IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JOHN D. COCKSHUTT, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-532 

 Magistrate Judge King 

STATE OF OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 

REHABILITATION & CORRECTION, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

 

OPINION AND ORDER 

I. Background 

Plaintiff John D. Cockshutt, a state prisoner, filed this civil 

rights action on June 18, 2012, naming as defendants Trooper Schmutz 

and twelve employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction (“ODRC”), the Madison Correctional Institution (“MaCI”), 

and the Lebanon Correctional Institution (“LoCI”), and complaining 

that his security level had been increased because of a false conduct 

charge. Plaintiff alleges that his rights to due process and to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment were thereby violated. 

The Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 40, alleges that, while 

incarcerated at MaCI, plaintiff was investigated for his alleged 

involvement in a plot to smuggle a gun into MaCI so that he could 

kidnap a nurse, escape from MaCI, and then murder the nurse. Id. at 

p. 10. During this investigation, defendant Schmutz allegedly 

interrogated plaintiff without identifying himself as an Ohio State 

Trooper and without reading plaintiff his Miranda rights. Id. at pp. 

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9-11. The Amended Complaint also alleges that defendant Schmutz, and 

nearly every other defendant, falsely informed plaintiff that one 

Ronald May was the confidential informant who had provided information 

about the alleged plot. Id. These actions, plaintiff alleges, 

resulted in a “false conduct report” that has been included in 

plaintiff’s institutional record. Id. at pp. 10-11. The conduct 

report was allegedly drafted by defendant Scott Ackley, an MaCI 

Investigator. Id. at p. 2. 

As a result of the allegedly false conduct report and other 

allegedly false evidence, plaintiff was found guilty at a Rules 

Infraction Board (“RIB”) hearing of attempting to escape and 

attempting to convey firearms into the institution. Id. at pp. 3-4, 

8, 11-12. Defendant Lt. Lambert, the RIB Chairperson, allegedly 

prohibited plaintiff from calling Ronald May as a witness at the RIB 

hearing. Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff appealed his RIB conviction, but 

defendant Ernie Moore, the former Director of the ODRC and current 

Warden of LoCI, and defendant Rod Johnson, the Warden of MaCI, 

allegedly failed to investigate the actions of their employees and 

denied plaintiff’s appeals. Id. at p. 1. Defendant Melody Haskins, 

an MaCI Warden’s Administrative Assistant, also allegedly denied 

plaintiff’s administrative appeals. Id. at p. 6. 

As a result of the allegedly false conduct report and his 

conviction at the RIB hearing, plaintiff was “placed in isolation for 

six months” and transferred to a higher security prison, which has 

caused plaintiff “to have a mental breakdown” and has caused “serious 

physical deterioration of” plaintiff’s health. Id. at pp. 11-12. The 

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Amended Complaint further alleges that plaintiff’s chance of release 

on parole has been “jeopardized” because “the inclusion of the false 

conduct report in [plaintiff’s] institutional record will likely cause 

his [p]arole to be denied.”1

 Id. at p. 11. 

On October 24, 2012, defendant Schmutz filed a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim, Doc. No. 31, and plaintiff thereafter 

filed a motion to amend the complaint, Doc. No. 40. On June 3, 2013, 

the Court granted plaintiff leave to amend, but denied leave as to 

defendant Schmutz on the basis of futility and granted defendant 

Schmutz’s motion to dismiss. Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 86. 

This matter is now before the Court, with the consent of the 

parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for consideration of 

defendants’ motion for an extension of time, Doc. No. 101, and on 

Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Defendants’ Motion for Judgment 

on the Pleadings Instanter, Doc. No. 102, in which defendants seek 

leave to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings one day after the 

deadline established in the Court’s August 9, 2013 Opinion and Order, 

Doc. No. 98. Defendants’ motions are unopposed, and the motions are 

for that reason GRANTED. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2). 

Also before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings (“Defendants’ Motion”), Doc. No. 103, which was filed on 

behalf of the twelve remaining defendants. Plaintiff opposes 

Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff[’]s Response to Defendants[’] Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. No. 113. Defendants have filed a 

reply, Doc. No. 115. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion 

 

1

 Plaintiff was in fact denied parole on May 28, 2013. See Doc. No. 87. 

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is GRANTED. 

II. Standard 

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant 

to Rule 12(c) is evaluated by reference to the same standard as is a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 

603, 605 (6th Cir. 2011). In determining whether dismissal on this 

basis is appropriate, an amended complaint must be construed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded facts must 

be accepted as true. See Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 

203 (6th Cir. 1996); Misch v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 734, 

738 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The United States Supreme Court has explained 

that, “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by 

showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the 

complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). 

However, a plaintiff’s claim for relief “requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough 

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. 

Accordingly, an amended complaint must be dismissed if it does not 

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Id. at 570. 

III. Discussion 

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 

provides in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 

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the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A prima facie case under § 1983 requires evidence 

of (1) conduct by an individual acting under color of state law that 

causes (2) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or 

laws of the United States. Day v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Auditors, 749 

F.2d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 

527, 535 (1981)). Section 1983 merely provides a vehicle for 

enforcing individual rights established elsewhere and does not itself 

establish any substantive rights. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 

273, 285 (2002). Moreover, liability based on a theory of respondeat 

superior is not cognizable under § 1983. See Turner v. City of 

Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 643 (6th Cir. 2005); Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., 

Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). In order to be held liable 

under § 1983, a defendant with supervisory authority must have either 

“encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way 

directly participated in it.” Turner, 412 F.3d at 643. 

As noted supra, the Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiff’s 

security level was increased because of a false conduct charge, 

thereby denying him his rights to due process and to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also complains that he did 

not receive Miranda warnings prior to being interrogated at MaCI in 

June 2010. The Amended Complaint asserts claims against each 

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defendant in his or her individual and official capacities. See

Amended Complaint, pp. 1-9. 

A. Official Capacity Claims 

 Official capacity suits “‘generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 

agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting 

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). “[A]n 

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be 

treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. (citing Brandon v. Holt, 

469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)). In the present action, the remaining 

defendants are all employees of ODRC, MaCI, or LoCI. MaCI and LoCI 

are both subdivisions of ODRC, which is a state agency, is immune from 

suit in this Court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. See Beil v. Lake Erie Corr. Records Dept., 282 

F. App’x 363 (6th Cir. 2008). See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 

Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 

applies not only to the states themselves but also to “state agents 

and instrumentalities”). The Eleventh Amendment does not, however, 

preclude official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief. 

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 

 In the case presently before the Court, the Amended Complaint 

does not contain a demand for relief beyond asking that the Court 

grant “relief.” See Amended Complaint, p. 12. The Complaint, 

however, sought monetary damages and the expungement of the alleged 

false conduct report. Complaint, Doc. No. 4, p. 10. Plaintiff’s 

requested expungement would be retroactive in nature. See Belill v. 

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Hummel, 835 F.2d 877, 1987 WL 24114, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 1987). 

Because plaintiff seeks only retroactive relief and monetary damages, 

defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on plaintiff’s 

official capacity claims. 

 B. Individual Capacity Claims

 Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated in 

connection with his RIB hearing. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that 

he “could not take a properly conducted Voice-Stress Test, Polygraph 

Test, or even [] call witnesses . . . at the RIB Hearing” and, after 

having been found guilty at the RIB hearing, plaintiff’s security 

status was increased and he “was placed in isolation for six months.” 

Amended Complaint, pp. 11-12. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants 

“jeopardized his Liberty Interest with the Parole Board, because the 

inclusion of the false conduct report in his institutional record will 

likely cause his Parole to be denied, even though he is not guilty of 

any of the false allegations made against him in that conduct report.” 

Id. The Amended Complaint fails to state a colorable due process 

claim on any of these theories. 

 The Amended Complaint alleges that the inclusion of a false 

conduct report in plaintiff’s institutional record and the increase in 

plaintiff’s security status violates the due process clause because it 

“will likely cause [plaintiff’s] [p]arole to be denied,” and thus, 

will “jeopardize[]” his liberty interest in being released on parole. 

Id. at pp. 10-11. In order to establish a procedural due process 

violation, a plaintiff “must show that the state deprived him or her 

of a constitutionally protected interest in ̔life, liberty, or 

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property’ without due process of law.” Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. 

App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 

113, 125 (1990)). 

 In the case presently before the Court, plaintiff has failed to 

allege that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected 

liberty or property interest. First, the Amended Complaint alleges 

that plaintiff’s liberty interest in parole has been “jeopardized” in 

that his parole “will likely” be denied. Amended Complaint, pp. 10-

11. These allegations are insufficient to state a due process claim 

because the United States Constitution does not guarantee an inmate’s 

release on parole, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Swihart, 209 F. App’x at 458, and 

“̔[t]he state of Ohio has not created a liberty interest in parole 

eligibility, as it has a completely discretionary parole system.’” 

Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Swihart, 

209 F. App'x at 458-59). See also Saunders v. Williams, 89 F. App’x 

923, 924 (6th Cir. 2003); State ex rel. Hattie v. Goldhardt, 630 

N.E.2d 696, 698 (Ohio 1994); O.R.C. § 2967.03 (providing that Ohio’s 

adult parole authority “may” grant parole to a parole-eligible inmate 

under certain circumstances). Furthermore, plaintiff’s transfer to 

LoCI does not implicate the due process clause because, ordinarily, 

inmates have no constitutional right to be incarcerated in a 

particular institution, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Crosky v. Ohio Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr., No. 2:09-cv-400, 2012 WL 748408, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 

8, 2012), “or to enjoy a particular security classification.” Crosky, 

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2012 WL 748408 at *9 (citing Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 

(1976)). 

Plaintiff has also failed to allege that he has been deprived of 

a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest with respect 

to his six month “place[ment] in isolation.” In Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that due process 

liberty interests created by prison regulations are 

generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while 

not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as 

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its 

own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life. 

Id. at 484 (internal citations omitted). In other words, the due 

process clause simply does not apply to a prison disciplinary 

proceeding unless, as a result of the proceeding, an inmate suffers 

some particularly unusual or serious punishment in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life. See Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 

795, 803-04 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Constitution itself can create 

protectible liberty interests, but only if corrections officials 

impose restraints upon the prisoner which ‘exceed [the prisoner’s] 

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by 

the Due Process Clause of its own force.’”); Crosky, 2012 WL 748408 at 

*7; Bloodworth v. Timmerman-Cooper, 2:10-CV-926, 2010 WL 4384250, at 

*2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2010). The transfer from one prison to another 

and spending six months in “isolation” simply do not fall within the 

category of punishments that courts have found to be unusual or 

atypical. See Bazzetta, 430 F.3d at 804 (no liberty interest in 

transfer from one prison to another); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 

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812 (6th Cir. 1998) (Finding that a two-and-one-half year stay in 

administrative segregation did not “implicat[e] a protected liberty 

interest”) (citing Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 

1995); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997)); Merchant v. 

Hawk-Sawyer, 37 F. App’x 143, 145-46 (6th Cir. 2002). Cf. Wilkinson 

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)(inmates had a liberty interest 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause in avoiding 

assignment to Ohio’s supermax prison); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 

489-90 (1980) (finding a liberty interest in not being involuntarily 

committed to a mental hospital); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 

(1990) (finding a protectable liberty interest in not being 

involuntarily subjected to psychotropic drugs). In short, even if, as 

plaintiff alleges, see Amended Complaint, p. 11, the RIB hearing was 

premised on a “false conduct report” and even if plaintiff was denied 

a “properly conducted Voice-Stress Test, Polygraph Test, or . . . 

witnesses . . . at the RIB Hearing,” plaintiff’s due process rights 

were not implicated by the RIB proceeding because those proceedings 

did not subject plaintiff to a significant and atypical hardship. See 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Williams v. Wilkinson, 51 F. App’x 553, 557-

58 (6th Cir. 2002) (Finding no liberty interest implicated where a 

prisoner was not permitted to call witnesses at an RIB hearing because 

the punishment received was not a “significant and atypical 

hardship”). 

Finally, to the extent that the Amended Complaint alleges a due 

process violation with respect to defendants’ alleged failure to 

provide Miranda warnings prior to plaintiff’s interrogation at MaCI in 

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June 2010 regarding the alleged plot to convey a gun into MaCI, the 

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Regardless of 

whether Miranda warnings were required when plaintiff was investigated 

in June 2010, see Howes v. Fields, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (2012), 

plaintiff cannot assert an independent cause of action under § 1983 

based solely on the failure to provide Miranda warnings; the proper 

remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion of evidence in a 

criminal proceeding. McLoughlin v. Maxwell, 705 F.2d 456, 1982 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 11837, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1982) (“Although the 

failure to give Miranda warnings may result in the exclusion of a 

statement from evidence in a criminal trial, it does not subject the 

officer to liability for damages under the Civil Rights Act.”). See 

also Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1999) (“̔The 

reading of Miranda warnings is a procedural safeguard rather than a 

right arising out of the fifth amendment itself. . . . Thus, the 

remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any 

compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 action[.]’”) (quoting 

Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiff also alleges that his subjection to false allegations, 

his placement in isolation for six months, and his transfer to LoCI 

“constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Amended Complaint, p. 12. 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that contravenes the 

civilized standards of humanity and decency, or which involves the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976) (citations omitted). To prove an Eighth 

Amendment violation, an inmate must show that he has been deprived of 

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the minimum civilized measures of life’s necessities. See Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). However, “placement in segregation 

is a routine discomfort that is a part of the penalty that criminal 

offenders pay for their offenses against society [and] it is 

insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.” Estep v. Million, 

191 F.3d 451, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23827, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 

1999) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). Moreover, 

plaintiff makes no factual allegation about the actual conditions of 

his confinement, nor does he allege the deprivation of life’s 

necessities. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state a 

colorable Eighth Amendment claim. 

 In short, the allegations in the Amended Complaint, even taken as 

true, fail to state a colorable claim for relief against defendants. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. 

No. 103, is GRANTED. 

 Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion to compel, Doc. No. 

83, which seeks, inter alia, information about the “prisoner witnesses 

and confidential informants[]” who provided information to defendants 

during May and June 2010, is now moot. The parties’ related discovery 

motions, Doc. Nos. 99, 100, 105, and defendants’ motion to vacate the 

dispositive motions deadline, Doc. No. 114, are now also moot. Doc. 

Nos. 83, 99, 100, 105, 114 are therefore DENIED as moot. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of 

defendants. 

December 10, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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