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MARK HEINONEN v. WALLACE I. GUPTON ET AL.

(AC 38414)

Sheldon, Keller and Prescott, Js.

Argued January 13—officially released May 9, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Truglia, J.)

Mark Heinonen, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Leslie A. Link, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented plaintiff, Mark

Heinonen, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

dismissing this action alleging fraud on the part of the

defendants, Wallace I. Gupton and Roberta S. Douglas,

in connection with their purchase of property located

in the town of Sherman. The dispositive claim in this

appeal is whether the court improperly dismissed this

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to his

lack of standing.1 We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On February 6, 2015, the plaintiff

filed a complaint alleging that in January, 2012, the

defendants illegally purchased property located at 138

Rt. 37 South in Sherman (premises) ‘‘without the owners’ knowledge and for a fraction of its real value.’’ In

paragraph three of his complaint, he alleged that in

October, 2007, he transferred his interest in the premises to his three children by means of a trustinstrument.2

In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff requested the sum

of $3,000,000 to compensate him for the ‘‘agony he has

suffered as a result of the defendants’ fraud—cruel and

illegal dealings.’’

On March 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to

dismiss this action and an accompanying memorandum

of law on the ground that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendants argued

that the plaintiff, as a prior owner of the premises,

lacked standing to prosecute a claim that he was

defrauded as the rightful owner of the property. On

April 9, 2015, the plaintiff, by means of a single filing,

objected to the motion to dismiss and moved for summary judgment in his favor.3 The court heard argument

on the defendants’ motion to dismiss on April 27, 2015.

In its decision granting the motion to dismiss, the

court found in relevant part: ‘‘In this action, the plaintiff

. . . claims compensatory damages for fraudulent

actions allegedly committed by the defendants when

they purchased [the premises].4 The plaintiff claims that

in January of 2012, the defendants illegally purchased

the premises ‘without the owner’s knowledge and for

a fraction of its real value.’ The defendants argue in

support of their motion that it is undisputed (and admitted in the plaintiff’s complaint) that he no longer owns

any interestin the premises and,therefore, has no standing to bring the present suit. In response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has filed a

combined objection to the motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment5

. . . essentially

asserting that the manner in which the defendants came

into ownership of the premises was tainted by illegality. . . .

‘‘After reviewing the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint and the briefs of the parties, the court is satisfied
and agrees with the defendants that the plaintiff has

failed to allege sufficient facts to invoke the court’s

jurisdiction. The record indicates that the plaintiff is

not the current owner of the premises which are the

subject of this action, had no interest in the premises

at the time of conveyance to the defendants, or any

time thereafter, and has not owned any interest in the

premises since October of 2007.’’ (Footnotes added.)

The court rendered a judgment of dismissal on May

12, 2016, after concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action because he was not the owner

of the premises and, therefore, was not an aggrieved

party with respect to the subject matter of his complaint. On May 27, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for

clarification, articulation, and reargument, which the

court denied on June 1, 2015. This appeal followed.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before we address the merits of the plaintiff’s claim,

we first set forth the standard of review. ‘‘The proper

procedural vehicle for disputing a party’s standing is a

motion to dismiss.’’ D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610,

615 n.6, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). ‘‘A motion to dismiss . . .

properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially

asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law

and fact state a cause of action that should be heard

by the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 627, 941 A.2d 266

(2008). ‘‘[O]ur review of the trial court’s ultimate legal

conclusion and resulting [granting] of the motion to

dismiss will be de novo. . . . When a . . . court

decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial

motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of

the complaint in their most favorable light . . . . In

this regard, a court must take the facts to be those

alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a

manner most favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion

to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded,

invokes the existing record and must be decided upon

that alone.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 122 Conn. App. 438,

442–43, 998 A.2d 838 (2010), rev’d on other grounds,

305 Conn. 523, 46 A.3d 102 (2012). ‘‘Any claim of lack

of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be

waived; and whenever it is found after suggestion of

the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction

of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss

the action.’’ Practice Book § 10-33. ‘‘Whenever the

absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the

court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and

the matter passed upon before it can move one further

step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the

exercise of jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E.,

Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996).
In the present case, the defendants’ motion to dismiss

was premised on the plaintiff’s lack of standing. ‘‘If a

party is found to lack standing, the court is without

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Because

standing implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing. A trial court’s determination of whether a plaintiff

lacks standing is a conclusion of law that is subject

to plenary review on appeal. We conduct that plenary

review, however, in light of the trial court’s findings of

fact, which we will not overturn unless they are clearly

erroneous. . . . In undertaking this review, we are

mindful of the well established notion that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction,

every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be

indulged. . . . This involves a two part function: where

the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we

must determine whether they are legally and logically

correct and whether they find support in the facts set

out in the memorandum of decision; where the factual

basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must

determine whetherthe facts set out in the memorandum

of decision are supported by the evidence or whether,

in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole

record, those facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Success,

Inc. v. Curcio, 160 Conn. App. 153, 162–63, 124 A.3d

563, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 952, 125 A.3d 531 (2015).

‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party

claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is

classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for

determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a

well-settled twofold determination: first, the party

claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate

a specific personal and legal interest in the subject

matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general

interest . . . . Second, the party claiming

aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specifically

and injuriously affected by the decision. . . .

Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as

distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland,

296 Conn. 186, 207, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).

‘‘Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep

aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to

ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits

brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that

judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others

are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and

vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are

ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant

makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered
or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative

capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of

concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . . The

requirement of directness between the injuries claimed

by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also

is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus

on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert

the claim at issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

PNC Bank, N.A. v. Kelepecz, 289 Conn. 692, 705, 960

A.2d 563 (2008).

In his complaint, the plaintiff admitted that he had

not possessed any ownership interest in the premises

since October, 2007, and that the sale that he alleges

was fraudulent and illegal took place in 2012. Although

the plaintiff challenges the legality of the sale of the

premises to the defendants, it is undisputed factually

that he relinquished any interest, whether legal or equitable in nature, to the premises when he transferred

his interest to the trust he created for the benefit of

his children.6 After thoroughly reviewing the record, we

agree with the court that the plaintiff, in his individual

capacity, was not entitled to set the machinery of the

court in operation to obtain redress for an injury he

claims to have suffered as a result of an alleged fraudulent transfer of the premises. The plaintiff did not hold

an ownership interest, whether legal or equitable in

nature, in the premises at the time he filed the complaint—and indeed had held no such interest since 2007.

The sale occurred in 2012. An ‘‘owner’’ is ‘‘[o]ne who

has the right to possess, use, and convey something; a

person in whom one or more interests are vested,’’ and

‘‘ownership’’ means ‘‘[t]he bundle of rights allowing one

to use, manage, and enjoy property, including the right

to convey it to others.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.

2009). If the plaintiff intended to assert a claim to protect an allegedly fraudulent deprivation of the interest

of the children’s trust in the premises, such a claim, if

viable, should have been brought by the trustee.7

‘‘The

trustee is the proper person to bring an action against

anyone who wrongfully interferes with the interests of

a trust.’’ Naier v. Beckenstein, 131 Conn. App. 638, 646,

27 A.3d 104, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 910, 32 A.3d 963

(2011). The court’s conclusion that the plaintiff lacked

standing is legally correct and wholly supported by facts

that the plaintiff fully admitted.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 Because our decision on the issue of subject matterjurisdiction is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the plaintiff’s other four claims,

which essentially allege error with respect to the court’s refusal to consider

his case on the merits.

2 The plaintiff attached to his combined objection to the motion to dismiss

and motion for summary judgment a copy of the trust instrument and the

probate court decree, dated December 28, 2011, Landgrebe, J., accepting

and approving it. The probate court decree references the court’s awareness

of both ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] stated . . . declination to receive . . . [his interest

in the premises] and [the plaintiff’s recognition of] the transfer of his interest

[in the premises] to his children by way of his described irrevocable trust
agreement to the Court . . . .’’

3 Attached to this filing are ten exhibits comprised of the trust instrument,

excerpts from legal decisions and treatises, and various other documents,

without any accompanying analysis. Exhibit eight is a copy of the contract

of sale for the premises, executed by the defendants and Arthur Scott, the

executor of the estate of the plaintiff’s mother.

4

‘‘This action is one of a long line of cases brought by the plaintiff to

contest the disposition by the New Fairfield/Sherman Probate Court of the

assets of the estate of Barbara H. Scott, the [plaintiff’s] late mother, who

died on December 1, 2006. The principal asset of her estate [was the premises] . . . .

‘‘The plaintiff did attach what purports to be two decrees of the Housatonic

Regional Probate Court . . . . The first is a decree for sale of the [premises]

in which it was expressly noted that ‘the will of the said deceased (Scott)

does not prohibit the sale or mortgage of said property.’ ’’ Heinonen v.

Landgrebe, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-12-

5009022-S (January 15, 2014), appeal dismissed, Appellate Court, Docket

No. 36860 (July 9, 2014), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 922, 100 A.3d 853 (2014).

5 The court, having found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the

plaintiff’s lack of standing, did not consider his motion for summary

judgment.

6 The plaintiff questions the validity of the probate of his mother’s will

by asserting that the defendants, along with certain lawyers and relatives

of the decedent, illegally participated in the perpetration of a fraud upon

the rightful heirs of the estate, which commenced with a redrafting of her

will shortly before she died. The defendants purchased the premises from

the estate in a sale that was approved by the probate court. Although the

plaintiff claims to be seeking to protect his children’s interests, during

argument before the trial court, he referred to himself as the owner of both

the premises and the trust, and his prayer for relief seeks only compensation

for himself.

7 To the extent that the plaintiff is the trustee, he did not bring his action

in that capacity.