The Hono ra b l e R obert Holmes B ell, Chief United States District Judge f or the Western * District of Michig an, sitting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0179n.06 F iled: April 4, 2008 No. 06-4069 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

AL EX AN DRU N ER G HES, P etitioner -Appellant,

v. MICHAEL MUK

ASEY, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON P ETIT ION F OR RE VI EW OF AN OR

DE R O F THE BOA RD OF IM M IG RA TIO N AP P EA LS

Be fore : BO GGS, Chief J udg e; GI BB ONS; Circuit J udg e; B EL L , District J udg e. * BO GGS, Chief J udg e. Al ex an d ru Ner g hes appe als an orde r of the B oard of I mmigration Ap p ea l s (“ BI A” ). T h e B I A o rd er edNe rgh es d ep o rt ed , re v er s i n g t h e ru l i n g o f an I m m i gra t i o nJ u d ge (“I J ”) w ho had g rante d Ne rgh es a def err al of re moval under the Convention Ag ainst Torture (“CAT” ). Our review is limit ed to “constitutional or leg al questions” bec ause N erg hes wa s order ed d e p o rt e d a f t e r c o m m i t t i n g an“ a g g r av a t e d f e l o n y. ” N e r g h e s ’ s s o l e l e g a l ar g u m e n ti s t h a tt h e B IA applied the wr ong leg al standar d for “ torture” by failing to acknowle dg e that g overnme ntal “willful blindness” to private a

buses ca n constitute “torture .” We re ject this argument and af

firm. INo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

We use the term “ Roma” throug hout this opi nion beca use“Roma” is more acc urate g iven 1 that numerous non-Romani ethnic g roups hav e b ee n ca l l ed “Gy psies.” See http:// en.wikipedia.or g /wiki/Gy psy (last visited Marc h 31, 2008). Fur thermore , many

Roma object to the term “G y

psy ” to be “ pejorative.” Seehttp:// en.wikipedia.or g /wiki/R oma_people ( last visited Marc h 31, 2008). - 2 - Alexandru Ne rghes, ag e for ty , is a native a

nd citizen of Romania. He is also a Roma, or Gy psy , an ethnic a

nd cul tural g roup that has of ten bee n perse cuted throug hout easter n Europe. 1 Al on g wi th h is p are nts , h e ent e re d th e Un ite d St a te s le g a lly on Au g us t 30 , 1 97 5, and

ha s li ve d in Cleveland, Ohio, since that time. Nerg hes alleg es t hat he has never returned to Romania, knows no family there , and spea

ks only “a w ord or two” of Romanian. On Ap ri l 11 , 2 00 3, an Oh io state jur y c on vic te d N e rghe s o f f

e lon iou s a ssa

ult and ra pe . B oth

c o u n t s ar o s e f

r o m t h e s am e a t t a c k

o nh i s g i r l f

r i e n d t h a te n d e d

w i t hh e r i nt h e h o s p i t a l

. F i v e d ays late r, the jud g e se nte nc e d h im t o tw o c on c ur re nt f ive -ye ar p ri so n te rm s f

or the tw o cr ime s. Th e Oh io Court of Appea ls upheld both convictions on March 17, 2004. N er gh es h as been inc arc erated throug hout these proc eeding s. Under United Stat es immigration law, resident a liens who commit certa in ag g ravated felonies, includingthose for which Ner g hes was c onvicted, ar e subjec t to deportation. See 8. U. S.C. § 1227(a) (2)( A)(iii). Ner g hes rec eived a “Notice to A ppear in Removal Procee dings” on Aug ust 4, 2004. On J une 16, 2005, Ne rg hes filed to def er r emoval u n d er the re g ulations impl ementingthe CAT. The I J held a f

ull hearingon Fe bruar

y 24, 2006.No. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

Ev a Ne rg he s te sti fi e d th a t sh e be c a me a c iti zen in 1 98 7. 8 U.S. C. § 1433 (a ) p e rm its pa re nts 2 who ac hieve citiz enship to natura liz e their fore ign- born children only if the child is under eig hteen. Alexandru Ner g hes wa s born in 1967 and thus was twe nty when his mother wa s naturalized. - 3 - Mr. Ner g h es ’s m o t h er, Eva Ner g hes, testified fir st. She explained that the family left 2 Romania in 1975 to esca

pe anti-Roma pe rsec ution. She testified that the family wer e tre ated a s the “last people ” in their vil lag e because of t heir ethnicity , and that when they applied for

a visa to leave, the police of

fice rs bea t and punche d the couple wh ile the superior office r sat ar ound “laug hing.” Finally , she said that she ha d no family left in Romania

and that Alexandru would suff er pe rsec ution if he we re f

orce d to return. Alexandru Ner g hes t hen testi fied that he had never returne d to Romania, knew no one there , and spoke very littl e R omanian. He stated that he feare d returning beca use he “ don’t know nothing [si c] about that country , sir. . . . Ig rewup here . This is all I know.” When asked why else he fea

red to return, he responde d that he “w ould be tortured . . . be cause of my rac e.” Ne r g h e s ’ s e xp e rt, M r . Ro n a ld L e e , s p o k e la s t. L e e is a s e mi

- r e ti r e d jo u r n a li s t an d author fr om T or on to, Cana da , a

nd a Rom a him se lf . He te sti fi e d that he ha s in te rv ie we d hun dr e ds of Rom a

re fu g e e s, has wri tt en abo ut t he pli g ht o f t

he Rom a , a

nd ha s w or ke d w ithor g anizatio ns tha t he lp Roma integ rate into Canadian society . L ee speaks R omani (the langua g e of the Roma) fluently even though he has bee n to Romania only once. L ee tes ti fi ed a t le ng th a

bo ut h owthe Rom a

are “ a t th e bo tto m of

the pe c kin g or de r” in Romania and fa ce a

strong neg ative stere oty

pe fr om the non-Roma popul at i o n . L ee c laimed that there have be en 53 pog roms ag ainst th e R oma in Romania since the f all of communism, and i n dividual attacks a

re c ommon in rural ar eas. The police “r are [l y ]” investigate these c rimes; theyNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

At oral a rgument, the gover

nment sug g ested that the Romanian g overnme nt need not find 3 out about the convictions bec ause al i ens like Ne rg hes ar e not alwa y s sent back “ chaine d to a Marsha l.” Howe ver, the re is no evide nce in the r ecor d either w ay on this point . Fort unately , the me tho d o f N e rg he s’ s r e tur n is imm a te ri a l to o ur

de c isi on tod ay , b ut w e wo uld

fi nd e vid e nc e on

thi s point helpful in future c ases whe re the method of re turn is releva nt. - 4 - are more likely

to stand around a

nd make sure the pog rom “fir es d[on’t] sprea d to house s owned by Romanians.” Wheneve r a c rime is discovere d, Roma are routinely rounde d u p as “the usual suspects” a

nd sometimes beaten by

police in orde r to forc e a confe ssion. Be cause private c itiz ens

are fre e to refuse to rent to Roma and add “ no Roma need a pply ” to job applications. Roma often live in substandard c onditions, and unemploy ment amongthe Roma is around sixt y perc ent. L ee a cknowledg ed that the Romanian go v er n ment does not perse cute the Roma, but that pe rs e c uti on

ari se s inst e a d fr om the “ min ds e t of the pe op le ” that th e g ov e rnme nt c ann ot, or wi ll n ot, control. While admitti ng that the Romanian g overnme nt ha s passed law s favor able to the Roma, L ee

c la ime d th a t th e laws we re “cos met ic” a tte mpt s to fu rt he r i ts a dmi ssi on

to t he EUand

are ra re ly

e nf or c e d. A fin a l thr e a t, L e e a dd e d, c a me fr om the ma fi a , w hic h o ft e n e xtor t or thr e a te n th e Rom a beca use they know that the Roma ca

nnot go to the police

. Ac c or din g to L e e , th e Rom a re ly on e xtende d f

a mil y su pp or t to c op e wi th t

he se ha rs h conditions. He empha siz ed that bec ause N erg hes has no r elatives lef t in Rom ania, he would not be

a ble to a c c e ss thi s supp or

t sy ste m. L e e a dd e d th a t N e rghe s w ou ld b e imm e diate ly re c og nize d a s a Roma based on his phy sical fe ature s, and that the c ommunity would lear

n that he had be en depor

ted fo r a fe lony , a nd the re fo re the po lic e wo uld be e ve n mo re lik e ly

to a bu se Ne rghe s. 3 Ner g hes also submitted documentation on t he cur rent c ountry

conditions in Rom ania. The State Depa

rtment’s 2004 Cou ntr

yRe po rt on Rom ania sa y s th a t:No. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 5 - The Gove rnment g ener ally respe cted the human rights of i ts citiz ens; howeve r, there wer e proble ms i n some are as. Police off icer s sometimes beat deta inees a nd re po rt e dly

ha ra sse d a nd us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e a g a ins t Ro ma . Wh ile so me pr og re ss was made in refor

ming the po l i ce , case s of inhuman and de g radingtreatment continued to be repor

ted. Investig ations of police a buses g ener ally

wer e leng thy

and inc on c lus ive , r are ly

re su lti ngin p ro se c uti on

or punis hme nt. The Repor

t went on to state that “no e x trajudicial killings,” took pl ace, but the Report found “cr edible re ports that police beat detainee s,” and ide ntified two incidents where police and

a c c omp anyingc ivi lia

n thug s beat Roma

c ivi lia ns . It li sts se ve ra l g ov e rnme nt p ro g ra ms d e sig ne d to he lp t he Rom a , b ut d e sc ri be s th e pr og ra ms a s “ un de rs ta ff

e d a nd un de rt ra ine d. ” Th e 20 03 State De pa rtme nt Cou ntr

yRe po rt contains substantially

simil ar state ments. Ne rg he s a lso su

bmi tte d a 20 04 Amne sty

I nte rn a tio na l r e po rt

that di sc us se s Ro mania

and lis ts two incidents wher e private sec urity g uards be at Roma civilians. A serie s o f re p orts from the Europea n Romani Rights Center discusses the Roma situation. The upshot of these repor ts is that in addition to seve re discr imination, two or three dozen re ported attacks on Roma occ ur ea ch y ear , and they rang e fr om fatal be ating s to property destruction to m inor street violence. Police office rs

occa sionally

perpe trate the attacks, but they are more likely to look the other wa y when they

happen. These doc uments paint a bleak picture of life in Romania as a Roma, but a pic ture less ha rsh than the picture L ee pa ints. On Fe bruar

y 24, 2006, the day

of the he aring , t h e I J fo u n d Ner g hes re movable base d on conviction of a

n ag g reg ated f

elony , but gr anted Ne rg hes’s req u es t t o defe r depor tation under the CAT. T h e I J fi rs t fo und Ner g hes and his witnesses c redible, a nd then found that the e vidence painted a “ g rim” picture for a Roma in Romania. Four f acts infor med the I J ’s dec ision that Nerg hes

was more likely

than not to be tortured if returne d to Romania: 1) Ne rgh es has no status and noNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 6 - family protec tion in R omania; 2) Ne rg hes cannot speak Romanian and thus ca nnot communicate; 3) Ne rg hes does not eve n have a high school education a nd there fore fac es bleak job prospects; and 4) Ne rg hes’s c riminal rec ord will make him an i m m ediate ta rg et for the Romanian police. Acc ording to the I J , these fa cts make N erg hes par ticularly vulnera

ble t o mistreatment well bey ond

“ ro uti ne po lic e br

uta lity .” Mo st imp or

tantl y , the I J con c lud e d th a t th e Rom ania g ov e rnme nt w ou ld “ac quiesce ” to this “sy stematic and se vere mistreatment,” be cause the re cord s h o wed that “the g overnme nt of Romania is willfully blind to the conduct of its citizens and police for ces.” The g overnme nt appea led this decision to the BIA. On Jul y 11, 2 0 0 6 , a spl it BIA pane l

re ve rs e d th e I J’s d e c isi on . J.A. a t 6– 10

. Whil e the B I A fo un d no “ c le ar e rr or ” in t he I J’s c re dib ili ty finding s, it neverthele ss held that Ner g hes failed to pr ove that it was “more likely than not that he would be subjec ted to torture if r eturne d to Romania.” Id. at 6–7. The BIA acknow ledg ed that the

re c or d s ho we d th a t inc ide nts of vio le nc e and

dis c ri min a tio n a g a ins t th e Rom a we re “ a pr ob le m in Rom ania ,” bu t r e a so ne d th a t be c a us e of re c e nt i mpr ov e me nts in c ountr y c on dit ion s d oc ume nte d in State Depa

rtment Reports, it wa s “not more likely than not that a public official w ould consent or acquiesc e ” t o whateve r mistreatment Ne rg hes fa ced. Id. at 7 (e mphasis added) . There fore , any mistreatment, no matter howsever e, would not be tor tur e within the meaningof the CAT. The B I A also “discounte d” Mr. L ee’ s testimony , finding that whi l e i t wa s “probative and useful,” it dese rved l es s we i ght than the I J aff orded it bec ause L ee ha d no deg ree in any rele vant field. Id. at 8. Fina lly , the BIA conclude d that the “four fac tors” identified by the I J wer e re levant only to N erg hes’s risk of hardship and not to the probability of torture

. Id. at 9

. T h e d i s s en t i n g j u d geNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

Al tho ug h th e pa

rt ie s d o n ot a

rgue thi s p oint, t

he dis se nti ngjud g e wa s c or re c t. Wh ile 4 Ner g hes’s inability to spe ak Romanian a nd lack of family connec tions may

be re levant to har dship, and ha rd sh ip i s u su a lly

ir re le va nt t o tor tur e , the se fa c tor s ar e a lso log ic a lly re le va nt t o th e pr ob a

bil ity that he will be picke d up and bea ten by the pol ice and there fore rele vant t o the s tatistical likelihood of torture in this case. - 7 - believed that these four

fac tors wer e rele vant to the probability of torture , but favore d rema nding 4 the ca se to the I J beca

use she wa s skeptical of some of Ner g hes’s fa ctual cla ims. Id. at 10. Ner g hes now a

ppeals. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. II We b e g in b y

e xpla ini ngthe lim its to our jur isd ic tio n and the n c on sid e r Ne rghe s’ s so le c la im

over w hich we ha

ve jurisdiction. Our c ourt deter mines its own jurisdiction de novo. Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales , 4 36 F .3 d 6 27 , 6 30 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) . We re vie w the BIA’ s c on str uc tio n o f a

statut e to deter mine if it is “manifestly

contra ry t o t h e l aw.” Amir v. Gonzales , 467 F.3d 921, 927 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A Re sid e nt a lie ns su c h a s Ne rg he s wh o c omm it c e rt a in “ a g g ra vate d f e lon ie s” lis te d in

8 U .S. C. § 12 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( ii i) ar e s u b je c t t o r e mo v a l. N e r g h e s c o n c e d e s h is r e mo v a b il it y u n d e r th is statute. The statute is par

t of a lar g er sc heme de signe d to “expedite the rem o v al of aliens who have be en convicted of

ag g ra v at ed fe l o n i es ,” Zha ng v . I NS , 274 F.3d 103, 108 ( 2d Cir. 2001), and one of Congr ess’s t o o l s t o acc omplish t hat g oal was a provision that limi ts our jurisdiction. Under the statutory scheme Congr ess established, [n] otwithstanding a

ny other provision of law (statutory or nonst atutory ), .

. . no c ou rt sh all ha v e jur isd

ic tio n to re v ie w an

y fi na l orde r o

f re mo v al a g a ins t an a lie n w ho isNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 8 - remova b l e by rea son of havingcommitted a cr iminal offense cover ed in sec tion 1182(a) (2) or

1227(a) (2)( A)(iii), (B ), (C), or (D) of this ti tle . . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (C) (e mphasis added)

. Th is b ar t o ju

ri sd ic tio n is qu a lif

ie d b y the ne xt sub pa

ra g ra ph : Nothing in subpa

rag raph ( B) o r (C), or in any other provision of this cha pter (othe r than this section) which lim i t s or eliminates judicial re view, shall be c onstrued as prec luding r eview of c on sti tut ion al c lai ms or qu esti on s o

f la w raised upon a

petition for r eview f

iled with an appr opriate c ourt of appe als in acc ordanc e with this section. Id. at § 1252(a )(2) (D) ( emphasis adde d). We the ref ore have jur isdiction over Ner g hes’s c laims only to the extent that they

are “constitutional claims or questions of law .” Our c ircuit has stated that the phrase “questions of law ” in § 1252(a) (2)( D) mea ns “matters of statutory

construction.” Almuhtaseb v. Gonzale s , 4 53 F .3 d 74 3, 74 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) . T he se “matter s” subject to re view include whether the alien’ s crime wa s an ag g ravat ed felony , Patel v. As hc ro ft , 4 01 F .3 d 4 00 , 4 07 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) , a nd “ wh e the r t

he BI A us e d th e c or

re c t st and ard

in revie wing the I J ’s dec ision and whether it [ the B I A] assigne d him [ th e al ien] the corre ct burde n of proof.” Tran v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 937, 943 ( 6th Cir. 2006). They do not include “discr etionary or fac tual questions.” Almuhtaseb , 453 F.3d at 748. The alien in Tran a dmi tte d that he wa s r e mov a ble beca use he c ommitt ed an ag g ravated felony , but, like Nerg hes, he soug ht to defer remova l under the CAT. Id. a t 938. Th e B I A re je c te d his cl a im, and we a ff ir me d be c a us e Tr an ra ise d no leg a l is su e s. Id. at 243. More r ece ntly , we held once ag ain that when an alien fac ing remova l a fter committing an

a g g ra vate d f e lony ra ise s “ on ly

a qu e sti on of fa c t . . . w e are wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n” to h e ar t he a pp e a l. Pepaj v. M

ukasey , 509 F.3d 725, 728 (6 t h C i r. 2007) (r efusingto consider a lien’s ar g ument aboutNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 9 - c ha ng e d c ountr

y c on dit ion s) . T he se c a se s sh owthat ou r c ir c uit ha s ex pl icitly

and re pe a te dly

he ld that its jurisdi ction in case s such as Ner g hes’s is limited to “ pure” questions of law such a s statutory construction and whether the cor rec t standard wa s applied. Ne rg hes ra ises o n e s u ch question: whether the B I A applied the c orre ct leg al def inition of “torture.” B To rt ur e is “ any act by wh ic h s e ve re pa in o r s uf fe ri ng , w he the r m e nta l or ph y sic a l, i s intentionally

inflicted on a person . . . by or at the instigat ion of or with the consent or acquie scenc e of a pu bli c off

ic ial or oth e r pe rs on

a c tin g in a

n o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity

. ” Singh v . A sh c ro

ft , 398 F. 3d 396, 40 4– 05 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (qu ot in g 8 C. F .R. § 2 08 .1 8( a )( 1) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ). Pur e ly pr ivate mistreatment, even extreme abuse that one might commonly call torture, is not “torture ” un d er the CAT beca

use there is no gove rnmental involvement. This require ment m ak es relief under the CAT more diff icult to obtain than other for ms of

re lie f u nd e r t he I NAbe c a us e “ tor tur e ” re qu ir e s g ov e rnme nta l “ c on se nt o r a c qu ie sc e nc e ” to p ri vate abuses. “ To rt u re ” als o cover s a nar rowe r, more se vere cate g ory of abusive c onduct than “per secution” f

or purpose s of asylum. Mouawad v. Gonzales , 485 F. 3 d 4 0 5 , 4 1 3 (8th Cir. 2007). Fur thermore , under the CAT the petitioner must prove that it is m ore likely than not that he will be tortured if r eturne d to his native country , 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2), while a n alien ca n obtain asylum by sh ow ingon ly

a “ we ll- fo un de d f

e ar o f p e rs e c uti on .” 8 U. S.C. § 11 01 (a )( 42 )( A)

. We h a ve no t sa id how proba

ble per secution must be in order for the alien’s fear of

perse cution to be well-f

ounded, but we have stated that the alien’s bur den of pr oof is “sig nifican t l y gre at er ” under the CAT. Sarr v. Gonzales , 485 F.3d 354, 362 ( 6th Cir. 2007). This makes sense, be cause the CAT explicitl y require sNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

For example, in Zhe ng

v . A sh c ro ft , 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 ( 9th Cir. 2003), Mr. Z hengfea red 5 violence at the hands of the “ Snakehea ds,” a p o werful Chinese cr iminal org anization who had ini tia lly smu g g le d Z he ng out of

Chi na and int o th e Un ite d St ate s. Th e Chi ne se g ov e rnme nt, wh ile no t acce pting or approving

of the Snake heads’ private violenc e, refused to step in and prevent the violence be cause it pretende d that the Snakehe ads did not exi st. Acting would require the g overnme nt to acknowledg e the Snake heads’ ex i s t en ce and there by “lose fa ce,” something the g overnme nt was unwilling to do. Ibid. - 10 - the alien to show that a

g reater than f

ifty perc ent cha

nce of torture ex ists to obtain relief , but one ca

n easily have a well-founde d fea

r whe n the probability of abuse is, sa y , twenty -five perc ent. But re lief under the CAT is easier

to o btain in one re spect: the a pplicant nee d not show that “he f ear s future harm on t h e b asis of any statutorily -def

ined g round.” Mouawad , 485 F.3d at 413. The cr itical question for this case is what a “public officia l” m ust do, or not do, to “ac quiesce ” to private citizen’s conduct to make that conduct “torture.” Fe dera l regulations provide that the off icial must know of the pr ivate a

bu se a nd “ br e a c h h is o r h e r legal duty to i nte rv e ne to p re ve nt s uc h a c tiv ity .” 8 C. F .R. § 1208.18(a) (7). One B I A ca se, In Re S- V- , 22 I

. & N. Dec

. 1306 (2000), he ld that under this regulation, the official s m u s t “willfully

acc ept” the tor

turous activities of private par ties. Id. a t 13 12 . M ult ipl e courts of a

ppeal, including our own, have reje cted this holding as “manife stly contra ry to the law.” Amir v. Gonzales , 4 67 F .3 d 9 21 , 9 27 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (c iti ng case s fr om t he Se c on d a

nd Ni nth Circuits). The c orre ct interpre tation is that “ac quiesce nce” does not require “ will ful acceptanc e ” of private pa rties’ a ctivities, but can be satisfied if the off icials are will

fully blind t o wh at i s h ap p en i n g. Am ir , 476 F. 3d at 927. “Willful blindness” is “ deliberate avoidanc e of know ledg e.” Black’ s Law Di c tio na ry

(8th ed. 2004). It can c o-exist wit h either approval or disapproval of the activity to which one is willfully

blind. Ner g hes ar g ues t h at t he B I A incorr ectly applied the “ willful acc eptanc e” 5No. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

The dissent sug g ests that the citation tells us litt le. On that re ading , the B I A did not cite Al i 6 w h e nd e f i n i n g “ a c qu i e s c e n c e , ” b u tc i t e d o n l y Matter of S-V- . D iss e nti ngOp . at 2. We r e sp e c tf ull y disag ree and point o u t t h at t he B I A discussed a nd define d “ac quiesce nce” throug hout the entire above- quoted par ag raph, a nd that the B I A cited Al i befor e, and the regulations both be fore and af ter, the citation to Matter of S-V-

. - 11 - standard r ather

than the “w illful bli ndness” standa rd because it neve r re fer

red to “ willful blindness,” and cited Matter of S-V-

. C Although the BIA dec ision is not a model of clar ity or judicial cra ftsmanship, three r easons

su pp or t f ind ingthat it

a pp lie d th e c or

re c t st and ard . T he re le va nt B I A d isc us sio n f

oll ow s: Furth e r , th e h ar

m f e ar e d mu s t b e “ in f

li c te d b y o r a t th e in s ti g a ti o n o f o r w it h the consent or a cquiesc ence of a public of fi ci al or other pe rson ac ting in an of ficial c a pa c ity .” 8 C. F .R. § 1 20 8. 18 (a )( 1) ; see also Ali v. R eno , 237 F.3d 591, 597 ( 6th Cir. 20 01 ). Whe n th e a lie n a lle g e s a lik e lih oo d of tor tur e fr om n on g ov e rnme nta l a c tor s, he or she must establish that the torture fe are d would be inflicted by or with the acquie scenc e of a

public officia l or other pe rson ac tin g i n an off icial ca pacity . To de mon str a te a c qu ie sc e nc e , th e re sp on de nt mus t do mor e tha n sh owtha

t th e of fi c ia ls are simply

awa re of the ac tivity constituting torture and ar e powe rless to stop it. See Matter of S-V

-, 22 I & NDec . 1306, 1 3 1 2 (B I A 2000). A public of ficial’s a c qu ie sc e nc e to t or

tur e “ re qu ir e s th a t th e pu bli c offic ia l, p ri or

to t he a c tiv ity constituting torture , have awa rene ss of such ac tivity

and ther eaf

ter bre ach his or he r leg al re sponsibili ty

to intervene to preve nt such ac tivity .” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.(a )(7)

. J .A. 7. First, the BIA cited Ali v. Reno , 23 7 F .3 d 59 1, 59 7 (6 th Cir

. 20 01 ). J.A. 7. Th is c itatio n is to the specific pag e in the spec ific ca se whe re our court discussed the definit i o n o f t o rture a nd the quoted languag e appe ars in the same par ag raph that established t hat the ter m “ac quiesce nce” included “willful blindness.” See Al i , 237 F.3d at 597. Am ir had not y et bee n decide d when the B I A issued its decision in this case , s o t h e BI A cited the strong est then-e x isting authority in our circ uit for the willful blindness standard. 6No. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 12 - Second, the proposition for which the B I A cited Matter of S-V- is not the proposition from the

case that has bee n held “manife stly contra ry to the law.” I

nstead, the B I A cited Matter of S-V- for a proposition is l og ically

true and still g ood law. The BIA wrote that “re spondent must do more than show that the off

icials are simply

awa re of the a ctivity

constituting torture and ar e powe rless to stop it. See M atter of S-V- , 22 I& NDec . 1306, 1312 (B I A 2000).” J .A. 7. Th i s i s a logic ally true statement bec ause the person se eking relief must show something more tha n knowledg e and a

lack of power ; he or she must show acquiesc ence , and acquiesce nce can, in turn, be proven through willful blindness. A g overnme nt can know a bout privat e ab u s es, and instead of pre tending they do not happen, se ek to s top them, but lack the powe r to do so. I t is a leg ally corr ect state ment beca

use, as the Ei g hth

Cir c uit e xpla ine d, “ [a] g ov e rnme nt do e s no t a c qu ie sc e in the tor tur e of its c iti zen s me re ly beca use it is awa

re of torture but pow erle ss to stop it, but it does cross th e l i n e i n t o acquiescenc e when it s hows willful blindness toward the torture of c itiz ens by third parties.” Mouawad , 485 F.3d at 413. B y

contra st, Am ir

he ld t hat Matter of S-V- ’s state me nt t hat the a lie n mu st s ho w that “ of fi c ia ls

are will fully acce pting ” the torturous activities of private parties is ma nifestly contra

ry t o t h e l aw. Am ir , 4 67 F .3 d at 92 7. (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . T he “ wi llf ul a c c e pta

nc e ” re qu ir e me nt i s c on tr ary to the law, but it is not in t he B I A opinion. Third, t he BI A’s langua g e mi rror s that of ca ses wher e cour ts have found that the BIA applied the cor rec t sta ndard more closely than it r esembles the lang uag e in c ases wher e courts conc luded the opposite. The B I A quoted the corr ect r egulatory definition of “torture ,” and while it did not us e the

wo rd s “ wi llf

ul b lin dn e ss, ” it ne e d no t me c ha nic a lly re c ite the sp e c if

ic wo rd s “ wi llf

ul bli nd ne ss” in

ever y case . Courts have not imposed such a require ment. Cruz-Funez v. Gonzale s , 406 F.3d 1187,No. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 13 - 1 1 9 2 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ( B IA c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d “ w i l l f u l b l i n dn e s s ” s t an d ar d

e v e nt h o u g ht h e B IA op ini on did no t us e the wo rd s “ wi llf

ul b lin dn e ss” ). B y c on tr a st, in c a se s wh e re a c ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld that th e B I A a

pp lie d th e wro ng st and ard , th e B I A o pin ion s u su a lly c on ta in l angua g e pate ntl y inconsist en t wi t h t he willful blindness standard. See, e .g. , Ornelas-Chave z v. Gonzales , 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 200 6 ) (B IA ig nored w illful bli ndness test by requiringpetitioner to show that the g ov e rnme nt “ sa

nc tio ne d” his tor

tur e ); Re y es-Re y es v . A sh c ro

ft , 384 F.3d 782, 787 ( 9th Cir. 2004) (B I A ig nored w illful bli ndness test by requiringpetitioner to show that he would be tor tured “ by or at the instigation of the g overnme nt”). Ne rg hes ca nnot point to any

such l an guag e in the B I A’s opinion in his case . I n our re cent c ase of Tran , w e re mand e d to the B I A f or c lari fi c atio n, ho ldi ng that w e c ou ld not determine w hether the BI A applied the correc t standard of revie w. Tran , 447 F.3d at 944. Our dissenting c olleague believe s that we should do so here . The dissent off ers a plausible rea ding of

the

rec ord, but we do not think it offer s the best re ading . I n Tran , the B I A did not “re fer [] to any standard of re view,” ibid. , while i n this case , the BI A quot ed the corr ect regulatory standard, ne ver r efe renc ed the e rr on e ou s “ wi llf

ul a c c e pta

nc e ” sta nd ard and c ite d th e the n- le a din g c a se in whic h o ur c ir c uit deter mined that the standar d included “w illful bli ndness.” While the BI A s hould have spoke n more clea rly , we a re satisfied that it applied the cor rec t leg al standar d. III Ner g hes ar g ues that the B I A committed “leg al” err or by improperly discounting the testimony of his e xpe rt

wi tne ss a nd by “ re nd e ri ng a de c isi on wh ic h wa s no t c omp e lle d by the e vid e nc e sim plyNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 14 - beca use it did not ag ree with the I J .” Both errors are no more than factua l appea ls dressed up a s leg al challeng es, and a

re the ref ore not re viewable

. The B I A held that while Mr. L ee’ s testimony was “ probative a

nd useful,” it should have been g ive n “ dim ini sh e d w e ig ht” be c a us e he la c ke d a

ny fo rm a l ed ucati on

in t he fi e ld, ha d n e ve r b e e n to Rom ania , a

nd re lie d o n “ ane c do ta l in te rv ie ws ” and “ int e rn e t art ic le s” in r e a c hin g his c on c lus ion s. J .A. 8. Ner g hes off

ers a n extensive argument as to why L ee should be considered a n “expert” unde r the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence . We need not conside r the mer its of this argument beca use the F eder al Rules of Evidence do not apply at immigr at i on proce eding s. Singh v . A sh c ro ft , 398 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2005). A “violation” of irrele vant rules c annot be a leg al er ror. See ibid. Fur

thermore , we note that evidentiar

y matters in i m m i gra t i o n hear ings a re g overne d only

by the principles of

due proce ss. Ibid. Ner g hes receive d due process, as even the BIA ac knowledg ed that Mr. L ee’ s testimony was “ probative.” As mentioned ear lier, we have jurisdiction to revie w whether the BIA applied t h e c o rrect burden of proof. Tran , 4 47 F .3 d at 94 3. He re , th e B I A a pp lie d th e c or

re c t bu rd e n, that N e rghe s mu st show that it is “more likely than not” that he w ill be to rt u re d i f h e returns to Romania. J .A. 9. Ner g hes neve rtheless c ontends that the B I A committed a lega l err or by overturning the I J ’s dec ision wh en “s u b s t an t i al ev i d en ce ” s u

p p o rt edt h e IJ ’s co n c l u s i o n . (P et ’r Br

. 1 7 ) ( ci t i n g IN

S v . E lia sZacharias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). Case law for eclose s this arg ument. At the outset, Ner g hes fa ils to realize that the “substantial evidenc e” te st under IN S v . E lia sZacharias , a

pp lie s only wh e n a cou

rt re vie ws the B I A or I J. Th e B I A re vie ws the I J und e r a “ c le arl yNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

Ne rg he s may hav e th ou g ht h e wa s arguin g that th e B I A f a ile d to a pp ly the “ c le arl y 7 e rr on e ou s” sta

nd ard wh e n it re vie we d th e I J wh e n he re fe rr e d to the su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e te st i n h is brief. Whil e failure to a

pply the “c lear ly

err oneous” standa

rd is a re viewable question of law, Tran , 447 F. 3 d at 9 4 3, it is not an ar g ument Ner g hes made . Even if we wer e to consider the issue, the claim would fa il because the B I A cited the c orre ct “c lear ly err oneous” standa

rd. J.A. 6. - 15 - err oneous” standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)( 4)(A) . This is precisely what the B I A did in this case. J .A. 6 (c iting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (A), a nd explaining that re view is for c lear err or). 7 Ner g hes’s re al claim is t h at t h e BI A incorr ectly weig hed the e vidence when it held that the Ne rg he s f a ile d to me e t hi s b ur de n o f pr oo f and that th e I J’s c on tr ary c on c lus ion

wa s c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. This is a plausible argument, but not a leg al question which we may revie w. Pepaj , 509 F.3d at 728 (p ro of of c ha

ng e d c ountr

y c on dit ion s is fa c tua l, n ot l e g a l) ; Tran , 447 F.3d at 943 (we ight of evidenc e is a fa c tua l c on c lus ion ); Hamid v. Gonzale s , 417 F. 3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding I J decision of whe ther torture was “ more likely than not” to be a

fac tual, not leg al question). Ner g hes fa ces a

n unpleasa

nt future in Romania, but whe ther he can meet t he diffic ult burden of pr ov ingtha

t th e futur e is s o g ri m th a t it inc lud e s a

g re a te r t ha n f if ty pe rc e nt ch anc e of tor

tur e is a qu es t i o n we n eed not, and indeed c annot, consider . Ner g hes’s only claim over

which we have jurisdiction lacks merit, and we cannot consider his other claims without ignoringsettled law in our circ uit. The judg ment of the B I A is aff irmed.No. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 16 - JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Ju dge, dissentin g. Be cause we c annot asc erta in that the B I A a

pp lie d th e c or

re c t s tan da

rd fo r t or tur e thr ou g h “ a c qu ie sc e nc e ,” purs ua nt t o 8 C.F .R. § 1 20 8. 18 (a )( 7) , a

nd be c a us e the pr op e r c ours e in s uc h in sta nc e s is to r e mand , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. A s t h e m a

j o r i t y c o r r e c t l y n o t e s , “ a c qu i e s c e n c e ” d o e s n o tr e qu i r e “ w i l l f u l a c c e p t an c e ” b y a public officia l; “willful blindness” wil l suffice

. See A mir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927 ( 6th Cir. 2006). As the majority

also notes, re mand to the B I A is appropr iate whe re w e ar e unable deter mine whether the BI A has applied the c orre ct leg al standar d. See Tran v. G onzales , 44 7 F .3 d 93 7, 94 4 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) . H e re , a lth ou g h th e B I A d id n ot m e nti on the “ wi llf ul b lin dn e ss” sta

nd ard and c ite d a

c a se that provides the wrong standard, the majority nonetheless stra ins to conclude that the B I A applied the cor rec t standard. I

am unper suaded by

the majority ’s re asoning

. First, the majority rea ds this court’s dec ision in Amir v. Gonzales too narrow ly . I n Am ir , th is

c ourt e xpla ine d: I n the ca s e at bar, the I J applied In Re S- V-, 22 I . & N . Dec . 1306 (2000), to Amir' s CAT claim. In S-V , the B I A held that a pet i t i oner “must do more than show that the officia ls are a war e of the activity

but are power less t o stop it. He must demonstrate that ... offic ials are will fully acce pting of the guerill as ' torturous ac tiviti es.” Id. at 1312 (empha sis suppli ed). B eca use Amir did not show that the Indonesian g o v e r n m e n tw a s w i l l f

u l l y a c c e p t i n g o f t h e f

an a t i c a l M u s l i ma c t i v i t y, the I J dism iss e d th e CA T c la im with ou t fu rth e r a na ly sis

. We j oin the Ni nth

and Se c on d Ci rc uit s i n ho ld ingthat In Re S- V

direc tly conflicts with Cong ress' s clear i n t ent t o include “w illful bli nd ne ss” in t he de fi nit ion

of “ a c qu ie sc e nc e .”

. . . T od ay we e xplic itl y hold that the I J ' s relianc e on In Re S- V was manife stly

contra ry to the law. 467 F.3d at 927 (empha sis added) . I n other wor ds, the Am ir c o u rtr e m an d e d n o to n l y b e c a u s e t h e IJ h a d e r r o n e o u s l y a p p l i e d t h e “ w i l l f

u l a c c e p t an c e ” s t an d ar d , b u tbe c a us e t h e I J had not analyzedNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 17 - whether public officials w er e willful ly blind. Id. The B I A’s ana ly sis in thi s case also suffe rs from the latter de ficienc y . Despite the I J ’s finding s of “numer ous i n s tance s where the g overnme nt of Romania is willfully blind to sever e mi streatment of Roma citizens by its own police,” the B I A made no mention of the possibilit y of ac quiesce nce thr oug h willful blindness. Second, contrary to the m ajority ’s s ug g estion, the BI A’s citation of Ali v. Reno , 237 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 2001), tells us litt le. The B I A cited Al i for its re cog nition of the re g ulatory definition of “tortur e” pur suant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a) (1). To be sure , the Al i court noted later in its opinion, while interpre ting “ acquie scenc e,” that the leg islative h is to r y of § 1208.18(a )(7) sug g ests that “willful blindness” constitutes “ac quiesce nce.” 237 F.3d at 597. H ad the BIA cited Al i for its definition of “ac quiesce nce,” we mig ht surmise that the BIA had rea d to this l ater point in the Al i decision and ha d willful blindness in mind whe n it a naly zed N erg hes’s claim. B ut while interpre ting “ acquie scenc e,” th e B I A o n ly

cited Ma tter of S-V- , 22 I& NDec . 1306, 1312 (B I A 2000), whic h contains the definition of “ac quiesce nce” that is now “manife stly contra ry to law.” Am ir , 467 F.3d at 927. The

ma jor ity su g g e sts that “ the qu ote d langua g e ” fr om the B I A’ s de c isi on is f ro m th e same pa

ra g ra phin which the Al i court established that “ac quiesce nce” includes “w illful bli ndness.” Ma jority Op. at 11. Yet the q uoted languag e fr om 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)( 1) appe ars in a dif fer ent par ag raph, 30 lines (including a footnote) befor e the Al i court first mentions “ willful blindness.” 237 F.3d at 597. The majority ’s cha

ritable re ading of the B I A’s re fer ence to Al i seems unjustified. F ina lly , the ma

jor ity ’s su g g e sti on that th e B I A h a s so me tim e s e rr e d mo re e g re g iou sly tha n it did in this case does not resolve whether rema nd is a ppropriate here

. The majority is corre ct that the BIA nee d not rec ite the words “w illful bli ndness” whe never “ac quiesce nce of

a public off

icial” is atNo. 06-4069

Ner g hes v. Mukase y

- 18 - issue. For example, w e would not e x pect to see ref ere nce to the “ willful blindness” standard w hen the i ssue was w hether

a per petrator was a

“public off

icial.” See Cruz-Fune

z v. Gonzales , 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) (conc luding that I J did not err in f inding exis tence of a “

pr iv atevendetta” rathe r than “ acquie scenc e of a public official ” ) ( e mph a se s a dd e d)

. B ut wh e re a c qu ie sc e nc e its e lf is

a t is su e , w e mig ht e xpe c t, i f no t an ex pl icit r e fe re nc e to t he “ wi llf ul b lin dn e ss” sta

nd ard , at le a st a clea r indication that the B I A applied the c orre ct standar d. Her e, t h e I J specific ally found

a c qu i e s c e n c e t h r o u g h “ w i l l f u l b l i n d [ n e s s ] ” b y

t h e R o m an i anG o v e r

n m e n t

. Y e t , b e c a

u s e t h e B IA

reve rsed the I J ’s CAT deter mination with no re fer ence to the proper standard (and one citation to a dubious standard) , we do not know whether t he BI A also considere d the “willful bl indness” standa rd. The B I A’s dec ision here, a s judge d by its own opinio n , in my

view just as likely

derive s from application of a

n improper standa

rd as f rom application of a prope r one. For these re asons, I

would rema

nd to the BIA with instructions to analy ze Nerg hes’s CAT application under

the “willful blindness” standa rd.