SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

March 25, 2010 

LETTER FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Projects to Develop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces 

(SIGIR 10-009) 

This report is to bring to your attention the concerns of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) about a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq1 (MNSTC-I) 

program to develop the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (SOF). About $326 million was 

obligated from the Iraq Security Forces Fund to develop these forces. 

We reviewed two contracts awarded to provide the Iraqi SOF with a counter-terrorism 

communications network and intelligence database. Together, the contracts were to provide: 

• a secure communications network known as the Counter-Terrorism Network, or CTNET, 

that links major counter-terrorism centers in Iraq;

• a software system (known as Memex) that uses CTNET to consolidate field reports to 

identify terrorist networks, targets, and their activities; and

• training in the use and maintenance of both systems.

The CTNET contract ended in June 2008 and the Memex contract ended in February 2009. The 

two contracts together had a total cost of about $19.3 million. The CTNET and its associated 

Memex software appear to be available to the Iraqi SOF. However, SIGIR has the following 

concerns:

• SIGIR’s audit work found that the CTNET is only being used at 5 of 252

 sites that were 

to be connected to the network. In written comments on a draft of our report, USF-I 

stated that CTNET is operational at 17 locations. However, it acknowledged that many 

of these locations are not the locations identified in the contract. Moreover, Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) did not modify the contract to 

authorize changes to planned locations. Changing contract requirements without 

modifying the contract impairs accountability and adds significant risks for MNSTC-I. 

Because United States Force-Iraq (USF-I) did not provide information about CTNET at 

other sites until after audit field work was complete, we were unable to conduct checks 

on the other locations. 

 

1

 MNSTC-I was subsumed into U.S. Forces-Iraq, which replaced the Multi-National Force-Iraq on January 1, 2010 2

 As of October 22, 2009 
2 

• Nearly $1 million worth of satellite communications equipment consisting of 18 units, 

one for each of the provincial coordination centers, is either not being used, or is missing. 

Possible reasons the Iraqis are not using the systems include poor training of Iraqi SOF 

personnel in the use and maintenance of the systems, and the high operating costs of the 

systems. 

• Memex is being used at only 5 of 63 sites that were to have data analysis capability, and 

none of those are in use at their full intended capacity. We found that of the five sites 

operating, the current capacity ranges from 6% to 38% of what officials intended. In 

comments on a draft of this report, USF-I said that a sixth site has since been added and 

that the Iraqis have funded a new contract to provide both on-site technical support, and 

also maintenance that should increase use of the system. 

• Both the CTNET and Memex contracts’ statements of work were poorly written and we 

had difficulty obtaining information on the contracts. For example, the CTNET contract 

contained conflicting instructions on government-furnished equipment, and both 

contracts lacked milestones for some deliverables. Further, even after the completion of 

the contracts, officials from MNSTC-I’s Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism ForceTransition Team (INCTF-TT) could not provide reliable information on the number of 

troops trained or the operational status of equipment purchased. 

• Much of the documentation for the CTNET and Memex contracts that is required by the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation is either missing, incomplete, or of such poor quality that 

it is difficult to determine the contract requirements. It was also difficult to determine 

whether MNSTC-I exercised appropriate contract oversight due to the lack of 

documentation. As a result of poor oversight, one INCTF-TT official explained that they 

are not certain what has been delivered under the contracts and directed SIGIR to the 

contractor for information pertaining to which sites are operational, and how many 

servers are at each site. 

Background 

Since 2003, the Congress has appropriated $18.04 billion in Iraqi Security Forces Funding to 

support the development of the Iraqi Security Forces. Of this total, about $333 million was 

appropriated to train and equip the Iraqi SOF from 2004 to 2009. The Iraqi SOF fall under the 

Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC), which responds to target priorities and mission execution 

orders conveyed by the Prime Minister, through the Counter-Terrorism Service (formerly the 

Counter Terrorism Bureau).4

 The CTC is also responsible for integrating intelligence and 

providing command and control of counter-terrorism operations nationwide. Under the direction 

of the CTC, the Iraqi SOF operational mission specializes in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency tactics. 

 

3

 As of November 14, 2009 

4

 The Counter-Terrorism Service advises the Prime Minister on counter-terrorism issues and develops the Iraqi 

Counter-Terrorism National Strategy, policies, and procedures. 
3 

Responsibility for organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces belongs to the 

Commander, U.S. Central Command. As of January 1, 2010, these duties are now carried out by 

one of the Central Command’s subordinate commands, USF-I. Prior to January 1 these duties 

were carried out by the U.S. Central Command’s former subordinate command, the MultiNational Force-Iraq, under which MNSTC-I was responsible for training and equipping the Iraqi 

SOF. JCC-I/A executed contracts for MNSTC-I to train and equip the Iraqi SOF. 

Developing a Communications Network and an Intelligence Software System 

MNSTC-I’s project to develop the Iraqi SOF communications network and intelligence software 

system was accomplished through two related contracts, both awarded by the JCC-I/A. The first 

of two contracts reviewed (W91GY0-07-D-0015) was awarded to Astro Systems, Inc. in May 

2007, to design, install, and maintain a secure communications network at 25 locations in Iraq 

(18 Joint Provincial Coordination Centers, 4 Regional Coordination Centers, the Iraqi CounterTerrorism Bureau, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command Headquarters, and the Iraqi SOF 

Brigade Headquarters), and to train Iraqi counter-terrorism personnel in its maintenance and use. 

The training requirement included developing a training facility, training curriculum and course 

materials, and conducting training classes. The contract was awarded for an initial period of 

eight months, with one six-month option period. 

The second of two contracts reviewed (W91GY0-07-C-0009) was awarded to Nour USA in 

January 2007. The contract was to install a database software program, known as Memex, which 

provides a platform for intelligence analysis. Memex was designed to analyze information on an 

individual to determine if there are links to insurgents or terrorist organizations, such as family 

ties, business associations, or political background. The initial requirement was to install Memex 

at five locations, but the contract was later modified to six locations, including the Iraqi 

Counterterrorism Center, two Iraqi SOF Brigade Headquarters, and three Regional Coordination 

Centers. The sites were to have access to Memex through the CTNET. 

The CTNET and Memex Systems Are Not Being Used to Full 

Potential 

After two years of effort and the expenditure of approximately $19.3 million, the CTNET and its 

associated Memex software appear to be available to the Iraqi SOF, albeit at a greatly reduced 

capability. CTNET for instance, is only being used at 5 of 25 sites that were to be connected to 

the network, and the Memex software is only operational at 5 of 6 sites that were to have data 

analysis capability. After significant delays and missed timelines, much of the equipment is now 

available for use; however, SIGIR found that it is only minimally utilized by the Iraqi SOF. 

In order to transmit classified information and connect regional and provincial coordination 

centers, 18 Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) kits were provided to the Iraqis. 

However, according to an INCTF-TT official, these satellite communication kits are not in use, 

and an Iraqi official has locked 16 of them away at the Regional Centers. Furthermore, he noted 

that 2 of the 18 BGAN kits cannot be located. Each BGAN system costs $54,000, and together 

the 18 kits comprise nearly $1 million dollars worth of equipment that is not being used or has 

been lost. Overall, INCTF-TT officials believe that the Iraqis may not be using the BGAN 

systems because of the high cost. 
4 

While there are five sites that have Memex operating, an INCTF-TT official stated that none of 

those are in use at their full intended capacity. We were told by an Iraqi official that Iraqi SOF 

personnel sometimes have to choose between running the air conditioner or powering the 

Memex equipment due to electrical shortages. We found that of the five sites operating, the 

current capacity ranges from 6% to 38% of what officials intended. Throughout the life of the 

contract, there were four different configurations, with sites added and removed three different 

times. This included removing a site one month prior to the expiration of the contract. 

While the contractor did provide training classes to Iraqi personnel on the CTNET system, 

attendance varied to the point where the contractor could not track the personnel that were 

supposed to graduate from the training classes. MNSTC-I officials considered training as critical 

to the successful operation of the system after the contract conclusion date. If training classes 

had been attended on a regular basis by Iraqi personnel, the CTNET would have a better chance 

to succeed. The total cost of training classes and materials for the CTNET was over $1.7 

million, and without full commitment by the Iraqis to attend class, this money was at a 

significant risk of waste. 

Training was an integral part of the Memex contract to promote a successful transition of the 

Memex software to designated Iraqi SOF personnel. Both INCTF-TT and Iraqi officials think 

initial training of the workforce by Nour USA, Inc was of high quality. However, one Iraqi 

official noted that training continues to be an issue at nearly every site due to the availability of 

personnel to be trained. Under the current situation, soldiers may be pulled away from training 

to participate in other activities deemed more pressing. As a result, a soldier may receive only 

hours of instruction on the system out of one day of training. The absence of continuity in 

training prevents Iraqi SOF personnel from completing the curriculum, retaining much of the 

information, or advancing to higher level courses. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, dated March 13, 2010, USF-I did not concur with 

the information on the number of sites with an operating CTNET system. According to USF-I, 

the CTNET is currently operating at 17 locations rather than the 5 sites identified by SIGIR. 

However, USF-I acknowledged that many of these locations are different from the 18 Provincial 

Joint Coordination Centers where CTC planned to locate the equipment when the contract was 

originally awarded. USF-I did not provide this information until after we issued the draft report 

to the agency for comment, so we were unable to conduct further checks. However, we remain 

concerned about this issue for several reasons. First, MNSTC-I officials did not provide 

information on the equipment’s location during our field work. Second, based on USF-I’s 

comments, the terms of the contract were changed without modifying the contract. The lack of a 

properly modified contract impairs our ability to verify the explanation provided in the 

comments. Third, without a modified contract MNSTC-I had no record of the change in plans, 

and once the individuals responsible for the project left the theater, MNSTC-I could not provide 

evidence of what was achieved by the contract. 

Weak Contract Administration and Oversight 

Much of the documentation for the CTNET and Memex contracts that is required by the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation is either missing, incomplete, or of such poor quality that it is difficult to 
5 

determine the contract requirements, or whether MNSTC-I exercised appropriate contract 

oversight. The contract administration and oversight problems that SIGIR found include: 

• While the CTNET contract required Astro Systems, Inc. to provide regular status 

updates, the majority of the daily, weekly, and monthly situation reports were missing or 

never completed. One Contracting Officer’s Representative’s (COR) memorandum for 

record noted that daily situation reports were never submitted from September 19, 2007 

through February 8, 2008. Moreover, if daily situation reports were submitted after 

February 15, 2008, they were not documented in the CTNET contract files. Furthermore, 

JCC-I/A was able to provide only 12 daily reports for a contract that lasted from May 

2007 through June 2008, accounting for approximately 3% of required daily reports. 

While we are unable to determine if the contractor did not submit the reports as required 

or if the COR did not keep accurate records of correspondence, failure to follow internal 

controls made the CTNET program more vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. The 

amount of missing documentation constitutes a material weakness in contract 

management and left MNSTC-I vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

• The Memex contract failed to include contractor reporting criteria and a quality assurance 

plan, significantly increasing the overall risk for fraud, waste, and mismanagement. 

According to JCC-I/A officials, a subject matter expert in intelligence databases from 

Great Britain wrote the original statement of work, and they attributed the lack of quality 

assurance to his unfamiliarity with American contracting laws. The lack of required 

contractor reports led to inconsistent tracking of the project’s status and overall progress. 

Furthermore, over 20 months into the contract, an incoming contracting officer conducted 

a file review of the contract and noted seven pre-award action discrepancies. These 

discrepancies included no evidence of acquisition planning, no evidence of market 

research, no evidence of a technical review of the offeror’s proposal, no price 

reasonableness memo, and no evidence of a notice posted in accordance with Federal 

Acquisition Regulation 5.201 of contract action, which requires the publication of a 

proposed contract action for acquisition of supplies and services. Without clear evidence 

of fair and reasonable proposals and market research in the contract files, we cannot be 

certain that Nour USA was the best option for providing the Iraqi SOF with an 

intelligence database system. 

• A poorly written statement of work for the CTNET contract resulted in delays and a lack 

of adequate oversight. Unclear language in the statement of work on the provision of 

government-furnished equipment led to disagreements between the CORs and the 

contractor over what equipment each party was supposed to provide. Because the 

statement of work was vague, the government entered into a second contract for CTNET 

equipment that probably should have been provided under the original contract with 

Astro Systems, Inc. In addition to the possibly unnecessary expenses, it also led to 

significant delays early in the contract. Two contracting officers and two CORs 

responsible for the CTNET contract expressed frustration with the contract and statement 

of work, and believed that the vague contract hampered overall project success. Since the 

contract lacked milestones, contracting officers and CORs spent significant amounts of 

time negotiating the terms of the contract. Without clearly defined benchmarks, it is 

difficult to measure progress of work and hold the contractor accountable for delays. 
6 

• Two JCC-I/A officials stated that neither the CTNET nor the Memex contracts would 

have met standards for quality assurance and internal controls in the United States. The 

officials stated that they would have rejected both contracts and attributed the contract 

discrepancies and poor file administration to COR inexperience and operating in a 

contingency environment. 

Conclusion 

The lack of commitment from the Iraqi Government to provide soldiers for training makes it 

difficult for the projects to succeed. In these cases, Iraqi soldiers did not report for training, 

consequently the systems provided are not being used as MNSTC-I expected, potentially leading 

to waste. We also believe that moving forward with contracts to improve the capabilities of the 

Iraqi security forces when the contracts do not clearly define milestones or require regular 

contractor updates creates inherent program and cost risks. Moreover, poor contract 

management on these contracts combined with lack of training attendance and poorly written 

contracts contributed to the contracts failing to achieve their desired outcomes. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq take the following actions: 

1. Assist the Counter-Terrorism Service in developing a plan to use the equipment provided to 

them under these two contracts. The plan should focus on achieving full operational 

capability for both CTNET and Memex. This plan should identify each party's roles and 

responsibilities, a time line for achieving the goals, and Iraqi SOF training needs for the 

systems. If the Counter-Terrorism Service (formerly the Counter-Terrorism Bureau) is 

unable to operate or configure the systems in the manner envisioned under the contracts, 

determine if the systems can be operated or configured in a manner consistent with the goal 

of increasing the operational capability of the Counter-Terrorism Service. 

2. Conduct a review of the CTNET and Memex contract files and develop a plan for addressing 

the deficiencies identified in this report for these contracts and future contracts. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

SIGIR provided two drafts of this report to USF-I for comment. The first draft was issued to the 

USF-I Commanding General on January 7, 2010, and USF-I provided comments on January 17, 

2010. However, the comments received did not directly address the findings contained in our 

draft report. Following discussions with senior Joint Forces Special Operations Component 

Command-Iraq officials, USF-I agreed to a second opportunity to comment on the draft. During 

the same discussions, SIGIR agreed to modify one of our draft recommendations to better reflect 

the possible options for addressing our concerns. SIGIR provided the revised draft report to the 

command for comment, and USF-I resubmitted its comments on March 13, 2010. 

In written comments to the second draft of this letter report, USF-I did not concur with the 

information on the number of sites with CTNET capabilities. However, it acknowledged that 

many of these locations are not the locations identified in the contract. There were no 
7 

modifications to the contract that indicate changes in these locations, and because we did not 

receive information about these sites until after field work was complete, we were unable to 

conduct further checks on the locations. 

USF-I also stated in its comments that we are correct that 2 BGAN systems are “unlocated” and 

the other 16 are not being used. USF-I reiterated its earlier point that the recurring cost of 

commercial satellite usage to operate the BGAN is beyond the fiscal capability of the CounterTerrorism Service to fund. Thus, the nearly $1 million spent purchasing this equipment is 

wasted. 

Finally, USF-I stated that Memex is currently operational at six locations, one more location than 

the five SIGIR reported. This change occurred since SIGIR completed its field work. USF-I 

also said that the Counter-Terrorism Service has taken steps increase its Memex usage by 

contracting for on-site technical support, Memex server maintenance, and the installation of 

Memex at a seventh site. 

USF-I provided technical comments to the report and we have made changes in the report where 

appropriate. USF-I’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix D. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact David Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, (703) 604-0982/ 

david.warren@sigir.mil or Glenn Furbish, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector General for 

Audits, (703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 
8 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

Scope and Methodology 

In June 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

9023 to review the contracts supporting the equipping and training of Iraqi Special Operations 

Forces (SOF). SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to determine: (1) whether the contracts 

met their intended goal (results) and their overall cost; and (2) the extent to which the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq has taken appropriate steps to ensure proper 

administration and oversight of the contracts, to include whether adequate controls were in place 

to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. SIGIR issued this report as an interim report to 

bring SIGIR concerns regarding two contracts to the attention of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I). This 

audit was performed by SIGIR under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work during June 2009 through January 2010 in Baghdad, 

Iraq. 

To accomplish our objectives, we visited or held discussions with officials, and reviewed 

documents and data from the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and the Iraqi Military. Officials at 

these organizations included senior Iraqi and U.S. military officials, contracting officers, and 

contracting officers’ representatives. We visited the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Bureau (now the 

Counter-Terrorism Service) in September 2009, which advises the Prime Minister in counterterrorism issues and develops the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism National Strategy, policies, and 

procedures. 

To determine outcomes of the contract, we obtained and analyzed relevant programmatic 

documents and other information on contractor’s performance. These sources included 

contractor reports on the work performed and prior audit reports relevant to the work being 

performed. To determine costs we obtained and analyzed relevant contract, financial, and other 

information from JCC-I/A and MNSTC-I. This information includes the basic contract, 

modifications, and invoices submitted by contractors for work. We reviewed and summarized 

contract obligations and expenditures data received from contracting officials. We compared 

initial cost estimates and periods of performance with actual costs and status of performance. We 

also conducted surveys with prior contracting officers and contracting officers’ representatives, 

and we conducted interviews with senior MNSTC-I officials from the Iraqi National CounterTerrorism Force-Transition Team as well as senior Iraqi military and civilian personnel. 

To determine the adequacy of contract management and oversight, we obtained and analyzed 

relevant contract information. Additionally, we reviewed relevant portions of the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation and government internal control standards applicable to the two 

contracts. To understand MNSTC-I’s process for overseeing the contracts, we met with officials 

on site and toured the counter-terrorism facilities in Baghdad. 
9 

SIGIR provided two drafts to USF-I. SIGIR initially issued a draft to the USF-I Commanding 

General on January 7, 2010, and USF-I provided comments on January 17, 2010. However, the 

comments received did not directly address the findings contained in our draft report. Following 

discussions with senior Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq officials, 

USF-I agreed to a second opportunity to comment on the draft. During the same discussions, 

SIGIR agreed to modify one of our draft recommendations to better reflect the possible options 

for addressing our concerns. SIGIR provided the revised draft report to the command for 

comment. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not use data from computer-based systems to perform this audit. Instead, we used 

financial data provided by contracting personnel to achieve the audit’s objectives. SIGIR 

determined that this data was the best available for purposes of our review. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit objectives 

regarding the administration and oversight of contracts. Specifically, we identified and reviewed 

internal and management control procedures for contract oversight and for monitoring and 

evaluating activities in the field. To do this, we relied on the very limited available reports in the 

contract files and discussions with key oversight officials to understand both JCC-I/A’s and 

MNSTC-I’s internal controls. We did not examine internal management and financial control 

systems. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports by SIGIR:

Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight 

Problems, SIGIR 09-014, 4/26/2009. 

The U.S. Has Reduced Its Funding for the Iraqi Security Forces, but Continued Support Will 

Likely Be Necessary, SIGIR 09-012, 1/26/2009. 

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue, SIGIR 09-

002, 10/21/2008. 

Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, SIGIR 06-032, 

10/28/2006. 
10 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

BGAN Broadband Global Area Network 

COR Contracting Officer’s Representative 

CTC Counter-Terrorism Command 

CTNET Counter-Terrorism Network 

INCTF-TT Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force-Transition Team 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

SIGIR 

USF-I 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

United States Forces-Iraq 

 
11 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Wilson D. Haigler 

Paul J. Kennedy 

P. Hayden Morel 

Nancee Needham 

William Shimp 

Norris W. Smith III 
12 

Appendix D—Management Comments 
13 
14 
15 

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Danny Kopp 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil