DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOSE ANGEL MALDONADO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-1396

[November 17, 2021]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Sherwood Bauer, Jr., 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 431996CF000135A.

Jose Angel Maldonado, Indiantown, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessenia J. 

Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, J.

Jose Maldonado appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to 

correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). 

He asserts that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing using the 1994 

sentencing guidelines pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 

in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000). The State counters that 

Maldonado is not entitled to resentencing because the trial court’s reasons 

for its upward departure were valid under both the 1994 and 1995 

guidelines. We agree with the State and affirm the denial of Maldonado’s

motion for the reasons stated below. We also affirm without comment all 

other claims raised in his motion.

In 1996, Maldonado entered a no-contest plea to attempted first-degree 

murder and burglary of a structure while armed. A scoresheet was 

prepared pursuant to the 1995 sentencing guidelines, which reflected his 

sentencing range as 124.2 to 207 months in prison. However, the trial 

court sentenced him outside the guidelines to 480 months in prison, 

providing two written reasons for its upward departure: “(1) the victim was 

especially vulnerable due to age and physical or mental disability, [and] (2) 
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the victim suffered extraordinary physical and/or emotional trauma and 

permanent physical injury or was treated with particular cruelty.” 

Maldonado argues that the 1995 guidelines were invalidated by Heggs, 

and that the 1994 guidelines should have been used, which provided for 

a sentencing range of only 103.65 to 172.75 months in prison. The trial 

court denied Maldonado’s motion. 

The standard of review from the denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion to 

correct illegal sentence is de novo. Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 476 

n.10 (Fla. 2018).

In Heggs, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated certain provisions of 

the 1995 sentencing guidelines. 759 So. 2d at 627. The Court 

acknowledged that its decision would only require the resentencing of 

defendants who were “adversely affected” by the application of the 1995 

guidelines, as amended by Chapter 95-184. See id. “[I]f a person’s 

sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines could have been imposed 

under the 1994 guidelines (without a departure), then that person shall 

not be entitled to relief under our decision here.” Id. The Second District 

interpreted Heggs to hold that a defendant was not “adversely affected” by 

application of the 1995 guidelines if the departure sentence was based on 

departure reasons valid under both the 1994 and 1995 guidelines. See 

Ray v. State, 772 So. 2d 18, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Kwil v. State, 768 So. 

2d 502, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 

In State v. Lemon, 825 So. 2d 927, 930 (Fla. 2002), the Florida Supreme 

Court approved the Second District’s holding in Ray that the limitation of 

Heggs to “adversely affected” defendants applied to departure sentences 

as well as guideline sentences. In Lemon, the trial court sentenced Lemon 

outside the 1995 guidelines and “gave two written reasons for its upward 

departure sentence: ‘offense created substantial risk of death or great 

bodily harm to many persons or to one or more small children,’ and ‘victim 

was physically attacked by [Lemon] in the presence of one or more 

members of the victim’s family.’” Id. at 928.

In her motion to correct illegal sentence, Lemon made the same 

argument as Maldonado does here: that under Heggs she was entitled to 

be resentenced under the 1994 guidelines. See id. at 928–29. The Florida 

Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that Lemon was not “adversely 

affected” by application of the 1995 guidelines because her sentence was 

an upward departure that could have been imposed under either the 1994 

or 1995 guidelines. Id. at 931. The Court explained that the statutory 

aggravated circumstances cited by the trial court were valid under both 
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the 1994 and 1995 guidelines, and thus, Lemon was not “adversely 

affected” by the 1995 guidelines and not entitled to relief under Heggs. 

See id.

Here, like Lemon and Ray, the trial court sentenced Maldonado outside 

of the guidelines for multiple departure reasons: “(1) the victim was 

especially vulnerable due to age and physical or mental disability, [and] (2) 

the victim suffered extraordinary physical and/or emotional trauma and 

permanent physical injury or was treated with particular cruelty.” First, 

a victim’s vulnerability was a valid basis for departure under both the 1994 

and 1995 guidelines. See § 921.0016(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1993) (departure 

from sentencing guidelines is justified where “[t]he victim was especially 

vulnerable due to age or physical or mental disability”).

Additionally, a victim’s suffering of extraordinary trauma, permanent 

physical injury, and the cruelty of the crime were likewise valid departure 

grounds under both the 1994 and 1995 guidelines. See § 921.0016(3)(l), 

Fla. Stat. (1993) (departure from sentencing guidelines is justified where 

“[t]he victim suffered extraordinary physical or emotional trauma or 

permanent physical injury, or was treated with particular cruelty”).

Thus, Maldonado was not “adversely affected” by the application of the 

1995 guidelines at his sentencing because the trial court imposed an

upward departure sentence based on statutory aggravating circumstances 

that were valid under both the 1994 and 1995 sentencing guidelines. See 

Lemon, 825 So. 2d at 931. As a result, Maldonado is not entitled to

resentencing pursuant to Heggs.

Affirmed.

LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.