IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 vs. Civil Action 2:11-CV-1064 

 Magistrate Judge King 

DK 547, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This is an action for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 

101 et seq., in which plaintiffs allege that defendants DK 547, LLC 

and Dimo Kuzmanovski (“Kuzmanovski”) performed or caused to be 

performed nine (9) copyrighted musical compositions at Classics Sports 

Bar – S High St. (“Classics Sports Bar”), in Columbus, Ohio, without 

license or authority. This matter is now before the Court, with the 

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for 

consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ 

Motion”), Doc. No. 18. Plaintiffs’ Motion seeks injunctive relief, 

$45,000 in statutory damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and 

costs. Defendants, who are represented by counsel who have been 

expressly advised by the Court of the consequences of their failure to 

respond to the motion, Order, Doc. No. 20, have nevertheless filed no 

response to Plaintiffs’ Motion. 

 For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED. 

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I. Background 

 Plaintiff Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) possesses the right to 

license the public performances of numerous copyrighted musical 

compositions owned by each of the fifteen other plaintiffs in this 

action. Declaration of Renee S. Wolfe (“Wolfe Declaration”), Doc. No. 

18-1, ¶ 2. BMI alleges that defendants performed or caused to be 

performed nine (9) copyrighted compositions at Classics Sports Bar in 

Columbus, Ohio, on October 2 and 3, 2010 and March 17, 2011. 

Defendant DK 547, LLC is the legal entity that owns or controls 

Classics Sports Bar. Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set 

of Interrogatories to Defendants, Doc. No. 18-17, p. 3. Kuzmanovski 

is the sole owner of DK 547, LLC. Id. 

On the evening of October 2, 2010, in the early morning of 

October 3, 2010, and on March 17, 2010, defendant DK 547, LLC, 

operated, maintained, had the right and ability to direct and control 

the activities of, and had a direct financial interest in Classics 

Sports Bar. Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Request for 

Admissions to Defendants, Doc. No. 18-17, pp. 12, 14-15; Defendant’s 

[sic] Amended Response to Plaintiff’s [sic] Request to Admit, Doc. No. 

18-18, p. 1. Kuzmanovski held a financial interest in Classic Sports 

Bar and, as the owner, had the “ability to direct the activities of” 

and to “supervise the persons employed at Classic Sports Bar” on those 

dates. Id. However, Kuzmanovski denies having “direct control over 

the activities of” and “having the ability to supervise the persons 

employed” by Classic Sports Bar because he was not present at Classic 

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Sports Bar on the relevant dates. Defendant’s [sic] Amended Response 

to Plaintiff’s [sic] Request to Admit, pp. 1-2. 

 Sometime prior to July 2009, BMI learned that defendants were 

offering musical entertainment at Classic Sports Bar without a BMI 

license. Declaration of Lawrence E. Stevens (“Stevens Declaration”), 

Doc. No. 18-11, ¶ 3. On July 10, 2009, BMI sent a letter to 

Kuzmanovski at Classics Sports Bar advising that a license was 

required to publically perform copyrighted music and offering a 

license to publicly perform BMI affiliated music. Letter Dated July 

10, 2009, Doc. No. 18-14, p. 1. From October 8, 2009 through March 

18, 2010, BMI sent approximately seven letters to defendants informing 

them that a license was required to publicly perform BMI copyrighted 

musical works. Stevens Declaration, ¶¶ 3-5; Letters, Doc. No. 18-14, 

pp. 3-10. In much of the correspondence, plaintiffs offered terms of 

a license that would authorize the public performance of BMI’s music 

at Classics Sports Bar. See Stevens Declaration, ¶¶ 3-5. Letters 

sent on May 3, June 30, July 19 and September 20, 2010 and on January 

17 and on March 4, 2011 directed defendants to cease and desist all 

use of BMI licensed music at Classics Sports Bar. Id. at ¶¶ 3-6; 

Letters, Doc. No. 18-14, pp. 12-20. A letter dated July 1, 2010 

notified defendants that a BMI music researcher had visited Classic 

Sports Bar and had confirmed that defendants were “publicly performing 

music which would require a public performance license.” Letter Dated 

July 1, 2010, Doc. No. 18-14, p. 15. 

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In addition to the letters sent to defendants, BMI’s licensing 

personnel telephoned Classics Sports Bar on twenty-nine (29) 

occasions. Stevens Declaration, ¶ 8. 

Defendants did not respond to plaintiffs’ letters, see id. at ¶¶ 

3, 5; Letters, Doc. No. 18-14, pp. 12-24, and at no time have 

defendants entered into a licensing agreement with BMI. Stevens 

Declaration, ¶ 9. 

 On October 2, 2010, plaintiffs sent an investigator, Scott 

Farkas, to Classics Sports Bar to make an audio recording and written 

report of the music being publicly performed at that establishment. 

Id. at ¶ 10. According to plaintiffs, that investigation revealed 

that defendants publicly performed five BMI copyrighted works on the 

evening of October 2, 2010 and in the early morning hours of October 

3, 2010. Id.; Certified Infringement Report, Doc. No. 18-13. 

On March 17, 2011, plaintiffs sent a second investigator, Robert 

Allman, to Classics Sports Bar to make an audio recording and written 

report of the music being publicly performed at that establishment. 

Stevens Declaration, ¶ 12. According to plaintiffs, that 

investigation revealed that defendants publicly performed six BMI 

copyrighted compositions on March 17, 2011. Id.; Certified 

Infringement Report, Doc. No. 19. In a letter dated April 25, 2011, 

plaintiffs advised defendants of the results of their investigation 

and offered to resolve the matter by entering into a license agreement 

in exchange for payment of outstanding licensing fees and costs of the 

investigation in the amount of $11,613.12. Letter Dated April 25, 

2011, Doc. No. 18-14, p. 21; Stevens Declaration, ¶ 13. 

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 According to Lawrence E. Stevens, Assistant Vice President of 

General Licensing for BMI, 

[h]ad the [d]efendants entered into an agreement at the 

time BMI first contacted them in July 2009, the blanket 

license fees from July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010 would 

have been approximately $4,617.00; the blanket license fees 

from July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011 would have been 

approximately $4,779.00; the blanket license fees from July 

1, 2011 through June 30, 2012 would have been approximately 

$4,779.00; and the blanket license fees for the year 

commencing July 1, 2012 would have been approximately 

4,833.00. 

Stevens Declaration, ¶ 18. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion seeks an injunction against further 

infringement, statutory damages in the amount of $5,000.00 for each of 

the nine alleged copyright infringements, costs and attorney’s fees 

and interest on the judgment. 

II. Standard 

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This 

standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which provides in pertinent part: “The court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Rule 56(a), summary 

judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. In making this determination, the evidence “must be viewed 

in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. 

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie 

if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, “that is, if the 

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evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing 

party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The “mere existence of a scintilla of 

evidence in support of the [opposing party’s] position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [opposing party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

 The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions” of the record which 

demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “Once the moving party has proved that no 

material facts exist, the non-moving party must do more than raise a 

metaphysical or conjectural doubt about issues requiring resolution at 

trial.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th 

Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). 

III. Discussion 

As noted supra, defendants have not responded to Plaintiffs’ 

Motion; the facts stated in the affidavits and other papers submitted 

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in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion will therefore be accepted as true by 

the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

 A. Infringement 

To establish a claim for copyright infringement of a 

musical work by means of public performance, a claimant 

must prove: (1) the originality and authorship of a 

composition; (2) a valid copyright under the formalities of 

the Copyright Act; (3) claimant's ownership of the 

copyright at issue; (4) defendant's public performance of 

the composition; and (5) defendant's failure to obtain 

permission from the claimant for such performance. 

Jobete Music Co., Inc. v. Johnson Communc’ns, Inc., 285 F.Supp.2d 

1077, 1082 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Varry White Music. V. Banana Joe’s 

of Akron, Inc., No. 5:01CV1074, 2002 WL 32026609 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 

2002)). See also Superhype Pub., Inc. v. Vasiliou, 838 F.Supp. 1220, 

1224 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 

 Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Renee Wolfe, a BMI 

attorney, to establish the first three elements of their claim. Wolfe

Declaration, Doc. No. 18-1. Ms. Wolfe’s declaration references the 

Schedule attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, which lists the 

musical works allegedly infringed and the registration dates and 

numbers for each; the Wolfe Declaration also attaches registration 

certificates issued by the United States Copyright Office for the 

musical works as well as documentation relating to the chain of 

ownership of each copyrighted work. See Wolfe Declaration, ¶ 4 and 

attachments (Doc. Nos. 18-1 – 18-10). Defendants have not 

controverted this evidence, nor have they otherwise created a genuine 

issue of material fact regarding plaintiffs' ownership of valid 

copyrights in the songs at issue in this litigation. Plaintiffs have 

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therefore established their ownership of valid copyrights in the nine 

songs allegedly infringed. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 

 As to the fourth element, i.e., the defendants’ public 

performance of the copyrighted works, plaintiffs have submitted two 

“Certified Infringement Report[s]” as evidence of that element. 

Certified Infringement Report, Doc. No. 18-12; Certified Infringement 

Report, Doc. No. 19. The Certified Infringement Reports were prepared 

by Scott Farkas and Robert Allman, who visited Classics Sports Bar on 

October 2 and 3, 2010 and on March 17, 2011, respectively, and who 

documented that BMI works were publicly performed at that 

establishment on those dates. Certified Infringement Report, Doc. No. 

18-12; Certified Infringement Report, Doc. No. 19; Stevens 

Declaration, ¶¶ 10, 12. Again, defendants have presented no 

contradictory evidence. The Court therefore concludes that the 

“public performance” element of plaintiffs’ claims has been satisfied. 

 Finally, defendants did not have a BMI license to publicly 

perform the copyrighted music on October 2, 2010, October 3, 2010, or 

March 17, 2011. See Stevens Declaration, ¶ 4; Defendants’ Responses 

to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Admissions to Defendants, Doc. No. 

18-17, p. 20. The Court therefore expressly finds that defendants 

lacked plaintiffs’ permission to perform BMI copyrighted music. 

 Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding 

plaintiffs’ copyright infringement claims and plaintiffs are entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law on those claims. 

 

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 B. Liability 

 Having concluded that plaintiffs established unlawful 

infringement, the Court now turns to the issue of defendants’ 

liability. Plaintiffs argue that DK 547, LLC and Kuzmanovski are 

jointly and severally liable for infringement at Classics Sports Bar. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion, pp. 7-9. 

In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 

417 (1984), the United States Supreme Court observed that 

[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 

for infringement committed by another. . . . [However,] 

vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of 

the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is 

merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the 

circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 

accountable for the actions of another. 

Id. at 434–435. Accordingly, DK 547, LLC, as the entity that 

operated, maintained, had a direct financial interest in, and had the 

right and ability to direct and control the activities of Classics 

Sports Bar on October 2 and 3, 2010 and on March 17, 2011, is liable 

for the infringement regardless of whether it had actual knowledge of 

the music played on those dates. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 

Branham, No. C-1-80-124, 1982 WL 1271, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1982) 

(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 

(1975) (“The entrepreneur who sponsors such a public performance for 

profit is also an infringer . . . .”)). 

 Defendant Kuzmanovski is the president and owner of DK 547, LLC. 

“Courts within virtually every circuit, including the Sixth Circuit, 

have adopted a two-prong test to determine whether a corporate officer 

is jointly and severally liable with the corporation for copyright 

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infringement.” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Rooster’s Inc., No. 04-140-

DLB, 2006 WL 335583, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 14, 2006) (citing Jobete 

Music Co., 285 F.Supp.2d at 1083). See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 

H.S.I., Inc., No. C2-06-482, 2007 WL 4207901, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 

26, 2007) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 

Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)). 

[F]or a corporate officer to be vicariously liable, he must 

possess: (1) the right and ability to supervise the 

infringing activity, and (2) a direct financial interest in 

such activities. Thus, under this standard, liability for 

copyright infringement is not limited to those individuals 

who directly engage in infringing activity. 

Rooster’s Inc., 2006 WL 335583, at *3 (citing Jobete Music Co., 285 

F.Supp.2d at 1083). 

 Defendant Kuzmanovski has admitted that he held a financial 

interest in Classic Sports Bar and that, as the owner, he had the 

“ability to direct the activities of” and to “supervise the persons 

employed at Classic Sports Bar” on the evening of October 2, 2010, in 

the early morning hours of October 3, 2010, and on March 17, 2010. It 

is of no legal consequence that he was not present at Classic Sports 

Bar when the alleged infringements occurred. See Broadcast Music, 

Inc. v. Nolan Enters., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-705, 2013 WL 143370, at *3 

(S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2013). Defendant Kuzmanovski is therefore also 

vicariously liable for the infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights on 

those dates. 

 C. Injunctive Relief 

 Plaintiffs ask that the Court enjoin defendants from further 

unauthorized public performances of BMI’s copyrighted music. The 

Copyright Act authorizes temporary or final injunctive relief as a 

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remedy for infringement “on such terms as [the court] may deem 

reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 

U.S.C. § 502(a). It is well established “that a showing of past 

infringement and a substantial likelihood of future infringement 

justifies issuance of a permanent injunction.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. 

v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470, 492 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and 

quotations omitted). “Not only is the issuance of a permanent 

injunction justified ‘when a copyright plaintiff has established a 

threat of continuing infringement, he is entitled to an injunction.’” 

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 

F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Otherwise, awarding damages without 

injunctive relief would amount to a “̔forced license to use the 

creative work of another.’” Id. (quoting Silverstein v. Penguin 

Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2004)). 

 In the case presently before the Court, plaintiffs have 

established past infringement by defendants. Further, defendants have 

persistently disregarded plaintiffs’ invocation of their rights and of 

plaintiffs’ offer to license their copyrighted works. Under these 

circumstances, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have established a 

substantial likelihood of future infringement by defendants. See 

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Pub Dayton, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-58, 2011 WL 

2118228, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio May 27, 2011). 

 Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining 

defendants from publicly performing BMI’s copyrighted music without a 

license. 

 

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 D. Statutory Damages 

 Plaintiffs also seek statutory damages of $5,000 for each of the 

nine claimed infringements. The Copyright Act permits an award of 

statutory damages in lieu of actual damages attributable to the 

infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(c). Statutory damages for each 

individual act of infringement ordinarily ranges from $750 to $30,000. 

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Where the copyright owner establishes willful 

infringement, however, the Court may increase the award of statutory 

damages to $150,000 per infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). “The 

Court has substantial discretion to set statutory damages within the 

permitted range, but it is not without guidance.” H.S.I., Inc., 2007 

WL 4207901 at *4 (citing Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210 

(1935)). When determining the proper amount of statutory damages, 

“̔courts have looked to: (1) whether [d]efendants' infringement was 

willful, knowing, or innocent; (2) [d]efendants' profit from 

infringement; (3) [p]laintiffs' loss from infringement; and (4) 

deterring future violations by [d]efendants and similarly situated 

entities.’” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 4737 Dixie Highway, LLC, No. 

1:12-cv-506, 2012 WL 4794052, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2012) (quoting 

H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 4207901 at *6). 

 In an action for copyright infringement, 

“willfully” means with knowledge that the defendant’s 

conduct constitutes copyright infringement. Otherwise, 

there would be no point in providing specially for the 

reduction of minimum awards in the case of innocent 

infringement, because any infringement that was nonwillful 

would necessarily be innocent. This seems to mean, then, 

that one who has been notified that his conduct constitutes 

copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good 

faith believes the contrary, is not “willful” for these 

purposes. 

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Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 

1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

 This is a case of willful infringement. Beginning in July 2009, 

BMI sent defendants approximately fourteen letters and called Classics 

Sports Bar 29 times demanding that defendants secure a license in 

order to lawfully perform BMI’s copyrighted music. BMI also directed 

defendants on multiple occasions to cease and desist all use of BMI 

licensed music at Classics Sports Bar. Defendants’ receipt of these 

communications before the date of the claimed infringements 

demonstrates that each infringement was in fact willful. See 4737 

Dixie Highway, LLC, 2012 WL 4794052 at *3; H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 

4207901 at *5; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Leyland Co., LLC, No. 

5:11CV2264, 2012 WL 5879838, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2012); Pub 

Dayton, LLC, 2011 WL 2118228 at *3. 

 With regard to profits and losses associated with the 

infringements, plaintiffs have established more than $15,000 in lost 

licensing fees from July 1, 2009 to the present. The Court concludes 

that this amount sufficiently establishes defendants’ costs savings as 

well as plaintiffs’ loss. See 4737 Dixie Highway, LLC, 2012 WL 

4794052 at *3; Pub Dayton, LLC, 2011 WL 2118228 at *3-4. 

 As to the amount of the award, “̔in the narrow class of cases 

dealing with willful, unauthorized, musical performances in public 

establishments, the damages awards range from two times the licensing 

fee to five times the licensing fee.’” 4737 Dixie Highway, LLC, 2012 

WL 4794052 at *4 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DeGallo, Inc., 872 

F.Supp. 167, 169 (D.N.J. 1995)). “In fact, cases within this Circuit 

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have recognized that the method of awarding statutory damages 

based ̔on some multiple of unpaid fees is more appropriate than 

measuring damages by the number of infringements.’” Id. (quoting 

H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 4207901 at *6 (awarding “statutory damages of 

three times the unpaid fees”)). 

Plaintiffs’ request for statutory damages of $5,000 per 

infringement, for a total award of $45,000, is less than three times 

the amount of plaintiffs’ lost licensing fees. The Court concludes 

that this amount is reasonable under the circumstances. “If the 

Copyright Act is ̔to have any effect, judgment against defendant[s] 

must be appreciably more than the amount [they] would have had to 

expend to obtain appropriate permission.’” H.S.I., Inc., 2007 WL 

4207901 at *6 (quoting Music City Music v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., 616 

F.Supp. 1001, 1003 (E.D. Va. 1985)). “Defendants ̔should be put on 

notice that it costs less to obey the copyright laws than to violate 

them.’” Id. (quoting Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 623 F.Supp. 

889, 892 (W.D. Pa. 1985)). Defendants had actual notice for more than 

a year that their public performance of BMI-licensed music without 

license or permission constitutes copyright infringement. Defendants 

nevertheless refused to secure a license. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that statutory damages in the 

amount of $45,000, which constitutes an award of $5,000 for each of 

the nine claimed infringements, properly accounts for defendants' 

gain, plaintiffs' loss, and the interest of the Copyright 

Act in deterring future violations. 

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E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 

 Finally, plaintiffs seek an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees 

and costs. The Court is vested with the discretion to award fees to 

the prevailing party in a copyright infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 

505. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 

identified a series of factors to consider in determining whether to 

award attorney fees, including such factors as “̔frivolousness, 

motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the 

legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances 

to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.’” Zomba 

Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 589 (6th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)). 

“The grant of fees and costs ̔is the rule rather than the exception 

and they should be awarded routinely.’” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB 

Music Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Positive Black 

Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 380 (5th Cir. 

2004)). 

 In the case presently before the Court, defendants willfully 

infringed plaintiffs’ statutory rights despite numerous warnings that 

a license was required in order to publicly perform BMI works. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

 “It is well settled law that the ‘lodestar’ approach is the 

proper method for determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ 

fees.” Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v. 

Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing 

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Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 

U.S. 546, 563 (1986)). The lodestar approach multiplies the number of 

hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (quoting 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). There is a “strong 

presumption” that this figure is a reasonable fee. Id. (quoting 

Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565). 

 The Declaration of Ronald H. Isroff (“Isroff Declaration”), Doc. 

No. 18-15, itemizes attorneys’ fees in the amount of $10,681.001

 and 

costs in the amount of $350.00, for a total of $11,031.00. Isroff 

Declaration, pp. 2-11. According to the Isroff Declaration, attorney 

Ronald Isroff charged an hourly rate in 2011, 2012 and 2013 of $455, 

$470, and $480, respectively, and attorney Christine E. Watchorn 

charged an hourly rate of $280, $305 and $320 in 2011, 2012 and 2013, 

respectively. Id. at ¶ 9. The Isroff Declaration avers that these 

fees and costs were 

reasonable and necessary to advance [p]laintiffs’ interest 

in this matter given the level of experience of the 

lawyers, the time and labor required in light of the fees 

customarily charged in this locality for similar legal 

services. 

 

Id. at ¶ 10. Again, defendants offer no contradictory evidence. The 

Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ 

fees and costs, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, in the amount of 

$11,031.00. 

 

1

 $10,681 represents the total amount billed by attorneys Ronald Isroff and 

Christine Watchorn. Isroff Declaration, pp. 2-11. Attorney Isroff billed 

$3,032 for 1.8 hours in 2011, 4.3 hours in 2012 and 0.40 hours in 2013. Id. 

Attorney Watchorn billed $7,649.00 for 1.90 hours in 2011, 22.60 in 2012 and 

0.70 hours in 2013. Id. 

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WHEREUPON, and based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 18, is GRANTED. 

 Defendants DK 547, LLC, and Dimo Kuzmanovski are PERMANENTLY 

ENJOINED from publicly performing BMI’s copyrighted music without a 

license. 

 Plaintiffs are AWARDED statutory damages from defendants DK 547, 

LLC, and Dimo Kuzmanovski in the amount of $45,000. 

 Plaintiffs are AWARDED attorneys’ fees and costs from defendants 

DK 547, LLC, and Dimo Kuzmanovski in the amount of $11,031.00. 

The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiffs and 

against defendants DK 547, LLC, and Dimo Kuzmanovski. 

April 15, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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