IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

Gregory Gimbrone, :

 Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:12-cv-251

 v. : JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

 Magistrate Judge Kemp

Dr. Krisher, et al., :

 Defendants. :

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court to consider a motion to

supplement the amended complaint (Doc. #42), a motion for an

extension of time (Doc. #50), and a motion for a teleconference

(Doc. #56) filed by plaintiff Gregory Gimbrone, and a motion to

stay (Doc. #60) and a motion to strike (Doc. #59) filed by

defendants Dr. Gary Krisher, the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction, Ms. Beth Higginbotham, and Mr.

Corby Free (collectively “defendants”). For the reasons set

forth below, the motions will be denied. 

I. Background

Plaintiff, Gregory Gimbrone, is a prisoner who resides at

the Chillicothe Correctional Institution. On March 22, 2012, Mr.

Gimbrone filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging

that defendants improperly denied him the use of a cane beginning

in 2010. (Doc. #2). More specifically, Mr. Gimbrone alleged

that he suffers from foot problems as a result of the partial

amputation of his right foot when he was fourteen (although the

foot was subsequently reattached), and that he used a cane on a

fairly consistent basis from 1999, when he was first

incarcerated, until 2010. Id. at 3. Mr. Gimbrone sought

restoration of the cane, as well as substantial monetary damages

for the time he has spent without it. Id. at 5. 

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On April 27, 2012, defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint, citing a variety of grounds for dismissal, including

the Eleventh Amendment, qualified and state-law immunity, and the

failure to plead facts sufficient to state a viable Eighth

Amendment claim. (Doc. #11). Rather than responding directly to

the motion to dismiss, Mr. Gimbrone asked the Court for leave to

amend his complaint. (Doc. #13). The Court granted the motion

(Doc. #17), and Mr. Gimbrone filed his amended complaint on June

11, 2012 (Doc. #19).

On October 24, 2012, Mr. Gimbrone filed a motion to

supplement the amended complaint. (Doc. #42). Defendants did

not file a response to the motion. Thereafter, Mr. Gimbrone

filed a motion for extension of time (Doc. #50) and a motion for

a teleconference (Doc. #56). Defendants oppose the motion for

extension of time (Doc. #52) and filed a motion to strike the

motion for a teleconference (Doc. #59). Finally, defendants

filed a motion to stay (Doc. #60).

II. Discussion

The Court will first consider the motion to stay, followed

by consideration of the motion to supplement the amended

complaint. The Court will next consider the motion for a

teleconference and the motion to strike together. Finally, the

Court will consider the motion for an extension of time. 

A. Motion to Stay

On January 30, 2013, defendants filed a motion to stay the

remaining dates in the scheduling order until the Court rules on

defendants’ pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. #60). Because

there is no pending motion to dismiss, defendants’ motion will be

denied.

On May 25, 2012, this Court issued an order granting Mr.

Gimbrone leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. #17). With

respect to the motion to dismiss the original complaint, the

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Court stated that any determination as to the continued vitality

of the motion would be deferred until Mr. Gimbrone filed his

amended complaint and defendants moved or plead in response to

the amended complaint. Id. at 6. In the motion to stay,

defendants state “[s]ince that point, [the motion to dismiss] has

not been revisited.” Id. at 2. In the motion to stay,

defendants request that the Court rule on the motion to dismiss. 

Id.

As noted above, subsequent to the filing of the motion to

dismiss, Mr. Gimbrone filed an amended complaint. Consequently,

the amended complaint superseded the original complaint,

rendering the motion to dismiss moot. See Parry v. Mohawk Motors

of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2000)(noting that an

amended complaint supercedes the original complaint as the

“legally operative complaint”). Here, defendants did not attempt

to renew their motion to dismiss or file a new motion to dismiss

in response to the amended complaint; rather, defendants filed an

answer to the amended complaint. Under F. R. Civ. P. 12(b), a

motion to dismiss “must be made before pleading if a responsive

pleading is allowed.” By filing the answer instead of renewing

its motion to dismiss or filing a new motion to dismiss based on

the amended complaint, defendants lost the ability to file such a

motion based upon the defenses in Rule 12(b). See, e.g., BAC Home

Loans Servicing LP v. Fall Oaks Farm LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 818,

822-23 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss as untimely

filed based on the fact that it was filed contrary to “the

prohibition that a motion to dismiss must be made before a

responsive pleading is allowed”) (internal quotations omitted). 

To the extent that defendants seem to suggest that the

Court’s May 25, 2012 Order preserved the motion to dismiss, this

argument is without merit. This Court stated that the continued

vitality of the motion was deferred until defendants moved or

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plead in response to the amended complaint. Thus, it was

defendants’ actions that determined whether the motion would

remain before the Court. Defendants had the opportunity to renew

the motion to dismiss or file a new motion to dismiss based on

the amended complaint. Instead, defendants opted to file an

answer. In doing so, they allowed the motion to dismiss the

original complaint to remain moot, and it is not before the Court

for consideration. Defendants are left to make their arguments,

if they so chose, using a post-answer mechanism that complies

with the federal rules. See id. at 823. Because there is no

motion to dismiss pending before the Court, the motion to stay

the proceedings pending resolution of such a motion is denied. 

(Doc. #60).

B. Motion to Supplement the Amended Complaint

The Court now turns to Mr. Gimbrone’s motion to supplement

the amended complaint. (Doc. #42). Defendants have not filed a

response to the motion. F. R. Civ. P. 15(d) provides that, “[o]n

motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms,

permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any

transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of

the pleading to be supplemented.” In deciding whether to permit

a plaintiff to supplement the complaint, the Court must “take

into account the history of the litigation, including the history

of discovery, the parties’ efforts to prepare, implement, and

adhere to a case schedule, and the likely impact that such . . .

supplements have on the existing schedule.” U.S. v. American

Elec. Power Service, Corp., No. 02-99-1182, 2004 WL 2049263, at

*1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2004). 

In this case, Mr. Gimbrone has not submitted the proposed

supplement to the amended complaint, nor has he described matters

which have occurred since the filing of the amended complaint

that would warrant such a supplement under F. R. Civ. P. 15(d). 

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Because Mr. Gimbrone has not made the Court aware of any

transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after he filed

the amended complaint, the Court cannot, on just terms, grant the

motion to supplement. Consequently, Mr. Gimbrone’s motion to

supplement the amended complaint will be denied. (Doc. #42).

C. Motion for a Teleconference and Motion to Strike

The Court next examines Mr. Gimbrone’s motion for a

teleconference. (Doc. #56). In the motion, Mr. Gimbrone seeks a

teleconference “in an effort to avoid a motion to compel

discovery” relating to an interrogatory concerning Ms.

Higginbotham. (Id. at 1). Defendants filed a motion to strike

the motion for a teleconference, alleging that Mr. Gimbrone has

failed to comply with S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.1. (Doc. #59 at 2). 

Mr. Gimbrone filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to

strike. (Doc. #61). 

S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.1, which supplements the procedures

mandated by F. R. Civ. P. 37, provides that discovery-related

motions shall not be filed unless all extrajudicial means to

resolve the differences have been exhausted. Once such

extrajudicial means are exhausted, a party may then seek an

informal telephone conference with the Court. See Watson v. Citi

Corp., No. 2:07-cv-0777, 2008 WL 3890034, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug.

19, 2008). If, after the informal telephone conference, the

dispute remains unresolved, the party seeking the discovery may

then file a motion to compel pursuant to F. R. Civ. P. 37(a). 

See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.2. The motion to compel shall be

accompanied by a supporting memorandum and a certification

informing the Court of the extrajudicial means that have been

attempted to resolve the dispute. See id.

Here, it does not appear from the record that Mr. Gimbrone

has complied with the procedural requirements of S.D. Ohio Civ.

R. 37.1. Mr. Gimbrone may not seek a telephone conference absent

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a showing that he has exhausted all extrajudicial means to

resolve his differences with defendants. Although Mr. Gimbrone

attached a letter to his memorandum in opposition to defendants’

motion to strike, it appears to be defendants’ response to

discovery and does not indicate that the parties have attempted

to use extrajudicial means to resolve the dispute. Because Mr.

Gimbrone’s request fails to demonstrate compliance with S.D. Ohio

Civ. R. 37.1, it will be denied. However, should he be unable to

resolve the issue with defendants’ counsel, he may, at that time,

renew his request for an informal discovery conference. Further,

because Mr. Gimbrone’s motion for a teleconference will be

denied, the motion to strike will be denied as moot. 

D. Motion for Extension of Time

Finally, the Court considers Mr. Gimbrone’s motion for an

extension of time. (Doc. #50). In the motion, Mr. Gimbrone

seeks a modification of this Court’s July 19, 2012 scheduling

order. (Doc. #23). Mr. Gimbrone seeks an extension of ninety

days on the deadlines contained in the order because he is

attempting to retain paid counsel and defendants’ counsel have

allegedly failed to cooperate with his discovery requests. (Doc.

#50 at 1). Defendants have opposed the motion (Doc. #52), and

Mr. Gimbrone has filed a reply brief in support of the motion

(Doc. #55).

F. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) provides that a schedule may be

modified only upon a showing of good cause. Although the Court

has broad discretion to modify its own pretrial orders, it must

be remembered that “adherence to reasonable deadlines is critical

to maintaining integrity in court proceedings” and that “pretrial

scheduling orders are the essential mechanism for cases becoming

trial-ready in an efficient, just, and certain manner.” Shrieve

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 2:05-CV-0446, 2006 WL 1526878, at

*1 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 2006) (internal quotations and citations

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omitted). In determining whether the party seeking the extension

has demonstrated good cause, the Court is mindful that “the party

seeking an extension must show that despite due diligence it

could not have reasonably met the scheduled deadlines.” Id.

In the scheduling order, this Court stated that no date

“will be extended without a written motion which sets forth

particular reasons why good cause exists to grant an extension.” 

(Doc. #23 at 2). The first of Mr. Gimbrone’s reasons, that he is

attempting to retain paid counsel, is vague. As Mr. Gimbrone

admits, he “has been looking for qualified legal counsel since

the first day his Complaint was filed.” (Doc. #55 at 1). 

Without additional information, this Court is without reason to

believe that extending the dates as requested would result in Mr.

Gimbrone retaining counsel. Consequently, this reason does not

constitute good cause sufficient to extend the established

deadlines.

The Court now considers Mr. Gimbrone’s second reason for

seeking the extension, namely the alleged lack of cooperation by

defendants’ counsel. According to defendants, they have provided

Mr. Gimbrone with more than 200 pages of documents during

discovery. Defendants contend that they have timely responded to

all of Mr. Gimbrone’s discovery requests. Defendants further

represent that:

when Plaintiff and Defendants filed cross-motions to

compel discovery, it was Defendants’ counsel who arranged

for a telephone conference with the Court . . . to

expeditiously resolve the pending discovery issues. When

Defendants were ordered during that telephone conference

to arrange for Plaintiff to again review his medical and

mental health files, Defendants’ counsel personally

ensured that Plaintiff reviewed both files to his

satisfaction . . . less than a week after the telephone

conference, by personally traveling to Chillicothe

Correctional Institution to oversee Plaintiff’s tagging

and copying of his records. This occurred almost three

months before the . . . discovery completion deadline.

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(Doc. #42 at 3). Mr. Gimbrone disagrees with defendants’

representations and claims that they are denying him crucial

discovery resulting in his inability “to locate, identify and

subpoena witnesses.” (Doc. #55 at 1).

The discovery dispute generally referred to by Mr. Gimbrone

is not presently before the Court for consideration. As set

forth above, S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.1, which supplements the

procedures mandated by F. R. Civ. P. 37, governs the procedure

for filing discovery-related motions. There is no such motion

before the Court. 

In deciding whether to grant the requested extension, the

Court must look to whether Mr. Gimbrone made a showing of good

cause under F. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Ever mindful that adherence

to reasonable deadlines is critical to maintaining integrity in

court proceedings, the Court finds that Mr. Gimbrone has failed

at this time to provide sufficient information to demonstrate

good cause. Consequently, Mr. Gimbrone’s motion for an extension

of time will be denied. (Doc. #50). Again, however, should the

Court conclude that there is a legitimate discovery dispute which

cannot be resolved by the parties, and if the Court grants

additional discovery, it will extend the time for completing

discovery at that time because a showing of good cause would have

been made. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to supplement

the amended complaint (Doc. #42), the motion for an extension of

time (Doc. #50), and the motion for a teleconference (Doc. #56)

filed by Mr. Gimbrone are denied. The motion to stay (Doc. #60)

and the motion to strike (Doc. #59) filed by defendants are

likewise denied. 

 /s/ Terence P. Kemp 

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United States Magistrate Judge

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