U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Railroad Administration

Office of Railroad Safety

Office of Railroad Development

Version 1.0

November 2009
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Contents 

Preface to Version 1.0 ........................................................................................................................ iii

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................1

Guidance for Highway­Rail Grade Crossings ...............................................................................5

1.  Consolidation and Grade Separation.....................................................................................................5

2.  Safety Improvements at Private Crossings.........................................................................................5

a.  Public Access Crossings.........................................................................................................................6

b.  Industrial Crossings................................................................................................................................6

c.  Residential Crossings..............................................................................................................................6

d.  Agricultural Crossings ...........................................................................................................................7

3.  “Sealed Corridors” .........................................................................................................................................8

4.  Warning Systems and Other Highway Traffic Control Devices .................................................9

a.  Interconnection and Supplementary Traffic Control ...............................................................9

b.  Presence Detection............................................................................................................................... 10

c.  Remote Health Monitoring................................................................................................................ 10

5.  Train Control Integration ........................................................................................................................ 11

6.  Barrier Systems ........................................................................................................................................... 12

7.  Pedestrian and Trespass Considerations ......................................................................................... 13

8.  Systems Approach ...................................................................................................................................... 14

Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 17

Appendix:  Potential Tier Structure for Passenger Systems ............................................... 19
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 iii 

Preface to Version 1.0    

On July 28, 2009, FRA distributed for comment, through the Railroad Safety Advisory 

Committee (RSAC) and its member organizations, an initial draft of these Highway‐Rail 

Grade Crossing Guidelines (Guidelines).  Comments were requested through August 28, 

2009, and a report on the comments was provided to the RSAC at its meeting on September 

10, 2009.  Subsequently, FRA published a notice concerning the establishment of a public 

docket (FRA Docket No. 2009‐0095) which will remain open indefinitely to receive 

comments on the High‐Speed Rail (HSR) Safety Strategy and this document (74 FR 50270; 

Sept. 30, 2009). 

In preparing these Guidelines, FRA has taken into consideration all of the comments that 

touched on the issue of highway‐rail grade crossings in high‐speed territory, as well a 

comment on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Positive Train Control Systems (74 FR 

35950; July 21, 2009)(FRA Docket No. 2008‐0132).  In general, there was continued strong 

support for consolidating both public and private highway‐rail grade crossings.  Beyond 

that, FRA encountered a wide range of views in these comments, from strong support for 

aggressive engineering that would include integration of highway‐rail warning systems 

with train control to concerns that excessive expectations could arrest progress toward 

new rail service. 

Any discussion of rail passenger service and safety draws notable comments regarding 

costs, funding, and liability.  Likewise, host or tenant freight railroads conducting 

operations on lines used for Emerging HSR are concerned that provisions for safety might 

disrupt or unduly burden freight service.  Responses to the draft Guidelines were replete 

with such comments. 

FRA has attempted to take into account issues of cost and practicability in adopting these 

initial Guidelines.  FRA has also taken into account the compelling reality that HSR service 

will succeed only if it is very safe.  Exposure at highway‐rail grade crossings is the area of 

risk over which it is most difficult to establish reasonable control, specifically because two 

independent modes of transportation are involved.  Accordingly, FRA offers Guidelines that 

attempt to advance safety and take advantage of techniques successfully implemented on 

one or more existing high‐speed corridors. 

Two observations are crucial:  First, these are guidelines, not regulations.  They do not 

establish a standard of care, and no court should view any departure from these guidelines 

as suggesting a failure to exercise reasonable care.  Second, they should be taken seriously 

by those who are planning high‐speed service.  They will be used, with other relevant 

factors, in determining the relative merit of applications for Federal assistance, and they 

will be used by FRA as grant agreements are negotiated.  Of course, as guidelines, they will 

be weighed in the particular context along with other considerations advanced by the 

applicant.  FRA is aware that very safe HSR service has been provided under conditions not 

wholly aligned with the guidelines, so they should not be applied reflexively or arbitrarily.  

At the same time, applicants should keep in mind that serious rail passenger accidents are 
 iv

rare events, and that abating risk can make them even less frequent.  Waiting for the first 

event to happen is a sure formula for failure.  

One commenter suggested that elements of the Guidelines should “rise to the level of 

regulation.”  FRA has a completely full regulatory agenda for the time being; however, the 

agency remains open to including additional standards development in the High‐Speed Rail 

Safety Strategy as resources permit. 

Finally, FRA notes that these Guidelines will remain a work in progress.  The dialogue that 

has been possible over the past months has been severely constrained by the demands 

imposed on FRA and its colleagues by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, the 

Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, and the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009.  Together, these legislative actions present substantial 

opportunities supporting growth in passenger rail service and improvements in railroad 

safety.   FRA will maintain an active dialogue with all of those participating in this historic 

process and refine safety strategies to address these opportunities. 
1   

Introduction  

Highway‐rail grade crossings pose inherent hazards to train operations, as they do to 

motor vehicles, non‐motorized vehicles, and pedestrians.  Since the issuance of the 

Secretary’s Highway‐Rail Grade Crossing Action Plan in 1994, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT) policy has supported consolidation of crossings on active rail lines.  

Where an at‐grade crossing cannot be eliminated, provisions must be made to ensure that 

the roadway approaches and crossing surface are suitable for all traffic, that sufficient 

warning is provided of the approach of trains, and that management of the highway‐rail 

intersection is coordinated with other intersections involving nearby roads.  In addition to 

the consolidation of crossings and engineering improvements at crossings that remain, 

DOT policy has stressed— 

 Education and awareness to prepare drivers for challenges at highway‐rail grade 

crossings; and 

 Enforcement of traffic laws at crossings. 

In addition, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has taken actions to better ensure 

the conspicuity of rail equipment and to provide for effective audible warnings or 

compensating safety measures. 

The national grade crossing partnership—consisting of DOT agencies, States, Operation 

Lifesaver Inc., railroads, suppliers, and the research community—has been very effective in 

reducing collisions and casualties at grade crossings even in the face of rising exposure 

(which may be measured by motor vehicle miles and train miles). 

Collisions, Fatalities and Collisions, Fatalities and 

Exposure Exposure

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

76

78

80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04

06

08

Rail (million train miles) X Hwy Volume (trillion hwy miles)

Collisions / 10

Fatalities

(= quadrillion)
 2

This general approach is equally relevant without regard to the type or speed of rail traffic.   

However, where rail lines carry high‐speed passenger trains, special care must be observed 

to ensure that road traffic does not present an obstruction that could result in a collision 

and subsequent derailment.  The presence of both high‐speed passenger trains and slower‐

moving trains creates another dimension of risk, warranting1 additional attention to 

governance of all traffic over the highway‐rail intersection.  Under these circumstances, 

exclusive reliance on sight distance or audible warnings to judge the arrival of trains is not 

practical.  Particularly where there are two or more tracks, the potential for an event 

involving more than the single train initially impacting a road user adds to the potential for 

additional risk. 

Accordingly, at crossings with high‐speed passenger trains, special care must be taken to 

follow existing guidance concerning a systems approach to highway‐rail grade crossing 

safety.  This includes the use of diagnostic teams to plan improvements, elimination of 

redundant crossings and those that cannot be re‐engineered to provide reasonable safety, 

the use of automated warning devices including constant warning time circuitry where 

feasible, and other sound safety approaches as set forth in the Manual on Uniform Traffic 

Control Devices (MUTCD) and Railroad‐Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, both published 

by the Federal Highway Administration.   

In addition, FRA requirements for approved barrier systems where train speeds exceed 

110 mph and the prohibition of at‐grade crossings where train speeds exceed 125 mph 

must be observed as provided in the Track Safety Standards. 

Although these fundamentals are very important, they will not be sufficient to meet the 

safety challenges associated with high‐speed passenger rail going forward.  Accordingly, 

the purpose of this document is to provide supplementary guidance useful to those 

planning high‐speed passenger service and to FRA as guidance for the negotiation of 

funding agreements and for the administration of the Track Safety Standards (i.e., with 

respect to the characteristics of barrier systems suitable for approval).  This guidance 

restates and supplements preexisting guidance, building on experience gained through 

projects initiated under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act and 

subsequent surface transportation legislation, engineering options proven during 

development of the Train Horn Rule, and continuing research.   This experience shows that 

the safety challenges associated with high‐speed rail (HSR) can be effectively met. 

The primary purpose of this guidance is to support the highest level of safety that is 

practical, given the necessity associated with those highway‐rail crossings that remain after 

efforts toward consolidation are complete.  However, it must also be recognized that 

collisions at highway‐rail grade crossings disrupt rail passenger service and local road use.  

Accordingly, in addition to saving lives, preventing injuries, and avoiding property damage, 

actions that effectively reduce risk at these locations will pay dividends in more reliable 

service that will enjoy a reputation for quality as well as safety.  Good planning that 

 

1

 Variants of the term “warrant” as used in the Guidelines are intended to have their common meaning. This 

document does not prescribe “warrants” as the term is used in highway engineering. 
 3

consolidates crossings and substitutes grade separations for at‐grade crossings will 

significantly enhance mobility and contribute to livable communities. 
 4

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Guidance for Highway‐Rail Grade Crossings

1.  Consolidation and Grade Separation 

As emphasized in the Secretary of Transportation’s 2004 Action Plan for Highway­Rail

Grade Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention:  “The Department supports efforts to close 

crossings and limit the creation of new highway‐rail crossings except where the public interest 

clearly provides justification.”2  Regardless of anticipated train speeds, any new or enhanced 

passenger service should begin with an aggressive effort to close redundant crossings and 

those that cannot be re‐engineered to provide a reasonable level of safety (e.g., because of 

geometry, proximity of road intersections).3  Consolidation of at‐grade crossings requires 

significant effort, but pays off in real results and reduced costs.  Accordingly, crossing 

consolidation is the cornerstone of effective planning for high‐speed passenger rail.  

Effort and results in minimizing the number of highway‐rail grade crossings will be 

considered favorably when evaluating competing funding requests, given the finite 

resources that are available for transportation improvements, and given the fact that 

crossing closures are typically very cost‐effective when compared to the alternatives 

(upgrading warning devices, maintaining warning devices and crossing surface through the 

program lifecycle, additional expense associated with maintenance of track structure at 

crossing location, etc.).4   Clearly, consolidation planning must consider the need for 

crossings adjoining those that are closed to be equipped with high‐quality warning systems 

so that safety is advanced.5

Multi‐track crossings pose special problems, especially where some trains are expected to 

move slowly in approach to yards or stations while others proceed at higher speeds on an 

adjacent track.  Where there are more than three tracks, or where frequent low‐speed 

movements are expected, strong consideration should be given to closure or grade 

separation.  Mobility and safety will demand it.  By involving road authorities and 

metropolitan planning agencies early on, opportunities for cooperative efforts toward 

grade separations can be identified and built into project plans. 

2.  Safety Improvements at Private Crossings 

Private highway‐rail crossings constitute a significant part of the crossing safety problem in 

the United States, and in most States, there is no public regulation of this issue.  On average, 

movements over private crossings are a greater risk to persons on trains because of the 

 

2 Secretary’s Action Plan, Highway­Rail Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention, DOT (June 2004), (available at 

http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1752), page 7.  3 See Highway­Rail Grade Crossings – A Guide to Crossing Consolidation and Closure, FRA and FHWA (June 

1994), (available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1752).  4

 In this setting, demonstrated effort would include making application to a state agency having authority to order 

closure (where such authority exists). 

5

 Some have suggested that FRA specify a maximum number of crossings per mile. Although FRA is hesitant to 

specify a number (e.g., 2) given the agency’s inability to enforce such a limitation, FRA recognizes that the 

number—apart from grade separated crossings—should be very small. 
 6

prevalence of heavy trucks and agricultural equipment.6  Closing private crossings should 

be an integral part of the crossing safety strategy for any HSR corridor.  Cost‐effective 

access can often be provided to the crossing holder by establishing an alternative route as 

part of the HSR improvements even though such alternatives are not currently present.  

Where a private crossing cannot be closed, the crossing should be evaluated according to 

its use and appropriately treated. 

a.  Public Access Crossings   

Very often, private roads are open to public use, such as where the public is invited to enter 

a shopping mall or entertainment venue.  In general, these “public access crossings” should 

be treated in the same manner as any public grade crossing, and their inclusion in crossing 

consolidation programs is similarly desirable.   

b.  Industrial Crossings

Industrial crossings often pose special threats to trains because competing roadway traffic 

consists of heavy trucks that may also be transporting hazardous commodities.  Typical 

locations include gravel pits, chemical and energy plants, steel and aluminum production 

facilities, warehouses, intermodal transfer facilities, and many others.  Each of these 

crossings should be evaluated individually to ensure proper advance signage, adequate 

active warning, suitability of roadway approaches (including elimination of “hump” 

crossings capable of hanging up low‐profile vehicles), adequate storage distance for longer 

combination vehicles between tracks and nearby traffic intersections, presence of traffic‐

calming devices approaching the crossing that are compatible with the road traffic, and 

effective barrier systems where required (see below). 

Ongoing training and awareness efforts for drivers regularly using the crossing will also be 

important to ensure familiarity with the crossing safety system and the importance of 

observing warnings. 

c.  Residential Crossings

Private roads used to access individual residences and residential developments inevitably 

draw business guests (mail delivery persons, repair personnel, gardeners, etc.) as well as 

personal guests and the residents themselves.  Although it may be impractical to treat 

every such location as a public access crossing, crossings providing access to multiple 

residences should be so considered.  One commenter on these guidelines suggested a rule 

of thumb of 5 or more residences constituting public access for a single crossing location, 

which appears to be a reasonable compromise. 

There is also precedent for using gate arrangements at the crossing to control access to 

residential developments.  In one approach, gates are normally down at the crossing and 

access is provided by an electronic card system or frequently changed code.  The gate rises 

 

6 See Private Highway­Rail Grade Crossing Safety Research and Inquiry, Office of Research and Development 

and Office of Safety, FRA (May 2008)(available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1712). 
 7

and provides access to the development only if there is no train on the approach circuit.  

The suitability of this arrangement would depend on assignment of responsibility for 

maintenance and proper control of the means of entry (e.g., cards, tags, codes).  The design 

of the system should ensure that gates will close behind the authorized user to prevent 

later unauthorized access.  Another approach is to treat the crossing in the same manner as 

a public crossing, which would include the use of flashing lights and gates, plus any other 

appropriate treatment. 

If it is not financially feasible to provide automated warning devices at a crossing providing 

entry to one or two residences, special care should be taken to ensure that the crossing is 

well marked with a crossbuck and either a yield or stop sign, and that sight distances are 

adequate for all types of vehicles expected to use the crossing.  Appropriate attention 

should be afforded to the crossing surface, including adequate width.  If train speeds 

exceed 90 mph at the location, flashing lights and gates should be provided in each case.  

High‐speed trains present elusive visual targets and will close on a crossing too rapidly for 

audible warnings to be effective. 

d.  Agricultural Crossings

Thousands of agricultural crossings will remain on Emerging HSR corridors in the coming 

years as they are necessary to provide access to fields in season and for other legitimate 

purposes.  However, as operating speeds increase, the danger of a catastrophic incident 

involving heavy agricultural machinery and a passenger train will also rise.  Casual and 

unauthorized users (moving over the crossing to hunt, fish, or engage in other recreation) 

pose a special risk to themselves and others because of the potential lack of familiarity with 

rail traffic on the line and because of crossing approaches, sight lines, and surface that may 

be less than optimal. 

For Emerging HSR, the most rudimentary approach to agricultural crossings that cannot be 

permanently closed is to require that they be closed when not in use by employing a locking 

device within the control of the crossing holder.  A simple padlock on a fence gate may be 

sufficient in many cases.  However, experience shows that getting manual locks re‐secured 

after passage of the authorized user can be a problem.  Further, limited sight distances or 

the relatively long clearance time required for heavy agricultural machinery will often 

indicate a more aggressive approach. 

As passenger rail speeds increase, systems that provide active warning, controlled opening 

of the crossing, and provide feedback when it is secured are very desirable.  This is 

particularly true when sight distances are limited (as would be true where track curvature 

or multiple tracks, vegetation (including seasonal issues involving tall crops), topography 

or other factors block sight distance for any period of time).  The potential for adverse 

weather (e.g., heavy rain, snow, or fog) should also be considered.  For many locations, an 

electronic lock with a timed release controlled through the signal or train control system 

may be more cost‐effective and appropriate than a traditional arrangement with flashing 

lights and gates.  These arrangements could take into consideration the maximum time 

typically required to move equipment over the specific crossing and could provide 
 8

feedback through the train control system if the crossing remains open beyond the 

specified period. 

3.  “Sealed Corridors” 

In guidance provided through the 1990s, the DOT advocated for a minimum of active 

warning systems with gates, controlled by constant warning time circuitry, on rail lines 

with speeds of 80 mph and greater.7  Gates provide an unequivocal indication to the 

motorist regarding the behavior expected.  This continues to be a good foundation for 

crossing safety on HSR lines, but developments since that time point the way to additional 

strategies.8   

The State of North Carolina has pioneered many of the subsequent advances on the North 

Carolina Railroad under the concept of a “Sealed Corridor.”9  NCDOT defines the concept as 

follows:   

An  extended  rail corridor  or segment  thereof on  which  all  public  at‐

grade crossings  are  evaluated  through  an  engineering diagnostic  process to 

determine  the  appropriate level  of safety improvement  needed  to  decrease 

or eliminate violations.  Safety improvements include closure/consolidation, 

enhanced warning devices, medians, and grade separation.  The end result is 

that  redundant  and/or  unsafe  crossings  are consolidated  through  closure 

and/or grade separation and all remaining public crossings are equipped as 

appropriate  with  four  quadrant  gates,  median  separators,  and longer  gate 

arms.   Private  crossings  are  also  evaluated  for  closure,  signal  treatment 

and/or special signage. 

In keeping with that concept, public crossing treatments for Emerging HSR lines should 

provide an additional level of safety by blocking all lanes of travel.  These types of 

arrangements add safety by preventing left turns from parallel roadways that inadvertently 

result in driving around the tip of the gate arm.  They also discourage those who might 

attempt to go around the lowered gate.  This can be accomplished using one or more of the 

following— 

 Four‐quadrant gates 

 Median arrangements 

 Paired one‐way streets with gate arms extending across all lanes of travel10

 

7 High­Speed Track and Equipment Safety Standards (Report to the Committees on Appropriations, May 1997), 

page 7. 

8 Constant warning time circuitry may not be practical on electrified rail lines under some conditions 

(including the nature of the legacy train control system).  If that is the case, special care should be given to 

ensuring that warning system traffic control at the crossing is observed.   9 Reports and other information on North Carolina’s Sealed Corridor can be accessed online at 

http://www.bytrain.org/safety/sealed.html and http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/Research/rr0807.pdf. 10 NCDOT has also found long gate arms to be effective on two-lane roads with travel in both directions. However, 

they have also found them to require significant maintenance. 
 9

These types of improvements have been accepted by the highway engineering community 

and the railroads in connection with programs for enhanced passenger rail service and in 

connection with quiet zones.11  They can be paired with selective use of barrier gates at 

particularly troublesome crossings. 

FRA expects that funding proposals will reflect sealed corridor treatments for all highway‐

rail grade crossings at locations where train speeds exceed 79 mph.  FRA will look 

favorably on proposals for locations within the limits of developing high‐speed corridors 

that include sealed corridor treatments at crossings with maximum authorized train 

speeds below that threshold. 

It should be noted that sealed corridor treatments are also appropriate at crossings with 

more than two tracks, regardless of speed, and particularly near passenger stations.  These 

are cases where “second train” concerns can be particularly acute.  Additional warning time 

will be required at these locations to ensure that all road traffic clears the crossing.  

Pedestrian gates and effective channelization should be provided. 

4.  Warning Systems and Other Highway Traffic Control Devices 

Automatic warning devices at crossings (such as flashing lights and gates) provide valuable 

information to the motorists that are approaching the crossing.  These devices may be 

supplemented by additional systems and traffic control devices to enhance the 

effectiveness of the warning systems.  These additional systems should be carefully 

considered at crossings on HSR lines. 

  

a.  Interconnection and Supplementary Traffic Control

Warning systems in HSR lines must conform to the MUTCD and other Federal Highway 

Administration guidance.  Special attention should be given to the interconnection of grade 

crossing warning systems with other traffic control systems in the vicinity of the crossing, 

and periodic verification that timing is adequate to avoid “storage” of vehicles on the 

crossing (i.e., vehicles that are stopped on the crossing due to traffic that is queued because 

of the highway traffic signal).  Actual conditions may indicate the necessity of 

interconnection even though the nominal MUTCD threshold is not met. 

In some cases, heavy highway traffic volume may defy reasonable attempts to use timing of 

the highway traffic signal as the means of preventing storage.  Since storage of a large truck 

or bus could pose a hazard to persons on and off the train, consideration should be given, 

where appropriate, to the use of interconnected traffic signals prior to the crossing and 

placed specifically to prevent storage.  A traffic engineering study should be conducted to 

determine the appropriate timing for the interconnection and whether the interconnection 

 

11 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 222. 
 10

should be simultaneous or advanced preemption.  The use of pre‐signals and queue‐cutter 

signals should also be explored where warranted.12  

b.  Presence Detection

Accepted design for four‐quadrant gates includes a delay on the descent of exit gates to 

permit traffic on the crossing to clear before arrival of the train.  Where a four‐quadrant 

gate system is employed and storage is a potential issue, consideration should be given to 

using vehicle presence detection to maintain the exit gates in the raised position until 

traffic within the crossing clears.13

Storage may also be an issue where conventional gates and channelization through use of 

medians is employed.  For crossings where storage is a known possibility, and in the case of 

crossings on segments with train speeds above 100 mph, regardless of a prior history of 

storage, presence detection should be provided in connection with operation of the train 

control system (see below).  Motor vehicles stalled or trapped on a crossing present a 

derailment hazard; and in multiple track territory or where freight equipment is standing 

on adjacent sidings or industry tracks, derailments can result in catastrophic secondary 

collisions.  

c.  Remote Health Monitoring

Warning systems are designed to be fail‐safe.  However, the potential for continuous 

operation (eroding the credibility of the warning), intermittent malfunction, or even total 

failure is always present.  Confidence in warning system performance is acquired through 

many means, including periodic inspections and tests,14 emergency notification systems, 

constant attention by train crews.  In recent years, the additional option of remote health 

monitoring has been added.  Grade crossing controllers and simple sensors together can 

diagnose developing problems and failures (including failure of commercial power and 

system unresponsiveness caused by lightning strikes and other factors).  By using cellular 

phone links and other communication paths, crossing warning systems can report 

problems to a central location, leading to responsive action by dispatchers, train crews, and 

signal maintainers.  Use of remote health monitoring on HSR lines is clearly indicated.  

Typically, exceptions are reported to a signal trouble desk for review and action.  However, 

unless the signal trouble desk is continuously monitored, critical exception data from 

health monitoring should also be presented to dispatchers for acknowledgment and 

appropriate action.  

FRA will include consideration of these issues in its review of grant applications and in 

negotiation of grant agreements. 

 

12 See Railroad­Highway Grade Crossing Handbook, FHWA (August 2007), (available at 

http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1752), pages 114‐115, 129, and 134.  13 NCDOT advises that decisions on presence detection and whether gates are designed to fail up or down should be 

entrusted to the crossing safety engineer in charge or to the diagnostic team. 

14 See 49 CFR Part 234. 
 11

5.  Train Control Integration 

One of the potential functions of a train control system is to provide the locomotive 

engineer with information concerning route conditions ahead.  FRA has in place existing 

train control requirements for operations above 79 mph.15  On July 21, 2009, FRA 

published a proposed rule on Implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) systems as 

required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008.16  PTC will be required by law on all 

intercity and commuter passenger lines by December 31, 2015. 

The question arises whether the train control system can be engaged as a means of 

preventing certain low‐frequency, high‐severity collisions involving vehicles that linger on 

grade crossings as a result of being stored, disabled, or deliberately placed there.   

The following examples illustrate recent experiences: 

 One of the primary objectives of Federal and local investment in the Northeast 

Corridor (NEC) from the 1970s through the 1990s was the elimination of highway‐

rail grade crossings.  In fact, all crossings were eliminated south of New York City, 

and only a half dozen (mostly lightly used) crossings remain north of New York City.  

Anticipating the enhancement of HSR service between New Haven and Boston, FRA 

acted through an Order of Particular Applicability for the Advanced Train Control 

and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (affecting certain NEC railroads) to 

address residual grade crossing risk on that territory.17  The Order limited speeds to 

80 mph with conventional crossing treatments, and to 95 mph where four‐quadrant 

gates were present with presence detection and a feedback loop to the train control 

system that would cause the cab signals to display the most restrictive signal aspect 

if a vehicle was stored on the crossing after the exit gates timed out.  (Amtrak 

ultimately elected to take a more conservative approach than required, equipping 

additional crossings with four‐quadrant gate systems tied into the train control 

system.)  FRA’s justification for the requirements was directly related to the 

specifics of the NEC operation. 

 In Michigan, Amtrak’s line (which is part of the Detroit‐Chicago corridor) is 

equipped with the Incremental Train Control System.  This system functions to 

provide pre‐starts for highway‐rail grade crossings, avoiding the expense and 

complexity of extending approach circuits to provide proper warning for high‐speed 

trains.  Using a radio data link, each train establishes a “session” with each of the 

crossings along the line.  The system verifies warning system health and operation 

as the train approaches the crossing.  If proper functioning cannot be verified, the 

crossing becomes a target for the train control system and the train’s speed is 

reduced to the extent possible.   

 

15 49 CFR § 236.0 and §§ 501 et seq. 

16 74 FR 35950, July 21, 2009. 

17 63 FR 39343; July 22, 1998. 
 12

 FRA understands that the State of Illinois is also considering a feedback loop to  

the train control system that will verify that the four‐quadrant gates on the  

Chicago-St. Louis designated HSR corridor are operating properly and that  

crossings are clear. 

It should be noted that there is significant opposition within the rail community to the use 

of any technology that seeks to determine the presence of obstacles on highway‐rail grade 

crossings and create any sort of feedback loop to the train.  The opposition arises in part 

from the reality that today, motor vehicles often clear crossings only a few seconds before 

the arrival of the train.  In order to be effective in providing warning to the train, the traffic 

control devices at the crossing would need to operate well ahead of the train’s arrival, 

lengthening road‐user dwell time significantly—which itself can erode compliance with the 

crossing warning system.  Further, delivery of repeated false warnings to freight trains 

could lead to additional train handling challenges as well as significant fuel and emission 

costs. 

However, where HSR passenger trains are present, it will be important for each crossing to 

be equipped with sealed corridor treatments.  In most cases, there will be some portion of 

the crossing where presence detection is necessary to execute the sealed corridor strategy 

or is properly elected to deal with special challenges.  Crossings with presence detection 

should be monitored by the train control system, and continued presence of obstacles 

following the expiration of the expected clearance timing should be communicated to high‐

speed passenger trains for action by the crew and the train control technology.  FRA would 

not expect freight trains to be governed by this information unless route conditions 

indicate and the freight railroad so elects.  Accordingly, this would be a function 

independent of the wayside signal system. 

FRA will consider appropriate use of the train control system in reviewing grant 

applications, negotiating grant agreements, and reviewing filings under the PTC 

regulations.  FRA will insist on integration of train control technology if any crossings are 

retained at speeds exceeding 110 mph. 

Planners should note the potential project efficiencies that may be possible with effective 

train control integration.  In addition to secure warning system pre‐starts at higher speeds, 

train control might be configured to permit acceleration on approach circuits equipped 

with constant warning time circuitry (leaving stations and departing curves) to aid trip 

time.  

6.  Barrier Systems 

The Track Safety Standards require that, at speeds exceeding 110 mph, “the railroad shall 

submit for FRA’s approval a complete description of the proposed barrier/warning system 

to address the protection of highway traffic and high‐speed trains.”18  The system must be 

approved and implemented before high‐speed train operations may begin.   

 

18 49 CFR § 213.347. 
 13

As speeds increase, there is a heightened concern with any condition that could result in a 

derailment.  At times, mere warning to highway users is insufficient.  Slick road surfaces, 

brake failures, stalled vehicles, motorist misperceptions, and other factors can result in 

vehicles going through gates just ahead of a train’s arrival or vehicles becoming disabled on 

the crossing.  Barrier systems, where required, need to meet the following tests to be 

effective: 

 Barriers systems must operate in concert with the crossing warning system, and 

the combined system must provide critical information concerning system health 

and status to the train control system in real time. 

 Barriers must be capable of stopping short of the crossing the heaviest motor 

vehicle operated on that roadway, taking into consideration the posted speed limit 

on the roadway. 

 Barrier systems must include the capability to detect any object of significant 

obstruction (car, truck) that remains on the crossing after the barriers go into place. 

 Barrier systems must communicate to approaching high‐speed trains the presence 

of any significant obstruction in time for the train to reduce speed (i.e., to 

approximately 20 mph) or stop before reaching the crossing. 

Through research and demonstration, FRA sought during the 1990s to determine the 

practicality and effectiveness of energy‐absorbing barrier systems at highway‐rail grade 

crossings.  Those efforts were generally considered unsuccessful.  FRA remains open to 

appropriate technology that is shown to be effective and reliable. 

FRA is aware that barrier gates are in use at a small number of highway‐rail grade 

crossings in the United States.  These arrangements are suitable for low‐speed roads and—

together with presence detection—can add to the options available for improvement of 

HSR lines at speeds up to 110 mph.  Under these circumstances, barrier gates deter 

violations and contribute to public awareness.  However, presently marketed barrier gates 

do not address heavier motor vehicles and would therefore not be suitable without 

modification for protection of a rail line carrying trains above 110 mph. 

7.  Pedestrian and Trespass Considerations 

High‐speed passenger trains are difficult to detect visually and can be virtually silent until 

their arrival at any given location.  Pedestrian treatments at vehicular crossings and 

associated sidewalks, including pedestrian pathways, are an essential safety element.  

Active warning directed at pedestrians should be provided, and warning system timing and 

the nature of the warning given should take into consideration special needs road users 

(e.g., the visually impaired or motorized wheelchair users).  Channelization of pedestrian 

traffic is recommended to ensure that warning is effectively delivered and pedestrian 

behaviors are adequately cabined.  Intercity and commuter railroads have implemented 
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many innovative techniques that can significantly reduce hazards to pedestrians.19  FRA is 

working with industry representatives and through the RSAC to refine strategies for 

controlling pedestrian movements in and around stations. 

Crossings near stations pose special issues for persons with disabilities.  Attention should 

be given to control of the flangeway gap in accordance with applicable standards.   

Trespassing on railroad property is the single largest cause of deaths associated with 

railroad operations.  HSR lines should be clearly posted against entry, and consideration 

should be given to use of tamper‐resistant fencing, video surveillance, and similar 

measures in high‐traffic areas.  Control of trespassing is also essential to the reliability and 

security of HSR service.  

8.  Systems Approach 

The Federal Highway Administration’s Railroad­Highway Grade Crossing Handbook has 

long emphasized the importance of the systems approach to crossing safety.  Although FRA 

regulations and this guidance document provide certain categorical requirements based on 

train speed, many areas of judgment remain.  Planners should use the Handbook, the 

Technical Working Group report,20 FRA’s Collision Hazard Analysis Guide,21 and reports 

from diagnostic team studies of conditions at individual crossings to make sound 

engineering judgments that may go well beyond the categorical criteria provided herein.  

Crossing safety and trespass prevention should be further integrated in support of system 

planning and operation by its inclusion in System Safety Programs for HSR. 

Project planning should incorporate strategies for: (1) educating road users concerning the 

onset of HSR service and making them aware of the inherent risks, and (2) gaining the 

support of law enforcement and the judiciary for strict application of traffic laws governing 

behavior at remaining highway‐rail grade crossings.  Public information and safety blitzes 

should be carried out at crossings and in communities prior to raising speeds by significant 

margins.  Ongoing awareness efforts, including those directly addressed to commercial 

drivers serving facilities in the vicinity of the rail line, can help ensure familiarity with the 

crossing safety system and the importance of observing warnings. 

The “system,” of course, includes the railroad as well as the roadway.  It should be 

emphasized that limiting train speed may be an available option to deal with a particularly 

difficult crossing.  Hazard analyses should take into consideration the potential for second‐

 

19 See, e.g., resources gathered at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1752; ROW Fatality and Trespass

Reduction Workshop 2008:  Summary of Results (DOT/FRA/ORS‐09‐001 February 2009) (available at 

http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/2232).    20 Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway­Rail Grade Crossings (report of the Highway‐Rail Crossing 

Technical Working Group), FHWA (November 2002)(available at 

http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/xings/collision/twgreport/).    21 Collision Hazard Analysis Guide:  Commuter and Intercity Passenger Rail Service, Office of Safety, FRA 

(October 2007) (available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/1785).   
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train collisions and for blocking crossings in a manner likely to present other challenges in 

the community (e.g., interfering with emergency response).  Most often, these kinds of 

issues are best addressed at the design stage (i.e., initially as the project is planned or when 

a new facility, such as a passing track, is added).  When safety is considered in project 

planning, capital can be used wisely to foster the best outcomes. 

   

The Appendix provides a potential tier structure for passenger systems that have highway‐

rail grade crossings, and will provide a quick overview of issues to be considered in a 

systems approach. 
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Conclusion 

The safety of high‐speed passenger systems is achieved only through proper planning, 

investment, operations and maintenance.  Highway‐rail grade crossings present major 

risks for train operations as well as for road users.  As speeds increase, measures designed 

to reduce the frequency of crossing collisions must be strongly emphasized.  Although FRA 

regulations provide minimum criteria for grade crossings on high‐speed lines, including a 

prohibition of any at‐grade crossings at speeds above 125 mph, responsible rail planners 

and railroads have gone well beyond those minimums, and technology has been 

demonstrated that has broader application.  This document describes additional steps that 

should be taken to reduce risk and enhance the quality of HSR service.   

Safety is FRA’s paramount goal.  In reviewing requests for funding for HSR FRA will actively 

apply this guidance. 
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Appendix: Potential Tier Structure for Passenger Systems

Highway­Rail Grade Crossings

Tier 0 IA IB IC II III Description Regional Rail Conventional Emerging 

HSR 

HSR Regional 

HSR Mixed Operations 

HSR Mixed Passenger 

HSR Dedic

Max. Speed mph 

0-65 0-79 80-110 111-125 126-150 0-150 0-150 

Other traffic on same track 

None (or temporally separated) 

Mixed passenger and freight 

Mixed passenger and freight 

Mixed passenger and freight 

Mixed passenger and freight 

Conventional passenger only 

None 

Closures Consolidation encouraged in 

regional and conventional service; funding condition if part of HSR corridor 

Demonstrated effort and results required as part of funding process. No crossings above 125 mph 

Grade separentire 

Public highway-rail grade crossings, generally 

Automated warning; supplementary measures where warranted 

Automated warning; supplementary measures where warranted 

Sealed corridor; evaluate need for presence detection and PTC feedback 

Barriers above 110, see §213.247 Presence detection tied to PTC above 110 mph 

See IC None above 125 mph 

See IC None above 125 mph 

None speed 

Private highway-rail grade crossings, generally 

Automated warning or locked gate preferred; cross-buck and stop or yield sign where conditions permit 

Automated warning or locked gate preferred; cross-buck and stop or yield sign where conditions permit 

Automated warning with gates; or locked gate (interlocked with signal system at higher speeds) 

None or as above 

None above 125 mph 

None above 125 mph 

None speed 

System Safety Programs 

Crossing safety and trespass prevention issues included in SSP process. Plus FRA reviews manag

disapprove. 

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