MARITIME 

SECURITY

Progress and 

Challenges with 

Selected Port Security 

Programs

Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland 

Security and Justice

Testimony

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

10:30 a.m. ET

Wednesday, June 4, 

2014

GAO-14-636T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-636T, a testimony 

before the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs

June 4, 2014

MARITIME SECURITY

Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security 

Programs 

Why GAO Did This Study

Ports, waterways, and vessels handle 

billions of dollars in cargo annually, 

and an attack on our nation’s maritime 

transportation system could have dire 

consequences. Ports are inherently 

vulnerable to terrorist attacks because 

of their size, general proximity to 

metropolitan areas, the volume of 

cargo being processed, and their link 

to the global supply chain—that is, the 

flow of goods from manufacturers to 

retailers. Balancing security concerns 

with facilitation of the free flow of 

people and commerce remains an 

ongoing challenge for federal, state, 

local, and private stakeholders 

operating in ports.

Within DHS, several components are 

responsible for port security activities. 

These activities include, among other 

things, promoting maritime domain 

awareness, conducting port facility 

inspections, and screening incoming 

vessels’ cargoes for the presence of 

contraband such as weapons of mass 

destruction, illicit drugs, or explosives. 

This statement discusses progress and 

challenges in key areas of DHS port 

security programs. It is based on work 

GAO has previously conducted from 

September 2003 to September 2013 

with selected updates conducted 

through May 2014. For these updates, 

GAO contacted DHS officials and 

reviewed relevant documents. 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made 

recommendations to DHS to 

strengthen various port security 

programs. DHS generally concurred 

with the recommendations and has 

taken actions, or has actions under 

way, to address most of these 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

GAO’s prior work has shown that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and its component agencies—particularly the Coast Guard and Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP)—have made substantial progress in three key areas of 

port security since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), but some 

challenges remain. 

Maritime domain awareness and information sharing. DHS agencies along 

with other port partners have taken actions to enhance visibility over the maritime 

domain and facilitate cooperation among partners by collecting, assessing and 

sharing key information. However, some challenges remain in implementing the 

tools necessary to maintain this focus and increase coordination among 

stakeholders. For example, in multiple reports since 2011, GAO found the Coast 

Guard’s weak management of technology acquisitions—that were focused on 

enhancing maritime awareness and increasing communication among partners— 

resulted in these acquisitions not fully achieving their intended purposes. DHS 

concurred with GAO’s recommendations for addressing these weaknesses. 

Security in domestic ports. Since 9/11, DHS components have taken a wide 

variety of actions to better secure domestic ports. For example, the Coast Guard 

has assessed risks to cruise ships in accordance with DHS guidance and is 

providing escorts for high-risk vessels such as cruise ships and ferries while CBP 

is reviewing passenger and crew data to target inspections. In addition, since 

2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has provided almost 

$2.9 billion in federal funding through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) to 

help defray the cost of implementing security efforts in many ports and has 

established measures to improve the administration of the PSGP. However, in 

2014 FEMA stated that it is unable—due to resource constraints—to annually 

measure reduced vulnerability attributed to enhanced PSGP-funded security 

measures. Meanwhile, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the 

Coast Guard have been administering a program requiring maritime workers to 

obtain a biometric identification card to gain access to certain facilities. However, 

in 2011, GAO recommended that DHS assess internal controls to identify actions 

needed to address, among other things, weaknesses governing enrollment and 

background checks. As of March 2014 this action had not been completed. 

Protection of the global supply chain. DHS agencies, especially CBP, have 

taken steps to enhance the security of the global supply chain—particularly for 

cargo bound for the United States. Efforts have focused on assessing and 

mitigating cargo risk before it enters U.S. ports by better targeting and scanning 

cargo, and establishing security partnerships with the foreign countries and 

companies that ship cargo to the United States. However, in multiple reports 

since 2005, GAO found that DHS programs focused on protecting the global 

supply chain have been implemented with varying degrees of success and that 

many would benefit from the DHS agencies conducting further assessments of 

the programs, among other things. GAO has made recommendations to address

these issues and DHS has concurred or generally concurred with most of these

recommendations and has taken actions to address many of them.

View GAO-14-636T. For more information, 

contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610

or CaldwellS@gao.gov
 

Page 1 GAO-14-636T 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and Members of the 

Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) ongoing port security efforts and programs. Ports, 

waterways, and vessels handle billions of dollars in cargo annually, and 

an attack on our nation’s maritime transportation system could have dire 

consequences. Ports are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks 

because of their size, general proximity to metropolitan areas, the volume 

of cargo being processed, and the ready access the ports have to 

transportation links into the United States. An attack on a large port could 

also have a widespread impact on the broader global supply chain—the 

flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers—and the world economy. 

Balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of 

people and commerce remains an ongoing challenge for federal, state, 

local, and private stakeholders operating in ports.

Within DHS, several components, including the Office of Policy, the U.S. 

Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO), and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) are responsible for port security activities. These 

activities include, among other things, promoting maritime domain 

awareness, conducting port facility and commercial vessel inspections, 

and screening incoming vessels’ cargoes for the presence of contraband 

such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illicit drugs, or explosives, 

while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and passengers.

My statement today discusses progress and challenges with DHS 

programs responsible for enhancing port security. Specifically, I will 

address maritime domain awareness and information sharing, security in 

domestic ports, and protection of the global supply chain.

My statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 

September 2003 through September 2013 related to maritime, port, 

vessel, and cargo security—with selected updates on how DHS 

responded to our prior recommendations, which we conducted through 

May 2014. To perform the work for our previous reports and testimonies, 

we visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program 

documents, port security plans, and other documents; and interviewed 

officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors, 

among other things. The officials we met with represented a wide variety 

of stakeholders including the Coast Guard, CBP, port authorities, terminal 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-636T 

operators, vessel operators, foreign governments, and international trade 

organizations. For the selected updates, we contacted DHS officials and 

reviewed relevant documents pertaining to the status of recommendation 

implementation. Further details on the scope and methodology for the 

previously issued reports and testimonies are available within each of the 

published products. A list of products on which this statement is based is 

included at the end of the statement. We conducted the work on which 

this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), Congress 

established a new port security framework—much of which was set in 

place by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and 

the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port 

Act).1

Enacted in November 2002, MTSA was designed, in part, to help protect 

the nation’s ports and waterways from terrorist attacks by requiring a wide 

range of security improvements. Among the major requirements included 

in MTSA were (1) conducting vulnerability assessments for port facilities 

and vessels; (2) developing security plans to mitigate identified risks for 

ports, port facilities, and vessels; (3) developing a biometric identification 

card to help restrict access to secure areas to only authorized personnel; 

and (4) establishing a process to assess the security levels of foreign 

ports from which vessels depart on voyages to the United States.

This framework is implemented through various strategies and 

plans, and the combined efforts of several DHS components.

In 2006, the SAFE Port Act, which in part amended MTSA, became law. 

The SAFE Port Act required DHS to develop, implement, and update, as 

appropriate, a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international 

supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers. Further, 

 

1

Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064; Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884.

Background

Legislation, Strategies, 

and Plans
 

Page 3 GAO-14-636T 

the SAFE Port Act required DHS to establish pilot projects at three ports 

to test the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo 

containers at foreign ports.

The federal government has made progress in national and port-level 

security planning by developing strategies and plans. Specifically, the 

National Strategy for Maritime Security, published in September 2005, 

aimed to align all federal government maritime security programs and 

activities into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving 

appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities.2

DHS is the lead federal department and with its component agencies has 

responsibility for administering much of the port security framework, DHS 

and its components must balance security priorities with the need to 

facilitate legitimate trade through the efforts of several component 

agencies. DHS components with port security responsibilities include:

Further, the 

Coast Guard has developed Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP) to 

enhance the security of domestic ports around the country. Applicable 

governmental and private entities contribute to the AMSPs, which serve 

as the primary means to identify and coordinate Coast Guard procedures 

related to prevention, protection, and security response.

• Office of Policy: The Office of Policy leads the coordination, integration, 

and development of DHS-wide policies, programs, strategies, and plans.

• U.S. Coast Guard: The Coast Guard, among other things, conducts port 

facility and commercial vessel inspections and leads the coordination of 

maritime information-sharing efforts.

• TSA: TSA has lead responsibility for managing the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential program, which is designed to control the 

access of maritime workers to regulated maritime facilities in the United 

States.

 

2

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13) directed the Secretaries of 

Defense and Homeland Security to lead a joint effort to draft the national strategy. HSPD13 also directed DHS to develop eight supporting implementation plans to address the

specific threats and challenges of the maritime environment. These plans include 

overarching strategies such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness 

and are implemented by specific plans such as the Countering Piracy off the Horn of 

Africa: Partnership & Action Plan. 

Roles and Responsibilities
 

Page 4 GAO-14-636T 

• DNDO: DNDO is responsible for acquiring and supporting the 

deployment of radiation detection equipment, including radiation portal 

monitors at domestic seaports, to support the scanning of cargo 

containers before they enter U.S. commerce.

• FEMA: FEMA is responsible for administering grants to improve the 

security of the nation’s highest-risk port areas.

• CBP: CBP is responsible for the screening of incoming vessels’ crew and 

cargoes for the presence of contraband, such as WMDs, illicit drugs, or 

explosives. As shown in figure 1, CBP programs are involved throughout 

the global supply chain process.
 

Page 5 GAO-14-636T 

Figure 1: Global-Supply Chain Process

a

The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary program designed to improve the 

security of the international supply chain while maintaining an efficient flow of goods. Under this 

program, CBP officials work in partnership with private companies to review their supply chain 

security plans to improve members’ overall security.
 

Page 6 GAO-14-636T 

b

The Automated Targeting System is a mathematical model that uses weighted rules to assign a risk 

score to arriving cargo shipments based on shipping information. CBP uses the Automated Targeting 

System as a decision support tool in targeting cargo containers for inspection.

c The Container Security Initiative places CBP staff at participating foreign ports to work with host 

country customs officials to target and examine high-risk container cargo for WMDs before it is 

shipped to the United States. CBP officials identify the containers that may pose a risk for terrorism 

and request that the officials’ foreign counterparts examine the contents of the containers.

Our prior work has shown that DHS and its component agencies—

particularly the Coast Guard and CBP—have made substantial progress 

in implementing various programs that, collectively, have enhanced port 

security but some challenges remain. Examples of progress and 

challenges in the areas of (1) enhancing maritime domain awareness and 

information sharing, (2) increasing security in domestic ports, and (3) 

protecting the global supply chain are discussed below.

DHS, its component agencies, and other port partners have taken a 

variety of actions to enhance visibility of the maritime domain and 

facilitate cooperation among partners by collecting, assessing and 

sharing key maritime domain information, but challenges remain. Timely 

awareness of the maritime domain, and knowledge of threats helps the 

Coast Guard and other agencies to detect, deter, interdict, and defeat 

adversaries.

• Interagency operations centers: Interagency operations centers (IOCs) 

are physical or virtual centers of collaboration to improve maritime 

domain awareness and operational coordination among port partners—

including federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Port 

partners are able to use these centers to participate in maritime security 

activities, such as the implementation and administration of intelligence 

activities, information sharing, and vessel tracking. The SAFE Port Act 

required the establishment of certain IOCs, and the Coast Guard 

Authorization Act of 2010 further specified that IOCs must provide, where 

practicable, for the physical colocation of the Coast Guard with its port 

partners, and that IOCs must include information management systems.3

In February 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard is continuing its 

efforts to establish IOCs at 35 locations and share maritime domain 

awareness information with its port partners.4

 

3

46 U.S.C. § 70107a.

However, we identified 

4

GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management of 

Interagency Operations Centers, GAO-12-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2012).

DHS Has Made

Substantial Progress 

in Enhancing Port 

Security, but 

Challenges Remain

Maritime Domain 

Awareness and 

Information Sharing
 

Page 7 GAO-14-636T 

factors that jeopardized the centers from meeting their purpose of 

improving information sharing and enhancing maritime domain 

awareness across federal, state, and local port partners, including weak 

management of the Interagency Operations Center Acquisition Project 

which was to provide information-management tools to improve 

interagency coordination, enhance awareness, and automate anomaly 

detection. As a result, we made five recommendations to address these 

issues—including recommendations related to improving the Coast 

Guard’s process for collecting data and incorporating port partners’ input 

into the development of requirements for an information-management 

and sharing system that would facilitate the IOCs. The Coast Guard 

concurred with these recommendations but has not implemented them, 

stating that neither the President’s fiscal year 2013 nor fiscal year 2014 

budget requested resources for the Interagency Operations Center 

Acquisition Project.

• Common Operating Picture: In general, the Coast Guard’s Common 

Operating Picture (COP) can be described as a map-based information 

system— that can be shared among Coast Guard commands—that 

displays vessels, information about those vessels and the environment 

surrounding them. As a way to display COP information, the Coast Guard 

in 2010 deployed the Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS).5

However as we reported in April 2013, there have been numerous issues 

with EGIS.6

 

5 EGIS is the Coast Guard’s geographic information system used to view and manage 

information about geographic places, analyze spatial relationships, and model spatial 

processes.

For example, Coast Guard information technology (IT) 

officials told us they had experienced challenges in meeting its goals for 

the system largely related to insufficient computational power on some 

Coast Guard workstations, a lack of training for users and system 

installers, and inadequate testing of EGIS software before installation. 

Consequently, the Coast Guard began developing a new COP-related 

technology, Coast Guard One View (CG1V). However, as we also 

reported in our April 2013 report, the Coast Guard did not follow its own 

IT development guidance when implementing CG1V. As a result, we 

recommended that the Coast Guard issue guidance clarifying the 

application of the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) for the 

development of future projects. The Coast Guard concurred with the 

6

GAO, Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common Operational 

Picture Development Would Strengthen Program, GAO-13-321 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 25, 2013).
 

Page 8 GAO-14-636T 

recommendation and reported that it planned to issue guidance and 

clarify procedures regarding the applicability of the SDLC. In January 

2014, the Coast Guard updated its SDLC tailoring plan. We reviewed the 

updated plan and determined that while it represented progress, it did not 

fully meet the intent of our recommendation because it was focused 

narrowly on the COP acquisition rather than more broadly clarifying 

procedures regarding the applicability of the SDLC for other IT projects 

as well. As a result, this recommendation remains open.

• Vessel and aircraft maritime domain awareness: To further enhance 

its ability to monitor the maritime domain, the Coast Guard planned to 

build a command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and put this system on 

all of its planes and larger vessels.7 This system was designed to 

improve the probability of executing a successful mission by increasing 

the speed and accuracy of the Coast Guard’s process of surveying the 

maritime domain, detecting and classifying targets, and then responding 

to the situation. A planned system-of-systems concept was intended to 

connect Coast Guard assets through a single command and control 

architecture—C4ISR.8 However, in July 2011, we reported that the Coast 

Guard had not met its goal of building the $2.5 billion C4ISR system.9

 

7

In July 2011, we reported that the Coast Guard was developing C4ISR infrastructure that 

it expected to collect, correlate, and present information into a single COP to facilitate 

mission execution. See GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater 

Program Remains Unachievable, 

Specifically, we reported that the Coast Guard had repeatedly changed 

its strategy for achieving the C4ISR system’s goal of building a single 

fully interoperable command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance system across the Coast Guard’s new vessels and 

aircraft. Further, we found that not all aircraft and vessels were operating 

the same C4ISR system, or even at the same classification level, and 

hence could not directly exchange data with one another. Given these 

uncertainties, we concluded that the Coast Guard did not have a clear 

vision of the C4ISR required to meet its missions. In response to our 

recommendation, the Coast Guard has developed needed 

documentation and truncated portions of the program. The Coast Guard 

is now working toward the goal of developing compatible and 

GAO-11-743 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011). 

8

A system-of-systems is a set or arrangement of assets that results when independent 

assets are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities. 

9

GAO-11-743. 
 

Page 9 GAO-14-636T 

manageable software packages on major cutters and medium-and longrange planes. We will continue to assess the C4ISR program through our 

ongoing work on Coast Guard recapitalization efforts and expect to issue 

a report in summer 2014.

Port stakeholders and DHS component agencies have implemented a 

wide variety of security measures that are intended to better secure U.S. 

ports. For example, in 2003, the Coast Guard issued regulations requiring 

offshore facility and port and operators to enhance their own security 

through the implementation of security plans for their facilities.10

• Port and offshore facility security plans and inspections: To enhance 

the security of port facilities, the Coast Guard has implemented 

regulations and programs requiring port facility security plans. Owners 

and operators of certain maritime facilities are required to conduct 

assessments of security vulnerabilities, develop security plans to mitigate 

these vulnerabilities. The Coast Guard inspects these facilities annually.

In addition to inspecting port facilities, the Coast Guard also conducts 

inspections of offshore facilities, such as oil rigs. In our October 2011 

report on inspections of offshore energy facilities, we found that the 

Coast Guard had taken actions to help ensure the security of offshore 

energy facilities, such as developing and reviewing security plans, but 

faced difficulties ensuring that all facilities complied with requirements.

Further, 

the Port Security Grant Program was established in 2002, and through 

FEMA’s management of this program, federal grant funding is made 

available to states, localities and private parties to help defray the costs of 

required security measures. Other security measures directly involving 

DHS agencies include Coast Guard inspections and escorts of high-risk 

vessels, among other actions.

11

 

10 33 C.F.R. §§ 105.400-.415, 106.400-.415.

We recommended that the Coast Guard develop policies and procedures 

to ensure that annual security inspections are conducted and information 

entered into databases is more useful for management. The Coast Guard 

concurred with these recommendations and is in the process of updating 

its guidance for Coast Guard units and program managers. In February 

2014, Coast Guard officials told us that the Coast Guard plans to improve 

its inspection database by March 2015.

11GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of Offshore 

Energy Infrastructure, GAO-12-37 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 2011).

Security in Domestic Ports
 

Page 10 GAO-14-636T 

• Port Security Grant Program: To help defray some of the costs of 

implementing security at ports around the United States, the Port 

Security Grant Program was established in January 2002 and since then 

has awarded almost $2.9 billion for port security efforts.

12 The Port 

Security Grant Program awards funds to states, localities, and private 

port stakeholders to strengthen the nation’s ports against risks 

associated with potential terrorist attacks. We reported in November 2011 

that, for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, allocations of these funds were 

based on DHS’s risk model and implementation decisions were made 

largely in accordance with risk.13 For example, we found that allocations 

of funds to port areas were highly positively correlated to port risk, as 

calculated by DHS’s risk model. However, we also noted that the method 

used to calculate vulnerability—a port’s relative exposure to an attack—

could be strengthened to better account for how the implementation of 

grant-funded security projects affects a port’s vulnerability score. 

Accordingly, we recommended that DHS develop a vulnerability index 

that accounts for how security improvements affect port vulnerability, and 

incorporate these changes into future iterations of the grant’s risk model. 

In February 2014, FEMA officials stated that they have determined that 

this specific enhancement is not achievable, in part because the agency 

lacks the resources to annually measure the reduced vulnerability 

attributed to enhanced PSGP security measures. However, they also 

stated that FEMA remains committed to improving the measure of 

vulnerability within the grant’s risk model. In our 2011 report, we also 

raised questions about the effectiveness of the administrative 

management of the grant program, and we recommended that FEMA 

develop timeframes and related milestones for implementing 

performance measures. In February 2014, FEMA officials provided 

documentation of management and administrative performance 

measures to help strengthen the implementation, administration and 

oversight of the PSGP, and thus we have closed this recommendation.

• Personnel access to port facilities: The Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential (TWIC) program, administered by TSA and the 

Coast Guard, requires maritime workers to undergo background checks 

and obtain a biometric identification card to gain unescorted access to 

 

12Pub. L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230, 2327 (2002). MTSA codified the program when it 

was enacted in November 2002. 46 U.S.C. § 70107.

13GAO, Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness 

Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-12-47 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2011).
 

Page 11 GAO-14-636T 

secure areas of regulated maritime facilities. Initiated in December 2001, 

we have been reporting on TWIC progress and challenges since 

September 2003.14 Among other issues, we have highlighted steps that 

TSA and the Coast Guard have taken to meet an expected surge in initial 

enrollment as well as various challenges experienced in the TWIC testing 

conducted by a contractor for TSA and the Coast Guard from August 

2004 through June 2005. We also identified challenges related to 

ensuring that the TWIC technology works effectively in the harsh 

maritime environment.15

In November 2009, we reported on the design and approach of a pilot 

initiated in August 2008 to test TWIC readers, and found that DHS did not 

have a sound evaluation methodology to ensure information collected 

through the TWIC reader pilot would be complete and accurate.16 As a 

result, we recommended that the DHS components implementing the 

pilot—TSA and Coast Guard—develop an evaluation plan to guide the 

remainder of the pilot and identify how they will compensate for areas 

where the TWIC reader pilot would not provide the information. DHS 

agreed and took initial steps, but did not develop an evaluation plan, as 

we recommended. Moreover, in May 2011, we reported that internal 

control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and 

use of TWIC potentially limit the program’s ability to provide reasonable 

assurance that access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities is 

restricted to qualified individuals.17

 

14GAO, Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation 

Security Act, but Concerns Remain, 

Accordingly, in our 2011 report, we 

recommended that DHS assess TWIC program internal controls to 

identify needed corrective actions, assess TWIC’s effectiveness, and use 

the information to identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting 

program objectives. While DHS concurred with our recommendation, as 

GAO-03-1155T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).

15GAO, Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before 

Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). TWIC readers and related technologies operated 

outdoors in the harsh maritime environment can be affected by dirt, salt, wind, and rain. 

16GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Progress Made in Enrolling 

Workers and Activating Credentials but Evaluation Plan Needed to Help Inform the 

Implementation of Card Readers, GAO-10-43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2009). 

17GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Internal Control Weaknesses 

Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives, GAO-11-657 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 10, 2011). 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-636T 

of May 2013 DHS had not taken significant action to address our 

recommendation. We therefore reaffirmed this recommendation in May 

2013, recommending to Congress that it repeal a requirement that DHS 

issue regulations consistent with the TWIC reader pilot and instead 

require DHS to complete an assessment that evaluates the effectiveness 

of using TWIC with readers for enhancing port security, and then use the 

results of the assessment to promulgate a final regulation as 

appropriate.18

In January 2014, the explanatory statement accompanying the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, directed DHS to complete the 

TWIC program assessment that we recommended within 90 days after 

the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (by April 

17, 2014).19

• Operations and escorts: To further protect ports, DHS agencies assess 

risks, conduct inspections, and escort high-risk vessels. For example, the 

Coast Guard has assessed risks to cruise ships in accordance with DHS 

guidance—which requires that the agency analyze threats, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences. CBP reviews passenger and crew 

data to help target inspections. In addition, the Coast Guard escorts a 

certain percentage of high-capacity passenger vessels—cruise ships, 

ferries, and excursion vessels—to protect against external threats, such 

as a waterborne improvised explosive device. Specifically, the Coast 

Guard has provided escorts for cruise ships to help prevent waterside 

attacks and has provided a security presence on passenger ferries during 

their transits. Further, the Coast Guard has conducted energy commodity 

tanker security activities, such as security boardings, escorts, and 

As of March 2014, DHS had taken steps toward addressing 

our 2011 recommendation, such as developing a list of control issues we 

identified in 2011 and establishing an Executive Steering Committee to 

address the recommendations. However, TSA had no estimate for when 

the effectiveness assessment would be completed.

 

18GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Card Reader Pilot Results Are 

Unreliable; Security Benefits Need to Be Reassessed, GAO-13-198 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 8, 2013).

19Explanatory statement accompanying Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. 

No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5.
 

Page 13 GAO-14-636T 

patrols. Such actions enhance the security of these vessels, thereby also 

protecting the ports in which they operate.20

DHS agencies have also taken steps to enhance the security of cargo 

bound for the United States—even before it arrives in U.S. ports. Some of 

these efforts have focused on increasing the volume, accuracy and timing 

of information available to DHS agencies for assessing cargo risk. Other 

efforts have involved an increased use of technology such as scanners. 

DHS agencies have also taken steps to enhance U.S. port security by 

establishing security measures and partnerships with the foreign 

countries and companies that ship cargo to the United States—so that 

cargo risk is assessed and mitigated before the cargo may enter U.S. 

ports. These various measures and programs have been implemented 

with varying degrees of success.

• Cargo screening and the Automated Targeting System: As part of its 

efforts to target high-risk maritime cargo containers for inspection, CBP 

screens containers in advance of their arrival in the United States. To 

enhance the screening of these containers, DHS developed the 

Automated Targeting System (ATS)–a computerized system that 

assesses information on each U.S.-bound cargo shipment and assigns it 

a risk score. CBP officers then use this risk score, along with other 

information, such as the shipment’s contents, to determine which 

shipments to physically examine. In September 2010, we reported that 

CBP had made progress in implementing ATS and enhancing it through 

the use of additional data.21

 

20For additional information on the Coast Guard’s role in protecting and/or escorting 

certain vessels, please see the following GAO reports. GAO, Maritime Security: Varied 

Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain, 

However, in 2012, we also found that more 

regular assessments of ATS were needed to enhance its targeting of 

maritime cargo containers and better position CBP to provide reasonable 

assurance of the effectiveness of ATS. We therefore recommended that 

the Commissioner of CBP (1) ensure that future updates to the rules that 

GAO-10-400 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2010); Maritime Security: Ferry Security 

Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further 

Enhance Security, GAO-11-207 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2010); Maritime Security: 

Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist 

Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007). 

21GAO, Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in 

Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges 

Remain, GAO-10-841 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2010).

Protection of the Global 

Supply Chain
 

Page 14 GAO-14-636T 

identify risks are based on results of assessments that demonstrate the 

effectiveness of such updates; and (2) establish targets for CBP’s 

performance measures and use those measures to assess the 

effectiveness of ATS on a regular basis to better determine when 

updates to the rules that identify risks are needed.22 CBP concurred with 

the recommendations and in May 2014 provided milestones for 

implementing the recommendations by June 2015.

• Deploying scanning technologies: Once cargoes such as those 

shipped in containers arrive in U.S. ports, DHS deploys various 

technologies to scan their contents. DHS technological improvements 

have been focused on developing and deploying equipment to scan 

cargo containers for nuclear materials and other contraband to better 

secure the supply chain. Specifically, to detect nuclear materials, CBP, in 

coordination with DNDO, has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal 

monitors at U.S. ports of entry. Most of the radiation portal monitors are 

installed in primary inspection lanes through which nearly all traffic and 

shipping containers must pass. These monitors trigger an alarm when 

they detect radiation coming from a vehicle or shipping container. CBP 

then conducts further inspections at its secondary inspection locations to 

identify the cause of the alarm and determine whether there is a reason 

for concern. In 2005, DNDO began working with CBP on a program to 

develop and test a type of next-generation radiation portal monitor—the 

advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP)—designed to both detect radiation 

and identify the source as benign, suspect, or a threat.23

 

22GAO, Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo 

Targeting System, 

The initial 

concept of the program was to develop, procure, and deploy enough 

ASPs to replace many of CBP’s currently deployed radiation portal 

monitors and handheld detectors at a cost of $2 billion to $3 billion, 

according to DNDO. However, in 2007, we found that the initial testing 

related to DNDO’s efforts to develop and procure the ASP was not 

GAO-13-9 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2012).

23GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from Cancelled Radiation Portal 

Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisitions, GAO-13-256 (Washington, D.C.: May 

13, 2013). As we reported in 2013, ASP may have reduced the rate of alarms that are 

triggered by benign radioactive materials that naturally occur in common items such as 

kitty litter and granite. The reduced rate of alarms may also have reduced the number of 

unnecessary secondary screenings.
 

Page 15 GAO-14-636T 

rigorous enough.24 Once the testing became more rigorous, these portals 

did not perform well enough to warrant deployment. Accordingly, DHS 

scaled back the program in 2010 and subsequently canceled the 

program in 2012, after DNDO had spent more than $280 million on 

development and testing.

• CSI program overseas: CBP has also developed the Container Security 

Initiative (CSI) program, which places CBP officials at selected foreign 

ports to use intelligence and risk assessment information to work with 

host country officials to determine whether U.S.-bound cargo container 

shipments from those ports are at risk of containing WMDs or other 

terrorist contraband.25 CBP’s selection of the initial 23 CSI ports in 2002 

was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but 

beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat information when it 

expanded the number of CSI ports. In September 2013, we reported that 

CBP had not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to 

the United States since 2005 and recommended that DHS direct CBP to 

periodically assess the risks from all foreign ports that ship cargo to the 

United States and use the results of these risk assessments to inform 

any future adjustments to CSI locations.26 DHS concurred and reported 

that, by December 2014, it plans to develop a process for conducting 

such periodic risk assessments. In addition, in a May 2014 letter to 

Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security reported that DHS will 

work to increase the percentage of containers scanned abroad and will 

engage other countries to discuss the potential expansion of CSI to 

additional ports that ship high-risk cargo to the United States.

• Megaports Initiative: We reported in 2005 and 2012 on the Megaports 

Initiative—a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

nonproliferation program that funds the installation of radiation detection 

 

24For further information regarding our work on the advanced spectroscopic portal, see 

GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate 

Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-07-1247T (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007); and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of 

Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the 

New Technology, GAO-09-655 (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009).

25As of July 2013, there were 58 CSI ports in 32 countries that, collectively, accounted for 

over 80 percent of the container shipments imported into the United States. 

26GAO, Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically 

Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO-13-764 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2013). 
 

Page 16 GAO-14-636T 

equipment at seaports overseas.27 The Initiative seeks to deter, detect, 

and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials from being smuggled 

through foreign seaports. At the time of our 2012 report, NNSA had 

completed 42 of 100 planned Megaports in 31 countries. NNSA equipped 

these seaports with radiation detection equipment and established 

training programs for foreign personnel. However, in 2012, we found that 

the Megaports Initiative and DHS’s Container Security Initiative were not 

sufficiently coordinated. For example, in two countries where both 

programs were operating, DHS officials told us that they were using 

personal radiation detectors—a type of equipment intended for personal 

safety but not appropriate for scanning containers—to inspect containers 

if their radiation detection equipment was broken. In both countries, the 

Megaports Initiative had more suitable equipment that DHS officials could 

have used to improve detection capabilities. We made several 

recommendations in our 2012 report, including that NNSA and DHS 

jointly assess the extent to which the two initiatives are effectively 

coordinated. In response to this recommendation, in December 2012, 

NNSA established standard operating procedures that formalized 

coordination between the two programs. Subsequently, the 

administration concluded that there were diminishing returns for new 

Megaports and limitations in the effectiveness of the technologies used 

and proposed reducing the initiative’s fiscal year 2013 budget by about 

85 percent. As a result, NNSA had planned to shift the initiative’s focus 

from establishing new Megaports to sustaining existing ones. However, 

we reported in 2012 that NNSA had not finalized a long-term plan for 

ensuring the sustainability of Megaports operations and recommended 

that NNSA finalize this plan. In response to this recommendation, in 

October 2012, NNSA finalized its sustainability plan.

• Secure Freight Initiative: The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) established 

pilot projects to test the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound 

containers at foreign ports to address concerns that terrorists would 

smuggle WMDs inside cargo containers bound for the United States. We 

testified in June 2008 that CBP faced difficulties in implementing SFI 

because of challenges related to host nation examination practices, 

performance measures, resource constraints, logistics, and technology 

 

27See GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing 

Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005) and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports

Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges, GAO-13-37 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 31, 2012). 
 

Page 17 GAO-14-636T 

limitations.28 In October 2009, we issued a report on SFI and 

recommended, among other things, that DHS, in consultation with the 

Secretaries of Energy and State, conduct cost-benefit and feasibility 

analyses and provide the results to Congress. CBP partially concurred 

with these recommendations, but CBP officials told us that CBP does not 

plan to conduct the analyses because it has insufficient funds to conduct 

such analyses. The SAFE Port Act, as amended in 2007 by the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, directed 

DHS to implement 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound maritime cargo 

container shipments by July 2012, but authorized DHS to extend the 

deadline for 2 years and renew such extension in additional 2-year 

increments if at least two of six statutory conditions existed.29 The former 

DHS Secretary exercised this authority and formally notified Congress by 

letter dated May 2, 2012 that she had extended the deadline until July 1, 

2014. In a letter to Members of Congress, in May 2014, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security stated that the conditions and supporting evidence 

cited in the 2012 deadline extension—negative effects on trade capacity 

and the flow of cargo and characteristics of foreign ports that prevent the 

installation of scanning systems— continue to prevail and preclude fullscale implementation.

• Partnerships with industry: The Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism (C-TPAT) program is a voluntary program that enables CBP 

officials to work in partnership with private companies to review and 

approve the security of their international supply chains. Companies that 

join the C-TPAT program commit to improving the security of their supply 

chains and agree to allow CBP to verify, among other things, that their 

security measures meet or exceed CBP’s minimum security 

requirements. This allows CBP to ensure that the security measures 

outlined in a member’s security profile are in place and effective. In return 

for their participation in the program, C-TPAT members are entitled to a 

reduced likelihood of scrutiny of their cargo. In April 2008, we found that 

the C-TPAT program held promise as part of CBP’s multifaceted 

maritime security strategy.30

 

28GAO, Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo 

Containers, 

We also found that the program allows CBP 

GAO-08-533T (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008).

29 Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701(a), 121 Stat. 266, 489-90 (amending 6 U.S.C. § 982(b)).

30GAO, Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its 

Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security 

Practices, GAO-08-240 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2008).
 

Page 18 GAO-14-636T 

to develop partnerships with the international trade community and 

provides CBP with a level of information sharing that would otherwise not 

be available due to CBP’s usual jurisdiction and activities. However, our 

report raised questions about the management of the program’s records 

and performance, and challenges in verifying that C-TPAT members 

meet security criteria. Thus, we recommended in 2008 that CBP 

strengthen program management by developing planning documents and 

performance measures, and by improving the process for validating 

security practices of C-TPAT members. CBP agreed with these 

recommendations and, in 2009, completed its development of policies, 

performance measures and guidance to ensure process improvements.

• International Port Security program: While CBP is focused on the 

security of the cargo shipped to the United States from foreign ports, the 

Coast Guard is focused on the security of both foreign and U.S. ports, 

and the vessels arriving in U.S. ports. Under the International Port 

Security program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to evaluate 

their antiterrorism security measures against established international 

standards. We reported in October 2007 that the Coast Guard had visited 

over 100 countries and found that most had substantially implemented 

international standards.31 In September 2012, we reported that the Coast 

Guard had made progress with implementing its International Port 

Security program despite a number of challenges.32 For example, we 

reported that the Coast Guard was able to alleviate sovereignty concerns 

of some countries by inviting foreign delegations to visit U.S. ports. 

Further, as we reported in September 2013, the Coast Guard had visited 

port facilities in over 150 countries by June of 2013 and developed a riskinformed model—that it updates annually—as part of its International Port 

Security program.

33 The Coast Guard uses the model to make informed 

decisions on how to engage each country within the International Port 

Security program, including (1) how often to visit ports, (2) how many 

staff to assign to a particular visit, and (3) whether the country requires 

assistance to enhance its port security.

 

31GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year 

Later, GAO-08-126T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

32GAO, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, GAO-12-1009T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2012). 

33GAO-13-764. 
 

Page 19 GAO-14-636T 

• Mutual recognition: Through mutual recognition arrangements with 

foreign partners, the security-related practices and programs established 

by the customs or maritime security administration of one partner are 

recognized and accepted by the administration of another.34 Both CBP 

and the Coast Guard have entered into such arrangements. For example, 

CBP can expand the reach of its supply chain security programs (such as 

C-TPAT) through mutual recognition arrangements. According to the 

World Customs Organization, mutual recognition arrangements allow 

customs administrations to target high-risk shipments more effectively 

and expedite low-risk shipments by, for example, reducing redundant 

examinations.35 In September 2013, we found that mutual recognition 

arrangements may allow the Coast Guard to allocate resources more 

efficiently and reduce risks.36 For example, we reported that the Coast 

Guard signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union 

that establishes a process for mutually recognizing security inspections of 

each other’s ports.37

 

34Mutual recognition arrangements can be entered into with other countries as well as 

other governing bodies, such as the European Union. For the purposes of this testimony, 

the countries and governing bodies that enter into mutual recognition arrangements with 

the United States are considered partners.

According to DHS documents and Coast Guard 

officials in Europe, by signing this memorandum of understanding, the 

Coast Guard plans to reassign some International Port Security officials 

from Europe to Africa, where certain countries are having more difficulties 

than others in implementing effective antiterrorism measures in their 

ports. Further, we reported that one trade-off of signing the memorandum 

of understanding is that Coast Guard’s International Port Security officials 

will not have the same opportunities to have face-to-face interactions and 

share port security information and practices directly with their European 

Union counterparts as in the past. Despite this trade-off, Coast Guard 

officials stated that entering into such arrangements increases 

efficiencies and noted that they intend to negotiate additional 

35The World Customs Organization is an intergovernmental organization representing the 

customs administrations of 179 countries, which aims to enhance the effectiveness and 

efficiency of Customs administrations. 

36GAO-13-764. 

37According to DHS officials, the European Union characterizes its port visits as 

“inspections.” Under the memorandum of understanding procedures, the Coast Guard 

recognizes a successful European Union inspection of its member states’ ports in the 

same manner as it would recognize a successful country visit by Coast Guard inspectors. 

Coast Guard officials stated that they have collaborated with their European counterparts 

to develop standard operating procedures for these port inspections. 
 

Page 20 GAO-14-636T 

memorandums of understanding with other foreign governments that 

have strong port inspection programs.

Thank you Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and Members of 

the Committee. This completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 1 GAO-14-636T 

For information about this statement please contact Stephen L. Caldwell, 

at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions 

included Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director, Laurier Fish, Kevin Heinz, Tyler 

Kent, Amanda Kolling, Glen Levis, Kevin Tarmann, Katherine Trimble, 

and Edwin Woodward. Additional contributors include Jonathan 

Bachman, Christopher Conrad, Frances Cook, Katherine Davis, Michele 

Fejfar, Alana Finley, Paul Hobart, Katherine Lee, and Tracey King.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 1 GAO-14-636T 

Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by 

Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports. GAO-13-764. 

Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2013.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from Cancelled 

Radiation Portal Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisition.

GAO-13-256. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2013.

Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Card Reader Pilot Are 

Unreliable; Security Benefits Need to Be Reassessed. GAO-13-198. 

Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2013.

Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common 

Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program.

GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and 

Sustainability Challenges. GAO-13-37. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 

2012.

Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of 

Its Cargo Targeting System, GAO-13-9. October 25, 2012.

Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 11, 2012.

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management 

of Interagency Operations Centers. GAO-12-202. Washington, D.C.: 

February 13, 2012.

Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and 

Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-12-47. 

Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of 

Offshore Energy Infrastructure. GAO-12-37. Washington, D.C.: October 

28, 2011.

Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains 

Unachievable. GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 2 GAO-14-636T 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Internal Control 

Weaknesses Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives.

GAO-11-657. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2011.

Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but 

Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security.

GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.

Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade 

Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, 

but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: 

September 10, 2010.

Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship 

Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 2010.

Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Progress Made in 

Enrolling Workers and Activating Credentials but Evaluation Plan Needed 

to Help Inform the Implementation of Card Readers. GAO-10-43. 

Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2009.

Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist 

DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to 

Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, 

D.C.: October 30, 2009.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced 

Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits 

of the New Technology. GAO-09-655. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009.

Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-

Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 

2008.

Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has 

Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges 

Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: 

April 25, 2008.

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility 

Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, 

and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 3 GAO-14-636T 

Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in 

Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity 

Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One 

Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 

Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.

GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.

Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before 

Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

Program. GAO-06-982. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.

(441228)
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