IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

LAJUANNA I. JOHNSON, et al., : 

 : Case No. 2:11-CV-1130 

 Plaintiffs, : 

 : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 v. : 

 : Magistrate Judge King 

CHEEK LAW OFFICES, LLC, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

OPINION & ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for an Award of 

Attorney Fees (Doc. 52) (hereinafter, the “Supplemental Motion”) and Plaintiff’s Summary of 

Time Relating to Attorney Fees for Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion (Doc. 54). In February 

2013, Plaintiffs and Defendants reached a settlement of all class claims brought pursuant to the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act 

(“OCSPA”). (See Doc. 38-1). By the terms of the Class Action Settlement Agreement and 

Release (the “Settlement Agreement”), “Defendants agree[d] that the Action has been successful 

for the Class representatives and the Class members within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692K.” 

(Id. at 8). Plaintiffs move the court for a supplemental fee award against Defendants in the 

amount of $6,090.00.1

 For the reasons set forth below, the Court AWARDS Plaintiffs $6,090.00

in supplemental attorney fees. 

                                                            

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 Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion requests $6,125.00 in supplemental fees. (See Doc. 52 at 2). Plaintiffs’ Summary 

of Time Relating to Attorney Fees for Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion (Doc. 54), however, reduces the amount of 

hours worked by Mr. Freytag by 0.10 hours, (see Doc. 54-2), reducing the total number of hours worked by both 

attorneys from 17.50 to 17.40. Thus, the overall supplemental fee request is reduced from $6,125.00 to $6,090.00 

(17.40 multiplied by $350/hr). 

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II. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs brought this action based on Defendants previous action in suing Plaintiffs in 

Franklin County, Ohio, to recover debts secured by promissory notes. Plaintiffs alleged that they 

neither signed the notes in Franklin County nor resided there at the time Defendants commenced 

the suits or post-judgment collection proceedings there, in violation of the FDCPA and OCSPA. 

Defendants placed a forum selection clause in the Notes that stated that “[t]his Agreement is 

entered into in Columbus, Ohio on [date] and any law suit filed to enforce this Agreement shall 

be venued in Franklin County, Ohio.” (Doc. 2 at 16). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants 

employed the forum selection clause to circumvent the plain requirements of the FDCPA venue 

mandate by misrepresenting the material circumstances of the transaction. (Id. at 15-18). 

 The Parties agreed to a settlement in early 2013, and they submitted the Settlement 

Agreement for preliminary approval on February 21, 2013. (Doc. 38-1). The Court held a 

Fairness Hearing on the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on October 22, 2013. 

(See Doc. 40). 

 Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendants agreed to “pay Attorneys’ Fees to 

Class Counsel in an amount either awarded by the Court or otherwise agreed to by the Settling 

parties.” (Id. at 8). The parties were unable to come to an agreement regarding attorney fees, 

however, and on October 15, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, (Doc. 

45), for the period through October 14, 2013. Plaintiffs moved the Court to award fees in the 

amount of $36,415 and costs in the amount of $391.01. (Doc. 45 at 11-12). On May 8, 2014, 

after consideration of the parties’ arguments presented to the Court at a Fairness Hearing and 

through the parties’ briefing, this Court ordered an award in the amount of $35,455 in attorney 

fees and $391.01 in costs to Plaintiffs. (Opinion and Order, Doc. 51). 

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In their Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, Plaintiffs’ informed the Court of its 

intention to file a supplemental request for additional attorney fees for additional time counsel 

expected to spend on the case, including: filing a reply memorandum in support of this motion, 

preparing for and attending the fairness hearing, responding to Class Members’ questions 

regarding the checks they receive, and distributing the cy pres award. (Doc. 51 at12). 

Plaintiffs now ask the Court to award an additional $6,090.00 in attorney fees for the 

period of October 15, 2013 through May 23, 2014. Plaintiffs assert that its counsel, Edward A. 

Icove, spent a total of 10.70 hours of attorney time on this case from October 15, 2013 through 

May 23, 2014, with 1.80 hours spent on work related to attorney fees. Attorney Daniel R. 

Freytag spent a total of 6.70 hours of attorney time in the same time period, with 0.70 hours 

spent on work related to attorney fees. (Doc. 54; Doc. 54-1; Doc. 54-2). Thus, in total, Plaintiffs 

request attorney fees for an additional 17.40 hours of work. Each attorney charged a rate of 

$350.00 per hour, for a total supplemental fee request of $6,090.00. Defendants did not respond 

to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion. Therefore, the matter is ripe for review. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The FDCPA mandates the award of “a reasonable attorney's fee” and costs to a prevailing 

party. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Lee v. Thomas & Thomas, 109 F.3d 302, 307 (6th Cir. 

1997). A reasonable fee is one that is “adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel yet 

which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.” Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 

2004) (internal quotes omitted). Determining a reasonable fee begins with calculating the 

product of “a reasonable hourly rate” and “the number of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This product has come to be known 

as the “lodestar.” Garner v. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, 554 F.3d 624, 642 (6th Cir. 

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2009). There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar “represents a ‘reasonable’ fee.” 

Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). The 

inquiry, however, does not end with calculation of the lodestar. Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning 

Contractors Pension Plan v. Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995). The 

Court has the discretion to adjust the award depending on a plaintiff’s success, the complexity of 

the case, and the risk of recovery. Id. 

 A district court has “broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly 

rate for an attorney.” Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir. 1994). A useful 

guideline in determining a reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing market rate [ ] in the relevant 

community,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), defined as “that rate which lawyers of 

comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command,” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of 

Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 2000). “The appropriate rate . . . is not necessarily the 

exact value sought by a particular firm, but is rather the market rate . . . .” Gonter v. Hunt Valve 

Co., 510 F.3d 610, 618 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 653 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (“Paying counsel in FDCPA cases at rates lower than those they can obtain in the 

marketplace is inconsistent with the congressional desire to enforce the FDCPA through private 

actions, and therefore misapplies the law.”). A court may rely on an attorney’s customary billing 

rate, Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1995), and the court’s knowledge of local 

billing practices to determine whether counsel’s fees fall “well within the range of 

reasonableness.” Dowling v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 320 F. App’x. 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Setting hourly rates solely based on rates awarded in prior cases, however, “has the 

[impermissible] effect of capping attorney’s fees.” Id. 

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 The recovery of fees for time spent preparing a party’s request for attorney’s fees is 

legitimate. See, e.g., Auto Alliance Int’l, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 155 Fed. Appx. 

226, 229 (6th Cir. 2005); Weisenberger v. Heucker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979). The 

Sixth Circuit’s “general rule is that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, the ‘fees for fees’ 

recovery should not exceed three percent of the hours in the main case which is decided without 

trial.” Auto Alliance Int’l, Inc., 155 Fed. Appx. at 229 (citing Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 

146, 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 620 (6th Cir. 

2007) (same). As the Sixth Circuit instructs in Coulter, the three-percent limitation is “necessary 

to insure that the compensation from the attorney fee case will not be out of proportion to the 

main case and encourage protracted litigation.” Coulter, 805 F.2d at 151. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiffs petition the Court for $6,090.00 in supplemental attorney fees. Plaintiffs ask 

the Court to award $2,345 for Daniel R. Freytag’s work (6.70 hours at an hourly billing rate of 

$350/hr) and $3,745.00 for Edward A. Icove’s work (10.70 hours at an hourly billing rate of 

$350/hr). (Doc. 54-1; Doc. 54-2). Of the total $6,090.00 award requested, $875.00 is sought for 

a total of 2.5 hours of work related to the recovery of attorney fees. In determining the proper 

fee award, the Court must first calculate the lodestar and then determine whether to adjust this 

figure. 

A. Billing Rates 

 In this case, this Court has previously determined the lodestar rate for each of the two 

attorneys here, taking into consideration the market rate for attorneys with comparable skill and 

experience, as well as other “indicia of reasonableness” that have been approved by the United 

States Supreme Court. (See generally Doc. 51). 

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With respect to Mr. Freytag, the Court considered his level of experience, customary 

billing rates, the challenges of successfully concluding a class action suit under the FDCPA and 

OCSPA, and the Court’s knowledge of billing rates in the community to determine that a rate of 

$350 per hour is well within the range of reasonableness for similarly skilled litigators. (Doc. 51 

at 5). Similarly, with respect to Mr. Icove, the Court considered his experience, his clients’ 

award history in federal court, and the Court’s knowledge of billing rates in this community to 

determine that a rate of $350/hr is consistent with the evidence in this case and within the range 

of reasonableness of similarly skilled litigators. (Doc. 51 at 6). The Court incorporates herein 

the complete reasoning and analysis from its Opinion and Order, (Doc. 51), determining the 

reasonableness of the billing rates for Mr. Freytag and Mr. Icove, respectively. 

B. Lodestar Amount 

Mr. Freytag submits billing for 6.70 hours. Mr. Freytag’s billing rate of $350/hr 

multiplied by his 6.70 billed hours yields a fee of $2,345.00. Mr. Icove submits billing for 10.70 

hours. A rate for Mr. Icove of $350/hr multiplied by his 10.70 billed hours yields a fee of 

$3,745.00. Therefore, the lodestar for this matter is $6,090.00. The Court must now determine 

whether any downward adjustment to the lodestar figure is warranted. 

C. Recovery of “Fees for Fees” 

Because Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion seeks, in part, the recovery of fees for time 

related to preparation of Plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions, the request is subject to the Sixth 

Circuit’s general rule that, absent unusual circumstances, “fees for fees” recovery should not 

exceed three percent of the hours in the main case which is decided without trial. See, e.g., Auto 

Alliance Int’l, Inc., 155 Fed. Appx. at 229 (citing Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 151, 152 

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(6th Cir. 1986)); see also Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 620 (6th Cir. 2007); 

Weisenberger v. Heucker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979). 

The total number of attorney work hours in the main case, for which the Court previously 

allowed recovery of fees (see Doc. 51), was 101.3 hours (19.2 hours for Mr. Icove’s work; 82.1 

hours for Mr. Freytag’s work). Three percent of 101.3 is 3.039. Plaintiffs here have not 

presented any “unusual circumstances” warranting an exception to the Sixth Circuit’s general 

rule regarding “fees for fees” requests. See Auto Alliance Int’l, Inc., 155 Fed. Appx. at 229. 

Thus, Plaintiffs may recover for a maximum of 3.039 hours for the attorneys’ “fees for fees” 

work in this case. 

Plaintiffs request 1.8 hours for Mr. Icove’s “fees for fees” work and 0.7 hours for Mr. 

Freytag’s “fees for fees” work, for a total of 2.5 hours. Because the requested amount does not 

exceed three percent of the total hours spent in the main case, no adjustment by the Court is 

required on this basis. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney fees for the entire amount 

of time spent preparing Plaintiffs’ requests for attorney fees identified in Plaintiffs’ Summary of 

Time Relating to Attorney Fees for Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion (Doc. 54, Doc. 54-1, Doc. 

54-2). 

Defendants have not challenged any of the hours submitted by Plaintiffs, nor have they 

requested downward adjustment of the lodestar amount on any other basis. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the lodestar is a reasonable measure 

of Plaintiffs’ attorney fees and no downward adjustment of the lodestar amount is necessary. 

Thus, the Court hereby ORDERS a supplemental award in the amount of $6090.00 in attorney 

fees to Plaintiffs. This case is hereby CLOSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

DATED: February 10, 2015 

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