(4-"' Technical Report 458 E ( I

GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR

CSUMMARIZATION OF TACTICAL DATA

Michael G. Samet and Ralph E. Geiselman

Perceptronics, Inc.

HUMAN FACTORS TECHNICAL AREADT!

NOV 1 7 1981

E

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

May 1980

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

i ... . ... A' i J
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

FRANKLIN A. HART

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel, US Army

Technical Director Commander

Research accomplished under contract

to the Department of the Army,

Perceptronics, Inc

NOTICE

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Technical Report 458 JL; A() _ _ _ _ _

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR SUMMARIZATION OF Interim Report

STACTICAL DATA. 3/15/79 - 5/15/80

S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER PDFTR-1083-80-5

7. AUTHOR(s) 6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(m)

_$ubcontrac..L.to Michael G. Samet and Ralph E. Geiselman , DAHC19-78-C-0027

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK

Vector Research, Inc. Perceptronics, Inc. AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

P.O. Box 1506 6271 Variel Avenue . m 2Q163739A793

Ann Arbor, MI 48106 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 -

,, CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

Combined Arms Combat Development Activity May /980

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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Acknowledgment and appreciation are extended to Stanley M. Halpin for contract monitoring, Betty M. Landee for technical support, George P. Huber

for comments on the draft manuscript, and the military personnel who served

as participants.

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on rever** side It necaeaary and Identify by block number)

Command and control Intelligence briefing Tactical intelligence

Enemy situation data Message processing

Information management Schema

Information processing Summarization

Information purging Summarization guidelines

20. Aft"ACt (wetan am reveres shft N neceee mrd identify by block number)

"The present study was conducted to validate and expand the generalizability of a set of guidelines for summarizing tactical message content, and

to develop guidelines for conducting a manual purge of a message file.

Thirty-two Army staff officers studied a scenario and 30 enemy-situation-data

(ESD) messages describing an enemy defensive operation. Their task was to

summarize the tactical information in the form of an intelligence briefing.

Half the officers were supplied with three general guidelines to follow

FM E(Continued)

D J 1473 ETION OF NOV 655 OBSOLETE i Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

- , .. . . . ... . = . . . .. . . - .. t . . .. . . . .. ' . . . . = .... ~ . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ' ' . . . J . . ..'. . + . I
Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(Wlau Date Catered

Item 20 (continued)

"An preparing the summary: *(I) provide an interpretation of the data,

(2) give a dynamic portrayal, and (3) use conversational style.* After the

summarization task, the participants were asked to delete 15 of the 30 messages and to rank-order the rest on the basis of importance. The 32 summaries were evaluated by seven military raters in terms of quality of content, interpretation, accuracy, organization, and style.

'-The raters judged the summaries prepared with the aid of the guidelines

to be significantly 4better" summaries on an overall evaluation scale and on

four of five qualitative scales. Potent positive effects were revealed for

all three guidelines. The ten summaries that received the highest overall

evaluations were used to derive a general suggested outline for describing

the message content. The outline structures information according to levels of importance, from description of immediate enemy threat to details about

support units. The p rging-task data also revealed general levels or clusters of messages on which to base guidelines for reducing the size of ESD

files by different amou ts. Future research needs to explore the development and usefulness of tk-related schematic aids for supporting information

management, utilization, d presentation.

I

ii Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Whn Dot& Bnftred)
Technical Report 458

GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR

SUMMARIZATION OF TACTICAL DATA

Michael G. Samet and Ralph E. Geiselman

Perceptronics, Inc.

Accclion For

I4iT 1 ,7

Submitted by: StanleyM Halpin, Acting Chief

HUMAN FACORS TECHN ICAL AREA Di t:'

A-v8U1"'. ::;ciz/or

Dist Spec i)

Approved by:

Edgar M. Johinson, Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue. Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

May 1980

Army Project Number Information Systems

2016373gAMg Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

ift
ARI Research Reports and Technical Reports are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and for other research and military agencies. Any findings ready

for implementation at the time of publication are presented in the last part

of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv
FOREWORD

The Human Factors Technical Area of the Army Research Institute is concerned with aiding users and operators to cope with the ever-increasing

complexity of the man-machine systems being designed to acquire, transmit,

process, disseminate, and utilize tactical information on the battlefield.

The research focuses on the interface problems and interactions within command and control centers and is concerned with such areas as tactical symbology, user-oriented systems, information management, staff operations

and procedures, systems integration and utilization, as well as issues of

system development.

An area of special concern is the development of procedures for effective system control and utilization. The inevitable need for engineering

tradeoffs during system design often results in systems which are unmanageable or which at best achieve only a small portion of their potential. Explicit attention to the procedures to be followed by the user can compensate

for some of these problems, particularly if accomplished early enough in the

development cycle.

The present publication is one of several from a project that initially

focused on the Tactical Operations Systems (TOS) to develop procedures for

managing the flow of information in TOS. Work in the second phase of this

project focused'on issues of general concern in any type of automated command and control system. This report describes research on the particular

problem of summarizing tactical data to ease the data input burden and improve the usefulness of data base contents.

Research in the area of information management is conducted as an inhouse effort augmented through contracts with organizations selected for

their unique capabilities and facilities for research in this area. The

present study was conducted by personnel from Vector Research Inc. under

DAHCl9-78-C-0027 with program direction from Dr. Stanley M. Halpin and

Mr. Robert S. Andrews. This effort is responsive to requirements of Army

Project 2Q163739A793 and to the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity,

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and Communications R&D Command (CORADOCOM), Fort

Monmouth, N.J. Special requirements are contained in Human Resource Need

80-305, Information Management Within the Tactical Operations System.

L YA PHZ E ERO

Tech ical Director

I
GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR SUMMARIZATION OF TACTICAL DATA

BRIEF

Requi rement:

Automated information systems are capable of supplying intelligence

from a battlefield faster than the staff of a command and control center

can organize and use the data. Therefore, the development and validation

of methods for summarization and condensation of tactical intelligence

data can enable users to derive greater benefit from automated systems.

The present study was conducted to test the validity and generalizability

of a set of guidelines for summarizing military message content and to

develop useful guidelines for conducting a manual purge of certain message

files.

Procedure:

Thirty-two Army staff officers were asked to read a description of

a tactical scenario in which the enemy was engaged in a defensive operation,

and to examine 30 enemy-situation messages. Each officers' task was to

rate each message in terms of its importance to the understanding of the

situation and to summarize the tactical information provided in preparation

for a 3-minute briefing to the Corps G-2. Sixteen officers were supplied

with three general guidelines to follow in preparing the summary: "(1)

provide an interpretation of the data, (2) give a dynamic portrayal, and

(3) use conversational style." The other 16 were not supplied with any

guidelines and served as a control group. After the summarization task,

the participants were asked to delete 15 of the 30 messages and to rankorder those retained on the basis of importance. The 32 summaries were

rated by seven military raters in terms of the quality of content, interpretation, accuracy, organization, and style. Each summary also received

an overall numerical evaluation.

Findings:

An analysis of the contents of the summaries revealed potent, positive

effects for all three guidelines. Furthermore, the military raters judged

the individual summaries prepared with the aid of the guidelines to be

significantly "better" summaries (than those prepared without guidelines)

on the overall evaluation scale and on four of five qualitative scales.

vii
The ten summaries that received the highest overall evaluations were

used to derive a general suggested outline for describing the message

content. This outline was found to differ from that derived using a

different scenario during an earlier phase of this research only in terms

of the inferences drawn from the intelligence data. That is, the types

of "hard facts" considered to be most important did not vary as a function

of scenario (in this case, whether the enemy was portrayed as being in an

offensive or defensive posture). In addition, the data collected from the

purging task revealed three general levels of clusters of messages upon

which guidelines could be based for reducing the size of enemy situation

data files by different amounts.

Utilization of Findings:

The results suggest that a relatively small number of schemata,

corresponding to standard tactical situations, may be sufficient to

effectively present the "hard facts" contained in a file of intelligence

messages. Based on these schemata, potentially successful training

programs and performance aids could be developed to improve the ability

of staff officers to manage large intelligence data files. These techniques would rely on guidelines for retaining/deleting and organizing

information derived from pre-established hierarchical levels of information importance. However, future work is necessary toward the development of rules for understanding information integration and the interpretation of battlefield indicators.

viii
GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR

SUMMARIZATION OF TACTICAL DATA

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION. .. ... ..... ..... ..... ........1

METHOD .. .. .... ..... ...... ..... ..... .. 5

Participants. .. ..... ..... ..... ...... .. 5

Materials and Procedure .. .. .... ...... ..... .. 5

Evaluation .. ... ...... ..... ..... ....... 10

Analysis. .. ..... ..... ..... ...... .... 11

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .. .. .... ...... ..... .... 13

Judges' Ratings of the Summaries .. ... ...... ..... 13

Effects of Guidelines on Summary Content. .. ..... .... 17

Derivation of a Schema .. ... ...... ..... ..... 19

Comparisons Between Scenarios .. .. .... ...... .... 21

Purging .. .. .... ...... ..... ..... ..... 23

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS. .. ... ..... ..... .... 26

REFERENCES .. .. .... ...... ..... ..... ..... 29

APPENDIXES .. .. .... ...... ..... ..... ..... 3]

Ilkx
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1. Beta Weights Obtained From Judges'

Standardized Ratings ..... .................. .. 15

2. Average Ratings for Summaries Prepared

With and Without Guidelines .... .............. 16

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Task Sequence ....... ..................... 6

2. A Schema of General Topics Included

in the Ten "Good" Summaries .... .............. 20

3. A Schema of r4essages Based on

Purging-Task Data ..... ................... .24

x
INTRODUCTION

The technical capability of computer-based military systems will most

likely increase the density of information to the point where it will

overwhelm the users. Therefore, appropriate procedures must be developed

for use within the framework of a computer-based system to condense and

to organize the volume of information into a form that can be managed in an

efficient manner. For example, manual summarization procedures can be

employed when the computerized system is operative to prevent overloads on

hardware and software, and to provide hardcopy backup information if the

computer-based system should go down. Once such manual procedures have

been developed and validated, summarization routines sensitive only to the

tactical situation could conceivably be operationalized within the software

to support a user's summarization efforts.

The general approach taken in this project was to: (a) determine the

"natural" existing procedures used by typical users of automated systems

(i.e., those personnel assigned to Division Staff positions) in condensing

and summarizing military information; (b) suggest variations in those

procedures which might be more effective; and (c) evaluate the suggested

variations. The initial step represents a research challenge.

The problem of understanding and modeling the thought processes of

persons engaged in complex tasks has long been a focus on cognitive psychology. One theoretical structure of the thought process is offered by schema

theory. Schema theory holds that the comprehension of any type of meaningful information is affected by knowledge gained in the past. This knowledge

is said to be organized as a structured mental representation of the

learner's general knowledge of a topic, commonly referred to as a "schema."

The underlying logical structure, or "schema," representing a person's

general knowledge of a topic, provides a mental outline that can be used

I1
to organize and interpret new material to be learned. Thus, a schema

constitutes a basis for categorization, selection, deletion, abstraction,

consolidation and organization of information.

With the refinement of "schema theory" within the domain of cognitive

psychology (see Kintsch, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977), it is now possible to

describe underlying logical information structures, from which guidelines

for condensing and summarizing the information can be developed. A schema

can be portrayed by a two-dimensional plot of pertinent elements or categories of information, with the dimensions being "importance" and "preferred sequence of presentation." Such schemata are easy to derive, easy

to interpret, and can be usefully applied in a variety of informationdriven situations. Each empirically derived schema can be employed to

provide an organizational framework for certain sets of information as well

as to generate specific guidelines (which are easy to follow by users) such

that the task-related processing of relevant information can be normatively

structured and thereby facilitated; a family of such schemata could form

an important part of a manual or computer-based decision support system.

It is conceivable that a small set of schemata exists for the comprehension of certain types of military data by highly skilled staff officers.

Schemata, then, could provide part of the basis for developing guidelines

for the management of military information.

To obtain data to support the development of useful guidelines for

the summarization of message content, particularly tactical intelligence

data, an initial experimental investigation was conducted by Geiselman and

Samet (1979). In their experiment, an attempt was made to first identify

"good" summaries, and then to analyze their properties and structural

characteristics. In this manner, the essence of what makes an effective

summary was used to suggest guidelines for summarizing tactical data. In

brief, sixteen Army staff officers were asked to examine a description of

a tactical scenario and 30 enemy-situation-data (ESD) messages. The

messages, presented in computer printout format, described the beginning

I
of an enemy border crossing and attack. The task was to rate each message

in terms of how essential it was to the understanding of the situation at

hand, and to summarize the tactical information contained in the messages

in preparation for a three-minute briefing to the Corps G-2. The 16 handwritten summaries were subsequently typed to improve legibility, and were

then rated by five experienced military personnel in terms of content,

accuracy and organization. For each summary, an overall numerical evaluation, as well as specific critical comments concerning positive and

negative qualities, were also collected.

These early results provided valuable information concerning the

content and structure of those summaries that are likely to be judged

most effective in the communication of information contained in a file

of messages about enemy offensive activity. For the present study, such

behavioral norms for "good" summaries were translated into specific guidelines to support the generation of more useful and effective intelligencemessage summaries. One purpose was to investigate the effects of those

guidelines upon summarization performance. A second purpose was to compare

and contrast the guidelines with others developed for the summarization of

military messages reflecting different tactical situations. In particular,

if differences in preferences for information or organization were found

across different scenarios, this would imply that different priorities

should be given for various aspects of intelligence information under

different conditions. These priorities for information management could

conceivably be incorporated into standard operating procedures or into

training programs. Given that the scenario examined by Geiselman and Samet

was an enemy-offensive scenario, it seems appropriate to now examine

summaries of ESD messages received in an enemy-defensive scenario.

The Enemy-Situation-Data (ESD) file is likely to be one of the

largest files, and it is likely to grow at a rapid rate in critical periods,

such as during attacks. Therefore careful information management of this

file is essential (Blum, Callahan, Graulich, Kinley, and Witus, 1979). 3 One procedure that is sometimes used to achieve this aim is purging, which

3
-"9

can be accomplished in a number of ways. However, to date there has been

no systematic investigation of the substantive criteria to be used to

conduct a purge. Thus, a third purpose of the present research was to

collect data to support the development of guidelines for conducting a

purge of ESD files. It seems reasonable that a schema of the purging

process should resemble a schema derived for summarizing the ESD messages.

If so, discriminable levels of purging could be identified, such that

guidelines could be developed for reducing the size of ESD files by varing

amounts.

Thus, three objectives for additional research follow logically from

the previous phase of work by Geiselman and Samet (1979). These objectives

are:

(1) To determine whether military personnel using summarization

guidelines produce "better" summaries that do personnel working

without the aid of guidelines.

(2) To test the generalizability of the guidelines for summarizing

ESD messages by examining their applicability in a second basic

tactical scenario, specifically a defensive posture by enemy

forces.

(3) To obtain data to support the development of guidelines for

conducting a purge of ESD files.

The present research addressed each of these three objectives with a single

experiment. Firstly, 32 staff officers were asked to summarize a set of

intelligence messages with 16 being supplied with general guidelines for

constructing the summary, and 16 not being supplied with such guidelines.

Secondly, the enemy-offensive scenario used in the previous research was

modified such that the enemy would be engaged in a defensive maneuver. The

summaries generated in this context were analyzed to derive a schema for

summarization that could be compared with that derived using the enemy4
offensive-scenario. Thirdly, during a final segment of the experiment,

the participants were asked to purge half of the set of intelligence

messages (eliminating those that were least important) and to rank-order

the remaining messages on the basis of the importance of retaining them.

These behavioral data allowed for the derivation of a schema for reducing

the size of ESD message files by varying amounts.

METHOD

Participants

The participants were 32 staff officers, with a minumum rank of

major, at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.

The primary specialities of the participants were varied as follows:

intelligence (7), infantry (6), artillery (6) aviation (5), armor (4),

electronic warfare (2), air defense (1), and operations research (1).

These officers participated in two groups of 16 each.

Materials and Procedure

The general procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. In a classroom

setting, each participant was given a booklet that contained a short

tactical scenario in which Warsaw Pack forces are said to have attacked

U.S. forces in Germany. This scenario, which was used by Geiselman and

Samet (1979), was taken from materials used in a standard course

("Forward Deployed Force Operations") at the Command and General Staff

College. This scenario was modified and extended using other course

materials ("Offensive Operations") such that the U.S. Forces are said

to be engaged in a counter-attack maneuver against the enemy forces.

The scenario included a description of (a) the strategic environment

(with background map), (b) strategic developments during several days

5
STUDY TACTICAL SCENARIO

EXAMINE AND RATE ESSENTIALITY

OF 30 ESD MESSAGES

+

EXPERIMENTAL GROUP CONTROL GROUP

RECEIVE SUMMARIZATION RECEIVE SUMMARIZATION

INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS

WITH GUIDELINES WITHOUT GUIDELINES

PREPARE SUMMARY OF MESSAGE CONTENT

CONDUCT PARTIAL PURGE OF MESSAGE SET

FIGURE 1

TASK SEQUENCE

6
immediately preceding the day at hand, (c) the known composition and

position of enemy forces at the beginning of the day at hand (with a

tactical situation map), and (d) task instructions. These materials

are presented in Appendix A-I. The participants were told that,

"The general purpose of this study is to determine plausible

ways of summarizing battlefield intelligence information,

such that the important aspects of the current situation

can be understood by a conmander within a very brief period

of time. Later on, our procedure will be to have you roleplay the G-2 section TOC duty officer."

After having sufficient time to review the scenario and the task

requirements, each participant was given 45 minutes to study a set of

30 enemy-situation-data (ESD) messages. These messages were obtained by

modifying the 30 messages used previously by Geiselman and Samet to

coincide with the modified scenario. Each message was typed on a separate

sheet of paper and was presented in a standard format which provided for

the following types of information: a precedence code (supplied by the

intelligence source to indicate the urgency of the information), the

subject of the message, the size and type of the enemy unit detected,

the activity observed, the time of occurrence, the estimated location of

the subject and the probable error of this estimate, the intelligence

source and its reliability, and free-text remarks supplied by the source.

Several aspects of the original messages were preserved so that the

results of the present experiment could be compared with those obtained

earlier. The properties that were preserved are: (a) the subject

matter (e.g., the type and size of unit), (b) the proximity of the

reported activity to the FEBA, and (c) whether or not free-text remarks

were included. In addition to the messages, each participant was given

a key to terms used in the ESD format, and a key to abbreviations used

in the messages. These keys, along with the instructions and messages,

are presented as a message booklet in Appendix A-2.

7
During the second phase of the experiment, the participants were

told to:

"Study the 30 messages and, from them, try to comprehend

the enemy situation. As you work, please keep in mind

that you may be subsequently called upon to summarize

the enemy situation data."

As the participants studied the messages, they rated how essential

each message was to the understanding of the entire tactical picture.

These ratings were based upon the following 1-5 scale, which was used by

Geiselman and Samet and also by Coates and McCourt (1976) for a similar

task:

5 - essential

4 - important

3 - useful

2 - of some use

1 - of little use

For each message, the subject placed his rating in a blank corresponding

to the message number on a rating sheet provided.

In the third phase of the procedure, the participants were given typed

instructions that asked them each to compose a summary of the 30 messages

within 20 minutes in preparation for a three-minute briefing of the G-2.

The rationale given for the summary task was that the G-2 and Corps

commander had been absent during the half-hour period when the 30 messages

had arrived. The purpose of the summary was to inform the G-2 of the

enemy situation, rather than to make tactical recommendations regarding

possible courses of action. They were asked not to draw pictures as part

of their summaries, but they were allowed to refer to map coordinates. In

brief, they were instructed to write their summaries as they would say

them, given only three minutes with the G-2.

8
In addition, 16 of the participants were given three guidelines for

constructing the sunary. These guidelines were derived from the results

of Geiselman and Samet (1979) and appeared in the instructions as follows:

(1) Prepare the intelligence summary in a conversational style.

Do not present information in the form of lists alone since

this makes understanding the information time-consuming and

difficult.

(2) Provide an interpretation of the intelligence information

if that is possible. In other words, in addition to the

"hard facts," try to state what the intelligence means in

terms of the enemy situation. However, these statements

must be well-founded.

(3) Provide a dynamic portrajyal of the enemy situation. That

is, emphasize the speed and direction of enemy movement,

rather than merely the current static position of enemy

units.

The 16 participants in the control group were not given any guidelines in their instructions. After 20 minutes, all of the participants

were asked to re-copy their summaries in legible form. Appendix A-3

contains the complete instructions for this summarization phase of the

experimental session.

Prior to the final phase of the experiment, the summaries were

collected. Then, the participants were told that,

"It might sometimes be the case that too many messages are

received such that the task of maintaining an ongoing record

of them is overwhelming. In order to determine the kinds

9
of messages that need not be retained, please examine the

30 messages again and, this time, put an 'X' through any

message that you feel can be deleted from the message set.

Please continue to examine the messages in this manner until

you have deleted 15 of the messages. When you have finished

deleting 15 messages, please gather together the 15 messages

that you feel should be retained and rank order them on the

basis of how important they are to keep. Give the most

important message a '1', the next most important message a

'2', aid so on."

The participants were each asked to make a 50% reduction in the number

of messages in order to maximize the likelihood that interpretable results

would be obtained; that is, most messages should be included by at least

one participant, yet there should be few specific messages that would

be included by every participant. Without specification of the number

of items to be deleted, McKendry, Wilson, Mace, and Baker (1973) found

that most officers #".,ose tz delete very few messages. The instructions

for the purging task -e presented in Appendix A-4.

2valuation

The first step in analyzing the summaries was to obtain ratings of

the quality of the summaries from experienced military analystF to

identify "good" and "poor" summaries. Seven highly qualified judges were

used for the evaluation task. On average, these individuals have had

20 years of experience covering various combat specialty areas including

tactics, intelligence, and operations. All of the judges were thoroughly

familiar with the doctrinal procedures taught at the Command and General

Staff College, and with the objectives of this study of summarization as

well as the specific tactical scenario and message file employed. Each

judge received the evaluation package by mail and returned the completed

material within about a week.

I

10
Each evaluator was provided the tactical scenario, the ESD messages

with accompanying keys, a detailed description of the instructions given

to the participants (except the guidelines and discussion of them), and

the summaries generated by each of the participants. The summaries were

typed on separate sheets of paper with a structured rating sheet attached

to each one. The summaries from the 32 officers (who worked with either

guidelines or no guidelines) were intermixed. The raters were asked to

first review the scenario and messages, and then to read through all of

the summaries. When fully familiar with these materials, the raters

evaluated the quality of each summary on each of five dimensions using the

following 1-5 scale: "very good" (5), "good" (4), "borderline" (3) "poor"

(2), and "very poor" (1).

The five evaluative dimensions were: (a) content (to what degree does

the summary include what the G-2 should know, yet exclude what the G-2 does

not need to know?); (b) interpretation (how meaningful and useful is the

integration of information contained in the messages?); (c) accuracy (how

true or plausible is the information presented in the summary in light of

the detailed message content?); (d) organization (to what extent is the

important information presented in an order that would facilitate understanding of the tactical situation?); and (e) style (how effective is the

manner in which the information in the summary is communicated?). Finally,

a single numerical rating (on a 0-100 scale) was requested as the overall

quality assessment for each summary. The complete set of instructions for

the raters, including the evaluation form, is presented in Appendix B.

Analysis

To determine whether the three guidelines given to half of the participants aided those officers in producing "better" summaries, a multfvariate

analysis of variance (Hotellings T2 , Morrison, 1967) was conducted using the

five dependent variables corresponding to the average ratings given on the

five evaluation scales (content, interpretation, accuracy, organization,

11I
and style). In addition, comparisons were made of the specific contents of

the summaries generated with and without guidelines. These comparisons involved the computation of the proportion of officers including certain types

of information in their summaries.

The summaries were analyzed toward the development of summarization

guidelines using the basic procedure developed by Geiselman and Samet (1979).

First, the 10 summaries that received the highest average overall evaluations

(i.e., top third) were identified as "good" summaries. Then, these summaries

were used to derive a schema for summarizing the intelligence information.

Operationally, a schema can be defined as a two-dimensional, or hierarchical

outline with the dimensions being subordination (importance) and sequential

order.

Subordination or importance was determined for each idea included in

a summary in terms of the percentage of the staff officers who included

some aspect of that idea in their summaries. That is, an idea with a

higher inclusion percentage was assigned a higher position in the structure.

A list of general ideas or topics was extracted systematically from the

"good" summaries such that the list exhausted the summary contents. The

topics were identified by noting the authors' syntactical divisions (e.g.,

paragraphs, listings) and transitions in subject matter within these divisions. The topic labels were then taken verbatim from the identified summary

segments.

Sequential order was assessed by deriving an output-position percentile

for each topic included in each staff officer's summary. The output-position

percentile [(sequential position of a topic in a summary/total number of

topics included in the summary) X 100] is a measure of output position where

the derived value is standardized with respect to the number of ideas in

the respective output.

12
To derive a schema from the ten "good" summaries, the percentage of

the ten staff officers who included a given topic in their summaries was

noted, and a corresponding median output-position percentile was computed

for each topic that was included in at least one of the ten summaries.

The schema generated form the "good" summaries obtained in the present

experiment, involving an enemy-defensive scenario, was compared to the

schema derived by Geiselman and Samet (1979) for an enemy-offensive scenario.

The essentiality ratings given by the present subjects were also compared

to those obtained in the previous experiment.

In addition, a schema of the purging process was derived from the data

collected during the final phase of the experiment in which the participants

were asked to delete 15 of the 30 messages and to rank-order the remaining

15 messages on the basis of the importance of retaining them. To derive the

schema, an inclusion percentage and a median rank order were computed for

each of the 30 messages that were retained by at least one participant. A

number, representing each of the 30 messages, was then plotted in the twodimensional space (inclusion percentage by median rank order). Since each

subject was instructed to retain the same number of messages (15), the

median rank orderings were analogous to median output-position percentiles.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Judges' Ratings of the Summaries

The initial step in considering the ratings was to determine the

extent to which the raters agreed with one another. The coefficient of

concordance (Kendall's W) for the ratings made on the five qualitative

dimensions and on the overall evaluation scale were: content, .38, £ <

.001; interpretation, .33, p < .001; accuracy, .18, p > .10; organization,

.31, p < .001; style, .30, p < .001; and overall evaluation, .28, P < .005.

Thus, accuracy was the only scale upon which there was not significant

agreement among judges.

13
To examine the overall evaluations of the summaries more closely,

the ratings made by each of the seven raters on each of the six scales

were standardized (within each scale) and five beta weights were

from a regression of the five qualitative dimensions on the overall

evaluation ratings. These standardized beta weights and the associated

multiple R2 , along with those ratings of the summaries on the five scales,

are shown in Table 1. In assigning the overall evaluations, it appears

from the table that the raters weighted the interpretation and accuracy

dimensions most heavily. This illustrates the importance placed upon

providing an adequate interpretation of the intelligence data, and also

sug-gests a paradox concerning the accuracy dimension. Most raters weighted

accuracy heavily in their assignment of the overall evaluations; but from

the interrater correlations, the raters did not agree upon which summaries

were accurate. The latter result was obtained possibly because of

differences in the degree to which each judge actually matched the summary

contents with the message data. Thus, in future studies, measures will

be required to determine the specific points of disagreement regarding

accuracy.

The average ratings given by each rater to the summaries prepared with

guidelines and without guidelines are presented in Table 2, and all 32

summaries are included in Appendix C. To determine whether the three

guidelines given to some participants affected their performance, a multivariate analysis of variance (Hotellings T2 ) was conducted using the

average ratings given on each of the five independent evaluation scales.

This analysis demonstrated that the guidelines treatment was, in fact,

effective in discriminating the two groups, F(5,26) = 7.87, p <.001; and

therefore, an examination of the univariate analyses is warranted. Univariate t tests showed that summaries written with the aid of guidelines were

considered to be "better" on all scales except accuracy: content, t(30) =

3.83, p <.001; interpretation, t(30) = 4.31, p <.001; accuracy, t(30) =

0.81, p >.05; organization, t(30) = 4.48, p <.001; and style, t(30) =

3.92, p <.001.

14
TABLE 1

BETA WEIGHTS OBTAINED FROM JUDGES' STANDARDIZED RATINGS

RATING SCALE

RATER CONTENT INTERPRETATION ACCURACY ORGANIZATION STYLE R2

A +.12 +.18 +.37*** +.16 +.33* *91***

B +.20 +.10 +.19 +.47* -.28 .60*

C +.29* +.44*** +.38*** +.05 - .02 .9*

D +.24*** +.31** +.57*** -.12 +.13 .7*

E +.12 +.24* +*37*** +.15 +.22 .6*

F +.21* +3* +.09 +.06 ..37** .94***

G +.14 +*43*** +.17* +.13 +.26* .4*

AVRAGS +.18 +*47*** +*35*** -.05 +.12 .3*

Noe: p < .001, p < .01, p < .05.

15j
TABLE 2

AVERAGE RATINGS FOR SUMMARIES PREPARED

WITH GUIDELINES (G) AND WITHOUT GUIDELINES (NG)

RATING SCALE

RATER CONTENT INTERPRETATION ACCURACY ORGANIZATION STYLE OVERALL

G NG G NG G NG G NG G NG G NG

A 3.9 3.4 3.8 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.5 2.4 3.9 2.6 49.4 45.3

B 3.9 3.3 3.9 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.9 3.2 3.8 3.2 59.3 48.3

3.8 2.5 3.3 2.1 3.8 3.2 3.7 2.8 3.5 2.4 56.1 42.9

3.3 2.3 3.6 2.5 2.7 2.4 3.8 2.7 4.0 3.1 48.4 40.3

-. 1 3.3 4.1 3.1 3.4 3.5 4.3 2.9 4.3 3.1 69.9 53.1

F 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.4 3.2 2.8 3.3 2.6 3.3 2.4 54.1 43.4

G 3.6 2.7 3.0 2.6 3.4 2.8 3.1 2.7 3.0 2.6 55.3 43.8

AVERAGE 3.7 2.9 3.5 2.6 3.1 3.0 3.7 2.8 3.7 2.8 55.4 45.3

RAT INGS

16

• I
The lack of a significant difference on the accuracy dimension is understandable given that none of the three guidelines addressed procedures

for improving accuracy. A separate test on the overall evaluation showed

a significant between-group difference, t(30) = 2.18, 2 < .04, in spite

of the fact that the accuracy scale was weighted heavily in those

evaluations.

These results serve as validation both for the three general guidelines used here and for the basic experimental methodology developed by

Geiselman and Samet (1979). In addition, the fact that three simple

guidelines can be used to improve the summarization of intelligence

information has promising implications for the potential success of

training programs and job-performance aids in the area of tactical information management.

Effects of Guidelines on Summary Content

Since the participants rated the essentiality of each message before

receiving the summarization instructions, one way of demonstrating the

influence of the guidelines on summarization behavior would be to determine the extent to which the staff officers in each group chose to include

information that they had previnusly rated to be most essential. Thus,

for each participant, a point-biserial correlation coefficient was

computed between the essentiality ratings for each of the messages and

whether or not information related to each message was included in that

participant's summary (yes = 1, no = 0). A message was considered to be

included when a statement in the summary contained a direct reference to

information or combinations of information specific to that message (e.g.,

grid coordinates, time of occurrence, subject matter, direction of movement,

intelligence source). The extent of detail was not considered as a

criterion for inclusion. These correlations were standardized with a

_a
Fisher's z transformation. Without guidelines, the participants did tend

to include information associated with the messages that they considered

most essential [r(14) = .63, p < .01], as would be expected. In contrast,

the participants who received the guidelines were much less likely to

include in their summaries what they had initially considered to be the

most essential information [r(14) = .12, p > .05]. It should be noted

that the two groups did not differ initially in terms of which messages

they considered to be essential, F(I, 30) < 1. Thus, the guidelines did

appear to have a potent effect on the participants' summarization behavior.

Specific differences in summary content were observed between groups

corresponding to each of the three guidelines. First, regarding interpretatio n, the participants with guidelines were more than twice as likely to

include a statement at the beginning of their summaries about the overall

strength of the enemy forces (63% versus 31%, z = 1.91, p < .03). In

addition, these participants were somewhat more likely to include a statement of inference concerning the enemy's intentions (retreat, delay,

counter-attack, etc.) at the end of their summaries (68w versus 58%), but

this difference was not significant. Regarding style, the participants

with guidelines were significantly less likely to present information in

the form of a list (13% versus 44%, z = 2.07, p < .02). Regarding a

dynamic portrayal of the enemy situation, the participants with guidelines

were considered somewhat more likely to discuss enemy movement away

from the FEBA (50% versus 30%, p < .12) as either a retreat or re-supply

effort; and they were slightly more likely to discuss enemy movement

toward the FEBA (81% versus 75%). The lack of significance in the latter

comparison is probably misleading since enemy movement toward the FEBA is

an obvious threat to an ensuing counter-attack by friendly forces; and

therefore, even participants without guidelines would be expected to note

the importance of such movement. Overall then, the guideline manipulation

did affect th' content of the summaries, and the specific effects were in

agreement with the spirit of the guidelines.

18
Derivation of a Schema

To derive a schema for summarizing the intelligence information as

outlined in the analysis section, the ten summaries that received the

highest average overall evaluations from the judges were selected as

"good" summaries. Six of these summaries (1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9) with an

average overall evaluation of 67.6 were from the group that received

summarization guidelines; the other four summaries (2, 6, 8, and 10)

with an average overall evaluation of 64.3 were from the no guidelines

group. A list of topics included in these ten summaries was generated to

replace the 30 messages as the units of analysis. As described in the

method section, the topics were extracted systematically from the summaries

such that all components of all the "good" summaries were represented in

the list.

Only ten general topics were necessary to describe all of the contents

of the ten "good" summaries. These ten topics are plotted in Figure 2 as

a function of inclusion percentage and median output-position percentile.

The nature and location of the topics can be interpreted by proceeding

in left-to-right, top-to-bottom fashion. The higher the vertical position

of a topic in the plot, the more superordinate or important it is perceived

to be. Thus, "unit movement toward the FEBA," "engagements," and an

inference concerning "enemy intentions" appear to be the most important

considerations with 100%, 90%, and 80% of the ten staff officers including

some reference to these topics in their summaries. In contrast, "command

posts," "radio jamming," and the "location of the second defensive belt"

were topics that came out lowest in importance with 30%, 20%, and 10%

selection percentages, respectively. The other four topics fell into the

mid-importance range with selection percentages of either 60% or 50%.

Shifting now to the horizontal dimension, the closer the proximity of the

topic to the ordinate, the earlier it should be discussed in the summary.

According to the schema shown, an assessment of "overall enemy strength"

19

iL
100 MOVEMENT

TOWARD

90 ENGAGE90 MENTS

ENEMY

fliTEN? IONS

700

W OVERAOL

60 ENEMYARIL Y

STRENGTH

A 50LMOVEMENT AEF 50 EE"EN TOWARDT 

REAR

40

C0144AND

POSTS

0 RADIO JAMMING

10 DEFENS IVE

BELT

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

MEDIAN OUTPUT-POSITION PERCENTILE

FIGURE 2

A SCHEMA OF GENERAL TOPICS INCLUDED

IN THE TEN "GOOD" SUMMARIES

20
should be presented first, whereas an assessment of "enemy intentions" should

be given last. Note that "unit movement toward the FEBA" and "artillery"

are equivalent in where they were discussed in the summary although the

former is considered to be a more important topic.

Three different levels of abstraction (top to bottom) are indicated in

the figure by dashed lines, and these three levels could be used to extract

guidelines to generate summaries of three different levels of detail. At the

moet general level, the "good" summaries included information of immediate

threat to friendly forces, such as engagements and enemy movement toward the

FEBA, plus an inference regarding the enemy's immediate intentions. At the

next level of detail, the "good" summaries further included an introductory

summary statement concerning overall enemy strength plus a discussion of

enemy units of less importance behind the FEBA (e.g., support units, unit

movement toward the rear, air defense). At the most detailed, level the

"good" summaries further included ancillary information such as the location

of the second defensive belt, locations of command posts as targeting information, and instances of radio jamming.

Comparisons Between Scenarios

One important purpose of the present investigation was to extend the

findings of Geiselman and Samet (1979) regarding summarization of ESD messages at the Corps-level in an enemy-offensive scenario to encompass the enemydefensive situation. Therefore, it would be helpful to determine major

points of departure in information management between scenarios. Of course,

the implementation of procedures for summarizing ESD files would be more

simplified the more minor the differences. The reader is reminded that only

minor changes were made in the 30 messages to adapt them to the new scenario

(see the Method section for a description of the changes).

21
First, an analysis of variance was conducted to determine whether

certain types of messages were seen to be more or less essential as a

function of scenario. In this analysis, the 32 summaries from the present

experiment (those prepared with guidelines and those prepared without

guidelines) were compared with the 16 summaries from the previous experiment,

with the dependent variable being the essentiality ratings given to each of

the 30 messages. The analyses showed that the Scenario X Message interaction

effect was not significant F(2, 45) = 1.98, p > .05. This indicates that

the 30 messages were perceived to be of the same relative importance

irrespective of the scenario. In each case, information concerning nuclear

weapons, engagements, movement toward the FEBA, and locations of regimental

command posts were seen as most important; whereas locations of enemy radar,

jamming efforts, battalion command posts, and movement away from or far

behind the FEBA were rated as being least important. Thus, with respect

to the selection of "hard facts" to present or retain, it does not appear

that the enemy's presumed posture (defensive, offensive) is a crucial factor.

This is an important result since it suggests that officers maintain a

hierarchy of information priorities that may be somewhat generalizable across

different tactical situations.

However, as noted by Geiselman and Samet (1979), not all useful information is contained in isolated "hard facts" or in independent messages.

That is, the interpretation or integration of the "hard facts" in the form

of overall assessments and inferences of battlefield indicators (Johnson,

1977) is a process that would likely be affected by the nature of the

scenario. The fact that information integration, that is the drawing of

conclusions or summary statements not stated explicitly in the messages,

was influenced by the scenario was apparent in a comparison of the schema

derived by Geiselman and Samet. With an enemy-offensive scenario, inferences

concerning the location of the probable point of main thrust and the

location of the second echelon were prevalent in the summaries. With an

enemy-defensive scenario, other inferences included the enemy's likely

22
intentions (retreat, delay, attack, etc.) and an introductory summary

statement concerning the overall strength of the enemy forces. Such

statements did not, however, appear in the summaries generated with the

enemy-offensive scenario. Therefore, given different tactical situations,

different inferences appear necessary. Thus, further work in the area of

battlefield indications is crucial for the development of training

programs toward the generation of effective intelligence summaries that

take into account situational requirements.

Aside from differences in the inferences made in the contexc of each

scenario, the schemata were quite similar. Three levels of detail (subordination) could be clearly discriminated within the schema in each case, and

these three levels could provide a basis for specific guidelines regarding

content and order of presentation for general and more detailed summaries.

Thus, if the inferential process were either left to the commander or

automated through further work on battlefield indicators, then the number

of schemata needed to derive algorithms for describing ESD information may

be relatively small.

Purging

A two-dimensional schema of the results from the purging task was

derived by plotting a number corresponding to each message as a function

of (a) the percentage of staff officers that retained the message, and

(b) the median rank assigned the message by officers who retained it.

This representation is shown in Figure 3. It is apparent that the schema

is linear in form rather than hierarchical; that is, only one dimension

is necessary to adequately describe the purging-task results. In fact,

the correlation between the two dimensions used to derive the schema in

Figure 3 is -.84, p < .001. Further, across participants, the essentiality

ratings collected at the beginning of the experiment account for 80% of

the variance, on average, in the inclusion data from the purging task

23
'dO

0 FROG

O@RGT CP ( RGT CP

Q 31 ARTY PSNS TNKN ( )

Ds TNK SN (NW) Q VEH (NNW) SA8

BN (ENGAGED) 0 130 0 SA8

D 0N RGT CP

( ) @SA6

( BN (ENGAGED)

n23 122 DAG @ SA8

T NK C-EGENGAGED) (D T 11 1 122

QTNK BN (ENGA ED) - 0)122

~ Sl~ ~ ThK BN6 C- d B 14 BN CP

O VEH-BN (E)

GVhF jAM (D INME N K?(

V( Q :NME BN (?)

20 V VEH NE)

10

3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 11. 12

MEDIAN RANK

FIGURE 3

A SCHEMA OF MESSAGES BASED

ON PURGING-TASK DATA

24

_ , 1
[.(30) .89, p < .001]. Thus, for the most part, it appears that the

participants based their decisions regarding the purging of the ESD file

almost exclusively upon their perceptions of the essentiality of the

messages. This was true even though the essentiality ratings were collected

by the experimenter early in the procedure, prior to the summarization and

purging tasks.

What is particularly striking about this finding is that the high

degree of correlation between the essentiality ratings and the probability

of retention of a message in the purging task was obtained regardless of

whether a participant was given guidelines in the preceding summarization

task or not [t(30) < 11, or whether the participant was above or below

the 50th percentile on the judges' overall evaluations of the summaries

[t(30) < 1]. Thus, certain ESD messages are perceived to be essential to

the comprehension of a tactical situation, and there is considerable

agreement among staff officers concerning these perceptions. As noted by

Geiselman and Samet (1979), who also found substantial agreement among

officers on ratings of the essentiality of messages, the Army appears to

be imparting a cormon core of knowledge to its officers about the need

for information of various types. In this context, therefore, the tasks

of information organization and integration, rather than selection, should

be emphasized in future research efforts.

Concerning recommendations for guidelines for purging an ESD file

at the Corps level, the staff officers ordered the messages such that

three clusters were evident as can be seen in Figure 3. With a requirement

for an extensive purge, it appears that the officers would retain only

messages concerning the enemy's nuclear capability. With a less extensive purge, the officers would also retain messages pertaining to

conventional enemy threats (engagings with the enemy, movement toward the

FEBA, artillery and rocket installations) and the locations of regimental

command posts. With a minimal purge, only messages that describe enemy

25
movement away from the FEBA or battalion command posts would be deleted.

These three divisions could be used as a basis for developing guidelines

for reducing the size of ESD files by different amounts, depending upon

the requirements of the situation at hand.

Finally, whether or not a given message contained free-text remarks

(see Appendix A-2 for examples) was a powerful indicator of whether that

message was retained [65% versus 39%, t(28) = 2.94, p < .011. That is,

messages without free-text remarks were more likely to be purged. Thus,

as noted by Geiselman and Samet (1979), the participants' perceptions of

the relative importance of the messages were influenced markedly by the

descriptive remarks previously provided by other intelligence personnel.

This implies that greater attention should be given to the prospect of

describing intelligence information in the form of text, rather than in

formats more suitable for cataloging than for comprehending.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The present results provide valuable insight concerning the content

and structure of those summaries which are likely to be judged most

effective in the communication of information contained in a file of

messages about enemy offensive activity. Such prescriptive norms for

"good" summaries can be translated into guidelines, and possibly formats,

for staff officers to enable them to produce better intelligence-message

summaries. Quality summaries can be extremely useful in the communication

of intelligence information, as previous research has shown that carefullyprepared summaries can be more effective than extended texts in promoting

the comprehension and retention of main points (Reder and Anderson, 1980).

Staff officers utilized three general guidelines developed in the

first of this series of studies to produce "better" summaries of intelligence messages, thus lending validity to the guidelines. The effects of 5

26
the guidelines on overall summary quality, although reliable, were not

very large (i.e., the guidelines group's summaries were judged to be

about 25% better than those of the no-guidelines group). This is understandable considering that the present staff officers were given very

little exposure to the guidelines, which were stated only in general form,

and they were not given any training with regard to the use or effect of

the guidelines. Further, the summary evaluators were found to place substantial emphasis on the accuracy dimension, an attribute that was not

addressed by any of the guidelines. Additional research is now called

for to assess the impact of these management information guidelines on

tactical decision making, and to investigate the degree to which these

guidelines can be generalized to the summarization of other forms of

military messages (e.g., friendly situation data).

For the enemy-defensive scenario studied here, three levels of

detail were extracted from the schema portrayed in Figure 2; namely,

one referring to elements of immediate threat to friendly forces, such

as engagements and enemy movement toward the FEBA, followed by an inference regarding the enemy's immediate intentions. At the next level of

detail, the summary should further include an introductory summary statement concerning overall enemy strength plus a discussion of enemy units

of less importance behind the FEBA (e.g., support units, unit movement

toward the rear, air defense). At the most detailed level, a summary

could further include ancillary information such as the location of the

second defensive belt, locations of command posts as targeting information,

and instances of radio jamming. Whether a schematic aid such as this

can be utilized effectively by staff officers to summarize ESD messages

must be assessed in future experiments.

It is reasonable to assume that different, meaningful schemata can

I b be developed for appropriately representing information for planning and

decision making in a manageable number of recogn;zable tactical scenario.

27
The content and organization of the schema derived from summaries judged

to be "good" in the present experiment were found to be basically the

same as that observed by Geiselman and Samet (1979) even though the posture

of the enemy was changed from offensive to defensive. This implies that

the number of variations of schemata, and thus specific guidelines needed

to describe ESD files might be relatively small such that message-file

summarization routines could eventually become operative. However,

differences between scenarios were identified in terms of information

integration and inferences (i.e., analysis). Therefore, further research

on battlefield indicators seems warranted, especially in light of the

pressing need to support human performance in intelligence analysis (see

Fulcher, 1979).

28

LAA
REFERENCES

Blum, R.W., Callahan, C.A., Graulich, f.G., Kinley, W.D., and Witus, G.

Guidelines for Information Management for the Tactical Operations System

(TOS): Provisiotial Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). Vector Research

(Ann Arbor, I), ARI Working Paper HF 79-01, April 1979.

Coates, E.N. and McCourt, A.W. A Questionnaire-Based Analysis of Orderof-Battle Elements. U.S. Army Research Institute (Alexandria, VA),

Technical Paper 271, January 1976.

Fulcher, S.L.T. On Development the Human Element in Military Intelligence.

Military Intelligence, 1979, July-September, 32-33.

Geiselman, R.E. and Samet, M.G. Information Summarization in a CorpsLevel Scenario. U.S. Army Research Institute (Alexandria, VA), Technical

Paper 385. (Also, Human Factors, 1980, in press:)

Johnson, E.M. The Perception of Tactical Intelligence Indications: A

Replication. U.S. Army Research Institute (Alexandria, VA), Technical

Paper 282, September 1977.

Kintsch, W. Comprehension and Memory of Text. In W.K. Estes (Ed.),

Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes, Vol. 6. Hillsdale, N.J.:

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1978.

McKendry, J.M., Wilson, R.C., Mace, D.J., and Baker, J.D. Application of

a Method for Determining Information Requirements in a Field Army. U.S.

Army Research Institute (Arlington, VA), Technical Paper 247, August 1973.

Morrison, D.F. Multivariate Statistical Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill,

1967.

Reder, L.M. and Anderson, J.R. A Comparison of Texts and Their Summaries:

Memorial Consequences. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,

1980, 19, 121-134.

Thorndyke, P.W. Cognitive Structures in Comprehension and Memory of

Narrative Discourse. Cognitive Psychology, 1977, 9, 77-110.

29
APPENDIXES

Page

APPENDIX A: Participant Material

A-1. Scenario and Task Instructions. .. ... .... 33

A-2. Message Booklet. .. . .... .... .... 43

A-3. Instructions for Summarization Phase .. .. ... 83

A-4. Instructions for Purging Task .. .. . ..... 89

APPENDIX B. Instructions for Raters .. .. . .. .... . .... 93

APPENDIX C. The Participants' Sur.iaries .. .. ... .... .. 99

31

A1
APPENDIX A-1

PARTICIPANT MATERIAL: SCENARIO AND TASK INSTRUCTIONS

33
INFORMATION SUMMARIZATION EXPERIMENT

AUGUST 1980

SUMMARIZATION OF ENEMY SITUATION DATA

1. Introduction

2. Strategic Scenario

2.1 Strategic Environment

2.2 Strategic Developments

2.3 Comparison of Forces

3. Task Instructions

No.:

3

35
1. SUMMARIZATION OF ENEMY SITUATION DATA

1.1 Introduction

The general purpose of this study is to determine plausible ways of

summarizing battlefield intelligence information, such that the important

aspects of the current situation can be understood by a Corps Commander

within a very brief period of time. A brief tactical scenario involving

a conflict in a European setting is provided here to give you an overview of the present tactical environment. Later on, our procedure will

be to have you role play the G2 section TOC duty officer of the 10th

Corps. Detailed instructions will be given after you have had a chance

to read the scenario. At this time, please begin to study the scenario

on the pages that follow.

3

36
2. STRATEGIC SCENARIO

2.1 Strategic Environment

The reality of deployed NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Northern and

Central Europe inexorably poses the threat of tension and crisis escalating

to war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have vital national

security interests in Europe that are dramatically reflected in their

military contributions in the two opposing alliances. Combined with

military forces of other alliance/pact members, the European theater is

composed of large, modern, and potentially destructive forces unparalleled

in the history of warfare.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE NATO WARSAW PACT

Combat and direct support troops

available 625,000 895,000

Tanks 7,000 19,000

Tactical aircraft 2,050 4,025

Nuclear weapons 7,000 3,500

2.2 Strategic Developments

2.2.1 On 6 August 1980, amid a background of steadily deteriorating

relations between NATO and the Communist powers and increasing global

tension, ministers of the Warsaw Pack nations met with the Politburo and

agreed to attack West Germany. East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia

were most receptive, and their forces were called on to participate in

the offensive. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania moved forces to the borders

of the southern NATO countries to prevent NATO from reinforcing central

Europe. Covert preparations were initiated, to include the assembly of

rolling stock and increasing units to full strength.

37
2.2.2 Subsequent chronological events are:

(1) On 21 August 1980, armed forces of the Warsaw Pact launched

a nonnuclear attack against NATO forces in the Federal

Republic of Germany.

(2) Central Army Group (CENTAG) conducted a successful active

defense, severely punishing the leading divisions and

preventing commitment of thedivisions of the opposing

armies' second echelons. Forces in Northern Army Group

(NORTHAG) were not as successful, however, and CENTAG was

ordered to delay east of the Rhine commencing on 26 August.

The entry of French forces into the conflict at this time,

combined with increasingly effective air interdiction of

bridges and highways, immobilized the fronts' secondechelon tank Army east of the international boundary and

south of the 10th (U.S.) Corps sector.

(3) The opposing force developed two salients in NORTHAG (a

sketch map showing CENTAG and NORTHAG dispositions is

attached). One, south of Hamburg, threatened Bremen and

another, just north of the CENTAG boundary threatened

Munster. To reinforce these more successful attacks, the

commander of the Warsaw Pact forces stripped three secondechelon divisions from the armies opposing the 10th (U.S.)

Corps for commitment against Munster and ordered the northern

front second-echelon army committed against Bremen.

(4) On 28 August, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)

ordered CENTAG to terminate the delay and occupy defensive

positions farther to the east than previously planned. All

38
units of the 10th Corps were alerted for imminent counteroffensive operations to relieve pressure on NORTHAG.

(5) At 0400 Hrs on 29 August 1980, the 10th Corps launched

a counterattack operation in its sector. The Commander in

Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (CINAFCENT) gave the

following guidance:

"We will attack to restore the international boundary

from Kassel southward. "

The 10th (U.S.) Corps Commander gave the following guidance:

"This will be a two-phase operation--penetration of the

main and second defensive belts and an exploitation to

the international boundary. Speed will mean everything --to both insure our immediate success and to convince

the other side to divert major forces against us. Assume

95-percent friendly strength, support available, and air

parity with local air superiority when needed. Also,

assume that the battle will be nonnuclear."

2.3 Comparison of Forces

2.3.1 NATO forces

(1) 10th (U.S.) Corps: Assigned sector is depicted in the sketch

map. The early declaration of a state of emergency by the

U.S. Congress on 14 August greatly facilitated the reinforcement of Europe. The President immediately ordered

the deployment of the dual-based 53rd and 54th Mech Div and

the 25th Armd Div and called the Ready Reserve and Standby

Reserve to active duty. By 25 August, these three units and

other service support units were available for commitment

to the counteroffensive.

39
(2) 8 (Allied) TAF: Elements of the 8th (Allied) TAF is

supporting the Corps. Estimates indicate that the friendly

air forces will be able to achieve local air superiority

for limited periods of time.

2.3.2 Enemy forces:

(1) The forces opposing the 10th (U.S.) Corps are elements of

the enemy First Zapadnian Front. When the enemy attacked

on 21 August, nine divisions (three motorized rifle and

six tank) were employed against the 10th (U.S.) Corps. At

present, the first echelon consists of three motorized

rifle and two tank divisions, with one tank division remaining in the second echelon.

The attached enemy situation map depicts the known positions

of some enemy units as of 0400 Hrs, 29 August 1980 (D-day,

H-hour).

(2) As part of the enemy's strategic reserve, two airborne

divisions could be employed by the central front against

the 10th Corps sector.

40
3. TASK INSTRUCTIONS

It is now 0430 on 29 August 1980 (D-day, H-hour plus 30 minutes). You

have been involved in activities which have prevented you from reading

messages received between 0400 and 0430. Shortly, you will be given a

series of enemy situation data (ESD) messages received by the 10th Corps

HQ between 0400 and 0430 Hrs. The messages will be presented in the

order received.

Currently, the 10th Corps Commander and the Corps G2 are out of the TOC

at the 52nd Division CP. As the Corps G2 section TOC duty officer, it

is your responsibility to be prepared to provide a summary of the enemy

situation upon request. Therefore, as you study the messages, please

keep this responsibility in mind. Please feel free to make marks upon

the messages.

In addition, as you read each message, we would like you to rate how

essential it is to the understanding of the enemy situation between 0400

and 0430 lirs. at the Corps level. Please indicate the ratings on the

rating sheet provided with the messages using the following 5-point scale:

1 - of little use

2 - of some use

3 - useful

4 - important

5 - essential

This essentiality rating reflects message importance which may have nothing

to do with the evaluation (reliability and accuracy ratings) provided with

each message.

You will be given the 30 messages as soon as everyone has had an adequate

opportunity to examine the tactical scenario that you now have.

41

I 4
HPAUN

Nowma

CUT"}

- - - I KIXc xx

locos ~~maa

GISI

A1z NorIA

KILS0

SkthMp Stainaso 9Agst 1980.

42
APPENDIX A-2

PARTICIPANT MATERIAL: MESSAGE BOOKLET

1

43
MESSAGE

BOOKLET

NO.: _____

PRIMARY SPECIALTY: __________________________

45
Instructions

The series of enemy situation data (ESD) messages is presented on the

following pages in the order in which they were received at the HQ of

the 10th Corps. First, however, the format in which the messages are

presented is described briefly for your information, and a key to

abbreviations is included. (The format descriptions and key are presented

on the yellow sheets of paper.) Of course, some of the entries provided

for in the message format are left blank; this is because the associated

information is either unknown or irrelevant to your task.

As you examine the messages, one at a time, please be sure to rate each

message for its essentiality in understanding the enemy situation between

0400 and 0430 at the Corps level. Your ratings for the 30 messages should

oe made on the sheet provided in this booklet for the ratings, not on

the messages themselves. Please make the ratings using the following

5-point scale:

1 - of little use

2 - of some use

3 - useful

4 - important

5 - essential

Please feel free to make notes upon any of the messages, either of the

two maps, or on the scrap paper provided.

You will be given 45 minutes to study the messages and make your essentiality ratings. As you work, please bear in mind that you may be subsequently

called upon to summarize the enemy situation data, at the Corps level.

You will be told when there are 10 minutes remaining so that you can verify

that you have rated each and every message for essentiality. Please begin

your examination of the messages.

46

-.....-. L..
No.:

ESSENTIALITY RATING SHEET

Please rate each of the 30 messages for their essentiality in understanding

the enemy situation between 0400 and 0430 at the Corps level. Please do

so by putting one rating in each of the 30 blanks below corresponding to

the messages numbered 1 to 30. Please use the following scale,

I - of little use

2 - of some use

3 - useful

4 - important

5 - essential

1. 11. 21.

2. 12. 22.

3. 13. 23.

4. 14. 24.

5. 15. 25.

6. 16. 26.

7. 17. 27.

8. 18. 28.

9. 19. 29.

10. 20. 30.

47
The General Format for ESD Messages

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ACTION: FILE-NAME: PREC:

SCTY: RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : LOC:

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE

EMPL

ACTV: NATION:

SPEED:

DIR : TGT?:

ACTV-TIME: TGT-NO

QTY: ALT

LOC-ERR:

SOURCE:

AGENCY: CH-TO-MSG: REF

EVAL : TASK NO:

REMARKS:

Key:

Identifier Purpose

ORIG/MSG NO To provide a unique identifier for

each TOS message. Terminal assigns

the value entered in MSG-NO.

FILE To specify the TOS file that a

message will affect.

ACTION To specify the type of transaction.

A=add, C=change, D=delete.

FILE-NAME Ignored.

PREC To specify the communications

precedence of the message.

SCTY To specify the security attributes

of the message.

RESTR To specify the restriction of access

to data contained in the message.

4B

j
Key (continued):

Identifier Purpose

DISTR To specify the distribution of the

message.

SUBJ To specify the Subject of an ESD

intelligence report.

LABEL To provide a label for a graphic

symbol.

SIG-EVENT? To indicate that an ESD record

concerns a significant event or

item. (This has been ignored for

this experiment.)

ACTV To specify the activity associated

with subject of an intelligence report.

SPEED To specify the speed of movement in

kilometers per hour.

DIR To specify the direction of movement

in either degrees or mils measured

from grid north.

ACTV-TIME To specify the time when an activity

took place.

QTY To specify the quantity of items

identified in the subject of a

report.

SOURCE To specify the source of information.

AGENCY To specify the category of Agency

that has received or gathered

intelligence information and has

reported on the information.

EVAL To specify an evaluation of reliability and the accuracy of the

information.

UNIT To specify an enemy unit identification.

49
Key (continued):

Identifier Purpose

ECH To specify either the echelon level

or the echelon size of a unit that

could occupy a terrain feature.

TYPE To specify the principal and/special

organizational type of the enemy

unit.

EMPL To specify how a unit is employed.

NATION To specify a country of the world

from which an enemy unit derives

its origin.

TGT? To indicate if the contents of an

ESD message identify a potential

target.

TGT-NO To specify the American, British,

Canadian, Austrailian target

identifiers assigned to a potential

target.

ALT To specify the altitude above or

below mean sea level of a target

measured in meters.

LOC-ERR To specify the probable error in

meters of the locating source.

CH-TO-MSG Ignored.

LOC To specify a location.

REF To allow the user to reference

another ESO record by its ORIG/MSG-NO.

TASK-NO To specify the identification number

assigned to an intelligence collection task.

REMARKS To provide for entry of amplifying or

clarifying remarks.

50
Ad

KEY TO MESSAGE ABBREVIATIONS

PRECEDENCE:

Z = flash

I = immediate

P = priority

R = routine

SUBJECT:

RDRACQ = radar acquisition

122 = Howitzer

130 = field gun

SA8 = short range SAM

SA6 = low/medium altitude SAM (GAINFUL)

SOURCE:

SLAR = Side Locking Airborne Radar

CEINT = Communications Intelligence

TACFIR = Artillery (computerized)

RECNGE = Recon (ground)

RECNAV = Aerial Visual Recon

RORCM = Radar Communications

RPV = Remotely Piloted Vehicle

IR = Infra red

EVALUATION (reliability and accuracy):

A = completely reliable I = confirmed by other sources

B = usually reliable 2 = probably true

51
#1

ORIG/MSG NO: 23/208 FILE: ESO ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BN LOC: NB050010

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :TANK

EMPL

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACT V-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 100

SOURCE: SLAR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS: LEAD ELEMENTS ENGAGED.

If desired, use this space for notes.

52
#2

ORIG/MSG NO: 11/203 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC. Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT: UNK

LABEL: ECH : BN LOC: NA150950

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : AR

EMPL :

ACTV: NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 100

SOURCE: SLAR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: Al

REMARKS: IN CONTACT

-------------------------------------------------------------

If desired, use this space for notes.

53
#3

ORIG/MSG NO: 3/7044 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: RDRACQ UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :LOC: NA390800

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL :

ACTV: DETECT NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290350AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: CEINT/20 CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY : TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

54
#4

ORIG/MSG NO: 201 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC:

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: VEH UNIT: UNK

LABEL: ECH : BN LOC: NA190900

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE

EMPL

ACTV: MOV NATION:

SPEED: 25 MPH

DIR: EAST TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290405AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 700

SOURCE: SLAR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: Al

REMARKS: ENEMY COLUMNS MOVING FROM GRID COORDINATES NOTED.

If desired, use this space for notes.

55
#5

ORIG/MSG NO: 20CEWI FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: P

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: 122 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BTRY LOC: NA210900

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE ARTY

EMPL

ACTV: DELAYING NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290405AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 5 LOC-ERR: 90

SOURCE: SLAR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: A2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

56
#6

ORIG/MSG NO: 2BDE/52 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: MECH VEH UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : LOC: MB950100

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL :

ACTV: MOVING NATION:

SPEED: 15 MPH

DIR: NNW TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 45-60 LOC-ERR: 50

SOURCE: RDRCM CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: A2

REMARKS: LARGE NUMBER OF TRACKED VEHICLES MOVING ON ROADS THROUGH LOCATION NOTED.

If desired, use this space for notes.

57
#7

ORIG/MSG NO: SZD FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: TANK CO UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :CO LOC: MB880190

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : TANK

EMPL : DEFEND

ACTV: DEFENDING NATION:

SPEED:

DTr TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 15 LQC-ERR: 50

SOURCE: RECNGE CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

REMARKS: ENEMY TANKS ENGAGED.

------------------------------------------------------------------

If desired, use this space for notes.

58
#8

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :LOC: MB990080

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : MRR

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCO NATION: I. SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 50

SOURCE: RECNGE CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: 2B TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS: LEAD ELEMENTS ARE ENGAGED.

If desired, use this space for notes.

59
#9

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: 122 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :LOC: MB990190

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :FA

EMPL

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 50

SOURCE: TACFIR/52 CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS: CM/CB RDR LOCD ENEMY ARTY - CB FIRES LEVIED AS PERMITTED.

If desired, use this space for notes.

60
#10

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC:

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: VEH UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : LOC: NB150200

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL :

ACTV: MOV NATION:

SPEED: 20 MPH

DIR: NE TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290355AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 100

SOURCE: IR/lO CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

61
#11

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC:

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: 130 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BTY LOC: ND300080

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :FA

EMPL

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290355AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: CEINT CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS: DIV ARTY GP (DAG).

If desired, use this space for notes.

62
#12

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: CP UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BN LOC: NB040020

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : TANK

EMPL:

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT -NO

ACTV-TIME: 290351AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

63
#13

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BN LOC: NB110150

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :INME

EMPL

ACTV: NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOG-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: CEINT/lO CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

64
#14

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESO ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: P

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: CP UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BN LOC: NB055149

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : INME

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290357AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: CEINT/1O CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

65
#15

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: R

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: VEH UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : LOC: NB300020

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : WHEEL

EMPL :

ACTV: MOV NATION:

SPEED: 35 MPH

DIR: EAST TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290403AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 20 LOC-ERR: 150

SOURCE: IR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS: TRUCKS HIGH SPEED, PROBABLY EMPTY.

------------------------------------------------------------------

If desired, use this space for notes.

66

S
#16

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC:

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: ARTY UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BTRY LOC: NA290910

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : FA

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACT V-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 100

SOURCE: RDRCM CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: A2

REMARKS: DIV ARTY HAS LOCATED 31 EN ARTY PSNS (CONFIRMED) 122 MH-12, 130 MM-4,

152 MM-2, 122 MRL-1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

If desired, use this space for notes.

67
#17

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: I

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BN LOC: NB210060

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :INME

EMPL

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290345AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: VR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: 23 TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

68
#18

ORIG/MSG NO: 11/0858 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC:

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BN LOC: NB290100

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :TANK

EMPL :

ACTV: MOV NATION:

SPEED: 20 MPH

DIR: NW TGT?:

TGT -NO

ACTV-TIME: 290345AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 500

SOURCE: RPV/1O CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

69
#19

ORIG/MSG NO: 3/0876 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: RGT UNIT: UNK

LABEL: ECH : RGT LOC: MB910260

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL:

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 700

SOURCE: CEINT/13 CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS: RGT CP.

If desired, use this space for notes.

70
#20

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: P

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: 122 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BTY LOC: NA350790

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : FA

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290359AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: RADAR/54 CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY : TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS: DIV ARTY GP (DAG).

If desired, use this space for notes.

71
#21

ORIG/MSG NO: 3/0895 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: FROG UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BTY LOC: NB190090

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: SLAR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

72
#22

ORIG/MSG NO: 201 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC:

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: SA8 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BTRY LOC: NB120010

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : ADSA

EMPL :

ACTV: MOVING NATION:

SPEED: 20 MPH

DIR: W TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 4 LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: 201 CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: A2

REMARKS: SA8 BTRY ADVANCING.

If desired, use this space for notes.

73
#23

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESO ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: JAMR UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :LOC: NA490820

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL :

ACTV: DETECT NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290352AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: CEINT CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TAF TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS: VHF JAMMERS LOCATED.

If desired, use this space for notes.

74
#24

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: p

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: SA8 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BTY LOC: MB960210

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : FA

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290401AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: IR/lO CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: I TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

75
#25

ORIG/MSG NO: 6/08123 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: R

SCTY: RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: SA8 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : BTY LOC: NA210880

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE

EMPL

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290400AAUG8O ALT

QTY: 4 LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: IR CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: BI

REMARKS: UNIT ACTIVATED RADAR IN RESPONSE TO RPV FLIGHT.

If desired, use this space for notes.

76
#26

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: SA6 UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BTRY LOC: NA240810

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE :

EMPL :

ACTV: NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290401AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 2 LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: TACFIRE/54 CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS:

if desired, use this space for notes.

77
#27

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: Z

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: CP UNIT: 177

LABEL: ECH : REGT LOC: NA310820

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : INME

EMPL :

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290359AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: CEINT CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

78
#28

ORIG/MSG NO: FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: P

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT:

LABEL: ECH :BN LOC: NA350710

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : TANK

EMPL :

ACTV: MOV NATION:

SPEED: 20MPH

DIR: W TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290410AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: RECNAV CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL:

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

79
#29

ORIG/MSG NO: 54 FILE: ESD ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: P

SCTY: U RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: BN UNIT: UNK

LABEL: ECH : BN LOC: NA290750

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : WHEEL

EMPL

ACTV: MOVING NATION:

SPEED: 10 MPH

DIR: WEST 55 TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290355AAUG80 ALT

QTY: 10-15 LOC-ERR:

SOURCE: RECNAV CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: DI AVN TASK NO:

EVAL: A2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

VP
#30

ORIG/MSG NO: 52 FILE: ESO ACTION: A FILE NAME: PREC: r

SCTY: RESTR: DISTR:

SUBJ: RGT UNIT:

LABEL: ECH : RGT LOC: NB030220

SIG-EVENT?: TYPE : MR

EMPL

ACTV: LOCD NATION:

SPEED:

DIR: TGT?:

TGT-NO

ACTV-TIME: 290359AAUG80 ALT

QTY: LOC-ERR: 1000

SOURCE: CEINT CH TO MSG: REF

AGENCY: TASK NO:

EVAL: B2

REMARKS:

If desired, use this space for notes.

81
APPENDIX A-3

PARTICIPANT MATERIAL: INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUMMARIZATION PHASE

83
GUIDELINES GROUP

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUMMARIZATION PHASE

To help us with the first of two tasks, which remain, we would now like

you to do the following. Assume that the Corp G2 and Corp commander will

be arriving at TOC momentarily. Your task is to prepare a summary or

update briefing of the enemy situation for the G2. The summary should

not be merely a listing of messages, but rather it should represent a

well thought-out and well-organized description of the situation. This

description should not include tactical recommendations. For our

purposes, we ask that you write-out the summary as you would say it

directly to the G2; blue scrap paper will be provided to you on which you

are asked to work. With respect to length, assume that your summary

would take about 3 minutes to present orally, and that in final written

form it should take up nc more than 3 pages. Your summary cannot contain

any drawings or graphics, although you may refer to map coordinates.

You will be provided a list of three guidelines which we would like you

to follow as closely as possible in preparing your summary. These

guidelines were suggested from research conducted earlier this year here

at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. The three guildelines

are as follows:

(1) Prepare the intelligence summary in a conversational style.

Do not present information in the form of lists alone since

this makes understanding the information time consuming and

difficult.

(2) Provide an interpretation of the intelligence information

if that is possible. In other words, in addition to the

"hard facts," try to state what the intelligence means in

85
terms of the enemy situation; however, these statements

must be well founded.

(3) Provide a dynamic portrayal of the enemy situation. That

is, emphasize the speed and direction of enemy movement,

rather than merely the current static position of enemy

units.

Shortly, you will be given up to 20 minutes to compose and draft your summary.

Because this is i limited amount of time, we realize that you may not be

able to provide a neat copy of the summary. However, since it is necessary

that your summary be completely legible so we can analyze it, we must ask

you to copy it over into final form. Thus, during the 20-minute period,

all you need to do is to draft your summary on the blue scrap paper.

Then, at the completion of that period, you will be given special sheets

upon which to copy the final summary. You will be given only 5 minutes

to copy your summary; and therefore, you should not plan to use this

time to modify or expand your summary.

86
NO GUIDELINES GROUP

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUMMARIZATION PHASE

To help us with the first of two tasks, which remain, we would now like

you to do the following. Assume that the Corps G2 and Corps commander

will be arriving at TOC momentarily. Your task is to prepare a summary

or update briefing of the enemy situation for the G2. The summary should

not be merely a listing of messages, but rather it should represent a

thought-out and well-organized description of the situation. This

description should not include tactical recommendations. For our purposes,

we ask that you write out the summary as you would say it directly to the

G2; blue scrap paper will be provided to you on which you are asked to

work. With respect to length, assume that your summary would take about

3 minutes to present orally, and that in final written form it should take

up no more than 3 pages. Your summary cannot contain any drawings or

graphics, although you may refer to map coordinates.

87
Shortly, you will be given up to 20 minutes to compose and draft your

summary. Because this is a limited amount of time, we realize that you

may not be able to provide a neat copy of the summary. However, since

it is necessary that your summary be completely legible so we can analyze

it, we must ask you to copy it over into final form. Thus, during the

20-minute period, all you need to do is to draft your summary on the

blue scrap paper. Then, at the completion of that period, you will be

given special sheets upon which to copy the final summary. You will be

given only 5 minutes to copy your summary, and therefore, you should not

plan to use this time to modify or expand your summary.

88
APPENDIX A-4

PARTICIPANT MATERIAL: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PURGING TASK

89
Instructions For Purging Task

To complete this exercise, we would like you to participate in one final

phase of the experiment. The rationale and procedure for the final task

is as follows. It might sometimes be the case that too many messages

are received by an intelligence staff such that the task of maintaining

an ongoing record of them is overwhelming. In order to determine the

kinds of messages that need not be retained about the enemy in the present

situation, please examine the 30 messages again and, this time, put a

large "X" through any message that you feel could be deleted permanently

from the message set. Please continue to examine the messages in this

manner until you have deleted exactly 15 of them. You should complete

this task with the tactical scenario in mind, but you should consider

this task to be independent of the summarization task that you have

already cormpled. That is, assume that all that can and will be retained

about the set of 30 messages for later reference by other members of the

intelligence staff is 15 messaaes in their present form.

When you have finished deleting 15 messages, please gather together the

15 messages that you feel should be retained and rank-order them on the

basis of how important they are to keep in the remaining message set.

Give the most important message a "1," the next most important message

a "2," and so on until you have rank-ordered all 15 of the messages you

feed should be retained. You can put the numbers anywhere on the

messages that you wish, but please be consistent and make the numbers

large so they can be found easily.

91

iA
APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS FOR RATERS

q3
Instructions for Evaluators

Perceptronics is currently engaged in an empirical study of the quality

and structure of tactical-situation summaries prepared by staff officers.

In this study, 32 advanced students at the U.S. Command and General

Staff College at Forth Leavenworth were asked to role-play an intelligence-section TOC duty officer at the Corps level. After reading a

tactical scenario of a developing conflict in Europe and reviewing an

enemy situation map, the students were asked to study 30 Enemy Situation

Data (ESD) messages said to have been received over a specific halfhour period. Their task was to summarize the information contained in

the 30 messages in preparation for a three-minute briefing to the G2

on the events transpiring during the half-hour period. The students

were told that their task was simply to inform the G2, who had been

absent during the half-hour period, of the enemy situation; they were

not to make tactical recommendations. The summaries were written out

by the students; they were not allowed to draw pictures, but they were

allowed to refer to map coordinates. In brief, they were to write the

summary as they would say it given only three minutes with the G2.

Enclosed are:

(a) a description of the tactical scenario (excerpted from

instructions to subjects)

(b) the 30 ESD messages as presented to the students in

standard TOS format (keys to the format and abbreviations

are included)

(c) typed copies of the 32 student-generated summaries of

the messages, with an evaluation sheet attached to each

The first thing we would like you to do is to read through the scenario

and messages. We realize that you may be overly familiar with this

95
scenario, but you should keep in mind that the summaries you are to

judge were based only on the 30 messages included here. Then, after

you have studied the scenario, please read each of the 32 summaries

over once. This initial view of all summaries will help you to establish a framework for the individual summary evaluations we wish you

to make.

An evaluation sheet has been attached to each of the 32 summaries.

Using these forms, we would like you to judge the quality of each

summary with respect to the following five general evaluative attributes:

(1) content, which refers to the appropriateness of the scope of the

factual information selected for inclusion in the summary, i.e., to

what degree does the summary include facts that the G2 should know,

yet exclude facts that the G2 does not need to know? (2) interpretation,

which refers to the meaningfulness and usefulness of an integration of

the information contained in the messages, including an assessment of

the summarizer's use of references drawn from the available information;

(3) accuracy, which indicates the degree to which the information

presented in the summary correctly reflects the detailed information

contained in the messages, i.e., is the information included in the

summary true or plausible? (4) organization, which reflects how well

the important bits of information are presented in an order that would

facilitate understanding uf the tactical situation by the G2, i.e., how

adequate is the structure of the information presentation? (5) style,

which refers to the effectiveness of the manner or format by which the

information in the summary is communicated, i.e., how well does the

presentation style facilitate understanding of the tactical situation

by the G2. Your rating for each attribute is to be indicated on a

five-point scale ranging from "very poor" to "very good"--please mark

the appropriate box in each case.

96
Finally, for each summary, we need your single assessment of the overall

quality of the entire summary; in other words, as expressed by the summary,

how well did the student performing the summarization task role-play the

duty of the G2-section TOC duty officer? This judgment is made in the

form of a quantitative rating on a 0-to-lO0 quality scale, with the

correspondence between some numerical anchors and their verbal tags shown

as a guideline in the box in the lower left portion of the evaluation

sheet. Your assigned overall rating for a summary, which can be any number

between 0 and 100, should be recorded in the box provided in the lower

right corner of the sheet.

If you wish to make any additional comments about a summary, please feel

free to do so on the back of the evaluation form for that summary.

We realize that the tasks we are asking you to do are somewhat time-consuming.

However, we need your work returned within ten days in order to complete

this phase of our program on schedule; for your convenience we have enclosed

a return-mail envelope. Therefore, we would like to thank you in advance

for your speedy cooperation.

97
SUMMARY EVALUATION SHEET

Summary No. Rater

Very Very

Attribute Poor Poor Borderline Good Good

CONTENT DD D DD --appropriateness of scope of

factual information included.

INTERPRETATION D I-] E I I

--meaningfulness and utility

of information integration.

ACCURACY E El F-1 --correctness of facts or

plausiblility of inferences

in light of message content.

ORGANIZATION ElElED DE --logic of order of

information presentation.

STYLE i - --effectiveness of manner

or format of information

communication.

Overall Rating Scale Overall Rating

0 25 50 75 100

Very Poor Borderline Good Very

Poor Good

98
APPENDIX C

THE PARTICIPANTS' SUMMARIES

[Summaries are presented in descending order of

quality; the average overall evaluation and whether

or not the summary was written from guidelines is

provided with each summary]

99
SUMMARY NO. 1

Sir, while you were gone we received some updated reports which may be

important.

Our most recent information indicates that we are in contact in the

201st area and that some air defense units in that are moving forward.

New artillery and air defense has been located in the 54th Div area

and there is armored battalion movement toward the west in the 54th Div

sector primarily in the south.

Northwest movement of armored and wheeled vehicles has been detected in

the 23 DIV sector as well as in the rear of the 201st sector.

Division artillery has been located near NB30070 and a nuclear capable

FROG BN has been located in that area.

Although enemy intentions are not clear at this time it is apparent that

the heaviest contact is in the 201st area and the enemy is increasing

pressure by moving to contact in the 54th Div area.

At the same time the enemy is moving units to beef up their capability

in the 23rd Div sector or to cross the Corps boundary in the North.

Average Overall Evaluation = 78.3

Group: Guidelines

101
SUMMARY NO. 2

During the period 29 0400 to 29 0430 Aug 80, sporadic enemy activity

occurred across the Corps front. The principal activity occurred in the

center of the Corps sector. Several enemy armor battalions were engaged

in the 201st ACR sector and in the Northern part of the 54th mech sector.

Small enemy units were reported delaying in the North while Battalion

size units were reported moving North and Northwest, indicating a possible

movement of large elements out of the Corps sector toward the North.

Further, there were several reports of large numbers of wheeled vehicle

convoys moving eastward toward the enemy rear. This could mean either a

relatively large re-supply effort in this sector, or the impending move

to the North.

Of some concern is the report that an enemy tank battalion is moving west

and into the South of the 54th mech Div sector, perhaps from this 12th

(NATO) corps area. This may indicate a limited attack along the Corps

southern boundary though evidence of this is scarce.

Elements of DA6's were located at NB3088, and NA350790. A FROG Btry was

located at NB190090. In all, Div. Arty. has confirmed 31 enemy arty PSNS.

including 122 MRL's.

Three SA8 Btry's (one in each sector) were located and one SA6 Btry was

found forward in the 54th mech sector.

Based upon the above, indications are that the enemy will conduct limited

attacks across the Corps front to defend/delay while withdrawing the

bulk of his forces to reinforce the Northern area.

Average Overall Evaluation =73.9

Group: No Guidelines

102
SUMMARY NO. 3

Update briefing - Corps situtation as of 0400 hrs. Corps elements are

opposed by elements of three enemy motorized rifle divisions and two

tank divisions. On the Corps north flank, the 23d armored division appears

to be opposed by elements of one MRD and one tank division. Movement

in this sector shows a shifting of forces toward the northwest, vicinity

MB920110. Vehicle movement toward the NNE in this sector could indicate

resupply is taking place. In the Corps center sector, the 201 ACR is

opposed by elements of a TK Div on the north and probably a motorized

rifle division on the south. Activity has been heavy in the northern

sector of the 201 ACR vic NBl0050 with vehicle movement to the NW.

Vehicle movement vic VN350050 could indicate additional replacements and/

or resupply to the MRD on the southern portions of the 201 ACR.

The 54th mech appears to be opposed by elements of an MRD on the north

and a TK div on the south. Wheel and track vehicle movement in the southern

portion of Corps area vic NA3070 indicate repositioning of units and

possible supply locations of a jamming unit implies a potential area of

attack on the boundary of the 10 and 12 Corps. Positioning of a DAC in

the same area could provide fire support for any threat assaults.

We must continue to develop the situation on the south flank to preclude

enemy from surprising us with a spoiling attack. If enemy chooses to

attack, his main effort will probably be along 23AD/201ACR boundary with

a secondary effort along 10 (US) and 12 (NATO) Corps flanks.

Average Overall Evaluation = 68.9

Group: Guidelines

103
SUMMARY NO. 4

Sir, the major activity in the 10th Corps sector is the movement of

battalion size units away from us and toward the units to our North.

All of this movement is being done by maneuver units with no supporting

artillery going along. We have located one regimental artillery group

and two DAG's. There are at least two or three air defense batteries

moving well up to the enemy's front lines in our sector. A FROG battery

has moved within 10 KM of the 201st ACR front. Two RGT CP's have been

located as well as several BN CP's. No really heavy engagements appear

to be going on in our sector; although units of battalion size are

engaged in these locations aross the entire front.

My opinion is that the enemy is moving maneuver units from in front of

us to reinforce his success against the units on our left flank. In order

to deny us knowledge of these movements he has moved ADA forward to limit

our air activity behind his lines. The FROG is probably part of a demonstration. I think he is conducting a holding action against us.

Average Overall Evaluation = 68.3

Group: Guidelines

104

-di
SUMMARY NO. 5

Since we began our counter offensive we have met with immediate enemy

resistance along only portions of our front. In the 23rd Div sector

this has been strongest in the south and consists of mechanized forces

although a tank Co from the MRB has been used in the 1st echelon defense

(MB880190) and not as a C-ATK force. In the 54th sector arty has been

used in direct fire roles to bolster the defensive/offensive effort

there (NA210900). No other significant contact has been reported along

the front.

We have detected a forward displacement/positioning of surface to air

missile units, jammers, and other counter air elements. This seems a bit

unusual but our reports are all from high quality sources. SA8's are at

NB120010, MB960210, and NA210880. SA6's at NA240810. A jammer unit is

at NA490820. The most significant unit identified however is a FROG

Btry located by 8LAR at 0400 vic NB190090. From this it appears that

the enemy is either unsuspecting of our plans to C-ATK and is currently

preparing to continue his offensive to the west, or, he is prepared to

cross the nuclear threshold (FROG) and strike deep. At the same time

his AD coverage far forward can neutralize our own air threat arid

protect his key units.

A tank Bn, probably from a MRR or possibly Div Indep Bn, is moving NW

rapidly vic NB290100.

Average Overall Evaluation = 67.4

Group: Guidelines

105
SUMMARY NO. 6

Current Situation 10th US Corps as of 290430A Aug 80:

General -- Front generally stable with minor enemy contact (battalion

size). Possible probing attacks. (a) vic NB050010 at 290400A Aug 80

lead elements of an enemy tank battalion engaged (results unknown).

(b) vic MB990080 at 290400A Aug 80 lead elements of enemy MRR engaged

(results unknown). (c) vic NA150950 at 290400A Aug 80 enemy tank battalion

in contact (results unknown).

Significant activity -- Vic MB950100 at 290400A Aug 80 45-60 enemy mech

vehicles reported moving NNW at 15 MPH. Could be moving to stabalize line

(grid MB890140) or could attempt limited objective attack (MB020760).

Confirmed major enemy locations -- (a) 177th INME Rgt CP vic NA310820.

(b) MRR vic NB030220. (c) Rgt CP vic MB9102160. (d) DAG vic NB300080/

(e) DAG vic NA350790. (f) 31 arty pos. confirmed vic NA290910 (122, 120,

152, 122 MRL). (g) FROG Btry vic NB190090. (h) ADA Btry strength

MB960210 (SA8) NA210880 (SA8) NA240810 (SA6) enemy appears to be building

up to counter attack unit, can attack, defend, or withdraw. Will

probably defend initially until buildup complete.

Average Overall Evaluation = 64.7

Group: No Guidelines

106
SUMMARY NO. 7

It appears that we are opposed by elements of 3 emeny divisions deployed

in belts across the 10th Corps front. 2nd Echelon Divisions and enemy

locations have not been identified.

Recent enemy activity indicates that the enemy will defend along the

present LC. He has shifted, or is in the process of shifting, forces to

the Northern sector along the E4/E70 autobahn which he no doubt considers

his most dangerous avenue of approach. He appears to be spread thin

throughout the Vogelsberg area which affords him the best defendable

terrain.

Enemy forces in the vicinity of Landerback (positioned behind the Vogelsberg) are being moved to the North as was previously mentioned, probably

to reinforce or counterattack in the Alsfeld area.

The enemy is defending in the sector south of the Vogelsberg with the

majority of his forces along the Kinzig River Valley approach to Fulda.

The enemy is using REC and has AD elements well forward.

There has been no indication of NBC use or commitment of Airborne/Air

Mobile Forces.

Average Overall Evaluation = 63.3

Group: Guidelines

107
SUMMARY NO. 8

During the last 30 minutes we have confirmed the locations of 11 previously

known units and discovered 10 more previously unknown. The enemy is

continuing to defend in sector with his artillery and SAMs far forward.

Significant activities are as follows:

In the 23AD area there is currently lateral movement by an enemy MR unit.

It is moving NW along the FEBA. Its destination and mission are unknown.

At MB990090 we have engaged a tank battalion. We don't know if they were

in the process of following the MR unit or not. Immediately to the rear

of the tank battalion we have located 2 MRBs - the 3rd echelon regt of the

1st echelon division. The only significant activity in the 201 ACR AD is

the NW movement of a tank Bn on road 254 toward Alsfeld. This may indicate

the enemy is expecting us to penetrate either in the 23AD or just across

the Corps boundary. In the 54 mech AD the confirmation of one DAG at

NB350790 and indications of another at NB290910 plus the confirmation of

a number of mech, armor, RA and active ADA units far forward indicate the

enemy will put up a stiff defense in this area

The most significant events in the 10 Corps AD are the 3 instances of

lateral movement; the 1st on the FEBA and the 2nd to the center area of

the AD. The significance is not known.

Average Overall Evaluation 60.4

Group: No Guidelines

108
SUMMARY NO. 9

The intelligence summary for events reported 0345 hrs through 0415 hrs

in the Corps zone:

In the northern area now occupied by the 23rd: At approximately 0400 hrs

45-60 mech vehicles reported moving NNW at 15 MPH vicinity MB950100. A

iegt size unit was located approx MB910260. This unit has been on the

intell summary and this is a confirmation. Ground recon has located

approx 15 tanks vic MB880190. Unit was defending and targets were engaged.

Recon elements located a MRR vic MB990080. Unit in a static area. 122 MM

FA unit located MB990190 by the TAC FIR/52 target engaged.

In the center section now occupied by 201st ACR CEINT/IO has located a

BN CP vic NB055149. An armored CP has been located vic BN0240020. Both

units are not moving at the time reported. An MMR regt has been located at

coord NB030220. A tank BN of unknown number has been located at coord

NB290100 moving NW at 20 MPH. A tank BN, coord NB050010 and two INME BNs

located at NB110150 and NB210060 respectively have been identified. The

tank BN is a verification but the two INME BNs are new to the intell

report. Several vehicles have been reported moving east from this area.

Approx 20 wheeled vehicles frorl NB300020 and other single spotted reports.

Average Overall Evaluation = 59.1

Group: Guidelines

109
SUMMARY NO. 10

There has been significant activity between 290400-290430 aug 80 in the

10th Corps A.D. The most activity has occurred in the 201st sector.

However contact is in progress in the 23rd sector. The 53rd sector is

relatively quiet for the time being but numerous sightings indicate it

will not stay that way.

In the center sector, the 201st engagements, vehicle sightings, regimental

CP's, and regimental arty groups have been located. The 201st have

engaged elements at NB050010, NA150950, and NA390800. Vehicles have been

sighted at Grid NA190900 and moving east. A regimental CP, probably an

MRR has also been located in the 201st area. The RAG is believed to be

vicinity NB1505.

In the North, lead elements have made contact at MB990080, probably a

MRR. In addition a tank company is in defensive position at MB880190.

The RAG is vicinity MB990190. Numerous vehicles have been sighted

moving east out of this area, probably re-supply vehicles.

The Southern AD, the 53rd has not had much activity but numerous sightings.

The DAG has been located at NA2595 with 122, 130, and MRL's. Also, CP's

have been located in the A.D.

Overall most activity is in 201st AD and we can expect most activity there.

Average Overall Evaluation = 58.1

Group: No Guidelines

110
SUMMARY NO. 11

Sir, the general situation has caused no movement of the FEBA/LOC. The

enemy situation has solidified and is beginning to expose itself. He

has anticipated our counter-attack and is preparing for it while also

moving uncommitted or non-influential forces to reinforce the salients

established earlier in NORTHAG.

Most of the reports received during your absence were timely and tended

to confirm the locations of units already plotted and/or identified, or

showed movement to the N and NW, especially from the northern sector.

Also, movement to the west (i.e., to the FEBA) was noted in the

southern sector. Identification of new units was key to the center

sector. Enemy units in our area of responsibility are moving to establish better defensive positions to thwart our counter-attack at the

least cost to themselves.

The enemy has placed emphasis on the center sector by his positioning of

a FROG unit (battery) at this location (NB190090). This of course is a

front asset and will be used once he has identified our assembly/massing

areas, CP's, nuclear storage sites or logistics areas. (Beware that

the FROG carries either a conventional, nuclear, or chem/bio warhead).

Our defense signatures also give away his intention. Though missions have

been recorded across the front, the significance is again the center

sector. He is protecting his own crucial area of defense from observations

and close air strikes.

In summary, he has increased his ability to defend in our sector.

though more so in the center. He retains the capability to employ massstrike weapons and to conduct limited attacks against us.

Average Overall Evaluation = 57.6

Group: No Guidelines

111

.. . . ... .. ........ ........ . ..... . .. .... ... ... . .. . .. . . . .... . .. ... . . ... --. .. . A
SUMMARY NO. 12

Sir, 10th Corps has not met with any unexpected enemy resistance. 23 AD

is opposed by two MRR in the 1st echelon with a possible composite TR/MRR

in the 2nd defensive belt. 201 ACR is opposed by two TR in 1st belt,

probably reinforced by an MRB each, and a TR with one MRB in 2nd Def Belt.

54 mech is opposed by two MRR in 1st Def Belt, one TR on its flank with

12 (NATO) Corps; and one MRR in 2nd defensive belt. Expect one TR and

one MRR as OPFOF ARMY 2nd defensive belt between Alsfeld (NB22) and Fulda

(NB4505).

Expect enemy to continue to defend in place.

No enemy reserves identified moving into area of operations.

Enemy has full air defense complement in each division defensive area.

Have located one FROG BN vic NB2010.

Enemy may be short on supporting field artillery, since we have located

(and presumably shot) several RAG/DAG.

Average Overall Evaluation = 57.3

Group: Guidelines

112
SUMMARY NO. 13

The current tactical situation is as follows. The enemy defends in depth

in the 23rd AR DIV's sector, and 201 ACR sector. The 54th DIV has

experienced less tactical residence to the south. Enemy units encountered

in the 54th DIV sector include 122 MM arty in direct fire role; I MRR

defending vic NA3574. One Bn observed moving east vic NB1990 right on the

201ACR and 54th D11 boundary. Numerous SAM systems were reported in the

54th DIV zone.

201ACR zone reflects the enemy deployed in zone with 3 BNs on line at the

LD/LC. A FROG system was observed at NB1809. The 23 AR DIV has engaged

tank units (unknown size) and 1 MRR in zene along the LD/LC; a 122 MM

RAG at MB9518, 2 regts at NB0422 and MB9225 consist of the 2nd belt of

defense.

A tank BN was spotted moving NNW at NB 2515 and could reinforce the LD/

LC in the 23 or 201ACR zone of action.

The DAG appears to be located at NA2892; additionally BN MM arty is

located vic NB3008.

Enemy is strongest and in depth the 201 and 23 DIV zone. 54 DIV has met

with less maneuver force elements and has observed more combat supt elements.

Average Overall Evaluation = 57.1

Group: Guidelines

113
SUMMARY NO. 14

Our lead elements are engaged along the FEBA in the 23rd and 201st zones.

Intel reports confirm enemy positions at MB910260 (RGT), MB880190 (TK CO),

MB99080 (MRR), MB990190 (122 ARTY), and NA29010 (ARTY Positions all

Calibers) the tank Co at MB880190 is now defending. 45-60 mech vehicles

are moving from MB950100 toward this tank Co. possibly to assist by

relieving pressure. This could indicate initial success of our counteroffensive in the north of 23rd zone. SA8 movement from NB120010 toward

the FEBA was sighted. Also an MTB was reported moving east from NA190900.

This can be interpreted as enemy preparation to secure better defensive

position and counter our CAS. Enemy air defense and arty are located

well forward and are capable of damaging our offensive. Enemy tank

battalion has moved toward FEBA from NA350710. Also, an enemy Bn on

wheels moved west from NA290750. This can be interpreted as a luck of

success for our counter-offensive in 54 mech zone. Two incidents of

enemy vehicles moving east were reported. This could be either routine

movement or as a result of the enemy feeling our offensive pressure in

23rd and 201st zones.

Average Overall Evaluation = 55.9

Group: Guidelines

114
SUMMARY NO. 15

Summary of message traffic -- 0400-0430.

The En appears to be concentrating his efforts in the 23rd AR Div

sector. It is estimated that within 1-2 hrs the 23rd AR will be

opposed by an En force the size of 2 divisions plus. (Explain MVT of

En units into 23rd sector.) This may indicate: 1st - an ATK in this

sector or 2nd - the En expects a C/ATK in this area. Additionally,

westward movement of Bn size elements in the 54th Div's sector has been

reported.

Numerous arty and AD unit locations across the Corps front have been

confirmed. Note that one AD unit was reported moving westward.

Possibly, AD units moving forward all targeted (aimed at) preventing

overflights; e.g., recon.

Note location of En's VHF Jammer (distance from FEBA) located out of

* the Corps sector.

Average Overall Evaluation = 51.9

Group: Guidelines

115
SUMMARY NO. 16

All source information received over the last few hours provides a mixed

picture of static defense and shifts of maneuver units and artillery

to support a possible counter-attack with a supporting attack potentially

aided with the capability of a forward deployed FROG missile unit.

Starting up in the 23rd Div sector we see almost a doctrinal disposition

of an MRR in the division southern boundary with the 201st whose northern

boundary we see a correlating buildup with a possible tank regt. This

places the center of a possible break thru attack vic MB9950 where

engagements have already begun. These units are supported by normal

artillery but there is an added threat with a FROG unit vic NB1505

covering ADA units in the area of the FROGs.

In the south, t 51th Div appear to be facing a support artillery

on its soutirn boindary with the 12th Corps. Such an attack appears

to be heavily supported by massed artillery directly opposite the 54th.

Average Overall Evaluation = 48.3

Group: No Guidelines
SUMMARY NO. 17

1) Enemy positions, size and type of units depicted prior to the attack

have been confirmed as the results of engagements all along the Corps

front.

2) Locations of unit CP's have been confirmed in the following locations:

Tk Bn CP NB040020; Tk NB110150 INME CP NB055149.

3) Enemy resistance is strongest in the 23rd Div's sector.

4) Tank and mech units in the 54th Div and 201st ACR have been observed

moving to the west and northwest toward the 23rd Div sector.

5) The enemy will continue to defend, and are moving tank and mech units

into position for a counter ATK.

Average Overall Evaluation = 47.9

Group: Guidelines

117
SUMMARY NO. 18

Since the kick off of the operation, a number of previously located

enemy units have been confirmed and new one identified along the FEBA.

There is a general movement of some Bn and Co size units to the NW

along the FEBA. 'hile some deeper units seem to be moving west to fill

the void.

A number of rgmt size units have been identified indicating the approximate trace of the second defensive belt along the FEBA. Movement of antiaircraft missiles have been noted toward the FEBA. This could be an

attempt to deny us the use of overflight to gain intelligence or to

cover a shift in enemy forces or camouflage a withdrawal as indicated

by eastward movement of forces in Bn strength vicinity of NA1990.

Individual events are posted on the intell situation map and coded to

correspond to the ESD messages received since 0400.

Average Overall Evaluation 47.3

Group: Guidelines

118

A
SUMMARY NO. 19

There has been sporadic activity along the Corps front from 0400 and 0430

hrs today. The attack was launched in the 201 ACR sector at 0400, causing

the Tank Battalions at MBOOOO and MB0100 to begin to delay East. The 23rd

Div is encountering heavy resistance in the North, and it appears that

enemy trains in our center sector are moving NNE, possibly to reinforce

units in the 23rd Div sector. Elements of the DAG have been located in

our southern sector at NA350790 in the 54th Div zone. There has been

increased activity in this area as well, and it appears that the enemy

plans to reinforce or counter attack in this area, while delaying in the

center. Firing batteries of 130, 152, and 122 have been detected relocating

in the North and South. Two tank battalions have been seen advancing

west in the 54th Div sector and SA6s and SA8 missiles are being moved

toward in both the 23rd and 54th Div sectors. We can conclude, therefore,

that the enemy is planning for possible offensive actions against the 23rd

and 54th Divs while delaying in the 201 ACR sector.

Average Overall Evaluation = 46.7

Group: No Guidelines

119
SUMMARY NO. 20

During my watch the enemy has continued to advance gradually as shown

by the current location on the sit map.

The most potentially significant report was the SLAR report of a FROG

(NB1909).

Other significant reports include:

- a probable RAG at NA2991

- a 130MM Batry at NB3008

I'd like you to note the forward deployment of this arty, which, when

coupled with the maneuver unit deployment changes suggest the enemy

will shortly (probably at first light) launch an attack.

Significant maneuver unit reports include:

- a U/I En Regt (MB9126)

- En Tank Bns at (NB2910; 0402)

- En MRB's at (NB2146) (NB055149) (NB1115)

Other items of interest include the close-in presence of an SA6 (NA2481).

A report of trucks moving east, empty at (NB3002) (Prob resupply).

An anonymous report of a tank Co, defending, as of 0400 at MB8819.

Average Overall Evaluation = 45.6

Group: No Guidelines

120
SUMMARY NO. 21

We are currently opposed by elmts of 3 MRD; 2 TK, all on 1st Ech; and

one TK in 2nd Echl. There is one T and one RR div opposing the 23

and 201 and one MRD opposing the 54th. The other TD is in a pos to

exploit success in either 23 or 201 area. The En is preparing to ATK

with his main effort being in the north and a spotting ATK in the

south. Currently elmts of 21 and 201st are in contact and other EN

units are moving westerly. They have moved their arty up forward,

especially the 130 MM and have positioned SA6's closer to the FEBA

than normal. A large amount of trucks have been seen going east from

vic 0220 and 0320 and is probably supply TRKS returning to the rear for

more ammo. By going N the EN will avoid the Frankfurt mess and will

facilitate his exploiting other success to the North of the 23rd sector

Average Overall Evaluation = 44.3

Group: Guidelines

121 i
SUMMARY NO. 22

General The Corps is opposed by elements of at least 4 MRRs at present.

The situation is very fluid. In the Northern Corps sector there is solid

evidence of a move to the NNW by many track vehicles (and some wheels)

which indicates an enemy move to reinforce their successes in the Northag

area. Remaining units in the Corps northern area appear to be preparing

to delay:

Units in the Corps center sector appear to be preparing to defend although

their capability to do so seems slight. Additionally, there is significant

ADA hardware and the possibility of an airborne assault by the eneiy

seems most likely in this sector.

In the Southern Corps sector there is strong evidence of the enemy moving

forward with tanks and arty to the west. This suggests either an attack

in this area or a buildup for a strong defense. Basea on info reporting

trucks moving to the east approx 20 Ks behind LD/LC, I feel that this

is a feint operation (but it does appear to be strongest area in Cn-,s).

Recommend priority attack in the North W/ support ATK in center.

Average Overall Evaluation 42.9

Group: Guidelines

122
SUMMARY NO. 23

Lead elements of the 23rd AD have made contact along their front. Two

BN's positions, one being an MRR, have been located at MB990190 and

MB990080 respectively. 54th Div Arty has located enemy arty positions

vicinity coordinates NA 290910.

An enemy tank Bn has detected moving NA towards 23rd AD sector vic

NB290100.

Aerial visual recon reports another tank battalion moving W vic NA350710

generally parallel to the Corps southern boundary.

A FROG battery has been located vic NB190090; unit was in position, unknown if prepared or able to fire.

SAM sites have been reported in various locations.

Type WPN Size unit Position Status

SA8 Battery NB120010 Moving W

SA8 Battery MB960210 Static

SA8 Battery NA210880 Static-prepared

to fire

SA6 Battery NA240810 Unknown

SLAR reports indicate enemy column moving to the East from NA1909

in Bn strength.

A large number of tracked vehicles have been detected by radar communications moving NNW on the roads vic MB905100 in 23rd AD sector.

(continued)

123
SUMARY NO. 23 (Continued)

Enemy CP locations have been identified at:

Size Unit Location

Regt MB910260

Regt NA310820

Tank Bn NB040020

Enemy Brty units have been reported at:

Type Location

DAG, 122MM NA350790

DAG, 130MM NB300080

An enemy En has been located vic coord NB210060.

VHF jammers have been located at NA490820.

Average Overall Evaluation = 73.9

Group: No Guidelines

124
SUMMARY NO. 24

1) Confirmed FA locations in our zone depicted on map showing 5 FA

batteries, 1 Frog Bn, 1 SA8 site, and a DAG.

2) One jammer located at NA490820.

3) In the 54 area we have a tank Bn moving to FEBA and a Bn of wheel

vehicles also moving to the west.

4) In 201 ACR is still in contact with 2 TK Bns and a TK Bn moving to

contact. A mech Bn and a TK Bn is on the move NW.

5) In the 23 area is a tank Bn and TK company in contact, and a mech

unit moving NW along the FEBA. A mech regt and 2 TK Bns have been

located.

6) Two large wheel convoys are moving NW at NB150200 and NB300020.

Trucks appear to be empty.

Average Overall Evaluation = 40.0

Group: Guidelines

125
1

SUMmARy NO. 25

The enemy situation is as you can see on the map before you. Significant

developments within the past hour are:

1) Location of possible DAG vic NBOO8

2) Location of FROG Btry vic NA1909.

3) MR Bn moving NW vic NA 1215.

4) Tank Bn moving NE vic NA2910.

5) Several AD units have been located along the FEBA.

6) Several artillery units have been located along the FEBA.

Summary:

The two Bns reported moving may intend to link up vic Alsfeld and form

a counter attack force or to provide security of Aisfeld.

The additional AD units would indicate the enemy is beefing up his air

defense to oppose increased air attacks on our part.

Average Overall Evaluation 39.0

Group: No Guidelines

126
SUMMARY NO. 26

Messages received indicate enemy is continuing to defend. Most significant

movement/maneuver is in 23rd Div sector with new reports of contact with

lead elements. Maneuver in 201st and 54th zones not reported - contact

not reported. Absence of contact may imply economy of force measure

with main defense in another part of Corps zone.

Movement to NW of BN-CO, size unit in 23rd Div sector suggests possible

C-ATK or reinforcement in area. Location of several Bn size units and arty

units to indicate a DAG will assist in templating the enemy.

Significant also is the presence of a FROG Btry well forward!

Significant enemy sightings include:

BN's located - NB050010

NA150950

NA190900

Enemy movement - MB950100

Average Overall Evaluation = 36.3

Group: No Guidelines

127

i . ... .. ....... .
SUMMARY NO. 27

The information presented is based on 30 messages which have been

received. Basically, at this time, the situation remains relatively

stable or as expected in the very early stages of the attack. Messages

have been received which are confirming enemy dispositions which have

already been presented, in part G-2 updates. The situation appears to be

developing which will permit a more indepth analysis probably within the

next hour. Of significance is the location of 31 enemy artillery positions

by one of the divisions. The origin of the message is being determined

and all locations should be available within the next 30 minutes. SA6

and 8 batteries have been sighted in the vicinity of the FEBA which will

effect close air support in the Corps sector. As stated earlier, data will

continue to be analyzed and a clearer picture presented probably within

one hour. At this time there is no indication of several echelon forces

being moved or committed.

Average Overall Evaluation = 36.0

Group: Guidelines

128

* ,
SUMMARY NO. 28

Primary movement in 201st ACR and 23 AD sectors appears to be to the NNW,

which tends to confirm reports of enemy attempts to exploit success in

the North. Significant reports supporting this possibility: MB950100

45-60 mech vehicles NNW at 15 MPH, UNK BN NB290100 NW at 20 MPH. Movement in the 54th Div sector appears to be to the west, possibly to reinforce forward deployed units: Tank Bn NA350710 moving west at 20 MPH,

Bn moving west at 10-15 MPH vic NA290750. There have been several reports

of SA8s and SA6s moving or located forward in our position area. The

pace of activity seems to be increasing in the 54th Div and southern

201 ACR sectors. There have been numerous reports confirming previously

reported enemy units.

Average Overall Evaluation = 33.3

Group: No Guidelines

129
SUMKARY NO. 29

Sir, during your absense the following significant acty occurred:

FROG Bn LOC NB1909

Regt CP LOC MB9126

Regt OP LOC NA3182

BN CP LOC NB0514

BN CP LOC NB0402

DAG LOC NB9919

DAG LOC NB3007

DAG LOC NB2991

DAG LOC NB3579

En has been observed moving air def wpns fwd (SA6 and SA8).

There has been enemy contact in the 23rd armor and 201st ACR zones. No

report of enemy arty in 54th mech zone.

An enemy jammer was ]oc just south of the Corps zone. 12 NATO Corps was

informed.

It appears the enemy is preparing to defend in place and is shifting

combat forces to the north as shown by the movement of tank forces (Bn

in rpt #18) and mech forces (45-60 veh in rpt #6).

Average Overall Evaluation 32.4

Group: No Guidelines

130
SUMMARY NO. 30

Enemy forces consisting of 6 TK Divisions and 3 MR Divisions of the 1st

Zapadnian front conduct resupply operations in preparation to continue

the attack. We have begun to identify elements of the Divisional 1st

echelons along the 10th Corps front.

Of particular significance is the apparent resupply of forward units

and rearward movement of resupply vehicles. The forward movement of

enemy artillery units (probably divisional artillery groups) to locations

vic NB3010, NA2900, and NA3577, and the location of a FROG unit vic

NB1908 are particularly significant. ADA elements well forward in 54th

Mech Div area, the position of VHF jammers just S. of the 10th Corps

boundary and the positioning of BN sized elements on breakthrough

frontages of 1 KM indicate a possible breakthrough attempt in the 54th

Mech Div area, possibly along the 10th Corps/12 NATO Corps boundaries.

U

Average Overall Evaluation = 31.9

Group: No Guidelines

131
SUMMARY NO. 31

The total intel reports indicate there is considerable movement west or;

the right side of the FEBA with at least 2 Divs facing the 54th Div.

Two DAG's are in position to support an attack by those 2 Div's. At

least one Bn sized unit has been noted moving west.

The enemy facing the 201st in our center appear to be withdrawing and

avoiding engagement. A FROG unit has been noted with a DAG to its rear.

There is definite indication of movement on our left front with at least

one tank Co. defending. Movement along the FEBA noted thus far has been

NNW. Army has been located in this area in position to support an attack.

It is possible that a pincher movement is contemplatable by the enemy

closing on our center (the 201st).

Average Overall Evaluation = 29.3

Group: No Guidelines

132
SUMMARY NO. 32

There has been no significant change in enemy disposition since the last

update. He continues to attack and is in contact with our forces along

the FEBA.

It appears as if some of his second echelon forces are pulling out and

moving NW towards the Hanover salient, but his 1st echelon is still

attempting to advance.

Significant activities/reports since the last update include:

1) MRR located vic MB990080.

2) FA unit (size UNK) located MB990193.

3) 122MM, 130MM, 152MM and 122MM MRL located NA290910.

4) Regt CP (unit UNK) located MB910260.

5) DAG located NA350790.

6) SA8 battery moving west vic NB120010.

7) EN Rgt located NA310820.

8) EN Rgt located NB030220.

Average Overall Evaluation 27.4

Group: No Guidelines

133
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I UISA ijUAkTERMASIEH SCHOOL DIREtORIUATE UF IRAININO UEVFIOPMENTS

I US CujAST UUANLI ACAOEMY/

I USA iRANSPORTAIO'. SCHOOL UiRFLIORATE OF TRAINING 4 DOCTRINE

I USA INFANTRY SLHOUL LIURAHY /

I USA INFANTRY SCHUDL ATTN: ATSH-I-V

I US AHMY INFANTRY SCHOOL ATTN: ATSH-CJ

I IUSA INFANTRY SCHOU)L ATTN: A15H-UOI-LRU

I USA INFANTRY SCHOL. AI1N: Alii-LV

I USA mP + CHEM SCH/TNO CEN + FT. MCCLELLAN ATTN: ATZN-PTS

I USA r4P + CHEM SCH/TNG CEN + FT. MCLLEL..LAN DIR. COM8AT DEVELOPMENT

I USA hIP + CHEM SCH-/TNb, CEN + FT. MCCLELLAN DIR. TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

I USA M4P # CHEM SCH/TNUj CLN + FT. MCLLEL.LAN ATTN: ATZN-,mP-ACE

I UJSA INSTITUTE. OF ADMINISTRATION ATTN: RESIDENT TRAINING MANA6EMENT

I USA i-IELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL MOPHIS SWETT LIdRARY

I USA iNSTITuTE. OF AUMINISTHATIUj ALADEMIC LIBRARY

I USA wAR COLLEGE ATTN: LIBRARY

I USA o-NGINEER SLHUDL LIBRARY ANOL LLARI~INC, RESOURCES CFNITER

I USA mRMOR SCHOOL (OSARMS) ATTN: LIBRAHY

I ORGA.'dZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CFN + SCrI ATTN: LI6RARIAN

1 US AitMY INTELL1EJCE CENTER # SCHOOL ATTN: ATSI-TD

I US AWMY INTELLhELJCE CENTER + SCHOOL ATTN: ATSI-RM-M

I US ANMY INTELLI6ENCE CENTER + 5LHOUL ATTN: ATSI-TU-Ln

I US AWMY INTELL16EJCE CENTER # SCHOOL ATTN: ATSI-CU-CS-C

1 US ANMY INTELLIGEN4CE CENTtW + SLHOUL ATTN: ATSI-DT-SF-IM

I DEPAwTMENT OF IHE AIR PORCE AIH UNIVERSITY LIORAPY (ATC)

I HO TWADOC TRAININ6( DEVLOPMENT INSTITUTE

2 BRITISH EMRASSY 4PITISm UEFENCE STAFF

2 CANAI)IAN JOINT STAFF

I COLS (W) LIBRARY

I FRENCHM ARMY ATTAC4E

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IAIJiTwIAN EMHASS)Y DEFENSE.p MILl IARY A'JL) AIR ATTACHE

3 CA'AIAN UFFENLE LIAISUN STIAPF ATTN: COIINSELLOR, uEFFNcE R ANUD

I OYAi NETHFRLANIJS EMbjASSY MILIFAHY ATTACHIE

ICANJAAAN t OfCES bASE CORNWALLIS ATTN: PFRSONNEL SE.LLCTION ~? CA14AiIAN FORCEbS V-ESONNLL APPL H!)Ch UNILT

I ARM'Y PERSONNEL RESEARCH L )[AtL1SHMkNT

I NEIIHi.LANDS Em4dMSSY (J11ILE OF Ift AIR ATTACHE

6 Llt3RiaNY OF CO(,LSS EXCIMNL ANU bIFI DlV

I DEIFEr4SL TECHNICAL INFON,4AIIUN CLN ATTN: n)TIL-UDA-2

140l L14AHY OF~ CONURESS UNIT UUCU,,ALNT5 EXPEOITING PHOJECT

1 US GoVERNMUNT PINTING uF(L LItiHARY, ?U6LIC UOCUMENTS nEIVAPTMLNT

I US GUtVERNMFNT PHI'4T!N6 OIFC LIHHAWY AND0 STATUTORY, LIHi uIV (SLL)

I THE ARMY LIBRARY ATTN: AkMY SFULIIEs SLC

3 WOYAl ARMY EDUCATIONAL LORPS CNIWL ARMY SCHOOL OF TPAINING !SUPPOwI

NUMHER tuF ADDRESSLES 199

TOTAL NtMbER OF COPIES 379

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