Technical Report 497 'I',II

USER-ELICITED TACTICAL INFORMATION

REQUIREMENTS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR

SYMBOLOGY AND GRAPHIC

PORTRAYAL STANDARDS

eBetty M. Landee and Michael G. Samet

Perceptronics, Inc.

and

Leon H. Gellman

Army Research Institute

2719

,I . JAN 2 7 1982

HUMAN FACTORS TECHNICAL AREA

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

April 1980

(. K, Aoproved for public release; distribution unlimitld.
It U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

L. NEALE COSBY

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel, IN

Technical Director Commander

Research accomplished under contract

to the Department of the Army

Perceptronics, Inc.

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this report has been made by ARI.

Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sclences, ATTN:

PERI-TST, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This report may be destroyed when It Is no longer

needed. Please do not return it tc the U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings In this report are not to be construed as en official

Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized

documents..
Unclassified

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION, PAGE BEFORE'COMPLETINGFORM 1.REPORT N UMBER I2. GOVT AC CESSION No. 3. REFCIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER-" ' Technical Report 497

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) S. TYPE OF REPORT--& PERIOD COVERED

USER-ELICITED TACTICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS Fi Techniicl

WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR SYMBOLOGY AND GRAPHIC Mar. 16, 1979 - Mar. 15, 1980

PORTRAYAL STANDARDS 0 1I-PERFORMING 6 ORG. REPORT NUMBERe

F ), PTR-1063-80-4-( I )

7 AUTHORq) ."ICO4TRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(o)

Betty M. Landee

Michael G. Samet DAHC19-78-C-0018

Leon H. Gellman (ARI)

S. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK

SPerceptronics, Inc. AREA 6:WORK.UNITNUMUERS

> 6271 Variel Avenue ~2Q762722A765 _ Woodland Hills, CA 91367 ,

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12, REPORT DATE

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral April 1980

and Social Sciences 1S. NUMBER OF PAGES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333 112

14' MONITORING AGENCY NAME & AODRESS(/f different ftom Controlling Oilco) IS. SECURITY CLASS.'(ol thle tepoeH)

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

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I " IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Technically monitored by Leon H. Gellman, Human Factors Technical area, ARI.

Francois G. Christen performed the cluster analyses described in this report,

and Franklin L. Moses provided valuable comments on the draft manuscript.

IS. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side it neceesary mnd identify by block number)

Battlefield information Requirements elicitation Tactical scenario

Cluster analysis Role playing User requirements

Graphic portrayal Situation displays

Information requirements Symbols

Military symbology Tactical information

1&...AT ACr (cawhwe a r evoee .*u it nogetemy md Identify by block num~bo)

SThe primary purpose of this research was to elicit and organize selected

battlefield information requirements of the command staff, and to examine the

adequacy of conventional symbology for satisfying these requirements. An

elicitation procedure was developed and utilized with small groups of Army

officers in a tactical role-playing exercise involving a specified Divisionlevel scenario. Information requirements in the form of tactical questions

were generated and reviewed by participants, both individually and together. -- ' ;"(Continued)

W I 73 EmTIOM OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE (Cntine

FOR7)MEIT Unclassified

$,EC:JRITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (WBher Data Entered) \c<
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OFTHIS PAGE(heP Daia "nter..d

Item, 20. (Continued)

In addition, for each question, the participants completed a form which projided descriptive information such as whether the answer to the question isavailable from a display with conventional symbology (FM 21-30). In an effort to organize the information requirements, an hierarchical Clustering

technique was applied that analyzed the similarity between questions in terms

of 58 semantic features (e.g., friendly, enemy, artillery, vulnerability,

etc.).

The elicitation .seSsions resulted in the generation, of & total of 272

distinct tactical questions. These questions formed seven major clusters

which were assigned the following names to reflect the central theme of their

respective information content: friendly, enemy, in_e/capabilit , status, i

activities/procedures, terrain/routes, and planning. nhT descriptive data

about the questions, analyzed for each cluster of inform tion individually

and for the entire set of questions, indicated that conventional symboloy

fails in many respects to meet basic user needs. For example, 43% of the

information requirements identified were said to be unavailable from a conventional display. Furthermore, there appears to be a proliferation of

personalized techniques being employed by users to portray their information requirements. Some major informational deficiencies in conventional

symbology are identified, and examples are given on how the findings can be

employed in development efforts toward making standardized, tactical symbology more useful and effective.

ii

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(ften Data Ent t d)
ITT

j Technical Report 497

-lo

USER-ELICITED, TACT ICAL INFORMATION'

REQUIREMEINTS 'WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR

SYMBOLOGY-AND- GRAPHIC______ cf Accession For

PORTRAYAL STANDARDS NIS TRA&I

Uniannounc ed

Betty M. Landee and Michael G. Samet '1Perceptronics, Inc. By --- and Distribution/

Leon H. Gellman Availability Codes

Dist jSpecial

{ Submitted by: Stanley M. Halpin, Chief

HUMAN FACTORS TE!CHNICAL AREA DI

Approved by: INSPEcTEo N,

Edgar M. Johnson, Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

- U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

~ Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

April 1980

4Army Project Number Human Factors in System Development

20762722A765 and Operations

Amprwed for public rvoe.: dlistributlon unlimiled.
C 777~ -,-77711 * l 1- - - 711777771'",

AMt Research Reports and 'Technical Papeirs are intended--for,.sponsors of

R&D tasks~and .other research and militiary agencies JAyfinings readylfo

'impemnato atietieo #biaio ,aepr sied-iihe-i I tepjart ot

the Bref. Upon completion of a ajr phase of the taski formhal recommendations -for official,,action--normially,.are conrveyedtoappraemiar

agencies by :brief in: or 'Disosition 'Form.

i1v
-! -

The Human Factors Techfiical Area of the Army Research Ihstitute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI); is conCerned with.aiding users and

operators to cope with the ever increasing complexity of the man-mLchihe

systems being designed to acquire, transmit., process, disseminate, and uti"

lize tacticai information on the battlefield. The research-is focused on

the interface problems and interactions Within command-ahd control centers

and is concerned with such areas as topographic products and procedurest

tactical symbology., usereoriented systems, information manag ment, staff

operations and procedures, sensor systems integratiOn and utilization, and.

issues of system development.

The current symbology, as provided in FM 21-30 and FM 21-21, is widely

agreed to be inadequate. As a result, a number of Army agencies are-working to evolve special subsets of new or modified symbols that are better

suited to their particular information-processing needs. In the absence of

2 a common frame of reference, these efforts could result in a proliferation

of specialized symbols that meet the needs of some, but not all, potential

users. The present pubiicdtion tries to identify and categorize the situational, information, and behavioral factors that contribute to the effecI tive design and use of visual symbols for representing the battlefield.

This analysis is a necessary first step in the development of a comprehensive framework, typology, and theory of tactical symbology.

Research in the area of tactical symbology is conducted as an in-house

effort augmented through contracts with organizations selected for their

specialized capabilities and unique facilities. The present study was conducted by personnel of Perceptronics, Inc., under Contract DAHC19-78-C-0018.

This research is responsive to requirements of Army Project 2Q762722A765

and related to special requirements of the Combined Arms Combat Development

Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Special requirements are contained in

Human Resource Need 80-307, Optimizing Display of Topographic and Dynamic

Battlefield Information, 81-57 Strategy for Design and Improvement of Communications, and 81-96 Effectiveness of Multicolor Air Defense Weapon Systems Display.

JOS PHE

e nical Director 2

v
-77i777 777

ACK!'OWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful for the cooperation and couirtesy extended to thde r-I

search team by the U.S. Army War College(alseBrakP. ndth

National War College (Washington, D.C.). We are inde-bted-to the stdentsof these colleges who participated-in this research effort;- we thank theseofficers for their patience, valu~ble' in~ights, and-interest in this work.

Further, we thank Francois G. Christen for erformingn- the statisticlli

ter analysis reported here, an rnln.Moe4n ao di.tifk 'o

their valuable, comments 6h the draft mauscrjt.

ii

.7 -7 j7' 7-7
USER-ELICITED TACTICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMiNTS WITH IMPLICATIONS,

FOR SYMBOLOGY AND GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL STANDARDS

3BRIEF

Requirement:

The primary purpose of this research was to elicit and organize selected

battlefield information requirements of command staff personnel, and to examine the adequacy of conventional symbology and graphic procedures now in

use for satisfying these requirements.

Procedure:

An elicitation procedure was developed and employed to identify tactical information requirements. The procedure involved small groups of military

officers in a tactical role-playing exercise using a specified Division-levei

scenario (European setting, defensive posture). Information requirements in

the form of tactical questions were generated and reviewed by participants,

both individually and together. In addition, for each question, the participants provided descriptive information such as whether the answer to the

question was obvious, derivable, or unavailable from a display with conven- tional symbology (FM 21-30). The information requirements were organized

into a meaningful structure by using a semantic clustering technique. This

technique required the content of each question to be analyzed and described

in terms of semantic features. A total of 58 features (e.g., friendly,

enemy, configuration, vulnerability, etc.) were derived for this purpose;

an index of feature similarity was then calculated across questions and a

hierarchical cluster analysis was performed.

Findings:

The elicitation sessions resulted in the generation of a total of 272

different tactical questions. When subjected to the cluster analysis procedure, these questions formed 7 major clusters which were assigned the following names to reflect the central theme of their respective information

content: friendly, enemy, time/capability, status, activities/procedures,

terrain/routes, and planning. The descriptive information about the questions was analyzed for each cluster individually and for the entire set of

questions. Overall, the results indicate that conventional symbology fails

in many respects to meet basic information needs of users. For example,

43% of the information requirements identified were said by users to be unavailable from a conventional display. Furthermore, there appears to be a

proliferation of personalized techniques being employed by users to portray

their information requirements. In general, some major deficiencies in

conventional symbology were identified with respect to the portrayal of

specific areas of tactical information, such as friendly unit information

and dynamic information (including availability and current status).

ix I3UCUUD PAGI &"~m40V fl
Utilization of Findings:

-I The findings of this research can be employed in development efforts

toward making tactical symbology and graphic displays, more responsive tO

user needs. Such efforts should stress the completeness, refinement, ard 7< standardization in the graphic portrayal of battlefield information.

1< I

x

- 1rN - 'N7' r _NN'& ~ 2 .-..~~N~ P<
USER-ELICITED TACTICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS WITH

IMPLICATIONS FOR SYMBOLOGY.AND GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL

STANDARDS

CO1NTENTS-

,PagO

1. INTRODUCTION................... .. . . . ... ... .. .. .. .. .....

overview .. ........................... 1

Statement of the Problem .. ......... .. .. .. ........

objectives .. ................... ........ 3

Technical Approach. ........ ............... 4

Report Organization. .. .................... 4

2. METHOD .. .. ...... ........................ 5

General .. ....... ...................... 5

Grout. Composition....... . ..... . ... .. .. .. .. ........ 5

Elicitation Procedure .. ......... ............ 6

Information Requirements Organization....... . .. .. .. .. ....

3. RESULTS .. ....................... ...... 15

Cluster 1--Friendly Information...... ... . .. .. .. .. .... 1

Clstr --Enemy Information. .................. 23

Cluster 3--Time/Capability Information. ......... .... 25

Cluster 4--Status Information .. . . . . . . . 25

Cluster 5--Activities/Procedures Information ............... 28

Cluster 6--Terrain/Route Information....... . .. .. .. .. .... 2

Cluster 7--Planning Information .. ........ ........ 31

Question Characteristics. . ...... ............. 3

Introduction .. ............. ........ ... 37

Conventional Symbology and User Information Requirements . . . 37

Conclusions. .. ...................... ... 40

REFERENCES. .. ...................... ....... 43

%"PE',IDIX A. RESEARCH MATERIALS. ........ ............ 45

B. SEMANTIC FEATURES: DEFINITIONS/SYNONYMS/RELATED TERMS 19

C, PARTICIPANT GENERATED QUESTIONS .. ........ ..... 87

DISTRIBUTION. .. ...................... ..... .. 127

xi
7 7 ; . . . . . . . .

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Elicitation procedure: sequence of session events . . . . . 7

2. Semantic features ........... ............. 10

3., Summary of cluster analysis results ......... . .. . i1

4. Summary of QDF responses .. ............... 34

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Question Data Form . . ....... . . . . . . .. .. . 9

2. Part of question by semantic feature matrix (showing

four selected questions and five selected features) . . . . 12

3. Friendly information cluster ...... . . ... . 17

4. Friendly unit information subcluster .......... . 18

5. Friendly location information subcluster . . . . 21

6. Enemy information cluster . ....... .. . .... 24

7. Time/capability information cluster ....... . 26

8. Status information cluster . .......... ...... 27

9. Activities/procedures information cluster ...... . 29

10. Terrain/route information cluster ... . . . . ... . 30

11. Planning information cluster ................... . 32

12. Graphic status of potential answers ... ............ ... 36

xii
7- -75= F--

I USER-ELICITED TACTICAL INFORMATi0N REIQUikMkTS wiTH I PLICATIONS j ~ FOR SYMBOLOGY AND GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL STANDARDS

1. INTRODUCTION

S ~Overview

I Tactical symbology is, an important medium or tool in the planning, , I analysis, and communication of command functions. In this regard, sidorsky,

Geilman, and Moss (1979) offered the following definition:

Tactical symiology refers to the symbols used tb portray the information acquired, manipulated and displayed by a Tactical pera d -

- tions Center (TOC) in supporting the on-line information needs of

a commander engaged in planning and/or conducting a combat

operation.

Because of a growing awareness of the deficiencies and limitations of

current symbology for meeting the modern command and control requirements

that accompany emerging tactical doctrine and advancing technology, research

efforts have begun toward the establishment of a framework for the development of improved tactical symbology (Ciccone, Gamet, & Channon, 1979).

The focus of the work described in the current report concerns tactical

information requirements. A preliminary functional analysis of information

Irequirements was performed based on one set of operational tasks which currently depend on tactical symbology as well as those which might, in the future, be supported by symbology. The overall goal was to identify a broad

range of battlefield information requirements which represent typical tasks

performed by different military users. In addition, in light of the needs

specified, an analysis of the adequacy of conventional symbology for fulfilling them was accomplished. To meet the research objectives, a methodol"

ogy was developed to elicit specific information requirements from appropri -

ate users, and to organize these requirements into a meaningful structure

and to analyze the requirements accordingly.

I7 Statement of the Problem

The use of military symbols dates back to the days of Napoleon. Warfare has changed since that era and so have the methods by which the battle-

-field environment is graphically portrayed. Yet the symbology used to portray the tactical situation has remained the same for decades. Conventional

symbology (as represented in U.S. Army Field Manual 21-30, Military Symbols)

is frequently an integral part of tactical graphic displays which provide

command staffs with an overview of the friendly and enemy battlefield situation. The symbology of FM 21-30, and its related NATO version, provides a

communicative language for the U.S. Army and other services as well as the

Allied Nations. However, there is a widespread consensus that the mechanics

and utility of the current symbol system are being severely strained by the

increasing volume and complexity of tactical data.

%

t1
_ 7.

In particular, conventional svmbology has been criticized for such

reasons as: the level of detail is often in'AprPrci-te; the 6lement§ of

the code are hard to remember; the extraction of !lidnt information is

difficult; and the adaption tp automated displays is cumbersome and inefficient. In an effort to compensate for the -inadequacies of conventional

symbology, users frequently augment or modify basic symbols to fulfill

their needs. While personalization of symbols may be a -functional approach

from the user perspective, the lack of standardization could severely diminish the communicative value of the symbology across different user

groups (e.g., echelons, TOC personnel, etc.). Furthermore, if standard

symbology does not keep pace with actual dter needs, thd the efiPlymdnt

of personalized portrayal methods i§ likely to increa§d. Hence, filytidal

and empirical work is required to carefully identify current problems with

symbology.use and to suggest .promising, Standardized .s0utions that incorporate both human factors and technological donsid~rati6n.

Fortunately, modern electronic storage and display systems are now

available that may significantly reduce the tactical information processing burden. Whereas conventional symbology is static in nature--requiring

a one-to-one mapping of symbol-to-concept, symbologies used with automated

systems may be dynamic--permitting the form and content of symbols to change

in response to changing user requirements. Consonant with this increase in

information processing and displa power, modern symbology may come to assume a larger role in tactical assessment and planning. The issue remains,

however, that any innovations in tactical symbology and display systems

must be responsive to user needs, and emphasis on standardization will be

critical.

Thus, emerging doctrine and advancing technology call for the development of improved tactical symbology. Although conventional symbology (FM

21-30) can convey basic unit information (e.g., identify, function, size,

and unit type), it -annot communicate a richness of detail considered important by command personnel, and it cannot accommodate most of the new

essential elements of tactical doctrine (e.g., U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5,

operations). An improved tactical symbology needs to aim at portraying dimensions of information such as the dynamic composition of units (e.g.,

combined-arms team), unit capability (e.g., threat, effectiveness, mobility,

firepower, logistics, terrain, support, and density), and the updated nature

of elements in a current display (e.g., changes in unit position). Such

parameters of information, which vary in their degree of abstractness, appear to be necessary for supporting modern tactical performance.

As a specific example, the issues concerning the graphic portrayal of

unit capability can be discussed in terms of related information requirements (Ciccone, et al., 1979). Such requirements can be presented conveniently in the form of tactical questions. For example, the following might

be key questions in determining what is important about the capability of

an enemy unit:

1. Is it a striking unit?

2. How powerful is it?

3. With what force and range can it strike?

2

--------------------------------------
4. Is it moving now?

5. Is it changing its structure (e.g., assembling into a combined

arms formation)?

Some experts consider these questions to be so important that they

should take precedence over other related information requirements such

as static order-of-battle details (e.g., training and. tactics). With unit

capability serving as only one example among many,. symbology development

appears to require an expanded tactical data base (ie., organized set of

information requirements) to accommodate both the: emerging prirciples of

tactical doctrine and the increased precision and rangt of modern.,weaponry.

However, an organized data base of tactical information- requirements)

can be formulated only through the application of an appropriate and valid

methodology. The selection of such a methodology presents a challenging

methodological problem, resulting from a combination of several factors.

For one thing, although they often pinpoint objectives, fieldmanuals on

tactical doctrine are very general in nature and rarely provide detailed,

useful lists of the information content a user must acquire in order to,

perform routine intelligence and operations tasks; and such lists do not

appear to exist within the circulated or uncirculated military literature.

For another thing, the development of systematic easily replicable and

objective techniques for defining information requirements has been less,

than encouraging (see Saalberg, Miller, Friesz, & Keegan, 1977, for a brief

review). Various applications of some of the more basic psychological

measurement techniques for eliciting military information requirements,'

such as checklists (e.g., McKendry, Wilson, Mace, & Baker, 1973), ranking

and rating procedures (e.g., Coates & McCourt, 1976), and introspective

(reports and protocol analysis (e.g., Bowen, Halpin, Long, Lukas, Mullarkey,

& Triggs, 1973; Wilcox, 1972) have made some gains but, for the most part,,

they have provided static results without much potential for improving

the design of military information processing systems. Given this background, the current project sought a more effective, formal methodology

for eliciting candidate information requirements from experienced military

tacticians.

• Objectives

Overall, the objective of the current work was to generate a set of

representative information requirements for symbology. While symbology

4development was a prime concern of this research effort, no attempt was

made to distinguish between information requirements that could or could

not, or should or should not, be portrayed in graphic displays. Rather,

the objective was to begin formulating a data base of information requirements that is independent of state-of-the-art display capability constraints, As an additional research goal, a preliminary analysis was

undertaken to assess the adequacy of conventional symbology to meet the

specified information requirements.

3
Technicai.Approach

To meet these objectives, an approach was formuited b-asd oh 'the a§-

sumption that deciding i.hat information to portray in n impr&@d syboldgy

can be derived by deciding what questions it should be able to answer for

specific users and different tactical tasks. SPeeificl-ly, the process of

asking questibns in the context of a given scenario seeis tO ireesnt a

more straightforward and less ambiguous task tha. creatin4 or checking

lists of information requirements; Perhaps. this is because, some form of

self-interrogation always intervenes, either covertly or overtly, wheh

individuals try to identify their inform&tion re"uirements." Furthermoke,

once a question is stated, reflection upon- the range of possible "ahswets"

to it can help refine the question's meaning and stimulate the generation

of other important questions.

Using the question-and-answer model as its core, an inf6rmatibn-requirements elicitation procedure was developed for repeated application

with different groups of tactical officers. The approach took the form of

a role-playing exercise in which participants were -instructed to4enerate-i

tactical questions which, if adequately answered, would permit them-to

comply with the doctrinal requirements of standard military practice. To

help guide the elicitation process, participants worked within a specifically defined tactical scenario and they were prompted so as to address

certain basic issues in tactical information processing, such as: "Understand the Enemy," "See the Battlefield," "Concentrate at the Critical Times

and Places," etc. So, for example, in response to "Understand the Enemy,"

one might ask: "What is the principal deficiency of a specific enemy unit

(e.g., mobility, personnel, ammunition...)?"1 In addition, a form was prepared to enable participants to provide descriptive information for each

question such as whether the potential answer would be obvious, derivable,

*or unavailable from a display with conventional symbology. Finally, a

semantic cluster-analysis technique was developed so that the hundreds of

tactical questions that were generated by the elicitation prodedute could

be classified/organized into meaningful structures.

Report Organization

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the methodology used for information elicitation

and organization. Chapter 3 describes the study results in terms of clusters or related tactical questions and an analysis of the capability of

conventional symbology to satisfy these requirements. Finally, Chapter 4

gives a discussion of the significance and implications of the results,

including examples of how they may be used to support the development of

improved tactical symbology. Supplementary material regarding the method

and results sections is provided in the appendix.

~ 4
2. METHOD

General

To meet ithe research objectives_, an integrated methodology was fOrmdlated based on an adaptation, of An information eiicitatiohproceduredev6eoped in a previ6us phabd of this work (Cicc6he, Samet, &chann6h 1979).

The procddur wa§: extehded, and refined, in order to s e es a systematic,

structured ,method that c6uld' be replicated with a number 6f participant

groups. In gener&ia the c6nceris that guided-the development and .pplicatioh of-the method ihcluded 6 pratiohal practicality and, efficiency,

task realism and- credibilityi-and the potential for prom6ting creative

responses.

7 The elicitatih procedure c6mbined what appeared to ;be advantage6us

j features of different .methods used in the specification of ihformation requirements; in particular,. fe&tures were selected that would seem to be

familiar to, and work effectively with, Army officers. One such feature

was the implementation of a tactical game-simulation framework into the

task environment,(Olmstead & Elder, 1978)4 This approach to the analysis

of military information has, in fact, been successfully demonstrated for

complex tactical simulation environments like the Simulated Tactical Operations System (SIMTOS) (e.g., Levit, Aldeni Erickson, & Heaton, 1977) and

the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS) (e.g., Kaplan &

Barber, 1979). Another important feature of the method was to have participants work both as individuals and in groups so as to enhance the motivation, knowledge pool, relevance, and productivity of task effort (Hackman & Morris, 1974). Because the generation of original responses was so

important, it was thought that participants would become more creative and

productive while responding in a game-like, somewhat competitive atmosphere.

Grou2 ComositionI

The elicitation procedure utilized four groups consisting of three to

four students each from the National War College in Washington, D.C., and

the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Each participant was required to play a specific Division Tactical Operating Center (TOC) role,

such as G-2 or G-3. The role assigned to each participant was based on

his tactical background (e.g., intelligence, operations, etc.) as deter- f mined by a brief interview prior to the beginning of a session. Across

the four sessions, the following frequencies of occurrence of specific TOC

roles were represented, without duplication of roles within a session:

Commander, three participants; G-2 (Intelligence), three participants;

* G-3 (Operations), four participants; G-4 (Logistics), two participants;

and Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD), two participants. However, it

should be noted that some participants had background experience in more

than one area, such as both intelligence and operations. These individuals, though assigned a specific role, were permitted to draw upon

their diverse background experience rather than be restricted to the information needs of their specified role.
Elicitation Procedure

Table 1 provides a list of the sequence of events involved in the

elicitation of user-based information requirements. To acquaint partici-;

- pants with the goals of the exercise, the session began with a brief presentation of relevant research background material (see Appendix A-i

The procedure was then facilitated by a specific instructional setting, which included a strategic scenario background-and "doctrinal prompts."

The scenario, which was employed for all elicitation sessions, was ab"

stracted from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College course entitled "Forward Deployed Force Operations (European Setting)., 'The scenario

(see Appendix A-2) contained the following elements: (1) an account of the

events ledding up to the present tactical situation; (2) a mission statement; (3) comparison of forces; and (4) task organization. Accompanying

the written scenario were two 1:50,000 topographic maps of Germany (USACGSC

50-242 and 50-243) which were provided for the participants' reference.

Additionall7, a sequence of three situation overla ys was attached to the

maps at various times throughout the session to display pre-engagement

arrangement of- forces (friendly and enemy), movement to contact of forces,

and engagement of forces, respectiveiy. The .doctrinal prompts, stated in

terms of tactical fundamentals, were implemented to remind participants of

the critical aspects of battle, as specified by defensive dbctrine.

To introduce the question generation technique, instructions- were

read to participants by the experimenter. These instructions began as

follows:

Our goal is to translate doctrine into guidelines for the graphic

portrayal of battlefield information. To accomplish this goal we

need to put together a data base of the information requirements

needed in today's TOC. The data base will consist of questions

which various TOC personnel must ask in order to do their assigned

job. The questions will be related to the fundamentals of doctrine as specified by FM 100-5 and FM 71-100. I will read excerpts from FM 71-100 about each of the fundamentals of defense.

As I read these statements I'd like you to think about the application of these principles to graphic portrayal. For example,

the first two fundamentals of defense are "Understand the Enemy"

and "See the Battlefield"; in the form of question, you will be

asked to itemize what you need to know to "Understand the Enemy,"

and "See the Battlefield."

After I have read the excerpts I will give you a sample of the

types of questions and answers which were formulated during the

first year of the research effort. Following a review of sample

questions and answers, I would like each of you to write out

your information requirements to do your job. Please write only

one question per card. In addition, please write one possible

answer to each question on the same card. This should be an

answer, not an explanation of the question. As you are thinking

about the type of answer to a given question, you may consider

whether knowledge of the potential answer might lead you to ask

other questions--if so, feel free to write these questions on

additional cards.

6
I TABLE 1

~I

IITATION PROCEDURE:SE'QUENCE OF SE-SSION EVENTS

2.RMiltaryRcenaro"preented

1. ResearCh background presented.

2. Iili'ary scenario pi'sented.

3. Question generation instructions given.

I. -4. Excerpts from funda~inta1s of defense - () "undertad theEie-"

-and (2) "See the Battlefield" .(corresponding :overlay depicting

- pre-engagement of friendly and eenmy uni.ts) presented together.

:5. Individual'questions generated (lO-minutes). 1 6. Questions discussed by group.

7. Question Data Forms (QDFS) completed by each participant fOr his

own questions.

8. Brief break taken.

9. Excerpts from fundamentals of defense- (3) "Concentrate at the

Critical Times and Places" (corresponding overlay depicting movement

to contact of forces) presented.

i 10. Steps 5, 6, and 7 repeated.

11. Excerpts from fundamentals of defense- (4) "Fight as a Combined

Arms Team" and (5) "Exploit the Advantages of the Defender" (corres-

*ponding overall depicted. engagement of forces) presented together.

* 12. Steps 5, 6, and 7 repeated.

13. Participants debriefed.

i r
A total of five -fundamentals of defense were employed as doctrinal

prompts and these were presented in three separate sets (see Appendix A-3):

fundamentals () and 1(2), together; fundmental (3); and. fundametals (4)

and (5) together. For each set of fundamentals (corrlespofnding to a subsession of information requiremeits elicitation), the 'same procedure was

used. First, edited. excerpts from the fundamentals of defense included0

in Field Manual 71-100 (Armored and Mechanized Division erations;, Sep- . tember 1978) were read by the experimenter. The all partidipants.we re

given written versions of the excerpts along .with sample questions Andpossible answers (Appendix A-3). The sample questi6ns ad answe§i had

been generated in earlier research (Ciccone,, Samet, & Channon,. 1979)' -and

participants were informed that these samples were provided for illustrative purposes only, in order to stimulate their thinking rather thanrestrict it. e r r t

Next, participants were provided wit ynumbred 4 x 6 index cardoii

(color coded for each participant). To keep the task ,proceduie on schedule,

a 10-minute period was given in-which participants were asked to write

their questions and answers (one set per card). Following this question

generation period, the group worked together with the experimenter to

eliminate redundant questions. This was accomplished by having each participant read his questions aloud one at a time- while the other participants looked over their own questions and pulled out any which were similar

to the one being read. When similar questions were uncovered, the entire

group would determine if in fact the questions were the same or different.

If the questions were the same they were stapled together and returned to

one of the originators of the question; if the questions were different

Nthey were returned to their respective question originators. During this

discussion period, question wording was modified if necessary to clarify

the meaning of the question.

Once al. the question.s were read, and redundant questions eliminated,

participants were given a "Question Data Forri" (QDF) to complete (see Figure 1). The purpose of the QDF was to obtain descriptive information about

each of the questions and answers generated by the participants. The most

vital information obtained from this form were the answers to Questions 2

and 3: Question 2 asked the participant to characterize the ability of

conventional symbology (FM 21-30) to portray the specified requirement;

Question 3 asked him to state whether or not he had used a personalized

method to portray that requirement. Thus, these QDF responses enabled the

identification of gaps in the ability of conventional symbology to portray

user information requirements as well as to document the use of nonstandardized methods of portrayal. Each participant completed one form for each of

his own questions, and each question-card was stapled to its respective QDF.

As indicated in Table 2, the elicitation procedure was recycled until

all three sets of fundamentals of defense were covered. Following the

elicitation session, participants were debriefed and asked for additional

comments and insights.

8
_7- -W

QUESTION -F FORK

EVALUATOR ROLE: ___________ PIESTIONiNO.: _________

(1) -ilho woul d ber.tfi t aIost by thi!' answver 'to this question? (check nomori than 3boxes)

QCoiarier 0 -2 Q G-3 0 FSCOOR Q TAC Air

-'Cothe- (please specify)-

(2) From locking at a display with conventional (FM 21-30) symbology,-the answer to this

q uesticoi is:

QObvious Qobtainable by inferenke Unavailable

(3) Have you ever4 used your own (Ie.personalized) method (e~g., special symboly annttib,,

overlay, etc.) to represent the type of information addressed by~fhls question6?

CYes QNo h i(4) To answer this question, wich of the following sources of information would you consult?'

(Check all that apply)

0 Situation display 0 File ONone

0Commander 0 Other collection sources Other (please specify)

CAnother staff officer 0 it own experience

(5) Based on your own tactical function and judgment, check one item in each box.

The answer to the ouestlon:

is easy to get need not be precise

_____is hard to get must be precise

FIGURE 1. QUESTION DATA FORM.

9
TABLE 2

SEMANTIC FEATURES

Activity - Personnel

Air Positions

Air Force/Marines/Navy ProcedUre

Amount/Quantity Projected

Artillery Range/Distance

[ Attack/Counterattack/Penetration Refugees/Civil Affairs,

Availability Results/Effectiveness

Behind FEBA Reinforce

Capability Rei nforcements/Reserves

Configuration Routes/Avenues

Corps Smoke

Control Measures Special Weapons

Decontamination Status/Situation

Disposition/Location Supporting Mission

Division Surveillance

Drop/Landing Zones Sustainability

Enemy Target/Targets

Engineer Terrain

EW/Communication Time

Flanks Trafficabil ity

Forward FEBA Unit Size

Friendly Unit Type

Ground/Field Visibility

Indication Vulnerability

Logistics Weapons/Equipment/Platforms

Movement Weather

Objecti ves/Pl ans Withdrawal/Retrograde/Reti rement/

Obstacles Delay

Own Sector Ist Echelon

2nd Echelon

10

- -. '>w' -
j- T

Information Requirements Organization

Questioh Classification. The output of the elicitation procedr,

combined'over all the fundamentals of defense that were presented, consisted of information requirements expressed as 272 specific tactical qups

tions. Although this data base of tactically relevant information.was %

rkch in content, the form of the data base (i.e., tactical questions) wa

nct of practical use for symbology development. A more dseful rg_#Piza

" tionai scheme would allow identification of the military concePts required

by 'users as well as the dimensions of ilformatign contained in the cn.-

cepts.. 'Thus, iii an effort to organize the data into a comprehensible scheme, asemantic clustering technique Was developed.

The first step in the technique wag to develop a set of semantic fea"

tures on which questions could be described. Based on a careful dxamindtibnof the question content as well as relevant military literature, 58 feAture

names were derived and these appear in Table 2. Appendix B c6ntains the

names as, well as definitions, synonyms, or related terms for each feature.

The features represent a wide range of infbrmation including distinct concepts, such as artillery and smoke as well as more abstract concepts, such

as vulnerability and sustainability. Overall, the features attempt to rer

flect the rich content of battlefield information in a systematic manner.

I Each questioi was examined individually and the applicability of each

feature to the question was determined. Three criteria were used to determine the correspondence of a given feature to a question:

1. The feature is explicitly stated in the question, e.g., What is

the current friendly available supply requirement? The features

"friendly," "supply," znd "availability" are allexplicit in the

question.

2. The feature is implicit in the question, e.g., What size and type

of units are we facing? The feature "enemy," though not explicit

in the question, is implicitly represented.

3. The feature is explicit in the sample answer(s) providea, e.g.,

Question--The 23rd Division is opposed by nine division6, at what

percent are those divisions? Answer--The three MRD are at ]n%

strength, the six tank divisions are at 85% strength. The categories of unit size and type, as well as strength, are explicit

in the answer. This criteria was added because in many cases,

as in the sample question, the answers served to clarify the information requirements of the question.

using the criterion stated above, the number of features associated

with each question ranged from 2 to 12, with a mean of 4.9, and a median

and mode of 4. At the conclusion of the feature-description process each

question was represented as a vector with 58 entries of 1 and 0, 1 indicating a feature applied to the question and 0 indicating that the feature

did not apply.

Cluster Analysis. The next step in organizing the information requirements involved the performance of a cluster analysis on the tactical-question

i 11
feature -data,-. to ebxplore and uncover thd% structure &1d'iriterreai onships

~;Iinheren~t in the tactical questions. ig a stat-ii-tica1 technique, cusier

2 1- analysis is A method for okganiiing and describing -data and -4as therefore.

used.

-rn order to Identify common concepts within the' tactical' quostions-, An

index of similarity was calculated between questions on, the--i of sem'

tic similafity. In essence, the logic behind the ,prodeduredis-that the more

common thd pres~nce 'f sped'ific seiiantic features iii two tactical q46stibns,

the4reterthesii~iariy btwen the two questions. For demonstrationpurposes, a sample of part of the questions (7)xsmatcfture§ (58)

matrix used to calculate similarity is contaiiied in Figure 2. From the feature data shown in the figure, it can be seen that questions 1 and 2 are

similar on three semanlaic features (i.e., "enemhy," "personfiel.," and weapons"), whereas questions 3 and 4 are similar on two features (i.d., "st~ttus"

and "weap6hs"). Thus, based on only the five features doded.here, questiofvs

l and 2 are more similar to each other than questions 3 and'\4.

QUESTIONS AVAILABILITY ENEM'Y FRIENDLY STATUS WEAPONS

~..ej. 3z. n r 0 1 01 1

'ee,)u~ie (X xh~0 1 0 01 -: we~o's z,:'

ra _-nd ia 3~ 1 0 1 1 0

are =aia e zid wha= x-ai 1 0 1 1

Figure 2. Part of question by semantic feature matrix (showing four selected

(iuestions and five selected features).

An index of similarity (Sij1 ranging from 0 to 1) among each pair of

n questions can be calculated using the formula (from Stefflre, 1972):

R.R.1 + R.R.'

i P RR' + R R.

where the R's represent a row vector of ones and zeros for questions i and

j, and R' is the column vector obtained by transposing the row vector R.

These calculations are performed separately for each participant's data and

yield an n x n matrix of similarities among questions. For example, the

calculated similarity (based on only 6 of the 58 features) between questions

1 and 2 and between 3 and 4 from the data described in Figure 2 are .75 and

12
- 7q-

.67, respectively. The output of this procedure was a. 272x 2-72 matrix of similarity ,measures, with each question expressed- in 'erms of its mi

laxity to all other questions across all 58 features. The. loer triangle

of this matrix served as the input to the cluster analysis procedure.

The cluster analysis was performed by a computer routine entitled

"Aggregation Hierarchical Clustering Program" (Oliver, 1973). In this program, the sirnilartty data are clustered using a technique sometimes referred

to, as "mean between" clustering (e.5., Andenberg, 1972). According to this

method, the distance between clusters A and B is the mean of the _.imilarities betiween pointsooA and points of B. That is,

d(A,B) = (1/nAnS) E d(a,b)

where nA and riB are the number of points in A and B, respectively, and the

summation is over all point a in A and b in B. This method assumes that

the similarity data contain enough metric information such that the calculation of mean similarities makes sense.

;B

I T

13
4. RESULTS

The semantic clustering technique resulted in seven-major clusters of

tactical information from the 272 questions generated by participants in

the elicitation procedure. These clusters were assigned the following names

to reflect the common military concept contained in each: friendly, eqemy,

time/capability, status, activities/procedures, terrain/routes, and plans.

A discussion of the contents of each cluster is presented in this chapter

and includes cluster diagrams and sample participant-generated questions.

For reference purposes, Table 3 provides a summary of the clustAr analysis,

showing each cluster by name, the chapter-section number in which it is

discussed, the frequency of questions contained in it, and a brief overview

of the nature of these questions. Appendix C contains all the questions

generated by the participants, listed by cluster. The final section of the

chapter presents the findings of the Question Data Form,'(QDF) collected

during the elicitation procedure.

With the clustering technique employed here, tactical questions were

restricted to membership in a single cluster; in other words, questions

were clustered in terms of the most similar relationships. Thus, the cl--

ter to which a question belongs reflects the notion that the question has

more in common with questions in that particular cluster than with questions

in any other cluster. However, although questions appear together in a

cluster on the basis of common features, questions in another cluster may

also share the same features. For example,' one large cluster of questions

may have in common a feature such as geographic location, while another

(usually smaller) cluster may also contain questions pertaining to geographic location; in the latter case, however, the questions appear in another cluster because of more prominent similarities attributable to features other than geographic location.

Cluster 1--Friendly Information

The military concept "friendly" is the common element contained in the

106 questions which formed the friendly information cluster (see Appendix C,

page 89). Within this cluster there are two major subclusters (i.e., cluster components) with unit characteristics as the dominant element in one

and geographical location information in the other. Figure 3 presents an

overview of the subclusters of the friendly information cluster. Because

of their size and complexity, each subcluster is discussed separately.

Subcluster la--Unit Characteristics. One of the most prevailing information requests in the friendly unit characteristics subcluster (Figure 4)

was that of unit availability. While other concepts, such as plans and

terrain-related information, appeared, availability was a more frequent

theme. Within the unit characteristics subcluster there are two major

branches, one dealing with air/artillery information and one related to

logistics and unit-related information. The friendly air/artillery branch

decomposed into two segments, namely air only information and artillery

information (including artillery and artillery combined with air informaation). The logistics and unit-related information branch also decomposed

into two segments, namely mistion-relevant information and unit-related

information.

15

IIMMBTZ PAGE BLA"-N4O? Ui
TABLE 3

SUMARY OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS RESULTS

INF4ATOH ECTION FREQUENCY OF CLL'STERMNE NUMER QUESTIONS CONTENT_ OVERVEi~ti

Friendly 3.1 106 (29'.1 Friendly unit avilibilitv;,jai * and artillery unit in~iofrafion,;

logistics ififoition; 7- Location iifOtfintion ibout uwts , obstacls and -rei,,forceme~ts;

Enemy 3.2 81 (3V.) -identlficijion of eneMy units by size and types; unit and activity

locations

Type, quantity and capability of

enemy weapons,-and equipment.

Time/Capability 3.3 22 (8%) Tlme/distance for movement; time

to completion of obstacles and

Positions; reinforcement capability

(for enemy and friendly).

Status 3.4 20 (7%) Current situation concerning:

commnunications; Positions; roads;

weather; traficabil ity.

Activities/Procedures 3.5 18 (6.5y.) Spezial weapons employment and

proce%"lres; indications of enemy

aCtivitit:-, refugee actlvlties;' ITerrain/Route 3.6 15 (5.5.) Identification of useable routes,

avenues of approach, obstacles;

terrain overview.

Planning 3.7 10 (4-%) En~emy objectives; defensible terrain;

engir-er plans.

272

16
ARTILLERY AXD/ORk-.AIR UNITS

UN:IT CHARACTERISTICS

(64)

LOGISTICS AND UNIT RELATEP'INFORPAATION

(28)

FRIENDLY !NFORMATI.ON-

(106)

UJNITS/OBSTACLES/AREAS/VULNERA8ILITIES

(30)

I -LOCATION INFORMATION REINFORCEMENTS

(42) (6)

LAVAILABLE UNITS

FIGURE 3. FRIENDLY INFORMATION CLUSTER.

1'17

4k'
' c

".-m-I I S.

_AVisIIIt *If Ain

A S It LINT 0 1

((1)

"I AV IAIIT If TLK

-AIR - OMIIT--- 

,c(wISIKI PRUAAIREO ANe

_ 40111 IsORw VI(RI ltLAI

z INAICATIP fllsf IlI

v AIRfo #AN AllS 0IS11RA

AIRICI 01- I-. AlS1111.1411$tu 31AI

14S1011IC 1114011IA 

1(1(0(141- 4

AIR AWO A(.111,1161100 AIRFill%

OR) [l~ll AYII~AR

(14) 4)

L-(ARIILIER? F

(I(S)

10151( JIERI

INFORMATIO

(IS))

IIALC10RIERAIIAL&

MMCOOESISIAIU$IOAITY AVAILAMILE

LOGISTICS

(14)

V 3 RMISSIWINI

RELE AN? INRAION

ISTMICE

N IOITC PLAIIS

UNIT 11ELAIO iRFIARANI SPECIFIC SIZE Am-O

(28) Ilf OF UNITS .4 (9)

R"LARD %- IJPPORTIIG IS SINUIS INFOMAION 0iA1(Il OF CAT FORCES/

(11) TASK ORLARIZATION

t WIN1 USES IAn CONING FORCE

FIGURE 4. FRIENDLY UNIT INFORMATION SUBCLUSTER.

18
4 E Inspection ,of the air/artillerty branch of the,friendly unit informAr Ad eion indicates the range of information requested by users.';, . he, fol1oing

are a sample of the questions contained in the "air only" segment 6f,,,the, branch; some sample answers, when supplied by users, are given in parenthde,.

What air force support is available--sorties per day? (10-15)

What TAC air other than our organic close &-kpor, , f

available now to strike at the enemy'p b4.{j :i'jW$ i A;,,

(Number of sorties and time on stat, y ,'/, w JI' l '

What antitank helicopter capa#(.,a

How many sorties of TAC , a tao " How~~ may~and, what i a ntdLIP".

they have? (20 sort1i.b,ji,1 tin nt k) " ,' , 1}

What is the tactical a ixr" Ton

Ordnance? ,,

Does the Division have its attack helicopters in general support

4 "(GS) or direct support (DS) of brigade? (Initially in GS under

Division troops with priority to 2d Bde, 3d Bde, and lst Bdei

From these few examples, it is evident that users require avai abiity/

capability information about air units; that is, 15 of 18 air unit questions

concerned the availability/capability dimension. Further, users requested

answers which were in terms of quantity of craft or time on station or response time. Specifically, 13 of the 15 air availability/capability questions requested an answer in time or quantity.

Concerning artillery information, some questions dealt with combined

air and artillery fire while others were related to artillery alone. The

following are examples of the questions found in the artillery segment of

the air/artillery branch:

What friendly fires can be massed on enemy penetration? (artillery,

TAC air)

What are the results of our fire support use?

ZWhat is the ASR (available supply rates) for field artillery ammu4 nition? (20 rounds per tube per day)

What is the status of our air defense forces? (locations, strengths,

and ammunition availability)

What percent of the TAC air and field artillery ammunition will we

allocate to various phases of combat? (Save a minimum of 30% of

resources for a counterattack.)

The artillery information required by users represented a considera;le

range of information. The eight questions dealing with combined fires requested information concerning fire availability as well as results of fires

and fire support plans. The remaining seven questions were seeking quantitative information, such as the amount of available ammunition.

19

s
The second 'major compohent of the-4unit information stubcluster, entitled

logistics and& uii-related, inf6imtion, contained 28, questions . Half of'

these questiuis'Wie concerned 'with a range-of logistical information, such, as the foIowing: ....

Wht isi-my AS R (availabiity Supply r&tes). - for al-l types of amnuni "

ti6n? (155m- , 8mmb ' , ADA'

Are -there any restrictions -on ammunition supply rates? '(4.2" aid

8imm are in short -supply--80- rounds per day per tube-, all other'

unlimited.)

What is the status' of resupply to the Division of class III, V, and

VII? (gallonsi per day of class III, number of' founds of. dlcss V,

and' numbir bf tanks, etc.)

Will my supply procedure 'be manual or ADP? (ADP)

What is the policy on exchanging deadlined combat vehicles with ekisting theatre stocks? (as required)

What is the current status of friendly forces in terms of -major enditem availability/serviceability? (list of losses/projection of

supply to units)

Common to a number of the questions was that the answer involved, quantitative information; yet others were related to procedures or policy.

Within this same subcluster there were questions concerning other aspects

of unit information, such as the following:

Are special weapons available and in range of the main attack?

(155mm-3, 8"-2, both--chemical)

What is the friendly field artillery order of battle? (a Corps

group--by the type battalion--supporting the Division and tactical

missions assigned to it and organic units)

What engineer support is available to dig in and construct fortification? (one combat engineer battalion)

What is the mix of combat forces now committed in each area?

(two armor, one infantry--lst brigade)

Where are the fields of fire? (tanks, TOW, DRAGON, small arms)

What are the terrain uses for the covering force?

This grouping of information requests required a large range of varied

types of information, including current dynamic information, such as availability as well as more static information concerning the terrain.

' 'Subcluster lb--Location Information. The second subcluster (42 questions) of the friendly information cluster contained the common element of

location information. Figure 5 provides an overview of the subcluster.

20

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - '- - - - ',-
LOC ST.. . . -. I' CSPSITOS A E

li-,0CNAIA O LNS111I

rTY.4

I C VEL'FESU NAIAIItlSuI

08(14) [

AN AULERAILIIESLOLSITL[

(200)

VLAINITIS/A NO c mO

1811 S/(DTACLS/ANAS 

AND W.NIAaI~TI~sL 

ISTATSSLOA

OS'CL1

F (4),

OIVISION/coops LOCATION

(5) M2

LOCATION INFORMATION- NIINVOACLINTSAAI ILT

(42) () -AVILAILT

CORPS AVAILABILITY

(4) [1-.AVAILASE UNIITS CBNRIIT

FIGURE 5. FRIENDLY LOCATION INFORMATION SUBCLUSTER.

21
I - < " ' S " < -; -..

Thirty questions dealt with location requests for a variety of different

units as well as areas, for example:

If I reinforce outside sector where are the coOrdination points?

(coordination point PVll6111)

What is the current location of ammunition supply points? (locations by coordinates)

Where are areas that can be used to decontaminate vehicles and

equipment? (fire pond located PV116117)

Whefe are the. friendly units to company level? '(six-digit

coordinates)

What types of surveillance means are available and where are they?

(locations of observerg, radar-counter artillery, personnel, RECCE,

photo, electronic

Where are my obstacles placed? (lobations)

From this sample it is evident that a wide variety of information related to location is required, most of which can be answered in terms of

grid coordinates.

The remaining 12 questions in the location cluster dealt with the location of reinforcements and available units. For example:

Where are Corps artillery assets in the Division area and those

in other areas that can support the Division?

Where is the Division reserve located? (coordinates)

What Corps units are available for use in the Division sector and

what are their reinforcement times? (list of units and times)

Can Corps provide reinforcements if necessary--where are they

currently located? (yes, one division - in reserve, 1 hour

march time away)

What additional tank obstacles can be emplaced by combat engineers

on major avenues of approach in the south to slow enemy advance?

(can knock down trees blocking all routes through forested area x)

Can our units dig new defensive positions, prepare obstacles on

major enemy avenues of approach to rear of current defensive lines--

what engineer support available? (Division engineer battalion can

put priority on effect in x area.)

For this set of questions, sample answers were again given in grid coordinates. However, a few questions concerning the movement of units, such

as reinforcements, required an answer expressed in units of time.

22
"luster 2-7Efiemy, Information,

The concept of "enemy" was the common eiemefi for 81 questiohs contained in the enemy information- cluster,, which is descfibed in Figure 6. This cluster contained t~o-*ajor tubclutters, one whiah related& to are-a/

-units and aciVit and A second whichpertinedto weapon and-euint : ~information. -

Subcluster 2a--Areas/Units and Activity Inf6rmation. This-,ubclust6e

contained 65 questions, concerning areas/unit§ and- ativity information.

Here are some examples:

with what type and size units will the enemy move intour sector?

What are the latest enemy lopations and enemy configurations of

units?

Where are the potential drop zones in the area for enemy airborne

operations? (vicinity ___, etc. with size and troop capability)

From what enemy locations are most electronic emissions radiating?

Where are enemy air strikes concentrating?

At what point is the enemy most vulnerable? (vicinity due to

restriction of narrow front)

The prominent enemy information requested in this subcluster concerned

grid coordinate locations and the identification of types of enemy units.

Though concepts such as capability and strength were requested, the frequency of these requests was not high.

ISubcluster 2b--Weapons and Equipment Information. This second subIcluster of enemy information contained 16 questions about weapons and

equipment. The following are sample questions from the subcluster:

What is the enemy strength? (% level at battalion in personnel

and equipment)

What is the enemy bridging capability? (The enemy has 14 mobile

bridges.)

What are the specifics on the major equipment of the opposing

force? (Armor T-72, T-60, T-54; strength)

Does intelligence report any large amount of artillery anmunition

being moved forward? (Total amount of artillery projectiles reported in the area opposite our forces is greater than the unit's.

capability to carry--indicating preparation for attack.)

Where is the enemy stockpiling POL?

What type of enemy field artillery is there? (standard Soviet organization, 120mm, 152mm, etc.)

23

I;'A
TYPE AND QUANITY, OF MUNo AND'AIR/

STRENGTH/CONFIRATION/IATE OFAOVANCE

I RESERVES UNIT SizLL . (15)

(18) ACTIVITY (2No eCHELON/TANK ARMY)

(3)

UNIT TYPE

!"UNITS (29) .L.ARTILLERY/EADQUARTERS/IN FRIENDLY

(34) QUIPNENT TYPE/ -LOCATION

STRENGTH-A1 -- CONFIGURATION uRTS I ()(3)

(38) TERRAIN RELATED-CROP ZONES, AVENUES OF APPROACH, DISTANCE ,EAS/----FROM NSR

ACTIVITIES/ (4) FIELD ARTILLERY/AIR MOBILE OPERATIONS/

UNITS .. . , SMKE/SPECIAL WEAPONS

(6AS) UHRSLIY.. ACTIVITIES/UNITS.[

LOCATION -" B (21),iyI TA (23) NSC CAPAILIY (4) " (27) ' VULNERASILITY (2)

ENEMY (4)

] FC RNAT 0ON

81) r EQUIPENT AND PERSONNEL CAPABILITY/

STRENGTHS AND LOSSES

(8) - QUANTITY/STATUS- "

(~iEAOSCONAT POWER

WEAPONS (1)

EQUIPMENT LOGISTICS ACTIVITY/QUANTITY OR TYPE

L (3)

-RTILLERY/OGISTIC

(7) ARTILLERY EFFECTSITRENOSITYPE CAPABILITY

(4)

FIGURE 6. ENEMY INFORMATION CLUSTER.

24
HAv6 any trends been established by the efnemy in the use of his

fire support? (Command and control field artillery, etc.)

* The questions ranged considerably from concerns about enemy trend information to quantity information about specific equipment. , Of the 16

questions, 7 requested information concerning enemy capability 6r strength.

Cluster 3--Time/Capability Information '"

The cluster of information in which the common elements were time andtr

capability d6sisted of 2 questions. Figure 7 shows the branches of the

clU tier And'the following represent samplei queStions:

What are my day and night time-distance factors for movement

(forward, back, and. lteraliy)? (Show times by T+.)

What alternate/subsequent battle positions are available, are they

prepared--when will they be prepared? (for each battalion and

artillery battery, no, 3 days)

- - For how long can the enemy sustain combat operations on a continuous basis in my sector? (for 72 hours)

When will the Ist echelon attack? (measured in time--hours and

minutes--or a "gate" of time)

What is the enemy capability to employ high performance aircraft?

(17 sorties of MIG 21 in my sector per day)

What is the enemy current rate of movement and capability to increase? (10-15 km/hr on particular axis increases to 20-25)

S' Within this cluster, answers were expressed in tine units for 20 of

the 22 questions. For some questions, time was used to estimate movement

distance. In other questions, time pertained to estimates of completion

or provided the time frame for unit employment or reinforcement capability.

* Out of 9 questions requiring unit capability information, 7 requested time

frames in the answer as well as unit information, while 2 questions were

concerned with ground movement capability and did not request time

information.

Cluster 4--Status Information

The common element among the 20 questions in this cluster was the request for status (i.e., current situation) information. This cluster is

shown in Figure 8, anO. the following are sample questions:

What is the communication capability and status? (net status--who

can talk)

What is the status of prepared blocking or secondary positions?

(60% complete)

25
-~

-ISTANCE FACTORS

(5)

FRIENDLY

OR - ENEMYS LFRIENDLY POSITIONS/OBSACLES

TIME TO MOVE /(4)

TIME TO COMPLETIO (13) -.SUSTAINABILITY

L ION ENEMY(2)

ONLY

4) L-IST ECHELON

TIME/CAPABILITY (2)

INFORATIONOF FRIENDLY/ENEMY (22) TO EMPLOY/REINFORCE

WITH GROUND OR AIR UNITS

(5)

CAPABILITY

(7)

MOVEMENT

(2)

FIGURE 7. TIME/CAPABILITY INFORMATION CLUSTFR~.

26
-COUNICATIONS/POSITIONS/FLANKS/DEFE-NDING FORCE

(13))

UNITSUNITS/ROADS

WEATHER()

STATUS LWEATHER-CURRENT/PROJECTED INFORMATION- (4) (20)

VISIS ILITY/TRAFFICABILITY

(3)

FIGURE 8. STATUS INFORMATION CLUSTER.

27

7_ '7 7- -
What is the situation on the Division's northern and southern

flanks? (trace--enemy and friendly)

What is the status of the defending/delaying forces in the bridges

actually executing the covering force mission? (locations)

What is the situation regarding roads and trafficability? (roads

clogged, bridges out, etc.)

What is the current weather and predicted effects?

wind direction) ,

The types .of answers requested by particip&,,ts varied with the inclusion

of listsof units (for net status), numbers (for ,emperature) as wel. a.;

locatio information. , C

Cluster 5--Activities/Procedures Information

The concepts of either activities or procedures were common elements of

the 18 questions contained in this cluster. Figure 9 provide, 'an overview

of the information organization of this cluster, and the f11owii4jarea

few sample questions: .,

What are the indications of enemy activity? (They are in attack

formations and could attack in 12-24 hours.) J

How many of my units are engaged? (2/3)

Have any special weapons been employed, if so, what kind and where?

(number of weapons, b" types, etc.)

What is the time required to get friendly release of special weapons?

(40 hours)

Has smoke been authorized for use? Available? Used? (from battalion FSO)

What is the civilian occupation of critical built-up areas--size,

activity? (HAHN vicinity _ , 50% preparing to evacuate)

From this sample of questions, it is evident that requests for activity

or procedure information may be answered in a number of ways, including

reference to time, types and numbers of weapons, as well as location data.

Cluster 6--Terrain/Route Information

This cluster, in which the common element is terrain or route information, consisted of 15 questions. Figure 10 provides an overview of the infrrmation structure and the following are sample questions from the cluster:

What are the avenues of approach? (direction in relation to major

terrain features and our key terrain)

28

-

.....-. . - . - . - . ---.---- . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - - - -
- ENEMY tNDICATIONS/MOVEMENT/POSITI0N4' rCONSOLIDATION$

I(4)

FRIENOLY/ENEKY

ACT!VITY- (L_ FRIENDLY/ENEMY COMBAT RATIO AMOUNT OF

l[" 10 ,FRIENDLY UNITS ENGAGED

ENEMY/FRIENDLY -SPECIAL WEAPONS

yI ACTIVITIES AND (2) SpECAl WEAPONS

PROCEDURES (4)

(16)

:Vl':ES.;PRO~~ ;RCEDURESLFREDYPOEIS

~:v~;~5g~E. R L EFUGEEAT'I~ ~AUE

FIGURE 9. ACTIVITIES/PROCEDURES INFORMATION CLUSTER.

29

; :- 29
LOCATION OF AVENUES OF APPROACH/

USEABLE ROUTES

(4)

-AVENUES OF APPROACH

(ROUTES) (7) FOR ENEMY ATTACK/ RE INFORCEMENT/2ND ECHELON

TERRAIN AND ROUTE- (3)

INFORMATION MOVIEET/REINFORCEMENT

(15) ()(4)

ENEMY RELATEDLTERRAIN INFORMATION (2)

(8) OBSACLSTACIGLEES

(2)

FIGURE 10. TERRAIN/ROUTE INFORMATION CLUSTER.

) - 1 30J
K. ( .What are the usable routes for friendly movement? (route, direction,

trace)

What are. the. likely routes along which the enemy will commit 2nd

echelons? (high steed avenues of approach)

Does the terraii lend itself to the enemy to reinforce his breakthrough? (yes, both from the south and the north--reinforcement

ability based'on the terrain)

What are the natural barriers or obstacles kacing the enemy?

(mountains, ravines, streams, rivers, bridges)

What obstacles are critical to movement, MSR, reinforcement, etc.?

(bridges, restricted roadways, swamps, etc., without bypass)

The questions contained in this cluster pertain to map information.

However, most of the questions could not be answered with a hard copy map

alone. For example, the usability of routes may change over time, and

avenues of approach are identified according to the size of units they can

, support. Thus, survey participants appear to be requesuing updated and/or

processed information.

, Cluster 7--Planning Information

The concept of planning is common to the 10 questions contained in this

cluster. An overview of the cluster may be found in Figure 11; the following are sample questions contained in the cluster:

What is the enemy's tactical doctrine? (frontal attack, penetration, deep objectives)

What terrain is most defensible?

What is the Commander's concept of the defense? (strong in center,

economy force in south, counterattack exposed flanks and to destroy

o enemy formation, covering force do not become engaged)

Is any area designed for preplanned TAC NUC? (DGZ with iminimum

safe distance and strike warning time)

What route priorities have we assigned to artillery units in order

to facilitate rapid movement and responsive support? (outline of

priorities by unit)

Within this cluster, the answers varied from relatively static and objective answers concerning enemy doctrine to changing information concerned Iwith friendly tasking priorities.

31

________________ - - ~--l '4
E.'ENY OMECTIVESD/C INE/IMEMTIOS

(3)

. " • WW/TEMI'tl,

(O) N KEY TEVIAIN OR MOST DEFE,1

SIBLE TERRAIN

(2)

I ENGXNEERS/DEFENSE CONCEPT/COMUJNICATIONS/TAC XUC

1 (4),

1 -FRIENOLY PLANS

ARTILLERY ROUTES

S(1)

FIGURE 11. PLANNING INFORMATION CLUSTER.

32

-~ _ _,
Question Characteristics

During- the elicitation sessions, participants were asked to complete a

Question Data Form (QDF) for each of their questions. One of the questions

on the QDF asked participants to characterize the given information requirement as either obvious, obtainable by inference, or unaailable from

a display with conventional symbology. Obvious information is easily understood from a display with conventional symbology, and would include,

for example, unit type (e.g., armor, infantry). Information which is char-

-- acterized as obtainable by inference implies that some of the information

is portrayed but not in a complete or casil - recognized manner; for example ,

the type of equipment contained in an enemy unit might be inferred based 5J

additional information, such as an Order of Battle file. The third category dealt with information requirements which are not portrayed or deriv-

*able from a conventional display, for example, friendly available supply

routes (ASR).

Table 4 provides a summary of the results of the QDF responses for the

questions contained in each of the seven clusters of information identified

by this analysis. The table gives the number of questions contained in

each cluster as well as the percentage of questions which survey particiPants characterized as either obvious, obtainable oy inference, or unavailable from a display with conventional symbology. The final column in the

table lists the percentage of questions in the cluster for which participants noted that they have use& - personalized method to portray the answers.

The two clusters which contained major subclusters are al.o decomposed

in this table. For example, consider the unit characteristics within the

friendly information cluster. For the branch dealing with air/artillery

(number of questions, n = 36), the required information was said to be obvious from a display with conventional symbology for 6% of the questions.

Users responded that answers to 64% of the questions are unavailable from

a conventional display. Further, users said that they have portrayed the

nece3sary information with personalized methods in 53% of the cases. Looking at the branch dealing with logistics and unit-related information

(n = 28), the picture isn't much different. While the users noted that

18% of the information is obvious from a display with conventional symbLxlogy, 71% of the information was judged unavailable; and for 68% of the

questions, survey participants said they have used personalized methods to

represent the information.

The second subcluster of friendly information contained 42 questions

related to location. The results of the QDF analysis revealed that for

50% of the location information answers were considered obvious from a

display with conventional symbology. Only 22.5% of the needed information

was classified as unavailable from a display. However, respondents noted

the use of personalized methods of portrayal for 40% of the location information. For the enemy information subclusters, the same type of analytical comparisons can be made.

As another example, the third cluster of information requirements related to time/capability (n = 22). From the QDF results we see that only

9% of this information was indicated by participants to be obvious from a

conventional display, and 45.5% of the information was considered to be

" - 33
11 TABLE 4

;SUMMARY Of QDF.RESPONSES

IFrom a displiy with conventional

s~ublogy theli~ormaioiii ~ -Survey par icipaits-_havi used'

iLOITOIATIFA NIER0 I VIOU OBtAINABLE UN-WAALABL ______________

a. Unit I

AirIArtillery 36 18% Ill. 641 I 53%

Logistics 3nd Unit-related 28 61 30M 711 68.

------------------------------------------------- ----------------------

a. Areas/Unit an ciiy 65 48.31 32.31 19.31 "41

b. W4eapons adEupet16 --- 12.51 251 62.5125

3. Time/Capability 22 91 45.51 45.51 36%

4. Status 20 151 15% 70% 45%

5. Activity/Procedures 18 171 281 551 50%

6. Terrain/Route * 57% 721 21% 64%

Plnin 0201 301 501 40%

272

34
a unavailable. Personalized portrayal methods were said to have been employed

by participants for 36% of the information contained in the cluster. As

indicated in the lower portion of the table, the QDF results for the remaining clusters of status, activity/procedure, terrain/route, and planning

infornation are described in a similar fashion.

The histogram in Figure 12 provides an overview of the results of the

QDF for all of the participant-generated questions. Among the 272 questions,

participants considered the answers to only 27% of them to be obvious from

a display with conventional symbology and 431 to be unavailable from such

a display. Furthermore, the data indicate that the use of personalized methods to portray required information is widespread. Not only have personalized methods been employed for information which is said to be unavail-

*able, but personalization has even been used for portraying information

which is said to be obvious from a display. This latter finding is both

interesting and perplexing; the indication is that even information, which

is obvious from a display requires modification in some cases to fit the

specific needs of the user. Overall, these data reveal a significant gap

in the ability of conventional situation displays to provide users with

required infor..acion, and also that users will in many cases attempt to

fill this gap in their own way.

35

' i

4-- - '' -
PERSNALZEDMET HOD

UgROAI RESENT

50%-

N =116

c~40%v

S30%. N =81

ui N 72

0/0

10%

OBVIOUS OBTAINABLE UNAVAILABLE

BY

INFERENCE

FIGURE 12. GRAPHIC STATUS OF POTENTIAL ANSWERS.

36

777T77777
A. DISCUSSION

Introduction

The primary objective of this-research effort was to conduct &pre. .

liminary investigation ihto the symbol~gy needs of Division level 'Army personnel, and to assess the adequacy -of conventional symbolojy (FM 21-20) fo

fulfilling these needs. To meet these objectives, workA6le tehniques were

developed to elicit user informatin requirements and refine and" Organize

them into a preliminary data base. The elicitatih--procedure wai employed

successfully with military personnel serving as participants. The elicited

data resulted in 272 user-generated tactical questions, for Which deddkiptive data were obtained concerning the graphic pottrayal of. t e nei ato

L associated with the poteitial answers to each question. in-parti ,la .a

determination was made of the degree to which answers are 6on id6red av&ilable fiom conventional symbology or are generatedby personalized.portrayal

methods. This information served to identify the gaps between serv-required

information and. the capability of conventional symbolojy tdportray the.information. For example, it was found that very little friendly unitinf6r-

.;ation is obvious from a conventional display, and n.ore than half of the

needed information is said to be portrayed by users with personalized methods.

As with any language, tactical terminology is not completely standardized, and subtle differences between words may reflect 'vast and meaningful

differences to tacticians. This research effort, therefore, attempted to

capture meaningful distinctions as well as to integrate similar concepts. 1 K With this purpose in mind, a semantic clustering technique was developed

for organizing the tactical questions to identify key concepts underlying

the structure and content of the information. Overall, the application of

the cluster analysis technique proved successful in identifying several

distinct groups (i.e., clusters) of information that had specific, meaningful military concepts in common.

Conventional Symbology and User Information Requirements

Traditionally, conventional symbology has served a communicative function, providing users with such information as unit type and size, as well

as identification, principal weapon systems, and locations. For these purposes, conventional symbology seems adequate. In this spirit, FM 21-30

offers the following guidance for military symbology:

...operational personnel and intructors should strive to depict

only essential information. Simplicity, uniformity, and clarity

are the keys to good symbology.

Thus, a symbol set, representing essential information in a simple, clear,

and uniform manner, probably would be ideal.

However, the results of current research indicate that user information requirements extend well beyond the scope of conventional symbology.

That is, the battlefield does not seem to be portrayed adequately by unit

functions and designators alone. Further, the proliferation of personalized portrayal methods indicates an attempt by users to represent the

37

''4 '"N "'
-information in one way or another in order -to compensate for the inadequacies of conventional symbology. That is, when users do not .have a standard

method for portraying additional information, they will, in many cases,

3 develop their own method. While this inventiveness may serve as a pradt!-

z

cal solution for individual needs, the lack of standardization can lead to

communication difficulties and even mitunderstandings among. users. Furthermore, -as nevi 4utomated ata pr6qessIng systems are fi6elded with greater

potential for rapid transfer of _graphic information within and between cormmand groups, these difficulties can be/ expected to increase. In ,geneka1,

therefore, imfroved standardized techniques of graphic portrayal are needed.

Dynamic Information. Th6 cluster analysis of information requirements

and the results from the corresponding Qhestion Data Forms (QDFs) revealed

a number of areas where aisplays with conventional sybbol6gy are not providing users with the information they need. These gaps are cleariy evident

with regard to dynamic tactical information, especially within the context

of the "friendly information cluster." Existing symbols for friendly unit

information fall short of satisfying user requirements; for when a user

requests information about his own units, he is looking for much more than

unit type, size, and designator. The user is seeking information that is

relevant to his decision-making needs. For example, he wants to inquire

about unit availability and capability, the results of actions, unit de7

ployment plans and procedures, as well as the current status of logistical

support. As one might predict, answers to questions about location information are obvious from a display with a greater frequency than are answers

to questions concerning unit information. Yet, even the required friendly

location information was said to be obvious for only half of the questions,

possibly because user requests for availability, status, or movementcapability information were often combined with location-related requests.

Information requests related to enemy areas/units and activity within

the "enemy information cluster" fare much better with respect to current

graphic portrayal methods than friendly unit information. Nearly half of

the user-requested enemy information was considered to be obvious from a

conventional display; this is probably attributable to the fact that half

of the questions required enemy location information. There were, however,

requests for dynamic types of information about the enemy posture as well

as for enemy strength, capability, vulnerability, and rate-of-advance information that are not generally obvious on the display. When users requested specific information concerning enemy weapons and equipment, they

found only a small amount of the information obvious on a conventional

display.

The requirement for dynamic information also is apparent in the remaining clusters of tactical questions. For example, in the time/capability

information cluster, the capability to employ or reinforce with specific

types of units represents information needed about both the friendly and

enemy forces. In the "status information" cluster, the concept of current

status is applied to roads and weather as well as communication nets, and

a majority of this information is unavailable on a conventional display.

Or, as shown in the "planning information" cluster, users requested information concerning friendly force plans and procedures as well as types of

enemy activity. It is evident, therefore, that a variety of dynamic

38

38
information is requested by users, and that only a small amount oi it is

obvious from a display.

Indications from this pre,liminary data gathering effort point to the

fact that users have a need f,-', stuation displays that can c&tur6 the

dynamic aspects of A rapid]J chbe.ging battlefield. This. inforfmation can

range from an identifiilation ot impassable roads to a discrimination- between friendly units within communication Zontaft ind thk6 without. For

example, comments from survey participants noted that Uogistical infofmation, such as Available supply routes and ammunition all6cations fbr ph4ses

of combat, should be portrayed on a: display. Other cebmknt: expressed the

b need for a system to selectiVely or collectively display artillery range

fans for both enemy and friendly units. One participant noted, that merely

indicating that a field artillery unit was ftioi6niig in' the role6 -direct support (DS) or general support (GS) would bi extremely Useful.

Dimensions af Required Information. The formulation of guidelines for

the graphic portrayal of the battlefield requires identificatioh of th

relevant cluster analysis dimensions performed of user here information can provide requirements. guidance in The this results endeavor. of theThe

reader should recognize, however, that the dimensions to be discussed are,

at this stage, tentative and based on a relatively small sample of users

and one specific scenario. Future research will be required to increase

the number of scenarios as well as to sample a larger number of users.

Availability and Capability. From the analysis of friendly unit information, the concept of availability appears to be a key concern; in other

words, the user needs to know whether or not a specific asset is available.

This concept is considered when decisions must be made concerning the optimum usage of battlefield assets. If availability were to appear on a display, the question of what information it should convey becomes important.

From this survey, it is evident that users are looking fok more than binary

(i.e., yes-no) information. For example, concerning the availability of

friendly air units, users want an answer in terms of the quantity of craft

(or number of sorties) or their time on station/response time. Concering

logistics, users may request details such as fuel consumption in gallons

per day. Quantity and time, therefore, appear to be relevant dimensions of

user requested availabilty information whose display should be given

serious consideration. However, from this limited sample it cannot be

concluded that portrayal of unit availability could be handled exclusively

by providing quantity or time information.

The concept of unit "capability" is an important aspect of both friendly

and enemy forces. Generally, requests for capability information involve

dimensions similar to those pertaining to availability. Based on this preliminary survey, participants appear to use availability and capability as

interchangeable terms. Whether these concepts could or should be portrayed

by the same dimensions of information, however, requires further

investigation.

Time. The requirement for time information was not limited to availability and capability requests. For example, distance information was

sometimes referred to in terms of time, implying that the amount of time

necessary for units to move may be more relevant than actual distance per

39

7777. -r-7-7--7777 ~ 
• L .... . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . • -

se. Concerning enemy activities, time is an answer to sustatinability as

well as to when an attack is expected. An answer in time is used frequently

to indicate the expected completion of friendly obstacle emplacement and

position readiness. Conventional 3ymbology does provide a standard method

for indicating proposed obstacles and positions, namely, a "dashed line."

However, this use of a dashed line conflicts with at least one existing

symbol (i.e., that used to show mine clusters) which is also formed with

a dashed line. Returning to the time issue, conventional symbology does

not have a standard method for noting the projected time of completion for

positions. Thus, standardization of improved portrayal procedures might

permit users to easily display and understand time-related information.

Status. Looking through the cluster of status information in detail,

. certain dimensions are apparent for small groups of related questions.

For example, communication status is important and may be portrayed in a

binary fashion, i.e., through differentiation between units with functivning communication links and those without. Such information may be indicated by simple binary coding, possibly by use of highlighting. Attention

should be given to the information in this ciuster since a large amount of

it is unavailable on a conventional display, and nearly half of the information currently is portrayed through personalized techniques. Additional

surveys of tactical personnel may help to identify the required dimensions ~of information.

Activity. Activity, along with procedure information, formed only a

small cluster of questions that involved a variety of information dimensions. Some of these dimensions, such as type and location of employed

special weapons, are portrayable with conventional symbology, which provides

a few symbols for specific battlefield activities, such as ambush, firefights, and harassing fire. Others, however, such as combat ratio and indications of enemy activity, do not have a standard method for portrayal.

Since this cluster of activity/procedure information was relatively small,

further data are needed to identify important common information features

that may be present.

Conclusions

Frequent users of conventional symbology are not likely to be surprised

by the present research findings; the shortcomings of conventional symbology

probably have been apparent to most users for some time. As stated earlier,

no attempt was made in this research effort to distinguish between information requirements that could or could not, or should or should not, be portrayed in graphic displays. Thus, there is the possibility that many of

the user information requirements specified do not lend themselves -to convenient graphic display; some, for example, might be more usable in a hard

copy tabular form. Further, certain user-desired information may be displayable by modifications to existing symbology, while other information

may require a new symbol.

One of the most important features of the cluster analysis employed

here, therefore, is its utility for enabling the matching of user required

information with the information currently portrayed by conventional symbology. For example, the branches in the cluster analysis show that

40

iL4t
M.

conventional symbology falls short of information needs. Looking at the

air/artillery branch of friendly unit information, it is clear that conventional symbology does allow differentiation between air and artillery

units. However, if the user wants information that is farther down in the

tree, such as the availability of units, it may not be found on a standard

display. This is not to say that a new symbol is required to show unit

availability. Instead, conventional symbology might be modified to reflect

unit availability information.

To illustrate, consider the dimensions of quantity and time that are

important to the portrayal of availability information. As an example, the

following symbol modification might be used to indicate the availability of

15 attack helicopters per day:

LI

15 AH/DAY

This example is n6t intended to signify a definitive portrayal technique, nor i it suggested that such information fulfills all user requirements concerning availability. Rather, the point to be stressed is that

some user requirements may be satisfied by simple modifications to conventional s'mbology, and there are probably numerous effective modification

techniques already in use by personnel who have created their own way of

displaying specific information requirements.

Furthermore, various symbol modification techniques are becoming available with automated graphic display systems that could provide the user with

more detailed information while avoiding the clutter problem inherent in

the display of additional information. For example, automated systems can

provide selective, call-up displays that allow the user to access specific

information only as needed. Such systems can offer zooming and declutter

capability and various coding manipulations through the use of size, color,

shading, density, flashing, perimeter highlighting, etc. Such techniques

appear worthy of systematic exploration to arrive at new standards and

guidelines for enhancing understanding among users.

This research effort has documented some of the major deficiencies of

conventional symbology and constructed a preliminary data base of information requirentents. A more comprehensive data base should include input from

a larger sample of users, with emphasis placed on active field personnel

with a wide range of tactical knowledge and expertise. In addition, future

research should include an offensive as well as a defensive scenario and

should cover both Middle Eastern and European terrain. Whether the ultimate goal is m&cification of conventional tactical symbology or the development of a new improved symbol system, a comprehensive data base of user

information requirements will provide an essential building block.

41 -
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+ ! iformation Service (Springfield, Va., AD 738301, January 1972.

Bowen, R. a., Halpin, J. A., Long, C. A., Lukas, G., Mullarkey, M. M., &

Triggs, T. J. Decision flow diagrams and data aggregation in Army

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Coates, E. N., & McCourt, A. W. A questionnaire-based analysis of orderof-battle elements. U.S. Army Research Institute (Alexandria, Va.),

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Hackman, J. R., & Morris, C. G. Group tasks, group interaction process,

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Sciences, Yale University (New Haven, Conn.), Technical Report No. 7, + " IiAugust 1974.

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U.S. Army Research Institute (Alexandria, Va.), ARI Technical Paper

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Levit, R. A., Alden, D. E., Erickson, J. M., & Heaton, B. J. Development

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McKendry, J. M., Wilson, R. C., Mace, D. J., & Baker, J. D. Application

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Olivier, D. C. Aggregative hierarchical clustering program. Department of

Psychology and Social Relations, Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.),

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Olmstead, J. A., & Elder, B. L. The use of management games for developing

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43

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+'
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Wilcox, J. W. A method f3r measuring decision assumptions, Cambkidge, Mass.:

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1977.

U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-100, Armored and mechanized division operations,

Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.), September 1978.

U.S Army, Field Manual FM 21-30; Military Symbols. Headquarters, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.), May 1970.

44

~~1

N- - _ _ _ __ jx _ _ _
~APPENDIX A

"i RESEARCH MATERIALS

44

o

S I

4.4
APPENDIX A-i

2INTRODUCTION FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS

47 WO M IPAGS XM-NO? IMLJMD
• !!

1 4

INTRODUCTION TO FIELD SURVEY

l- PERCEPTRON ICS

6271 VARIEL AVENUE • WOr' LANO HILLS 0 CALIFORNIA 81367 @ PHONE (213) 864-747'0

i 49
BACKGROUND

Perceptrcnics is currently working with the Army Research Institute on a

continuing project dealing with. the )"Graphic Portrayal. of Battlefield

Information." The ultimate goal of this project is the development of

preliminary guidelines to improve and make-more effective the graphic

representation of the battlefield situation. Currently, the visual

display of the battlefield environment consists of a map. and over.lay

containing conventional symbology (FM21-30. and FM 71-100). This method

of display is generally abstract, cluttered and static jn nature. The

graphic systems of the future are likely to have the capacity ofdisplaying information selectively and in a dynamic manner, with rapid

updating, zooming capabilities, pulsation and the like. If such

advanced systems are to be of value in the coming decades they must

satisfy the changing battlefield information needs of the useri

CONVENTIONAL SYMBOLOGY

The first year of this research effort focused upon the development of a

method for determining the information requirements of users. A roleplaying exercise was developed for eliciting information requirements

from experienced military tacticians. These staff officers were assigned

a TOC user role (e.g., G-3 section duty officer) and given a tactical

function to perform (e.g., recommend friendly troop deployment against

potential enemy threat). The participants would then enumerate the

information that they. would require to complete their function. The

exercise was conducted with a limited number of staff officers and tasks;

however, some insights concerning conventional symbology and the modern

battlefield became apparent. More specifically, although conventional

symbology can convey basic unic information (e.g., identity, function,

size and weapon type), it cannot communicate a richness of detail

S51
considered important by command personnel, and it cannot accomodate most

of the new "imperatives" of tactical doctrine (e.g., combined arms

forces, unit threat, etc.). Such parameters Of ,,formatiOn apper to be

necessary for-supporting modern tactical performance.

CURRENT OBJECTIVES

While a great deal-was learned from the first year effort, there is still

more to 'be done. Phase II of the project will continue to uncover the

information requirements at the Division TOC level. The objective of this

phase of the research effort is to translate current and developing

doctrine into practical guidelines for the graphic portrayal of battlefield

information.

ADVANCED TACTICIANS AND EXPERIENCED STAFF OFFICERS

A research effort such as this cannot achieve its goal in isolation. The

input of military expertise is essential! We have, therefore, sought out

individuals within the military community, like yourself, who are

knowledgeable about the division TOC operations as well as up-to-date

on current and developing doctrine. To take advantage of your expertise,

we are conducting structured interviews within a small group setting.

Each group consists of staff officers, all of whom have a specialty or

experience relevant to TOC information processing and decision making.

PROCEDURE

In order to determine the information requirements of the TOC staff, we

will be using an adaptation of a U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College (USACGSC) course (P313, Forward Deployed Force Operations -

European Setting) to provide the strategic and tactical environment. All

I 52

Ail
members of the group will be given time to familiarize themselves with

the scenario and situation map. We will be asking each of you to roleplay a specific Division TOC personality, such as Commander, G-2,

G-3., etc.. All of you are probably familiar with the role-playing

technique from your days at USACGSC.

For the purpose of this exercise we will ,ask each of you to make an

unrealistic but necessary assumption, namely that collection sources

have advanced to the point that they may ,provide you with any

information you need, concerning enemy forces, friendly forces or the

terrain. Also, we recognize the fact that a major problem in the TOC

environment is not so much obtaining information but storing the

information once it has been obtained. For the purpose of this exercise,

we must ask you to ignore the problem of information storage. Once again,

this may seem very unrealistic, but it is important to this research

effort and we ask for your cooperation in this matter.

Since our objective is to translate doctrine into guidelines for graphic

portrayal, we will ask that you relate your information needs to the

fundamentals of doctrine as specified by FM 100-5 and FM 71-100. For

example, the first and second fundamentals of defense are "Understand

the Enemy" and "See the Battlefield;" and we ask you to reflect on what

information you would need in order to "Understand the Enemy" and "See

the Battlefield." Please note that we are not asking you what you do

to understand the enemy and see the battlefield; we are not looking

for a job description, rather, we are trying to identify the information

requirements necessary for accomplishing the job.

I 53

- ------ ,-
APPENDIX A-2

ELICITATION SCENARIO

O3i PAGI MW 40 M

55~
STRATEGIC SCENARIO

Strategic Environment

The reality of deployed NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Northern

and Central Europe inexorably poses the threat of tension and crisis

escalating to war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have

vital national security interests in Europe that are dramatica'ly

reflected in their military contributions in the two opposing alliances.

Combined with military forces of other alliance/pact members, the European theater is composed of large, modern and potentially destructive

forces unparalleled in the history of warfare.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE NATO WARSAW PACT

Combat and direct support troops available 625,000 895,000

Tanks 7,000 19,000

Tactical aircraft 2,0O 4,025

Nuclear weapons 7,000 3,500

Strategic Devel ooments

It is now 6 August 1980. Amid a background of steadily deteriorating relations between NATO and the Communist powers and increasing

global tension, ministers of the Warsaw Pact nations meet with the

Politburo and agree to attack West Germany. East Germany, Poland and

Czechoslovakia are most receptive and their forces are called on to

participate in the offensive. Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania will move

forces to the border of the southern NATO countries to prevent NATO

from reinforcing central Europe. Covert preparations are initiated, to

include the assembly of rolling stock and increasing units to full

strength.

57
I ~Subsequent chronological events leading to hostilities are:

(1) On 8 August, Warsaw Pact nations initiate full mobilization.

Pact nations make every effort to limit NATO intelligence

operations and thus hope to complete substantial military

preparations without permitting a firm indication of their

intent.

(2) On 9 August, Moscow publicly announces a forthcoming field

exercise to test Warsaw Pact defense plans and at the same

time a restriction on foreign travel within Warsaw Pact

countries is invoked.

(3) On 10 August, intelligence reports indicate that Soviet

military traffic from western USSR to Poland and East

Germany is unusually heavy and appears excessive to the Fneeds of the previously announced field exercise. Supreme

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) orders a state of Military

Vigilance.

(4) By 11 August, the Warsaw Pact buildup in Communist Europe

, is apparent to the West. Increased rail, road and air

activities, as well as the arrival of several Soviet

divisions in East Germany have been confirmed. SACEUR

requests authority to declare Simple Alert.

(a) The request is transmitted to the NATO Secretary General,

who chairs the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). This

committee consists of the permanent representatives to

the NATO council, with the exception of France and

Greece and is vested with authority over the major

NATO commanders: Supreme Allied Commander Eurooe (SACEUR)

58
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and

Commander in Chief Channel Forces (CINCHAN). After

- consulting with their national governments as well

as their permanent representatives to the NATO

Military Committeej the permanent representatives

to the DPC voice no objection to SACEUR's request

when polled by the Secretary General, who then

authorizes the declaration of Simple Alert.

(b) As a result, SACEUR alters his allied force headquarters in northern, central and southern Europe.

Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT),

in turn, places its two Army groups and Headquarters,

Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), along with

its two Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF's) on

increased alert.

(5) On 13 August, because of the increased pace of the Warsaw

Pact buildup, SACEUR issues planning guidance and requests

authority to declare Reinforced Alert. The DPC, now in

continuous session, approves the request. Efforts by the

UN to halt the Warsaw Pact buildup continue to be unsuccessful. Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central

Europe (CINCENT) issues theater guidance.

(6) On 14 August, evidence is received that Warsaw Pact forces

are mobilizing and will soon attack. As a result, SACEUR

receives authorization from the DPC to declare General Alert.

NATO forces begin moving to their assigned emergency defense

positions. Obstacle construction is initiated. The U.S.

Congress declares a state of national emergency and orders

units and members of the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve

59 " i
to active duty. The President orders the deployment of dualbased forces to Europe. Other'NATO nations commence mobilization at the same time.

(7) On 15 August, an increase in tactical air movement is

detected - generally to bases in the vicinity of known

training areas in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

(8) On 16 August, Soviet forces continue to deploy into East

Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(9) By 18 August, a major portion of the Sov'et theater reserve

forces has arrived in western Poland and are deployed along

lines of communication that would facilitate their rapid

movement into East Germany.

(10) On 20 August, Pact units are detected moving toward the

western borders of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. NATO

units patrolling border areas report the evacuation of

civilians and other noncombatants.

(11) On 21 August at 0320, enemy units are detected 1-2 KM from

the international border along much of the sector assigned

to the 10th (U.S.) Corps (a sketch of CENTAG dispositions

is attached). At 0330, heavy artillery and mortar fire is

received by several elements of the 10th (U.S.) Corps

positioned near the international border. At 0345, a BN

size reconnaissance force is seen moving across the border

at coordinates NB 6730 (see situation display).

60

LI 770 __-
*HANNOVE

tjolI'A* HAN00V

OORTMUNO

KASSEL

I GISSENFULDA

FRANKURT#COSURG,

I *IEIOELSENG NUERNIERG 6

SKETCH OF C.FNTAG DISPOSITIONS

61

------- - - -.
' 1

MISSION

On order, H hour, 0 day, 23d Armd Division establishes covering force

along international border and defends in sector from NB486505 to

NB425120, to defeat the first echelon Army forward of Alsfeld.

ii

k 62

-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ _ __ _ ~ _ _ ~ _ _ _ ~ _ __ ~ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ --- _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----.- _
Comoarison of Forces

Friendly Force:

The 23d Armored Division will be operating as part of the 10th Corps

in the assigned sector as depicted on the situation display. The division

is at full strength, their task organization is given in Table 1.

All TOE equipment has been issued, no major equipment shortage exists.

Troops have been undergoing intensive combat training. Morale is good.

Enemy Force:

The forces opposing the 23d Division are elements of the enemy First

Zapadnian Front. The front is composed of a shock army, two combined

arms armies, and two tank armies. This front consists of approximately

11 motorized rifle divisions and 12 tank divisions. When the enemy

attack, it is estimated that nine of these divisions (3 motorized rifle

and 6 tank) will be employed against the 10th Corps. The first echelon

will consist of 3 motorized rifle and 2 tank divisions, with 4 tank divisions

in the second echelon (see Table 2).

As normal, the front has an additional Army, presently being mobilized,

that could be employed in the U.S. sector.

As part of the enemy's strategic reserve, up to 5 airborne divisions could

be employed by the central front against the 10th Corps sector.

63

_________
TABLE 1 TASK ORGANIZATION: 23d ARMORED DIVISION'

1ST BRIGADE

1-91 Mech

1-95 Mech

1-13 Armor 1-15 Armor

TF 2-18 Armor (2T, IM)

1-50-P 'A (DS)

1/A/440 ADA (atchd for CFA opn)

1/b/23d CEWI

(6 GSR TO, 3 REMS Tm).

1 IPW Tm/23d CEWI

* 1 OPSEC,,Tm/23d CEWI

A/23d Engr H+ (DS)

A/5l0th Engr Cbt Sn (Corps) ()(OPCON)

2D BRIGADE

1-92 Mech

1-93 Mech

1-10 Armor

1-12 Armor(-)

1-14 Armor

1-201 AMiid Cav Regt

1/5021 Engr Co

TP 2-142 Mech (2M, IT)

9/1-11 Armor

1-51 PA (DS)

2/A/440 ADA (atch for CFA opn)

2/B/23d CEWI

(9 GSR Tm, 4 REMS Tm)

1 IPW Tin/23d CEWI

1 OPSEC Tm/23d CEWI

Task Force 510 Engr (OS)

510th Engr Cbt Bn (Corps)()

B/23d Engr( OPCON)

O/23d Engr (OPCON)

3D BRIGADE

1-94 Mech

1-11 Armor()

1-22 Cay

8/1-12 Armor

1-52 PA (DS)

3/A/440 ADA (atchd for CFA opn) 3/B/23d CEWI

(3 GSR Tm, 3 REMS Tm)

1 IPW Tm/23d CEWI

1 OPSEC Tm/23d CEWI

C/23 Engr /D (S)

C/510 Engr (-)(PC0N)

64

LA. _ ---
-TABLE 2 FIRST ZAPADNIAN FRONT I

CODE NAME ORO

CODE NUMBEF51568

AREA OF OPERATIONS Central Eurooe

UNIT COMMANDER CODE NO.

- CG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marshal DZIEDZIC. . . . . . . . . .

CofS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

H&S Bn . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12th Shock Any ... ....... .......... .... .339994

2d CAA. . . . . . . . . . . .. . Gen Cal PESTEL . . . . . . . . . .200711

Sth Gds Tk Arny . .... . ... Gen Col MURAVIEV, 0. . . ... .439276

St5h Gds Tk Amy . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505722

; ~~20th CAA ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35th SSM Sde. .. ........ Gen Maj BIBIKOV, G. .... ... 528620

31st Engr Ccnst Regt. . . . . . . Cal KUTUZOV, J ...........

19th Engr Pon Regq . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44 th Sig Reqt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

129th Med Regt. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cnl Sde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 EW Bn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .

Sig Intep Reg-t. . . . . . . . . *. . . . . . . . . .

Intel Regt. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ...

2d Arty Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4th MT Sn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18th Encr Pipelaying 2de. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

65
K

F

APPENDIX A-3

DOCTRINAL PROMPTS

AND

4' SAMPLE QUESTIONS

\ a

I67

4-A

--
FUNDAMENTALS OF DEFENSE: SET 1

The following are excerpts from FM 71-100:

1. UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY

Commanders must be thoroughly familiar with the .capabilities 'and limitatio'ns

of enemy weapons and equipment. They must know how enemy units are

organized, how the enemy organizes for combat and deploys, and jiow the

enemy fights--in otheriwords, the echelonment and tactics of ehemy units.

...As in offensive operations, the division commander and his itaff must

also have a sound understanding of where enemy field and air defense

artillery, combat service support,, and critical command control facilities

can be found. These are the systems the division must destroy so

battalion task forces, attack helicopter units, and USAF air support

can operate successfully against enemy tactical formations.

2. SEE THE BATTLEFIELD

Prior to the battle, the defending commander must organize to defeat

different types of likely attacks from several feasible directions. He

must then undertake aggressive operations to learn where the enemy is,

how he is organized, which way he is moving, and what his strength is.

As the battle unfolds he must seek to establish a continuous flow of

information, and must deny the enemy similar information about his own

forces as he maneuvers to counter the enemy and seek an opportunity to

attack.

69=W PAGI SAW-VOf FInIK

69
SET 1: SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

FUNDAMENTAL OF DEFENSE 1: UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY

Concerning the opposing ground threat, you might ask the following questions:

Question: Which type of combat units are we facing?

Possible answer: Armor units.

Question: what is the special weapon capability of the units?

Possible answer: FROG.

Concerning the reach of enemy threat, you might ask the following questions:

Question: Will terrain limitations alter the range of the weapon's

platform?

Possible answer: Partially.

Question: What is the range of the weapon itself?

Possible answer: Over 2000 meters.

70
SET 1: SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

FUNDAMENTAL OF DEFENSE 2: SEE THE BATTLEFIELD

Concerning the immediate threat posed by the enemy force, you might ask

the following questions;

Question: What units are moving toward us?

Possible answer: Armor units.

Question: What kind of threat musr we respond to?

Possible answer: TacticaZ aircraft.

Concerning battlefield areas of obscuration, you might ask the following

questions:

Question: .In which direction is the smoke moving?

Possible answer: Northwest.

Question: How Zong will the smoke remain?

Possible answer: Approximateiy 20 minutes.

71
FUNDAMENTALS OF DEFENSE: SET 2

The following are excerpts from FM 71-100:

3. CONCENTRATE AT THE CRITICALT:IMES ANDVPLACES

To defend against enemy breakthrough tactics, the commander must not

only concentrate forces at the right time and place, but he must also

take risks on the flanks.... It may be necessary to concentrate up to

six or eight manuever battalions on one-fifth of the division's front

to meet breakthrough forces which may number 20 to 25 battalions.

Remaining ground is then covered with air and ground cavalry, remaining

battalions, and attack helicopter units.

Concentration of field artillery is equally important. Field artillery

fire can often be concentrated without moving batteries. In extended

areas, however, field artillery batteries must be moved to positions

within range of the main battle.

Air defense batteries and platoons pose a special problem. The first

priority for deployment of division air defense batteries in the defense

should be protection of the division command control facilities and

operations in the division support area. Some Vulcans may be used to

protect forward brigades.

...Close air support must be applied in mass, in time, and at the

critical point, supported by a well planned and conducted air defense

suppression operation.

OWMAG PAG NK40? ]MU

73 _ IA,

_4
SET 2: SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

FUNDAMENTAL OF DEFENSE 3: CONCENTRATE AT THE CRITICAL TIMES AND PLACES

Concerning the point of enemy penetration, you might ask the following

questions:

Question: What is the orientation of mass of enemy units

reported moving across the FEBA?

Possible answer: Heading towards center of sector.

Question: Aar logicaZ avenues of apprcach are avaiZabie i n

that direction?

Possible answer: Avenue of approach B.

Concerning the identification of priority targets, you might ask theI

following question: I

Question: What are the enemy's tacticaZ nerve centers (i.e.,

targets)?

Possible answer: Conmunication centers.

Question: What is the area of the target?

Possible answer: 100 M.

4 1
FUNDAMENTALS OF DEFENSE: SET 3

The following are excerpts from FM 71-100:

4. FIGHT AS A COMBINED ARMS TEAM

As friendly units converge on the critical battle site, commanders commit

them to combat according to their weapons' capabilities and movement of

the enemy force .... The first increment of combat power available is

usually the massed fire of all field artillery in range .... The second

increment of combat power available could be attack helicopters .... As tank

4nd mechanized battalions begin to arrive, the commander cross-reinforces

as necessary and assigns battle positions and missions.

...As the battle develops, the commander must move defending forces

from one position to another to take maximum advantage of his weapons,

the terrain, and mines or obstacles that he has been able to employ.

Combat vehicles must be refueled, rearmed, and repaired as far forward

as possible and quickly returned to battle.

5. EXPLOIT ADVANTAGES OF THE DEFENDER

The defender's advantages are numerous and permit a numerically inferior

force to defeat a much larger attacker. Perhaps the defender's greatest

advantage is the opportunity to become intimately familiar with the terrain

prior to the battle .... The defender can prepare the ground in advance,

building obstacles, firing positions, and improving routes between battle

It 75

- - ------
Ipositions .... The attacker must adhere to a predetemined course of action

and risk being out-maneuvered, or must alter his-plans as the battle

develops and suffer from uncoordinated effort....

Each position should combine the best characteristics of a defense and

an ambush. Several positions designed for mutual support should be used

to multiply the strength and value of each. The combination of all these

advantages repeated in each set of positions in depth, supported by

field artillery, offensive air support, and attack helicopters, should

enable the defender to inflict very high losses on an attacking enemy.

7

i

!i76

S A
SET 3: SAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

FUNDAMENTAL OF DEFENSE 4: FIGHT AS A COMBINED ARMS TEAM

Concerning the TAC air situation, you might ask the following questions:

Question: What type of air support is available?

- Possible answer: Close air support.

I" Question: What type of attack capability?

Possible answer: Anti-tank.

I

Concerning the relative defensive readiness of friendly units, you might

ask the following questions:

Question: What degree of combined arms status have they achieved?

Possible answer: Tank/infantry/artillery tean within air

defense unbrella.

Question: hat is the fire relationship among units?

Possible answer: Overlapping fires with supporting positions.

*1

77
SET 3: EXAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 41

FUNDAMENTAL OF DEFENSE 5: EXPLOIT THE ADVANTAGES OF THE DEFENDER

Concerning the obstacles on the battlefield, you might ask the following

questions:

Question: What types of obstacles are available?

Possible answer: Mine fields.

Question: How long can we expect the enemy to be delayed?

Possible answer: 30 minutes.

Concerning the mutual support of your units, :) might ask the foilnwing

questions:

Question: Wh:at percent of our 4nits ha7)e i'npro-'ed their

positions and dressed thv' wt*h f ,esh camouflage?

Possible answer: 50%

Question: What percent of our units have observation posts ard

patrols out and active9

Possible answer: 40%

78

H4

[NL7
44

APPENPIX B

SEM~ANTIC FEATURES:

DEFINITIONS/SYNONYMS/RELATED TERM~S

79
s:EmANT:" FEATURE DEF1NtTIONS/SYNONYMS/RELATED TERMS

Activity General category indicatina action; engagement.

Air Air space of~ the battlefield.

Air Force/44arines,.Navy service branches other than Army.

AiiountIOuantity Number of something; "how many.

Artilleyv Cannon or missle launchers.

Attak/Conterttak/PeetraionA combat action characteriz.ed by fire and maneuver, culminating ina

Attak/CuntratackPentraionviolent assault. Penetration is a form of offensive maneuver that

seeks to breakthrough the enemy's defensive operations. widen the gap

created and destroy the continuity of his positions.4

Availability Readiness based on current activity and under commw'unications control

(in contact).

Behind FESA General category indicatino that area of interest which lies behind the

FEBA, this includes the participants area of reiponsibility as will as

the area on the flanks.

Capability Potential of unit based on TOE, training, tactics, cersonalities, etc.

Configuration The arrancement of units; template; pattern.

Corps The echelon higher than participant echelon.

Control 'leasures Boundaries, coordinatino points, contact points, etc., which assign resoonsibiIi ties, coordinate fires and traneuver and generally manage

comb~at operations.

Decontamination Special purpose area for riddino personnel and/or e~ulpment of

contaminants.

"74

pAwpss'-o u

81

I i------------ ~ 
* I

-I o

SEOWITIC .ATLE DEFpNTwiNS/SYNONYSIRELAT TER!4

Oisposition/Location Location-of elements of a force, ,usually the exact location of I eat unit heidauarters and the deployment of the forces sutordinate

to it; grid coordinates; *where." I Division Echelon of ;wvey Oarticipants.

DroplLandig Zones Soecified area wherein airborne troops, equipment and suoplies are dropped by parachute or free fall delivery of supplies and equipment or area used for the landing of aircraft.

Enemy Opoosing force; Soviets.

Engineer Combat engineers including bridging, minefield emlacement and

clearing, position fortification.

EW/Comunication Includes electronic warfare reasureso electronic countermeasures,

electronic counter-counter measures as well as the comunication

nets between units and headouarters.

SFlanks Area's adjacent to the participants area of responsibility.

Forward FEBA General cateory indicating that area of interest which lies in front of the FE9A; enemy area; enemy terrain.

Friendly Own; my; our.

t I Ground/Field Ground space of the battlefield.

Indication A sign or sins which point to possiole intentions or likely actions.

Logistics Suoply (all classes), maintenance.

Iov-rent Relocating of troops, equipment, enemy.

82

,7 -
I - ....... ... . .. .. . - .-.- - - :

SEMANTIC FEATURE DEFINITIONS/SYNONYM/RELATED TERIS

Objectives/Plans The ohysical object of the action taken. %ethod~by which

/ objective or operation will be accomplished.

Obstacles Any natural or artificial obstruction that canalizes, delays,

restricts or diverts movement of a force; barriers.

I Own Sector Participant area of responsibility.

I Personnel Man; casualties.

4 Positions Location or area occupied by a military unit; locations of a weapon, unit or individual from which fir,% is delivered upon a target.

Procedure 'OP; chain of cormnd; method or methods.

Projected Predicted; future.

Range/Distance The distance beteen any given point and an object or target. The

extent or distance limiting the operation or action of somthing.

The distance which can be covered over a hard surface by a ground

vehicle with its rated oayload, using the fuel in its tank and in

; cans normally carried as Part of the ground vehicle equipment.

Distance is noted in kilomters.

Refugees/Civil Affairs Pertains to the civilian population in the area In which military

operation is taking place.

Results/Effectiveness Estimate of outcome of an action; estimate of "how well" in action

is going.

Reinforce The strengthening of a force by committing additional forces, Isupporting elements or fires.

83
SEIANTIC FEATURE DEFINITIONS/SYNONYMS/ELATED TERMS

Reinforcements/Reserve.s The portion of- the force withheld from action to be available

at the appropriate time.

Routes/Avenues Terrain conducive to the movement of a specified unit, my

include terrain relevant to the movement of aircraft.

Smoke An artifically induced product which attenuates the passage

of visible light or toher forms of electromagnetic radiation.

Includes identification smoke, obscuration smoke and screening smoke.

Special Weapons Weapons other than those organic to unit; NBC/CBR (nuclear/

radiation, biological and chemical).

Status/Situation Current state of affairs. In the case of units, status refers to

effective strength (TOE strength minus losses plus reinforcements). In other cases, status my refer to the degree of radiness or

comletion, such as status of obstacle emplacement (answer in time

to completion).

buPOrting Mission A specific task wherein the action of a force aids, protects,

complements or sustains another force in accoer-lishing its mission.

Surveillance A systematic observation of airsoace or surface areas by visual,

aural, electronic, photoqraphic or other means.

Sustainability Resilience, redundancy, robustness (more than expected capability

for extended operations).

Target/Targets Personnel, materiel or terrain that is designated and numbered for

firing.

Terrain Geographic area.

Time Estimate in minutes, hours or days; "how soon."

84

A
L4

tN

SEMANTIC -EATURE OEFINITIONS/SYNONYMSERELATED TERMS

rafficability Capability or extent to which the terrain will bear traffic or Permit continued movement of a force.

Jnit Size Battalion, Division, Regiment, etc.

Unit Type Mechanized infantry, tank, armor, etc.

Visibility The greatest distance toward the horizon that objects can be

identified visually.

Vulnerability Danger status; weakness; problem.

Weaoons/Equipment/Platforms Organic to a specific unit, such as a T-72,

Weather Atmospheric conditions such as wind speed and direction, temperature

and humidity.

Withdrawal/Retrograde/Retirement/ Movement of a command away from the opposing force.

elay

1st Echelon First wave of an opposing force.

2nd Echelon Seccnd wave of an opposing force.

,

85

*,.------ ;-;-- %~~;.
APPENDIX C

PARTICIPANT GENERATED QUESTIONS

87 f~ =M PAGN 5dIbQ uI

~ffiw -
CLUSTER 1

FRIENDLY INFORMATION

89
no

FRIENDLY AIR/ARTILLERY INFORMATION

What air force support is available- sorties per day? 10 - 15.

How much TAC air will I have to support me? 20 sorties per day.

Can we get additional immediate airstrikes (CAS)? From ALO from USAF.

What TAC air other than our organic CAB do we have available now to strike

at the enemy's breakthrough point? None (number of sorties and time on

station).

What helicopter airlift capability is available to move forces on the

battlefield? List of units available and lift capability expressed in

terms of units (i.e., 3 rifle companies in 1 hour).

What close air support is available to block his penetration and what

response times can we expect? List of sorties by type, type ordnance

expected to be delivered and response times.

What is the status of friendly and enemy close air support? Type A/C

available and times available on station if called, i.e., H + 30 min.

How many attack helicopter sorties can I generate each day? 75.

Are attack helicopters available? Yes, 2 sections.

What is the availability of attack helicopters? 2 teams.

What anti-tank helicopter capability do we have? 30 cobras.

Are armed helicopters being used independently? If not in Bde Co control

separate zone of operations designated or fire control measures (FCL,

FCA) used.

How many sorties of TAC air are available and what armament do they have?

20 sorties, cannons, rocket, antitank.

What chemical warfare capability do we currently have? TAC air can

deliver x sorties of x chemical bombs.

What is the tactical air/Army air capability? Reaction time? Ordnance?

How many sorties of CAS are preplanned? According to OPORD.

K ~91 IG

~-<e i 
Does the Div have it's-attack helicopters in G.S. or D.S. of Bdez,

Initially in G.S. under Div troops with priority to 2d Bde, 3 Bde and

1st Bde.

What procedures used to coordinate CASin BDE/DIV sector? Air corridor

to a CFZ wide enough to allow attack and breakoff.

How much air cover do I have and how effective is it? We have.air superiority.

What friendly fi.res can be massed on enemy penetration? Artillery, TAC

air.

What combined fires can be placed on enemy penetration? Arty, helicopter,

TAC air.

What friendly fires can be placed on enemy reinforcements and avenues of

approach? TAC air, artillery.

What forces are engaged in main attack - friendly and enemy? Fr - 2 TF

of 2nd Bde; enemy - 2 armor Bns, 3 mech Bns, arty, TAC air.

How well are our means of fire support being coordinated? Subjective

answer.

What are the results of our fire support use? Units destroyed.

What are the control measures for controlling indirect and air support

during friendly movement and in congested common battle areas? Designation of one command and control HQ.

Will the priorities of fire support be altered due to the situation? Yes,

as determined by designated headquarters - Div or 1st Bde, etc.

How much general support field artillery and/or artillery from Corps and

Army can we have in the Division sector? What is their ASR? 2 8" Bns

8 rounds per tube per day.

What is the ASR (available supply rates) for field artillery ammunition? 20 rounds per tube per day.

What is the status of our air defense forces? Locations, strengths, and

ammunition availability,

What is FA location? 3 DS locations, I GS locations, all ranging FA that

can affect our sector.

92

...................................................... z37
What is the status of FA tubes, i.e., how many are operational? From

What percent of his TAC air and FA ammunition resources will he use in

the attack? 50% save, 50% for exploitation.

What percent of the TAC air and field artillery ammunition will we

allocate to various phases of combat? Save a minimum of 30% of resources

for a counterattack.

Wnat fires are available to concentrate on different parts of the obstacles?

DS artillery, GS artillery, tanks, TOWs, DRAGONs, small arms.

Have preplanned FA delivered minefields been employed? Helicopter

delivered? From Bn FSO.

K

93

77
FRIENDLY LOGISTICS AND OTHER UNIT INFORMATION

What is my ASR for all types of ammunition? 155mm - , 8mm - , ADA -

What is the CSR and is additional ammunition available? According to the

OPORD request through Div to Corps to group.

What kind and how much back up support can I expect for class IX? As

needed.

What is the current friendly ASR (available supply requirements)? (Do we

have enough ammunition with forward elements?) Yes, units are making

every shot count.

How and how much of my needed class V, III and I be delivered? By rail

to the Div support area, _ gallons/day diesel.

What is the supply - resupply levels by class or item? Class III, V or

M6OAI, M109.

What is ammunition status by type? From BN S-3.

What is the status of forces of the reserve elements? Strength, logistical

profile, ammunition status.

What is the status of combat power of my units? Per TF - number of weapons

systems, status of class V and III and positions status.

Are there any restrictions on ammunition supply rate? 4.2" and 81mm are

in short supply - 80 rounds per day per tube, all others unlimited.

What is thc status of resupply to the Div of class III, V and VII? Gallons

per day of class III, number of rounds of class I and number of tanks, etc.

Will my supply procedure be manual or ADP? ADP.

What is the policy on exchanging deadlined combat vehicles with existing

theatre stocks? As required.

What is the current status of friendly forces in terms of major end-item

availability/service-ability? List of losses/projection of resupply to

units.

How much of our arty can range main attack? 2 DS and 1 GS Bns.

Are special weapons available and in range of the main attack? 155nin - 3, 8" - 2, both - chemical.

94
What is the distance between Division support area and front line units?

20KM.

What is FA organization combat/tactical missions? 3 DS BNS, 1 GS BNS,

attached reinforcements.

What is the friendly FA order of battle? A Corps group (by type Bn) is

supporting the Division and tactical missions assigned to it and organic

units.

What additional artillery do we have in support of the Div (non-organic)?

1 Bn 175 G.S., 1 Bn 8" G.S.R.

What type and how much of a logistical support base do we have to back up

the Div? A COSCOM package with the following - maintenance Bn (DS and GS),

2 heavy truck companies, medium and heavy helicopter Bn, etc.

What engineer support is available to dig in and construct fortifications?

1 engr Bn (combat).

What is the mix of combat forces now committed in each area? 2 arm, 1 inf

1st Bde.

Do the Bdes have a good mix of tank/mech infantry units in their TF's in

relation to the terrain? Yes.

How long to fortify 1 mech Bn, reinforced with 1 tank co.? hour.

, What is the task organization? Composition, unit designations.

Where are the fields of fire? Tanks, TOW, DRAGON, small arms.

What are the terrain uses for the covering force?

95
FRIENDLY LOCATION !NFORMATION

Where should ammunition and POL be stockpiled?

If I reinforce out of sector, where are class III and V pre stock points?

Class III PV 116113, Class V PV 111111.

What is the current location of ammunition supply points? Locations by

coordinates?

Where are my best defensive positions? Along west bank of river.

Where are the CPs locations? Six digit grid coordinates.

Where are the areas that can be used to decontaminate vehicles and

equipment? Fire pond located PV 116117.

Where are targets I can engage? Unit locations, etc.

What are the locations of other friendly echelons of units? Combat units

located at ,log maintenance .

Where are the friendly units to company level? Six digit grids.

What is the status and location of fists, should they be re-allocated?

From FSO.

What is the current disposition of security forces (cav/air cav) forward

of the defending bridgades? 2 sir/cav troops screening.

Where are the prepared positions in my flank sectors (assuming I reinforce

in:o these sectors)? Company position PV 116136.

WhaL types of surveillance means are available and where are they?

Locatiori: of observers, radar - counter artillery, personnel, RECCE, photo

electronic.

What is the special weapon allocation for the 23rd Div and where are the

units capable for firing them located? List of weapons and locations.

Where is the brigade and division CFL plotted? Shown as line approximately

1000 m front of defending BDE.

If I reinforce outside sector where are the coordination points? Coordination point PV 116111.

96
Where is the FSCL plotted? In Corps zone forward of division area

plotted on map.

What is the status of forces on my flanks? Full strength, active defense,

coordinating point at

What are the fire control measures? FSCL, FCL, CFL.

Are no fire areas, free fire areas applicable - how plotted. No fire area

independent operation - or sensitive area (important bridge) free area for

no friendly troops - USAF bomb drop.

Where are the friendly barriers? Mine field at PV 116131.

Where are my obstacles placed? Locations.

Where are the obstacles? Grid coordinates - trace.

What is the status of obstacle/barriers? Where, activation, execution

status.

Whot is the status of the barrier plan execution? List of barriers

constructed/executed with locations.

What are the details of the obstacle plan? Minefields, tank ditches, wire,

natural obstacles, defensive fires integrated.

How effective is my barrier plan? Enemy is avoiding mines, etc.

What is the status of Corps engineer units to assist in barrier construction? I cbt eng Bn available in 12 hours.

What friendly units are being jammed most?

Do I have rear area problems? Yes, one platoon penetrated, etc.

Where are Corps arty assets in the division area and those in other areas

that can support the division?

What is the status of elements in 10th Corps that could be used to reinforce the 23rd Div.? List by type and location.

Where are the Corps and Division reserve located? Coordinates.

What Corps units are available for use in the Div. sector and what are

their reinforcement times? List of units and times.

97
What Corps assets may I ask for?

How long will it take Bde in north to reinforce southern element, barring

no major terrain obstacles? 1 hour.

Can Corps provide reinforcements if necessary - where are they currently

located? Yes, 1 div (-) in reserve, 1 hour march time away.

What friendly forces can be shifted to contain penetration if needed? 1

bde (-) in the north.

Can we counterattack in south to contain penetration? No, Bde in north

does not have capability.

What additional tank obstacles can be emplaced by combat engineers on

major avenues of approach in 1he south to slow enemy advance? Can knock

down trees blocking all routes through forested area x

Can our units dia new defensive positions, prepare obstacles on major

enemy avenues of approach to rear of current defensive lines - what

engineer support available? Div Engr Bn (-) can put priority on effect in x area.

98

5 98
I

t

CLUSTER 2

ENEMY INFORMATION

1I

L p 2* -*CLUSTER 

*,ENEMjINFOMATIO

"_ ____
ENEMY AREA/ACTIVITY/UNITS

What Sdviet forces are deployed in the South? 15 bns; -6 tank, 9 inf.

What is the disposition of the enemy forces in the main attack? 4 MRR

moving NE at PV 116135i 2 Tk-Regts mo.;ng NE at Pv, 117144, 1 Cav Sodmoving NE at PV 119143.

i What is the-strength of enemy supporting attacks? MR Bn moving NE at

PV 116113 is at 50% strength, it is supported by 2 tank platoons.

What is the configuration of the 5 divisions in the ehemy"first echelon?

S1MRD and 1 Tk Div in the north, I MRD and 1 Tk Divin the center, 1-MRD

f in the south.

The 23rd Division is opposed by 9 divisions, at what percent are those 9 '

divisions? The 3 MRD are at 100% strength, the 6 Tk Divs are at.85%

strength.

What type and how many special weapons does the enemy have? 3 Bns for

FROG Il1 (18 launchers/Bn, 30 warheads/Bn with yields from 1KT to 1OKT).

Will the enemy use chemical or biological warfare first? Chemical yes

biological - no, chemical posture, unit type, equipment and locations.

With what type and size of units will the enemy move into our sector?

~PC116151. What type of forces oppose my unit in my sector? Tank Bn located at

What size and type of enemy units are we facing? Armor/mech infantry

division.

What is the quantity and type of air against us? What targets will he

hit? Standard air of the Soviets; Bn size troop concentrations and Bn

or higher size HQs.

What type of forces oppose the units to the flanks of my units? MRR

located at PC 115121.

What type and how many reserve units does the enemy have? 2 tank divisions

within 12 hours.

What are the enemy's rates of advance? Number of minutes by enemy unit.

What are the indicators of the 2nd echelon commitment? Presence of tank

regiment/tank army.

Y1

IMMIMI PAGZ 4)kMa40T 7n.J

101 .I ~________________
Where is the tank army of the Soviet front and what is it doing? Location

and moving, or stopped.

What are the actions of enemy 2nd echelon forces - i.e., are they oriented

to a specific area to exploit penetration? Locations and composition.

What are the locations of enemy EW, CC, FS, CSS? Grid coordinates.

What is the location of enemy command and control HQs? Grid coordinates.

Where are the bulk of enemy tank forces and what direction are they moving?

Where is the enemy force in my sector? Armor unit located at PC186115.

Where is the enemy in my flank sector? Armor unit located at PC116151.

What are the locations and types of artillery units? Locations known as

of xxx hours are _ types are.

Where is the enemy artillery? 155mm Howitzer Bn located at CP19111i.

Can I locate enemy artillery units? Engineer units? Logistics units?

yet - attack them, no - find them.

What are the latest enemy locations and enemy configurations of units?

What is the disposition of enemy forces in the 1st echelon? Whatever

arrangement of armor, arty and motorized forces are there.

What is the configuration of enemy units within penetration area? Mech

heavy, armor heavy.

What type of enemy equipment is in the units? T-72 tanks - latest

personnel carriers.

What type of cannon artillery are supporting the opposing force? 120 mm

direct support artillery, 152 mm general support artillery and 130 mm

guns not from the opposing division but attached from higher artillery HQ.

What is the current range fan for all friendly and enemy artillery, i.e.,

what friendly units are in range of enemy artillery and vice versa? List

of units by type, i.e., 130 mm, 122 mm, etc. with current locations.

How many tubes of what kind of artillery can be brought to bear in my

sector by the enemy? What sustained rate of fire? 300 tubes capable of

300 rounds per minute.

102
. 77t'v~'r -t'

What is the state of readiness of the enemy force? 3rd MRR has been

fighting for 6 days, has sustained 50% losses equipment, 30% loss of

personnel, officer strength at 20%, morale is low.

Where are the drop zones and landing zones in our area (i.e., behind the,

FEBA)? Field to the west of the battalion sector will support regimental

size airborne drops or 30 helicopters.

Where are the potential drop zones in the area for enemy airborne operations? Vicinity , etc. with size and troop capability.

Where are the avenues of approach in my sector? What density of armored

vehicles will these avenues of approach support? The Fulda River Valley

running NE to SW is a major avenue of approach capable of supporting one

MRR.

What is the enemy capability to sustain operations, location and distance

from MSR? 2-3 days of operations, MSR vicinity , with support units

located , with probable displacement to

What areas are contaminated by enemy chemicals? Geographic locations.

Have enemy chemicals/nukes been used, and where?

What are the enemy units doing? Presently in assembly areas located at

the following coordinates

Where are the enemy offensive chemical warfare units? Near multiple

rocket launchers.

Where are enemy nuclear units? Probably in 2nd echelon of front.

Where is the enemy smoke being most employed?

From what enemy locations are most electronic emissions radiating?

Does the enemy have counter-artillery radar? Has it been turned on?

What is his frequency and location? Yes, no, unknown, unknown.

Where are the enemy EW units? With the 1st echelon.

Where is the enemy? (to Bn level) six digit grid coordinates.

Where are the larger (Bn size and up) enemy targets loca .J? Grid coordinates.

Where are enemy air strikes concentrating?

I
7 7,7-

What is the enemy capability -to conduct air mobile oper tions? Where?

Enemy can secure critical road juhction on.my route of :lateral, communications at PV 116111 with one rifle -company.

Where is the enemy FA concentrieting? Where is the enemy general support,'

field artillery units located, especially FA located near roads? Center

sector, mass of FA near good roads and trails.

-' What is the location of enemy field artillery? Closer to the front lines

than usual.

What are the future likely enemy ground objectives (i.e., terrain, cities.,

communication centers)? Continue west to high ground vicinity _Xxx.

What is the enemy disposition on our flanks and possible operations to

Corps rear areas?

Where is the major Soviet axis of attack? .In the south.

Where is the enemy most likely to conduct a breakthrough operation? In

the center sector (brigade).

Where is the main attack? Along axis to to

What is the density of enemy units in the area most likely to be the area

for penetration? Location by coordinates.

What is the enemy nuclear weapons capability? Does he plan .to use it

first? FROG, standard weapons; yet (location).

What is the enemy capability for biological and/or chemical warfare?

Chemical - deadly gases available, biological - yes.

Is the enemy susceptible to propaganda shells, particularly the non-Soviet

troops? No, the attack forces are highly motivated and well trained.

At what point is the enemy most vulnerable? Vicinity _ due to restriction of narrow front.

What is the enemy capability/strength disposition? % levels, locations.

What are the current enemy weaknesses? Supply, communications.

104
.. . ..... . :i . .

ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

What is the current fighting capability of enemy units within the-penetration? 50% strength in person.el and equipment, low morale.

What are the enemy losses? What is his combat capability? The MRR in thenorthern sector is at 50% strength and has lost all tanks.

What is the enemy strength? % level at Bn in personnel and equipment.

What is the approximate percentage fill of the enemy weapons and- personnel"

of the units? 90% combat fill (851 weapons, 95% personnel).

What losses have we taken, as opposed to the enemy? 10%, enemy 15%.

What is the enemy bridging capability? The enemy has 14 mobile bridges.

What is the trafficability of the area - friendly, enemy, heavy vehicles',

light, etc..? By sector high speed, reduced speed and impassable.

What are the specifics on the major equipment of the opposing forces?

Armor T-72, T-60, T-54; strength, etc.

What is the current combat power strength of friendly units? % levels

of weapons, crews, mobility.

Does intelligence report any large amount of artillery ammunition being

moved forwara? The total amount of artillery projectiles reported in the

area opposite our forces is greater than the unit's capability to carry -

indicating preparation for attack.

What is the quantity and type of conventional field artillery ammunition?

More than or less than Soviet basic load.

Where is the enemy stockpiling POL?

What is the enemy air defence capability? Organic Redeye.

What type of enemy FA is there? Standard Soviet organization, 120mm,

152mm, etc.

Have any trends been established by the enemy in the use of his fire

support? Command and control field artillery, etc.

What are the effects of enemy artillery on my forces? Do I need to move

units? Can I sit out an artillery attack?

105

3-\. . . .
TIECPBLT INFORATIO

iIga i

fir107

IiL
7-

What are the critical time distance factors for friendly, -units? TF .16-.

2hours to position 10, etc. (2-1b arty displace t6 over position 10,I

hours,).

What are my day and night time-distance factors for movement ii(forward,

back and laterally) Show times by T+,.,

When will the enemy close on FEBA? Time, distance, attrition.

What is the reinforcing distances/times for the covering, forces locations?

What is the time/distance for units in the 1st.and 3rd,'Bde sectosm plus

the reserve to move to reinforce the Div in the enemy breakthrough sector?

1st Bde - TF etc., 3rd Bde TF etc., Res. TF etc,

When will the battle positions be occupied? Time.

Can field artillery batteries move easily and quickly to forward, rear--.

ward, alternate and supplemental positions? East to west or west to,

east good movement, north to south fair (or answer with a time range).

What alternate/subsequent battle positions are available, are they prepared - when will they be prepared? For each Bn and artillery Btry,

no, 3 days.

Which obstacles are in (will be in) at the time of attack? 24 hours - mine fields, 48 hours - complete obstacle plan, 60 hours - plus bunkers

and dug in weapons.

For how long can the enemy sustain combat operations on a continuous basis

in my sector? For 72 hours.

What rate of advance are the enemy forces capable of maintaining - or - based on the resistance we can offer when will the first echelon reach

our main defensive positions? Approximate time.

When will the 1st echelon attack? Measured in time (hours and minutes)

or a "gate" of time,

What is the "distance" between the 1st and 2nd echelons? Measured in time.

What is the enemy capability to reinforce in the battle area? 3 divisions

within 4 hours.

What is the enemy capability to reinforce in my sector? Can reinforce ] with one MRR in 3 hours.

109 0= 1UPG MRNT7
'What is the enemy capability to employ anti-tank helicopters? 15

companies at an imployment rate of once each 3 hours.

What is my capability to reinforce with TOW Cobra helicopters? 2

-:vmpanies each 3 hours.

What is my capability to reinforce with high performance aircraft? One

sorti per day for the first seven days.

What is my capability to reinforce with artillery? 10 tubes of 155 mm

Howitzer at 15 rounds 0er minute.

What is- the enemy capability to emPloy high performance aircraft? 17

sorties Of MIG 21 in my sector per day.

What forces are altering planned movement speeds and capabilities? Route

17 is impassable due to civilian traffic accidents, etc.

What is the enemy current rate of movement and capability to increase?

10-15 Km/hr on particular axis increase to 20-25.

110
CLUSTER 4

STATUS INFORMATION

: I i

i1ii
'What is the, communication-capabilit#y and status? Net status (who can

talk).

Can I (Commander) communicate with :subordinate tatctical commanders? Can

DTOC talk to Bde TOG?

Are my tactical cummunication links working and secure? Yes.

Does the enemy have secure lines of communication? Yes, secured with

troops and air defense weapons.

What is the status of prepared blocking or secondary positions? 60%

complete.

What is the status of the friendly battle position occupation and preparation? Degree of preparation or occupation.

What is the status of routes between successive or alternate battle

positions? Conditions of roads, bridges.

What targets are we developing by each means of target acquisition?

SOTAS. SLAR.

What is the situation on the Divisions northern and southern flanks?

Trace - enemy and friendly.

What's the situation with Division on my flanks? Holding.

What is the status of the defending/delaying forces in the bridges

actually executing the coverinq force mission? Locations.

What is the situation regarding roads and trafficability? Roads clogged,

bridges out, etc.

What is the status of road network into my area? Map with roads, bridges,

etc.

What is the current weather and predicted effects? Temperature and wind

direction.

What is the immediate and long term weather?

What are the weather and light conditions? Standard briefing (including

visibility information).

i ; th weather favorable for the use of smoke? Yes, 3-5 knots from north

tn south.

113

%-
What is the weather outlook with respect to trafficability and visibility

for friendly and enemy forces in the air and on the ground?

What are the-visibility conditiont? Impact on air support, ground

I visibility limitations of 300 meters.

What is the *errain condition in the area of operation? Trafficability

estimate.

114

I %-.'-'-~--~
CLUSTER 5

ACTIVITIES/PROCEDURES INFORMATION

115
Are there any signs/indications of NBC offensive employment? Units do

not appear to be using NBC protective procedures.

What are the indications of enemy activity? They are in attack formations

and could attack in 12 - 24 hours.

Are the enemy forces consolidating their positions? They are digging in

and placing obstacles (i.e., mines, etc.).

Where is area of most significant forward enemy movement?

What is the combat ratio of friendly to enemy systems - battle calculus -

do I win or lose? Win - , lose - get help.

How many of my units are engaged? 2/3.

What hapening in other Corps sectors? Enemy is attacking in large scale

operations.

Are friendly committments sufficient to permit concentration by companies/

teams and BNS/TFs rather than brigales?

Has CBR been used? No, has not employed.

Have any special weapons been employed, if so, what kind and where?

Number of weapons, by types, etc.

Can I employ special weapons? Yes or no.

What is the time required to get friendly release of special weapons?

40 hours.

Will friendly TAC NUC weapons be employed? How many? Affect on FA support?

The number usea will degrade conventional artillery support.

What is the number, location, load status, release and authorization of

nuclear weapons for the friendly forces?

Has smoke been authorized for use? Available? Used? From BN FSO.

Are any FCL used? To substitute for boundary to coord fire support when

no boundary applicable.

What is the refugee - civil affairs situation? Nunibers and locations.

What is the civilian occupation of critical built-up areas - size, activity?

HANN vicinity , 50% preparing to evacuate.

F]IMNG PAG} BLM"K-NOTI 7JEI

117
5.~

CLUSTER 6

TERRAIN/ROUTE INFORMATION

119 N F= AGN MANX-NOT FIlMD
Where are the main avenues of approach - what forces will they support?

to to

What are the avenues of approach? Direction in relation to major terrain

features and our key terrain.

What are the useable routes for friendly movement? Route, direction, trace.

What routes are clear for movement?

Where s the enemy main attack (1st and 2nd echelon)? Avenues of approach

and locations.

What are the likely routes along which the enemy will commit 2nd echelons?

High speed avenues of approach.

What are the likely avenues of enemy withdrawal or reinforcement?

Where are the road networds and high speed approaches both in front and to

the rear of the enemy area?

What kind of terrain are they moving through (all forces)? Rolling hills,

forested secondary network of roads.

What terrain is available for use of attack helos on enemy armor on likely

avenues of approach? Hills, wooded areas, etc.

Does the terrain lend itself to the enemy to reinforce his breakthrough?

Yes, both from the south and the north (reinforcement ability based on the

terrain).

What are the natural barriers or obstacles facing the enemy? Mountains,

ravines, streams, rivers, bridges.

What are the obstacles to the enemy in my sector? Natural? Manmade? The

Fulda River and its associated flood plain is the natural obstacle. The

9 ton bridge over the Fulda River at PC 116171 is the obstacle to the enemy

on the avenue of approach from the NW.

What obstacles are critical to movement, MSR, reinforcement, etc.? Bridges,

restricted roadways, swamps, etc., without bypass.

What does the terrain look like? Maps, photos, terrain analysis, avenues

of approach, obstacles, etc.

121

C IpW= PAGE a..NOT I
'K CLUSTER 7

.5' PLANS

123 M N ANSMNTn-Z
What is the enemy's main objectives? Some critical terrain feature or

major production area.

What is the enemy's tactical doctrine? Frontal attack, penetration, deep

objectives.

What are the enemy's intentions? Cross border and march to the sea.

What is the key terrain in my sector? Friendly? Enemy? Hill 116 and

Hill 171 are key terrain features for the enemy. The ridge extending

from PC 116132 to PC 111191 are the key friendly terrain features.

What terrain is most defensible?

What is the priority of engineer tasks? Bridges, obstacles.

What is the Commander's concept of the Defense? Stong in center, economy

force in south, counterattack exposed flanks and to destroy enemy formation, covering force do not become decisively engaged.

What is the impact of communication failures, alternate methods, automatic

reactions? Perform as planned and IAW last instructions. Deviate only

on receipt of authenticated order.

Any area designated for preplanned TAC NUC? DGZ with minimum safe distance

and strike warning time.

What route priorities have we assigned to artillery units in order to

facilitate rapid movement and responsive support? Outline of priorities

by unit.

125 PAGE BILAN-NOT nl*
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I HEA~wUARTERS9 US 4ARINL CORPS ATTN: CODE mPI-ao

2 US A"MY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY

I 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND FT. RILEY ATTN% AFZN-UPT-T

I USA INTELLIGENCE AN)) SECURITY CUMMAN) ATTN% IAOPS-TNG-T

? HQ THADOC TE~CHNICAL LIBRARY I NAVAL TRAINING EUIJIPMENT L.EN ATTN; TECHNICAL LIBRARY

I MILliARY OCCUPA113NAL UEVLLOPMENI DIRECTORATE AITTN: ATZI-NCR-MS-M, RN 3N33 HOFFmAN SLOG 11

I DATA ANALYSIS DIVISION ATTN; AIZI-NCR-MO, HOFFMAN ULMG 11

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128
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TOTAL N4uMBER OF CUWIES 40b

130
ENEMY AREA/ACTIVITY/UNITS:

What Sdviet forces are deployed in the SOuth? 15 bns; 6 ank, 9 i'nf.

What is the disposition of the enemy forces in the main attack? 4 MRR"

moving NE at PV 1l'6135j 2 Tk Regts rx ;ng NE at, Pv 1,17144, 1" Cay Sqd

moving NE at PV 119143.

What is the-strength of enemy supporting attacks? MR Bn moving NE at

PV 116113 is at 50% strengthi it is supported by 2 tank platoons.

What is the configuration of the 5 divisions in the enemy first echelon?

1 MRD and 1 Tk Div in the north, 1 MRD and 1 Tk Div in the center, 1 MRD

in the south.

The 23rd Division is opposed by 9 divisions, at what percent, are' those '9

divisions? The 3 MRD are at 100% strength, the 6 Tk Divs are at 85%

strength.

What type and how many special weapons does the enemy have? 3 Bns for

FROG Ill (18 launchers/Bn, 30 warheads/Bn with yields from 1KT to 1OKT).

Will the enemy use chemical or biological warfare first? Chemical yes

biological - no, chemical posture, unit type, equipment and locations.

With what type and size of units will the enemy move into our sector?

What type of forces oppose my unit in my sector? Tank Bn located at PC116151.

What size and type of enemy units are we facing? Armor/mech infantry

division.

What is the quantity and type of air against us? What targets will he

hit? Standard air of the Soviets; Bn size troop concentrations and Bn

or higher size HQs.

What type of forces oppose the units to the flanks of my units? MRR

located at PC 115121.

What type and how many reserve units does the enemy have? 2 tank divisions

within 12 hours. I What are the enemy's rates of advance? Number of minutes by enemy unit.

What are the indicators of the 2nd echelon commitment? Presence of tank

regiment/tank army.

101 AEL)wOII