NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN CONRAD JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0417

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201200356

The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By William Scott Simon

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

2

H O W E, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Stephen Conrad Johnson appeals his convictions and 

sentences for two counts of aggravated assault, class three felonies and 

repetitive dangerous offenses; one count of misconduct involving 

weapons, a class four felony and non-dangerous but repetitive offense; 

and one count of disorderly conduct involving weapons, a class six felony, 

and repetitive dangerous offense. Johnson challenges the trial court’s 

ruling denying his requested instruction to the jury on self-defense as 

justification to the charged crimes. Johnson also argues the court 

reversibly erred by coercing the jury’s verdicts. Finally, Johnson contends 

the court violated his due process rights by denying his request to 

continue the aggravation and mitigation hearing so he could present 

additional mitigation evidence. For the following reasons, we disagree 

with Johnson’s assertions of error and therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The trial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the verdicts,1 reveals the following. Shortly before 11:00 a.m. 

on March 10, 2012, Johnson walked into a truck stop convenience store 

wearing a pulled-up hoodie, sunglasses, and a blue cloth or bandana

covering his lower face. At trial, the evidence conflicted on whether 

Johnson purchased a bag of candy and either demanded money from the 

cashier saying that he had a gun, or said nothing about the gun and asked 

for a pack of cigarettes. Whatever occurred, however, Johnson was 

confronted by another employee JA, who tried to remove Johnson’s face 

covering. Johnson resisted, pulled out a handgun and pointed it at JA’s 

face. Other customers and employees in the store dropped to the floor and 

scattered upon noticing the gun. A store employee called 911 when she 

learned from the cashier that Johnson was purportedly attempting to rob 

the store. 

¶3 Johnson ran from the store followed by JA and TV, the 

store’s maintenance manager. JA and TV chased Johnson not to capture 

him, but to “keep him in sight” to assist police in locating him. At some 

point during the foot chase, Johnson turned, pulled out his handgun, and 

fired a “warning shot” before lowering the gun and pointing it at TV, who 

 1 See State v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196 ¶ 2, 150 P.3d 769, 769 (App. 

2007).
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

3

was approximately forty to fifty feet away. TV believed Johnson was 

going to shoot him. A passer-by, DN, who was in his truck when he 

noticed the chase, joined TV in pursuing Johnson and was next to TV

when Johnson fired the shot into the air. Police officers subsequently 

intervened and apprehended Johnson. 

¶4 The State charged Johnson with one count of attempted 

armed robbery and three counts of aggravated assault, one each relating 

to the victims JA, TV, and DN. The State further charged Johnson with one 

count of misconduct involving weapons2 and disorderly conduct 

involving a weapon. Johnson testified that he covered his face in the store

because he had been receiving threats to this life, and he was afraid the 

people who made the threats would recognize him in a public place. 

Based on this testimony, Johnson also testified that he pointed the gun at 

JA, someone he claimed not to recognize as a store employee, after she 

tried to pull off his mask and he “realized I couldn’t get away from her, 

[and] I was in fear for my life.”

¶5 After the close of evidence, Johnson requested a self-defense 

jury instruction. The court denied the request, concluding that no trial 

evidence supported the proposed instruction because, although the trial 

evidence showed Johnson could have feared for his life based on the prior 

threats he received, no evidence showed that “anybody involved in this 

case . . . engaged in unlawful deadly physical force” against Johnson.

Immediately after the court’s ruling, defense counsel informed the court 

the self-defense instruction was necessary “[b]ecause that’s what I’m 

going to argue to the jury.” Counsel then argued during closing argument 

that Johnson acted in self-defense, despite the trial court’s refusal to 

instruct the jury on self-defense. 

¶6 After the jury commenced deliberations, the forewoman 

notified the court that the jury had reached verdicts on three of the counts, 

but was unable to do so on the remaining three counts. With no objection 

from either party, the court instructed the jurors on their apparent 

impasse pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.4. The jury 

continued deliberating and approximately one hour later informed the 

court that “one juror was not fully engaged in the deliberations and is not 

open to discussion.” The jury also asked the court whether “self-defense 

 2 Johnson stipulated at trial that, because of prior felony convictions, 

he was prohibited from possessing a firearm and his civil right to possess 

or carry a gun or firearm had not been restored. 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

4

[is] applicable in all issues in this case[,]” and “Are [JA’s] actions just 

cause for the defendant to draw a gun? Can the issues of self-defense be 

taken into consideration?” The forewoman addressed the court, and 

stated: “I think if we had some clarification on those questions [regarding 

self-defense] . . . perhaps we could [continue further deliberations and 

reach a decision on the charges].” Based on the jury’s apparent confusion 

over the applicability of self-defense to the case, the trial court, over 

Johnson’s objection, instructed the jury on self-defense in a manner 

consistent with Arizona law.

¶7 The jury subsequently returned verdicts finding Johnson

guilty of the aggravated assaults committed against JA and TV and guilty 

of the misconduct involving weapons and disorderly conduct charges. 

The jury could not reach a decision on the charges of attempted armed 

robbery and aggravated assault against DN. At the hearing on mitigation 

and the State’s alleged aggravating factors, Johnson presented the court 

with a Rule 26.5 evaluation report prepared by Dr. S. as evidence of 

mitigation, but requested a continuance so that his investigator could 

interview Johnson at the jail and so that he could present further evidence

in the form of Dr. S.’s testimony. The court denied the request. 

¶8 Upon considering and weighing the evidence of aggravation 

and mitigation, the court sentenced Johnson to an aggravated prison term 

of twenty years for his aggravated assault conviction relating to JA to be 

served consecutive to the slightly aggravated sentence of thirteen years’ 

imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction regarding TV. The 

court imposed a mitigated sentence of eight years in prison for the 

weapons misconduct conviction to run concurrently with the thirteen-year 

aggravated assault conviction. Also to run concurrently with these two 

sentences, the court imposed an aggravated term of four-and-a-half years’ 

imprisonment for the disorderly conduct conviction. Johnson timely 

appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Self-Defense Instruction

¶9 Johnson argues that the court erred in initially refusing to 

give the requested self-defense instruction because the evidence 

supported it. “The decision to refuse a jury instruction is within the trial 

court’s discretion, and this court will not reverse it absent a clear abuse of 

that discretion.” State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309, 896 P.2d 830, 849 (1995).
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

5

¶10 A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if 

the slightest evidence of justification exists for his act. State v. Buggs, 167 

Ariz. 333, 335, 806 P.2d 1381, 1383 (App. 1990). The “slightest evidence” is 

evidence which tends to prove a hostile demonstration which might be 

reasonably regarded as placing the accused in imminent danger of losing 

his life or sustaining great bodily harm. Id.; see also A.R.S. § 13-404(A)

(“[A] person is justified in threatening or using physical force against 

another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that 

physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the 

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful physical force.”); A.R.S. § 13-

405(A) (1), (2).

¶11 The record does not indicate that anyone involved in this 

case used or attempted to use unlawful deadly force against Johnson; 

rather, the only evidence of threats to Johnson’s life were from people not 

involved in this case, and those threats occurred before the March 10 

incident. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing 

to initially instruct the jury on self-defense. In any event, even if the court 

did err in this respect, any prejudice to Johnson was cured when the court 

instructed the jurors on self-defense after they indicated confusion on 

whether self-defense applied to this case.

II. Coercion of Verdicts

¶12 Johnson argues that the court’s decision to instruct the jury 

on self-defense coerced the verdicts. He claims that the instruction 

“necessarily put improper pressure on the hold out juror . . . and likely 

influenced that juror to change its position and reject self-defense on at 

least one of the counts.”3 

 3 Although Johnson asserts the court’s ruling on this issue 

established a Sixth Amendment violation, he provides no substantive 

argument in support of this assertion. Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 13(a)(6) requires that an appellant’s opening brief “shall 

contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 

presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, 

statutes and parts of the record relied on.” Failure to comply with the 

rule’s requirements results in waiver of the argument. See State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Novak, 167 Ariz. 363, 370, 807 P.2d 531, 538 (App. 1990)

(court declined to consider matters for which party failed to comply with 

Rule 13(a)(6)); Modular Sys., Inc. v. Naisbitt, 114 Ariz. 582, 587, 562 P.2d 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

6

¶13 We review the court’s decision to provide additional 

instruction to the jury regarding self-defense for an abuse of discretion. See

State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, 384 ¶ 42, 224 P.3d 192, 200 (2010) (“We review 

a trial court’s response to jurors for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the 

same result under the circumstances.” State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 

354 ¶ 40, 93 P.3d 1061, 1070 (2004). In determining whether the court 

abused its discretion and coerced the jury, we consider “the actions of the 

judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the 

circumstances and [we] attempt[] to determine if the independent 

judgment of the jury was displaced.” State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 97 ¶ 5, 

75 P.3d 698, 702 (2003).

¶14 Initially, the record does not support Johnson’s assertion that 

the trial court interpreted the jury’s comment regarding the hold-out juror 

“as proof of possible juror misconduct.” Further, Johnson’s contentions 

regarding the purported coercive effect the self-defense instruction had on 

the hold-out juror are speculative. Nothing in the record indicates that the 

court knew that the hold-out juror was not properly deliberating because 

he or she held some erroneous belief regarding the law of self-defense and 

its applicability in this case. Nothing shows that the hold-out juror, or any 

of the other jurors, did not properly understand the instruction.

¶15 In any event, Johnson’s argument regarding the coercive 

effect the additional self-defense instruction had on the verdicts fails on 

the merits. In conformance with the comment to Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 22.4, the court expressly informed the jury in the impasse 

instruction (that directly led to the jury’s request an hour later for 

information on self-defense):

This instruction is offered to help you, not to force you to 

reach a verdict. . . . We are merely being responsive to your 

apparent need for help. . . . [Y]ou should not change your 

belief concerning the weight or effect of the evidence solely 

because of the opinions of your fellow jurors or for the mere 

purpose of returning a verdict. . . . If you decide . . . [further 

 

1080, 1085 (App. 1977) (issues deemed abandoned when party “failed to 

state with any particularity why or how the trial court erred in making 

these rulings and simply concludes that error was committed”). We 

therefore deem this specific issue waived and do not address it. 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

7

assistance is necessary on] issues [of] . . . law . . . advise me 

in writing of whether we can attempt to assist you . . . [in] 

reach[ing] a verdict[.] . . . I do not wish or intend to force a 

verdict.

¶16 This instruction clearly indicates that the court’s invitation to 

further deliberate and request assistance if necessary did not lead to 

coerced verdicts when the court provided the self-defense information 

that the jury subsequently desired. See State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 465, 

930 P.2d 518, 542 (App. 1996) (finding similar instruction “made it clear 

that the trial court was not pressuring the jurors to sacrifice their 

convictions to reach a verdict”).

¶17 Although the court here knew that one juror was holding

out, nothing in the record indicates that juror favored acquittal on all 

counts or any particular count. And Arizona law does not recognize per se

coercion when the court knows the numerical split of a jury at impasse. 

State v. Sabala, 189 Ariz. 416, 418-19, 943 P.2d 776, 778-79 (App. 1997). 

Finally, the fact the jury deliberated for over two-and-a-half hours after 

receiving the self-defense instruction indicates the instruction did not 

coerce the verdicts. See id. at 420, 943 P.2d at 780 (thirty minutes of 

deliberating after receiving additional instructions to assist a deadlocked 

jury “suggest that the holdout juror changed position as a result of 

receiving clarifying information not that he or she surrendered ‘honest 

convictions’ due to overbearing pressure from the court.”).

¶18 Based on the foregoing, and considering the totality of the 

circumstances – including the parties’ references to self-defense during 

closing arguments, the resulting confusion to the jury regarding the 

application of self-defense to this case, and the jury’s explicit assertion that 

further instructions on self-defense would assist further deliberations—we 

cannot conclude the self-defense instruction displaced “the independent 

judgment of the jury[.]” Huerstel, 206 Ariz. at 97 ¶ 5, 75 P.3d at 702. 

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in giving the 

supplemental self-defense instruction. Indeed, under these circumstances, 

the court had a “responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by a 

lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria.” State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 

116, 126, 871 P.2d 237, 247 (1994) (quoting Des Jardins v. State, 551 P.2d 181, 

190 (Alaska 1976), and Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 

(1946)).
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

8

III. Court’s Refusal to Continue Mitigation Hearing

¶19 Finally, Johnson argues that the trial court denied him his 

due process right to present evidence by refusing to grant his request for a 

continuance of the aggravation and mitigation hearing. We review for an 

abuse of discretion. See State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 164, 800 P.2d 

1260, 1272 (1990) (“The granting of a continuance is within the discretion 

of the trial court, and its decision will only be disturbed upon a showing 

of a clear abuse of such discretion and prejudice to defendant.”).

¶20 Here, Johnson did not make an offer of proof about what the 

additionally sought mitigation evidence would be. Thus, he cannot 

challenge the court’s ruling “unless the substance [of the excluded 

evidence] was apparent from the context.” See Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) (“A 

party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the

error affects a substantial right of the party and . . . if the ruling excludes 

evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, 

unless the substance was apparent from the context.”). Id. The substance 

of the evidence Johnson sought in a continued hearing is not “apparent 

from the context.” Additionally, Johnson’s request at the hearing was 

untimely. Furthermore, the court did admit as mitigation evidence Dr. S.’s 

report and evidence of Johnson’s abuse as a child, his history of substance 

abuse and mental illness, and his remorse for his actions. As noted, the 

court expressly considered the mitigation evidence that was presented.

¶21 On this record, we cannot conclude the trial court acted 

outside its discretion in denying Johnson’s request for a continuance of the 

mitigation hearing. 

CONCLUSION

¶22 Johnson’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.