PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

PETER DAUSEN MUNIS, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 12-9593

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION FROM THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Submitted on the briefs: * Peter Dausen Munis, Pro Se. Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorn ey General, William C. Peachey, Assistant Director, Lindsay Corliss, Tr ial Attorney, Office of Im migration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justi ce, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before HARTZ , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and EBEL , Circuit Judge.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 2, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Peter Dausen Munis, who appear s in this court pro se, is a native of Rwanda and a citizen of Tanzania. He appeals from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed hi s administrative appeal from an order of the immigration judge (IJ) denying his requests for discretionary relief from removal. We dismiss the petition for revi ew for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student in 1999. He stopped attending school and got a job with out authorization, which led to the initiation of removal proceedin gs against him in 2006 for failing to maintain his nonimmigrant status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). The government presented evidence of petitioner’s criminal history, which began in 2000. Petitioner conceded the charge of removability but sought disc retionary relief from re moval. He sought adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 based on his 2003 marriage to a United States citizen. But because one of hi s convictions constitu ted a crime involving moral turpitude, making him inadmissible un der 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), he also sought a waiver of in admissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B), based on alleged extreme hardship to his wife, if he is removed. In the alternative to relief from removal, he requested voluntary depa rture under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. The IJ denied petitioner any relief, and the BIA dismissed his administrative appeal. Construing petitioner’s brief broadl y in light of his pro se status, see Haines v.
Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), he challenges the agency’s denial of- 3 - a waiver of inadmi ssibility and adjustment of st atus, the agency’s hardship determination in connection w ith those denials, and the ag ency’s denial of voluntary departure. All of these d ecisions are discretionary a nd generally not subject to judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We have jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law,” see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), but we take a “restrictive view of § 1252(a)(2)(D),” Shepherd v. Holder , 678 F.3d 1171, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2012). We have held, for example, that re viewable questions of law include the interpretation of treaties and certain issues regarding statutory construction. Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer , 483 F.3d 1013, 1019 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2007). But we have also held that “a challenge to the agency’s discre tionary and fact-finding exercises cloaked in constitutional garb . . . remain[s] outside the scope of judicial review.” Kechkar v. Gonzales , 500 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10t h Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The agency’s discretionary denial of a waiver of inadmissibi lity or adjustment of status is unreviewable in the absen ce of a legal or cons titutional question. Schroeck v. Gonzales , 429 F.3d 947, 950-51 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the explicit jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i ), as qualified by § 1252(a)(2)(D)). We have never held specifically that th e hardship determination underlying the denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) is an unreviewable discretionary decision, althoug h two of our sister circuits have. See Cospito v. Att’y Gen. , 539 F.3d 166, 170-71 (3d Ci r. 2008) (per curiam);- 4 - Rodrígues-Nascimento v. Gonzáles , 485 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 2007); cf. Bugayong v.
INS , 442 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curi am) (noting that an IJ’s hardship determination, as previous ly held under circumstance s analogous to § 1182(h), “is itself a discretionary determination that we have no jurisdiction to review”); Camara v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 497 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (reaffirming that the hardsh ip determination for a waiv er of inadmissibility under § 1182(i) is an unreviewable discretionary decision). We now hold based on existing Tent h Circuit law that the hardship determination required for a waiver of in admissibility under § 1182(h)(1)(B) is an unreviewable discretionary deci sion. We have previously observed that “8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2) provides that ‘[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver [of inadmissibility] under this subsection.’” Schroeck , 429 F.3d at 950 (quoting § 1182( h)(2)). And considering a similar hardship issue, we have held that the agency’s hardsh ip determination for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 122 9b “involved an exercise of discretion insulated from our review under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Alzainati v. Holder , 568 F.3d 844, 848 (10th Cir. 2009). S ections 1182(h) and 1229b are both listed in the explicit jurisdictional bar for the agen cy’s discretionary decisions in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). In addition, this court has noted generally that “challenges direct ed solely at the agency’s discretionary and factual determinations rema in outside the scope of judicial review.” Diallo v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2006)- 5 - (discussing the exception to the discretiona ry decision bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B) for legal and constitutional questi ons under § 1252(a)(2)(D)). Accordingly, we may not review the agency’s hardship determination in this case. The agency’s decision not to grant vol untary departure is also discretionary and outside our jurisdiction in the absence of a constitutional or legal question. Kechkar , 500 F.3d at 1083. Petitioner’s brief on appeal cannot be r ead to raise any discernible legal or constitutional question that would fall within this court’ s jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D). As a result, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision. The petition for review is dismissed.