STATE 

DEPARTMENT

Pervasive Passport 

Fraud Not Identified, 

but Cases of 

Potentially Fraudulent 

and High-Risk 

Issuances Are under 

Review

Report to Congressional Requesters

May 2014

GAO-14-222

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-222, a report to 

congressional requesters

May 2014

STATE DEPARTMENT

Pervasive Passport Fraud Not Identified, but Cases of 

Potentially Fraudulent and High-Risk Issuances Are 

under Review

Why GAO Did This Study

Fraudulent passports pose a significant 

risk because they can be used to 

conceal the true identity of the user 

and potentially facilitate other crimes, 

such as international terrorism and 

drug trafficking. State issued over 13.5 

million passports during fiscal year 

2013. 

GAO was asked to assess potential 

fraud in State’s passport program. This 

report examines select cases of 

potentially fraudulent or high-risk 

issuances among passports issued 

during fiscal years 2009 and 2010—the 

most recently available data at the time 

GAO began its review. GAO matched 

State’s passport data from fiscal years 

2009 and 2010 for approximately 28 

million issuances to databases with 

information about individuals who were 

deceased, incarcerated in state and 

federal prison facilities, or who had an 

active warrant at the time of issuance. 

GAO also analyzed the passport data 

to identify issuances to applicants who 

provided a likely invalid SSN, which 

had not been assigned at the time of 

the passport application, or had been 

publically disclosed. From each of 

these five populations, GAO selected 

nongeneralizable samples for 

additional review. GAO also randomly 

selected a generalizable sample from a 

population of passport issuances to 

applicants who used only the SSN of a 

deceased individual. GAO reviewed 

State’s adjudication policies, and 

examined passport applications for 

these populations to further assess 

whether there were potentially 

fraudulent or high-risk issuances. State 

provided technical comments and 

generally agreed with our findings. This 

report contains no recommendations. 

What GAO Found 

Of the approximately 28 million passports issued in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 

that GAO reviewed, it found issuances to applicants who used the identifying 

information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, had active felony warrants, 

or used an incorrect Social Security number (SSN); however, GAO did not 

identify pervasive fraud in these populations. The Department of State (State) 

has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using identifying 

information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its 

process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded 

measures to verify SSNs in real time. GAO referred, and State is reviewing, 

matches from this analysis. The following summarizes GAO’s findings:

• Deceased individuals. As shown in the figure, GAO identified at least 1 

case of potential fraud in the sample of 15 cases, as well as likely data 

errors. State reviewed the cases referred by GAO, and indicated fraud could 

likely be ruled out in 9 of the 15 cases; State plans to further review 6 cases. 

• State prisoners. GAO found 7 cases of potential fraud among the sample of 

14 state prisoner cases. State noted fraud could likely be ruled out in 10 of 

the 14 cases, and intends to conduct additional reviews of 4 cases. 

• Federal prisoners. None of the 15 cases in this sample had fraud indicators, 

since all individuals were not actually in prison when applying for passports. 

• Individuals with active warrants. GAO found five cases where State 

identified the warrant and resolved it prior to issuance. As the figure shows, 

GAO also identified three cases with warrants that State was not aware of or 

alerted to, but should have been in State’s system for detection during 

adjudication. 

Summary of GAO’s Matching Analysis and Nongeneralizable Samples 

a

In addition, GAO found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who used the 

SSN, but not the name, of a deceased person, as well as 24,278 issuances to 

applicants who used a likely invalid SSN. GAO reviewed a 140-case 

generalizable sample and a 15-case nongeneralizable sample for these two 

populations, respectively, and determined the cases were likely data errors. State 

has taken steps to capture correct SSN information more consistently.

Total passport issuances are solely based on the matching criteria. GAO did not verify that all 

issuances from its match populations were actual fraud cases or issuances to individuals with active 

warrants. Rather, it selected samples for further review and referred all matches to State. 

View GAO-14-222. For more information, 

contact Stephen M. Lord at (202) 512-6722 or 

lords@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Letter 1 

Background 6

Examples of Potentially Fraudulent or High-Risk Passport 

Issuances Found, but Pervasive Fraud Not Identified 13

Agency Comments 30

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 31

Appendix II Passport Application and Adjudication Process 37

Appendix III The Department of State’s (State) Use of the Social Security 

Administration’s (SSA) Records for Death Checks 39

Appendix IV Description of Warrant-Matching Analysis 41

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Table

Table 1: Warrants by Type of Offense to Individuals Issued 

Passports from Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 42

Figures

Figure 1: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by 

Population 4

Figure 2: Passport Application and Adjudication Process 8

Figure 3: Description of Matching Analysis and Sample of 

Deceased Individuals 14

Figure 4: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of State 

Prisoners 16

Figure 5: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Federal 

Prisoners 18

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 6: Timeline Showing When the Department of State (State) 

Began Checking for Federal, State, and Local Warrants 22

Figure 7: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of 

Applicants with Active Warrants 23

Figure 8: Summary of Whether State Identified the Warrants in 

Our Sample Population 24

Figure 9: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of 

Deceased-SSN Errors 26

Figure 10: Estimated Percentage of Causes of Incorrect SSNs 

Associated with Deceased Individuals in State’s Passport 

Data 28

Figure 11: Summary of Analysis and Invalid Social Security 

Number Sample 29

Figure 12: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by 

Population 35

Figure 13: Passport Application and Adjudication Process 38

Figure 14: Social Security Administration’s Responses and 

Actions of Passport Specialists 40
Page iii GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Abbreviations

BOP Bureau of Prisons 

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System 

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

EVS Enumeration Verification System 

FAM Foreign Affairs Manual 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

FPM Fraud Prevention Manager 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

SSA Social Security Administration 

SSN Social Security number

State Department of State 

TDIS Travel Document Issuance System

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 1, 2014

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

United States Senate

The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse

Chairman

Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin

United States Senate

Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to 

conceal the true identity of the user. In addition, according to the 

Department of State (State), passport and visa fraud are often committed 

in connection with crimes such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, 

organized crime, alien smuggling, money laundering, pedophilia, and 

murder. As a result, even a few instances of passport fraud can have farreaching effects. A passport is an official government document that 

conveys certain benefits, such as certifying an individual’s identity, 

permitting a citizen to travel abroad, proving citizenship, assisting with 

loan applications, and fulfilling other needs not related to international 

travel. State issued over 13.5 million passport cards and books during 

fiscal year 2013. 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Since May 2005, we have issued several reports identifying fraud 

vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process.1 In 2005 and 2007, we 

reported on weaknesses in State’s information sharing with other federal 

agencies, such as the Social Security Administration (SSA), as well as 

opportunities to improve the agency’s oversight of passport acceptance 

facilities. In 2010, we tested State’s passport issuance procedures by 

using counterfeit documents and the identities of fictitious or deceased 

individuals, inducing State to issue five genuine U.S. passports.2 State 

identified two of our seven applications as fraudulent during its 

adjudication process; however, we were able to obtain passports using 

counterfeit documents in three cases.3

You asked that we assess potential fraud in State’s passport program. 

This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk 

issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010.

We have made several 

recommendations beginning in 2005 designed to help reduce passport 

fraud, including that State improve information sharing with other federal 

agencies, improve execution of passport fraud-detection efforts, and 

strengthen internal controls at its passport-acceptance facilities. State 

generally concurred with our recommendations and has taken steps to 

address them.

 

1

GAO, State Department: Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process Remains 

Vulnerable to Fraud, GAO-10-922T (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010); State Department: 

Significant Vulnerabilities in the Passport Issuance Process, GAO-09-681T (Washington, 

D.C.: May 5, 2009) Addressing Significant Vulnerabilities in the Department of State’s 

Passport Issuance Process, GAO-09-583R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2009); 

Department of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State’s 

Passport Issuance Process, GAO-09-447 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009); Border 

Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to 

Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, GAO-07-1006 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007); and 

State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection 

Efforts, GAO-05-477 (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2005). 

2

Suspicious identifying information and documentation included passport photos of the 

same investigator on multiple applications; a 62-year-old applicant using a recently issued 

Social Security number (SSN); passport and driver’s license photos showing about a 10-

year age difference; as well as the use of a California mailing address, a West Virginia 

permanent address and driver’s license address, and a Washington, D.C., phone number 

in the same application. 

3

In the two remaining cases, State recovered the passports from the mail before they 

were delivered.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

To examine potentially fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances in fiscal 

years 2009 and 2010,4 we matched State’s passport-issuance data for 

approximately 28 million passport issuances (including passport books 

and cards)5 to databases containing information about individuals who 

were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in a state prison facility, (3) in the 

custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or (4) the subject of an 

active warrant at the time of the passport issuance.6 We conducted this 

matching on the basis of common data elements including Social Security 

number (SSN), name, and date of birth. We also analyzed the passport 

data to identify issuances to applicants who provided an invalid SSN, 

which was defined as an SSN that had not been assigned at the time of 

the passport application, or had a high risk of misuse.7

 

4

We used data from these fiscal years because they were the most recent, full fiscal years 

available at the time State complied with our data request. In addition, for purposes of this 

report, potentially fraudulent passport issuances are those that involved an applicant using 

someone else’s identity to apply for and receive a passport. We defined high-risk passport 

issuances as issuances to individuals who may pose a risk to public safety, but who did 

not necessarily steal someone’s identity to apply for a passport, such as people with 

active warrants for felony charges. 

From each of 

these five populations, we selected nongeneralizable samples for further 

review. In addition, from a population of 13,470 passport issuances to 

applicants who used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased individual, 

we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport 

issuances, including 70 passport issuances from both fiscal years 2009 

5

According to publically available passport issuance statistics, State issued a combined 

total of 28,964,775 passports during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. GAO reviewed 

domestically issued passports and excluded passports issued by the Special Issuance 

Agency to government travelers. We reviewed a total of 28,000,063 passport issuance 

records for these fiscal years. 

6

Our review included state prison data from 11 states including Alabama, Arizona, 

California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. We 

also obtained state prisoner data from five other states including Illinois, Louisiana, 

Michigan, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, but did not use the data from these sources 

for our matching analysis for various reasons, including the absence of key fields or 

delays in receiving the data. We selected these 16 states because they had the largest 

prisoner populations as of December 31, 2009. 

7

Prior to June 25, 2011, the Social Security Administration (SSA) issued SSNs according 

to a sequential and geographic logic. SSNs that were issued after fiscal years 2009 and 

2010 should not be found in passport data from that time and therefore all SSNs in the 

passport data should be subject to SSA’s sequencing logic. In addition, SSNs that have 

been publicly disclosed in advertisements or those used as placeholders by data entry 

clerks (e.g., 012-34-5678 or 111-11-1111) are at higher risk of misuse, and may represent 

a fraud indicator if found in the passport data. 
 

Page 4 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

and 2010. We analyzed these cases to determine whether the applicant 

provided the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or whether the 

applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN 

in its system. Figure 1 summarizes the focus of our matching analysis 

and the related sample sizes selected for further review.

Figure 1: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by Population

a

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

b

In our data matching, we used state prisoner data from 11 states including Alabama, Arizona, 

California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. However, even 

though we used data from all 11 states during our matching analysis, three of these state prison 

databases did not have any valid matches to the passport data. In addition, data from three states did 
 

Page 5 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

not include dates of birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to State’s passport data 

based on Social Security number (SSN) and name only.

c

As described in more detail later in this report, our review indicated that some matches may be a 

result of identity theft perpetrated by the state prisoner, prior to incarceration, and not the passport 

applicant.

d

We selected a nongeneralizable sample of up to two prisoners incarcerated in each of the states we 

reviewed for a total of 14 cases from eight different states.

e

This number includes passport issuances to people residing in halfway houses, and therefore may 

not represent issuances to individuals using the identities of federal prisoners to apply for a passport.

f

These 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique individuals that had a total of 564 

open warrants. We did not confirm that all of these warrants were associated with felony charges, but 

we excluded warrants with a description of either a “traffic crime” or “misdemeanor” from our analysis.

g

As highlighted in figure 1, we selected a total of 214 passport issuances 

for additional review from our five nongeneralizable and one 

generalizable samples. For each of the 214 passport issuances selected, 

we reviewed a copy of the original passport application, submitted the 

SSN from State’s passport data to SSA for verification, and obtained 

records of the passport holder’s travel activity from the Financial Crimes 

Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury. We also reviewed State’s documentation of additional 

investigative steps the agency took, if any, to resolve fraud indicators 

during the adjudication of the passports. Where applicable, we obtained 

additional documentation about the death, incarceration, or fugitive status 

of applicants from federal and state agencies. For this review, we 

included only issued passports; we did not examine passport applications 

that were rejected by State or abandoned by the applicant. Furthermore, 

we did not attempt to identify all possible types of passport fraud.

The generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport issuances included 70 passport 

issuances from both fiscal years 2009 and 2010.

We assessed the reliability of State’s passport data, TECS travel-activity 

data provided by FinCEN, SSA’s full death file, state and federal prisoner 

data, and data on individuals with open warrants provided by the U.S. 

Marshals Service by reviewing relevant documentation, interviewing 

knowledgeable agency officials, and examining the data for obvious 

errors and inconsistencies.8

 

8

TECS is a data repository to support, among other things, law enforcement “lookouts” 

and border screening. TECS is owned and managed by the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection with the Department of Homeland Security.

With the exception of prisoner data from five 

states, which we did not use, we concluded that all of the data we used 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We examined 

State’s policies, guidance, including the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

and other materials provided to passport specialists. We reviewed 

changes to State’s controls since fiscal years 2009 and 2010 with respect 

to preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances. We also 

interviewed State officials, observed the adjudication process at a 

passport facility, and reviewed the 214 passport applications in our 

samples to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or 

high risk issuances. For a more-detailed description of our objectives, 

scope, and methodology, see appendix I.

We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.9

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objective.

According to agency officials and guidance posted on State’s public 

website, applicants can apply for a U.S. passport in one of three ways: in

person at an acceptance facility, by mail (for renewal applications), or at a 

passport facility that offers acceptance services (typically expedited 

applications). Applicants submit documents, such as a birth certificate or 

driver’s license, to passport acceptance agents to provide evidence of 

citizenship, or noncitizen nationality, and proof of identity. The acceptance 

agents are to watch the applicant sign the application, review submitted 

documents for completeness, and check for application inconsistencies. 

For example, acceptance agents are to assess whether photographs and 

descriptions in the identification documents match the applicant. If an 

acceptance agent suspects that an applicant has submitted fraudulent

information or exhibits nervous behavior, the acceptance agent is 

instructed to accept the application and complete a checklist indicating 

 

9

The extended period required for our review was a result of various factors, including 

data-sharing negotiations with State, the time required to receive and review requested 

documentation, extensive data preparation and analysis involving multiple agency 

databases, and State’s requirement to review all sensitive information on-site at the State 

Department. 

Background

Passport Application 

Process
 

Page 7 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

the reason for suspected fraud. The agents are to then send the 

application, checklist, and photocopy of the identification to State’s Fraud 

Prevention Manager (FPM). Acceptance agents are not State employees; 

however, State provides training, as well as detailed guidance that 

governs their work. State also conducts periodic inspections and audits of 

acceptance facilities to ensure compliance with regulations and policies.

According to State officials, the most common way to renew a passport is 

by mail. An individual with a passport issued during the previous 15 years 

may renew it by submitting a mail-in application, along with the previously 

issued passport, a recent photograph, and documentation of a name 

change, if applicable. Applications submitted by mail or at an acceptance 

facility are sent to a Department of the Treasury contracted lockbox 

service provider for data entry and payment processing. The lockbox 

service provider converts handwritten or typed text into electronic data

and deposits passport fees paid by the applicant. Once the lockbox data 

entry and payment are complete, the electronic data and paper passport 

application are sent to passport-issuing facilities around the United States 

for adjudication.

Applicants who demonstrate a need for in-person expedited service for 

either a first-time issuance or a renewal may submit their applications 

directly to a passport-issuing facility. State employees at these facilities 

accept passport fees and enter application data directly into State’s 

electronic processing system, called the Travel Document Issuance 

System (TDIS), before forwarding the application for expedited 

adjudication. 

Figure 2 provides an overview of the passport application and 

adjudication process for applications received in person at an acceptance 

facility, by mail, or at a passport facility that offers acceptance services

(see app. 2 for static version of this figure). 
Page 8 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 2: Passport Application and Adjudication Process

Interactive Graphic

Print Version: Click here or go to appendix II.

Application submitted 

at a passport facility Application mailed Application submitted at an acceptance facility

Instructions: Roll over the for more information.

Passport specialists adjudicate all applications

Data entry and payment processing

Passport specialist checks 

identity and citizenship 

documentation

Role of Passport Specialist

Passport specialist reviews 

results of database checks

Passport specialist refers applications 

with fraud or ineligibility indicators to 

supervisor or authorizing entity

Passport specialist addresses issues 

identified as a result of database 

checks and review of documentation

Authorizing entity 

reviews application 

Issuance approved

X Issuance denied

Source: GAO review of the Department of State (State) data. Art Explosion (images).
 

Page 9 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

As we have noted in previous products, each passport application is to be 

individually reviewed by a passport specialist during a process known as 

adjudication.10 State’s FAM specifies the steps passport specialists must 

take to address various fraud indicators. According to State documents, 

specialists are responsible for reviewing applications and documents 

establishing the applicants’ identity and citizenship, as well as conducting 

various checks, as described below. Depending on the results of the 

adjudication, passport specialists may approve or deny the passport 

issuance, conduct additional checks, request more information from the 

applicant, or forward the application for additional review by their 

supervisor, the FPM, or by offices in Passport Headquarters.

11 Once a 

passport has been issued, the application is scanned and archived. 

Passports issued to individuals 16 years or older are generally valid for 10 

years.12

Several federal statutes and regulations either require or permit State to 

withhold a passport from an applicant in certain situations. For example, 

State must withhold passports from individuals who are in default on 

certain U.S. loans, who are in arrears of child support in an amount 

determined by statute, or who are imprisoned, on parole, or on 

supervised release as a result of certain types of violations of the 

Controlled Substances Act, Bank Secrecy Act, and some state-level drug 

laws.13 Likewise, State may choose to refuse a passport to applicants 

who are the subject of an outstanding local, state, or federal warrant of 

arrest for a felony, or the subject of probation conditions or criminal court 

orders that forbid the applicant from leaving the country and the violation 

of which could result in the issuance of a federal arrest warrant.14

During the adjudication process, passport specialists are to review 

applications and results of checks against various databases to detect 

fraud and suspicious activity, and for other purposes. Application data are 

 

10For example, see GAO-10-922T. 

11According to a State official, Passport Headquarters consists of eight offices, such as 

the Office of Adjudication and the Office of Technical Operations. 

12A passport issued to an applicant who is under 16 years old is generally valid for 5 

years. 

1322 U.S.C. § 2671(d), 42 U.S.C. § 652(k), and 22 U.S.C. § 2714.

1422 C.F.R. § 51.60(b). 

Passport Adjudication 

Process
 

Page 10 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

entered into TDIS, State’s electronic processing system. TDIS 

automatically checks applicants’ names against a number of sources, 

including SSA’s death records and a database of warrants. For example, 

TDIS automatically checks key identifying information of all passport 

applicants against SSA’s full death file, as well as a database of felony 

warrants for certain crimes. Passport specialists are to compare the 

application to the information in TDIS to make sure it was entered 

properly and to identify missing information. 

Passport specialists are also to review the results of automatic checks 

during a process State refers to as “the front-end” process of adjudication. 

For instance, during this process, passport specialists are to determine 

whether an applicant currently holds a passport, has a history of lost or 

stolen passports, or has already submitted a passport application. 

According to State officials, such checks are intended to facilitate the 

identification of suspicious activity and prevent multiple passport 

issuances to the same person. Passport specialists also are to consider 

the results from facial recognition technology which is used to help 

prevent the issuance of passports to individuals using false identities and 

people who should be denied passports for other legal reasons, such as 

terrorists in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) terrorist 

database.15 In addition, passport specialists may employ commercial 

databases and other tools during the adjudication process to assist in 

confirming an applicant’s identity or citizenship. 

 

15In technical comments, State officials clarified that specialists do not deny passport 

applications based solely on the results of facial recognition technology. According to 

officials, facial recognition technology is one of many tools specialist use to determine 

whether an application should be referred for further review and investigation. Officials 

added that State does not deny passports to individuals identified in the FBI’s terrorist 

database without additional review and investigation by the appropriate office.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement 

that allows State to query SSA’s records for verifying applicants’ identities 

and identifying deceased individuals. In accordance with this agreement, 

State’s TDIS automatically queries SSA’s Enumeration Verification 

System (EVS) to verify that a passport applicant’s SSN, name, and date 

of birth match the records at SSA.16 EVS includes a death indicator based 

on SSA’s full death file of approximately 98 million records, which aids 

State in identifying applicants using the identity of a deceased individual 

to apply for a passport.17

 

1626 U.S.C. § 6039E requires passport applicants to provide an SSN, if they have one, 

when applying for or renewing a passport. However, passports may be issued to 

applicants who do not have an SSN.

In most cases, State’s controls will not flag an 

applicant as deceased unless certain fields such as the SSN, name, and 

date of birth all match the identifying information of a deceased individual. 

According to State’s procedures, passport specialists must refer any 

applications with a positive death indicator to State’s FPM for additional 

review, since the match may indicate a case of stolen identity. The FPM 

reviews all applications referred to it by passport specialists to determine 

whether the identifying information on the passport application is in fact 

associated with a deceased individual. The FPM can approve the 

passport application once it has reviewed and resolved any indicators of 

17As GAO previously reported in May 2013, (GAO, Social Security Administration: 

Preliminary Observations on the Death Master File, GAO-13-574T [Washington, D.C.: 

May 8, 2013]), the Social Security Act places limitations on SSA’s sharing of statereported death information; SSA removes the state-reported records from the full death 

file and provides the public death file, or public Death Master File, to the Department of 

Commerce’s National Technical Information Service, which sells it through a subscription 

service. Since October 2009, State used its subscription to the public death file, which 

excludes state-reported death information and is available publicly to any interested party 

for a fee. State officials noted in their technical comments that all applications are now 

checked using SSA’s real-time verification system, and that State uses the public death 

file in exceptional circumstances, such as when the real-time system is unavailable or for 

postissuance audits. Unlike the public death file, the full death file contains all death 

records, including state-reported death information, and is available to federal benefitpaying agencies; however, State has access to certain data elements from the full death 

file as a result of its information-exchange agreement with SSA.

Selected Controls for 

Detecting Potentially 

Fraudulent and High-Risk 

Issuances

SSN Verification and Data 

Checks for Deceased 

Individuals
 

Page 12 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

potential fraud. See appendix III for additional details on State’s use of 

SSA’s records for death checks.

In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the years of passport issuances we 

reviewed, State did not have access to federal and state prisoner 

databases in order to check whether applicants’ identities matched those 

of incarcerated individuals. Since then, State has taken steps to explore 

access to such databases. For example, in June 2013, State entered into 

a data-sharing agreement with the BOP in order to access federal 

prisoner data. In addition, officials told us that in December 2013, State 

completed the first phase of a pilot project using prisoner data from two 

states, Florida and Rhode Island, to identify whether applicants are 

fraudulently using identities of state prisoners. We provide additional 

details on State’s initiatives to improve data checks for incarcerated 

individuals in a subsequent section.

In 2002, the Marshals Service began transmitting certain warrant data to 

State for use during the passport adjudication process. Since then, the 

information State receives has changed to include additional warrants 

from the FBI, as described in detail below. To help State determine 

whether an applicant may have an active warrant for a felony charge, 

TDIS automatically checks applicants’ identifying information in State’s 

Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), a database that 

maintains warrant data.18

 

18In addition to warrant data, CLASS contains other information, such as data from the 

FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center database and information from the Department of Health 

and Human Services about individuals delinquent on child support.

TDIS indicates a possible match if certain data 

elements from the passport application, such as the name, SSN, date of 

birth, place of birth, or gender, matches information in CLASS within 

certain parameters. State’s policies require that passport specialists refer 

likely matches in CLASS to State’s passport legal office. Officials said 

paralegals in the passport legal office are to review the information and 

contact the warrant issuer to confirm the identity of the subject in the 

warrant against the passport applicant, verify that the warrant is active 

and related to a felony charge, and further coordinate, as necessary. The 

passport legal office may also use commercial databases, or photographs 

obtained from the warrant issuer, to confirm applicants’ identities. In 

technical comments, State officials clarified that the passport legal office 

is authorized to deny the passport issuance when it determines, or is 

informed by a competent authority, that the applicant is the subject of an 

Data Checks for Incarcerated 

Individuals

Data Checks for Individuals 

with Active Warrants
 

Page 13 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

outstanding federal, state, or local warrant of arrest for a felony crime. In 

addition, the passport legal office can authorize the passport issuance if it 

determines, upon additional review, that there was not in fact a legitimate 

match in CLASS. The legal office may approve an issuance in cases 

where the warrant was closed, associated with a misdemeanor charge, or 

for other reasons, such as a request by law enforcement agencies.

Of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we 

reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found instances of 

issuances to individuals who applied for passports using identifying 

information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, as well as applicants 

with active felony warrants. The total number of cases we identified 

represented a small percentage of all issuances during the two fiscal 

years, indicating that fraudulent or high-risk issuances were not 

pervasive. We also determined that State’s data contained inaccurate 

SSN information for thousands of passport recipients. Most of the 

instances in which there was inaccurate SSN information appeared to be 

applicant or State data-entry errors, rather than fraud. Since fiscal years 

2009 and 2010, State has taken steps to improve its detection of passport 

applicants using the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated 

individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying 

applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify 

SSNs in real time.

Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 

we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 181 

passports issued to individuals whose name and SSN both appeared in 

SSA’s full death file, suggesting that the applicant may have 

inappropriately used the identity of a deceased person.19

 

19These 181 passport issuances were associated with 167 unique individuals. 

To ensure that 

Examples of 

Potentially Fraudulent 

or High-Risk Passport 

Issuances Found, but 

Pervasive Fraud Not 

Identified

Passport Issuances to 

Applicants Associated with 

Deceased Individuals, 

Prisoners, and Individuals 

with Active Warrants 

Issuances to Applicants Using 

Identifying Information of 

Deceased Individuals
 

Page 14 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

our matches did not contain legitimate applicants who died shortly after 

submitting their applications, we included only individuals who had died 

more than 120 days before the passport issuance.20

Figure 3: Description of Matching Analysis and Sample of Deceased Individuals

Figure 3 summarizes 

our matching analysis and sample results.

a

It is not possible to determine from data matching alone whether the 

passport issuance was appropriate or fraudulent without reviewing the 

facts and circumstances for each individual case from the 181 passport 

issuances. Thus, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 

cases for additional analysis. For each case, we attempted to verify death 

information from SSA’s full death file by obtaining a copy of the death 

certificate and confirming that SSA’s most-current records listed the 

individual as deceased. We also requested TECS travel data from 

FinCEN and reviewed open-source information to search for additional 

fraud indicators. The following information provides additional details on 

the 15 cases.

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

• In one case, the applicant applied for and received an expedited 

passport by mail in January 2009 using the SSN, name, and date of 

birth of a deceased individual. The SSA’s full death file and the death 

certificate indicated that the purported applicant had died in May 

 

20We selected 120 days after death to allow for approximately 60 days of passport 

application processing time and 60 days of lag time in reporting an individual’s death to 

SSA for inclusion in the full death file. 
 

Page 15 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

2008. According to TECS travel data, the passport was used in June 

2009 to fly to the United States from Mexico and had not been used 

again as of June 2013. As a result of information we provided, State 

reviewed this case in 2013 and determined that the applicant 

appeared to be an imposter. State officials noted that the application 

should have been referred to the FPM during adjudication, because it 

contained multiple fraud indicators. State officials said this case 

should be referred to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) for 

further investigation.

• In another case, the applicant’s passport issuance was delayed by 

more than a year because her name mistakenly appeared in SSA’s 

full death file. In our May 2013 testimony, we found that SSA’s data 

contained a small number of inaccurate records, and SSA has stated, 

in rare instances, it is possible for the records of a person who is not 

deceased to be included erroneously in the death file.21

• In 4 of the 15 cases, the applicant used a similar name to, as well as 

the same SSN as, a deceased individual. For each of the four cases, 

we verified the death information in SSA’s full death file by obtaining a 

copy of the deceased person’s death certificate. However, State 

officials said fraud could likely be ruled out in all four cases for various 

reasons, such as the inadvertent use of an incorrect SSN.

Situations 

where a living individual is inappropriately listed as deceased in SSA’s 

records can create a hardship for the person who has been falsely 

identified as deceased. This case highlights one of the challenges 

State encounters when querying SSA’s full death file, and illustrates 

why State reviews applicants with death indicators on a case-by-case 

basis.

• In 9 of the 15 cases, we could not verify the death of the applicants 

because we were unable to identify the state in which the individual’s 

death was recorded (possibly because the applicant was not 

deceased) or because state officials would not or could not provide 

the death certificate to us. State’s subsequent review of these cases 

indicated that fraud could likely be ruled out in four cases, and that 

five of the cases should be referred to DS for further investigation.

As of May 2014, we have referred all 181 passport issuances we 

identified from our matching analysis using SSA’s full death file, including 

 

21GAO-13-574T. 
 

Page 16 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

the 15 cases we examined in more detail, to State for further review and 

investigation.

Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 

we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 68 issuances 

to individuals who used an SSN, name, and in some cases, date of birth 

of a state prisoner on their passport application.22 Without reviewing the 

facts and circumstances for each case, it is not possible on the basis of 

data matching alone to determine the extent to which these instances 

represent fraudulent issuances. Thus, from the group of individuals 

related to the 68 issuances, we selected 14 cases for further review.23

Figure 4: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of State Prisoners

For 

each sample case, we obtained additional documentation from state 

departments of corrections to verify key data fields for these passport 

recipients. Figure 4 summarizes our matching analysis and sample 

results.

a

 

22In our data matching, we used state prisoner data from 11 states including Alabama, 

Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and 

Virginia. Three of these state prison databases did not have any valid matches to the 

passport data. In addition, data from three states with matches did not include dates of 

birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to State’s passport data based 

on SSN and name only. 

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

23The 68 passport issuances were associated with 61 unique individuals. In addition, our 

review indicated that some matches may reflect situations in which a prisoner stole the 

applicant’s identity prior to incarceration, resulting in matches to State’s passport data that 

do not represent fraud. 

Issuances to Applicants Using 

the Identifying Information of 

State and Federal Prisoners
 

Page 17 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

b

Our review indicated that some matches may be a result of identity theft perpetrated by the state 

prisoner, prior to incarceration, and not by the passport applicant. In addition, data from three states 

with matches did not include dates of birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to 

State’s passport data based on SSN and name only.

c

From our nongeneralizable sample of 14 cases, we identified seven 

passport applicants who may have fraudulently used the identities of state 

prisoners, since the incarcerated individuals could not have physically 

appeared at a passport facility to submit their applications.

We selected a nongeneralizable sample of up to two prisoners incarcerated in each of the states we 

reviewed for a total of 14 cases from eight different states.

24

We could not conclusively determine that all our sample cases or 

matches represented passport fraud, because for instance, it is possible 

that the state prisoner may have stolen the identity of the applicant prior 

to incarceration. For example, we identified two cases involving data from 

the same prison facility in which the prisoner had an alias name, in 

addition to an SSN and date of birth, that matched the information of the 

passport applicant. We provided information on all our matches, including 

the 14 state prisoner cases in our sample, to State for review. According 

to officials, State’s review of these cases included, but was not limited to, 

an assessment of fraud indicators in the passport applications, and 

review of the applicants’ information in commercial and internal 

databases. State determined that fraud could likely be ruled out in eight 

cases. Officials initially said they should refer the remaining six cases to 

DS for further investigation. In their technical comments on a draft of this 

report, State officials said they conducted a second review of the six 

remaining cases and determined that two individuals used their true 

identities on their passport applications, and they ultimately referred four 

cases to DS for investigation.

The seven 

remaining cases in our state prisoner sample of 14 individuals were either 

not incarcerated at the time of application submission, applied for 

passports using mail-in applications, or represented possible identity theft 

by the prisoner prior to incarceration. Federal regulations do not prohibit 

State from issuing passports to prisoners; however, according to officials, 

State’s policy is to deny passport issuances to individuals who are 

incarcerated at the time of application submission.

 

24These seven individuals applied for a passport using a DS-11 application, which must 

be submitted in person at an acceptance facility or passport agency.
 

Page 18 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Of the four cases in our state prisoner sample that State officials referred 

to DS, we identified three instances where the passport was used to 

cross an international border during the prisoners’ periods of 

incarceration. These cases highlighted the active use of passports 

obtained by potentially fraudulent means. We verified this travel activity 

by comparing the names, dates of birth, and passport numbers in State’s 

passport data for these cases with TECS travel data provided by FinCEN. 

The TECS travel log for the three cases showed that the individuals used 

the passports for international travel at least once during the prisoners’ 

periods of incarceration. In one case, an individual used the passport 

obtained by potentially fraudulent means to cross the U.S.-Mexico border 

more than 300 times.

In addition to our analysis of state prisoners, we also identified 206 

passport issuances to individuals who used an SSN, name, and date of 

birth in their applications that matched identifying information in the BOP’s 

federal prisoner data. However, the data we received included individuals 

residing in halfway houses. Unless otherwise stated in the conditions of 

release for parole, passport issuances to individuals living in halfway 

houses are legally permissible. Since we focused our in-depth analysis on 

a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases, we did not determine the extent 

to which the 206 cases represented individuals in federal prison facilities 

as opposed to halfway houses. Figure 5 summarizes our matching 

analysis and sample of 15 cases.

Figure 5: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Federal Prisoners

a

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

b

This number includes passport issuances to people residing in halfway houses, and therefore may 

not represent issuances to individuals using the identities of federal prisoners to apply for a passport.
 

Page 19 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

From our sample of 15 cases, we did not identify any individuals who 

applied for a passport using the identity of a federal prisoner in their 

passport application. We determined that at least 9 of the 15 individuals 

were living in BOP halfway houses when the passport application was 

submitted. Moreover, we did not find any indications of identity theft. The 

other six individuals were either not in a halfway house at the time of 

application submission, or we were unable to determine, on the basis of 

the information provided, their location after they were released from a 

federal prison facility.25

In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, officials said State did not have access to 

federal and state prisoner databases in order to check whether 

applicants’ identities matched those of incarcerated individuals. In June 

2013, State entered into a data-sharing agreement with the BOP that will 

allow it to access federal prisoner data, including information about 

individuals incarcerated in federal facilities or halfway houses. In addition, 

State obtained data-sharing agreements with two individual state 

departments of corrections, Florida and Rhode Island, as part of a pilot 

project to identify whether applicants fraudulently used the identities of 

state prisoners. State officials said these states represent different 

geographical regions and a large and small inmate population, and both 

had technical capabilities to transfer data efficiently and securely to State 

for adjudication purposes. Officials said in their technical comments that 

State completed the first phase of the pilot project in December 2013. 

This phase included the development of search criteria for detecting the 

fraudulent use of prisoners’ identities. According to officials, State referred 

three potential fraud cases to DS for further investigation as a result of 

this effort. Officials also reported in their technical comments that State 

plans to acquire prisoner data from other states, and that it is developing 

best practices for obtaining such data. In addition, officials noted that 

State is in the early stages of planning a second phase of the pilot project. 

However, the documentation for these six 

individuals indicated that they were not incarcerated when the application 

was submitted.

State officials highlighted various challenges with respect to using 

prisoner data during adjudication, including technical requirements and 

issues related to data transmission, as well as potential legal limitations. 

 

25Of these six individuals, one was incarcerated in a federal prison facility at the time of 

passport issuance. However, the individual applied for the passport prior to being in 

federal custody, and was subsequently issued a passport once his sentence began.
 

Page 20 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

For example, according to BOP officials, State and the BOP will have to 

develop a technical infrastructure to facilitate sharing of federal prisoner 

data, which officials expected to occur no later than the end of fiscal year 

2014. Similarly, with respect to state prisoner data, State officials noted 

that data from state departments of corrections would need to be 

automatically transmitted to allow for the updating of information on a 

consistent basis. In technical comments, State officials clarified that they 

would prefer to receive data from individual state departments of 

corrections on a real-time basis; however, the frequency with which State 

receives these data is not a factor in determining whether State enters 

into a data-sharing agreement with a department of corrections. State 

officials also highlighted issues regarding the compatibility of systems 

from various states, as well as concerns about poor data that could lead 

to false matches and delays in processing passport applications. 

Moreover, State officials told us legal limitations may prevent the transfer 

of state-level inmate data; however, State did not report having such 

challenges working with Florida and Rhode Island during its pilot project.

Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 

we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 486 

issuances to individuals using the SSN, name or alias, and date of birth of 

people with active warrants on their passport applications.26 We could not 

determine from matching analysis alone whether all warrants were 

associated with felonies, but our analysis excluded warrants with a 

description of either a “traffic crime” or “misdemeanor” in data provided by 

the Marshals Service (see app. IV for additional details). The type of 

warrant data State has received for detecting active felony warrants 

through CLASS has changed over time. In 2002, the Marshals Service 

began providing State with certain warrant information in CLASS. These 

only included Class 1 warrants, which is a designation for warrants the 

Marshals Service enters and maintains in the National Crime Information 

Center (NCIC) database, a criminal database that provides the warrant 

data to CLASS.27

 

26These issuances include individuals whose SSN, partial name (or alias), and date of 

birth in warrant data provided by the Marshals Service matched information in State’s 

passport data. In addition, these 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique 

individuals with a total of 564 open warrants. 

According to State officials, the FBI began providing 

State with federal felony warrants in 2005 for use during the adjudication 

27The NCIC database is an electronic repository of data on crimes and criminals of 

nationwide interest and a locator file for missing and unidentified persons.

Issuances to Individuals with 

Active Warrants
 

Page 21 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

process. In late July 2009, officials said State began receiving state and 

local warrants from the FBI for crimes of varying degrees of severity, 

including misdemeanors, serious felonies, and nonserious felonies.28

 

28FBI officials told us the bureau completed modifications of its warrant data for State in 

August 2007 to include not only federal warrants, but also state and local warrants. 

According to State officials, it would have been infeasible for State to receive or use state 

or local warrant data in 2007, given the technical and operational requirements for 

preparing CLASS, guidance to passport specialists, and instructions to offices that assist 

in the passport adjudication process. Officials added that State’s regulatory authority to 

deny or revoke passports on the basis of an outstanding state or local felony warrant was 

not effective until February 2008. Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding between 

the FBI and State for sharing state and local warrants was not signed by both parties until 

January 2009. 

According to State officials, the high volume of warrant cases was 

unmanageable and State had no authority to take action on misdemeanor 

warrants. Thus, in November 2010, State officials said they updated 

CLASS so that it included only state or local warrants connected to moreserious felonies they selected. Officials also said CLASS is updated daily 

with information provided by the Marshals Service and the FBI, and 

currently contains information for federal, state, and local felony warrants 

related to State’s selected felony charges. Figure 6 illustrates the 

evolution in State’s data checks for warrants.
 

Page 22 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 6: Timeline Showing When the Department of State (State) Began Checking for Federal, State, and Local Warrants

a

“Class 1” is a designation of the Marshals Service for warrants it enters and is responsible for in the 

NCIC database, a criminal database that sources the warrant data in Consular Lookout and Support 

System (CLASS).

b

From the population of 486 issuances with active warrants that we

identified through matching, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable 

sample of 15 individuals for additional analysis. Figure 7 summarizes our 

matching analysis and sample results.

According to officials, in November 2010, State selected certain felonies for inclusion in State’s 

CLASS in response to a high volume of state and local warrants it received in July 2009, which also 

included warrants for misdemeanors.
 

Page 23 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 7: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Applicants with Active Warrants

a

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

b

According to the Marshals Service, all 15 of the individuals in our 

nongeneralizable sample had warrants related to felony charges, 3 of 

which the Marshals Service was responsible for executing. Fugitives with 

felony warrants may pose a risk to public safety, and passports could help 

them evade capture by law enforcement agencies. State may choose to 

refuse a passport to applicants who are the subject of an outstanding 

felony warrant. In our analysis of the 15 cases, we took into account the 

evolution in State’s controls. Figure 8 summarizes our review of the cases 

in our sample.

These 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique individuals with a total of 564 open 

warrants. Beyond our sample items, we did not confirm whether the warrant was associated with a 

felony charge. However, these records excluded all warrants with a description of either a “traffic 

crime” or “misdemeanor.”
 

Page 24 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 8: Summary of Whether State Identified the Warrants in Our Sample Population

a

According to officials, State received a notice from the relevant U.S. District Court regarding this 

individual that indicated the court order for the person had ceased and the individual was sentenced 

to probation. As a result, State officials said the warrant for this individual was not included in the 

Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for State’s warrant check.

b

Upon further review of our original sample of 15 cases, we identified one individual who had a state 

or local warrant that was not issued until after the applicant applied for his passport. In addition, our 

review of court documents for another case indicated the individual was unlikely to have been a 

fugitive when applying for the passport, since he was arrested and faced criminal charges after the 

warrant was issued, but about a decade before submitting the application. As a result, we did not 

further review these cases as part of our sample.
 

Page 25 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Among the 13 applicants we reviewed in detail, we found five cases with 

warrants that State identified during the adjudication process. For 

instance, after detecting the warrant in one case, State’s passport legal 

office ultimately determined the passport applicant was a victim of identity 

theft and was not the subject of the warrant. In another case, State 

identified a warrant at the state or local level for an applicant who applied 

for a passport at a time when State’s controls had begun checking for 

such warrants. In this case, State’s passport legal office authorized the 

passport issuance to the individual after concluding the associated charge 

was for a misdemeanor crime, as opposed to a felony offense. We also 

identified five cases where the applicants had outstanding state or local 

felony warrants on the application date, and State’s CLASS did not have 

data for such warrants when the individuals applied.29 In the other 3 of the 

13 sample cases we reviewed, we found no indications that State was 

aware of or alerted to the individuals’ warrants at the time they applied for 

passports, even though it appeared that CLASS should have included the 

warrant data.30 We referred all passport issuances we identified from our 

matching analysis, including our sample cases, to State for further review 

and investigation.

 

29For one of these cases, State provided additional details on a subsequent passport 

issuance. Specifically, State highlighted a case of passport fraud involving an individual in 

our sample that occurred after the period of passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal 

years 2009 and 2010. 

30Officials of the Marshals Service told us there can be delays between the date a warrant 

is issued and the date a law enforcement agency validates it in the NCIC database. 

Alternatively, the officials said, law enforcement agencies may elect not to enter the 

warrant into a federal database at all. In such circumstances, State would not be alerted to 

the warrant, regardless of whether it was federal, state, or local, because CLASS would 

not contain information about it for use during the passport adjudication process. 
 

Page 26 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 

we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found 13,470 passport 

issuances to individuals who submitted an SSN associated with a 

deceased individual,

31 but where the name used in the passport 

application did not match the name of the deceased individual.

32

Figure 9: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Deceased-SSN Errors

As we 

previously noted, we analyzed these cases to determine whether the 

applicant provided the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or 

whether the applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the 

incorrect SSN its system. Specifically, from this population, we selected a 

stratified random sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, 

evenly divided between fiscal years 2009 and 2010 (see fig. 9). We refer 

to these cases below as deceased-SSN errors.

a

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

b

The generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport issuances included 70 passport 

issuances from both fiscal years 2009 and 2010.

 

31State may issue multiple passports to the same individual, such as when the applicant 

applies for both a passport book and a passport card. These 13,470 passport issuances 

were associated with 12,781 unique individuals.

32We also found 181 passport issuances where both the applicant’s name and SSN 

matched the SSN and name of a deceased individual. These issuances are described in 

detail in the previous section under the subheading “Issuances to Applicants Using 

Identifying Information of Deceased Individuals.”

State’s Records Contained 

Erroneous SSNs for 

Thousands of Passport 

Issuances as a Result of 

Applicant or State DataEntry Error
 

Page 27 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

We estimated that approximately 50 percent of the 13,470 cases with 

deceased-SSN errors were instances where the applicant provided an 

SSN that did not belong to him or her.33

 

33From 13,470 passport records with names that did not match the corresponding record 

in the SSA full death file, we selected a stratified random sample of 140 passport 

issuances. All estimates from this sample have a margin of error of +/-9 percentage points 

or fewer unless otherwise noted. See app. I for more details. 

We did not identify any other 

evidence of potential fraud in this group of cases, which suggests that 

applicants may have made mistakes in filling out the passport application. 

We estimated that in approximately 44 percent of the 13,470 cases with 

deceased-SSN errors applicants provided the correct SSNs, but State 

entered them incorrectly into TDIS. State officials could not provide an 

explanation for the errors related to these cases, which included 

applications with handwritten SSNs that were difficult to read, as well as 

typed SSNs. The remaining 6 percent of cases did not fall into either of 

these categories. Such cases included instances where the applicant did 

not provide an SSN, or where we were unable to ascertain the applicant’s 

actual SSN. Figure 10 summarizes the issuances we reviewed involving 

deceased-SSN errors. 
 

Page 28 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 10: Estimated Percentage of Causes of Incorrect SSNs Associated with 

Deceased Individuals in State’s Passport Data

Notes: All percentage estimates in figure 10 are generalized to the population of 13,470 cases with 

deceased-SSN errors. All estimates in figure 3 have a margin of error of +/-9 percentage points or 

fewer at the 95 percent confidence level.

a

In addition to deceased-SSN errors, we also found 24,278 issuances

during fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to individuals who applied for a 

passport using a likely invalid SSN that SSA has never issued.

Records that did not fall into any of the two categories above were classified as “other.” Examples 

include instances where the applicant did not provide an SSN, or where GAO was unable to ascertain 

the applicant’s actual SSN.

34

 

34State may issue multiple passports to the same individual, such as when the applicant 

applies for both a passport book and a passport card. These 24,278 passport issuances 

were associated with 22,543 unique SSNs. In some cases, more than one individual used 

the same likely invalid SSN to apply for a passport. 

For 

example, SSA has never issued the SSN “999-99-9999,” so we would 
 

Page 29 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

have included an applicant who used that SSN in this population.

35 We 

randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases from the 

population of unique, likely invalid SSNs for additional review (see fig. 

11). In seven cases, State improperly recorded the applicants’ SSNs in 

TDIS. In six cases, the applicant provided an incorrect SSN, five of which 

were close to the applicant’s actual SSN.36

Figure 11: Summary of Analysis and Invalid Social Security Number Sample

We did not determine the 

cause of the invalid SSNs in the remaining two cases, because they

involved minors for whom we could not ascertain the passport recipient’s 

actual SSNs.

a

State officials were unable to identify the specific reason for the 

deceased-SSN errors or likely invalid SSNs we identified, but the agency 

said it has taken actions to capture correct SSN information more 

consistently. For example, since January 2010, State’s management has 

issued memorandums clarifying the policies and procedures for capturing 

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.

 

3526 U.S.C. § 6039E requires passport applicants to provide an SSN, if they have one, 

when applying for or renewing a passport. When an applicant has not been issued an 

SSN, State requests applicants to enter all zeroes in the SSN field on the passport 

application. We therefore excluded SSNs with all zeroes from our analysis of invalid 

SSNs. However, we included in our analysis other single-character SSNs, such as “999-

99-9999.” While these SSNs are invalid, they may reflect an attempt by applicants without 

SSNs to follow State’s guidance. 

36We defined a “close” SSN as one where at least six digits matched the applicant’s actual 

SSN. SSNs that were not close were defined as those with more than three digits that did 

not match the applicant’s actual SSN. 
 

Page 30 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

and correcting applicant SSN information. In addition, in September 2011, 

State signed an information-exchange agreement with SSA to implement 

a real-time verification process through a secure online system. As of 

June 2013, State officials said all 28 domestic agencies and centers were 

able to verify SSNs in real time. We have not assessed these measures’ 

effects on reducing SSN errors, but among the issuances we reviewed, 

SSN errors fell from about 24,762 in fiscal year 2009 to approximately 

12,986 in fiscal year 2010.37

We provided a draft of this report to State and the Department of Justice

for comment. State provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

into the report, as appropriate. The Department of Justice did not have 

any comments.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. In addition, 

the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-6722 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix V.

Stephen M. Lord

Managing Director

Forensic Audits and Investigative Service

 

37These incorrect SSNs only include SSNs associated with a deceased individual, or 

SSNs that we could identify as having never been issued. They do not include legitimately 

issued SSNs listed incorrectly in State’s data that do not belong to a deceased individual, 

and therefore the count may be understated. 

Agency Comments
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 31 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

You asked that we assess potential fraud in the Department of State’s 

(State) passport program. This report examines potentially fraudulent or 

high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 

2010.1

To examine potentially fraudulent and high-risk passport issuances in 

fiscal years 2009 and 2010,

2 we matched State’s passport-issuance data 

for approximately 28 million passport issuances to databases containing 

information about individuals who were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in 

a state prison facility, (3) in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons 

(BOP), or (4) the subject of an active warrant at the time of the passport 

issuance.3

 

1

For purposes of this report, potentially fraudulent passport issuances are those that 

involve an applicant using someone else’s identity to apply for and receive a passport. We 

defined high-risk passport issuances as issuances to individuals who may pose a risk to 

public safety, but who did not necessarily steal someone’s identity to apply for a passport, 

such as people with active warrants for felony charges. 

We conducted this matching on the basis of common data 

elements including Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of 

birth. We also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to 

applicants who provided an invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN 

that had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had 

a high risk of misuse. Because our review focused on passport issuances 

with certain fraud indicators, we did not review other types of passport 

fraud, such as identity theft involving individuals who were not deceased 

or imprisoned. Similarly, since we focused on high-risk issuances 

involving applicants with active warrants, we did not match the passport 

data against all databases with individuals at risk of misusing a passport, 

such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center 

data. We only reviewed data with passport issuances, therefore we did 

not examine passport applications that were rejected or abandoned by 

the applicant. In addition, our unit of analysis was passport issuances, 

2

We used data from these fiscal years because they were the most recent, full fiscal years 

available at the time State complied with our data request. 

3

According to publically available passport issuance statistics, State issued a combined 

total of 28,964,775 passports during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. GAO reviewed 

domestically issued passports and excluded passports issued by the Special Issuance 

Agency to government travelers. We reviewed a total of 28,000,063 passport issuance 

records. State erroneously excluded passport records from the Houston Passport Agency 

for the months of October 2008, November 2008, and December 2009 and provided 

duplicate passport records from the Houston Passport Agency for the months of 

November 2009 and September 2010. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

instead of passport holders. Some individuals in our sample may have 

been issued multiple passports. 

In addition, we examined policies, guidance, including the Foreign Affairs 

Manual, and other materials provided to passport specialists. We 

reviewed changes to State’s controls since fiscal years 2009 and 2010 

with respect to preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk passport 

issuances. We also assessed the reliability of State’s passport data, 

TECS travel activity data provided by the Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network (FinCEN), the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) full death 

file, prisoner databases provided by the BOP and by departments of 

corrections in 15 selected states, as well as data on individuals with open 

warrants provided by the Marshals Service, by reviewing relevant 

documentation, interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, and 

examining the data for obvious errors and inconsistencies. We concluded 

that all but four of these databases were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. Through data tests and interviews, we concluded 

that state prisoner data from Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and 

Pennsylvania were not sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We did not 

assess the reliability of state prisoner data from North Carolina because 

they were not provided in time to be included in our analysis.

To identify individuals using the SSN of a deceased individual, we 

matched State passport data to SSA’s full death file as of September 

2011. The full death file contains all of SSA’s death records, including 

state-reported death information. We included only those individuals who 

died more than 120 days before the passport was issued to ensure that 

our matches did not include legitimate applicants who died shortly after 

submitting an application.4

From 13,470 passport records with names that did not match the 

corresponding record in the full death file, we selected a stratified random 

sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, evenly divided between 

fiscal years 2009 and 2010. For each case, we examined a copy of the 

original passport application and submitted the SSN from State’s passport 

We further divided these passport applications 

into two groups on the basis of whether the name in the passport file 

matched the name in the corresponding death file record.

 

4

As previously noted, we selected 120 days after death to allow for approximately 60 days 

of passport application processing time and 60 days of lag time in reporting an individual’s 

death to SSA for inclusion in the full death file. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 33 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

data to SSA for verification. We analyzed these cases to determine 

whether the applicant provided the correct SSN and State recorded it 

incorrectly, or whether the applicant provided the wrong SSN and State 

recorded the incorrect SSN in its system. Our estimates had a margin of 

error of at most +/-9 percentage points for the entire population, at the 95 

percent confidence level.

From 181 passport records with names that matched the corresponding 

record in the death file, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample 

of 15 records for additional analysis. To verify that these individuals were 

deceased at the time their identity was used to apply for a passport, we 

attempted to obtain a death certificate for each applicant. In some cases, 

we were unable to obtain a death certificate because we could not identify 

the state in which the individual’s death was recorded or because state 

officials could not or would not provide the death certificate to us. The 

results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of 

applicants using the SSN and name of a deceased person.

To identify individuals incarcerated at the time of passport issuance, we 

matched State passport data to a database of federal prisoners provided 

by the BOP and prisoner databases from Alabama, Arizona, California, 

Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. 

Federal prisoner data included individuals incarcerated during fiscal years 

2009 and 2010. State prisoner data included individuals incarcerated as 

of the date the state provided data to us, which ranged from May to 

November 2011. We identified records for which the passport applicant’s 

SSN, name, and date of birth matched that of a person who was 

incarcerated on the date of passport issuance. State prisoner data from 

Florida, New York, and Texas did not contain dates of birth. For these 

states, we matched passport data to state prison data by SSN and name 

only. From our matches, we randomly selected 15 federal prisoners and 

up to 2 prisoners incarcerated in each of the states for additional analysis. 

If a state had two or fewer valid matches, we selected all matches from 

that state, for a total of 14 cases from eight different states. Three states 

did not have any matches. We obtained documentation from BOP and 

prison officials from the eight states to confirm that the selected 

individuals were incarcerated on the dates of passport application and 

issuance. The results of these samples are not generalizable to the entire 

population of applicants using the name, SSN, or date of birth of an 

incarcerated person. However, the cases offered insights on applicants 

who potentially used the identity of prisoners to apply for passports, and 

related efforts by State to identify such individuals.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 34 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

To identify individuals with active warrants at the time they applied for a 

passport, we matched State passport data to warrant data provided by 

the Marshals Service. We identified records for which the passport 

applicant’s SSN, name (or alias), and date of birth matched that of an 

individual with an open warrant on the date of passport issuance. From 

this population, we randomly selected 15 warrants for crimes other than 

misdemeanors and traffic violations for additional analysis. We confirmed 

with the Marshals Service that all 15 individuals had warrants related to 

felony charges. In addition, we referred to documentation provided by the 

Marshals Service that had warrant information for each case. We 

compared the warrant dates, the SSNs, names, and dates of birth, if 

available, in the warrant data we received from the Marshals Service for 

our matching analysis to the hard-copy documentation. For all 15 cases, 

the warrant issuance dates, as well as the names and fugitive unique 

identifiers, in the hard-copy documentation matched the information in the 

warrant data we used to match with the passport database. In addition, 

for 12 cases, at least one date of birth and SSN noted in the hard-copy 

documentation matched the warrant data used for our matching analysis. 

The dates of birth and SSNs in the documentation for 3 of the 15 

individuals were redacted, and therefore the match was based on name 

and unique identifier only. The results of this sample are not generalizable 

to the entire population of applicants using the name (or alias), SSN, and 

date of birth of a fugitive, but provided insights about State’s efforts to 

identify such individuals during the adjudication process.

Because we matched passport data to databases of deceased 

individuals, prisoners, and fugitives using two or more identifiers—SSN, 

name, date of birth—we are generally confident in the accuracy of our 

results. However, in some cases, our matches may include applicants 

who were not deceased, incarcerated, or the subject of an active warrant. 

This can occur when a passport applicant has an SSN, name, and date of 

birth that are similar to an individual listed in one of the other databases 

or when the applicant is listed in the other database erroneously. In 

addition, our matches may be understated because we may not have 

detected applicants whose identifying information in the passport data 

differed slightly from their identifying information in other databases. 

Moreover, federal warrant data do not contain information on all 

individuals with an open warrant issued by a state court.

We analyzed State passport data to identify issuances to individuals 

using an invalid SSN. We defined invalid SSNs as SSNs that had not 

been issued as of fiscal year 2010 or commonly misused SSNs. SSNs 

with certain digit combinations, such as those starting with 000 or 666, 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

had never been issued as of fiscal year 2010. Commonly misused SSNs 

include single-character SSNs, or SSNs that have been publically 

disclosed in advertisements. From this population, we selected 15 cases 

for additional analysis. The results of this sample are not generalizable to 

the entire population of applicants using an invalid SSN, but the cases 

provided insights on State’s controls related to identifying inaccurate 

SSNs on passport applications. In total, we selected 214 cases for 

additional analysis, as shown in figure 12.

Figure 12: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by Population

a

These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. We conducted additional reviews to 

verify data for the sample items in the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 

matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to individuals with active warrants. Rather, 

we selected samples for additional review, and referred all matches to State for further investigation.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 36 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

b

In our data matching, we used state prisoner data from 11 states including Alabama, Arizona, 

California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. However, even 

though we used data from all 11 states during our matching analysis, three of these state prison 

databases did not have any valid matches to the passport data. In addition, data from three states did 

not include dates of birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to State’s passport data 

based on Social Security number (SSN) and name only.

c

As described in more detail later in this report, our review indicated that some matches may be a 

result of identity theft perpetrated by the state prisoner, prior to incarceration, and not the passport 

applicant.

d

We selected a nongeneralizable sample of up to two prisoners incarcerated in each of the states we 

reviewed for a total of 14 cases from eight different states.

e

This number includes passport issuances to people residing in halfway houses, and therefore may 

not represent issuances to individuals using the identities of federal prisoners to apply for a passport.

f

These 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique individuals that had a total of 564 

open warrants. We did not confirm that all of these warrants were associated with felony charges, but 

we excluded warrants with a description of either a “traffic crime” or “misdemeanor” from our analysis.

g

In all, we selected a total of 214 passport issuances for additional review 

for our five nongeneralizable and one generalizable samples. For each of 

the 214 passport issuances selected, we reviewed a copy of the original 

passport application, verified the SSN in State’s passport data using 

SSA’s database, and obtained records of the passport holder’s travel 

activity from FinCEN. We also reviewed State documentation of additional 

investigative activities taken in any of our cases. Where applicable, we 

obtained additional documentation about the death, incarceration, or 

fugitive status of applicants from federal and state agencies, and followup actions planned or taken by State. We could not determine whether 

the passport issuance was inappropriate or fraudulent without additional 

investigation of the facts and circumstances for each individual case. We 

were not able to perform these investigations due to restrictions on the 

use of State’s passport data. The period required for our review was a 

result of various factors, including a data-sharing negotiation with State, 

time required to receive requested data and documentation, extensive 

data preparation and analysis involving multiple databases, and the 

necessity for resource-intensive reviews of information on-site, given the 

sensitivity of certain information.

The generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport issuances included 70 passport 

issuances from both fiscal years 2009 and 2010.

We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Passport Application and 

Adjudication Process

Page 37 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

This figure is a printable version of the interactive graphic presented 

above, which provides an overview of the passport application and 

adjudication process. 

Appendix II: Passport Application and 

Adjudication Process
Appendix II: Passport Application and 

Adjudication Process

Page 38 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 13: Passport Application and Adjudication Process
Appendix III: The Department of State’s (State) 

Use of the Social Security Administration’s 

(SSA) Records for Death Checks

Page 39 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement 

that allows State to automatically query SSA’s Enumeration Verification 

System records for verifying applicants’ identities and identifying 

deceased individuals. SSA provides State the death status of an applicant 

when all identifying fields—the Social Security number (SSN), name, and 

date of birth on the passport application—match an SSA record.1

 

1

SSA’s criteria for matching include tolerances on the name and date of birth to account 

for input or typographical errors on records submitted. 

However, if one of these identifying elements does not match, SSA will 

not provide a response with respect to death status. For example, SSA 

would not provide State a death status if an applicant submitted the SSN 

of a deceased individual but used a different name. Figure 14

summarizes the potential responses State receives from SSA.

Appendix III: The Department of State’s 

(State) Use of the Social Security 

Administration’s (SSA) Records for Death 

Checks
Appendix III: The Department of State’s (State) 

Use of the Social Security Administration’s 

(SSA) Records for Death Checks

Page 40 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Figure 14: Social Security Administration’s Responses and Actions of Passport Specialists
Appendix IV: Description of Warrant-Matching 

Analysis

Page 41 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Out of the approximately 28 million combined passport issuances we 

reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 1,096 individuals 

whose Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth were 

associated with 1,309 warrants in data provided by the Marshals Service 

from the Justice Detainee Information Center database. Of these 1,309 

warrants, we identified 486 passport issuances to individuals who may 

have had active felony warrants at the time of application submission. 

Over half of the 1,309 warrants were for offenses such as misdemeanors 

and traffic violations. According to officials at the Department of State 

(State), the department has no regulatory authority to take action on 

misdemeanor warrants.

Officials from the Marshals Service said the agency tracks other warrants 

for federal agencies, including those related to misdemeanors and traffic 

offenses, as well as cases at the state level that require the assistance of 

the Marshals Service. Officials of the Marshals Service also said they do 

not have responsibility for entering information about such warrants into 

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, and therefore 

such warrants are classified as non–Class 1 warrants. On the other hand, 

Class 1 warrants are those that the Marshals Service is responsible for 

entering into NCIC and that it transmits to State’s Consular Lookout and 

Support System (CLASS) for adjudication.

Marshals Service officials told us that of the 1,309 warrants we identified 

in our matching analysis, 111 (9 percent) were Class 1 warrants. Because 

the Marshals Service only transmits Class 1 warrants into CLASS, State 

would have identified the non–Class 1 warrants only if it received them 

from another source, such as warrants provided by the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. Table 1 lists the types of open warrants we identified from 

our matching analysis.1

 

1

The warrant data we received from the Marshals Service included warrants classified as 

“State/Local” that may have included both felonies and misdemeanors. In addition, the 

underlying offense may have been a misdemeanor or traffic violation for some warrants 

that were parole violations; we were unable to identify these on the basis of the data 

provided. 

Appendix IV: Description of WarrantMatching Analysis
Appendix IV: Description of Warrant-Matching 

Analysis

Page 42 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Table 1: Warrants by Type of Offense to Individuals Issued Passports from Fiscal 

Years 2009 and 2010

Offense type

Number of active 

warrantsa Percentage

Traffic Crimes and Misdemeanors 766 59%

Others 112 b 9 

Parole Violation and Bond Default 110 8 

Drug Crimes 101 8 

Weapon Offenses and Violent Crimes 79 6 

Fraud, Forgery, and Financial Crimes 66 5 

Sex Offenses 65 5 

Border and Immigration Crimes 10 < 1

Total 1,309 100%

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State (State) and the Marshals Service

a

One individual can have more than one warrant. The table includes warrants for 1,096 different 

fugitives.

b

Some of the 1,309 passport issuances we identified with active warrants 

were associated with felony offenses, including violent crimes ranging 

from assault to homicide. Ten of the warrants were associated with 

border and immigration crimes such as smuggling aliens and immigration 

violations. State may have identified and reviewed these warrants during 

the adjudication process, and decided to issue the passport after 

reviewing and resolving the circumstances of the case. We referred all 

our matches to State for further review and investigation.

This offense type includes various crimes, such as gambling, burglary, and child neglect.
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-14-222 Department of State Passport Services

Stephen M. Lord, (202) 512-6722 or lords@gao.gov

In addition to the contact above, Heather Dunahoo (Assistant Director); 

Hiwotte Amare; James Ashley; Patricia Donahue; Richard Hillman; Leslie 

Kirsch; Maria McMullen; Sandra Moore; Anthony Moran; James Murphy; 

Rebecca Shea; and Gavin Ugale made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(192352)
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