* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health

and Human Services in social security cases were tr ansferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is subs tituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision. PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 9/19/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

PATRICIA JAMES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-2231

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. CIV-93-920-JP)

Submitted on the briefs: Gary J. Martone and Francesca J. MacDowell, Albuque rque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has

determined unanimously to grant the parties’ reques t for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument.

-2- John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, District of New Mexico, and Ronald F. Ross, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque , New Mexico, Joseph B. Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Region VI, and Randall Halford, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Social Secu rity Administration, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before EBEL, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from a district court order affirming the decision of the Secretary denying her application for disability in surance benefits (DIB). 1 We review the record as a whole to determine whether the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and adheres to ap plicable legal standards. Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Questions o f evidentiary weight and witness credibility are the province of the Secretary, whose judgment on such matters is entitled to consi derable deference. See Gay v. Sullivan , 986 F.2d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1993); Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). Upon considerati on of the briefs and appellate-3-

record in light of these standards, we affirm. Further, we announce a prospective rule today that should have a significant salutary effect on the administrative prosecution of social security disability claims: As in other agency adjudications, issues not presented to the Secretary through the a dministrative appeal process may be deemed waived on subsequent judicial review.
I The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that as of December 1988, when plaintiff last satisfied the earnings requirem ent for entitlement to DIB, she retained the physical and mental capacity to perfor m her past relevant work as a counselor. Basically, after inquiring at some leng th into plaintiff’s informal and relatively undemanding counseling activities, see App. at 121-23, 137-41, which, by her own admission, continued into December of 19 88 and then ceased due to a lack of business, see id. at 298, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the functional capacity for such work through the perio d of her DIB eligibility. Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled at step four of the Secretary’s2 The ALJ also stated, in passing, that plaintiff cou ld return to work as

a secretary as well. However, unlike the counselin g job properly considered by the ALJ, the nature and demands of plaintiff’s pastsecretarial work were neither explored at the evidentiary hearing nor discussed i n the ALJ’s decision. Thus, reliance on the latter occupation is precluded by e stablished precedent requiring an informed comparison between past work requirements and the claimant’s functional limitations as a condition to any step-f our disposition. See, e.g. , Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 13 F.3d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993). We have therefore reviewed this case s olely for the adequacy of the ALJ’s determination regarding plaintiff’s ability t o return to her counseling job. -4- dispositive sequential analysis. 2See generallyWilliams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s objections to this administrative decis ion were thoroughly discussed and thoughtfully rejected in the extensiv e recommendation issued by the magistrate judge, App. at 41-78, adopted in its entirety by the district court. We have but three brief comments to add on the meri ts. First, plaintiff points out that the ALJ did not devote much attention to wheth er her counseling constituted substantial gainful activity, a prerequisite for it s status as past relevant work, Jozefowicz v. Heckler , 811 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1987). However, plaintiff’s own statements consistently reflect an average work week of fifteen to twenty hours at fifteen dollars an hour, see App. at 138, 178, 265, 267, which gives a monthly income (with evidently minimal overhead expense) nearly four times the presumptive level for substantial gainful activity, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(b)(2)(vi) & 404.1575(a)(3), (b)(1), (c) (1). Second, plaintiff-5-

complains of noncompliance with Social Security Rul ing 83-20, because the ALJ did not call a medical advisor to testify regarding onset of disability, specifically with respect to psychological impairment. This arg ument is frivolous. The cited ruling indicates that such testimony is necessary w hen the issue is whether “the onset of a disabling impairment(s) occurred some ti me prior to the date of the first recorded medical examination.” 1983 WL 31249 at *3. Here, there were pertinent examinations both before and after the al leged onset date. Third, we emphasize that there is no problematic inconsistenc y between the denial of DIB in this case and the award of supplemental security in come (SSI) to plaintiff commencing March 14, 1989, in a separate proceeding . Quite apart from the time disparity involved, the two decisions turn on signi ficantly different step-four analyses--i.e., for unexplained reasons, the SSI de cision focused on plaintiff’s past secretarial employment, to which, it was found , she could not return, and did not address her ability to perform the counseling w ork crucial to the proper disposition of her DIB application. See App. at 313.
II We turn now to the procedural matter anticipated atthe outset of this opinion. The record indicates counsel did not rais e before the Appeals Council any of the particular objections now urged against the Secretary. Counsel evidently declined the option of filing a brief, se e 20 C.F.R. § 404.975, electing-6-

instead to rely solely on a summary request for rev iew, which did not address the ALJ’s decision at all but merely restated in conclu sory terms the basic claim underlying any disability proceeding: “I am disabl ed and entitled to benefits.” App. at 94. Such a statement was plainly inadequat e to apprise the Appeals Council of the particularized points of error couns el has subsequently argued in the courts. Cf. Soliz v. Chater , 82 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1996)(holding objection that “[t]he Findings of the Secretary . . . are not based on substantial evidence,” too general to preserve specific issues for appellate review under waiver rule applicable to proposed findings of magi strate judge). Ordinarily, issues omitted from an administrative appeal are deemed waived for purposes of subsequent judicial review. See, e .g. , McConnell v. Director,
OWCP , 993 F.2d 1454, 1460 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993); Rivera- Zurita v. INS , 946 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991); Coastal States Energ y Co. v. Hodel , 816 F.2d 502, 508 n.10 (10th Cir. 1987). Many circuits have appl ied this general rule to social security disability adjudications in published opin ions, see, e.g. , Pope v. Shalala , 998 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993); Harper v. Se cretary of Health & Human
Servs. , 978 F.2d 260, 265 (6th Cir. 1992); Weikert v. Sul livan , 977 F.2d 1249, 1254 (8th Cir. 1992); Ginsburg v. Richardson , 436 F.2d 1146, 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , 402 U.S. 976 (1971), and/or unpublished dispositi ons, see, e.g. , Clagg v. Chater , No. 94-2302, 1995 WL 679841, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 16, 1995);3 We did call attention to a social security claimant ’s failure to raise a

due process objection to the Appeals Council in Mar shall v. Chater , 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996), but in subsequently holding the issue waived, we appeared to rely exclusively on the independent rule barring appellate consideration of “[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections t o the magistrate judge’s recommendation.” Id. (citing only authorities enforcing latter waiver rule). -7- Miller v. Shalala , No. 93-56444, 1995 WL 299847, at *1 (9th Cir. May17, 1995). This court has not yet done so. 3 Given the due process concerns implicated by enforcement of a waiver rule about which the advers ely affected party did not have adequate notice, through such means as direct admonition for pro se claimants, see, e.g. , Moore v. United States , 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991); Frank v. Johnson , 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1038 (1992), or published case law guidance for counsel, see, e.g. , Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd. , 838 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1988); United Steelworke rs of America, AFL-CIO v. New Jersey Zinc Co. , 828 F.2d 1001, 1006-07, 1008 n.9 (3d Cir. 1987), we have reviewed this appeal on the merits. We emphasize, however, that this kind of request for administrative review, whi ch does not identify the issues with any particularity, effectively sandbags the Ap peals Council. We are thereby deprived of its informed views on those issues. Fu rther, had those issues been meritorious, this action could cause a claimant yea rs of delay by requiring her to pursue judicial proceedings to obtain relief which would have been available on administrative appeal.-8-

This court has on a number of recent occasions reco gnized that waiver principles developed in other litigation contexts are equally applicable to social security cases. Thus, waiver may result from the d isability claimant’s failure to (1) raise issues before the magistrate judge, Marsh all , 75 F.3d at 1426, (2) object adequately to the magistrate judge’s recommendation , Soliz , 83 F.3d at 375-76, (3) preserve issues in the district court as a gene ral matter, Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994), or (4) present issu es properly to this court, Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1994). In lightof the considerations discussed above, we join our sister circuits and extend this line of authority to include the principle of administrativ e waiver. Henceforth, issues not brought to the attention of the Appeals Council on administrative review may, given sufficient notice to the claimant, be deemed waived on subsequent judicial review. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.