Department of Homeland Security
 

Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of Alleged 

Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia 

OIG-13-24 January 2013
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

January 24, 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 The Honorable Mark Sullivan 

Director 

United States Secret Service 

FROM: 	Charles K. Edwards
 

Deputy Inspector General 

SUBJECT: 	 Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of Alleged 

Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia 

Attached for your action is our final report, Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of 

Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia. We incorporated the formal comments from 

the United States Secret Service in the final report. The report contains no recommendations. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing copies 

of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation 

responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our 

website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Carlton I. Mann, Assistant 

Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254-4100, or William J. McCarron, Chief 

Inspector, at (202) 254-4206. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1 


Background ......................................................................................................................... 2 


Results of Review................................................................................................................ 3 


USSS Management in Cartagena Responded Appropriately to 

Allegations That Employees Solicited Prostitutes .................................................. 4 

USSS Inspection Division Conducted an Administrative Investigation ..................... 6 

USSS Revised Policies and Changed Supervision Staffing on Protective Visits....... 13 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................. 16 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report................................. 17 


Appendix C: Timeline of Events ........................................................................... 18 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................. 19 


Appendix E: Report Distribution .......................................................................... 20 


Abbreviations 

CNP Colombian National Police 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

FSD Forensic Services Division 

GS General Schedule 

ISP Inspection Division (USSS) 

NCCA National Center for Credibility Assessment 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

RAIC Resident Agent in Charge 

RES Office of Professional Responsibility 

SAIC Special Agent in Charge 

USSS United States Secret Service 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

In April 2012, United States Secret Service (USSS) employees were in Cartagena, 

Colombia, preparing for a Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas. During these 

preparations, several USSS employees were suspected of soliciting prostitutes. In 

response, USSS took the following steps: (1) managers in Cartagena responded to the 

alleged solicitation; (2) USSS’ internal affairs office investigated the alleged solicitation; 

and (3) USSS revised policies and supervision staffing for protective visits. We assessed 

USSS’ response to the alleged solicitation of prostitutes by its employees. 

We determined that USSS responded expeditiously and thoroughly to the allegations. 

Managers in Cartagena began a management inquiry to determine whether USSS 

employees solicited prostitutes and to ensure that the protective mission was not 

compromised. The USSS Director relieved 11 employees who allegedly solicited 

prostitutes from their protective assignments in Cartagena. USSS replaced 5 of the 11 

employees and reorganized staff to maintain the integrity of the protective mission. 

USSS placed the 11 employees suspected of soliciting prostitutes on administrative 

leave and suspended their security clearances. USSS’ internal affairs organization, the 

Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspection Division, conducted an investigation. 

Investigative activities included interviewing 232 subjects and witnesses, sending four 

inspectors to Colombia, reviewing thousands of email messages, and administering 14 

polygraph examinations. 

On August 29, 2012, USSS issued a report on its investigative activities through 

May 24, 2012. The report presented a thorough account of employee conduct, and 

concluded that Presidential security, sensitive information, and equipment were not 

compromised in Cartagena. On December 27, 2012, the agency issued a second report 

on the results of its interviews and investigative work conducted after May 24, 2012. 

We received the second report while we were preparing our final report, and 

determined that it did not alter our findings or conclusions. 

USSS subsequently established and issued a directive that reiterated agency 

expectations and policies, and introduced additional guidance regarding briefings, 

supervision, and off-duty activities on foreign trips. The USSS Director also created a 

Professional Reinforcement Working Group to assess USSS’ organizational behavior, 

performance, and accountability. 

We make no recommendations in this report. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-13-24 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

USSS has two primary missions: (1) to safeguard the Nation’s financial infrastructure 

and payment systems and (2) to protect national leaders, visiting heads of state and 

government, designated sites, and high-profile events. USSS employs approximately 

3,200 special agents, 1,300 uniformed officers, and more than 2,000 technical, 

professional, and administrative support personnel. 

In April 2012, USSS staff were preparing for a Presidential visit to Cartagena, Colombia, 

for the Summit of the Americas. The Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Miami Field 

Office is responsible for USSS activities in Colombia. Other managers such as the SAIC of 

the Protective Intelligence Division and the Assistant SAIC of the Presidential Protective 

Division were also present (figure 1). In addition, the Resident Agent in Charge (RAIC) of 

the Bogota, Colombia office was in Cartagena in support of preparations for the 

Presidential visit. 

Figure 1. USSS Chain of Command During the Presidential Visit to Cartagena, 

Colombia, in April 2012 

Source: USSS. 

On April 12, 2012, the Colombian National Police (CNP) received a complaint from a 

prostitute alleging that a patron at the Hotel Caribe, who was a USSS employee, did not 

pay for sexual services she provided. After CNP and USSS personnel were unsuccessful 

at contacting the employee, a discussion concerning payment ensued among CNP 

officers, the prostitute, and USSS personnel outside the room of the alleged solicitor. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The prostitute’s complaint was resolved when two other USSS employees paid the 

complainant. The head of security for Hotel Caribe notified U.S. Embassy personnel 

about the incident. The State Department’s Deputy Regional Security Officer notified 

USSS managers of the incident and that other USSS employees might have solicited 

prostitutes. 

Although prostitution is not specifically addressed in USSS’ standards of conduct, USSS 

officials asserted that solicitation of prostitutes violated standards, which state that 

“employees shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously 

disgraceful conduct or other conduct prejudicial to the [United States] Government.” 

Further, the agency’s standards of conduct state that the absence of a specific, 

published policy covering an act that brings discredit to an employee or USSS does not 

mean the act is condoned, is permissible, or would not call for and result in corrective or 

disciplinary action. USSS employees are expected to adhere to these standards both on 

and off duty. 

In addition, adjudicative guidelines for revoking access to classified information state, in 

part, that sexual behavior is a factor when the behavior may subject the individual to 

coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. All USSS 

employees must maintain eligibility to access classified information at the Top Secret 

level to remain employed. 

Results of Review 

USSS managers must use their discretion to address employee conduct concerns while 

meeting security needs on protective assignments. Managers in Cartagena responded 

appropriately by notifying headquarters promptly about the incident, gathering facts, 

and taking steps to ensure that the protective mission was not compromised. The USSS 

Director relieved employees who allegedly solicited prostitutes from their protective 

assignments in Cartagena. 

Subsequent to the employees’ removal from the protective assignment in Cartagena, 

USSS’ internal affairs organization, the Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), 

Inspection Division (ISP), investigated the alleged solicitation. The investigation was 

consistent with USSS procedures, was conducted quickly, and provided a credible 

account of employee conduct. 

USSS also established and issued a directive that reiterated agency expectations and 

policies, and introduced additional guidance regarding briefings, supervision, and offduty activities on foreign trips. In addition, the USSS Director created a Professional 

Reinforcement Working Group to assess USSS’ organizational behavior, performance, 

and accountability. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

USSS Management in Cartagena Responded Appropriately to Allegations That 

Employees Solicited Prostitutes 

The allegations that USSS employees in Cartagena, Colombia, solicited 

prostitutes prompted a resource-intensive response in Cartagena and at 

headquarters. The Miami SAIC began a management inquiry to determine 

whether USSS employees solicited prostitutes and to ensure that the protective 

mission was not compromised. We determined that the Miami SAIC’s inquiry 

was thorough, given the impending arrival of the President and the need to 

focus on the protective aspects of the visit. 

USSS Management in Cartagena Performed a Management Inquiry 

After the Department of State’s Deputy Regional Security Officer informed USSS 

management in Cartagena of the alleged misconduct, the Miami SAIC instructed 

managers to notify their respective chains of command in the Office of 

Protective Operations and the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. 

The Miami SAIC informed the chain of command in the Office of Investigations of 

the intent to conduct a management inquiry. 

After alerting USSS headquarters, the Miami SAIC began collecting facts 

surrounding the alleged misconduct and identifying individuals who may have 

had prostitutes as guests at the Hotel Caribe. The Miami SAIC did not attempt to 

determine whether USSS employees solicited prostitutes prior to April 11, or at 

other hotels in Cartagena. 

Within an hour of the Miami SAIC learning of the allegations, the Assistant 

Directors of the Office of Investigations and the Office of Protective Operations 

briefed the USSS Director on the incident. The USSS Director contacted the 

Miami SAIC to discuss the incident and potential courses of action. 

The Department of State’s Deputy Regional Security Officer provided USSS 

managers a handwritten note that included names of USSS employees who Hotel 

Caribe personnel believed may have been involved in the alleged solicitation of 

prostitutes. The Miami SAIC instructed USSS logistics officials to verify that the 

names and room numbers matched, and that the individuals were USSS 

employees. However, USSS managers questioned the accuracy of the note 

because one of the individuals listed had been working an all-night shift on 

April 11, and could not have been involved. Hotel Caribe charges registered 

guests a fee for hosting female visitors in their rooms between 11:00 p.m. and 

6:00 a.m. These visitors must register with the front desk and provide 

identification. To determine who might have been involved, the Miami SAIC 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

requested a list of all Government employees who checked an overnight guest 

into their rooms on April 11. This list included the names of 12 USSS employees 

for whom the hotel provided overnight guest registration cards. 

Within 11 hours of learning of the incident at the Hotel Caribe, USSS managers 

had interviewed 12 USSS employees whose room numbers were associated with 

having overnight guests. During these interviews, 11 employees admitted to 

hosting female foreign nationals in their rooms, and 1 employee denied the 

allegation. After reviewing the overnight guest registration and observing that 

the room number had been changed by hand, the Miami SAIC determined that 

this employee did not have a female foreign national in his room. After further 

inquiry with Department of Defense (DOD) officials, the Miami SAIC determined 

that a DOD employee hosting a female guest overnight wrote the USSS 

employee’s room number on the card without the USSS employee’s knowledge 

or consent. The USSS employee resumed his duties in support of the Presidential 

visit. On April 13, 2012, the Miami SAIC sent a message to the Assistant 

Directors of the Office of Investigations and RES that summarized the interviews. 

We determined that the Miami SAIC’s inquiry was thorough and timely, given 

the impending arrival of the President and the need to ensure appropriate 

attention to the protective aspects of the visit. 

USSS Management Took Steps To Ensure That the Protective Mission Was Not 

Compromised 

According to USSS policies, misconduct allegations can result in removing 

employees from their protective assignments, putting them on administrative 

leave, and suspending their clearance. While the inquiry in Cartagena was 

ongoing, the USSS Director ordered the removal of the 11 individuals who 

allegedly solicited prostitutes from their protective assignments and their return 

to the United States. They departed Cartagena on the morning of April 13, less 

than 24 hours after the allegations were made. Because preparations for the 

President’s arrival were near completion at the time of the allegations, 

managers’ efforts to remove the implicated employees from Cartagena did not 

affect the execution of the security plan. USSS replaced 5 of the 11 employees 

and reorganized staff to maintain the integrity of the protective mission. 

Based on information obtained during the inquiry, the USSS managers in 

Cartagena concluded that employee interactions with female foreign nationals 

did not compromise the protective mission. During the inquiry, USSS managers 

concluded that employees did not disclose sensitive information. The employees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

had not received details of the security plan and therefore did not have 

information that could jeopardize the protective mission. 

The Miami SAIC emphasized to staff assisting with the response that the alleged 

misconduct was sensitive and should not be discussed with colleagues. 

Additionally, the Miami SAIC reminded employees supporting the Cartagena 

protective assignment that they were representing the U.S. Government and 

USSS, and must adhere to policies regarding acceptable ethics and conduct. 

USSS Inspection Division Conducted an Administrative Investigation 

On April 13, 2012, ISP initiated an administrative investigation to collect facts 

concerning possible conduct violations by employees in Cartagena and 

determine whether national security or the President’s safety was compromised. 

ISP initiated an administrative investigation since the management inquiry did 

not identify any potential criminal activity. USSS placed the 11 employees 

suspected of soliciting prostitutes on administrative leave and suspended their 

security clearances, which is a standard USSS practice during administrative 

investigations. 

Between April 13 and May 24, 2012, ISP took the following investigative actions: 

•	 Requested a U.S. intelligence agency check for derogatory information on the 

foreign nationals involved in this incident; 

•	 Interviewed 232 subjects and witnesses; 

•	 Sent four inspectors to Colombia; 

•	 Reviewed thousands of email messages; and 

•	 Requested that the Forensic Services Division (FSD) administer 14 polygraph 

examinations. 

On August 29, 2012, USSS issued a report on its investigative activities through 

May 24, 2012. The report presented a thorough account of employee conduct, 

and concluded that Presidential security, sensitive information, and equipment 

were not compromised in Cartagena. On December 27, 2012, the agency issued 

a second report on the results of its interviews and investigative work conducted 

after May 24, 2012. We received the second report while we were preparing our 

final report, and determined that it did not alter our findings or conclusions. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6	 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

USSS Initiated Investigative Activities in Accordance With Departmental 

Policies 

USSS initiated investigative activities in accordance with DHS Management 

Directive 0810.1 and an existing memorandum of understanding between USSS 

and the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The memorandum states that RES 

should initiate an investigation upon receipt of an allegation, and notify OIG’s 

Office of Investigations within 5 business days. OIG’s Office of Investigations will 

then notify ISP if it intends to assume control or become involved in the 

investigation, but absent such notification, ISP maintains full responsibility for 

these investigations. 

USSS received the allegations of misconduct on April 12, 2012, and began an 

investigation the following day. The USSS Director informed the Acting Inspector 

General of the allegations by noon on April 13, 2012. On April 17, 2012, 3 

business days after the incident at the Hotel Caribe, USSS notified OIG’s Office of 

Investigations in writing of its intent to conduct an administrative investigation 

of the alleged misconduct in Cartagena. OIG’s Office of Investigations declined 

to assume control of the investigation but asked to be kept informed of its 

outcome. 

ISP’s Investigative Approach Was Consistent With Internal Procedures 

Solicitation of prostitutes in Cartagena is not a violation of Colombian law. RES 

determined that, consistent with provisions in its Internal Operating Procedures 

Guide, an administrative, rather than a criminal, investigation was the appropriate 

course of action. The guide specifies that in an administrative investigation, 

inspectors are not required to advise employees of their rights before an 

interview. 

Scope 

In the interest of conducting a focused, timely investigation, ISP limited its scope 

to the allegations of solicitation of prostitutes in Cartagena. ISP did not attempt 

to determine whether solicitation of prostitutes is widespread within USSS. 

However, a senior RES manager said that USSS addresses all allegations of 

misconduct, citing as an example a concurrent but separate inquiry into alleged 

solicitation of prostitutes by employees in El Salvador. We determined that the 

investigative scope was appropriate, given the allegations of solicitation of 

prostitutes by employees in Cartagena and the need to provide facts to USSS 

management in a timely manner. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Methodology 

ISP’s strategy was to interview implicated employees to assess the extent and 

nature of the allegations, and determine whether national security or the 

President’s safety were compromised. After ISP managers provided the USSS 

Director with details of the alleged solicitation of prostitution by USSS employees 

in Cartagena, the Director authorized ISP to interview all USSS personnel who 

were in Colombia during the summit. 

To assess whether national security was compromised, USSS asked a U.S. 

intelligence agency to check for derogatory information on the foreign nationals 

involved in this incident. Additionally, USSS asked CNP to conduct a criminal 

records check on the foreign nationals and to check for derogatory information 

on establishments visited by USSS employees. Both the USSS and DHS OIG 

investigative reports concluded that there was no compromise of national 

security. We did not evaluate those efforts. 

To assess ISP’s methodology, we interviewed 3 ISP managers, 17 inspectors, and 

3 support personnel who were involved in the Cartagena investigation. ISP 

employees said that the investigation was consistent with previous internal 

investigations for the following reasons: 

•	 ISP managers provided sufficient guidance; 

•	 The pace of the investigation was fast but did not compromise the quality or 

integrity of ISP’s work; 

•	 Inspectors recused themselves from an interview when their relationship 

with the subject could cause a lack of objectivity; and 

•	 The investigation was fair and impartial. 

ISP’s Investigation Was Expeditious and Thorough 

ISP conducted an expeditious investigation of alleged solicitation of prostitutes 

by its employees in Cartagena. Within 42 days of learning of the alleged 

misconduct, ISP had completed interviews and polygraph examinations, 

reviewed records, and started drafting its initial report of investigation (see 

appendix C). ISP used all of its 24 inspectors, support personnel, and managers. 

ISP canceled a scheduled inspection of the USSS Technical Security Division to 

allocate additional personnel to the Cartagena investigation. Furthermore, ISP 

employees worked extended hours, including weekends, on the investigation. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8	 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ISP’s investigation resulted in subject and witness statements, polygraph 

examination reports, email communications, and hotel records that provide a 

credible account of employee conduct. Subjects of the investigation included: 

•	 Eleven employees who the Miami SAIC determined had guests in their rooms 

at the Hotel Caribe; 

•	 One employee who inspectors in Cartagena determined had a guest in his 

room at the Hilton Hotel, Cartagena (hereafter referred to as “Hilton Hotel”); 

and 

•	 One employee who notified his manager after he returned from Cartagena 

that he had received sexual services in exchange for money at a private 

apartment. 

Interviews of USSS Personnel 

Between April 14 and May 24, 2012, ISP inspectors interviewed all USSS 

personnel in Cartagena for the President’s trip. Inspectors documented all 

interviews of USSS personnel and other witnesses through written sworn 

statements by interviewees, memorandums of interview, or both. 

To ensure that interviews of USSS employees addressed relevant concerns, ISP 

designed different interview templates for personnel implicated in the incident 

from those employees not suspected of misconduct. We analyzed interview 

templates and determined that the questions adequately addressed employee 

conduct, as well as Presidential and national security. ISP inspectors asked USSS 

employees whether: 

• 	 Any misconduct took place; 

• 	 Additional employees solicited prostitutes; 

• 	 Employees disclosed sensitive information; 

• 	 Agency equipment was compromised; and 

• 	 Personnel were familiar with the standards of conduct and procedures for 

reporting a foreign contact. 

Although ISP managers instructed inspectors to follow the templates during 

interviews, they also expected inspectors to ask additional questions when 

appropriate. 

We reviewed all statements written by subjects and witnesses, as well as ISP 

inspectors’ written accounts of the interviews, to assess whether inspectors 

asked relevant questions and documented interviews consistently. Even though 

some interviewees’ written statements did not address interview questions, the 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9	 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

inspectors’ written accounts of interviews typically contained additional 

information or explained why an interviewee was not able to answer all 

questions. 

Investigative Activities in Colombia 

From April 17 through 25, 2012, four inspectors went to Cartagena, Colombia, to 

interview witnesses, assess the establishments where employee misconduct 

originated, and obtain records relevant to the investigation. Inspectors 

interviewed female foreign nationals identified during the management inquiry, 

Hilton Hotel and Hotel Caribe staff, CNP officers, Cartagena law enforcement 

representatives, and U.S. Government employees with potential knowledge of 

the incident. USSS Bogota Resident Office personnel and CNP assisted the ISP 

team. 

One of ISP’s priorities was to interview female foreign nationals involved in the 

incident at the Hotel Caribe. ISP had difficulty locating them and requested 

assistance from CNP officials. Investigators used data from national 

identification cards and health record databases to locate 10 of 12 women 

implicated with USSS employees at the Hotel Caribe. On May 10, 2012, USSS 

located and interviewed another allegedly involved female foreign national in 

Spain. USSS could not locate one female foreign national allegedly involved. ISP 

used information from interviews with the Colombian women to corroborate or 

refute the statements of implicated USSS employees. 

Interviews of Hotel Caribe employees and Colombian police assigned to the 

Hotel Caribe provided useful details about the actions of implicated USSS 

personnel. In addition, interviews with Hilton Hotel staff revealed that another 

USSS employee may have solicited a prostitute. 

Conducting an investigation in a foreign country posed unique challenges. For 

example, interviewing foreign nationals required the use of translators, which, 

according to some inspectors, created communication barriers. Another 

complicating factor was that USSS does not have legal authority to conduct an 

investigation in Colombia. Inspectors relied on CNP officers to coordinate 

investigative activities. Even with their assistance, inspectors depended on 

female foreign nationals’ consent to be interviewed, since prostitution is not 

illegal in Cartagena. In addition, without investigative authority, inspectors were 

unable to obtain records from the Hilton Hotel while in Colombia. However, 

with assistance from the Department of Justice, USSS subsequently obtained 

records of rooms billed to USSS during the summit. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Examination of Email Communications 

Between April 13 and May 9, 2012, inspectors reviewed the USSS email accounts 

of subjects and witnesses. Inspectors coordinated with the USSS Office of 

Technical Development and Mission Support to access the email accounts and 

retrieve information relevant to the investigation. ISP conducted targeted 

searches of employee email communications and identified individual email 

messages that provided additional evidence. 

Polygraph Examinations 

ISP asked FSD to administer national security and specific-issue polygraph tests 

to employees implicated in misconduct. Through these tests, ISP planned to 

determine whether USSS employees compromised the President’s security, 

national security, or sensitive information, and whether the employees provided 

truthful statements to inspectors. Between April 17 and 27, 2012, FSD 

administered 14 polygraph examinations to 10 employees, requiring 22 series.1 

FSD administered polygraph examinations in accordance with USSS and Federal 

guidelines.2

 ISP decided not to pursue polygraph examinations for three 

employees because they were in the process of separating from the agency by 

April 17, 2012. 

We determined that the agency’s use and administration of the polygraph 

examinations were consistent with USSS procedures. Specifically, we evaluated 

their compliance with the following processes: 

• Initiation of a polygraph examination; 

• Polygraph equipment and facilities; 

• Administration of polygraph examinations; 

• Polygraph program quality control; and 

• Retention of polygraph examination files. 

USSS polygraph guidelines state that, prior to administering polygraph 

examinations, inspectors should attempt to exhaust all feasible investigative 

leads; have a strong working knowledge of the case details; thoroughly interview 

the subjects; and collect sworn statements, when possible. Although ISP had not 

exhausted all investigative leads when FSD administered the examinations, ISP 

1

 A series is the collection of the required polygraph chart(s) for a particular examination. Multiple series 


may be required to complete one examination.
 2

 The USSS Polygraph Program Operating Procedures, June 2007, and the National Center for Credibility
 

and Assessment Federal Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (Polygraph) Examiner Handbook, 


December 2011.
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

interviewed subjects and obtained sworn statements prior to examinations in 

accordance with USSS polygraph guidelines. Inspectors provided examiners with 

sworn statements prior to examinations. 

We interviewed 2 USSS Polygraph Program managers and 14 examiners who 

were involved with the polygraph examinations. Seven examiners suggested 

that the timing of the polygraph examinations was unusual because ISP had not 

exhausted all investigative leads at that time, but all examiners asserted that 

polygraph examinations followed standard procedures and were performed with 

integrity and professionalism. USSS officials explained they prioritized polygraph 

examinations to identify potential national security threats. 

We also asked the National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA), a DOD 

agency that trains polygraph examiners and provides oversight of Federal 

polygraph programs, to assess USSS’ polygraph examinations. NCCA determined 

that polygraph testing protocols, procedures, and test question construction 

were consistent with Federal polygraph standards. 

NCCA concurred with 19 of the 22 series. However, NCCA could not support 

USSS’ conclusions in three series involving three employees. In each case, 

NCCA’s independent scoring changed a definitive decision by USSS, whether 

truthful or deceptive, to “no opinion.”3

 Table 1 lists the scoring differences 

between USSS and NCCA: 

Table 1. Polygraph Scoring Discrepancies Between USSS and NCCA 

Examination Series Type USSS Decision NCCA Decision 

Employee 1 National Security No Deception Indicated No Opinion 

Employee 2 National Security Deception Indicated No Opinion 

Employee 3 National Security No Deception Indicated No Opinion 

Source: NCCA. 

For employees 1 and 2, NCCA’s evaluation of examination data resulted in a 

different decision from that of USSS because of differences in scoring 

methodologies and interpretation of data by NCCA subject matter experts. 

Although the USSS scoring methodology differed from that of NCCA, NCCA 

determined that the USSS scoring methodology was consistent with Federal 

polygraph standards. NCCA said that these minor discrepancies are not 

indicative of problems with the examination, but rather differences of opinion 

during the subjective polygraph scoring process. NCCA determined that 

employee 3’s physiology was too poor to assign a score to the data collected 

3

 “No opinion” is the term used when a conclusive decision on physiological data cannot be rendered. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

during the examination, necessitating a “no opinion.” 

USSS Revised Policies and Changed Supervision Staffing on Protective Visits 

On April 27, 2012, in response to alleged misconduct by employees in Cartagena, 

Colombia, the USSS Deputy Director issued a directive reiterating existing 

expectations and policies and introducing additional guidance. The short 

amount of time this guidance has been in effect, and concurrent work by our 

Office of Investigations, limited our ability to fully assess its effectiveness. The 

USSS Director also created a Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group to 

assess USSS’ organizational behavior, performance, and accountability. 

New Directive Further Restricts Off-Duty Activities 

In response to the Cartagena incident, the USSS Deputy Director issued a 

directive addressing personal and professional conduct. This directive amends 

USSS standards of conduct with additional guidance and policies regarding offduty conduct, briefings, and supervision on foreign trips. In addition, the 

directive restates that the absence of a specific, published standard of conduct 

covering an act or behavior does not mean that the act is condoned, is 

permissible, or will not result in corrective or disciplinary action. Prior to 

issuance of the directive, USSS employees were subject to USSS and Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct standards, as well as Federal guidelines for 

all employees of the executive branch. These policies state that employees shall 

not engage in infamous or disgraceful conduct and have a standard of personal 

behavior that reflects positively upon and will be a credit to both employees and 

the Government. 

While in Cartagena, employees were accused of soliciting prostitutes and having 

them as guests in their hotel rooms, consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, 

and patronizing questionable local establishments while off duty. To address 

this alleged conduct, the directive amended standards of conduct to include the 

following: 

•	 A prohibition on foreign nationals entering employees’ hotel rooms, 

excluding hotel staff and official counterparts; 

•	 A mandate that, on official travel, alcohol may be consumed only in 

moderate amounts while off duty; 

•	 An extension of the period before duty that employees must abstain from 

alcohol from 6 to 10 hours; 

•	 A prohibition on the consumption of alcohol at the protectee hotel once the 

protectee arrives in the country; 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13	 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 A prohibition on patronizing nonreputable establishments; and 

•	 An application of the laws of the United States to USSS personnel while 

abroad. 

The directive prohibits access to “nonreputable establishments.” Several 

interviewees expressed concern that the directive does not clearly define what 

constitutes a “nonreputable establishment.” 

USSS Elevated Supervision and Intensified Briefings To Reinforce Conduct and 

Safety 

Prior to the new directive, two employees at the General Schedule (GS)-14 pay 

grade supervised personnel traveling to foreign protective assignments. In 

Cartagena, these supervisors were alleged to have solicited prostitutes. Policy 

now requires that supervisors of personnel traveling to foreign protective 

assignments be GS-15 supervisors—one from RES and one from a field office. 

The directive also requires that these supervisors brief personnel on standards of 

conduct prior to departure to the foreign country, and enforce these standards 

while in the foreign country. Standards of conduct briefings will be conducted 

for all domestic and foreign protective assignments and high-profile events. In 

addition, all personnel traveling abroad must complete relevant ethics training to 

be eligible for protective travel. 

USSS officials expressed concern that the nine GS-15 inspectors in RES are not 

sufficient to staff all foreign protective assignments and fulfill their internal 

affairs role. Another concern expressed was that a GS-15 would not be an 

effective deterrent against misconduct, given that the supervisor cannot feasibly 

enforce standards of conduct for all USSS employees associated with the visit. 

The GS-15 inspectors have a demanding role at a command center, working as 

many as 16 hours per day, which may prevent them from enforcing standards of 

conduct for employees with other protective assignments and duty hours. In 

addition, it is unclear whether the supervisor will have time to respond to 

misconduct while fulfilling security-related duties. 

To ensure that all employees are aware of the local laws and customs upon 

arrival in a foreign country, the directive requires the USSS Security Clearance 

Division to provide country-specific briefings covering pertinent topics prior to 

departure to the foreign country. In addition, the directive states that the 

Department of State Regional Security Officer will work with USSS to provide 

intensified country-specific briefings upon arrival in a foreign country. The 

briefings will update personnel on safety issues, zones and establishments that 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14	 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

are off limits to USSS personnel, and any country-specific rules imposed by the 

U.S. Ambassador in the country. 

Even with the help of Department of State personnel to identify reputable 

establishments, misconduct can occur in any location. For example, one club 

where employees allegedly solicited prostitutes was considered a reputable 

establishment. Therefore, USSS employees must still use their judgment to 

ensure that they do not discredit themselves or the U.S. Government. 

USSS Established a Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group 

In May 2012, the USSS Director established the Professionalism Reinforcement 

Working Group to assemble objective senior Government officials to examine 

the agency’s organizational behavior, performance, and accountability. The 

group planned to review USSS’ internal controls on professional conduct. It also 

planned to benchmark the agency against the best practices of peer 

organizations to identify areas where USSS is successful or in need of 

improvement. 

The group is cochaired by the Directors of the Office of Personnel Management 

and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and has senior representatives 

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DOD, and USSS. The USSS Director 

requested a report within 90 days of the group’s establishment. 

The group reviewed USSS’ policies and standards of conduct, internal controls, 

patterns of discipline related to misconduct, and ethics training. In addition, 

through interviews and literature review, the group identified best practices at 

peer components and agencies such as U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, DOD’s Joint Special Operations 

Command, and the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The DHS OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107­

296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of 

audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities 

to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

OIG’s Office of Inspections reviewed USSS’ efforts to investigate alleged solicitation of 

prostitutes by its employees during preparations for a Presidential visit to Cartagena, 

Colombia, for the 2012 Summit of the Americas. Our objectives were to determine 

(1) the adequacy of USSS’ response to the incident in Colombia; (2) the adequacy of the 

scope, methodology, and conclusions of its investigation; and (3) the sufficiency of 

corrective actions taken or planned. On May 23, 2012, Senators Joseph Lieberman and 

Susan Collins asked the Acting Inspector General to conduct an independent 

investigation into misconduct by USSS employees in Colombia. DHS OIG conducted the 

investigation concurrent with our review. 

To accomplish objectives 1 and 2, we interviewed USSS personnel responsible for 

responding to and investigating the alleged misconduct. We compared USSS internal 

investigation procedures with the execution of this investigation. In addition, we 

observed selected ISP interviews and reviewed ISP investigative files, including interview 

statements, polygraph examination reports, email communication, and hotel records. 

We compared ISP investigative files with USSS’ initial report of investigation. We 

enlisted NCCA, a DOD agency responsible for training polygraph examiners and 

overseeing Federal polygraph programs, to assess the USSS polygraph examinations. To 

avoid interfering with the OIG’s investigation, we did not interview USSS officials 

regarding its reports of investigation or evaluate USSS’ efforts to determine whether 

there was a compromise of national security. However, the OIG’s investigative report 

concluded that there was no compromise of national security. 

To accomplish objective 3, we reviewed new conduct guidance. USSS issued the 

guidance on April 27, 2012. At the conclusion of our fieldwork, the guidance had not 

been in effect for a period long enough to assess its sufficiency. 

We conducted fieldwork from May to September 2012. We conducted this review 

under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-13-24 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

urit.y 

* 

U.S. Department of Hom~hHld Sec

UNT1'ED STATES SECRET SERVlCE 

Washing/on. D.C. 20223 DIRECTOR 

December 26, 2012 

The Honorable Charles K. Edwards 

Acting Inspector General 

Office of the Inspector General 

Depa rtment of Homeland Security 

Washington, D.C. 20528 

Re: Draft Report titled "Adequ<!cy of USSS' Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in 

Cartagena, Colombia," DIG Project Number 12-14B-ISP-USSS 

Dei3r Mr. Edwards: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The u.s. Secret Seruice 

(USSS) appreciates the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) positive acknowledgement regarding our 

investigation of this incident. 

We are pleased t o note that the DIG's review of our investigation fo und that the USSS acted 

e)(peditiously, appropriately, and professionally in its investigation of its employees and their actions in 

Cartagena, Colombia. Please know that I remain committed to ensuring that every USSS employee 

respects, recognizes, and understands their responsibi lities in regard to personal and professional 

conduct. 

Although the report does not contain recommendations, it does recognize our progress thus far in 

strengthening policy guidance, providing more comprehensive briefings for foreign trips, and 

restructuring superviSion during foreign trips. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical comments 

and a sensitivity request have been provided under separate cover. We look forwa rd to continuing this 

work with a cooperative spirit in the future . 

Sincerely, 

Mark Sullivan 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-13-24 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Timeline of Events 

APRIL 2012 

Apr 11-12: 11 em ployees 1-__ Apr 12-13: Miami SAIC bring female foreign conducts initial inquiry into nationals to their hotel 

of misconduct rooms, some of who 

were prostitutes Apr 13: 11 employees return 

to US from Ca a 

Apr 14: RES Inspectors 

interview 11 employees Apr 17: USSS provides written 

notification to GIG; 

Apr 17-25: GIG declines to Apr 17-27: 

Inspectors Specific I Apr 17: USSS requests 

conduct and National intelligence checks on involved 

fieldwork in Security foreign nationals 

Cartagena polygraphs 

conducted Apr 18-

Apr 19: A 12th May 24: 

employee is RES Inspectors 

implicated and interview all 

a 13th employees on 

self-reports assignment in 

Cartagena 

MAY 2012 May 15: RES requests 2 

additional intelligence 

community checks 

AUGUST 2012 

Aug 29: RES issues report of 

investigative activity through 

May 24 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-13-24 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Major Contributors to This Report 

William McCarron, Chief Inspector 

Paul H. Bergstrand, Lead Inspector 

Karen Cottrell, Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

Kimberley Lake de Pulla, Senior Inspector 

Tatyana Martell, Senior Inspector 

Pharyn Smith, Senior Inspector 

Nicholas Ketter, Inspector 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-13-24 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

USSS Liaison 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-13-24 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To expedite the reporting of alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any 

other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) programs and operations, please visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov 

and click on the red tab titled "Hotline" to report. You will be directed to complete and 

submit an automated DHS OIG Investigative Referral Submission Form. Submission 

through our website ensures that your complaint will be promptly received and 

reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: DHS Office of Inspector General, Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline, 245 

Murray Drive, SW, Building 410/Mail Stop 2600, Washington, DC, 20528; or you may 

call 1 (800) 323-8603; or fax it directly to us at (202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.