SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4613-16T1

DARRAN CASSAR, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY RACING 

COMMISSION,

Respondent-Respondent.

___________________________

Submitted September 26, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Accurso and Moynihan.

On appeal from the New Jersey Racing Commission, 

Docket No. NJRC-16-H-14-MD.

Arleo & Donohue, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

(Timothy M. Donohue, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; George N. Cohen, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 31, 2018
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Appellant Darran Cassar appeals from a final decision of the New Jersey 

Racing Commission (Commission) suspending his license as a Standardbred 

trainer for one year, "barring him from all grounds subject to the Commission's 

jurisdiction," and imposing a $1000 fine after a post-race urine sample from a 

horse he trained tested positive for morphine and hydromorphone.

1

 The 

Commission adopted the administrative law judge's (ALJ's) conclusion that 

appellant violated regulations imposing liability on trainers who fail to guard 

any horse with which they are "charged with the custody, care and responsibility 

. . . against the administration of any drug or substances foreign to the natural 

horse," N.J.A.C. 13:71-23.6, and fail "to protect the integrity of horse racing 

[and] guard the health of the horse," N.J.A.C. 13:71-23.1(a). Appellant was also 

found to be in violation of the regulation prohibiting conduct deemed

detrimental to harness racing, N.J.A.C. 13:71-7.29(a)(13). He argues the 

Commission's penalty was arbitrary and capricious in that the Commission

"inexplicably eschew[ed] reliance upon the same [Association of Racing 

Commissioners International (ARCI)] guidelines that it admittedly consulted" 

before imposing the penalty – guidelines appellant contends should have been 

 

1 The Commission's decision also disqualified the horse, which had finished 

first, and redistributed the purse.
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considered by the Commission – and that the penalty was "grossly 

disproportionate" to another recently imposed for a similar offense. The 

Commission acted within its authority in determining the penalty. 

Consequently, we affirm.

The Commission found that both morphine and hydromorphone were 

listed in the ARCI Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances

and Recommended Penalties as Class 1 drugs. It accepted the ALJ's findings

that: hydromorphone found in appellant's horse was a metabolite of morphine;

appellant failed "to protect the horse from the administration of morphine" and 

"to protect the integrity of the race and . . . to guard the health of the horse"; and

appellant's conduct was detrimental to the sport. It, however, rejected the ALJ's 

penalty, determining the ALJ's reduction of the one-year suspension and $1000 

fine imposed by the Commission's Board of Judges to a fifteen-day suspension 

and $500 fine was based on the penalties set forth in the ARCI guidelines for 

the "unintentional administration of morphine."

In determining its penalty, the Commission adverted to the testimony of 

John Tomasello – "a racing official [employed by the Commission serving] in 

the capacity of presiding judge at the Meadowlands Race Track" – during

proceedings before the ALJ, "regarding the Commission's procedure for 
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imposing penalties and the factors that must be considered and weighed." The 

Commission noted Tomasello's acknowledgement that the Board of Judges 

consulted the ARCI guidelines "regarding its classification of drugs and 

recommended penalties" but found Tomasello clearly stated that the 

"Commission has not adopted the ARCI [g]uidelines and those penalty 

recommendations are used solely as guidelines." The Commission accepted

Tomasello's testimony, including his opinion "that the appropriate penalty for 

this morphine positive, where there is no indication that the drug was 

intentionally administered, is a [one-year] suspension and $1[]000 fine."

2

In considering appellant's challenge to the penalty imposed by the 

Commission, we heed our Supreme Court's recent iteration of our standard of 

review:

Traditionally, we give substantial deference to an 

agency’s imposition of a disciplinary sanction, based 

on its “expertise and superior knowledge of a particular 

field.” In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28. “In light of the 

deference owed to such determinations, when 

reviewing administrative sanctions, ‘the test . . . is 

whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the 

offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be 

 

2 Although the Commission described Tomasello's proposed penalty as one for 

a "morphine positive," Tomasello's sanction was based on the finding that 

morphine and hydromorphone were administered to the horse. The ALJ's 

penalty was based on the administration of morphine alone, after finding 

hydromorphone was present as a metabolite of morphine.
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shocking to one’s sense of fairness.’” Id. at 28-29

(quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). That 

standard gives the agency a wide berth of discretion. 

Our task is not to substitute our judgment for that of the 

agency, but rather to stay our hand even if we would 

have reached a different result. Ibid. Only a patently 

unreasonable sanction would call for this Court’s 

intervention.

[In re Hendrickson, __ N.J. __, __ (2018) (slip at 16-

17) (alteration in original).]

The Court previously recognized that the Legislature granted the 

Commission 

full regulatory power over horse racing in this state. 

State v. Dolce, 178 N.J. Super. 275, 285 (App. Div.

1981); N.J.S.A. 5:5-22 to -109. In particular, the 

Racing Commission is empowered to prescribe the 

rules, regulations, and conditions under which all horse 

races are conducted, N.J.S.A. 5:5-30, and to regulate 

the licensing of those connected with horse racing, 

N.J.S.A. 5:5-33. Furthermore, the State has a vital 

interest in maintaining the integrity of the horse-racing 

industry. Dolce, N.J. Super. at 284. Towards that end, 

N.J.S.A. 5:5-33 imposes on the Racing Commission a 

statutory obligation "to revoke or refuse to issue a 

license if in the opinion of the Commission the 

revocation or refusal to issue such license is in the 

public interest."

[Delguidice v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79, 90 

(1985).] 

To that end, the regulatory scheme affords the Commission broad discretion in 

meting out penalties for violations including:
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1. Denial, revocation or suspension of license;

2. Monetary fines not exceeding $ 50,000 for each 

violation. The steward and board of judges may not 

impose directly a fine in excess of $ 5,000.

3. Suspension from one or more activities at one or 

more tracks;

4. Expulsion from racing in New Jersey;

5. Forfeiture of purse;

6. In addition to the foregoing, the Commission may 

impose as a condition to licensing such conditions as it 

shall deem appropriate to secure compliance with the 

rules, regulations and directives of the Commission.

[N.J.A.C. 13:71-2.3(a).]

Although the Commission acknowledged its adoption of the ARCI 

guidelines pertaining to enhanced-penalty provisions for repeat offenders, 

N.J.A.C. 13:71-23.7(c), and threshold levels for prohibited controlled 

therapeutic medications, N.J.A.C. 13:71-23.1(b)(14), it has not adopted the 

ARCI guidelines pertaining to penalties for first-time morphine positives. Its 

decision to decline adoption of those penalty provisions because it "does not 

agree with many of the recommended penalties" and to treat the guidelines only 

as "a useful tool" is within the prerogative granted the Commission by the 

Legislature. See N.J. Racing Comm'n v. Elliot, 290 N.J. Super. 140, 146 (App. 
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Div. 1996) (holding "with the principles of 'trainer responsibility' and 'no 

medication' clearly established in law, it is well within the authority and 

discretion of the Commission to impose severe sanctions for violations of those 

principles" it saw as "especially dire").

We do not agree with appellant's argument that the Commission was 

required to abide by or consult the ARCI guidelines because Tomasello 

referenced them when he testified why he believed a one-year suspension was 

appropriate.3 The Commission was vested with the authority to determine the 

penalty; it was not bound by Tomasello's or the ALJ's opinion regarding the 

sanction. N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6(b).

The Commission conceded there was no evidence the morphine was 

intentionally administered to the horse. It concluded, however, that appellant 

did not "protect the horse under his care" and that the ALJ's penalty was 

inappropriate where the presence of morphine, a Class 1 drug, was detected. 

 

3

 The ARCI guidelines in effect at the time of appellant's violation recommended 

a Class B penalty for morphine and a more severe Class A penalty for 

hydromorphone, although both were Class 1 drugs. ARCI amended its 

guidelines subsequent to the violation but prior to the hearings to change the 

penalty classification for morphine to Class A. The ALJ appears to have relied 

on the unamended ARCI guidelines. We need not consider which of those 

guidelines should have been considered because the Commission declined to 

adopt either version. 
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Considering the Legislature's broad grant of power to the Commission, N.J.S.A. 

5:5-22, and the "intent of [the administrative] rules to protect the integrity of 

horse racing, to guard the health of the horse, and to safeguard the interests of 

the public and racing participants through the prohibition and/or control of all 

drugs and/or substances foreign to the natural horse," N.J.A.C. 13:71-23.1(a), 

we do not conclude the imposition of a one-year suspension and $1000 fine to 

be "so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be 

shocking to one’s sense of fairness." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28-29. The 

balance of appellant's argument regarding the disproportionality of the penalty 

to others imposed is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.