r -. 

W’ILL WILSON 

AXTORNEYOENERAI. 

December 27, 1962 

Mr. George Beto, Director Opinion No. WW-1510 

Department of Corrections 

Huntsville, Texas Re: The beginning date of prisoner's sentence where prisoner was denied the right 

of bail under Article 815 

of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure and remained in 

jail while his conviction 

Dear Mr. Beto: was being affirmed. 

In your letter of November 13, 1962, you requested an 

opinion of this office on the following question: 

"When should the sentence of Carrel Lee 

Glen begin and to what credits, if any, is 

he entitled for time spent in jail?" 

Carrol Lee Glen was convicted in the District Court 

of Cherokee County, Texas, on April 29, 1961, for murder and 

his punishment assessed at twenty-five years. On June 9, 

1961, he was formally sentenced. He appealed and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals with the 

mandate bearing date of October 5, 1962. Carrol Lee Glen 

was received in prison at Huntsville on October 10, 1962. 

From the time of the jury verdict on April 29, 1961, to the 

date he was transmitted to Huntsville he was held in jail. 

The trial court sentenced Carrel Lee Glen on June 9, 1961, 

and did not give him credit for jail time from April 29, 

1961, to the date of sentence. 

Under the provisions of Article 815, Code of Criminal Procedure, Carrol Lee Glen was not entitled to bail 

pending appeal. Ex Parte McBride, 108 Cr.R. 618, 2 S.W.2d 

267. 

You state in your letter that the inmate is contending that, under the rule stated by the court in Ex Parte 

Neisler, 69 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Crim. 193&), he is entitled to 

credit for time spent in jail after conviction and sentence. 

We would point out that the court itself says that the facts 

in that case were "meager". It is not clear in that case 

whether the court is speaking of time spent in jail after 

conviction and sentence pending appeal. We do have a clear 

statement covering the situation pending appeal in Powell 
.5 , 

Mr. George Beto, Page 2 

V. State, 63 s.w.2d 712 

the court says: 

(ww-1510) 

(Tex.Crim. 1933), where at page 713 

"When an appeal is taken; the sentence 

begins from the date of the mandate of the 

appellate court whether the judgment was 

affirmed or whether the appeal was dismissed 

at the request of the appellant." 

The Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas 

in Brown v. State, 300 S.W.2c.l 101 (1957), stated that it was 

without jurisdiction to entertain or grant a request crediting the appellant with time spent in jail. Under the provisions of Article 768, Vernon's Code of Criminal Procedure, 

the trial court alone has jurisdiction to grant such credit, 

however, it isspecifically provided in said article that 

the provisions of this act shall not apply after conviction 

and sentence in felony cases' in which bond or recognizance 

is not permitted by law. We, therefore, concur in your 

opinion and hold that the inmate's sentence commenced on 

October 5, 1962, 'the date of the mandate of the Court of 

Criminal Appeals. 

SUMMARY 

When an appeal is taken,by the defendant 

from a sentence of conviction for a nonbailable offense, the sentence begins to run from 

the date the appellate court issues its mandate 

in the case. 

Respectfully, 

NVS:nss 

Assistant Attorn 
W. George Beto, Page 3 (WW-1510) 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Sam R. Wilson 

Grady Chandler 

Pat Bailey 

Vernon Teofan 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: Leonard Passmore