Cite as 2022 Ark. 112

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CV-21-467

CALVIN PERRY AND

MARCUS ATKINS 

APPELLANTS

V.

DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, 

ARKANSAS DIVISION OF 

CORRECTION

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: May 26, 2022

APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 35CV-20-540]

HONORABLE JODI RAINES 

DENNIS, JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

WITH DIRECTIONS.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

In 2007, Calvin Perry, Marcus Atkins, and Kyron Watkins were jointly tried and 

convicted for their participation in a criminal episode that involved kidnapping, battery, 

firearms, and the presence of a minor. See Watkins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 124, 302 S.W.3d 

635. The acts were committed in April 2007. All three received differing sentences. Perry 

and Atkins bring this appeal from the denial of their petition for declaratory judgment, writ 

of mandamus, and request for injunctive relief. They contend the Arkansas Division of 

Correction is wrongfully calculating the parole eligibility on their fifteen-year sentence 

enhancement for committing a felony with a firearm. The State concedes error on this issue,

and we reverse and remand with directions. 

Perry and Atkins brought the petition in the circuit court objecting to the Division’s 

calculation of their parole eligibility. Together with varying convictions on battery, 
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kidnapping, and other charges, both had received consecutive fifteen-year enhancements 

for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony under Arkansas Code Annotated section

16-90-120 (Supp. 2021). They alleged that Dexter Payne, as Director, was improperly 

requiring them to serve 70 percent of the enhancement sentence before they would be 

eligible for parole. Directly, the issue was whether the Division was incorrectly applying the 

parole-eligibility statute for crimes committed after July 2, 2007, when their crimes were 

committed in April 2007.

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The circuit court held a hearing where appellants argued the Division should treat 

their firearm enhancement as an unclassified felony, which is subject to parole eligibility

after either one-half or one-third of the sentence has been served. The circuit court denied 

the petition in June 2021. Appellants then filed this appeal.

While this appeal was proceeding, this court considered the same issue in another 

matter. See Rogers v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 2022 Ark. 19, 638 S.W.3d 265. There, the 

defendant had been convicted in 2006 and received a fifteen-year enhancement for using a 

firearm under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-120. We held the enhancement was 

subject to the parole-eligibility law in place when the offense was committed. Id. at 4, 638 

S.W.3d at 268. Thus, we concluded the enhancements should be treated like unclassified 

felonies and that the governing parole-eligibility law for that enhancement was Arkansas

1Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-120(e)(1) requires any person sentenced to 

a firearm enhancement, for certain underlying felonies committed after July 2, 2007, to 

serve 70 percent of the enhancement.
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Code Annotated section 16-93-1301 (Supp. 2005). This statute provides parole eligibility 

after serving either one-half or one-third of the sentence, depending on the circumstances.

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The State, recognizing the recent Rogers holding, concedes error here. As in Rogers, 

parole eligibility for Perry and Atkins should be calculated based on section 16-93-1301. 

We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order and remand with directions for the court to 

issue the writ of mandamus and order the Division to calculate parole eligibility consistent 

with this opinion.

As a final point, we have no basis to address sovereign immunity under article 5, 

section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. A majority of this court has stated that “sovereign 

immunity certainly has jurisdictional qualities” but that those are more like personal 

jurisdiction because the immunity protects a particular defendant (i.e., “the State”) from 

suit. See Walther v. FLIS Enters., Inc., 2018 Ark. 64, at 4–5, 540 S.W.3d 264, 267. We 

therefore treat sovereign immunity like an affirmative defense that a party must first raise 

below.3Id. at 5, 540 S.W.3d at 267; see also id. at 16, 540 S.W.3d at 273 (“I join the majority 

2“All other classified or unclassified felons who are incarcerated therefor shall be 

eligible for transfer to community punishment after having served one-third (1/3) or onehalf (1/2), with credit for meritorious good time, of their sentences depending on the 

seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, or one-half (1/2), 

with credit for meritorious good time, of the time to which their sentences are commuted 

by executive clemency.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1301(c)(3)(A), repealed by Act 570 of 

2011. 

3The constitution contains no explicit mandate that immunity under article 5, section 

20 be treated like an affirmative defense, as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, or 

something in between. But a majority of this court has adopted the view that the immunity 

should be treated like an affirmative defense. This is our law. No sound argument has been 

raised that would permit us to ignore stare decisis and, volte-face, suddenly treat sovereign

immunity as implicating subject-matter jurisdiction. 
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. . . in holding that sovereign immunity is to be applied as an affirmative defense that must 

be raised by the parties below.”) (Womack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

The State of Arkansas agrees. Here, the State not only never raised the defense but also 

conceded that mandamus should issue “order[ing] the ADC to compute appellants’ parole 

eligibility for their sentencing enhancement in a manner consistent with Rogers.” App. Brief 

at 8. 

And sovereign immunity doesn’t deprive courts of their jurisdiction over the subject 

matter of mandamus. What’s more, a separate constitutional provision affords a positive 

grant of power to issue the writ. Amendment 80, § 10 provides that “the General Assembly 

shall have the power to establish jurisdiction of all courts.” Through this provision, the 

legislature empowered circuit courts with subject-matter jurisdiction to issue writs of 

mandamus. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-115-102. Amendment 80, § 10, being a more recent and 

specific constitutional provision than article 5, § 20, controls in the event of any conflict. 

See Rutledge v. Remmel, 2022 Ark. 86, at 8; Chesshir v. Copeland, 182 Ark. 425, 428, 32 

S.W.2d 301, 302 (1930).

Reversed and remanded with directions. 

BAKER and WYNNE, JJ., concur.

WOMACK, J., dissents.

ROBIN F. WYNNE, Justice, concurring. I cannot join the majority opinion in full 

because I disagree with this court’s treatment of sovereign immunity as an affirmative 

defense. Harris v. Hutchinson, 2020 Ark. 3, at 9–10, 591 S.W.3d 778, 783–84 (Wynne, J., 

concurring); Wilson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. 358, at 8–9, 562 S.W.3d 201, 
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205 (Wynne, J., dissenting); Walther v. FLIS Enters., Inc., 2018 Ark. 64, at 14, 540 S.W.3d 

264, 272 (Wynne, J., concurring). In any event, as the majority explains, sovereign 

immunity does not bar this mandamus action.

I respectfully concur.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. While the Arkansas Division of 

Correction plainly erred in calculating appellants’ parole eligibility for their firearm 

enhancement, relief is barred by article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. See

Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 16, 639 S.W.3d 319, 327 

(Womack, J., dissenting). Although I share the majority’s concern that a plain reading of 

article 5, section 20 forecloses any judicial remedy, we cannot ignore our constitutional 

mandate simply because it presents an uncomfortable truth. 

The majority responds to my position on sovereign immunity by offering two 

distinct reasons for why the doctrine should not apply in this case. It argues that sovereign 

immunity is treated as an affirmative defense and the State’s failure to raise the defense below 

precludes the doctrine’s application. Requiring the State to raise the issue effectively allows 

a State entity to waive sovereign immunity “either as a result of poor lawyering skills, 

negligent omission, or even as a matter of trial strategy.” Walther v. FLIS Enters., 2018 Ark. 

64, at 23–24, 540 S.W.3d 264, 276 (Baker, J., dissenting). This conflicts with the 

constitution’s unequivocal command that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made 

defendant in any of her courts.” Ark. Const. art. 5, § 20 (emphasis added). Thus, immunity 

applies regardless of the State’s inaction. 
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The majority also argues that through Amendment 80, § 10, our courts are vested 

with jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. This provision states that “[t]he General 

Assembly shall have the power to establish jurisdiction of all courts and venues of all actions 

therein, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution.” Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 10 (emphasis 

added). According to the majority, this provision empowered the legislature to enact Ark. 

Code Ann. § 16-115-102 (Rep. 2016), which grants circuit courts jurisdiction to issue writs 

of mandamus. Yet the presence of the language “unless otherwise provided in this 

Constitution” makes explicit that Amendment 80, § 10 yields to more specific jurisdictional 

provisions within the constitution, such as article 5, § 20. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ark. 

v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, at 5, 535 S.W.3d 616, 619 (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional 

immunity from suit.”). Mandamus actions against State actors therefore remain 

constitutionally infirm.

In sum, we are presented with an unfortunate situation in which appellants are 

entitled to relief, yet no judicial relief exists under our constitution. To reconcile this 

incongruity, the General Assembly should consider proposing to the electors of this state a 

constitutional amendment that addresses sovereign immunity, the extent of its application, 

and the existence of any exceptions or an acceptable method of creating exceptions. See 

Ark. Const. art. 19, § 22. Until such time, the clear language of our constitution controls.

I respectfully dissent.

Craig Lambert, for appellants.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.