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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 125,728

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

DANIEL ONTIVEROS,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; MICHAEL A. RUSSELL, judge. Submitted without oral 

argument. Opinion filed January 12, 2024. Affirmed.

Grace E. Tran, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Njeri Mwangi, deputy district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Kris W.

Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., SCHROEDER and COBLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Daniel Ontiveros appeals the denial of his presentence motion to 

withdraw his plea. He argues the district court abused its discretion because he 

demonstrated good cause to withdraw his plea due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel 

failing to fully explain the nature of his plea and the plea agreement. Because we find, 

after a thorough review of the record on appeal, that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Ontiveros' motion, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2019, Ontiveros pled guilty to one felony count of sexual 

exploitation of a child in exchange for the dismissal of three other felony counts (one for 

electronic solicitation and two for attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child). 

But before sentencing, Ontiveros moved to withdraw his plea because he "did not fully 

understand the implications of his guilty plea, including the gravity of his alleged prior 

conviction in the State of Georgia." He also claimed that his "lack of understanding was 

compounded by insufficient representation insofar as counsel failed to adequately inform 

him of the full implication of his prior criminal history and how it would potentially 

impact his ultimate sentencing."

The district court conducted a hearing at which Ontiveros and his plea counsel, 

Michael Duma, testified.

Ontiveros' testimony at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea

Ontiveros testified that his attorney, Michael Duma, met with him to go over the 

plea petition on the day that he entered his plea, seven days before his trial was set to 

begin. He also testified that he reviewed the discovery in his case with his attorney at the 

district attorney's office three days before he entered his plea, while a law enforcement

officer was present in the room. He stated that he "didn't want to say too much because 

the officer's sitting right there." He was concerned about the confidentiality of the 

discussions and felt intimidated. He claimed that his attorney never discussed the 

sentencing possibilities or the possibility of a civil sexual predator finding under the 

Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA), K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq., with him. He 

also cited the "serious nature of the charges" that he faced deprived him of his ability to 

be very rational when he considered his plea. He said Duma never discussed a defense to 
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his charges, prepared him for the type of questions that may be asked of him when he 

entered the plea, or discussed the potential consequences of his plea.

Ontiveros admitted that he left out his conviction in Georgia when he discussed 

his criminal background with Duma because he "never thought that [he'd] have to ever 

bring that up again." So Duma did not have all the necessary information to advise him 

regarding potential penalties—through no fault of Duma's.

Ontiveros had very little recollection of the district court inquiring into his 

understanding of the plea. He did remember the district court asking him if he understood 

that the State would ask for the maximum penalty of 272 months' imprisonment and the 

defense could argue for anything less at sentencing. Ontiveros also remembered the 

district court asking if it was his signature on the plea petition and Ontiveros further 

confirmed that the signature was his. However, he did not remember being asked if he 

was coerced or pressured to enter a plea or agreeing that he was of sound mind on the day 

that he entered the plea—although the record reflected all of those things were asked.

Duma's testimony

Duma testified that he met with Ontiveros "many, many, many times over the 

preceding year before the preliminary hearing." As to the plea petition, Duma testified 

that his standard practice consisted of using a preprinted form filled out ahead of time, he 

would then go over each paragraph with the defendant, informing the defendant that the 

judge will go over the petition in detail in court, then have the defendant sign it. He 

testified that he typically would write out the potential maximum punishment before the 

defendant signed the petition.

Duma did not recall the details of Ontiveros' plea hearing, including whether the 

judge asked Ontiveros whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
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given; nor did he recall whether he discussed the persistent offender rule with Ontiveros. 

Duma did, however, recall discussing the possibility of having to register as a sexual 

predator with Ontiveros.

District court denies Ontiveros' motion to withdraw his plea.

Counsel’s advocacy was not incompetent or lackluster. 

The district court found that Duma's testimony at the motion to withdraw 

Ontiveros' plea was more credible than Ontiveros' testimony. The district court found that 

Duma advised Ontiveros of the potential plea and while Duma did not have an 

independent recollection of going over the plea petition with Ontiveros, Duma testified to 

his standard practice regarding plea petitions. Finding that Ontiveros testified that he read 

the plea petition and discussed it with his attorney, understood the contents of the petition 

and did not want the district court to explain anything further, and then signed the 

petition, the district court concluded that Ontiveros was represented by competent 

counsel.

On Ontiveros' allegation that his attorney failed to advise him that his conviction 

could make him eligible for possible commitment under the KSVPA, the district court 

cited two Kansas cases that dealt with similar issues. In the first cited case, Bussell v. 

State, 25 Kan. App. 2d 424, 428, 963 P.2d 1250 (1998), the district court stated that the 

Bussell court held that in a postsentence motion to withdraw a plea, the failure of the 

defendant's counsel to advise him of potential consequences does not declare that 

representation to be constitutionally deficient. The second cited case, State v. Schaefer, 

305 Kan. 581, 385 P.3d 918 (2016), dealt with a presentence motion to withdraw a plea 

where the defendant's counsel did not advise him of the potential for involuntary 

commitment under KSVPA, but the court found this did not amount to mere lackluster 

advocacy. 305 Kan. at 589-90. The district court expanded on Schaefer, stating that the 
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holding of the Kansas Supreme Court was that the defense attorney did not have a duty to 

advise the defendant of the potential KSVPA consequences where that possibility was 

remote.

Using those cases, the district court concluded that Ontiveros was not advised of 

the possibility of civil commitment, but that possibility was not a certain consequence. 

Thus, the district court denied Ontiveros' motion to withdraw his plea because he failed to 

show enough evidence supporting the allegation that his attorney demonstrated lackluster 

advocacy.

Ontiveros' plea was fairly and understandingly made.

On the second allegation that Ontiveros' plea was not fairly and understandingly 

made, the district court found that the plea petition and the court's colloquy with 

Ontiveros at the plea hearing established that Ontiveros understood the potential 

maximum sentence he could face—despite his testimony to the contrary.

The district court cited several times that Ontiveros received notice of the potential 

maximum consequences of his plea. The first notice was the plea petition, in which the 

district court used language on page two of the petition to find Ontiveros was informed of 

the maximum punishment of his plea. Ontiveros received notice at the plea hearing first 

when the State put the petition on the record, which stated that Ontiveros would be 

subject to lifetime postrelease and lifetime registration, as well as Ontiveros' prior sexual 

convictions from Missouri. The State also indicated that one of his convictions would 

qualify as a sexually violent crime which would qualify him for designation as a 

persistent sex offender. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6804(j)(2).

Instead, the district court found Ontiveros' testimony at the plea hearing more 

credible and persuasive than his plea withdrawal testimony. The district court noted 
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Ontiveros informed the court at his plea hearing that his plea was his complete 

understanding of the plea agreement, that no one threatened, coerced, or promised him 

anything to plead guilty, and that he had sufficient time to make a decision that was in his 

best interests.

After the district court's denial of Ontiveros' motion to withdraw his plea, he 

moved for a competency evaluation, objected to sentencing, objected to his criminal 

history score, and moved for downward durational departure. The district court ordered 

an evaluation of competency, which resulted in a finding of competency. After denying 

his remaining motions, the district court ordered Ontiveros to serve 256 months in prison 

with lifetime postrelease supervision.

ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s holding for an abuse of discretion.

Generally, appellate courts review a district court's decision to deny a motion to

withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Frazier, 311 Kan. 

378, 381, 461 P.3d 43 (2020). "The movant bears the burden to prove the district court 

erred in denying the motion." State v. Hutto, 313 Kan. 741, 745, 490 P.3d 43 (2021).

A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or

unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State

v. Bilbrey, 317 Kan. 57, 63, 523 P.3d 1078 (2023). The party asserting the district court 

abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Keys, 

315 Kan. 690, 708, 510 P.3d 706 (2022).
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A defendant must demonstrate good cause to withdraw a plea before sentencing.

"A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the

discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged."

K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1).

In determining whether a defendant has established good cause to withdraw their 

plea, a district court generally looks to these three factors from State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 

30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006): (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent 

counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken 

advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made. Frazier, 311 

Kan. at 381. These factors should not "be applied mechanically and to the exclusion of 

other factors." State v. Fritz, 299 Kan. 153, 154, 321 P.3d 763 (2014). These factors 

establish "'viable benchmarks'" for the district court when exercising its discretion, but 

the "court should not ignore other factors that might exist in a particular case." Schaefer, 

305 Kan. at 588; see Frazier, 311 Kan. at 382 (applying contract principles to good cause 

showing).

A review of the Edgar factors does not support Ontiveros' motion to withdraw his plea.

Factor 1: Whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel.

Ontiveros failed to establish good cause to withdraw his plea on the allegation that 

his counsel was not competent. To demonstrate incompetent counsel under the first 

Edgar factor, it is not required to show that counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective

under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; rather, a showing of 

"'lackluster advocacy'" may suffice. State v. Herring, 312 Kan. 192, 198, 474 P.3d 285 

(2020). Lackluster advocacy may be characterized as "'lacking energy or vitality, boring, 

unimaginative.'" 312 Kan. at 201.
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Ontiveros alleged that his counsel was incompetent because his counsel failed to 

inform him of the possible civil commitment under the KSPVA. Duma admitted he did 

not discuss possible civil commitment with Ontiveros.

Citing Schaefer, Ontiveros argues that his case presented more than a remote 

possibility of civil commitment under the KSVPA and thus his attorney had a duty to 

inform him of the possibility. He argues that, given his criminal history, there was a 

higher probability of proceedings under the KSVPA. Ontiveros concedes that with this 

conviction he has multiple sexually violent offenses in his criminal history.

In Schaefer, the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether a presentence motion 

to withdraw a plea was supported by good cause when the defendant alleged his counsel 

failed to advise him of the possibility of civil commitment under the KSVPA. The 

Supreme Court found the district court's credibility finding on Schaefer's plea, that the 

plea agreement lessened the "prison time Schaefer faced" and that "Schaefer's statement 

that he would not have pled, had he known about the KSVPA, was unbelievable." 305 

Kan. at 594. The Supreme Court deferred to the district court's weighing of evidence and 

assessment of credibility, concluding that if "knowledge of the KSVPA would not have 

changed Schaefer's decision to plead, his attorney's failure to provide that knowledge is 

not good cause for the withdrawal of the plea." 305 Kan. at 594. 

This case shares many similarities with the facts of Schaefer. Ontiveros received a 

benefit in the plea agreement by avoiding convictions and a considerable reduction in 

prison time by pleading to the sexual exploitation charge in exchange for the dismissal of 

three other felony counts. Moreover, Ontiveros does not assert that had he known about 

the possibility of civil commitment under the KSVPA, he would not have pled. Ontiveros 

was 61 years old at the time of these offenses. He received a sentence of 256 months in 

prison, or more than 21 years. Any civil commitment proceeding, if instituted, would be 

initiated at the end of his prison term and would have to establish that he remained a 
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sexual predator at about 80 years old. Ontiveros fails to carry his burden to demonstrate 

an abuse of discretion by the district court for denying his motion to withdraw his plea on 

the basis of failure to receive advice concerning possible civil commitment.

Ontiveros also claims his counsel was incompetent for not reviewing discovery 

with him until November 22, 2019, less than two weeks before his trial date. But Duma 

testified that he went over the evidence with Ontiveros in detail at the November 

meeting. It lasted for several hours including watching a video. And it cannot be 

overlooked that Ontiveros elected to exercise his right to a preliminary hearing two 

months prior to the scheduled trial date. At the hearing, he was able to observe the victim 

testify in detail about her encounters with Ontiveros. In addition, the victim was crossexamined at length by Duma. Ontiveros also listened to the testimony of the investigating 

officer from Homeland Security. Ontiveros does not allege that there was any new or 

surprising information he obtained two weeks prior to trial that he was not aware of after 

sitting through the preliminary hearing.

Next, Ontiveros alleged that he never discussed possible defenses against the 

charges against him with his counsel, nor did his counsel discuss the plea with him until 

the day of his plea. Duma indicated that they talked strategy at their November meeting.

Finally, we agree with the State that any claim of incompetence on the part of 

Duma for not taking into account Ontiveros' Georgia convictions in properly advising 

him "on the maximum potential punishments" was invited error to the extent he did not 

advise his attorney about those convictions.

In sum, in the district court's pronouncement of its decision to deny Ontiveros'

motion, the court considered the testimony of Ontiveros and Duma, together with 

information contained in the plea petition and plea transcript, to find Ontiveros was 
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represented by competent counsel. The district court stated on the record the factual 

findings made to arrive at its decision to deny the motion.

The burden for establishing good cause to withdraw a plea is on the defendant, and 

the district court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 

See Hutto, 313 Kan. at 745; Frazier, 311 Kan. at 381.

Here, there is substantial competent evidence supporting the district court's finding

that Duma was competent. Ontiveros fails to establish the district court's decision was 

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; was based on an error of law; or was based on an 

error of fact.

Factor 2: Whether Ontiveros was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken 

advantage of.

Ontiveros did not allege that he was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken 

advantage of. An issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned. State v. Davis, 313 

Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021).

Factor 3: Whether Ontiveros fairly and understandingly entered his plea.

Ontiveros alleges that his plea was not fairly and understandingly made because he 

lacked information or was confused about the details and consequences of his plea. 

Ontiveros argues the possible civil commitment under the KSVPA, last-minute 

discussion with counsel the day of his plea, confusion regarding the maximum sentence 

he could face, and the discovery review taking place in the district attorney's office with a 

sheriff's deputy present amounted to an unfair and misunderstood plea.
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The State argues that even if Ontiveros' counsel gave faulty advice, the advice was 

countered and clarified by other sources to inform Ontiveros of the consequences of his 

plea. Ontiveros received information, the State argues, from the district court during the 

court's colloquy with Ontiveros and through the written plea agreement. In response to 

Ontiveros' argument that he was not informed of the possible civil commitment under 

KSVPA, the State argues that commitment is not automatic, and Ontiveros presented 

only a speculative consequence of his plea. We agree.

The district court's findings on the record are supported by substantial competent 

evidence. The district court found Ontiveros received information from the district court 

during the plea hearing through the State's oral reading of the written plea agreement and 

the court's colloquy with Ontiveros before entering his plea. The district court also cited 

the plea petition as evidence of notice regarding the potential consequences of his plea. 

Finally, the district court found that the potential civil proceedings under KSVPA were 

not a certain consequence of his plea and therefore did not deprive Ontiveros of fully 

understanding his plea. 

In sum, Ontiveros failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 

the motion to withdraw his plea. The findings by the district court are supported by 

substantial competent evidence, and the decision reached by the court was not arbitrary, 

fanciful, or unreasonable. Therefore, we have no hesitation in affirming the district 

court's denial of Ontiveros' motion to withdraw his plea.

Affirmed.