DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND 

SECURITY

Opportunities Exist to 

Enhance Visibility 

over Collaborative

Field Mechanisms

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2013

GAO-13-734

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-734, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2013

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over 

Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS is the third-largest department in 

the federal government, with an annual 

budget of about $60 billion, 200,000 

staff, and a broad range of missions. In 

2002, DHS was created from 22 legacy 

agencies. The geographic overlap of 

these agencies’ legacy field office 

structures was extensive, underscoring 

the importance of collaboration among 

them when conducting missions that 

crossed across boundaries. As a 

follow-on to GAO’s September 2012 

report on DHS’s efforts to integrate 

field operations, GAO was asked to 

review DHS and key operational 

components’ use of collaborative 

mechanisms. This report (1) assesses 

DHS’s visibility over collaborative field 

mechanisms established by 

component agencies, and (2) 

describes factors that enhance or 

impede collaboration within these 

mechanisms, and the extent to which 

DHS has collected and disseminated 

successful collaborative practices. 

GAO analyzed selected mechanisms’

guidance; conducted 10 mechanism 

site visits based on their geographic 

diversity, among other factors; and 

compared their practices with 

collaboration practices identified in 

previous GAO work. GAO also 

interviewed DHS and component 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS (1) collect 

information on existing collaborative 

mechanisms for better visibility over

them, and (2) collect promising

practices from the mechanisms and 

distribute them to components. DHS 

concurred with the recommendations

and identified planned actions to 

address them. 

What GAO Found

Opportunities exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance 

its visibility over collaborative field mechanisms (i.e., multiagency groups such as 

task forces, committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration to 

more effectively and efficiently achieve their missions) established by component 

agencies. DHS, at the departmental level, has limited visibility over the universe 

and operation of these mechanisms and does not identify information from them 

that could further enhance collaboration across DHS and inform future DHS 

decisions. In the absence of a single DHS regional/field structure, DHS

components have created collaborative mechanisms to better integrate field 

operations by better coordinating their missions and sharing information.

However, when GAO sought to identify these mechanisms, in conjunction with 

DHS, senior DHS officials stated that while they maintain regular visibility over 

component activities—which may involve these collaborative mechanisms—DHS 

does not collect information on the types of mechanisms and collaborative 

practices these mechanisms employ because the mechanisms operate under the 

components, and thus this information was not readily available at the 

departmental level. DHS officials stated that primary oversight over the 

mechanisms is the responsibility of the operational components or mechanism 

participants. However, DHS’s own strategic goals emphasize the importance of 

cross-departmental integration and coordination to enhance DHS’s mission, and

DHS could benefit—on a strategic level—from greater awareness of these

mechanisms and the collaborative practices they employ. DHS is ultimately 

accountable for the resources that support these mechanisms, and is responsible 

for decision making about its overall field structure and for moving the 

department closer to its goal of greater component unification and integration. By 

collecting additional information on collaborative mechanisms, DHS could 

achieve better visibility over the universe of existing mechanisms, and thus be 

better positioned to analyze or implement any future changes to DHS’s 

regional/field structure. 

Participants from each of the collaborative mechanisms GAO reviewed identified

several common factors that enhanced their collaboration, which DHS could 

benefit from collecting and disseminating on a broader scale. For example, 

participants identified the value of sharing resources, information, and recognition 

of successful missions as examples of successful collaboration practices they 

employed. Officials also cited collaboration challenges, including resource 

constraints, rotation of key personnel, and lack of leadership commitment. As 

GAO’s fieldwork indicated, similar collaboration issues are relevant to multiple 

components, thus, DHS leadership could benefit from undertaking a review of 

collaborative mechanisms to solicit and identify promising practices, and then 

sharing this information among all components. In addition, given DHS’s more 

strategic perspective, a more centralized DHS clearinghouse of collaborative 

practices information could be more efficient to collect and more easily accessed 

by a wider range of DHS components than under the current structure, where 

such information may not be readily shared outside of individual components or 

mechanisms. Collecting and disseminating information on collaborative practices 

would allow DHS to inform components about promising practices and lessons 

learned from which they could benefit. 

View GAO-13-734. For more information, 

contact Joseph Kirschbaum at (202) 512-

9971or kirschbaumj@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Letter 1

Background 8

Opportunities Exist for DHS to Enhance Its Visibility over 

Collaborative Field Mechanisms of Its Key Operational 

Components 14

Participants Identified Practices That Enhanced or Served as 

Challenges to Collaboration; DHS Could Benefit from Collecting 

and Disseminating Promising Practices 17

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments 25

Appendix I Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected and 

Visited 28

Appendix II Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms Identified, 

but Not Visited 33

Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37

Appendix IV Key Issues to Consider when Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms 42

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 44

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Table

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operational 

Component Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected for 

Our Site Visits 13

Figures

Figure 1: Geographic Overlap among FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG 

Operational Boundaries in the Southwestern Region of 

the United States 3

Figure 2: States and Territiries That Include Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and Key Operational 

Component Collaborative Field Mechanisms and Our Site 

Visit Locations 10

Figure 3: Successful Collaborative Practices Most Frequently 

Identified by Participants from Selected Field 

Mechanisms 18

Figure 4: Challenges to Collaboration Identified Most Frequently by 

Participants from Selected Field Mechanisms 21

Abbreviations

ACTT Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives

BEST Border Enforcement Security Task Force

BUR Bottom-Up Review Report

CBIG Caribbean Border Interagency Group

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

COP Common Operational Picture

CTCEU/TTPG Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

Terrorist Tracking and Pursuit Group

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOD U.S. Department of Defense 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FURA Forces United for Rapid Action

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
Page iii GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

GPRAMA GPRA Modernization Act of 2010

HSI Homeland Security Investigations

HSTF-SE Homeland Security Task Force Southeast

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IOC Interagency Operations Center

JFC Joint Field Command

JIATF-South Joint Interagency Task Force-South

JTT Joint Targeting Team

NBU National BEST Unit

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NSARC National Search and Rescue Committee

OAM Office of Air and Marine

OBIM Office of Biometric Identity Management

OIC Operational Integration Center

OPS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning

OVS Operations Plan Vigilant Sentry

PA&E Program Analysis & Evaluation Division

QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

RCT Regional Concurrence Team

ReCoM Regional Coordinating Mechanism

RISC Regional Interagency Steering Committee

SAFE Security and Accountability for Every Port Act

SEWG Special Event Working Group

STBIC South Texas Border Intelligence Center

STC South Texas Campaign

TCO transnational criminal organization

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USAO U.S. Attorney’s Office

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

USMS U.S. Marshals Service

USSS U.S. Secret Service

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Page 1 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 27, 2013

Congressional Requesters 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the third-largest cabinetlevel department in the federal government, with an annual budget of 

about $60 billion, 200,000 staff, and a broad range of missions, including 

aviation, maritime, and border security, as well as emergency 

management and infrastructure protection, among others. In 2002, when 

DHS was created from 22 separate agencies, among other actions, it had 

to integrate many disparate agencies—some with long histories of 

independent or autonomous operations, and all with distinct operational 

cultures—while maintaining their unique strengths and capabilities.1 This 

merger presented significant public policy and management challenges 

for DHS. With its establishment, DHS also inherited the legacy field office 

structures and authorities of its component agencies, which resulted in an 

environment where components were conducting their respective 

missions in overlapping geographic regions. These overlapping 

component boundaries were especially relevant to DHS’s seven key 

operational components—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Secret 

Service (USSS)—and each component was accustomed to carrying out 

its missions within its identified set of geographic regions and system of 

field offices.2

Further, in November 2010, we reported on the overlap in mission and 

operational boundaries that exists among agencies at the northern and 

southern borders—a condition that requires coordination and 

 1

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS, which began operations in March 

2003. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

2

DHS officials identified the seven listed agencies as the key DHS operational 

components. GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Efforts to Assess Realignment of 

Its Field Office Structure, GAO-12-185R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2012).
Page 2 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

collaboration for efficient and effective law enforcement.3 In some cases, 

agencies have separate responsibility for investigating crimes that are 

committed by the same criminals or organizations in the same geographic 

region, making agency collaboration and coordination important to their 

mission success. The overlap in geographic and operational boundaries 

among DHS components that continues to exist underscores the 

importance of collaboration and coordination among these components 

when conducting their missions 10 years after beginning operations under 

DHS. Agencies not sharing information or coordinating their operations 

can lead to competition, interference, and operational inflexibility, as the 

DHS Inspector General reported in 2005 and 2007.4 However, 

interagency mechanisms or strategies to coordinate programs that 

address crosscutting issues may reduce potentially duplicative, 

overlapping, and fragmented efforts.5 Figure 1 provides an example of the 

extent to which geographic boundaries overlap in the southwestern 

United States for four of the seven DHS key operational components 

discussed in this report—FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG. 

 3

GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 

Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 18, 2010).

4

DHS, Office of Inspector General, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and 

Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 1, 2005), and DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between 

Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-07-38 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2007). 

5

GAO, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides 

Important Opportunities to Address Government Challenges, GAO-11-617T (Washington, 

D.C.: May 10, 2011).
Page 3 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Figure 1: Geographic Overlap among FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG Operational Boundaries in the Southwestern Region of the 

United States 

a

The map represents geographic and operational boundaries for FEMA Region VI, CBP Office of 

Border Patrol sectors, ICE Homeland Security Investigations special agent in charge field offices, and 

USCG sectors. 
Page 4 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Recognizing the overlapping geographic and operational boundaries of its 

components and the potential coordination and other benefits to be 

gained by better aligning its field organizational structure, DHS has 

considered potential organizational changes to its field structure twice 

since its inception in 2003. These efforts included a recommendation in 

DHS’s 2010 Bottom-Up Review Report (BUR) that the department create 

a single unified field structure for its key operational components to 

improve intra-agency coordination, among other things.6 However, we 

reported in September 2012 that creating a single unified field structure 

was no longer DHS’s preferred approach because of operational and 

budgetary constraints.7 We also reported that DHS could have better 

documented its examination of the potential costs and benefits of a single 

unified field structure. The department agreed with our findings and 

acknowledged that its efforts to assess regionalization, colocation, 

consolidation, and operational integration options could have been better 

documented. 

Even without a single unified field structure, increasing regional 

collaboration across DHS components may help facilitate more effective 

and efficient mission execution. For example, increasing collaboration 

across components could facilitate information sharing and allow 

agencies to coordinate their patrols within a common geographic region, 

allowing them to more effectively and efficiently conduct their missions. 

Increasing collaboration within DHS also aligns with both congressional 

and executive branch recognition of the need for improved collaboration 

across the federal government as indicated by the Government 

Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), 

which, among other things, establishes a new framework aimed at taking 

a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing on results and 

improving government performance.8 Moreover, DHS reported in its fiscal 

 6

The BUR report recommended the realignment of component regional configurations into 

a single DHS regional structure. The report also identified priority initiatives, such as 

strengthening aviation security and enhancing the department’s risk management 

capability, to strengthen DHS’s mission performance, improve departmental management, 

and increase accountability. DHS, Bottom-Up Review Report, (Washington, D.C.: July 

2010).

7

GAO-12-185R.

8

Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). GPRAMA amends the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. 
Page 5 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

years 2012-2016 strategic plan9 that while effective mechanisms exist for 

interagency and intradepartmental operational and intelligence 

coordination, the department must learn from the successes of the Joint 

Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) and other similar constructs 

to further integrate and enhance domain awareness across its efforts to 

secure the border and expedite lawful travel and trade.10

This report is a follow-on to our September 2012 report on DHS’s efforts 

to improve collaboration and integrate its field operations.11 It responds to 

your request that we review the extent to which DHS and key operational 

components are using collaborative field mechanisms—that is, 

multiagency groups such as task forces, committees, and teams that 

enhance stakeholder collaboration across the participating agencies in 

order to more effectively and efficiently achieve their missions.12 This 

report (1) assesses the extent to which DHS has identified the 

collaborative field mechanisms of its key operational components, and (2) 

describes factors that participants of selected mechanisms identified that 

enhance or are challenges to their collaboration, and assesses the extent 

to which DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative 

practices. 

 9

DHS, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, 

(Washington, D.C.: February 2012).

10JIATF-South, located in Key West, Florida, serves as the catalyst for integrated and 

synchronized interagency counterdrug operations and is responsible for the detection and 

monitoring of suspected air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of 

Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. In efforts to reduce the drug threat, JIATF-South works 

with partner nations; the Department of Defense; U.S. law enforcement agencies, such as 

the Drug Enforcement Administration, CBP, and USCG; the Central Intelligence Agency; 

and the National Security Agency. Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, National University, Strategic Perspectives 5: Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, (Washington, 

D.C.: June 2011).

11GAO-12-185R.

12For the purpose of this review collaboration is defined as any joint activity by two or 

more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced 

when the organizations act alone. Collaboration can involve federal and nonfederal 

governmental organizations as well as nongovernmental organizations. In 2012, we 

reported on collaboration mechanisms and the subject matter specialists interviewed 

defined an interagency mechanism for collaboration as any arrangement or application 

that can facilitate collaboration between agencies. GAO, Managing for Results: Key 

Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). 
Page 6 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

To address the first objective, we contacted DHS officials to identify a list 

of collaborative mechanisms that they deemed to be successful examples 

of field component collaboration while we also independently identified 

such mechanisms. Of the 13 mechanism types ultimately identified, 11 

mechanisms focused on law enforcement activities.13 For these 13 

mechanisms, we examined organizational documents related to 

mechanism mission, objectives, stakeholder composition, locations, and 

date organized, among other things. We also interviewed officials from 

the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning about the 

establishment and operation of these 13 mechanism types. We analyzed 

documentation (i.e., component daily activity reports) obtained from 

senior DHS headquarters officials to identify the extent to which the 

department has visibility over the collaborative field mechanism 

activities—including any plans to increase visibility over the mechanisms 

in the future.

To address the second objective, we selected 4 types of collaborative 

field mechanisms from the list of 13, including the Regional Coordinating 

Mechanism (ReCoM), the Border Enforcement Security Task Force 

(BEST), the South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT), and the 

Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC). We based our 

selection of these 4 types of mechanisms on the following factors: 

geographic location, continuity of the mechanism (established for at least 

16 months), participation of multiple DHS component agencies, and 

variation in the lead component agency. Except for JTT, we selected 

mechanism types that existed in more than one location to allow for 

geographic comparison—such as BEST, with 35 locations throughout the 

United States. Appendix I describes each of the selected mechanisms in 

detail. Among these 4 different mechanism types, we then selected 10 

individual mechanism sites—3 ReCoMs, 4 BESTs, 1 JTT, and 2 RISCs—

for more in-depth review. For each of the selected mechanisms, we 

interviewed senior headquarters officials to discuss their views on the 

successes and challenges experienced with collaboration, including how 

the successes are replicated and communicated across the mechanisms 

and how challenges are addressed. At each of the 10 mechanisms we 

visited, we gathered information from participants on what they believed 

to be promising practices that helped them to succeed as collaborative 

 13Each collaborative field mechanism type may have units or entities in multiple locations 

throughout the United States; however, for the purposes of this review, we are considering 

mechanisms that have the same title and mission as one general type of mechanism. 
Page 7 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

mechanisms, as well as the factors they viewed as challenges to their 

collaboration. We also discussed their efforts to establish performance 

measures to assess mechanism effectiveness. We reviewed planning, 

operations, and management integration documents such as strategic 

plans, annual performance reports, and memorandums of understanding 

or agreements among the participating agencies. We compared these 

documents and their responses with the information-sharing and 

collaboration practices identified in our past work on this subject.14 We 

interviewed responsible senior DHS headquarters officials to determine 

the extent to which the department has collected and reported on the 

collaborative practices identified by the mechanisms. We also interviewed 

component officials at the selected mechanisms to identify the extent to 

which information, such as information about performance, successes, 

challenges, and collaborative practices used are provided to DHS 

headquarters officials who have departmental-level oversight of these 

mechanisms. Appendix II provides a listing and description of the 

remaining 9 mechanisms not selected for a more in-depth review. For a 

more detailed discussion on our scope and methodology, see appendix 

III. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 14See, for example, GAO-12-1022, and Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and 

Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).Key 

collaboration practices were identified from literature reviews, government agency and 

research institution studies, interviews with academics and practitioner experts, as well as 

a detailed analysis of prior GAO reports and testimonies on collaboration. 
Page 8 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

DHS’s interest in better integrating its legacy agencies has been longstanding, and on several occasions since 2004 the department has 

identified an approach or vision for establishing a more unified field 

structure to enhance mission coordination among its component agencies 

but has not implemented such a structure. As we reported in September 

2012, according to senior DHS officials, the fragmentation associated with 

each operational component having different boundaries for its area of 

responsibility prompted some in DHS and other stakeholders to promote 

the idea of a single unified DHS field structure, sometimes referred to as 

regionalization.15 Proponents believed that a more unified structure of 

DHS regional offices could foster better collaboration and integration of 

multiple components’ operations, making DHS as a whole more 

responsive and better prepared to counter man-made or natural threats. 

In addition to improving operational effectiveness, proponents of a single 

DHS field structure envisioned opportunities for long-term cost savings 

through the sharing of assets, including office space. 

For example, in 2005 and 2006, DHS considered implementing an 

overarching plan to unify its components under a single unified field 

structure, but then opted not to pursue this vision because of component 

resistance to the concept and significant up-front costs associated with 

colocating components. Again, in 2010, DHS chose not to realign its 

component regional configurations into a single DHS regional structure, 

as recommended in its BUR. In 2012, DHS and component officials 

stated that transforming the existing structure into a single unified DHS 

system would be a huge undertaking, and those not in favor of largescale regionalization cited numerous challenges, including budgetary 

constraints, and other drawbacks to such a plan. As we reported in 

September 2012, while DHS’s intention of improving collaboration among 

its agencies is a sound goal—whether through regionalization or other 

means—its approach has lacked the systematic analyses and 

documentation needed to support its proposals for change. The 

department agreed with our findings and acknowledged that its efforts 

could have been better documented.16

 15GAO-12-185R.

16GAO-12-185R.

Background

Past DHS Efforts to 

Integrate Component Field 

Operations
Page 9 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

In lieu of a single unified field structure, DHS has proposed other 

alternatives for enhancing collaboration among its components in the 

field, but has not implemented these proposals. For example, the 

department reported plans to harmonize operations and intelligence—

utilizing concepts and structures modeled after JIATF-South. In 2012, 

DHS identified a new approach for enhancing regional collaboration 

among its components through virtual integration—that is, by improving 

component agencies’ coordination of mission activities and 

communication through the use of technology. According to a senior DHS 

official, virtual integration would allow for coordination of component 

functions without actually consolidating or merging the functions. DHS’s 

intention toward virtual integration was communicated in its fiscal years 

2012-2016 strategic plan and reported to us in September 2012.17

However, in 2013, DHS officials stated that the department was not 

specifically pursuing virtual approaches to regional coordination. DHS 

officials also reported that although DHS no longer planned to pursue 

virtual collaboration on a larger scale, it was occurring on a more limited 

scale, within the department and components, for certain efforts.18

In the absence of a unified field structure, DHS’s operational components 

have established and utilized collaborative mechanisms, including virtual 

approaches, to better integrate their field operations. Specifically, DHS 

field components have employed collaborative mechanisms to coordinate 

their missions and share information among multiple stakeholders in 

order to increase their mission effectiveness and efficiencies. These 

mechanisms have both similarities and differences in how they are 

structured, which missions or threats they focus on, and which agencies 

participate in them, among other things. All of the mechanisms identified 

in this report involve multiple DHS components, as well as other federal, 

state, and local agency participants, and their purpose is to improve 

operational integration, coordination, and efficiency among DHS 

components. These mechanisms focus on a range of missions and are 

located throughout the United States. Figure 2 shows the states and 

 17DHS, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016.

18For example, according to senior DHS officials, one virtual collaboration effort is DHS’s 

Common Operational Picture (COP), which provides an unclassified consolidated 

information “hub” for homeland security partners to ensure critical terrorism- and disasterrelated information is available. According these officials, there are currently over 3,500 

partners and users in the COP.

Component Efforts to 

Integrate Field Operations 

through Collaborative 

Mechanisms
Page 10 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

territories that contain 1 or more of the 13 collaborative field mechanism 

types (including the 4 mechanism types we selected for further study) 

involving DHS’s key operational components that we identified in 

conjunction with the department and these components.

Figure 2: States and Territories That Include Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Key Operational Component

Collaborative Field Mechanisms and Our Site Visit Locations

Notes: The shaded areas reflect only the states and territories containing the coordination 

mechanisms reviewed for this report. This figure does not represent the locations of DHS 

mechanisms that were not reviewed. 

a

An additional ReCoM not depicted on the map is located in the U.S. territory of Guam. 
Page 11 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

b

Each of the 10 FEMA regional offices manages a RISC. While the geographic area covered by the 

RISC aligns with that covered by each region, the RISC meetings are not necessarily located at a 

specific geographic point and can occur throughout the region or be held virtually.

All 4 mechanism types we selected for a more in-depth review (ReCoM, 

BEST, JTT, and RISC) had been established through formal organizing 

documents (e.g., a charter or memorandum of understanding); involve 

stakeholders from various federal, state, and local agencies; and have an 

established lead agency to provide oversight and guidance to 

participants. In addition, all 4 of these mechanism types are funded by the 

participating agencies—no funding has been allocated or budgeted 

specifically for these collaborative mechanisms.19

• ReCoMs were officially established in 2011 through the Maritime 

Operations Coordination Plan, which was signed by their Executive 

Team of the Senior Guidance Team, composed of the Director of ICE 

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Commissioner of CBP, 

and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Maritime Operations 

Coordination Plan directs these agencies to utilize the fusion of 

intelligence, planning, and operations to target the threat of 

transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal border. 

USCG serves as the lead agency responsible for planning and 

coordinating among components, and as of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs 

had been established aligning with the USCG sectors’ geographic 

areas of responsibility.

• In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in 

partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35 

BESTs had been established throughout the United States. The 

BESTs have a mission to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and 

emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders.

• The first JTT was organized in November 2011 as a CBP-led 

partnership among the U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field 

Operations, ICE HSI, and the government of Mexico to support the 

South Texas Campaign (STC). The purpose of the STC is to integrate 

intelligence, pursue enhanced coordination with the government of 

Mexico, and conduct targeted operations to disrupt and dismantle 

 19The Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act provided that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security may provide financial assistance, as appropriate, for the 

operational, administrative, and technological costs associated with the participation of 

BEST participants (e.g., federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies). Pub. L. 

No. 112-205, § 3(a), 126 Stat. 1487, 1488 (2012) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 240). As of June 

2013, no funding has been appropriated for this purpose. 
Page 12 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

transnational criminal organizations.20 As of June 2013, JTTs had 

been established across four geographic boundary areas in Del Rio, 

Laredo, McAllen, and Houston, Texas.

• The first RISC was organized in 2003 to provide a forum for senior 

DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland 

security for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach 

involving federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization 

and private sector partners. As of June 2013, a RISC had been 

established in each of the 10 FEMA regions. 

The purpose of all of these selected mechanisms includes increasing 

operational effectiveness through greater collaboration and leveraging of 

resources and expertise. Our review identified commonalities within the 

same type of mechanism across multiple locations, as well as 

commonalities across the 4 types of mechanisms that we focused on for 

our review. Table 1 provides a summary description of the 4 selected 

collaborative field mechanism types that we reviewed and the locations 

we visited for each of them.

 20Transnational criminal organization refers to crime coordinated across national borders, 

involving groups or networks of individuals working in more than one country to plan and 

execute illegal business ventures. In order to achieve their goals, these criminal groups 

utilize systematic violence and corruption.
Page 13 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operational Component Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected for Our 

Site Visits 

Mechanism name

Description of the DHS operational component field mechanisms selected for site visitsa

Selected agenciesb Mechanism purpose/description

Regional Coordinating 

Mechanism (ReCoM) 

Lead agencies: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) 

Stakeholders: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA); U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO); state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies; and foreign law enforcement agencies

Sites we visited: San Diego, California; Houston, Texas; and Corpus Christi, 

Texas

The purpose of the ReCoM is to plan 

and conduct joint operations that 

target terrorist and criminal activity 

along the coastal border. 

Border Enforcement 

Security Task Force 

(BEST) 

Lead agency: ICE HSI

Stakeholders: CBP; DEA; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF); FBI; USCG; USAO; state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; and 

foreign law enforcement agencies

Sites we visited: San Diego, California; Houston, Texas; Laredo, Texas; and 

Blaine, Washington

The purpose of the BEST is to provide 

a platform for coordination across all 

levels of government—both domestic 

and international—to investigate 

border-related crimes. 

South Texas Campaign

Joint Targeting Team (JTT) 

Lead agency: CBP 

Stakeholders: ICE HIS; DEA; FBI; ATF; Department of Defense (DOD); USAO; 

U.S. Marshals Service; Texas Department of Public Safety; state, local, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies; and foreign law enforcement agencies

Site we visited: Laredo, Texas

The primary purpose of the JTT is to 

gather and deconflict information on 

South Texas Campaign targets and 

initiate operations against those 

identified targets.

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

Regional Interagency 

Steering Committee (RISC)

Lead agency: FEMA 

Stakeholders: CBP; ICE; Federal Protective Service; DHS Science and 

Technology Directorate; DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate; TSA; 

USCG; federal emergency support agencies; state, local, and tribal agencies; 

voluntary organizations; educational institutions; private sector entities; and 

nongovernmental organizations

Sites we visited: Atlanta, Georgia, and Bothell, Washington

The purpose of the RISC is to provide 

senior-level officials with a forum to 

share their expertise and engage with 

other stakeholders on addressing 

issues related to disaster planning 

and emergency preparedness. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.

a

See appendix I for additional information (i.e., description and locations) on the selected 

mechanisms.

b

We included the lead agency (or agencies) for each mechanism, but did not provide a 

comprehensive listing of stakeholders, which may include other federal, state, local, tribal, and private 

sector agencies.
Page 14 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

DHS, at the departmental level, has limited awareness of the universe of 

component field collaborative mechanisms and of the types and quality of 

collaborative practices they employ to better coordinate and integrate 

mission operations. As a result of its limited visibility over these 

mechanisms, DHS headquarters is not well positioned to routinely identify 

valuable information obtained from the mechanisms that could inform 

decisions about DHS field structures or further enhance collaboration 

across components. 

According to senior DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

(OPS) officials, DHS headquarters does not actively catalog or routinely 

monitor the universe of collaborative field mechanisms because they are 

organized and monitored by their respective lead operational components 

or participants. However, although the collaborative mechanisms may be 

monitored by individual components, the components do not have the 

same high-level perspective—or accountability—as the department as a 

whole, to look across all components and assess the state of 

collaboration occurring in the field. Moreover, according to senior OPS 

officials, their departmental-level office is focused on the specific 

outcomes of operational activities and not whether the activities are 

carried out by a certain collaborative mechanism, as the collaborative 

mechanisms employed to accomplish tasks are not as important as the 

end results. Therefore, these DHS headquarters officials believe they 

have visibility—primarily through the components—over activities carried 

out by collaborative mechanisms, but stated that they have little or no 

visibility over the nature of the collaboration itself, since they do not 

collect this type of information. OPS officials also noted that the Program 

Analysis & Evaluation Division (PA&E), within the Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer, which is involved with performance measurement, 

monitors whether the operational components are meeting their 

performance requirements or goals, but does not track performance or 

other information on cross-component field mechanisms. PA&E officials 

stated that their division is responsible for strategic-level management 

and oversight, not operational-level, and per various laws and policy 

frameworks, their division measures performance of higher-level DHS 

programs.

DHS’s limited visibility at the departmental level of the number and type of 

existing collaborative field mechanisms was demonstrated in part by the 

challenges DHS headquarters experienced in providing us with a list of 

mechanisms. Specifically, when we asked for a list of formalized 

mechanisms that DHS headquarters considered to be successful 

examples of field collaboration, this information was not readily available 

Opportunities Exist 

for DHS to Enhance 

Its Visibility over 

Collaborative Field 

Mechanisms of Its 

Key Operational 

Components 
Page 15 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

at the departmental level, according to senior DHS officials. After 

consulting with operational component officials, DHS headquarters 

provided 6 of the 13 examples that constituted our final list of 

mechanisms. We acknowledge that identifying a universe of successful 

collaborative field mechanisms can be difficult, in part because of the 

relatively large size of DHS and the breadth of activities involving 

component agencies. However, systematically collecting information 

(e.g., related to operational mission, capabilities, performance, etc.) about 

the mechanisms from the component agencies that sponsor them would 

yield important information about which mechanisms are effective.

Senior DHS headquarters officials stated that although they have limited 

visibility over the universe of collaborative mechanisms and the specific 

collaborative practices utilized by the groups, the department does obtain 

regular knowledge of component operational activities and results. For 

example, senior OPS officials said that they receive situation reports 

about daily operational actions broken out by lead component, regardless 

of whether the operation is affiliated with a particular collaborative 

mechanism. They also noted their DHS Common Operational Picture

(COP), which provides an unclassified consolidated information hub for 

homeland security partners to ensure critical terrorism- and disasterrelated information is available.21 However, senior DHS officials agreed 

that having increased visibility and additional mechanism information at 

the headquarters level could benefit departmental and component efforts 

to improve collaboration in the field and better integrate operations. For 

example, obtaining and analyzing this information, which DHS has lacked 

in recent deliberations about revamping its field structure, could provide 

DHS with a stronger basis for decision making regarding the 

establishment of new mechanisms, the effective allocation of scarce 

resources, or other changes to its field structure. Having some access to 

this information gains importance because the potential increase in 

mission effectiveness and efficiencies that may have been realized from 

earlier regionalization plans that were not adopted could be accomplished 

through other means—including through collaborative field mechanisms. 

 21DHS officials stated that the COP allows for a greater understanding and geospatial 

awareness of actual and emerging homeland security events and enables senior 

leadership to identify more effective courses of action, and make informed decisions 

before, during, and after an event.
Page 16 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

DHS’s limited ability to monitor the collaborative mechanisms operating 

under the DHS umbrella is inconsistent with its own departmental-level 

strategic goals. Specifically, several key DHS initiatives and documents, 

including the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), BUR, and 

the DHS fiscal years 2012-2016 strategic plan, contain strategic goals 

aimed at greater unification and integration of efforts across individual 

DHS components.22 In particular, DHS’s strategic plan specifically 

outlines objectives related to the goals of “improving cross-departmental 

management, policy, and functional integration,” as well as “enhancing 

intelligence, information sharing, and integrated operations.” DHS’s 

limited departmental visibility over these mechanisms is also inconsistent 

with elements of the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, which calls for the establishment of control activities, such 

as a mechanism to identify and monitor the activities of components 

within an organization, to help ensure achievement of the organization’s 

objectives.23 The internal control objective pertaining to effectiveness and 

efficiency of operations is of particular relevance to DHS’s oversight of the 

collaborative mechanisms and relates more to the assessment of the 

efficiency of the mechanisms themselves in addition to the operationallevel visibility that we discuss above. Collecting information on the 

existing collaborative mechanisms will enable the department to better 

monitor these mechanisms. Doing so could also better position DHS to 

judge at a more strategic level which mechanisms offer potential for 

replication in other geographic or mission areas. Given current budget 

constraints, it is important for DHS to identify and promote the most 

effective and efficient collaborative field mechanisms as possible.

 22DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a 

Secure Homeland (Washington, D.C.: February 2010); Bottom-Up Review Report; and 

Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016.

23GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
Page 17 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

During the course of our review, participants from the four selected DHS 

collaborative mechanism types provided information on successful 

practices that enhanced their collaboration that could be useful for DHS to 

collect and disseminate on a broader scale. At each of our 10 site visits, 

we asked cognizant participants to identify and provide examples of 

collaborative practices or other factors that they considered particularly 

important to the success of their group’s collaboration and operations. We 

evaluated their responses and summarized them into seven broad 

categories, as shown in figure 3, based upon the practices that were 

reported most frequently. This summary information provides valuable 

insights on approaches for enhancing collaboration among the DHS 

component agencies—information that could also be beneficial for DHS 

to collect from a larger group of component mechanisms.

Participants Identified 

Practices That 

Enhanced or Served 

as Challenges to 

Collaboration; DHS 

Could Benefit from 

Collecting and 

Disseminating 

Promising Practices 

Participants Identified 

Common Practices That 

Enhanced Collaboration, 

Which DHS Could Benefit 

from Collecting and 

Disseminating on a 

Broader Scale

Common Practices That 

Enhanced Collaboration
Page 18 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Figure 3: Successful Collaborative Practices Most Frequently Identified by Participants from Selected Field Mechanisms

Among participants that we interviewed, there was consensus that certain 

practices facilitated more effective collaboration, which, according to 

participants, contributed to the groups’ overall successes. In many cases, 

the same or similar successful collaborative practices were reported by 

participants of different mechanism types as well as by participants of the 

same mechanism type in different geographic regions. For example, 

despite having a different mission focus or operating in different 

geographic regions, participants we interviewed from all three ReCoMs, 

all four BESTs, the JTT, and both RISCs—the total sample population 

that we met with with—identified three of the seven categories of 

practices as keys to success: (1) positive working 

relationships/communication, (2) sharing resources, and (3) sharing 

information. 
Page 19 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Furthermore, participants from most mechanisms also drew connections 

among the successful collaborative factors. For example, participants 

from all 10 mechanisms stated that forming positive working relationships 

was tied to better information sharing among them. Specifically, in our 

interviews, BEST mechanism officials stated that developing trust and 

building relationships helps participants respond quickly to a crisis, and 

communicating frequently helps participants eliminate duplication of 

efforts. Participants from the ReCoMs, BESTs, and JTT also reported that 

having positive working relationships built on strong trust among 

participants was a key factor in their law enforcement partnerships 

because of the sensitive nature of law enforcement information, and the 

risks posed if it is not protected appropriately. In turn, building positive 

working relationships was facilitated by another collaborative factor 

identified as important by 6 of the 10 mechanisms: physical colocation of 

participants. Specifically, participants from the mechanisms focused on 

law enforcement investigations, such as the BESTs and JTT, reported 

that being physically colocated with members from other agencies was 

important for increasing the groups’ effectiveness. Participants from one 

of the three ReCoMs we visited also stated that colocation enables 

operations planning and database/information sharing. It also helps build 

trust and overcome cultural barriers among agency participants.

Successful collaboration practices can help the participating components 

mitigate a variety of challenges, and they are generally consistent with the 

seven key issues to consider when implementing collaborative 

mechanisms that we identified in our 2012 report on interagency 

collaboration.24 DHS leadership could benefit from engaging the 

mechanisms—soliciting promising collaboration practices information and 

organizing it through the lens of our seven key collaborative issues. As 

noted earlier in this report, DHS does not collect this type of information at 

the departmental level primarily because the mechanisms operate under 

the components. However, collecting promising practices information 

from the collaborative mechanisms at the departmental level and 

disseminating it to components throughout DHS would inform 

components about specific practices from which they could also benefit. 

Senior DHS officials agreed with this assessment. In addition, it may be 

more efficient for a single DHS departmental-level office to collect and 

 24GAO-12-1022. See appendix IV for the key issues to consider when implementing 

interagency collaborative mechanisms. 

DHS Could Benefit from 

Collecting and Disseminating 

Information on Successful 

Collaboration
Page 20 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

disseminate this type of information than all the components individually, 

especially given DHS’s higher-level, strategic perspective across the 

department. Also, given that our fieldwork indicated similar collaboration 

issues are relevant to multiple components, a more centralized DHS 

clearinghouse of collaborative promising practices information could be 

more easily accessed by a wide range of DHS component stakeholders 

than under the current structure, where such information is now 

stovepiped and may not be readily shared outside of individual 

components or mechanisms. 

Key features of interagency collaboration include agencies establishing or 

clarifying guidelines, agreements, or procedures for sharing information. 

Among other things, these guidelines, agreements, and procedures 

should identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective 

communication and collaboration among federal, state, and local 

agencies.25 The benefit of sharing promising practices includes the ability 

to replicate positive program outcomes by leveraging the experiences of 

different stakeholders with the same or similar goals.26 Key features of 

interagency collaboration also identify the sharing of promising practices 

as an example of government agencies building capacity for improved 

efficiency.27 Accordingly, DHS component agencies could benefit from 

better access to collaborative promising practices, as this would help 

them in their own efforts to leverage the experiences of many 

collaborative mechanisms.

Participants from the 10 collaborative field mechanisms we visited also 

identified challenges or barriers that affected their collaboration across 

components and made it more difficult. Using the same approach as that 

for eliciting successful collaborative practices, at each of the 10 locations 

we visited, we asked cognizant participants to identify challenges to 

 25GAO-09-904SP.

26See, for example: GAO, VA Education Benefits: VA Needs to Improve Program 

Management and Provide More Timely Information to Students, GAO-13-338

(Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2013), and School Meal Programs: Sharing Information on 

Best Practices May Improve Programs’ Operations, GAO/RCED-97-126 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 21, 1997). Findings from these reports demonstrate the benefits of collecting, 

analyzing, and disseminating promising practices information.

27GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select Efficiency Initiatives Should 

Be Shared Governmentwide, GAO-11-908 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2011). 

Officials Identified 

Common Barriers to 

Successful Collaboration
Page 21 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

collaboration that they believed had impeded their groups’ operations or 

effectiveness. We evaluated their responses and created three broad 

categories, as shown in figure 4, based on the challenges that they 

reported most frequently.

Figure 4: Challenges to Collaboration Identified Most Frequently by Participants 

from Selected Field Mechanisms 

Our discussions with participants representing the 10 mechanisms 

identified three barriers that participants most frequently believed 

hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms: (1) resource 

constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel, and (3) lack of leadership buyin. For example, when discussing resource issues, participants from 9 of 
Page 22 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

the 10 collaborative mechanisms said that funding for their group’s 

operation was critical and identified resource constraints as a challenge to 

sustaining their collaborative efforts. These participants also reported that 

since none of the mechanisms receive dedicated funding, the 

participating federal agencies provide support for their respective 

representatives assigned to the selected mechanisms. This support 

included such things as funding for employee salaries, office space, and 

law enforcement equipment (e.g., night vision capability and surveillance 

vehicles), among other things. A lack of resources also affected state and 

local law enforcement participation in some of these collaborative

mechanisms, and mechanism participants explained that ensuring state 

and local participation has been challenging because of resource 

constraints, which, in some cases, have led to a mechanism missing key 

participants. For example, participating agencies fund ReCoM positions 

out of their respective operating budgets—no dedicated ReCoM funding 

has been provided. As a result, some agencies are not able to participate 

(such as state and local law enforcement) because of resource 

constraints. Also, there was a majority opinion among mechanism 

participants we visited that rotation of key personnel and lack of 

leadership buy-in hindered effective collaboration within their 

mechanisms. For example, JTT participants stated that the rotation of key 

personnel hinders the JTT’s ability to develop and retain more seasoned 

personnel with expertise in investigations and surveillance techniques. In 

addition to collecting promising practices information from the 

collaborative mechanisms and disseminating it to components throughout 

DHS, collecting and disseminating information on any ways to address 

identified challenges or barriers to collaboration would similarly help 

leverage the experiences of other collaborative mechanisms. 

Collaborative field mechanism participants could also benefit from DHS 

sharing information related to performance measurement. While sharing 

such information is not a challenge to collaboration itself, officials from all 

mechanisms agreed that establishing metrics that could measure the 

impact of their collaboration, including whether the benefits of the 

collaborative mechanisms outweigh the costs, were difficult to establish or 

did not yet exist. Nonetheless, officials reported that the ReCoMs, BESTs, 

and JTT have all undertaken efforts to develop output or outcome 

performance measures to track the accomplishments of their 
Page 23 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

collaborative mechanisms.28 For example, the fiscal years 2012-2016 

BEST Strategic Plan states that BESTs are to be evaluated annually on 

their overall performance, which is quantified by output enforcement 

metrics (e.g., number of arrests, indictments, convictions, and seizures). 

The JTT’s efforts to develop performance measures include identifying 

emerging threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in the South Texas corridor 

where it operates. Developing output and outcome measures can provide 

insight into the performance of each mechanism; however, ReCoM, 

BEST, JTT, and RISC officials all stated that is very difficult to develop a 

metric that isolates the benefits of their collaboration from the benefits 

that they may have achieved operating separately under their respective 

agencies. Despite these measurement challenges, ReCoM, BEST, JTT, 

and RISC officials were able to provide anecdotal examples of the 

positive benefits of their collaboration and coordination. For example, 

ReCoM officials in one location told us that they were able to make 

significant progress toward meeting their goal of “persistent presence” 

along a coastal ship channel because they had coordinated the 

schedules of the USCG and CBP Office of Air and Marine resources that 

conducted these patrols.29 BEST and JTT officials stressed the value of 

leveraging their participating agencies’ legal authorities to develop more 

robust cases, which increased the likelihood that their cases would be 

successfully prosecuted, and that convicted criminals would receive 

longer sentences. RISC participants in both locations cited their 

collaborative mechanisms as important to identifying emergency 

response capability gaps across different levels of government and 

integrating courses of action to take in response to disasters. Leveraging 

mechanism participants’ experiences and insights regarding the 

development of performance metrics to quantify their accomplishments 

and the impacts of their collaboration, and disseminating promising 

practices that they have identified could provide benefits to other DHS 

collaborative efforts.

 28An output measure describes the level of activity to be provided over a period of time, 

including a description of the characteristics (e.g., timeliness) established as standards for 

the activity. Outcome measures describe the intended results of carrying out a program or 

activity. They define an event or condition that is external to the program or activity and 

that is of direct importance to the intended beneficiaries or the public.

29The Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is a subcomponent of CBP that has primary 

responsibility for the management, control, and protection of U.S. borders. OAM performs 

various missions in response to requests for air and marine support from other DHS 

components—primarily Border Patrol, within CBP, and ICE, as well as other federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies.
Page 24 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Effective collaboration within and among federal agencies is important for 

improving operational success, especially in a resource-constrained 

environment. DHS component agencies have made progress in 

developing and evolving collaborative field mechanisms that have allowed 

them to better coordinate mission activities in the field, and these 

collaborative efforts are even more important in light of DHS’s decision in 

2012 to not pursue a single unified field structure to integrate component 

field operations. Given the overlapping geographic areas of responsibility 

and authorities, and the many operational activities that DHS components 

are conducting, component efforts to collaborate are important. However, 

DHS’s limited visibility over the universe of collaborative field mechanisms 

operating under its purview reduces its ability to maximize the 

effectiveness and efficiency of these mechanisms to enhance crossdepartmental management and integrated operations. DHS senior 

officials believe the components, not the department, are responsible for 

the mechanisms’ oversight because the department is more focused on 

strategic rather than operational-level management activities. We agree 

that the components are capable of operating and monitoring their 

collaborative field mechanisms. However, consistent with its own 

departmental-level strategic goals, we believe that DHS could benefit 

from greater awareness of the mechanisms themselves and the 

collaborative practices that they employ. Not only is the department 

ultimately accountable for the resources that support these mechanisms, 

it is also responsible for making important decisions about the overall field 

structure of its components, and for moving the department closer to its 

goal of greater component integration. By collecting information about the 

universe of collaborative mechanisms and developing a fuller 

understanding of them and the promising practices they employ, DHS 

could be in a better position to utilize these practices across components 

to help move the department toward its strategic goal of increased 

operational integration.

To help ensure that any future efforts to analyze or implement changes to 

DHS’s regional field office structure, including the establishment of 

collaborative field mechanisms, are informed by current collaborative 

practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 

the appropriate department official to take the following two actions: (1) 

collect information on the existing collaborative mechanisms to have 

better visibility of them, and (2) collect information on promising practices, 

including such things as potential ways to address any identified 

challenges or barriers to collaboration as well as any identified 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 25 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

performance metrics, from the collaborative mechanisms and disseminate 

them to components.

We provided a draft copy of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security for review and comments. DHS provided official written 

comments, which are reprinted in appendix V. In response to our first 

recommendation, DHS concurred and stated that the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning (OPS), in coordination with other DHS 

components, as appropriate, will develop a method to enhance the 

collection of information on collaborative field coordination and integration 

mechanisms. OPS will schedule appropriate data calls to collect the 

information and leverage the Homeland Security Information Network as 

a means for sharing information among the components. DHS also 

concurred with our second recommendation and stated that OPS, in 

coordination with other DHS components, as appropriate, will develop 

and implement a method of collecting and disseminating information to 

the components regarding promising practices, including challenges or 

barriers to collaboration, from various field coordination and integration 

mechanisms. DHS estimated completion of actions related to both 

recommendations by September 30, 2014. DHS provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also changed 

some specific descriptions of DHS component operations and removed 

others because DHS identified them as sensitive. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and interested congressional committees as 

appropriate. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.If you or your staff have any 

questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9971 or 

Agency Comments 
Page 26 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix 

VI. 

Joseph Kirschbaum

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Page 27 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

List of Requesters

The Honorable Thomas Carper

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Susan Collins

United States Senate

The Honorable Candice Miller

Chairman

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Henry Cuellar

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited

Page 28 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan was signed in June 2011 by 

the senior leadership of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE)1

, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG), directing these agencies to form ReCoMs for maritime 

homeland security enforcement and intelligence integration.2 USCG, ICE 

HSI, and CBP serve as the lead agencies responsible for planning and 

coordinating among stakeholders, and as of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs have 

been established aligning with the USCG sectors’ geographic areas of 

responsibility.3 In addition to ICE HSI, CBP, and USCG, ReCoM 

stakeholders include other federal, state, local, tribal, and international 

agencies including, but not limited to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Attorney’s Office 

(USAO), state agencies, local police departments, and foreign law 

enforcement partners. 

According to the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, the ReCoM was 

established for each region to coordinate component maritime operational 

activities. All ReCoM members are responsible for participating in 

integrated planning efforts with a goal to maintain active patrol and 

targeted monitoring. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Senior 

Guidance Teams (composed of senior USCG, ICE HSI, and CBP 

officials) are to assign a working group to monitor ReCoM operational 

performance, coordination efforts, and information sharing.4 Accordingly, 

the components must measure the performance of the ReCoMs to ensure 

the most effective use of resources. 

 1

ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is the directorate within ICE that participates 

in the ReCoM. 

2

The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan states that ReCoMs are required to reside in 

a physical or virtual location.

3

A USCG sector is a shore-based operational unit that is responsible for the execution of 

all USCG missions within its area of responsibility. As of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs have 

been established in each of the following states and territories: (1) Alabama, (2) Alaska, 

(3) California, (4) Connecticut, (5) Florida, (6) Hawaii, (7) Louisiana, (8) Maine, (9) 

Maryland, (10) Massachusetts, (11) Michigan, (12) New York, (13) North Carolina, (14) 

Oregon, (15) Pennsylvania, (16) South Carolina, (17) Texas, (18) Virginia, (19) 

Washington, (20) Wisconsin, and (21) the U.S. territories of Guam and Puerto Rico. 

4

DHS Senior Guidance Teams are established for each ReCoM area of responsibility. 

Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited

Regional Coordinating 

Mechanism (ReCoM)
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited

Page 29 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in 

partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35 BESTs 

have been established throughout the United States.5 BEST stakeholders 

include CBP; DEA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF); FBI; USCG; USAO; and other key state, local, tribal, 

and international law enforcement and intelligence resources, which 

partner with one another to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and 

emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders. The BEST concept is 

built upon the guiding principles of colocation and cross-designation.

6

According to the 2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan, ICE HSI serves as the 

“executive agent” for BEST and provides a standardized platform of policy 

and procedure for BEST units, as well as primary resourcing.7 The BEST 

units use qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods to 

efficiently allocate resources. The National BEST unit (NBU) serves as 

the programmatic lead on establishment, deployment, and oversight of 

the BEST units nationwide, including overseeing policy and 

implementation of the BEST program. As stated in the 2012-2016 BEST 

Strategic Plan, BEST units are also evaluated annually on their overall 

performance, including their effectiveness and efficiency of operations 

based on established criteria. The overall success of the BEST program 

 5

As of June 2013, there are 35 BEST units in 16 states and one territory: (1) Arizona 

(Phoenix, Tucson, Nogales, Yuma, and Casa Grande), (2) California (Imperial Valley, Los 

Angeles Seaport, San Diego Seaport, San Ysidro, San Francisco Seaport), (3) Florida 

(Miami Seaport, Fort Lauderdale Seaport), (4) Michigan (Detroit), (5) New Mexico 

(Albuquerque, Deming, Las Cruces), (6) New York (Buffalo, Massena, New York Seaport), 

(7) New Jersey (Newark Seaport), (8) Texas (El Paso, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, 

Houston Seaport, Big Bend), (9) Washington (Blaine, Seattle Seaport), (10) Louisiana 

(New Orleans Seaport), (11) Alabama (Mobile Seaport), (12) Mississippi (Gulfport 

Seaport), (13) South Carolina (Charleston Seaport), (14) Georgia (Savannah Seaport), 

(15) Virginia (Hampton Roads), (16) Hawaii (Honolulu Seaport), and (17) Puerto Rico 

(San Juan Seaport).

6

ICE HSI is authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1401 to cross-designate other federal, state, 

and local law enforcement officers to investigate and enforce customs laws. Customs 

cross-designation authority can also be extended to foreign law enforcement partners for 

cases that cross international boundaries. This authority enhances ICE HSI’s ability to 

work more closely with these counterparts and foster cooperation between the United 

States and other countries.

7

Through the Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security may provide financial assistance to the BESTs. Jaime Zapata Border 

Enforcement Security Task Force Act, Pub. L. No. 112-205, § 3(a), 126 Stat. 1487, 1488 

(2012) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 240). 

Border Enforcement 

Security Task Force 

(BEST) 
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited

Page 30 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

is measured by its impact on border-related criminal activity levels. The 

2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan also states that the NBU is required to 

provide a written evaluation to the ICE HSI Executive Associate Director 

and Executive Steering Committee within 90 days following the end of 

each fiscal year. These reports, which are to continue through fiscal year 

2016, are to include an evaluation of the field metrics, as well as the 

implementation of the strategic plan by headquarters, the field offices, 

and their BEST units.

The JTT originated in November 2011 as a CBP-led partnership among 

the Del Rio area U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field Operations, and 

ICE HSI, and was expanded to support the South Texas Campaign 

(STC).8 The purpose of the STC is to disrupt and dismantle transnational 

criminal organizations (TCO).9 As of August 2013, JTTs had been 

established across four geographic boundary areas in Del Rio, Laredo, 

McAllen, and Houston, Texas. In addition to ICE HSI, JTT stakeholders 

include DEA; FBI; ATF; USAO; U.S. Marshals Service; and state, local, 

tribal, and international law enforcement agencies. To the greatest extent 

practicable, each participating agency within the JTT is structured to be 

colocated and function as a unified team to ensure deconfliction of 

intelligence information while focusing on STC targets.

According to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials, 

FEMA established the first RISC in 2003 to provide a forum for senior 

DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland security 

for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach involving 

federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization, and private 

sector partners.10 According to FEMA officials, the majority of RISCs 

 8

CBP developed and implemented the STC to identify and address current and emerging 

threats along the border in South Texas. The STC conducts targeted operations to disrupt 

and degrade the ability of transnational criminal organizations to operate throughout the 

South Texas corridor while it simultaneously facilitates legitimate trade and travel. 

9

TCO refers to self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally 

for the purpose of obtaining power, or monetary or commercial gains, wholly or in part by 

illegal means. In order to achieve their goals, these criminal groups utilize systemic 

violence and corruption.

10As of June 2013, a RISC had been established for each of the 10 FEMA regions. 

South Texas Campaign 

Joint Targeting Team (JTT)

Regional Interagency 

Steering Committee 

(RISC) 
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited

Page 31 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

include representatives of the following DHS components: FEMA, CBP, 

ICE, Federal Protective Service, Science and Technology Directorate, 

National Protection and Programs Directorate, Transportation Security 

Administration, and USCG, among others.11 In addition, other federal 

agencies representing the emergency support community participate in 

RISCs, such as the Department of Transportation, Department of 

Defense, and the Department of Agriculture. The authority to establish 

RISCs derives from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of 2006, which provides the FEMA regional administrators with the 

responsibility to ensure effective, coordinated, and integrated regional 

preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation activities 

and programs for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters (including planning, training, exercises, and professional 

development) and perform such other duties relating to such 

responsibilities as the Administrator may require.12 According to FEMA 

officials, representatives from the FEMA regions developed a draft RISC 

charter in 2010, and several regions subsequently used this document as 

a basis for developing their own charters. For example, a FEMA RISC 

charter may contain (1) objectives and scope of RISC activities, (2) 

membership requirements, (3) annual operating costs, and (4) executive 

committee governance.13

According to FEMA officials, in general, most FEMA regions convene 

RISC meetings on a quarterly or semiannual basis to discuss various 

topics, such as making preparedness, protection, response, recovery, or 

mitigation more easily accomplished and increasing regional capability. 

RISC meetings typically include presentations, workgroups, training 

workshops, and panel discussions led by DHS components. During these 

RISC meetings, DHS components are able to share lessons learned and 

 11The FEMA RISCs also include other DHS components, including the Office of 

Emergency Communications, the Office of the Inspector General, the U.S. Secret Service, 

and the Intelligence and Analysis Office.

126 U.S.C. § 317. The law requires the regional administrators to work in partnership with 

federal, state, local, and tribal governments; emergency managers; emergency response 

providers; medical providers; the private sector; nongovernmental organizations; 

multijurisdictional councils of governments; and regional planning commissions and 

organizations in geographical areas served by the regional office.

13Although annual operating costs for each RISC vary by region, FEMA officials stated 

that many FEMA regions have begun hosting virtual RISCs via teleconference and videoteleconference to reduce expenses associated with the RISCs.
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Selected and Visited

Page 32 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

best practices with members, as well as develop plans that identify 

resource capabilities and integrated courses of action to take in response 

to disasters. One FEMA official explained that FEMA has not developed 

any specific performance-reporting requirements regarding the content or 

output from RISC meetings; however, the value of the coordination and 

communication gained through these meetings supports various planning, 

response, and recovery activities.
Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Identified, but Not Visited

Page 33 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Mechanism name, 

number of 

mechanisms, and 

year established

Description of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborative field mechanismsa

Selected agenciesb Mechanism purpose/description Locations

Counterterrorism 

and Criminal 

Exploitation Unit 

Terrorist Tracking 

and Pursuit Group 

(CTCEU/TTPG)

Total number of 

CTCEU/TTPGs: 1

CTCEU/TTPG was 

established in 2003.c

Lead agency: 

ICE HSI

Stakeholders: 

CBP 

DOD 

The Office of Biometric Identity 

Management (OBIM) 

National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC) 

DHS Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis (I&A)

The CTCEU/TTPG leverages ICE HSI 

expertise across partnering agencies 

dedicated to promoting national security.

The group leads the DHS National 

Security Overstay Initiative in cooperation 

with CBP, OBIM, and NCTC to identify 

and apprehend nonimmigrants who have 

overstayed or violated the terms of their 

admission and pose a potential risk to the 

national security of the United States, as 

well as to prevent terrorists and other 

criminals from exploiting the nation’s 

immigration system. 

Rosslyn, Virginia

Homeland Security 

Task Force 

Southeast (HSTFSE) 

Total number of 

HSTF-SEs: 1 

HSTF-SE was 

established in 2003. 

Lead agency: 

None

Stakeholders: 

CBP 

ICE 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS)

USCG

U.S. Department of Justice

State and local law enforcement 

agencies 

HSTF-SE is a joint task force that provides 

the framework for coordination of a unified 

response command and control 

organization for all DHS agencies. HSTFSE is responsible for the development and 

execution of Operations Plan Vigilant 

Sentry (OVS), which includes interdiction, 

detention, protection screening, 

processing, and repatriation during a 

mass migration from a Caribbean nation. 

HSTF-SE is a standing task force that is in 

effect at all times, although full activation 

of the task force does not occur until a 

mass migration plan is implemented.

Miami, Florida 

Caribbean Border 

Interagency Group 

(CBIG)

Total number of 

CBIGs: 1 

CBIG was 

established in 2006.

Lead agency: 

None

Stakeholders: 

CBP

ICE

USAO

USCG

Puerto Rican Police Department’s 

Forces United for Rapid Action 

(FURA)

CBIG serves to coordinate the operations 

of USCG, CBP, ICE, and USAO, targeting 

illegal migration and narcotics trafficking 

near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands.

d

San Juan, Puerto Rico 

Appendix II: Description of DHS 

Collaborative Field Mechanisms Identified, 

but Not Visited 
Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Identified, but Not Visited

Page 34 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Mechanism name, 

number of 

mechanisms, and 

year established

Description of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborative field mechanismsa

Selected agenciesb Mechanism purpose/description Locations

Operational 

Integration Center 

(OIC) 

Total number of 

OICs: 1

OIC was established 

in 2011.

Lead agency: 

CBP 

Stakeholders: 

USCG

Michigan State Police

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Ontario Provincial Police

OIC provides a centralized location for 

CBP, along with federal, state, local, and 

international partners, to gather, analyze, 

and disseminate operational and strategic 

data in the Great Lakes region of the 

northern border for use by frontline agents 

and officers. 

Detroit, Michigan 

National Search and 

Rescue Committee 

(NSARC) 

Total number of 

NSARCs: 1 

NSARC was 

established in 1973.

Lead agency: 

None

Stakeholders: 

DOD

Department of Interior

Department of Commerce 

Department of Transportation 

Federal Communication Commission

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

State and local search and rescue 

authorities

USCG

The purpose of NSARC is to coordinate 

interagency search and rescue matters. 

NSARC works with other state and local 

search and rescue authorities to 

coordinate implementation of the national 

search and rescue system. 

Washington, D.C. 

South Texas Border 

Intelligence Center 

(STBIC) 

Total number of 

STBICs: 1 

STBIC was 

established in 2012.

Lead agency: 

CBP 

Stakeholders: 

ICE HSI

FBI

DEA

Texas Department of Public Safety

Webb County Sherriff’s Office

Laredo Police Department

STBIC is a facility designed to intensify 

and integrate intelligence gathering and 

sharing activity among law enforcement 

agencies across South Texas. 

Laredo, Texas 

The Alliance to 

Combat 

Transnational 

Threats (ACTT)

Total number of 

ACTTs: 1 

ACTT was 

established in 2009.

Lead agency: 

DHS 

Stakeholders:

CBP 

ICE HSI

USAO

Bureau of Land Management

U.S. Forest Service

TSA

State, local, and tribal law

enforcement agencies

ACTT was established to counter the 

threats posed by transnational criminal 

organizations operating in the Arizona 

corridor. Specifically, ACTT leverages the 

capabilities and resources of more than 60 

federal, state, local and tribal agencies in 

Arizona and the government of Mexico to 

combat individuals and criminal 

organizations that pose a threat to 

communities on both sides of the border.

Tucson, Arizona 
Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Identified, but Not Visited

Page 35 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Mechanism name, 

number of 

mechanisms, and 

year established

Description of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborative field mechanismsa

Selected agenciesb Mechanism purpose/description Locations

Interagency 

Operations Centers 

(IOCs) 

Total number of 

IOCs: 35

IOC was established 

in 2006.e

Lead agency: 

DHS; delegated to USCG 

Stakeholders: 

CBP

ICE

State and local law enforcement 

agencies

Mandated by the Security and 

Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 

(SAFE Port Act), IOCs were established to 

improve multiagency maritime security 

operations and enhance cooperation 

among partner agencies at 35 U.S. ports. 

Specifically, IOCs transformed the Coast 

Guard sector command centers by 

upgrading their information management 

tools. IOCs also help port agencies to 

collaborate on first response, law 

enforcement, and homeland security 

operations.

Mobile, Alabama

Anchorage, Alaska

Juneau, Alaska

San Diego, California

San Francisco, California

San Pedro, California

New Haven, Connecticut

Atlantic Beach, Florida

Key West, Florida

Miami Beach, Florida

St. Petersburg, Florida

Honolulu, Hawaii

Louisville, Kentucky

New Orleans, Louisiana

South Portland, Maine

Baltimore, Maryland

Boston, Massachusetts

Woods Hole, 

Massachusetts

Detroit, Michigan

Sault Ste. Marie, 

Michigan

St. Louis, Missouri

Buffalo, New York

Staten Island, New York

Wilmington, North 

Carolina

Warrenton, Oregon

Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania

Charleston, South 

Carolina

Memphis, Tennessee

Corpus Christi, Texas

Houston, Texas

Portsmouth, Virginia

Seattle, Washington

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

San Juan, Puerto Rico

U.S. territory of Guam 
Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative 

Field Mechanisms Identified, but Not Visited

Page 36 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Mechanism name, 

number of 

mechanisms, and 

year established

Description of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborative field mechanismsa

Selected agenciesb Mechanism purpose/description Locations

Special Event 

Working Group 

(SEWG) 

Total number of 

SEWGs: 1 

SEWG was 

established in 2004.

Lead agency: 

DHS Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning (OPS)

Stakeholders: 

DHS National Protection and 

Programs Directorate

U.S. Secret Service

FEMA

FBI

SEWG is an interagency forum that 

ensures comprehensive, coordinated 

interagency awareness of, and federal 

support to, special events. 

Washington, D.C. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. 

a

Although DHS provided two additional examples of collaborative field mechanisms for our 

consideration, we eliminated them from our sample because they did not meet our criteria for a 

collaborative mechanism. These two examples were (1) USCG’s area, district, and sector offices and 

(2) the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) federal security directors. We eliminated them 

because they are part of the organizational structures of the components rather than mechanisms 

established for the purpose of enhancing collaboration across components.

b

We included the lead agency (or agencies) for each mechanism, but did not provide a 

comprehensive listing of stakeholders, which may include other federal, state, local, tribal, and private 

sector agencies.

c

In June 2003, ICE established the Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) as the first national program 

dedicated to the enforcement of nonimmigrant visa violations. In September 2010, ICE HSI 

redesignated the unit as the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) because of the 

changing landscape of the national security arena and the expanded responsibilities and mission of 

CEU.

d

The Regional Concurrence Team (RCT) is one of the mechanisms the CBIG uses to coordinate 

specific responses and develop courses of action to a maritime threat. The purpose of RCT is to 

rapidly and effectively coordinate interagency decision making and, as authorized, resolve maritime 

threats associated with people, cargo, or vessels (e.g., migrant smuggling).

e

The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) mandated the 

establishment of IOCs in all high-priority ports. Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884, 1892-93 

(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 70107A). High-priority ports have been defined as those ports 

with a designated captain of the port, which currently correlate to all 35 USCG sectors, except 

Humboldt Bay and North Bend. However, because of their virtual operation, IOCs are not necessarily 

located at specific geographic points.
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

We were asked to continue our work on DHS’s efforts to improve 

collaboration and integrate its field operations.

1 This report (1) assesses 

the extent to which DHS has identified the collaborative field 

mechanisms—that is, multiagency groups such as task forces, 

committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration across the 

participating agencies in order to more effectively and efficiently achieve 

their mission—of its key operational components, and (2) describes 

factors that participants of selected mechanisms identified that enhance 

or are challenges to their collaboration, and assesses the extent to which 

DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative practices.

To address the first objective, we contacted DHS officials to identify a list 

of collaborative mechanisms that they deemed to be successful examples 

of field component collaboration while we also independently identified 

such mechanisms.2 Upon receiving DHS’s list of mechanisms, we 

combined this list with our own and sought input from DHS and the seven 

key operational component agencies to create a master list of agreedupon collaborative field mechanisms. Our final list included 13 

collaborative mechanisms that DHS and operational component officials 

agreed were models of collaboration among component agencies in the 

field.3 The 13 collaborative mechanisms we identified are used by federal 

agencies to implement interagency collaborative efforts, such as agencies 

colocating within one facility or establishing interagency task forces.4 In 

addition, all of the identified mechanisms involved multiple DHS 

component agencies, as well as other federal, state, and local agency 

participants, and their purpose was to improve operational integration, 

 1

GAO-12-185R.

2

Subject matter specialists have defined an interagency mechanism for collaboration as 

any arrangement or application that can facilitate collaboration among agencies.

3

For purposes of this report, these mechanisms refer to those that are organized through 

a charter, directive, memorandum of understanding, or other such agreement. 

4

GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). For 

example, geographically based offices or colocated offices are places where one office 

maintains responsibility for collaborating with federal agencies or departments that are 

located in the same geographic region. Also, in some cases, more than one program 

office from different federal agencies can be located in a facility with the intention of 

personnel from the agencies collaborating with one another. Interagency groups, whether 

led by agency and department heads or component-and program-level staff, are 

sometimes referred to as task forces, working groups, councils, and committees.

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

coordination, and efficiencies among DHS agencies. Of those we 

identified, 11 of the 13 mechanisms focused on law enforcement 

activities.5 For these 13 mechanisms, we examined organizational 

documents related to mechanism mission, objectives, stakeholder 

composition, locations, and date organized, among other things. We also 

interviewed officials from DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning about the establishment and operation of these 13 mechanism 

types. We also interviewed DHS officials and analyzed documentation 

(i.e., components daily activity reports) obtained from responsible senior 

DHS headquarters officials to identify the extent to which the department 

has visibility over the collaborative field mechanisms activities—including 

any plans to increase visibility over the mechanisms in the future. We 

compared DHS’s efforts to identify and collect information on the 

collaborative field mechanism with criteria in Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government, which call for the establishment of 

control activities, such as a mechanism to identify and monitor the 

activities of components within an organization, to help achieve the 

organization’s objectives.6

 

To address the second objective, we selected 4 types of collaborative 

mechanisms in 10 locations from the list of 13—ReCoM, BEST, JTT, and 

RISC.7 We based our selection of these 4 types of mechanisms on the 

following factors: geographic location, continuity of the mechanism 

(established for at least 16 months), participation of multiple DHS 

component agencies, and variation in the lead component agency. 

Except for the JTT, we selected mechanism types that existed in more 

than one location to allow for geographic comparisons—such as BEST, 

with 35 locations throughout the United States. To describe the factors 

 5

Although DHS provided 2 additional examples of collaborative mechanisms for our 

consideration, we eliminated them from our sample because they did not meet our criteria 

for a collaborative mechanism. These two examples were (1) USCG’s area, district, and 

sector offices and (2) TSA’s federal security director regions. We eliminated these 

examples because they are part of the organizational structures of the components rather 

than mechanisms established for the purpose of enhancing collaboration across 

components. 

6

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

7

The 10 locations we visited included: BEST and RECoM in San Diego, California; FEMA 

in Atlanta, Georgia; ReCoM in Corpus Christi, Texas; BEST and ReCoM in Houston, 

Texas; and BEST and JTT in Laredo, Texas; BEST in Blaine, Washington; and FEMA in 

Bothell, Washington. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

that participants of the selected collaborative mechanisms identified that 

enhance or are challenges to collaboration, we conducted site visits to 

interview operational component officials directly participating in each of 

the 4 types of mechanisms, and in total we met with over 55 participants 

from 10 mechanisms—including officials from three ReCoMs, four 

BESTs, one JTT, and two RISCs. The BEST, ReCoM, and JTT are law 

enforcement–focused, while the RISC focuses on emergency 

management activities and exercises. For each of the selected 

mechanisms, we also interviewed senior headquarters officials to discuss 

their views on the successes and challenges experienced with 

collaboration, including how the successes are replicated and 

communicated across the mechanisms and challenges are addressed. At 

each of the 10 mechanisms we visited, we gathered information from 

participants on what they believed to be promising practices that helped 

them to succeed as collaborative mechanisms, as well as the factors they 

viewed as challenges to their collaboration. We also discussed their 

efforts to establish performance measures to assess mechanism 

effectiveness. While we cannot generalize our work from visits to these 

collaborative mechanisms, we chose these locations to provide examples 

of the way in which the mechanisms identify, communicate with others, 

and address the successes and challenges experienced with 

collaboration.

We also reviewed planning, operations, and management integration 

documents such as strategic plans, annual performance reports, and 

memorandums of understanding or agreements among the participating 

agencies. We compared these documents and their responses with the 

information-sharing and collaboration practices identified in our past work 

on this subject.8 Our past work on interagency collaboration has 

highlighted the importance of agencies establishing or clarifying 

guidelines, agreements, or procedures for sharing information. These 

guidelines, agreements, and procedures should identify and disseminate 

practices to facilitate more effective communication and collaboration 

 8

See, for example, GAO-09-904SP. These practices were identified from a literature 

review, government agency and research institution studies, and an analysis of prior GAO 

reports and testimonies on collaboration.
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 40 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

among federal, state, and local agencies.9 In addition, our prior work has 

demonstrated the benefits of sharing promising practices as a means to 

replicate positive program outcomes by leveraging the experiences of 

different stakeholders with the same or similar goals.10 We have also 

identified the sharing of promising practices as an example of government 

agencies building capacity for improved efficiency.11 At each of the 10 

mechanisms we visited, we noted any alignment or divergence from the 

mechanisms’ reported successes and challenges with key features 

identified in our 2012 report on interagency collaboration.12 These key 

features include seven categories, (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) 

bridging organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and 

responsibilities, (5) participants, (6) resources, and (7) written guidance 

and agreements. We interviewed component officials responsible for 

managing the selected mechanisms and determined that our work and 

past recommendations related to information sharing and collaborative 

practices are still valid and were deemed reasonable by the respective 

officials. We then assessed the extent to which the mechanism 

participants’ responses regarding integration, coordination, and 

collaboration practices utilized by their mechanisms aligned with those 

identified in our 2012 report. See appendix IV for a list of key issues to 

consider when implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms that 

were identified in our 2012 report. We interviewed responsible senior 

DHS headquarters officials to determine the extent to which the 

department has collected and reported on the collaborative practices 

identified by the mechanisms. We also interviewed component officials at 

the selected 4 mechanisms to identify the extent to which information, 

 9

GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Prior to our site visits, we provided the respective mechanisms with a listing of the 

identified promising practices for review and to obtain comments on their applicability and

relevance to the mechanism(s).

10See, for example: GAO, VA Education Benefits: VA Needs to Improve Program 

Management and Provide More Timely Information to Students, GAO-13-338

(Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2013), and School Meal Programs: Sharing Information on 

Best Practices May Improve Programs’ Operations, RCED-97-126 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 21, 1997). Findings from these reports demonstrate the benefits of collecting, 

analyzing, and disseminating promising practices information.

11GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select Efficiency Initiatives Should 

Be Shared Governmentwide, GAO-11-908 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2011). 

12GAO-12-1022. 
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

such as information sharing and collaborative practices are provided to 

DHS headquarters officials who are responsible for oversight of the 

collaborative field mechanisms.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix IV: Key Issues to Consider when 

Implementing Interagency Collaborative 

Mechanisms

Page 42 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

In September 2012, we indentified 12 mechanisms that the federal 

government uses to lead and implement interagency collaboration.1

Although these mechanisms differ in complexity and scope, our 

September 2012 report notes that these mechanisms all benefit from the 

seven features below. Key issues to consider when implementing 

collaborative mechanisms are listed under each feature. 

1. Outcomes and accountability

• Have short-term and long-term outcomes been clearly defined?

• Is there a way to track and monitor progress toward the short-term 

and long-term outcomes?

• Do participating agencies have collaboration-related competencies or 

performance standards against which individual performance can be 

evaluated?

• Do participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward 

accomplishments related to collaboration?

2. Bridging organizational cultures

• What are the missions and organizational cultures of the participating 

agencies?

• What are the commonalities between the participating agencies’ 

missions and cultures and what are some potential challenges?

• Have participating agencies developed ways for operating across 

agency boundaries? How did they develop these ways?

• Have participating agencies agreed on common terminology and 

definitions?

3. Leadership

• Has a lead agency or individual been identified?

• If leadership will be shared between one or more agencies, have roles 

and responsibilities been clearly identified and agreed upon?

 1

GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). Identified 

mechanisms for interagency collaboration are (1) presidential assistants and advisors, (2) 

collaboration structures within the Executive Office of the President, (3) national strategies 

and initiatives, (4) interagency groups, (5) designation of leadership, (6) geographically 

based offices/colocation, (7) positions and details, (8) specially created interagency 

offices, (9) interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding, (10) joint 

program efforts, (11) conferences and communities of practice, and (12) collaboration 

technologies.

Appendix IV: Key Issues to Consider when 

Implementing Interagency Collaborative 

Mechanisms 
Appendix IV: Key Issues to Consider when 

Implementing Interagency Collaborative 

Mechanisms

Page 43 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

• How will leadership be sustained over the short term? How will it be 

sustained over the long term? 

4. Clarity of roles and responsibilities

• Have participating agencies clarified the roles and responsibilities of 

the participants?

• Have participating agencies articulated and agreed to a process for 

making and enforcing decisions? 

5. Participants

• Have all relevant participants been included?

• Do the participants have

• full knowledge of the relevant resources in their agency;

• the ability to commit these resources;

• the ability to regularly attend activities of the collaborative 

mechanism; and 

• the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to contribute? 

6. Resources

• How will the collaborative mechanism be funded? If interagency 

funding is needed, is it permitted?

• If interagency funding is needed and permitted, is there a means to 

track funds in a standardized manner?

• How will the collaborative mechanism be staffed?

• Are there incentives available to encourage staff or agencies to 

participate?

• If relevant, do agencies have compatible technological systems?

• Have participating agencies developed online tools or other resources 

that facilitate joint interactions?

7. Written guidance and agreements

• If appropriate, have the participating agencies documented their 

agreement regarding how they will be collaborating? A written 

document can incorporate agreements reached in any or all of the 

following areas:

• leadership,

• accountability,

• roles and responsibilities, and 

• resources.

• Have participating agencies developed ways to continually update or 

monitor written agreements?
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 44 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 45 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 46 GAO-13-734 Collaborative Field Mechanisms

Joseph Kirschbaum, (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, 

Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director, and Frederick Lyles, Jr., Analyst-inCharge, managed this engagement. Chuck Bausell, Eric Hauswirth, 

Tracey King, David Lutter, Jess Orr, Janay Sam, and Cynthia Saunders 

made significant contributions to the report. 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441116)
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