III 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 78 

Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report 

Iran to the United Nations Security Council. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 27, 2006 

Mr. FRIST (for himself, Mr. REID, Mr. ALLARD, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. 

BROWNBACK, Mr. BURR, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. 

ENSIGN, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. KYL, Mr. 

LIEBERMAN, Mr. LUGAR, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. 

SANTORUM, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. TALENT, Mr. WARNER, Mr. MCCAIN, 

Mr. VOINOVICH, Mr. DODD, Ms. CANTWELL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. KERRY, and Mr. MENENDEZ) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United 

Nations Security Council. 

Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 

(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty’’), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the Treaty, ‘‘not to receive the transfer from 

any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
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nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons 

or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 

nuclear explosive devices’’; 

Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 

of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 

19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Safeguards 

Agreement’’), which requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear materials and 

activities to ensure that such materials and activities are 

not diverted to any military purpose and are used for 

peaceful purposes and activities; 

Whereas Iran signed the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection 

with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons at Vienna on December 18, 2003 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Additional Protocol’’); 

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing 

an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years 

and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to 

produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities; 
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Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision 

to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, 

and stated that the suspension would cover all activities 

at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all 

feed material for enrichment, and the importation of any 

enrichment-related items; 

Whereas, in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the 

Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of 

its enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the 

IAEA was invited to verify, including the suspension of 

the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with or 

without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment 

Plant at Natanz, the suspension of further introduction 

of nuclear material into any centrifuges, the suspension 

of the installation of new centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel 

Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges at 

the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent 

practicable, the withdrawal of nuclear material from any 

centrifuge enrichment facility; 

Whereas, on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and 

clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that cannot be suspended 

will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited the 

IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the 

suspension of enrichment activities applied to all facilities 

in Iran; 
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Whereas, in November 2004, the Governments of the United 

Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran’s nuclear program (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Paris Agreement’’), securing a formal 

commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily 

suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for 

discussions on economic, technological, political, and security issues; 

Whereas the Department of State has reported for a decade 

on Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism and has declared 

in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism that 

Iran ‘‘remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2004’’; 

Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, 

in an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for ‘‘a world 

without America’’ and his desire ‘‘to wipe Israel off the 

map’’ and has subsequently denied the existence of the 

holocaust; 

Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires 

the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security 

Council and General Assembly of the United Nations; 

Whereas Article III.B–4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies 

that ‘‘if in connection with the activities of the Agency 

there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify 

the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 

and security’’; 
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Whereas, on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the 

Safeguards Agreement constitute noncompliance in the 

context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and 

that matters concerning Iran’s nuclear program have 

given rise to questions that are within the competence of 

the Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 

and security; 

Whereas, on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research efforts, nullifying the Paris Agreement; 

Whereas, in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence 

of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from 

the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran; 

Whereas Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Jack 

Straw warned Iranian officials that they were ‘‘pushing 

their luck’’ by removing the United Nations seals that 

were placed on the Natanz facility by the IAEA 2 years 

earlier; 

Whereas President of France Jacques Chirac said that the 

Governments of Iran and North Korea risk making a 

‘‘serious error’’ by pursuing nuclear activities in defiance 

of international agreements; 

Whereas Foreign Minister of Germany Frank-Walter 

Steinmeier said that the Government of Iran had 

‘‘crossed lines which it knew would not remain without 

consequences’’; 

Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ‘‘It is 

obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its 
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international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would 

indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N. 

Security Council.’’; 

Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ‘‘The Iranian government and nation has no fear of the Western ballyhoo 

and will continue its nuclear programs with decisiveness 

and wisdom.’’; and 

Whereas the United States has joined with the Governments 

of Britain, France, and Germany in calling for a meeting 

of the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations: Now, 

therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) condemns the many failures of the Govern4 ment of Iran to comply faithfully with its nuclear 

5 nonproliferation obligations, including its obligations 

6 under the Safeguards Agreement (as reported by the 

7 Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board 

8 of Governors since 2003), its suspension commit9 ments under the Paris Agreement, and prior com10 mitments to the EU–3 to suspend all enrichment11 and reprocessing-related activities; 

12 (2) commends the efforts of the Governments of 

13 France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek 

14 a meaningful and credible suspension of Iran’s 

15 enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities and 

16 to find a diplomatic means to address the non-
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1 compliance of the Government of Iran with its obli2 gations, requirements, and commitments related to 

3 nuclear non-proliferation; 

4 (3) strongly urges the IAEA Board of Gov5 ernors, at its special meeting on February 2, 2006, 

6 to order that Iran’s noncompliance with its safe7 guards obligations be reported to the United Nations 

8 Security Council; and 

9 (4) calls on all members of the United Nations 

10 Security Council, in particular the Russian Federa11 tion and the People’s Republic of China, to act expe12 ditiously to consider any report of Iran’s noncompli13 ance in fulfillment of the mandate of the Security 

14 Council to respond to and deal with situations bear15 ing on the maintenance of international peace and 

16 security. 

Æ