The Honor able Paul L

. M al o n ey , C hief Judge of the United States District Court for the * Western District of Michig an, sitting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0200n.06 Nos. 08-3994/09-4124 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. JAME S E. DI ERKER, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DI STRI CT OF O H IO OP IN ION
BEFORE: G IBBO NS and WHITE , Circuit Judges, and MALONEY, District Judge. * HELE NE N. WHITE, Circuit Jud ge. Def endant J ames E. Dierke r was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit secur ities and wire fra ud, 18 U.S.C. § 371, one count of conspira cy t o co m m i tm o n ey

l au n d er i n g, 1 8 U. S
. C
. § 1 9 5 6 , an d t wo co u n t s o f c o n ce al m en tm o n ey l au n d er i n g, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1)( B) (i). He was sente nced to se rve c oncurr ent terms of sixty months for ea ch conviction, and or dere d to pay $7,885,000.00 in restitution and forfe it $47,572,373.63. Die rk er
a pp e a ls his c on vic tio n an d sen te nc e , as we ll as the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s re sti tut ion and fo rf

e iture or de rs . We a ff ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e in p art
.Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 2 - I. The fa cts surroundingthis case a re de scribed in de tail in Un ite d S tates v . F au lk e nb e rry , 614 F .3 d 5 73 (6 th C ir . 2 01 0) , an a pp e a l by on e of Di e rk e r’ s co- de fe nd ants . We inc lud e the m he re on ly
as nec essar

y to reviewDierke r’s a

rg uments. Natio na l Ce ntu

ry F ina nc ia l E nte rp ri se s (NC F E) purc ha se d h e a lth c are pr ov ide rs ’ a c c ounts
rec eivable at a discount and pooled thos e re ce i v ables to sec ure bonds that it sold to insti tutional investors to raise c apital for the purcha se of the re ceiva bles. NCFE a lso collected pr og ram fe es fr om the hea lthcare providers. The investors ear ned intere st and wer e re paid throug h collections on the
rec eivables. Providers, mea nwhile, wer e paid a lmost i mmediately for se rvice s, rather

than having to wait for insure rs to proce ss and pay claims. This business model was, in theory , a sound one. NCFE ope rate d primarily throug h two subsidiaries, NPF VI and NPF X I I . These e ntities issued the ac tual bonds. Another NCF E subsidiary , National Premier Financ ial Service s (NPFS),
wa s re s p o n s i b l e f

o r p e r f o r m i n g t h e d ay - t o - d ay

s e r v i c e s n e c e s s ar

y t o p u r c h a s e t h e r e c e i v a b l e s, administer the ac cou n t s , and manag e the c ollection of the re ceiva bles. A Master

I ndenture Ag ree ment detailed the le g al obliga tions among the bond issuers, NPFS, and the banks t hat serve d as trustee s of the NPF pr og rams’ a ccounts. NPF S was responsible f or dete rm in in g

wh ich re ceiva

bles
wer e elig ible for pur chase and the trustee banks we re r equire d to monitor the progra ms on behalf

of the bo nd ho lde rs . T he no te s is su e d to bo nd -h old e rs c on ta in ed wr itt e n te rm s th a t r e str ic te d th e us e of the fu nd s inve ste d to the purc ha se of e lig ibl e rec e iva

ble s. Th e no te s a lso de ta ile d c re dit enhanc ements, i ncluding overc ollatera liz ation, cre dit rese rves, and other means of ensuring that the principal owe d on the notes would be se cure .Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

Three other for

mer e x ecutives c ooperated with the g overnme nt and pled guilty

. 1 - 3 - Although its busi n es s m o d el was outwardly strong , the ac tual prac tices of NCF E varie d dr a sti c a lly

fr om what in ve sto rs we re pr omi sed . Rathe r t ha n b e ingus e d o nly

to f un d th e purc ha se of eligible receiva

bles, much of the funding brought in from the sale of bonds w as used to adva nce money to healthca

re pr oviders without the purc hase of rec eivables. Seve ral of the se provider s had
no re a lis tic a

bil ity to r e pa y the a dv anc e s and

la c ke d adeq uat e re c e iva

ble s to su pp or t th e a mou

nts adv anced . T he i mp rop er ad van ces, so me o f w h i c h w e r e ma de t o co mp ani es i n wh ich NC FE principals held owner ship stake s, sever ely depleted the cash r eser

ves that NPF V Iand NPF X I Iwer e requ ir ed t o m ain tai n to pro tec t bon dh ol ders

. To cov er t he l os ses , NC FE i ss uedmo re no tes . NC FE executives also fa lsified data pr esente d t o i n v es tors. Additionally , NCFE moved f unds betwee n
va ri ou s a c c ounts wi thi n a

nd a c ro ss N PF VI

and NPF XI Ito m e e t mi ni mu m f un din g re qu ir e me nts on repor ting dates. The r eportingdates for the two prog rams we re stag g ere d so that the same f unds
c ou ld b e c ounte d s e pa

rate ly by e a c h p ro g ra

m to me e t in ve sto r r e qu ir e me nts
. Eventually , the sche me becam e u n s u s t ainable. A t the end of Septe mber 2002, one of the t ru s t ee b an k s b l o ck ed a tr an s fe r be t we en NP F VI an d NP F XI I , t ri gger i n g an ev en t o f de fa u l t
. In November

2002, NCFE f

iled for ba

nkruptcy , resulting in investor losses of appr ox imately $2.4 billion. On No v em b er 12, 2002, the FB Iraide d NCFE’ s headqua rters, se izi ng its files and do c ume nts . T he e ns uin g inv e sti g a tio n r e ve a le d s ub sta nti a l f ina nc ia l ir re g ula ri tie s. I n 2006, the g overnme nt secure d indictments ag ainst seven of NCFE’ s executives on char g es of conspira cy , secur ities fraud, w ire fr aud, mail fra ud, and money launder ing. Dierke r wa s char g ed 1Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 4 - based on his author ization of advance s to California P sy chiatric Manag ement S ervic es (CPMS), a healthca re c ompany

in which NCFE he ld a 49.9% owne rship intere s t, a n d wh ich re ceive d funds from NPF XI I . I n June 20 00 , CPM S f ile d a Cha pte r 1 1 b ank

ru ptc y pe tit ion . N PF X, an N CF E e nti ty responsible for

non-investor funds, w as a p p o in te d a s CP M S’ s p o s t- p etition financing party . Milli ons of dol lars’ worth of credit was ex tended to CPMS from NPF XI I , instead of NPF X. Dierke r wa s in char g e of the CPMS acc ount during the re levant time per iod. Five of the seven executives, including Dierke r, wer e jointly tried. After a six -we ek trial a nd two day s of deliber ation, Dierke r wa s convicted of one count of conspirac y to commit securities and wire f raud, one count of c onspiracy to commit money

launder ing, a

nd two counts of conc ealment money launder ing. D ierke r moved for a judgment of acquittal pursua nt to Fede ral Rule of Criminal Procedur e 29 at t he close of the g overnme nt’s case -in-chie f and a g ain at the c lose of trial. The dis tr ic t c o u rt d e n i e d b o t h m o t i o n s , a s w e l l a s D i e r k e r ’ s r e n e w e d m o t i o n m a d e f o l l o w i n g his
co n v i ct i o n s , s t at i n g: The trial in this case lasted for six wee ks

. T h e t we n ty -two volume trial tra nscript shows that Def

endants ha d considera

ble opportunities to, and in f act did, attac k the Gover nment’s evidenc e ag ainst them by putting on their own defe nses and by e xten siv e ly

c ro ss- e xam ini ngthe Go ve rnme nt’ s w itn e sse s and c ha lle ng ingits do c ume nta

ry e vid e nc e . Th e re c or d a lso sh ow s that the e vid e nc e a g a ins t D e fe nd ants was substantial. Six former National Century

employ ees te stified and thre e of the se —JonB e a c ham, S he rr y Gi bs on , a nd Jess ic a B ily

—w e re se nio r e xec uti ve s w ith intimate know ledg e of the company ’s operations a nd how it pe rpetrat ed i nvestor fra ud. Eac h of these e x ecutives a dmitted to enga g ing in c riminal conduct a nd they all implicated Def

endants in the c riminal conspirac y . Be sides National C en t ury i n s i d e r s , t h e G o v e r

n m e n tp u to n w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y f r o m t h e i n v e s t o r s w h o s e m o n e y, unbeknownst to them, was imprope rly used to make unse cure d loans to h ea lthcare providers. The Government also called to the stand repr esentatives of the hea lthcare providers, w ho confirme d that they asked for, a nd rec eived, hundr eds of millions of dollars in National Century loans that the provider s had little ability to pay back.Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 5 - Dierke r appe als, claiming that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support his convictions, that the g overnme nt’s failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidenc e wa rra nts a new tria l, and that the district court e rre d in calculating r estitution and forfe iture. II. Dierke r cla ims that the district court erre d when it denied his motion for ac quittal based on insufficienc y of t he evidence. He arg ues t hat t he gover nment failed to introduce sufficie nt evidence of his g uil t and

tha t his c on vic tio ns ste m f

ro m th e jur

y ’s imp uti nge vid e nc e int ro du c e d a g a ins t hi s alleg ed co- conspirator s to him. We reviewde novo a dis trict court’s denial of a motion for acquittal based on sufficienc y of the evidenc e. Un ite d S

tates v . M

ab ry , 518 F.3d 442, 447- 48 (6th Cir. 2008). “In revie wing
c ha lle n g e s r e g ar d i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y , w e ar e l imi te d to
asce rtaining whether

. . . any ra t i o n al trier of

fac t could have f

ound the essential e lements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. Carmichae l , 232 F.3d 510, 519 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns and c itatio ns omi tte d)

. We “mus t vie w a ll e vid e nc e and re so lve a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in fa

vor of the gove rnment.” United States v. Hughe s , 505 F.3d 578, 592 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (c i t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In doing so , h o we v er , we do not independe ntly

weigh t he evide nce or

substitut e our judg ment for that of the jury

. Id . Thus, “[a] defe ndant bring ing such a c halleng e bea rs a ‘ very heavy burden.’ ” United States v. Danie l , 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (c itations omi tted).Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 6 - A. We f ir st a dd re ss D ie rk e r’ s c on vic tio n o f c on sp ir a c y to c omm it se c ur iti e s and wi re fr a ud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The g overnme nt must show three elements to prove a conspirac y : “(1) the exist ence of an a g ree ment to violate the law; (2) knowledg e and intent to join the conspira cy ; and (3) an overt act constituting actua l pa rticipation in the conspirac y .” Hughes , 505 F.3d at 593. “A tacit or mate rial under stan d i ng among the par ties to a conspira cy

is sufficient to establish the

a g re e me nt[, and

a ] co ns pir a c y

may be inf e rr e d f ro m c ir c ums tanti a l evi de nc e wh ic h ma y re a so na bly be interpre ted as participation in a common plan.” Id. (citations om itted) (alter ations in origina l);

s e e a ls o U

n ite d S ta te s v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 518 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (“No pr oof of a formal ag ree ment is require d to establish a conspirac y to violate fede ral law; a tacit or mutual understa nding among the par

ties will suffice. . . . Just as the consp i ra cy m ay be infe rre d from cir cumstantial evidenc e, a de fenda

nt’s knowledg e of a

nd participation in a conspirac y also may be infe rre d from his conduct and e stablished by circ umstantial evidence .”) ( citations and inte r n a l q u otations omit ted). Dierke r conte nds that none of the gove rnment witnesses dire ctly linked him to a conspirac y
and that th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e to s up port a fi nd in g that he kn e w o f a c on sp ir a c y

a t N CF E. I t is undisputed that NPF X wa s authorized to m ak e ad v an ce s to CP MS. I t is also undisput ed that advanc es we re w rong fully made by NPF XI I
. Di erke r cla ims that there is no evidenc e that he

a uth or ize d, or

wa s e ve n a

wa re of , th e dis burs e me nt o f fu

nd s fr om NPF XI I
. He c la ims that a ll h is

a c tio ns we re c on sis te nt w iththe dir e c tiv e s and or de rs of the Un ite d St a te s B ank

ru ptc y Cou rt . A mpl e
e vid e nc e and

te sti mony

ind ic a te d, ho wev e r, that D ie rk e r d id k no wi ng ly joi n in the c on sp ir a c y

to defr aud investors. Although Dierke r’s observation that no document expressly establishes that heNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

DVI was a CPMS cre ditor to which CPMS made monthl y m o rt g ag e pay ments of 2 approximately

$84,000. - 7 - authorized disbursements fr om NPF XI I is acc urate , there is sufficie nt circ umstantial evidence that he wa s awa

re of the source of the funds a nd aided in fa cilitating the unse cure d advanc es. Dierke r, who ha d joined NCFE in e arly 1999 and held the positions of assoc iate dire ctor of

mark e tin g , v ice pr e sid e nt f or c lie nt d e ve lop me nt, and c hie f c re dit

of fi c e r o ve r t

he c ours e of

his employ ment, was in cha

rg e of the CPMS acc ount during the re levant t i m e p er i o d

. I n J une 2000, CP M S f il e d a Ch a p te r 1 1 b an kr u p tc y p e ti ti o n . B r

y anWe is s , a

me mb e r o f CP M S’ s p o st-petition manag ement committee, se nt Dierke r we ekly e-ma il requests for

funding to pay

operating e x penses for two hospitals owned by CPMS
. These r equests included itemized summaries showingthat the hospitals required hundr eds of thousands of dollars in “supplementa l f unding” —funding that was “not supported by

acc ounts rece ivabl e.” D ierke r for war ded Weiss’s reque sts to NCFE’s funding de pa rtme nt w ithins tr

uc tio ns to a dv anc e the re qu e ste d amou nts
. Dierke r’s e -mail corr espondenc e re flec ted his knowledg e that the major ity of the funds provided to CPMS did not come from NPF X, as the ba nkruptcy court’s or der r equire d. On J une 7, 20 01 , D ie rk e r f

or wa rd e d a n e- ma il fr om Wei ss to the NC F E f un din g de pa

rtme nt i ns tr

uc tin g that it fund “$ 530 thousand to CPM S rather tha n the $620 thousand [he had pre viously reque sted]. The $84 thousand diffe renc e [intended for D VI ] will be funded via another aff iliate.” Jessica Bily , an 2 NCFE e x ec u t i v e an d the manag er of the fundingdepar

tment, testified that the term “ another aff iliate” re fer

red to NPF X. Four

day s later, on June 11, 2001, Dierke r re quested that $84,024.12 be wire d from NPF Xto CP MS’s acc ount. Thus, if NPF X was the a lternative “ another aff iliate”Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

Snoble was in cha

rg e of N CFE’s a ccountingdepar tment. 3 - 8 - source of the $84,000, it could not be the source of the $530,000. F urther, D ierke r’s re sponse to an
e-m ail fro m an accou nt in g-depa rt men t em pl oy ee ask in g how t he fu nd s w ou ldbe re pai d t o NP F X indicates a

n awa rene ss that funds had bee n transfe rre d from NPF X I I : “[i] n total there w ere 5 such pay ments of [sic] $84,012.12, althoug h the first one ma y have be en the only

one to have orig inated fr o m NP F X.” I t is also significa nt that the wire tra

nsfer reque st went direc tly

to the acc ounting de p artm e n t, r a th e r

th anto th e f

u n d in g d e p artm e n t. A c c o r d in g to B il y , N CF E ’ s a c c o unting depar tment was re sponsible for funding NPF X, while the fundingdepar tment administered NPF V I and NPF X I I . On J uly

12, 20 0 1 , Di erke r sent an e -mail asking the fundingdepar tment to “fund $330[,000] to CP MS thi s wee k. Howeve r, please chec k with J ohn Snoble reg ardingthe $84[,000] 3 for DV I . He ma y wa n t t o s en d that component fr om NPF X leaving $246[,000] to come from funding .” B ily

testified that “f

rom funding ” re fer

red to funds c oming from NPF XI I . Be tween June 29 , 2 00 1, and

Oc tob e r 2 6, 20 01 , D ie rk e r a uth or ize d n

ume ro us sim ila

r a dv anc e s of fund s to CPMS, including a

n advanc e of $670,000 on Aug ust 3, 2001 and an advance of $720,000 on September 28, 2001. Fur

ther, a September 26, 2001 me morand u m re co m mending the sale of one of CPMS’s hospitals that Dierke r sent to NCFE executives include d a summary ref lecting that rese rves ha d been deducte d from CPMS’s weekly funding during the bankr

uptcy
. Sherry Gibson, an NCF E executive, te sti fi e d th a t N PF X did no t ma int a in re se rv e a c c ounts
. Di e rk e r a lso te sti fi e d that “ re se rv e a c c ounts
wer e in the [acc ount s-re ceiva ble]-based fundingprog rams” a nd that NPF X did not have rese rveNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

One memo state s that one provider , Compreh en s ive Addiction Prog rams, Inc., wa s 4 “under funded by approximately 7 mm.” and explained that a nother provider, T ender

L oving Ca

re, “re ceive s advanc es to meet budg etar y needs. A pply rese rve ove rag es.” - 9 - accou nt s. W hen ask ed ab ou t t he S ept emb er 26 memo rand um , Dierk er stat ed t hat alt ho ugh NP F X did n o t “r eq u ire re serve acc ounts,” it could withhold reserve s “at our disc retion depe nding on the transac tion.” Additionally , Bily testified t hat s he had conce rns about CPMS funding and discussed the m wi th Di erke r. S peci fi cal ly , Bi ly was worri ed t hat th e “con ti nu al a dv anci ng of f un ds

. . . fr om [ NP F] VI and XI Iwi tho ut a

ny c oll a te ra l” me ant t

hat N CF E “ did

no t ha ve e no ug h mo ne y

in t he bo ok s to meet [the ] complianc e re quirements of the investors.” NCF E executive Jon Beac ham also stated that Dierke r told him in t he summer of 2001 that “some of the clients that he wa s working with in client devel o pment wer e over -adva nced” ; these clients we re “ under w ater . . . and they

wer e within the
secur itiz ed prog rams.” Bily testified that “[NPF] X was not a hea lth care secur itiz ation prog ram.” Gibson also stated that af

ter a n investor pre sentation, Dierke r commente d to her that the “ I vy L eague” inve stors “we ren’ t a sking questions .

. . . about the funding prog ram as it actually worke d.” Gi bs on te sti fi e d th a t ne ith e r s he no r D ie rk e r eve r t old the inv e sto rs “ ho w the bu sin e ss a c tua lly worke d.” F inally , Dierke r had be en copied on cer tain signific ant and r evea ling memos, including
on e de sc ri bin g NC F E’ s “ sp e c ia l f un din g arr ang e me nts ” wi th c e rt a in h e a lth c are pr ov ide rs . 4 Dierke r does not dispute that a c onspiracy to commit fraud occ urre d at NCFE, but he a rg ues t h a th e w a s n o ti n v o l v e d

i nt h e c o n s p i r a c y. H o w e v e r , t h i s c o u rtw i l l n o t w e i g h w i t n e s s c r e d i b i l i t y, and a r ational jury could have believed the testimony of Weiss, Bea cham, B ily , and Gibson re g ardingNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 10 - Dierke r’s knowle dg e. Dier ker doe s not contest that he wa s involved in c arr ying out the transac tions in question. D ierke r’s challeng es addr ess the infe renc es dra wn from the e vidence , rathe r than the ins uf fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e . Th e inf

e re nc e s ne c e ssa

ry to su pp or t th e jur y ’s g uil ty ve rd ic t w e re we ll within the rea lm of rea son and common sense . We theref ore f ind no error

in the district court’s de nia l of Di e rk e r’ s mo tio n f

or a c qu itt a l. B. Di e rk e r n e xt ch a lle ng e s h is c on vic tio ns of c on sp ir a c y

to c om mi t mone y

la un de ri ngin violati o n o f 1 8 U.S .C. § 1956, and conc ealment money launder ing in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1)( B) (i). The conce alment money -launde ring conviction was ba sed on wir e t ra n s fers of $670,000 and $720,000 fr om NPF XI Ito CP MS. Section 1956(a) (1)( B) (i) make s i t a cr ime to eng ag e in a f inancial tra

nsaction involving proce eds fr om specified unla wful ac tivity

“knowingthat the transa ction is designe d . . . to conce al or disg uise the nature , the location, the sourc e, the owne rship, or the c ontrol of the proc eeds.” The Supreme Court r ece ntly interpre ted the money -launde ring statute, holding that the word “desig ned” r equire s proof of a purpose. See Cue llar v. United States , 553 U.S. 550, 563-64 (2008) (“[W] hen an a ct is ‘ desig ned to’ do something, the most natural re ading is that it has that something
as its purpose .”). I n Cuellar , the Court hear d an appe al of a conviction under

§ 1956(a) (2)( B) (i), wh ic h c on ta ins a lmo st ide nti c a l langua g e to § 19 56 (a )( 1) (B )( i) , e xce pt that it re late s sp e c if ic a lly to tr ans po rt ingfu

nd s in te rn a tio na lly . T he de fe nd ant w a s c a ug ht atte mpt ingto d

ri ve to M e xico wi th $81,0 0 0 i n proce eds fr om unlawful ac tivity (drugtraff

icking ), which he had hidden in a se cre t compar tment under his ca

r’s re ar fl o o rb o ards. See id. at 553-54. The Court held that it wasNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

“L isted attribute” r efe rs t o the nature, the l ocation, the source , the owner ship, or the control 5 of the proc eeds. Cuellar , 553 U.S. at 559. - 11 - insufficient to show that the f un d s h ad bee n disguised w hile being transporte d; rather , it was
nece ssary to show that the transportation was aimed at disguising a listed attribute of the funds. See 5 id. at 563-64. The Court noted that conce aling a listed attribute “ne ed be only one of the purposes of the tra nsportation,” but that the g overnme nt had only introduced e vidence that hiding money was
a mea ns of fa cilitating its movement to Mexi co. Id. at 567 n.7. No evide nce e stablished that the purpose of

taking the money

to Mex ico was to disg uise a listed attribute. The Court stated that the str uc tur a l me anin g of

“ de sig n” is b oth

ov e ri nc lus ive and

un de ri nc lus ive : I

t w o u ld captur e individuals who structure d transportation in a secr etive way but lacke d any c ri min a l int e nt ( su c h a s a

pe rs on wh o h id i lli c it f

un ds en route to tur

n the m ov e r t o law enforce ment); y et i t would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the funds i n order to impede detection by law enforce ment but failed to hide the m during the transpor

tation. Id. at 565. Di e rk e r a rgue s th a t th e tr ans a c tio ns a t is su e we re no t “ de sig ned to c on c e a l,” a s th e statut e require s. Although Dierke r di d not advanc e thi s argument in his briefs, he r aised it in a supplemental fi lin g re lying on thi s c ourt ’s de c isi on s in Un ite d S tates v . A y e rs , 386 F. App’ x 558 (6th Cir. 2010), and Fa ulk

e nb e rry , 6 1 4 F
. 3 d 5 7 3
. W e h a v e d i s c r e t i o nt o a p p l y Ay e rs and the published pre cede nt in Fa ulk e nb e rry to a ca se that ar ose fr om the same unde rlying f raud. I n Ay e rs and F

a u l k e n b e r ry , we appli ed Cuellar and over

turned the mone y -launde ring convictions of Dona ld Ay ers a nd Roge r Faulkenbe rry , two NCFE principals. The convictions were based on wire transfe rs authorized by Ay ers and F aulkenbe rry , which we re a ccompa nied by falsifiedNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

Di e rk e r p oin ts o ut t

hat a lth ou g h th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d h is Brady m otion, it gra nted a 6 ne arl y ide nti c a l mo tio n fi le d b y his c o- de fe nd ant, Jame s K . H a pp . T his c omp ari so n d oe s n ot h e lp a dv anc e Di e rk e r’ s argume nts , h ow e ve r, a s H a pp wa s a se ve re d c o- de fe nd ant who wa s tr ie d n e arl y a y ear afte r Dierke r. Ha

pp filed his motion for production of doc uments befor e his criminal trial a nd - 12 - rec eivables pur chase repor ts and promissory

notes stating that NCFE’ s o wn m o ney , rathe r than inv e sto r m on ie s, wo uld

fu nd the tr ans a c tio n. We h e ld t hat th e g ov e rnme nt fa ile d to pr ov e that th e se transfe rs wer e “de signe d in w hole or in par t . . . to concea l or disguise ” the nature or sour ce of the fra udulently obtained funds, Fa ulk

e nb e rry , 614 F.3d at 585, beca use the g overnme nt did not show that “conc ealment wa s one of the pur p o s es t h at d rove [ Ay ers a nd Fa ulkenber ry ] t o eng ag e in the transac tion[ s] i n the first plac e,” id. at 586. The g overnme nt makes no attempt to disting uish these ca ses. Indeed, the g overnme nt stated in its briefs and at or al ar g ument that if this c ourt “applies its holding in Faulkenbe rry to this case, Dierke r’s [money

-launde ring ] convictions . . . shoul d be reve rsed.” We the ref ore reve rse Die rker ’s
mon e y -l a un de ri ngc on vic tio ns . III . Dierke r also asse rts that the g overnme nt wrong fully withheld evidenc e fr om a par allel Secur it ie s an d

E xc h an g e Co mm is s io n( SE C) inv e s ti g a ti o no f th e b an k s th a t s e r

v e d a s tr u s te e s for NPF VI and NPF XI I
. I n his second post-convic tion moti on for a new tria l, Dierke r ar g ued that the g ov e rnme nt w ith he ld d e po sit ion s g ive n b y th re e ind ivi du a ls—Rob e rt Pand a and Cy nth ia Stephenson-Collins of Pricewate rhouse Cooper s L L P, one of NCFE ’s outside aud i t o rs , and J ohn Rothrock of B ank One , the trustee ba nk for NPF XI I

—as part of t he S EC investigation, in viol ation of Brady v. M

aryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 6Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

thi s mo tio n, un lik e Di e rk e r’ s Bradymotion, was not a post-trial motion. - 13 - We revie w t he “denial of a mot ion for new t rial based on Brady vio latio ns un de r a n a bu se of discre tion standard. Howe ver, the district court’s de termination as to the existe n ce o f a Brady violation is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Graham , 4 8 4 F. 3 d 4 13, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). As the district court c orre ctly summarized: To establish a Bradyviolation , a d ef endant has the burden of showing that “the Gover nment suppressed evidence , that such evidence was favorable to the defe nse, and that the suppre ssed evidenc e wa s material.” United States v. Graham , 484 F.3d 41 3, 41 7 ( 6t h Cir. 2 00 7) . “ Mate ri a l” me ans “ that th e re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, had the e vidence been disc losed to the def ense, the outcome would have been differ ent.” United States v. J ones , 399 F. 3 d 6 4 0 , 648 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n omitte d)

. “ Re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity me ans a

pr ob a bil ity sufficie nt to undermine conf i d ence in the outcome.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he question is n o t whether the def endant would more lik e ly tha n n ot h a ve re c e ive d a dif

fe re nt ve rd ic t withthe e vid e nc e , b ut whe the r i n it s absenc e he rec eived a

fair tr ial, understood as a trial resulting in a ver dict worthy of confide nce.” Strickler v. G reene , 527 U.S. 263, 289-90 (1999). I ndeed, “ there is no Bradyvio latio n if

the de fe nd ant k

ne w o r s ho uld

have kn ow n th e e sse nti a l f a c ts permitting him to take advanta g e of the information in que stion, or if the information was available to him from anothe r sourc e.” Graham , 484 F.3d at 417 (internal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). At the outset, it is not clea r that Dier

ker satisfies the first re quirement of a Bradyclaim, the suppression of e vidence . The SEC depositions Dierke r soug ht “wer e not only made available, but

a c tua lly pr ov ide d, to D e fe nd ants pr ior to t ri a l. T he se de po sit ion s a

nd the ir a c c omp anyinge xhibi ts
wer e cle arly

identified in a discove ry index dated April 19, 20 07, as ‘SEC DEPOSI TI ONS AND EX HI B I TS’
. . . , re qu e ste d by c ou ns e l for De fe nd ant Ay e rs on Ap ri l 23, 200 7 to be ma de a va ila bleNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

Al l de fe nd ants , inc lud ing Di e rk e r and Ay e rs , pa rt ic ipate d in the same Joint Defense 7 A g r e e m e n t , an d t h e r e f

o r e w e r e e x p e c t e d t o s h ar e i n f o r m a t i o np r o d

u c e d i nd i s c o v e r

y. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Ay ers wa s desig nated a s the individual who would coordinate discovery for de fenda

nts. - 14 - fo r c op ying

. . . , and

pr ov ide d to De fe nd ants purs ua nt t o th a t re qu e st, be g inn ing in A pr il a nd a t le a st by Aug ust, 2007.” 7 Dierke r has a lso f

ailed to e stablish that the alleg edly suppressed e vidence was mate rial. As the district court found: E v e na s s u mi n g th a t t

h e d o c u me n ts w e r e n o t p r o d u c e d , th e r e ar e n o g rounds under e ither Brady or Rule 33 for se tting aside the ver dict and g ranting Dier ker a new tria l. As this C ourt previously held, althoug h the “e vidence would have be en ‘f a vo ra ble ’ t o D e fe nd ants, [] th e Court c ann ot s ay

it w a s ‘ mate ri a l,’ su c h th a t it s non-disclosure unde rmines conf idence in the j ury ’s guilty verdic t[ ]. (Doc. No. 758, 67.) The Court is unconvince d that evidenc e that two PwC employ ees ma y have be en awa re of the “a dvancing ” and ma y have be lieved it was a

ppropriate and that an e mpl oy e e of

the NPF XI I Tr

us te e be lie ve d th a t f

luc tuatio ns in t

he re se rv e a c c ounts we r e p e r m i s s i b l e w o u l d

h a v e t i p p e d

t h e s c a l e s i nD i e r

k e r ’ s f a v o r e n o u g h t o r a i se conce rns about the fairness of the t rial. This is particular ly true g iven that any

such testimony at trial could have been impeached by the presentation of evide nce that the PwC a ud ito rs and

the Tr us te e s we re late r fo un d by the SEC to b e a c tin g ne g lig e ntl y with respec t t o t h ei r roles in connection with National Century . As the Court previously

explained, “re sponsibili ty third parties may bear for failing to detect the fra ud or fur theringits ends, does not dimini sh Dierke r’s c ulpability as a N ational Century co-c onspirator.”
I n light of this analy sis, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deter mining that, eve n if there
was e vidence of trustee neg lige nce suppr essed by the g overnm en t , t h e evide nce w ould not have undermined c onfidenc e in the ver dict and thus a ne w trial wa s not warr anted.Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

Sig nif ic antl y , D ie rk e r doe s not ar g ue that his sen te nc e , whi c h fa c tor e d in a 30 -l e ve l in c re a se 8 for a ctual loss, is procedur ally or substantively

unrea sonable be cause Dierke r also re ceive d a “19- le ve l do wnwa

rd va ri anc e ” b a se d u

po n h is “ e xemp lary

lif e his tor y and c ha ra c te ri sti c s and

lim ite d r ole in the offe nse.” Instead, Die rker limit s his arg ument here to “the fina ncial impact of

the er roneous ruling s made by

the district court a

t the time of Dierke r’s sente ncing .”

- 15 - IV. Finally , Dierke r asse rts that the district court e rre d in or dering him to for feit $47,572,373.63 and to pay restitution in the amount of $7,885,000.00. Dier ker obje cted to these deter minations prior t o an d at s en t en ci n g. 8 We revie w a d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s f in d in g s o f

f a c t at s e n te n c in g a s to “ lo s s ” an d r e s ti tuti o nf

or “cle ar e rror ,” and its methodolog y for c alculatingloss de novo. Un ite d S tates v . R oth we ll , 387 F.3d 57 9, 58 2 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; se e als o U nite d S tates v . M c Car ty , 628 F.3d 284, 290 ( 6th Cir. 2010). “A fac tual finding is clear ly

err oneous whe re, a lthough ther e is evidenc e to support t h at finding , ‘the revie wing court on the e ntire evide nce is lef t with the definite and firm conviction that a mi stake ha s been c ommitt ed.’” Un ite d S tates v . W ar e , 282 F.3d 9 0 2 , 907 (6th Cir. 2002) (c itations omi tted). Howeve r, “w hether

those fac ts as deter

mined b y t h e d i strict court wa rra nt the application of a particula r g uideline provision is purely a leg al questio n an d i s re v i ewe d de novo by this court.” United States v. Garne r , 940 F.2d 172, 174 ( 6th Cir. 1991). Un de r t he U. S. Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s, the dis tr ic t court is t o d e te rm ine the a mou nt o f l os s by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Mc Car ty , 628 F.3d at 290. Particularly “in situ at i ons where the losses occ asioned by financ ial fra uds are not e asy to quantify , the district court ne ed only make
a re asonable estimate of the loss, g iven the ava ilable information.” United States v. Triana , 468 F.3dNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 16 - 308, 320 (6th Cir. 2006) (c itations omi tted). “We re view de novo the question of whe ther re stitut ion is pe rm i t t ed u n d er the law, a nd revie w the amount of a restitution awar d for a

buse of discr etion.” United States v. Boring , 557 F.3d 707, 713 ( 6th Cir. 2009). A. For feiture is not controlled by the Guidelines. Se e Un ite d S tates v . H all , 411 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005). Instead, “ [f] orfe itu re is to be imposed upon a cr iminal defenda nt as provided by statute.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.4. Under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (C), the followingis subject to forfe iture: Any proper ty , rea l or persona l, which consti tutes or is derived f rom proce eds trac eable to a violation of section 215, 471, 472, 473, 474, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 485, 48 6 , 4 8 7 , 4 88, 501, 502, 510, 542, 545, 656, 657, 842, 844, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1032, or 1344 of this title or any offe nse constituting “spec ified unlawf

ul acti v i t y ” (as defined in sec tion 1956(c)( 7) of this title), or a conspirac y

to commit such offense

. I n rea ching the forfeiture- amount deter mination, the district court relied on G X VI -13, a repor t prepa red by NCFE’ s funding depar

tment that summarized NCFE’s fundingof CPMS and other provide rs as of July 31, 2002. This report state d that the CPMS fu n d i n g was
un de rc oll a te ra lize d b y

$4 7, 57 2, 37 3. 63 . T he g ov e rnme nt h a d mo ve d f o r a n o r d e r o f f o r fe iture a g a ins t all defe ndants (including Dierke r) in the amount of $1,771,918,476.29, but the district court
c on c lud e d th at on ly

fo ur of the de fe nd ants , a

nd no t D ie rk e r, wo uld

be he ld j oin tly

and se ve ra lly liable for this amount. The district c ourt found that “$47,572,373.63 f airly constitutes or is derived from proce eds trac eable to Mr. Dierke r’s off enses. This amount is the total sum that NCFE’s own documents showed that Mr. Dierke r would be r esponsible for ba sed on his advanc es.”Nos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 17 - There is no question that forfe iture i s authorized by statute in this case. More over, suf ficient evidenc e shows that Dier ker w as in cha

rge of the CPMS acc ount and that he wa s a knowing participa nt in the fraud pe rpetrated by NCFE. Give n that the district court de clined to hold Dierke r jointly and seve rally

liable for a

much larg er sum and limited Dier ker’ s responsibility

to his a ctions with respec t to CP MS, we find no er ror. B. Restituti on in this case was mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A, “whic h stipulate that restitution is required for victims of offense s u n d er Title 18 of the United States Code.” United Sta te s v . B lan c ha rd , 6 18 F .3 d 5 62 , 5 76 (6th Cir . 2 01 0) . U nd e r t he se statut e s, “ ‘i f s ome on e is convicted of

a conspira cy , the court can order restitution f or damag e resulting from any conduct that was pa rt of the c onspiracy

and not just from specif

ic conduct that met the over t act re quirement of the conspira cy

conviction.’” United States v. Elson , 577 F. 3 d 7 1 3 , 723 (6th Cir. 2009) (c itations omitted). Courts must , howeve r, “e x clude inju ri es ca u s ed by offe nses that ar e not par t of the [conspiracy ] of which [t he def endant] has been convicted.” Id

. (q u o t i n g United States v. Ge orge , 403 F.3d 470, 474 ( 7th Cir. 2005)) (a lterations in orig inal). The district cour

t calculated Dier

ker’ s restitution amount based on the advan ce s t h at he improperly

made to CPMS. I t found that “the monetary losses stemming from the NCF E fra ud total $2,894,150,500. When [ sic] taken into account r ecove ries to date, t h e t o tal outstanding losses a re $2 ,3 84 ,1 47 ,1 05 .0 9. ” Th e dis tr ic t court he ld the oth e r d e fe nd ants joi ntl y and se ve ra lly lia ble fo r t his

a mou nt, bu t r e du c e d D ie rk e r’ s re sti tut ion to “the a mou nt of $7 .8 85 mil lio n[,] whi c h re pr e se nts c os ts
a sso c ia te d w ithhis 19 ill e g a l a dv anc e s. ” I n do ing so , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re a so ne d th a t D ie rk e r’ s r oleNos. 08-3994 and 09- 4214

United States v. Die rker

- 18 - in the fra ud was much more limit ed than those of the other defe ndants. Given that the district cour t order ed re stitut ion commensurate with Dierke r’s role in the fra ud, and did not exercise its discre tion to hold Dierker jointly and sever ally liable for the total outstandinglosses stemming fr om the fra ud, the district court did not abuse its discre tion in ordering the re stitut ion amount. V. Ba sed on the for eg oing, w e AF F IRM Di e rk e r’ s c on vic tio n f or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it

secur ities and wire fra

ud, RE VE RSE Di e rk e r’ s mon e y -l a un de ri ng c on vic tio ns , and re mand the c a se fo r r es en t en ci n g.