IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOEY L. STARR,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-290

Judge Graham

Magistrate Judge King 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying plaintiff’s application for disability insurance

benefits. This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff’s

Statement of Specific Errors, Doc. No. 16, the Commissioner’s

Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 17, and plaintiff’s Reply to

Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 18.

Plaintiff Joey L. Starr filed his application for benefits on

November 10, 2009, alleging that he has been disabled since November

15, 2007. The application was denied initially and upon

reconsideration, and plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an

administrative law judge. 

An administrative hearing was held on August 9, 2011, at which

plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a

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vocational expert. PAGEID 76. In a decision dated September 1, 2011,

the administrative law judge concluded that plaintiff is not disabled.

PAGEID 54. That decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council declined

review. PAGEID 43-45. 

Plaintiff was 36 years of age on the date the administrate law

judge issued his administrative decision. See PAGEID 54, 197. 

Plaintiff has a limited education and is able to communicate in

English. PAGEID 67. Plaintiff was last insured for disability

insurance purposes on December 31, 2012. PAGEID 54. Plaintiff has

past relevant work experience as a groundskeeper and as a stock clerk. 

PAGEID 121-22. He has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since November 15, 2007, PAGEID 56, although he worked for four or

five months in 2009 for a landscaping company. PAGEID 88, 221. 

In his Statement of Errors, plaintiff does not challenge the

administrative law judge’s evaluation of the medical evidence relating

to his alleged impairments. Rather, plaintiff argues that the

administrative law judge erred in concluding that plaintiff does not

meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C, in determining plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, and in posing

hypothetical questions to the vocational expert. See Statement of

Errors, pp. 12-18. The Court will therefore limit its consideration

of the record to these issues.

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I. Evidence of Record

Plaintiff’s school records reflect a history of hearing loss in

the left ear and behavior problems. PAGEID 297. In 1991, when

plaintiff was 16 years old, testing indicated a verbal IQ score of 81,

a performance IQ score of 94, and a full scale IQ score of 85. PAGEID

300-02. A tutor helped him with tests and classroom assignments. 

PAGEID 297. 

On October 4, 2008, plaintiff underwent a comprehensive

psychiatric evaluation by Christopher Sanders, Ph.D. PAGEID 336-42. 

Plaintiff reported depression, night terrors, anxiety and visual

hallucinations. PAGEID 338. During the evaluation, plaintiff

exhibited poor eye contact, flat facial expressions, subdued behavior,

slowed mental activity, a depressed mood and a flat affect; he

appeared to be distracted. PAGEID 338-42. Plaintiff’s memory and

ability to calculate and engage in abstract thinking were impaired. 

PAGEID 340-41. Plaintiff was able to perform a simple three-step

command with some difficulty. He reported being able to make

breakfast, play on the computer and shop at Walmart. PAGEID 341. Dr.

Sanders opined that plaintiff could not manage his own funds and that

the likelihood of emotional deterioration in the work environment was

high. According to Dr. Sanders, plaintiff was impaired in his ability

to understand and remember very short and simple instructions, to

understand and remember detailed instructions, to maintain

concentration and attention, to accept instructions from a supervisor

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and respond appropriately, to sustain an ordinary routine without

special supervision, to complete a normal workday/workweek without

interruptions at a constant pace, to interact with coworkers, and to

deal with changes in the work setting. PAGEID 342.

Plaintiff underwent a second consultative psychological exam on

January 30, 2010, by Ronald J. Olah, Ph.D. PAGEID 496-502. Plaintiff

reported that he had received no medical treatment since 2009 because

he lacked insurance. Id. Plaintiff believed that he is disabled

because “I don’t do things I used to do. I don’t have the meds I used

to take. A number of stuff. I forget to get up and go to work.” 

PAGEID 496. He also reported a history of anger issues, problems with

people in authority, and problems getting along with supervisors and

co-workers. PAGEID 497. Plaintiff reported difficulty following

instructions and completing even repetitive tasks. Id. He also

reported depression, weight gain, mood swings, recurrent nightmares,

auditory hallucinations, irritability and problems sleeping. Id. He

spends his day “[p]laying with the dog. Wandering around. Talking

with people over the computer. If I remember, there’s a game I like

to play.” PAGEID 499-500. Plaintiff is able to write letters, tell

time, count change and drive a car. PAGEID 500. 

Dr. Olah reported a blunted and restricted affect. Plaintiff was

not fully alert during the interview, but did not demonstrate frank

confusion. PAGEID 498-500. On the WAIS, plaintiff achieved a full

scale IQ score of 63. Id. According to Dr. Olah, because plaintiff

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was visibly depressed during the testing session, the score “may be

only a minimal estimate of his capabilities.” Id. Moreover,

plaintiff “revealed a great deal of variability in ability levels

across indices;” nevertheless, there was a 95% chance that plaintiff

would obtain a score between 60 and 68 if tested again. Id. Dr. Olah

diagnosed major depressive disorder and borderline intellectual

functioning. Id. 

According to Dr. Olah, plaintiff was moderately impaired in his

ability to relate to others, to understand, remember, and follow

instructions, to maintain attention and concentration and to perform

simple repetitive tasks; plaintiff may have difficulty performing

simple, repetitive tasks. His ability to withstand the stress and

pressures associated with day-to-day work activity was also moderately

impaired. PAGEID 501.

Jennifer Swain, Psy.D., reviewed the record for the state agency

on February 17, 2010. PAGEID 503-16. According to Dr. Swain,

plaintiff had a moderate impairment in his ability to: (1) remember

detailed instructions; (2) carry out detailed instructions; (3)

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; (4) work in

coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by

them; (5) complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions

from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent

pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (6)

interact appropriately with the general public; (7) accept

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instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors;

(8) get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or

exhibiting behavioral extremes; and (9) respond appropriately to

changes in the work setting. PAGEID 517-18. Dr. Swain concluded that

plaintiff is “capable of simple to moderate tasks in a setting which

does not require more than occasional contact with the public,” and

that he “would likely perform best in a more solitary setting with no

over-the-shoulder supervision.” PAGEID 519.

In July 2010, plaintiff was examined by a psychologist for a

county welfare agency. PAGEID 595-96. Plaintiff was described as

depressed and lacking in personal hygiene, with soft and mumbled

speech and a constricted affect. Id. The psychologist diagnosed

major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. 

Plaintiff was characterized as “unemployable” for a period of 12

months or more. Id. 

In March 2011, plaintiff began monthly treatment sessions with

Debbie Marshall, a certified nurse practitioner. PAGEID 630. In

August 2011, Ms. Marshall opined that plaintiff was seriously limited

in his ability to: (1) maintain regular attendance and be punctual

within customary, usually strict tolerances; (2) sustain an ordinary

routine without special supervision; (3) work in coordination with or

proximity to others without being unduly distracted; (4) complete a

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically

based symptoms; (5) deal with normal work stress; (6) maintain regular

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attendance; (7) understand and remember detailed instructions; (8)

carry out detailed instructions; and (9) deal with stress of

semiskilled and skilled work. PAGEID 632-33. As used by Ms.

Marshall, the term “seriously limited” means “less than satisfactory,

but not precluded in all circumstances.” Id. 

II. Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that he has an

11th grade education in classes for the learning disabled. PAGEID 108. 

It took him “a while to learn how to ride a bike,” and “longer to

learn how to do things that normal kids would already be able to do.”

He also had anger problems. PAGEID 114-15.

As to his mental impairments, plaintiff testified that he suffers

from bipolar disorder and depression, as a result of which he feels

tired and worthless and has suicidal thoughts. Nightmares limit him to

no more than three to four hours of sleep per night. PAGEID 82, 95-

96, 98-102, 110-12, 118. Anger management problems cause him to cuss

people out at work and prevent him from working. PAGEID 93-95. 

Plaintiff last worked full-time for four to five months in 2009

as a landscaper, earning approximately $11,408. PAGEID 88-89. In

that position, he received instructions from, and worked alongside,

his supervisor. Id. He was laid off when the season ended, but was

unable to return to work when asked in October 2009 because of his

physical and mental state. PAGEID 88-89, 104.

Plaintiff testified that he lives with his mother and does no

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cooking or cleaning. He can care for his personal needs. PAGEID 84,

118. Plaintiff walks his dog every day (less than two blocks), plays

computer games on occasion, and taught himself to replace computer

parts. PAGEID 116-17. 

The vocational expert testified that plaintiff’s past relevant

work as a groundskeeper was semi-skilled and, as performed by

plaintiff, required heavy exertion. His work as a stock clerk -

retail was a semi-skilled position generally performed at the heavy

exertional level. PAGEID 122. The vocational expert was asked to

assume a claimant with plaintiff vocational profile who is limited to

light exertion and who

would be unable to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, could

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, could also occasionally

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, would need to avoid jobs

requiring fine hearing capabilities, would also need to

avoid an environment that would have a loud background

noise, would also need to avoid hazards, such as unprotected

heights, dangerous moving machinery and driving as part of

work, would be limited to doing simple routine, no more than

three to four step tasks and in [an] environment without

fast paced production demands and with occasional

interaction with others.

PAGEID 122-23. The vocational expert responded that such a claimant

could not perform plaintiff’s past relevant work, but would be able to

perform unskilled jobs at the light exertional level, including such

jobs as inspector and laundry folder, of which there are 15,000 and

25,000 positions in the state, respectively. PAGEID 124. 

IV. Administrative Decision

In his decision, the administrative law judge found that

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plaintiff’s severe impairments consist of a 

history of a left canal down mastoidectomy, chronic left

mastoiditis, hearing loss on the left, right knee lipoma,

lumbar degenerative disc disease, lumbar disc herniation,

peripheral neuropathy, back spasms, abnormal proprioception

associated with the left mastoidectomy and hearing loss,

seizures, learning disability, adjustment disorder with

depressed mood, major depressive disorder, psychotic

disorder, nightmare disorder, dysthymic disorder, PTSD, and

borderline intellectual functioning (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

PAGEID 56. Plaintiff’s impairments, whether considered singly or in

combination, neither meet nor equal a listed impairment, including

Listing 12.05. PAGEID 57. 

With regard to Listing 12.05C, which addresses mental

retardation based on I.Q. scores, the administrative law judge found

that the requirements of the Listing were not met. PAGEID 57-59. 

Specifically, the administrative law judge found that “the claimant

does not have a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60

through 70. . . .” Id. The administrative law judge noted that the

January 2010 I.Q. testing, on which plaintiff achieved a full scale IQ

score of 63, did not represent a valid measure of plaintiff’s

cognitive functioning because plaintiff was not taking his medications

and was “visibly depressed” during the testing and because Dr. Olah

reported that the score “may be only a minimal estimate of his

capabilities.” Id. The administrative law judge also noted the

result of an I.Q. test administered when plaintiff was 16, on which

plaintiff achieved a verbal IQ score of 81, a performance IQ score of

94, and a full scale IQ score of 85. PAGEID 297-304. 

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The administrative law judge went on to find that plaintiff has

the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except

he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can

occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can occasionally stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl; must avoid jobs requiring fine

hearing capabilities; must avoid working in environments

with loud background noise; must avoid jobs exposing him to

hazards such as dangerous moving machinery or unprotected

heights; and cannot drive as part of work. Further, he is

limited to simple, routine work involving no more then 3-4

step tasks in an environment without fast-paced production

demands that involves only occasional interactions with

others. 

PAGEID 59.

In making this finding, the administrative law judge accorded

significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Olah, which was “consistent

with the examination, the objective evidence, and the claimant's

ability to use computers, talk over the internet, and walk the dog.” 

PAGEID 66. Less weight was given to the opinion of the initial

consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Sanders, “as his assessment

is vague as to the degree of limitation in each relevant area.” 

PAGEID 66. 

The administrative law judge gave little weight to the opinion

of the county welfare psychologist because plaintiff was receiving no

treatment or taking medication at the time of the examination and

because the assessment was inconsistent with plaintiff’s “reported

ability to use and fix computers and take daily walks with his dog.” 

PAGEID 66. The administrative law judge also gave little weight to

the opinion of the nurse practitioner because a nurse practitioner is

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not an acceptable source under the Commissioner’s regulations and

because she had only recently begun her treatment of plaintiff at the

time she made her assessment. Id. 

The administrative law judge discounted plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, finding that those complaints were not credible to the

extent that they were inconsistent with the residual functional

capacity assessment found by the administrative law judge. PAGEID 60. 

Relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the

administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s impairments preclude

the performance by him of his past relevant work as a groundskeeper

and stock clerk, but would permit the performance of a significant

number of other jobs in the national economy. PAGEID 67-68. 

The administrative law judge accordingly found that plaintiff

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

PAGEID 69.

V. Discussion

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review of the

Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings

of the administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence

and employed the proper legal standards. Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389 (1971); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595

(6th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of

evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

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See Buxton v. Haler, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001); Kirk v. Sec’y

of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981). This

Court does not try the case de novo, nor does it resolve conflicts in

the evidence or questions of credibility. See Brainard v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v.

Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).

In determining the existence of substantial evidence, this

Court must examine the administrative record as a whole. Kirk, 667

F.2d at 536. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if this Court would

decide the matter differently, see Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d

1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if substantial evidence also

supports the opposite conclusion. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595.

Plaintiff argues, first, that the administrative law judge

erred in concluding that plaintiff does not meet the requirements of

Listing 12.05C. Statement of Errors, p. 18. Specifically, plaintiff

argues that the administrative law judge erred in finding that

plaintiff did not have a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ

between 60 and 70, because Dr. Olah, the doctor who administered

plaintiff’s IQ test, did not conclude that plaintiff’s January 2010

full scale IQ score of 63 was invalid. Id. 

Listing 12.05 requires, under appropriate circumstances, a

finding of disability based on the claimant's mental retardation:

Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive

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functioning initially manifested during the developmental

period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of

the impairment before age 22.

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when

. . . (C) [the claimant has demonstrated] a valid verbal,

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a

physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional

and significant work-related limitation of function.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05(C). A claimant must

establish three elements in order to satisfy Listing 12.05(C): that he

experiences “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning

with deficits in adaptive functioning [that] initially manifested

during the developmental period” (i.e., the diagnostic description);

(2)that he has a “valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60

through 70;” and (3) that he suffers from “a physical or other mental

impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related

limitation of function.” Id. See also Foster v. Harris, 279 F.3d

348, 354–55 (6th Cir. 2001). Current IQ scores do not alone establish

that the claimant suffered subaverage intellectual functioning or

deficits in adaptive functioning during the developmental period. “A

claimant must produce evidence beyond his present IQ scores to show

that he exhibited deficits during his developmental period.” Turner

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. App’x 488, 491–92 (6th Cir. 2010)

(citing Foster, 279 F.3d at 354–55).

In rejecting plaintiff’s 2010 IQ scores, the administrative law

judge noted that plaintiff was not taking his medications and that he

was “visibly depressed” during testing; moreover, Dr. Olah indicated

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that the score “may be only a minimal estimate of his capabilities”

and that there was a discrepancy between plaintiff’s 2010 score and

his scores when he was tested at the age of 16. Id. 

The administrative law judge’s finding in this regard enjoys

substantial support in the record. First, it was not necessary that

Dr. Olah expressly characterize plaintiff’s scores as invalid; an

administrative law judge may properly consider factors beyond the test

score and the examiner’s own comments in determining the score’s

validity. See Brooks v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-2608, 2010 WL 1254323, at

*5-7. Second, even Dr. Olah noted that, because plaintiff was visibly

depressed during the testing session, the score “may be only a minimal

estimate of his capabilities.” PAGEID 500. This comment is

significant, in part, because there is a large discrepancy between

plaintiff’s 2010 full scale IQ score of 63 and his 1991 full scale IQ

score of 85, verbal IQ score of 81, and performance IQ score of 94. 

PAGEID 297-304. It is also notable that plaintiff has never been

diagnosed with mild mental retardation, but only with borderline

intellectual functioning, see PAGEID 500, which generally suggests a

higher IQ. See Brooks, 2010 WL 1254323 at *5-6.

In short, the Court concludes that the administrative law

judge’s determination that plaintiff’s mental impairment does not

satisfy Listing 12.05C enjoys substantial support in the record. 

Plaintiff also argues that the administrative law judge erred

in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. Specifically,

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plaintiff argues that, in asking the vocational expert to assume a

claimant limited to “simple, routine, no more than three to four step

tasks,” the administrative law judge improperly omitted the moderate

mental impairments found by Dr. Olah and Dr. Swain and failed to

include the restrictions articulated by Nurse Practitioner Marshall. 

Statement of Errors, pp. 12-17. 

Hypothetical questions posed to a vocation expert need not

include every limitation proposed by the claimant or mentioned by a

doctor; rather, the administrative law judge must include in the

residual functional capacity all the limitations found by the

administrative law judge. Stanley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

39 F.3d 115, 118-19 (6th Cir. 1994); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff does not argue

that the administrative law judge’s hypothetical did not include all

the limitations actually found by the administrative law judge;

plaintiff instead challenges the administrative law judge’s residual

functional capacity determination. 

The residual functional capacity determination is an

administrative finding of fact reserved to the Commissioner. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (3); Edwards v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 97 F.

App'x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2004). It represents the most, not the

least, that a claimant can do despite his impairments. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a); Griffeth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 217 F. App'x 425, 429

(6th Cir. 2007). In assessing a claimant's residual functional

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capacity, an administrative law judge must consider all relevant

evidence, including medical source opinions, relating to the severity

of a claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d),

404.1545(a). Furthermore, courts have stressed the importance of

medical opinions in determining a claimant's residual functional

capacity, and have cautioned administrative law judges against relying

on their own expertise in drawing conclusions from raw medical data. 

See Isaacs v. Astrue, No. 1:08-CV-828, 2009 WL 3672060, at *10 (S.D.

Ohio Nov. 4, 2009) (quoting Deskin v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 605 F.Supp.2d

908, 912 (N.D. Ohio 2008)).

In the case presently before the Court, the administrative law

judge found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except

he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can

occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can occasionally stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl; must avoid jobs requiring fine

hearing capabilities; must avoid working in environments

with loud background noise; must avoid jobs exposing him to

hazards such as dangerous moving machinery or unprotected

heights; and cannot drive as part of work. Further, he is

limited to simple, routine work involving no more then 3-4

step tasks in an environment without fast-paced production

demands that involves only occasional interactions with

others. 

PAGEID 59. In making this assessment, the administrative law judge

expressly considered all the medical opinions and provided an

explanation for the weight given to each. PAGEID 66-67. 

The administrative law judge gave some weight to the opinion of

Dr. Swain, but determined that the limitation to a more solitary

setting with no over-the-shoulder supervision was unwarranted because

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plaintiff “testified extensively that various individuals had helped

him complete his work even prior to his alleged onset date.” PAGEID

67. The administrative law judge also gave significant weight to the

opinions of Dr. Olah and concluded that, based on plaintiff’s record

of poor memory and deficits in concentration, he would be limited to

“simple, routine work involving no more than 3-4 steps.” Id. The

Court concludes that these findings enjoy substantial support in the

record. 

In considering the opinion of Nurse Practitioner Marshall, the

administrative law judge properly noted that the opinions of nurse

practitioners are not entitled to the controlling weight or deference

to which the opinions of treating physicians are ordinarily entitled. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 404.1527(d). The administrative law

judge accorded little weight to Ms. Marshall’s opinion because of her

status and because she had “just begun treating the claimant with

minimal records on file supporting her assessment.” The Court

concludes that these findings also enjoy substantial support in the

record. 

The Court also disagrees with plaintiff's contention that the

administrative law judge improperly substituted his own evaluation of

the medical evidence when he found that plaintiff would be limited to

“simple, routine, no more than three to four step tasks.” Statement

of Errors, pp. 12-18. The residual functional capacity assessment is

expressly reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2),

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404.1546. The reports and opinions of Dr. Sanders, i.e., that

plaintiff could perform simple, three-step commands, PAGEID 341, and

Dr. Swain, that plaintiff is capable of simple to moderate tasks in a

setting that does not require more than occasional contact with the

public, PAGEID 519, provide substantial support for the administrative

law judge’s assessment.

In short, the administrative law judge’s residual functional

capacity assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Because, as discussed supra, the administrative law judge

included all the limitations found by him in the hypothetical posed to

the vocational expert, the Court concludes that the administrative law

judge did not err in relying on the vocational expert’s testimony. 

See Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994) (the

Commissioner may rely on vocational testimony based on a hypothetical

that “accurately describes the plaintiff in all significant, relevant

respects”).

In short, the Court concludes that the decision of the

Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and it must,

therefore, be affirmed.

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the decision of the

Commissioner be AFFIRMED and that this action be DISMISSED.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,

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specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy

thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

 

 

 s/ Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King

January 25, 2013 United States Magistrate Judge

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