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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

28 Nebraska Appellate Reports

WEAVER v. WEAVER

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

Meaghann Shaw Weaver, appellee, v. 

John Glen Weaver, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed August 11, 2020. No. A-19-1058.

1. Modification of Decree: Appeal and Error. Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, 

whose order is reviewed de novo on the record, and which will be 

affirmed absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

2. Child Custody. Ordinarily, custody of a minor child will not be modified unless there has been a material change in circumstances showing 

that the custodial parent is unfit or that the best interests of the child 

require such action.

3. Modification of Decree: Child Custody: Proof. In a child custody 

modification case, first, the party seeking modification must show a 

material change in circumstances, occurring after the entry of the previous custody order and affecting the best interests of the child. Next, the 

party seeking modification must prove that changing the child’s custody 

is in the child’s best interests.

4. Divorce: Judgments: Property Settlement Agreements: Final 

Orders. A decree is a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution 

becomes final, its meaning, including the settlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law from the four corners of 

the decree itself.

5. Divorce: Intent. If the contents of a dissolution decree are unambiguous, the decree is not subject to interpretation and construction, 

and the intention of the parties must be determined from the contents of 

the decree.

6. Divorce. If the contents of a dissolution decree are unambiguous, the 

effect of the decree must be declared in the light of the literal meaning 

of the language used.

7. Constitutional Law: Foreign Judgments: States. The Full Faith and 

Credit Clause requires states to give the same effect to a judgment 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

08/18/2020 01:07 AM CDT
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WEAVER v. WEAVER

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

in the forum state that it has in the state where the court rendered 

the judgment.

8. Stipulations: Parties: Trial: Courts. Stipulations voluntarily entered 

into between the parties to a cause or their attorneys, for the government of their conduct and the control of their rights during the trial 

or progress of the cause, will be respected and enforced by the courts, 

where such stipulations are not contrary to good morals or sound public policy.

9. Stipulations: Parties: Courts: Good Cause. Courts will enforce valid 

stipulations unless some good cause is shown for declining to do so, 

especially where the stipulations have been acted upon so that the parties could not be placed in status quo.

10. Stipulations: Parent and Child. Disposition of a question pertaining 

to a child’s best interests is not governed exclusively by a parental 

stipulation.

11. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: James 

T. Gleason, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

John A. Kinney and Jill M. Mason, of Kinney Mason, P.C., 

L.L.O., for appellant.

Virginia A. Albers, of Slowiaczek Albers, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellee.

Moore, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Arterburn, 

Judges.

Riedmann, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

John Glen Weaver (Glen) filed a complaint to modify 

the judgment of absolute divorce entered by the District of 

Columbia Superior Court, which complaint he had registered 

in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Attached to 

the decree was a separation and property settlement agreement 

signed by the parties which gave Meaghann Shaw Weaver 

physical custody of their minor child. Although the district 

court found that additional time with Glen would be in the 
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WEAVER v. WEAVER

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

best interests of the child, the court found no material change 

in circumstances had occurred; thus, it declined to modify the 

decree. We conclude that the agreement allowed modification of custody without a material change in circumstances. 

Therefore, because the court found modification would be in 

the child’s best interests, we reverse the order and remand 

the cause for the district court to reconsider the relief sought 

by Glen.

BACKGROUND

Glen and Meaghann were married in 2004 and had a child 

in 2015. They separated shortly after their child was born, and 

Meaghann later filed to dissolve the marriage. The parties were 

living in Washington, D.C., at the time, and they were able to 

reach an agreement on all aspects of their divorce, including 

custody of the child, parenting time, and child support. Thus, 

the District of Columbia Superior Court entered a decree in 

May 2016. The court incorporated the parties’ agreement into 

the decree and dissolved the marriage.

Pursuant to the agreement, the parties share joint legal 

custody of the child, but physical custody was placed with 

Meaghann subject to Glen’s parenting time. The agreement contemplated that both parties would move to Omaha, 

Nebraska, and set forth increased parenting time for Glen upon 

relocation to Omaha. The parties moved to Omaha in the summer of 2016. At the time of the modification hearing, Glen had 

parenting time with the child every other weekend from Friday 

evening through Sunday evening and every other Wednesday 

from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m.

Paragraph 4.2 of the agreement is entitled “Modification of 

Physical Custody” and states:

Upon a material and significant change in circumstance 

of either party, or in the needs or interests of [the child], 

either party may request a modification to the physical 

custody of [the child]. Upon such a request, the parties 

will discuss the modification in good faith and attempt to 

agree upon a resolution that is in the best interests of [the 
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child]. If either party believes the terms of this Agreement 

related to custody are not in [the child’s] best interest 

at a future time, the parties may discuss negotiation of 

a modification of custody in good faith and attempt to 

agree upon a resolution that is in the best interests of [the 

child]. If the parties are unable to agree, they shall follow the protocols for Dispute Resolution Regarding Child 

Custody set forth herein.

The protocols for “Dispute Resolution Regarding Child 

Custody” are set forth in paragraph 4.4, which provides:

The parties agree that if a dispute arises in the future 

about any important parenting issue and they are unable 

to resolve the dispute through several discussions on their 

own, they agree to meet with a mutually agreed upon 

mediator or facilitator, or they will meet with an expert 

in the field of the dispute (physician, teacher, etc.) to gain 

more information and advice. Parents share a commitment to resolve any future parenting disagreements via 

an alternat[ive] dispute resolution process that remains 

outside of Court. In the event the parties are unable 

to reach an agreement through this dispute resolution 

process, including agreements related to modifications in 

the physical custody schedule as provided in Paragraph 

4.1 and 4.2 supra, either party may petition a court of 

competent jurisdiction for relief, provided however that 

any court of competent jurisdiction shall apply the thengoverning legal standard to such a request for modification of custody.

In February 2017, Glen filed a petition for registration of the 

foreign decree in the Douglas County District Court. The court 

entered an order of confirmation in May. In December, Glen 

filed the operative complaint to modify the decree, asking the 

court to award him joint physical custody of the child, allocate 

holidays and vacation time, and recalculate child support.

A modification hearing was held in April 2019, and the evidence established that Glen is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. 
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

Air Force and is currently stationed at Offutt Air Force Base. 

He owns a home in Omaha, where the child has her own bedroom, and his home is close to a park and a school. Glen was 

fairly certain he would not be relocated to another city in the 4 

months that he has remaining in the military before he is retirement eligible and testified that thereafter, if he were asked to 

move, he would simply retire from the military.

Glen is allotted no specific holidays or vacation time in the 

agreement, and he testified that he requested additional parenting time on at least 50 occasions during the 2 years preceding 

the hearing, but his requests were denied. He also explained 

that although the agreement allows him to see the child for 

additional parenting time while she is at daycare, he is precluded from exercising that time in Meaghann’s home, and currently, Meaghann’s mother provides full-time daycare for the 

child at Meaghann’s home while Meaghann is working. The 

child informed him that she is attending a preschool program 

two mornings per week, so he has attended an event at her 

school on one occasion. Otherwise, he has been unaware of the 

child’s daycare arrangements, other than Meaghann’s telling 

him that the child is “in a safe place.”

Glen acknowledged that he agreed to the current custody 

and parenting time arrangement but explained that the child 

was an infant when the agreement was created and Meaghann 

was nursing her. Consequently, his priority was that the child 

be with Meaghann during that time. He testified that he never 

contemplated having so little time with the child when she was 

at daycare and explained that he wants to be an equal parent 

with equal time with the child, including alternating holidays 

and vacation time. He proposed a modified decree awarding 

the parties joint physical custody with a graduated parenting plan so that he has equal time, under a week-on-week-off 

schedule, by the time the child is 6 years old.

Meaghann works as a pediatric palliative and hospice physician. She testified that she has no objection to Glen’s seeing 

their child as long as it is conducive to the child’s development 
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and schedule. She explained that the current schedule is working well for the child and that she is thriving. Nevertheless, 

she offered to give Glen additional parenting time, while still 

allowing her to retain physical custody.

In an order following the hearing, the district court found 

that although it would be in the child’s best interests to have 

more time with Glen, there was insufficient evidence of a 

material change in circumstances which would warrant modification of the decree. The court therefore denied the complaint 

to modify. Thereafter, Glen filed a motion to alter or amend, 

which was denied. Glen now appeals to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Glen assigns that (1) the district court erred in determining 

that he was required to plead and prove a material change in 

circumstances, (2) the court erred in determining that he failed 

to prove a substantial and material change in circumstances had 

taken place not within the contemplation of the parties at the 

time of the original judgment, (3) the court erred in failing to 

determine child custody modifications should be determined on 

the basis of the best interests of minor children and should have 

found that the original judgment violated Nebraska’s Parenting 

Act, and (4) administrative dismissal of the first complaint to 

modify was not a decision on the merits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Modification of a dissolution decree is a matter entrusted 

to the discretion of the trial court, whose order is reviewed de 

novo on the record, and which will be affirmed absent an abuse 

of discretion by the trial court. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 294 Neb. 

417, 883 N.W.2d 363 (2016).

ANALYSIS

[2,3] Glen first argues that the district court erred in finding 

that he was required to plead and prove a material change in 

circumstances in order to modify custody. Ordinarily, custody 

of a minor child will not be modified unless there has been a 
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WEAVER v. WEAVER

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

material change in circumstances showing that the custodial 

parent is unfit or that the best interests of the child require such 

action. Id. First, the party seeking modification must show a 

material change in circumstances, occurring after the entry of 

the previous custody order and affecting the best interests of 

the child. Id. Next, the party seeking modification must prove 

that changing the child’s custody is in the child’s best interests. Id.

The parties’ agreement, which was incorporated into the 

dissolution decree, addresses custody modification. Paragraph 

4.2 states that upon a material and significant change in 

circumstance of either party, or in the needs or interests of 

the child, either party may request modification of physical 

custody. What follows in the remainder of paragraph 4.2 and 

paragraph 4.4 is the procedure for modifying physical custody. If those efforts are unsuccessful, the parties may turn to 

the court.

[4-6] A decree is a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its meaning, including the settlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law 

from the four corners of the decree itself. Carlson v. Carlson, 

299 Neb. 526, 909 N.W.2d 351 (2018). If the contents of a dissolution decree are unambiguous, the decree is not subject to 

interpretation and construction, and the intention of the parties 

must be determined from the contents of the decree. Rice v. 

Webb, 287 Neb. 712, 844 N.W.2d 290 (2014). In such a case, 

the effect of the decree must be declared in the light of the 

literal meaning of the language used. Id. Based on the plain 

language of paragraph 4.2, we conclude that the parties agreed 

that upon the request of either Glen or Meaghann, modification 

of physical custody was permissible without a material change 

in circumstances if doing so would be in the best interests of 

the child.

Glen argues on appeal that because the parties agreed to 

allow custody modification based solely on the best interests 

of the child, the district court erred in requiring that he prove 
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

a material change in circumstances. We recognize that he did 

not specifically raise this argument in the district court, and 

generally, issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be 

considered. See First Express Servs. Group v. Easter, 286 Neb. 

912, 840 N.W.2d 465 (2013). However, Meaghann does not 

claim that Glen waived this issue and, by contesting his request 

for modification, she was asking that the terms of the decree 

be enforced.

[7] Regardless of whether the specific language of the agreement was raised in the district court, both state and federal law 

require that we give full faith and credit to the decree, including the parties’ agreement. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of 

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, requires states to give the same effect 

to a judgment in the forum state that it has in the state where 

the court rendered the judgment. In re Adoption of Jaelyn B., 

293 Neb. 917, 883 N.W.2d 22 (2016). Acting under its authority in art. IV, § 1, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012) 

to ensure states give full faith and credit to other states’ custody orders. See Gjertsen v. Haar, 347 P.3d 1117 (Wyo. 2015). 

Section 1738A(a) provides: “The appropriate authorities of 

every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not 

modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of 

this section, any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a 

court of another State.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Likewise, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1226 to 

43-1266 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2018), provides that a 

court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order 

issued by another state and consistent with the UCCJEA which 

enforces a child custody determination by a court of another 

state unless the order has been vacated, stayed, or modified 

by a court having jurisdiction to do so under §§ 43-1238 to 

43-1247. See § 43-1260. In addition, a court of this state shall 

recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court 

of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in 
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WEAVER v. WEAVER

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substantial conformity with the UCCJEA or the determination 

was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA and the determination has not 

been modified in accordance with the UCCJEA. § 43-1250(a). 

There is no dispute that the trial court in Washington, D.C., 

properly exercised jurisdiction in conformity with the UCCJEA 

at the time the decree was entered or that Nebraska now 

qualifies as the child’s home state under the UCCJEA. See 

§§ 43-1227 and 43-1238. Therefore, the decree and agreement 

must be enforced according to their terms.

In a case similar to the case at issue, the parties in Gjertsen 

v. Haar, supra, reached an agreement regarding custody of 

their child, visitation, and child support, which was incorporated into a judgment in a California court while California 

was the child’s home state. The stipulated judgment recognized that the father and child had moved to Wyoming and 

that the mother planned to move there as well; it set forth 

the mother’s visitation upon her relocation. The agreement 

also provided that the mother’s visitation schedule “‘may be 

adjusted on request by either party, without the necessity of 

proving a change of circumstances, as is in the best interests 

of [the child] as the Court, in its discretion, may believe to be 

proper.’” Id. at 1123.

In that case, the father registered the judgment in Wyoming; 

thereafter, the mother filed a petition to modify the California 

judgment, asserting that there had been material changes in 

circumstances since the California judgment was entered and 

seeking modification of custody, child support, and visitation. 

Following trial, the court found that the mother was required to 

establish a material change of circumstances in order to warrant a change in custody or visitation but that she had not met 

that burden. The trial court, therefore, denied her modification 

motion, although it also indicated a change in the terms of visitation may be in the child’s best interests.

On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court observed that 

Wyoming law generally requires proof of a material change 
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

in circumstances in order to modify an order concerning child 

custody or visitation. Gjertsen v. Haar, 347 P.3d 1117 (Wyo. 

2015). It noted that the California judgment, however, contained a provision allowing modification upon a showing that 

it is in the child’s best interests, without requiring proof of a 

material change of circumstances. Id. The mother argued on 

appeal that the trial court erred in failing to give full faith 

and credit to this provision of the California judgment and, 

instead, requiring her to establish a material change of circumstances before it would consider modifying visitation. The 

father asserted that the mother waived this argument by failing to present it to the district court, but the Supreme Court 

observed that it was the father who registered the judgment 

in Wyoming and that in response to the mother’s petition, he 

repeatedly asked the trial court to enforce the terms of the 

California judgment. Id.

Further, the Supreme Court found that the significance of 

the provision which allowed changes in visitation in the best 

interests of the child without a showing of material change of 

circumstances was clear. Id. It cited the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause of the federal Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, as 

well as the UCCJEA of Wyoming. Gjertsen v. Haar, supra. The 

court noted that under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. 

VI, cl. 2, federal law preempts state law in proper cases, and 

in that case, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that federal 

law required it to give full faith and credit to the California 

judgment as long as it was in effect. Gjertsen v. Haar, supra. 

The Supreme Court determined that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1738A, the California judgment had to be enforced according to its terms, and that those terms, which were stipulated by 

the parties and approved by the California court, state that the 

mother’s visitation rights may be altered upon a showing that 

it is in the best interests of the child, even though no material 

change in circumstances has occurred.

Likewise here, we must enforce the agreement according to its terms, which permitted a modification of custody 
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 716

without showing a material change in circumstances. Pursuant 

to paragraph 4.4 of the agreement, the court was to apply the 

“then-governing legal standard to such a request for modification of custody.”

[8-10] As previously explained, generally a material change 

in circumstances is required before a court of this state can 

modify custody. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 294 Neb. 417, 883 

N.W.2d 363 (2016). However, as we found above, the parties 

agreed to allow modification of custody based solely on the 

best interests of the child as an alternative to showing a material change in circumstances. In Walters v. Walters, 12 Neb. 

App. 340, 673 N.W.2d 585 (2004), this court recognized that 

stipulations voluntarily entered into between the parties to a 

cause or their attorneys, for the government of their conduct 

and the control of their rights during the trial or progress of the 

cause, will be respected and enforced by the courts, where such 

stipulations are not contrary to good morals or sound public 

policy. Courts will enforce valid stipulations unless some good 

cause is shown for declining to do so, especially where the 

stipulations have been acted upon so that the parties could not 

be placed in status quo. Id. We also recognized, however, that 

disposition of a question pertaining to a child’s best interests is 

not governed exclusively by a parental stipulation. Id.

In Walters v. Walters, supra, the parties stipulated in their 

divorce decree that the decree with respect to child visitation 

would be subject to modification upon the application of either 

party without a showing of a material change in circumstances. 

This court noted that although whether there is a material 

change in circumstances is one factor courts normally examine 

when modifying child visitation, it is not the only factor; nor 

is it the most important factor. Id. We reiterated that it is the 

children’s best interests which are paramount to a decision to 

modify. Id. We found that agreeing to allow visitation to be 

modified without showing a material change in circumstances 

potentially enhances the visitation rights of both parties by 

reducing the potential for litigation over visitations, and it 
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makes modification dependent solely on the best interests 

of the children, not on the nuances of the parties’ circumstances. Id.

We also determined that the stipulation and the decree did 

not contradict the statute controlling child visitation, as the statute looks to the best interests of the child as being paramount 

in decisions of child visitation and does not require a material change in circumstances. Walters v. Walters, supra. See 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364(2) (Cum. Supp. 2018). We therefore 

concluded that the parties’ stipulation, which was expressly 

made part of the decree, was not against good morals or public 

policy, and thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying modification based on a finding that there was no material 

change in circumstances. See Walters v. Walters, supra.

The same analysis is applicable with regard to custody 

modification. As with visitation, the children’s best interests are also paramount to a custody award or modification. 

Section 42-364(2) also governs custody awards and states that 

custody shall be determined on the basis of the best interests 

of the child. As cited above, a party who requests modification 

of custody must show that doing so would be in the child’s 

best interests. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 294 Neb. 417, 883 

N.W.2d 363 (2016). Thus, the “then-governing legal standard” 

which would apply “to such a request for modification” referenced in Glen and Meaghann’s agreement would refer to the 

standard set forth in Walters v. Walters, 12 Neb. App. 340, 

673 N.W.2d 585 (2004), which enforces agreements between 

parties to allow modification of custody without requiring 

proof of a material change in circumstances if modification is 

in the best interests of the child. The district court therefore 

abused its discretion in requiring proof of a material change 

in circumstance. Because the district court found that it would 

be in the child’s best interests to have more time with Glen, 

we reverse, and remand for the district court to reconsider the 

relief sought by Glen in accordance with the best interests of 

the child.
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[11] Given the outcome of this assignment of error, we need 

not address Glen’s remaining assigned errors. An appellate 

court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. Applied 

Underwriters v. S.E.B. Servs. of New York, 297 Neb. 246, 898 

N.W.2d 366 (2017).

CONCLUSION

Because the custody agreement incorporated into the parties’ 

dissolution decree stipulated that modification of custody could 

be sought based solely on the best interests of the child, the 

district court abused its discretion in requiring that Glen prove 

a material change in circumstances. We therefore reverse the 

court’s order and remand the cause with directions consistent 

with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.