U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

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39–011 2014

113th Congress, 2d Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 113–86 

TEXT OF A PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN AND THE TAIPEI ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

A PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE 

AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN AND THE TAIPEI ECONOMIC 

AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN THE UNITED 

STATES CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, 

PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 2153(b), (d) 

JANUARY 8, 2014.—Message and accompanying papers referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed 


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To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 

123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 

(42 U.S.C. 2153(b), (d)) (the ‘‘Act’’), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the American Institute in Taiwan 

(AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 

in the United States (TECRO) Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 

Energy (the ‘‘Agreement’’). I am also pleased to transmit my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the 

Agreement, and an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 

Statement (NPAS) concerning the Agreement. (In accordance with 

section 123 of the Act, as amended by title XII of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277), 

a classified annex to the NPAS, prepared by the Secretary of State 

in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information, will be submitted to the Congress separately.) The joint memorandum submitted to me by the 

Secretaries of State and Energy and a letter from the Chairman of 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) stating the views of the 

Commission are also enclosed. An addendum to the NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the export control system of 

Taiwan with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with other countries of proliferation concern and the actual 

or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-related transfers to such 

countries, pursuant to section 102A of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1), as amended, is being submitted separately 

by the Director of National Intelligence. 

The proposed Agreement has been negotiated in accordance with 

the Act and other applicable law. In my judgment, it meets all applicable statutory requirements and will advance the nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States. 

The proposed Agreement provides a comprehensive framework 

for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the authorities on Taiwan 

based on a mutual commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. The 

proposed Agreement has an indefinite term from the date of its 

entry-into-force, unless terminated by either party on 1 year’s written notice. The proposed Agreement permits the transfer of information, material, equipment (including reactors), and components 

for nuclear research and nuclear power production. The Agreement 

also specifies cooperation shall be in accordance with the provisions 

of the Agreement and applicable legal obligations, including, as appropriate, treaties, international agreements, domestic laws, regulations, and/or licensing requirements (such as those imposed by 

the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 110 and the Department of 

Energy in accordance with 10 CFR 810). It does not permit transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology and facilities, 

or major critical components of such facilities. The proposed AgreeVerDate Mar 15 2010 05:26 Jan 09, 2014 Jkt 039011 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\HD086.XXX HD086

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ment also prohibits the possession of sensitive nuclear facilities and 

any engagement in activities involving sensitive nuclear technology 

in the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO. In the 

event of termination of the proposed Agreement, key nonproliferation conditions and controls continue with respect to material, 

equipment, and components subject to the proposed Agreement. 

Over the last two decades, the authorities on Taiwan have established a reliable record on nonproliferation and on commitments to 

nonproliferation. While the political status of the authorities on 

Taiwan prevents them from formally acceding to multilateral nonproliferation treaties or agreements, the authorities on Taiwan 

have voluntarily assumed commitments to adhere to the provisions 

of multilateral treaties and initiatives. The Republic of China ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 

in 1970 and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the ‘‘Biological 

Weapons Convention’’ or ‘‘BWC’’) in 1972. The authorities on Taiwan have stated that they will continue to abide by the obligations 

of the NPT (i.e., those of a non-nuclear-weapon state) and the 

BWC, and the United States regards them as bound by both treaties. The authorities on Taiwan follow International Atomic Energy 

Agency standards and directives in their nuclear program, work 

closely with U.S. civilian nuclear authorities, and have established 

relationships with mainland Chinese civilian authorities with respect to nuclear safety. A more detailed discussion of the domestic 

civil nuclear activities and nuclear nonproliferation policies and 

practices of the authorities on Taiwan, including their nuclear export policies and practices, is provided in the NPAS and in a classified annex to the NPAS submitted separately. As noted above, an 

addendum to the NPAS containing a comprehensive analysis of the 

export control system of the authorities on Taiwan with respect to 

nuclear-related matters is being submitted to you separately by the 

Director of National Intelligence. 

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed Agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute 

an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the Agreement and authorized its execution 

and urge the Congress to give it favorable consideration. 

This transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of 

both sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Act. My Administration is 

prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as provided in section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30 days 

of continuous session review provided for in section 123 b., the 60 

days of continuous session review provided for in section 123 d. 

shall commence. 

BARACK OBAMA. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 7, 2014. 


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AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE 

AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN AND THE TAIPEI 

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN 

THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF 

NUCLEAR ENERGY 

The American Institute in Taiwan ("AIT") and the Taipei Economic and 

Cultural Representative Office in the United States ("TECRO"), 

REAFFIRMING their commitment, and that of the authorities they 

represent, to ensuring that the international development and use of 

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are carried out under arrangements 

that will to the maximum possible extent further the objectives of the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons done at London, 

Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as ''the 

NPT"); 

AFFIRMING their support, and that of the authorities they represent, for 

the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

("IAEA"), including the Additional Protocol; 

DESIRING to cooperate in the development, use, and control of peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy; 

MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a 

view to protecting the international environment from radioactive, 

chemical, and thermal contamination; 

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AFFIRMING in particular the goal of pursuing the safe, secure, and 

environmentally sustainable development of civil nuclear energy for 

peaceful purposes and in a manner that supports nuclear nonproliferation 

and international safeguards; 

RECOGNIZING in this regard the importance of the Joint Convention on 

the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 

Waste Management, done at Vienna on September 5, 1997, and the 

Convention on Nuclear Safety, done at Vienna on June 17, 1994; 

TAKING NOTE OF the intent of the authorities represented by TECRO 

to rely on existing international markets as an alternative to the pursuit of 

enrichment and reprocessing, and the intent of the authorities represented 

by AIT to support these international markets in order to ensure a reliable 

supply ofthe fuel cycle services necessary to implement a peaceful 

nuclear energy program; 

RECALLING the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government 

of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 

China Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed on April 4, 

1972, as amended and extended on March IS, 1974 (hereinafter "the 

1972 Agreement for Cooperation"); 

RECALLING also the Agreement Between the International Atomic 

Energy Agency, the Government of the Republic of China and the 

Government of the United States of America for the Application of 

Safeguards, signed on December 6, 1971 (hereinafter "the Safeguards 

Transfer Agreement"); 

RECOGNIZING that, in accordance with Sec. 4.(c) of the Taiwan 

Relations Act (P.L. 96-8, 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the 1972 Agreement 

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for Cooperation and the Safeguards Transfer Agreement have continued 

in force according to their terms; 

NOTING that the IAEA continues to apply safeguards under the 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement to source material and special 

fissionable material transferred under the 1972 Agreement for 

Cooperation; 

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 

ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITIONS 

For the purposes of this Agreement and the Agreed Minute: 

(A) "Agreed Minute" means the minute annexed to this Agreement, 

which is an integral part hereof; 

(B) "Authorized person" means any individual or any entity subject to 

the jurisdiction ofthe authorities represented by either Party and 

authorized by that Party to conduct activities subject to this Agreement 

but does not include the Parties to this Agreement or the authorities they 

represent; 

(C) "Byproduct materiaf' means any radioactive material (except special 

fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the 

radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special 

fissionable material; 
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(D) "Component" means a component part of equipment, or other item 

so designated by agreement of the Parties; 

(E) "Conversion" means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel 

cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which 

uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another -- for 

example, from UF6 to U02 or from uranium oxide to metal; 

(F) "Decommissioning" means the actions taken at the end of a facility's 

useful life to retire the facility from service in a manner that provides 

adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning 

workers and the general public, and for the environment. These actions 

can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of 

source material and special fissionable material coupled with continuing 

maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual 

radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the 

facility and its site; 

(G) IIDesignated representatives" with respect to AIT refers to the U.S. 

Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of Defense, the u.s. 

Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of State, or the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, as appropriate, and with respect to TECRO 

refers to the Taiwan Atomic Energy Council or any successor agencies, 

as appropriate. In case of a change in its designated representatives or 

designation of additional such designated representatives. a Party shall 

inform the other Party in writing; 

(H) "Equipmenf' means any reactor, as a complete unit; other than one 

designed or used primarily for the formation of plutonium or uranium 

233, reactor pressure vessel, reactor calandria. complete reactor control 

rod drive system, reactor primary coolant pump, on-line reactor fuel 

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charging and discharging machine, or any other item so designated by 

agreement of the Parties; 

(1) "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent 

or greater in the isotopes 235 or 233; 

(J) "Information" means scientific, commercial, or technical data or 

information in any form that is appropriately designated by agreement of 

the Parties to be provided or exchanged under this Agreement, except 

technical data that is in the public domain; 

(K) "Low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than 

twenty percent in the isotopes 235 or 233; 

(L) "Major critical component" means any part or group of parts 

essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility; 

(M) "Materiaf' means source material, special fissionable material, 

byproduct material, radioisotopes other than byproduct material, 

moderator material, or any other such substance so designated by 

agreement ofthe Parties; 

(N) "Moderator materiaf' means heavy water or graphite or beryllium of 

a purity suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons 

and increase the likelihood of further fission, or any other such substance 

so designated by agreement of the Parties; 

(0) "Parties" means the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), on behalf 

of the authorities it represents, and the Taipei Economic and Cultural 

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Representative Office in the United States (TECRO), on behalf of the 

authorities it represents; 

(P) "Peaceful purposes" include the use of ilfformation, material, 

equipment, and components in such fields as research, power generation, 

medicine, agriculture, and industry but do not include use in, research on, 

or development of any nuclear explosive device, or any military purpose. 

Military purposes shall not include the supply of electricity to a military 

base from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for 

medical purposes in a military environment for diagnostics, therapy and 

sterilization, and other similar purposes as may be agreed by the Parties; 

(Q) "Person" means any individual or any entity subject to the 

jurisdiction of the authorities represented by either Party but does not 

include the Parties to this Agreement or the authorities they represent; 

(R) "Reactor" means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other 

nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction 

is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium or thorium or any 

combination thereof; 

(S) "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture 

or utilization of nuclear weapons, (2) the production of special fissionable 

material, or (3) the use of specialjissionable material in the production 

of energy, but shall not include data of the authorities represented by a 

Party that such authorities have declassified or removed from the 

category of Restricted Data; 

(T) "Sensitive nuclear facility" means any facility designed or used 

primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, heavy 

water production, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium; 

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(U) "Sensitive nuclear technology" means any information (including 

information incorporated in equipment or an important component) that is 

not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, 

fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or 

any other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the 

Parties; 

(V) "Source materiaf' means (l) uranium, thorium, or any other material 

so designated by agreement of the Parties, or (2) ores containing one or 

more of the foregoing materials in such concentration as the Parties may 

agree from time to time; 

(W) "Specialjissionable materiaf' means (1) plutonium, uranium 233, or 

uranium enriched in the isotope 235, or (2) any other material so 

designated by agreement ofthe Parties. 

ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION 

1. Cooperation in the development and use of nuclear energy for 

peaceful purposes under this Agreement shall be in accordance with the 

provisions of this Agreement and applicable legal obligations. including, 

as appropriate, treaties, international agreements, domestic laws, 

regulations, and/or license requirements. 

2. Transfer of information, material, equipment) and components 

under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or 

through their deSignated representatives or through other authorized 

persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such 

additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties. 

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3. The Parties, through their designated representatives or through 

other authorized persons, intend to cooperate in the following areas: 

(A) Development of requirements for grid-appropriate power reactors 

and fuel seIVlce arrangements for the authorities represented by TECRO; 

(B) Promotion of the establishment ofa reliable source of nuclear fuel 

for future civil nuclear reactors deployed within the territory of the 

authorities represented by TECRO; 

(C) Development of the use of civil nuclear energy in a manner that 

supports global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation; 

CD) Civil nuclear energy training, human resource and infrastructure 

development, participation in international and regional research, and 

appropriate application of civil nuclear energy, and related energy 

technology, consistent with the highest standards of safety, security and 

nonproliferation; 

(E) Application of radioisotopes and radiation in industry, agriculture, 

medicine, and the environment; 

(F) Radiation protection and management of radioactive waste and spent 

fuel; 

(G) Promotion of participation in international conferences and activities 

related to safety, security, and safeguards; 

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(H) Promotion of participation in cooperation relevant to compensation 

for nuclear damage; and 

(I) Other areas of cooperation as may be determined by agreement ofthe 

Parties. 

4. Cooperation may be undertaken by the Parties or their designated 

representatives or other authorized persons in the following forms: 

(A) Exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation; 

(B) Exchange and training of personnel; 

(C) Organization of symposia and seminars; 

(D) Provision of relevant technical assistance and services; 

(E) Transfers of material. equipment, and components; and 

(F) Other forms of cooperation as may be mutually agreed by the 

Parties. 
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ARTICLE 3 - TRANSFER OF INFORMATION 

1. In/ormation concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 

purposes may be transferred. Transfers of information may be 

accomplished through various means, including reports, data banks, 

computer programs, conferences, visits, and assignments of staff to 

facilities. Fields that may be covered may include, but shall not be 

limited to, the following: 

(A) Development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use 

of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning; 

(B) The use of material in physical and biological research, medicine, 

agriculture, and industry; 

(C) Fuel cycle studies of ways to meet future world-wide civil nuclear 

needs, including multilateral approaches to guaranteeing nuclear fuel 

supply and appropriate techniques for management and treatment of 

nuclear wastes; 

(D) Safeguards and physical protection of material, equipment, and 

components; 

(E) Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the 

foregoing; and 

(F) Assessing the role nuclear power may play in energy plans for the 

territories of the authorities represented by the Parties. 

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2. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information 

that the Parties, their designated representatives, or the authorities 

represented by the Parties are not permitted to transfer under applicable 

legal obligations. 

3. Restricted Dala and sensitive nuclear technology shall not be 

transferred under this Agreement. 

ARTICLE 4 - TRANSFER OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND 

COMPONENTS 

1. Material, equipment, and components may be transferred for 

applications consistent with this Agreement. Special fissionable material 

transferred to the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO under 

this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except (a) as provided in 

paragraph 4 or, (b) if agreed by the Parties, special fiSSionable material 

contained in spent fuel or waste being transferred to support spent fuel 

management and disposition. Sensitive nuclear facilities and major 

critical components thereof shall not be transferred under this Agreement. 

2. Lo·w enriched uranium may be transferred, including inter alia by 

sale or lease, for use as fuel in reactors and reactor experiments, for 

conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed by 

the Parties. 

3. The quantity of special fissionable material transferred under this 

Agreement shall not at any time be in excess of that quantity the Parties 

agree is necessary for any of the following purposes: use in the loading of 

reactors or in reacto~ experiments; the reliable, efficient, and continuous 

operation of reactors or conduct of reactor experiments; the storage of 

speciaJfissionab/e material necessary for the efficient and continuous 

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operation of reactors or conduct of reactor experiments; the transfer of 

irradiated nuclear material for storage or disposition; and the 

accomplishment of such other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties. 

4. Small quantities of specialfissionable material may be transferred 

for use as samples, standards, detectors, targets, or for such other 

purposes as the Parties may agree. Transfers pursuant to this paragraph 

shall not be subject to the quantity limitations in paragraph 3. 

5. AIT, through its designated representatives, shall endeavor to take 

such actions as are necessary and feasible to ensure a reliable and timely 

supply of nuclear fuel to the authorities represented by TECRO, including 

the export of nuclear fuel on a timely basis during the period of this 

Agreement. AIT, through its designated representatives, shall also 

consider such actions as are feasible to assist the authorities represented 

by TECRO in safe and secure management, storage and disposition of 

irradiated special fissionable material produced through the use of 

material or equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement. 

ARTICLE 5 - STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS 

1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as contained in irradiated fuel 

elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or 

equipment so transferred shall only be stored in a facility to which the 

Parties agree. 

2. Material, equipment, and components transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use 

of any such material or equipment shall not be transferred to anyone who 

is not an authorized person or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the 

territorial jurisdiction of the authorities represented by the relevant Party. 

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3. In order to facilitate management of spent fuel and management of 

source material and special fissionable material, material transferred or 

special fissionable material produced through the use of material or 

equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement may be transferred to a 

third party as agreed by the Parties, or, if AIT agrees and designates a 

storage or disposition option, to the territory of the authorities represented 

by AlT. In the event of transfer to the territory of the authorities 

represented by AIT, the Parties shall make appropriate implementing 

arrangements. 

ARTICLE 6 - REPROCESSING, OTHER AL TERA TION IN FORM 

OR CONTENT, AND ENRICHMENT 

I. Material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and material used 

in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred 

shall not be reprocessed unless the Parties agree. 

2. Plutonium, uranium 233, high enriched uranium and irradiated 

source or special fissionable material transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or ' 

equipment so transferred shall not be otherwise altered in form or content, 

except by irradiation Of further irradiation, unless the Parties agree. 

3. Uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in any 

equipment so transferred shall not be enriched after transfer unless the 

Parties agree. 
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ARTICLE 7 - SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES WITHIN THE 

TERRITORY OF THE AUTHORITIES REPRESENTED BY TECRO 

TECRO shall ensure that TECRO, the authorities represented by TECRO, 

or any person authorized by or who acts with the knowledge of the 

authorities represented by TECRO within the territory of the authorities 

represented by TECRO shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities or 

otherwise engage in activities related to the enrichment or reprocessing of 

material or to the alteration in form or content (except by irradiation Of 

further irradiation or, if agreed by the Parties, post-irradiation 

examination or spent fuel stabilization) of plutonium, uranium-233, high 

enriched uranium or irradiated source material or special fiSSionable 

material. 

ARTICLE 8 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION 

1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to 

any source material or special fiSSionable material and equipment 

transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fiSSionable 

material used in or produced through the use of material Of equipment so 

transferred. 

2. To comply with the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party, 

through its designated representatives, shall ensure the application, at a 

minimum, of measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical 

protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA 

document INFCIRC/225IRev. 5 entitled "The Physical Protection of 

Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" and in any subsequent revisions 

of that document the Parties agree to apply and (ii) the provisions ofthe 

Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuc1ear Material, done at 

Vienna and New York on March 3,1980, and any amendments to the 

Convention that the Parties agree to apply. 

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3. The adequacy of physical protection measures maintained pursuant 

to this Article shall be subject to review and consultations by the Parties 

from time to time and whenever either Party, in consultation with its 

designated representatives, is of the view that revised measures may be 

required to maintain adequate physical protection. 

4. The Parties shall keep each other informed through appropriate 

channels of those designated representatives having responsibility for 

ensuring that levels of physical protection for source material and special 

fissionable material in the territory or under the jurisdiction or control of 

those authorities are adequately met and having responsibility for 

coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of 

unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The 

Parties shall inform each other, as well, of the designated points of 

contact within their deSignated representatives to cooperate on matters of 

transportation beyond the jurisdiction of the authorities represented by the 

Parties and other matters of mutual concern. 

5. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a 

manner as to avoid undue interference in the nuclear activities within the 

territories or under the jurisdiction or control of the authorities 

represented by the Parties, and to be consistent with prudent management 

practices required for the safe and economic conduct of the nuclear 

programs within the territories or under the jurisdiction or control of 

those authorities. 

ARTICLE 9 - NO EXPLOSIVE OR MILITARY APPLICATION 

Material, equipment, and components transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement and material used in or produced through the use of any 

material, eqUipment, or components so transferred shall not be used for 

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any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any 

nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose. 

ARTICLE 10 - SAFEGUARDS 

1. Cooperation under this Agreement shall require the application of 

IAEA safeguards with respect to all nuclear activities within the territory 

of the authorities represented by TECRO, under the jurisdiction of those 

authorities or carried out under the control of those authorities anywhere. 

Implementation of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement with respect to all 

such nuclear activities shall be considered to fulfill this requirement. 

2. Source material, special fissionable material. moderator material, 

and equipment transferred to the territory, jurisdiction or control of the 

authorities represented by TECRO pursuant to this Agreement and any 

source material or special fissionable material used in or produced 

through the use of material, equipment, or components so transferred 

shall be subject to safeguards in accordance with the terms of the 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement and to the measures provided for in the 

Model Additional Protocol (published in INFCIRCI540 (Corrected». 

3. Source material or special fissionable material transferred to the 

territory, jurisdiction, or control of the authorities represented by AIT 

pursuant to this Agreement and any source material or special fissionable 

material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, 

or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between 

the United States of America and the IAEA for the Application of 

Safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna on November 

18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and the 

Additional Protocol thereto, which entered into force on January 6,2009 

(hereinafter referred to as the "IAEA Safeguards Agreement"). 

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4. If either Party becomes aware of circumstances that demonstrate 

that the IAEA for any reason is not or will not be applying safeguards in 

accordance with the Safeguards Transfer Agreement and the measures 

described in paragraph 2 of this article, to ensure effective continuity of 

safeguards the Parties shall consult and immediately enter into 

arrangements involving the lAEA or solely between themselves that 

conform with IAEA safeguards principles and procedures, that provide 

assurance equivalent to that intended to be secured by the system they 

replace, and that conform with the coverage required by paragraph 2 of 

this article. 

5. In the event that the IAEA Safeguards Agreement of this Article is 

not being applied, the authorities represented by AIT shall enter into an 

agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards that provides 

for effectiveness and coverage equivalent to that required by the IAEA 

Safeguards Agreement, or if that is not possible, the Parties shall 

immediately establish safeguards arrangements for the application of 

safeguards which provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent to 

that provided by the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. 

6. Each Party, acting through its designated representatives, shall 

take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the 

application of safeguards applicable to it provided for under this Article. 

7. Each Party, acting through its designated representatives, shall 

establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of source 

material and special jissionable material transferred pursuant to this 

Agreement and source material and special fissionable material used in 

or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components 

so transferred and shall use this system of accounting and control to 

establish inventories of all source material and specialjissionable 

material subject to this Agreement as set forth in an Administrative 

Arrangement established pursuant to Article 14. The procedures for this 

system shall be comparable to those set forth in IAEA document 

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INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), or in any revision of that document that the 

Parties agree to apply. 

8. Each Party, acting through its designated representatives, shall 

establish and maintain an inventory of moderator material, tritium, other 

material, equipment, and components subject to this Agreement as set 

forth in an Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to Article 

14. 

9. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report to the 

requesting Party, in the manner provided for in the Administrative 

Arrangement referred to in Article 14 of this Agreement, on the status of 

all inventories of material, equipment, and components subject to this 

Agreement. The Parties further agree that the IAEA may at the request 

of either Party supplement such bilateral reporting by reporting to either 

Party or their designated representatives on the status of such 

inventories, as applicable. 

10. Material. equipment, and components subject to this Agreement 

shall remain subject to this Agreement so long as they remain in the 

territory of the authorities represented by the Party concerned or under 

the jurisdiction or control of those authorities anywhere or until such time 

as the Parties agree that such material, equipment, or components are no 

longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of 

safeguards. 

11. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a 

manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the nuclear 

activities within the territories or under the jurisdiction or control of the 

authorities represented by the Parties and so as to be consistent with 

prudent management practices required for the safe and economic 

conduct of such nuclear programs. 

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ARTICLE 11 - CESSATION OF COOPERATION 

AND RIGHT OF RETURN 

l. If at any time following entry into force of this Agreement: 

(A) either Party, itself or through its designated representatives, 

materially violates the provisions of Article 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 or if the 

authorities represented by either Party take actions that would constitute a 

material violation of any of those provisions iftaken by that Party; or 

(B) either Party, itself or through its deSignated representatives, or the 

authorities represented by either Party, terminate, abrogate, or materially 

violate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 

the other Party shall have the rights to cease further cooperation under 

this Agreement and to require the return of any material, equipment, and 

components transferred under this Agreement and any specialfissionahle 

material produced through their use. 

2. Ifat any time following entry into force of this Agreement, 

TECRO, the authorities represented by TECRO, or any person authorized 

by or who acts with the knowledge of the authorities represented by 

TECRO and who is either within the territory of the authorities 

represented by TECRO or under their jurisdiction or control detonates a 

nuclear explosive device, AIT shall have the same rights as specified in 

paragraph 1 above. 
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3. If either Party exercises its rights under this Article to require the 

return of any material, equipment, or components, it shall promptly, after 

removal from the territory of the authorities represented by the other 

Party, reimburse the other Party for the fair market value of such 

material, equipment, or components. 

4. In determining whether to exercise its rights under paragraph 1 of 

this Article based on a "material violation", a Party shall consider 

whether the facts giving rise to the right to take such action in accordance 

with paragraph 1 were caused deliberately. In the event that it fmds such 

material violation not to be deliberate, and to the extent that it judges that 

such material violation can be rectified, the Party deciding whether to 

exercise its rights under paragraph 1 ofthis Article shall endeavor, 

subject to the laws and regulations of the authorities represented by that 

Party, to afford the other Party an opportunity to cure the violation within 

a reasonable period. 

ARTICLE 12 -CONSULTATIONS, REVIEW AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

1. The Parties undertake to consult, directly or through their 

designated representatives, at the request of either Party regarding the 

implementation of this Agreement and the development of further 

cooperation in the field of peaceful uses ofnuc1ear energy. 

2. This Agreement shall be reviewed at any time at the request of 

either Party to take into account regional and international 

nonproliferation developments, international technological developments 

and institution'al arrangements, the energy needs of the territory ofthe 

authorities represented by TECRO, or other circumstances that may 

warrant such a review. The terms of this Agreement may, however, only 

be amended as agreed between the Parties. 

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3. The Parties shall consult, directly or through their designated 

representatives, with regard to activities under this Agreement, to identify 

the international environmental implications arising from such activities 

and shall cooperate, through their designated representatives, in 

protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical, or 

thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this 

Agreement and in related matters of health and safety. 

ARTICLE 13 * SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 

Any dispute in relation to this Agreement, including concerning the 

interpretation or implementation of its provisions, shaH be promptly 

negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute. 

ARTICLE 14 - ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT 

1. The Parties shall, by mutual consent, establish an Administrative 

Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the 

provisions of this Agreement. 

2. An Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this 

Article may be revised in writing by the Parties. 

3. The principles of fungibility, proportionality, and equivalence shall 

apply to source material, special fiSSionable material, and moderator 

material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying 

these principles, including provisions for the tracking of source material 

and special fissionable material subject to this Agreement, shall be set 

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forth in an Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to paragraph 

1 above. 

ARTICLE 15 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the 

Parties exchange letters informing each other that all applicable 

requirements for its entry into force have been completed, or on the date 

of expiration or termination of the 1972 Agreement for Cooperation, 

whichever is later. 

2. This Agreement shall be deemed by the Parties as a new 

superseding agreement for cooperation within the meaning of Section 

I ( c) of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement. 

3. This Agreement shall remain in force indefinitely unless 

terminated by either Party on one year's written notice to the other Party. 

Prior to termination of this Agreement, the Parties shall review this 

Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article 12.2. 

4. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or 

any cessation of cooperation hereunder for any reason, Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 

9, 10, and 11 and the Agreed Minute shall continue in effect so long as 

any material, equipment, or components subject to these articles remains 

in the territory of the authorities represented by the Party concerned or 

under the jurisdiction or control of those authorities anywhere, or until 

such time as the Parties agree that such material, equipment, or 

components are no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from 

the point of view of safeguards. 

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have 

signed this Agreement. 

DONE at Washington, this 20th day of December, 2013, in duplicate, in 

the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equaUy authentic. 

FOR THE AMERICAN 

INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN: 

23 

FOR THE TAIPEI 

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN 

THE UNITED STATES: 
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AGREED MINUTE 

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation between 

the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and 

Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) Concerning 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ("the Agreement") signed today, the 

following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the 

Agreement, were reached. 

The provisions of the Agreement shall not be used for the purpose 

of securing unfair commercial or industrial advantages, of restricting 

trade to the disadvantage of persons from the territory of the authorities 

represented by either Party, or of hampering the commercial or industrial 

interests, whether international or domestic, of the authorities represented 

by either Party. 

1. Coverage of Agreement 

a. At the time of entry into force of the Agreement, all source 

material, special fissionable material, minor actinides separated from 

special fiSSionable material, moderator material, tritium, and eqUipment 

in all nuclear activities in the territory or under the jurisdiction or control 

of the authorities represented by TECRO shall be subject to the 

Agreement as though such material or equipment had been transferred 

under the Agreement to the territory of the authorities represented by 

TECRO or to their jurisdiction or control. 

b. After entry into force of the Agreement, no source material, 

special fissionable material, minor actinides separated from special 

fissionable material, moderator material, tritium, equipment, or 

components for use in nuclear activities shall be produced, developed, or 

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manufactured in the territory of, permitted to enter the territory of, or be 

transferred to the jurisdiction or control of, the authorities represented by 

TECRO, without the prior written consent of both Parties. Consent of 

the Parties is hereby granted for the production of special fissionable 

material from material, equipment, or components for which the prior 

written consent of the Parties required by this paragraph has already been 

granted; provided, however, that this consent does not constitute the 

agreement ofthe Parties required by Article 6 of the Agreement for the 

activities described therein. 

c. After entry into force of the Agreement, all source material, 

special fissionable material, minor actinides separated from special 

fiSSionable material, moderator material, tritium, and equipment 

(regardless of origin) produced, developed, or manufactured in the 

territory of, or that are transferred for use in nuclear activities to the 

territory, jurisdiction, or control of the authorities represented by TECRO 

shall, upon the prior written consent of both Parties referred to in 

paragraph b. above, be subject to the Agreement and included in the 

inventories required to be established pursuant to Article 10, paragraphs 7 

and 8, to the extent provided in those paragraphs. 

d. After entry into force of the Agreement, all components, and all 

material not covered by paragraph c. transferred from the territory, 

jurisdiction, or control ofthe authorities represented by AIT to the 

territory, jurisdiction, or control of the authorities represented by TECRO 

shall be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to the Agreement 

only upon a request by AIT to TECRO and confirmation in advance of 

the transfer by TECRO to AIT that such components and material shall 

be subject to the Agreement and included in the inventory required to be 

established pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 8. 

e. After entry into force of the Agreement, components that are 

transferred to the territory, jurisdiction, or control of the authorities 

represented by TECRO from anywhere other than the territory, 

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jurisdiction, or control of the authorities represented by AIT, or 

developed or manufactured in the territory of the authorities represented 

by TECRO shall be made subject to the Agreement and included in the 

inventory required to be established pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 8 

only at the request of AlT. 

f. After entry into force of the Agreement, material, equipment, 

and components transferred from the territory, jurisdiction, or control of 

the authorities represented by TECRO to the territory, jurisdiction or 

control of the authorities represented by AlT, whether directly or through 

a third territory, shall be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to 

the Agreement only upon request in advance by TECRO to AIT and 

confirmation by AlT to TECRO that such material, equipment, or 

components shall be subject to the Agreement. 

g. With respect to the definition of "Restricted Data" in paragraph 

(S) of Article 1 of the Agreement, it is the understanding of the Parties 

that all information on the use of special fissionable material in the 

production of energy from standard civilian reactors has been 

declassified or removed from the category of "Restricted Data." 

h. With respect to paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Agreement, AIr 

intends to notify TECRO, where feasible, of any international agreement 

entered into by the authorities represented by AlT that AlT believes will 

significantly impact the peaceful nuclear program within the territory of 

the authorities represented by TECRO, including the supply of nuclear 

fuel cycle services to support the operation of nuclear reactors for the 

peaceful use of nuclear energy. 

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2. Safeguards 

a. If either Party becomes aware of circumstances referred to in 

Paragraph 4 of Article 10 ofthe Agreement, AIT shall have the rights 

listed below, to be implemented through its designated representatives, 

which rights shall be suspended if both Parties agree that the need to 

exercise such rights is being satisfied by the application ofIAEA 

safeguards under arrangements pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 10 of 

the Agreement: 

I. To review in a timely fashion the design of any equipment 

transferred pursuant to the Agreement, or of any facility that is to 

use, fabricate, process, or store any material so transferred or any 

special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of 

such material or equipment; 

ii. To require the maintenance and production of records and of 

relevant reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring 

accountability for material transferred pursuant to the Agreement 

and any source material or special fissionable material used in or 

produced through the use of any material, equipment, or 

components so transferred; and 

iii. To designate personnel acceptable to TECRO, who shall have 

access to all places and data necessary to account for the material 

referred to in paragraph ii. of this Section 2.a., to inspect any 

equipment or facility referred to in paragraph i. of this Section 2.a., 

and to install any devices and make such independent 

measurements as may be deemed necessary to account for such 

material. TECRO shall not unreasonably withhold its acceptance 

of personnel designated by AIT under this paragraph. Such 

personnel shall, if TECRO requests, be accompanied by personnel 

designated by TECRO. 

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b. Upon the request of AlT, the IAEA shall be authorized to make 

available to AIT or its designated representatives requested in/ormation 

on the implementation ofthe Safeguards Transfer Agreement or other 

applicable safeguards agreement with the IAEA within the scope of 

cooperation under the Agreement. 

3. Retransfers 

. a. The Parties agree that irradiated source material or special 

fissionable material subject to Article 5 and Article 6 of the Agreement 

may be transferred from the territory of the authorities represented by 

TECRO to France, or other countries or destinations as may be agreed 

upon in writing by the Parties for storage and reprocessing. All such 

transfers described in this paragraph a. of Section 3 shall be in 

compliance with the policies, laws, and regulations of the recipient 

country or destination, including any requirement that indicates a 

provisional period for the receipt and treatment of such irradiated source 

material or special fissionable material or that the waste produced as a 

result of the reprocessing be returned to the territory of the authorities 

represented by TECRO. 

b. All such transfers described in this paragraph a. of Section 3 

shall be subject to the following conditions: 

i. Prior to any such transfer, TECRO shall provide AIT with at least 

thirty (30) days advance notice of a proposed transfer to allow the 

authorities represented by AIT sufficient time to obtain 

confirmation from the receiving country or destination or, in the 

case of a proposed transfer to a country that is a member of the 

European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), from 

EURATOM, that source material and special fissionable material 

to be transferred will be held within EURATOM (if the transfer is 

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to a EURATOM member country) or the receiving country or 

destination subject to the terms and conditions of an agreement for 

peaceful nuclear cooperation to which the authorities represented 

by AIT are party and which authorizes nuclear exports from the 

jurisdiction of the authorities represented by AlT to EURATOM or 

to that country or destination, as appropriate. TECRO shall not 

proceed with the proposed retransfer until AIT notifies TECRO of 

the receipt of such confirmation. 

ii. TECRO through its designated representatives shall keep records 

of any such transfers to France or any other country or destination 

as may be agreed upon in writing by the Parties and shall upon 

shipment notify AIT through its designated representatives of each 

transfer. 

lll. The detailed provisions for such notifications and records shall be 

described in the Administrative Arrangement referred to in Article 

14 of this Agreement. 

c. The transfer of any special fissionable material recovered from 

any such reprocessing described in p'aragraph a. to the territory of the 

authorities represented by TECRO shall require written agreement of the 

Parties and shall be subject to the following conditions: 

1. Any such specialfissionable material returned to the territory of 

the authorities represented by TECRO shall be subject to this 

Agreement; 

ii. Any special fiSSionable material recovered from any such 

reprocessing shall be transferred in the form as agreed by the 

Parties; and 

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iii. No later than 60 days prior to each shipment to the territory of the 

authorities represented by TECRO of any specialjissionable 

material recovered from any such reprocessing, TECRO shall 

provide AIT with a written notification that shall include a 

statement advising that the measures arranged for the international 

transport are in accordance with the provisions of the Convention 

on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its subsequent 

amendments that the Parties agree to apply. 

d. The foregoing agreement regarding retransfers set forth in 

paragraphs a. and c. of this Section 3 may be suspended or withdrawn in 

whole or in part by either Party if that Party considers that one or more of 

the above conditions is not satisfied, or if it considers that exceptional 

circumstances of concern from a non-proliferation or security standpoint 

so require. To the extent that time and circumstances permit, the Parties 

shall consult prior to any such suspension or withdrawal. Such 

exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a determination 

by either Party that the approval cannot be continued without a 

significant increase of the risk of proliferation or without jeopardizing the 

security of the territory of the authorities it represents. 

e. The provisions of Section 3 concerning spent fuel retransfer do 

not limit the right of the Parties to agree to additional activities pursuant 

to the Agreement. 

4. Reprocessing, Other Alteration in Form or Content, Enrichment, 

Storage, and Disposition 

a. With respect to Article 5 and Article 6 of the Agreement, any 

enrichment of uranium transferred pursuant to the Agreement to which 

the Parties may agree, any reprocessing or other alteration in form or 

content (except for post-irradiation examination or spent fuel 

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conditioning) of irradiated source material or special fissionable material 

used in or produced through the use of equipment or material transferred 

pursuant to the Agreement to which the Parties may agree, and any 

storage of specialfissionable material (except for low enriched uranium, 

special fissionable material contained in irradiated fuel for reactors, and 

small quantities of special fissionable material transferred pursuant to 

paragraph 4 of Article 4 ofthe Agreement) will take place outside the 

territory of the authorities represented by TECRO, in such country and 

facility as may be agreed by the Parties. The disposition of any such 

special fissionable material that may result from any of the foregoing 

processes or any such special fissionable material that is stored outside 

the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO will be subject to 

mutual agreement of the Parties. 

b. The implementation of AITs rights under Article 5 and Article 

6 of the Agreement to consent to the activities covered by those articles 

will be guided by nonproliferation and safeguards considerations as well 

as technological and economic developments. Such implementation will 

not be conducted with the intent to gain any commercial or economic 

advantage from withholding consent and will be carried out with due 

consideration to the operational and economic requirements of programs 

and facilities within the territory of the authorities represented by 

TECRO. 

c. The disposition of any special fissionable material transferred to 

the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO pursuant to the 

Agreement, and any special fissionable material used in or produced 

through the use of any material or equipment so transferred, shall require 

agreement of the Parties as provided for in Article 5 and Article 6 of the 

Agreement. Notwithstanding Article 5 and Article 6 of the Agreement, in 

the event that AIT considers that exceptional circumstances of concern 

from a nonproliferation standpoint so require, it may require that the 

disposition of any special fissionable material which is subject to the 

Agreement in the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO be in 

a third territory agreed to by the Parties or, if the authorities represented 

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by AIT are prepared to accept such special fissionable material, within 

the territory of such authorities. If disposition is in the territory of the 

authorities represented by AIT, the implementing arrangements referred 

to below shall include reimbursement to TECRO ofthe fair market value 

of such special fissionable material. 

d. In the event that AIT exercises its right under this Agreed 

Minute to require disposition of special fissionable material in another 

country or in the territory of the authorities represented by AIT, or 

exercises its rights under Article 11 of the Agreement to require the return 

of any material, equipment, or components, the Parties shall make 

appropriate administrative implementing arrangements, and such 

material, equipment, or components shall not be subject to any further 

agreement between the Parties, notwithstanding Article 5 and Article 6 of 

the Agreement. 

FOR THE AMERICAN 

INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN 

FOR THE TAIPEI 

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN 

THE UNITED STATES 
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ilt AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN 

Dr. King Pu-tsung 

Representative 

1700 N. Moore street 

Suite 1700 

Arlington, Virginie 22209 

Tel; (703) 525-8474 

Fex: (703) 641-1365 

December 20, 2013 

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 

Office in the United States 

4201 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20016. 

Dear Dr. King: 

I am writing in reference to discussions between representatives of the authorities 

represented by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United 

States (TECRO) and the authorities represented by the American Institute in Taiwan 

(AIT) in the course of the negotiation of the proposed Agreement for Cooperation 

Between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States 

and the American Institute in Taiwan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the 

"Agreement for Cooperation") with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation between 

TECRO, the authorities represented by TECRO and any authorized person within the 

territory of the authorities represented by TECRO and certain countries and individuals 

within those countries ot under the jurisdiction of those countries. AIT recalls the 

following assurances from TECRO: 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are committed to pursuing a civil nuclear 

program in a manner consistent with the spirit and letter of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT"). 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are committed to cooperating only with 

responsible states in executing Taiwan's civil nuclear programs and to adhering to 

the highest standards of nonproliferation. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are abiding by and intend to continue to 

abide by the provisions of the NPT and the United Nations Security Council 

Resolutions addressing nuclear activities of concern. 
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Dr. King Pu-tsung 

Representative 

December 20, 2013 

Page 2 

• The authorities represented by TECRO therefore do not intend to engage in any 

nuclear cooperation, to the extent the following information is available to 

TECRO, with any states that are subject to UN Security Council Chapter VII 

measures related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, weapons of mass 

destruction-related activities, or activities related to the development of nuclear 

weapon delivery systems, such as ballistic missile-related programs; with any 

persons or entities designated for sanctions by the UN; or with any states that are 

in material non-compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

safeguards agreements or that have been identified by the IAEA Director General 

to the IAEA Board of Governors as having failed to provide the IAEA the level of 

cooperation required to resolve any outstanding questions in relation to the 

safeguards obligations of such state. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO intend to engage in cooperation with third 

parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the Guidelines of the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group (INFCIRC/254IParts 1 and 2, as amended), and its 

associated understandings. 

The authorities represented by AIT wish to recognize these assurances as reflecting the 

strong nonproliferation policies of the authorities represented by TECRO. 

In view of the fact that the authorities represented by TECRO are not represented in the 

United Nations, at the IAEA, or in conferences of the Parties to the NPT, AITwishes to 

assure TECRO that it will advise, as necessary and to the extent consistent with the 

obligations and commitments of the authorities represented by AlT, TECRO of relevant 

actions taken in the United Nations, at the IAEA, or by the Parties to the NPT relating to 

the aforementioned assurances. 

AITwishes to inform TECRO that its letter of December 20,2013, and this response will 

be included in the set of documents submitted to Congress in connection with 

Congressional review of the Agreement for Cooperation. 

Sincerely, 

~?iv-. f Ja{,~(r 

Barbara J. Schrage 

Managing Director, AIT 
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.!Ji ~ ~ it ;ir, $J! ifft X 1~ 1~ *- lot 

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 

in the United States 

4201 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washing(on, D.C, 20016 

Tel: (202)895-1800 

Managing Director Barbara J. Schrage 

American Institute in Taiwan 

1700 North Moore Street 

Arlington, VA 22209 

Dear Managing Director Schrage, 

December 20, 2013 

I am writing in reference to discussions between representatives of the 

authorities represented by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 

in the United States (TECRO) and the authorities represented by the American 

Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in the course of the negotiation ofthe proposed 

Agreement for Cooperation Between the Taipei Economic and Cultural 

Representative Office in the United States and the American Institute in Taiwan 

Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the "Agreement for Cooperation") 

with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation between TECRO, the authorities 

represented by TECRO and any authorized person within the territory of the 

authorities represented by TECRO and certain countries and individuals within 

those countries or under the jurisdiction of those countries. In this regard, TECRO 

wishes to assure AIT as follows: 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are committed to pursuing a civil 

nuclear program in a manner consistent with the spirit and letter of the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT"). 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are committed to cooperating only 

with responsible states in executing Taiwan's civil nuclear programs and to 

adhering to the highest standards of nonproliferation. 
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• The authorities represented by TECRO are abiding by and intend to continue 

to abide by the provisions of the NPT and the United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions addressing nuclear activities of concern. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO therefore do not intend to engage in 

any nuclear cooperation, to the extent the following information is available 

to TECRO, with any states that are subject to UN Security Council Chapter 

VII measures related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, weapons of 

mass destruction-related activities, or activities related to the development of 

nuclear weapon delivery systems, such as ballistic missile-related programs; 

with any persons or entities designated for sanctions by the UN; or with any 

states that are in material non-compliance with International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements or that have been identified by the 

IAEA Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors as having failed to 

provide the IAEA the level of cooperation required to resolve any 

outstanding questions in relation to the safeguards obligations of such state. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO intend to engage in cooperation with 

third parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the 

Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (INFCIRC/254IParts 1 and 2, as 

amended), and its associated understandings. 

Sincerely, 

r~~l ~ 

Pu-twng King n 

Representative 

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 

In the United States 
(39) 

Presidential Determination No. 2014–06 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, DC, December 20, 2013. 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy. 

Subject: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural 

Representative Office in the United States Concerning Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear Energy 

I have considered the proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic 

and Cultural Representative Office in the United States Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, along with the views, recommendations, and statements of the interested agencies. 

I have determined that the performance of the Agreement will 

promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Pursuant to section 123 b. of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(b)), I hereby approve the proposed Agreement and authorize the Secretary of State 

to arrange for its execution. 

The Secretary of State is authorized to publish this determination in the Federal Register. 

BARACK OBAMA. 


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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENT STATEMENT 

Pursuant to Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, 

with Respect to the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation 

Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the 

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States 

Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 

INTRODUCTION 

This Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement ("NP AS") relates to the 

proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the American Institute in Taiwan 

("AIT") and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United 

States ("TECRO") Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the 

"Agreement"). The Agreement is being submitted to the President jointly by the 

Secretary of State and Secretary of Energy for his approval and authorization for 

signature. 

Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended (the "Atomic Energy 

Act" or "Act"), provides that an NP AS be submitted by the Secretary of State to 

the President on each new or amended agreement for cooperation concluded 

pursuant to that section. Pursuant to Section 123 a., the NPAS must analyze the 

consistency of the text of the proposed agreement with all the requirements of the 

Act, with specific attention to whether the proposed agreement is consistent with 

each of the criteria set forth in that subsection. The NP AS must also address the 

adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use 

assurances contained in the agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance 

furnished thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive 

purpose. 

With this statutory mandate in mind, this NPAS: (a) provides background 

information on the nonproliferation policies of the authorities on Taiwan and their 

civil nuclear program and aspirations (Part I); (b) describes the nature and scope of 

the cooperation contemplated in the proposed Agreement (Part II); (c) reviews the 

applicable substantive requirements of the Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Act of 1978 ("NNP A") and details how they are met by the proposed Agreement 

(Part III); (d) describes the legal obligation of the authorities on Taiwan to accept 

full scope safeguards (Part IV); ( e) describes the issue of third-party supply under 

the proposed Agreement (Part V); (t) describes and analyzes the advance, long-
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term ("programmatic") AIT consent given in the proposed Agreement for TECRO 

to retransfer spent fuel subject to the proposed Agreement to France, or other 

countries or destinations as may be agreed upon in writing by the Parties, for 

storage and reprocessing, subject to specified conditions, including that any 

separated special fissionable material is not to be returned to the territory of the 

authorities represented by TECRO without further agreement by the United States 

(Part VI); and (f) sets forth the net assessment, conclusions, views and 

recommendations of the Department of State as contemplated by Section 123 a. of 

the Act (Part VII). 

On January 1, 1979, the United States government established diplomatic 

relations with the People's Republic of China ("PRC") and terminated diplomatic 

relations with the Republic of China ("ROC") as the government of China. 

Several months later, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-

8,22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) (TRA), Section 4(b)(I) of which provides that 

"[w]henever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign ... nations ... , 

such term(] shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan." 

Meanwhile, Section 4(b)(2) of the TRA provides that "[w]henever authorized by or 

pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, 

transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign ... nations ... , the 

President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct 

and carry out, in accordance with [Section 6], such programs, transactions, and 

other relations with respect to Taiwan .... " These provisions form the basis for 

the application of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which refers to 

"cooperation with any nation," with respect to Taiwan. 

Section 6(a)(1) of the TRA provides that any "programs, transactions, and 

other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the 

United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall ... be conducted and 

carried out by or through ... [AIT] .... " Section 6(b) provides that "(w]henever 

the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or 

required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, 

enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such 

agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced ... by or 

through [AIT]." Meanwhile, Section IO(a) of the TRA provides for the creation of 

a counterpart "instrumentality established by Taiwan" - TECRO. 

Consequently, the Parties to the proposed Agreement are AIT and TECRO. 

As is customary with AIT-TECRO agreements, the operative provisions of the 

Agreement will be implemented by the Parties' designated representatives. AIT's 
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designated representatives are the U.S. Department of Commerce, the 

u.s. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department 

of State, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; TECRO's designated 

representatives are the Taiwan Atomic Energy Council and any successor agencies. 

Either Party to the Agreement may change its designated representatives or add 

designated representatives by informing the other Party in writing. 

I. NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES OF 

THE AUTHORITIES ON TAIWAN 

Overview 

The Role of Nuclear Power on Taiwan 

The people on Taiwan are almost completely dependent on imports to meet 

their energy needs. According to the Atomic Energy Council ("AEC") of Taiwan, 

99.4% of energy sources used on Taiwan relied on imports in 2011. The power 

generation mix on Taiwan is comprised of a variety of sources, with coal, 

natural gas, and nuclear being the three largest contributors. Figures from the 

Taiwan Power Company (Taipower; the island's primary utility conglomerate, 

which is owned by the central authorities) indicate that the installed nuclear 

generation capacity on Taiwan is 5,144 MW, and the six units of their three 

operating nuclear power plants generated a total of 42 terawatt-hours ("TWh") in 

2011, accounting for 16.7% of the total energy supply on Taiwan. 

According to a November 3, 2011, announcement, the policy of the 

authorities on Taiwan regarding nuclear energy is ultimately to eliminate its 

reliance on nuclear power, but in a gradual, stepwise, and conditional manner. 

This "nuclear-free homeland" goal is enshrined in Article 23 of the Basic 

Environment Act, which states that "the government shall establish plans to 

gradually achieve the goal of becoming a nuclear-free country." The timeline for 

such a reduction is not immediate and the authorities on Taiwan have stated that 

reliance on nuclear power will be reduced only insofar as the authorities on Taiwan 

can avoid power rationing, maintain reasonable power prices, and fulfill its stated 

commitments to reduce carbon emissions. 

According to the energy policy of the authorities on Taiwan, as stated by 

President Ma Ying-jeou in a November 2011 press conference, the three operating 

nuclear power plants (at Chinshan, Kuosheng, and Maanshan) on Taiwan will not 
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have their licenses renewed and will be decommissioned at the end of their original 

design life, which would leave them operating until 2018-2025. While the energy 

policy calls for the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant at Lungmen to 

proceed, the authorities on Taiwan are currently considering whether or not to hold 

a referendum on whether it will operate. If the two units of the new Lungmen 

plant are commissioned and operate stably by 2016, the authorities plan to 

decommission their First Nuclear Power Plant (Chinshan) ahead of schedule. This 

would still leave the Second and Third Nuclear Power Plants (Kuosheng and 

Maanshan, respectively) in operation until 2021-2025. Assuming a 40-year 

operating life for the Lungmen plant, the people on Taiwan would utilize nuclear 

energy for several decades to come, meaning that elimination of nuclear power on 

Taiwan is unlikely to occur before 2050. (For further detail, see Power Reactors 

below.) 

Nonproliferation Credentials 

Nonproliferation Policy 

The authorities on Taiwan have been a dependable democratic partner and 

supportive on issues of nuclear material safety and security for decades. Crossstrait relations appear to be warming, including nascent civil nuclear cooperation, 

which we see as reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation in the cross-straits area. 

While concerns about the direction of the nuclear program of the authorities 

on Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s have been widely reported in the press and 

literature, in recent years this program has been without blemish. In 1998, it was 

the first significant nuclear program to accept application of the measures of the 

Additional Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency's ("IABA") 

Safeguards Statement has repeatedly stated that the IAEA Secretariat found no 

indication ofthe diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear 

activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this 

basis, the Secretariat has repeatedly concluded that all nuclear material on Taiwan 

remained in peaceful activities. The nuclear program of the authorities on Taiwan 

does not include either enrichment or reprocessing, nor have they indicated to the 

United States any desire to pursue these technologies. 

The authorities on Taiwan over the last two decades established a generally 

reliable record on nonproliferation and on commitments to nonproliferation. Their 

political status prevents them from formally acceding to multilateral 

nonproliferation treaties or agreements. The ROC ratified the Nuclear Non-
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Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") in 1970 and ratified the Biological Weapons 

Convention ("BWC") in 1972. The authorities on Taiwan have stated they will 

continue to abide by the obligations of the NPT (i.e. those of a non-nuclear-weapon 

state) and BWC, and the United States regards them as bound by both treaties. 

Due to their political status, the authorities on Taiwan cannot join the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, are not eligible to sign the International Convention for the 

Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and are not eligible to participate in 

the Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism or the UN Register of Conventional 

Arms. 

Their political status also prevents the authorities on Taiwan from joining 

the four multilateral export control regimes Australia Group, Missile Technology 

Control regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement, and Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

Nonetheless, the authorities on Taiwan have voluntarily assumed commitments to 

adhere to key multilateral treaties and initiatives. The authorities on Taiwan follow 

IAEA standards and directives, work closely with U.S. civilian nuclear authorities, 

and have established relationships with mainland Chinese civilian nuclear 

authorities with respect to nuclear safety. 

With the involvement of AIT and TECRO, the authorities on Taiwan 

participate in a number of U.S. initiatives. Under the State Department's Export 

Control and Related Border Security ("EXBS") program, the authorities on Taiwan 

receive training from the United States designed to enhance the export control 

system of the authorities on Taiwan by strengthening their enforcement capabilities 

and mechanisms and improving industry compliance. The EXBS program helps 

the authorities on Taiwan identify weaknesses in their export control system and 

provides expert support to close the gaps to help prevent proliferation. Additional 

examples of ongoing engagement include the participation by the authorities on 

Taiwan in both the U.S. Container Security Initiative ("CSI") a high-risk cargo 

detection and interdiction program that was launched on Taiwan in 2004 - and the 

U.S. Megaports initiative, which began operation on Taiwan in 2006 to detect and 

interdict illicit radioactive and nuclear cargo. 
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Side Letter to the Proposed Agreement 

In the course ofthe negotiation of the proposed Agreement, TECRO assured 

AIT of the following in a side letter: 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are committed to pursuing a civil 

nuclear program in a manner consistent with the spirit and letter of the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuc1ear Weapons ("NPT"). 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are committed to cooperating only 

with responsible states in executing the civil nuclear programs of the 

authorities on Taiwan and to adhering to the highest standards of 

nonproliferation. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO are abiding by and intend to continue 

to abide by the provisions of the NPT and the United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions addressing nuclear activities of concern. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO therefore do not intend to engage in 

any nuclear cooperation, to the extent the following information is available 

to TECRO, with any states that are subject to UN Security Council Chapter 

VII measures related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, weapons of 

mass destruction-related activities, or activities related to the development of 

nuclear weapon delivery systems, such as ballistic missile-related programs; 

with any persons or entities designated for sanctions by the UN; or with any 

states that are in material non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements 

or that have been identified by the IAEA Director General to the IAEA 

Board of Governors as having failed to provide the IAEA the level of 

cooperation required to resolve any outstanding questions in relation to the 

safeguards obligations of such state. 

• The authorities represented by TECRO intend to engage in cooperation with 

third parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the 

Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (INFCIRC/254IParts 1 and 2, as 

amended), and its associated understandings. 

AIT recognized these assurances in a communication with TECRO as reflecting 

the strong non-proliferation policies of the authorities represented by TECRO. 
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

The ROC ratified the treaty in 1970, prior to the United Nations General 

Assembly's vote to transfer China's seat to the PRC in 1971. When the PRC 

subsequently ratified the treaty, it described the ROC ratification as "illegal." 

Nonetheless, the authorities on Taiwan have committed themselves to continue to 

abide by the requirements of the treaty, and the United States has declared that it 

still considers the authorities on Taiwan to be "bound by those requirements." 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement 

The Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 

Government of the Republic of China, and the Government of the United States of 

America for the Application of Safeguards was signed on December 6, 1971 

(hereinafter "the Safeguards Transfer Agreement") (INFCIRCI158). The 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement was concluded under the Agreement between the 

Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic 

of China for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. The 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement applies safeguards to all material, equipment, and 

facilities on Taiwan supplied by the United States to Taiwan under the nuclear 

cooperation agreement then in effect or under any superseding agreement(s), and 

all special fissionable material produced therefrom and all nuclear material used 

therein. In the absence of any other vehicle for application of safeguards, no other 

country besides the United States has had the ability to engage in direct nuclear 

trade with the authorities and people on Taiwan and still meet its obligations to 

require safeguards on exports. However, the United States has long allowed such 

supply by others to Taiwan to be treated as though it came from the United States 

and added to the inventory of U.S. transfers to Taiwan, as long as there were 

agreed transfer conditions. Such conditions have been established for certain 

supply arrangements involving Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the 

Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. As the authorities on Taiwan have 

accepted that all nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment currently on Taiwan, 

regardless of origin, are treated as if they were supplied by the United States and 

safeguarded under the Safeguards Transfer Agreement, this provides for full-scope 

safeguards. 
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Application of Safeguards to the Taiwan Research Reactor Facility 

In October 1969, the lAEA and the ROC concluded an agreement for the 

application of safeguards to the Taiwan Research Reactor facility ("IAEA-ROC 

Safeguards Agreement," INFCIRC/133). The ROC made this request to the 

Agency with regard to the reactor and associated research facilities the ROC 

intended to purchase from a supplier in Canada and to the fuel and heavy water for 

that facility. The IAEA agreed to apply its safeguards system to the nuclear 

facility and to any material listed in the Inventory, as defined in the IAEA-ROC 

Safeguards Agreement. 

Additional Protocol 

On March 25, 1998, the IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards 

Bruno Pellaud sent a letter to the Chairman of the Taiwan AEC proposing 

implementation of the measures ofthe Additional Protocol on Taiwan. By return 

letter of June 26, 1998, the Chairman of the Taiwan AEC accepted this proposal. 

As such, the nuclear power program on Taiwan was the first to which the measures 

of the Additional Protocol were applied. 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

The fuel cycle facilities on Taiwan are quite limited, encompassing six 

nuclear reactors, two reactors under construction, and spent fuel storage facilities. 

The primary governing authority for nuclear energy on Taiwan is the AEC. 

Upstream Fuel Cycle 

All nuclear fuel on Taiwan is imported. Australia and Canada are the 

principal suppliers of natural uranium and enrichment services are provided by the 

U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), URENCO, and Areva. All the power and 

research reactor fuel used on Taiwan is manufactured in the United States. 

Power Reactors 

As noted above, Taipower has three nuclear power plants with two reactors 

operating at each site. The Chinshan and Kuosheng Plants each have two General 

Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), with start-up years ranging from 1978 to 

1983. The Chinshan units are each capable of generating 636 MWe, while the 

Kuosheng units can each generate 985 MWe. The Maanshan power plant houses 
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two Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) capable of951 MWe each, 

which started up in 1984-1985. Collectively, these plants are licensed to years in 

the range 2018-2025 (i.e., 40 years from start-up). 

Construction of a fourth nuclear power plant at Lungmen is ongoing, with 

97% completion for construction and 41 % completion for pre-operations testing. 

Two 1350 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactors ("ABWRs") designed and 

supplied by General Electric are planned for the site, with the overall design done 

by a group comprised of General Electric Nuclear Energy, Stone & Webster, and 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with Taipower maintaining control and oversight of 

design engineering. Construction has undergone considerable delays, including a 

halt in construction ordered after the Democratic Progressive Party won the 

presidential election in 2000. The Fukushima nuclear accident led to calls for 

enhanced safety measures. The AEC conducted an evaluation of the safety of all 

existing reactors and the results showed that continued operation of nuclear power 

plants poses no imminent risk to the public health and safety, while there are some 

areas that need improvement. The AEC ordered Taipower to put in place more 

countermeasures to further enhance the capability to cope with extreme natural 

disasters. President Ma's energy policy statement from November 2011 noted that 

construction will move forward, but "even more comprehensive and strict trial 

operations" will be required before commissioning of the plant. 

Although the authorities on Taiwan are trying to reassure the public that 

nuclear energy is safe, opposition to nuclear energy remains high on Taiwan 

following the Fukushima accident in Japan. This opposition is reinforced by the 

fact that the fourth nuclear power plant'S construction process has taken over 

20 years, has involved multiple contractors, and had been suspended at one point. 

In addition, some oppose nuclear energy because the authorities on Taiwan have 

not identified a long-term storage plan for nuclear waste. During an Apri12013 

visit from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") commissioner to 

Taipei, members of the Legislative Yuan noted that opposition to nuclear power on 

Taiwan had never been higher and described the future of the fourth nuclear power 

plant as "the hottest issue in Taiwan now." In August 2013, Premier Jiang Yi-huah 

reiterated the support of the authorities on Taiwan for completion of the fourth 

reactor. 
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Research Reactors and Institutes 

The authorities on Taiwan have only one operational research reactor at the 

present time, a TRlGA reactor called THOR. The THOR facility is located at 

National Tsing Hua University (NTHU) and is used for neutron radiography, 

boron-neutron capture therapy, neutron diffraction, isotope production, and neutron 

activation analysis. It went critical in 1961. As noted above, IAEA safeguards are 

applied to the research reactor under the Safeguards Transfer Agreement. 

The Institute of Nuc1ear Energy Research ("INER"), under the 

administration of the AEC, is the sole nuclear research institute of the authorities 

on Taiwan. Its mission is to promote peaceful applications of nuclear science. It 

was established in 1968 and engages in research related to the safe operation of 

nuclear power plants, radiation safety, radioactive waste treatment and disposition, 

plasma technologies, and nuclear medicine, among other related areas. It has 

halted all but one area of its previous work on the nuclear fuel cycle, which had 

included uranium recovery, conversion, fuel fabrication, operation ofthree 

research reactors, a small scale reprocessing facility, a plutonium handling facility 

and a post irradiation examination ("PIE") facility. Only the PIE facility is still 

operational and being used for examination of failed power reactor fuel, support to 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") experiments 

on high bum-up power reactor fuel, and stabilization of spent research reactor fuel. 

Downstream Fuel Cycle 

The AEC describes the overall government management strategy as "storage 

in spent fuel pools for the near term, onsite dry storage for the mid-term, and final 

deep geological disposal for the long term." However, long term efforts by the 

authorities on Taiwan have suffered a number of setbacks resulting in the need to 

pursue other measures for the nearer term. 

A "Preliminary Technical Feasibility Report for Final Disposal of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel" was submitted to the AEC for review in September 2009 and was 

approved by the AEC in July 2012. However, further work on the site of an 

underground research laboratory in eastern Taiwan was halted due to protests by 

the local aboriginal people. A substitute plan was proposed and submitted to AEC 

for review in late September 2012, which envisioned using abandoned tunnels and 

on-going tunnel construction projects for conducting geological research. A 

"Technical Feasibility Report for Final Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel" is 
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scheduled to be submitted to AEC for review in 2017. Operation of a final 

repository is now projected for 2055. 

In the interim, the authorities on Taiwan are pursuing "at reactor storage." 

The Maanshan plant has sufficient wet storage to handle the spent fuel for the 

lifetime of the plant, as will the Lungmen plant, assuming it operates, but both the 

Chinshan and Kuosheng plants have limited pool storage, even after efforts to 

enhance the storage capacity (the plants lose full core discharge capability in 2014 

and 2016 respectively). After weathering considerable opposition from both the 

local authorities and the central authorities, Taipower is constructing dry storage at 

Chinshan. The facility is being built by INER using concrete storage casks 

("INER-HPS") based on U.S.-origin technology. According to information 

provided by Taipower in November 2012, operation was scheduled to begin in 

2013, increasing the storage capacity by over 20%. Taipower is also constructing 

dry cask storage at the Kuosheng plant, also based on U.S.-origin technology for 

the casks, and expects to receive an operational license for the facility by the end 

of2015, increasing the storage capacity by over 25%. 

In view of its setbacks in constructing dry storage at Chinshan and 

Kuosheng, Taipower has been considering sending spent fuel to France for 

reprocessing since at least 1998. Such arrangements would not provide for return 

of the recovered plutonium but would require that the waste, including high-level 

waste, be returned to Taiwan for final disposal. Taipower recognizes this would be 

a costly endeavor but is considering it as an option for disposing of spent fuel at 

Chinshan and Kuosheng if necessary to leave sufficient space in the spent fuel pool 

for full core discharge. The authorities remain keen to have the option of 

transferring fuel for such reprocessing, which is the rationale for the AIT advance 

consent provisions in the Agreed Minute of the proposed Agreement. 

Waste management and disposal on Taiwan is funded by a tax on electricity 

of 0.17 new Taiwan dollar (NTD) per kilowatt hour. According to March 2013 

press reports, the fund currently holds about 200 billion NTD (approximately 

$6.7 billion at current exchange rates). 

At present, Taipower is storing the low level radioactive waste (LL W) 

produced by operation of its nuclear power plants on site. The AEC describes 

these storage facilities as "modem air-conditioned, automated and well-shielded 

storage facilities" that accommodate tens of thousands ofLLW drums at each 

nuclear power plant site. Taipower has engaged in a concerted effort to reduce the 

volume of this waste in order to ensure that these sites have adequate capacity, and 
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it has reported that it generated only 234 barrels ofLLW in 2010 (the lowest 

annual figure in history). 

From 1982 to 1996, off-site interim storage of LL W was provided by the 

Lan-Yu (Orchid Island) Storage Site. However, adverse environmental conditions 

led to deterioration of waste drums. The AEC subsequently charged Taipower 

with implementing a waste storage modification program for corroded drums, 

which included use of drums with improved corrosion resistance and drum 

examination and repacking. While the waste stored in corroded drums has been 

repackaged for storage, continued use of the site is opposed by the local aboriginal 

people, and the AEC has been promising to remove the waste since protests in 

2002. New LL W storage sites are under consideration. Although Taipower 

announced two candidate sites in August 2012, the local jurisdictions both declined 

to host a site. Taipower has proposed a procedure to select a new site with local 

participation, but the status of the effort is unknown. 

The authorities on Taiwan have also sought to ship LL W overseas for 

disposal. The most highly publicized effort was in 1997 when Taipower signed a 

contract with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). 

However, protests in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) put an end to that effort. 

Subsequently, the AEC chairman promised to select a disposal site on Taiwan. 

Small producers ofLLW, such as medical, academic, and industrial sites, 

have their waste collected, treated, and stored by lNER. lNER is also storing 

waste from decommissioning a number of on-site facilities. 

Nuclear Regulations and Statutes 

The nuclear activities of the authorities on Taiwan are conducted under the 

authority granted by its Atomic Energy Act (Taiwan AEA) of December 1971. 

Detailed regulations are established under the authority of the Taiwan AEA. The 

Taiwan AEA establishes the authority to regulate: 

1) The safety protection for the transportation of nuclear material, including 

safeguards (Article 24-28); 

2) Nuclear material storage areas, which must be divided by their 

characteristics into three areas: the control area, material area, and vital area 

(Article 29); 
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3) Protection of nuclear materials in use and storage (Articles 30-32), including 

the following measures: 

• Access and admission control system (employees, vehicles, and 

packages) 

• Escorting and controlling visitors 

• Key control procedures 

• Alarm systems to detection instruction 

• Security guard forces 

• Management of nuclear material accounts; 

4) Nuclear emergency response exercises at nuclear power plants, which must 

be conducted every four years (Article 11). 

Violations of regulations result in the issuance of a Violation Notice of 

varying levels, depending on the severity ofthe violation. These result in 

administrative, not criminal, penalties. 

The authorities on Taiwan instituted a number oflaws relating to nuclear 

facilities and material, including the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act 

(January 2003), Taiwan Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management 

Act (December 2002), and Ionizing Radiation Protection Act (February 2003). The 

requirements for measures against unauthorized removal and sabotage of nuclear 

material during transport are as follows: 

• Must comply with the regulations of the authorities on Taiwan: 

- Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act 

- Regulation for the Nuclear Materials Transport Safety Management 

- Regulation for the Nuclear Fuels Operational Safety Management 

• Must comply with IAEA INFCIRC/225 

Physical protection of nuclear materials 

The AEC is responsible for developing the rules and regulations for 

execution ofthe physical protection system of nuclear materials and nuclear 

facilities, as noted in the Taiwan AEA. The AEC has advised U.S. experts that 

according to the current regulations, the Department of Nuclear Technology is 

responsible for the regulation and supervision of nuclear security and physical 

protection. However, since 1992, the Fuel Cycle and Materials Administration 

("FCMA") has been gradually assuming some of the responsibilities for 
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supervision and inspection of facilities not directly related to power generation, 

such as NTHU and INER. Inspections are conducted oflNER on a semi-annual 

basis and NTHU on an annual basis. The Maanshan and Lungmen plants are 

inspected on a quarterly, semi-annual, and annual basis for different physical 

protection topical areas. Surprise inspections are also conducted during the year, 

and the periodic on-site security force response exercises are also inspected 

annually. An anti-terrorism exercise involving off-site security forces is 

conducted every four years. An ABC inspector is sent to accompany each nuclear 

material transport from the pier at the receiving port on Taiwan to the destination 

facility. 

Reorganization of administration 

The authorities on Taiwan are currently in the process of carrying out a 

reorganization across various ministries that includes moving the nuclear regulator, 

the ABC, from a second tier agency to a third tier agency and changing its name to 

the Nuclear Safety Commission ("NSC"). Unlike the original reorganization plan, 

which was to place NSC under the Ministry of Science and Technology 

("MOST"), the reorganization currently planned retains NSC's independent status, 

a status for which AIT had pressed. While the structure of the NSC has not been 

finalized, the current draft organizational plan includes an NSC managerial level 

similar to the U.S. NRC. It will be composed of a chairman, a vice chairman, and 

several commissioners, all of whom will be nominated by the premier. In parallel, 

the bulk of AEC's research and technical support arm, INER, which consists of 

about one thousand people, is to be moved under the Ministry of Economic and 

Energy Affairs (MOEEA) and to be renamed the Institute of Energy Research 

(IER). MOEEA is also responsible for oversight of Taipower. The technical 

support INER currently supplies to the regulatory activities of the AEC will be 

supplied by a new, much smaller organization built around those at INER currently 

providing that support. The new organization will be named the Research Center 

for Nuclear Safety Regulations (still to be confirmed) and will consist of around 

sixty-six people. Concern has been expressed that this new organization may lack 

the experience, resources, and competence to provide strong technical advice to 

AEC and AIT has indicated to the authorities on Taiwan the need for its regulator 

to have strong technical support. 
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II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE COOPERATION CONTEMPLATED 

BY THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT 

The proposed Agreement would accomplish, inter alia, the following: 

1) establish the conditions for U.S. nuclear trade with the authorities on Taiwan; 

2) articulate a legal requirement for full scope safeguards on Taiwan and the 

mechanism for implementing it; 3) establish the basis for countries other than the 

United States to use the Agreement as a mechanism for peaceful nuclear 

cooperation; and 4) demonstrate the leadership of the authorities on Taiwan in the 

nonproliferation arena. 

Article 2 of the proposed Agreement describes in general terms the kinds of 

cooperative activities envisaged. These include, inter alia: 

• Transfers of information, material, equipment, and components under the 

Agreement either directly between the Parties or through their designated 

representatives or through other authorized persons. 

• Development of requirements for grid-appropriate power reactors and fuel 

service arrangements for the authorities represented by TECRO. 

• Promotion ofthe establishment of a reliable source of nuclear fuel for 

future civil nuclear reactors. 

• Development of the use of civil nuclear energy in a manner that supports 

global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. 

• Civil nuclear energy training, human resource and infrastructure 

development, participation in international and regional research, and 

appropriate application of civil nuclear energy and related energy 

technology, consistent with high standards of safety, security and 

nonproliferation. 

• Application of radioisotopes and radiation in industry, agriculture, 

medicine, and the environment. 

• Radiation protection and management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. 
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• Promotion of participation in international conferences and activities 

related to safety, security, and safeguards. 

• Promotion of participation in cooperation relevant to compensation for 

nuclear damage. 

Article 3.1 of the proposed Agreement further specifies the types of 

information concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that may be 

transferred. Fields that may be covered include the following: 

• Development, design, construction, operation, maintenance, and use of 

reactors; reactor experiments; and decommissioning. 

• The use of material in physical and biological research, medicine, 

agriculture, and industry. 

• Fuel cycle studies of ways to meet future world-wide civil nuclear needs, 

including multilateral approaches to guaranteeing nuclear-fuel supply and 

appropriate techniques for management and treatment of nuclear wastes. 

• Safeguards and physical protection of material, equipment, and 

components. 

• Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the 

foregoing. 

• Assessing the role that nuclear power may play in energy plans for the 

territories of the authorities represented by the Parties. 

The Agreement states that Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology, 

sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components of such facilities shall not 

be transferred under the Agreement (Article 3.3 and Article 4.1). 

Transfers of special fissionable material to TECRO under the Agreement 

will be low enriched uranium, except (a) small quantities for use as samples, 

standards, detectors, targets, or other agreed purposes, or (b) if the Parties agree, 

special fissionable material contained in spent fuel or waste being transferred to 

support spent fuel management and disposition (Article 4.1 and 4.4). Any such 
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transfers may not be in excess of the quantity that the Parties agree is necessary for 

the activities envisaged (Article 4.3). 

The proposed Agreement will have an indefinite term from the date of its entry 

into force unless terminated by either Party on one year's written notice to the 

other Party (Article 15.3). In the event of termination of the Agreement, key 

nonproliferation conditions and controls provided for in the Agreement will 

continue in effect as long as any material, equipment, or components subject to the 

Agreement remain in the territory of the authorities represented by either Party or 

under the jurisdiction or control of those authorities anywhere, or unless the Parties 

agree that such items are no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from 

the point of view of safeguards (Article 15.4). 

III. SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS 

Section 123 of the Act, as amended by the NNPA, sets forth certain 

substantive requirements for agreements for cooperation. Sections 402 and 407 of 

the NNP A set forth supplementary requirements. The provisions contained in the 

proposed Agreement satisfY these legal requirements as follows: 

(1) Application of Safeguards: Section 123 a.( 1) of the Act requires a 

guaranty from the cooperating party that safeguards in perpetuity will be 

maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant 

to an agreement for cooperation and with respect to all special nuclear material 

used in or produced through the use of such transferred nuclear materials and 

equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or 

control of the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of the other provisions 

of the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any 

reason. 

This requirement is satisfied by Articles 10 and 15 of the proposed 

Agreement. IAEA safeguards on Taiwan are applied pursuant to the Safeguards 

Transfer Agreement. Section l(c) of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement defines 

"Agreement for Cooperation" as "the Agreement Between the Government of the 

Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America for 

Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy signed on 18 July 1955 as 

amended, or a new superseding agreement for cooperation, as amended." 

(Emphasis added.) Article XIV of the 1972 Agreement for Cooperation states, 

"The Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of 
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America and the Government of the Republic of China Concerning the Civil Uses 

of Atomic Energy, signed on July 18, 1955, as amended, is superseded by this 

Agreement on the dates this Agreement enters into force." Therefore, the 1972 

Agreement for Cooperation is an agreement for cooperation within the scope of 

Section I(c) of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement. 

Pursuant to Section 33 of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement, the 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement "shall remain in force during the term of the 

Agreement for Cooperation, as extended or amended from time to time ... " As long 

as the 1972 Agreement for Cooperation or a new superseding agreement for 

cooperation is in force, the Safeguards Transfer Agreement will remain in force. 

Under Article 15.2 of the proposed Agreement, "[t]his Agreement shall be deemed 

by the Parties as a new superseding agreement for cooperation within the meaning 

of Section l(c) of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement." Therefore, the IAEA 

safeguards will be maintained pursuant to the proposed Agreement since the IAEA 

will apply safeguards in accordance with the Safeguards Transfer Agreement to 

materials, equipment, and facilities listed in inventories as defined and described in 

the Safeguards Transfer Agreement. 

Article 10.2 stipulates that source or special nuclear material (referred to in 

the proposed Agreement as "special fissionable material"), moderator material, and 

equipment transferred to the territory, jurisdiction, or control ofthe authorities 

represented by TECRO pursuant to the Agreement - and any source material or 

special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of any material 

(which under the Agreement includes source material, special fissionable material, 

byproduct material, radioisotopes other than byproduct material, moderator 

material, or any other such substance so designated by agreement of the Parties), 

equipment, or components transferred -- shall be subject to safeguards in 

accordance with the terms of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement and to the 

measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol (published in 

INFCIRC/540). (Note that while the authorities on Taiwan cannot adopt their own 

Additional Protocol, the Article 10.2 language requires the measures provided for 

in the Model Additional Protocol to be applied.) Article 10.4 provides for "backup" safeguards in the event the lAEA safeguards provided in accordance with the 

Safeguards Transfer Agreement and the measures provided for in the Model 

Additional Protocol are not being implemented. Article lOis one of the articles of 

the Agreement that, pursuant to Article 15, continues in effect so long as any 

material, equipment, or component subject thereto remains in the territory of the 

authorities represented by AIT or the authorities represented by TECRO, or under 

the jurisdiction or control of the authorities represented by either Party to the 
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Agreement anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that item is no longer 

usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards. 

(2) Full-Scope Safeguards: The requirement for full-scope safeguards as a 

condition of cooperation mandated by section 123 a.(2) is met by Article 10.1 of 

the proposed Agreement. 

(3) Peaceful Use: The requirement of section 123 a.(3) of the Act for a 

guaranty against explosive or military uses of nuclear materials and equipment 

transferred and special nuclear material produced through the use of such items is 

met by Article 9 ofthe proposed Agreement. It is not necessary to include a 

peaceful uses guaranty with respect to sensitive nuclear technology transferred 

under the Agreement or special nuclear material produced through the use of 

sensitive nuclear technology transferred, as would otherwise be required by section 

123 a.(3), because Article 3.3 of the proposed Agreement provides that sensitive 

nuclear technology shall not be transferred under the Agreement. 

(4) Right of Return: The requirement in section 123 a.(4) of the Act that, in 

the event of a nuclear detonation by a non-nuclear weapon state cooperating party 

or termination or abrogation of an lAEA safeguards agreement by such a party, the 

United States has a right to the return of any nuclear material and equipment 

transferred pursuant to an agreement for cooperation and any special nuclear 

material produced through the use of such transferred items, is met by Article 11 of 

the proposed Agreement. This right is triggered ifTECRO, the authorities 

represented by TECRO, or any person authorized by or who acts with the 

knowledge of the authorities represented by TECRO, and who is either within the 

territory of the authorities represented by TECRO or under their jurisdiction or 

control, should detonate a nuclear explosive device or ifTECRO or its designated 

representatives materially violates the provisions of Articles 5, 6, 7, 8,9 or 10 of 

the proposed Agreement, or the authorities represented by TECRO take actions 

that would constitute a material violation of any of those provisions if taken by 

TECRO. 

Article 11.4 ofthe proposed Agreement requires that a Party, in determining 

whether to exercise its rights under Article 11.1 based on a "material violation," 

shall consider whether the facts giving rise to the right to take such action in 

accordance with Article 11.1 were caused deliberately. In the event that a Party 

finds such material violation not to be deliberate, and to the extent that it judges 

that such material violation can be rectified, that Party is obligated to endeavor, 

subject to the laws and regulations of the authorities represented by that Party, to 
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afford the other Party an opportunity to cure the violation within a reasonable 

period. This provision in Article 11.4 does not, however, make the exercise of the 

right of return by the United States under Article 11 contingent upon any 

substantive conditions nor require the consent of the authorities represented by 

TECRO. 

(5) Retransfer Consent: The requirement of section 123 a.(5) of the Act for 

a guaranty by a cooperating party that "any material or any Restricted Data ... and 

any production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement ... or 

any special nuclear material produced through the use of such facility or .. . 

material" will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction 

or control of the cooperating party without prior U.S. consent, is met by Article 5.2 

of the proposed Agreement. A retransfer consent right over Restricted Data (RD) 

is not provided because RD transfers are prohibited under Article 3.3 ofthe 

proposed Agreement. 

As noted above, Section 3 of the Agreed Minute ("Retransfers") to the 

proposed Agreement provides advance, long-term ("programmatic") approval of 

the authorities represented by AIT for retransfers by the authorities represented by 

TECRO of irradiated nuclear material subject to Article 5 and Article 6 of the 

Agreement to France or other countries or destinations as may be agreed upon in 

writing by the Parties for storage and reprocessing. All such transfers must be in 

compliance with the policies, laws, and regulations of the recipient country or 

destination, including any requirement that indicates a provisional period for the 

receipt and treatment of such irradiated source material or special fissionable 

material or that the waste produced as a result of the reprocessing be returned to 

the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO. The transfers are also 

subject to certain listed conditions. This advance approval is discussed further 

below in this memorandum in "Conformity with Section 131 of the Act." 

(6) Physical Security: The requirement of section 123 a.( 6) of the Act for a 

guaranty that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any 

nuclear material transferred pursuant to an agreement of cooperation and any 

special nuclear material (in this Agreement referred to as "special fissionable 

material") used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, 

or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement is met by Article 8 of 

the proposed Agreement. 
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(7) EnrichmentlReprocessingiAlteration Consent Right: The requirement of 

section 123 a.(7) of the Act for a guaranty that "no material transferred pursuant to 

the agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use 

of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to 

the agreement ... will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, 

uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty per cent in the isotope 

235, or other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered in 

form or content without the prior approval of the United States," is met by Article 

6 of the proposed Agreement. That Article provides that material transferred 

pursuant to the Agreement, and material used in or produced through the use of 

material or equipment transferred, shall not be reprocessed unless the Parties agree, 

and further specifies that plutonium, uranium 233, high enriched uranium, and 

irradiated source material or special fissionable material transferred pursuant to the 

Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so 

transferred shall not be otherwise altered in form or content, except by irradiation 

or further irradiation, unless the Parties agree. The Agreement also specifies that 

uranium transferred pursuant to the Agreement or used in any equipment so 

transferred shall not be enriched after transfer unless the Parties agree. Further, 

Article 7 of the Agreement provides that TECRO, the authorities represented by 

TECRO, or any person authorized by or who acts with the knowledge of the 

authorities represented by TECRO within the territory ofthe authorities 

represented by TECRO, will not possess sensitive nuclear facilities or otherwise 

engage in activities related to the enrichment or reprocessing of material, or to the 

alteration in form or content (except by irradiation or further irradiation or, if 

agreed by the Parties, post-irradiation examination or spent fuel stabilization) of 

plutonium, uranium 233, high enriched uranium, or irradiated source material or 

special fissionable material. 

Article 6 of the proposed Agreement also satisfies section 402(a) of the 

NNP A, which states that, except as specifically provided in any agreement for 

cooperation, no source or special nuclear material exported from the United States 

after the date of the NNP A may be enriched after export without the prior approval 

of the United States for such enrichment. 

(8) Storage Consent Right: The requirement of section 123 a.(8) of the Act 

for a guaranty of a right of prior U.S. approval over facilities for the storage of 

specified nuclear materials is met by Article 5.1 of the proposed Agreement. 
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(9) Sensitive Nuclear Technology: The requirement of section 123 a.(9) of 

the Act pertains to situations that may result when sensitive nuclear technology is 

transferred pursuant to a section 123 agreement for cooperation. Article 3.3 of the 

proposed Agreement provides that sensitive nuclear technology will not be 

transferred under the Agreement, and Article 4.1 provides that sensitive nuclear 

facilities and major critical components thereof will not be transferred under the 

Agreement. Accordingly, the requirement in section 123 a.(9) is not relevant to the 

proposed Agreement, and the requirement in section 402(b) of the NNP A 

precluding the transfer of major critical components of facilities for uranium 

enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production unless an 

agreement for cooperation "specifically designates such components as items to be 

exported pursuant to [ such] agreement" is also satisfied. 

Environmental: Article 12.3 of the proposed Agreement requires the Parties 

to consult, with regard to activities under the Agreement, to identify the 

international environmental implications arising from such activities and to 

cooperate in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical, 

or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under the 

Agreement, thereby satisfying the requirements of section 407 of the NNP A. 

Conformity with Section 131 of the Act 

Section 131 of the Act establishes procedural requirements for the 

conclusion of "subsequent arrangements" entered into pursuant to agreements for 

cooperation. Subsequent arrangements implement the consent rights obtained 

pursuant to the requirements of section 123. Section 3 ("Retransfers") of the 

Agreed Minute to the proposed Agreement sets forth advance approval by AIT 

for certain activities ofTECRO which, ifnot approved in the context of an 

agreement for cooperation, could be permitted only as "subsequent arrangements" 

following compliance with the provisions of section 131 of the Act. AIT 

provides such approval for TECRO to retransfer for storage and reprocessing 

irradiated nuclear material subject to Article 5 and Article 6 of the proposed 

Agreement to France or other countries or destinations as may be agreed upon in 

writing by the Parties. All such transfers must be in compliance with the policies, 

laws, and regulations of the recipient country or destination and are subject to 

specified conditions. These conditions ensure that AIT will be notified at least 

thirty days in advance of a proposed transfer to allow the authorities represented 

by AIT sufficient time to obtain confirmation from the receiving country or 

destination, or, in the case of a proposed transfer to a country that is a member of 

the European Atomic Energy Community ("EURATOM"), that the material will 
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be held within EURATOM or the receiving country or destination subject to the 

tenns and conditions of an applicable agreement for cooperation to which the 

authorities represented by AIT are party and which authorizes nuclear exports 

from the jurisdiction of the authorities represented by AIT to that country or 

destination, as appropriate, and therefore be subject to the conditions required by 

the Act. TECRO may not proceed with the proposed transfer until AIT notifies 

TECRO of the receipt of such confinnation. AIT retains the right to tenninate 

this approval at any time, if it considers that one or more of the aforementioned 

conditions is not satisfied or it considers that exceptional circumstances of 

concern from a non-proliferation or security standpoint so require. 

The mechanism in the proposed Agreement itself of providing advance 

long-term consent for retransfer for reprocessing or storage has been used in U.S. 

nuclear cooperation agreements with Norway and the United Arab Emirates (as 

well as Finland and Sweden, which are now part of EURATOM). The Executive 

Branch has taken the position that this approach is legally sustainable, and 

Congress, after careful and detailed consideration of both the principles of 

including advance long-tenn consents in cooperation agreements and their 

implementation in specific agreements, has not blocked their use in any of these 

agreements. 

Advance Approval ofRetransfers for Storage or Reprocessing 

Sections 123 and 127 of the Act require the United States have certain 

approval rights, including reprocessing and retransfer approval rights. However, 

no provision of the Act or the NNP A precludes the United States from giving such 

approvals in advance when all the requirements of the Act can be properly met. In 

fact, the Act clearly indicates that U.S. consent rights can be granted in advance. 

In that regard, Section 131 a.(3) ofthe Act provides that: 

The United States will give timely consideration to all requests for prior 

approval, when required by this Act, for the reprocessing of material 

proposed to be exported, previously exported and subject to the applicable 

agreement for cooperation, or special nuclear material produced through the 

use of such material or a production or utilization facility transferred 

pursuant to such agreement for cooperation, or to the altering of irradiated 

fuel elements containing such material, and additionally, to the maximum 

extent feasible, will attempt to expedite such consideration when the tenns 

and conditions for such actions are set forth in such agreement for 

cooperation ... 
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The reference to "material proposed to be exported" makes clear that the 

consent for reprocessing or alteration of irradiated fuel may be granted prior to the 

export of any nuclear material. In the course of normal reactor operations, the fuel 

to be exported and then used in a reactor would not be reprocessed for five or more 

years. Therefore the "prior approval" that this section of the Act would allow the 

United States to give would be far in advance of the actual time that the material in 

question would be reprocessed or altered in form or content. 

Section 131 a.(3) of the Act provides that expedited consideration will be 

given to requests for consent for reprocessing "when the terms and conditions for 

such actions are set forth in such agreement for cooperation." This provision 

authorizes AIT to specify in the proposed Agreement with TECRO the conditions 

that would have to be met for a subsequent approval of a request for retransfer for 

reprocessing or other fuel cycle activities. There is no substantive difference 

between that and the proposed Agreement, which makes the approval granted by 

the Agreed Minute ofthe proposed Agreement contingent on continued 

compliance with the conditions specified in the proposed Agreement, which are 

described above in Part III. 

The Agreed Minute provides inter alia that the agreement regarding 

retransfers "may be suspended or withdrawn in whole or in part by either Party if 

that Party considers that one or more of the [specified] conditions is not satisfied, 

or if it considers that exceptional circumstances of concern from a nonproliferation or security standpoint so require. To the extent that time and 

circumstances permit, the Parties shall consult prior to any such suspension or 

withdrawal. Such exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a 

determination by either Party that the approval cannot be continued without a 

significant increase of the risk of proliferation or without jeopardizing the security 

ofthe territory of the authorities it represents." 

Further, advance consent in an agreement for cooperation means that under 

the approval provisions of Section 123 b. ofthe Act, the President approves and 

authorizes the proposed Agreement and makes a determination in writing that the 

performance of the proposed Agreement will promote, and will not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. In contrast, the subsequent 

arrangement procedures in Section 131 of the Act require the determination of the 

Secretary of Energy only that the arrangement will not be inimical to the common 

defense and security. 
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Finally, the requirements under Section 131 of the Act for public notice and 

Congressional scrutiny for a subsequent arrangement providing approval of the 

retransfer of all U.S.-obligated special nuclear material if such approval had been 

granted as a subsequent arrangement rather than, as here, in the proposed 

Agreement itself, will effectively be satisfied in the present case ofTECRO by 

implementation ofthe procedures set forth in Section 123 of the Act for 

Congressional review of proposed new agreements for cooperation. This is 

because Section 123 of the Act permits Congress to review a new agreement for 

cooperation for up to ninety days of continuous session, while section 131 provides 

that subsequent arrangements involving retransfer of special nuclear material for 

reprocessing resulting from such reprocessing must lie before Congress for only 

fifteen days of continuous session (in addition to the section 131 requirement 

applicable to all subsequent arrangements of publication in the Federal Register 

for at least 15 days before taking effect). 

Thus, although the Act does not require that the advance consent provided 

for in the proposed Agreement meet the applicable standard in Section l31, the 

advance consent granted by the United States in the proposed Agreement has been 

analyzed in regard to all the relevant criteria of Section 131 as well as Section 123 

of the Act, and it has been judged that such advance consent will not be inimical to 

the common defense and security and will promote and will not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. 

In sum, the proposed Agreement satisfies all the substantive requirements 

specified for agreements for cooperation by the Act and the NNP A. 

IV. FULLSCOPESAFEGUARDS 

While the ROC ratified the NPT in 1970, it was unable to conclude a full 

scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA before its political status changed. 

While the IAEA was able to continue to implement the two existing safeguards 

agreements mentioned above, i.e., the IAEA-ROC Safeguards Agreement 

concluded in October 1969 and the Safeguards Transfer Agreement concluded in 

December 1971, the IAEA-ROC Safeguards Agreement applies only to the Taiwan 

Research Reactor and associated material and equipment, and the Safeguards 

Transfer Agreement applies only to material, facilities, and equipment supplied by 

the United States to the authorities on Taiwan under the peaceful nuclear 

cooperation agreement in effect at that time or under any superseding agreement(s) 

and all special fissionable material produced therefrom and all nuclear material 
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used therein. As a consequence, the authorities on Taiwan have no apparent legal 

obligation to accept full scope safeguards (safeguards on all nuclear material in all 

peaceful nuclear activities) apart from their view of their own obligations under 

Article III of the NPT. However, the U.S. Government has advised other 

suppliers, including inter alia, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 

Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, that the lAEA applies safeguards 

under the Safeguards Transfer Agreement to all the nuclear facilities on Taiwan, 

creating de Jacto full scope safeguards on Taiwan. 

As noted above, one of the objectives of concluding this AIT-TECRO 

agreement was to make full scope safeguards a legal obligation of the authorities 

on Taiwan. Article 10, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the proposed Agreement state: 

1. Cooperation under this Agreement shall require the application of 

IAEA safeguards with respect to all nuclear activities within the 

territory of the authorities represented by TECRO, under the 

jurisdiction of those authorities or carried out under the control of 

those authorities anywhere. Implementation of the Safeguards 

Transfer Agreement with respect to all such nuclear activities shall be 

considered to fulfill this requirement. 

2. Source material, special fissionable material, moderator material, 

and equipment transferred to the territory, jurisdiction or control of the 

authorities represented by TECRO pursuant to this Agreement and 

any source material or special fissionable material used in or 

produced through the use of material, equipment or components so 

transferred shall be subject to safeguards in accordance with the terms 

ofthe Safeguards Transfer Agreement and to the measures provided 

for in the Model Additional Protocol (published in INFCIRCI540). 

Furthermore, the Agreed Minute, Section 1 establishes that: 

a. At the time of entry into force of the Agreement, all source 

material, special fissionable material, minor actinides separated from 

special fissionable material, moderator material, tritium and 

equipment in all nuclear activities in the territory or under the 

jurisdiction or control of the authorities represented by TECRO shall 

be subject to the Agreement as though such material or equipment had 

been transferred under the Agreement to the territory of the authorities 

represented by TECRO or to their jurisdiction or control. 
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b. After entry into force ofthe Agreement, no source material, special 

fissionable material, minor actinides separated from special 

fissionable material, moderator material, tritium, equipment, or 

components for use in nuclear activities shall be produced, developed, 

or manufactured in the territory of, permitted to enter the territory of, 

or be transferred to the jurisdiction or control of, the authorities 

represented by TECRO, without the prior written consent of AIT. 

AIT consent is hereby granted for the production of source material 

or special fissionable material from material, equipment, or 

components for which the prior written consent of AIT required by 

this paragraph has already been granted. 

c. After entry into force of the Agreement, all source material, special 

fissionable material, minor actinides separated from special 

fissionable material, moderator material, tritium and equipment 

(regardless of origin) produced, developed, or manufactured in the 

territory of, or that are transferred for use in nuclear activities to the 

territory, jurisdiction or control of the authorities represented by 

TECRO shall, upon the consent of AIT referred to in paragraph b. 

above, be subject to the Agreement and included in the inventories 

required to be established pursuant to Article 10, paragraphs 7 and 8. 

As a consequence of these provisions, all nuclear material in all nuclear activities 

on Taiwan at the time of conclusion of the proposed Agreement and all nuclear 

material subsequently transferred to Taiwan are required by the terms of the 

proposed Agreement to be safeguarded. 

V. THIRD-PARTY SUPPLY UNDER THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT 

Over thirty years ago, the United States government determined it would not 

use nonproliferation conditions to create a monopoly supply situation regarding 

the export of nuclear material, equipment, and components to Taiwan. As noted 

above, in the absence of any other vehicle for application of safeguards, no other 

country besides the United States had the ability to engage in direct nuclear trade 

with the authorities on Taiwan and still meet its obligations to require safeguards 

on exports. Consequently, the United States has long allowed such supply by 

others to Taiwan to be treated as though it came from the United States and added 

to the inventory of U.S. transfers to Taiwan. However, by the same token, the 
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United States also detennined that it did not want other suppliers to use our nonproliferation vehicle to undercut U.S. suppliers through unfair trade practices or 

to burden the United States as a consequence of their sales. As a consequence, 

the United States has concluded agreements or other arrangements establishing 

conditions for supply to Taiwan with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 

the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Under these agreements or 

arrangements, supply from these countries is treated as though it came from the 

United States and reported to the IAEA as such, whether or not the supply 

actually entered U.S. territory. 

Consequently, another objective of the proposed Agreement is to bring this 

third-party supply under the Agreement. The provisions of the Agreed Minute 

noted in the previous section require U.S. consent for production on Taiwan of 

source material, special fissionable material, minor actinides separated from 

special fissionable material, moderator material, tritium, equipment, or 

components or for their import from a third party. However, once consent is 

granted, the specified items become subject to the proposed Agreement, and 

hence subject to the reporting requirements of the Safeguards Transfer 

Agreement. Under this procedure, the United States will be aware of all proposed 

production on Taiwan or any third-party supply and be able to ensure that the 

United States is not being economically disadvantaged. The authorities on 

Taiwan and the United States will have the information needed to exercise the 

reporting requirements of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement. A separate 

provision of the Agreed Minute provides, inter alia, that AIT will not use this 

consent right to the economic disadvantage of the people or authorities on 

Taiwan: 

The provisions of the Agreement shall not be used for the purpose of 

securing unfair commercial or industrial advantages, of restricting 

trade to the disadvantage of persons from the territory of the 

authorities represented by either Party, or of hampering the 

commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic, 

of the authorities represented by either Party. 

VI. ADVANCE, LONG-TERM ("PROGRAMMATIC") CONSENT 

As noted above, at the request of the authorities represented by TECRO, the 

proposed Agreement provides advance, long-tenn ("programmatic") approval from 

AIT for retransfers by the authorities represented by TECRO of irradiated nuclear 

material subject to the Agreement to France or other countries or destinations as 
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may be agreed upon in writing by the Parties, for storage and reprocessing. (It is 

understood by the Parties that transfers for storage without reprocessing may occur 

and are covered by this consent.) All such transfers shall be in compliance with 

the policies, laws, and regulations of the recipient country or destination (Agreed 

Minute, "Retransfers"). Additionally, all such transfers shall be subject to the 

following conditions: 

• Prior to any such transfer, TECRO shall provide AlI with at least 

thirty days advance notice of a proposed transfer to allow the 

authorities represented by AIT sufficient time to obtain confirmation 

from the receiving country or destination, or, in the case of a proposed 

transfer to a country that is a member of the European Atomic Energy 

Community (EURATOM), from EURATOM, that source material 

and special fissionable material to be transferred will be held within 

EURATOM (if the transfer is to a EURATOM member country) or 

the receiving country or destination subject to the terms and 

conditions of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation to which 

the authorities represented by AIT are party and which authorizes 

nuclear exports from the jurisdiction ofthe authorities represented by 

AIT to EURATOM or to that country or destination, as appropriate. 

TECRO shall not proceed with the proposed retransfer until AlI 

notifies TECRO of the receipt of such confirmation. 

• TECRO through its designated representatives shall keep records of 

any such transfers to any other country or destination as may be 

agreed upon in writing by the Parties and shall upon shipment notifY 

AlI through its designated representatives of each transfer. 

• The detailed provisions for such notifications and records shall be 

described in the Administrative Arrangement referred to in Article 14 

of the Agreement. 

• The transfer of any special fissionable material recovered from any 

such reprocessing to the territory of the authorities represented by 

TECRO shall require written agreement of the Parties and shall be 

subject to the following conditions: 
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o Any such speciaijissionabie material returned to the territory 

of the authorities represented by TECRO shall be subject to the 

Agreement; 

o Any special jissionable material recovered from any such 

reprocessing shall be transferred in the form as agreed by the 

Parties; and 

o No later than 60 days prior to each shipment to the territory of 

the authorities represented by TECRO of any special 

jissionable material recovered from any such reprocessing, 

TECRO shall provide AIT with a written notification that shall 

include a statement advising that the measures arranged for the 

international transport are in accordance with the provisions of 

the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 

and its subsequent amendments that the Parties agree to apply. 

This consent regarding retransfers may be suspended or withdrawn in whole 

or in part by either Party if that Party considers that one or more of the above 

conditions is not satisfied, or if it considers that exceptional circumstances of 

concern from a nonproliferation or security standpoint so require. To the extent 

that time and circumstances permit, the Parties will consult prior to any such 

suspension or withdrawal. Such exceptional circumstances include, but are not 

limited to, a determination by either Party that the approval cannot be continued 

without a significant increase of the risk of proliferation or without jeopardizing 

the security of the territory of the authorities it represents. 

There is precedent for programmatic approval for retransfers ofU.S.-

obligated irradiated nuclear material to France, with any transfer of the recovered 

plutonium back to the original location requiring further U.S. approval. 

Specifically, the United States provided such approval in an agreement for 

cooperation concluded with Norway in the mid-1980s and in 2009 with the United 

Arab Emirates (UAE). The U.S. bilateral agreements with Sweden and Finland 

have been replaced by the 1996 Agreement for Cooperation Between the United 

States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community Concerning 

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (U.S.-EURATOM Agreement) (signed 

November 7,1995, and March 29,1996, entered into force April 12, 1996 (House 

document No. 104-138)), since Sweden and Finland are Member States of the 

European Union. The bilateral U.S.-Norway Agreement (signed January 12, 1984, 

entered into force July 2,1984) remains in force (House Document No. 98-164). 
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The programmatic approval provisions in the proposed Agreement are modeled 

very closely on the corresponding provisions in the US.-UAE Agreement. 

In acceding to the request from the authorities represented by TECRO, the 

authorities represented by AIT considered the fact that routine removal of spent 

fuel from the East Asia region offered prima facie benefits from a nonproliferation 

perspective, for example by transferring the obligation to maintain adequate 

physical protection with regard to this nuclear material to jurisdictions with greater 

experience in implementing such obligations. 

As detailed in Part III above, provision in the Agreement of an advance AIT 

programmatic consent for retransfer of irradiated material to France for 

reprocessing or storage is consistent with applicable statutory requirements. There 

is adequate protection of AIT interests through the AIT ability to terminate the 

advance consent regarding such retransfers under certain conditions, and through 

continued AIT control over any return to Taiwan of the recovered special 

fissionable material. U.S. policy is to limit the number of reprocessing facilities 

worldwide. The approach taken in the Agreement allows the authorities on Taiwan 

to plan rationally for their intended civil nuclear power program while maintaining 

strong nonproliferation policies. It does not result in the establishment of new 

reprocessing facilities but relies on use of those that already exist, in a jurisdiction 

to which the United States Government has already given its prior approval for 

reprocessing U.S.-obligated nuclear material. Under the 1996 US.-EURATOM 

Agreement the United States has given EURATOM advance, long-term 

("programmatic") approval for the reprocessing of spent fuel subject to that 

Agreement. (See House Doc. No. 104-138 for a discussion of that approval.) Any 

spent fuel subject to the proposed Agreement subsequently retransferred by the 

authorities on Taiwan to EURATOM would become subject to the US.-

EURATOM Agreement, including the controls that the United States would have 

under that U.S.-EURATOM agreement on the disposition of special fissionable 

material recovered from reprocessing of that spent fuel to countries outside 

EURATOM. If AIT and TECRO were to agree in writing to the transfer of 

irradiated source material or special fissionable material to another country or 

destination, such material must be subject to the terms and conditions of an 

agreement for cooperation to which the authorities represented by AIT and the 

recipient country or destination are party and which authorizes nuclear exports 

from the territory or jurisdiction of the authorities represented by AIT to that 

country or destination. 
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The programmatic arrangement for TECRO permitting retransfers of spent 

nuclear fuel to France or other countries or destinations as may be agreed for 

storage or reprocessing will help to ensure the continued cooperation of the 

authorities represented by TECRO with the authorities represented by AIT on 

nonproliferation matters. Spent fuel disposition is a difficult issue for many 

recipients of U.S. power reactor fuel. In giving advance approval for these 

retransfers, the authorities represented by AIT recognize the importance of 

allowing cooperating partners to manage their fuel cycles in a predictable marmer 

consistent with energy security and nonproliferation objectives. 

It should be emphasized that limitations on the types of special fissionable 

material that may be transferred under the Agreement would preclude the 

retransfer of separated plutonium from EURATOM to the territory of the 

authorities represented by TECRO following reprocessing in France. 

The proposed Agreement requires that all transfers of spent fuel to third 

parties for storage and reprocessing must be in compliance with the policies, laws, 

and regulations of the recipient country or destination, including any requirement 

that indicates a provisional period for the receipt and treatment of such irradiated 

source material or special fissionable material, or that the waste produced as a 

result of the reprocessing be returned to the territory of the authorities represented 

by TECRO. Should the authorities on Taiwan not be willing or able to take back 

the spent fuel or radioactive waste associated with storage and reprocessing, the 

United States government has no legal obligation to accept this waste or spent fuel 

into the United States, nor does the United States have any other obligation with 

respect to that waste. This provision also imposes no legal obligation on the 

United States with respect to disposition of the recovered special nuclear material, 

in particular the plutonium. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Entry into force of the proposed Agreement will put in place a framework 

for mutually beneficial civil nuclear cooperation between the authorities 

represented by AIT and the authorities represented by TECRO and provide a 

foundation for continued collaboration on nuclear non-proliferation goals. 

On the basis of the analysis in this NP AS and all pertinent information of 

which it is aware, the Department of State has arrived at the following assessment, 

conclusions, views, and recommendations: 
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1. The safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use 

assurances in the proposed Agreement are adequate to ensure that any assistance 

furnished thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive 

purpose. 

2. The Agreement meets all the legal requirements of the Act and the 

NNPA. 

3. Execution of the proposed Agreement would be compatible with the nonproliferation program, policy, and objectives of the United States. 

4. Therefore, it is recommended that the President approve and authorize 

the execution of the proposed Agreement; and that the President determine that the 

performance of the proposed Agreement will promote, and will not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. 
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

SjES 201318492 

UNCLASSIFIED December 5, 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: John F. Kerry~ Secretary of State 

Ernest Moniz F------. 

Secretary ofEnerg~ / 

SUBJECT: Proposed Agreement Between the American Institute in Taiwan 

and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the 

United States Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 

The attached proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the American 

Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in 

the United States Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the "Agreement") 

will supersede the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the 

United States of America and the Government of the Republic of China 

Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed in Washington, April 4, 1972, 

as amended and extended March 15, 1974 (the "1972 Agreement for 

Cooperation"), which will expire by its terms June 22, 2014. If you authorize 

execution of the Agreement, it will be signed by representatives of the American 

Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 

Office in the United States (TECRO). After signature, in accordance with sections 

123 band d ofthe Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the "Act"), the 

Agreement must be submitted to both houses of Congress for a review period of 

90 days of continuous session. Unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted, 

the Agreement may be brought into force upon completion of the review period. 

The Agreement provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear 

cooperation with the authorities on Taiwan based on a mutual commitment to 

nuclear nonproliferation. The Agreement will continue in force indefinitely. 

Either party may terminate the proposed Agreement on one year's written notice. 

The Agreement permits the transfer of information, material, equipment (including 

reactors), and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production. The 

proposed Agreement prohibits the possession by the authorities on Taiwan of 

UNCLASSIFIED 
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UNCLASSIFIED 

-2-

sensitive nuclear facilities and any engagement in activities involving sensitive 

nuclear teclmology in the territory of the authorities represented by TECRO. It 

does not permit transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive 

nuclear facilities, or major critical components of such facilities. In the event of 

termination of the Agreement, key nonproliferation conditions and controls 

continue with respect to material, equipment, and components subject to the 

Agreement. 

The proposed Agreement provides advance, long-term ("programmatic") 

consent to the authorities represented by TECRO for the retransfer of irradiated 

material, which is subject to the Agreement, to France, or other countries or 

destinations as may be agreed upon in writing by the Parties, for storage and 

reprocessing. It requires all such transfers must be in compliance with the policies, 

laws, and regulations of the recipient country or destination, including any 

requirement indicating a provisional period for the receipt and treatment of such 

irradiated source material or special fissionable material, or the waste produced as 

a result of the reprocessing be returned to the territory of the authorities 

represented by TECRO. Should the authorities on Taiwan not be willing or able to 

take back the spent fuel or radioactive waste associated with storage and 

reprocessing, the United States government has no obligation to take this waste or 

spent fuel back to the United States, nor does the United States government have 

any other obligation with respect to that spent fuel waste. This provision also 

conveys no obligation on the United States government with respect to disposition 

of the recovered special nuclear material, in particular the plutonium. 

As noted above, the advance U.S. consent to storage and reprocessing of 

irradiated material is limited to facilities in France or other countries or 

destinations as may be agreed upon in writing by the Parties. We have considered 

the question of whether this advance consent will result in a significant increase of 

the risk of proliferation beyond that which existed at the time the approval was 

granted, and have considered whether there would be timely warning "of any 

diversion well in advance ofthe time at which a non-nuclear weapon state could 

transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device." We have 

concluded the advance approval of reprocessing and storage will not result in a 

significant increase in the risk of proliferation. 

Over the last two decades, the authorities on Taiwan have established a 

generally reliable record on nonproliferation and on commitments to 

nonproliferation. While the political status of the authorities on Taiwan prevents 

them from formally acceding to multilateral nonproliferation treaties or 

UNCLASSIFIED 
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UNCLASSIFIED 

- 3 -

agreements, the authorities on Taiwan have voluntarily assumed commitments to 

adhere to the provisions of key multilateral treaties and initiatives. The Republic 

of China ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 

1970 and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 

and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC) in 1972. The 

authorities on Taiwan have stated they will continue to abide by the obligations of 

the NPT (Le., those of a non-nuclear-weapon state) and the BWC, and the 

United States regards them as bound by both treaties. The authorities on Taiwan 

follow lABA standards and directives in their nuclear program, work closely with 

U.S. civilian nuclear authorities, and have established relationships with mainland 

Chinese civilian authorities with respect to nuclear safety. A more detailed 

discussion of the domestic civil nuclear activities and nuclear non-proliferation 

policies and practices of the authorities on Taiwan, including their nuclear export 

policies and practices, is provided in the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 

Statement (NP AS) at Attachment 4, and in a classified annex to the NP AS 

submitted to you separately. An addendum to the NPAS containing a 

comprehensive analysis of the export control system ofthe authorities on Taiwan 

with respect to nuclear-related matters, including interactions with countries of 

proliferation concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or 

missile-related transfers to such countries, pursuant to section 102A of the National 

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended, is being submitted to you 

separately by the Director of National Intelligence. 

In accordance with the provisions of Section 123 of the Act and of the 

Taiwan Relations Act, the proposed Agreement was negotiated under the aegis of 

AIT by the Department of State, with the technical assistance and concurrence of 

the Department of Energy. The proposed Agreement has also been reviewed by 

the members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Commission's views 

are being submitted to you separately. 

In our judgment, the proposed Agreement satisfies all requirements ofU.S. 

law for agreements of this type. We believe, as well, that AIT cooperation with 

TECRO in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the proposed Agreement will 

be supportive of U.S. nonproliferation, foreign policy, and commercial interests. 

We recommend, therefore, you determine, pursuant to Section 123 b of the Act, 

that performance of the Agreement will promote, and will not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security; and that you approve the 

Agreement and authorize its execution. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
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Recommendation 

UNCLASSIFIED 

- 4-

That you sign the transmittal letter to the Congress at Attachment A and the 

Presidential determination, approval, and authorization at Attachment B. (The . 

transmittal will be held until the Agreement is signed.) 

Attachments: 

Tab A - Draft transmittal letter to the Congress (to be held until after the 

Agreement is signed) 

Tab B - Draft Presidential determination, approval, and authorization 

Tab C - Text of Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the 

American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural 

Representative Office in the United States Concerning Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear Energy 

Tab D - Text of side letters to the Agreement 

Tab E - Unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement 

UNCLASSIFIED 
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The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555·0001 

December 11, 2013 

In accordance with the provisions of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviewed the proposed Agreement between the 

American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 

(TECRO) in the United States Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. It is the view of 

the Commission that the proposed Agreement includes all of the provisions required by law and 

provides a sufficient framework for continued civilian nuclear cooperation between AIT and 

TECRO. The Commission therefore recommends that you make the requisite positive statutory 

determination, approve the proposed Agreement, and authorize its execution. 

~~ Allison M. Macfarlane 

o