Filed 6/3/21 Popescu v. Cal. Highway Patrol CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SORIN POPESCU et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY 

PATROL et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

2d Civil No. B306287

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-

00520506-CU-CR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION 

[NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 2, 

2021, be modified as follows:

The counsel page of the opinion, in the last 

paragraph starting with “Xavier Becerra” at the end of the 

counsel listing, delete the word “Plaintiff” and insert 

“Defendants,” and add an “s” to the word “Respondent.” Should 

now read “for Defendants and Respondents.”

No change in judgment. 

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.
Filed 6/2/21 Popescu v. Cal. Highway Patrol CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SORIN POPESCU et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY 

PATROL et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

2d Civil No. B306287

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-

00520506-CU-CR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

A drunk and off-duty California Highway Patrol 

(CHP) officer shot Sorin Popescu in the back while Popescu was 

standing in the entry way of his own home. Popescu, his wife and 

their children (appellants) conclusionally allege in their second 

amended complaint that the officer, Trever Dalton, was acting in 

the course and scope of his employment at the time. They further

allege that the CHP is liable for Dalton’s unjustified use of force 

and for its negligent failure to train, supervise and discipline 

Dalton. The trial court sustained the CHP’s demurrer to their 

second amended complaint without leave to amend. Appellants 
2

contend the trial court erred when it concluded their complaint 

failed to state a cause of action against the CHP and when it 

denied them leave to file a third amended complaint. We affirm.

FACTS

In December 2017, the Thomas Fire destroyed or 

damaged numerous residences and caused widespread power 

outages in Ventura. Appellants lived on a cul-de-sac in a 

neighborhood that lost power. As the family was trying to decide 

whether to evacuate, appellant Sorin Popescu heard a noise from 

the house next door. He went to investigate, worried someone 

might be looting his neighbor’s house. Once outside, appellant 

encountered Dalton, approaching the neighbor’s door.

Dalton was employed as a California Highway Patrol 

(CHP) officer. He is not alleged to have been in uniform, driving 

a marked black and white CHP car, or to have displayed a badge 

or other identification. Popescu asked Dalton who he was. 

Popescu decided Dalton was drunk and told him to leave. 

Instead of leaving, Dalton started questioning Popescu about his 

identity and where he lived. He became increasingly aggressive 

with Popescu. He repeatedly told Popescu that he was a cop and 

was carrying a gun. 

Dalton was riding a bicycle. As the two men 

exchanged words in the street, Dalton rode the bike in circles 

around Popescu, eventually hitting him in the leg with the wheel.

Popescu grabbed the handlebars and pushed the bicycle away. 

This caused the intoxicated Dalton to fall off the bike. He began 

yelling that Popescu had assaulted him. 

Popescu retreated and called 911. He told the 

operator about Dalton’s behavior including his claim that he was 

a police officer and that he said he had a gun. Dalton continued 
3

to make threatening statements while Popescu was on the phone. 

He said Popescu didn’t need to call the police because Dalton was 

the police. At one point during the interaction, Dalton used his 

phone to take a picture of the license plate on Popescu’s car. 

Popescu returned to his house and talked with his 

wife about the conflict with Dalton. Meanwhile, Dalton had a

confrontation with another neighborhood resident, Cason White. 

Dalton asked White, who was standing outside with his son, 

whether White was calling the police. He said White should call 

the police because, “‘it’s about to go down’” and then Dalton 

pulled a gun from an ankle holster. White went into his house to 

call 911. 

While White was calling 911, Popescu was standing 

inside his house, near the open front door, talking to his wife with 

his back to the street. Dalton walked up the driveway toward the 

front door. Neighbors heard Dalton say, “‘put your gun down.’” 

Popescu was not armed and had not been at any point during his 

confrontation with Dalton. Dalton fired two shots, one of which 

hit Popescu in the back. 

Popescu suffered severe injuries and spent five days 

in the hospital. Dalton was taken into custody and charged with 

firearms and assault offenses. 

About three months before the shooting, in 

September 2017 one of Dalton’s neighbors called the CHP office 

in Ventura to complain about his behavior in the neighborhood. 

The neighbor reported that, while intoxicated, Dalton walked 

around the neighborhood holding a live rooster and asking 

people, “‘do you want to pet my cock.’” Dalton would also stand in 

the street at night and stop passing motorists for no reason. 

Dalton’s co-workers reported that he “‘drunk-dialed’” them and 
4

made inappropriate and unprofessional comments to them. The 

supervisors referred Dalton to the employee assistance program 

to address these issues and his admitted alcohol consumption 

practices. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants’ first and second amended complaints

attempted to allege causes of action for assault and battery, 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, 

negligence, negligent supervision, training and discipline, 

violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1), and violation of civil 

rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both pleadings alleged the CHP was 

vicariously liable for Dalton’s misconduct because he was acting 

within the course and scope of his employment when he shot 

Popescu. In support of this conclusion, appellants alleged that:

Dalton carried a concealed, loaded firearm during the incident; he 

repeatedly invoked his status as a police officer; he photographed 

the license plate on Popescu’s car and asked questions as if he 

was investigating something; and he gave commands to Popescu 

as if he was preparing to arrest Popescu. Appellants further 

alleged the shooting occurred during a state of emergency 

declared by the governor due to the Thomas Fire. During the 

state of emergency, all law enforcement officers were deemed to 

be on-duty at all times. Appellants also alleged that officers are 

authorized at all times to carry out law enforcement functions 

such as making arrests. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 836, 25450, 

25900; Veh. Code, § 2253.) 

In addition to its respondeat superior vicarious 

liability theory, appellants alleged the CHP is directly liable for 

its own negligent training, supervision and discipline of Dalton. 

In support of this theory, appellants alleged that Dalton’s 
5

supervisors were aware, before the shooting occurred, that Dalton 

had a drinking problem. Supervisors were also aware that 

Dalton’s neighbors had complained to the CHP that he behaved 

in intimidating and unprofessional ways in the neighborhood. He 

also made inappropriate comments to neighbors and to coworkers. The CHP had referred Dalton to its Employee 

Assistance Program for counselling. 

The CHP’s demurrers argued appellants could not 

allege a cause of action against it on a respondeat superior theory 

because Dalton was off-duty and not acting within the course and 

scope of his employment when the shooting occurred. The CHP 

contended it had no direct liability for failure to supervise Dalton 

because it had no special relationship with appellants. 

In sustaining the demurrer to appellants’ first 

amended complaint, the trial court noted, “All of the factual 

allegations plead[ed] are of an off-duty officer.” Dalton appeared 

to be drunk, was not in uniform and was not using a CHP vehicle.

Although he referred to himself as a “cop,” Dalton did not identify 

the agency he worked for or display a badge. Popescu’s actions 

reflected that he did not believe Dalton was acting as a peace 

officer. For example, Popescu told Dalton to leave and did not 

answer his questions. He pushed the handlebars of Dalton’s bike. 

Popescu walked away from Dalton while Dalton was asking him 

questions. Because the factual allegations did not establish 

Dalton was acting within the scope of his employment when he 

shot Popescu, the trial court concluded the complaint failed to 

state a cause of action against the CHP. 

Appellants amended their complaint to allege 

additional facts in support of their claim that Dalton was acting 

within the course and scope of his employment. They also added 
6

causes of action alleging the CHP and Dalton’s supervisors were 

negligent in their supervision, training and discipline of Dalton. 

Respondents again demurred on the grounds that Dalton was not 

acting within the course and scope of his employment. They 

contended the CHP had no direct liability for negligence because 

it had no special relationship with appellants. The trial court 

agreed with respondents and sustained their demurrer without 

leave to amend. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the second amended complaint “de novo to 

determine whether [it] alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 

action under any legal theory or to determine whether the trial 

court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law.” 

(Aguilera v. Heiman (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 590, 595.) “In doing 

so, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly 

pleaded.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist.

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 866.) The complaint is to be given a 

reasonable interpretation and is read as a whole, with all its 

parts in context. (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

Vicarious Liability

“A public entity is liable for injury proximately 

caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity 

within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, 

apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action 

against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. 

Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) Under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior, summarized in this statute, “an employer may be held 

vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the 

scope of employment.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 
7

Cal.3d 202, 208 (Mary M.).) Intentional torts and criminal acts 

may fall within the scope of the tortfeasor’s employment, even if 

the employer did not authorize the employee to commit those 

acts. (Id. at p. 209; Perry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 

Cal.App.4th 94, 101 (Perry).)1

The risk that an employee will commit an intentional 

tort or crime “‘arises out of employment’” when “‘“in the context of 

the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual 

or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting 

from it among other costs of the employer’s business. [Citations.] 

In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, 

the inquiry should be whether the risk was one ‘that may fairly 

be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental’ to the enterprise 

undertaken by the employer. [Citation.]” [Citation.] Accordingly, 

the employer’s liability extends beyond his actual or possible 

control of the employee to include risks inherent in or created by 

the enterprise.’” (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1003 (Farmers Ins. Group), quoting Perez 

v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 968 (Perez).)

By contrast, “vicarious liability is deemed 

inappropriate where the misconduct does not arise from the 

conduct of the employer’s enterprise but instead arises out of a 

personal dispute [citations]. In such cases, the risks are 

engendered by events unrelated to the employment, so the mere 

1 Nothing in Inouye v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 30 

Cal.App.4th 278, compels reversal. There, the court held only 

that the County’s “policy of deeming its off-duty safety police 

officers to not be engaged in the performance of their duties is 

ineffective to insulate the County from respondeat superior 

liability . . . .” (Id. at p. 280.) No written policy is here at issue. 
8

fact that an employee has an opportunity to abuse facilities or 

authority necessary to the performance of his or her duties does 

not render the employer vicariously liable.” (Farmers Ins. Group, 

supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1006.)

Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d 202 and Perry, supra, 215 

Cal.App.4th 94 illustrate this distinction. In Mary M., a police 

officer who was on duty, in uniform and driving a patrol car, 

detained Mary M. using the red lights on his patrol car. He 

ordered her into the car and drove her to her home, where he 

pushed her onto her couch. When Mary M. screamed, the officer 

threatened to take her to jail. Then the officer raped her. (Mary 

M., supra, at p. 221.) Our Supreme Court held a jury could find 

the officer was acting in the course of his employment because he 

used the authority given to him by his employer to commit the 

rape. (Id. at pp. 207, 221.) 

In Perry by contrast, a corrections officer at the 

county jail got into a car accident while he was off duty, driving

his own car. Perry was injured in the accident and sued the 

officer. The officer used jail computers to find the mailing 

addresses of inmates. He then wrote threatening letters to the 

inmates, in Perry’s name, hoping to provoke inmates into 

retaliating against Perry and intimidating him into dropping the 

lawsuit. The court of appeal found no causal nexus between the 

officer’s employer and his letter writing scheme because the 

officer’s dispute with Perry “had absolutely no connection to [the 

officer’s] employment.” (Perry, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) 

The car accident and resulting lawsuit “were not work related.” 

(Ibid.) Although the officer had access to inmates’ personal 

information through his work, “[t]he motivation behind [his]

scheme was not generated by, or an outgrowth of, workplace
9

responsibilities, conditions or events. Rather, [the officer’s] 

endeavor was purely personal. Accordingly, [the officer’s] 

wrongful tort was outside the scope of his employment.” (Ibid.)

In Mary M., the rapist encountered, detained, 

transported and subdued his victim by (mis)using the weapons, 

uniform, vehicle and other features of law enforcement authority 

provided to him by his employer. In Perry, the tortfeasor

obtained information through his employer that he then used to 

intimidate his opponent in a dispute that was unrelated to his 

employment. 

The question here is whether appellants have 

sufficiently alleged a causal nexus between Dalton’s criminal act 

and his employment as a CHP officer. Like the trial court, we 

conclude they have not. Dalton’s violence toward Popescu had 

nothing to do with his employment. Dalton was not driving a 

CHP car, was not being paid by the CHP at the time of the 

shooting, and was not enforcing the California Vehicle Code. He 

was riding his bicycle around a residential neighborhood while 

drunk. There is no allegation that Dalton claimed to be 

investigating a crime or performing a public safety function such 

as warning residents about the Thomas Fire or encouraging them 

to evacuate. When Popescu asked Dalton what he was doing, 

Dalton started to argue with him. He said he was a cop and that 

he had a gun, but never displayed a badge or identified his 

employer. He was not in uniform. There is no allegation that 

Dalton verbally threatened to arrest Popescu or told Popescu he 

was under arrest. When Popescu walked away from him, Dalton

did not immediately follow or order him to stop. Instead, he 

started arguing with another neighborhood resident. Even as he 

walked up the pathway to appellants’ front door with his weapon 
10

drawn, Dalton did not announce himself as a police officer. He 

said, “drop your gun,” and then fired. There is no allegation that 

Dalton used a CHP issued firearm.

Appellants’ second amended complaint alleges facts 

that describe a “personal dispute” Dalton created with an 

innocent resident, not misconduct in the exercise of his law 

enforcement responsibilities or authority. (Farmers Ins. Group, 

supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1006; Perry, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 

102.) The risk that an officer would get drunk, start an argument 

with a stranger and then shoot that person is not one “‘“that may 

fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental” to the 

enterprise undertaken by [the CHP]. [Citation.]’” (Perez, supra, 

41 Cal.3d at p. 968.) Because Dalton’s confrontation with 

Popescu was not generated by, or an outgrowth of, his workplace 

responsibilities, Dalton’s shooting of Popescu was outside the 

scope of his employment.

Appellants contend the trial court placed too much 

emphasis on the fact that Dalton was “off duty” when the 

shooting occurred. They note Dalton was technically on duty 

because of the fire-induced state of emergency. We agree that 

Dalton’s on-duty or off-duty status is not dispositive. As we have 

explained, the dispositive question is whether there is “a causal 

nexus between the tort and the employee’s work, i.e., the tort (the 

[shooting]) must be engendered by or arise from the work.” 

(Perry, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 101; see also Lisa M. v. 

Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 

297-298.) That causal nexus is absent here, without regard to 

Dalton’s on or off-duty status, because his confrontation with 

Popescu was not related to CHP work responsibilities.
11

Direct Liability

Appellants allege the CHP and Dalton’s supervisors 

were aware of his abusive drinking and aggressive, 

unprofessional behavior toward civilians and toward his coworkers. Respondents failed to protect the public from Dalton’s 

growing dangerousness by referring him to voluntary counseling 

rather than disciplining him, suspending him or requiring him to 

complete a mandatory counseling or substance abuse program.

Appellants allege respondents’ negligent failure to train, 

supervise or discipline Dalton were a proximate cause of their 

damages. They allege respondents are directly liable for their 

negligence in training, supervising and disciplining Dalton. 

“Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A 

public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury 

arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public 

employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815.) The direct 

tort liability of a public entity “must be based on a specific statute 

declaring [the public entity] to be liable, or at least creating some 

specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of 

Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity 

for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine 

application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire 

Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183 (Eastburn); see 

also de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 

247 (de Villers).) 

No statute imposes direct liability on the CHP or its 

supervisory employees for negligence in the training, supervision 

or discipline of an officer. Similarly, no statute imposes on the 

CHP a specific duty of care to the general public relating to the 

training, supervision or discipline of officers. (Munoz v. City of 
12

Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1112-1113, disapproved 

on other grounds in Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 

Cal.4th 622, 639.) Finally, appellants allege no facts suggesting 

that respondents “under[took] a special protective relationship 

toward” appellants. (de Villers, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 

249.) Respondents are not alleged to have encouraged Dalton to 

harass his neighbors, acted to increase the risk that he would do 

so, or increased residents’ vulnerability to his violent outbursts. 

(M.B. v. City of San Diego (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 699, 706.) The 

second amended complaint thus fails to allege a cause of action 

for negligence against respondents. The trial court correctly 

sustained the demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action.

Appellants argue that respondents improperly 

withheld from the discovery process Dalton’s mental health 

records. These records are relevant, appellants contend, because 

they demonstrate respondents’ knowledge of, and negligent 

failure to protect appellants from Dalton’s mental health and 

addiction issues. Because we have concluded appellants cannot, 

as a matter of law, allege causes of action for negligence against 

respondents, we need not address these contentions.

Violation of Civil Code § 52.1

Appellants’ sixth cause of action alleges Dalton 

violated the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1)2 because he shot 

2 Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b) provides, “If a 

person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, 

interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to 

interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or 

enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights 

secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney 
13

Popescu while attempting to arrest him without probable cause, 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Appellants further allege 

the CHP is liable for damages associated with Dalton’s 

misconduct because he was acting in the course and scope of his 

employment when he shot Popescu.

The Bane Act does not create direct liability on the 

part of a state agency for an employee’s conduct that violates

constitutional or statutory rights. As a result, appellants fail to 

allege a cause of action against the CHP for violation of the Bane 

Act. (Gov. Code, § 815; Eastburn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1183.) 

In addition, for the reasons we have already stated, appellants 

fail to allege facts showing respondents’ vicarious liability for 

Dalton’s conduct. For these reasons, the trial court correctly 

sustained the demurrer with respect to appellants’ sixth cause of 

action. 

Respondents further contend the demurrer was 

properly sustained because the complaint does not allege Popescu 

believed Dalton was actually a police officer, or believed himself 

to be under arrest prior to the shooting. (Brendlin v. California

General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil 

action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the 

name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect 

the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights 

secured.” Subdivision (c) of the statute allows a person “whose 

exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or 

laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution 

or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be 

interfered with” to file an action for damages or equitable relief 

against the interfering person. 
14

(2007) 551 U.S. 249 [seizure of a person for purposes of the 

Fourth Amendment occurs when, in light of surrounding 

circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he or she was 

not free to leave]; Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 

Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [Bane Act requires allegation of threatening 

conduct independent of alleged interference with or violation of 

civil rights].) We need not address these contentions because we 

have concluded the demurrer was properly sustained on other 

grounds.

Leave to Amend

Appellants contend the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied them leave to file their proposed Third 

Amended Complaint. The proposed amended complaint would 

have added factual allegations relating to the CHP and the 

supervisors’ knowledge of Dalton’s substance abuse, mental 

health challenges and prior misconduct. Appellants would also 

allege that Dalton was on duty at the time of the shooting, 

because of the state of emergency and that, when he shot 

Popescu, Dalton was using police powers to effect an unlawful 

arrest. 

We review the trial court’s order denying leave to 

amend for abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 

311, 318.) “Failure to grant leave to amend constitutes an abuse 

of discretion only if there is a reasonable possibility that the 

defect can be cured by amendment.” (Schmid v. City and County 

of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 496.) Leave to 

amend is properly denied where the proposed amendment fails to 

state a cause of action. (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 594, 618-619.) In addition, “‘[a] plaintiff may not 

avoid demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended 
15

complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the original 

complaint or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts 

false. [Citation.]’” (McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.

(2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1206–1207, quoting Cantu v. 

Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877; see also 

Astenius v. State of California (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 472, 476–

477 (Astenius).)

The trial court here properly denied leave to amend 

because appellants’ proposed amendment would not cure the 

defects in their current pleadings. Additional allegations 

regarding respondents’ knowledge of Dalton’s drinking problem 

or mental health concerns does not establish a special 

relationship between respondents and appellants. Without such 

a relationship, respondents had no duty to protect appellants 

and, therefore, no direct liability for negligence. 

Similarly, the allegation that Dalton was on duty and

attempting unlawfully to arrest Popescu when he fired his 

weapon does not cure the defect in the vicarious liability claims. 

The factual allegations describe a confrontation that was not 

work related and had no connection to Dalton’s employment. 

Concluding this was an attempt to make an unlawful arrest

directly contradicts those factual allegations. Leave to amend 

may properly be denied when the proposed amendment 

contradicts admission made in the original pleadings. (Astenius, 

supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 477.) 

CONCLUSION

The picture that emerges, even at the pleading state, 

is clear. Dalton had a drinking problem and was drunk when he 

shot Popescu. This was a private dispute. That Dalton said he 

was a cop with a gun does not make the CHP liable for the 
16

shooting. The CHP has no liability for a shooting having no 

causal nexus to CHP duties. And, finally, what we said in People 

v. McNally (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1423-1424, bears 

repetition: firearms and alcohol do not mix. 

The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondents.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.
Mark S. Borrell, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Andrew M. Wolf, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 

Danielle F. O’Bannon, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Pamela J. Holmes, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Shirley 

R. Sullinger, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.