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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 EASTERN DIVISION 

MONTROSE P. FORD, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-1139 

 Judge Sargus 

 Magistrate Judge King 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

ORDER AND 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This action sought review of the administrative decision denying 

plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. On February 28, 2013, this action was 

remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration of plaintiff’s 

mental impairments. Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 16. On June 25, 

2013, plaintiff was awarded fees, costs, and expenses under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of $5,000. 

Order, Doc. No. 21. Upon remand, plaintiff obtained a favorable 

decision and an award of benefits. 

This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff’s application 

for an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Doc. No. 

22. Upon unopposed motion, the Court previously stayed proceedings on 

plaintiff’s motion until October 31, 2014. Order, Doc. No. 24. 

Plaintiff has filed a motion to lift the stay and has offered 

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additional support for his application for attorney’s fees. Doc. No. 

25. Plaintiff’s motion to lift the stay is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s motion for fees seeks an award of $11,332.35 for 

41.75 hours of work performed in this case. The Commissioner does not 

oppose the request; according to the Commissioner, plaintiff’s request 

for an award of $11,332.35 in attorney’s fees “represents an hourly 

fee of $271.43 for the 41.75 hours of work performed in this case and 

is a reasonable fee.” Doc. No. 26., p. 1. 

By statute, a court must award "a reasonable fee . . . not in 

excess of 25 per cent of the total past-due benefits." 42 U.S.C. § 

406(b). A fee award should reflect the purpose of the social security 

program to provide a measure of economic security to the recipient, 

the extent and type of legal services provided, the complexity of the 

case, the level of skill and competence required of the attorney, the 

amount of time spent on the case, the results achieved, and the level 

at which the favorable decision was made. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.925(b); 

416.1525(b). A fee agreement between a recipient and his or her 

counsel “should be given the weight ordinarily accorded a rebuttable 

presumption.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1989). 

Deductions are permissible when there is improper conduct or 

ineffectiveness of counsel or when counsel would otherwise enjoy a 

windfall because of either an inordinately large benefit award or 

minimal effort expended in the matter. Hayes v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 923 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1990). “[A] hypothetical 

hourly rate that is less than twice the standard rate is per se

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reasonable.” Id. at 422. In the final analysis, an award must be 

“reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 

U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 

 Upon consideration of all the appropriate factors, the Court 

concludes that the requested fee is reasonable. It is far less than 

25% of the past-due benefits, plaintiff has signed a contingency fee, 

the requested fee does not reflect a rate of compensation more than 

twice the standard rate and it cannot be said that plaintiff’s counsel 

was ineffective or expended minimal effort in the case. 

 Upon consideration, the Court determines that an award of 

$11,332.35 is a reasonable fee. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the 

Court award plaintiff's counsel an attorney's fee of $11,332.35, or 

twenty-five percent (25%) of the past due benefits, whichever is less. 

 At plaintiff’s request, and to prevent double-recovery, see 

Jankovich v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 867, 871 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989), it is 

RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s counsel be ordered to refund to plaintiff 

his previous award of $5,000 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access 

to Justice Act, and, upon doing so, make a formal representation of 

such on the record. 

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report 

and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file 

and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, 

specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part 

thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections 

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must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy 

thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to 

de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

October 30, 2014 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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