*

The Honorable Daniel M. Friedman, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 09a0320p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO WYNN,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 07-4307

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 07-00054—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.

Argued: June 16, 2009

Decided and Filed: September 2, 2009 

Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judges.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jonathan Witmer-Rich, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Gregory C. Sasse, ASSISTANT UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jonathan WitmerRich, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for

Appellant. Gregory C. Sasse, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. 

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GIBBONS, J., joined.

FRIEDMAN, J. (pp. 16-21), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part.

1
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Antonio Wynn

(“Wynn”) appeals his 235-month sentence resulting from a guilty plea, pursuant to a

written plea agreement, to one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams

or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B). Wynn’s sole

argument on appeal is that, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Begay v.

United States, --- U.S. ----, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), the district court erred in concluding

that Wynn’s guilty plea to “sexual battery” under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 was a

“crime of violence” for purposes of determining that Wynn was a career offender. For

the reasons discussed below, we VACATE Wynn’s sentence and REMAND to the

district court for the limited purpose of resentencing Wynn after determining whether

Wynn qualifies as a career offender in light of Begay.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. On December 30, 2006,

Cleveland police officers stopped Wynn’s car for speeding and changing lanes without

signaling. During the stop, police noticed a plastic bag containing a white substance,

later identified as crack cocaine, in plain view. Wynn was arrested, and the police

discovered more crack cocaine upon a search of the car. All told, Wynn possessed 44.7

grams of crack cocaine at the time of his arrest.

Wynn was indicted and, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Wynn pleaded

guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B), on August 1, 2007. Prior to

pleading guilty, Wynn consented to a pre-plea Presentence Investigation Report

(“PSR”), which was prepared and updated prior to the sentencing hearing.

The updated PSR calculated Wynn’s adjusted offense level to be 30, and then

applied the career-offender enhancement under the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 3

MANUAL (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1 for a total offense level of 37. The PSR based the

§ 4B1.1 enhancement on two prior convictions: (1) “Assault on [a] Peace Officer” and

(2) a plea of guilty to “Sexual Battery” in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03. PSR

¶ 19. The PSR described the latter offense as follows:

According to an August 2001 Cuyahoga County Adult Probation

Department presentence report, the following is known: On October 21,

2000, at 4:00 a.m. the defendant, his friend, and his friend’s girlfriend

went to the home of the girlfriend’s 16-year-old female cousin, after a

night of drinking. The juvenile girl went upstairs to lay down, and the

defendant followed her into her bedroom. After a brief conversation, the

defendant started rubbing the girl’s leg, but she told him to stop. He

initially stopped, however, he began touching her again as she tried to

leave the room. The defendant forced the girl onto her bed and removed

her clothes. The girl screamed, and the defendant placed his hand over

her mouth. She told the defendant that she could not breath[e], and he

removed his hand. The defendant then opened the girl’s legs and

inserted his penis into her vagina. After the defendant finished moving,

the girl got up and told her cousin what happened.

PSR ¶ 34. The PSR assigned Wynn a criminal history category of VI, which, coupled

with a total offense level of 37, resulted in an advisory guidelines range of 360 months

to life imprisonment. Wynn’s counsel filed a sentencing memorandum that argued for

a downward variance from the guidelines range, but did not object to any factual

assertions in the PSR or to the finding that Wynn was a career offender.

After reviewing the PSR, the district court determined that the correctly

calculated total offense level was 37; however, the court awarded a three-point reduction

for acceptance of responsibility for a total offense level of 34, reducing the guidelines

range to 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. The district court further noted that Wynn

was a career offender but that “because of [Wynn’s] forthrightness, [and Wynn’s]

willingness to help,” it would treat Wynn’s final total offense level as a 33, with a

criminal history category of VI. Record (“R.”) at 29 (09/18/07 Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 11).

This produced a guidelines range of 235 to 293 months. The district court sentenced

Wynn to 235 months of imprisonment. Wynn timely appealed this sentence.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 4

1

Wynn further notes that under the current version of the U.S.S.G., his guidelines range would

be 110 to 137 months. Wynn Br. at 4. However, Wynn does not account for the ten-year mandatoryminimum sentence applicable to his conviction. See PSR ¶ 60; Record on Appeal (“ROA”) at 26 (Plea

Agreement at 2). This statutory minimum is based on Wynn’s prior conviction for a drug offense. ROA

at 21-22 (Information Regarding Prior Conviction).

II. ANALYSIS

Wynn’s sole contention on appeal is that, in light of Begay v. United States, ---

U.S. ----, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), the district court erred in imposing the U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1(a) career-offender enhancement to his sentence because his conviction under

Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 is not a “crime of violence” under the Begay test. Wynn

asserts that, without this enhancement, his total offense level would have been 27, with

a criminal history category of VI, for a guidelines range of 130 to 162 months.1

 As

explained below, we conclude that we must vacate Wynn’s sentence in light of Begay.

A. Standard of Review

After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005), we review sentences “for reasonableness—including for procedural error in the

calculation of the guideline range such as defendant asserts in this case.” United States

v. Bartee, 529 F.3d 357, 358 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007)). Thus, when reviewing a district court’s sentencing

determination, we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines

range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,

selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the

chosen sentence.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. We review de novo the district court’s

determination that a prior conviction is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

United States v. Hargrove, 416 F.3d 486, 494 (6th Cir. 2005).

B. Career-Offender Status

“A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years

old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 5

2

Although Taylor, Shepard, and Begay all involved the definition of “violent felony” under the

Armed Career Criminal Act, we have repeatedly applied the analysis espoused in these opinions “to the

parallel determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under USSG

§ 4B1.2(a).” Bartee, 529 F.3d at 359.

3

The government misquotes this phrase in its brief. Gov’t Br. at 12 (“The categorical approach

established in Taylor requires that a court look to the ‘facts of conviction’ and to the ‘statutory definition’

of the offense when analyzing the ‘crime of violence’ question.” (emphasis added)).

offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

Wynn does not contest the fact that requirements one and two are met; rather, Wynn

asserts that he does not have the two predicate “crime of violence” convictions necessary

to be a career offender because, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay, his

conviction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 is not a “crime of violence.”

A prior conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” if the crime was “punishable

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added).

To determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a “crime of violence,” we

must apply the categorical approach expressed in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575

(1990), and expanded to convictions based on guilty pleas in Shepard v. United States,

544 U.S. 13 (2005).2

 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir.

1995); Bartee, 529 F.3d at 359. “Under this categorical approach, the court must look

only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition—not the facts underlying the

offense—to determine whether that definition supports a conclusion that the conviction

was for a crime of violence.”3

 Bartee, 529 F.3d at 359 (emphasis added) (citing United

States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602

(holding that a court is required to “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 6

definition of the prior offense” when determining if a prior conviction constitutes a

“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (emphasis added)); Begay, 128

S. Ct. at 1584 (“[W]e consider the offense generically, that is to say, we examine it in

terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender

might have committed it on a particular occasion.”). There is, however, an exception to

the categorical approach: “[W]hen the statutory definition [of the prior crime to which

the defendant pleaded guilty] is ambiguous . . . the court may examine . . . ‘the terms of

the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between

judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the

defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.’” Bartee, 529 F.3d

at 359 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26).

Given this framework and the facts in the record, we must answer two questions

to resolve the instant appeal. First, is a generic conviction under Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2907.03 categorically a “crime of violence”? Because we conclude that the answer to

this question is “no,” we must next determine whether the district court could

nevertheless conclude that Wynn’s conviction under § 2907.03 constitutes a “crime of

violence” by using the factual recitation of the crime provided in the PSR. Because we

also conclude that the answer to this question is “no,” we must vacate Wynn’s sentence.

1. Is a Generic Conviction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 Categorically

a “Crime of Violence”?

At the time of Wynn’s conviction, Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 criminalized the

following activity:

(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the

spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply:

(1) The offender knowingly coerces the other person to

submit by any means that would prevent resistance by

a person of ordinary resolution.

(2) The offender knows that the other person’s ability to

appraise the nature of or control the other person’s own

conduct is substantially impaired.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 7

(3) The offender knows that the other person submits

because the other person is unaware that the act is being

committed.

(4) The offender knows that the other person submits

because the other person mistakenly identifies the

offender as the other person’s spouse.

(5) The offender is the other person’s natural or adoptive

parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or

person in loco parentis of the other person.

(6) The other person is in custody of law or a patient in a

hospital or other institution, and the offender has

supervisory or disciplinary authority over the other

person.

(7) The offender is a teacher, administrator, coach, or other

person in authority employed by or serving in a school

for which the state board of education prescribes

minimum standards pursuant to division (D) of section

3301.07 of the Revised Code, the other person is

enrolled in or attends that school, and the offender is

not enrolled in and does not attend that school.

(8) The other person is a minor, the offender is a teacher,

administrator, coach, or other person in authority

employed by or serving in an institution of higher

education, and the other person is enrolled in or attends

that institution.

(9) The other person is a minor, and the offender is the

other person’s athletic or other type of coach, is the

other person’s instructor, is the leader of a scouting

troop of which the other person is a member, or is a

person with temporary or occasional disciplinary

control over the other person.

Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03(A) (2001). There is no indication in the record as to the

subsection of § 2907.03(A) to which Wynn pleaded guilty. Thus, we must initially

review § 2907.03(A) in its entirety to determine if, categorically, generic convictions

under § 2907.03(A) are “crimes of violence.”

We have previously noted that, “[a]s statutorily defined, sexual battery [under

§ 2907.03] simply does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 8

4

There is some authority in this circuit that suggests that Mack II’s holding was limited to

§ 2907.03(A)(3) and (4). Hargrove, 416 F.3d at 495. Hargrove, however, contains no analysis regarding

how it determined that Mack II is so limited. Id. Indeed, such a holding seems contrary to Mack II’s

blanket declaration that “sexual battery as defined in Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 categorically qualifies as

a ‘violent felony’ under” the “otherwise” clause. Mack II, 53 F.3d at 128. Because we conclude that a

generic conviction under § 2907.03 is not categorically a “crime of violence,” the propriety of Hargrove’s

distinction is not significant.

Rather, the crime is complete upon using any coercive means to induce the victim to

engage in sexual conduct with the perpetrator.” United States v. Mack, 8 F.3d 1109,

1112 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Mack I”), vacated and superseded on rehearing on other grounds

by United States v. Mack, 53 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Mack II”). Moreover, “sexual

battery” is not one of the enumerated crimes listed in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a); thus, we can

conclude that “sexual battery” is a “crime of violence” only if we determine that “sexual

battery” is encompassed by the “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another” clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) (hereafter referred

to as the “otherwise” clause). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).

We held just that in Mack II. Relying on our opinion in United States v.

Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Mack II panel concluded that

“sexual battery as defined in Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 categorically qualifies as a

‘violent felony’ under” the “otherwise” clause of the ACCA—a determination parallel

to the determination whether a conviction is a “crime of violence”—because § 2907.03

carries with it “a serious ‘potential’ for violence.” Mack II, 53 F.3d at 128.4

The law has changed since Mack II, however. In Begay, the Supreme Court

considered whether a New Mexico driving-under-the-influence (“DUI”) statute was

encompassed by the “otherwise” clause of the ACCA and was thus a “violent felony.”

Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. In rejecting such a characterization, the Court assumed that

DUI carries “a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” but concluded that

such a fact was not enough to categorize the crime as a “violent felony” under the

“otherwise” clause. Id. at 1584-86. Rather, as we have previously explained, the

Supreme Court determined that a crime is encompassed by the “otherwise” clause if it

is “similar in both kind and in degree of risk to the enumerated examples—burglary of

a dwelling, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives.” Bartee, 529
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 9

F.3d at 363. The Begay Court stressed that “burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes

involving the use of explosives[—t]he listed crimes[—]all typically involve purposeful,

‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct,” a trait that the DUI statute in question did not share.

Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1586. Thus, to be alike in kind to the enumerated offenses, a crime

must be “alike in the ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ nature of the conduct.”

Mosley v. United States, --- F.3d ---, 2009 WL 2176634, at *2 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1586).

In light of Begay, our decision in Mack II is no longer good law. The Mack II

panel did not consider whether the crimes included in § 2907.03 were similar both in

kind (i.e., whether § 2907.03 crimes involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct)

and in degree of risk to the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes

involving explosives. After Begay, these inquiries must be performed when determining

whether an offense is categorically a “crime of violence” under the “otherwise” clause.

See Mosley, 2009 WL 2176634, at *2.

Furthermore, applying the Begay test, we conclude that a generic conviction

under § 2907.03 is not categorically a “crime of violence” because some subsections of

§ 2907.03 can result in convictions for crimes that, while involving purposeful behavior,

do not involve aggressive and violent behavior. For example, § 2907.03(A)(5)

criminalizes a consensual sexual encounter between a woman and her 21-year-old

adopted stepson. See State v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 515 (Ohio 2007) (“Courts

examining R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) have found the statute clear and unambiguous in its

criminalization of all sexual conduct falling within its purview, regardless of a victim’s

age or consent.”). Such a consensual sexual act between adults would not be violent and

aggressive by nature, and thus would not be a “crime of violence” under the Begay test.

Initially, in its brief, the government conceded this point. Gov’t Br. at 14 (noting

that when one applies the narrow Begay test to § 2907.03 as a whole, one easily

concludes that “some permutations of the Ohio crime of sexual battery, by definition, are

not categorically violent crimes”). At oral argument, however, the government

attempted to revoke this concession and assert a new argument focused on the definition
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 10

of “forcible sex offenses” located in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, the guidelines

provision pertaining to unlawful entry to the United States. The panel requested that the

government file a letter brief on the issue and that Wynn respond. After considering

these letter briefs, we are not persuaded by the government’s new argument.

In its letter brief, the government observes that the commentary notes to § 2L1.2

and to § 4B1.2, which enumerate various per se “crimes of violence” applicable to the

term as used in each subsection, both list “forcible sex offenses” as “crimes of violence.”

Essentially, the government contends that these “forcible sex offenses” terms are

“analogous” and should be interpreted to encompass the same crimes. Gov’t Letter Br.

at 1. Moreover, the government asserts that § 2L1.2’s commentary “was amended in

November 2008 to define ‘forcible sex offenses’ as ‘including where consent to the

conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is

involuntary, incompetent, or coerced,’” and that “all convictions under . . . § 2907.03 (as

it existed in 2001 when Wynn was convicted under it) categorically fall within th[is]

definition of ‘forcible sex offenses.’” Id. Because we disagree with the government’s

initial premise, that “forcible sex offenses” under § 2L1.2 and § 4B1.2 should be read

to cover the same offenses, we reject the government’s argument.

The commentary notes of both §§ 2L1.2 and 4B1.2 enumerate various offenses

that are per se “crimes of violence.” See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2008);

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2008). Prior to the November 2008 amendment, both such

sections included “forcible sex offenses” as an enumerated offense, without further

elaboration. See id. However, the 2008 amendment added language to the “forcible sex

offenses” term of § 2L1.2: “forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the

conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is

involuntary, incompetent, or coerced).” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2008)

(emphasis added). According to the Sentencing Commission, the purpose of this

amendment is to “clarif[y] the scope of the term ‘forcible sex offense’ as that term is

used in the definition of ‘crime of violence’ in § 2L1.2.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 app. C,

amend. 722 (2008) (emphases added).
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 11

5

We express no opinion regarding whether any individual subsection of § 2907.03 categorically

constitutes a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2.

Section 4B1.2’s commentary did not receive such an amendment, even though

it was within the Sentencing Commission’s discretion so to amend that section. See

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2008). By arguing that we should apply § 2L1.2’s additional

language to § 4B1.2, the government asks us to treat § 4B1.2 as if it also were amended.

Given the fact that the Sentencing Commission failed to amend § 4B1.2 and that the

Commission specifically stated that the purpose of the 2008 amendment was to clarify

the scope of “forcible sex offenses” under § 2L1.2, the logical conclusion that we must

draw is that the Sentencing Commission did not intend for “forcible sex offenses” under

§ 4B1.2 to be defined the same way as “forcible sex offenses” under § 2L1.2. We will

not accept the government’s invitation to overrule this decision.

Moreover, such differential treatment regarding the scope of “forcible sex

offenses” between the two sections is consistent with other differences in the sections.

Even before the 2008 amendment, § 2L1.2’s commentary included both “statutory rape”

and “sexual abuse of a minor” in its list of enumerated “crimes of violence,” while

§ 4B1.2 did not specifically list those crimes. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii)

(2007); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2007). Thus, § 2L1.2’s definition of “crime of

violence” has always expressly covered more sex crimes than § 4B1.2’s definition, and

there is nothing irrational about the Sentencing Commission’s decision to continue that

approach with the 2008 amendment adding language to § 2L1.2 alone. We therefore

reject the government’s argument and conclude that a generic conviction under Ohio

Rev. Code § 2907.03 does not qualify categorically as a “crime of violence” under

§ 4B1.2.5

2. Could the District Court Conclude that Wynn’s Conviction Under Ohio

Rev. Code § 2907.03 Constituted a “Crime of Violence” by Using the

Factual Recitation in the PSR?

Even though we have determined that we cannot say categorically that a

conviction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03 is a “crime of violence,” this does not end

our inquiry. The government also asserts that, if convictions under § 2907.03(A) are not
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 12

categorically “crimes of violence,” the statute is at least ambiguous and, applying the

Taylor/Shepard exception, the district court was permitted to look to the underlying facts

of the prior conviction, as detailed in the PSR (the only evidence in the record regarding

the prior conviction), to ascertain that Wynn was convicted under § 2907.03(A)(1),

which the government contends is categorically a “crime of violence.” Wynn counters

that factual recitations in a PSR “do not fall under Taylor’s ‘narrow exception,’ and that

the government’s attempt to use [the PSR] invites the very harm that Taylor sought to

prevent: re-litigation in the present judicial proceeding of the facts underlying the

defendant’s prior conviction.” Wynn Reply Br. at 3. We find Wynn’s argument

persuasive.

The government’s argument is dependent on whether the factual recitation in a

PSR constitutes a “comparable judicial record” under Shepard that a district court can

consider in determining if a defendant’s prior conviction is a “crime of violence.” A

panel of this court has previously held, in a published opinion, that a district court’s use

of the factual description of a prior conviction contained in a PSR to determine if the

prior conviction is a “crime of violence” does “not adhere to the dictates of Taylor and

Shepard.” Bartee, 529 F.3d at 361. In Bartee, according to the amended information,

the defendant pleaded guilty to “sexual contact with another person, to-wit: Angela . . .

during the commission of another felony, to-wit: solicit[ing] minor for immoral

purposes.” Id. at 360 (alterations in original). The Bartee panel concluded that, in order

to determine that this conviction was for a “crime of violence” under the “otherwise”

clause, one necessarily had to consider the factual allegations contained in the PSR,

which explicitly noted that “Angela” was a minor when the defendant engaged in sexual

contact with her. Id. at 361. The Bartee panel noted that “the Court [in Shepard]

specifically rejected the government’s call to permit consideration of police reports and

criminal complaint applications to support a finding that the guilty plea could only have

been based on facts that would qualify the conviction as a ‘violent felony.’” Id. at 359-

60 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21). In vacating the defendant’s sentence, the panel

concluded that the factual descriptions contained in a PSR are “the sort of information
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 13

6

Additionally, in United States v. Johnson, 308 F. App’x 968 (6th Cir. 2009), when considering

whether a conviction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-103 is a “crime of violence” under the “otherwise”

clause, the panel praised the district court’s treatment of the PSR: “Although the presentence report, which

is the only evidence in the record concerning this conviction, recounts the factual basis for the conviction,

the district court properly focused on the statutory definition in concluding that the offense otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at 975 (emphasis

added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

that one might expect to find in a police report or application for criminal complaint.”

Bartee, 529 F.3d at 361.6

We are bound by Bartee. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 309 (6th

Cir. 2001) (“[A] panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The

prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United

States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc

overrules the prior decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Applying Bartee, we

conclude that it would be improper for the district court to rely on the factual recitations

in the PSR to determine that Wynn’s § 2907.03 conviction was for a “crime of violence.”

The government attempts to minimize Bartee’s application to the current case by

contending that “[n]owhere in Bartee does it indicate whether the defendant objected to

the factual recitation in the Presentence Report.” Gov’t Br. at 15. Bartee suggests in a

footnote the possibility that the defendant did not object to the PSR. Bartee, 529 F.3d

at 361 n.4 (“Nor can we conclude that the error was harmless simply because the

defendant never denied that the prior conviction involved sexual contact with a minor.”

(emphasis added)). Further, even if the defendant in Bartee had objected to the factual

recitations of the PSR, the Bartee panel did not base its conclusion regarding the PSR

on such a fact. Instead, the Bartee panel compared the factual recitations in a PSR

generally to the information contained in a police report or like materials, concluding

that the PSR contained “the sort of information that one might expect to find in a police

report or application for criminal complaint.” Id. at 361. Moreover, such a holding,

declaring PSRs to be non-Shepard documents, is consistent with Shepard’s decree that

Taylor “require[s] that evidence of [a] generic conviction be confined to records of the

convicting court,” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 23, because a PSR prepared for a federaldistrict-court sentencing can never be a record of a convicting state court.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 14

At oral argument, the government raised a new argument and contended that

everything said in Bartee regarding the use of a PSR as a Shepard document is dicta

because, in Bartee, the government did not assert that a PSR was a Shepard document.

Any failure of the government to raise a Shepard argument in Bartee does not render

Bartee’s PSR analysis dicta. A statement in a case can be considered dicta if it “was not

necessary to the determination of the issue on appeal.” United States v. Hardin, 539

F.3d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 2008). In Bartee, in order to convince the district court to treat

the defendant’s prior conviction as a “crime of violence,” “the government urged the

district court to use ‘common sense’ to infer that since the defendant had sexual contact

with Angela ‘while’ soliciting a minor, Angela must have been that minor and, therefore,

the sexual contact must have been with a minor.” Bartee, 529 F.3d at 361. As the panel

noted, this inference “could only have been drawn by considering the underlying facts”

of conviction contained in the PSR. Id. If it were appropriate for the district court to

look at the PSR and draw the necessary inference, then the Bartee panel would have had

no reason to vacate the sentence. However, reliance on the PSR by the district court

would be appropriate only if the PSR were a Shepard document. Thus, a necessary

precursor to the panel’s decision to vacate the defendant’s sentence in Bartee was its

determination that a PSR is not a Shepard document, regardless of whether the

government specifically made a Shepard argument.

In sum, we conclude that a generic conviction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03

is not categorically a “crime of violence,” and that, in the instant case, there is no

Shepard-approved document in the record that can be used to determine whether Wynn’s

specific conviction under § 2907.03 constitutes a “crime of violence.” We therefore

VACATE Wynn’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for the limited purpose

of resentencing Wynn after determining whether Wynn qualifies as a career offender in

light of Begay. On remand, the district court should not consider the factual recitations

in the PSR in order to determine whether Wynn’s § 2907.03 conviction is a “crime of

violence.” Instead, the district court should allow the government to submit further

evidence on the issue of career-offender status, so long as such evidence adheres to the

Shepard standard. See United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 455 & n.10 (6th Cir. 2009)
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 15

(allowing the government to present new evidence on remand, “[e]ven though at the

original sentencing hearing ‘[t]he government had the burdens of production and

persuasion’ to prove that defendant’s reckless endangerment conviction qualified as a

predicate felony under § 4B1.1(a), [because] its failure to do so was justified by ‘special

circumstances’—the fact that Begay had not yet been decided at the time the sentencing

hearing took place.” United States v. Goodman, 519 F.3d 310, 323 (6th Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995).”). Additionally,

because Wynn’s conviction involves crack cocaine, the district court should consider the

Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,

128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), and Spears v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009),

and any other relevant precedents.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we VACATE Wynn’s sentence and REMAND

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 16

______________________________

DISSENTING IN PART

______________________________

FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 

1. I would affirm the sentence. Unlike the court, I do not conclude “that it would

be improper for the district court to rely on the factual recitations in the PSR to

determine that Wynn’s § 2907.03 conviction was for a ‘crime of violence’”– facts which

Wynn did not challenge.

 As this court has recognized, under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26

(2005). “[W]hen the statutory definition [of the prior crime to which the defendant

pleaded guilty] is ambiguous . . . the court may examine . . . ‘the terms of the charging

document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and

defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to

some comparable judicial record of this information.’” United States v. Bartee, 529

F.3d 357, 359 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shepard). This court’s other cases similarly have

recognized that in addition to the charging document, the plea agreement or a colloquy

between judge and defendant, the sentencing judge also may consider a “comparable

judicial record.” United States v. Mosley, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 2176634, at *4 (6th

Cir. 2009). 

In criminal cases it is common practice for a defendant who wants to contest or

challenge facts set forth in the presentence report to object to them. If a defendant does

not do so, it is understood that those facts are admitted and accepted as a basis for

determining the sentence. See United States v. Carter, 355 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 2004)

(“‘The district court is allowed to accept as true all factual allegations in a presentence

report to which the defendant does not object.’”). Here the facts as set forth in the

presentence report (which the court quotes in its opinon) relating to Wynn’s prior state

court conviction for a “sexual battery” leave no doubt that the generic state crime to

which he pleaded guilty was categorically a crime of violence. 
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 17

Since Wynn has not challenged or questioned those facts, there is no valid

concern here that attempted reliance upon them would produce the kind of collateral

litigation that the Supreme Court wished to avoid when it refused to permit the district

court to utilize police reports and complaint applications for determining the character

of a state conviction. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21-23. As this court stated: “One of the

policies animating the Court’s adoption of this approach was to avoid ‘the practical

difficulties and potential unfairness’ of permitting a sentencing court to relitigate the

facts and delve into the details of a prior conviction.” United States v. Armstead, 467

F.3d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601

(1990).

Indeed, in view of Wynn’s failure to challenge those facts, it would appear that

he acknowledges their accuracy as a basis for determining his sentence.

The court states, however, that it is “bound” by our alleged holding in Bartee that

“a district court’s use of the factual description of a prior conviction contained in a PSR

to determine if the prior conviction is a ‘crime of violence’ does ‘not adhere to the

dictates of Taylor and Shepard.’” Although there are statements in the Bartee opinion

that provide support for that conclusion, I do not read Bartee as so holding or indicating,

or as requiring us so to hold.

In Bartee, the sentence-enhancing prior Michigan state conviction was for

criminal sexual conduct. That crime included sexual contact “under circumstances

involving the commission of any other felony.” The state information charged the

defendant with sexual contact with “another person to-wit: Angela” while committing

the felony of soliciting a minor for immoral purposes. The government conceded that

the crime of sexual contact of which the defendant was convicted did not require that the

contact be with a minor. It contended, however, that because the indictment charged the

defendant with sexual contact during the commission of another felony, namely,

soliciting a minor for immoral purposes, the district court properly could infer that he

was convicted of a “crime of violence” because the person with whom he had sexual

contact was the minor girl whom he was charged with soliciting for immoral purposes.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 18

This court noted that “neither the statutory definition nor the amended

information specified that the sexual contact was with a minor.” 529 F.3d at 361. It held

that although it appeared “to have been the case factually” “that since the defendant had

sexual contact with Angela ‘while’ soliciting a minor, Angela must have been that minor

and, therefore, the sexual contact must have been with a minor.” “[C]ategorically

speaking, the conviction did not necessarily require proof of sexual contact with a

minor.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

The court then pointed to certain facts “revealed” in the presentence report

relating to the sexual relationship between the defendant and Angela. It then stated:

Not only is this the sort of information that one might expect to find in

a police report or application for criminal complaint, but the government

also makes no attempt to argue that it was based on Shepard-eligible

records. While these underlying facts reflect conduct known in common

parlance as “statutory rape,” that was not the offense to which defendant

pleaded guilty. 

Id.

This court concluded that:

the district court did not adhere to the dictates of Taylor and Shepard in

determining that the prior conviction in this case was an offense

involving sexual contact with a minor. As the Court recently explained,

the categorical approach requires that “we consider the offense

generically, that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines

the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have

committed it on a particular occasion.” Begay v. United States, __ U.S.

___, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1584, 170 L. Ed.2d 490 (2008).

Id.

A footnote to the last quoted sentence includes the following statement:

Nor can we conclude that the error was harmless simply because the

defendant never denied that the prior conviction involved sexual contact

with a minor. See Shephard, 544 U.S. at 28-29, 125 S. Ct. 1254

(O’Connor, dissenting) (criticizing the majority for rejecting a “common

sense” inference that the state burglary convictions involved entry into

buildings).
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 19

Id. at 361 n.4.

I do not view the foregoing statements from Bartee or the court’s decision there

as a holding that in determining the character of the prior sentence-enhancing conviction

facts set forth in the pre-sentence report that the defendant did not challenge cannot be

considered. Bartee did not explicitly so state. Nor did the court’s decision necessarily

announce such a rule. The court did not refer to the points made in the prior discussion

of this partial dissent, which one would think it would have done if it were announcing

the broad rule that the court here attributes to it. 

It could probably be inferred, based on the statements in Bartee, that if the issue

of the use of unchallenged statements in a pre-sentence report were presented to the

Bartee panel, that panel would come out the same way that this court does in this case.

Bartee, however, did not decide that question, either explicitly or implicitly. In my

opinion, such conjectural analysis does not, could not and should not convert the Bartee

opinion into a binding ruling on that issue.

The Supreme Court’s recent case addressing this general subject, Begay v. United

States, ___ U.S. ___ ,128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), sheds no light on this issue. The question

there was whether a New Mexico conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol

constituted a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which includes in its

definition of “violent felony” a crime that is “burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use

of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.” The Supreme Court held that the state crime was not a

“violent felony” under that definition because ‘that term covers only crimes “similar”

to the listed crimes of “burglary, arson, or extortion” “rather than every crime that

‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct.

at 497.

In other words, the only question Begay addressed and decided was the scope

of the federal statutory definition of “violent felony.” Apparently there was no question

of what evidence could be considered in deciding whether the state crime of conviction

came within the definition, and the Supreme Court did not address that question.
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 20

In sum, I believe that whether the presentence report could be considered to

determine the character of Wynn’s prior conviction is an open question that we may

decide either way. For the reasons given, I would hold that consideration of those facts

would be permissible.

2. There is another aspect of the court’s opinion that troubles me. The court

states that “there is no indication in the record as to the subsection of § 2907.03 to which

Wynn pleaded guilty.” That is correct, if only the presentence report is considered. In

United States v. Alexander, however, this court dealt with the similar situation in which

the question whether a defendant’s prior state conviction constituted a categorical “crime

of violence” could not be answered by resort to the presentence report. 543 F.3d 819

(6th Cir. 2008). This court upheld an enhanced sentence based on that conviction for a

“crime of violence” because the Michigan Department of Correction, and the State

Police maintained internet databases that provided “publicly viewable criminal-history

records indicating that [the defendant] was in fact convicted of violating a specific

statutory provision that was such a crime.” Id. at 824. The court ruled that “even if the

record is not entirely clear about the precise statutory offense that served as one of the

predicate crimes, any ambiguity is readily resolved by taking judicial notice of

[defendant’s] criminal-history records.” Id. 

Similarly, it would seem that in the present case we may take judicial notice of

publicly available Ohio judicial records that show unequivocally that the state sexual

battery offense of which Wynn was convicted was a “crime of violence.” The

presentence report in this case shows that that state case was docket CR-01-403077. The

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court records show that in case no. CR-01-403077 on

July 31, 2001, the defendant:

ENTERS A PLEA OF GUILTY TO SEXUAL BATTERY, RC 2907.03

A (1) FEL-3 (SB2) AS AMENDED IN COUNT 1 OF THE

INDICTMENT. COURT FINDS THE DEFENDANT GUILTY.

(State of Ohio v. Antonio Wynn, CR-01-403077, Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas,

Docket Information) (available at http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us/ ) (Last
No. 07-4307 United States v. Wynn Page 21

checked, August 13, 2008) The state court’s records also show that the defendant was

sentenced on September 5, 2001 for the sexual battery conviction under § 2907.03(A)(1).

The Ohio criminal statute to which Wynn thus pleaded guilty states:

(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of

the offender, when ...

(1) The offender knowingly coerces the other person to

submit by any means that would prevent resistance by a

person of ordinary resolution.

Under the Begay standard discussed above, this sexual conduct was a “crime of

violence.” It thus appears that, for this additional reason, the district court here properly

enhanced Wynn’s sentence as a career criminal. Alexander indicates that even if resort

may not be had to facts about a prior conviction in the presentence report, judicial notice

still may be taken of publicly available judicial records. Alexander was decided several

months after Begay and referred to it. 543 F.3d at 824.

Alexander possibly could be distinguished on two grounds. There all of

Alexander’s “criminal history records” that established the nature of its prior conviction

apparently were cited to the court by the government. In the present case, however, it

is necessary to rely on the presentence report to ascertain the docket number of Wynn’s

state conviction. Even if the presentence report generally cannot be used to determine

the facts of the prior state sentence-enhancing conviction, I do not think that principle

would preclude resort to the presentence report for the limited purpose of determining

the docket number of that conviction. That is a fact that, in the language of Alexander,

is “not subject to reasonable debate in this case.” 543 F.3d at 824.

The other possible distinction from Alexander is that there the government

apparently submitted the state conviction information to the court, whereas here the

court itself obtained the data. That fact, however, appears to make this a stronger rather

than a weaker case than Alexander for taking judicial notice of the state information.

Here there is no possibility that the government may have given the court incorrect or

inaccurate information about a state conviction.