NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL ALLEN CHANNEL, SR., Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0011

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-008195

The Honorable Joshua D. Rogers, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Michael Allen Channel, Sr., Tucson

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Pamela J. Linnins

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

FILED 3-6-2018
CHANNEL v. STATE

Decision of the Court

2

W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Michael Allen Channel, Sr., appeals the superior court’s 

judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 In July 2013, police officers, responding to a disturbance at an 

apartment complex, arrested Channel after he admitted possessing a gun 

and that he was a prohibited possessor due to a prior felony conviction. A 

jury convicted him of misconduct involving weapons, the trial court 

sentenced him to ten years in prison, and this court affirmed his conviction 

and sentence. State v. Channel, 1 CA-CR 15-0813, 2017 WL 1506568 (Ariz. 

App. Apr. 27, 2017) (mem. decision), at *1-2, 4, ¶¶ 7, 10, 22. Channel did 

not file a petition for review, and on June 16, 2017, this court issued the 

mandate in case number 1 CA-CR 15-0813.

¶3 In the meantime, on August 18, 2016, Channel filed a civil 

complaint captioned “Unauthorized Practice of Law” against the “State of 

Arizona, et al.” within which he named numerous judicial officers, 

attorneys, and law enforcement officers who he generally alleged had acted 

unlawfully, ostensibly stemming from his dissatisfaction with his 

misconduct involving weapons conviction and appeal.

2 He also asked that 

 

1 Channel does not cite to the record in his opening brief. An appellant

must support his opening brief with citations to the record in his statements 

of the case and facts, as well as in his argument. See ARCAP 13(a)(4), (5), 

(7). Although the State points out that we may deem his arguments waived 

on this basis, see, e.g., State v. West, 238 Ariz. 482, 497-98, ¶ 55 (App. 2015), 

we decline to do so.

2 In a section of the complaint he entitled “Events,” Channel named 

Judge Danielle J. Viola, Commissioner Virginia L. Richter (who presided 

over his criminal trial and sentencing), and Anthony Mackey, a Judge Pro 

Tempore of this court, and he cited several authorities, but did not explain 

what conduct those persons had engaged in that allegedly harmed him. In 

a section he entitled “Claim for Relief,” Channel asked that the case files of 

Judge Viola, Commissioner Richter, other judges, several deputy county 

attorneys, and several private attorneys be audited for “abuse of 

unauthorized practice of law and discretion.” He also named numerous
CHANNEL v. STATE

Decision of the Court

3

an outside special team of prosecutors investigate his “Civil Claim of 

Judicial Ethics to the Ariz[ona] Criminal Justice Commission,” but did not 

identify the judicial ethics claim to which he was referring.3 Although 

Channel’s request for deferral or waiver of service of process fees was 

granted, the record does not indicate he served the original complaint on 

anyone except Mark Brnovich, the Arizona Attorney General.4

¶4 Channel filed a first amended complaint on September 19, 

2016, again with a caption identifying the “State of Arizona, et al.” as the

“Defendant[s].” However, his first amended complaint did not mention 

any State entity, officer, or employee, and did not include any of the 

previous allegations or claims for relief made in his original complaint.5

 

police officers who supposedly had violated his civil rights and asked that 

they “be imprisoned not more than five years.”

3 Channel did attach to his complaint a letter from the Arizona 

Criminal Justice Commission’s Executive Director stating he could not file 

a complaint against Commissioner Richter with that commission because it 

did not have oversight authority over Arizona’s court system.

4 The record contains two affidavits of service, each indicating 

Channel (through Deputy William Prather of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 

Office’s Civil Process Section) served Brnovich with a copy of a “Summons, 

Civil Complaint (Unauthorized Practice of Law), [and] Civil Cover Sheet –

New Filing Only” on September 21, 2016. The first affidavit, filed in the 

superior court on September 26, 2016, is signed “W. Prather.” The second 

affidavit, filed on October 3, 2016, contains the notation “/s/” scribbled on 

the signature line. Other than the signature line, the affidavits are identical, 

and no other affidavits of service exist in the record for either the original 

complaint or any subsequent complaints.

5 The first amended complaint appeared to be aimed at alleged 

wrongdoing on the part of Channel’s appellate counsel in the appeal of his 

misconduct involving weapons conviction. See Channel, 1 CA-CR 15-0813, 

2017 WL 1506568. Channel attached a letter from his appellate attorney 

dated September 7, 2016, which referenced an August 25, 2016 letter from 

Channel accusing the attorney of disclosing “false material” to this court. 

The attorney denied doing so, and stated he had “enclosed with this letter 

the August 18, 2015 transcript that [he] cited to.” The complaint accused 
CHANNEL v. STATE

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4

¶5 On October 3, 2016, Channel filed a second amended 

complaint, again with a caption identifying only the “State of Arizona, et 

al.” as the “Defendant[s].”6 Channel’s allegations in the second amended 

complaint, as best we can discern, comprised a general collateral attack on 

his criminal conviction. Without factual support or cogent context, he

asserted his July 2013 arrest had been illegal, his Miranda7 rights had been 

violated, two unnamed county attorneys had suborned perjury at the grand 

jury proceedings, police officers had committed perjury, his attorney had 

failed to file a motion on his behalf, Commissioner Richter had committed 

ethics violations, police officers had been uncooperative in interviews, 

various judges had been uncooperative with his complaints, his appellate 

attorney had tampered with public records by sending him a fraudulent 

document, and numerous unnamed police officers, county attorneys, 

assigned defense counsel, and judges had been involved in a criminal 

cover-up involving numerous types of misconduct, which amounted to

“abuse of unauthorized practice of law and discretion.” The last page of 

the second amended complaint, entitled “Certificate of Service,” stated

Channel mailed the complaint to the Maricopa County Superior Court 

Clerk, Attorney General Brnovich, and the United States Department of 

Justice’s Civil Rights Division in Washington, D.C. The record, however, 

contains no affidavit of service other than those previously mentioned in 

footnote four of this decision. See supra note 4.

¶6 The Arizona Attorney General’s Office, representing the 

State, moved for a more definite statement under Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(e).8 The motion alleged the complaint (1) did not include 

sufficient factual allegations to permit the State to ascertain the lawsuit’s 

nature and scope; (2) attempted to present a multitude of claims and factual 

allegations, but it was unclear how the factual allegations related to the 

 

the attorney (or perhaps the court reporter) of submitting “fraudulent 

documents.”

6 As a general rule, Channel’s second amended complaint superseded 

his original and first amended complaints and rendered them of no further 

effect. See Francini v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 188 Ariz. 576, 586 (App. 1996).

7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

8 “If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so 

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 

responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement 

before filing a responsive pleading.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
CHANNEL v. STATE

Decision of the Court

5

claims made; (3) did not allege how the conduct of a specific State entity or 

the State in general had harmed Channel; and (4) contained “et al.” in the 

caption, which did not sufficiently indicate who in addition to the State had 

allegedly engaged in wrongdoing or injured Channel.

¶7 Channel responded that he was attempting to properly 

present his case of “abuse of unauthorized practice of law,” and was being 

denied the right to be heard by the court concerning wrongdoing by police 

officers, county attorneys, judges, Commissioner Richter, and defense 

counsel in connection with his arrest and conviction. He reiterated many 

of the allegations previously made in his original and second amended 

complaints, but again generally failed to provide factual support or context 

for those allegations, or to identify how any alleged violations had injured 

him. He stated he had mailed the response to the Maricopa County 

Superior Court Clerk, the Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and the 

United States Department of Justice.

¶8 The State replied that (1) Channel had still not listed the

specific defendants he meant to identify as included in the “et al.” 

designation in the caption of his complaint; (2) even as supplemented in his 

response, Channel’s second amended complaint did not allege sufficient 

facts to permit any defendant to ascertain the lawsuit’s nature and scope;

(3) the court should not allow Channel to further amend his complaint 

because he had demonstrated that any additional amendments would be 

futile by continuing to fail to provide any cohesive or logical statement of 

facts or legal argument; and (4) although he was attempting to allege that 

the unauthorized practice of law had taken place, this was an allegation the 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider until the State Bar of Arizona had 

addressed the matter. The State requested that the court dismiss the matter

under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of 

jurisdiction and Channel’s failure to state a claim for which the court could 

grant relief.

¶9 In response, Channel asked the court to deny the State’s 

motion to dismiss because the unauthorized practice of law claim he was 

alleging had taken place and he had not yet received records to provide the 

court with “the rest of the historical and statutory felon[ies].” He also 

protested the results of various bar complaints he had filed and the State 

Bar’s conduct, and contended the court had jurisdiction to consider these 

matters.

¶10 On January 5, 2017, the court dismissed Channel’s second 

amended complaint after finding Channel “would not be entitled to relief 
CHANNEL v. STATE

Decision of the Court

6

under any state of facts susceptible of proof under the claim stated.” On 

May 19, 2017, the superior court issued a signed judgment pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c).

9 We have jurisdiction over 

Channel’s timely appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 12–

2101(A)(1) (2016).

ANALYSIS

¶11 We review de novo a judgment dismissing a complaint under 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, 234 

Ariz. 397, 401, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). In our review, we look only to the 

complaint itself, assume the well-pled factual allegations are true, and 

indulge all reasonable inferences therefrom. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 

218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7 (2008). We will affirm only if the plaintiff would not 

be entitled to relief under any set of facts pled that is susceptible of proof. 

Albers v. Edelson Tech. Partners L.P., 201 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 7 (App. 2001).

¶12 An opening brief must state with particularity why or how 

the trial court erred in ruling. Modular Sys., Inc. v. Naisbitt, 114 Ariz. 582, 

587 (App. 1977). Channel fails to address the superior court’s judgment 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), much less identify any error he believes that court 

made in issuing that judgment. Accordingly, he has waived on appeal any 

assertion the superior court erred. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis, 231 

Ariz. 103, 124, ¶ 82 (App. 2012); see also Belen Loan Inv’rs, LLC v. Bradley, 231 

Ariz. 448, 457, ¶ 22 (App. 2012) (recognizing issues not clearly raised and 

argued on appeal are waived and declining to address the dismissal of a

claim with respect to which the appellant made no specific argument).

¶13 Moreover, even were we to consider any argument related to 

the dismissal not to be waived, Channel’s opening brief raises numerous 

allegations concerning the judicial and criminal justice system that he did 

not raise in his second amended complaint or his response to the State’s 

motion for a more definite statement. He has waived consideration of these 

new allegations. See Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 215 Ariz. 344, 349, ¶ 17 

(App. 2007) (explaining why appellate courts generally do not consider 

issues raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Claxton, 122 Ariz. 246, 249 

 

9 This certification was correct because only the State appeared in 

response to Channel’s complaint and nothing shows he served any other 

persons or entities mentioned in his various filings. See McHazlett v. Otis 

Eng’g Corp., 133 Ariz. 530, 532 (1982) (stating that unserved defendants are 

not parties for the purpose of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)’s 

requirement that a final judgment dispose of all claims and parties).
CHANNEL v. STATE

Decision of the Court

7

(App. 1979) (“One cannot claim the trial court erred in rejecting a theory if 

the theory was never presented to it.”).

¶14 In addition, Channel’s allegations—both those that are new 

and those previously raised—clearly have as their purpose obtaining relief 

from his misconduct involving weapons conviction. The superior court 

could not, however, have granted Channel relief from that conviction based 

on claims that collaterally attacked the conviction. See generally State ex rel. 

Collins v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 71, 75 (1988). Instead, if Channel believed 

those persons involved in his conviction committed legal errors or abused 

their discretion, he had to raise such claims either in his direct appeal from 

his conviction or in a petition for post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32. See, e.g., State v. Glassel, 233 Ariz. 353, 354-55, 

¶¶ 9-10 (2013); see also State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, ¶¶ 11-12 (2009) 

(stating that Rule 32 consolidated most avenues for post-conviction relief 

into “a single comprehensive remedy,” and that it generally precludes 

collateral relief on a ground that was or could have been raised on direct 

appeal or in a previous post-conviction relief petition). Channel’s civil 

unauthorized practice of law action is neither a direct appeal from his 

conviction nor a Rule 32 action, and he cannot collaterally attack his 

conviction through this civil action. Accordingly, the superior court 

correctly determined that Channel failed to state a claim for which the court 

could grant relief.

10

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

judgment dismissing Channel’s lawsuit.

 

10 Because we affirm on the aforementioned bases, we do not address 

the State’s remaining arguments for affirming the judgment.