PREPOSITIONED 

STOCKS

Inconsistencies in 

DOD’s Annual Report 

Underscore the Need 

for Overarching 

Strategic Guidance 

and Joint Oversight

Report to Congressional Committees

September 2013

GAO-13-790

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-790, a report to 

congressional committees

September 2013

PREPOSITIONED STOCKS

Inconsistencies in DOD’s Annual Report Underscore 

the Need for Overarching Strategic Guidance and 

Joint Oversight

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD prepositions stocks such as 

combat vehicles and repair parts worth 

billions of dollars at strategic locations 

around the world. These assets are 

used to prepare forces quickly for

conflicts when needed. Over the years, 

GAO has made recommendations for 

DOD to develop overarching strategic 

guidance and improve joint oversight of 

the military services’ prepositioning 

programs. Section 2229a of Title10 

requires DOD to report annually on the 

status of its prepositioned stocks and 

for DOD’s report to include 12 specific 

elements—for example, the material 

condition of the equipment. The law 

also mandates that GAO review DOD’s 

report and provide any additional 

information to Congress that would be 

informative on issues relating to the 

status of prepositioned stocks. This is

GAO’s sixth report, and it assessed the 

extent to which (1) DOD’s fiscal year 

2012 prepositioning report addressed 

the 12 statutory reporting elements and 

(2) DOD has made progress in 

addressing GAO’s prior 

recommendations on department-wide 

strategic guidance and a coordinated 

joint-military service approach for 

managing prepositioning. To conduct 

this work, GAO analyzed DOD’s 

prepositioning report, reviewed DOD’s 

guidance, and interviewed officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop 

guidance to ensure that it reports 

consistent information across the 

services and strengthens quality 

assurance procedures for its report.

GAO also suggests that Congress 

require DOD to develop strategic 

guidance, including joint oversight, for 

its prepositioning programs. DOD 

concurred with the recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) provided information on all 12 required 

reporting elements in its fiscal year 2012 prepositioning report; however, 3 of 

these elements were only partially addressed. For example, DOD provided a list 

of non-standard items slated for inclusion in its prepositioned stocks but did not 

include a specific plan for funding those items as required by the law. Federal 

internal control standards state that decision makers need complete and relevant 

information to manage risks and achieve efficiency and effectiveness goals.

However, GAO found that DOD’s report contained some inconsistencies in 

information across the services as well as several inaccuracies and omissions. 

For example, DOD’s report included funding information for 6 or 7 fiscal years for 

most of the services but only 2 fiscal years for the Navy’s stocks. Service 

information was also presented in different formats in the report, which makes it 

difficult to compare data. Because the Joint Staff did not provide specific 

guidance to the services to ensure consistency when requesting data, the 

services adopted separate approaches to reporting information to the Joint Staff 

for compilation in the report. In addition, although an agency should monitor the 

quality of information provided to Congress, GAO found several inaccuracies in 

the report, such as incorrect calculations and information that had been 

inadvertently omitted. While officials from the Joint Staff and each of the services 

stated that they have their own review processes, the errors found in the report 

indicate weaknesses in DOD’s quality assurance procedures. Until DOD 

addresses these issues and provides complete, consistent, and accurate 

information on its prepositioned stocks, its report will be of limited use to 

Congress in making informed decisions about DOD’s prepositioning programs.

DOD has not made progress in addressing GAO’s prior recommendations to 

develop department-wide strategic guidance and implement a coordinated jointservice approach for managing its prepositioning programs, nor has it set a 

timeline for doing so. As far back as 2005, GAO has reported that each of the 

military services was planning the future of its prepositioning programs without 

the benefit of an overall plan or joint doctrine to coordinate their efforts, which 

made it difficult to determine how the services’ different programs would fit 

together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Recently, DOD issued a strategy 

for materiel response to support the full range of military activities and an 

implementation plan for directing, coordinating, and prioritizing DOD-wide 

development plans, initiatives, and activities for the period 2013-2020 to achieve 

the strategy. However, neither provides guidance for DOD’s prepositioning 

programs, and the plan specifically excludes prepositioning. Hence, the services’ 

individual prepositioning programs are still not linked to overarching strategic 

guidance. DOD has also not improved joint oversight of its prepositioning 

programs because a working group that was expected to provide such oversight 

has not been functioning as intended, and other joint activities do not specifically 

address prepositioned stocks. An increased emphasis on joint oversight would 

help unify DOD’s prepositioning efforts in support of defense priorities, reduce 

potential unnecessary duplication, and achieve cost savings and efficiencies. 

Congress is currently considering legislation that would direct DOD to develop an 

overarching strategy for its prepositioning programs and establish joint oversight.

View GAO-13-790. For more information, 

contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or 

russellc@gao.gov .
Page i GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

Letter 1

Background 5

DOD Provided Information on All 12 Required Elements, but Some 

Shortcomings Limit the Report’s Usefulness 7

DOD Has Not Developed Strategic Guidance or a Coordinated 

Joint-Service Approach for Managing Prepositioning Programs 17

Conclusions 23

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Matter for Congressional Consideration 24

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 32

Related GAO Products 33

Tables

Table 1: Summary of GAO’s Assessment of the DOD Fiscal Year 

2012 Report’s Responses to the 12 Reporting Elements 

Required by 10 U.S.C. § 2229a 8

Table 2: Comparison of the Military Services’ Funding 

Requirements Information Presented in DOD’s Fiscal Year 

2012 Prepositioning Report 12

Table 3: Examples of Inaccuracies and Omissions in Information 

Reported by the Military Services in DOD’s Fiscal Year 

2012 Prepositioning Report 16

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

Figure

Figure 1: Examples of the Different Formats Used in Reporting 

Military Services’ Funding Requirements in DOD’s Fiscal 

Year 2012 Prepositioning Report 13

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

IMRL Individual Material Readiness List

MRAP Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (Vehicle)

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Page 1 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 26, 2013

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions stocks worth billions of 

dollars—including items such as combat vehicles, rations, medical 

supplies, and repair parts—at strategic locations around the world. Both 

afloat and ashore, prepositioning enables DOD to field combat-ready 

forces in days, rather than the weeks it would take if stocks had to be 

moved from the United States to the locations of conflicts. Prepositioned 

stocks have played an important role in supporting operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and can also be used to support military activities related to 

security cooperation, deterrence, multilateral training exercises, 

humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Sustained operations have 

taken a toll on the condition and readiness of military equipment, and 

fiscal challenges require DOD to carefully balance its investment in 

prepositioned stocks to achieve military objectives and other DOD 

priorities. Moreover, DOD’s new defense strategy issued in January 2012 

discusses the drawdown in Afghanistan and a future emphasis on the 

Asia Pacific region, which are likely to have implications for 

prepositioning.1

Section 2229a of Title10 of the United States Code requires the Secretary 

of Defense to report annually to the congressional defense committees on 

the status of prepositioned stocks and requires DOD’s report to include 

the following 12 elements:2

1. The level of fill for major end items of equipment and spare parts in 

each prepositioned set as of the end of the fiscal year covered by the 

report.3

 1

Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 

Defense (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2012).

2

10 U.S.C. § 2229a, as established by Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 352 (2008) and amended 

by Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 341 (2011).

3

While the statute does not define “major end items,” DOD defines a major end item as a 

final combination of end products that is ready for its intended use. Department of 

Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness), DOD 

Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, DOD 4140.1-R, AP1.1.11.7 (May 23, 

2003).
Page 2 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

2. The material condition of equipment in the prepositioned stocks as of 

the end of such fiscal year, grouped by category or major end item.

3. A list of major end items of equipment drawn from the prepositioned 

stocks during such fiscal year and a description of how that equipment 

was used and whether it was returned to the stocks after being used.

4. A timeline for completely reconstituting any shortfall in the 

prepositioned stocks.

5. An estimate of the amount of funds required to completely reconstitute 

any shortfall in the prepositioned stocks and a description of the 

Secretary’s plan for carrying out such complete reconstitution.

6. A list of any operations plan affected by any shortfall in the 

prepositioned stocks and a description of any action taken to mitigate 

any risk that such a shortfall may create.

7. A list of any non-standard items slated for inclusion in the 

prepositioned stocks and a plan for funding the inclusion and 

sustainment of such items.

8. A list of any equipment used in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

Operation New Dawn, or Operation Enduring Freedom slated for 

retrograde and subsequent inclusion in the prepositioned stocks.4

9. An efficiency strategy for limited shelf-life medical stock replacement.

10. The status of efforts to develop a joint strategy, integrate service 

requirements, and eliminate redundancies.

11. The operational planning assumptions used in the formulation of 

prepositioned stock levels and composition.

12. A list of any strategic plans affected by changes to the levels, 

composition, or locations of the prepositioned stocks and a description 

of any action taken to mitigate any risk that such changes may create.

On March 7, 2013, DOD submitted its fiscal year 2012 report on the 

status of its prepositioned stocks from October 2011 through September 

 4

While the statute does not define “retrograde,” DOD defines retrograde as the process for 

the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset 

(replenishment, repair, or recapitalization) program or to another directed area of

operations to replenish unit stocks, or to satisfy stock requirements.
Page 3 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

2012.5 DOD’s report includes an unclassified section that addresses 

reporting elements one through five, as well as seven through ten, and a 

classified annex to address reporting elements six, eleven, and twelve. 

Section 2229a of Title 10 of the United States Code requires us to review 

DOD’s report and, as appropriate, to submit to the congressional defense 

committees any additional information that will further inform the 

committees on issues relating to the status of the materiel in the 

prepositioned stocks. We have issued several reports since 2005 

addressing DOD’s reporting and management of prepositioning, and this 

report is GAO’s sixth report in response to our annual reporting 

requirement. In our prior reports, we have identified a number of ongoing 

and long-term challenges to DOD’s prepositioned stocks related to 

strategic planning, joint service coordination, requirements determination, 

inventory management, and other issues. In particular, we have 

recommended that DOD develop a department-wide strategy on 

prepositioned materiel and equipment and strengthen joint oversight of its 

prepositioning programs to integrate and synchronize at a DOD-wide 

level the services’ prepositioning programs to maximize efficiency in 

managing prepositioning across the department and reduce potential 

unnecessary duplication.6 DOD has generally agreed with these past 

recommendations. The objectives of this report are to assess: (1) the 

extent to which DOD has addressed the 12 statutory elements and (2) the 

progress DOD has made in addressing our prior recommendations to 

develop department-wide strategic guidance and a coordinated jointmilitary service approach for managing its prepositioning programs.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD’s annual report addressed the 12 

reporting elements set out in 10 U.S.C. § 2229a, regarding prepositioned 

 5

Department of Defense, Report on Status of Department of Defense Programs for 

Prepositioning of Materiel and Equipment: A Report to Congress as required by Section 

352 of Public Law 110-181 (Mar. 1, 2013).

6

GAO, Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment: DOD Would Benefit from Developing 

Strategic Guidance and Improving Joint Oversight, GAO-12-916R (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 20, 2012); Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce 

Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-12-453SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Warfighter Support: Improved Joint 

Oversight and Reporting on DOD’s Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies, 

GAO-11-647 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2011); Opportunities to Reduce Potential 

Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011); and Defense Logistics: Better 

Management and Oversight of Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and 

Improve Future Programs, GAO-05-427 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
Page 4 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

stocks, we analyzed DOD’s report on the status of prepositioned materiel 

and equipment for fiscal year 2012. We performed a detailed content 

analysis in which we compared the prepositioned stocks information in 

DOD’s fiscal year 2012 report with the 12 reporting requirements and 

assessed the extent to which DOD had addressed each required 

element. We assessed an element as addressed if DOD’s report explicitly 

addressed all parts of the element. We assessed an element as partially 

addressed if at least one or more—but not all—parts of the required 

element were explicitly addressed. Finally, we assessed an element as 

not addressed if it did not explicitly address any part of the required 

element. We also included in our review analyses of DOD policies, 

prepositioning guidance from the services, and the prior year’s (fiscal year 

2011) annual report to Congress on prepositioned materiel and 

equipment to understand the variations of information reported by the 

services on the status of prepositioned stocks and the quality assurance 

processes used during the development of the fiscal year 2012 report. To 

obtain additional information for our review, we met with officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military 

service headquarters, and U.S. Pacific Command.7

To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in addressing 

our prior recommendations to develop department-wide strategic 

guidance and a coordinated joint-service approach for managing its 

prepositioned stocks, we reviewed prior GAO reports, DOD and service 

guidance, and DOD’s Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy and 

associated plan.8 This strategy and plan focus on integrating and 

synchronizing DOD’s global materiel response to support the full range of 

military activities. We discussed the extent to which department-wide 

guidance specific to prepositioned stocks and joint oversight have been 

developed with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, and all four of the military 

services. We also examined DOD guidance and actions on the Global 

Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group to review DOD’s 

 7

We visited U.S. Pacific Command because of the new national defense strategy’s 

emphasis on the Asia Pacific region and to determine how prepositioning requirements 

and options for addressing the strategy are determined.

8

Department of Defense, Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

May 10, 2012) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Comprehensive Materiel 

Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2013).
Page 5 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

progress in developing a coordinated approach for prepositioning.9 We 

did not independently assess the data DOD provided to Congress, but we 

assessed the reliability of the systems used to develop the data and 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to meet the objectives 

of this engagement. A more detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology is included in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 through 

September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The military services preposition stocks ashore and afloat to provide DOD 

the ability to respond to multiple scenarios by providing assets to support 

U.S. forces during the initial phases of an operation until follow-on 

capabilities are available through strategic lift and the supply chain has 

been established. Each military service maintains different configurations 

and types of equipment and materiel to support its own prepositioning 

program. The Army stores equipment sets in its Army Prepositioned 

Stocks, which consist of sets of combat brigade equipment, supporting 

supplies, and other stocks located both ashore and afloat. The Marine 

Corps forward deploys and prepositions sets of materiel and equipment to 

support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. These capability sets are stored 

aboard ships in two Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons and ashore in 

Norway. The Navy maintains materiel in the Maritime Prepositioning 

Squadrons in support of the Marine Corps. Its prepositioning program 

provides construction support, equipment for off-loading and transferring 

cargo from ships to shore, and expeditionary medical facilities. 

Prepositioned assets in the Air Force’s war reserve materiel program are 

located at 43 sites worldwide as well as in munitions storage afloat. The 

war reserve materiel includes assets such as direct mission support 

 9

DOD’s Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group comprises officials from 

the services, the Defense Logistics Agency, joint organizations, and entities within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. The working group is responsible for, among other 

things, providing oversight and addressing joint-service issues concerning prepositioned 

stocks.

Background
Page 6 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

equipment for fighter and strategic aircraft as well as base operating 

support equipment to provide force, infrastructure, and flight line support 

during wartime and contingency operations.

DOD’s prepositioned stocks are intended to support national military 

objectives, which are described in strategic and operational documents. 

High-level military strategic guidance includes the National Defense 

Strategy and the National Military Strategy,10 which the Office of the

Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff use to develop guidance that 

instructs the geographic combatant commanders11 on what operation 

plans they must develop to meet operational objectives that address 

certain scenarios.12 Joint operation planning is a coordinated process 

used by commanders, including the geographic combatant commanders, 

to determine the best method of accomplishing a mission. Combatant 

commands develop plans with varying levels of detail, and the most 

detailed plans contain, among other things, time-phased force and 

deployment data, which include the specific units to be deployed in 

support of the plan and the timeline for when those forces are needed.13

The services then determine how best to meet the needs of the 

combatant commanders, which may include the use of prepositioned 

stocks or other types of equipment to support the commanders’ goals and 

ensure timely support of deployed forces during the initial phases of an 

operation until follow-on capabilities have been established. Combatant

commanders periodically review their plans, assess the risk to those 

plans, and report the results to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

 10The National Defense Strategy, signed by the Secretary of Defense, is strategic 

guidance to DOD that articulates the department’s priorities and reflects the President’s 

strategic direction for DOD. The National Military Strategy, signed by the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides strategic direction for the armed forces.

11A geographic combatant commander is a commander of one of the unified or specified 

combatant commands established by the President under 10 U.S.C. § 161. The six 

geographic combatant commands are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, 

U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. 

Southern Command.

12The Office of the Secretary of Defense planning guidance to the combatant commands 

is provided in the form of the Guidance for Employment of the Force, and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning guidance is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

13DOD plans with the highest level of detail are called operation plans, or OPLANs, which 

are defined as complete and detailed joint plans that contain a full description of the

concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and time-phased force and 

deployment data.
Page 7 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

By providing needed prepositioned materiel and equipment, the military 

services can reduce the risks associated with a plan.

Prepositioned stocks are employed by the geographic combatant 

commanders, who have the authority to, among other things, organize 

commands and forces and employ forces as they consider necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions.14 DOD apportions the services’

prepositioned materiel among the geographic combatant commands 

according to the joint guidance, and the afloat prepositioned stocks may 

be apportioned to more than one geographic combatant command.15

Requirements for prepositioning are developed based on an approved 

operation plan. The approval of the Secretary of Defense is generally 

required to use the prepositioned capabilities.

The Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, including 

representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff, has 

responsibility for, among other things, addressing joint issues concerning 

prepositioned stocks. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 

provided the annual report on prepositioned stocks on behalf of the 

Secretary of Defense since the report’s inception.

DOD’s fiscal year 2012 report on prepositioned stocks provided 

information on all 12 statutorily required elements; however, it only 

partially addressed three of those elements. Also, the report contains 

some inconsistencies among the services’ prepositioning data as well as 

some inaccuracies and omissions, which limit its usefulness to 

congressional decision makers.

 1410 U.S.C. § 164.

15DOD defines apportionment to be the distribution of forces and capabilities as the 

starting point for planning.

DOD Provided 

Information on All 12 

Required Elements, 

but Some 

Shortcomings Limit 

the Report’s 

Usefulness
Page 8 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

DOD provided some information on the each of the 12 reporting elements 

enumerated in section 2229a in its fiscal year 2012 annual report on 

prepositioned stocks. Specifically, we assessed that DOD addressed nine 

of the elements because the information provided in the report was 

responsive to the reporting requirements. However, we assessed that 

DOD partially addressed three of the elements—elements seven, ten, 

and twelve— because it did not provide all of the required information. 

Table 1 summarizes our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s report 

included the required elements.

Table 1: Summary of GAO’s Assessment of the DOD Fiscal Year 2012 Report’s Responses to the 12 Reporting Elements 

Required by 10 U.S.C. § 2229a

Reporting elements

Our assessment of DOD’s 

report Comments a

(1) The level of fill for major end items of 

equipment and spare parts in each prepositioned 

set as of the end of the fiscal year covered by the 

report.

Addressed DOD’s report contains information on each service 

pertaining to the amount of assets on hand in 

relationship to its requirements.

(2) The material condition of equipment in the 

prepositioned stocks as of the end of such fiscal 

year, grouped by category or major end item.

Addressed DOD’s report contains information on each service 

pertaining to the serviceability of those assets 

identified for element one.

(3) A list of major end items of equipment drawn 

from the prepositioned stocks during such fiscal 

year and a description of how that equipment was 

used and whether it was returned to the stocks 

after being used.

Addressed DOD’s report contains information from each 

service pertaining to its prepositioned equipment, 

including the reason for its use and whether it was 

returned to the stocks after use.

(4) A timeline for completely reconstituting any 

shortfall in the prepositioned stocks.

b

Addressed DOD’s report contains information on each service’s 

anticipated timelines for reconstituting its 

prepositioned stocks.

(5) An estimate of the amount of funds required to 

completely reconstitute any shortfall in the 

prepositioned stocks and a description of the 

Secretary’s plan for carrying out such complete 

reconstitution.

Addressed DOD’s report provides an estimate of each service’s 

funding requirements in various funding information 

categories.

(6) A list of any operations plan affected by any 

shortfall in the prepositioned stocks and a 

description of any action taken to mitigate any risk 

that such a shortfall may create.

Addressed In the classified annex, DOD’s report contains 

information on whether shortfalls have affected 

combatant command plans and the status of 

mitigation efforts.

(7) A list of any non-standard items slated for 

inclusion in the prepositioned stocks and a plan 

for funding the inclusion and sustainment of such 

items.

Partially addressed DOD’s report provides a list of non-standard items 

for the Marine Corps but not a corresponding 

funding plan. Moreover, the report states that the 

Army, Air Force, and Navy have not identified nonstandard equipment for inclusion in their 

prepositioned stocks. However, elsewhere in the 

DOD report, the Army provided information on nonstandard equipment that will be included in its 

prepositioned stocks.

DOD’s Report Included 

Information on Each 

Required Element but Only 

Partially Addressed Some 

Elements
Page 9 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

Reporting elements

Our assessment of DOD’s 

report Comments a

(8) A list of any equipment used in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn, 

or Operation Enduring Freedom slated for 

retrograde and subsequent inclusion in the 

prepositioned stocks.

Addressed DOD’s report describes retrograde plans for the 

Army and Air Force. The report also lists Marine 

Corps equipment that the service plans to include in 

its prepositioned stocks. The report noted that the 

Navy has no retrograde plans.

(9) An efficiency strategy for limited shelf-life 

medical stock replacement.

Addressed DOD’s report identifies its prepositioning strategy for 

limited shelf-life medical stocks, including initiatives 

to minimize costs that involve the services and the 

Defense Logistics Agency.

(10) The status of efforts to develop a joint 

strategy, integrate service requirements, and 

eliminate redundancies.

Partially addressed DOD’s report provides information on DOD’s 

strategic guidance process and broad logistics 

governance, but it does not identify specific efforts 

that are under way to develop a joint prepositioning 

strategy that would integrate service requirements 

and eliminate redundancies.

(11) The operational planning assumptions used 

in the formulation of prepositioned stock levels 

and composition.

Addressed DOD’s report lists combatant command 

prepositioning assumptions used when developing 

plans. The report also contains information from the 

Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force that identifies a 

mix of operation plans, contingency plans, and 

other priority plans, and describes for each service 

how the service’s supporting prepositioned stocks 

are aligned with those plans.

(12) A list of any strategic plans affected by 

changes to the levels, composition, or locations of 

the prepositioned stocks and a description of any 

action taken to mitigate any risk that such 

changes may create.

Partially addressed DOD’s report contains a list of plans that DOD 

identifies as being affected by changes to the 

levels, composition, or locations of the 

prepositioned stocks. However, the report does not 

provide, along with the list of plans, a description of 

any action taken to mitigate risks resulting from any

changes to the prepositioned stocks.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

We assessed an element as addressed if DOD’s report explicitly addressed all parts of the element. 

We assessed an element as partially addressed if at least one—but not all—parts of the required 

element were explicitly addressed.

b

We assessed three of the elements as being partially addressed because 

DOD’s report did not provide all of the required information:

As discussed in the section that follows, the Navy’s table did not originally include a column 

identifying the date the equipment was returned to the prepositioned stocks; however, Navy officials 

later provided a revised table with this information.

• Element seven requires DOD to provide a list of non-standard items 

slated for inclusion in the prepositioned stocks as well as a plan for 

funding the inclusion and sustainment of those items. DOD’s report 

contained a table with Marine Corps non-standard equipment slated 

for inclusion in that service’s prepositioned stocks that included the 

quantities and purpose of each item, but it did not identify a specific 

plan for funding the inclusion and sustainment of those items as 
Page 10 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

required. Further, in this section of the report, the Army, Air Force, 

and Navy stated that they had not identified any non-standard 

equipment for inclusion in prepositioned stocks as of the time of the 

report. However, in responding to element one of DOD’s report, the 

Army had provided a table with the level of fill of non-standard items, 

in which it provided data on some non-standard equipment that it 

would be placing in its Army Prepositioned Stocks operational 

projects. DOD’s report also did not fully describe how those additional 

Army assets would be funded and sustained, instead indicating that 

the Army will assess enduring requirements for non-standard items 

being retrograded from Southwest Asia and program required funding 

for storage and maintenance in future budget submissions. Because 

the information provided did not address both required parts of 

element seven, we assessed that DOD’s report only partially 

addressed the element.

• Element ten requires DOD to report on the status of efforts to develop 

a joint strategy, integrate service requirements, and eliminate 

redundancies. While the report contains a paragraph describing 

DOD’s strategic guidance process and framework in response to this 

element, it does not identify specific efforts that are under way to 

develop a joint strategy for its prepositioning programs and to 

integrate service requirements and eliminate redundancies to produce 

greater efficiency and effectiveness in those programs. Because the 

information provided did not address all of the required parts of 

element ten, we assessed that DOD’s report only partially addressed 

the element.

• Element twelve requires DOD to list any strategic plans affected by 

changes to the levels, composition, or locations of the prepositioned 

stocks and to describe any action taken to mitigate any risks resulting 

from those changes. In addressing this element, DOD’s report 

provided a list of strategic plans from the combatant commands that 

have prepositioning requirements. However, the report did not 

provide, along with the list of plans, a description of any action taken 

to mitigate risks resulting from any changes to the prepositioned 

stocks. The Joint Staff official overseeing the development and 

submission of DOD’s prepositioning report said that the information 

describing actions to mitigate risks could be found elsewhere in other 

sections of the report. However, that information pertained to 

mitigating shortfalls affecting operation plans, as required by element 

six, and did not fully address actions taken to mitigate changes to the 

levels, composition, or locations of prepositioned stocks affecting 

strategic plans, as required by element twelve. While some of those 
Page 11 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

mitigation actions relate to the operation plans identified as part of 

DOD’s response to element twelve, it is unclear the extent to which 

those actions will mitigate the risks to some of the other strategic 

plans identified in the list provided as part of element twelve. Because 

DOD’s report did not fully address the second part of the required 

element regarding changes to prepositioned stocks and actions taken 

to mitigate any resulting risks, we assessed this element as being only 

partially addressed.

Inconsistencies in some of the information provided by the military 

services limit the usefulness of the data presented in DOD’s report. 

Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need 

complete and relevant information to manage risks and achieve efficiency 

and effectiveness goals.16 Such information can be used to compare and 

assess different sets of data so that agencies can analyze relationships 

and take appropriate actions. However, we found inconsistencies in the 

amount and types of data presented on each of the services in DOD’s 

report.

In particular, DOD’s report inconsistently reported information on the 

services’ future funding requirements, providing decision makers with an 

incomplete picture of DOD’s future funding needs for prepositioning (see 

table 2). First, the Marine Corps reported its procurement requirements as 

“to be determined” rather than giving projected funding amounts, whereas 

that information was provided for the other services in DOD’s report.17

Second, the Marine Corps and the Air Force provided information that 

could be used to identify funding shortfalls in their prepositioning 

programs for each fiscal year across the five year defense plan whereas 

the Army and Navy did not provide this information. Third, three of the 

 16GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

17DOD’s fiscal year 2012 report stated that the Marine Corps procurement requirements 

had not been included because those requirements are tracked at the enterprise level and 

not at the program level. Marine Corps officials also said that they did not report 

procurement requirements for fiscal years 2011 and 2012 because those requirements 

had not been finalized given the ongoing decommissioning process of a maritime 

prepositioning ship squadron. They expect to provide data in the fiscal year 2013 report as 

they had done for DOD’s fiscal year 2010 prepositioning report. However, Marine Corps 

officials said that they could provide an estimate on the cost of covering the gap between 

equipment on-hand and the desired quantity of equipment for its prepositioning program, 

but had not done so for the fiscal year 2012 report.

Inconsistent Information 

Among the Military 

Services Limits Usefulness 

of DOD’s Report
Page 12 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

services reported working capital funds requirements or indicated that 

they had no working capital funds requirements.18 The Navy, however, did 

not report whether or not it had working capital funding requirements. 

Lastly, each of the services reported its current funding requirements, as 

of fiscal year 2012, and its projected funding requirements, but they did 

not all use the same time frame for these estimates. The Navy, as shown 

in table 2, reported its actual operation and maintenance and 

procurement funding for fiscal year 2012 and its estimated funding 

requirements for fiscal year 2013. In contrast, the other services provided 

funding requirements information for fiscal years 2012 to 2018: a 

difference of five fiscal years. As a result, it is not possible for users of 

DOD’s report to compare procurement requirements, funding 

requirements, actual funding, or anticipated shortfalls across the services 

and assess trends over time.

Table 2: Comparison of the Military Services’ Funding Requirements Information 

Presented in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2012 Prepositioning Report

Funding information 

categories Army Marine Corps Air Force Navy a

Operation and 

maintenance

Procurement

Funding shortfalls

Working capital fund

Reporting time frame in 

fiscal years

2012 – 2018 2012 – 2018 2012 – 2018 2012 – 2013

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

The Air Force provided two separate funding tables that describe various funding information under 

different time frames ranging from fiscal years 2012 to 2018.

Furthermore, DOD’s report presented the services’ funding requirements 

in different formats (see figure 1). Three of the services provided 

numerical tables to display their funding information, but the Navy used 

text to report its funding requirements. The lack of a standard reporting 

format makes it difficult for users of DOD’s report to accurately combine 

 18DOD defines a working capital fund as a revolving fund established to finance 

inventories of supplies and other stores. A service uses its working capital fund to provide 

goods and services, on a reimbursable basis, to other activities within DOD and to nonDOD activities when authorized.
Page 13 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

and assess the data from the services to identify funding trends across 

DOD’s prepositioning programs and perform other analyses.

Figure 1: Examples of the Different Formats Used in Reporting Military Services’ Funding Requirements in DOD’s Fiscal Year 

2012 Prepositioning Report

Moreover, we found inconsistent reporting among the services 

concerning the levels of fill and material condition of their prepositioned 

stocks. DOD’s report included information on the overall status of each 

service’s prepositioned stocks, but the amount of detail for specific items 

or categories of items within the prepositioned stocks varied among the 

services. For example, the Army reported the levels of fill and material 

condition of individual major end items and categories of prepositioned 

stocks, but it also provided information on the levels of fill for its 

prepositioned equipment sets, which are located in selected sites across 
Page 14 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

the world.19 However, the Marine Corps and Navy did not provide similar 

information on the levels of fill for on-hand prepositioned equipment sets 

for their respective locations in the fiscal year 2012 report.20 Decision 

makers could find this information useful in monitoring the fill levels of 

prepositioned stocks in various parts of the world for oversight and 

funding purposes, such as assessing the prepositioning needs in a given 

combatant commander’s area of responsibility and having greater 

assurance that required assets would be available when and where they 

are needed to meet combatant command requirements.

According to service officials, the reason for the inconsistent reporting in 

funding requirements and major end items was that without specific 

guidance from the Joint Staff, each of the services had adopted its own 

reporting approach, independent of each other. The Joint Staff did 

provide the services with a tasking document instructing them to update 

their fiscal year 2011 prepositioning data and take into account 

recommendations from our prior report when submitting their data.21 This 

tasking document to the services also included a copy of the 12 reporting 

elements. However, the Joint Staff did not direct the services to 

coordinate their information with each other or provide more consistent 

reporting instructions. In the absence of detailed guidance to provide data 

in specific formats, the services reported their funding requirements and 

major end item information for the fiscal year 2012 report based on the 

previous year’s submission and their own reporting preferences. Each of 

the services did make some changes in its reporting based on changes 

within its respective programs and added new information per GAO’s 

prior recommendations, but the type of information and formatting were 

consistent with how the services had provided the information in the 

previous fiscal year, thus yielding inconsistencies in DOD’s final report.

 19These equipment sets refer to groups of equipment that have been configured to meet 

the operational needs of specific Army units, such as an infantry brigade combat team or 

sustainment brigade, and prepositioned in select forward locations throughout the world. 

Similarly, the Marine Corps prepositions equipment sets configured to provide capabilities 

for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade onboard maritime prepositioning ships and other 

locations. The Navy supports the Marine Corps’ prepositioning program, so it has its 

prepositioned stocks collocated onboard the maritime prepositioning ships.

20In the fiscal year 2012 report, the Air Force reported detailed information on the types of 

equipment in its War Reserve Materiel program, which are prepositioned throughout the 

world at 43 locations and onboard several ships.

21GAO-12-916R.
Page 15 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

According to GAO’s internal control management and evaluation tool, 

which is based on federal internal control standards,22 to effectively 

communicate information to the Congress, an agency should monitor the 

quality of the information being captured, maintained, and communicated 

as measured by accuracy, among other things.23 However, we found 

some inaccuracies and omissions in DOD’s prepositioning report, which 

affect the quality of the information provided to Congress by DOD. We 

reviewed the information in DOD’s report on each service and found 

examples of inaccurate information, such as incorrect calculations within 

data tables and reporting that seemed to conflict with data presented 

elsewhere in the report. For instance, the Air Force, in one table, reported 

the level of fill of equipment, such as fuel pumps and storage bladders, 

that it uses for fuel operations at austere forward locations; however, the 

Air Force had incorrectly calculated the change in operationally available 

levels of equipment from fiscal years 2011 to 2012 for many of the items 

in the table. Furthermore, we found some discrepancies between fiscal 

year 2011 data that were reported in both the fiscal year 2011 and the 

2012 reports and instances where information provided in the tables did 

not match the report’s text. Air Force officials provided us updated tables 

addressing these inaccuracies as well as explanations for the 

discrepancies we found, but this information was not available in DOD’s 

report itself.

In addition, we found examples of information that had been inadvertently 

omitted from DOD’s report; in some cases, this information could have 

shed light on reporting that appeared to be inaccurate. For example, in 

the Marine Corps’ table on the level of fill and material condition of its 

major end items and repair parts, we found that the change in on-hand 

totals from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012 seemed to be inaccurate 

for nearly two-thirds of the listed items. For those items, the Marine Corps 

provided on-hand totals for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, but reported no 

change between the two fiscal years even though the data seemed to 

indicate changes had occurred. According to Marine Corps officials, they 

reported “no change” for the items because those items were newly 

added to the fiscal year 2012 report. Since these items were not reported 

in fiscal year 2011, there would be no changes to report in the fiscal year 

 22GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

23GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, 

GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).

Inaccuracies and 

Omissions in Data 

Reporting Affect Report’s 

Quality
Page 16 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

2012 report, according to Marine Corps officials. However, the fiscal year 

2012 report did not provide an explanation for the differences in the data 

or why the Marine Corps considered there to be no change. Table 3 

highlights some examples of inaccuracies and omissions that we found in 

DOD’s fiscal year 2012 prepositioning report.

Table 3: Examples of Inaccuracies and Omissions in Information Reported by the Military Services in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2012 

Prepositioning Report

Service Inaccuracies/Omissions

Army • Mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle discrepancy: The Army reported two different objective 

levels for MRAPs in two different tables, one describing major end items and the other for non-standard 

items. Army officials informed us that the Army was conducting a study on the disposition of MRAPs during 

the development of the report, which led to changing numbers, but this explanation was not provided in the 

report.

• Mortar carrier discrepancy: DOD’s fiscal year 2012 prepositioning report included a mortar carrier that has 

fiscal year 2011 data, but the item was not included in the fiscal year 2011 report. No information was 

included to provide context for this discrepancy.

Marine Corps • Changes from previous on-hand levels seemingly inaccurate: In one table, the Marine Corps reported no 

changes in the on-hand levels of certain major end items from the previous fiscal year to the current fiscal 

year, although the data provided in the table would suggest otherwise. Marine Corps officials explained the 

reason for this discrepancy but they did not provide this explanation in the report itself.

• Lack of explanation of new items in table: The Marine Corps did not provide information detailing the major 

end items that were added to the fiscal year 2012 report. For example, it included data on “non-IRML” items 

but did not explain in the table or text what these items are or what the acronym stood for. Marine Corps 

officials later informed us that the correct acronym is IMRL, or Individual Material Readiness List, and not 

IRML. More specifically, IMRL refers to a consolidated allowance list of aviation support equipment required 

to maintain and repair certain types of aircraft.

Air Force • Some fiscal year 2011 information inconsistent with prior year’s report: In some places, the information for 

fiscal year 2011 changed between DOD’s fiscal year 2011 and 2012 prepositioning reports. Air Force officials 

explained that there were many changes in the service’s reporting between late fiscal year 2011 and early 

fiscal year 2012, including switching from reporting on individual end items to reporting on packages of 

capabilities, or unit type codes. However, this information was not included in DOD’s fiscal year 2012 report.

• Changes from previous on-hand levels seemingly inaccurate: In several of its tables of information in DOD’s 

report, the Air Force reported changes in operationally available levels from the previous fiscal year for 

several major end items that were incorrect. Air Force officials provided updated tables to us that corrected 

most of these issues.

Navy • Missing column in table: The Navy’s table for equipment drawn did not include a column indicating when the 

equipment had been returned, which the other services had provided. Navy officials said that this column had 

been inadvertently omitted and provided us an updated table with this information.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

While officials from each of the services and the Joint Staff stated that 

they employed their own internal controls to review their respective 

reporting for quality assurance, the inaccuracies and omissions we found 

in the services’ reporting indicate weaknesses in DOD’s overall quality 

assurance procedures for its annual prepositioning report. In 2011, we 

reported that it was important for DOD to provide context in its annual 
Page 17 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

prepositioning reports to enable decision makers to determine whether 

there have been significant changes in DOD’s prepositioning programs 

from the prior year and the reasons for those changes.24 Although DOD 

provided additional information in fiscal year 2012 in response to our 

2011 report, without more consistency and accuracy in reporting from the 

services, DOD’s annual prepositioning report will continue to present 

incomplete information to decision makers on the status of DOD’s 

prepositioning programs. Also, greater consistency would improve the 

usefulness of the report by facilitating analyses of data across the 

services and across reports from different fiscal years, making it easier for 

decision makers to assess DOD’s progress in meeting prepositioning 

goals and track changes in DOD’s prepositioning programs over time. 

Until DOD provides complete, consistent, and accurate information on its 

prepositioned stocks, its report will be of limited use to Congress’s ability 

to oversee and make informed decisions about DOD’s use of its 

equipment and resources in this constrained fiscal environment.

Since we last reported on this issue in September 2012, DOD has not 

made progress in addressing our prior recommendations to develop 

department-wide strategic guidance and implement a coordinated jointservice approach for managing its prepositioning programs, nor has it set 

a timeline for doing so.25 Without department-wide guidance and joint 

oversight, DOD may not be able to fully recognize potential efficiencies 

that could be gained by synchronizing the services’ prepositioning 

programs with each other and the new defense strategy.

 24GAO, Defense Logistics: Department of Defense Has Enhanced Prepositioned Stock 

Management but Should Provide More Detailed Status Reports, GAO-11-852R

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2011).

25GAO-12-916R.

DOD Has Not 

Developed Strategic 

Guidance or a 

Coordinated JointService Approach for 

Managing 

Prepositioning 

Programs
Page 18 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

In response to recommendations we have made in reports on DOD’s 

annual prepositioning programs, DOD has stated that it planned to 

develop department-wide strategic guidance for its prepositioning 

programs; however, DOD has made no progress in developing such 

guidance, nor has it set a timeline for doing so. Key principles of resultsoriented management emphasize the importance of strategic planning as 

the starting point and foundation for defining what an agency seeks to 

accomplish, identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, 

and then determining how well it succeeds in reaching results-oriented 

goals and achieving objectives. Strategic planning can help clarify 

priorities and unify an agency in pursuit of shared goals.26

As far back as 2005, we have reported that each of the military services 

and the Defense Logistics Agency were planning the future of their 

prepositioning programs without the benefit of an overall plan or joint 

doctrine to coordinate their efforts, which made it difficult to determine 

how the services’ different programs would fit together to meet the 

evolving defense strategy.27 DOD officials from the Joint Staff and the 

services agreed with our assessment and said that they shared our 

concerns. In June 2008, DOD issued an instruction directing the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate for approval by 

the Secretary of Defense guidance that identifies an overall war reserve 

materiel strategy, which includes prepositioned stocks, to achieve desired 

capabilities and responsiveness in support of the National Defense 

Strategy.28

We reported in May 2011 that at that time DOD still had limited 

department-wide guidance that would help ensure that its prepositioning 

programs accurately reflect national military objectives such as those 

included in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military 

Strategy.29 We recommended that DOD develop appropriately detailed 

authoritative strategic guidance for prepositioned stocks and that the 

 26GAO, Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate 

Congressional Review (Version 1), GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997).

27GAO-05-427.

28Department of Defense Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policy (June 

23, 2008).

29GAO-11-647.

DOD Has Not Made 

Progress in Developing 

Overarching Strategic 

Guidance for 

Prepositioning Programs
Page 19 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

guidance include planning and resource priorities linking the department’s 

current and future needs for prepositioned stocks to evolving national 

defense objectives. Our report stated that such strategic guidance would 

provide the services with information on the medium- and long-term 

department-wide priorities they need to effectively plan and apply their 

resources to meet future contingencies, thus linking DOD’s prepositioning 

programs with its overall national defense strategies.

In response to our May 2011 report, DOD stated that it would develop 

strategic direction concerning prepositioned stocks. In the fall of 2011, 

DOD program officials stated that the department was in the process of 

conducting a department-wide review, which would result in enhanced 

joint oversight, increased program efficiencies, and expanded guidance to 

link prepositioning programs with national military objectives. The result of 

that review was DOD’s Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy, 

issued in May 2012, which describes DOD’s strategy for integrating and 

synchronizing materiel response to support a full range of military 

activities globally in an increasingly constrained resource environment. 

Also, in January 2013, DOD issued a Comprehensive Materiel Response 

Plan, which provides guidance for directing, coordinating, and prioritizing 

DOD-wide development plans, initiatives, and activities for the period 

2013-2020 in order to achieve the Comprehensive Materiel Response 

Strategy end state.30

However, neither the Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy nor the 

Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan provides guidance for DOD’s 

prepositioning programs, and the plan specifically states that the services’

prepositioned programs are outside the scope of the plan. During our 

review for our September 2012 report, Joint Staff officials developing the 

strategy told us that prepositioning programs were excluded because the 

planners received new direction for this effort in spring 2012, re-focusing 

the strategy and plan on integrating and synchronizing materiel response 

to support the full range of military activities, which is much broader than 

prepositioned materiel and equipment. Accordingly, in September 2012, 

we reported that DOD still had not made progress in implementing 

overarching DOD-wide strategic guidance for its prepositioning programs. 

Because DOD had planned to develop department-wide strategic 

 30Department of Defense, Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy (Washington, 

D.C.: May 10, 2012) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Comprehensive Materiel 

Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2013).
Page 20 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

guidance for its prepositioning programs and these efforts had not 

materialized because of other departmental priorities, our September 

2012 report recommended that DOD set a timeline for implementing our 

prior recommendation.31 In commenting on a draft of that report, DOD 

concurred with the recommendation but said the department will continue 

to focus on ensuring that combatant commanders’ equipment 

requirements identified in operation and contingency plans are satisfied 

by the services.

In conducting our current review, we found that DOD had still not made 

progress in developing an overarching strategy for its prepositioning 

programs. Hence, the services’ individual prepositioning programs are still 

not linked to overarching strategic guidance, which could lead to 

inconsistencies and potential overlap and duplication among the services’

prepositioning strategies and between the service strategies and the new 

national defense strategy. Further, without a set timeline for the

development and implementation of department-wide strategic guidance 

that aligns DOD’s prepositioning programs with national defense strategic 

guidance and new departmental priorities, DOD could face difficulties in 

effectively planning and implementing its prepositioning programs and 

risks the potential for duplicative or unaligned efforts among the services.

DOD has also not improved its joint oversight of its prepositioning 

programs because a working group that was expected to provide joint 

oversight has not been functioning as intended and other joint activities 

do not specifically address prepositioned stocks. We have previously 

reported that an increased emphasis on joint program management and 

oversight of prepositioned stocks is needed to reduce potential 

unnecessary duplication and achieve cost savings and efficiencies. We 

also identified the need to strengthen joint oversight and synchronize 

prepositioning programs at a department-wide level in our first annual 

report to Congress on potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in 

the federal government.32 Without joint-service oversight, DOD may not 

be able to fully recognize potential efficiencies among prepositioned 

stocks across the department.

 31GAO-12-916R.

32GAO-11-318SP.

DOD Has Not Improved 

Joint Oversight of its 

Prepositioning Programs
Page 21 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

DOD’s instruction on war reserve materiel directed establishment of the 

Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, which is to 

comprise officials from the services, the Defense Logistics Agency, joint 

organizations, and entities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.33

In particular, according to DOD officials involved with the group since its 

inception, the intent of the working group is to provide an overall view of 

DOD’s prepositioning programs and ensure that the services’ programs 

are synchronized. Based on its charter, the working group’s joint 

prepositioning activities are to include, among other things, providing 

oversight of DOD’s prepositioning programs through reviewing risk 

assessments, addressing joint issues concerning requirements and 

positioning of prepositioned stocks, and making recommendations that 

balance limited resources against operational risk for use during budget 

and program reviews. However, the working group has not carried out all 

of the responsibilities specified in the instruction or the objectives in its 

own charter related to prepositioned stocks. Rather, officials said that the 

main function of the working group has been to consolidate the services’

individual submissions on their prepositioning programs into DOD’s 

annual report for Congress. According to DOD officials, the working group 

has met only sporadically and has not yet addressed many of the duties 

specified in its charter. Further, officials from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the 

Joint Staff told us that they are considering revising the DOD instruction 

on war reserve materiel policy to eliminate the working group. Without 

strategic guidance from the Secretary of Defense that emphasizes the 

importance of joint oversight of prepositioned stocks, the working group 

may in fact be abolished, or it may continue to operate as it has been, 

with little impact on enhancing jointness or efficiency across the services’

prepositioning programs.

DOD has developed some joint activities related to the supply chain, but 

many of these efforts are either in very early stages or do not specifically 

address prepositioned stocks and focus instead on more broadly 

supporting the full range of military activities. For example, DOD’s 

Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan calls for increasing sharing, 

standardization, and synchronized planning across the services. 

However, this plan does not contain details on where to position or how to 

manage prepositioned stocks.

 33DOD Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policy (June 23, 2008).
Page 22 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

An example of where joint oversight could highlight areas for potential 

efficiencies is in the services’ prepositioned medical stocks. Currently, 

each service determines its requirements for prepositioned stocks in 

support of a geographic combatant commander’s operation plan. For 

instance, each service has determined its requirements for the number of 

prepositioned field hospitals—the Army has 8; the Navy, in support of the 

Marine Corps, has 10; and the Air Force has 3. Also, the size of these 

hospitals varies across the services, with costs ranging from about $10 

million for the smaller ones to about $33 million for the larger ones. 

According to Joint Staff medical logistics officials, DOD has not conducted 

a coordinated department-wide analysis of the services’ requirements and 

the preferred options for meeting those requirements and supporting each 

other. Further, they said coordinating this type of analysis is difficult 

because of the individual ways the services identify requirements, 

configure hospitals, and package medical equipment. The officials 

pointed out, for example, that while the services are providing essentially 

similar medical services in their field hospitals, they individually identify 

requirements and develop capabilities and design processes to address 

them. Prepositioned hospitals are the end results of such processes; 

therefore, the officials said opportunities exist to assess theater 

hospitalization as a joint-service capability and still recognize potentially 

minimal unique aspects of requirements that each service has. According 

to the Joint Staff medical logistics officials, DOD has recognized that 

there are challenges associated with the coordination of medical logistics 

among the services, including prepositioned stocks to support theater 

hospitalization. To address these challenges, the officials said that they 

are taking a number of actions. For example, DOD plans to establish a 

new agency—the Defense Health Agency—in October 2013. This agency 

will interface with the combatant commanders and focus on improved 

coordination between the services and shared services, including medical 

logistics. However, until these challenges are met, the military services’

fragmented approach to planning and prioritizing the need for 

prepositioned resources, such as medical equipment, absent specific 

strategic guidance, increases the potential for overlap and duplication at a 

time when the services are seeking ways to reduce budgets and achieve 

efficiencies in virtually all areas.

Congress has expressed concerns that DOD has not implemented an 

overarching strategy and joint-service oversight framework for its 

prepositioning programs. In a proposed bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the Senate Armed Services 

Committee recommended a provision that would require the Secretary of 

Defense to develop an overarching strategic policy, along with an 
Page 23 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

implementation plan, to integrate and synchronize at a department-wide 

level, the services’ prepositioning programs, among other things.34 In the 

committee report accompanying the bill, the committee said that 

developing such a strategy and implementation plan would help ensure 

that DOD’s prepositioning programs, both ground and afloat, align with 

national defense strategies and DOD priorities and emphasize joint 

oversight to maximize effectiveness and efficiencies in prepositioned 

materiel and equipment across DOD.35 The legislation is currently 

pending. The House also passed a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, which does not include a similar 

provision, thus it is unclear whether the final National Defense 

Authorization Act, when passed, will address these issues.

DOD’s annual report on prepositioning programs—with three partiallyaddressed elements, data inconsistencies among the services, 

inaccuracies, and omissions—is illustrative of long-standing problems 

stemming from the lack of overarching DOD strategic guidance and 

oversight. The resulting product is, for the most part, a separate report by 

each of the services on its prepositioning efforts, rather than a 

coordinated joint-service picture of DOD’s prepositioning programs. 

Strategic guidance and enhanced joint departmental oversight could 

strengthen the coordination and quality assurance procedures that DOD 

uses to compile its annual prepositioning reports for Congress. 

Importantly, a more complete, consistent, and accurate report would aid 

Congress in its ability to oversee and make informed decisions about 

DOD’s prepositioning programs. Further, an increased emphasis on joint 

program management and oversight of prepositioned materiel and 

equipment would serve to unify DOD’s prepositioning efforts in support of 

defense priorities, identify and reduce any unnecessary overlap or 

duplication, and achieve cost savings and efficiencies. Because we have 

made recommendations for strategic guidance and oversight for several 

years without meaningful actions by DOD, and in response to continued 

congressional concern and proposed legislation related to this issue, we 

are elevating this issue as a matter for congressional consideration.

 34S. 1197, § 312, 113th Cong. (2013).

35S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 71-72 (2013).

Conclusions
Page 24 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

To improve DOD’s annual prepositioning report and more fully inform the 

congressional defense committees on the status of prepositioned materiel 

and equipment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in 

coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to

1. develop guidance that clearly articulates the type and format of 

information the services should provide for the report to ensure 

consistency across DOD’s prepositioning programs, and

2. identify and correct weaknesses in DOD’s quality assurance 

procedures to minimize inaccuracies and omissions in the report.

Congress may wish to require the Secretary of Defense to develop 

overarching strategic guidance, along with an implementation plan, to 

integrate and synchronize the services’ prepositioning programs 

department-wide. The strategic guidance and implementation plan, which 

should be developed within a specified time frame, should ensure that 

DOD’s prepositioning programs align with national defense strategies and 

new departmental priorities and emphasize joint oversight to maximize 

efficiencies and reduce the potential for unnecessary overlap or 

duplication in prepositioned materiel and equipment across the 

department.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations. Regarding our first recommendation that DOD develop 

guidance that clearly articulates the type and format of information the

services should provide for the report to ensure consistency across 

DOD’s prepositioning programs, DOD said it will review previous annual 

reports and related reference material and develop a reporting template 

to solicit service information and standardize respondent data format. The 

agency said this standardized format will be implemented in the next 

report cycle. Regarding our second recommendation that DOD identify 

and correct weaknesses in its quality assurance procedures to minimize 

inaccuracies and omissions in the report, DOD said it will insert a review 

step in the process to validate components’ inputs for data accuracy and 

completeness. If implemented, these actions will help improve the 

consistency and quality of information contained in DOD’s annual report, 

which will better assist Congress in overseeing and making informed 

decisions about DOD’s prepositioning programs.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 25 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; 

and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

Cary Russell

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 26 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 27 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

To evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

annual report addressed the 12 reporting elements set out in 10 U.S.C. § 

2229a, regarding prepositioned stocks, we analyzed DOD’s report on the 

status of prepositioned materiel and equipment for fiscal year 2012. We 

performed a content analysis in which we compared the prepositioned 

stocks information in DOD’s fiscal year 2012 report with the 12 reporting 

elements and assessed the extent to which DOD had addressed each 

required element. One GAO analyst conducted this analysis, coding the 

information and entering it into a spreadsheet, and a different GAO 

analyst checked the information for accuracy. Any initial disagreements in 

the coding were discussed and reconciled by the analysts. The analysts 

then tallied the responses to determine the extent to which the reporting 

elements were addressed. We assessed an element as addressed if 

DOD’s report explicitly addressed all parts of the element. We assessed 

an element as partially addressed if at least one—but not all—parts of the 

required element were explicitly addressed. Finally, we assessed an 

element as not addressed if it did not explicitly address any part of the 

required element. We also analyzed each of the tables in the fiscal year 

2012 report to identify any inconsistencies in the reporting of data among 

the services, as well as any inaccuracies or omissions in the data. 

Additionally, we compared the data in the fiscal year 2012 report with 

data presented in the fiscal year 2011 report, where applicable, to identify 

discrepancies between the two reports. We did not independently assess 

the data in the fiscal year 2012 report, but we assessed the reliability of 

the systems used to generate the data and concluded that the data were 

sufficiently reliable to meet the objectives of this engagement. To assess 

reliability, we developed and administered a survey to appropriate service 

officials to collect information on data system management, data quality 

assurance processes, potential sources of errors, and mitigations of those 

errors. We also interviewed service officials to collect information on their 

experiences working with these data systems and the data validation 

process. Furthermore, we reviewed DOD policies, prepositioning 

guidance from the services, and the prior year’s (fiscal year 2011) annual 

report to Congress on prepositioned materiel and equipment to 

understand the variations of information reported by the services on the 

status of prepositioned stocks and the quality control processes used 

during the development of the fiscal year 2012 report. To obtain additional 

information for our review, we met with officials from the:

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics;

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 

Integration;

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

• Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operations, Logistics, and Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment Directorates;

• U.S. Army, Headquarters, Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations and 

Plans, Logistics, and Programs;

• U.S. Army Materiel Command;

• U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency;

• U.S. Army, Office of the Surgeon General;

• U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, Logistics, Installations and Mission 

Support;

• U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Logistics Readiness and 

Plans;

• U.S. Air Force Medical Operations Agency;

• U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Expeditionary Warfare Division;

• U.S. Naval Medical Logistics Command;

• U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Expeditionary Programs 

Office;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Installations and Logistics;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Plans, Policies and Operations; 

and

• U.S. Pacific Command.1

To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in addressing 

our prior recommendations to develop department-wide strategic 

guidance and a coordinated joint-service approach for managing its 

prepositioned stocks, we reviewed prior GAO reports, DOD and service 

guidance, and DOD’s Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy and 

associated plan. This strategy and plan focus on integrating and 

synchronizing DOD’s global materiel response to support the full range of 

military activities. We discussed the extent to which department-wide 

guidance specific to prepositioned stocks and joint oversight have been 

developed with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, and all four of the military 

services. To review DOD’s progress in developing a coordinated jointservice approach for prepositioning, we examined DOD guidance, 

 1

We visited U.S. Pacific Command because of the recent emphasis on the Asia Pacific 

region and to determine how prepositioning requirements and options for addressing them 

are determined. We met with officials from the Operations; Logistics, Engineering, and 

Security Cooperation; Strategic Planning Policy; and Resources Assessment Directorates 

as well as with the Defense Logistics Agency liaison to U.S. Pacific Command. We also 

interviewed officials from the service components—U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pacific Air Forces, 

U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific—and Special Operations Command, 

Pacific.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

including DOD Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policy

(2008) and the Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working 

Group’s charter, and identified activities the working group had 

performed.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 through 

September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 30 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 31 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 32 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

Cary B. Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key 

contributions to this report include: Alissa H. Czyz and Larry Junek, 

Assistant Directors; Karyn Angulo; Lionel C. Cooper; Susan Ditto; Gilbert 

H. Kim; Greg Pugnetti; Michael D. Silver; Maria Storts; and Michael 

Willems.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 33 GAO-13-790 Prepositioned Stocks

Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment: DOD Would Benefit from 

Developing Strategic Guidance and Improving Joint Oversight. 

GAO-12-916R. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2012.

Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce 

Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance 

Revenue. GAO-12-453SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-

342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Defense Logistics: Department of Defense Has Enhanced Prepositioned 

Stock Management but Should Provide More Detailed Status Reports. 

GAO-11-852R. Washington, D.C.; September 30, 2011.

Warfighter Support: Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD’s 

Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies. GAO-11-647. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2011.

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington, 

D.C.: March 1, 2011.

Defense Logistics: Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Status 

of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Further Enhanced to 

Better Inform Congress. GAO-10-172R. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 

2009.

Defense Logistics: Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Status 

of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Enhanced to Better 

Inform Congress. GAO-09-147R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008.

Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination 

Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army’s Prepositioning Strategy. 

GAO-07-144. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007.

Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning 

Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs. 

GAO-05-427. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.

Related GAO Products

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