JOINT MILITARY 

EDUCATION

Actions Needed to 

Implement DOD 

Recommendations for 

Enhancing Leadership 

Development

Report to Congressional Committees

October 2013

GAO-14-29

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-29, a report to 

congressional committees

October 2013

JOINT MILITARY EDUCATION

Actions Needed to Implement DOD 

Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership 

Development

Why GAO Did This Study

To facilitate unified operations across 

the services, DOD has provided JPME 

programs at departmental and service 

academic institutions for almost 30 

years. In July 2012, the Director for 

Joint Force Development, who reports 

to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, tasked the MECC to review 

DOD’s joint education objectives and 

institutions to help ensure that 

outcomes match requirements for the 

strategic environment projected for 

Joint Force 2020. Subsequently, the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to 

report to Congress on the analytical 

approach used by the MECC not later 

than 90 days after the Director

submitted the MECC’s report to GAO,

which the Director did on July 1, 2013. 

In this report, GAO (1) identifies the 

purpose of DOD’s study of the JPME

program, and (2) assesses DOD’s 

methodology used to conduct the Joint 

Professional Military Education study 

and its planning for follow-on actions.

GAO analyzed the MECC’s final report 

and relevant planning documents, 

interviewed DOD officials who 

conducted portions of the study, and 

reviewed leading practices for 

evaluating programs by GAO and other 

entities. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD establish

well-defined timeframes for conducting 

any follow-on actions and include 

stakeholders necessary for 

implementation, and assess the costs 

of implementing recommendations 

made in the MECC’s recent study of 

joint professional military education.

DOD concurred with both of GAO’s 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The purpose of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) study of its Joint 

Professional Military Education (JPME) program was to identify (1) desired 

leader attributes as part of the JPME career-long learning experience needed to 

support DOD’s strategic vision and (2) any gaps in the current educational 

program to facilitate the development of the leaders needed to achieve that

vision. Specifically, a Military Education Coordination Council (MECC)—following 

direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director for Joint 

Force Development—proposed six desired leader attributes, including, for 

example, the ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty, and 

concluded that the existing institutional structure for providing JPME should be 

retained. The MECC’s gap analysis, however, indicated that in order to support 

the development of these attributes, a greater emphasis on career-long selfdirected learning is also needed, among other things. In line with its findings, the 

MECC made 21 recommendations to improve the JPME program that address

increased accessibility of educational programs, changes to teaching 

methodologies and assessment mechanisms, and enhanced use of technology.

DOD’s methodology generally included leading practices for assessing training

programs, but DOD has not yet fully planned for follow-on actions and engaged

all stakeholders, nor has it assessed the costs of the MECC’s recommendations 

to provide decision makers with more timely and complete information and help 

ensure that the study’s results are implemented. Specifically, the MECC

reviewed other related studies, conducted a gap analysis to identify gaps based 

on existing and future needs, used the best available data and acknowledged 

limitations—all practices identified by GAO and other government agencies and

research institutions as leading practices for successful evaluations of training 

and other programs. By contrast, DOD documents state that the results of the 

study were intended to inform and shape the fall 2013 academic year, but the 

MECC did not complete its study until June 24, 2013 and provided its report to 

GAO on July 1, 2013. Further, DOD has not yet identified milestones and 

timeframes for implementing all of its recommendations. Subsequently, the 

department developed an update to inform actions for moving forward on its 

recommendations. DOD identified target dates for completion not later than

September 2014 for 9 recommendations, but did not include interim milestones, 

and has not yet developed target dates for 12 recommendations. In addition, the 

MECC did not formalize plans to achieve the buy-in of all stakeholders for 

recommendation implementation. Without this information, it may be difficult for 

DOD to ensure that stakeholders agree on and are accountable for implementing 

the recommendations in a timely manner. Finally, the MECC did not analyze the 

costs or efficiencies associated with implementing its recommendations, but it 

identified 5 recommendations that could incur additional costs because they 

require further study. Leading practices such as accounting for program 

resources enable managers to better manage existing resources and plan for 

future programmatic needs. Without cost data on the study’s recommendations 

or plans to assess cost in the near term as part of continued efforts to implement 

the results of the JPME study, decision makers could be hindered in determining 

the most efficient allocation of departmental resources for JPME.

View GAO-14-29. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Letter 1

Background 3

DOD’s Study Was Intended to Identify Leader Attributes, CareerLong Education Goals, and Educational Gaps 10

Study’s Methodology Generally Included Leading Practices, but 

DOD Has Not Yet Fully Planned for Follow-on Actions and 

Engaged All Stakeholders, or Considered Potential 

Implementation Costs 16

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments 25

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28

Appendix II Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 

Institutions 30

Appendix III Recommendations Made by the Military Education Coordination 

Council (MECC) in Its Study of Joint Professional Military 

Education 32

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 34

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36

Tables

Table 1: Gaps in Officer Curricula Associated with the Desired 

Leader Attributes 14

Table 2: Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) 

Recommendations by Category 32

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Figures

Figure 1: The Five Levels of Officer Joint Professional Military 

Education (JPME) 7

Figure 2: Evolution of Joint Professional Military Education 

(JPME) Study Objectives 12

Figure 3: Map of Officer JPME Institutions 30

Abbreviations

AJPME Advanced Joint Professional Military Education

DLA Desired Leader Attribute

DOD Department of Defense

EMERC Enlisted Military Education Review Council

EPMEP Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy

JCOA Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division

JPME Joint Professional Military Education

MECC Military Education Coordination Council

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

OPMEP Officer Professional Military Education Policy

PAJE Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education

PME Professional Military Education

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Page 1 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

October 23, 2013

Congressional Committees

Professional military education is key to the development of the nation’s 

armed forces, and it is the quality of that military education that 

distinguishes U.S. forces around the world.1 As operations over the last 

decade have demonstrated, military officers must think critically, 

communicate well, conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others in 

difficult and often dangerous situations that require forces from across the 

military departments. The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department 

of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) marked one 

of the most significant attempts over the past few decades to coordinate 

service efforts.2 Among other things, the act sought to establish clearer 

lines of command and control and improve the ability of the services to 

work with each other in truly joint, rather than simply multi-service, 

operations. In the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, a panel chaired by 

Representative Isaac N. “Ike” Skelton IV in 1989 undertook a 

comprehensive review of joint professional military education (JPME) and 

made a number of specific recommendations on how the joint reforms of 

Goldwater-Nichols should be institutionalized among the services through 

officer in-residence education. Since the Skelton Report, Congress has 

passed additional legislation affecting the professional military education 

system, including a requirement to create a program of JPME, through

which military officers would be educated on joint matters throughout their 

careers.3

 Over time, the Department of Defense (DOD) and others have 

conducted studies that, to some extent, reviewed the cumulative effects 

of these legislative changes. 

The commitment within DOD to JPME demonstrates a major investment, 

both of time and money. Some of the education programs are an 

academic year in length, which represents a significant part of an officer’s 

 1

U.S. Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military

Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel, H.R. 111-

4 (Washington, D.C.: April 2010).

2 Pub. L. No. 99-433 (1986).

3

10 U.S.C. § 2154. 
Page 2 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

career. To support the academic programs, in fiscal year 2012, DOD 

spent approximately $47.8 million on its JPME schools within National 

Defense University alone.4

In July 2012, DOD’s Director for Joint Force Development, expanding on 

a white paper signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed

DOD's Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) to prepare a 

report on the value of the JPME program, the educational outcomes 

sought, and any changes necessary to strengthen the program’s value to 

DOD. According to the director’s memo, this review was necessitated by 

changes in the security environment, the fiscal climate, and the 

experiences of DOD’s joint force since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols 

in 1986. Subsequently, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

for Fiscal Year 2013 required us to report to Congress on the analytical 

approach used by the MECC for that report not later than 90 days after 

receiving DOD’s report from the Director for Joint Force Development. 5

Our report (1) identifies the purpose of DOD’s study of the Joint 

Professional Military Education program, and (2) assesses DOD’s 

methodology used to conduct the Joint Professional Military Education 

study and its planning for follow-on actions.

To identify the purpose of DOD’s study of the JPME program, we 

reviewed the documents directing the study, the minutes of the MECC 

meetings, interim briefing report, and the MECC’s final report, dated June 

24, 2013.6 We also interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials from the 

 4

According to its Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates, DOD’s National Defense University 

is the premier center for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and is under the 

direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The university conducts JPME seminars, 

symposia, and professional development and conferencing for DOD and Congressional 

representatives. The National Defense University is located at Fort McNair in Washington, 

D.C. The dollar amount cited here, provided by a DOD official, includes both direct and 

reimbursable expenses and includes expenses for the Joint Forces Staff College (located 

in Norfolk, VA), the Dwight D. Eisenhower School of National Security and Resource 

Strategy, the National War College, and the CAPSTONE, PINNACLE, and KEYSTONE 

programs at the National Defense University. It does not include National Defense 

University’s overhead costs, nor does it constitute the entirety of DOD’s JPME expenses 

that are associated with the military services’ JPME schools. According to a DOD official, 

it would be difficult to determine what percentage of the services’ funding goes specifically 

to JPME because, in part, JPME is only a portion of their programs. 

5

Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 547 (2013).

6

DOD provided us with a copy of its final report on July 1, 2013. We met our mandate with 

a draft copy of this report. 
Page 3 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Joint Professional Military Education Division within DOD’s Joint Staff’s 

Directorate for Joint Force Development (J7). The Joint Professional 

Military Education Division, in conjunction with the MECC, was 

responsible for leading DOD’s effort. To assess the methodology DOD 

used to conduct the JPME study and its planning for follow-on actions, we 

analyzed relevant reports and guidance by GAO, the Office of 

Management and Budget, the Office of Personnel Management, and 

private sector organizations such as the RAND Corporation, among 

others.7 We identified key practices contained in these documents for 

evaluating educational programs and information that were applicable for 

the purposes of this engagement. We then compared DOD’s 

methodology with these select leading practices for educational program 

evaluation. We also reviewed documents identified by DOD officials as 

project plans for the study, as well as documentation of the department’s 

intended follow-on actions. Again, we interviewed DOD officials from the 

Joint Professional Military Education Division within the Directorate for 

Joint Force Development. We also met with officials across DOD, 

representing institutions such as the National Defense University, the 

U.S. Army War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College, among 

others, who were identified as Team Leads for the study. Further details 

about our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from March through October 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Joint education is provided to some extent at all levels of officer and 

enlisted professional military education. The professional development 

and career progression for both officers and enlisted personnel through 

DOD’s professional military education is a service responsibility; 

embedded within the professional military education systems is a 

program of JPME that is overseen by the Joint Staff. 

 7

See appendix I for a list of reports and guidance we reviewed.

Background
Page 4 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

For officers, this system is designed to fulfill the educational requirements 

for joint officer management as mandated by law.8 The joint education 

program is intended to prepare aspiring military leaders for both 

conducting operations in a coherently joint force and thinking their way 

through uncertainty. Officer JPME program courses are taught at multiple 

sites across the country, including the service Staff and War Colleges and 

the National Defense University.

9 See appendix II for a list and map of 

DOD’s academic institutions where officer JPME courses are taught. 

According to the Officer Professional Military Education Policy 

(OPMEP),10 the JPME program for officers comprises curriculum 

components in the five levels of the officer professional military education 

system and includes three-statutorily mandated levels of JPME designed 

to progressively develop the knowledge, analytical skills, perspectives, 

and values that are essential for U.S. officers to function effectively in 

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. For 

each of those levels, the emphasis changes to provide instruction in 

target areas to enhance leader attributes of attending service members at 

their specific rank and tenure.

Within officer PME, the first level of JPME—precommissioning—provides 

officer candidate and officer training school, Reserve Officer Training 

Corps, and Military Service Academy students with a basic foundation in 

defense structure, roles and missions of other military services, the 

combatant command structure, and the nature of American military power 

and joint warfare. The second level of JPME—primary—provides junior 

officers at the O-1 through O-3 ranks11 with primary education on the 

 8

10 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2157.

9

Active duty and reserve officers can also satisfy some JPME requirements by completing 

the non-resident curricula provided by National Defense University and the services’

schools.

10Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional 

Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

1800.01D (Washington, D.C., Dec. 15, 2011).

11O-1 through O-3 ranks denote the first through the third levels of commissioned military 

officer ranking, the titles for which vary among the services. O-1, or officer level 1, signifies 

an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps Second Lieutenant, or a Navy Ensign. O-2, or 

officer level 2, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps First Lieutenant, or a 

Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade. O-3, or Officer level 3, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a 

Marine Corps Captain, or a Navy Lieutenant.
Page 5 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

tactical level of war. This level of JPME helps to foster an understanding 

of the Joint Task Force combatant command structure and how national 

and joint systems support tactical-level operations, among other subjects. 

The third level begins the first statutorily-mandated level of JPME 

requirements—JPME Phase I.12 This phase generally focuses on tactical 

and operational levels of war, and is typically attended by intermediatelevel officers at the O-4 rank, as well as some officers at the O-5 and O-6 

ranks.13 JPME Phase I is incorporated into the curricula of the 

intermediate- and senior-level service colleges, as well as other 

appropriate educational programs that meet JPME criteria and are 

accredited by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This level of 

education provides officers the opportunity to gain better understanding 

from a service component perspective of joint force employment at the 

operational and tactical levels of war. The subject matter to be covered by 

JPME Phase I instruction must, by law, include at the least (1) national 

military strategy; (2) joint planning at all levels of war; (3) joint doctrine; 

(4) joint command and control; and (5) joint force and joint requirements 

development.14

The fourth level of JPME provides Phase II of the statutorily-directed 

JPME requirements.15 JPME Phase II is a follow-on for selected 

graduates of service schools and other appropriate education programs 

that complements and enhances the JPME Phase I instruction. Phase II 

is taught at National Defense University’s National War College and 

Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource 

Management, the Joint Forces Staff College’s Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School and Joint Advanced Warfighting School to both 

intermediate- and senior-level (O-5 and O-6) students, and at senior-level 

 1210 U.S.C. § 2154(a). 

13The O-4 rank denotes the fourth level of commissioned military officer ranking, the title 

for which varies among the services. O-4, or officer level 4, signifies an Army, an Air 

Force, or a Marine Corps Major, or a Navy Lieutenant Commander. The O-5 and O-6 

ranks denote the fifth and the sixth levels of commissioned military officer ranking, the 

titles for which vary among the services. O-5, or officer level 5, signifies an Army, an Air 

Force, or a Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, or a Navy Commander. O-6, or officer level 

6, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps Colonel, or a Navy Captain.

1410 U.S.C. §§ 2151(a), 2154(a)(1).

1510 U.S.C. § 2155. 
Page 6 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

service colleges to senior-level students, and consists of courses on the 

operational and strategic levels of war. Phase II helps prepare officers for 

high-level policy and command and staff responsibilities, with a focus on 

areas such as national security strategy and joint strategic leadership. In 

addition to the subjects specified in JPME Phase I, the curriculum for 

JPME Phase II must, by law, include: (1) national security strategy; 

(2) theater strategy and campaigning; (3) joint planning processes and 

systems; and (4) joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.16 This phase 

completes the educational requirement for joint officer management. 

The fifth and final level of instruction is the CAPSTONE course of JPME 

for general/flag officers17 and focuses on the operational and strategic 

levels of war for high-level joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational responsibilities.18 Specifically, the CAPSTONE course 

focuses on (1) the fundamentals of joint doctrine; (2) integrating elements 

of national power across military operations to accomplish security and 

military strategies; and (3) how joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational operations support strategic goals and objectives. This level 

of JPME is tiered to ensure the progressive and continuous development 

of executive level officers. Figure 1 summarizes the five levels of JPME.

 1610 U.S.C. § 2155(c). 

17General/flag officer denotes rank above the O-6 level, the titles for which vary among 

the services. An officer at this rank in the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps holds 

the title of Brigadier General or higher. A Navy officer at this level holds the title of Rear 

Admiral Lower Half or higher.

1810 U.S.C. § 2153. 
Page 7 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Figure 1: The Five Levels of Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 

a

Denotes statutorily-directed JPME course level.

In addition to meeting legislative requirements to provide education on 

JPME matters, DOD’s colleges and universities that provide academic 

year-long programs for officers are Master’s Degree-granting institutions. 

According to the Middle States Commission for Higher Education, the 

body that accredits National Defense University, among others, 

accreditation is the means of self-regulation and peer review adopted by 

the educational community. The accrediting process is intended to 

strengthen and sustain the quality and integrity of higher education, 

making it worthy of public confidence and minimizing the scope of 

external control. Accreditation by the Commission is based on the results 

of institutional reviews by peers and colleagues and attests to the 

judgment that the institution has met the following criteria: 

• that it has a mission appropriate to higher education;

• that it is guided by well-defined and appropriate goals, including goals 

for student learning;
Page 8 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

• that it has established conditions and procedures under which its 

mission and goals can be realized;

• that it assesses both institutional effectiveness and student learning 

outcomes, and uses the results for improvement; 

• that it is substantially accomplishing its mission and goals;

• that it is organized, staffed, and supported so that it can be expected 

to continue to accomplish its mission and goals; and 

• that it meets the Requirements of Affiliation and accreditation 

standards of the Middle States Commission on Higher Education.

DOD also conducts periodic assessments of the three statutorilymandated levels of officer JPME to ensure that the curricula meet the 

prescribed joint educational requirements at each level, and uses the 

results of these assessments to update educational policy as appropriate. 

For enlisted personnel, the Enlisted Professional Military Education 

Policy19 circulates the policies, procedures, objectives, and 

responsibilities for enlisted professional military education and enlisted 

JPME. According to that policy, enlisted professional development and 

progression through the enlisted military education continuum is a service 

responsibility. The initial focus of enlisted professional military education 

is military occupational specialty training and education required to 

produce enlisted personnel capable of performing assigned tasks. 

Beyond occupational specialty training, the Enlisted Professional Military 

Education Policy states that all enlisted personnel also should be 

exposed to enlisted JPME as they progress through their respective 

services’ enlisted professional military education system. In addition, the 

policy states that, for some enlisted personnel, more comprehensive joint 

education is required to prepare those servicemembers for specific joint 

assignments. 

Enlisted JPME includes programs that span an enlisted member’s career 

and apply to all enlisted personnel. Basic Enlisted JPME addresses 

educational guidelines that should be completed by pay grade E-6,20

while Career Enlisted JPME addresses educational guidelines for senior 

enlisted personnel in grades E-6 or E-7 and above. Beyond these 

 19Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Enlisted Professional 

Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

1805.01A (Oct. 1, 2010). 

20The general pay grade structure for enlisted personnel runs from E-1 through E-9.
Page 9 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

programs, Senior Enlisted JPME is a stand-alone Web-based course 

designed specifically for senior enlisted personnel in pay grades E-6 

through E-9 who are serving in or are slated to serve in joint 

organizations. DOD’s KEYSTONE course exists to prepare command 

senior enlisted leaders for service in flag level joint headquarters or joint 

task force organizations. This course is designed for personnel who are 

serving in pay grade E-9. The focus of this course is to enable command 

senior enlisted leaders to think intuitively from a joint perspective while 

serving in their capacity in a general/flag officer joint organization.

DOD also developed a program that, since 2003, has provided JPME 

specifically to reserve officers. In response to legislative direction,21 the 

Joint Forces Staff College established a 40-week, blended learning 

Advanced Joint Professional Military Education program (AJPME) that 

consists of two distance learning periods and two face-to-face periods. 

Similar to the active component courses, the Officer Professional Military 

Education Policy outlines the requirements for AJPME. The program’s 

mission is to educate reserve component officers to plan and execute

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations to 

instill a primary commitment to teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives. 

AJPME builds on the foundation established by the institutions teaching 

JPME Phase I and prepares reserve component officers (O-4 to O-6) for 

joint duty assignments.

DOD’s JPME programs are approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. The Director for Joint Force Development retains responsibility 

to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint 

warfighter through joint force development, in order to advance the 

operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. The Joint 

Staff’s Directorate for Joint Force Development (J7) oversees general 

policy for the JPME programs. The MECC, which was tasked with 

conducting the most recent DOD-initiated study on JPME, serves as an 

advisory body to the Director of the Joint Staff on joint education issues. 

The purpose of the MECC is to address key educational issues of interest 

to the joint education community, promote cooperation and collaboration 

among the MECC member institutions, and coordinate joint education 

initiatives. Its membership consists of the MECC principals and a 

supporting MECC Working Group. These principals include the Director 

 21See 10 U.S.C § 666. 
Page 10 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

for Joint Force Development; the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for 

Military Education; the presidents, commandants, and directors of the 

joint professional military education colleges and service universities; and 

the heads of any other JPME-accredited institutions. Additional 

representatives from other commands and organizations may be invited 

to participate as is appropriate. The MECC Working Group is comprised 

of dean’s level/ O-6 representatives of the MECC principals. The Deputy 

Director of the Joint Education and Doctrine Division chairs the MECC 

Working Group. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense, service chiefs, 

and combatant commanders are invited to send participants to the MECC 

meetings to provide feedback to improve the educational process.

The purpose of DOD’s issued study of the JPME program was to identify 

desired leader attributes by defining what is needed from the JPME

career-long learning experience to support DOD’s strategic vision, as well 

as any gaps in the current educational program to facilitate the 

development of the leaders needed to achieve that vision. The original 

purpose and objectives for the study were laid out in a July 16, 2012, 

white paper from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Joint 

Staff memorandum issued with the white paper. 

In the white paper, the Chairman stated that the study’s purpose was to 

support the development of the department’s leaders by fostering the 

values, strategic vision, and critical thinking skills needed to lead and 

support the development of Joint Force 2020.22 This white paper also 

identified four attributes that the department’s education programs should 

develop in its leaders. Those attributes include the following:

• the ability to understand the security environment and the 

contributions of all elements of national power; 

• the ability to deal with surprise and uncertainty;

• the ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; 

and

• the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and 

understanding. 

 22Joint Force 2020—outlined in the September 10, 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint 

Operations: Joint Force 2020—is the concept behind the Chairman’s plan for the future 

force.

DOD’s Study Was 

Intended to Identify 

Leader Attributes, 

Career-Long 

Education Goals, and 

Educational Gaps
Page 11 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

The Chairman’s white paper also stated that other attributes for leader 

development would evolve and would need to be aligned with future 

operations and incorporated into curricula to help ensure that gaps are 

identified and eliminated. 

The memorandum, signed by the Director for Joint Force Development, 

identified three questions meant to shape the review. The first question 

focused on the value of joint education, why it is needed, and how the 

military will train and educate its leaders to meet the requirements of Joint 

Force 2020. The second question focused on the educational outcomes 

sought by the department, specifically with regard to training leaders for 

carrying out DOD’s strategic vision, in order to help ensure alignment of 

desired leader attributes with the curriculum. The third question built upon 

the first two by focusing on any changes needed to strengthen and 

achieve the value and outcomes DOD seeks in building leaders for Joint 

Force 2020. The memorandum also instructed DOD’s MECC to conduct 

the study.

Subsequent to the issuance of the white paper and memorandum, the 

MECC met on August 23, 2012, to refine the study’s specific objectives. 

According to officials, at the direction of the Director for Joint Force 

Development, the MECC removed the requirement to address the value 

of joint education and instead focused its efforts on identifying the 

intended outcomes of the educational program and actions needed to 

achieve the outcomes. The MECC’s discussions also established two 

broad objectives for the study—documented in meeting minutes and an 

enclosure—based on the direction in the memorandum and further 

direction received by the Chairman. The two broad objectives the MECC 

established were to:

1. define the Joint Education Continuum23 needed to meet the joint 

leader development goals for Joint Force 2020, and 

2. determine the gaps that need to be addressed for the Joint Education 

enterprise to progress from the current joint leader development 

outcomes to producing the future desired joint leader attributes for 

Joint Force 2020. 

 23The Officer Professional Military Education continuum, and similarly the Enlisted 

Professional Military Education continuum, is a graphic representation of key elements of 

career-long officer (and enlisted) education that takes into consideration educational 

institutions and course curricula.
Page 12 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

The evolution of the study’s objectives is described below in figure 2.

Figure 2: Evolution of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Study Objectives

The MECC’s first objective focused on defining and improving upon both 

the officer and enlisted joint education continuums to ensure that they are 

in line with the development goals for DOD’s strategic vision. The MECC 

identified a need to retain many aspects of the current officer joint 

education continuum, as well as a need to incorporate new elements into 

the proposed officer joint education continuum that would help to meet 

the changing needs of future leaders of Joint Force 2020. For example, 

the proposed officer continuum retains the comprehensive approach of 

embedding elements of JPME at each level of service-delivered 

education with an emphasis on the statutory requirements for JPME 

Phases I and II, as well as key milestones from the precommissioning 

level of JPME to the general/flag officer rank. In addition to retaining the 

existing institutional structure for providing JPME education, however, in 

its report the MECC also emphasized the importance of self-directed, 

career-long learning and development. This facet of officer development 

is intended to convey an expectation that an individual is responsible for 

his or her own education and development, thereby inculcating a culture 

of lifelong learning. The MECC’s study concluded, on the other hand, that 

changes to the enlisted JPME continuum—specifically, between the 

Senior Enlisted JPME and KEYSTONE courses— are needed to improve 

the depiction of the Chairman’s intent for enlisted professional military 

education. Currently, enlisted personnel who complete the Senior 

Enlisted JPME course at pay grade E-6 or E-7 are not eligible to attend 

the KEYSTONE course until they attain pay grade E-9, potentially leaving 

a significant interval in time between participation in the two courses. 

Accordingly, the MECC recommended dividing the existing Senior 
Page 13 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Enlisted JPME course into two parts. Both parts would be offered prior to 

the KEYSTONE course and reduce the interval of time that senior 

enlisted servicemembers must wait between phases of enlisted joint 

education.24

The second objective expanded upon the first, and focused on identifying 

and closing gaps in the current JPME curriculum to produce joint leaders 

with attributes that are in line with Joint Force 2020. Specifically, the 

MECC refined the four attributes proposed in the Chairman’s white paper, 

added two additional attributes, and identified a set of subattributes 

associated with each of the six desired leader attributes, that the MECC 

used to analyze the current capabilities of the department’s joint 

education programs. The refined list of desired leader attributes consists 

of the abilities to:

1. Understand the security environment and contributions of all 

instruments of national power,

2. Anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty,

3. Anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions,

4. Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding,

5. Make ethical decisions based on shared values of the profession of 

arms, and,

6. Think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles 

and concepts to joint operations.

The MECC then conducted a gap analysis to identify and crosswalk the 

desired leader attributes for Joint Force 2020 with the current officer and 

enlisted personnel JPME education continuums. 

For officers, the MECC’s analysis showed that, while the JPME program 

currently addresses the desired leader attribute outcomes at some level 

and also meets the intent of the existing requirements identified by the 

Skelton Panel, gaps exist where changes are needed to meet the 

challenges of Joint Force 2020. These include changes to teaching 

methodologies, assessment mechanisms, and other areas in support of 

the newly-identified desired leader attributes. Table 1 summarizes where 

 24We discuss DOD’s efforts to address the MECC’s recommendations later in this report.
Page 14 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

DOD has identified gaps in its officer JPME curricula associated with the 

identified list of desired leader attributes and subattributes. 

Table 1: Gaps in Officer Curricula Associated with the Desired Leader Attributes

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs)

DOD assessment of the 

existence of gaps Examples of identified gaps

1. Ability to understand the security environment and 

the contributions of all instruments of national power.

 No gaps in curriculum.

2. Ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and 

uncertainty.

 Additional faculty development may be 

required for instruction.

3. Ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead 

transitions.

◐ Additional scenarios and simulations for 

instruction may be required.

4. Ability to operate on intent through trust, 

empowerment, and understanding.

 Some subattributes of desired leader 

attributes are not covered in curriculum and 

may require additional technology for 

simulations. 

5. Ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared 

values of the profession of arms.

 No gaps in curriculum. 

6. Ability to think critically and strategically and apply 

joint warfighting principles and concepts in joint 

operations spanning all levels of warfare.

 No gaps in curriculum.

Source: DOD.

Legend

 DOD did not identify any gaps in its JPME curricula to meet the desired leader attribute, and no 

corrective action is needed.

◐ DOD found potential gaps and that some refinement to the curriculum may be needed.

 DOD found that gaps exist in the JPME curricula to meet the desired leader attribute, and that 

corrective action is needed.

For enlisted personnel, the MECC determined that a separate and distinct 

set of desired leader attributes should be developed for senior enlisted 

leaders that will require additional study. Officials from the Joint Staff 

initiated this work on April 8, 2013 and assigned this task to DOD’s 

Enlisted Military Education Review Council (EMERC).25 The EMERC took 

up this effort at its August 22, 2013 meeting and proposed a list of six 

desired leader attributes for enlisted personnel. DOD officials provided us 

 25The Enlisted Military Education Review Council (EMERC) serves as an advisory body to 

the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Military Education on enlisted joint education issues. 

The EMERC addresses issues of interest to the joint education community, promotes 

cooperation and collaboration among EMERC member institutions, and coordinates joint 

education initiatives.
Page 15 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

with the proposed list of enlisted desired leader attributes on September 

16, 2013. 

The MECC made a total of 21 recommendations, which collectively 

address the study’s objectives and span four categories, including: 

(1) desired leader attributes, subattributes, or educational outcomes; 

(2) joint education continuums; (3) lifelong learning and advancements in 

learning technologies; and (4) faculty quality. See appendix III for a list of 

the 21 recommendations. Several of these recommendations call for 

additional study by the National Defense University and the services to 

support the achievement of leader attributes. Other recommendations 

emphasize the importance of strengthening the educational outcomes at 

the primary level of joint education, making education programs more 

accessible, and using prior learning assessments to tailor education 

opportunities to students’ needs, among other things. One 

recommendation, in particular, calls for undertaking an approach to 

develop a separate and distinct set of desired leader attributes to guide 

enlisted joint education. Additionally, the MECC considered whether to 

make any legislative proposals, but did not identify the need for any 

legislative changes to the joint education enterprise based on the results 

of the review. According to officials, the results of the study will be used 

ultimately to inform updates and revisions to the Officer Professional 

Military Education Policy26 and the Enlisted Professional Military 

Education Policy,27 which are the primary instructions that distribute the 

policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for professional 

military education and JPME. Our next section discusses DOD’s plans in 

this area. 

 26CJCSI 1800.01D. 

27CJCSI 1805.01A.
Page 16 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

The methodology DOD used for its study of JPME generally included 

leading practices for evaluating strategic training and other programs, 

such as reviewing existing literature, using available data, and assessing 

skills gaps. However, the department has not yet fully planned for followon actions or fully engaged all stakeholders to help ensure that they are 

held accountable for making progress in implementing the study’s 

recommendations. Specifically, the department has not taken steps to 

ensure that the results of the study will be implemented using an 

approach agreed upon by all stakeholders, or that the results will be 

implemented in a timely manner. Further, the department has not yet fully 

evaluated the potential costs associated with the implementation of the 

MECC’s recommendations to provide decision makers with more 

complete information and assurance that the recommendations will be 

cost-effective.

According to our 2012 report, Designing Evaluations,28 a key first step in 

designing a program evaluation is to conduct a literature review in order 

to understand the program’s history, related policies, and knowledge 

base. A review of the relevant policy literature can help focus evaluation 

questions on knowledge gaps, identify design and data collection options 

used in the past, and provide important context for the requester’s 

questions. Further, according to the RAND Corporation’s Standards for 

High-Quality Research and Analysis,29 a study team should demonstrate 

an understanding of other related studies, which should be evident in, for 

example, how a problem is formulated and approached. The team should 

also take particular care to explain the ways in which its study agrees, 

disagrees, or otherwise differs importantly from previous studies. 

The MECC’s report states that the initial step in its review was to 

determine the JPME enterprise’s effectiveness in meeting its current 

requirements. According to an official, the MECC reviewed many 

documents as part of a literature review, but derived its findings from four 

 28GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G (Washington, D.C.: January 

2012).

29RAND Corporation, Standards for High-Quality Research and Analysis (Santa Monica, 

Calif.: November 2011).

Study’s Methodology 

Generally Included 

Leading Practices, but 

DOD Has Not Yet 

Fully Planned for 

Follow-on Actions 

and Engaged All 

Stakeholders, or 

Considered Potential 

Implementation Costs

MECC Reviewed Existing 

Literature, Used Available 

Data, and Assessed Gaps
Page 17 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

specific sources—all issued within the last 5 years—that it determined 

were most relevant to the review. Specifically, these sources were:

• The 2010 House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations (O&I), study30 which provided a 

detailed assessment of the state of JPME;

• A Decade of War,31 conducted by the Joint and Coalition Operational 

Analysis Division32 within the Joint Staff (J7);

• The Ingenuity Gap: Officer Management for the 21st Century33; and 

• Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps.

34

According to the MECC’s report, these documents collectively provide a 

broad look across joint education. The MECC found that the 2010 HASC 

report, for example, provided a detailed assessment of the state of JPME, 

and concluded that while the overall PME system was basically sound, 

some areas needed improvement, such as an increased emphasis on 

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. 

Consistent with this finding, the MECC made a recommendation that the 

Joint Professional Military Education Division review specific subject 

areas for increased emphasis within joint education as part of the process 

of revising the officer and enlisted policies. These subject areas include 

cyber warfare, interagency and intergovernmental operations, and 

information and economic instruments of national power, among others. 

Further, these sources suggested that responsibilities for junior officers 

will increase and that joint education should be expanded at lower levels. 

 30Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the GoldwaterNichols Act and the Skelton Panel

31Joint Staff J-7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War, Volume 

I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Suffolk, VA: June 15, 2012).

32In support of the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program, and as directed, the Joint 

Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division collects, aggregates, 

analyzes, and disseminates joint lessons learned and best practices across the range of 

military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities. JCOA examined over 400 

findings, observations, and best practices to identify enduring lessons that can inform 

future joint force development in its Decade of War, Volume I study.

33Maren Leed and David Sokolow, The Ingenuity Gap: Officer Management for the 21st 

Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010). 

34John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton, Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military 

Officer Corps (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2010). 
Page 18 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Similarly, the MECC found that officers are receiving joint education 

exposure earlier in their careers, and also recommended that the services 

strengthen the instruction of the desired leader attributes at the primary 

level of joint education for junior officers. Additionally, these sources 

recognized the need for increased emphasis on handling uncertainty and 

critical thinking skills. DOD’s study also focused on the ability to anticipate 

and respond to surprise and uncertainty, and critical thinking in joint 

operations. 

RAND’s Standards35 report further indicates that the data and information 

used for a study should be the best available and that a research team 

should indicate limitations in the quality of the available data. As part of its 

second objective, the MECC analyzed data from joint accreditation visits, 

that provided broad areas of assessment, and institutional survey and 

outcome assessments, that provided more detailed observations related 

to curricula. More specifically, the MECC conducted a review of the 

Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) reaffirmation 

results and institutional self-studies for the past 10 years.36 DOD uses 

these studies to document compliance with the Officer Professional 

Military Education Policy (OPMEP) standards and identify areas for 

improvement. These reviews have not identified systemic problems or 

required changes of PME over the past 10 years, and have concluded 

that PME institutions are successful in meeting policy and curricula 

standards, as well as the intent of the Skelton Report. The MECC also 

obtained and analyzed existing survey data 37—from various JPME 

institutions—of students, graduates, and supervisors of graduates as an 

indirect assessment of the programs to identify common areas and trends 

in JPME, as well as outcome assessments such as exams, quizzes, oral 

presentations, among other things, from the past 2 years as a more direct 

measurement of student learning. Consistent with the aforementioned 

RAND Standards report, while the MECC did leverage existing data, the 

 35Standards for High-Quality Research and Analysis.

36According to the MECC’s report, the peer-review PAJE process is conducted every 6 

years and the reports provide a continuous, systemic examination of the health of the 

JPME system. The institutional self-studies are detailed assessments and form the 

foundation for the PAJE on-site visits. 

37The MECC report states that because the vast majority of data concerning joint 

education have been focused on the statutorily mandated levels of JPME for officers 

(JPME Phase 1, JPME Phase II, and CAPSTONE), the data analysis portion of the 

second objective focuses solely on those programs.
Page 19 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

MECC’s report also presented limitations of the existing survey data that 

it used for the study, stemming from variations in survey questions and 

measures that the separate JPME institutions used to conduct their own 

surveys.

Regarding gap assessments, our 2004 Guide for Assessing Strategic 

Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government38 highlights 

the need for determining the skills and competencies necessary to meet 

current and future challenges, and to assess any skill and competency 

gaps. According to the MECC’s report, to determine the ability of joint 

education to meet the Joint Force 2020 joint leader development 

requirements, the MECC conducted a three-phase gap analysis. These 

three phases included: (1) refinement of the desired leader attributes, 

which included breaking these attributes down into subattributes; 

(2) analysis of data provided by 27 officer and enlisted programs across 

the JPME system to identify gaps in the JPME program;39 and (3) gap 

analysis and documentation to break down the data into cohorts and rank 

the desired leader attributes. Specifically, 27 officer and enlisted 

programs, which included the services’ staff and war colleges and 

National Defense University, among others, were asked to assess the 

current capabilities of their joint education programs to achieve Joint 

Force 2020 outcomes by addressing the following three questions: 

• Is the curriculum effective, that is, do we teach it? 

• Are current instructional methods effective, that is, how well do we 

teach and deliver it? 

• Are we achieving the educational outcomes, that is, can we measure 

it? 

According to its report, the MECC relied on the professional opinion of the 

academic deans of the JPME schools and directors of other joint 

education programs to make determinations about the effectiveness of 

their officer and senior enlisted programs based on the 35 subattributes 

identified by the MECC. To conduct the gap analysis, the MECC analyzed 

 38GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development 

Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).

39The 27 officer and enlisted programs surveyed as part of the gap analysis data 

collection included two precommissioning level, ten intermediate level, eight senior level 

and CAPSTONE programs, and six senior enlisted programs. According to the MECC’s 

report, data were requested from primary schools but omitted from analysis due to time 

constraints. 
Page 20 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

the 945 responses it received from the 27 programs and used a stoplight 

color coding scheme to summarize by cohort group each program’s 

assessment of its current capabilities to achieve the Joint Force 2020 

outcomes.40 The gap analysis results were then coded, scored and 

ranked by officer cohort group (precommissioning, intermediate, senior, 

CAPSTONE) using four categories to describe the program’s current 

capabilities. In turn, this gap analysis helped inform the MECC’s 21 

recommendations. While the MECC conducted a similar gap analysis for 

its senior enlisted JPME programs, the results of that analysis led the 

MECC to conclude that the department needed to further reconsider and 

redefine the desired leader attributes for enlisted personnel. 

The MECC has not yet fully developed timeframes and coordinated with 

all stakeholders, nor has it assessed the costs associated with 

implementing any of the study’s recommendations. As a result, it is not 

clear how the department will obtain concurrence among its stakeholders 

regarding an approach for moving forward, or how the department will 

hold its stakeholders accountable for implementing change. Furthermore, 

the department will not know whether the implementation of its 

recommendations will be cost effective.

We have previously found41 that project planning is the basis for 

controlling and managing project performance, including managing the 

relationship between cost and time. Our 2004 Training Guide42 highlights

the need for agencies to develop a formal process to help ensure that 

strategic and tactical changes are promptly incorporated in training and 

development efforts. Specifically, that report advises that agencies 

develop plans that describe or outline the way in which the agency 

intends to incorporate strategic and tactical changes into its training and 

developmental efforts. Our guide also highlights that including important 

agency stakeholders in the process can contribute to an open and 

 40We did not independently assess the responses of the 27 programs or the MECC’s 

determinations of any gaps as part of our review. For the purposes of our review, we have 

found that conducting a gap analysis is a leading practice and reviewed the MECC’s 

approach accordingly. 

41GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, 

GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 2012). 

42GAO-04-546G.

MECC Has Not Yet Fully 

Developed Timeframes 

and Coordinated with All 

Stakeholders, nor 

Assessed Costs for Followon Action
Page 21 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

continuous exchange of ideas and information, particularly when it comes 

to ensuring that strategic and tactical changes are promptly incorporated 

into training and developmental efforts.

According to the July 16, 2012 memorandum that directed the MECC 

study, the March 1, 2013 deadline for the results of the study was 

intended to help shape the fall 2013 academic year. The MECC 

completed its report on June 24, 2013, and provided us with a copy of the 

final report on July 1, 2013. Subsequently, officials provided us with an 

informational paper that identifies an office of primary responsibility and 

outlines details on the status of the recommendations. However, this 

paper does not fully lay out DOD’s planned actions in a transparent 

manner. For nine of the recommendations, the document identifies 

potential target dates for completion, one of which is to be completed later 

in 2013, and eight of which are to be completed not later than September 

2014. For the remaining 12 recommendations, DOD identified a target 

date for completion as either “not applicable” or “to be determined” 

because most of those recommendations fall under the purview of the 

services, the services’ schools, or National Defense University. 

Accordingly, officials states that consideration or implementation of any 

recommendations that fall under the purview of these stakeholders is at 

the discretion of those organizations and, according to officials, the 

department cannot identify or impose timeframes for implementing those 

recommendations. We recognize that the implementation of several of the 

recommendations fall under the purview of the services, the services’ 

schools, or National Defense University. However, the MECC has not yet

reached out to these entities to identify estimated target dates for 

implementation to help guide these efforts. Further, the document does 

not identify interim milestones for specific actions between the date of the 

report and the target completion dates. The document also states that 

completion or implementation of a number of the recommendations is 

contingent on revisions to the Enlisted Professional Military Education 

Policy or the Officer Professional Military Education Policy, which officials 

estimated may take 12-18 months. 

Officials did tell us that the Joint Staff’s Joint Professional Military 

Education Division staff and members of the MECC are currently in the 

beginning stages of incorporating the changes into policy and that the 

individual schools may begin to incorporate changes resulting from the 

study at any time. However, at the time of our review, the department’s 

process for monitoring the implementation of the MECC’s 

recommendations was unclear. Without established milestones and 

timeframes for taking follow-on action, and mechanisms for coordinating 
Page 22 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

with all key officials and stakeholders and holding them accountable, 

DOD may not be reasonably assured that the study’s recommendations 

will be implemented across the department or that its JPME program will 

achieve the potential benefits resulting from these recommendations. 

In addition, the department did not include a requirement that the MECC 

assess the costs associated with the JPME program or any 

recommendations resulting from the study. The MECC’s report 

acknowledges that the resource-limited environment facing the 

Department of Defense will make it difficult to sustain current practices, 

such as maintaining small class sizes and small student-to-faculty ratios, 

at the intermediate and senior courses or to consider additional 

requirements for the lower-level courses. The report states that 

leveraging new learning approaches, such as increased distance learning 

options, will not provide an inexpensive or free solution for increased joint 

education requirements.43 However, the MECC did not analyze or 

consider either the costs associated with implementing the study’s 

recommendations or efficiencies to be derived from implementing the 

study’s recommendations. Of the MECC’s 21 recommendations, the 

MECC identified five recommendations requiring further study and other 

possible investments, which suggests a potential need for additional 

funding resources to conduct those studies and implement any findings. 

For example, the report included recommendations to (1) conduct a study 

to identify and evaluate potential educational tools to achieve certain 

desired leader attributes, and (2) consider and explore opportunities to 

incentivize and reward lifelong learning. The costs associated with these 

recommendations are unclear and officials responsible for the study could 

not provide us with cost estimates. 

Prior studies of professional military education also did not or were unable 

to fully identify the costs associated with the overall JPME program, or 

with individual JPME programs. The Skelton Panel, for example, inquired 

into the cost per student at each school. The Office of the Secretary of 

Defense provided the panel with raw data produced with different 

methodologies by service, and sometimes by school, which resulted in 

 43The MECC report states that the existing JPME process implements an adult learning 

model that comes at the high price of small class sizes and small student-to-faculty ratios. 

Most courses for junior officers and enlisted personnel do not have the resources to 

support this model; thus adding more joint education in officer and enlisted policy could 

pose challenges at all levels.
Page 23 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

widely varying costs for roughly similar programs. More recently, the 

House Armed Services Subcommittee for Oversight and Investigations44

made its own effort to ascertain whether a uniform cost accounting 

system existed for DOD’s professional military education system.45 The 

Department provided cost-per-student figures with standardized criteria. 

Comparative figures were no longer characterized by such enormous 

variations, but there were still a number of unexplained differences in the 

data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Our 2004 Training Guide46 states that agencies should strategically target 

training and development investments to help ensure that resources are 

not wasted on efforts that are irrelevant, duplicative, or ineffective. Our 

Training Guide further recommends that agencies should consider the 

appropriate level of investment and prioritize funding so that the most 

important training needs are addressed first. We have previously 

concluded47 that leading practices such as accounting for program 

resources enables managers to better manage existing resources and 

plan for future programmatic needs. Further, accounting for program 

resources is becoming increasingly important for decision makers within 

the department who must make difficult trade-off decisions in a 

sequestration budget environment.

According to officials, the MECC omitted any and all cost elements from 

the study so as to not limit their assessment of the department’s needs for 

educating its leaders for Joint Force 2020 based on resources. Officials 

told us that they did not want to eliminate options for change based on the 

cost associated with them. However, by not assessing the cost of the 

MECC’s recommendations, as well as any efficiencies that may be 

achieved through their implementation, DOD may not be in a position to 

know if it has the resources to implement them or whether efficiencies will 

be achieved, and, without plans to assess cost in the near term as part of 

continued efforts to implement the results of the JPME study, decision 

 44Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986 and the Skelton Panel Study of 1989.

45The House Armed Services Committee’s study was focused on professional military 

education as a whole, of which joint professional military education is a subset.

46GAO-04-546G. 

47GAO, Environmental Justice: EPA Needs to Take Additional Actions to Help Ensure 

Effective Implementation, GAO-12-77 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2011).
Page 24 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

makers may not know if implementing their recommendations will be cost 

effective.

The experiences of the last 12 years of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have underscored the importance of U.S. military officers’ 

ability to work jointly across the services and reinforced the need for an 

effective joint military education program. DOD’s recently completed 

study of JPME is an important step forward as DOD considers how to 

adapt its joint military education program to reach the goals it laid forth for 

Joint Force 2020. Nonetheless, some questions remain about how well its 

findings can be applied to the task of revising the department’s officer and 

enlisted JPME policies. Specifically, ensuring transparency and taking 

certain actions to ensure this study’s findings and recommendations can 

be utilized effectively is important. For instance, without establishing 

milestones and timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, and involving 

necessary stakeholders and developing an implementation approach that 

provides for accountability, the department may not be assured that the 

study’s findings and recommendations will be incorporated into the JPME 

program at institutions across the department and the services in a timely 

manner. Additionally, without reliable information on the costs of 

implementing the study’s recommendations, decision makers could be 

hindered in determining the most efficient allocation of departmental 

resources for JPME. DOD’s JPME program will continue to play a role in 

the future development of departmental leaders, and acting to help 

ensure the findings and recommendations of this and any future studies 

are both utilized and cost-effective could allow the department to make 

the best use of the resources it devotes to this program. 

To guide the implementation of actions DOD identified in its study on 

JPME, we recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

direct the Director for Joint Force Development to take the following two 

actions:

• establish well-defined timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, 

coordinate with all stakeholders, and identify key officials 

responsible for implementing the study’s recommendations to help 

ensure the usefulness, timeliness, and implementation of any 

actions DOD takes in response to the findings and 

recommendations contained in its study, and 

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 25 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

• assess the costs of implementing recommendations made and 

efficiencies to be derived from the recommendations in order to 

implement DOD’s recommendations in a cost-effective manner. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our two 

recommendations to guide implementation of the actions that DOD 

identified in its review of joint education. DOD’s comments are reprinted 

in appendix IV. DOD also provided technical comments on the draft 

report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Regarding our first recommendation that DOD establish well-defined 

timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, coordinate with all 

stakeholders, and identify key officials responsible for implementing the 

study’s recommendations, DOD stated that, as the Joint Staff pursues 

implementation of the recommendations in its review, it will establish 

timelines, identify offices of primary responsibility, and coordinate with 

stakeholders as appropriate. DOD also noted that efforts are already 

underway to update the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s professional 

military education policies to ensure that these policy directives are 

consistent with the results and recommendations of the recent study. 

Regarding our second recommendation that DOD assess the costs of 

implementing recommendations made and efficiencies to be derived from 

the recommendations, the department again concurred, stating that, 

although assessing the costs of its recommendations is beyond the 

original scope and purpose in this study, it will consider costs and 

efficiencies prior to moving forward with the implementation of any 

recommendations. It also stated that a number of recommendations will 

be implemented through policy changes which are cost neutral. Further, it 

stated that the services will also consider such costs and efficiencies for 

recommendations under their purview.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Directorate 

for Joint Force Development. In addition, this report will also be available 

at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://gao.gov.

Agency Comments
Page 26 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix V.

Brenda S. Farrell

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 27 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman 

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

To identify the purpose of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) study of 

the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program, we reviewed 

relevant DOD guidance and other documents related to the study, 

including the final report dated June 24, 2013, and met with 

knowledgeable officials. We reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff’s July 16, 2012 white paper that called for and outlined the general 

focus of the study. We also reviewed the Director for Joint Force 

Development’s (J7) memorandum that was issued with the white paper 

and clarified the overall intent of the study and specific questions to help 

frame the study, and directed responsibility of the study to the Military 

Education Coordination Council (MECC). We analyzed the MECC’s 

meeting minutes and interim briefing report, which provided insight into 

how the MECC addressed the questions posed in the Director’s 

memorandum, as its approach differed somewhat from the framework 

provided in the memorandum. We then compared the aforementioned 

guidance documents and interim report findings to the final report to 

assess consistency. In addition, we met with knowledgeable officials from 

the Joint Professional Military Education Division within DOD’s Joint 

Staff’s Directorate for Joint Force Development who, in conjunction with 

the MECC, were responsible for guiding DOD’s effort. We also met with 

the officers of primary responsibility and/or team leads responsible for 

carrying out the various elements of the study. These meetings helped to 

ensure our understanding of the purpose and objectives of the study. We 

reviewed the final report section that focused primarily on the study’s 

findings and recommendations for change to gain an understanding of the 

MECC’s findings and recommendations. Further, we met with 

knowledgeable officials within the Directorate for Joint Force 

Development and the team lead for the findings and recommendations 

portion of the study to gain clarification and insight into the major 

takeaways from the study, areas in need of change, and any plans for the 

way ahead. 

To assess the methodology DOD used to conduct the joint professional 

military education study and its planning for follow-on actions, we 

reviewed the MECC’s final report and supporting documents. We 

interviewed DOD officials from the Joint Professional Military Education 

Division within the Directorate for Joint Force Development and officials 

from across DOD who were identified as officers of primary responsibility 

or team leads for specific study tasks associated with the study’s two 

objectives. We reviewed relevant reports and guidance by GAO; the 

Office of Management and Budget; the Office of Personnel Management; 

and private sector organizations such as the RAND Corporation, among 

others, to identify select leading practices for evaluating training, 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

educational, and other programs. The following list includes select 

sources we consulted for leading practices, in addition to those listed 

throughout the report, and against which we assessed DOD’s JPME 

study:

• GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 

Schedules, GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 2012),

• GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G

(Washington, D.C.: January 2012),

• RAND Corporation, Standards for High-Quality Research and 

Analysis (Santa Monica, Calif.: November 2011),

• The Office of Personnel Management, Training Evaluation Field 

Guide (Washington, D.C.: January 2011), 

• GAO, Government Auditing Standards: 2007 Revision, GAO-07-162G

(Washington, D.C.: January 2007), 

• GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 

Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G

(Washington, D.C.: March 2004),

• The Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and 

Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 1992), and 

• GAO, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD-10.1.4 (Washington, D.C.: 

March 1991). 

We identified key practices contained in these documents for evaluating 

educational programs and information that were applicable for the 

purposes of this engagement. We then compared DOD’s methodology 

with these select leading practices for program evaluation. We also 

reviewed documents provided to us and identified by DOD officials as 

project plans for the study, as well as documentation of the department’s 

intended follow-on actions.

We conducted this performance audit from March through October 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Officer Joint Professional Military 

Education (JPME) Institutions

Page 30 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Figure 3: Map of Officer JPME Institutions

• National Defense University (CAPSTONE, PINNACLE), Washington, 

DC 

• Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Management, 

Washington, DC 

• National War College, Washington, DC

• National Intelligence University, Washington, DC

• Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA

• Joint Combined Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA

• Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA

• Advanced JPME Reserve Component, Norfolk, VA

Appendix II: Officer Joint Professional 

Military Education (JPME) Institutions

Department of 

Defense Institutions
Appendix II: Officer Joint Professional Military 

Education (JPME) Institutions

Page 31 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

• Army War College, Carlisle, PA

• United States Army Command and General Staff School, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS

• Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL

• Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Montgomery, AL

• Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare and College of Naval 

Command and Staff, Newport, RI

• United States Marine Corps War College, Quantico, VA

• United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, 

VA

United States Army

United States Air 

Force

United States Navy

United States Marine 

Corps
Appendix III: Recommendations Made by the 

Military Education Coordination Council 

(MECC) in Its Study of Joint Professional 

Military Education

Page 32 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

The MECC made a total of 21 recommendations, which collectively 

address the study’s two objectives and span four categories, including: 

(1) desired leader attributes, or educational outcomes; (2) joint education 

continuums; (3) lifelong learning and advancements in learning 

technologies; and (4) faculty quality. Several of these recommendations 

call for additional study by the National Defense University and the 

services to support the achievement of leader attributes. Other 

recommendations emphasize the importance of strengthening the 

educational outcomes at the primary level of joint education, making 

education programs more accessible, and using prior learning 

assessments to tailor education opportunities to students’ needs, among 

other things. Table 2 lists the recommendations by category. 

Table 2: Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) Recommendations by Category

Recommendation Category Recommendation

Desired leader attributes/ subattributes/ 

educational outcomes

The MECC should adopt the desired leader attributes as guideposts for officer joint 

education. 

A “whiteboard” approach should be conducted to develop a separate and distinct set 

of desired leader attributes to guide enlisted joint education.

Develop/refine appropriate educational outcomes to support achievement of the 

desired leader attributes across a career via the Officer Professional Military 

Education Policy (OPMEP)/Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP) 

revision processes. 

National Defense University and the services should conduct further study to 

evaluate potential educational tools (including online learning, gaming, and 

simulation technologies) that are available to support achieving the desired leader 

attributes’ educational outcomes, particularly for specific desired leader attributes.

Review specific subject areas for increased emphasis within joint education via the 

OPMEP and EPMEP revision processes, including cyber warfare, cultural 

considerations in planning, interagency and intergovernmental operations, 

information and economic instruments of national power, writing with precision, 

operations with private entities, and professional ethics. 

The joint training community should conduct/continue efforts aimed at achieving the 

desired leader attributes. 

Joint functional communities should incorporate the desired leader attributes into 

their education and training programs as appropriate.

Joint education continuums Determine the appropriate weighting of emphasis of the desired leader attributes 

along the education continuums via the OPMEP/EPMEP revision processes. 

Strengthen the educational outcomes at the primary level of joint education for junior 

officers within the OPMEP revision process to enhance achievement of the desired 

leader attributes (while retaining balance with service primary level educational 

requirements). 

Explore the use of prior learning assessments to aid in tailoring education 

opportunities. 

Appendix III: Recommendations Made by the 

Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) 

in Its Study of Joint Professional Military 

Education
Appendix III: Recommendations Made by the 

Military Education Coordination Council 

(MECC) in Its Study of Joint Professional 

Military Education

Page 33 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Recommendation Category Recommendation

National Defense University should explore potential opportunities for making 

increased joint education content available for junior officers via distance learning 

capabilities. 

Services should explore earlier determination of follow-on assignments from 

education to allow tailoring of educational opportunities, recognizing that experience 

is critical to fully develop the desired learning attributes in service members. 

National Defense University should explore breaking the senior enlisted JPME 

course into two phases, one to serve the E-6/ E-7 community and a second to serve 

the E-8/E-9 community. 

Revise the EPMEP to establish a fourth level of enlisted JPME: Command Senior 

Enlisted Leaders. KEYSTONE remains aligned with the enlisted PME “executivelevel” for specific command senior enlisted leader positions. 

Lifelong learning and advancements in 

learning technologies

National Defense University should conduct a study to explore opportunities to 

implement elements of lifelong learning in support of joint education. The study 

should examine: 

Current service efforts toward establishing lifelong learning capabilities. 

Best lifelong learning practices within the civilian academic community.

Incorporating the development of lifelong learning skills in education program 

curricula. 

Opportunities to leverage advanced education technologies to support lifelong 

learning including potentially partnering with the Advanced Distributed Learning 

Initiative.

National Defense University and the services should explore opportunities to make 

content from their education programs available. 

Services should explore opportunities to incentivize and reward lifelong learning.

Faculty quality Services should establish procedures/policies for special selection of military 

personnel for joint education faculty duty and to recognize/reward faculty duty.

Services and National Defense University should review civilian hiring 

practices/policies to ensure the highest level of quality and proper breadth of subjectmatter expertise within their faculties, with an eye on whole-of-government 

approaches in today’s security environment. 

Services and National Defense University tailor faculty development programs to 

ensure members can educate to the desired leader attributes and sustain current, 

relevant, and rigorous curricula.

In light of the new desired leader attributes and lifelong learning strategy, current 

standards that address the requirements for faculty development should be 

reexamined within the OPMEP revision process. 

Source: DOD
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 34 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 36 GAO-14-29 DOD's 2013 JPME Study

Brenda S. Farrell (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov.

In addition to the individual named above, David Moser, Assistant 

Director; Richard Burkard; Timothy Carr; Gustavo Crosetto; Melissa 

Emrey-Arras; Jennifer Madison; Terry Richardson; Jennifer Weber; and 

Erik Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351810)
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