Techulcal Report 440

1EYE

IDENTIFICATION OF COMBAT UNIT LEADER SKILLS

AND LEADER-GROUP INTERACTION PROCESSES

Kermit F. Henriksen, Donald R. Jones, Jr., David L. Hannaraan,

Peter B. Wylie, and Edgar L. Shriver

Kinton, Inc.

!• I and

Bruce W. Hamill and Robert H. Sulzen

Army Research Institute

SIMULATION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

DTIC _______ ELECTEPF __,_____ U: UN3 1980

A

U. S. Army

. iResearch Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

January 1980

Approved for Pu0blic rele•ts; distrbuti(.unIo, I 2 0 2 1
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIOý,AL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

FRANKLIN A. HART

JOSL:_U-H ZEIDNER Colonel, US Army

Tecbhaical Dircctor Commander

,sei on Fio.

OfTIS G&UAA

DIXC TA.B

Ukamounc ed

Justifioatio_

By___________

Research accomplished under contract to Distribution/

the Departm~nt of the Army

Kinton, Inc. Avail and/or

Dist special

NOTICES

DISTRIBUL'ION Pr,.ry.,y distribulion of this report has been made by ARI. Please aedrrets correspondi-n. .

concerning distribution of reports to U S. Army Rswearch Institute for the Behavioral end Social Sciences.

ATTN: PERI-TP. 5001 Eisenhovwr Avenue. Alexandria. Virginia 22333.

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the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE The findings in ths report ore not to be construed as an official ODeprtment of the Army nosition,

u'i.-. so desigalted by other euthoriled documents.

777=
/ SECeRITY CASF. HF CTO THIrPGE(Wen Donald ff/Joner.O Da id -

O4STRIEUTIO 1.,0. NO:E~EN (.1 019,i.1 ' CAALG 111411121

Tehicl XUP NOTE 40ENTARY 

EnideentifScauiation; Tomact Ui al Tra9kining; RaL" TcianTan

Ssm; LedrTinn;Leader interaction;Poess kls edr-Group .PROMIGOG EOTNME

Le aderskilsandlead er-ru itracthiveprocse havin A9nfluenc poeta 

( non ) Bntprfomace in tacti cl sibe tR uaioen. ýAn itoia rveJoJh

leader, reeac h litraur wa conducted with npc fcson la erS

1500Continued on r vereet

1L ONTOLIN 13 ETONOFFIC N AND ADR OV3 SSOLT jc~sf

US~SC~T Insttut ArmyPIATO fort Reeac the ehavoralandW'd)

Sociisenowe Scencs, Aveue, 501 lexndri Is.--mnar
-- 4

Unclassified

UCUmATY CLA•FICATION OF THIS PAUIS II A . W.

20. Abstract (Continued)

-----Leader research and theory from industrall, maragerial, ar academic

"-• settings was useful for acquiring an understanding of the state-of-the-art.

Of the leader models reviewed, the problem solving approach was the most

relevant for addressing the skills and demands placed upon leaders in

tactical settings. The research on communications waS also considered quite

relevant. Both of these =reas of research aided in the delinedtion of the

leader skill categories.

On tl~e basis of historical ES data (battle.narratlves, audio tapes, and

net control sheets collected at ES exercises), the literature research, and

rasearch staff ES/combat experience, a listing of leader skill categories

and individual Leader skills was developed. The skill categories were

arrived at inductively by listening to audio tapes a t examining battle

narratives, listing the individual skills involved, and arriving at a

general sk 11 category under which the numerous individual skills could be

subsumed_ there were a parallel skill category already existing in the

reseArch 1 terature (e.g., initiating structure) that consisted of the same

skills inv lved in ES, it was readily adopted. Many of the skill categories,

however, d d not have identical counterparts in the research literature.

The skill ategories, subsumed under five broad headings were: (a) management

3kills--pl nning, execution and control, initiating structure, and interacting

with subor inates and superiors, (b) communication skills--transfer of

informatio , and pursuit and receipt of Information, (c) problem solving

skills--id ntification and interpretation of cues, weighing alternatives,

and choosiTg a course of action, (d) tactical skills--application, and (e)

technical ,kills--equipment and basic.

ii 1Unclassif-ed

SECUNITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS UAGE(Wfh Daa Oft. )
Tecimlcel lepert 440

IDENTIFICATION OF COMBAT UNIT LEADER SKILLS

AND LEADER-GROUP INTERACTION PROCESSES

Kermit F. Henriksen, Donald R. Jones, Jr., David L. Hannaman,

Peter B. Wylie, and Edgar 1. Shrlver

Kinton, Inc.

and

Bruce W. Hamill and Robert H. Sulzen

Army Research Institute

Submitted by.

Frank J. Harris, Chief

_ SIMULATION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL AREA

Approved By:

E. M. Johnson, Actinn Director

ORGA':IZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria. Virgir&i. 22333

Offi',e, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel FJ Department of the Army

January 1980

Army Project Number Simulation Systems Training

2Q263744A795

APPrawI for ouIblc rielai; dk iributioin unlifind.

1tt

K77 .- r 
SI

ARI Researvh Reports and Technical Reports are intsnded for sponsors of

R&D taskl and for other research and military agencies, Any findlngs reedy

for implementation at the time of publication are presmnted in the last part

of the P ef. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommendat. -ns tor official attion normally are conveyed to approprate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv

iv
FOREWORD

Research initiated by the U.S. Army Res,,tTch Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences (ART) in il'. has led to the development

of a family of tactical engagement simu'ation training techniques. This

report presents a taxonomy of leader skills and leader-group processes

developed from a review of leader research literature and an analysis of

engagement simulation outa and combat experience. The taxonomy constitutes a means of measuring observable leader performance during engagement simulation exercises which may be related to tactical unit performance. The research conducted was in response to the requirements of

Army Project 2Q263744A795 as a part of a larger program of research in

tactical training for TRADOC.

ISEPH ZEIER

Te hnical Director

pv

!;.i

• _ ,

:!V
IDENTIFICATION OF COMBAT UNIT LEADER SKILLS AND LEADER-GROUP INTERACTION

PROCESSES

BRIEF

Requirement:

To identify leader skills and leader-group interaction processes

that may have potential influence on unit performance in tactical

situations,

Procedure;

A review of leader research literature was conducted, and an

analysis was made of recorded engagement simulation data from peevious

field exercises. A taxonomy of leader skills and group interactive

process categories was synthesized, and an operational listing of

individual leader skills was developed.

Findings:

Twelve skill categories, subsumed under five broader headings, were

identified as follows: (a) management skills--planning, execution and

control, initiating structure, and interacting with subordinates and

superiors, (b) communication skills--tr-nsfer of information, and

pursuit and receipt of information, (c) -oblem solving skills--identification and interpretation of cues, weighing alternatives, and choosing

a course of action, (d) tactical skills--application, and (e) technical

skills--equipment and basic.

Utilization of Findings:

The taxonomy developed for leader skills and leader-group interaction process may be utilized to observe and measure behavior during unit

tactical performance. Analysis of leader behuvior and unir performance

in varying situations has tbe potential of identifying the important

variables producing effective unit and leader performance. When the

important variables are identified, a training model for employing both

engagement simulation and battle simulation technologies may be developed for combat arms unit leaders.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction x:L

Historical Review 1

STrait nd Situational Approaches I

The Ohio State Leadership Studies 4

The Study of Military Leadership 5

Some Current Models of Leadership 11

Fiedler's Contingency Model 11

House's Path-Goal Theory 13

Graen's Vertical Dyad Linkages 14

A Decision Making Model 15

An Information Processing Approach 22

Against the Mainstream 24

A Leader Taxonomy for Tactical Settings 26

Management 27

Communi cation 35

Problem Solving 38

Tactical 43

Technical 46

Measurement Procedures and Limited Scale Investigation 50

vi'

Aj
Table of Contents (Continued)

TABLES

1 Performance of Five Leadership Functions

in 69 Squads 9

2 Decision Methods of Group Problems 16

F IGURES

1 Decision-Process Flow Chart for Group Problems 20

2 Variables Used in Leadership Research 39

APPENDICES,•

A Leader Skills by Category Al

B Leader Skill Categories and Individual Skills Matrix B1-B18

C Leader Observation Checklist C1-C9

D Subordinate Questionnaire DI-D12

viii

___VII,_,
Introduction

For several years, the Army Research Ins ite, in conjunction

with the research and development community, has been developing tactical engagement simulation (ES) systems for unit training in the combat arms. Engagement simulation is a tactical training technique

employing devices to simulate with a high degree of psychological

fidelity the casualty-producing effects of weapons found on the modern

battlefield. Experience with ES indicates that leader behavior and

leader-subordinate interaction processes play critical roles in unit

performance. However, it has not yet been possible to identify and

define explicitly those leader behaviors and group processes that lead

to successful tactical performance. Therefore, the purpose of the

present research is to determine what leader skills and leader-group

interaction processes have a potential influence on unit performance

in tactical situations.

The literature on leadership certainly does not suffer from a

dearth of inquiry. If one were to accept the proposition that disarate approaches and conflicting results were a sign of intellectual

vitality and well-being, then one should not be too alarmed by recent

reviews that characterize the state-of-the art as not encouraging

(Hunt and Larson, 1977). Not only do investigators disaqree on how to

interpret their findings meaningfully, but dlSU there is an apparent lack

of coo'fidence in the methodologies employed and the ensuing data

baser. Theoretical structures placed atop such a shaky foundation

are precarious edifices indeed. However, in order to acquire an

j appreciation of the current status of research on leadership, one

needs to start with the origins and subsequent developments of this

interesting field. The first part of this section is therefore

devoted to an historical review of significant research movements.

The second part will examine some prominent theoretical models of nmre

recent vintage. The third part will narrow its focus to a leader

taxonomy--in particular, those leader skills and group interactive

t processes that are likely to have a potential influence on unit performance in tactical ituations. Finally, measurement procedures will ~ . be discussed.

ix-.1
Historical Review

Trait and Situational Atpproaches

Notions on leadership no doubt could be traced back to the

writings of the ancients; however, it is the systematic study of

leadership that concerns us, and as a result our historical sketch

spans only a century. Galton's (1879) influential study of the hereditary backgrou,* ýf distinguished men in the arts and sciences helped

to set the gro\. itlc.rk for what came to be known as the "great man"

theory of leade:rhip. Likewise, Carlyle's (1910) landmark essay on

leadership ebraced the concept of the leader as a person endowed with

unique qualities that set him or her apart from the masses. Those who

followed in Carlyle's footsteps set about the task of identifying

those qualities or traits with which "great men" were blessed. The

Zeitgeist was appropriate for the trait approach to leadership to

take hold among psychologically-oriented investigators of the 1930s

and 1940s. Psychologists have had a long-standing interest in individual differences, and when they found themselves equipped with a new

tool--the personality test--it seemed eminently appropriate that they

should actively pursue personality traits that distinguish leaders

from non-leaders. The writings of Bingham (1927), Tead (1929),

Kilbourne (1935), and Dowd (1936) provide good examples of the trait

approach to leadership. Despite the early enthusiasm, studies of

leadership traits never produced the yield that the original investigators had envisioned. Successive reviews (Stogdill, 1948; Mann,

1959; Hollander ant Julian, 1969) report very little in the way of

reliable or useable results.

The problems that are encountered with a pure trait approach are

many. To maintain that there is a unique set of traits that leaders

share in common would force us to conclude that General George Patton,

Florence Nightingale, and Mahatma'Gandhi had highly similar leadership

traits. Any position that emphasizes the centrality of traits would

also predict that leaders in one situation would be leaders in other

situations as well. Mahatma Gandhi thus would be just as effective a

leader of the 2nd Armor Division as was George Patton. Conversely,

"George Patton could just as effectively lead the teeming masses of

India as did Mahatma Gandhi. While this may be an intriguing (if

inane) suggestion, it is easy to see how the early attempts to uncover I' essential leader characteristics met with repeated failure. Perhaps

the most serious criticism of the trait approach is that it presents

a static, one-way view of leadership--leaders are portrayed as

detached, isolated entities, immune from the consequences of their

actions. Such factors as the nature of the task faced by the group

and the overall context within which the group operates are ignored by

the trait theory. In the face of this unprofitable state of affairs, psychologists turned their attention to a different approach.

* ,-k-
This newer movement, which started to take hold in the 1950s

(Stogdill, 1948; Gouldner, 1950), focused on situational rather than

personal ity determinants. Research started to show that the person

most likely to become a leader in a given situation was not the

cha,'ismatic "great man." Instead the leader was differentiated

from non-leaders by the given task of the group and its corresponding

situational demands. The nature of the group task favored those individuals who were especially well-equipped and competent to guide the

group toward ettainment of its particular goals. Furthermore, and

perhaps most important, the situational approach anchored leadership

events to the life space in which they occur. Hollander and Julian

(1969) put It this way "...it was to recognize that the qualities of

the ieader w-'re variously elicited, solved, and reacted to as a function of differential group settings and their demands" (p. 389). Or

as Cartwright and Zander (1960) state "...while certain minimal abilities are required of all leaders, these are widely distributed among non-leaders as well. Furthermore, the traits of the leader which

are necessary and effective in one Sroup or situation may be. quite different from those of another leader in a different setting" (p. 492). After declaring "there are no absolute leaders, since successful leadership must always take into account the specific requirements imposed by the nature of the group" (1949a, p. 225), Hemphili went on

to publish in the same year his well-known Situational Factors in

Leadership. This work investigated system&tically the characteristics

of group situations as they were related to the behavior of leaders.

At this point, the group situation became the primary focus of study.

Was there any empirical justification for this radical shift?

Indeed there was. Carter and Nixon (1949) conducted a study of

leaderless high schoýol boys as they performed on three different

kinds of tasks: intellectual, mechanical, and clerical. Boys who

were leaders on the intellectual tasks also tended to be leaders on the

clerical tasks; however, for the mechanical tasks, new leaders tended

to emerge. Thus, to some extent at least, requirements for leadership

were situationally dependent. In related experiments, Carter, Haythorn, Shriver, and Lanzetta (1951), and Gibb (1947), very similar

results were found--that is, the behavior of leaders differed from

one situation to another, depending upon requirements of the group

task. In a study of 40 naval officers--20 of whom were transferred to

new positions, and also the 20 whom were to replace--Stogdill, Shartle,

Scott, Coons, and Jayris (1956) found that after several months in

their new positions, transferred officers resembled officers whom they

replaced in patterns of work performance but not in pctterns of interpersonal behavior. In other words, job requirements were such that

they instilled highly similar patterns of work performance in whoever

held the position. Job requirements did not, however, mold interper-.

sonal behavior. In yet another study, Megargje, Bogart, and Anderson

(1966) had subjects who differed on dominance test scores (high and

low) perform two different tasks. Instructions on one of the tasks

2

- .," ...- L '
emphasized the task itself; in the other condition, leadership was

emphasized in the instructions. When leadership was emphasized, the

highly dominant subjects emerged as leaders. But when the task was

emphasized, there was no significant difference between the two groups

in terms of leadership emergence.

Results from the above studies tend to support the conclusion

that the nature of the task that confronts group memb~ers plays an

important role in determining who emerges as a leader-. It should be

pointed out that studies can be cited that are contrary to those

reviewed1 above. Consistency of performance in different groups with

varying tasks has been found in the same leader as well (Blake

Mouton, and Fruchter, 1954; Borg and rupes, 1958; and Borgatta: 1954).

If the situational view is pursued to the ultimate extreme, it

suggests that virtually any member of the group c~an become a leader as

long as favorable conditions prevail. There is some evidence,

although not unequivocal, for thi s pInt of view (Zdep and Oakes,

1967). In the Zdep and Oakes (1967) study, individuals who were initially ranked low in kadership by other group members following group

discussion were then either reinforced for taking a more active role

or punished for remaining passive. Under these conditions, subjects

did indeed play a more active role. Even more interesting, they were

ranked significantly higher in leadership by other group members

following this second session thar they had been after the initial

session.

However, in bold form, the situational view is subject to criticism, too. It also presents a "one-way" view of leadership whereby

the situation appears as the controlling factor and seemingly "selects"

a leader. The more current viewpoint of the approaches discussed so

far is that they present a far too simplistic view of reality

(Hollander and Julian, 1969; Stogdill, 1974). Rather than being

separate entities, the leader and situation merely represent different

components in a continuing multidirectional process of social

influen~ce and exchange. As a reciprocal phenomenon, leaders not only

U influence the situation and group members.. but are influenced, in

turn, by them. This interactive-transactional approach points to a

more complicated, and perhaps richer, view of leadership. It casts

new light on the leadership process and allows fresh possibilities to

be explored.

it may be useful to review some of these more recent con-

* . siderations. A distinction, which was not made in the earlier literature, can be made between leadership and the leader. Leadership is a

process of social influence and exchange among two or more lr'terdependent persons who are grouped together for the attainment of mutual

goals. The leader, as a person, usually occupies a central role in

this process. In the last two decades, research interest has shiftr I

from the leader as a unidirectional force to the study of the process

3
of leaaershlp. It is also important to realize that the leadership

process or transaction takes place over time ar, is continuously

changing. Most of the research studies, hoever, are one-shot

affairs. There are very few longitudinal studies of leadership 1Z the

literature. It takes time for group goals, leader abilities, and

situational factors to becom. synchronized in a working relationship.

Many of the early studies--and much of the recent literature--were

conducted on groups formed solely for the purpose of the experiment.

It is certainly reasonable to entertain the belief that such groups

will differ in significant ways from well-established groups in formal

organizations (Jacobs, 1971). Another distinction that impacts on

the internal processes of the group is between emergent and imposed

leadership. Emergent leadership usually arises from a loosely structured group and is contingent upon the consent of other group mers.

Bales (1950) finds that a mtask leader" and a "social-emotional

leader" often emerge from such groups. By contrast, an imposed leader

is appointed by external authority in a formally structured situation.

Imposed leaders may or may not be perceived favorably for attributes

that would make them acceptable to group members as emergent leaders

as well. Surely, the source of the leader's authority as it is perceived and reacted to by the group is an important component in the

leadership process. Other external restraints, often overlocked, are

instructional or organizational in nature. Appointed leaders are

usually assigned to groups with specific functions and related in

well-prescribed ways to other areas of operation within the organization. The actions of such leaders can be highly determined by

the surrounding context. Under these conditions, leadership becomes a

means rather than an snd in itself (Hollander, 1967). As Bavelas

(1960) suggests "organizational leaders" may well be those who perform

certain functions rather than having certain attributes of personality.

The Ohio State Leadership Studies

The Ohio State Leadership Studies represent another clearly identifiable movement in the leadership literature. Rather than study

personality traits, the new effort concentrated on the behaviors that

individuals displayed in leadership positions. Hemphill (1949a) and

his associates constructed a list of approximately 1,800 itetts

describing different aspects of leader behavior. The items were theb

sorted by staff members into nine categories or subscales; 150 items

were found on which sorters agreed about the subscale to which an item

should be assigned. It was from these itenms that the first Leader

Behavior Description Questionnaire developed (Hemphill, 1950; Hemphill

and Coons, 1957). Several factor analytic studies performed by Halpin

and Winer (1957) of item intercorrelations produced two factors, identified by Hemphill as initiating structure and consideration. Two

different patterns of behavior, rather than the nine originally

suggested, actually composed the scale. For more than 25 years, the

concepts of initiating structure and consideration have been an

integral part of the language of leade,-ship and its measurement.

4
According to Fleishman (1973), initiating structure involvcs acts that

imply that the leader "organizes and defines the relationships in the

group, tends to establish well-defined patterns of communication and

ways of getting the job done (e.g., he assigns people to particular

tasks, he emphasizes deadlines, etc-.)" (pp.7-8).

The Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire was first used witfl

Air Force personnel. Halpin (1954) found that supervisors tended tQ

evaluate positively those air crew commnanders described high on initiating structure and evaluated aeegatively those described high on

consideration. Crew member satisfaction, conversely, was positively

related to consideration and negatively related to structure during

training. For the same crews in combat, however, member satisfaction

was positively related to both consideration and structure. In an

educational setting, when teachers and principals are described as

high in consideraticzi and structure, their pupils tend to make higher

scores on achievement tests (Brown, .967; Greenfield, 1968; Dawson,

1970). An industrial study by Fleishman and Harris (1962) fourd, that

grievances and turnover tend to decreas~e with increased supervisory

consideration, but increase with increased supervisory structure.

The underlying intent of the above studies was to identify specific leader behaviors that would be relate~d to effective group performance as well as to member satisfaction Go that leaders might be trained

to enagae in these behaviors. A review of the literature by Korman

(1966) indicates that these lofty expectations have not been fully

realized. While there is general consensus that consideration and

initiating structure describe important leader behaviors, so far these

behaviors have not correlated consistently with group performance.

The Study of Military Leadership

It was shortly after World War II that the study of military

leadership started in earnest. In accord with the research temper of

the time, Otis (1950) published a paper entitled "The Psychological

Requirements Analysis o Company Grade Officers." In addition to surveying the available literature, extensive combat interviews at the

division and small unit level weriP taken. Citations for medals among

officers were also analyzed. From all this information, clusters of

traits characteristic of good officers were identified. A distinction

that continues to be made was made between garrison and combat

leadership. It was realized that good garrison and combat leaders

might not display the same traits. As It turned out, identification

of personality traits proved far too getie'ral to be useful for

selecting leaders. The results of the Otis study were noteworthy not'

simply because they made a distinction between garrison and combat off icers but also because they pointed out that different things were

expected of officers in different situations.

211

5

k ________ _________
Several resea,*ch studies were conducted to develop performance

measures of small unit (squad) effectiveness and to Identify reliable

predictors of effective performance that could be used for selection

and placement purposes. All of these efforts were based on the pre- mise that "tombat success in modern warfare is coming to depend, to an

ever-increasing degree, upon the effective operation of small groups

of men, working in teams" (Havron, Fay and Goodacre, 1951, p. t).

Training small units in their group operations, and measuring the effectiveness of such training, was seen to be important,

esp ially in view of the commlitment of American troops in Korea.

Bec is.t= of this invclvement, the emphasis of Havron's early study was

on the development of ways of assessing the operational readiness of

small units. The technique used to measure effectiveness was a set of

criterion field problems. These field problems were developed to cover

all the critical combat duties of a unit. The problems were then

administered under standardized conditions; effectiveness was calculat~d as the sum of scores derived from squad leaders, squad members,

and total squad performance. Similar methods were used to develop and

evaluate field problems in later studies (Havron, Lybrand, and Cohen,

1954a, b, c, d).

The drawback of Havron's method seems to be that, although team

interactions are recognized to be the major element of squad effectiveness,. the actions identified for inclusion in the field problem

are those that primarily depend on individual skills. Group behavior

is difficult to measure unless it is something easily observed like "squad moves oat on time" or "squad forms skirmish line." The critical skills of communication among members and decision making by the

leader based on available information were not considered. Nor did

the testing situation of these studies allow these skills to be exercised to any significant degree. Performance was evaluated by comparing it to the standardized individual responses described as

appropriate behavior. Such rigid situations do not allow for the

diversity of actions and conditions that would occur in combat, and

they do not measure what the research sets out to measure.

In roombat, the most effective course of action will depend upon the specific s~tuation (conditions)--primvrily enemy behavior, but

including terrain dnd weather and other variables as well. The tactical noves (behavior) made by each side will be in response to early

moves of the opponent. This constantly changes the stimuli and makes

"standard" situations and solutions artificial. The advantage of

artificial situations is ease of performance measurement. Each step

can be evaluated in isolation since it will not be affected by pre- vious actions or affect subsequent actions. However, this step-bystep approach dues not reflect the true nature of a combat situation

and therefore will not produce a valid measurement of combat readiness

regardless of how steps are weighted in a predictive formuli.

6
The second goal of Havron's studies wat to develop reliable pre- dictors of unit effectiveness. This was done by identifying

personal/sociological variables from high and iow scoring groups end

correlating them to the scores on the field problem. Variables were

cor.sidered for the leader alone, for each of the team members, and for

the team as a group. The variables included: individual characteristics,

measures of Interpersonal relationships, and *easures of group-derived motivations toward Army-defined goals. Analysis of these variables

did not produce a significant degree of correlation except for a low

correlation between individual characteristics of squad leaders and

criterion scores. i.

In the 1950s a project called Offtrain undertook the development

of a leadership course for junior officers from which a series of

research reports resulted (e.g., Lange, Rittenhouse, and Atkinson, 1956;

Lange, Campbell, Katter, and Shanley, 1958; Lange and Jacobs, 1960;

Jacobs, 1962; ard Jacobs, 1963). Lange, Rittenhouse, and Atkinson

(1956) used a combined film-discussion techniqu'e to portray realistic

leadership problems and to allow participants to engage in the

problem solving process. Students who received the film-discussion

technique showed greater improvement in the qualty of their solutions

than did students who received regular training. It was concluded

that such a film-discussion technique would improve leadership

training.

Another study sought to describe the actual day-to-day, on-thejob .eadership behaviors that distinguish effective and ineffective

Infantry platoon leaders (Lange, Campbell, Katter, and Shanley, 1958).

In brief, it was found that effective leaders clearly and consistently

emphasized performance as a basis for reward and punishment, clearly

comnmunicated desired standards, and provided precise information for

needed improvements. It is apparent that these behaviors are what is

meant by the term "initiating structure." In the sequel study, Lange

and Jacobs (1963) developed the Leader Behaviors Questionnaire (LAQ)-.-

a paper-and-pencil measure of the leader behaviors encountered -n the

earlier study. The LAQ was conceived as an L.onomical device to be

used after training to assess the degree to wiiich the actual on-thejob behaviors of platoor jeaders had been favorably modified. There

was satisfactory agreement e;nong platoon members with regard to the

behavior descriptions they gave their pl•toon leaders. It was

concluded that the LAQ measured fairly well those leader behaviors it

was designed to measure. Jacobs (1963) next developed a leadership

course based (1) on the research findings that identified effective and

ineffective leader actions, and (2) on previously demonstrated effective

training methods. The course focused on the effect of the leader's

actions on both the morale of his men and the .nilt's ability to

perform assigned tasks. Students' reaccions to the course were

reported as favorable.

I7

LN
Research on leadership at the NCO level is of equal Interest and

importance. Clark (1IM55) and his colleagues interviewed the umbers

of 81 rifle squads rn the front line during the Korean conflict to

determine some of the factors associated with effective squads$ The

men were ask-d with whom they would like to share a bunker, go on

leave, or fight. Various sociometric indices were obtained for

acceptance patterns and friendships among squad and platoon members.

These indices were then related to effectiveness as judged by

superiors' ratings and successful combat missions. Five non-combat

functions, some related to the "emotional climate" of the squad, were

found characteristic of effective squads. According to Clark (1955)

they were:

Managing. Managing the squad involves supervising the distribution and maintenance of supplies and equipment, serving as a channel

of communications, and assuming the responsibility fnr seeing

that the squad carries out its assigned mission.

Defining. Defining rules and procedures for appropriate behavior is

largely a verbal activity. Individuals performing this function

initiated discussions among squad members, talking about what the

men wanted and needed. "Definers" promoted understanding of what

was expected of each man in the squad.

Modeling. Performing as a model is a verbal process in which,

tIrough discussions, squad members come to agree on what

activities constituted appropriate behavior. An individual who

performs this function might be described by squad mates as "the

best all-around combat man" or "whatever he does, he does the

best he can."

Teaching. Teaching squad mates is a function that requires two

attributes: to teach one has to be skilled in some operation and

be able to explain the process or operation in a way understandable to others.

Sustaining. Those individuals who sustained squad mates

With emotional support were described as: "He's easy to talk to;"

"He listens to our gripes and helps to set things straight;" and

"He just seems to understand things." The sustaining function

was seen as having therapeutic value--interpersonal problems

come out in the open and are settled. Squad members develop more

confidence in each other and seem to be a closer, more harmonious

group.

8

f ~ . 0
Table 1, adapted from Clark (1955), shows the number of squads In which the leadership function wa.., performed, and who in the squad actually performed the function.

TASLI 1

Performance Of Five Leadership Funt€lans

In 69 Squads (Adapted From Clark, 1955)

Numbe~r Of Squads In Which Function Performed by

Function Assi-ont' Other

Squad Squad Squad

tunction was performed was not performed Leader Leader Membher

Managing 67 2 64 37 1

Defining 52 17 35 19 14

Modeling 26 43 13 8 8

Teaching 26 43 14 6 9

Sustainli 24 45 11 7 11

* It is clear that the managerial functions of managing the squad and

defining rules and procedures for acceptable behavior were the most

frequently performed activities. Performing as a model, teaching, and

sustaining with emotional support--functions that encompass interpersonal skills--were certainly in evidence (in approximately 36% of

the squads) but considerably less so than the managerial functions.

It is also interesting to note that it was primarily the squad leader

or assistant squad leader who performed the managerial functions while

the interpersonal functions of modeling, teaching, and sustaining were

as likely to come from other squad memibers. Since not all the

functions were performed by the leader, this suggests any training

program must be focused on the platoon members as well.

Sociologists and social psychologists for a long time have

realized that groups display qualities that are more than simply a sum

* of their individual parts. It is therefore not surprising that military

social and behavioral scientists would be interested in investigating

the conditions that distinguish successful squads from unsuccessful

ones. Watson (1978) reports on a series of studies performed by the

Arn•'s Personnel Research Branch in which field exercises that included

reconnaissance, attack, and defense elements were developed to pinpoint

differences between good and poor squads. These differences were then

correlated with simple and economical psychological tests. Accordingly, squads with men who were sociable and conventionally "masculine"

performed effectively, as did squads who were psychologically homogeneous (men who had similar levels of aspiration). Squad members

9
were also given a questionnaire tUat masured the artent to which

they wanted to share non-tilitary activities, garrison activities, and

combat duties. Squ&ds that had quite a few isolates--men who were not

chosen by anyone for shared activities--performed the poorest on the

field exercises. The fewer faiorites that a leader had (as reflected

in how he distributed assignments among his men) the better the squad.

Garrison behavior also tended to be related to exercise performance.

Men who nmaintained discipline when the leader was absent, who kept

their weapons and quarters clean, and Who reported promptly for duty,

also did above average in the field. A general motivational factor is

perhaps the most plausible explanation for this relationship.

I Coordination, or what others call team work, has obvious relevance for small units. George (1966) developed a method that taught

men in a rifle squad how to coordinate their fire to improve their

kill ratio. Four- or five-man squads were instructed to fire at

fleeting pop-up targets. Once hit, the targets would not reappear

until all the targets had been hit--that is, the man who just hit his

own target could not score any more personal hits and had to turn

his attention to targets of his fellow squad members. Wide variation

existed among the men in their readiness to coordinate their fire.

Some fired on targets when it was not required and others fired upon

dead targets. To enhance coordination, two changes were instituted;

the men were instructed to fire only at their own and adjacent targets,

and the ammunition was redistributed so that the "wild shooters" were

given less ammunition than the rest of the squad. The group trained

in this fashion out-performed the conventionally trained group with

respect to kill ratio. An important by-product of the coordination

training was increased self-esteem within the squad. George's

research is interesting in that it suggests what has long been

expected: coordination among the members of a unit will improve some

measure of overall performance (albeit in a fairly well structured

setting). It would be too much to assume, however, that the same

finding would unequivocally generalize to a more dynamic, free-play,

simulation setting until such a setting can be empirically studied.

Effective communication, as will Ib seen, is an essentiei group

process upon which successful functioning of the squad depends. It is

understandable that the Army is interested in manipulating different

aspects of communication in, order to observe their effects on squad

performance. Dees (1969) developed a simulated tactical problem based

upon the type of tasks that might be performed by infantry squads in

decentralized combat operations. The combat simulations included:

1) a daylight search and destroy operation, 2) a night raid, and 3) a

night defense. Special events that required a communicative reaction

were introduced at each phase. Radio communication was manipulated

so that no one had a radio, or just the platoon and squad leaders

had radios, or to a situatioh where everyone had a radio. The time

taken to spot a boobytrap, to report it back to the squad leader, and

for the squad leader to issue the appropriate order are examples of the

10

Ll-o
dependent mezsures used. Observers also rated the squads on

maintaining noise discipline, maintaining contact with squ,%d elements,

following designated procedures, and keeping leaders informed of

relevant developments. Across a wide variety of events--evaluation of

casualties, defending a landing zone, organizing a successful assault--

the distribution of radios had a significant effect on the time taken

to perform these operations, Too many two-way radios had a deleterious effect on the effectiveness of the unit. The most effective

form of two-way radio distribution was to assign radios only to the

platoon and squad leaders. Chaos and needless chatter resulted when

everyone had a radio.

Apart from the trait and situational approaches, leadership

research up until the late 1950s appears to have been thwarted by a

lack of direction. To be sure, there were pockets of activity such as

the Ohio State studies and the leadership problems that were of

interest to military investigators. Overall, however, disparate

approaches seemed to reign supreme. Fortunately, during the last 20

years, a nunimer of models and theories have appeared on the leadership

scene and have provided some needed guidance to those seeking empirical relationships. Many of the models are quite recent and have

not been adequately tested. Others have generated considerable

research and, while their status among theoretically-oriented

investigators Is mixed, there appears to be a greater sharing and

cross-fertilization of ideas. It is our intention to review briefly

these theories and models that have achieved some prominence. Where

it is appropriatt to plpoint flaws and inadequacies, we will do so.

Some Current Models Of Leadership

Fiedler's Contingency Model

First to be considered is Fiedler's contingency model of

leadership effectiveness (Fiedler, 1967). Central to Fledler's work

is his use of a Least Preferred Co-worker (LPC) score. A premise of

this theoretical midel is that leaders very in the degree of esteem

they fee' "or the person in the group with whnm they least like to

work. Thu.;, a person 0ith a high LPC sco;-e desc.ibes his least preferreo co-vorker in a relatively favorablt light. Such a person tends

to be tulerant, human relations-oriented, and considerate of subordinate-. A person with a low LPC score, on the other hand, describes

* his least preferred co-worker in an unfavorable light. This person

tends ýo he task-oriente4 and is less concerned with ,uman relations.

The LPC inr.trument consists of a series of 16 or 28 eight-point bipolar adjective pair% mudeled after the semantic differential (Osgood,

Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). The contingency aspects of Fiedler's

model propose that the important factor in determining whether high or low LPC leaders would be more effective in leading a group would be

,11
the degree to which the situation favored the leader. The degree of

favorability, according to the model, Is a function of three factors:

1) leader's relationships with group members, 2) the degree of task

structure facing the greup, 4nd 3) leader's position of power. A

highly favorable situation is one in which the leader enjoys good

relations with other group members, the task is highly structure4 arid

the leader's power in the group is strong. The converse would hold

true for an unfavorable situation. Fiedler next predicted that low

LPC leaders (task-oriented) would be very effective in situations

highly favorable to the leader since the group situation is already

geared for such a leader. In situations highly unfavorable to

leadership, a low LPC leader would also be effective since under

adverse conditions a take-control type of leader is needed for effective functioning. Under conditions that are only moderately

favorable to the leader, however, a high LPC style of leadership (nondirective, human relations-oriented) is considered best in order to

improve group cooperation and morale.

The situational base from which Fiedler constructed his model is

quite broad and ranges from, among other things, anti-aircraft

artillery crews on training missions (Hutchins and Fiedler, 1960) to

church groups on discussion problems (Fiedler, Bass, and Fledler,

1967). In his best known work, Fiedler (1967) found interactions between LPC score and situation favorability that conformed to the

model. His research, however, has not escaped criticism. A number of

writers have pointed out that the ost hoc development of the model

isolates it from the self-correctlii-7nTrlences of disconfirming

empirical results (Graen, Alvares, Orris, and Martella, 1970; McMahon,

1972, Schrieshelm and Kerr, 1977). The studies cited in support of

the model are the same ones used to construct it! Since the model has

been revised and changed to fit the results, these same studies cannot

be used in support of the model. In addition to methodological

problems, data offered in support of the model often fail to meet

standard prescribed levels of significance (Green, Orris, and Alvares,

1971). Another problem centers on the construct validity of the LPC

score. Schriesheim and Kerr (1977) note that it is "a measure in

search of a meanlng"-,or as Fiedler and Chemers (1974) state,

"Understanding LPC has been a maddening and frustrating odyessy. For

nearly 20 years, we have i:"n attemptirng to correlate it with every

conceivable personality trait and every conceivable behavior observation score. By and large these analyses have been uniformly

fruitless" (p. 74).

It is apparent that the contingency model is not without its

shortcomings. It is, however, the best known of all the situational

theories and has played an important role in generating systematic

research and in stimulating others to develop alternative theories

incorporating different variables.

12

"" 4-
House's Path-Goal Theory

The original version of House's (1973) path-goal theory attempted

to define situationally the causal relationships linking the 'loder's

initiating of structure and consideration to subordinates' performance

and work attitudes. In this model, a leader who initiates structure

assigns particular tasks, specifies procedures to be followed, clarifies his expectations of subordinates, and schedules the workload.

Corsideration is used to describe the degree to which the leader

creates a -upportive environment, characterized by warmth, help.

fulness, and a concern for the personal welfare of subordinates.

Leaders who initiate stv cture for subordinates have generally been

rated higher by supey ,rs and also have higher producirg work groups t when compared to leauurs' low on initiating structure (Filley and

House, 1969). It is reported that leaders who are considerate of

subordinates have more satisfied employees; however, studies that

have attempted to pinpoint the relationship between initiating struct ture and subordinate satisfaction have produced conflicting results. t• Initiating structure among unskilled and semi-skilled employees

appears to result in dissatisfaction, grievances, and turnover

(Fleishman and Harris, 1962), while for employees situated in large

groups initiating structure is more palatable (Hemphill, 1950; Mass, 

J I 1950; Vroom and Mann, 1960). In this way, House (1973) thus tried to

reconcile these conflicting findings under a set of general proposi- tions from which they could be logically deduced. The theory posits thiat the leader's effectiveness in performing either of these motivetional functions is dependent upon the structure of the task. In an

unstructured situation, the effective leader will be one who clarifies

the paths and subordinate work roles for task accomplishment. By

removing the roadblocks to successful work performance, it is

suggested that greater subordinate satisfaction and intrinsic reward

will accrue. On the other hand, if a leader tries to initiate structure on tasks that are already highly structured, such attempts may be

perceived by subordinates as excessively directive and restrictive.

Under 0hese circumstances, it would behoove the leader to motivate his

or her .ýubordinates with considerate direction.

Sheridan, Downey, and Slocum (1975) tested the notion that there

is a causal linkage between leader behavior and subordinates' per- ceived expectancies, which, in turn, is supposed to affect job performance and satisfaction. They examined leader behavior along four

imensions--role clarification, supportive, participative, and

autocratic House and Mitchell (1974) maintained that each of these

leadership styles would differentially lead to effective task performance and employee satisfaction under different task structures. In

brief, role clarification was considered optimal for subordinates

engaged in unstructured tasks; supportive leader behavior was best

matched with highly structured work; participative leaders were

considered most effective with subordinates engaged in ambiguous and

13

V
poorly defined tasks, 3,utocrctic ltdeeshlp was expected to have an

adversi effect on subord4nite sat;3faction and performance In both

structued and unstructi,,ed tak situatlonis. The rssults of the

Sheridan, et al. (1975) stk,4y "oI o+ irwvida support for the above

causal relations. Leader ýehaj.io was foutid to be related to subordinate satisfaction and motthatlon, bu't not to job performance. The

relationships that t.ure found were of a reciprocal nature and thus

causal linkage to leadership cannot be inferred. Task structure did

not appreciably moderate these relationships. These results suggest

that leadership behavior jer se has only a weak impact on the criterion variables tested so-farT, Obviously, additional variables need

to be considered if a sizable portion of the variance is to be

accounted for. House and Dessler (1974) suspect that the

subordinate's need for achievement and affiliation, the norms of the

primary work group, the formal authority system of the organization,

and the subordinate's perceived ability relative to the task demands,

may all be implicated in the relationship between leadership style and

subordinates' satisfaction and performance. Part of the difficulty

with path-goal theory is that it may not be sufficiently operatioblal

in providing clear, testable propositions. As Os:orn (1974) has

pointed out, "the exact dimensions of the subordinates' environment

are not clearly defined" (p. 57). Surely the environment varies in

ways other than simply structureJ and unstructured.

Graen's Vertical Dyad Linkages

A somewhat different approach to the study of leader;hip has been

attempted by Graen and his associates (Dansereau, Green, and Haga,

1975; Graen and Cashman, 1975). Their primary focus is not on outcomes but instead on how influence processes develop and change over

time. According to Graen (1975) formal organizations se,. the stage

for role-making processes whereby dyadic (two-oerson) social structures emerge. These dyadic structures allow the interdependent Individuals to establish how they will interact and to agree on

relationship norms. When role-making processes are used to describe

the development of both interlocked behavior and relationship norms

between leaders and each of their members, Graen and Cashman (1975)

speak of vertical dyad linkages kVDL). An importent developmental

aspect of the model is the occurrence of signs (early warning

detectors) of the emerging dyadic structures. These signs are used to

predict over time the nature of the developing social structute. The

sign used in Graen's role-making mndel is called "negotiating latitude

between a member and his leader." Used as an independent variable,

this measure tries to assess the degree to which a leader will provide

individual assistance for a group member. The basic idea is that a

dyadic relationship that is characterized by individualized

assistance is more likely to result in negotiated exchanges between

member and leader than one not characterized by this treatment

variable (Graen and Cashman, 1975). In-group or out-group exchanges

14

1. ________________
are likely to follow aepending upon a group member's perception of his

leader as being either open or closed to requests for individualized

assistance. It is not assumed that a leader will be equally open to

all requests for individual assistance nor is it assumed that a

member's 

and Cashman 

reactions 

see the 

to 

assumption 

all leaders 

of 

will 

heterogeneous 

be the same. 

behaviors 

In fact, 

from 

Graen 

both

I

the supervisor and unit member as a unique and valuable feature of the

model that sets it apart from others. Not everyone agrees. Cummings

(1975) argues that "heterogeneity is equally as unrealistic as homogeneity while describing leader behaviors and member reactions."

Cummings cites equality considerations employed by a leader as a safeguard against charges of preferential subordinate treatment and the

time and energy costs associated with acting heterogeneously as two good reasons for not behaving differently to each subordinate. In the

same vein, as a result of similar past work-related reinforcement

histories and the generalized reinforcing properties of leaders,

followers do not behave differently toward all leaders past and present. Cummings suggests that it is just as likely the leader may

become a discriminative stimulus for a general or homogeneous class of

behavior. One only needs to think of the "yes men" that surround

leaders and the "groupthlnk" that stifles creative problem-solving

efforts to be convinced of the plausibility of horiogeneity as well.

Cummings (1975) is also critical of the xcessive constructural

baggage, fuzzyspecification of dependent variables, and inconsistent

operational definitions of key terms in the VDL model. In fairness to

Graen arid Cashman, it is best to remember that their model does

rep sent a new approach and, while this is no excuse for their lack of

precision, it will be up to subsequent research to demonstrate the

fruitfulness of their efforts. t

J

A Decision Making Model

Vroom and Yetton (1973) have developed a decision making model of

leadership that centers around the degree of participation of subordinates in the decision making process. Behavioral and social scientists have generally argued for greater participation by subordinates

at the decision making level, however, the research evidence is not

unequivocal on participative management. Studies that report that

increases in productivity can be brought about by subordinate participation (Coch and French, 1948; Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, 1967)

are offset by other studies showing no significant difference between

workers who did and those who did not participate in decision making

(French, Isra~l, and As, 1960; Fleishman, 1965). As is the case in

many areas where research results are conflicting, one suspects interactions that may obfuscate any order one hopes to find in the data.

The consequences of subordinate participation in decision making most

likely vary from one situation to the next. In their normative model,

Vroom and Yetton (1973) attempt to pinpoint the kind& of situations

in which various degrees of participation in decision making would

15

,._..... - ----- ---
seem indicated. One of the basic assumptions that Vroom and Yetton

make is that .leadership methods on decision processes will differ for

Individdals and groups. For purposes uf exposition, we shall list in

Table 2 the leader's decision processes that pertain to groups.

TABLE 2

Decision Methods for Group Problems

(Adapted from Vroom and Yetton, 1973)

Al. You solve the problem or make the decision yourself, using

information available to you at the time.

All. You obtain the necessary information from your subordinates,

then decide the solution to the problem yourself. You may

or may not tell your subordinates that the problem is in

getting the information from them. The role played by your

subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing

the necessary information to you, rather than generating or

evaluating alternative solutions.

CI. You share the problem with the relevant subordinates individually, getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing

them together as a group. Then you make the decision, which

may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence.

CII. You share the problem with your subordinates as a group,

obtaining their collective ideas and suggestions. Then

you make the decision, which may or may not reflect your

subordinates' influence.

GII. You share the problem with your subordinates as a group.

Together you generate and evaluate alternatives and attempt

to reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Your role is

much iike that of a chairman. Yod do not try to influence

the group to adopt "your" solution.

16

",r• ', - 7..
In their consideration of the empirical evidence that can be

brought to bear on the normative model, Vroom and Vetton differentiate

three classes of outcomes that influence the ultimate effectiveness of

decisions. These are: (1) the quality or rationality (degree of

objectivity) of the decision, (2) the acceptance of the decision by subordinates and their commnitment to execute it effectively, and (3) the

amount of time required to make the decision. The evidence concerning the effects of participation on these outcomes has been summarized by Vroom (1970):

"The results suggest that allocating problem-solving and

decision-making tasks to entire groups as compared with the

leader or manager in charge of the groups requires a greater

investment of man hours but provides higher acceptance of decisions and a higher probability that the decisions will be

executed efficiently. Differences between these two methods

in quality of decisions and in elapsed time are inconclusive

and probably highly variable.... It would be naive to think

that group decision making is always more 'effective' than

aut,-ratic decision making, or vice versa; the relative

effectiveness of these two extreme methods depends both on

differences in amount of these outcomes resulting from these

methods, neither of which is invariant fr-om one situation

to another" (pp. 239-240).

The next step for Vrooni and Yetton was to identify the properties

of the situation or problem attributes that serve as basic elements

of the model. Listed below are seven attributes of problems expressed

in the form of questions to be used by a leader in diagnosing a particular problem before choosing his leadership method (Vroom, 1976).

Queestion A. Is there a quality requirement such that one sulution is likely to be more rational than another?

QuetonB. Do I have sufficient information to make a high

quality decision.?

QuestionC. Is the problem struqtured?

Question D. Is acceptance of d1ecision by subordinates critical

to ~efetive implementation?.,

Questtion E. If you were to make the decision by yourself, is it

reasonably certain that it would be accepted by your

subordi nates?

17
b 4ueston F. Do subordinates share the organizational goals to

• obtained in solving this problem?

Q G. uuestton Is conflict among subordinates likely in preferred

so utions?

The above problem attributes are obviously continuous in nature;

however, they are stated in "yes-no" dichotomous form to reduce the

complexity of judgment faced by leaders. According to Vroom, managers

can diagnose a situation quickly and accurately by respondlig to these

questions. The judgments made on each of the attributes are used to

define a set of plausible alternatives. Rules are then applied that

eliminate decision processes from the plausible set under certain specifiable conditions. The rules serve to protect the quality and the

acceptance of the decision. They can be stated as either verbal statements or in the more formal notation of set theory. Altogether, Vroom

and Yetton (1973) posit seven rules. They are:

1) The informative rule. (A/flB=KAI)* When the quality of the

decision is important and the leader does not possess enough

information or expertise, Al is eliminated from the plausible

set.

2) The trust rule. (A(-ZG•G-MI) If the quality of the Oecision is important and if the subordinates cannot be trusted

to direct solutions towards organzational goals, GII is

eliminated from the plausible set.

*For the reader not familiar with set theory, A signifies that the

answer to question A for a particular probiem is yes-, T signifies

that the answer to the question is no; n-h indicates an intersection;

Smeans "implies"; and KI signifies not Al. Thus A(-TB == AI tells

us when the answers to A and B are yes and no respectively, decision

process Al is eliminated froin the pla-usible-set. ,

18

.. 4
3) The unstructured problem rule. (*=l A[, All, CI)

When the quality of the deciTsion is important, if the leader

lacks the necessary information and if the leader does not

know exactly what information is needed, who possesses It, or

how to collect it, methods that involve interaction among

knowledgeable subordinates are likely to be efficient and

insure quality. Under these conditions Al, All, and CI are

eliminated from the feasible set.

4) The acceptance rule. (Er'ýF TX, Ail) When the acceptance

of the decision by subordinates is critical to effective

implementation, and if it is not likely that an autocratic

decision made by the leader would receive that acceptance,

Al and All are eliminated from the plausible set.

5) The conflict r-ule. (Er-FrqH VAI, All, Cl) If the acceptance

of the decision is critical, an autocratic decision not likely

to be accepted, and subordinates are likely to be in conflict

over the appropriate solution, Al, All, and Cl are eliminated

from the feasible set.

6) The fairness rule. (AnErF=lFAI, All, CT, CI1) If the quality

of the decision is not important, and acceptance is critical but

not likely to result from an autocratic decision, Al, All, CI,

and CII are eliminated from the plausible set.

7) The acceptance priority rule. (EC-Gf'G=AI, All-, Cl, MI) If

acceptance is critical, not assumed by an autocratic decision,

and if subordinates can be trusted, Al, All, Cl, and CII are

eliminated from the plausible set.

19
treApplication of these rules to a problem results in a decision

treas shcrvn in Figure 1. Across the t ')p are the problem attributes,

A-G. For any given problem, starting frju the left and working toward

the right, one asks the "yes-now dichotomous questions that are

encountered. At each terminus location, the number designates the

problem type along with the decision processes that remain applicable

after the rules have been applied. It can be seen that all problems

that have no quality requirements and in whlich acceptance is not critical are of Type 1. Type 2 refers to all problems for which quality

is not a concern, acceptance is critical, and the prior likelihood of

acceptance by subordinates of the leader's decision is low. The same

decision process flow defines the other types as well.

A S D E F

40 1 AIClll, Cl

- 5:6 11

3b: CJllCll

no C1.611

thane ohr

C.robl tem stucurd 5r: 

accetedby m suordiate?61 : ClII

i. lio l tuordnaes share th r aiational goals b Go 

attainedhinprolvngmthisuprorld m

G. is aceptaict aongecsonb subordinates lkl npeerdsltos

criticl t efeciv DimIplementation? IAIPEOHU ESIS

E. f wretomak te ecsin b msefG1

is i reaonaly crtan tht i woud b

accpte bym uodnts 2 l F.Dosuodiats hreth ogniatonlgolstob
S. . ... ....;

As illustrated earlier, there ire some problem types for thtch

more than one decision process remains in the feasible set. When this

occurs, Vroom and Yetton (1973) list a numbn.s of alternative decision

rules that can be employed. For example, the number of man hours

required in solving the problem may be an important consideration

given a set of decision processes that equally satisfy both quality

and acceptance requirements. The method that requires the least

investment in man hours is farthest to the left and is the most

autocratic within the feasible set. If investment of man hours is not

of immediate concern, one might be more interested in the development

of subordinates rather than the conservation of time. Exclusive

weight on development would lead us to the most participative process

in the feasible set (the one farthest to the right).

In an attempt to validate the model, Jago and Vroom (1976) had

leaders describe, in written form, a recent problem they had to solve

in carrying out their leadership role and to specify the decision

process used in making the decision. The data generated from these "recalled problems" were used to determine how frequently the

managers4 reported decision processes corresponded to the normative

model. In other research, managers were asked to select one successful and one unsuccessful decision. The results showed thdt "if the

managers' method of dealing with the case corresponded with the model,

the probability of the decision being deemed successful was 65

percent; if the method disagreed with the model, the probability of

its being deemed successful was only 29 percent" (Vroom, 1976, p. 20).

Another research method, labeled "standardized prublems," evolved

around the construction of a standardized set of cases that involved

decision making problems. It is worth noting here that managers are

responding to incidents that they may have never experienced or never

will. Be that as it may, Jaao and Vroorn (1976, p. 11) report that

"analysis of correlations and similarity scores support the hypothesis

that statements of intended behavior on problem set cases are predictive of actual behavior in similar but real decision-making situations."

Not everyone agrees, however. The fact that actual behavior is

never really measured is disturbing to some critics (Schriesheim and

Kerr, 1977). Managers are only asked what they would do! Selfreports on "behavioral intent" seem to form the basis of the model's

validation; however, numerous studies (e.g., Jones and Nisbett, 1972;

Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Marecek, 1973) show that self-reports are

not statistically the same as descriptions of the leader by others.

Another shortcoming is that Jago and Vroom seem to treat

leadership and managerial behaviors interchangeably. In fact, the

model focuses on only a small aspect of managerial behavior--that of

subordinate participation in the decision making process. This raises

a serious question of how applicable the model is to other settings.

Could the model be used profitably in an enlagement simulation (ES)

21

- - ,**J. - -- * -, - a -
setting? Since the model addreases only a few ef the numerous

variables involved in ES, at best it would account for o.ily a small

oortion of the total variance. It should also be rvmembered that the

subordinates in Jago and Vroom's (1976) study were no less than midlevel managers themselves, equIvalent to perhaps captains in the U. S.

Army with respect to level of responsibility. The subordinates in

which we are interested--those who compose a platoon--are not as

sophisticated nor do they have the same decision making experience as

Jago and Vroom's subjects. The whole issue and relevance of the Vroom

and Yetton model may be superfluous if PFCs and Corporals, either

because of personal shortcomings or Army doctrine, are excluded from

any decision making responsibility.

All of the above approaches have heightened our understanding of

the intricacies involved in the leadership process. Investigators

have learned, however, there is no singular approach that will answer

all their questions concerning leadership. The present writers found

this even more true after examining t.he literature with a specific

purpose in mind--that of identifying leadership factors and processes

affecting the outcome of ES exercises. No one, to our knowledge, has

developed a leadership model solely for this purpose. It has been

"stated (Schriesheim and Kerr, 1977) that all current leadership

theories and models share two characteristics in common: 1) none of

them systematically accounts for very much criterion variance, and 2)

all of them unconditionally assume--regardless of the circumstances--

that leadership is the most significant determinant. And what of the

situational approaches? Even they assume that there is going to be an

appropriate leadership style for each situation encountered. It may

well be that there are many situatlins for which leadership behaviors

(as studied so far) are irrelevant.

An Information Processing Approach

One general avenue of approach that strikes us as promising is to

view the leaders and subordinates in ES as processors of information

or as problem solvers. A human information processing view is a relatively recent arrival as far as approaches to leadership are

concerned. An interesting paper by Wynne and Hunsaker (1975), which

focuses on how the actions of task-group leaders and subordinates are

mediated by each member's cognitive style, is represertative of this

approach.

The importance of information and how it is processed, organized,

and acted upon in relation to a leadership context has already been

demonstrated as a topic amenable to empirical investigation. One

"interpretation of Fledler's LPC score is an index of cognitive

complexity, that is, the degree to which an individual or group differentiates and integrates information (Driver and Streufert, 1969).

Foa, Mitchell, and Fiedler (1971) suggest that leader success may well

22

L --
be conditional upon a match between ti..e complexity characteristics

inherent in the group task and the level of cognitive functioning

demonstrated by the leader. A good example comes to mind. At ES

exercises at Fort Pickett (1978), one particular squad leader soon

acquired a moderate degree of respect for his ability to maneuver cle'-

verly and, using his six-powered scope, site opposition forces in

simple individual combat situations. However, When the problem bec~ee

more complicated and he was put in the position of reading map coordinates and adjusting artillery, he spent 20 minutes in one location

trying to figure out how it could be done. His level of cognitive

functioning did not match the task, and he and his squad were rendered

casualties by the opposition's indirect fire.

Rice and Chemers (1973) found that leaders high in cognitive

* complexity were more flexible across different situations than low

complexity leaders. It has also been found that optimal Job

complexity (neither too high nor too low) produces greatest performance and satisfaction (London and Klimoski, 1913). Highly relevant to the relationship between information processing and effective

leadership is Ryan's (1910) treatment of intentional behavior.

Individuals direct their own behavior (and the behavior of others)

when: 1) they are exposed to information about an issue, 2) they perceive the information as important to themselves, 3) they are able to

integrate the information, and 4) they conceive of situation-relevant

alternatives based upon the processed information. In accordance with

Ryan's conceptualization, House (1973) and Dessler and House (1972)

find that a high amount of information is required for effective

behavior in conditions of low task structure and role ambiguity. in

* the ES situation, task structure and role clarification deteriorates

soon after the platoon leader is killed. Survival, of the platoon

often depends upon how well group members reuspond to cues and other

sources of information regarding the enemy's movement. Berlo (1974) [ ~has shown that as uncertainty and comlplexity increase, access to and

control of information displaces formal authority as a primary source

of influence. p A closely related way of conceptualizing leadership skills in the ES context is to 'look at the platoon or squad leader as a problem

solver. We view problem solving as a skill. Like any other skill, it

4 is so-wething that a person acquires rather than an innate quality.

*Proficiency with problem solving is thus dependent upon practice, the

acquiSitie" n slobskllls, and their subsequent execution. It relies

on past experience, is subject to further development throu h appro- priate training, and involves the coordination of complex cumponent

processes such as respcnding to cues, organizing information, generating ideas and evaluating alternactive courses of action. Strategies are employed and give directlon to one's activities. When 'he

problem solving task involves many members, the gen~eral level of

execution is strongly affected by the adequacy or inadequacy of each

member's skills. Inability to perform these reqjuired skills has

often beetn observed in ES exercises.

2--.2

'S.,.. ~ 1M"_' **~ 
Against The Mainstream

Contributing to the diversity of the research literature, a

number of individuals, each marching to a different drummer, seriously

question much of vitat is being done in the field. One of those who

has departed from the mainstream is Argyris (1976a, 1976b). As it

concerns leadership, Argyris objects to much of the current research

literature, which he characterizes as Model 1 behavior. Model 1 behaviors are characterized by the desire "(a) to define unilaterally the

purpose of the situation; (b) to win and not to lose; (c) to suppress

feelings; and (d) to emphasize intellectual aspects of everyday life"

(Argyris, 1976c, p. 639). According to Argyris, such behavior tends

to generate dominance, defensiveness, deception, and manipulation in

people. The receipt of valid feedback is inhibited by unilateral

control. As an altcrnative, Argyris promotes Model 2 behavioral patterns, characterized by open inquiry, mutual trust, and shared decision making. It is implied that Model 1 behaviors ee inherently bad

because they do not promote personal growth. Argyt notes that it

is not too difficult to get people to espouse the principles of

Model 2, but it is extremely difficult for people to actually put the

principles of Model 2 into use. They tend to fall back on Model 1

behaviors. Such findinqs are not surprising, given the disappointing

results of research on T-groups as it relates to leadership (Stogdill,

1974). It is fairly easy to adopt and verbalize the principles of

openness and trust in a T-group setting; however, these principles

are rarely reflected in significant changes in interpersonal effectiveness in the work environment (Campbell and Dunnette, 1968; House,

1967).

Another work that critically questions current approaches to

leadership is a collection of widely divergent papers edited by McCall

and Lombardo (1977) and entitled Leadership: Where Else Can We Go?

Although the papers are not empirically oriented, the major criticisms

are, none-the-less, germane. Among the major criticisms, also made

elsewhere, are: (a) leadershp is assumed to be invariably important--

the sine qua non, to the neglect of other factors; (b) research limits

and imposes a uniformity of leadership behavior that does not really

exist in the real world; (c) it neglects to look at the overall

system, of which leadership is only a part; and (d) the issues and

problems that are addressed are basically insignificant ones. In

the same book, Pfeffer (1977) comments on the difficulties that

ambiguities of leadership definitions cause in studying leadership.

He also notes that, compared to other variables, leadership has not

been shown to have a reliable impact on organizational performance. The

criteria used to select leaders are often irrelevant considering

the missions of the organization.

24

,I
Pfeffer has furthermore turned to the literature on attribution

theory In an effort to make sense out of leadership findings. Often

success or failure is attributed to the leader in spite of his actual

impact on organizational outcomes. Heller (1971) has found, for

example, that senior subordinates of mahagers tend to overestimate

their involvement in the decisions of their superiors when compared to

the reports of the superiors themselves. According to Jago and Vrooni

(1915) "the subordinate, himself a manager, exaggerates his role in

the decision process creating in his subordinates the inaccurate perception of his responsibility for the outcome. The subordinates... are

likely to thus infer use of an autocratic mode of decision-making at

the level of their owin superior when in fact the actual process used

may have been of another type" (pp. 27-28).

Attribution theory also tells us that we are likely to make

situational attributions when 'it comes to inferring the causes of

substandard outcomes that personally concern us, but when the same

substandard outcomes involve others, we are likely to make dispositional attributions. for example, if Harry doesn't receive an

expected raise he may attribute the cause to the poor fiscal earning

of his company, but if Sam in the next office doesn't receive a raise,

Harry is likely to make a dispositional attribution (e.g., Sam's level

of competence doesn't warrant a raisi). Vrooni (1974) cites the

following research in support of what is kniown as the attribution error:

"Results reported [~from thirty-nine managers and

eighty-nine subordinates, responding with respect

to a set of thirty concrete but hypotheticAl

situations] show significantly less variance... in

subordinates' descriptions of their superiors'

behavior than in either the subordinates' or

supervisors' self-descriptions. Since situational

variance is the antithesis of a generalized trait,

this finding can be interpreted as consistent with

Jones and Nisbett's conclusion (1972) that actors

tend to attribute their actions to situational

requirements and the actions of others to stable

personal dispositions" (p.25).

Along these same lines, Rush, Thomas, and lord (1976) note that in studies using questionnaire measures of perceived leader behavior

an unknown proportion of the effects attributed to the leader's actual

behavior may instead stem from other sources. Rush et al. elaborate

further on why subordinate descriptions of leader behavior m-y be

biased:

25

4 ...----. -- ------ A*

- - 1 - -~ .. ~->'jt- n. . LA4 a 'Aa
"It seems unreasonable to assume that raters perceive and remember all the leader behavior displayed

in a given situation and then are able to accurately access this information at a later time when

filling out a behavioral questionnaire. What is

more likely is that raters reli heavily on

stereotypes and implicit theories to reduce the

amount of information processing required in perceiving and understanding the behavior of others"

(pp.14-15).

Ilgen and Fujii (1976) have found that subordinate descriptions

of leader behavior tend to be statistically unrelated to descriptions

by independent observers And are also unrelated to descriptions by the leaders themselves. T!is awareness that leaders are perceived

objects is certainly bound to figure in subsequent research, the

issue is not rmrely academic. Calder (1976) advocates that future

research not only identify what variables affect the perception of

leadership, but also that research efforts should focus on the underlying

nature of the attribution process.

As the diversity of the above studies attests, the ,task of trying

to characterize the research literature is not an easy one. It would

be presumptuous to expect the research literature to be organized in

such a fashion as to render a discernible listing of leader skills and

group interactive processes. Therefore, our interest in what follows

is to focus on the literature as it pertains to the leader skills we

have identified and to draw also from relevant combat and ES experience of research personnel. From these primary sources, we hope to

establish a rational framework upon which a useful taxonomy can be

constructed.

A Leadership Taxonomy for Tactical Settings

On the basis of historical ES data (battle narratives, audio

tapes, and net control sheets collected at ES execises), the literature research, and research staff ES/combat experience, a listing of

leader skill categories (Appendix A) and individual leader skills

(Appendix B) was developed. The skill categories were arrived

at inductively by listening to audio tapes and examining battle

narrative3, listing the individual skills involved, and arriving

at a general skijl category under which the nuerous individual

skills could be subsumed. If there was a parallel skill category

already existing in the research literature (e.q,., initiating

structure) that consisted of the same skills involved in ES, it

26

L.
was readily adopted. Many of the skill categories, however did

not have identical counterparts in the research literature.

Appendix A shows the identified skill categories, subsumed under

five broader headings, as follow: (a) management skills--planning,

execution and control, initiating structure, and interacting with

subordinaes and superiors, (b) communication skills--transfer of

information, and pursuit and receipt of information, (c) problem

solving skills--identification and interpretation of cues, weighing

alternatives, and choosing a course of action, (d) tacitcal skills--

application, and (e) technical skills--equipment and basic.

It should be noted that the skill categories are not mutually

exclusive. At times, one could think of two, sometimes three, skill

categories under which a particular skill could be placed. A matrix

of individual skills for each of the skill categories is reported in

Appendix B. To the extent possible, these skills have been cast

in the form of opertional definitions. In addition, the research

staff addressed each individual skill deciding: whether the skill

clearly occurs in a tactical situation, the most appropriate skill

category under which the skill could be placed (primary relationship),

:-d to what other skill category the skill relates (secondary rela- t ionshi ps ).

It has been mentioned that the leader skills and categories do

not exist independently of one another, nor are they static, as a

simple chart or listing may suggest. For ease of exposition, the

skill categories are treated individually in what follows. However,

it is best to remember that they collectively interact in a very

intricate fashion.

Management

The relation between management and leadership has not been a

topic of systematic inquiry. Surely, there is a relation, but it

is not easy to delineate. Most definitions of leadership assume a process of interpersonal influence or interaction:

"Leadership is the process of influencing group activities toward goal setting and goal "achievement" (Stoydill, 1948).

"Leadership is the initiation of acts that result

in a consistent pattern of group interaction

directed toward the solution of mutual problems"

(Hemphill, 1954).

27

. I- I•.,. _ 
Leadership thus posits a relation among people whereby thr

influence is unevenly distributed. The necessary complement to

leadership is followership--the two do not exist in isolation.

Accordingly, managers whose work involves the direction and super- vision of other people are In leadership positions. However, not al1, managers have supervision over employees. Some, like a produce

manager in a supermarket, manage things, not people. Thus, not all

managers are in leadership psitions. What about the converse

relationship? Can we have eadership without management? It should

not be very difficult to demonstrate such a case. A leading microbiologist may have great influence in the scientific community without exercising managerial responsibilites.

It is usually the case, however, that leadership and managerial

positions overlap; managers find themselves in leadership positions,

and leaders perform managerial functions. The infantry platoon

leader is a good example. His primary role is that of a leader; he

has considerable influence on the activities of fellow platoon members

toward mission attainment. He is also a manager who must engage in

such duties as identifying training nieeds, planning, providing

logistical support, and supervising equitpment maintenance.

A useful technique for identifying important aspects of managerial behavior has been the critical incident method developed by

Flanagan (1954). A study by Williams (1956), reported in Campbell,

Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (1970), illustrates the use of this technique. Williams recorded 3500 critical incidents of effective and

ineffective managerial behavior from a pool of 742 executives in

various companies. These incidents were grouped into the following categories;

Planning, organization, and execution of policy

Relations with associates

Technical competence

Coordination and integration of activities

Work habits

Adjustment to the job

Planning, organization, and execution of policy, good relations with

subordinates, and sound work habits were most frequently associated

with effective incidents.

A problem inherent to the developnmnt of a system of categories

that is to have wide applicability for a variety of organizations

lies in the loose f" that often exists between the system and one's

particular organiz..ion. In the attempt to develop a system that has

considerable breadth and scope, the trade-off is usually a lack of

fidelity to the group or organization of inmediate interest. Because

II

LV
of the unique demands of different organizational settings, one is

often better off in deriving one's own listing of critical incidents

f or effective and ineffective managerial behaviors. The critical

incidents method poses another problem. 'The Williams study tells us, f or example, that the effective manager "demonstrates ingenuity in

solving managem~ent problems" and "perseveres in efforts to reach

objectives." It does not tell us, however, how one should go about

"demonstrating ingenuity" or "persevering". We need to somtehow delineate the behaviors our manager will display when 'demonstrating ingenuity" or "persevering". Otherwise, resultant training programs will

be based on lofty platitudes alone. The greatest value of the critical incident method lies in pinpointing functional areas of management

in which effective and ineffective behaviors are likely to occur.

An examination of thL skill categories chart (Appendix A) shows

that management is used at a relatively high level of abstraction. As

a broad and muiltifarious term, it. needs to be anchored to reality,

preferably a tactical military setting. We have already referred to

the Clark k1955) study on leadership functions at the squad level

during the Korean conflict. 'This study clearly showed that managing

the squad was the most frequently occurring leadership function and

that it was the squad leader or assistant squad leader who most often

performed this function. Clark (1955) was also fairly exýplicit ini

what he meant by managing the squad. It involved supervising the distribution and maintenance of supplieb, and equipment, serving as a

channel of commiunications, and insuring that assigned missions were

carried out.

Traditionally, mianageme~nt refers to the efficient handling of

assets. In the ES context, these assets include people, equipment,

and support elements. Based upon our anaflysis of audio tapes and

battle narratives from various ES exerci,,es and the listing of indivi- I dual skills that resulted, four clusters or functional areas of management. became discernible. These were- planning, execution and

control, initiating structure, and interaction with subordinates and

superiors. The critical incident study of Williams, discussed above,

lends support to our analysis. Despite slight differences in terminology, it is interesting to find that Williams' categories of a)

planning. organization, and execution of policy, and b) relations with

associates are very similar to three of our management skill categories of planning, execution and control, and interaction with subordinates and superiors. Our other management skill category, initiating structure, was, in turn, a frequent funrtional skill area in

Clark's infantry squad study. Clark (1955), it will be recalled, used

the phrase "defining rules and procedures for acceptable behavior."

As a skill area, initiating structure has held' a prominent position in

Ah leadership literature. We shall now examine our four manaagement

categories in greater detail.

I 29
Planning. Planning is considered a managerial skill in various

treatments of leadership (Williams, 1956; Fiedler and Chemers, 1974;

Uhlaner, 1970). While many authors cite planning as an important

managerial skill, they do su in a relatively glib fashion. "Of

course, a manager has to be a good planner!" is the standard line.

What constitutes a good planner is much harder to specify. One needs

first to consider the context. In an ES or combat setting, planning

refers to formulating the means by which a tactical operation is to

be executed and achieved. A well-formulated plan, according to

FM100-12 Staff Officers' Field Manual - Staff Operations and

Procedures (1977) is one that takes into account all things normally

included in all Army Operation Orders: objective, enemy situation,

friendly situation, concept of operation, execution, and command and

signal. An analysis of tactical operations often reveals that the success or failure of an operation can be traced to the adequacy of the

plan. The following combat experience of Jones (1969) illustrates

this point.

In QLang Tri Province, Vietnam, a rifle company was given the

mission to assault a hill occupied by enemy forces. The assault was

launched from an adjoining hill occupied by remnants of a sister company. This company had taken heavy casualties in a day of fighting.

The company commander's plan for assaulting the hill included the

folio-wing: 1) artillery fire and tactical air strikes against the

enemy positions on the hill, 2) a covering element to lay down

suppressive fire with machine guns and Light Anti-tank Weapons (LAWs),

3) a two-platoon advance up the hill with Company Headquarters o)ving

with the left flank platoon, 4) a support element to fire f've E-8 riot

gas launchers (each launcher cont.;dned 28 gas rocket pods), and 5)

attacking platoons were to don gas masks one-half to two-thirds of the

way up the slope. This commar,. was given over the command net. A red

star cluster was the back-up si-nal for launching this gt..., attack.

The operation was successful. The gas attack was launched

agciJ;t the e'emy occupying the hill. Uie North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

was not equipped with gas mas,:e and was forced to withdraw. The two

attacking platoons occupied the hill with only 4

_a wounded. Jones

attributes the succes! if the operation to effective planning. An

analysis of the enemy situation tild the company commander he could

expect heavy resistance. The day befwre, a company assault against

enemy positions had resulted in heavy casualties. TPe same company

had been ovcrrjn d'iing the night. Another compaiv was surrounded and

cut off from che battalion. Expecting heavy resistance, the company

commander's plan for assaulting the hilt had two major components: 1)

to organize the platoon as A covering %orce so it could adequately

place effective supF)essing fire, toe number of machine guns was

doubled and the numb~r of LAWs (M72 rockets) was tr tied, and 2) to I surprise the enemy with an unexpected tactic, the company commander

anticipated the NVA would not have gas masks and that such an attack

would force the NVA to withdraw. "-ining was important. The gas could

30

_________ .i
not be fired too early. If it was, the gas would dissipate and the

NVA could re-occupy the hill before the attacking platoons reached the

top. This part of the plan involved further components: a) selecting

a gas launch element and training the element during the night, b)

developing a plan for when the gas would be fired, which included

back-up signals in the event of radio breakdown, and c) issuing and

testing Oas masks for the attacking platoons.

The importance of planning is readily revealed when its absence

produces disasterous effects. During an ES exercise* in Wildflicken,

West Germany (1274), an infantry platoon leader was given the mission

to delay an approaching tank column. The platoon leader did not develop a plan that took into account the disposition and coordination of

the weapons systems that were available to him. These were 90mm

Recoilless Rifles (RRs), M72 LAWs, heavy anti-tank mines, and

contrulled demolition. The platoon leader also did not formulate a

plan for withdrawal. Apparently as a result of the planning

omissions, the delay force damaged only one tank and was partly

overrun. The withdrawal was characterized by confusion and part of

the force and its equipment were left behind.

Garland (1967) tells of the fatal impact of planning oversights

as well. In 1965 in Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam, a U. S. rifle company was conducting a sweep operation. The company commander left the

weapons platoon on a hill to provide fire support for the company as

it conducted its sweep into a valley. He did not plan additional

security for the weapons platoon. Two hours after the company had

left the weapons platoon, it was attacked by a Viet Corng force and

overrun. This planning oversight resulted in 16 men killed and

six wounded. The Viet Cong also collected 18 individual weapons, ammunition, and two radios.

The relation between planning and other managerial skili categories is a close one. In fact, planning helps to lay the groundwork for our next skill category, execution and control.

4I

*All references to ES exercises are based upon observations of

Kinton research personnel.

I3

31t
Execution and control. As far as we can determine, there are no

equivalents to what we are calling execution and control in the mmnagerial or socio-psychological literature. An approximation to our

intended meaning comes from the military literature. Helme, Willemtin,

arid Grafton (1971) delineated eight general factors of officer

leadership in a simulated combat situation, two of which were command

of men and executive direction. According to these authors, command

of men refers to the direct command and control in a field operation

while executive direction, for the most part, refers to timely ana

decisive actions and organizing ability. Execution and control of a

tactical unit is a highly complex skill that is dependent in varying

degrees upon other skills (e.g., planning, communication, techrical).

A breakdown in any one of these skill areas inur-diately lessens execution and control. Jones' combat experience in Vietnam (1969) is, once

again, illustrative.

An infantry tank company team in Quang Tri Province was

attempting to surround and destroy an enemy unit. The company team

commanuder was maneuvering three rifle platoons and a tank platoon in an effort to trap the enemy unit. As these elements were

constantly changing positions in anticipation of the enemy dirertion

of retreat, the need for effective execution and control was paramount. Contact with the enemy force caused the company team commander

to move hli second platoon to a new blocking position on a ridgeline.

This .hange wa, not clearly relayed to the tank platoon leader.

Approximately an hour later the tank platoon spotted movement on the

ridge. Assuming the movement was the enemy force, the tank platoon

opened fire with their main guns. This execution and control error by

the company team commander resulted in seven dead and 13 wounded among the second platoon.

Leader difficulty in arai,;tIi iinn adequate execution dnd control

has also been apparent in ES exercjs• At Fort Lewis, Washington, in

August 1974, during an ES exercise, a ril',s piat.,e' ,,'as conducting an

assault on a bunker complex. Elements of the platoon had M-ae contact, and part of the platoon was also receiving some indir-nct fire.

The platoon leader had iccided to call for artillery supporL "afore

continuing his assault. However, at that time, the platoon leader was

net aware that one of his squads had penetrated the right flank of the

bunker and was still advancing. The platoon leader had not received

this information on the platoon radio net. Incoming artillery,

sporadic small-arms fire, casualties, dense woods, and undergrowth all

contributed to the confusion Dn the battlefield and hindered the platoon leader from knowing the exact status of his unit. The word to

pull back was oassed, but the squad that had penetrated the complex

did not receive this information and was caught in the artillery

barrage. Twelve casualties resulted from this loss of control. These

additional losses weakened the platoon so badly that the assault could

not be sustained.

32

Tr ZI
The dbove examples show that execution and control 4- the actual

implementation and follow-through of a tactical operation plan. It is a

multifaceted skill area representing an intricate composite of other

skills such ac etfective -mployment e' men, maintaining cormunicatlons, contingency arrangements, setting a rtandard, and making

timely and unequivocal decisions.

Initiating structure. As mentioned earlier, the term initting

structure orliinated from the work of Hemphill (194gb) and was further

isolated in several factor analytic studies of questioni.ire item

Intercorrelatlons (Halpin and Winer, 1957). It is one of two

leadership factors that has undergone extensive research during the

past 20 years, most notably by Fielshman and his colleagues (Fleishman,

1973). Because the term is already well defined and understood

by investigators of leadership, we have chosen to retain the term

as it is used in the psychological literature. Essentially, this

definition refers to the extent to which leaders are likely to define

and structure their roles and those of their subordinates toward goal

attainment. Initiating structure involves acts that demonstrate that

the leader organizes and defines tasks to be completed. People are

assigned to particular tasks and deadlines are set.

The need to define roles and tasks is extremely important in tactical operations. The success of an operation is dependent upon

leaders and their elements fulfilling the combat role assgned to

them. The failure to understand or comply with the assigned mission

is often the cause for the failure of a tactical operation.

In June 1969 in Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam, a reconnaissance tEam was given the mission to acquire intelligence on enemy

activities in a particular area of operation (Jones, 1969). The team

was to avoid contact as the mission was strictly one of gathering

intelligence. The team operating in the assigned reconnaisspnce

zone came upon approximately 15 NVA soldiers eating an evening meal.

Instead of reporting this information dnd plotting the coordinates, the

reconnaissance team commander decided to ambush the NVA force. The

reconnaissance team initiated a hasty ambush and soon found themselvws

surrounded by a large NVA force. The team had actually stumbled into

an NVA base camp. The team took several casualties and a reactionary

force w•c committed to rescue them. This force also tookl heavy

casualties and the fighting continued through the night. By nok.

understdnding or fulfilling his assigned role, the reconnaisiancoý team

commander was not only responsible for unnecessary casualties, but also

allowed a large enemy unit to escape before a coordinated operation could be launched against it.

Initiating structure is especially important in combined arms

operations. Here the need for defined roles and tasks among the elements of a combined arms team is essential for unit success. Given

the lethality of modern weapons systems and the need to suppress those

33
systems, each element of a combined arms operation must have a clear

understanding of its role and how it relates to other elements for

attainment of the mission. The ES exercises in Wildflicken, Germany

(1974) provide an apt example. A combined arms team was advancing

against torces with anti-tank capabilities. The task force commander

had employed his infantry to the front of the advancing tanks to provide a "protective umbrella" for his armor. Tank commanders were

instructed not to bypass the infantry. However, the tank commaneor of

the light section bypassed the infantry as he advanced along the left

flank axis. The two tanks were engaged by enemy weapons systems and

destroyed. Of the elements of the combined arms team (tanks,

infantry, anti-tank elements, and artillery), it was the tank commander who departed from the existing structure. In brief, a departure from defined roles by any one element can diminish the chances

for unit success.

Interaction with subordinates and superiors. Our use of the phrase

"interaction with subordinate and superiors" closely parallels what

the leadership literature refers to as "consideration." The Ohio

State Leadership Studies, previously examined, isolated consideration

as a prominent leadership dimension--the counterpart to initiating

structure. For the past 25 years it has been extensively sludied

(Fleishman, 1973). Basically, this dimension refers to the degree to

which an individual's interactions with subordinates and superiors

promotes nutual trust, respect, high morale, group cohesiveness, and

ultimately, progress toward goal attainment. Relations 0.ith associates, it will be remembered, was one of the functional managerial

areas of the Williams' (1956) study. Good interpersonal relations

with one's peers is an attribute, variously labeled, that appears

many places in the literature (e.g., McGregor, 1960; Blake and Mouton,

1964). We prefer the term "interaction with subordinates and superiors" because we find it more descriptive for a military setting.

The leader's interactions with others need not be fixed, but

should adapt to changes in the situation. In certain situations, a

very directive, hard-nosed, tasi-oriented style of interaction with

subordinates will be most effe•:ive (c.g., if they are procrastinating in digging defensive positions, a kick in the pants may work best).

At other times, however, an approachable, person-oriented style of

interaLtion will be most effective (e.g., a frustrated subordinate may

be trying to do a good job and only need encouragement rather than a

reprimand for his failures).

In combat, how well a leader develops mutual trust and support in

his squad or platoon depends on his ability to keep his men alive. The

overriding concern of soldiers in combat is survival. Soldiers identify with the leaders whom they feel offer the best chances of surviving an engagement with the enemy. In a very short time the good

units and bad ones (and good and bad leaders) are commonly known among

the soldiers and small unit leaders. for example, in Vietnam, Delta

34

.1

i. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Company enjoyed initial success against the enemy (Jones, 1969). In

one month, D Company killed approximately 60 enemy while suffering

only two wounded. The soldiers in that company had confidence in

their leaders and believed they had a good chance of surviving. In

another company in the same battalion, heavy casualties were sustained

on more than one occ~asion. The word was quickly out that one's chances "for making it" in that Company were not good. Group morale and

cohesiveness were serious problems.

The same identification prece:s has been observed in ES exercises. Dluring 19 weeks of observation of ES exercises at Fort Lewis,

Washington and Wildflicken and Berl-in, West Germany, it was quite

apparent to the authors that soldiers identified with the leaders with

* the best performance records. Leaders whose units continually suffered heavy casualties were often subject to open criticism and ridi- 

* cule. On the other hand, leaders who were successful seemed to emerge

as folk heroes. One such incident occurred in Wildflicken. A defensive force had suffered a series of setbacks. Leader roles changed and a platoon sergeant was given the mission of defending a town

against a tank infantry assault. The new leader planned a detailed

defense of the village that included anti-tank mines and controlled

demolitions covered 'y 00n RRs on the main tank approaches into the

town. The defense t~ý_ ý;.c.essful; four tanks were destroyed as well

as most of the advancing infantry. The sergeant received numerous

accolades from his solc.icrs and was recognized as a leader who could

perform well in a battle situation.

Communication

C~ommrunication can be studied as a group process or as an individual skill. We shall pursue both approaches. In a well-known series

of experiments, Leavitt (1951) investigated the effects of varicus

patterns or networks of communications upon group behavior. In the

standard procedure, positions at a table are separated by panels so

that group members are unable to see or speak to one another. Communication networks (e.g., circle, chain, Y, wheel, sta,') are

established by keeping certain slots on the panels opened and others

closed. In the "circle" network, a person can only communicate with

adjacent neighbors. In the "wheel," all communications must pass

* through the person occupying the nodal position of the wheel. The

* problem facing the five-member group was to identify the single symbol

that each member held in common on a card containing several symb~ols

such as a triangle, square, and asterisk. It was found that stable

organizations developed by the fourth or fifth trial in the more

centralized networks but not in the circle. In the wheel, Y, and

chain, the individual in the most central position transmitted more

messages than any other individual in the centralized groups. He

enjoyed his job more than did peripheral members and was designated as

the leader on the post-experimental questionnaire. The most inefficient group was the circle; this groaup sent the most messages and

35

-. ~ A
made the greatest number of errors in trying to identify the common

symbol. Group member satisfaction, however, was qreater for members

of the circle group than for peripheral members of the centralized

groups. In an interesting review by Shaw (1964) of his iwn and

others' work, centralized networks were found more effeutive in

solving simple problems of information exchar.ge but decentralized networks were more effective on problems characterized by complexity and

ambiguity.

Communication network research will undoubtedly uncover other

interactions. The present line of research is significant in that it

clearly shows that leadership emergence is strikingly affected by communication arrangements and that the most influential person is

usually the one privy to all communications. It is interestin, to

note that the same findings that occur in Leavitt's artificially

imposed laboratory study hold up in real life settings as well.

Kipnis (1957) studied the effect of communication in B-29 bomber crews

and obtained similar results. Individuals who, because of their crew

positions, had the most interaction with the other members of the crew

also tended to be most frequently chosen as most influential by them.

Spatial and physical arrangements have been shown to affect

leadership Wurster, emergence as well (Steinzor, 1950; Bass, Klubeck, and 1953; Howells and Becker, 1962; and Sommer, 1961). In a

three-person group, for example, the person sitting alone at the table

facing the others will be perceived as the leader. It is noteworthy

that even minor differences in the physical setting help to determine

who becomes a leader. These physical factors play a relatively minor

role, however, and whatever impact they would have in an ES setting is

likewise suspect.

When we initially constructed our taxonomy of skills, it was soon

realized that coninunication was perhaps the most pervasive of the

collection. In fact, it is difficult to think of another category

with which it does not interact. Nonetheless, our individual communication skills revealed two sub-sets that could be identified:

skills that were concerned with the transfer of information and

skills that involved the pursuit and receipt of information.

Transfer of information will be discussed first.

Transfer of information. Apart from the studies on communication networks (e.g., Leavitt, 1951) and spatial arrangemeents (e.g., Howells

and Becker, 1962), research on the actual transfer cf information with

respect to leadership is scarce. On the other hand, tihe affect of

exclusive possession of information upon leadership -w.wrq=tace has been

studied. Results from various studies indicate that Lhe possession of

task-relevant information provides an advantige In attempting and

gaining leadership in a group (Hemphill, Pepinsky, Shevitz, Jaynes,

and Christner, 1956; Shaw and Penrod, 1962; Shaw, 1S63; Rudraswanty,

1964). One important difference between the studies on leadership

36

I...4
emergence and ES is that in the latter situation the leader is

appointed rather than emerges. Still, the lesson to be learned from

the literature clearly suggests that the individual who possesses

information and knows how to handle it is often the most valued

member of the group.

The experience derived from combat and ES exercises points to

the criticality of tr;nsmittal of planned information and the acquisition of new information if tactical operations are to be sustained and

effective. Inadequate transfer of information is often the reason for

friendly casualties and mission failure. In an ES exercise at Fort

Stewart, Georgia, in 1977, the point elenment of an attacking platoon

detected a booby trap but failed to inform the following elements.

The point team made contact with the enemy and, as the platoon moved

forward to reinforce that element, the platoon leader and his Radio

Teleohone Operator (RTO) tripped the booby trap and became casualties.

Consequently, for about five minutes there was no platoon control over

the attacking squads.

Another example of the dire consequences of poor transfer of

information skills occurred in ar; ES exercise in Wildflicken, West

Germany in 1974. A TOW element as part of a defensive force, observed

an approaching tank platoon split and move on each side of a lung but

narrow wooded area. It also observed infantry dismount and advance

into this wooded terrain. The TOW element immediately took the near

tank section under fire. However, another part of the defensive

force, an infantry anti.-tank element located in the woods, was not

informi•d of the enemy activity. Conseruently, the team was taken by

surprise by the enemy infantry. As the team withdrew it came out on

the other side of the woods, and the APC that contained the anti-tank

element was taken under fire by the advancing tanks and destroyed. VThe lO-man anti-tank team was totally eliminated.

In a combined arms exercise in Wildflicken, West Germany, in

19'r a task force commander was informed by a forward infantry ele- -..t. that an enemy anti-tank team was tracking one of the advancing

sections of tanks. The immediate and complete communication of this

information was essential for preventing loss of one or nmre of the

tanks. The commander, receiving the report of enemy activity and

their location, was able to relay the information to the advancing

tanks, which were able to *ake evasive action before the enemy TOW

could er. Immediately vpo•i completing that transmission, the

task fhrce commander began to call for indirect fire on the enemy

position using the infantry team to adjust the mission on target.

This example shows the positive results that can be obtained through

eff'- "ye inications. It also demonstrates the importance of the

*,. sk,;. categories to effective communication skills. For

example, initiating structure was clearly a contributing factor to

the task force commander's good communication skills. The infantry squad fully appreciated the significance of their assigned role. By

37

• "~~ ~ :x.•• .",,•.'.-.

"f
immediately reporting the enemy position and its location, the infantry

elements were able to prevent tank losses. Slow or incomplete transfer

of information here most likely woul( lot have been good enough since

seconds made the difference in avoidiiig equipment losses.

Pursuit and receipt of information. The first component, pursuit, reflects the degree to wh'ch the'leader actively seeks out

needed information and tries to keep informed on all matters

pertaining to the mission. The second component, receipt, refers

not only to whether vital information is relayed back to the leader

but a', ' to whether he is open and receptive to that information. Of

the two components, the second comes closer to having a relation

to the research literature. The willingness to incorporate advice

from others and to share the decision making process with others is an

attribute that appears many places in the literature. The Vroom and

Yetton decision making model (1973), whic'i we examined earlier, centers

around the willingness to incorporate advice from subordinates.

Others have spoken of democratic vs. authoritarian forms of

leadership. Lippitt (1940), for example, found that a democratic form

of leadership tended to provide group members with greater freedom for

decision and action than an authoritarian or laissez faire pattern

of leadership. More recently, Heslin and Dunphy (1964) and Reid

(1970) also found greater member satisfaction with a leader who provided greater opportunity for participation.

In a tactical situation, failing to pursue needed information is

relatively common among inexperienced pljaoon leaders. In many of the

observed ES exercises, the platoon leader, upon being engaged, often

called for counter-battery fire withiout knowing the exact location of

elements of his unit. The usual result was that a sizeable part of

the platoon was killed by the mission.

The above examples show how essential the transmittal of planned

information and the receipt of new information are for successful tactical operations. In combined arms operations, the coorcindted

maneuver of task force elements is dependent upon continuous, complete,

and accurate transfer of itiformation. As the situation develops, new

information must be accurately reported to and processed by the task

force commander in the form of contingency instructions that are

responsive to the constant changes inherent in combined arms engagements. This transfer of planned information, receipt of new information, and transfer of new information is a constant cycle that, if

broken, inmiediately lessens the likelihood of accomplishing the

mission.

Problem Solving

Interest in problem solving cuts across several academic disciplines. Any discipline that purports to understand and predict

individual or group behavior must eventually concern itself with the

38
processes that regul'te and control efforts at problem solving and

decision making. Some disciplines, such as managerial science, economics, and operations research take a normative or prescriptive

approach while others, such as psychology and sociology, adopt a

descriptive model where the attempt is to ascertain the antecedent

conditions of problem solving. In the normative model, the le.-•dr's

behavior is usually treated as the inaependent variable and the organizational consequences of the behavior are the dependent variables.

With the descriptive approach, the leader's behavior is the dependent

variable that, in turn, is a function of the individual characteristics and situational factors that compose the independent

variables. These variables are shown in Figure 2.

1 4

Situational Organizational

Variables Outcomes

3 A•.

Leader

Behavior

I!

2 la

Personal ..- Situational

Attributes Variables

Figure 2. Variables Used In Leadership Research

39

S. ... . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ,F• 'I I I I. . :
The psychological studies discussed earlier assumed that leader

behavior (#3) was a function of personality traits (#2). This view

was replaced by one that focused on situational determinants (#1) as

the antecedent conditions of leader behavior (#3). Treating leader

behavior only as a dependent variabie is somewhat limiting. Vroom

(1976) asserts, "there is strong a Priori evidence that a theory which

attempts to account for the behavTr o a leader with only information

concerning his personal attributes (such as his LPC score) or only of

the situation he is confronting is automatically limited to

4xplaining only a small portion of the variance" (p. 1537). If one

Starts with leader behavior (#3) in Figure 2 and moves to the right,

,leader behavior serves as the independent variable and organizational

outcomes (#4) become the dependent variables. On this side of the

figure, the relevant processes are organizatiunal rather than psychological. What actions on the part of the leader are required in

guiding the organization toward achievement of its external

objectives? Vroom advocates the need for both descriptive models, in which leader behavior (#3) is treated as a joint function of

situational variables (#i) and personal attributes (#2), and normative

models, in which organizational outcomes (#4) are a function of leader

behavior (#3) and situational variables (#1a).

Our own concept of problem solving is to treat it as a process

as well as a skill. As indicated earlier, problem solving skill is something that a person acquires. Proficiency with problem solving is thus

dependent upon practice, the acquisition of sub-skills, and their subsequent execution. Evidence to support the view that problem solving

can be learned comes from numerous sources (e.g., Ray, 1957; Anderson,

1965; and Stern, 1967). One can trace interest in problem solving

back to the writings of the old-guard Gestalt psychologists (Koffka,

1935; Kohler, 1924, Wertheimer, 1945). Although American behaviorism

was predominant during this period, its reliance on past S-R associations did not do a very adequate job of explaining problem solving

activity. Problem solving depends on previous learning, yet it goes

beyond previous learning. Problem solving is distinguished from

learning by the occurrence of a correct response or solution previously not wiithin the individual's repertoire (Gagne, 1964; Johnson,

1972). Procedures for studying problem solving have centered on

puzzles wherE the solution was not immnediately available. The study

of problem solving makes many psychologists think of Maier's (1933)

pendulum problems, Duncker's (1945) paper clip and pyramid problems,

Luchins' (194) water jars, and Wertheimer's (1945) parallelogram.

Problem solviP'g ability, we know now, relies on past experience (in

fact, past experience can impede problem solving as the well-known

Einstellung and functional-fixity phenomena clearly demonstrate), is

subject to transient motivational states of the organism as well as to

situational and personal factors, and involves the integraticn of component processes into a new and higher order solution.

40
In the ES situation, these component processes can be classified

as idantification and interpretation of cues, weighing alternatives,

and choosing a course of action. This classification scheme of

dividing problem solving into three basic constituents approximates

fairly closely events as they occur in ES--usually after contact is

made. It rispresents our way of making sense of the ES problem solving

process. It is interesting to note that Simon (1960) interprets of

decision making in a very similar vein. According to Simon (1960),

"Decision-making co.prise5 three principal phases: finding occasions

for making a decision; finding possible courses of action; and

choosing among courses of action" (p. 1). Because problems encountered in ES vary enormously in their difficulty and scope, any given

classification scheme is likely to fall short of doing full justice to

the complexity of the phenomena under study. Consequently, all

classification schemes should be regarded as tentative until they have

proven their usefulness.

Identification and interpretation of cues. The first phase or

process that we have listed is identification and interpretation of

cues. In the ES context, a cue is either a sign of or contact with

the enemy. Identification and interpretation occur almost simultaneously but they can be measured individually. Identification, therefore, can be operationally defined as recognizing a cue as an

indication of an opposing force's actions, intentions, or presence. A

cue can be of high or low visibility. An example of a high visibility cue would be contact with the enemy, whether directly (firefight, incoming artillery) or indirectly (booby traps or detonated

mines). A low visibility cue would be one that indicates enemy activity in the not so distant area--a cigarette butt, footprint, or

freshly broken tree branch. Interpretation of an identified cue can

be defined as dpducing the opposing force's disposition given the

cue(s). , other words, does the leader make an effort to determine

the significance of the cue? For example, given the detonation of a

claymore, does the leader consider whether it was command detonated or

booby-trapped? If command detonated, this should tell the leader that

the enemy force i1 physically present and, therefore, his personnel

should take protective action. If the claymore was booty-trapped,

this should tell the leader that the mine may serve as an early

warning device and thus the opposing force may be aware of their location.

Weighing alternatives. Weighing alcernatives is not as easy as

it may first appear. Cognitive psychologists have shown that the tendency to produce solutions immediately often interferes with the

opportunity to derglop new cognitive structures and alternative

response patterns. Several experiments on a variety of problems have

shown that when subjects are instructed to wait rather than to start

the solution immediately, problem solving performance is improved

(Cohen, 1954, Duncan, 1963; Ray, 1957). Thus, an effective aid to

problem solving is to inhibit the innediate impulse to respond first

41
and to think later. This does not mean that one can wait forever before

respondivig. Another obstacle to the weighing of alternatives

is Duncker's (1945) concept of functional-fixity, the inability to see

beyond the usual function for an object. Becoming "trapped by the

stimulus object" accounts, in large part, for the lack of ingenuity,

resourcefulness, and flexibility that we observe in many futile

problem solving efforts. The inability of subjects to perceive other

than the prescribed use of objects has also been documented by

Adamson (1952). In a polemica) piece of writing entitled On The

Pschology of Military Incompetence, Dixon (1976) has singTid'it

"military leadership as es-Peci&TUlyvulnerable to a certain ridigity

of thinking. While Dixon would be hard put to demonstrate that the

military has a monopoly on rigidity, the survival record of social

units that succumb to it, is not very impressive.

In weighing alternatives, one assesses the likely consequences

of each action. Given that the claymore, in our last example, was

coimiiand detonated, at least these possible courses of action exist.

One can: 1) assault the enemy position, 2) withdraw and consolidate

force, or 3) maneuver force around and by-pass danger area. The consequences of assaulting the position would be the probable sustaining

of casualties through direct and indirect fire. Withdrawing and

consolidating the force could also result in indirect fire casualties.

Maneuvering and by-passing the danger area could result in no casualties and denying the enemy force any knowledge of your location.

Choosing a course of action. In the ES battles that Kinton has

monitored, we have observed on more than one occasion inactivity nn the

part of the leader, once contact has been made. Sometimes the leader

will stdy in one position !r as long as 30 minutes. The result of

failing to decide on a couse of action is usually heavy artillery

casualties. Once the alternative courses of action have been weighed,

the leader must select the alternative that leads to the most

favorable consequences. Moreover, he must decide on a timely course

of Action that will verify his estimates of enemy activity or provide

further cues to make a better determination of the enemy sit!-!tion.

Depending on the mission, such a course of action may be directed

toward avoiding casualties and denying the enemy information on your

location.

The importance of deciding on a timely course of action appears

in the military leadership literature as well. Uhlaner (1970, 1975),

in his factor analytic studies, speaks of proficiency on tasks requiring

decisive and timely action under his factor of executive direction.

Generally speaking, the three processes of identification and

interpretation of cues, weighing alternatives, and choosing a course

of action occur in the sequence discussed above. The cycling of processes, however, may not be as orderly as this sequence suggests. Tne

flow of events need not be unidirectional. The weighing alternatives

42
phase may need more information or cues for adequate assessment. A

course of action may be decided upon to obtain more cues. There are

problems at any given phase that generate sub-problems that, in turn, have their respective components of identifying and interpreting cues,

weighing alternatives, and choosing a Lourse of action. What we

really have are problem solving processes nested within problem solving processes. For expository purposes, it is easier to speak of

the three principal phases discussed above that become clearly

discernible as the problem solving process unfolds.

Tactical

Few would dispute the fact that a leader's tactical skills are a

primary determinant of a unit's performance in a tactical situation.

However, except for the studies by Uhlaner (1970, 1975) and Helme, Wellemin, and Grafton (1971), the leadership research literature is not

very helpful with respect to tactical skills. Although there is very little in the-research literature that addresses tactics specifically

for sinall units, varti.ous field manuals set forth the basic concepts of U. S. Army doctrine. For example, FM 21-6 How to Prepare and

Conduct Military Training (1975) states-that:

"The tactics and the t 4chniques used to accomplish the squad's missions are not fixed. As the enemy situation, terrain, and other environmental factors

change, the squad must adapt to these changes. It

must reach into its bag of tricks (the tactics and

techniques it uses) and find the right combination

which will permit it to' accomplish its mission without

sustaining excessive casualties" (p. 51).

Although the quotation was written with rifle squads in mind, the

thought or concept it conveys is applicable to all branches of the

combat arms and to all units from infantry fire teams or armor sectiiis

to mechanized infantry or armor companies. Furthermore, FM 21-6 scates

that leaders are responsible for preparing and conducting effective tactical collective training. This statement can be interpreted

to mean that a leader nust have tactical skills. Many other FMs, too

numerous to list here, also discuss various .spects of tactics and

further support its inclusion as a leader skill.

Tactics, most will agree, involve both knowledge and application. Before anything else, a leader ,ust ndV, tactical knowledge, a foundation of what the acceptable tactics are. However, knowledge cannot

be considered a skill. For the present effort, it is assumed that

tactical knowledge is present. It is the application of thdt know- ledge that constitutes the leader skill, Application may invoive combining portions of acceptable tactics, developing new tactics, or varying existing tactics.

~1 _ __ _C

EE EIEI_0L 
Atpop.tication. Regardless of a unic mission (e.g., defense, movement to conta•-, delay, retrograde), every, unii. is expected to accomplish

three major goals: detection of the enemy, destruction of the enemly,

and sustaining minimal casualties (FM 71-1 The Tank and Mechanized

Infantry Com an Tea. , 1977). One possible exception would be a

r'econnaTssan-e mission that would not normally include destroying the

enemy. In October 1966, a battalion of the 25th Infantry Division was

conducting a search and destroy mission in the HoBo Woods in Tay Ninh

Province of South Vietnam. An infantry platoon was bein used as the

battalion point element. Moving cautiously in heavily v oded terrain,

the platoon suddenly came under heavy and light machine gun fire. The

platoon had walked into a "V" shaped complex of reinforced concrete

bunkers manned by heavy and light machine gun crews. The platoon

leader had failed to detect the enemy. The consequences--100%

casualties including 11 killed. The above incident took place in

Operation Attleboro and is documented by Marshall (1969). Another

example is an incident that occurred during ES exercises conducted at

Fort Hunter-Liggett in September 1978. During a movement to contact,

a combined arms team consisting of an armor and mechaiized infantry

platoon and a TOW section was moving forward in a valley. The infantry platoon was leading the team. Suddenly, a defenise sagger engaged

the infantry platoon. Within seconds, the infantry platoo;, had lost

i11 personnel and four APCs. Again, the infantry platoon leader had

not detected the enemy, and the consequences were catastrophic. If the

leaders of these units had demonstrated better proficiency,.in the tactical skills associated with detecting the enemy, casua1lties might well

have been minimized. In both instances, overwatch techniques could

have been used for the purpose of detecting the enemy.

Once the enemy has been detected, one must possess the tactical

skills required to suppress and destroy the enemy. There exists an

overlap between these skills and the technical skills associated with

weapons. The: primary difference between the two is that the technical

skills associated with weapons primarily concern the matching of

weapons with potential targets (i.e., placing an anti-armor weapon as

opposed to light arms where an enemy tank is likely to appear), whereas the tactical skills associated with destroying the enemy concern

rendering the enemy force an ineffective element.

As was the case with tactical skills associated with detecting

the enemy, historical incidents illustrate the importance and justify

the inclusion of the tactical skills associated with destroying the

enemy. During ES exercises conducted in Wildflicken, West Germany

(1974), infantry elements were employed in small patrols well in front

(500-1,000 meters) of advancing tanks. The infantry units were

directed to locate anti-tank elements and register indirect fire on

them. They succeeded in this mission. Had they detected the antitank elements and not been able to destroy them with indirect fire,

they themselves, as well as the advancing tank force, could have

received heavy casualties. Another incident (Hannaman, 1967), which

44

>1.4
illustrates the importance of t;i) skill, occurred in June 1967 outside the village ,f Trang Bang, Tay Ninh Province in South Vietnam.

A squad from the reconnaissance platoon of the 1/27 infantry hd

eztablished an ambush on a trail frequently used by the 271st •-.jIment

of the NVA. A NVA platoon was sighted coming down the trail be~fre

daybreak. The reconnaissance pi-,toon had detected the enemy without

itself being detected. However, the ambush was triggered prematurely

by an impatient M60 gunner in a flank position. As a result, the NVA

platoon was engaged be!,Pre the entire element was within the kill

zone of the ambush. The unit and its leader demonstrated their profi

ciency in detecting the enemy, but were not effective at destroying

the enenmy. The NVA platoon sustainud only one casualty before

withdrawing into the jungle. Had -,se ambush not been triggered prematurely, the NVA platoon might ha,, ,been effectively destroyed.

A leader must be proficient in the tactical skills associated

with minimizing casualties. as well as detection and destruction of the

erp2my. If the leader and his un.,t are proficient in the detection and destruction of the enemy 5ut sustain a large percentage of casualties,

their overall tactical skill leavEs much to be desired. Specifically,

minimizing casualties involves rm.•aining an effective fighting force

after engaging the enemy.' Profidency in tfvis skill involves minimizing the probability of being detected prior to an engagement and

sustaining minimum casualties during an eneagement. A well-documented

incident that underscores the importance of minimizing casualties

occurred in April 1953 in Korea during the fight for Pork Chop Hill

(Marshall, 1956). Two rifle companies were committed to making an

assault up Pork Chop Hill in order to recapture it from the Chinese.

In brief, both units suffered heavy casualties ,4ich rendered them

ineffective fighting units. The division commande- iiad to reinforce

them with two other rifle companies. In another incident a platoon

was employed as a reactionary force to relieve a U. S. platoon pinned

down by the NVA (Hannaman, 1967). 4The reactionary force was landed

via helicopters behind the NVA platoon. They detected the NVA platoon

without being detected themselves and inflicted 100% casualties on the

NVA force. However, they failed to suppress the NVA force with

artillery or close air support and allowed the NVA to inflict approximately 85% casualties. In this example, the unit accomplished its

mission; however, it sustained heavy casualties that rendered it an

ineffective fighting force. Little proficit•icy was demonstrated in

the tactical skills associated with sustaining minimal casualties.

45

- ..
Ii brief, it should be understood thdt the tactical skills assoclated with detecting and destroying the enemy and sustaining minimal

casualties are not isolated from one another. To possess a high

degree of proficiency in the application of tactics, proficie;,.;y must

be demonstrated in all th;'ee areas. The aibsence of any one of the

tt-ee tactical application skills diminishes the efWctiveness of the

others.

Techni'vA

-l•oth Uhlaner (191'5) a•nd Williams (1956) cite te,-,-,nicai skills as

an important fa:6or in their respective leadership studies. In these

studies, however, technical skills are treated on a very general

level. According to Uhlaner (1975) in his description of technical

staff skills, "a major aspect of technical/managerial performance

invol:es use of specific knowledge and skills in logistics and technical services in supAoyt of combat activities" (p. 11). The critical

incident study by Williams (1956) reported in Campbell, et al. (197C)

includes the following descriptions under the heading of technical

competence: "effectively organizes and applies knowledge of management

to his job," "utilizes all available sources of information in reaching conclusions or decisions," and "demonstrates ingenuity in solving management problems." Both Uhlaner and Williams seem to be addressing

the managerial side of technical resources rather than identifying the

specific technical skills and knowledges required in a tactical setting.

At the more specific level, there are numerous DA publications

(FMs, TMs, TCs) that address a multitude of technical skills (e.g.,

camouflage, explosives and demolition, field radio techniques). These

publications are directed to both enlisted and officer personnel and

can be found referenced in ARTEP 71-2 (1977).

In an effort to avoid the extremes of being too general or too

specific, we have divided technical skills into the effective use of

equipment and proficiency on a number of basic skills. The cornponents of technical equipment skills include the effective use of tactical vehicles, communication equipment, and weapons. The components

of basic technical skills include map reading and terrain analysis.

Each of the components will be addressed individually.

EqLui mn. Proficiency in the use of tactical vehicles incluaes

understanding of when and how to use them. This is evident from

many observations of combined arms tactical ES exercises that involved

extensive use of both Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and tanks.

During such exercises conducted at Fort 1lunter-Liggett in September

1978, company teams moved tanks as a unit but did not employ overwatch. As a result, many tanks were lost to enemy fire and enemy

positions were not detected. Had proper overwatch been employed,

enemy positions probably could have been detected by overwatch ele- i ments.

46
Technically, communication equipment could be viewed to include

the Army's entire array of electronic communication equipment. However, for the purpose of this discussion, only communication equip- mehnt typical of small units is of concern, including platoon, squad,

field radios, and telephones. It is important that all available

means of conventional or electronic communication equipment be used in

tactical situations. This increases communicaticn within the unit and

the probability of succeeding in a tactical situation. During ES

exercises conducted in Berlin (1975), an infantry platoon leader in

the defense placed an observatioi; post (OP) 500 meters in front of his

main defensive line. The terrain was heavily wooded, which prevented

!. any visual contact with the OP, and the distance o•as too great to communicate verbally without a radio or telephone. However, the platoon

leader did not provide the OP with a radio or field t elephone although equipment was available. As a result, when the OP detected the

enemy, he had no means of informing the platoon leader. The OP was

killed, and the only intelligence receivd by the platoon leader was

the small arms fire. In another example ,VNnnaman, 1966), the leader

of a reconraissance platoon on a search and destroy mission had

insured that all three squads in his platoon were equipped with PRC-77

radios sirce it was impossible to maintain visual contect with all

squads involved. The squad serving as the point element for the platoo• w~s ambushed, and though there were few casualties, the NVA did

capture a PRC-77. The platoon leader began communication wit;. the two

remaining squads using his PRC-77 in order to coordinate an offensive

tactic, but the platoon net was limmediately keyed by the NVA force.

Because the platoon leader had failed to tell his squad leaders the

alternate frequency, all communications ceased. The platoon leader

had to physically locate the squad leaders to give them the alternate

frequency. To make matters worse, the platoon leac~r picked an

arbitrary alternate frequency, initiated a communication check, and

was abruptly told that the net he had selected was the command net of

a sister battalion. By the time the communication problems were

solved the NVA unit had disappeared. Both of the cases cited above

serve to justify and support proficiency in the use of communication

equipment as a leader skill.

Proficiency in the use of weapons is the third technical equipment

skill. In this context, weapons include only those organic to small

units and any weapons normally used to support small units. These

are the following:

small arms (M16 and M6U) anti-armor weapons (TOW, DRAGON, M72 LAW, and 90mm 4 Recoil mess Rifle)

anti-tank and anti-personnel mines

indirect fire (105mm, 155mm, 81mm mortar, 4.2 mortar)

tank main gun

grenades

.1 47

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _-* -
Proflciency in the use of weapons can be discussed in terms of three

aspects: 1) matching weapons with potential targets 2) selecting the

appropriate weapon for engaging an enemy when scieraf weipons are

available, and 3) effectively deploying weapons in a manner that permits their use to complement one another.

Matching weapons and targets involves placing anti-armor weapons

where armor targets are anticipated and small arms where human targets

are anticipated. For example, if a leader anticipated tanks would use

a dirt roaid within his area of operation, and he wantUJ to position

a weapon that could destroy approaching targets (tanks) near the road, he should not pldce an infantryman with an M16 at that location. An

anti-armor weapon would, of course, be more appropriate.

When several weapons are available, a leader must be proficient

at selecting the most appropriate weapon with which to engage the

enemy. The first concern is whether the available weapon can destroy

or delay the target. For example, if an infantryman, armed with grenades and an M16, suddenly saw an advancing tank, he has a choice of

two weapons with which he could engage the tank. However, in this

instance, neither weapon would be effective against the target. The

second concern is to select the appropriate weapon when more than one

exists that could destroy the target. When a choice is available, it

is wise to engage the enemy with the weapon that is least likely to

give away one s position.

The third aspect involved with the effective use of weapons is

effectively employing weapons in a manner tUhat permits their use to

complement one another. During ES exercises conducted at Fort Pickett

(1978) several incidents occurred thiat illustrate this point. The

defense had placed arn M60 in a woodline on the opposite side of a

clearing where offensive elements were expected to advance. A preplanned, indirect fire mission had been requested direct'.l on the opptsite side of the clearing. When the point man for the advancing

offense attempted to cross the open area, the MGO began to fire on

full automdtic. The offense bunched up and remained stationary in the

opposite woodline. The M60 position, equipped with a PRC-77, then

requested the prnplanned, indirect fire mission which inflicted more

than 40% casualties on the offense, The combination of the direct and

indirect fire complemented one another and appeared to oe a viable

tactic.

"Rasic. lhere are many basic skills that could have seen include'I

in thTFsi-s]Fill category. Only those that significant!y contribute to

the outcome ot z tactical situation and occur frequently have been

selected. First aid, chemical warfare, rappelling, anr mountaineering

are examples of basic skills that may contribute to the outcome of a

tactical situation, but not to a significant degree. We have selected

proticiency in map reading and terrain analysis.

48
Map reading is the ability to identify the location of objectives

or personnel on a nap. During ES exercises conducted at Fort Stewart

in 1976 with the 1/75th Ranger Battalion, sever-i incidents occurred

that illustrate the importance of this skill. In an operation order

(OPORD) received by a platoon leader, the coordinates of the linear

defense the platoon leader was to attack were given, The battle might

have been short-lived if the platoon leader had requested an indiract

fire mission prior to crossing his line of departure. Instead, the

platoon leader decided to move forward and not to reque-,t indirect fire

until his platoon was within 100 "eters :f the objective. As he

moved forward, his point element was engaged by small arms from the

linear defense. The leader halted his platoon, and referred to his

map to verify the coordinates of the defense he was given prior to the

exercise. He concluded that the coordinates he was given were lnacrate, changed them, and requested indirect fire at the coordinates

iO cuticluded were correct. His fire mission impacted behind the

aefense's positions. The d.'y that resulted from having to adjust

from the first indirect fire mission apparently contributed to the

platoon remaining in a stationary posture. The defense was able to

accurately pinpoint their position and requested a fire for effect on

the element. The platoon and its leader were killed.

Terrain ai,-vsis parallels map reading but does not include

pinpointing locatiois. Terrain analysis in this context meanre

interpreting topography (either from a map or by actually viewing the

terrain) for the purpose of planning actions and anticipating enemy

actions or positions. Analyzing the terrain for the purpcse of

deciding where to place detensive positions, where enemy ta.,ks are

likely to advance, ant :electing a route of advance offering cover and

concealment are examples of terrain analysis skills. The following

combat experience of Jones (1968) illustrates the importance of

terrain analysis.

In 1968 in (Quang Tri Province, Vietnam, a reconnaissar.c% team was

inserted just below the demilitarized zone. Ine reconnaissdnce team's

area of operation (AO) was suspected to contain enemy forces. Ttc

size and exact location of the enemy force was unknovp,. Once on the

ground the reconnaissance team leader began to analyze the terrain to

reassess his earlier thoughts on possible locations ot the enenmy

within his AO. The reconnaissance leader haO initially thought that a

large hill with protruding fingers at the nu,,tern end of the AO

provioEc excellent observations of the surroundine area and would be

an ideal location for directing artillery ano rocket tire ',jainst

American forces. The proximity of the hill to the DM.7 (500 meters

below) provided for a perfect route of withorawal. ir(Ai, his terrain

analysis, Lue reconnaissance team leader decided to r , several fire

missions on the hill and to monitor it closeLy iuv it.r,.ations of

enemy activity. A number of events proved the reconnaissance team

leader': terrain analysis to be correct. l.. iiic', s resulted

49

I. + +i,•
in stcundary explosions and the exput.ure of enemy ammunition storage

trenches and bunkers. A sizeable eneiiy force occupied the hill. Even

after artillery barrages and air strikes, the eneaty was still able to

repel an attempt by a Marine (ompany to seize the hill. Had the ter

leader not done a good terrain analysis, the reconnaissance patrol

could have decided to use the hill for its own observational purposes.

If the team had gone up the hill it probably would have been

surrounded and wiped out by the NVA forces already in position there.

Measurement Procedures and Limited Scale Investigation

Further subtasks of Section I called for (a) the de wopmfft of

candidate nPocedures for measuL",ng the identified skills and processes

and (b) a 'Pnited sa;le investigations of leader skills and processes

which utilize the measurement procedures. During leptember 1978, two

members of the researt!, staff had the opporturnlt: to attend Training

Instrumentation Evalution (TIE) exercises at Hunter-Liggett milit'iry

reservation. A limited number of participants were administered the

Leader Observation Checklist (Appendix C) and the Subordinate

Questionnaire (Appendix D). TheW, instruments were devriped from the

Leader Skill Categories and Individual Skills Matrix (Appendix B) and

were ,sed as rudimentary measures to assess ,e presence or absence y,

the ii•c4 tified leader skills and processes. The Leader Observation

Checklist contains a list of 95 behaviors and actions that leaders

usually manifest while giving an OPORD or during the actual exercise.

Research staff were assi-ned to leaders during a given exercise and

made their observations :n the iosis of the checklist. The value of

the Leacnv Observation Checklist in terms of research and development

was that it provided a systematic basis for assessing how well the

identified sk!,Is and processes matched or agreed 'j.th actual leazer

behaviors occurring in a tactical setting. The Subordinate

Questionnaire provided similar 1Iffimation. It was given to subordinates after the exercise and required the presence or absence of

listed leader skills to be indicated accordingly. The original version of the Subordinate Questionnaire also tonsisted of 95 items but

its length was considered to be impractical for administering I;nder

field conditions and thus it was reduced by half and appears in

odd/hven forms (Appendix D). The reduced forr:s took participants an

aierage of 20 minutes to fill out. Because o; the limited nature and

opportunity for data collects.., at Hunter-Liggett, no attempt is

rnmde here to portray data or make generalizations concerning leader

behavior. From the data collection with the Leader Observation

Checklist and Subordinate Quest~nmnaire, it was possible, however, to

pinpoint flaws and redundancies in the existing set of leader skills

and group interactive processes.

Another type of measurement procedure was developed which is

perhaps more appropriate for skills such as problem solving that are

50

,- a • , • • • ' • t : • , 2
difficult to cperationalize. A w-aith of accurate historical data

from previous ES exercises collect-d by MI provided the necessary

case material for the development of this procedure. With this Information, it was possible to take the salient events that leaders

encounter in an actua! exercise and inco?'±orate them into a measurement module that would expose other leaders without this experience to

similar skill demands. A prototype of the mepsurient techniqu 3as

been developed for individual skills associated with the leader skill

category of problem solving. This prototype module represents an

abstraction from an ES exercise where the leader's objective is to

locate the eneWy forces on a topographical map. The informtion for

the leader',:; problem solving decisions about enemy locations are

messages tr-.Lted between leaders during an ES exercise. To be

effective, every effort was made to keep the experiential quality of

the simulated perforr'nce intact.

The concept bei,!:- t-,:i. measurement technique or module is tV

confr%ýtt the company rid platoon leaders with probIle sV,!ving

demands similar .,j those found in ES ;r combat. Problem s-4iving in

this cont.At relers to the process by which a Jeader continually anticipates enemy disposition and intention. Each enemy action is analyzed to ascertain the opposition's overall scheme of maneuver and

deployment. A leader's ability to anticipate enemy deployment '•fore

and during an exercise bears directly on the deve',•pmert of effective

fire support plans, overwatch positions, and routt nf movement. For

example, poor enemy anticipation could result in fi,± support plans

that would not adequately suppress enemy weapons systems and would

therefore contribute to first round hits.

The measurement module is an audio-visual presentation constructed from historical data obtained in an ES exercise. First,

the leaders are shown an enlarged topoQ,,aphical map on a screen and

are provided with specific information about their mission and the ii enemy situation. (The mission is the same as one that was given

to a Team Commander in an actual ES exercise.) Based on this information, the leader!. are asked to mnr.e initial determinations about the

enemy'c probable deployment. Answers are written on answer sheets

Irr)viL*c.. Leaders are shown a series of slides and then listen to

"accompanying audio cur.N (radio transmissions) that describe a developing situation; that is, contact with an enerLy force that is

characterized by a progressive increase in engagement intensity.

After seeing each slide and listening to the appropriate audio cues,

each leader is asked to reassess the situation and to indicate probable

enemy deployment by a specific type of element or weapons system. A

time limit for completing this task is placed on the leaders so as to

simulate the time constraints dnd pressure a leader experiences in an actual exerci se. m

The content for each slide is an action that took place during an

ES exercise. The slides are presented in the same sequence as the

51

I i i, . . . . .iX
actions actually occurred. The actions are visually presented by

graphic symbols on an enlarged mp showing team deployment, enamy sightings, anO contact as indicated to the teem commander by various

elements of his maneuveo force. The audio portion is taken from the

actual two-way radio transmissions between the elements and the team

commander.

A simulated audio-visual technique of measurements has a number

of possible advantages.

6 It has potential use as a diagnostic tool to assess a

leadcr's ability to exercise problem-solving skills.

* PVter the nIntial presentation, it can be re-run to provide

a deo11ed analysis of each action. Certain enemy intentions might be identifled by cues within a certain action.

*• Several tactical experiences can be incorporated within a

probem solving module. This would provide a leader, in a

short period of time, with several problem solving experiences.

0F The opportunity for a leader to practice and focus on one

skill, without having to address the complexities of an ES

exercise, may be a way to help nxximize the learning of a

particular skill.

Since the measurement technique is based on actual occurrences in an ES exercise the technique helps to insure good

content validity.

Further refinement of this low-cost technique, and adapting

it to other skills, are indeed worthy pursui.S for future research.

Yet another type of candidate measurement procedure that was

given serious consideration was an analytic procedure whereby one

proceeds frtxn diagnosis of the outcome to causes. Diagnosis from

outcome to causes represents a way to pa(ital out the contributions

of various skills to the oý,erall outcome. Even the outcomes of equipment-related skills such as hitting a target are itInt products of

several contr(ibting factors (e.g., breath control, trigger squeeze,

and sight picture). As one moves along the contiruum of skills

from those .wich are machine dependent to those which are machine

non-dtcrendent (such as problem ,olving where the repertoire of

possible actions increases considerably), there appears to be an

even greater need for an analysis tromr outcome back to contributing

factors. Under such circumstances, outcomes are likely to depend on a

wider range of c,:.jtributing factors. The working bacKward analysis from outcome will alwiys be imperfect in that one might trace back to

the wrong contributing factor(s), but such an approach is far better

52

I_

-}
than guesses that are made without the benefit of analysis. The an&-

lytic procedure requires a certain degree of judgement on the part of

the observer and thus may not be as objective as the go/no-go criterion checklist type of measurement. But the go/no-go criterion

scheme of measurement does not allow one to causally relate unit performance or outcomes back to leader skills whereas the analytic procedure does. It is quite possible that the checks that a leader

receives in the go or no-go column of a checklist have no bearing

whatsoever on unit outromes. The problem is that one has no way of

knowing. Instead, with the analytic approach, one is making an explicit attempt (albeit more subject to individual bias) to determine if a

leader's actions and decisions were appropriate for the conditions

that developed and whether the consequences of these actions can be

linked to unit performance and outcomes.

The lesson to be learned from the above discussion is that any

attempt to develop candidate procedures for measuring leader skills

and group-interactive processes should not be restricted to a singular

approach. The sheer complexity of the ES environment and early developmental status of ES research argues against focusing on one

approach to the exclusion of others. Each of the measurement procedures discussed in this paper has its unique strengths and weaknesses

and thus may he appropriate for some skills and not others. It is

only through continued research that the boundary conditions of the

different measurement procedures can be determined.

Summary,. The purpose of the research effort so far has been to

determinewhat leader skills and leader-group interactive processes have the potential to influence unit perfonrtnce in tacticai situations. We started with a global and historical reviaw of the leadership research literature and then focused more selectively on leader

skills and processes as they occur in tacticai settings.

It was observed that much of the leadership research and theory

stems from industrial, managerial, or academic settings. The literature review was useful for acquiring an understanding of the state-ofthe art. Of the leadership models reviewed, the problef) solving

approach, we feel, is the most relevant for addressing the skills and

demands placed upon leaders in tactical settings. The re-2arch on

conmnunication is also considered quite relevant. Coth of these areas

of research aided in the delineation of the leader skill categories

and were especially useful in guiding our thinking in the subsequenit 

•

development of the candidate measurement procedures. The areas of re-

"search involving initiation of structure and interaction with

superiors and subordinates were also useful in the creation of skill

categories. Staff experience and ES data (e.g., battle narratives,

audio tapes, and net control sheets) collected at Fort Pickett and

other locations were used to. confirm leadership skills and processes If identified in the literature and for establishir•q other skill cate53

1I lm 

-. .. . _ __.. ...__ ,__.........___ _____
gories. Once these leader categories were identified, it was possible

to develop candidate procedures for measuring them in the context of

a limited scale investigation.

Ft A

I,54
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I.7
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r ®R
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66
APPENDIX A LEADER SKILLS BY CATECORY

F2 IQ

zz = I

-Ja w

W Ii

i I) I FS

w cI

L -;izzz~~ l _______in ~ ~Li
APPENDIX B LEADER SKILL CATEGORIES AND INDIVIDUAL SKILLS MATRIX

TECHNCICAL"

KRNAGE04ENT COMMO

E qpt sic

MANAGEMENT: Planning /

4eX - Primary Relationship

0 - Secondary Relationship y

Verbalizes objective in terms

of:

What i, supposed to be done.

Where it is to be done. X L,

At what time it is to be done X 0

Verbalizes enemy situation in

terms of:

How many. -

2 Where. d T

Anticipated action. X

Recent enemy activity. X 0 Equipment and weapons, X0

Verbalizes friendly situation

i n terms of:I,

S Support (artillery, TAC

•< air, gunship)

- Dispo1ition of friendly X

forces.

Verbalizes concept of operation in terms of: l

LD/LC

ADO

W When phases of operation, if X 0 any, have been met

Check points and phase lines, X if any

Organize element operation x 0

Verbalizes execution in terms

of:

What participating elements

will be doing

How security of movement go

will be maintained

Specific requirements for X 0 these elements and priorities

Actions to be taken in event

of enemy contact so

T".-
WMA6U(NT cowhI11

ECqt sit.

PAKAGEMENTý Planning /

X Primary Relationship ; Z

0 Secondary Relationship/

Specific measures for cons- trolling participating *- x 0 mints (phase lines, check

points, rally points, attack positions)

ldJustment of initial plan _ In eve;it of heavy casualties

"• erbaliwen s of: and and signal

Radio sign s frequencies and call

hain of coL•and x 0 0

Other signals O 0

Ask subordinate, to readback

specific responsibilities 0 00

Graphically displays overall

operation using visuAl aids

(ground, sticks, rocks). 0 [ 

Ask iubordinates to demonstrate. using visual aids,

their specific tasks. x --

Conducts abbreviated rehearsal of planned execution by deploying forces in mock ex- ercise,

B2

L L
PROBLEM ECIIA

I'ANG~?4NT ~ SOLVING ;

rAAEMorTin Excutinre Cnto

i.-. Prequenty askst fa nieit

Maindai contit nuoratl frommunii

c'adiancethal ele meinn10ts0

Contaes subordinates whrctio

and/ortgidng rcedInrespos

toen4'y ctvty(my irt X 0 0_ I

Frequentl addkins Iforimmdate3

i3nd copeteuionformpatin bypr-om j adcvatnce eleewnts Xnd

Gicorecs imsdae ieto

¶ 4 ~reqoniest crditional pintsrmatSwhich contingency plans sh'ould q~be imp~lemented

II 1 1 11 11

* I B3

*01,
~~NAGEAGFNN CnOtMOi StrLVtuG

FiT

X Primary Relationship . L'/

0 -Se,ýondary Rel~tionship ' 4

Provides detailed instruc- f

tions to subordinates regarding subordinates' responsibi- X 0

lities 

eements. 

and those of other 1

+

F -reaks issin s d own i nto0 0 X 0

achieveable steps. ~ t 

actly who will replece lead- 0

ers who become casualties.__---+

Informs subordinates of deadli,,es (e.g.. LD times. times 0 ý0 -. objectives are toj be secured) II

ten fcniuiain eg, XO

S Describes well eefined patSITREP%, ",iho talks to whom, T-

~. Specifies clearly contingency

iplans including conditions

lunder which contingency plan% I 0 IX 0

!Set s definite standarus of .~

tasks and responsibilities 0 0

Ex1'raince frationaecforpln

prone positions).I

K - ed act ions.1

Makes periodic checks on pro-- ' gress of group with respect) OX 0

to assjqned tasiks. 44

Enforces rules of conduct (e.g~

informing subordinates of violations/consequences and tak- X 0

ing appropriate disciPlinavy

actions).i

S Specifi questions are posed

S by the leader to subordinate~, -' concerning their responsibili- 0

S ties and those of their peers

S (e.g.. verbally responds to

9 uestions. uses as ae S round drawings,. etc.)

B4
MNAP4GEMENT: Interaction with Sub-/

ordinates and Superiors *

X =Prim~ry Relationship .. *. 4

- Secondary Relairsi .a

Solicits reactions, opinions,x 0

lResponds to nonverbal c25s

Igestures cf subordinate~ and ISuperiors '.!garding ti-vir r*

acin to the vlan.___

z! Proiides public praise and

ecognitiOn fn work well I

Ca done (docida. appropriateness X 0

S of public vs. private praise)

S Listens attentivety to i~e~o- 0

7 lit itpu .uggestinns from sub- 10 XI vrdinates.]

I.Delesates respon sibility t subordinates.10

S Allows subordinates to carry

out delegated tasks (avaid%

'iencroaching or, delegated re-

- spons~bilities and avoid pub- 0 ýX (D C licly' criticizirg subordin-I ates). ___------

RecoCnizes strengths ano weaknesses of subordinate; 0 X and Assigns task accordingly.4

f Calmly and fi rmly interrupts

I' other conflicti. among subirrefsalto arr ou anorder:

Attempts to find out why X 0

subordinate is refusing. I

Responds to objections by explaining rationale or pru- X

viding additional support.L

refue, rmoveindividual0

B5

~a
MA4AGENqCNT COMI PROBLEM

SOLVING

I-.

MANAGEMENT: Interaction with SubI

ordinat' and Sueriors /

X 

- Primary Relationship 4 

.

"

0 - Secondary Relationship

Specificially describes to

subordinates how they will be ni

backed up in tijr.t situations.

i Provides specific follow-up

, instructions in calm,

tone to subordinates who are

in danger and obviously

C anxious.

SNotices possible subordinate

injuries and provides for

appror',a1'e treatmne.it.

Tactfully corrective and feedback fi rmly to provides subordinates d f

Firmly states unpopular decisions without apologizing

(or blaming higher auithority). 

X

Defends/supports actions of

subordinates when criticized Sby others. 

I

Honestly admits mistakes to subordinates a:ýtd superiors. 

x

Tactfully disagrees with superior's plans and provides 

X possible alternatives.

Sets positive examples for

subordinates (e.g., noise

discipline, staying awake,

snot smoking at night, camouflage, etc.).

1 Speaking with enthusiastic,

confident tone. X 

-

Praising group instead of

individuals, if appropriate. 

X

Identifying importance of

specific team elements in 

0

achieving group goals.

SProvides specific positive praise )r particular task X 

0 S well d,,e.

Stays active by constantly

interacting with subordinates (inquiring about progress of individual tasks/assignments).

86

lI

p.-- 

--
Ti I ZINN M

~A~GNEt Q1 PflEMSOLVING pa mMI- ~Cp. scI

COMMUNICATION: Tr.unsfer of /5t~

I nformati onqu

SCorrects a.ry misunderstandingsh

IAnswers clarifying questions 0i

btarect l s. liii

Identifies information c'n- CoiCb ation " ants,. .. 0 x.

Idenforimetson to be t, ns- 0 0 X0

w.... verbal Informs meanso sb.rdites 

b of non- - tha 0 0 x 0 ýZ'ittnde coe (SALU TE) • oit _T__ a____ ___ 

for emphasis. Preth ts nonvrntains mteady eye cntact

! ( •_en ap__•prop•ritdt~e).... " iUses graptic aids. ___ !____

wiestures to convey meaning,

_ t ejlnites UPeriodic n.intervals to suborfonrtemphandsueis. -.

Ilnforms subordinates of ,:halite in planned actli n. 0.. . .

I. - __totr _____, __l 1_1

Sdotion, selects appropriate X

Stpaod of communication.

• 87 C

'.ntw--s -ed Contact -

LI 1717
TECHNIlCAL

MNKAGEMENT COM PRiOBLEM -

of Information

X • 1imary Relationship V 01 0 •sOCndo Relationship 1/

Encour verbally ags by suggestions st°n"ing withnoncontact, open posture. nodding. maintaining y avoidirg

frowning and grimacing.

Summarizes and paraphrasses key points without a coumii.-ent 0 x to implement or nnt to imple- I ment suggestion.

~-g Probes for more detail. 0_ __ 0 _

Determines what information X 00 I ,

SWho possesses it.

How to collect it.

, he Obje.tiveoof the mission. -, "il-

- Asks superiors questions on

any information that is un- / X

clear T-- he objective and needs of clarificatior, the mission. lT X { t

re ahe .spect enemy to situation size of forco, with is u.- I indirect fire capability. 1 0

armor capability, current - a ot. Cti-ity and anticipated ... Il I , :Proposed execution of opera- "*'= tion, including boundaries.

"- )o starting objective point, and appropriate location of 0 0 X

times. - -

.-• ~ What be available. artillery support Will I -- 00

° cessafry call signs and

adl f requencis0 0

Sends out lead element. - -4 ' 0 elects best personnel for

ask. (Skilled in map reading, ___ __ _ i S ving quietly. acute vision.) -o Ioi i aeans Of coimmunication is Sstablished (SlIREP). 0 0 0 X0

B8

I
S PROLEM TECIAICAL

MANAEMEM COMSOLVING

Eqpt ic

COMMJNICAIION: Pusi n o~~

X Primary Relationship

0 - Secondaryv Relationship

Give,, soi*h distinct duo (e.g.,

explosion, small arms fire.

etc.) attempts to Identify' 0 , specific natue Of cue 'by€

radi unr corncto 

etc.)

-

, .4

SAfter verbal * recei-,ing c enication, incomplete Jotains

more complete information by S.

iverally soei dstiý. nctodrma-V

ption• sending fire team, using

prearranged signalst etc.

If impossible to obtain more inroematon develops plau-tn

sible hypotheses as to nature X 0 0

of situation and makes deci- _____ sions accordinqly_. . .. .. - :

I ." B9
I MAAGEMNT c..~PROBLEM TECHNICAL

Eqpt ýsic

PROBLEM SOLVING: Identifying and

Interpreting Cues

X rimary - Relationship

Recognizes cuts as indicator

of enamny actions. lntent~ons.

' or 

ially 

paper, 

l1w 

presence. 

visibility 

important 

feces, 

(3ote: 

noise, 

cues 

to recognize

such 

land

especas p

lie, etc.).

time Forms tentative hypotheses as w to enemys disposition (size, • location, and intentinns) given current and previous

cuesI

L0

B1O

_ _ _ memo
~WSAUP(NT 4 TECHNICAL.

Eqpt sic

PROBLEM SOLVING: Weighing Altorna-Q

X Reainhp ', Prfr lb

0 - Secondary Relationships

Identifies alternative

actions. given an interpre- 0X

S tation of cues.

-- - - - -x

Octermnines probablz tonse- ~- quesnces of each altt!-native action. -

Bi11
TECHNEICAL

I.. .GEM.NT CO." •

Eqpt sic

!1-

PROBLEM SOLVING: Chooses and

Executes Course

of Action

X - Primary Relationship

0 • Seconda'-y Relationship

Selects alternative action

that leads to most favorable

(contributes most to mission

accomplistment) consequence. X (Aspects t^ be considered

include tAl.i, casualties,

• ammunition, weapons equired)

Executes course of action 0 0 0

SObtains i" '): tion regarding CZ consequences of chosen

• course of adtion

Repeats problem solving

cycle as nece'-oy

B12

4CI

_ _ _ _ 4 _-SAN&
MANAGEMENT CO PROBLEM I• TECHNICAL

SOLVING Eqpt 1asic

TACTICAL: Application

X Primary Relationship /.

0- Secondary Relationship

Instructing subordinates to

maintain noise and light 0 0 0 0

discipline.

t Maintaining minimal radio oo Straffic (radio discipline). 0

Moving during inclement weathe. l

o Instructing subordinates to Scamouflage weapons,.equipment, X

vehicles, positions, and

themselves. a

Instructing subordinate leader I

to use routes of movement (and Sthod of movement) to mini- 0 X

mize exposure. _ I 

SInstructing subordinates, in 1

methods for exercising caution

Iwhen moving.. -

Inlodes OPsI IPs Ieveral 

patrols and ambus'•es as fa,

forward as possible to provide 0 Ai

adequate early warn-ing and

maximum number of engagement c opportunities.

Includes a point element (or

RECON when moving) as far 0 0

Sforward as possible.

- Disperse overwatch elements

Sto maximlize observation and 0

ngigemnent opportunities.

CD-Baooby traps, mimes, probablem

venues of approach not cover- 0 X

d by personnel.

deotify :iemy's weakest point00

y employing probing action. 0

Engage attacking force as many

times zs possible before

becoming decisively engaged. T

S Engages enemy at unexpected

tlees and places (e.g.,

ttacking enemy's rear).

aintains reserves to meet

nforeseen disposition of

~~ B13 It'sy

i BI3
IpROL iM • TECHNICAL

MANAGEMENT COMMO OBLVING EM i

TECHNICAL-EOU PMENT • Vehicles

X - Primary Rltosi ýYr7

I o - Secondary Relationship !C, 

Operational check of vehicles

prior to mission.

on specific methods of move- mL.ent (e.g., follows folds of Sterrain, overwatch, smoke).

C Checks to ensure vehicles are

properly camouflaged. -,I

B

I, t

B14
S~ TECIli-AL

r r tEqpt sic 4

TECHNICAL-EQUIPMNT. CoMjnicstiOn

Equipment ~

X - Primary Relations~hip Q

S. i

0Oa ScondaryRWatioflship AM..- .

IVnPctj Communication equipht prior to initititing nissiqn.

ses all available ifnS of ammnication. 0x

'is cownication equip- -- -

ilt to post secure locations I

i [e,g,, center As Opposed to

riphery of mass).

Instructs wubOrdinates on how

o maint :n proper cok-lnicaion sec.r.ty (e.g., Upholds/ !. •, Enforces SOl) -

nstructs sibordinates oln how " -- to safeguard cOmmO '7"pen x

' • e.g.. conceal land-mine).li

velops alternAtie comuniation Olans and informs 0 ;ubordilutes of those plans. i

)tatns required frequencies

primary and ilternate) and .

nforis all personnel.

SIB1

II

BI5I

I .... . . --- - •I ,j- • ! *• -'• •
S~lING Eqpt Basic

ECHNlICALJ-EQUIPlNT: Weapoes

/C

X - Primary Relationsip

0 Seconlary Relationship

Inspects initiation weapons rissionprior to

Ploces weapons so thPt ty

take best advantage oe 0 x

nlxiau~m effective re

Positions weapons where tNy

are most likely to engage

opriate tarpons (e.g., 0 0( e

mtchea tes to weapons)a

positions weapons to haive

overlappeng fields of fire

Poion rei poiiti to -:ompensate for limyt octions of other w ea p o ns ( e g ., P u t t i n g Ln t i -

tank mines on a prao able

eavenue appsorh that caen't be covered by deployed Primary

sure% appnprtiate fuees aod amounts (VT on troops in the

open. DE on armored veh~cles,

PD on reinforced positions)

U~ses pre-planned f'ires on

anticipated ee.my loc~tion.0 0

Uses r.egistration puints to

ensure security and toen

sure artillery reques .

Request marking rounds prior

to FrEs to ensure proper

placemerrt and maximum effec- tive use of artill~ery

B16

44
,W S A 6W N T C O I W9 S M VII G q p ics 

1IUUCAL-M"C' Iurrain Analysis

p-ioary Relationlship

0 Secondary kelAtiOnshiP ce Ide iies robale eemy

poi on dpendng a

to raphI

lkccrptey ientiiesP~ssbl

enm vne favne

Use$terrin o COCC\

roues f dvace
.. .... S.... 

TECHNCL

r M~~IAXAGE[IENT COMM SO V NG Eqt i

X PiayRelationship -~0

0 f.econdary Relationship AO , 1 r /

Accurately follows planned

avenues of advance.

Sand Contains all action (movement fire) within $secified AO. __ Accurately identifies coordinates of elemay positions. . .

Occupies as identified correct on positions map. 44 x

B18

Iii

II

BI8
I >

APPENDIX C LLADER OBSERVATIOtW CRECKLIST

LEADER OBSERVATION CHECKLIT

OBSERVER: DATE: September

LEADER #: _ _

Enter arbitrary leader number above. Ensure that Subordinate Question- naires administered to this leader's subordinates,•ave this number enter-1

ed in the upper right hand corner of its coversheet. This will make

it possible to match observation checklists to Subordinate Questionnaires.

No names or unit designators are to be recorded anywhere.

The Leader Observation Checklist is broken into three sections. Section I

I lists behaviors and actions the leader should manifest while giving his

OPORD to subordinates. Section II lists behaviors and actions the leader

could manifest at any point during the exercise (including giving an OPORD).

Section III lists behaviors and actions the leader shou'id manifest during

the actual exercise. Observations should be made accordingly.

The checklist contains a list of 96 behaviors and actions. For each behavior or aLtion, observers shojuld check one of three boxes:

Check this box if, in most instances, the E-] YES leader did what is listed in the checklist.

t -- NO Check this box if, in most instances, the

leader did not do what is listed in the checklist.

Check this box if the leader did not have

F[1 N/A an opportunity to do what is listed in

the checklist.

C1

'Anne '•' •" " • I I • "" " '".... .'I•
LEADER OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

SEi,'TION I,

THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS SHOULD BE MADE

WHILE THE LEADER IS GIVING HIS OPORD. DID

THE LEADER:

YES NO N/A

1. State the OBJ.CTIVE in terms of:

A. What is supposed to be done. 0 [] El

B. Where it is to be done. 0] [] []

C. At what timueit isto bedone. LI Eli []

2. State the ENEMY SITUATION in terms of:

A. How many. 11

B. n'aere. W H]

C. Anticipated action. 0 11]

D. Recent enemy activity.

E. Equipment and weapons. LJL 11 J

3. State the FRIENDLY SITUATION in t-irms of:

A. Support (artillery, TAC air, gunship).

SB. Disposition of friendly forces. H

4. State the CONCEPT OF OPERATION in terms of:

A. LD/LC 0 L L

B. AO [ E] 0

C. Check points and phase lines, if any. 0 11 LI

C2

* - uL • .. -- , , . ,-.,, •,•-e. 
YES NO N/A

5. State EXECUTION in terms of:

A. What participating elements will be doing. 0 0i L1

B. How security of movement will be main- L i (0i

Specific aeC. -quiremnts for these elements .] El] [l]

and priorities.

0. Actions to be taken in event of enemy El] ] "contact.

"E. Specific measures for controlling I] El n l

participating elements (phase lines,

check points, rally points, attack posit ons).

F. Adjustment of initial plan In event of El l El]

heavy casualties.

6. State COMMAND AND SIGNAL in terms of:

A. Radio frequencies and call signs. l E l LI

B, Chain of command. El- El EDi

C. Other signa'Is. [1 II I

7. Ask subordinates to read back specific El Eli Eli

responsibil ities.

8. Graphically display overall operation using El Eli E

visual aids (ground, sticks, rocks).

9. Ask subordinates to demonstrate, using El El []

visual aids, their specific tasks.

M~ Conduct rehearsal of planned execution by l E _ deploying forces in mock exercise.

IC3iC|

m•I
SECTION II

THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS SHOULD BE MADE

AT ANY TIME DURING THE REALTRAIN EXERCISE.

DID THE LEADER:

YES NO N/A

11. Provide detailed instructions to subordinates 0 E] l

regarding subordinates' responsibilities and

those of other elements.

12. Explain tasks in terms of achievable steps. Li 0 Li]

13. Explain to subordinates exactly who will Li L] Li

replace leaders who become casualties.

14. Inform subordinates of deadlines (e.g., LD [i E-1 [

times, times objectives are to be secured).

15. Describe well defined patterns of communica- L [] Li

tion (e.g., SITREPs, "who talks to whom, when,

about what, and how").

16. Clearly specify contingency plans including Li 0 0

conditions under which contingency plans will

be implemented (e.g., loss of comnunication).

17. Set definite standards nf performance for [_E] EK

specific tasks and re: onsibilities (e.g.,

specific dimensions of prone positions).

18. Explain his reasons for planned actions. Li Li ] L

19. Pose specific questions by the leader to D DE ]

subordinates concerning their responsibilities

and those of their peers (e.g., verbally

responds to questions, uses maps, makes ground

drawings, etc.).

20. Specifically describe to subordinates how i Li EL

they will be backed up in tight situations.

21. Tactfully and firmly provide corrective feed- Li Li Li

back to subordinates.

22. Firmly state unpopular decisions without Li Li Li

apologizing (or blaming higher authority).

23. Defend/support actions of subordinates [ D1El 

when criticized by others.

C4
YES 11O NfA

24. Honestly admit mistakes to subordinates 0 [I [I

and superiors.

25. Tactfully disagree with superior's plans L1 ] [I

and provide possible alternatives.

26. Solicit reactions, opinions, suggestions LI L L

of subordinates regarding mission.

27. Respond to non-verbal reac.tions (frowns, Mi [ []

rolling of the eyes, head nods, etc.) of subordinates.

28. Provide public praise and recognition for [ LI L

work well done (decides appropriateness

of public versus private praise).

29. Listen to suggestions from subordinates. Mi nl [I

30. Assign responsibilities to subordinates. D Dl El

31. Assign tasks according to subordinate [I El El

strengths and weaknesses.

32. Calmly and firmly interrupt arguments, Ll El El

disagreements and other conflicts among

subordinates.

33. Set positive examples for subordinates LI E-l ID

(e.g., noise discipline, staying awake,

not smoking at night, camouflage, etc.)

34. Speak with enthusiastic, confident tone. L] El II]

35. eraise group instead of individuals, if MI [ZJ 0ii

appropriate.

*• • 36. State importance of specific team elements [ II Ein achieving group goals. ! "37. Provide specific positive praise for Li El El

particular tasks well done.

38. Stay active by constantly interacting with iD Li El

subordinates (inquire about progress of

individual tasks/assignments).

C5

____ .

- *,
YES NO N/A

39. Ask subordinates to explain suggestions, ideas, E ID i

objections that are unclear to him.

40. Ask subordinate to "read-back" their specific 0I LI 0I

responsibilities in operation.

4.Correct "read-back". any misunderstandings based on LI 0 L 

42. Answer questions directly. 0El [ Liii

43. Identify information consolidation points. LI LI [0

44. Inform subordinates of what information is l L

to be transmitted.

45. nform subordinates of non-verbal means of Li nl

communication (hand signals, whistles, smoke,

etc.) which could convey actions to be taken.

46. Emphasize critical points. El 0liEl 0

47. Speak distinctly and slowly. El El El

48. Maintain steady eye contact (when appropriate).

49. Gesture to convey meaning. 0li El El

50. Encourage suggestions non-verbally by standing El El El

with open posture, maintaining eye contact,

nodding, avoiding frowning and grimacing.

51. Summarize and paraphres, key points without LI ] El II)

a commitment to implement or not to implement

suggestion.

52. Probe for more detail. E l] [l

53. Instruct subordinates to maintain noise and El El El

light discipline.

54. Instruct subordinates to camouflage weapons, 0l El El

equipment, vehicles, positions, and themselves.

55. Instruct subordinates to use routes of move- 111 El El

ment (and method of movement) to minimize

exposure.

C6

L. 4,
YES NO N/A

56. Instruct subordinates to perform operational l] [Z] EI)

check of vehicles prior to mission.

57. Check to ensure vehicles are properly ED El 11

camouflaged.

58. Inspect communication equipment prior to Li [ LI

initiating mission.

59. Use all available communication equipment. ] El Li

60. Assign communication equipment to most secure [_0 0i 0•

locations (e.g., center as opposed toperipher,,

of mass).

61. Instruct subordinates on how to maintain proper El] El Li

communication security (e.g., Upholds/Enforces

Sol).

62. Instruct subordinates on how to safeguard Li Li Li

commo equipment (e.g., conceal land line).

63. Develop alternative communication plans and Li ] I ]

inform subordinates of those plans.

64. Inspect weapons prior to initiating mission. Li Li 0

65. Place weapons so that they take best advan- El 0 ]

tage of maximum effective range.

66. Position weapons where they are most likely Li Li Li

to engage appropriate targets (e.g., matches

targets to weapons).

67. Position weapons to hae overlapping fields Li L- Li

of fire.

68. Use pre-planned fires on anticipated enemy Li Li Li

locations.

69. Use registration points to ensure security El Li 0i

and to ensure artillery requests.

70. Identify probable enemy positions dependine Li Li Li

on topography.

71. Use terrain to conceal routes of advance. Li Li Li

'1k

'1 C

i "L ' 2 
SECTION III

THE FOLLOWING OBSEPVATIONS SHOULD BE MADE

DURING THE ACTUAL EXERCISE. DID THE LEADEk:

YFF N/A

72. Maintain continual communication with All elements.

73. Contict subordinates w~ho are not adhering E] [• E

to designated reporting procedures.

74. Frequently ask for immediate and complete El 0i L

information from advance elements.

75. Give immediate direction and/or guidance Li 0 LI

in response to enemy activity (may first

request additional information).

76. Quickly identify failures in execution of L Li Li

plan by participating elements and correct

them.

77. Recognize critical poinLs at which contin- Li L L-]

gency plans should be implemented.

78. Make periodic checks on progress of group L_] L Li

with respect to assigned tasks.

79. Enforce rules of conduct (e.g., informing [.1 _---] Li

subordinates of violatioris/consequences

and taking appropriate disciplinary actions).

80. Allow subordinates to carry out delegated Li Li L

tasks (avoids encroaching on delegated

responsibilities and avoid publicly

criticizing subordinates).

81. Provide specific follow-up instructions in L_] Li IIcalm, assuring tone to subordinates who are

in danger and obviously anxious.

"82. Disseminate information at periodic intervals L Li Li

to subordinates and superiors.

83. Inform subordinates of changes in planned Li -i Li

actior,.

C8

!-
YES NO N/A

84. Given some distinct cue (e.g., explosion, small LJ Li E]

arms fire, etc.), attempt to identify specific

nature of cue (by radic con-.iunication, runner, etc. ). 85. After receiving incomplete verbal communication, i t -

obtain more complete information by verbally

requesting information, sending fire team,

using prearranged signals, etc.

86. Maintain winimal radio traffic (radio discipline). [] Li L

87. Include a puint element (or RECON when moving) • Li -

as far forward as possible.

88. Disperse overwatch elements to maximize obser- Li Li Li

4 vation and engagement opportunities.

89. Identify enemy's weakest point by employing I. probing action.

90. Engage enemy at unexpected times and places Li L L

(e.g., attacking enemy's rear).

91. Maintain reserves to rmeet unforeseen disDosi- 0_I []- Ei

tior of enemy.

92. Use appropriate fuses and amounts (VT on troops R_ • •

in open, DE on armored vehicles, PD on reinforced

positions).

93. Request marking rounds prior to FFEs to ensure L_ Li L

proper placement and maximum effective use of

artillery.

94. Accurately follow planned avenues of :pproach. E-I Li [I]

95. Contain all action (movement and fire) within EL L L- F ~specified AO).

96. Accurately identify coordinates of enemy L Li Li

F [positions.

C9 I' . __ .. .. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _
APPENDIX D SUBORD)INATE QUESTIONNAIRE

SUBORDINATE QUESTIONNAIRE

IDENTIFICATION 0: DATE: __September

The Army Research Institute is engaged in a series of studies on leadership. You have Just completed a REALTRAIN exercise. We are interested in what your leader did and did not do during the exercise you

purposes only and will not hurt or help your leader's career in any

way--so be honest. Your answers will never be sent to your superiors

with any information which can be used to identify you or your unit.

Your privacy is protected by professional ethics and Federal Regulations,.

Instructions

You have been through several REALTRAIN exercises with your leader. Wie

are only interested in the exercise you have Just completed--not the

ones you were involved in yesterday or last week. This questionnaire

contains a list of things or actions your leader may havie done during

the exercise you have just finished. For each action there are three

choices you can make:

~2 YESCheck this box if your leader did do what is

listed in the questionnaire.

~ NO Check this box if your leader did not do NO what is listed in ti~e questionnaire.

SN/A C heck this box if your leader did not have a 4

V chance to do what is listed in the questionnaire.

~"N/A" means "not appropriate."

ONE AND ONLY ONE BOX IS TO BE CHECKED FOR EACOH ACTION LISTED.

If you have any, commnents, suggestions, or recommnendations about this

questioninaire, feel free to tell thie man who gave it to you or write

your commlents directly on the questionnaire. Your cooperation is

appreciated. 0
WHEN YOUR LEADER GAVE YOU HIS OPORD (OPERATION OROER), DID HE:

YES NO N/A

1. State the OBJECTIVE in t, of:

A. What is supposed to b,- ... ne: 1i 0 03

B. Where it is to be done. [J O EC

C. At what time it is to be done. ] i]i l

2. State the ENEMY SITUATION in temns ofA. How many. 0L-)C I

B. Where. [ 0 1)

C. Anticipated action. F- 81

D. Recent enemy activity. ",

E. Equipment and weapons. ' I ] LJ 

3. State the FRIENDLY SITUATION in terms of:

A. Support (artillery, TAC air, gunship). Ci D I

b. Disposition of friendly forces. Ci E_ Ci

4. State the CONCEPT OF OPERATION in terms of:

A. Where your LD/LC was. E]J ] C]

B. Where your AO was. - E] D

C. Check points and phase lines, if any. U] [ 1

5. State EXECUTION in terms of:

A. What participating elements will be doing. C- E- El

"B. How security of movement will be C- 1 C

maintained.

C. Specific requirements for these elements 'l EJ El]

and priorities.

D. Actioais to be taken In event of enemy 'I C O

contact.

E. Specific measures for controlling parti- E-1 0]

cipating elements (phase lines, check

points, rally points, attack positions).

F. Adjustment of initial plan in event of C- i U

heavy casualties.

(EVEN) i ~D2 '
YES 11o N/A

6. State COMMAND AND SIGNAL in terms of:

A. Wh4t your radio frequencies and call 17 L 17

signs were.

B. What your chain of command was. [i E --

C. Other signals.

7. Ask you to read backspecific responsibilities. Di El El

8. Graphically display overall operation using -1 C El

visual aids (ground, sticks, rocks).

9. Ask you to demonstrate, using visual aids, El El rl

your specific tasks.

10. Conduct rehearsal of planned operation by -1 El El , deploying forces in mock exercise.

-1

.1

(EVEN)

03

.- _= 1I •....=: 7 _ :.. .- ... _ _~7 ... -1a. I, 
AT ANY TIME DURING THE EXERCISE, DID YOUR LEADER:

YES NO N/A

1. Explain tasks in terms of achievable steps. 0 E F]

2. Infom you of deadlines (e.g., LD times, 1 El El

times objectives are to be secured).

3. Clearly specify contingency plans including Ei E] El

conditions under which contingency plans

will be implemented (e.g., loss of

communication).

4. Explain his reasons for planned actions. Li E E

5. Specifically describe to you how you will ] El El

be backed up in tight situations.

6. Firmly state unpopular decisions without l L El

apologizing (or blaming higher authority).

7. Honestly admit mistakes to you and his Li L L

superiors.

8. Solicit reactions, opinions, suggestions Li Li Li

from you regarding mission.

9. Provide Dublic praise and recognition for Li Li Li

work well done (decides appropriateness

of public versus private praise).

10. Assign responsibilities to you. Li L Li

11. Calmly and firmly interrupt arguments, Dl D E] - disagreements and other conflicts between

yourself and others.

12. Speak with enthusiastic, confident tone. Li Li Li

13. State importance of specific team elements Li Li Li

in achieving unit goals.

14. Stay active by constantly interacting with Li Li Li

you and others (inquire about progress of

individual tasks/assignmernts).

15. Ask you to "read back" your specific Li L Eli

responsibilities in operation.

(EVEN)

D4

AWA!

I.. ~
YES NO N/A

16. Answer questions directly. D 

O

17. Inform you of what information is to [I 

L

be transmitted.

18. Emphasize critical points. [ ]fi]

19. Maintain steady eye contact (when ] L [] appropriate).

20. Encourage suggestions non-verbally by D O 

D

standing with open posture, maintaining

eye contact, nodding, avoiding frowning

and grimacing.

21. Probe for more detail.

22. Instruct you to camouflage weapons, 11 -3 

0

cquipmnt, vehicle!;, positixns, and

yourself.

23. Instruct you to perform operational 0 0 Li

check of vehicles prior to mission.

24. Inspect conmnunication eqjipment prior 0 L LI

to initiating mission.

S~25. Assign communication equipment to most E] [• •Li,

secure locations (e.9., center as opposed

to periphery of mass)

26. Instruct you on how to safeguard commo Li Li ]i

* equipment (e.g., conceal land line). 

i

27. Inspect weapons prior to initiating [ D D

mission.

28. Position weapons where they are most L -i Li

likely to engage appropriate targets

(e.g., matches targets to weapons).

29. Use pre-planned fires on anticipated L Li Li

enemy locations.

30. Identify probable enemy positions --] L Li

depending on topography.

(EVEN)

D5
YES NO N/A

31. Contact you when you did not adhere to (2) 0 [J designated reporting procedures.

32. Give immediate direction and/or guidance 0 , 0 EJ

in response to enemy activity (may first

request additional information).

33. Recognize critical points at which E l E0 • contingency plans should be implemented.

34. Enforce rules of conduct (e.g., informing El 0I C]

you of violations/consequences and taking

appropriate disciplinary actions).

35. Provide specific follow-up instructions 0i 0I EL

in calm, assuring tone to you when you

were in danger and obviously anxious.

36. Inform you of changes in planned action. LI] El El

37. After receiving inzoniplete verbal coruiun!- 0l OE r

cat'lon, obtain more complete information

by verbally requesting inforation,

sending fire team, using prearranged

signals, etc.

38. Include a point element (or RECON when C] LI LI moving) as far forward as possible.

39. Identify enemy's weakest point by employing LI LI [-D

probing action.

40. Maintain reserves to meet unforeseen F1 LI 11]

disposition of enemy.

41. Request marking rounds prior to FFEs to

ensure proper placement and naximum effective use of artillery.

42. Contain all action (movement and fire) L- L L

within specified AO.

(EVEN)

D6

-4A
SUBORDINATE QUESTIONNAIRE

IDENTIFICATION #: DATE: __ September

The Army Research Institute is engaged in a series of studies on leadership. You have just completed a REALTRAIN exercise. We are interested in what your leader did and did not do during the exercise you

have just finished. The information you provide is for research purposes

only and will not hurt or help your leader's career in any way - so be

honest. Your answers will never be sent to your superiors with any information which can be used to identify you or your unit. Your privacy

is protected by professional ethic;r and Federal Regulations,

Instructions

You have been through several REALTRAIN exercises with your leader. We

are only interested in the exercise you have just completed - not the ones

you were involved inyesterday cr last week. This questionnaire contains

a list of things or actions your leader may have done during the exercise

you have just finished. For each action there are three choices you can

make:

Si YES Check this box if your leader did do what is

listed in the questionnaire.

SNO N Check this box if your leader did not do

what is listed in the questionnaire.

Check this box if your leader did not have a

SN/A chance to do what is listed in the questionnaire. "N/A" means "not appropriate".

ONE AND ONLY ONE BOX IS TO BE CHECKED FOR EACH ACTION LISTED.

If you have any crmments, suggestions, or recommendations about this questionnaire, feel free to tell the man who gave it to3ou or write your comments directly on the questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated.

D7
WHEN YOUR LEADER GAVE YOU HIS OPORD (OPERATION ORDER). DID HE:

YES NO K/A

1. State the OBJECTIVE in terms of:

A. What issupposed to be done. E ] [

B. Where it is to be done. [I] [] []

C. At what time it is to be done. [I] I]

2. State the ENEMY SITUATION in terms of:

A. hew man-. _. [i]

B. Where. ] E [

C. Anticipated action. ] ] ]

D. Recent enemy activity. [l L]

E. Equipment arid weapons. D D E

3. ccate the FRIENDLY SITUATION in terms of:

A. Support (artillery, TAC air, gunship). [El L] M]

B. Disposition of friendly forces. L] LI E

4. State the CONCEPT OF OPERATION in terms of:

A. Where your LD/LC was. ['7 D 0I

B. Where your AO was. LI [ i]

C. Check points and phase lines, if any. L-0 LII 0i

(ODD)

D8

1.

'S/
"IFS NO N/A

f 5. State EXECUTION in terms of:

A. What participating elements will be doing. LI LI Li

B. How security of movement will be ;in- LI D LI

tained.

C. Specific requirements for these elements D E LI

and priorities.

D. Actions to be taken in event of enemy LI LI

contact.

E, Specific measures for tontrolling LI -LI participating elements (phase lines,

check points, rally points, attack

positions).

F. Adjustment of initial plan in event of L LI L

heavy casualties.

6. State COMMAND AND SIGNAL in terms of:

A. What your radio frequencies & call signs were. LI LI LI

B. What your chain of comnand was. LI L LI

C. Other signals. L..J JL

7. Ask you to read back specific LI LI LI] responsibilities.

8. Graphically display overall operation usinq LI LI LI

visual aids (ground, sticks, rocks).

9. Ask you to demonstrate, using visual aids, D D El

your specifiL tasks.

10. Conduct rehearsal of planned operation by LI LI LI

deploying forces in mock exercise.

D9 (ODD) 'i D9
• 7 • ,•, - . . '• • • -•, • -' • ̧ •- :•; -. ,- . -

AT ANY TIME DURING THE EXERCISE, DID YOUR LEADER:

YES NO N/A

1. Provide detailed instructions to you re- I L]

garding your responsibilities and those

of other elements.

2. Explain to you exactly who will replace Li U Li

leaders who become casualties.

3. Describe well defined patterns of communi- I LI LI

cation (e.g., SITREPs, "who talks to whom,

when, about what, and how").

4. Set definite standards of performance for L L-] L

specific tasks and responsibilities (e.g.,

specific dimensions of prone positions).

5. Pose specific questions to you concerninn -L Li Li

your responsibilities and those of y.;-jr buddies to make sure you understuod iihat

to do.

6. Tactfully and firmly provide correc-ive LI I-- Li

feedback to you. IA

7. Defend/support your actions when Li Li 0L

criticized by others.

8. Tactfully disagree with superior's plans L I] L]

and provide possible alternatives.

9. Respond to non-verbal reactions (frowns, Li Li L0

rolling of the eyes, head nods, etc.)

of you and your buddies.

10. Listen to suggestions from you. -i L; L-i

11. Assign tasks according to your and your [ Ei Li

buddies strengths and weaknesses.

12. Set positive examples for you (e.g., FL L] Li

noise discipline, staying awake,

not smoking at night, camouflage, etc.).

13. Praise group instead of individuals, if Li Li Li

appropriate.

D1O (ODD)

D

I..
YES NO N/A

14. Provide specific positive praise for

particular tasks well done.

15. Ask you to explain any of your sugges- El [3 [3

tions, ideas, or objections that were

unclear to him.

16. Correct any misunderstandings you may E (I ] 

E

have had about what he said.

17. Identify who informatloi' is to be passed L l 

E

to when sor-t•ntng happens.

"18. Inform you of non-verbal means of com- L0 Li El

munication (hand signals, whistles,

smoke, etc.).

19. Speak distinctly and slowly. El E El

20. Gesture to convey me-ning. El El

21. Summarize and paraphrase key points with- 1l11 -El [E

out a commitment to implement or not to

implement suggestion. ,

22. Instruct you to maintain noise and/or El El El

light discipline.

23. Instruct you to use routes of movement El LI 

i

(and method of movement) to minimize

exposure.

24. Check to ensure vehicles are properly El El 

L

camouflaged.

25. Use all available communication equip- LI 11 El

ment.

26. Instruct you on how to maintain proper El1 El 11

communication security (e.g., Upholds/

Enforces SOI).

27. Develop alternative communication plans El El [i

and inform you of those plans.

28. Place weapons so that they take best El l El

advantage of maximum effective range.

29. Position weapons to have overlapping El1 El 

D

"fields of fire.

Dli (ODD)

D11--

f "'•"~ ~~ *••i..,
YES NO N/A

30. Use registration points to ensure security U Ei Li

and to ease artillery requests.

31. Use terrain to conceal routes of advance. -lO

32. Maintain continual communication with LI ]

all elements.

33. Frequently ask for immediate and corn- Li Li Li

plete information from advance elements.

34. Quickly identify failures in execution D l Li

of plan by participating elements and

correct them.

35. Make periodic checks on progress of Li) ] l

group with respect to assigned tasks.

36. Allow you to carry out delegated tasks Li LI l

(avoids encroaching on delegated responsibilities and avoidspublicly criticizing you).

37. Disseminate information at periodic in- K] Li Li

tervals to you and others.

38. Given some distinct cue (e.g., explosion, L ] Li

small arms Fire, etc.), attempt to

identify specific nature of cue (by

radio communication, runner, etc.).

39. Maintain minimal radio traffic (radio Li L L discipline).

40. Disperse overwatch elements to maximize ,i Li Li

observation and engagement opportunities.

41. Engage enemy at unexpected times and Li L i

places (e.g., attacking enemy's rear).

42. Use appropriate fuses and amounts (VT LI 111 Li

on troops in open, DE (n armored

vehicles, PD on reinforced positions).

43. Accurately follow planned avenues of L LiMi 

approach.

44. Accurately identify coordinates of U] Li

enemy positions.

D12 (ODD)

V. . . . ... . .
"AI OlerludNP Lbt

4 OASOIM&PAI 2 HCNWAMD6. Pt Ott. AMl Ubwvv

2 MODA (DAMI.CSZ I MUISACN. Pt Cd. ATTU, AT C-X-1-14wm Peuma

1 "WOA (OAFSPSRI 2 WSAlK Its Suswtmin ftw~. AMTY Isvv ft 

I 1400A IOAMA-API I USAACOC. Pt Sw~m n egnn lawlm. AM~ ATCP-NM

I ODA (OANS 4111.POI I USA Comammlest &A, Pt Menmaudsm, ATTNt AlIN-SA

I "a" 1110111040 1 USAIC. Pt Mwemeusi, AT?"- A11MUL-CT.-4111P

I QODA ioAA.-Oi-0 I USAIC, Pt Met ou A. ATTN: AMUUIL-PA-40

I MODA 10AP01-71Z-A? I USAKC Pt Meunmeial. AMV: AMSL-4-CU

I NOOA (OACH-PPZ-Ai t U%4Z. ft Mammeud. A"tIN C. Past Ow Or

I "ODA ICAPIMII"ll I USA MOW%%a S"~ AWa AMY Abarue. ATTN* AUXI-P

i mDa" ioAPamp.ci I Idpwmd Atu-aM. *A~aam. ATTN- ASA4.1

I HWA (DAN-OVA I USA Ord CUi & UdK Abwen, ATM-: ATIt.-TUM-C

1 NODA 4OAPI*IIAL) 2 USA Mum &nF La Miiam. ATTN*: Ubwvlit

*1 ~40G IDAPICVS) I USA Caolmb *Aim Tng Od. Pt Bowtng ATVNA: Ad 1up Imer

* ~I MODA, (OAFO-MPAI I USA lrfwmwh(w.lm "UNit. PmSnbg ATTm: Oef

I HaGA IOANDAO.AS.)I USA Intemov I,. Pt Sunning ATTW4 STSU-TI-T

I MOIDA IDA10PAIWA I VTASMA. Pst Was.. ATM: ATUO-LIPC

I HOD^ OUSA-Oft( I USA Ak Oaf 80, Pt from. ATYN' ATSA-CiD-MI

I IIODA 1OAMO-11ORI1 I USA Air Oaf S"l. Ilt Silas. ATTW4 Too, LA

I I400A IDA80 I USA Air Oaf ad. Pt Saft. AiTh: PILlS

I MOIDA iDAIO#1ll USA Air 0.f Sd. Pt Sila. ATTN: STUDO-PO

I Chtief, Coeoult Div (OA*OTIGl. Adlglto, MtO I USA Cmdi enrl Stf Colleg. Pt LatMwMer. ArTIN: LA

1 Mil Am. Muim Res. ODONSI, OAO (KILSI 1 USA Cmi & Geralo Sit C~ue. Pt Laaw ftrae' ATT: AT-SS-t.ý

1 HO USANAL, APO Seattle, ATTN: ANAOP.N I USA Cmd & General 5$ Cooloeg. Pt Lui'eumerth, AT7m: Id Adviser

1 HO Flrst Anne. ATTN: ...PKA.OlTi I USA Combined Arms Cme Dosw AVt. Pt Lsoeowenum . ATM?: OeuCd*

2 1MO PFit Army. Pt Samt Nouston I USA Ckonanehd Arms Capna Dow Act. Pt I am , a N . ATTM adS

1 V;-. Army Stf Itdilsp Ofa. ATTN: OAVCSA (SOPl 1 USA C@WAW..d Aims Co~t Ow AMt Pt Loramewerdt. ATTWi ATCASA

I Ott Chief f at~f. Studies (nft I USA Combined Arme Cmla Dew Act, Pt Lawummeeth. AT7M: ATCACO-6

I OCUIN. ATTN: CPS/OtP 1 UISA Combained Arms Cinbt Dow Act, Ft Lawowerdt. P.TYN: ATCACC-CI

I The Arm Lb nagn ATTN: RSS Chi~ef 1 UIAIICOM. Nltt Vision Lob. Pt Ielvoir, ATTN: AMSIL-MV-11O

1 T"' Army Lib. rentagpon. ATTN: ANNAL 3 USA Comisusr Sys Cmd. Pt Seivi. ATTN: Teook LWrarv

I Oft. Ant Sat of the Aimv (11160 1 USAMIROC, Pt Seiwaiir. Arfl74 WP-0OQ

*I Tech Support Diu., OJCS t USA Ing S$ch. PtSavr, ATTN* Libragy

1 USASA Arlington, ATTN: IARO-T I USA TopogIMAIc Lab. Pt ftw~ai. ATIN:i EIt. -TO-S

1 USA Rich Oft. Ourham, ATTN: Life Ic~ae 01. I USA Top 0 a- is Lab. Ft Salsvo,. ATTN: "'INPIO Cenaer

2 USANIRM. eNati.k ATTN: SGRO-UIfC. 1 USA Toepoft'li Lob, Pt Seolvor. ATTN* IIL-Mh

1 USAI C. Ft Clayton,. ATTN: S1'ETC-MO-A I USA lnvalllper Cv A Soh. Pt Musahueu. ATTIN: CYD-MIW

1 USAIMA. Pt Bras.L ATTN: AlSU.CTO-OM I USA infoIg5AUne Ct. & Soht. Pt Husestwa. ATTIN: AT$-Cli 4

1 USAIMA, Pt S1rag. ATTN: Marquat Lib I USA inWui4sne Ctr S 1, Pt Huadiume, AT Th- ATSI -TIE

I US WAC Ctr & Salt. 7t McCleflan. ATTN: Lib I USA Int5Ilgefi Car Salt. Pt Hunhuuoe. ATTN: .kTSl-Tt[X-GS

I US WAC Ctr Sc 1w t McClellan. ATTN: Tog Oir I UWA insellipenai Ctv & Sal, Ptl Husahuse. ATTN! ATSI-CTS-ON1

I USA Ntamrtenastr 5th. P! Lee, ATTN: ATSM-TE I USA $ntai~lras tm r & SalthP I uadwai. ATTN-. ATSI-CTO-OT

1 Intolllpm A MatialalDev Ift, EVIL. Ft Holeblri I USA Intelp 'jnCtr & Salt, Pt Huasaeug. ATT'N: ATII-(.1-CS

I USA SE Siptal Ft. Pt ion1, ATT'N: ATSO-GA 1 USA Islfltelpima Ct. & We.. Ft Mussipas. AM-i osM.Rso

1 )SAWCH. Pt Luati,.. -TN: Edue Advisow I i A irowilIprew Cv & Sc. Pt Ilusehliust ATTU, Ubrayv

I USA Wsr College. Carlisle darracks, ATTN: Lib I CON, NO Pt Husawsae ATTN: Talt 11.4 Div

I WIAl It Naourtmyhiauv ON, 2 CDRt. USA Ileetrni Pr" Oud. AiM: SItUP-MT-S

I 1 (II. SDA. Monierey I MO. TCATA. ATTN: Tm.- Library

IUSA Camlticg Antal AWay Seitetal. ATIi: MOCA-MA 1 "06 TCA rA, AiM: AT CAT404 Pt Hea

I USA C4&-wom Anal Api. Isetemmia ATTN: MOCA-J I USA Pleauliti" Cwd Ptt She idea. ATTN: USAACPWd.

I LiGA Arctic Test Ctr, AMV Sasnl-. ATTN: STA.,PL-MI I ISenior Army Ade. USAPACOGTAC, 51gM AP Awn Pig Me. S

.VSA Arctia Tqnt Cr. ADO Seat ArTN; AMSTI*LTS I MO. USARN AC. OCIPP. APO SP mSO ATIM: OPPI-SI I ~ US& ~~I Armemtnt Zmd,. itr1 illfn . ATTN: ATSK-TEM 1' -5mw Llb emnw ofH@ S aeas IN Ptm Sn eMa

I C.,A 4Aromanent ; loart Iland, ATTN: AJA5AR.TDC I Mar.. Corp Inst.. ATTN: Ousn-CI

1 ,'AA~ N NPEC, Attwitic .'it. ATTN: LibrarV I HM. USMC. Commerplwat. ATTN: Codi MITM

1 FAA.NAMIC. Ak. :-tic Citv, ATTN~: Human En. B I WHO. USMC. CowW arm~t~ ATiM Cdaf MPI-20-26

I FAA Aeronautical Ctr. Okia cm a CryV. ATTU: AAC-410 2 USCG Aceft v. New London. ATM: Aimmban

2 USA Fld Arty Sch, Ft Sill. ATTN: Library i USCOAcadey, MewL Lidn ATT: LibrmY

1 USA Armo Salt, Pt Knox. ATrN; Libtrer I USICO Trasnhwo Ct, MY. ATTN: CO

1 USA Armor Salt, Ft Knox. ATTN: ATSS-Dl-E i USCO Tranluq Ctr. NY. AiiM: Mdlac Svc Oft

1 USA Armor Salt. Ft Knox, ATrN: ATSS-OT.TP 1 USCG. Pwahod NA" 1r. DC. ATIi: OP 1/42

1 USA Arnor Salt. Ft Knox, ATTN: ATSSICO-AD 1 MO M*-Ange I,. MC Oat, Caueamia. ATTN: P&S ON0

D13
I US Mainno Classe Liasoen Of. AMC. Alictnuidtn. ATTN, AMCGS-Ir e i~ nto Siu ely. ar

I USATRAOOC. Pt Mett've. ATTN ATRO-10 I AIR CR1181, Korvsgimn, A-.-%i Itift In

6 USATRADOC, It Montreal. ATTN: ATPR-AO 1 wtisiralvel Tisardiall Qvisidalip

I USA TRAOOC. Pt Monica, ATTN: ATTS-IA I MiliStay AtteeftleI Ptenalf 9 %miam, ATTN! 0.. %

I USA Porci., Cold, Ot Me~liarsoe. ATTN: Library t Milt ifl Cites C IR.P -Arwena, 1rlsWo ml Fran.,

2 USA Aviaetio Ten L0, Pt Ruckerti. ATTN: STIBG-00P I PRio lSomistif ic Off. Asoi Hum lap nt"1~ OW. MIinisry

I USA Al4ev fitl Aviation Solletv. III Ruckear, ATTN: Lillrary of Deifine. 4"as. DU

I USA ApyV for Aviition Safety, fit liuakier ATTN4: Idu Adio I PiPathRef Ofe Libriary AKCA. tenaI Oeeseo Pa

I USA Aviowirn $ch. Ist fulustar ATTN: PO Orano 0 1 Mintister,,is 0.4Dtame,. OOOPIKL Atel lecleel

I I4OUSA Avisrign S" Crmi, It Louie, ATTN: AMSAV-01R1 P~okvok Zaka", "mt Hisaer. Neterlands

2 USA Aviation$" (ystt Act.. I&Msi API, ATTN: SAVT2-T

I USA Air Oil# Sat. Fit 211se. ATTN6- ATIA TIM

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I USA Aviattnle th RNo Tol Mgp, Ptt Ruckier, ATTN: ATST-T--RTM

IUSA A.tiaton Seis. CO. Pet R11wtter. ATTN: ATST-O-A

1 00. O.ARCOM. Allniimirts. ATfTN AMXCD-TL

I N4O. OARCGM, AWG4st~ai AT1I4 C6

I US lvilitery, Memlkiy. 1011t Point, ATTN: Serialse Unit

I US Military LAdsu&". Wasil POint. ATTN: Ole of Millt Ldraho

I US Military Acades". Weot Pistol. ATTN: MAOR

I USA Itanedissit a ftse UK. FPO NY, AT"-: fASI-GC

1 Ofe of Nsoof RIOs. ArN gim . ATTN: Cooe 412

3 D$c of Novel Pnsti Atlingb"n, ATTN: Cod. 468

I Oft of N"vo Richs. Arlinqwis, ATTN: Ceder 41*

I Oft of Novel Micht. Arlington. ATTN: Code "I1

1 Naval AV4Gec Mod Ma, Lab. Penuacola ATTN: Acosas Sot ON

I Novel Atiosiec Mod Rie, Lio. Porisaccla. ATTN: Cotts LSI

I Naval Asrolipc Mod A", Lao. Palsacola, ATTN: Code L5

I Chief of NayPen. ATTN: PorsON11

I NAVAIRSTA, Norfolk. ATTN: Safety Ctt

I Na' Ootaegrash-.e DC. ATTN: Coder 1251. Charts & Techt

1 Canver at Noval Anal, ATTN: Doc Ctr

I NavAir~vCom". ATTN: AIR-5313C

I Nit GuMild. ATTIN: It2

I N~avlicosstaerlub~lqa 2. FPO SP 0601

1 APIIRL (PT) Wil~liam APO

I AFMAL (TTI Lowy API

1 AFIIRL IASI WPAF9, ON

2 AFHRL 100.12) Brookis AFI

1 AFHRL 1DOJNI Lackland AFS

I IIDUSAF (INYSOI

I HOUSAP DOP'XAi

I AFVTG iRO) Randolofs APE

3 AMALI. El WPAF5. ONl

2 AF Intf of Toch, WPAPI. ON,. ATTN: ENEiSL

I ATC (XPTDI Rendition AFB

1 uSAF Aaro~sd Lib, Brooks APIJ ISUL-41, ATTN: DOC SEC

I AFOS" INL). Arlington

I AF Lot Cnsd. McClellan APE. ATTN: ALC.DOPCRS

IAir Forbie Academoy. CO. .6 rrN: Debt of Sall Sen

5N~vPs ti & 0v Ctr. Sin Diego

2 Navy Mod NeurootyChiatrie Racit Unit, San Dieigo

INoy Electronic Lab So Oie"o ATTN: Res Lab

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I NavPootGraSclt. Monterey. ATTN: Code *$A& I NavPostGrasSch. MontmVe, ATTN: Coda 2124 1 NavTrriqlquipCtr. Orlando, ATTN: Tacht Lab

I US Deat of Labor. DC. ATTN: Manpovwr Admits

I US Dept of Juatice. DC. ATTN: Drug Enforce Admin

I Nat Sun of Standards, DC. ATTN: Computetr Info Saction

I Not Clewring Mousle for MH-Info. Rockville

I enver Fecatral Cit Lakewood, ATTN: OLM

12 Defense Documeontation Center

4 Oit Psych., Army Hit, Russell Ofes. Canberra

I Sciantlaic Advif. 'hI~ Sd. Army lNo. Russell Ofcs. Carn,terris

I %vd in Air Attache, Austuian Embassy

I Ctritnee 6@ qcreirc-io De sPctyurs. Mumaiine do is Doefnsw

Cpnadian Joint Staff 'osmniigton

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.1 3iatih Dotf Staff. Brini' ESassiv. Vishl,oiton

D)14