construction cost and applicable crash reduction/

modification factor (columns with light blue shading), a spreadsheet tool can quickly 

estimate the crash reduction and construction cost (columns with dark blue shading) 

when testing different levels of deployment (the input by the safety program manager 

in the column with dark red shading). Including service life, interest rate, maintenance 

costs, and traffic growth rates (columns with light purple shading) in the tool provides 

the ability to calculate the benefit-cost ratio for the life of the countermeasure 

(column with dark purple shading). The output, an estimate of the severe crashes 

or fatalities and serious injuries that could be prevented across the roadway system, 

provides safety program managers with information about the value of the systemic 

investment. Another benefit of this approach to programmatic evaluation is that 

similar calculations can be completed with the same spreadsheet tool for driver 

behavior countermeasures, providing documentation about the expected crash or 

injury reduction for a comprehensive safety management program.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 63 Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments

Programmatic

Assessment
Engineering Entered Values

Systemic Countermeasure

Injury Data Road System Data

Crash Reduction 

Information Treatment Costs

Treatment 

Deployment

Fatalities

Major 

Injuries Years

Mileage 

or Feature 

Count

Traffic 

Growth 

Rate CRF Unit Unit Cost

Other 

Annual 

Cost

Service 

Life

Amount 

Deployed

Lane Departure — Rumble Strips on Roads

Primary Road 

System

2-Lane

Edgeline 150 550 5 5,500 miles 1.0% 20% of run-off-road injuries 

on paved rural roads

 $3,500 miles $- 10 2,500 miles

Shoulder 150 550 5 5,500 miles 1.0% 30% of run-off-road injuries 

on paved rural roads

 $3,000 miles $- 10 2,500 miles

Centerline 175 350 5 5,500 miles 1.0% 15% of head-on injuries on 

paved rural roads

 $3,000 miles $- 10 300 miles

Secondary Road 

System

Paved Roads

Edgeline 250 779 5 17,500 miles 0.5% 20% of run-off-road injuries 

on paved rural roads

 $3,500 miles $- 10 2,500 miles

Shoulder 250 779 5 17,500 miles 0.5% 30% of run-off-road injuries 

on paved rural roads

 $3,000 miles $- 10 2,500 miles

Centerline 50 165 5 17,500 miles 0.5% 15% of head-on injuries on 

paved rural roads

 $3,000 miles $- 10 300 miles

Lane Departure — Curve Delineation on Rural Curves

Primary Road 

System

2-Lane

Advance 

Warning 

Signs

50 125 5 2,000 curves 1.0% 20% of injuries in curves on 

paved rural roads

 $1,000 curves $100 6 1,000 curves

Chevrons 50 125 5 2,000 curves 1.0% 15% of injuries in curves on 

paved rural roads

 $3,500 curves $100 6 1,000 curves

Primary Road 

System

All Other Roads

Advance 

Warning 

Signs

25 75 5 600 curves 1.0% 20% of injuries in curves on 

paved rural roads

 $1,000 curves $100 6 1,000 curves

Chevrons 25 75 5 600 curves 1.0% 15% of injuries in curves on 

paved rural roads

 $3,500 curves $100 6 1,000 curves

Secondary Road 

System

Paved Roads

Advance 

Warning 

Signs

75 225 5 8,250 curves 0.5% 20% of injuries in curves on 

paved rural roads

 $500 curves $100 6 1,000 curves

Chevrons 75 225 5 8,250 curves 0.5% 15% of injuries in curves on 

paved rural roads

 $1,500 curves $100 6 1,000 curves

FIGURE 9. Benefit Cost Analysis Spreadsheet (continued on next page)

Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments 64 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Programmatic

Assessment
FIGURE 9. Benefit Cost Analysis Spreadsheet (continued from previous page)

Engineering Computed Values

Systemic Countermeasure

Injury Losses Benefits Costs

Benefit 

Cost 

Ratio

 Value of All 

Severe Injuries 

 Average Loss 

per Severe 

Injury 

Severe 

Injury 

Density

Avoided 

Injuries in 

First Year

 Present Value 

of Avoided 

Injury Losses Initial Cost 

 Present 

Value of All 

Costs 

Lane Departure — Rumble Strips on Roads

Primary 

Road System

2-Lane

Edgeline $657,000,000 $938,571 0.0255 12.73 $101,041,373 $8,750,000 $8,750,000 11.55

Shoulder $657,000,000 $938,571 0.0255 19.09 $151,562,059 $7,500,000 $7,500,000 20.21

Centerline $696,500,000 $1,326,667 0.0191 0.86 $9,640,454 $900,000 $900,000 10.71

Secondary 

Road System

Paved Roads

Edgeline $1,061,960,000 $1,032,031 0.0118 5.88 $50,261,031 $8,750,000 $8,750,000 5.74

Shoulder $1,061,960,000 $1,032,031 0.0118 8.82 $75,391,546 $7,500,000 $7,500,000 10.05

Centerline $214,600,000 $998,140 0.0025 0.11 $914,104 $900,000 $900,000 1.02

Lane Departure — Curve Delineation on Rural Curves

Primary 

Road System

2-Lane

Advance 

Warning 

Signs

 $205,000,000 $1,171,429 0.0175 3.50 $22,012,245 $1,000,000 $1,524,214 14.44

Chevrons $205,000,000 $1,171,429 0.0175 2.63 $16,509,184 $3,500,000 $4,024,214 4.10

Primary 

Road System

All Other Roads

Advance 

Warning 

Signs

 $105,500,000 $1,055,000 0.0333 6.67 $37,760,843 $1,000,000 $1,524,214 24.77

Chevrons $105,500,000 $1,055,000 0.0333 5.00 $28,320,632 $3,500,000 $4,024,214 7.04

Secondary 

Road System

Paved Roads

Advance 

Warning 

Signs

 $316,500,000 $1,055,000 0.0073 1.45 $8,140,881 $500,000 $1,024,214 7.95

Chevrons $316,500,000 $1,055,000 0.0073 1.09 $6,105,661 $1,500,000 $2,024,214 3.02

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 65 Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments

Programmatic

Assessment
Summary

Element 2 of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool presents a general framework for balancing site analysis and systemic safety investments. The following 

three components make up the recommended framework for developing a safety 

investment plan for systemic and site analysis programs: 

z Review past funding practices to provide insight into historical safety spending 

patterns.

z Apply the funding determination framework to determine the appropriate 

balance of safety investments.

z Assess the potential benefit to be gained by investing funding in systemic 

improvements. 

Using this data-driven framework, safety program managers can determine general 

goals for the distribution of safety investments based on crash and roadway 

characteristics. The framework provides agencies the flexibility to craft funding plans 

that are consistent with their established goals, priorities, and culture. 

There is no precise answer for any agency regarding the distribution of safety 

investments between candidate projects developed using either a site analysis or 

systemic approach. Safety program managers are encouraged to decide how to 

distribute safety investments, move forward, and then review following implementation 

to determine whether the results are consistent with expectations. If the results indicate 

a positive effect because of a downward trend in focus crashes, then moving forward 

would involve continuing along the same safety investment track. If the results were 

not in line with expectations, then the agency would need to reassess the distribution 

of the safety investments the following year. The review process continues on an 

annual basis. 

Element 2: A Framework for Balancing Systemic and Traditional Safety Investments 66 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Summary
Element 3:

Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program

Element 3:

Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program

Introduction to Systemic Safety Program Evaluation

focus facilities. In other words, countermeasures do not have to be implemented solely 

through dedicated safety projects. Through these additional implementation channels 

for safety improvements, the systemic approach reaches more locations in less 

time than safety funding alone accomplishes. Sharing the benefits of the approach 

helps all agency offices understand the justification for adopting changes and the 

results expected (i.e., fewer severe crashes) if traditional practices are modified to 

incorporate systemic safety priorities. Performance evaluation results, especially lives 

saved and injuries prevented, can be compelling information to bring about changes 

in business practices within agencies.

This section introduces the safety performance evaluation process for a systemic 

safety program. As the systemic safety evaluation process is new and continually 

evolving, this section does not present a process or a framework for evaluation. 

Instead, the following chapter provides an overview of an approach and potential 

methods, including the data needs and performance measures for these methods. 

This chapter also discusses several scenarios agencies might face as they evaluate 

their program. As the systemic approach to safety evolves and implementation 

continues, additional research is necessary to confirm systemic safety evaluation 

techniques.

Data Needs

Data required to evaluate the systemic portion of an agency’s safety program 

depends upon the level of analysis—systemwide versus improved locations. Evaluating 

improved locations requires the crash, roadway, and traffic data assembled during 

the systemic safety planning process (Element 1) and for a minimum of three 

years after implementation, and details about the implementation of specific 

systemic safety countermeasures. Data required to perform program evaluations 

include statewide, regionwide or systemwide crash and roadway data within 

the study area. The countermeasure-specific data are for the actual sites where 

projects (the term “projects” includes dedicated safety projects as well as safety 

improvements implemented as one component of a traditional construction or 

maintenance project like resurfacing or as part of routine maintenance efforts) 

were implemented and include key, descriptive information about the project type, 

Systemic safety programs are relatively new and evolving in the United States, as 

is the practice of evaluating systemic safety program effectiveness. Evaluating the 

performance of countermeasures implemented in locations that have no recent crash 

history—but that exhibit other characteristics that indicate the potential for a 

severe crash—is challenging, especially 

for specific locations or corridors. 

However, quantifying effectiveness is 

a critical aspect of systemic safety 

planning. Evaluating program performance is the last element of the 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool, 

and it provides useful feedback into 

the systemic safety planning process. 

Effectiveness information gained 

through the process of evaluating the 

performance of implemented countermeasures provides input to agencies that 

is useful for modifying and evolving their 

safety programs to prevent and reduce more severe crashes. Evaluating effectiveness 

also addresses an agency’s responsibility to invest resources in a way that best 

serves the traveling public and builds confidence that a systemic safety program is 

a  worthwhile investment. 

Another benefit to be gained by evaluating the safety effectiveness of systemic 

safety improvements is that positive results may generate support for the systemic 

approach and build institutional and cultural support to invest funding for this type 

of analysis and implementation. Building institutional support for systemic safety 

begins with the knowledge gained through the systemic planning process related 

to the systemic safety program’s focus on crash types, facility types, risk factors, and 

countermeasures to all offices within an agency. This promotion of safety throughout 

an agency is important because planning, design, operations, and maintenance 

activities all provide opportunities to implement systemic safety countermeasures on 

Quantification of effectiveness 

is critical to generate support 

for the systemic approach 

and to build institutional and 

cultural support to invest funding for this type of analysis 

and implementation.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 69 Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 

Systemic Safety

Introduction to

Program Evaluation
a detailed definition of the location , 

site conditions, and documentation of 

when specific countermeasures were 

implemented. The Recommended 

Protocols for Developing Crash Modification Factors report describes the 

collection and use of evaluation data 

to assess countermeasure effectiveness 

(Carter, 2012). 

Crash data support the effort to evaluate 

countermeasure effectiveness relative to 

changes in crash frequency. As a result, 

it is important to consider statistical 

reliability, which is highly influenced by 

sample size. Thus, while crash data would 

likely be documented on a site-by-site 

Although many states 

evaluate their safety program 

annually to meet Federal 

reporting requirements, 

a countermeasure’s 

effectiveness should not 

be based on a single year 

of data.

basis, data should ultimately be “rolled up” to represent the entire system along 

which a particular countermeasure was deployed. This “roll up” of crash data to the 

system level recognizes that, in the systemic approach, some deployment might take 

place at locations with a history of no or few crashes, which means that change in 

crash frequency at specific locations does not sufficiently tell the whole story about 

effectiveness. Also, rolling the crash data up to the system level maximizes the crash 

data sample size, which provides the greatest chance for statistical reliability. Analyzing 

at least three years of crash data after implementation also helps to attain a sufficient 

sample of crashes. 

Systemic Safety Performance Measures

The Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool relies on severe crash history and other 

indicators, such as risk factors, to determine future crash potential of particular sites. 

The resulting widespread deployment of countermeasures is intended to reduce the 

future crash potential. Therefore, the systemic safety program’s effectiveness can be 

measured by reduced system risk. Depending on the availability of data applied in the 

project identification process, risk might not be easily quantifiable. Instead, changes in 

the number of severe focus crash types, especially on the focus facility types, become 

the long-term performance measurement.

The recommended systemic safety evaluation process occurs at three levels, 

as follows: 

z Output: What is the output of the systemic safety program? Is the systemic safety 

program being implemented as planned and programmed? Are high priority 

countermeasures being deployed at the right type of locations and at the 

number of locations planned? 

z Focus Crash Type: Has implementation effectively reduced the identified focus 

crash types? That is, are the severe crashes trending down? 

z Countermeasure Performance: Within each crash type, are deployed countermeasures performing as expected? 

The following information provides an overview of these evaluation levels by identifying 

the purpose of each part of the evaluation and describing a general approach. This 

overview does not provide step-by-step instructions for specific analysis methodologies. 

This chapter concludes with sources for additional information to support systemic 

safety program evaluation efforts. 

Suggested Evaluation of Data

Countermeasure

z Definition of improvement 

implemented at site

z Precise implementation location

z Precise implementation date

Crash Data

z Severe crash data for focus crash type 

before implementation

z Severe crash data for focus crash type 

after implementation 

Before and After Site Conditions

z Roadway or intersection geometry

z Intersection traffic control device

z Shoulder surface width and type

z Road division

z Median width and type

z Speed limit

z Average daily traffic volumes

z Average daily entering vehicles 

z Roadway classification

z Area type (rural/urban/suburban)

Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 70 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Systemic Safety

Performance Measures
Systemic Safety Program Output

The first level of evaluation is an interim evaluation because, at such an 

early stage in program development, the evaluation is of “output,” rather 

than “outcome.” A period of at least three years is ideal to evaluate changes 

in crashes (the outcome); therefore, instead of waiting, agencies should 

begin annually reviewing their funding decisions to evaluate if selected 

improvements are consistent with the systemic funding goal (the output). 

Comparing allocated funding to the planned systemic safety program on 

an annual basis reveals opportunities to better align the following year’s 

systemic safety programming with program goals. Agencies might need to 

adjust funding within the systemic allocation or between the systemic and 

site-specific allocations. 

The process of balancing safety investments between projects identified 

through the site analysis approach versus the systemic approach involves 

reviewing past funding practices (Element 2) to gain an understanding of 

whether funded projects were directed toward the focus crash types and 

facilities identified through the systemic safety planning process (Element 1). 

Each funding cycle provides the opportunity to perform an interim evaluation using this same review technique. If there is a preference for and 

more familiarity with historical practices, projects selected for safety funding 

could easily stray from the focus crash type, focus facility type, or preferred 

countermeasure in new and evolving systemic safety programs. If this were to 

happen, then the outcome could very well fall short of what is expected of 

a systemic safety program. 

An output evaluation of the planned funding and implementation, as 

compared with actual funding, should consider the following:

z Did systemic safety projects reach the dollar amount set as a goal? If 

a goal was set for individual focus crash types, how do the planned and 

actual distributions compare? The answers indicate whether the goals 

for implementing improvements developed through a systemic risk 

assessment have been achieved.

z Were projects implemented on the focus facility types, especially 

locations consistent with the identified risk factors?

z Were investments distributed regionally (e.g., by district) and 

jurisdictionally (i.e., state versus local) as intended?

z Were the preferred countermeasures successfully selected for most 

candidate locations? The answer provides feedback about the list of 

priority countermeasures and the effectiveness of the countermeasure 

selection process.

Answering Some Common Concerns

Q: What if the program fell short of the overall spending goal and more 

systemic projects should have been implemented?

A: Consider two possible questions that may help to identify the reason:

 • Was agency culture a limiting factor? That is, did funding decisions 

revert to previous practice?

 • Were a sufficient number of sites reviewed to fulfill the funding available?

Addressing issues related to the first question requires continued effort to educate peers 

about the new systemic safety program, possibly providing assistance with selecting 

projects for programming. The second question addresses the systemic safety program 

design. Consider whether the problem might be the criteria used to identify which locations 

were eligible for project programming. A threshold that is overly strict can identify too few 

locations. Setting lower thresholds will allow the identification of more locations during the 

project identification process.

Q: What if plenty of locations were identified, but few projects were 

programmed because the countermeasure did not prove to be 

implementable at most of the locations?

A: A countermeasure may not be implementable at certain locations because of noise or 

lighting concerns, roadway cross-section, pavement condition or right-of-way constraints. 

Consider if the preferred countermeasure is appropriate for the focus facility types, 

especially locations that rank high in the prioritization process. For those locations where 

it is not appropriate, return to Element 1 to identify other countermeasures. Also review 

the decision process created in Element 1 that assigned a project to each location—were 

several applicable countermeasures assigned properly? Make sure the project selection 

process has appropriate alternatives with clear guidelines on when they can be used.

Q: There was not an issue with allocating funding, but what if I’m not 

certain enough locations were improved to make a difference in crash 

reduction or the potential for crash reduction?

A: A key aspect to a systemic safety program is widespread deployment of effective 

countermeasures. If funding needs to cover more locations, review the preferred and 

alternative countermeasures and the decision process that identifies the project type for 

each location. If the preferred countermeasure is too costly, then search for an alternative 

that is less costly to implement. Also refine the project type selection process to allow 

greater use of low-cost countermeasures by ensuring criteria do not allow overuse of 

higher-cost countermeasures. This decision-making process may be enhanced if CMFs are 

applied to understand crash reduction potential for the improved locations. An agency can 

estimate the expected benefits based on the crash reduction for all improved locations.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 71 Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 

Program Output
Observed Trends in Crash Frequency or Severity

The second level of evaluation is based on program-level trends that characterize 

the impact the countermeasures have on safety. This outcome evaluation addresses 

questions like What happened to the number of severe focus crash types, especially 

on focus facilities? The systemic safety program focuses on severe crashes using an 

approach that relies on a long-term outlook across entire roadway systems (e.g., rural 

freeways, rural county highways, urban signalized intersections). Widespread 

implementation of systemic countermeasures requires a long-term perspective 

because several funding cycles may be necessary to fund the improvements, culture 

change takes time, and at least three years of crash data should be gathered to 

determine countermeasure effectiveness that is useful for program modifications. 

Therefore, evaluation also requires a long-term perspective. Continuous long-term 

tracking is critical for identifying program impacts and useful life.

As previously discussed, communicating the 

program results is important to encourage 

agencies to embrace systemic safety efforts in 

their daily activities and to promote stakeholder 

and public support for continuing a systemic 

safety program. Simple charts and graphs are 

The NYSDOT has developed a 

tool to track safety projects to 

support a “before versus after” 

evaluation. The tool is called the 

Post Implementation Evaluation 

(PIE) System. PIE is organized by 

project type; documents where 

the project was implemented and 

when construction began and was 

completed; links with the crash 

record system to document the 

number of crashes in the before and 

after periods; and computes a CMF.

one method to visually disseminate program results to technical or non-technical 

audiences. A chart that presents information in an easy-to-understand format allows 

stakeholders and program managers to comprehend the potential relationship 

between crash reduction and implementation of systemic safety countermeasures. 

While not a statistical test, these simple tools easily demonstrate the relationship 

between actions and results to various audiences, including stakeholders, elected 

officials, and executive management. 

Figure 10 is an example of a chart that displays Minnesota’s statewide traffic fatalities 

for certain crash types (total, lane departure, and aggressive/speeding driving) 

along with the time period when related systemic safety improvement programs 

were initiated (Minnesota DOT, 2012). The figure shows that total fatalities were on 

FIGURE 10. Program Results for Addressing Lane Departure and Speeding-Related Fatalities 

Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 72 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Observed Trends
a downward trend starting in 2005. However, lane departure and speeding-related 

fatalities were relatively constant (or decreasing at a rate slower than total fatalities) 

until their respective countermeasure programs were initiated. Minnesota began a 

targeted enforcement campaign called Highway Enforcement of Aggressive Traffic 

(HEAT) in the spring of 2006. High enforcement levels were sustained through mid-2007 

and reinitiated in 2009. Figure 10 illustrates that related fatalities dropped each 

year of the enforcement campaign. Likewise, MnDOT began widely implementing 

countermeasures to address lane departure crashes during the 2009 construction 

program. At about the same time, the data appear to indicate that lane departure 

fatalities began decreasing at a faster rate. These charts were well received by 

managers and stakeholders and helped them understand the potential impact the 

programs had on severe crashes.

In addition to looking at annual totals only, MnDOT separated the data for the portions 

of the year when HEAT was in effect and when it was not. The analysis revealed that 

traffic fatalities were occurring at a faster pace than the previous year until HEAT 

began. Following the initiation of HEAT, the number of fatalities per month decreased 

and the state finished the year with fewer fatalities than the previous year. This 

approach focusing specifically on crashes that occurred during the targeted time 

intervals might better highlight the specific impact of safety programs. 

Figure 11 provides a chart showing information about the potential impact of a 

systemic safety countermeasure on a focus crash type. This chart presents data for a 

focus facility rather than for all roads in the state, as presented in Figure 10. Figure 11 

compares the numbers of total and fatal cross-median crashes (left axis) to the miles 

of high-tension cable median (HTCM) barrier (right axis) installed between 2005 

and 2008 (Illinois DOT, 2009). Prior to HTCM installation, an annual average of 11 total 

FIGURE 11. Illinois Department of Transportation Illustration of Cable Median Barrier Program Results for Treated Locations 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 73 Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 

Observed Trends
cross-median crashes (range of 6 to 16) and less than 4 fatal cross-median crashes 

occurred at these locations. The chart data demonstrate that the number of crossmedian crashes began decreasing the year after installation began (2006) and 

continued to decrease to a low of zero during the final year of construction.

This illustration technique was also used to demonstrate the positive results achieved 

after installing HTCM barrier along Interstate 70 across Missouri (Chandler, 2007). 

For another example, the NYSDOT report Centerline Rumble Strips on Secondary 

Highways: A Systemic Crash Analysis includes a simple line chart that compares the 

number of head-on fatality crashes with the installation of centerline rumble strips 

(NYSDOT, 2011). The same positive result of implementing systemic safety improvements is clearly discernible from the chart. This example is similar to the Minnesota 

example in that the chart shows statewide data for head-on fatality crashes rather 

than just data for the improved locations as the Illinois and Missouri examples show.

Another method to communicate a systemic safety program’s overall effectiveness is 

the dissemination of performance metrics such as cost effectiveness or benefit-cost 

ratio data. The cost-effectiveness performance measure expresses the cost invested 

to prevent each severe crash—that is, dollars spent per severe crash (or fatal crash or 

Q: What if I do not see a noticeable change in severe crashes at 

the program level? 

A: To see results at the program level, you will first have to improve enough 

locations so that results are noticeable. If you have not been able to implement 

enough projects to observe results systemwide, focus on the locations that have 

been improved and aggregate the data for all improved locations. Remember 

to collect data for a sufficient amount of time before any countermeasures 

are implemented to establish a baseline crash frequency so that impacts are 

observable. This may reveal effectiveness at the implemented locations that 

simply is not observable systemwide.

If severe crash reductions are still not visible when looking only at improved 

locations, you may need to move onto evaluating countermeasure performance. 

This will provide you greater detail on how specific countermeasures have 

performed, which could reveal that implementation has been too focused on 

a specific countermeasure that hasn’t proven effective at reducing the severe 

focus crash type.

Answering Some Common Concerns

fatality) prevented. From a funding perspective, the lower the cost-effectiveness value 

or the higher the benefit-cost ratio, the more successful the program is at reducing 

severe crashes. The method is also useful to compare systemic safety programs 

addressing different focus crash types as a way to normalize each program. Within 

a focus crash type, calculating cost-effectiveness values or benefit-cost ratios for 

individual districts, jurisdictions, and facility types allows comparison of the subareas to 

understand which parts of the program have been the most successful.

Countermeasure Performance

The first two levels of evaluation consider whether or not the systemic component of 

a safety program is being funded and/or implemented as intended and whether the 

overall program is a success. The outcome of these evaluations provides feedback 

about the consistency of an adopted funding goal to direct some fraction of safety 

investments toward improvements identified through a systemic risk assessment 

and long-term, systemwide crash trends. The third level of evaluation identifies how 

individual countermeasures perform on a systemic basis. This information allows 

program managers to understand the individual parts of the program and identify 

which countermeasures successfully reduced specific focus crash types and which 

did not. In the interest of an owner agency’s responsibility to invest resources in a way 

that best serves the traveling public, this third-level evaluation provides the opportunity 

for agencies to continue directing investments toward effective countermeasures and 

discontinue funding countermeasures not achieving desired results. However, given 

that a systemic safety program very likely will direct investments to facilities with few 

or no crashes, specific locations or corridors should never be evaluated. Instead, all 

improved locations should be aggregated and evaluated as a single set. This provides 

an estimate of the countermeasure’s effectiveness for a typical facility. 

More advanced techniques can play a greater role in this third level of evaluation. 

These techniques include Empirical Bayes (EB) to account for regression to the mean, 

multivariable regression to account for more than one independent variable, or confidence tests that determine the level at which the results are statistically reliable. When 

these methods are not options (e.g., a lack of safety performance functions to apply 

EB adjustments), then simple techniques (e.g., a before-after evaluation with control 

sites) can increase the confidence of the results. Also, benefit-cost or cost effectiveness 

evaluations quantify the crash reductions in monetary terms. 

It is important to understand that the approach described here and illustrated by 

Example 11 is the best available at this time. Additional research and future studies 

will define a best practice to evaluate countermeasure performance for systemic 

projects.

Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 74 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Countermeasure

Performance
Using the Empirical Bayes evaluation 

methodology with safety performance 

functions, the Missouri Department of 

Transportation (MoDOT) evaluated 

their Smooth Roads Initiative (SRI), 

which improved 2,300 miles of 

roadways with resurfacing, improved 

markings, and centerline rumble 

strips or shoulder/edgeline rumble 

strips (including combinations of 

these countermeasures) in 2005 and 

2006 (MoDOT, 2011). This evaluation 

computed a benefit-cost ratio for 

the improvements and the percent 

reduction in crashes for fatal crashes, 

fatal plus disabling injury crashes (also 

known as severe crashes), and fatal 

plus all injury crashes. The analysis was 

structured so that each combination 

of countermeasures was analyzed 

for each facility type for which it was 

implemented. 

Disaggregating the analysis to this 

level of detail allowed MoDOT to 

understand the degree to which 

individual countermeasures reduced 

crashes or the potential for crashes 

on each facility type. This study of 

18 countermeasure combinations 

concluded that all have statistically 

significant results with benefit-cost ratios 

substantially greater than 1.0. Of the 

18 combinations, the following four 

were reported as being particularly 

cost-effective:

•	 Wider markings with resurfacing on 

rural multilane undivided highways: 

benefit-cost ratio = 146

•	 Wider markings with resurfacing on 

urban two-lane highways: benefitcost ratio = 118

•	 Wider markings and both centerline 

and edgeline rumble strips with 

resurfacing on rural two-lane 

highways: benefit-cost ratio = 36

•	 Wider markings without resurfacing 

on urban multilane divided highways: 

benefit-cost ratio = 29

MoDOT also conducted an evaluation 

of a subsequent project that installed 

edgelines along 650 miles of low 

volume rural, two-lane roads in 2009. 

During the two years before the 

countermeasure was implemented, 105 

fatal and injury crashes and 576 total 

crashes occurred along these roadway 

segments. During the two years 

afterward, 46 fatal and injury crashes 

and 327 total crashes occurred along 

the same segments. 

MoDOT used their Countermeasure 

Evaluation Tool to perform a “Before vs. 

After” evaluation. The Countermeasure 

Evaluation Tool is a customized 

spreadsheet that incorporates Empirical 

Bayes methodology to estimate the 

effectiveness of the implemented 

countermeasure. The tool was created 

during the development of Missouri 

safety performance functions.

The countermeasure effectiveness 

is based on a comparison of the 

expected number of crashes with and 

without the edgeline treatment for the 

two years before the installation and 

the two years after the installation of 

the edgelines in 2009. Data input into 

the spreadsheet included segment 

beginning/end mile posts, Average 

Annual Daily Traffic, crash frequencies 

for each segment, and roadway type 

(i.e., rural two-lane undivided). 

With regard to the expected number 

of total crashes, the analysis revealed 

a 15 percent decrease in crashes 

occurred after the countermeasure 

was put into place, including a finding 

of significance at the 95 percent 

confidence level (indicating a high 

degree of certainty that the edgelines 

contributed to the reduction in total 

crashes). Based on the expected 

number of fatal and injury crashes 

with and without the countermeasure, 

the analysis found a 19 percent 

decrease in crashes; however this 

was not significant at the 90 percent 

confidence level. Despite a 19 percent 

decrease in the expected number of 

fatal and injury crashes following the 

deployment of edgelines, the relatively 

low density of injury crashes prevented 

the result from being statistically 

significant. While the result was viewed 

positively by the MoDOT, the result of 

statistical significance means there is 

a lesser degree of certainty that the 

edgelines contributed to the reduction 

in fatal and injury crashes. 

The MoDOT applied Empirical 

Bayes methodology with safety 

performance functions to 

evaluate the performance of 

countermeasures implemented to 

reduce lane departure crashes.

EXAMPLE 11. Missouri Department of Transportation Evaluation Using Empirical Bayes Methodology

Source: Missouri Department of Transportation

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 75 Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 

Countermeasure

Performance
A detailed breakdown of results by countermeasure and facility type (as Example 11 

shows) provides the opportunity to refine a systemic safety program by directing 

subsequent funding to proven projects and countermeasures. These refinements allow 

agencies to further their efforts to maximize crash reduction by allocating funding 

where it will provide the greatest benefit toward reducing of the frequency of severe 

focus crashes. 

A benefit of evaluating countermeasures is that the effort directly leads to developing 

CMFs that are specific for the systemic safety program. These results are useful for the 

particular agency’s efforts to incorporate safety into planning, design, operations, and 

maintenance projects. These CMFs are also useful to augment the common body of 

knowledge for systemic safety planning. As mentioned previously, many of the current 

CMFs were developed from programs that treated locations identified through the 

Q: What if my countermeasure is sufficiently proven effective, but 

a systemwide reduction in severe crashes is still not visible? 

A: Continue implementing the countermeasure. As deployment increases, 

systemwide results will become visible.

Q: What if my preferred countermeasure is not proving effective? 

A: Begin reviewing the process to identify locations for improvements. Review the 

risk factors to confirm their ability to indicate potential for a severe focus crash 

type and as necessary, adjust future risk analysis to compensate for any lessons 

learned.

Q: If my low-cost preferred countermeasure is not effective as the 

higher cost alternative, how do I achieve a balance in future 

implementation? 

A: You should strive for a balance that maximizes the number of locations 

improved by selecting the lower-cost countermeasure where appropriate 

but relies on the higher cost scenario where justified. For the high priority 

locations, an analysis that computes the potential crash reduction for different 

implementation scenarios can help identify the plan that should achieve the 

greatest system results. 

Answering Some Common Concerns

site analysis approach and may not be relevant to systemic safety programs. The 

availability of CMFs developed specifically for systemic safety improvements assists all 

agencies to better predict potential outcomes of safety countermeasure alternatives.

Program managers might also consider alternative performance measures to 

determine the effectiveness of individual countermeasures. Results such as reduced 

travel speeds, changes in citations issued, fewer red-light-running violations, and 

fewer maintenance repairs might indicate that the countermeasure deployment has 

changed driver behavior. Additionally, feedback from staff who spend a considerable 

amount of time in the field (e.g., maintenance staff, law enforcement) or citizens can 

provide early feedback on countermeasure performance.

Where to Go for More Information

Several resources provide information about countermeasure evaluation practices, 

both for individual locations and for systemic safety programs. The following lists a few 

of these resources:

z The Highway Safety Manual (AASHTO, 2010) contains detailed information on 

countermeasure evaluation in Part B.

z The Art of Appropriate Evaluation, A Guide for Highway Safety Program Managers

is published by the NHTSA (2008) for use in evaluating traffic safety programs, 

especially those that focus on driver education and enforcement. The guide 

contains practical advice that is applicable to systemic engineering programs.

z More detail on the evaluation approach to MoDOT’s Smooth Roads Initiative 

program can be found in the Benefit/Cost Evaluation of MoDOT’s Total Striping 

and Delineation Program: Phase II – Final Report (MoDOT, 2011).

z A Guide to Developing Quality Crash Modification Factors (FHWA, 2010), provides 

direction to agencies developing CMFs, including selecting appropriate evaluation methods and data considerations.

z The NCHRP report, Recommended Protocols for Developing Crash Modification 

Factors (Carter, 2012), provides guidance about data to collect and a process 

to follow for evaluating countermeasures. The report documents protocols that 

should be used in the development of CMFs, the goal of which is to describe 

what pieces of the research study should be documented by the study authors 

and how various potential biases should be addressed.

Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 76 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Where to Go for

More Information
Summary

Performance evaluation provides useful feedback for safety program decision-making 

and, as such, is an important aspect of continuing agency efforts to reduce severe 

crashes. Documenting systemic safety program effectiveness also helps agencies 

understand the impact a systemic safety program will achieve if incorporated into 

other standard agency practices for planning, design, operations, and maintenance 

activities.

Evaluating a systemic safety program comes with unique challenges, especially 

because implementation is based on risk factors in addition to historical crash 

performance. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the system at a program level and 

not at individual project sites. The evaluation process includes three levels. The first, an 

interim evaluation, is a check on output or projects programmed and constructed. 

This first evaluation is especially important in new systemic safety programs because 

modifications to the project identification and selection process might be required, 

and the program will be more successful if these are made sooner rather than 

later. Tracking long-term performance at the program level is the second level of 

analysis. Data about systemic countermeasure performance are especially useful for 

communicating results to stakeholders, executive management, and other interested 

parties. The third level, evaluating specific countermeasures, allows program managers 

to understand how individual elements are performing, identify where changes 

are needed, and adjust future funding to maximize return on investment. As with 

any evaluation, planning ahead is important. Identifying data needs in advance 

ensures that all relevant data are gathered at the appropriate time after projects 

are implemented.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 77 Element 3: Evaluation of a Systemic Safety Program 

Summary

References

References

AAA. United States Road Assessment Program. http://www.usrap.us/home/.

AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety. 

AASHTO. 2005. Strategic Highway Safety Plan. http://safety.transportation.org/. 

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.

AASHTO. 2010. Highway Safety Manual. First Edition. http://www.highwaysafetymanual.

org/Pages/default.aspx. American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials.

AASHTO. Safety Analyst. http://www.safetyanalyst.org. American Association of State 

Highway and Transportation Officials.

Carter, D., Srinivasan, R., Gross, F., and Council, F. 2012. Recommended Protocols for 

Developing Crash Modification Factors. http://www.cmfclearinghouse.org/collateral/

CMF_Protocols.pdf. National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project 20-07, 

Task 314. National Transportation Research Board. February.

Chandler, Brian. 2007. “Eliminating Cross-Median Fatalities – Statewide Installation 

of Median Cable Barriers in Missouri.” http://www.trb.org/Publications/

PubsTRNewsMagazine.aspx. TR News 248: January-February.

Davis, Scott. 2013. FHWA Systemic Safety Tool Thurston County Pilot Study. Presentation 

by Scott Davis, PE, Thurston County Department of Public Works. Presentation at 

Transportation Research Board 92nd Annual Meeting, Washington DC. January 13.

Doyle, Regina. 2012. Systemic Safety Pilot. New York State Department of Transportation, 

Office of Traffic Safety and Mobility. October 16.

Estochen, Brad. 2011. Minnesota Department of Transportation, Office of Traffic 

Engineering. August.

FHWA. 2009. Intersection Safety Issue Briefs. http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/

resources/intsafestratbro/inter_guide_key.cfm. U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Highway Administration. November.

FHWA. 2010. A Guide to Developing Quality Crash Modification Factors. http://safety.

fhwa.dot.gov/tools/crf/resources/fhwasa10032/. U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Highway Administration. December.

FHWA. 2010. Highway Safety Improvement Program Manual. http://safety.fhwa.

dot.gov/hsip/resources/fhwasa09029/. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 

Highway Administration. December.

FHWA. 2012. Developing Safety Plans: A Manual for Local Rural Road Owners. 

http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/local_rural/training/fhwasa12017/. U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. March.

FHWA. 2012. Model Inventory of Roadway Elements Fundamental Data Elements. 

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/map21/guidance/guidesafetydata.cfm. U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. January.

FHWA. Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse. http://www.cmfclearinghouse.org. 

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration.

FHWA. Office of Safety. A Systemic Approach to Safety – Using Risk to Drive Action. 

http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/systemic/. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 

Highway Administration.

FHWA. Office of Safety. Example Data Analysis Package and Straw Man Outline. 

http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/resources/edapsmo0709/#s5. 

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration.

FHWA. Office of Safety. HSIP Noteworthy Practice Series. http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/

hsip/resources/fhwasa1102/data_mn.cfm. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 

Highway Administration.

FHWA. Office of Safety. Proven Safety Countermeasures. http://safety.fhwa.dot.

gov/provencountermeasures/. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway 

Administration.

Illinois DOT. 2009. Report on the Advisability of Expanding the Use of Cable Median 

Barrier in Illinois. http://www.ediillinois.org/ppa/meta/html/00/00/00/02/17/96.html. 

Illinois Department of Transportation. July.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 81 References

References
Kaplan, Andy and Eric Gonzales. 2013. Systemic Approach to Roadway Safety 

Management in Salem County, NJ. Presentation by Andy Kaplan and Eric Gonzales, 

PhD, Center for Application of Information Technology, Transportation Safety Resource 

Center, Rutgers University. Presentation at Transportation Research Board 92nd Annual 

Meeting, Washington DC. January 13.

Legal Information Institute. United States Code 23 § 148 - Highway safety improvement 

program. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23/148. Cornell University School of 

Law.

Legal Information Institute. Code of Federal Regulations 23 CFR Part 924 - Highway 

safety improvement program. http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/23/924. Cornell 

University School of Law.

Minnesota DOT. 2012. Minnesota County Road Safety Plan using 2004 to 2010 

Minnesota crash records. 

Missouri DOT. 2011. Benefit/Cost Evaluation of MoDOT’s Total Striping and Delineation 

Program: Phase II – Final Report. http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id=1117526. Missouri 

Department of Transportation. June.

NHTSA. 2008. The Art of Appropriate Evaluation, A Guide for Highway Safety Program 

Managers. http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/ArtofAppEvWeb/. U.S. 

Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

NHTSA. 2013. Countermeasures That Work: A Highway Safety Countermeasure Guide 

for State Highway Safety Offices, Seventh Edition. http://www.ghsa.org/html/publications/countermeasures.html. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration.

NHTSA. Fatality Analysis Reporting System. http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS. U.S. Department 

of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

NYSDOT. 2010. 2010 New York State Strategic Highway Safety Plan. https://www.dot.

ny.gov/divisions/operating/osss/highway/strategic-plan. New York State Department 

of Transportation. 

NYSDOT. 2011. Centerline Rumble Strips on Secondary Highways, A Systematic Crash 

Analysis. https://www.dot.ny.gov/programs/rumblestrips/centerrumblestrips. New York 

State Department of Transportation. August.

TRB. Various. National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 500: Guidance 

for Implementation of the AASHTO Strategic Highway Safety Plan. http://safety.transportation.org/guides.aspx. Transportation Research Board.

References 82 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

References
Appendix

Appendix

Applying Existing Tools and Resources 

in a Systemic Safety Program

Agencies can incorporate a systemic safety program into their existing tools and 

resources along with national resources developed specifically for this purpose. 

Agencies may also wish to develop customized tools for their safety management 

system based on data availability, staffing resources, policies, and procedures. This 

appendix discusses the following national-level tools and provides general advice on 

the type of tasks and outputs they can support:

z Strategic Highway Safety Plan (SHSP)

z Roadway Departure and Intersection Safety Implementation Plans

z Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)

z Crash Modification Factors (CMF) Clearinghouse

z National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 500 and 

Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) Nine Proven Safety Countermeasures

z Highway Safety Manual (HSM)

z SafetyAnalyst and Interactive Highway Safety Design Model (IHSDM)

z United States Road Assessment Program (usRAP)

Strategic Highway Safety Plan

The American Association of Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) SHSP, last 

updated in 2005, provides a list of contributing factors and crash types that represent 

the greatest potential to reduce fatal and serious injuries. The topics covered include 

driver behavior, vehicle type, infrastructure, emergency medical services and data 

management. Additionally, each state has prepared their own SHSP, using state-level 

information to identify key emphasis areas within the state. Additionally, many areas 

are developing regional safety plans for urban areas, counties, or regions/districts. 

Therefore, it may be appropriate to review all available documents for selected 

emphasis areas that represent potential focus crash types.

Roadway Departure and Intersection 

Safety Implementation Plans

FHWA provided several states with assistance in developing implementation plans 

to address severe roadway departure or intersection crashes. These plans include 

an analysis of the states’ crash data that is directly applicable in Element 1 of the 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool. For example, the roadway departure safety 

implementation plans include information useful for focus facility type selection. 

Additionally, the example roadway departure plan also includes information useful 

to identify average daily traffic (ADT) ranges where severe crashes are concentrated, 

which could be a risk factor as defined in Element 1 of the Systemic Safety Project 

Selection Tool. Furthermore, the intersection safety implementation plan methodology 

suggests an approach to disaggregate total intersection crashes by jurisdiction, urban 

and rural area types, and traffic control type. This method is similar to the approach 

highlighted in the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) Case Study. 

Whether the process is applied to severe or total intersection crashes, it can help 

agencies select the focus facility types (e.g., differentiating the relative importance 

between urban signalized versus rural STOP controlled intersections). Both plans 

identify low-cost countermeasures for systematic deployment at locations that meet 

minimum crash level thresholds. These example countermeasures are appropriate 

treatments in a systemic safety program and were identified from a process similar 

to that outlined in the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool. FHWA has also prepared 

an example data analysis package that agencies can use if they were not part of 

the program to develop these plans. Through numerous examples, the example data 

analysis package provides a framework for roadway and intersection crashes, which 

agencies can modify as necessary.

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 85 Appendix

Tools and Resources
The key difference between the implementation plan process and the Systemic Safety 

Project Selection Tool is the criteria that allow the location to be eligible for treatment. 

The implementation plan process suggests crash frequency thresholds to identify 

priority locations and then treating the locations with the highest frequencies. While 

crash frequency can be a risk factor in the systemic safety planning process, it does 

not have to be the only criteria used to prioritize locations. Instead, the tool allows the 

agency to identify multiple risk factors. Thus, a site could be identified as a candidate 

for safety investment if it has multiple risk factors but no crash history.

Fatality Analysis Reporting System 

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) maintains an online database of fatal crash records that could be used by agencies with no crash records. 

These data records contain much of the same information that was suggested for 

consideration when selecting focus crash types and facility types. However, it contains 

limited information about the road and traffic characteristics (e.g., shoulder width and 

type) needed for identifying, evaluating, and selecting risk factors. FARS has an online 

query tool that creates pin maps to display crash locations. Agencies can use pin 

maps to locate the fatal crashes within their jurisdiction and identify associated road 

and traffic characteristics. If there are enough fatal crashes within the jurisdiction, a risk 

factor can be determined from patterns identified in the crash characteristics. 

Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse

The CMF Clearinghouse is an online, searchable database of CMFs from past safety 

effectiveness studies. The FHWA allows researchers to submit recently completed 

studies to keep the information current. Submitted studies are rated to provide the 

Clearinghouse user with information about the quality of the study design and 

reliability of the results.

The CMF Clearinghouse can serve two purposes in a systemic safety planning 

process. The first is identifying and selecting countermeasures. The searchable database allows users to identify countermeasures that address the focus crash type for 

the focus facility type. The CMF and the study’s quality rating are used to determine 

whether the specific countermeasure is reliable and appropriate for a systemic safety 

program.

The CMF Clearinghouse is also beneficial for instances where an agency does not 

have the capability to link crash records with road or traffic information for the purpose 

of identifying characteristics that are overrepresented in severe crashes, i.e., risk factors. 

Reviewing local crash records is the preferred way to select risk factors; however, 

information from the CMF Clearinghouse can identify characteristics found through 

research to have a proven impact on safety performance. For example, narrow travel 

lanes and shoulder surface type are roadway characteristics with CMFs available in 

the Clearinghouse for which an agency could use as potential risk factors for a rural 

lane departure focus crash type. When using CMFs in this way, make sure the facility 

types in the study are representative of the systemic safety program’s focus facility 

types. For example, lane width CMFs from rural or interstate studies are not appropriate 

to consider for an urban program. If available, state or local studies can augment 

the consideration and may help confirm if the characteristic is a risk factor within the 

jurisdiction.

When using CMFs from the Clearinghouse or any other source, it is important to note 

that some CMFs were developed from before-after studies when the countermeasure 

was implemented at a high crash location. Not enough information is available at this 

time to determine how appropriate these CMFs might be for predicting the success 

of a systemic safety program. Specifically, it is unknown whether the countermeasure 

will be as effective at reducing crashes in a systemic safety program as it was for a 

specific location identified through the site analysis approach. Until systemic safety 

programs mature and are evaluated, understand that some CMFs may not accurately 

reflect expected outcomes of a countermeasure implementation on a systemic basis.

NCHRP Report 500 and FHWA’s Nine Proven 

Safety Countermeasures

The NCHRP Report 500 series and FHWA’s Nine Proven Safety Countermeasures 

provide a similar resource to the CMF Clearinghouse. The NCHRP Report 500 series is 

a 24-volume set that contains hundreds of countermeasures covering topics in the 

areas of engineering, enforcement, education, emergency medical services, and data 

management. Each document provides information regarding implementation cost 

and what was known regarding effectiveness when the guide was published. (Note: 

The CMF Clearinghouse may contain results from newer studies. Countermeasures 

identified in the NCHRP 500 series should be checked in the CMF Clearinghouse 

to find the latest available safety effectiveness information.) The Nine Proven Safety 

Countermeasures, first published in 2008 and updated in 2012, generally represent 

low-cost countermeasures appropriate for systemwide implementation. 

Like the CMF Clearinghouse, these resources assist with assembling an initial list of 

countermeasures for the systemic safety program. Like the CMF Clearinghouse, these 

resources may help identify characteristics that could be used as risk factors if local 

crash data cannot be linked with geometric and traffic data sets.

Appendix 86 Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool

Tools and Resources
The Highway Safety Manual 

The HSM represents a collection of information and recommended practices for safety 

management and evaluation. Currently, the HSM includes predictive methods for rural 

two-lane, rural multi-lane, and urban/suburban arterials. The basis of the predictive 

method is crash prediction models, which are equations that use geometry, traffic 

and/or land use information to predict annual crash frequency for an intersection 

or a roadway segment. As research continues, AASHTO will update the HSM with new 

predictive methods and CMFs.

The HSM predictive method represents two potential uses for a systemic safety 

program. The first potential use is a means to identify risk factors. Based on nationallevel research, the inputs into the predictive method are found to directly impact 

crash frequency. In fact, some of the inputs (e.g., bus stops, schools, alcohol sales 

establishments) for the vehicle-pedestrian prediction model are surrogates to identify 

areas with high pedestrian densities or possibly at-risk users, such as school-age 

children. These factors do not necessarily cause crashes, but the models acknowledge 

that their presence indicates greater potential for a vehicle-pedestrian crash. 

Therefore, predictive method inputs could be considered as potential risk factors in a 

systemic safety program. Using the output of the crash prediction models is a second 

potential application of the HSM for a systemic safety program. The models provide a 

predicted average number of crashes per year, which is an estimate of the average 

crash potential for the site, i.e., a measurement of risk. In some cases, crash prediction 

model results are separated by severity and/or crash types, and then the different 

severities and crash types are summed together to generate the total crash potential. 

In such a case, the result that most closely matches the focus crash type is the ideal 

choice. For example, a predictive method may have one model which predicts single 

vehicle crashes resulting in fatalities or injuries. This might be the best and most direct 

comparison if the focus crash type is fatal road departure crashes and may be a 

more appropriate estimate of the risk being addressed by the systemic safety program 

than total predicted crashes. Likewise, instead of total predicted crashes, a pedestrian 

systemic safety program could incorporate the results of a vehicle-pedestrian crash 

prediction model. 

SafetyAnalyst and Interactive Highway Safety Design Model 

SafetyAnalyst and IHSDM are software programs that provide state-of-the-art 

analytical tools useful to identify and manage a systemwide program of site-specific 

improvements that enhance highway safety. SafetyAnalyst is capable of summarizing 

crashes by type and facility, which is useful to identify focus crash types and focus 

facilities. Additionally, SafetyAnalyst can apply the HSM predictive method for locations 

with data input into the software. Therefore, an agency with their system imported into 

the software could apply the predicted method as a means to quantify risk potential. 

Additionally, the systemic analysis for prioritizing locations could use some of the 

methods in the network screening module. 

IHSDM applies the HSM predictive methods for existing and proposed corridors. The 

software performs detailed design reviews of corridors and is not a tool applicable to 

network screening. As a result, IHSDM’s application in a systemic safety program is to 

complete a thorough estimate of crash reduction when multiple countermeasures are 

considered.

United States Road Assessment Program 

The U.S. Road Assessment Program (usRAP), sponsored by the AAA Foundation 

for Traffic Safety, systematically addresses risk to identify locations where fatal and 

serious injury crashes can be reduced by implementing countermeasures. usRAP 

aims to ensure that highway infrastructure improvements are programmed based 

on rational assessment of risk. usRAP has developed a risk-mapping protocol that 

highway agencies can use to create color-coded risk maps that show variations in the 

level of crash risk across a road network. The results can guide priorities for highway 

infrastructure improvements and targeted enforcement strategies. usRAP also provides 

highway agencies with usRAP Tools software that can develop a recommended 

program of location-specific crash countermeasures for any road network based on 

benefit-cost analysis. A strength of the usRAP Tools software is that it uses input data 

based on roadway and traffic control features to assess risk and does not require 

site-specific crash data. While the usRAP Tools software can be used by any highway 

agency, it is particularly well suited for highway agencies that lack good crash data 

or have lower volume roads with sparse crash experience. The roadway and traffic 

control input data can be obtained from existing highway agency databases or, with 

simple training, can be coded from Internet-based photo images with an average of 

20 minutes of labor per mile. 

Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool 87 Appendix

Tools and Resources


http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov

Publication No. FHWA-SA-13-019 

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 

Office of Safety 

400 Seventh Street, SW, HSSP

Washington, DC 20590