# FILED
April 22, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE FEBRUARY 1997 SESSION

CARL ED LEMING, ) ) Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9603-CC-00119

) ) Bledsoe County v. ) ) Honorable Thomas W. Graham, Judge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Habeas Corpus) JAMES A. BOWLEN, Warden, ) ) Appellees. ) For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Carl Ed Leming, Pro Se John Knox Walkup STSRCF Rt. 4, Box 600 Attorney General of Tennessee Pikeville, TN 37367 and Elizabeth T. Ryan Assistant Attorney Gener al of Tennessee 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 James Michael Taylor District Attorney General and James W. Pope, III Assistant District A

ttorney General 265 Third Avenue, Suite 300 Dayton, TN 37321

OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED Joseph M. Tipton Judge2 O P I N I O N
The petitioner, Carl Ed Leming , appeals as of right from the di smissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief by the Bledsoe County Circuit Court for failur

e to state grounds justifyi ng the issuance of a wri t of habeas corpus. The petitioner i s in the custody of the Department of Corr ection serving an effectiv e sentence of forty-three years for his 1983 convi ctions of two counts of agg ravated rape and one count of gr and larceny. The convict ions were based upon the peti tioner entering guilty pleas. The petitioner was sentenced on December 13, 1983, as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of forty y ears for each aggravat ed rape conviction to be s erved consecutively to a t hree-year sentence for the g rand larceny convi ction. On appeal, the petitioner essentially

contends that the trial cour t erred by dismissing

his petition for habeas corpus relief wit hout appointing counsel or c onducting an evidentiar y hearing because he has served the mini mum term required for release eligibility.

In his pro se petition, the petitioner asserts that he is being illegally restrained of his liberty because the judgment orders for his convictions stat

e that he would be eligible for release status upon serving thirty percent of his sentences. He claims that he entered the gui lty pleas based upon his und erstanding that he woul d be released after the servic e of thirty percent of his sen tences. He contends that he should be released because he has fully complied with t he criteria of his plea agreement.

Although the plea agreement i s not included in the recor d, we conclude that the petitioner is not enti tled to habeas corpus relief. Challenges regarding the involuntariness of a gui lty plea do not provi de a basis for habeas corpus rel ief because3

the judgment is merely voidable. Habeas corpus relief from a criminal case incarceration is only available in Tennessee when a petitioner’s conviction is void or the sentence has expired. See Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). Moreover, parole is a privilege and not a r ight. T.C.A. § 40-28-117(a ); T.C.A. § 40-35- 503(b). The authority to g rant parole is vested ex clusively in the board of pardons and parole, and the granting of parole is a discretionar y matter. Doyle v. Hampton , 207 Tenn. 399, 340 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1960). A prisoner does not have an absolute rig ht to be released on parole when h e has served the minimum term for his conviction. State ex rel. Wade v. Norvell , 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 447, 443 S.W.2d 839, 840-41 (1969).

Habeas corpus relief is not available to challeng e the denial of prison privileges and rel ated internal matters of our cor rectional institutions that have no bearing on the validi ty of the restraining c onviction, the resulti ng sentence, or the expiration of the sentence. See , e.g. , State v. Warren , 740 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). The appropriate method to cha llenge the Department of Correction’s failure to calculate sentenci ng credits and parole dates is the Administrativ

e Procedures Act. See T.C.A. §§ 4-5-101--325 (1991 a nd Supp. 1996); Brigham v. Lack , 755 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). When it is clear from the petition that the peti tioner is not entitled to relief, th e trial court is not r equired to conduct an evi dentiary hearing or appoint counsel to represent t he petitioner. See Passarella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

In this case, the petitioner claims that he has served his sentences and is entitled to immediate re lease becaus e he has serv

ed the requi site percen tage of time for release eligibili

ty. However, r

elease eligibility

does not amount to an entitlement to immediate release.4 Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the petition for habeas corpus
re li ef fa il s t o s ta

te a c la im fo r w hi ch ei th er a w ri t s ho ul d i ss ue

or re li ef be gr an te d. We affirm the judgment of the trial cour t.

_______________________________

Joseph M. Tipto n, Judge CONCUR:

_________________________ Jerry L. Smith, Jud ge

_________________________ Thomas T. W oodall, Judge