FUSION ENERGY

Actions Needed to 

Finalize Cost and 

Schedule Estimates 

for U.S. Contributions 

to an International 

Experimental Reactor

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2014

GAO-14-499

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-499, a report to 

congressional requesters

June 2014

FUSION ENERGY

Actions Needed to Finalize Cost and Schedule 

Estimates for U.S. Contributions to an International 

Experimental Reactor

Why GAO Did This Study

ITER is an international research 

facility being built in France to 

demonstrate the feasibility of fusion 

energy. Fusion occurs when the nuclei 

of two light atoms collide and fuse 

together at high temperatures, which 

results in the release of large amounts 

of energy. The United States has 

committed to providing about 9 percent 

of ITER’s construction costs through 

contributions of hardware, personnel, 

and cash, and DOE is responsible for 

managing those contributions, as well 

as the overall U.S. fusion program. In 

fiscal year 2014, the U.S. ITER Project 

received $199.5 million, or about 40 

percent of the overall U.S. fusion 

program budget. 

GAO was asked to review DOE’s cost 

and schedule estimates for the U.S. 

ITER Project. This report examines (1) 

how and why the estimated costs and 

schedule of the U.S. ITER Project have 

changed since 2006, (2) the reliability 

of DOE’s current cost and schedule 

estimates, and (3) actions DOE has 

taken to reduce U.S. ITER Project 

costs and plan for their impact on the 

overall U.S. fusion program. GAO 

reviewed documents; assessed DOE’s 

current estimates against best 

practices; and obtained the 

perspectives of 10 experts in fusion 

energy and project management. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that DOE formally propose the 

actions needed to set a reliable 

international project schedule and set a 

date to complete the U.S. fusion 

program’s strategic plan. DOE agreed 

with GAO's recommendations.

What GAO Found

Since the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Agreement 

was signed in 2006, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) estimated cost for the 

U.S. portion of ITER has grown by almost $3 billion, and its estimated completion 

date has slipped by 20 years (see fig.). DOE has identified several reasons for 

the changes, such as increases in hardware cost estimates as designs and 

requirements have been more fully developed over time. 

DOE’s current cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER Project reflect most 

characteristics of reliable estimates, but the estimates cannot be used to set a 

performance baseline because they are linked to factors that DOE can only 

partially influence. A performance baseline would commit DOE to delivering the 

U.S. ITER Project at a specific cost and date and provide a way to measure the 

project’s progress. According to DOE documents and officials, the agency has 

been unable to finalize its cost and schedule estimates in part because the 

international project schedule the estimates are linked to is not reliable. DOE has 

taken some steps to help push for a more reliable international project schedule, 

such as providing position papers and suggested actions to the ITER 

Organization. However, DOE has not taken additional actions such as preparing 

formal proposals that could help resolve these issues. Unless such formal 

actions are taken to resolve the reliability concerns of the international project 

schedule, DOE will remain hampered in its efforts to create and set a 

performance baseline for the U.S. ITER Project. 

DOE has taken several actions that have reduced U.S. ITER Project costs by 

about $388 million as of February 2014, but DOE has not adequately planned for 

the potential impact of those costs on the overall U.S. fusion program. The 

House and Senate Appropriations Committees have directed DOE to complete a 

strategic plan for the U.S. fusion program. GAO has previously reported that 

strategic planning is a leading practice that can help clarify priorities, and DOE 

has begun work on such a plan but has not committed to a specific completion 

date. Without a strategic plan for the U.S. fusion program, DOE does not have 

information to create an understanding among stakeholders about its plans for 

balancing the competing demands the program faces with the limited available

resources or to help improve Congress’ ability to weigh the trade-offs of different 

funding decisions for the U.S. ITER Project and overall U.S. fusion program. 

Total Estimated Cost and Completion Date for the U.S. ITER Project

View GAO-14-499. For more information, 

contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or 

ruscof@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Letter 1 

Background 6

The Estimated Cost and Schedule of the U.S. ITER Project Has 

Grown Substantially Since 2006 15

Despite Reflecting Most Characteristics of Reliable Cost and 

Schedule Estimates, DOE’s Estimates Cannot Be Used to Set a 

Baseline in Part Because They Are Linked to an Unreliable 

International Schedule 21

DOE Has Taken Actions to Reduce U.S. ITER Project Costs but 

Has Not Adequately Planned for Their Impact on the U.S. 

Fusion Program 30

Conclusions 36

Recommendations for Executive Action 38

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40

Appendix II List of Experts 45

Appendix III Status of U.S. Hardware Components for the International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) as of August 2013 46

Appendix IV GAO Assessment of DOE’s Current (August 2013) Cost Estimate 

for the U.S. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 

Project Compared with Best Practices 48

Appendix V GAO Assessment of DOE’s Current (August 2013) Schedule

Estimates for the Two Largest Hardware Items of the U.S. 

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project 

Compared with Best Practices 50

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Energy 51

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53

Tables

Table 1: U.S. Hardware Components to Be Delivered to the ITER 

Organization 12

Table 2: Four Characteristics of High-Quality, Reliable Cost and 

Schedule Estimates 22

Figures

Figure 1: The Fusion Reaction 6

Figure 2: Aerial View of Construction Progress at the ITER Site as 

of June 2013 9

Figure 3: Countries Participating in ITER and ITER Site Location 11

Figure 4: U.S. ITER Project Share of the U.S. Fusion Program 

Budget, Fiscal Years 2006-2015 13

Figure 5: Total Estimated Cost and Completion Date for the U.S. 

ITER Project 16

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy

ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

State Department of State

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 5, 2014

The Honorable Mary Landrieu

Chair

The Honorable Lisa Murkowski

Ranking Member

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

United States Senate

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairwoman

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Ron Wyden

United States Senate

In 2006, the United States signed an agreement with the European Union 

and five other countries1 to help build and operate the International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER),2

 

1

The five countries are India, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of 

Korea, and the Russian Federation. 

a first-of-its-kind research 

facility currently being built in Cadarache, France, to demonstrate the 

feasibility of fusion energy. Fusion occurs when the nuclei of two light 

atoms—typically hydrogen isotopes—collide and fuse together when 

heated at high temperatures and placed under tremendous pressure. The 

result is the release of a large amount of energy that, it is hoped, 

someday may be captured to produce electricity. Fusion has the potential 

to be an abundant source of energy to help meet future energy needs, 

and it also offers many other benefits. Among those benefits would be no 

emissions of greenhouse gases, no risk of the type of severe accidents 

that could occur at existing nuclear power plants, and no long-lived 

radioactive waste. Over the last 50 years, scientists around the world 

2

The term “International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor” is no longer used for the 

project. Instead, the project is simply referred to as “ITER.” 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

have made progress in understanding how to create the conditions for 

fusion, but many outstanding scientific and technical questions must still 

be addressed before fusion can be used as an energy source. As a 

result, the United States and the six other parties to the ITER Agreement 

identified ITER as a critical experiment that, if successful, could finally 

produce more power from fusion reactions than is needed to start the 

fusion reaction—the first step toward producing electricity from fusion 

energy and developing the first demonstration fusion power plant. By 

participating in ITER, the United States will share the cost of building this 

complex and expensive fusion device, benefit from the scientific and 

technological expertise of the six other ITER members, and have full 

access to ITER research results. However, since the ITER Agreement 

was signed in 2006, the expected total cost of building ITER has grown 

by billions of dollars from its original estimate of about $5 billion,3

The ITER Agreement established the management framework for ITER. 

Under the agreement, the international ITER Organization is responsible 

for managing the overall project, including specifying final hardware 

designs and performance parameters; managing the international project 

schedule; and assembling, installing, and commissioning the ITER 

facilities.

and its 

construction schedule has slipped by years, as have the cost and 

schedule estimates for the U.S. portion of the construction project.

4 The ITER Organization is led by a Director-General, who 

serves as its Chief Executive Officer and is responsible for the execution 

of the organization’s activities. The ITER Organization is governed by the 

ITER Council, which is composed of high-level government officials from 

each of the seven ITER members.5

 

3

According to a Department of Energy (DOE) document, the original estimate of about $5 

billion for ITER’s construction was in 2002 dollars and based on the 2001 ITER design. 

The estimate was developed for the purpose of establishing relative contributions of the 

ITER members toward ITER’s construction and was not comparable to a DOE 

construction project cost estimate. 

During ITER’s construction phase, 

each of the seven ITER members is responsible for procuring and

delivering an assigned set of hardware components and making cash and 

personnel contributions to the ITER Organization. Each member also is 

responsible for managing the cost and schedule of its assigned 

4

The ITER Organization will also be responsible for managing the operation and 

deactivation of the ITER facilities. 

5

The ITER Council meets at least twice a year. ITER members have the ability to raise 

issues for consideration and decision by the council. 
 

Page 3 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

contributions within the milestones set by the international project 

schedule. The United States has committed to providing about 9 percent 

of the cost of building ITER,6 and those construction contributions are 

managed by the Department of Energy (DOE) through the U.S. ITER 

Project Office at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, in partnership with Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory and 

Savannah River National Laboratory.7

In 2007, when the U.S. ITER Project was just beginning, we reported on 

the importance of DOE assessing the full costs of U.S. participation in 

ITER and setting a definitive cost estimate for the project.

DOE’s Office of Fusion Energy 

Sciences, which is responsible for managing the overall U.S. fusion 

program within the Office of Science, provides program-level oversight of 

the U.S. ITER Project. Through March 2014, DOE had spent about $692 

million on the project. In fiscal year 2014, the U.S. ITER Project received

$199.5 million, which represented about 40 percent of that year’s overall 

U.S. fusion program budget and continued a pattern of substantial 

funding increases for the project that began in fiscal year 2011 after 

several years of fluctuating funding levels.

8

 

6

Of the seven ITER members, the United States and five other countries—the People’s 

Republic of China, Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation—are 

each providing 9.09 percent of the total construction cost. The European Union is the 

largest contributor—45.46 percent—because ITER is being built on a European Union 

country’s soil, and the European Union has agreed to pay for infrastructure costs. 

We noted at 

the time that DOE had made a commitment to provide hardware 

components to ITER without a definitive cost and schedule estimate and 

a complete project design and, as a result, DOE’s preliminary cost 

estimate of $1.122 billion for U.S. contributions to ITER’s construction 

might be subject to significant change. We also noted the risk that 

management challenges facing the ITER Organization could result in 

ITER construction delays and further increase costs for the United States. 

Today, significant questions remain about how much the U.S. ITER 

Project will cost, when it will be completed, and how DOE plans to 

manage the impact of U.S. ITER Project costs on the overall U.S. fusion 

7

The U.S. ITER Project covers only U.S. contributions to ITER’s construction phase. U.S. 

contributions for ITER’s operation, deactivation, and decommissioning phases are not part 

of the U.S. ITER Project. 

8

GAO, Fusion Energy: Definitive Cost Estimates for U.S. Contributions to an International 

Experimental Reactor and Better Coordinated DOE Research Are Needed, GAO-08-30

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2007).
 

Page 4 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

program in a constrained federal budget environment. The House and 

Senate Appropriations Committees, in particular, have expressed concern 

that DOE will fund the U.S. ITER Project at the expense of the rest of the 

U.S. fusion program, and they have directed DOE to provide detailed cost 

and schedule estimates for the project.

In this context, you asked us to review DOE’s cost and schedule 

estimates for U.S. contributions to ITER’s construction. This report 

examines (1) how and why the estimated cost and schedule for the U.S. 

ITER Project have changed since 2006; (2) the reliability of DOE’s current 

cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER Project and the factors, if 

any, that have affected their reliability; and (3) the actions DOE has taken, 

if any, to reduce U.S. ITER Project costs and plan for their potential 

impact on the overall U.S. fusion program.

To conduct this work, we reviewed the ITER Agreement, relevant laws, 

and DOE guidance. To determine how and why the estimated costs and 

schedule for the U.S. ITER Project have changed since 2006, we 

reviewed DOE and U.S. ITER Project Office documents. We assessed 

the reliability of the data on the changes in the cost estimates by 

interviewing DOE officials and U.S. ITER Project Office representatives 

who had knowledge of the data and by other means, and we determined 

that the data were sufficiently reliable for reporting on the reasons for the 

changes in the cost estimates. To evaluate the reliability of DOE’s current 

cost and schedule estimates and the factors, if any, that have affected 

their reliability, we reviewed DOE’s most recent cost and schedule 

estimates for the U.S. ITER Project—as developed by the U.S. ITER 

Project Office in August 2013—and DOE’s internal peer review of those 

estimates. We also reviewed DOE’s project management order and 

related guidance, as well as an October 2013 report to the ITER Council 

on the results of a management assessment of the ITER Organization. 

We assessed the reliability of DOE’s current cost and schedule estimates 

by analyzing those estimates against best practices identified in GAO’s

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and Schedule Assessment 

Guide.

9

 

9

GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, 

Specifically, we reviewed documentation, interviewed the U.S. 

ITER Project Office representatives who prepared the estimates, 

GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009) and 

GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules—Exposure 

Draft, GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).
 

Page 5 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

reviewed relevant sources, and compared the information collected with 

the best practices. For DOE’s current schedule estimate, we assessed 

the characteristics of two selected subordinate schedules—the central 

solenoid modules schedule and the tokamak cooling water system 

schedule—that are used as inputs to the integrated U.S. ITER Project 

master schedule.10 We were able to use the results of the two 

subordinate schedules to provide insight into the integrated master 

schedule since the same strengths and weaknesses of the subordinate 

schedules would transfer to the master schedule. We determined that the 

schedules were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes, and our 

report notes the instances where reliability concerns affect the quality of 

the schedules. To examine the actions DOE has taken, if any, to reduce 

U.S. ITER Project costs and plan for their potential impact on the overall 

U.S. fusion program, we reviewed DOE and U.S. ITER Project Office 

documents on actions taken to reduce and plan for U.S. ITER Project 

costs and reviewed our prior work on leading practices in federal strategic 

planning for agency divisions, programs, or initiatives.11

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

We also 

interviewed 10 experts in fusion energy and the management of large 

scientific research projects. We selected these experts through a 

multistep process to ensure coverage and a range of perspectives from 

industry, DOE’s national laboratories, and universities. We analyzed the 

experts’ responses across a standard set of questions and summarized 

the results. Appendix I presents a more detailed description of our 

objectives, scope, and methodology, and appendix II lists the names and 

affiliations of the 10 experts we interviewed.

 

10We selected these two subordinate schedules because they are the largest two 

hardware items, in terms of value, that the United States is responsible for contributing to 

ITER. By examining the two subordinate schedules against our guidance, we conducted a 

reliability assessment on each of the schedules and incorporated our findings on reliability 

limitations in the analysis of each subordinate schedule. 

11For example, see GAO, Environmental Protection: EPA Should Develop a Strategic 

Plan for Its New Compliance Initiative, GAO-13-115 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2012) 

and Environmental Justice: EPA Needs to Take Additional Actions to Help Ensure 

Effective Implementation, GAO-12-77 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2011). 
 

Page 6 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Fusion is the energy source that powers the sun and stars. Fusion occurs 

when the nuclei of two light atoms collide with sufficient energy to 

overcome their natural repulsive forces and fuse together. Scientists are 

currently using deuterium and tritium—two hydrogen isotopes—for this 

reaction. When the nuclei of the two atoms collide, the collision produces 

helium and a large quantity of energy (see fig. 1). For the fusion reaction 

to take place, the atoms must be heated to very high temperatures—

about 100 million degrees centigrade, or 10 times the temperature of the 

surface of the sun—and placed under tremendous pressure.

Figure 1: The Fusion Reaction

For more than 50 years, the United States has been trying to control 

fusion to produce electricity. The United States is pursuing two paths to 

achieve controlled fusion—magnetic and inertial. The goal for both 

approaches is to generate more energy than is needed to begin and 

sustain the fusion reaction. The world’s first controlled release of fusion 

power was achieved in 1991, but no fusion device has succeeded in 

Background
 

Page 7 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

generating more power than it consumes. Magnetic fusion uses magnetic 

devices to confine a plasma, consisting of electrically charged atoms, and 

sustain a fusion reaction.12 ITER will be a magnetic fusion device known 

as a “tokamak.”13

ITER is considered to be the next step in magnetic fusion. It is an 

experiment to study fusion reactions in conditions similar to those 

expected in a future electricity-generating power plant. The goal is to be

the first fusion device in the world to produce a substantial amount of net 

power—that is, produce more power than it consumes. Specifically, the 

objective is to produce 10 times more power than is needed to start the 

fusion reaction in pulses of 5 or more minutes. ITER also will test a 

number of key technologies, including the heating, control, and remote 

maintenance systems that will be needed for a fusion power station. ITER 

has been planned to consist of four phases: (1) construction, (2) 

operation, (3) deactivation, and (4) decommissioning. The construction 

phase, which is the sole focus of the U.S. ITER Project, began in 2007

(see fig.2 for an aerial view of construction progress at the ITER site as of 

June 2013). The international project schedule, as of April 2014, 

anticipates that the ITER fusion device will be built by 2019 and achieve 

To reduce the risk of investing in only one device, 

DOE’s Office of Fusion Energy Sciences also funds scientific research on 

alternative types of magnetic devices. Inertial fusion relies on intense 

lasers or particle beams to heat and compress a small, frozen pellet of 

deuterium and tritium—a few millimeters in size—that would yield a burst 

of energy. The lasers or particle beams would continuously heat and 

compress the pellets, which would simulate, on a very small scale, the 

actions of a hydrogen bomb. The National Nuclear Security 

Administration, a separately organized agency within DOE, is leading 

efforts in inertial fusion because it can be used for defense needs, such 

as validating the integrity and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons 

stockpile.

 

12Current magnetic devices have not been able to sustain this fusion reaction for more 

than a few seconds, not the long period of time that the reaction would need to be 

sustained to produce electricity. 

13The term “tokamak” comes from a Russian acronym for a fusion device that was 

developed in the former Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s. A tokamak has been 

the most successful magnetic fusion device, but there is still uncertainty that it will lead to 

a commercially viable fusion energy device. 
 

Page 8 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

its “first plasma” in 2020.14

 

14“First plasma” refers to the first time the ITER device is able to successfully produce a 

plasma. Construction will continue after this to prepare ITER to use deuterium-tritium fuel. 

The introduction of deuterium-tritium fuel marks the start of full ITER operations. 

After ITER has achieved its first plasma, the 

next several years are expected to be devoted to a preliminary period of 

operation in pure hydrogen during which physics testing will be done, 

followed by operation in deuterium with a small amount of tritium to test 

ITER’s wall shielding. This will then be followed by the start of full ITER 

operations in an equal mixture of deuterium and tritium, at which point 

ITER will be used to try to produce 10 times more power than it 

consumes. As of April 2014, the international project schedule anticipates 

the start of deuterium-tritium operations in 2027. ITER’s operation phase 

is expected to last 20 years followed by a 5-year deactivation phase and 

then a decommissioning phase. If ITER is successful, it will lead to power 

plant design and testing.
 

Page 9 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Figure 2: Aerial View of Construction Progress at the ITER Site as of June 2013

Note: The ITER construction site sits on a total of 180 hectares (or about 450 acres) of land in 

southern France.

ITER was first proposed at the Geneva Summit in November 1985, when 

President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev recognized that joint 

activities were needed to diffuse the tension of the arms race during the 

cold war and begin the then Soviet Union’s economic integration into the 

world economy. The goal was to share scientific and technical information 

in a program where both sides had a comparable level of knowledge and 

could jointly realize commercial gains from the development of fusion 

technology. Following the Geneva Summit, the United States, the Soviet 

Union, Japan, and several European countries entered into an agreement 

to develop ITER’s design. The United States stopped participating in the 

project in 1999 after Congress raised concerns that the technical basis for 
 

Page 10 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

the proposed project was not sound, the cost was too high, and the 

facility was too large. In response to the U.S. withdrawal, the countries 

participating in ITER reduced the size of the facility and the estimated 

cost of building ITER to about $5 billion. Subsequently, a number of 

scientific advances increased U.S. confidence that the new ITER design 

would meet its scientific and technological goals and, in January 2003, 

President Bush announced that the United States would rejoin ITER. In 

2003, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea also 

joined the project; in December 2005, India became the seventh and 

most recent member to join. In November 2006, all six countries and the 

European Union signed the ITER Agreement. Figure 3 shows the 

countries participating in ITER and the location of the ITER site.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Figure 3: Countries Participating in ITER and ITER Site Location

Under the ITER Agreement, the United States is responsible for 9.09 

percent of ITER’s total construction cost.15

 

15The United States will also be responsible in the future for 13 percent of the costs of 

operating, deactivating, and decommissioning ITER. These costs—which DOE estimated 

would be about $1.5 billion when the ITER Agreement was signed in 2006—are not 

included in U.S. ITER Project cost estimates because the U.S. ITER Project only covers 

U.S. contributions to ITER’s construction phase. 

DOE fulfills this obligation by 

supplying personnel to work for the ITER Organization; by making cash 

contributions to the ITER Organization to cover common expenses; and 
 

Page 12 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy 

by procuring and delivering the 12 assigned U.S. hardware components 

to the ITER Organization (see table 1 for a list of the 12 U.S. hardware 

components).16 The ITER Agreement includes a provision that allows any 

ITER member except the European Union to withdraw from the project 

after the agreement has been in force for 10 years, which would be in 

October 2017.17 However, withdrawing members still have responsibility 

for providing the entire cost of their assigned hardware components and 

cash contributions to the construction phase, and they could be 

responsible for other costs as well if they withdraw during ITER’s 

operation phase. 

Table 1: U.S. Hardware Components to Be Delivered to the ITER Organization 

U.S. hardware component Purpose 

Central solenoid magnet system Confines, shapes, and controls the plasma inside ITER’s vacuum vessel. 

Diagnostics (15% of ITER diagnostics) Provides the measurements necessary to control, evaluate, and optimize plasma 

performance and to further the understanding of plasma physics. 

Disruption mitigation systems (up to a capped 

value) 

Limits the impact of plasma current disruptions to the tokamak vacuum vessel 

and other components. 

Electron cyclotron heating transmission lines Brings additional heat to the plasma and deposits heat in specific areas of the 

plasma to minimize instabilities. 

Ion cyclotron heating transmission lines Brings additional heat to the plasma. 

Pellet injection system Provides efficient fueling and delivers hydrogen, deuterium, or a 

deuterium/tritium mixture as required by plasma operations. 

Roughing pump system Exhausts certain parts of the ITER machine. 

Steady state electrical network (75% of total 

network) 

Supplies the electricity needed to operate the entire ITER plant, including offices 

and the operational facilities. 

Tokamak cooling water system Manages temperatures generated during the operation of the tokamak. 

Tokamak exhaust processing system Separates tokamak exhaust gases into a stream containing only hydrogen 

isotopes and a stream containing only nonhydrogen gases. 

Toroidal field conductor (8% of total conductor) Part of the toroidal field magnet that confines, shapes, and controls the plasma 

inside the ITER vacuum vessel. 

Vacuum auxiliary systems Creates low density in ITER’s vacuum vessel and connected vacuum 

components. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE documents. / GAO-14-499 

 

16See appendix III for additional information on the status of each U.S. hardware 

component as of August 2013. 

17The European Union, as the host of the ITER site, is not permitted to withdraw from the 

project under the ITER Agreement. 
 

Page 13 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

The percentage of the overall U.S. fusion program budget going toward 

the U.S. ITER Project has grown since fiscal year 2011 after fluctuating in 

previous years (see fig. 4). In fiscal year 2011, the U.S. ITER Project 

received $80 million, or about 22 percent, of the U.S. fusion program 

budget of roughly $367 million. In fiscal year 2012, the U.S. ITER Project 

received $105 million, or about 27 percent, of the U.S. fusion program 

budget of approximately $393 million. In fiscal year 2013, the project 

received about $124 million, or roughly 33 percent, of the U.S. fusion 

program budget of approximately $378 million and, in fiscal year 2014, it 

received just under $200 million, or about 40 percent, of the U.S. fusion 

program budget of approximately $505 million. DOE has requested that 

$150 million, or about 36 percent, of its fiscal year 2015 proposed budget 

for the U.S. fusion program ($416 million) go toward the U.S. ITER 

Project.

Figure 4: U.S. ITER Project Share of the U.S. Fusion Program Budget, Fiscal Years 

2006-2015

Note: This figure reports dollar values rounded to millions of dollars and percentages rounded to the 

nearest whole percentage point.
 

Page 14 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

DOE’s project management order18 establishes, among other things, a 

process for planning and executing large construction projects.19 The 

order establishes several major milestones—or “critical decision points”—

that span the life of the project and includes DOE’s review and approval 

of a project’s cost and schedule estimates at the major milestones. The 

order emphasizes that cost estimates should be provided at each major 

milestone, but the degree of rigor and uncertainty of the estimates will 

depend on the stage of the project. Specifically, it provides that cost and 

schedule estimates are not considered to be final until DOE has approved 

a “performance baseline” for a project.20 A performance baseline captures 

a project’s key performance, scope, cost, and schedule parameters, and 

it represents a commitment from DOE to Congress to deliver a project 

within those parameters. DOE’s project management order explains that 

a performance baseline sets the bar against which a project’s progress 

will be measured, and that cost and schedule estimates developed prior 

to DOE approval of a performance baseline are only preliminary 

estimates. According to DOE guidance,21

• fosters effective coordination and integration of planning and decision 

making among the different DOE parties involved in a project;

developing a performance 

baseline for a project

• enables routine monitoring and reporting on all aspects of a project’s 

performance;

• helps define a project and ensure that project requirements are 

rigorously refined; and

 

18Department of Energy, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital 

Assets, DOE Order 413.3B (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2010). 

19In December 2012, the Deputy Secretary of Energy authorized the removal of the U.S. 

ITER Project’s designation as a “capital asset project” as defined by DOE’s project 

management order because he determined that the U.S. ITER Project did not fit the 

definition of such a project. However, the Deputy Secretary directed the Office of Science 

to continue to apply DOE’s project management policies, principles, and processes to the 

extent practical. According to DOE documents, DOE is following the process described in 

DOE’s project management order, including its major milestones. 

20For the purposes of this report, we refer to the definitive cost and schedule estimates 

that DOE sets when it approves a project’s performance baseline as “final” estimates. The 

estimates set at the time DOE approves a performance baseline can change, but DOE’s 

project management order states that such a change would represent an irregular event 

that should be avoided to the maximum extent possible. 

21Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Performance Baseline Guide, DOE 

Guide 413.3-5A (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2011). 
 

Page 15 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

• facilitates the delivery of first-of-a-kind projects that typically have a 

high degree of uncertainty, high cost, high impact on stakeholders, 

and high visibility.

The estimated cost and schedule of the U.S. ITER Project has grown 

substantially since the ITER Agreement was signed in 2006 (see fig. 5), 

and DOE has identified several reasons for these changes. At the time 

the ITER Agreement was signed, DOE planned on spending $1.122 

billion on the U.S. ITER Project and expected to complete the project in 

201322 based on preliminary estimates it approved in 2005.23 In 2008, 

DOE formally increased its preliminary cost estimate to a cost range of 

from $1.45 billion to $2.2 billion.24 This was the most recent time DOE 

approved a cost estimate for the U.S. ITER Project.25

 

22According to DOE documents, the U.S. ITER Project will be considered to be complete 

when DOE has made the last delivery of hardware components and the final cash 

contribution for the U.S. share of ITER’s construction budget. DOE will still be responsible 

for making cash contributions to the ITER Organization for the operation, deactivation, and 

decommissioning phases of the ITER project. 

Also, in 2008, DOE 

said it expected ITER to achieve first plasma in 2016 and expected the 

U.S. ITER Project to be completed in 2017. DOE now estimates that the 

U.S. ITER Project will cost $3.915 billion, that ITER will achieve first 

plasma in 2023, and that the U.S. ITER Project will be completed in 2033. 

These estimates were developed based on a set of key assumptions that 

were not used by DOE in its 2008 estimates. The current estimates 

include an assumption of annual funding for the U.S. ITER Project of 

$225 million, starting in fiscal year 2015 and continuing until the project is 

23Under DOE’s program management order, projects are organized by phases and major 

milestones, starting with the initiation phase and approval of broadly-stated mission 

needs, known as “CD-0.” In 2005, DOE estimated that the U.S. ITER Project would cost 

$1.122 billion as part of the project’s CD-0 milestone. The $1.122 billion cost estimate was 

a rough-order-of-magnitude estimate, which means it was preliminary and based on highlevel project objectives. It remained DOE’s cost estimate for the U.S. ITER Project when 

the ITER Agreement was signed in 2006. 

24In 2008, DOE approved the start of the U.S. ITER Project’s execution phase at the 

project’s second major milestone, known as “CD-1.” This milestone included DOE’s 

approval of a preliminary cost range for the U.S. ITER Project of from $1.45 billion to $2.2 

billion. 

25According to DOE officials, the U.S. ITER Project estimate was capped at $2.2 billion 

until April 2011. They explained that, from January 2011 through August 2013, DOE 

directed the U.S. ITER Project Office to include various funding profiles in its detailed 

planning. 

The Estimated Cost 

and Schedule of the 

U.S. ITER Project 

Has Grown 

Substantially Since 

2006
 

Page 16 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

completed, with no adjustment for inflation; limited U.S. cash contributions 

to the ITER Organization from 2014 to 2016; future U.S. contributions to 

the ITER Organization for ITER’s operation, deactivation, and 

decommissioning phases coming out of the $225 million annual funding 

level; and a hardware delivery schedule not tied to the ITER 

Organization’s schedule. DOE also instructed the U.S. ITER Project 

Office to use its estimate of ITER achieving first plasma in 2023 rather 

than the 2020 date in the ITER Organization’s schedule, and to use its 

best estimate for ITER Organization construction costs rather than the 

budget most recently approved by the ITER Council.26

Figure 5: Total Estimated Cost and Completion Date for the U.S. ITER Project

Nonetheless, 

these current estimates remain preliminary, according to DOE officials, 

because DOE has not approved a performance baseline for the U.S. 

ITER Project. A performance baseline captures a project’s key 

performance, scope, cost, and schedule parameters, and represents a 

commitment from DOE to Congress to deliver a project within those 

parameters.

 

26As of March 2014, the official ITER Organization schedule anticipates ITER achieving 

first plasma in 2020, but DOE officials told us this date is unrealistic. Instead, the U.S. 

ITER Project Office developed the August 2013 estimates based on its best estimate that 

ITER will achieve first plasma in 2023, with contingency for another year delay to 2024. 

DOE officials told us that the August 2013 estimates also assumed an increase in the 

ITER Organization construction budget of 1 billion euros, and the U.S. share of this value 

was included in the estimates.
 

Page 17 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

According to DOE documents, the current $3.915 billion cost estimate for 

the U.S. ITER Project includes the following:

• $1.469 billion (38 percent)27

• $928 million (24 percent) in contingency to address potential schedule 

delays or increases in costs for manufacturing components, including 

$852 million in contingency for the remaining work to procure and 

deliver U.S. hardware components, and $76 million in contingency for 

U.S. cash contributions to the ITER Organization;

to complete the remaining work to 

procure and deliver U.S. hardware components for ITER;

28

• $541 million (14 percent) to account for project costs through June 

2013;

• $519 million (13 percent) for remaining cash contributions to the ITER 

Organization to pay for scientists, engineers, and support personnel 

working at the ITER Organization; the assembly and installation of the 

components in France to build the reactor; quality assurance testing 

of all ITER member-supplied components; and contingencies; and

• $458 million (12 percent) for escalation costs, such as changes in 

currency exchange rates and commodity prices, which are driven by 

the extended length of the project due to the funding assumptions 

used to develop the cost estimate. 

DOE documents and officials identified several key reasons for the

growth of the cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER Project. DOE 

officials identified a number of reasons that led to the change in the 

project’s initial 2005 cost estimate of $1.122 billion to its 2008 cost range 

of from $1.45 billion to $2.2 billion. These included (1) higher estimates 

for the cost of U.S. hardware components as their designs and 

requirements were more fully developed; (2) updated estimates for 

external factors such as currency exchange rates and commodity prices; 

(3) changes to U.S. hardware component requirements and the 

international project schedule due to a 2007 design review of the overall 

ITER project; and (4) additions for contingency and recognized risks. 

According to DOE documents and officials, the primary reasons the U.S. 

 

27The percentages in this list do not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. 

28According to DOE, the current cost estimate includes 47 percent in contingency for the 

remaining work to procure and deliver U.S. hardware components, and 12 percent in 

contingency for U.S. cash contributions to the ITER Organization. 
 

Page 18 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

ITER Project’s cost estimate grew from the upper range of $2.2 billion in 

2008 to the current $3.915 billion estimate included the following:29

• Higher estimates for U.S. hardware components as designs and 

requirements have been more fully developed over time: The design 

and requirements for U.S. hardware components have evolved over 

time, and the cost estimates for these components have changed as a 

result, according to DOE documents and officials. Specifically, the 

current U.S. ITER Project cost estimate includes about $770 million 

more than the 2008 figures due to greater understanding of what U.S. 

hardware components are likely to cost. According to DOE officials, 

expected hardware costs now reflect more fully developed designs, 

better industry estimates of the cost of producing those designs, and 

greater understanding of project risks, among other things. DOE 

documents noted that, as of February 2014, about two-thirds of U.S. 

hardware components by value were in final design or beyond, 

although there were some smaller components that were still in earlier 

stages of design.30

• Higher contingency amounts added to address risks: The U.S. ITER 

Project Office has increased the amount of contingency in the current 

cost estimate to address the risks from the project’s significantly 

longer schedule and to increase confidence in the estimate, according 

to DOE documents and officials. Specifically, the current estimate 

includes about $681 million more in contingency than was in the U.S. 

ITER Project cost estimate in 2008. According to DOE officials, the 

amount of contingency is based on detailed risk analyses as well as a 

management assessment of key assumptions. DOE officials told us 

According to DOE officials, because of the 

progress in developing hardware component designs, the project 

team has a greater understanding of what those components are 

likely to cost and has reflected that understanding in the current 

$3.915 billion cost estimate.

 

29The current $3.915 billion estimate does not include $667 million that was included in 

the $2.2 billion upper range estimate in 2008 to cover potential future cost growth from 

risks that were not fully understood at that time or difficult to quantify, according to DOE 

documents and officials. 

30See appendix III for the status of U.S. hardware components as of August 2013. Overall, 

U.S. hardware component designs were about 52 percent complete as of February 2014, 

with the level of completion varying by hardware component from as low as 40 percent 

complete to as high as 100 percent complete. At that time, DOE officials expected to finish 

delivering the first of the 12 U.S. hardware components in 2015 and to finish delivering the 

last of the U.S. hardware components in 2030. 
 

Page 19 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

that, to develop contingency amounts for the current estimate, the

U.S. ITER Project Office identified and evaluated program-level risks, 

such as changes in currency exchange rates and growth in ITER 

Organization cash contribution requirements. They also considered 

project-level risks, such as the U.S. ITER Project’s dependence on 

other ITER members or the ITER Organization for inputs needed to 

complete U.S. hardware components and potential procurement and 

manufacturing difficulties. Further, they added contingency amounts if 

U.S. ITER Project Office management representatives thought initial 

contingency amounts were too low for the risks associated with the 

project’s longer schedule or based on their past experience with large 

science projects.

• Schedule delays: U.S. schedule delays due to international project 

schedule delays and U.S. funding constraints accounted for about 

$544 million of the increase in the U.S. ITER Project’s cost estimate 

since DOE last approved the estimate in 2008, according to DOE 

documents and officials. First, international project schedule delays 

have lengthened the U.S. ITER Project schedule and have also led to 

increases in the cost estimate. For example, in 2007, an international 

review identified extensive changes that were needed in ITER’s 

design, and that significantly delayed the ITER Organization from 

defining requirements for U.S. hardware components.31

 

31DOE officials told us that ITER’s design was less developed than the United States 

understood it to be when the ITER Agreement was signed in 2006. At that time, the United 

States understood that ITER’s design was about 80 to 90 percent complete. However, 

DOE officials said it was later determined that ITER’s design was only about 40 percent 

complete and that extensive changes would be needed to the design. 

This in turn 

created delays in the U.S. ITER Project schedule for procuring and 

delivering those components, which led to higher cost estimates for 

those components. Second, U.S. funding constraints resulting from 

the project’s most recent $225 million per year funding plan and 

lower-than-requested funding levels in some years have lengthened 

the U.S. ITER Project schedule, according to DOE documents and 

officials. This in turn has made it necessary for the U.S. ITER Project 

Office to build additional amounts into the project’s cost estimate to 

account for higher escalation costs and the longer period of time the 

U.S. ITER Project workforce will be needed. For example, DOE 

officials told us that the project’s most recent $225 million per year 

funding plan reflected discussions between DOE, the Department of 

State (State), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to provide enough 
 

Page 20 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

funding to meet U.S. obligations to ITER and reduce the amount of 

the U.S. fusion program budget and the overall DOE budget that had 

to be devoted to the U.S. ITER Project on an annual basis.32

• Higher cash contributions to the ITER Organization due to growth in 

ITER construction costs: The U.S. ITER Project Office built an 

additional $348 million into the current cost estimate to reflect the 

increase in U.S. cash contributions it expects to have to make to the 

ITER Organization, according to DOE documents and officials. DOE 

officials explained this increase includes $169 million for the U.S. 

share of a previously approved increase in the ITER Organization’s 

construction budget, as well as $179 million for the U.S. share of a 

potential future billion euro increase in the ITER Organization 

construction budget and the anticipated cost increases for the ITER 

Organization staff based on a 2023 first plasma date.

However, this lengthened the U.S. ITER Project’s schedule and 

created procurement inefficiencies, resulting in increases in the 

project’s overall cost estimate.

• The United States has taken on additional hardware responsibilities: 

DOE agreed to take on additional hardware responsibilities, 

accounting for $39 million of the increase in the U.S. ITER Project 

cost estimates since 2008, according to DOE documents and 

officials.33 DOE officials told us that there is a cost cap for each of 

these additional hardware responsibilities, and that the ITER 

Organization will be responsible for paying any amounts that exceed 

the caps. As a result, they view taking on these additional hardware 

responsibilities as a way to reduce uncertainty about future U.S. ITER 

Project costs because DOE will not have to spend more than the 

amounts specified in the cost caps for each item.

 

32State had a role in the negotiation of the ITER Agreement and has a continuing role 

interpreting U.S. obligations under the agreement. OMB, as the implementation and 

enforcement arm of presidential policy, is responsible for, among other things, the 

development and execution of the federal budget. Under the National Science and 

Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-282), the 

primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the 

President, advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that 

require attention at the highest level of government. Further, the office serves as a source 

of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to 

major policies, plans, and programs of the federal government. 

33The additional hardware responsibilities DOE agreed to take on were the disruption 

mitigation systems and the design, fabrication, and testing of insert coils for the central 

solenoid magnet system and the toroidal field conductor.
 

Page 21 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

DOE’s current cost estimate for the U.S. ITER Project reflects most of the 

characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, and its schedule estimates 

reflect all characteristics of a reliable schedule.34 However, DOE’s 

estimates cannot be used to set a performance baseline that would 

commit DOE to delivering the project at a specific cost and date primarily 

because of some factors that DOE can only partially influence. The 

factors DOE can only partially influence include an unreliable international 

project schedule to which the U.S. schedule is linked and an uncertain 

U.S. funding plan. DOE has taken some action to address the factors that 

have prevented it from setting a performance baseline and finalizing its 

estimates, but significant challenges remain.

DOE’s current cost estimate for the U.S. ITER Project reflects most of the 

characteristics of high-quality, reliable cost estimates as established by 

best practices documented in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment 

Guide.

35 In addition, DOE’s current schedule estimates fully reflect the 

characteristics of high-quality, reliable schedule estimates as established 

by best practices documented in the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide.

36

 

34

According to the guides, four characteristics make up reliable cost 

estimates—they are comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and 

credible (see table 2). Similarly, four characteristics make up reliable 

schedule estimates—they are comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, 

and controlled. Cost and schedule estimates are considered reliable if 

each of the four characteristics is substantially or fully met. If any of the 

characteristics is not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the 

estimates do not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality estimate 

and cannot be considered reliable.

GAO-09-3SP and GAO-12-120G. 

35GAO-09-3SP. 

36GAO-12-120G. 

Despite Reflecting 

Most Characteristics 

of Reliable Cost and 

Schedule Estimates, 

DOE’s Estimates 

Cannot Be Used to 

Set a Baseline in Part 

Because They Are 

Linked to an 

Unreliable 

International 

Schedule

DOE’s Current Cost 

Estimate for the U.S. ITER 

Project Reflects Most 

Characteristics of a 

Reliable Estimate, and Its 

Schedule Estimates 

Reflect All These 

Characteristics
 

Page 22 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy 

Table 2: Four Characteristics of High-Quality, Reliable Cost and Schedule Estimates 

Characteristics of reliable cost estimates 

Comprehensive A comprehensive cost estimate has enough detail to ensure that cost elements are 

neither omitted nor double counted. 

Well-documented A well-documented cost estimate allows for data it contains to be traced to source 

documents. 

Accurate An accurate cost estimate is based on an assessment of most likely costs and has 

been adjusted properly for inflation. 

Credible A credible cost estimate discusses any limitations because of uncertainty or bias 

surrounding data or assumptions. 

Characteristics of reliable schedule estimates

Comprehensive A comprehensive schedule includes all government and contractor activities 

necessary to accomplish a project’s objectives. 

Well-constructed A well-constructed schedule sequences all activities using the most straightforward 

logic possible. 

Credible A credible schedule uses data about risks and opportunities to predict a level of 

confidence in meeting the completion date. 

Controlled A controlled schedule is updated periodically to realistically forecast dates for 

activities. 

Source: GAO. / GAO-14-499 

DOE’s current cost estimate for the U.S. ITER Project—as developed by 

the U.S. ITER Project Office in August 2013—substantially met best 

practices for comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate estimates, 

but only partially met best practices for credible estimates. For example, 

DOE’s cost estimate substantially met best practices for documenting all 

assumptions that will influence costs (comprehensive), describing step by 

step how the estimate was developed (well-documented), and adjusting 

properly for inflation (accurate). However, the U.S. ITER Project Office did 

not conduct a complete sensitivity analysis on the cost estimate, and an 

independent cost estimate has not been conducted (credible).37 The U.S. 

ITER Project Office did identify four key assumptions from the estimate 

for sensitivity testing. However, the analysis did not include some cost 

elements that represent high percentages of the overall estimate, 

including some of the most expensive hardware components being built 

by the United States. For example, the sensitivity analysis did not include 

the tokamak cooling water system, which is the most expensive U.S. 

 

37A sensitivity analysis describes how much costs can change by varying major 

assumptions, parameters, and data inputs. 
 

Page 23 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

hardware component. Without a comprehensive sensitivity analysis that 

identifies how the cost estimate is affected by changes to its assumptions, 

DOE will not fully understand how certain risks can affect the cost 

estimate and potentially result in decisions based on incomplete 

information. In addition, DOE did not conduct an independent cost 

estimate to determine whether other estimating methods produce similar 

results. DOE policy does not require an independent cost estimate until it 

approves a performance baseline, which the agency does not expect to 

occur until late 2015. However, including an independent estimate is a 

best practice associated with credible cost estimates. Independent cost 

estimates are less likely to reflect organizational bias. They also 

incorporate adequate risk, which generally results in more conservative 

estimates due to higher estimated costs. Without such an independent 

cost estimate, DOE faces a greater risk of underfunding the project, which 

can lead to overall cost growth and schedule slippage. (See app. IV for 

the individual ratings of each cost estimating practice.)

DOE’s current schedule estimates for the two most expensive U.S. 

hardware items38—the central solenoid modules and the tokamak cooling 

water system—fully met best practices for comprehensive schedules and 

substantially met best practices for well-constructed, credible, and 

controlled schedules. For example, DOE’s schedule estimate fully met 

best practices for capturing and establishing the duration of all activities 

(comprehensive), and substantially met best practices for sequencing all 

activities (well-constructed), conducting a schedule risk analysis 

(credible), and updating the schedule with actual progress (controlled). 

However, the schedule estimate partially met best practices for horizontal 

and vertical traceability,39

 

38We chose to analyze the schedule for the central solenoid modules, which are the 

largest part of the central solenoid magnet system that will help control the shape of the 

ITER plasma, and the tokamak cooling water system, which is designed to cool ITER’s 

systems, because they are the largest two hardware items, in terms of value, that the 

United States is responsible for contributing to ITER. The U.S. ITER Project Office 

developed the current estimates for these schedules in August 2013.

maintaining a baseline schedule, and ensuring 

reasonable total float, which is the amount of time an activity can be 

delayed before the dates of the program’s completion milestones are 

affected. U.S. ITER Project Office representatives acknowledged these 

39Horizontal traceability verifies that activities are arranged in the right order for achieving 

aggregated products or outcomes. Vertical traceability means that varying levels of 

activities and supporting subactivities can be traced to each other enabling different 

groups to work to the same master schedule.
 

Page 24 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

issues with the schedule and attributed them to problems with the 

international project schedule. For example, according to project 

representatives, DOE’s schedule does not align with the international 

project schedule (i.e.: is not vertically traceable) because the international 

project schedule does not account for delays in ITER Organization 

delivery milestones, including a 30-month delay in ITER construction site 

preparations. Without up-to-date reliable international milestones, DOE 

cannot develop realistic U.S. milestones that align with the international 

project schedule and set a baseline that can provide a reliable, specific 

cost and completion date for the project. (See app. V for the individual 

ratings of each scheduling best practice).

DOE considers its current cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER 

Project to be preliminary, and these estimates cannot be used to set a 

performance baseline that would represent a commitment from DOE to 

Congress to deliver the project at a specific cost and date. DOE policy 

says that cost and schedule estimates are considered final only after a 

performance baseline has been approved for a project, and DOE has not 

approved a performance baseline for the U.S. ITER Project. According to 

DOE’s project management order, a performance baseline sets a bar 

against which a project’s progress can be measured. DOE’s target date 

for setting a performance baseline finalizing its cost and schedule 

estimates for the U.S. ITER Project has continually slipped from an 

original expected date of fiscal year 2007 to the current target of late in 

fiscal year 2015. That is when DOE expects the international project 

schedule to be updated, according to DOE documents and officials.

According to DOE documents and officials, DOE’s current estimates for 

the U.S. ITER Project cannot be used to set a performance baseline 

because of three factors, two of which DOE can only partially influence as 

follows:

• First, the overall international project schedule that DOE uses as a 

basis for the U.S. schedule is not reliable. In July 2010, the ITER 

Council approved an official schedule for the overall ITER project. 

However, an October 2013 management assessment of the ITER

Organization determined that the international project schedule 

established in 2010 was not reliable. The assessment attributed the 

unreliable schedule, in part, to management deficiencies within the 

ITER Organization. For example, the assessment found that the ITER 

Organization’s senior management had insisted that the international 

project schedule not be changed even when staff had developed what 

DOE’s Cost and Schedule 

Estimates Cannot Be 

Used to Set a Baseline 

Due to Factors That DOE 

Can Only Partially 

Influence
 

Page 25 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

they thought were more realistic schedules, and that staff had not 

been allowed to openly challenge the schedule. According to DOE 

officials, the ITER Organization plans to spend the next year 

reassessing the international project schedule and taking actions to 

address the identified management deficiencies, and it hopes to 

complete its schedule reassessment by June 2015.40

• Second, DOE has not proposed a final, stable funding plan for the 

U.S. ITER Project. DOE’s most recent plan had been to provide a flat 

$225 million per year for the project, and that figure was the basis for 

its current cost and schedule estimates. However, DOE officials told 

us that this funding plan could potentially change depending on the 

outcome of the ITER Organization’s reassessment of the international 

project schedule. In March 2014, DOE requested $150 million for the 

U.S. ITER Project in fiscal year 2015, $75 million less than the $225 

million per year funding plan. According to DOE documents, the $150 

million request would allow the U.S. ITER Project to meet its fiscal 

year 2015 commitments to ITER but would not be enough for the 

project to meet the milestones set in the official international project 

schedule. Officials noted that if Congress provided less than DOE’s 

requested funding, the U.S. ITER Project schedule will slip further. Six 

of the 10 fusion energy and project management experts we 

interviewed said that identifying sufficient funding to execute the U.S. 

ITER Project poses a significant management challenge for DOE.

The third factor that has kept DOE from setting a performance baseline 

finalizing its estimates is within the agency’s direct control. Specifically, an 

August 2013 internal peer review found that the methodologies used to 

develop DOE’s current cost and schedule estimates were appropriate, but 

that the estimates do not sufficiently consider all project risks and 

uncertainties.41

 

40DOE officials told us the U.S. ITER Project Office used its best estimate of a realistic 

international project schedule to develop the August 2013 cost and schedule estimates for 

the U.S. ITER Project and included a contingency for 1 year of additional potential delay. 

For example, the review found that the U.S. ITER Project 

Office did not identify and quantify all risks, that its view of potential risk 

mitigation was too optimistic, and that the range of possible cost 

outcomes due to each individual risk factor was too narrow. Further, the 

review identified potential cost increases related to changing technical 

41At the request of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences, the Office of Project Assessment 

within DOE’s Office of Science conducted an internal peer review of the U.S. ITER Project 

in August 2013. The review evaluated, among other things, the project’s cost and 

schedule estimates and the supporting documentation.
 

Page 26 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

requirements, uncertainty about the ITER Organization’s performance, 

and the dependence on other ITER members for production of items that 

are used in U.S. hardware components. To better account for these risks 

and uncertainties, the review added additional amounts to DOE’s current 

cost estimate of $3.915 billion and found that the U.S. ITER Project was 

more likely to cost from $4 billion to $6.5 billion.42

In the absence of a performance baseline, DOE has developed a 2-year 

plan for the U.S. ITER Project that sets near-term cost and schedule 

targets to guide the project’s performance in fiscal years 2013 and 

2014.

The reviewers 

recommended, among other things, that the U.S. ITER Project Office 

update its risk estimates to be more comprehensive and reevaluate its 

risk mitigation assessments before DOE approves a performance 

baseline for the U.S. ITER Project.

43 However, this 2-year plan is an interim measure and does not 

represent DOE’s commitment to a specific cost and schedule for the U.S. 

ITER Project as a performance baseline would. Most of the fusion energy 

and project management experts we interviewed emphasized the 

importance of DOE approving a performance baseline for the U.S. ITER 

Project, with some experts noting that a performance baseline would 

provide a goal for all project stakeholders to work toward and might ease 

concerns about the uncertainty of the funding levels needed to complete 

the project. Several experts also told us that, until DOE approves a 

performance baseline for the U.S. ITER Project, there will continue to be 

uncertainty about the project’s direction.

 

42DOE, in its fiscal year 2015 budget request, identified the internal peer review’s 

suggested cost range of $4 billion to $6.5 billion as the best estimate for the U.S. ITER 

Project’s potential cost. According to DOE officials, the internal peer review’s cost range 

was not a detailed cost estimate like the U.S. ITER Project Office’s $3.915 billion estimate. 

Rather, the range reflected amounts added to the $3.915 billion estimate by peer review 

officials to address their assessment that the U.S. ITER Project Office estimate did not 

sufficiently consider all project risks and uncertainties. Four of the 10 fusion energy and 

project management experts we interviewed said they thought the internal peer review’s 

cost range was overstated and unrealistic, with 2 of the experts stating that the review 

committee used a worst case scenario, which they do not view as likely, to develop the 

higher end of the cost range. 

43DOE officials told us that the interim 2-year plan also allows the agency to formally 

monitor project progress.
 

Page 27 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

DOE has taken some actions to address the factors preventing it from 

setting a performance baseline that would allow the agency to finalize its 

cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER Project. However, project 

management and schedule deficiencies in the ITER Organization and 

uncertainty in the U.S. ITER Project funding plan continue to pose 

management challenges for the agency and delay its efforts to set a 

performance baseline.

According to DOE officials, DOE has taken several actions to try to get 

the ITER Organization to address international project management and 

scheduling deficiencies. For example, DOE officials told us that their 

aggressive participation in early ITER Agreement negotiations led to the 

adoption of a biannual management assessment requirement. This has 

focused attention on international management deficiencies, resulting in 

several recommendations for improving the project. Further, DOE officials 

told us they have used ITER Council Management Advisory Committee 

meetings to introduce, communicate, and advance project management 

principles, such as competitive procurement actions, in an effort to 

improve ITER Organization project management.44

 

44The ITER Council Management Advisory Committee, at the request of the ITER Council, 

reviews and evaluates matters of strategic management importance to the ITER project 

and makes recommendations to the ITER Council to facilitate the successful development 

of the ITER Organization and the successful execution of the ITER construction project. 

Additionally, DOE has 

developed position papers describing the agency’s concerns with 

ineffective ITER Organization scheduling and management and 

suggesting actions the ITER Organization could take to develop a reliable 

international project schedule and improve international management. For 

example, in a position paper on scheduling issues, DOE recommended 

the ITER Council direct the ITER Organization to focus on developing a 

short-term schedule, and defer long-term schedule development until 

lessons are learned from the short-term effort. DOE has provided the 

position papers to other ITER members and achieved some unofficial 

support, but the agency has not submitted a formal proposal on the 

suggested actions to the ITER Council, which could vote on and 

ultimately require the implementation of these actions. According to DOE 

officials, DOE has not submitted formal proposals because previous ITER 

Council Chairs delayed substantive discussions of issues such as 

schedule slippages and conducted meetings with a primary goal of 

obtaining consensus among ITER members. However, DOE officials said 

the ITER Council and other ITER members are aware of DOE’s position, 

DOE Has Taken Some 

Actions to Address the 

Factors Preventing It from 

Setting a Baseline, but 

Challenges Remain
 

Page 28 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

and they hope the new ITER Council Chair, who took over in January 

2014,45

Even so, challenges remain that will continue to hamper DOE’s ability to 

develop a baseline for the U.S. ITER Project. Eight out of the 10 fusion 

energy and project management experts we interviewed said DOE does 

not have enough information from the ITER Organization and other ITER 

members to effectively plan the U.S. ITER Project, and 7 of the 10 

experts said the international structure and management issues 

contribute to DOE’s management challenges. In this context, DOE’s 

efforts may have helped improve ITER Organization project management 

and helped jump-start efforts to develop a reliable international project 

schedule, but a reliable international project schedule is not expected until 

June 2015, as previously noted. Further, the previous international project 

schedule developed by the ITER Organization and approved by the ITER 

Council in 2010 has not proved reliable, and management issues that 

were identified in previous years continue to pose challenges at the 

international level. For example, the October 2013 management 

assessment of the ITER Organization found that the ITER Council had 

not acted on many recommendations for project management 

improvements from a previous management assessment in 2009 and that 

the problems identified in that assessment continue. The most recent 

management assessment attributed the inaction to the ITER Council’s 

reliance on consensus decision making, which caused it to avoid or delay 

difficult decisions. The 2013 assessment stated that the ITER members 

needed to openly discuss and then make decisions on difficult issues at 

ITER Council meetings, even if there is no consensus, and all members 

should be held accountable for results. The management assessment 

contained 11 recommendations that were designed to be taken together. 

The assessment further said that the international project would not 

achieve significant improvement if the ITER Council only adopted a few 

recommendations, as has been the case with recommendations in 

will change the way the ITER Council operates. DOE officials also 

said the ITER Council approved at the November 2013 ITER Council 

meeting the initiative for the ITER Organization to develop a short-term 

annual work plan for 2014, the results of which will inform long-term 

schedule development, and that all milestones had been met by all seven 

ITER members for the first three months. 

 

45Robert Iotti, a U.S. representative, became the ITER Council Chair in January 2014 and 

will serve a term of up to 4 years. 
 

Page 29 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

previous management assessments. DOE officials told us that the ITER 

Council had approved proposals to address the recommendations from 

the October 2013 management assessment and that the ITER Council 

Chair was actively monitoring the implementation of the 

recommendations. 

To address the uncertainty of the U.S. funding plan for the U.S. ITER 

Project, DOE has evaluated a range of funding scenarios for executing 

the project. As previously noted, DOE most recently developed a $225 

million per year flat funding plan with State, OMB, and OSTP, but DOE 

officials acknowledged that the plan constrained funding for the project to 

allow DOE to meet U.S. obligations to ITER and reduce the amount of the 

U.S. fusion program and overall DOE budgets devoted to the project 

annually. DOE officials told us the flat funding plan created a long and 

inefficient schedule and has created gaps between the design and 

fabrication stages of some systems, which has led to cost growth. DOE 

officials said that they will not be able to meet the most recent 

international project schedule under this funding plan, and delivery of 

some U.S. components will likely be late under the plan. DOE officials 

told us they plan to develop a final, stable funding plan for the U.S. ITER 

Project, but that plan can only be developed if the international project 

schedule is reliable.

To ensure that all risks and uncertainties are sufficiently incorporated into 

its estimates, DOE officials told us the U.S. ITER Project Office held a 

series of risk workshops. According to DOE officials, as of March 2014, 

the U.S. ITER Project Office had held risk workshops on U.S. hardware 

components and associated risks, as well as a workshop on external 

risks. U.S. ITER Project Office representatives told us that they are 

currently analyzing the results of the workshops and that the workshops 

will ultimately lead to updated risk estimates and an update to the current 

cost estimate of $3.915 billion for the U.S. ITER Project.
 

Page 30 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

DOE has taken several actions to reduce the cost of the U.S. ITER 

Project. Some fusion energy and project management experts we 

interviewed suggested additional strategies DOE could pursue that might 

further reduce U.S. ITER Project costs or improve project management. 

DOE has not adequately planned for the potential impact of U.S. ITER 

Project costs on the overall U.S. fusion program because it has not 

completed a strategic plan that would clarify the program’s priorities given 

those costs.

According to DOE documents and officials, DOE has taken several 

actions to reduce the cost of the U.S. ITER Project by about $388 million 

as of February 2014,46

• Value engineering: The U.S. ITER Project Office has identified ways 

to design U.S. hardware components that lower costs but maintain the 

component’s essential functions. According to DOE officials, this 

strategy—known as “value engineering”—has been an integral part of 

the U.S. design effort.

including the following:

47

 

46This includes amounts identified by DOE as “cost avoidance” or “cost savings.” 

According to OMB, “cost avoidance” is an action taken in the immediate time frame that 

will decrease costs in the future, and “cost savings” are a reduction in actual expenditures 

below the projected level of costs to achieve a specific objective. For purposes of this 

report, we are using the term “cost savings” to encompass both types of actions. 

For example, the U.S. ITER Project Office 

has been able to reduce the cost of the central solenoid magnet 

system by more than $18 million by eliminating, simplifying, or 

reducing the number of some parts. It also has reduced the cost of the 

vacuum auxiliary systems by almost $34 million by, among other 

things, revising test equipment items and quantities and reducing the 

number of system connections and pumps. According to DOE 

officials, these and other value engineering efforts have resulted in 

about $225 million in savings as of February 2014. DOE documents 

47According to DOE’s project management order, value engineering is a structured 

technique commonly used in project management to optimize the overall value of the 

project. Often, creative strategies will be employed in an attempt to achieve the lowest lifecycle cost available for the project. Value engineering is a planned, detailed review and 

evaluation of a project to identify alternative approaches to providing the needed assets. 

DOE Has Taken 

Actions to Reduce 

U.S. ITER Project 

Costs but Has Not 

Adequately Planned 

for Their Impact on 

the U.S. Fusion 

Program

DOE Has Taken Several 

Actions to Reduce U.S. 

ITER Project Costs
 

Page 31 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

indicated that about half of the savings come from value engineering 

the design of the tokamak cooling water system.

• Centralized and consolidated procurement for certain items: The U.S. 

ITER Project Office has agreed to have the ITER Organization 

centrally procure piping for the tokamak cooling water and vacuum 

systems for which the United States is responsible. It has also 

reached agreement with other ITER members to consolidate 

procurement of certain common parts rather than having each ITER 

member procure those parts for their assigned hardware components. 

For example, the U.S. ITER Project Office has agreed to have the 

European Union procure all cable trays needed for U.S. hardware 

components. According to DOE officials, centralized and consolidated 

procurement for certain items has saved the U.S. ITER Project about 

$120 million as of February 2014.

• Scope transfers and reallocations: The U.S. ITER Project Office has 

reached agreements to transfer some U.S. hardware responsibilities 

to the ITER Organization and to reallocate some hardware 

responsibilities among ITER members to improve procurement 

efficiency and reduce U.S. costs. For example, project officials told us 

that they reached an agreement to shift the U.S. responsibility for 

procurement of one system to other ITER members, with the United 

States taking on more engineering work for that system in return. 

DOE officials estimated that this resulted in $20 million in savings. 

According to DOE officials, scope transfers and reallocations have 

saved about $43 million as of February 2014.

• Other strategies: According to DOE documents and officials, the U.S. 

ITER Project Office has used several other strategies to reduce U.S. 

ITER Project costs. These strategies have included implementing 

lessons learned and leading practices from other large projects; 

working with the ITER Organization on cost reduction initiatives to 

improve ITER Organization processes and requirements; and 

minimizing costs associated with project execution by, for example, 

providing incentives in contract provisions. DOE officials said that it 

was too soon to quantify the cost savings resulting from these actions.

According to DOE documents and officials, these cost savings are 

reflected in the current $3.915 billion cost estimate for the U.S. ITER 

Project. DOE officials told us that cost containment will continue to be a 

high priority for the project. They told us that the most significant 

opportunity to further reduce U.S. ITER Project costs would be the 

adoption of an optimal funding plan for the project. Officials explained that 

$458 million of the current $3.915 billion cost estimate is included to cover 

escalation costs, and an optimal funding plan could potentially reduce 
 

Page 32 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

those and other costs by allowing the U.S. ITER Project to be completed 

in a shorter period of time.

Some of the 10 fusion energy and project management experts that we 

interviewed identified strategies DOE could pursue to further reduce the 

cost of the U.S. ITER Project. The following two strategies were 

suggested by several of these experts:

• Six experts suggested that DOE could reduce U.S. ITER Project costs 

by adopting an optimal funding plan for the project. The optimal 

funding plan being suggested would involve different dollar figures 

year to year rather than DOE’s most recent strategy of funding the 

U.S. ITER Project at a flat $225 million per year starting in fiscal year 

2015. Some experts noted that a funding plan that scaled up in the 

near-term and then scaled down in later years could potentially 

reduce overall U.S. ITER Project costs by hundreds of millions of 

dollars. Specifically, three experts said that an optimal funding plan 

could shorten the current U.S. ITER Project schedule, and that doing 

so would reduce overall project costs. Two experts noted that one 

issue with this strategy would be that the U.S. ITER Project would 

need to receive more funding in some years, and that could lead to 

funding cuts for other DOE projects and programs. To address that 

issue, one expert suggested DOE not propose an optimal funding 

plan for the U.S. ITER Project until the agency determines that there 

is a reliable international project schedule and that the ITER 

Organization has made significant progress improving its 

management of the overall ITER project. Another expert suggested 

that DOE first communicate its plans for managing the impact on the 

overall U.S. fusion program of higher U.S. ITER Project funding in 

certain years before proposing an optimal funding plan. When we 

discussed this strategy with DOE program officials, they agreed that 

an optimal funding plan for the project could shorten the U.S. ITER 

Project schedule and potentially reduce costs significantly. However, 

they emphasized that the most recent $225 million annual funding 

plan was an attempt to balance the funding needs of the U.S. ITER 

Project and the rest of the U.S. fusion program.

• Three experts suggested that DOE could reduce U.S. ITER Project 

costs by working with its international partners to develop a reliable 

international project schedule and aligning U.S. ITER Project efforts 

with that schedule. One expert noted that this would help make DOE’s 

cost estimate for the U.S. ITER Project more certain. Another expert 

told us that a reliable international project schedule was necessary for 

DOE to set an optimal funding plan, which in turn could help minimize 

Some Experts Suggested 

Strategies to Further 

Reduce U.S. ITER Project 

Costs or Improve 

Management
 

Page 33 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

U.S. ITER Project costs. The expert said that aligning the U.S. ITER 

Project with a reliable international project schedule was necessary to 

ensure that the United States was not producing its hardware 

components too early or too late, either of which could result in cost 

growth. When we discussed this strategy with DOE program officials, 

they said that the United States has actively presented its views to its 

international partners on what would be a realistic schedule for the 

overall ITER project. Further, the officials told us that they do try to 

align U.S. ITER Project efforts with the international project schedule 

in spite of imperfect knowledge due to the current international project 

schedule not being reliable.

Some of the 10 experts we interviewed also suggested strategies that 

DOE could pursue to improve its management of the U.S. ITER Project. 

The following two strategies were mentioned by several experts:

• Six experts suggested DOE establish a separate office that would 

report directly to top DOE management officials to provide oversight 

of the U.S. ITER Project. Two of these experts said that having a 

separate office would give the U.S. ITER Project greater visibility at 

the highest levels of DOE. Another expert said a benefit would be to 

enhance the project’s interaction with stakeholders, including 

Congress and the U.S. fusion community. Further, two experts told us 

that a separate office for the U.S. ITER Project would enhance DOE’s 

ability to oversee the project’s complexity and complications given the 

international structure the project operates within. When we discussed 

this strategy with DOE program officials, they said that a separate 

DOE office to oversee the U.S. ITER Project would not provide many 

benefits and could have unintended consequences. Specifically, they 

said that the project already has high visibility with top DOE 

management officials and that creating a separate office could result 

in a greater degree of funding competition between the U.S. ITER 

Project and the rest of the U.S. fusion program.

• Four of the 10 experts we interviewed said DOE should make more 

information on the U.S. ITER Project available to stakeholders in the 

U.S. fusion community. One expert said DOE should be more 

forthcoming about what the agency expects the U.S. ITER Project to 

cost and how they plan to pay for it. Two other experts suggested that 

DOE should disclose its internal peer reviews of the U.S. ITER 

Project. Several of the experts we interviewed also identified a 

number of negative effects of DOE not being sufficiently transparent 

about the U.S. ITER Project. These included the erosion of 

stakeholder commitment to the project and a diminished ability for 

stakeholders to effectively plan research efforts and make informed 
 

Page 34 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

funding decisions related to the impact of project costs on the overall 

U.S. fusion program. When we discussed this strategy with DOE 

program officials, they said they have shared a substantial amount of 

information on the U.S. ITER Project with stakeholders and were 

trying to share more. For example, they noted that DOE included a 

detailed section on the U.S. ITER Project in its fiscal year 2015 

budget request. In some cases, however, officials said they were 

limited in the information they could share with stakeholders by the 

international sensitivities of the overall ITER project, by procurement 

sensitivities, and by the nature of the budget process.

DOE has not adequately planned for the potential impact of U.S. ITER 

Project costs on the overall U.S. fusion program, although it has taken 

some steps. For example, as previously mentioned, the project’s most 

recent $225 million per year funding plan was an attempt by DOE and 

other parts of the administration to meet U.S. obligations to ITER and 

reduce the project’s impact on the U.S. fusion program and DOE’s overall 

budget. However, according to agency officials, DOE has not completed a 

strategic plan for the U.S. fusion program to clarify the program’s goals 

and priorities and its proposed approach for meeting them in light of the 

potential impact of U.S. ITER Project costs.48

The House and Senate Appropriations Committees directed DOE to 

submit a 10-year strategic plan for the U.S. fusion program in the 

explanatory statements that accompanied both the fiscal year 2012 and 

fiscal year 2014 energy and water development appropriation acts.49

 

48A DOE official told us that, in the absence of a completed strategic plan, the agency 

believes it has clearly stated the values that are driving U.S. fusion program priorities 

through DOE’s annual budget requests and presentations to stakeholders. Those 

presentations have provided some information on the program’s direction and the 

challenges it faces, but they are broad in nature and are not equivalent to a completed 

strategic plan. 

In 

addition, DOE’s Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee 

recommended in 2013 that DOE develop a strategic plan for the U.S. 

49See Explanatory Statement, 160 Cong. Rec. H 878 (daily ed., Jan.15, 2014), to the 

Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014, 

contained in Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76; 

and H.R. Rep. No. 112-331, at 855 (Dec.15, 2011) (Conf. Rep.). The fiscal year 2014 

explanatory statement further directed that the strategic plan DOE submitted should

assume U.S. participation in ITER and assess its priorities for the domestic fusion 

program based on three funding scenarios. 

DOE Has Not Adequately 

Planned for the Impacts of 

U.S. ITER Project Costs 

on the U.S. Fusion 

Program
 

Page 35 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

fusion program using the advisory committee process and with broad 

U.S. fusion community input.50

DOE officials told us they have not completed a strategic plan for the U.S. 

fusion program to date, for three reasons. First, they said an effort in 2012 

to obtain the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee’s input on U.S. 

fusion program priorities had been unsuccessful because the committee 

did not address program priorities under a constrained budget scenario 

due to conflict of interest issues. Second, DOE officials said there had 

been too much budget uncertainty in fiscal year 2013 regarding the U.S. 

ITER Project and the overall U.S. fusion program to complete a plan. 

They explained that the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 

proposed different direction and funding levels for the U.S. fusion 

program in fiscal year 2013, and these differences were not resolved until 

the passage of the fiscal year 2014 appropriations act in January 2014. 

Third, DOE officials said an effort in 2012 and 2013 to develop a highlevel strategic document for the U.S. fusion program was unsuccessful 

because OMB did not concur with the document developed by DOE. DOE 

officials said they are in the early stages of developing a strategic plan in 

response to the House and Senate appropriations committees’ direction 

in the explanatory statement that accompanied the fiscal year 2014 

appropriations act. These officials said they would ask the Fusion Energy 

Sciences Advisory Committee in April 2014 to provide input on U.S. 

fusion program priorities by October 2014. According to the officials, DOE 

will consider the committee’s input in developing a strategic plan for the 

U.S. fusion program, and it hopes to finalize a plan no later than the 

January 2015 deadline set by the House and Senate Appropriations 

Committees. However, DOE officials could not provide a specific date 

when they expect to complete the strategic plan.

Further, 9 of the 10 fusion energy and 

project management experts we interviewed agreed that it would be 

useful for DOE to develop such a plan.

We have previously reported that strategic planning is a leading 

management practice organizations can employ to define their mission 

and goals; help clarify priorities; address management and other 

 

50The Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee provides independent advice to the 

Director of DOE’s Office of Science on complex scientific and technological issues that 

arise in the planning, implementation, and management of the fusion energy sciences 

program. Committee members are drawn from universities, national laboratories, and 

industrial companies. 
 

Page 36 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

challenges that threaten an agency’s ability to meet its long-term strategic 

goals; align activities, core processes, and resources to accomplish those 

goals; and foster informed communication between an agency and its 

stakeholders.51

• involve and help create a basic understanding among stakeholders—

including Congress and the U.S. fusion community—about its plans 

for balancing the competing demands that confront the program with 

the limited resources available;

Without a strategic plan for the overall U.S. fusion 

program that addresses DOE’s plans for managing the impacts of U.S. 

ITER Project costs, the agency does not have information to

• better ensure that the U.S. ITER Project and other U.S. fusion 

program activities are aligned to effectively and efficiently achieve the 

program’s goals; and

• improve Congress’s ability to weigh the potential trade-offs of different 

funding decisions for the U.S. ITER Project and the overall U.S. fusion 

program within a constrained budget environment.

DOE has taken some actions to address the factors that affect the 

reliability of its cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER Project. 

However, more than 7 years and nearly $700 million after the ITER 

Agreement was signed, significant uncertainty remains about how much 

the U.S. ITER Project will cost, when it will be completed, and how DOE 

plans to manage the impact of the project’s costs on the overall U.S. 

fusion program. DOE’s current preliminary cost and schedule estimates 

met most characteristics of high-quality, reliable cost and schedule 

estimates, but the cost estimate was not fully credible. Specifically, the 

U.S. ITER Project Office did not include the most expensive U.S. 

hardware component in its sensitivity analysis and an independent cost 

estimate has not been conducted, which could result in DOE making 

decisions based on incomplete information and increase the risk of more 

cost growth.

It is important for DOE to set a performance baseline for the U.S. ITER 

Project in order to finalize its cost and schedule estimates, provide a bar 

against which the project’s progress can be measured, and allow 

Congress to make well-informed funding decisions about the project 

within a constrained budget environment. However, DOE has not yet set 

 

51For example, see GAO-13-115 and GAO-12-77. 

Conclusions
 

Page 37 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

a performance baseline for the U.S. ITER Project in part because the 

international project schedule is not reliable, a key factor that DOE can 

only partially influence. To its credit, DOE has taken several actions to 

push for a reliable international project schedule and improvements to 

ITER Organization project management. Nonetheless, the agency could 

do more to ensure the ITER Organization develops a reliable international 

project schedule and that ITER Organization project management 

deficiencies are addressed by making formal proposals to the ITER 

Council that address these issues and remaining vigilant about the timely 

implementation of the proposed improvements. Without a reliable 

international project schedule, DOE neither can propose a final, stable 

funding plan for the U.S. ITER Project, nor can it reasonably assure 

Congress that the project’s cost will not continue to grow and the 

schedule will not continue to slip.

DOE has taken some steps to reduce the cost of the U.S. ITER Project 

and plan for the impact of the project’s cost on the overall U.S. fusion 

program. However, even though there has been repeated direction from 

the House and Senate Appropriations Committees going back more than 

2 years and a recommendation from its own advisory committee to do so, 

DOE has not yet completed a strategic plan for the overall U.S. fusion 

program. Strategic planning is a leading practice that can help 

organizations clarify priorities and address challenges that threaten their 

ability to meet long-term strategic goals. Completing a strategic plan for 

the overall U.S. fusion program would reduce uncertainty by addressing 

DOE’s priorities for the program in light of U.S. ITER Project costs. 

Moreover, involving stakeholders, such as the Fusion Energy Sciences 

Advisory Committee, in the plan’s development would increase 

stakeholder understanding of DOE’s plans for balancing the competing 

demands that face the U.S. fusion program with the limited resources 

available. DOE is beginning the initial work on such a plan, but a similar 

effort that was started in 2012 did not result in a completed strategic plan 

for the U.S. fusion program, and the agency has not provided a specific 

date when it will complete its current effort. Without committing to a 

specific date, DOE may not complete a strategic plan for the U.S. fusion 

program in a timely manner and, without a completed strategic plan, DOE 

may face challenges ensuring that it has effectively aligned U.S. fusion 

program activities to achieve program goals. Further, Congress and the 

U.S. fusion community are likely to remain uncertain about DOE’s plans 

for balancing the competing funding demands of the U.S. ITER Project 

and the rest of the U.S. fusion program.
 

Page 38 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

To reduce uncertainty about the expected cost and schedule of the U.S. 

ITER Project and its potential impact on the U.S. fusion program, the 

Secretary of Energy should direct the Associate Director of the Office of 

Fusion Energy Sciences to take the following four actions:

• Direct the U.S. ITER Project Office to revise and update the project’s 

cost estimate to meet all characteristics of high-quality, reliable cost 

estimates. Specifically, the U.S. ITER Project Office should revise the 

project’s cost estimate to ensure it is credible by including a 

comprehensive sensitivity analysis that includes all significant cost 

elements and conducting an independent cost estimate;

• Develop and present at the next ITER Council meeting a formal 

proposal describing the actions DOE believes need to be taken to set 

a reliable international project schedule and improve ITER 

Organization project management. Continue to formally advocate for 

the timely implementation of those actions at each future ITER 

Council meeting until the ITER Council approves an updated 

international project schedule;

• Once the ITER Organization completes its reassessment of the 

international project schedule, use that schedule, if reliable, to 

propose a final, stable funding plan for the U.S. ITER Project, approve 

a performance baseline with finalized cost and schedule estimates, 

and communicate this information to Congress; and

• Set a specific date for completing, in a timely manner, a strategic plan 

for the U.S. fusion program that addresses DOE’s priorities for the 

overall U.S. fusion program in light of U.S. ITER Project costs, and 

involve the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee in the 

development of the plan.

We provided a draft copy of this report to DOE for review and comment. 

DOE provided written comments on the draft report on May 27, 2014, 

which are reproduced in appendix VI, and also provided technical and 

clarifying comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOE agreed 

with each of the report’s recommendations and said it has taken steps or 

plans to take additional steps to fully implement them.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the 

appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 39 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VII.

Frank Rusco

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 40 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Our review assessed: (1) how and why the estimated cost and schedule 

for the U.S. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 

Project have changed since 2006; (2) the reliability of the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE) current cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER 

Project and the factors, if any, that have affected their reliability; and (3) 

the actions DOE has taken, if any, to reduce U.S. ITER Project costs and 

plan for their potential impact on the overall U.S. fusion program. To 

address these objectives and better understand the U.S. ITER Project, 

we reviewed the ITER Agreement, relevant laws, and DOE guidance and 

met with DOE and Department of State officials, representatives from the 

U.S. ITER Project Office, and fusion energy and project management 

experts from industry, DOE’s national laboratories, and universities.

To determine how and why the estimated cost and schedule for the U.S. 

ITER Project have changed since 2006, we reviewed DOE and U.S. ITER 

Project Office documents. We assessed the reliability of the data on 

changes in the cost estimates by checking for obvious errors in accuracy 

and completeness; comparing the data with other sources of information; 

and interviewing DOE officials and U.S. ITER Project Office 

representatives who had knowledge of the data. We determined that DOE 

and the U.S. ITER Project Office’s data on changes in the cost estimates 

for the U.S. ITER Project were sufficiently reliable for reporting on the 

reasons for the changes in the estimates. We also contacted the national 

audit offices of each of the six other ITER members to identify any audit 

reports they had issued on ITER, and we reviewed each report that was 

identified.

To evaluate the reliability of DOE’s current cost and schedule estimates 

and the factors, if any, that have affected their reliability, we reviewed 

DOE’s most recent cost and schedule estimates for the U.S. ITER 

Project—as developed by the U.S. ITER Project Office in August 2013—

and DOE’s internal peer review of those estimates. We also reviewed 

DOE’s project management order and related guidance, as well as an 

October 2013 report to the ITER Council on the results of a management 

assessment of the ITER Organization. We assessed the reliability of 

DOE’s current cost and schedule estimates by analyzing the August 2013 

estimates against the best practices identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide) and Schedule Assessment Guide 

(Schedule Guide).

1

Specifically, we determined the reliability of the cost estimate by 

reviewing documentation DOE submitted for the cost estimate, 

interviewing U.S. ITER Project Office representatives who prepared the 

estimate, reviewing relevant sources, and comparing the information 

collected with the best practices identified in the Cost Guide to determine 

whether the cost estimate was (1) comprehensive, (2) accurate, (3) welldocumented, and (4) credible.2 After a review of all source data, we 

assessed the extent to which the cost estimate met these best practices 

by calculating the assessment rating of each criteria within the four 

characteristics on a five-point scale: not met = 1, minimally met = 2, 

partially met = 3, substantially met = 4, and fully met = 5.3

We determined the reliability of the current schedule estimate for the U.S. 

ITER Project by assessing the characteristics of two selected subordinate 

Then, we took 

the average of the individual assessment ratings for the criteria to 

determine the overall rating for each of the four characteristics. The 

resulting average became the overall assessment as follows: not met = 0 

to 1.4; minimally met = 1.5 to 2.4; partially met = 2.5 to 3.4; substantially 

met = 3.5 to 4.4; and fully met = 4.5 to 5.0. After conducting our initial 

analysis, we shared it with DOE officials and representatives from the 

U.S. ITER Project Office who developed the cost estimate to provide an 

opportunity for them to comment and identify reasons for observed 

shortfalls in cost estimating best practices. We took their comments and 

any additional information they provided and incorporated it into the 

assessments to finalize the scores for each characteristic and best 

practice.

 

1

GAO-09-3SP and GAO-12-120G. 

2

GAO designed the Cost Guide to be used by federal agencies to assist them in 

developing reliable cost estimates and also as an evaluation tool for existing cost 

estimates. To develop the Cost Guide, GAO cost experts assessed measures applied by 

cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and 

considered best-practices for the development of reliable cost-estimates. 

3

Not met– DOE provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion; minimally met– 

DOE provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion; partially met– DOE 

provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion; substantially met– DOE 

provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion; and fully met– DOE 

provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

schedules—the central solenoid modules schedule and the tokamak 

cooling water system schedule—that are used as inputs to the integrated 

master schedule. We selected these two schedules because they are the 

largest two hardware items, in terms of value, that the United States is 

responsible for contributing to ITER. We determined whether the 

schedules were (1) comprehensive, (2) well-constructed, (3) credible, and 

(4) controlled by reviewing documentation DOE submitted for the U.S. 

ITER Project schedule estimate, interviewing U.S. ITER Project Office 

representatives who developed the estimate, reviewing relevant sources, 

and comparing the information collected against the criteria for each of 

these characteristics identified in the Schedule Guide.

4

 

4

The Schedule Guide is intended to expand on the scheduling concepts introduced in the 

Cost Guide by providing 10 best practices to help managers and auditors ensure that the 

program schedule is reliable. The reliability of the schedule determines the credibility of 

the program’s forecasted dates for decision making. 

We also analyzed 

schedule metrics as a part of that analysis to highlight potential areas of 

strengths and weaknesses against each of our four characteristics of a 

reliable schedule. In order to assess each schedule against the four 

characteristics and their accompanying 10 best practices, we traced and 

verified underlying support and determined whether the U.S. ITER Project 

Office provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the criterion and assigned a 

score based on the same five-point scale we used in our analysis of the 

cost estimate. Then, we took the average of the individual assessment

ratings to determine the overall rating for each of the characteristics, also 

using the same scale we used in our analysis of the cost estimate. After 

conducting our initial analysis, we shared it with DOE officials and 

representatives from the U.S. ITER Project Office who developed the 

schedule estimate to provide an opportunity for them to comment and 

identify reasons for observed shortfalls in schedule management best 

practices. We took their comments and any additional information they 

provided and incorporated it into the assessments to finalize the scores 

for each characteristic and best practice. By examining the two 

subordinate schedules against our guidance, we conducted a reliability 

assessment on each of the schedules and incorporated our findings on 

reliability limitations in the analysis of each subordinate schedule. We 

were also able to use the results of the two subordinate schedules to 

provide insight into the health of the integrated master schedule since the 

same strengths and weaknesses of the subordinate schedules would 

transfer to the master schedule. We determined that the schedules were 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes, and our report notes the 

instances where reliability concerns affect the quality of the schedules.

To examine the actions DOE has taken, if any, to reduce U.S. ITER 

Project costs and plan for their potential impact on the overall U.S. fusion 

program, we reviewed DOE and U.S. ITER Project Office documents on 

actions taken to reduce U.S. ITER Project costs, interviewed DOE 

program officials about the status of their efforts to complete a strategic 

plan for the U.S. fusion program, and reviewed meeting records of DOE’s 

Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee.5 We also reviewed our 

prior work on leading practices in federal strategic planning for agency 

divisions, programs, or initiatives,6 as well as the House and Senate 

Appropriations Committees’ direction to DOE in the explanatory 

statements for the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2014 energy and water 

development appropriation acts to submit a 10-year strategic plan for the 

U.S. fusion program. Further, we summarized the results of 

semistructured interviews with 10 experts in fusion energy and the 

management of large scientific research projects. To select these experts, 

we first identified 105 experts by reviewing the results of a literature 

search; congressional hearings; National Academies of Science 

publications; membership lists for the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory 

Committee, the ITER Council Management Advisory Committee,7 the 

ITER Council Science and Technology Advisory Committee,8

 

5

The Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee provides independent advice to the 

Director of DOE’s Office of Science on complex scientific and technological issues that 

arise in the planning, implementation, and management of the fusion energy sciences 

program. Committee members are drawn from universities, national laboratories, and 

industrial companies. 

and DOE’s 

internal peer reviews of the U.S. ITER Project; and recommendations 

from other fusion energy experts we interviewed. From this list, we then 

6

For example, see GAO-13-115 and GAO-12-77. 

7

The ITER Council Management Advisory Committee, at the request of the ITER Council, 

reviews and evaluates matters of strategic management importance to the ITER project 

and makes recommendations to the ITER Council to facilitate the successful development 

of the ITER Organization and the successful execution of the ITER construction project. 

8

The ITER Council Science and Technology Advisory Committee, at the request of the 

ITER Council, reviews and advises the ITER Council on science and technology issues 

concerning the implementation of the ITER project. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

used a multistep process to select 10 experts.9

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To ensure coverage and a 

range of perspectives, we selected fusion energy and large scientific 

project management experts from industry, DOE’s national laboratories, 

and universities. We conducted semistructured interviews with the 10 

selected experts using a standard set of questions and analyzed their 

responses, grouping them into overall themes. We summarized the 

results of our analysis and then asked DOE program officials for their 

views on actions suggested by multiple stakeholders to potentially reduce 

U.S. ITER Project costs or improve U.S. ITER Project management. Not 

all 10 of the experts answered all of our questions. The views expressed 

by experts do not represent the views of GAO. Appendix II lists the 

names and affiliations of the 10 experts we interviewed.

 

9

We initially selected 15 experts using this multistep process. We eliminated 3 of the 

initially selected experts because they were working directly on the U.S. ITER Project, 

either for DOE or the U.S. ITER Project Office. Another expert we initially selected told us 

she did not have sufficient knowledge of the U.S. ITER Project to participate in our review, 

and we were unable to get in contact with one other expert we initially selected, so we 

eliminated both experts and ended up with our final list of 10 experts. We determined that 

the remaining 10 experts still ensured sufficient coverage and a range of perspectives. 
Appendix II: List of Experts

Page 45 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

• Dr. Riccardo Betti, University of Rochester

• Dr. Aesook Byon, Brookhaven National Laboratory (retired)

• Dr. Richard W. Callis, General Atomics

• Dr. Adam Cohen, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

• Dr. Ray Fonck, University of Wisconsin—Madison

• Dr. Charles M. Greenfield, General Atomics

• Dr. Martin Greenwald, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Dr. Richard Hawryluk, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

• Dr. Robert Iotti, CH2M Hill (retired) 

• Dr. Dale Meade, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (retired)

Appendix II: List of Experts
Appendix III: Status of U.S. Hardware 

Components for the International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) as 

of August 2013

Page 46 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Dollars in millions

U.S. hardware 

component Purpose

Design 

status 

Estimate to 

completea Estimated final 

delivery date

Procurement 

arrangementb

reached

Central solenoid 

magnet system

Confines, shapes, and controls the 

plasma inside ITER’s vacuum vessel.

Final

designc, f

$252.1 April 2019 Yes

Diagnostics (15% of

ITER diagnostics)

Provides the measurements necessary 

to control, evaluate, and optimize 

plasma performance and to further the 

understanding of plasma physics.

Preliminary 

designd $112.2 September 2024

Yes

Disruption mitigation 

systems (up to a 

capped value)

Limits the effect of plasma current 

disruptions to the tokamak vacuum 

vessel and other components.

Preliminary 

design

$19.4 June 2019 No

Electron cyclotron 

heating transmission 

lines

Brings additional heat to the plasma 

and deposits heat in specific areas of 

the plasma to minimize instabilities.

Final design $90.4 November 2024 Yes

Ion cyclotron heating 

transmission lines

Brings additional heat to the plasma. Preliminary 

design 

$98.1 August 2026 Yes

Pellet injection system Provides efficient fueling and delivers 

hydrogen, deuterium, or a 

deuterium/tritium mixture as required 

by plasma operations. 

Preliminary 

design

$39.0 July 2026 No

Roughing pump 

system

Exhausts certain parts of the ITER 

machine.

Conceptual 

designe $36.0 September 

2021

No

Steady state electrical 

network (75% of total 

network)

Supplies the electricity needed to 

operate the entire ITER plant, including 

offices and the operational facilities.

Design 

completef $39.2 March 2016 Yes

Tokamak cooling water 

system

Manages temperatures generated 

during the operation of the tokamak.

Final designf $463.4 September 

2029

Yes

Tokamak exhaust 

processing system

Separates tokamak exhaust gases into 

a stream containing only hydrogen 

isotopes and a stream containing only 

non-hydrogen gases.

Preliminary 

design

$107.0 April 2030 No

Toroidal field conductor 

(8% of total conductor)

Part of toroidal field magnet that 

confines, shapes, and controls the 

plasma inside the ITER vacuum 

vessel.

Design 

completef $10.3 July 2015 Yes

Vacuum auxiliary 

systems

Creates low density in ITER’s vacuum 

vessel and connected vacuum 

components. 

Preliminary 

designf $58.7 September 2023

Yes

Source: GAO analysis of DOE documents.

a

The “Estimate to complete” refers to the latest estimate of budget required to finish the work 

remaining. The estimates listed in this column are burdened, meaning they include direct and indirect 

costs, and unescalated, meaning they represent current year dollar values.

Appendix III: Status of U.S. Hardware 

Components for the International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 

as of August 2013
Appendix III: Status of U.S. Hardware 

Components for the International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) as 

of August 2013

Page 47 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

b

“Procurement arrangements” govern the procurement of plant systems, components, or site 

construction, detailing all the necessary technical specifications and management requirements.

c

“Final design” is the last stage of design development prior to implementation. At the final design 

stage, the project scope should be finalized and changes should be permitted only for compelling 

reasons.

d

The “Preliminary design” stage initiates the process of converting concepts to a more detailed design 

whereby more detailed and reliable cost and schedule estimates are developed. This stage of the 

design is complete when it provides sufficient information to support development of the performance 

baseline.

e

The “Conceptual design” process must ensure that a solution or alternatives are responsive to an 

approved need, and also technically achievable, affordable, and will provide the best value to the 

agency.

f

Certain parts of these components are already being fabricated or being prepared for fabrication.
Appendix IV: GAO Assessment of DOE’s 

Current (August 2013) Cost Estimate for the 

U.S. International Thermonuclear Experimental 

Reactor (ITER) Project Compared with Best 

Practices

Page 48 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Characteristic

Overall 

assessmenta Best practice

Individual 

assessment

Comprehensive Substantially met The cost estimate includes all life-cycle costs. Partially met 

The cost estimate completely defines the program, reflects the 

current schedule, and is technically reasonable.

Substantially met

The cost estimate work breakdown structure is product-oriented, 

traceable to the statement of work/objective, and at an appropriate 

level of detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor 

double-counted.

Substantially met

The estimate documents all cost-influencing ground rules and 

assumptions. 

Substantially met

Well-documented Substantially met The documentation should capture the source data used, the 

reliability of the data, and how the data were normalized.

Substantially met

The documentation describes in sufficient detail the calculations 

performed and the estimating methodology used to derive each 

element’s cost.

Substantially met

The documentation describes step by step how the estimate was 

developed so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could 

understand what was done and replicate it.

Substantially met

The documentation discusses the technical baseline description 

and the data in the baseline is consistent with the estimate.

Fully met

The documentation provides evidence that the cost estimate was 

reviewed and accepted by management.

Substantially met

Accurate Substantially met The cost estimate results are unbiased, not overly conservative or 

optimistic and based on an assessment of most likely costs.

Partially met

The estimate has been adjusted properly for inflation. Substantially met

The estimate contains few, if any, minor mistakes. Fully met

The cost estimate is regularly updated to reflect significant changes 

in the program so that it is always reflecting current status.

Substantially met

Variances between planned and actual costs are documented, 

explained, and reviewed. 

Substantially met

The estimate is based on a historical record of cost estimating and 

actual experiences from other comparable programs. 

Substantially met

The estimating technique for each cost element was used 

appropriately.

Partially met

Credible Partially met The cost estimate includes a sensitivity analysis that identifies a 

range of possible costs based on varying major assumptions, 

parameters, and data inputs.

Partially met

A risk and uncertainty analysis was conducted that quantified the 

imperfectly understood risks and identified the effects of changing 

key cost driver assumptions and factors.

Partially met

Major cost elements were cross-checked to see whether results 

were similar.

Partially met

Appendix IV: GAO Assessment of DOE’s Current 

(August 2013) Cost Estimate for the U.S. 

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

(ITER) Project Compared with Best Practices
Appendix IV: GAO Assessment of DOE’s 

Current (August 2013) Cost Estimate for the 

U.S. International Thermonuclear Experimental 

Reactor (ITER) Project Compared with Best 

Practices

Page 49 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Characteristic

Overall 

assessmenta Best practice

Individual 

assessment

An independent cost estimate was conducted by a group outside 

the acquiring organization to determine whether other estimating 

methods produce similar results.

Partially met

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

a

Not met– DOE provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion; minimally met– DOE provided 

evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion; partially met– DOE provided evidence that 

satisfies about half of the criterion; substantially met– DOE provided evidence that satisfies a large 

portion of the criterion; and fully met– DOE provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion.
Appendix V: GAO Assessment of DOE’s 

Current (August 2013) Schedule Estimates for 

the Two Largest Hardware Items of the U.S. 

International Thermonuclear Experimental 

Reactor (ITER) Project Compared with Best 

Practices

Page 50 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Overall assessmenta Individual assessment

Characteristic

Central 

solenoid 

modules

Tokamak 

cooling water 

system Best practice

Central 

solenoid 

modules

Tokamak 

cooling 

water 

system

Comprehensive Fully met Fully met Capturing all activities. Fully met Fully met

Assigning resources to all 

activities.

Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met

Establishing the durations of all 

activities.

Fully met Fully met

Well-constructed Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met

Sequencing all activities. Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met

Confirming that the critical path 

is valid.

Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met 

Ensuring reasonable total float. Partially met Partially met

Credible Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met

Verifying that the schedule is 

traceable horizontally and 

vertically. 

Partially met Partially met

Conducting a schedule risk 

analysis. 

Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met

Controlled Substantially 

met

Substantially 

met

Updating the schedule with 

actual progress and logic. 

Substantially 

met

Fully met

Maintaining a baseline 

schedule. 

Partially met Partially met

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

a

Not met– DOE provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion; minimally met– DOE provided 

evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion; partially met– DOE provided evidence that 

satisfies about half of the criterion; substantially met – DOE provided evidence that satisfies a large 

portion of the criterion; and fully met– DOE provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire 

criterion. 

Appendix V: GAO Assessment of DOE’s Current 

(August 2013) Schedule Estimates for the Two Largest 

Hardware Items of the U.S. International 

Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project 

Compared with Best Practices 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 51 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Energy
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 52 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 53 GAO-14-499 Fusion Energy

Frank Rusco, (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, other key contributors to this 

report were Dan Haas, Assistant Director; David Marroni; Andrew Moore; 

and Jacqueline Wade. Important contributions were also made by Cheryl 

Arvidson, Brian Bothwell, Nikki Clowers, Elizabeth Curda, R. Scott 

Fletcher, Cindy Gilbert, Jason Lee, Karen Richey, and Barbara 

Timmerman.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361499)
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