IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

COMPASS CONSTRUCTION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Civil Action 2:12-cv-186

Magistrate Judge King

INDIANA/KENTUCKY/OHIO REGIONAL

COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS OF THE

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS

AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action for damages under Section 303 of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187, brought by plaintiffs

Compass Construction (“Compass”), The Daimler Group, Inc. (“Daimler),

and TERiX Computer Services, Inc., (“Terix, Inc.”) against defendants

Indiana/Kentucky/Ohio Regional Council of Carpenters of the United

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“Regional Council”),

the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 200

(“Local 200"), Mark Moen, Doug Reffit, Wesley Osterhout, and Does

1–50. The Amended Complaint alleges unlawful secondary boycott

activities on defendants’ part in violation of 29 U.S.C. §

158(b)(4)(A), (B) and the illegal threatening and coercing an employer

to assign particular work to employees of a particular labor

organization in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D). Plaintiffs

also assert state law claims of defamation, false light invasion of

privacy, and civil conspiracy.

This matter is before the Court with consent of the parties, 28

U.S.C. § 636(c), for consideration of Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P.,

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Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint (“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”), Doc. No. 25, and

Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 26(c)(1), Motion to Stay Discovery

(“Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery”), Doc. No. 26. For the

reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and

Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery is DENIED as moot.

I. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint contains the following allegations: 

Regional Council and Local 200 are labor organizations that

represent employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. Amended

Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11. Regional Council is engaged in a labor dispute

with Compass because Compass allegedly fails to follow Regional

Council’s area standard wages and benefits. Id. at 20, Exhibit 1. 

Daimler is a general contractor that subcontracts work to Compass. 

Id. at 18, 27, 35.

Beginning in the winter of 2011, Regional Council and/or Local

200 started bannering, handbilling, and sending letters to parties who

either directly contracted with Daimler to do construction work or

were tenants whose landlord contracted with Daimler to do construction

work. Regional sent one letter to Net Jets Aviation (“Net Jets”), and

engaged in bannering and handbilling outside OhioHealth and Terix,

Inc., premises. 

The Letter. Bridgeway Partners LLC, as Net Jets’ landlord,

contracted with Daimler on or about April 2, 2011 to construct

interior tenant improvements and a café within a building being

constructed on Bridgeway Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. Id. at 17. 

Daimler then contracted with Compass to install and finish metal

studs, drywall, and an acoustic ceiling in the building. Id. at 18. 

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On or about February 7, 2012, Mark Moen sent a letter on behalf of

Regional Council to the CEO of Net Jets. Id. at 19. The letter noted

that “Daimler often uses subcontractors, including Compass, who fail

to follow the Regional Council’s area standard wages and benefits and,

as such, the Regional Council has a labor dispute with certain

subcontractors, including Compass.” Id. at 19–20. The letter asks

the CEO of Net Jets not to use Daimler “so long as their subcontracts

do not meet area labor standards.” The letter continues as follows: 

We want you to be aware that our public information campaign

against the above referenced Subcontractors will unfortunately

impact all parties associated with projects where they are

employed. That campaign will include highly visible lawful

banner displays and distribution of handbills at the jobsite

and premises of property owners, developers, general

contractors, and other firms involved with projects involving

a non-area standard contractor. We certainly prefer to work

cooperatively with all involved parties but cannot sit idly by

while these entities condone and/or support the non-area

standards contractor.

If you agree to comply with the request we have made in this

letter, or if our information about a non-area standard

contractor being involved with any of your projects is

incorrect, please call the undersigned immediately at

888-389-2828. Doing so will provide the greatest protection

against your firm becoming publicly involved in this dispute

through misunderstanding or error.

Id. at 22-23, Exhibit 1. 

The Banners. I-A Preserve Building LLC, identified as Terix,

Inc.’s landlord, contracted with Daimler on or about November 30, 2011

to oversee work being performed within a suite of an office building

located on Frantz Road in Dublin, Ohio. See id. at 34, 51. Daimler

then contracted with Compass to install and finish metal studs,

drywall, and an acoustic ceiling in the building. Id. at 35. 

Plaintiffs allege that Regional Council and/or Local 200 “engaged in .

. . bannering and handbilling at the Frantz Road project.” Id. at 36. 

“The banner read[] ‘SHAME ON TERIX COMPUTER’ in large bold print. Id.

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at 37, Exhibits 5, 6, and 7. “The phrase ‘Labor Dispute’” was “written

in smaller letters on either side of the banner.” Id. 

OhioHealth entered into a contract with Daimler on or about

August 18, 2011, for Daimler to oversee work being performed on

Riverside Methodist Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. Id. at 26. Daimler

then entered into a contract with Compass to perform renovations on

the building. Id. at 27. Regional Council and/or Local 200 engaged

in bannering at Riverside Methodist Hospital; the “banner read ‘SHAME

ON OhioHealth’ in large bold print” and the “phrase ‘Labor Dispute’

was written in smaller letters on either side of the banner.” Id. at

28, 29, Exhibit 2. 

The Handbills. Plaintiffs allege that Regional Council and/or

Local 200 engaged in handbilling at both the Frantz Road project and

Riverside Methodist Hospital. Id. at 28, 33. Regional Council

allegedly continued to engage in bannering and handbilling at the

Frantz Road project on at least five occasions after Compass completed

the project. Id. at 46-47. 

The handbills distributed at the Frantz Road project read “SHAME

ON Terix Computer For Desecration of the American Way of Life.” Id. at

38, Exhibit 8. Underneath this phrase was “a picture which depicts a

rat eating an American flag.” Id. “The Handbill further states: 

A rat is a contractor that does not pay all of its employees 

area standard wages, including either providing or making

payments for health care and pension benefits.

Shame on Terix Computer for contributing to erosion of area

standards for carpenter craft workers. Compass Construction is

performing work for general contractor Daimler Group on the

Terix Computer project located at 5450 Frantz Rd., Dublin, OH

43016. Compass does not meet area labor standards for all

their carpenter craft workers, including fully paying for

family health benefits and pension.

Carpenters Local 200 believes that Terix Computer has an

obligation to the community to see that area labor standards

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are met for construction work at all their projects, including

future work. They should not be allowed to insulate themselves

behind “independent” contractors. For this reason, Local 200

has a labor dispute with all the companies identified here.

Id. at 39. The handbill also “implored the general public to contact

Terix Computer’s CEO to ‘change the situation.’” Id. at 40. 

The handbills passed out at Riverside Methodist Hospital were

nearly identical to those distributed at the Frantz Road project, with

the exception of the company name and project address listed on the

handbill. See id. at 26-33, Exhibit 3.

II. STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a motion

to dismiss addresses a court's jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch

& St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass'n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th

Cir. 2002). “Specifically, the plaintiff must show that the complaint

‘alleges a claim under federal law, and that the claim is

substantial.’” Id. (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express

Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996)). Where, as here, the

motion to dismiss amounts to a facial attack on subject-matter

jurisdiction, a court must take the allegations in the complaint as

true, just as it would with a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Gentek

Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th

Cir. 2007).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) attacks the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel

Co., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983). In determining whether

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dismissal on this basis is appropriate, a complaint must be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded

facts must be accepted as true. See Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96

F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1996); Misch v. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 896 F.

Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1994). The United States Supreme Court has

explained that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be

supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations

in the complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546

(2007). However, a plaintiff’s claim for relief “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level[.]” Id. Accordingly, a complaint must be dismissed if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. at 570.

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Section 303 Claims

Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)

states: “It shall be unlawful for the purpose of this section only, in

an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization

to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor

practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 187(a). 

Section 158(b)(4), which is § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations

Act (“NLRA”), provides in relevant part: 

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization

or its agents . . .(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any

person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting

commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-- 

(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person

to join any labor or employer organization or to enter into

any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this

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section; 

(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing

business with any other person . . . 

. . . 

(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular

work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a

particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in

another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or

class . . . .1

1. Section 303 claims against Regional Council and Local

200

Section 8(b)(4)(ii), which prohibits secondary boycotts, has a

twofold purpose: “the preservation of the right of labor organizations

to place pressure on employers with whom there is a primary dispute as

well as the protection of neutral employers and employees from the

labor disputes of others.” Int’l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied

Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 223 n. 20 (1982) (citing NLRB v. Denver

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)). A colorable

claim under Section 8(b)(4)(ii) must satisfy a two part inquiry:

first, the claimant must make a showing of threats, coercion, or

restraints by a labor organization; second, a claimant must establish

a particular proscribed purpose behind the labor organization’s

conduct. 

The crucial question in the case presently before the Court is

whether the Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. To do so, the actions

1 It is unclear from the Amended Complaint whether plaintiffs allege

only a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii) and not 8(b)(4)(i); however, Plaintiffs’

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (“Plaintiffs’ Response in

Opposition”), Doc. No. 27, states that § 8(b)(4)(ii) is the “pertinent”

section “at issue in this case.” 

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allegedly taken by defendants – i.e., defendants’ letter to the CEO of

Net Jets, bannering, and handbilling – must amount to threats,

coercion, or restraint within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii). A similar

question was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in DeBartolo

Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.

568 (1988). 

In DeBartolo, a union distributed handbills at shopping mall

entrances urging customers not to shop at any of the mall’s stores

until the mall’s owner promised that all mall construction would be

performed by contractors paying fair wages. Id. at 578. The Court

held that peaceful handbilling does not constitute threatening,

coercive, or restraining activity violative of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), even

when the action urges a total consumer boycott of neutral secondary

businesses. Id. at 587-89. The Court noted that "more than mere

persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that

section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those

words . . . are ‘nonspecific, indeed vague,’ and should be interpreted

with ‘caution’ and not given a ‘broad sweep.’" Id. at 578 (quoting

NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960)). The DeBartolo Court

concluded that there was no "necessity to construe such language to

reach the handbills involved in th[e] case. There is no suggestion

that the leaflets had any coercive effect on customers of the mall. 

There was no violence, picketing, or patrolling and only an attempt to

persuade customers not to shop in the mall." Id. at 578. 

Although DeBartolo specifically addressed only the distribution

of handbills, its reasoning also applies to banners. See Overstreet

v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506,

409 F.3d 1199, 1211-13 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of

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preliminary injunction to bar use of a banner); Gold v. Mid-Atlantic

Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 407 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D. MD. 2005)

(declining to issue a preliminary injunction for failure to

demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that a banner violated §

8(b)(4)(ii)(B)); Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joinders of

Am., Locals 184 and 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Utah 2004); Kohn v.

Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D. Ca. 2003);

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 355

N.L.R.B. No. 159 (N.L.R.B. 2010) (finding that displaying a large

stationary banner announcing a “labor dispute” and seeking to elicit

“shame” did not threaten, coerce, or restrain a neutral employer under

§ 8(b)(4)(ii)); Southwest Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 355 N.L.R.B.

No. 216 (N.L.R.B. 2010) (finding that bannering at locations of

secondary employers did not violate § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because there was

no picketing and the display of banners did not constitute threats,

coercion, or restraint). As suggested by DeBartolo, the display of a

banner violates § 8(b)(4)(ii) only if there is a showing of threats,

coercion, or restraints, such as is present by an intimidating line of

picketers. See DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580. 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants "were engaged in bannering and

handbilling" at numerous locations and times, and plaintiffs describe

the banners and leaflets in detail. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 28-47. 

Similarly, plaintiffs allege that defendants sent a letter to the CEO

of Net Jets, and plaintiffs describe the letter in detail. Id. at

19-23. The Amended Complaint then alleges that these actions

"constitute illegal secondary activities," are "[t]hreatening,

intimidating and coercing," "unlawful," and violative of 29 U.S.C. §

158(b)(4)(A), (B), (D) and 29 U.S.C. § 187. Id. at 50-51, 54, 60. 

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Apart from these conclusory assertions, however, plaintiffs make no

factual allegations in the Amended Complaint that defendants’ use of

banners, handbills, or letters constituted a "threat," "restraint," or

"coercion" within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii). 

Plaintiffs do not allege that agents of Regional Council or Local

200 blocked or prevented customers’ ingress or egress from buildings,

promoted physical confrontations, or even initiated conversation or

physical interaction with anyone. Plaintiffs do not allege that

anyone carried signs, chanted, spoke in loud voices, walked or marched

in pattern, forced cars to stop, or otherwise even suggested that

defendants’ actions amounted to picketing. Pictures of the banners,

as reflected in Exhibits 2, 5, 6, and 7 of the Amended Complaint, show

two to three people holding an individual banner along a roadside,

away from entrances to buildings. Just as the distribution of

handbills at “all four entrances” to a shopping mall did not

constitute a secondary boycott in DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 571, the

presence of people holding banners cannot, by itself, be a threat,

restraint, or coercion in this case.

Plaintiffs also allege that Regional Council continued to engage

in bannering and handbilling at the Frantz Road project on at least

five occasions after Compass completed the project. Amended

Complaint, ¶¶ 46-47. Although this allegation may be sufficient to

show that Regional Council acted with the objective to force Daimler

to cease doing business with Compass or for Terix, Inc., to cease

doing business with Daimler, this allegation is not sufficient to show

that defendants’ conduct constituted a threat, coercion, or restraint. 

Just as a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii) requires more than presence, a

colorable claim under the statute must also allege more than mere

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presence. See DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 571. 

Similarly, the letter sent to Net Jets does not rise to the level

of a § 8(b)(4)(ii) violation. In applying DeBartolo, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a union’s use of

letters, telephone calls, and in-person visits to secondary employers

warning that they would be subject to handbilling unless they ceased

doing business with a particular company. Storer Commc’ns, Inc., v.

Nat’l Ass’n of Broad. Emps. & Technicians, AFL-CIO, 854 F.2d 144, 145-

47 (6th Cir. 1988). Those activities were 

permissible under DeBartolo because they merely

constituted the union's peaceful warnings that it

was about to exercise its rights under § 8(b)(4).

Since the handbilling itself was not proscribed

activity, peaceful warnings that handbilling will

occur are not unlawful. 

Id. at 147 (citing DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 579-81). 

The letter to which plaintiffs refer asks the CEO of Net Jets to

exercise his “managerial discretion to not use Daimler Group as long

as their subcontractors do not meet area labor standards and not allow

any non-area standard contractors to perform any work on any” Net Jets

projects. Amended Complaint, Exhibit 1. 

We want you to be aware that our public information campaign

against the above referenced Subcontractors will unfortunately

impact all parties associated with projects where they are

employed. That campaign will include highly visible lawful

banner displays and distribution of handbills at the jobsite

and premises of property owners, developers, general

contractors, and other firms involved with projects involving

a non-area standard contractor. We certainly prefer to work

cooperatively with all involved parties but cannot sit idly by

while these entities condone and/or support the non-area

standards contractor.

Id. Like the letters, telephone calls, and in-person visits in Storer

Communications, the letter referred to by plaintiffs merely warned Net

Jets that Regional Council intended to engage in handbilling and

bannering activities. Since those activities are not proscribed by §

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8(b)(4)(ii), the letter warning that handbilling and bannering would

occur is likewise not proscribed. See Storer Communications, Inc., 854

F.2d at 144.

Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition cites to Point Ruston, LLC v.

Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of the United Bhr. of Carpenters and Joiners of

Am., 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 93163 (W.D. WA 2010), for the proposition

that DeBartolo is inapposite to the facts of this case. Doc. No. 27,

at *10-14. The court in Point Ruston determined that DeBartolo and

other cases were distinguishable because “the secondary employer had

at least some direct or indirect relationship with the primary

employer for which the union had a dispute, or the demonstrations took

place at the site of the primary dispute.” Id. at *15-16. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs assert that DeBartolo is inapplicable because

there is no relationship, direct or indirect, between the secondary

employers, Terix, Inc., OhioHealth, and Net Jets, and the primary

employer, Daimler. Id. To the contrary, however, there is an

indirect relationship here because the handbilling and bannering all

occurred at Compass jobsites. See Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 28, 33. 

Additionally, there is a relationship between OhioHealth and Daimler

because OhioHealth contracted directly with Daimler to oversee work

being performed on Riverside Methodist Hospital, id. at 26; there is a

relationship between Net Jets and Daimler because Net Jets’ landlord

contracted with Daimler to perform tenant improvements on the building

Net Jets contracted to occupy, id. at 17; and there is a relationship

between Terix, Inc., and Daimler because Terix, Inc.’s landlord

contracted with Daimler to perform construction work on an office

building occupied by Terix, Inc., id. at 34, 51. As in DeBartolo,

there is a relationship between each of the secondary employers and

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the primary employer with which defendants have a dispute. 

Plaintiffs also claim that “[w]hether the Defendants had the

requisite objectives and whether its conduct was threatening or

coercive so as to constitute violations of the Act are plainly

questions concentrated on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.” Doc. No.

27 at 14. However, the fact that their pleading raises issues of fact

does not relieve plaintiffs of satisfying the pleading requirements of

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In evaluating the

sufficiency of a complaint, a court must determine whether the

complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Although this

standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’–

‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In the case presently before this Court,

plaintiffs have not alleged, apart from threadbare, conclusory

recitals, that defendants’ handbilling, bannering, or letter to Net

Jets was accompanied by violence, picketing, patrolling, or that

defendants’ activity in any way constituted threatening, coercing, or

restraining activity violative of § 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA or Section

303 of the LMRA. The alleged activities, even taken as true, simply

do not rise to the level of a § 8(b)(4)(ii) violation. See DeBartolo,

485 U.S. at 578. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

plaintiffs’ Section 303 claims against defendants Compass, Daimler,

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and Terix, Inc. is GRANTED.

2. Section 303 claims against Mark Moen, Doug Reffit,

Wesley Osterhout, and Does 1–50 

Section 303 of the LMRA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for

the purposes of this section only, in an industry or activity

affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any

activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice.” 29 U.S.C. §

187(a). Section 303 does not create a private cause of action against

natural persons. See Prater v. United Mine Workers of Am., Districts

20 and 23, 793 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 1986). This conclusion

is not contested by plaintiffs. See Doc. No. 27, at 20. Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 303 claims against

Mark Moen, Doug Reffit, Wesley Osterhout, and Does 1–50 is GRANTED. 

B. State Law Claims 

Plaintiffs assert state law claims of defamation, false light

invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Because the Court

dismisses all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims will be

dismissed without prejudice.

IV. MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY, DOC. NO. 26 

In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery,

Doc. No. 26, is DENIED as moot.

WHEREUPON, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint, Doc. No. 25, is GRANTED and Defendants’ Motion to Stay

Discovery, Doc. No. 26, is DENIED as moot. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter FINAL JUDGMENT in this action.

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August 20, 2012 s/ Norah McCann King 

 Norah McCann King

 United States Magistrate Judge

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