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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 EASTERN DIVISION 

LESLIE A. CANNON, SR., 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:12-cv-00384 

 v. JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King 

LEXUR APPRAISAL SERVICES, 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

 OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court for consideration of a motion for summary judgment filed 

by Defendants Lexur Appraisal Services and Lexur Enterprises, Inc.. (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff, 

Leslie A. Cannon, Sr., has not filed a memorandum in opposition. For the following reasons, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 

I. Background 

 Defendant Lexur Appraisal Services (“Lexur”) is a small business that performs 

residential and commercial real estate appraisals for several county governments in Ohio. Lexur 

is a subsidiary of Defendant Lexur Enterprises, Inc. (“Enterprises”). Lexur employed Plaintiff, 

Leslie A. Cannon, Sr., as a real estate appraiser between January 2008 and November 2010. 

 After Cannon failed to report for three days of work, Lexur terminated his employment 

by letter on December 10, 2010. Lexur deemed the termination effective November 29, 2010, 

and Cannon was not paid past November 14, 2010. 

 In May 2012, Cannon filed the instant action pro se. The complaint alleges a violation of 

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Cannon claims that he was paid less by Lexur than his 

Caucasian co-workers of equal experience in the field because he is an African-American. 

 Cannon filed two charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and EEOC claiming 

his suspension and termination from Lexur were based on his race. Cannon filed these charges 

shortly after his allegedly discriminatory termination. The instant case does not allege claims 

based on Lexur’s suspension or termination of Cannon. A third charge was filed on October 19, 

2011, concerning the allegations of discrimination in salary. 

II. Discussion 

A. Standard Involved

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion 

for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make 

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that party’s case. 

See Muncie Power Prods., Inc. v. United Tech. Auto., Inc., 328 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 

 In viewing the evidence, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party, which must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of 

material fact for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 234 (6th Cir. 2003). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

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verdict for the nonmoving party.” Muncie, 328 F.3d at 873 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Consequently, the central issue is “ ‘whether the evidence 

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided 

that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Hamad, 328 F.3d at 234-35 (quoting Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 251-52). 

B. Analysis 

 In order to bring a claim under Title VII, Cannon must have complied with the filing 

requirements by filing a charge with the EEOC or the proper state or local authority before the 

statutory cutoff date. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1), the controlling statue, requires Cannon to have 

filed a charge within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory employment practice occurred.1 

For the purposes of the statute of limitations for discrimination in payment, 

an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in 

compensation in violation of this subchapter, when a discriminatory compensation 

decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a 

discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is 

affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other 

practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, 

resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice. 

42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)(A). 

 Cannon’s 300-day filing window therefore began on the last day that he was “affected” 

by the allegedly discriminatory compensation decision. Lexur argues that the time to file began 

running on November 14, 2010, because that was the last day Cannon was paid based on the 

allegedly discriminatory compensation decision. Alternatively, Lexur argues that the claim is 

 1

 Ohio is a deferral state; therefore the charge must be filed within 300 days rather than 

within 180 days. See Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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time barred even if the last date that Cannon was affected was December 10, 2010, when Lexur 

sent the termination letter. 

 In this case, the 300-day period began on the last day Cannon was paid for his work at 

Lexur. Because Lexur did not pay Cannon for any work after November 14, 2010, the 

discriminatory effects of any racially based compensation decisions would have ceased on that 

day. Cannon would have had to file on or before September 9, 2011. The charge was not filed 

until October 19, 2011. (ECF No. 35-1.) Because Cannon did not file the charge until 339 days 

after the last day he was affected by application of the discriminatory compensation decision, 

Cannon’s claim is time barred. 

 This case would be time barred even if the Court were to consider December 10, 2010, 

the date of the letter informing Cannon of his termination, to be the applicable date. The October 

19, 2011 filing occurred 312 days after December 10, 2010. This case would still be barred by 

the statute of limitations. 

 Cannon has filed no response and made no arguments against summary judgment. The 

Court therefore does not reach Lexur’s alternative, anticipatory argument against potential 

application of the discovery rule. Cannon has not raised this argument or presented any evidence 

regarding when or how the evidence of the allegedly discriminatory compensation practice was 

discovered. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has thus far declined to apply the discovery rule in 

Title VII cases. Vaughn v. Louisville Water Co., 302 F. App’x 337, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2008). 

 Regardless of which date applies, the termination date or the last day that Cannon was 

paid, Cannon did not timely file with the EEOC as required by 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1). 

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Cannon’s claim is time barred, and Lexur is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action on the docket 

records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

 GREGORY L. FROST 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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