IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

PATTY L. SHACKLEFORD, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-398 

 Judge Graham 

 Magistrate Judge King 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. Background 

This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income. This matter is now before 

the Court on Plaintiff’s, Patty L. Shackleford’s, Statement of Errors 

(“Statement of Errors”), Doc. No. 13, the Defendant’s Memorandum in 

Opposition (“Commissioner’s Response”), Doc. No. 18, and Plaintiff’s, 

Patty L. Shackleford, Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition, 

Doc. No. 19. 

 Plaintiff Patty Shackleford filed applications for benefits on 

November 6, 2008, alleging that she has been disabled since September 

11, 2008. PAGEID 62, 221, 228. The applications were denied 

initially and upon reconsideration, and plaintiff requested a de novo 

hearing before an administrative law judge. 

 An administrative hearing was held on January 31, 2011, at which 

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plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did 

Richard P. Oestreich, Ph.D., who testified as a vocational expert. 

PAGEID 62, 85. In a decision dated April 19, 2011, the administrative 

law judge concluded that plaintiff was not disabled from November 6, 

2008, through the date of the administrative decision. PAGEID 77. 

That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security when the Appeals Council declined review on March 17, 2012. 

PAGEID 54. 

 Plaintiff was 48 years of age on the date of the administrative 

law judge’s decision. See PAGEID 76, 221. She has at least a high 

school education, is able to communicate in English, and has past 

relevant work as a factory assembler. PAGEID 76. Plaintiff was last 

insured for purposes of disability insurance benefits on December 31, 

2010. PAGEID 62. She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since September 11, 2008, her alleged onset date. PAGEID 64. 

II. Medical Evidence1

 Plaintiff presented at an emergency room in November 2006 for 

complaints of right knee pain of four days’ duration. PAGEID 392. 

Examination of the knee revealed some tenderness, but no effusion, 

palpable cords, warmth, swelling, or induration. PAGEID 393. An xray showed mild degenerative changes in the right knee with no acute 

abnormality. PAGEID 394. Plaintiff left the hospital prior to 

completing treatment. Id. 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors challenges the administrative law judge’s 

evaluation of Listing 1.02A, the administrative law judge’s residual 

functional capacity assessment, and the administrative law judge’s alleged 

failure to follow the treating physician rule when evaluating Dr. Hamill’s 

opinion. The Court will therefore limit its discussion to those issues. 

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In June 2007, plaintiff was transported to the emergency room 

due to “rather inflammatory behavior” after a domestic incident and 

altercation with the police. PAGEID 384-389. Plaintiff reported, 

among other things, that she had been stressed about raising her 

grandchildren. PAGEID 387. Clinical findings included full range of 

motion and no restriction of movement in her extremities. PAGEID 384. 

She was discharged after a psychiatric consultation found no risk of 

injury to herself or others. PAGEID 386. 

Jeffrey Lobel, M.D., saw plaintiff in February 2008 for 

complaints of low back pain that occasionally radiated to the anterior 

thighs. PAGEID 435-36. Upon physical examination, plaintiff was 

“able to ambulate without difficulty;” she was able to pick up a 

grandchild who had accompanied her to the appointment. Id. Plaintiff 

declined to be evaluated by a pain service for possible injections and 

opted to continue to treat with her chiropractor. Id. 

On June 4, 2008, plaintiff complained to W. Bradley Strauch, 

M.D., of right knee pain, especially with stairs. PAGEID 432-33. Dr. 

Strauch noted “no instability,” id., and diagnosed right quadriceps 

tendonitis. Plaintiff refused physical therapy. Id. Plaintiff was 

fitted for a knee brace and was instructed to start general stretching 

exercises. Id. In a July 23, 2008 follow up appointment, plaintiff 

reported pain a few days a week with activity. Dr. Strauch diagnosed 

right patellofemoral knee pain and right patellar tendonitis. PAGEID

431. Plaintiff refused corticosteroid injections and physical therapy. 

Id. 

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Plaintiff treated with Ellis Frazier, M.D., a family practice 

specialist, between February 2007 and July 2010. PAGEID 446-58, 505-

06, 599, 601, 674, 754, 756, 758, 778. Plaintiff reported knee pain 

on at least eight occasions. See id. In September 2007, March 2008, 

and August 2008, plaintiff reported that she was the “primary support 

for” and caretaker of her grandchildren. PAGEID 449, 451, 453. In 

January 2008, plaintiff reported difficulty with activities of daily 

living; she could sit for only 20 minutes. PAGEID 453. However, she 

reported in November 2008 that she walked several times per day. 

PAGEID 446-49. 

 Plaintiff treated with Christopher F. Hyer, DPM, FACFAS, on June 

10, 2008 for bilateral plantar pain. PAGEID 429. Dr. Hyer diagnosed 

fibromyalgia, bilateral metatarsalgia, bilateral pes planovalgus 

deformity, and bilateral post tib tendon insufficiency. PAGEID 430. 

Dr. Hyer prescribed a custom orthotic and opined that plaintiff would 

probably experience a permanent degree of baseline pain in her feet. 

Id. 

 An October 15, 2008 MRI of plaintiff’s right knee showed highgrade patellofemoral chondromalacia and mild medial capsulitis without 

internal derangement such as meniscal or cruciate tear. PAGEID 577. 

The findings were not substantially changed from a December 2006 

study. Id. 

 J. Mark Hamill, M.D., first began psychiatric treatment of 

plaintiff on December 4, 2008. PAGEID 478-84. Dr. Hamill noted manic 

symptoms; plaintiff also reported seeing ghosts and hearing voices. 

PAGEID 483-84. Dr. Hamill diagnosed bipolar disorder, manic, severe 

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with psychotic features, and r/o schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 

type. Id. 

 Plaintiff reported knee pain and difficulty with prolonged 

standing, walking, and sitting to James J. Sardo, M.D., in December 

2008. PAGEID 517-20. Her gait was antalgic, favoring the right lower 

extremity. PAGEID 593. 

 Plaintiff began treating with Charles M. Fields, M.D., and Ryan 

T. Bunch, D.O., in October 2008 for right knee pain of approximately 

one year’s duration. PAGEID 540-43. Plaintiff walked with an 

antalgic gait. PAGEID 543. Dr. Bunch performed a surgical 

arthroscopy of the right knee with chondroplasty and abrasion 

arthrosplasty of the patella on January 19, 2009. PAGEID 521. 

Plaintiff was diagnosed both pre- and post-operatively with 

osteoarthritis right knee. Id. She demonstrated a steady gait on 

January 30, 2009. PAGEID 589. In a February 3, 2009 postoperative 

follow-up with Dr. Fields, plaintiff stated that “she is doing 

reasonably well after surgery.” PAGEID 541. Although she still 

experienced discomfort, it was improved. She walked with a normal 

gait. Id. 

On February 5, 2009, plaintiff reported to Dr. Fields that she 

had re-injured her knee. She rated her pain as a ten on a ten-point 

scale. Id. Dr. Fields diagnosed chondromalacia patella and patella 

femoral arthritis and administered a synvisc injection. Id. On 

February 12, 2009, plaintiff reported that the injection had not 

alleviated her pain and that her knee inhibited her ability to walk. 

Id. Dr. Fields noted an antalgic gait. Id. 

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On February 19, 2009, plaintiff reported to Dr. Bunch that her 

knee pain, which had lasted for approximately eight months, interfered 

with her activities of daily living and ambulation. PAGEID 538-39, 

554-55. Upon examination, there was “tenderness [to] palpation about 

the right knee primarily in the anterior aspect. There is a 2+ 

effusion. There is crepitus under the patella with range of motion” 

and pain with patellar compression. Id. 

Dr. Bunch performed a patellofemoral replacement of the right 

knee on February 23, 2009. PAGEID 557-58. Plaintiff was diagnosed, 

before and after the surgery, with severe osteoarthritis of the right 

patellofemoral joint. Id. On March 6, 2009, plaintiff reported doing 

well postoperatively: she was able to ambulate without difficulty; she 

had occasional pain at night but no other complaints. PAGEID 540. On 

March 30, 2009, there was no evidence of effusion and her gait was 

mildly antalgic. PAGEID 572. On April 2, 2009, plaintiff reported 

doing very well postoperatively, with improving pain symptoms, but 

“some mild discomfort with strenuous activities.” Id. June 3, 2009 

x-rays of plaintiff’s knee were satisfactory; she demonstrated 

excellent range of motion. Id. On October 8, 2009, plaintiff 

reported that her “right knee is feeling significantly better,” but 

that she was having pain after a fall. PAGEID 740-41. On October 29, 

2009, plaintiff complained to Dr. Bunch of shoulder pain, but “no 

other complaints.” PAGEID 741. Dr. Bunch noted on October 8, October 

29, and November 5, 2009 that plaintiff walked with a normal gait. 

PAGEID 740-41. On November 5, 2009, Dr. Bunch decided to “not proceed 

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with treatment” due to “the resolution of [plaintiff’s] symptoms.” 

PAGEID 740. 

On December 31, 2009, plaintiff fell out of a U-Haul truck “after 

having tried to help her daughter quickly move out of” her home for 14 

hours. See PAGEID 751, 756. Plaintiff “was doing okay and feeling 

fairly well [until] she fell and injured herself.” PAGEID 756. 

At an office visit with Dr. Bunch on January 5, 2010, plaintiff 

complained of “occasional intermittent pain with the right knee 

particularly with climbing stairs.” PAGEID 749. Dr. Bunch noted that 

plaintiff “walks with a normal gait.” He administered an injection of 

DepoMedrol. Id. 

Plaintiff continued to treat with Dr. Hamill, her psychiatrist, 

through at least September 2010. PAGEID 646-47, 684, 745-46, 789. On 

March 18, 2009, plaintiff reporting trying to help her daughter with 

child care and being unable to stand and cook. PAGEID 647. On April 

27, 2009, plaintiff reporting “doing the walking” and was “making 

progress since her knee surgery.” PAGEID 645. She had also been 

walking six blocks to “pay court costs at the rate of $5.00 a month.” 

Id. In August 2009, plaintiff reported that she was still hearing 

voices, but was doing better overall. PAGEID 684. Dr. Hamill noted 

that plaintiff seemed anxious. Id. On October 22, 2009, Dr. Hamill 

commented: “It turns out [plaintiff] is not psychotic but life has 

been quite stressful and chaotic lately. Given the circumstances she 

seems to be handling it well.” PAGEID 746. On January 24, 2010, 

plaintiff reported that her mood was good. Dr. Hamill noted no 

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psychotic symptoms and no suicidal or homicidal ideation. According 

to Dr. Hamill, plaintiff “looks like she is doing well.” PAGEID 745. 

On June 29, 2009, Marianne Collins, Ph.D., reviewed the record 

and completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment and a 

psychiatric review technique form at the request of the state agency. 

PAGEID 656-73. According to Dr. Collins, plaintiff had moderate 

restrictions in activities of daily living and moderate difficulties 

in maintaining social functioning and in maintaining concentration, 

persistence, or pace. PAGEID 666. Plaintiff was not significantly 

limited in 14 of 20 areas of mental functioning and was moderately 

limited in the following six areas: (1) the ability to understand and 

remember detailed instructions, (2) the ability to carry out detailed 

instructions, (3) the ability to maintain attention and concentration 

for extended periods, (4) the ability to complete a normal workday and 

workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and 

to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and 

length of rest periods, (5) the ability to interact appropriately with 

the general public, and (6) the ability to respond appropriately to 

changes in the work setting. PAGEID 670-71. 

On July 23, 2009, Dr. Hamill completed a mental impairment 

questionnaire. PAGEID 677-83. According to Dr. Hamill, plaintiff had 

“some trouble with comprehension and memory,” she has “difficulty 

thinking or concentrating,” and “extreme” “[d]ifficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace.” PAGEID 679, 81. He 

opined that plaintiff was seriously limited in, but not precluded 

from, (1) maintaining attention for a two hour segment, (2) sustaining 

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an ordinary routine without special supervision, (3) working in 

coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly 

distracted, (4) getting along with co-workers or peers without unduly 

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, (5) responding 

appropriately to changes in routine work setting, (6) dealing with 

normal work stress, and (7) understanding and remembering detailed 

instructions. PAGEID 679-80. Plaintiff was unable to meet 

competitive standards in (1) her ability to maintain regular 

attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict 

tolerances, (2) complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and (3) to carry 

out detailed instructions. Id. Plaintiff had moderate limitations in 

activities of daily living and in maintaining social functioning, and 

“[n]o useful ability” to perform at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number and length of rest periods. Id. Finally, Dr. 

Hamill anticipated that plaintiff’s impairments or treatment would 

cause her to be absent from work more than four days per month. 

PAGEID 683. 

Dr. Hamill completed a second mental impairment questionnaire on 

April 13, 2010 which reflected many of the same limitations. PAGEID 

761-66. Dr. Hamill opined that plaintiff was less functional in her 

ability to (1) carry out very short and simple instructions, (2) 

accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors, (3) respond appropriately to changes in a routine 

setting, (4) set realistic goals or make plans independently of 

others, (5) maintain attention for a two hour segment, and (6) deal 

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with normal work stress. PAGEID 763-64. Plaintiff was more 

functional in her ability to (1) complete a normal workday and 

workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, 

(2) carry out detailed instructions, and (3) perform at a consistent 

pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; she 

could now satisfactorily (1) get along with co-workers or peers 

without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes and 

(2) understand and remember detailed instructions; she had no more 

than mild limitation in activities of daily living. PAGEID 763-65. 

 On September 15, 2009, W. Jerry McCloud, M.D., completed a 

physical residual functional capacity assessment at the request of the 

state agency. PAGEID 697-704. According to Dr. McCloud, plaintiff 

could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or 

carry ten pounds, stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight hour 

workday, and sit for six hours in an eight hour workday; she would not 

be limited in her ability to push or pull. PAGEID 698. Plaintiff 

could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, could occasionally 

crawl, and could frequently stoop and crouch. PAGEID 699. Plaintiff 

would be limited to only occasional overhead reaching on the left due 

to tendenosis. PAGEID 700. 

 Dr. Frazier, plaintiff’s family practitioner, saw plaintiff in 

July 2010 for a “checkup” and, noting that plaintiff “need[ed] a 

prescription for a disability placard,” completed a script as follows: 

“Patient with multiple health problems and has chronic disability 

warranting disability placard. Lifetime disability.” PAGEID 777-782. 

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III. January 31, 2011 Administrative Hearing 

 Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that she is 

unable to work because she can stand for only ten to 15 minutes at a 

time and has carpal tunnel syndrome and a left shoulder injury. 

PAGEID 93. Plaintiff also mentioned, in response to questioning, 

depression and pain in her legs and feet that lasts eight to nine 

hours every day. PAGEID 93-95. She testified that, in an eight hour 

day, she could sit for two hours, stand for 40 minutes, and walk for 

40 minutes, but would then need to lie down for the remainder of the 

day. PAGEID 109. 

 Plaintiff also testified that she can stand for a half an hour 

before having difficulty, she could walk four to five blocks, and 

could sit for 15 to 20 minutes at a time. PAGEID 100-01. She has 

trouble crouching, stooping, and bending, but has no problems reaching 

in any direction, using her fingers to pick things up, or pushing and 

pulling. PAGEID 101-02. She can lift ten pounds. PAGEID 101. 

 At the time of the hearing, plaintiff’s daughter and her 

daughter’s five children, aged 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7, lived with 

plaintiff. PAGEID 103-04. Plaintiff testified, however, that she 

does not care for the grandchildren when her daughter is at work 

because they have an “alternative babysitter.” PAGEID 104-06. 

 Plaintiff testified that, on a typical day, she arises at 6:30 or 

7:00 in the morning to make sure that her grandchildren “get up to go 

to school.” PAGEID 103. Plaintiff watches television for one and a 

half hours a day, but she this activity is interrupted by her 

grandchildren and neighbors who visit. PAGEID 103, 107-08, 110-11. 

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Plaintiff spends seven or eight hours a day organizing her house. Id. 

Plaintiff makes sure that her grandchildren pick up their toys. She 

does dishes and laundry, cooks dinner, takes the trash out, and bends 

over to put pots, pans, and groceries in cabinets. However, she must 

take breaks because of leg pain. PAGEID 107-08, 112. Plaintiff also 

drives to the grocery store once a week and shops for a half an hour. 

Id. 

 Plaintiff also testified that she hears voices but that she has 

not mentioned that fact to Dr. Hamill because she is afraid that he 

will change her medication to a more expensive product. PAGEID 113-

14. 

 The vocational expert testified that plaintiff has past relevant 

work as a fast food worker, factory assembler, and forklift operator. 

PAGEID 115. Asked to assume a claimant with plaintiff’s vocational 

profile and the residual functional capacity for a reduced range of 

light work, as ultimately found by the administrative law judge, the 

vocational expert testified that such a claimant could perform 

plaintiff’s past relevant work as a factory assembler. PAGEID 116-18. 

The vocational expert also testified that such a claimant could 

perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the local and 

national economy, including such jobs as assembler (Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 706.684-022), housekeeper (DOT 381.687-

018), and inspector (DOT 727.687-062). PAGEID 116-19. 

III. Administrative Decision 

 The administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s severe 

impairments consist of osteoarthritis of the right knee; degenerative 

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joint disease of the left shoulder; degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine; fibromyalgia; depressive 

disorder; and bipolar disorder, manic, severe with psychosis. PAGEID 

64. The administrative law judge also found that plaintiff’s 

impairments neither meet nor equal a listed impairment, including 

Listing 1.02. PAGEID 67-70. 

 With regard to Listing 1.02, which addresses major dysfunction of 

a joint, the administrative law judge found that “the specified 

criteria required of the listing [were] not demonstrated by the 

available medical evidence” and that the “evidence does not 

demonstrate that the claimant has the degree of difficulty in 

ambulating as defined in 1.00B2b.” PAGEID 68. 

 The administrative law judge went on to find that plaintiff has 

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except 

that she would be limited to 

unlimited pushing and pulling; no climbing of ramps or 

stairs; avoiding all exposure to operational control of 

moving machinery and unprotected heights; and work is 

limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with no 

fast paced production requirements and with only brief and 

superficial interaction with the public, co-workers, and 

supervisors. 

PAGEID 70. The administrative law judge found that this RFC would 

permit the performance of plaintiff’s past relevant work as a factory 

assembler. PAGEID 75-76. The administrative law judge also relied on 

the testimony of the vocational expert to find that plaintiff is able 

to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy, despite her impairments. PAGEID 76-77. 

Accordingly, the administrative law judge concluded that plaintiff was 

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not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from 

September 11, 2008, through the date of the administrative law judge’s 

decision. Id. 

IV. Discussion 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings 

of the administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence 

and employed the proper legal standards. Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389 (1971); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 

(6th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of 

evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

See Buxton v. Haler, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001); Kirk v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981). This 

Court does not try the case de novo, nor does it resolve conflicts in 

the evidence or questions of credibility. See Brainard v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. 

Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, this 

Court must examine the administrative record as a whole. Kirk, 667 

F.2d at 536. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if this Court would 

decide the matter differently, see Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 

1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also 

supports the opposite conclusion. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595. 

 Plaintiff argues, first, that the administrative law judge 

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erred in failing to accord controlling weight to the opinion of her 

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Hamill. Statement of Errors, pp. 16-21. 

The opinion of a treating source must be given controlling weight if 

that opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not inconsistent with the 

other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(2). Even if the opinion of a treating source is not 

entitled to controlling weight, an administrative law judge is 

nevertheless required to determine how much weight the opinion is 

entitled to by considering such factors as the length, nature and 

extent of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, 

the medical specialty of the treating physician, the extent to which 

the opinion is supported by the evidence, and the consistency of the 

opinion with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 

416.927(c)(2)-(6); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 

(6th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th 

Cir. 2004). Moreover, an administrative law judge must provide “good 

reasons” for discounting the opinion of a treating source, i.e., 

reasons that are “‘sufficiently specific to make clear to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating 

source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Rogers v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Soc. 

Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5). This special treatment 

afforded to the opinions of treating providers recognizes that 

“these sources are likely to be the medical professionals 

most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of 

[the claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a 

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unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be 

obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from 

reports of individual examinations, such as consultative 

examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 

 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). 

Dr. Hamill opined in July 2009 and April 2010 that plaintiff’s 

mental condition imposed numerous limitations. PAGEID 677-83, 763-65. 

In April 2010, Dr. Hamill opined that plaintiff was unable to meet 

competitive standards in her ability to (1) maintain attention for a 

two hour segment, (2) deal with normal work stress, (3) perform at a 

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 

periods, and (4) maintain regular attendance and be punctual within 

customary, usually strict tolerances. PAGEID 763. He also opined 

that plaintiff was seriously limited in eight areas; she also had an 

extreme limitation in her ability to maintain concentration, 

persistence, or pace, and a moderate limitation in her ability to 

maintain social functioning. PAGEID 763-64. Finally, Dr. Hamill 

anticipated that plaintiff’s impairments or treatment of her 

impairments would cause her to be absent from work more than four days 

per month. PAGEID 766. Dr. Hamill’s July 2009 opinion reflected 

similar limitations. See PAGEID 677-83. 

The administrative law judge categorized Dr. Hamill as a 

“treating psychiatrist,” expressly considered Dr. Hamill’s medical 

opinions, and provided specific reasons for assigning “little weight” 

to those opinions: 

I find that Dr. Hamill’s opinion is not supported by the 

evidence in the record. Specifically, Dr. Hamill’s opinion 

about the claimant’s extreme limitation in the area of 

concentration, persistence, or pace contrasts sharply with 

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the other evidence of record, especially the claimant’s 

activities of daily living where she cares for at least 

five young grandchildren and an ailing daughter, which 

renders it less persuasive. In addition, as with the 

opinions of Dr. Frazier, Dr. Hamill almost exclusively 

relies on the claimant’s subjective report of her symptoms 

and limitations. This is even more disconcerting because 

the claimant does not have a significant mental health 

treatment history despite her extreme allegations of 

auditory hallucinations. Also, the claimant admitted at 

the hearing that she omits material information about her 

symptoms to Dr. Hamill for fear that he might change her 

medication. Lastly, while Dr. Hamill does have a treating 

relationship with the claimant, the treatment history has 

been brief and intermittent and primarily consists of 

medication management. I give Dr. Hamill’s opinion little 

weight. 

PAGEID 74-75. The administrative law judge’s analysis is sufficiently 

specific as to the weight given to Dr. Hamill’s medical opinion and 

the reasons for assigning that weight. Although the analysis of 

individual factors may be succinct, it is clear that the 

administrative law judge considered each of the factors listed in 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) and 416.927(c)(2)-(6); a formulaic 

recitation of the factors is not required under the circumstances. 

See Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 

2010) (“If the ALJ’s opinion permits the claimant and a reviewing 

court a clear understanding of the reasons for the weight given a 

treating physician’s opinion, strict compliance with the rule may 

sometimes be excused.”). Further, the administrative law judge’s 

reasons for assigning “little weight” to Dr. Hamill’s opinion are 

supported by substantial evidence. 

Because the administrative law judge correctly applied the 

standards of the treating physician rule to her evaluation of Dr. 

Hamill’s opinions, and because substantial evidence supports her 

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findings, the Court finds no error with the Commissioner’s decision in 

this regard. 

Plaintiff also argues that the administrative law judge erred in

concluding that plaintiff does not meet the requirements of Listing 

1.02A. Statement of Errors, pp. 22-26. Specifically, plaintiff 

argues that the administrative law judge erred in finding that 

plaintiff “did not have the degree of difficulty ambulating 

effectively as defined in Listing 1.00(B)(2)(b).” Id. 

Listing 1.02 requires, under appropriate circumstances, a finding 

of disability based on a major dysfunction of a joint: 

Major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause): 

Characterized by gross anatomical deformity (e.g., 

subluxation, contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis, 

instability) and chronic joint pain and stiffness with 

signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal motion of 

the affected joint(s), and findings on appropriate 

medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony 

destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint(s). With: 

A. Involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint 

(i.e., hip, knee, or ankle), resulting in inability to 

ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b[.] 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appx. 1, § 1.02. Listing 1.00B2b 

provides: 

(1) Definition. Inability to ambulate effectively means an 

extreme limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an 

impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with the 

individual's ability to independently initiate, sustain, or 

complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is defined 

generally as having insufficient lower extremity 

functioning (see 1.00J) to permit independent ambulation 

without the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that 

limits the functioning of both upper extremities. . . . 

(2) To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of 

sustaining a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient 

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distance to be able to carry out activities of daily 

living. They must have the ability to travel without 

companion assistance to and from a place of employment or 

school. Therefore, examples of ineffective ambulation 

include, but are not limited to, the inability to walk 

without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the 

inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or 

uneven surfaces, the inability to use standard public 

transportation, the inability to carry out routine 

ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking, and 

the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace 

with the use of a single hand rail. The ability to walk 

independently about one's home without the use of assistive 

devices does not, in and of itself, constitute effective 

ambulation. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appx. 1, § 1.00B2b. 

 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Frazier’s March 23, 2011 notes, which 

indicate that plaintiff had “limited ambulation” and needed “to use a 

cane to walk,” see PAGEID 880, combined with plaintiff’s testimony at 

the administrative hearing, establish that plaintiff “is unable to 

walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces.” 

Statement of Errors, pp. 22-23. Plaintiff’s arguments are without 

merit. 

 First, Dr. Frazier’s March 23, 2011 notes were not available to 

the administrative law judge. Such evidence, even if submitted to the 

Appeals Council, may not be considered by this Court for purposes of 

substantial evidence review of the administrative law judge’s 

decision. See Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007); 

see also Cline v. Comm’r of Social Security, 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 

1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 1993); Casey v. 

Secretary of Health & Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 

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1993). A court may, under certain circumstances, remand a case under 

Sentence 6 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative 

proceedings in light of new and material evidence. See Cline, 96 F.3d 

at 148. However, plaintiff does not seek a Sentence 6 remand. 

 Second, the administrative law judge expressly considered 

plaintiff’s testimony at the administrative hearing and her subjective 

complaints of pain but found that plaintiff’s “statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are 

not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the” RFC 

assessment found by the administrative law judge. PAGEID 71. 

Plaintiff does not challenge this determination. 

 Finally, there is substantial evidence in the record to support 

the administrative law judge’s determination that plaintiff does not 

meet Listing 1.02. Plaintiff has established that she had knee 

surgeries in January and February 2009, see PAGEID 521, 557-58, that 

she experienced right knee pain before and after the surgeries, see 

e.g., PAGEID 707-08 (October 2008), 519 (December 2008), 515 (January 

2009), 599 (April 2009), 674 (July 2009), 818-19, 826-29 (December 

2010), 749 (January 2010), and that, at times, she walked with an 

antalgic gait. See PAGEID 543 (October 2008), 593 (December 2008), 

541 (February 2009), 572 (March 2009), 819 (December 2010), 538-39, 

554-55 (knee pain interfering with ambulation in February 2009). But 

see PAGEID 589 (walked with a normal gait in January 2009), 541 

(February 2009), 740 (October 2009), 740 (November 2009), 749 (January 

2010), 540 (able to ambulate without difficulty in March 2009). 

Nevertheless, in order to meet Listing 1.02, plaintiff must establish 

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an inability to ambulate effectively. No doctor has ever prescribed, 

and there is no evidence that plaintiff has ever used, a walker, two 

crutches, or two canes, cf. PAGEID 705 (September 2009 physical 

therapy notes stating that plaintiff used a cane). The record 

contains no medical opinion that plaintiff was unable to walk to the 

degree required by the Listing, and there is no evidence that any 

doctor has ever opined that plaintiff’s combination of impairments 

meets Listing 1.02. Plaintiff’s activities of daily living also 

suggest that she is able to ambulate effectively. Plaintiff can climb 

stairs, PAGEID 732-33 (June 2008), 749 (January 2010), she walks four 

to five blocks, see PAGEID 100-01, 645, she organizes her house for 

approximately seven or eight hours per day, PAGEID 103, 107-08, 110-

11, she does dishes and laundry, she cooks dinner, she takes out the 

trash, she bends over to put pots, pans, and groceries in cabinets, 

PAGEID 107-08, 112, and she drives to the grocery store weekly. Id. 

Plaintiff was able to help her daughter move for 14 hours in a single 

day in December 2009, PAGEID 751, 756, she is able to take her 

grandchildren to their doctor appointments, see PAGEID 756, she is 

able to bring infant and toddler grandchildren to her own doctor 

appointments, PAGEID 773-75, 790, and she is able to babysit up to 

five grandchildren at a time. See PAGEID 724 (May 2007), 484 

(December 2008), 599, 645, 685 (June 2009), 674 (July 2009), 754, 775 

(April 2010), 774 (June 2010), 778, 805, 773 (in July 2010 plaintiff 

was “still working 6 days a week baby setting [sic] her 3 

grandchildren at her daughter’s for close to 12 hrs a day”), 792-93, 

771 (in August 2010 plaintiff “talked about having to baby set [sic] 

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for her daughter’s 5 children only 4 days a week instead of 7 now”), 

791 (September 2010), 790 (in October 2010 plaintiff was watching five 

grandchildren, caring for her daughter who was expecting back surgery, 

and still “fight[ing] to adopt” three other grandchildren.), 802 

(November 2010). There is also no evidence to support plaintiff’s 

argument, see Statement of Errors, pp. 22-23, that she cannot “walk a 

block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces.” 

 In short, there is no evidence that plaintiff has an “extreme 

limitation of the ability to walk” that “interferes very seriously 

with [her] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete 

activities.” Plaintiff has therefore not carried her burden of 

establishing that she satisfies the requirements of Listing 1.02. 

See, e.g., Bingaman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 186 F. App’x 642, 645 (6th 

Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the administrative law judge’s decision is 

substantially supported in this regard. 

 Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors also summarily challenges the 

administrative law judge’s RFC assessment for a reduced range of light 

work: 

It is clear that Ms. Shackleford has had considerable knee 

impairments that have resulted in several surgical 

procedures. The record supports a finding that Ms. 

Shackleford’s condition meets or equals Listing 1.02. 

However, even if it does not, the evidence clearly shows 

that Ms. Shackleford would not be capable of light work, 

which is what the ALJ noted she could perform. 

Statement of Errors, p. 26. The Commissioner argues — with some 

justification — that plaintiff’s one-sentence critique of the 

administrative law judge’s RFC assessment is so conclusory that it 

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should be deemed waived. Commissioner’s Response, p. 7 (citing 

McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). Even if 

not waived, plaintiff’s argument is without merit. 

 The residual functional capacity determination is an 

administrative finding of fact reserved to the Commissioner. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (3), 416.927(d)(2), (3); Edwards v. Comm'r 

of Soc. Sec., 97 F. App'x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2004). It represents the 

most, not the least, that a claimant can do despite her impairments. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); Griffith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

217 F. App'x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2007). In assessing a claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, an administrative law judge must 

consider all relevant evidence, including medical source opinions, 

relating to the severity of a claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(d), 404.1545(a), 416.927(d), 416.945(a). Furthermore, 

courts have stressed the importance of medical opinions in determining 

a claimant’s residual functional capacity, and have cautioned 

administrative law judges against relying on their own expertise in 

drawing conclusions from raw medical data. See Isaacs v. Astrue, No. 

1:08-CV-828, 2009 WL 3672060, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2009) (quoting 

Deskin v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 605 F.Supp.2d 908, 912 (N.D. Ohio 2008)). 

In the case presently before the Court, the administrative law 

judge found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, except 

that she would be limited to: 

unlimited pushing and pulling; no climbing of ramps or 

stairs; avoiding all exposure to operational control of 

moving machinery and unprotected heights; and work is 

limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with no 

fast paced production requirements and with only brief and 

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superficial interaction with the public, co-workers, and 

supervisors. 

PAGEID 70. In making this assessment, the administrative law judge 

expressly considered all the medical opinions and provided an 

explanation for the weight given to each. PAGEID 73-75. The 

administrative law judge expressly adopted the opinions of the state 

agency physicians, Drs. McCloud and Collins, and discounted the July 

2010 opinion of Dr. Frazier and the July 2009 and April 2010 opinions 

of Dr. Hamill. Id. 

Plaintiff refers to Dr. Frazier’s December 2005 medical opinion 

as evidence that she could not perform light work. See Statement of 

Errors, pp. 23, 26. However, that opinion is not relevant here 

because it predated plaintiff’s alleged onset date by nearly three 

years. Accordingly, the administrative law judge’s residual 

functional capacity assessment is supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. 

In short, the Court concludes that the decision of the 

Commissioner applied all appropriate standards and is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. 

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner 

be AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED. 

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report 

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file 

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, 

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part 

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections 

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy 

thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to 

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 

June 6, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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