MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 218 Docket: A nd

- 17

- 16 Submitted

O n B riefs : June 2 9 ,	2017 Decided: November	28,	2017
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN , JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Majority: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	MEAD, GORMAN , JABAR ,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ. Concurrence/

Dissent: ALEXANDER,	J.

FRED	TAYLOR	et	al.

v. MARK	WALKER

JABAR ,	J. [¶1] Fred and	Eleanor	Taylor	appeal	 from	a	judgment	of	 the	Superior Court	 ( Androscoggin County, MG	 Kennedy,	 J .)	 vacating	 the	 District	 Court’s ( Lewiston, Oram,	J

. ) order	denying	Mark	Walker’s	motion to	set	aside a	small claims	judgment entered	in	the	District	Court ( Ende,	J. )

. Although	the	appeal	is interlocutory,	given	the	legislative	direction	that	small	claims	matters	proceed expeditiously, see 14	M.R.S.	§	7481	(2016) ; M.R.S.C.P.	1 , we	address	the	appeal pursuant	 to the	 judicial	 economy	 exception and remand	 for further proceedings.2 I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	following	facts	are	set	forth	in	the	record. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	76F (a)

. The	Taylors	are	homeowners	residing	in Auburn .		Walker	is	the	president	of	an insulation	installation	company.		In	the	spring	of	2015,	the	Taylors	contracted with Walker’s	company to	install	foam	insulation	in	their	home. The	Taylors allege	 that	 the	 job	 was	 done	 unsatisfactorily	 and	 that	 the	 method Walker’s
company used to install the	insulation	damaged	the	home’s	roof	and	siding. The Taylors	subsequently initiated	a	small	claims	action in	the	District	Court against Walker	 seeking	 damages	 of	 $4,256	 plus	 costs. A	 hearing	 on	 the	 Taylors’ statement	of claim	was	scheduled	for	July	5,	2016. [¶ 3 ]		On	 the	day	of	 the	hearing,	Walker	 failed	 to	appear , and	 the	court ( Ende,	J .) entered	a	default	judgment	in	favor	of	the	Taylors

. Later	t hat	same day,	Walker	 submitted	 to	 the	 court	 a	 letter	in	 which	 he	 alleged that he had appeared	at	the	wrong	courthouse , a nd	when	he	realized	his	mistak e , he	made efforts	to	get	to	the	hearing	in	a	timely	fashion. In his	letter,	Walker alleged that he	 finally	arrived	at	 the	correct	location	approximately	 two

- and

- a - half

- hours af ter	the hearing	was	scheduled	to	begin .		The District	C ourt	accepted the	letter3 as	 a	 motion	 to	 set	 aside	 the	 default	 judg ment 1 and	 in	 a	 handwritten	 order , without conducting	a	 hearing, the	 court ( Oram, J .) 2 denied that motion. The court’s	order	states	in pertinent	part ,	“A fter considering	the	filings,	[Walker’s] motion	to	set	aside	default	is	denied.” [¶ 4 ] Walker	subsequently	appealed	to	the	Superior	Court

. S ee M.R.S.C.P. 11( a )

. The Superior	Court vacated the	District	Court’s or der	denying Walker’s
motion to	set	aside	the	default judgment .		It made	factual	findings, entered	a n order	setting	aside	the	default , and remanded the	matter to	the	District	Court for	 a	 hearing	 on	 the	 Taylor s ’ underlying claims. In	 its	 judgment,	 without hearing	from	Walker	an d	the	Taylors,	the	Superior	C ourt made	various	factual findings and	 credibility	 determinations , found that	 the	 circumstances described	 in	 Walker’s	 motion to	 set	 aside	 the	 default judgment constituted excusable	neglect , and	 therefore concluded	 that the	Dist rict	Court abused	its discretion in	denying his motion

. M.R.S.C.P. 9 ;	M.R.	Civ. P. 60(b) .		The	Taylors then filed	a	motion	for	reconsideration , which	the Superior	C ourt denied. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	59(e) .		They	now appeal from	the	order	setting	aside	the	default

.

1 M.R.S.C.P.	9 ,	the	rule	governing	motions	to	set	aside	small	claims	judgments,	incorporates	the provisions of M.R.	Civ.	P.	60

.
2 It	is	not	clear	from	the	record	why	the District	Court judge who presided over	the	small	claims trial	list was	not	the	judge	who	acted	on	Walker’s	motion to	set	aside	the	default

.4 II. DISCUSSION
A. Process	for	Appealing	Small	Claims	Judgments [¶ 5 ]		The	Superior	Court	has	limited	and	specific	authority	when	a	small claims	 matter	 is	 appealed. See 4	 M.R.S.	 §	 105(3)(B)(2) (2016) ; 14	 M.R.S. § 7484

- A(1)	(2016) ; M.R.S.C.P.	11( d )

. If a defendant appeals and	seeks	a	trial of	the	facts, the	defendant mu st	include	a	jury	trial	request and	pay	the required fee for	a	jury	trial	in	the	Superior	Court

. See M.R.S.C.P.	11(d)(2); Revised	Court
Fees Schedule	 and	 Document	 Management	 Procedures ,	 Me.	 Admin.	 Order JB

- 05

- 26	(as	amended	by	A.	7

- 16),	§	I(A)(3)	(effective	July	29,	2016)

. However,

a plaintiff,	having	chosen	the	small	claims	forum, may	appeal	only	on	questions of	law	and cannot	appeal and	requ est a nother trial	of	the	facts. See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1). [¶ 6 ] A party	may	appeal a	small	claims	order to	 the	Superior	Court to
raise issues	of	law	or,	as	is	the	case	here, to	challenge	an exercise	of	discretion not	 related	 to	 the court’s	 factual	 findings on the	 substance	 of a motion

. See M.R.S.C.P.	11(d)(1)

- (2). Thus, although the	Superior	Cou rt	may	not	decide	facts in	a	small	claim appeal when	acting	in	a	purely	appellate	capacity , the	court may review challenges	 to	 the District	 Court’s application	 of the	 law or,	 in	 rare circumstances, the	Superior	Court	may	review	the	District	Court’s exercise of5 discretion	in	a	making	a	determination	that is not	related	to	the trial	of	facts on the merits	of	the	claim

. See	id.
B

. Final	Judgment	Rule [¶ 7 ] Here, Walker appealed	 from	 the	 District	 Court’s	 exercise	 of discretion	in	denying his motion	 to	set	aside	 the	default. Thus,	 the	Superior Court’s	 authority	 was	 purely on	 questions	 of	 law .	 	 Nonetheless,	 it made independent	factual	findings, vacated the District Court’s order , and	remanded the	matter	for	a	trial	on	the	substance	of	the	complaint. [¶ 8 ] The	matter	is	not	yet	final	because	there	is	further	action to	be	taken in	the District	C ourt. Griswold	v.	Town	of	Denmark ,	2007	ME	93,	¶	17,	927	A.2d
410. T herefore , the	appeal	to	us is	interlocutory and is not	ripe	for	appellate review	unless	an	exception to	the	 final	judgment	rule	applies. See Doggett	v. Town	of	Gouldsboro ,	2002	ME	175,	¶	8, 812	A.2d	256 (“We	have	regularly	held that	 appeals	 from	 court	 ord ers	 remanding	 a	matter	 to	 another	 court	 .	 .	 .	 for further	 action	 are	 interlocutory	 appeals	 .	 .	 .	 .”) ; Aubry	 v. Town	 of	 Mt. Desert , 2010 ME	 111,	 ¶	 5,	 10	A.3d	 662 ; Fiber	Materials,	 Inc.	 v.	 Subilia ,	 2009 ME	 71, ¶¶ 12

- 13,	 974 A.2d	 918

. “A	 party	 urging	 that	 we reach	 the	 merits	 of	 an otherwise	interlocutory	appeal	has	the	burden	of	demon strating	to	us	that	one6 of	th[e] exceptions	to	the	final	judgment	rule	justifies	our	reaching	the	merits of	the	appeal.” Sanborn	v.	Sanborn ,	2005	ME	95,	¶ 6 ,	877	A.2d	1075

. [¶ 9 ] Because	the	Superior	Court’s	authority	did	not	extend	to	deciding the	facts	related	to	the	motion to	set	aside	default ,	and because	of the	unique and	expedited nature	of	a	small	claims matter , see 14	M.R.S.	§	7481; M.R .S.C.P. 1, we	conclude	that	the judicial	economy exception	applies.		Accordingly,	rather than	simply dismissing the	matter	without	comment,	we address	the	authority of	the	Superior	Court	and	the	process	on	remand

. C

. Superior	Court	Authority	and Remand [¶1 0 ]	 	As	 noted	 above,	 the	Superi or	 Court vacated	 the	District	 Court’s order	denying	Walker’s	motion	to	set	aside	the	default	judgment and	entered judgment	in	Walker’s	 favor	 on	 that	motion.	 	 In	 doing	 so, the Superior	 Court made	 certain	 factual	 findings that	 exceeded	 its	 authority and	 vacated	 an exercise	 of the	 District	 Court’s discretion based	 on	 the	 facts	 that	 it	 found independently,	without	the	authority	for	fact	finding	or	a	record	upon	which	to review	the	facts

. The District	Court	was	authorized	to deny the	motion	without a	 h earing	 upon	 concluding	 that	 the	 facts	 alleged	in	Walker’s	motion,	 even	if proved,	 did	 not	 constitute	 excusable	 neglect	 f or	 the	 purposes	 of	 M.R.
Civ. P. 60(b). See Laurel	Bank	&	Tr.	Co.	v.	Burns ,	398	A.2d	41,	45	(Me.	1979)7 (stating	 that	 a	 party	 seeking	 rel ief	 from	 judgment	 bears	 the	 burden	 of presenting	 competent	 evidence	 demonstrating	 his	 entitlement	 to	 relief pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 60(b)).	 	 Acting	 as	 the	 appellate	 tribunal	 here,	 the Superior	Court	was	not	at	liberty	 to	independently	make the factual fin dings that	formed the	basis	of	its	decision	to grant Walker’s	motion. Cf. Suzman	v. Comm’r,	 Dep’t	 of	 Health	 &	 Human	 Servs. ,	 2005 ME	 80,	 ¶	 24,	 876	 A.2d	 29 (“Neither	this	Court	nor	the	Superior	Court,	acting	in	an	appellate	capacity,	is free	to	make	factual	findings	independent	of	those	made	by	[an]	agency

.	.	. .” );

see also Sheepscot	Land	Corp.	v.	Gregory , 383 A.2d	16,	24	(Me.	1978) (“Whether the default	 e ntry	 or	 default	 judgment	 resulted	 from	 factual	 circumstances justifying	relief	is	a	question	of	fact	and	must	be	proven	by	evidence

. .	.	. ” ). [¶1 1 ]	 	 Thus , assuming	 that , as	 an	 appellate	 court , the	 Superior	 Court identified an	 important factual allegation in	 the	 record	 before	 it that	 would necessitate	 fact

- finding ,	 it	 should	 have exercised	 its appellate authority	 to remand the	 matter to	 the District Court	 for	 a n	 evidentiary hearing	 on	 the motion	to	set	aside the	default

. [¶1 2 ] W e therefore remand	 to	 the	Superior	Court	with	instructions	 to determine	whether	the	allegations	set	forth	in	Walker’s	motion	to	set	aside	the default necessitated	an	evidentiary	hearing	on	the	motion .		If the	Superior	Court8 determines	that	the	District	Court	abused	i ts	discretion	in	deciding	the	motion without	a	hearing , it will remand	the	ma tter	to	the	District	Court	for	a hearing on	Walker’s	motion. If the	Superior	Court	determines	that	the	District	Court did	not	abuse	its	discretion	in	adjudicating	the	motion	to	s et	aside	the	default without	a	hearing ,	the	Superior	Court must affirm	the District	Court’s	denial	of the	 motion	 to	 set aside	 the	 default	 and	 affirm the	 judgment	 in	 favor	 of the Taylor s . The	entry	is: Order	of	the	Superior	Court	vacated. The	matter is	 rem anded	 to	 the	 Superior	 Court	 with instructions	 to determine	 whether	 to remand the	c ase	to	the	District	Court	for an	evidentiary hearing	on	the	motion	to	set	aside	the	default or to	affirm	the	District	Court’s	judgment

.

ALEXANDER,	J.,	concurring in	part /dissenting in	part

. [¶13]	 	 I	 concur	with	 the	Court	 that	we	 should	 reach	 the	merits	 of	 this interlocutory	 appeal,	 and	 I	 concur	 with	 the	 Court	 that	 the	 Superior	 Court’s judgment	on	appeal	from	the	District	Court	must	be	vacated.		However,	because

t he	record	of	information	available	to	the	District	Court	demonstrates	that	the District	Court	acted	within	its	discretion,	I	respectfully	dissent	from	the	Court’s9 remanding	 for	 any	 further	 review	 of	 facts	 by	 the	 Superior	 Court	 or	 by	 the
District	 Court.	 	 Be cause	 error	 in	 the	 District	 Court’s	 order	 has	 not	 been demonstrated	on	this	appeal,	the	District	Court’s	judgment	should	be	affirmed. [¶14]		Review	of	the	record	discloses	the	following	facts,	available	to	the District	 Court	 when	it	 reached	its	 decision, that	 support	 the	 District	 Court’s action	after	receiving	Mark	Walker’s	letter.		Fred	and	Eleanor	Taylor	initiated the	 small	 claims	 action	 in	 the	 Lewiston	 District	 Court	 seeking	 damages	 of $4,256	plus	costs.		A	hearing	on	the	Taylors’	statement	of	claim	was scheduled for	July	5,	2016,	at	8:30	a

. m. [¶15]		On	June	13,	2016,	three	weeks	before	the	hearing	date,	a	notice	of the	hearing	was	sent	to	Walker	at	his	Windham	address.		The	notice	specifically stated	that	the	hearing	would	be	held	at	the	Lewiston	Distri ct	Court,	with	the court’s	address	prominently	displayed	in	the	middle	of	the	page,	set

- off	 from the	rest	of	the	text.		The	notice	stated	that	the	hearing	was	set	for	8:30	a

. m . and warned	Walker	that	failure	to	appear	may	result	in	a	default	judgment	again st him.		On	July	5 ,	Walker	failed	to	appear, and	the	court	( Ende,	J .)	entered	a	default judg ment	in	favor	of	the	Taylors. [¶16]		Later	on	July	5,	Walker	submitted a	letter to	the	Lewiston	District Court.		 In	 the	letter,	Walker alleged	 that	he	had (i)	appe ared	at	 the	Portland10 District	Court;	(ii)	called	the	Lewiston	District	Court	at	9:08	a

. m . “and	was	told I	 could	 yet	 come	 to	 Lewiston”;	 (iii)	 found	 he	 had	 mislaid	 his	 car	 keys; (iv) discovered	that	his	car	keys	had	been	left	at	entry	screening;	(v)	called	t he “clerk”	 again,	left	 Portland	 after	 10:00	 a

. m . ,	 and	 arrived	 at	 Lewiston	District Court	around	11:00	a

. m.		The	letter	provided	no	justification	for	Walker	going to	Portland	rather	than	Lewiston,	as	the	notice	had	specifically	directed	him	to do,	nor	did	t he	letter	provide	any	justification	for	the	apparent	late	arrival	at Portland. [¶17]	 	 By	 letter	 to	 the	 District	 Court	 dated	 July	 15,	 2016,	 the	 Taylors opposed	 reopening	 the	 hearing. The	 District	 C ourt	 treated Walker’s	 July	 5 letter	as	a	motion	to	set	asid e	the	default	judgment. 3 In	an	order	dated	July	26, the	court	( Oram, J .)	denied the	motion. The	court’s	order	states , in	pertinent part,	 “After considering	 the	 filings,	 [Walker’s]	 motion	 to	 set	 aside	 default	 is denied.”		In	evaluating	the	motion,	the	cou rt	could	have	reasonably	concluded, based	on	its	 review	of	 the	letter	and	 the	court	 file,	 that	even	if	 the	claims	in Walker’s	letter	were	true,	he	was	not	entitled	to	relief.

3 M.R.S.C.P.	9 ,	the	rule	governing	motions	to	set	aside	small	claims	judgme nts,	incorporates	the provisions	of M.R.	Civ.	P.	60

.11 [¶18]		There	are	many	defaults	and	failures	to	appear	in	properly	noticed small	c laims	proceedings	and	other	minor	civil	actions.		Acting	without	hearing on	post
- judgment	letters	or	motions	seeking	to	excuse	defaults	in	such	minor civil	matters	is	frequent	practice. 4 Were	the	practice	otherwise,	final	resolution of	 such	 matters	 could be	 unduly	 delayed,	 and	 parties	 who	 did	 appear	 to prosecute	 or	 defend	 such	 matters	 could	 be	 unduly	 burdened	 because	 of	 a nonappearing	party’s	dilatory	behavior	or	carelessness. [¶19]	 	 As	 the	 Court’s	 opinion	 correctly	 notes:	 “ The District	 Court	 was authorized	to deny the	motion	without	a	hearing	upon	concluding	that	the	facts alleged	in	Walker’s	motion,	even	if	proved,	did	not	constitute	excusable	neglect for	the	purposes	of	M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(b).”		Court’s	Opinion	¶	10. [¶20]		In	his July	5	letter	to	the	District	Court,	Walker	did	not	explain	why he	went	to	Portland	when	the	notice	he	received,	in	explicit	terms,	directed	him to	 the	 Lewiston	District	Court;	and	he	did	not	explain	why	he	arrived	at	 the Portland	District	Court	clerk’s	o ffice	after	9:00	a

. m . ,	when	the	noticed	hearing
time	 was	 8:30	 a

. m. The District	 Court	 was	 authorized	 to deny the	 motion

4 See M.R.	Civ.	P.	7(b)(7)	(“Except	as	otherwise	provided	by	law	or	these	rules,	after	the	opposition is	filed	the	court	may	in	its	discretion	rule	on	the	motion	without	hearing.”);	M.R.	Civ.	P.	7(b)(5)	(“The court	may	in	its	discretion	deny	a	motion	for	recons ideration	without	hearing	and	before	opposition is	filed.”).12 without	a	 hearing	 upon	 concluding	 that	 the	limited	 facts	alleged	in	Walker’s July 5	letter,	even	if	they	could	have	been	proved	at	a	he aring,	did	not	constitute excusable	 neglect	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 60(b).	 	 Too	much	was	left unexplained	in	Walker’s	letter. See Laurel	Bank	&	Tr.	Co.	v.	Burns ,	398 A.2d	41, 45	 (Me.	 1979) (stating	 that	 a	 party	 seeking	 relief	 from	 judgment	 bears the burden	 of	 presenting	 competent	 evidence	 demonstrating	 his	 entitlement	 to relief	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	60(b)). [¶21]		The	trial	court’s	action,	whether	taken	with	or	without	a	hearing, is	reviewed	for	an	abuse	of	discretion. On	appeal from	the	Distr ict	Court	to	the Superior	Court , Walker, the	party	seeking	to change	the	decision	on	appeal,	had the burden	 of	 persuasion	 to	 demonstrate	 error or,	 in	 this	 case,	 abuse	 of discretion

. See Beal	v.	Town	of	Stockton	Springs ,	2017	ME	6,	¶	13,	153 A.3d 768;
Ross ignol	 v.	 Me.	 Pub.	 Employees	 Ret.	 Sys. ,	 2016	 ME	 115,	 ¶	 6,	 144 A.3d	 1175

. Walker	 had	 the	 burden	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 District	 Court	 abused	 its discretion	 in	 (i)	 not	 holding	 a	 hearing	 and	 (ii)	 denying	 Walker’s	 request	 to reconsider	and	reopen	the	hearing. [¶22 ] An	 abuse	 of	 discretion	 may	 be	 demonstrated	 when	 the	 record indicates	that a	court,	in	discretionary	decision

- making :	“(1)	considers	a	factor prohibited	 by	 law;	 (2)	 declines	 to	 consider	 a	 legally	 proper	 factor	 under	 a13 mistaken	belief	that	the	factor	cannot	be	considered;	(3)	acts	or	declines	to	act based	on	a	mistaken	view	of	the	law;	or	(4)	expressly	or	implicitly	finds	facts not	supported	by	the	record	according	to	the	clear	error	standard	of	review.” Smith	v.	Rideou t ,	2010	ME	69,	¶	13,	1 A.3d	441; Pettinelli	v.	Yost, 2007 ME	121, ¶	11,	930	A.2d	1074

. [¶23]	 	 The	 limited	 record that Walker	 presented	 to	 the	 District	 Court lacked	explanation	of	critical	facts	relating	to	his	disregard	of	the	explicit	notice Walker	receiv ed	directing him when	and	where	to	appear.		That	record	does not	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 District	 Court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in	 denying, without	hearing,	Walker’s	motion	to	strike	the	default	conveyed	by	his	letter	of July 5, 2016.	 	 Because	 no	 abuse	 of	 discr etion	 has	 been	 demonstrated,	 the District	Court’s	decision	must	be	affirmed.

Adam	 R.	 Lee,	 Esq.,	 Trafton,	 Matzen,	 Belleau	 &	 Frenette,	 LLP,	 Auburn,	 for appe llants	Fred	and	Eleanor	Taylor Mark	W.	Walker,	appellee	pro	se

Androscoggin	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP

- 2016

- 11 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY